§ 6.43 p.m.
THE MINISTER OF STATE, HOME OFFICE (VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS)My Lords, I beg to move that this Report be now received.
§ Moved, That the Report be now received.—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)
§ On Question, Motion agreed to.
§ Clause 4 [Contents of safety certificates]:
§
LORD STRATHCONA AND MOUNT ROYAL moved Amendment No. 1:
Page 3, line 35, at end insert ("and means of access to any such entrances or exits").
§ The noble Lord said: My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Colville of Culross, I beg to move Amendment No. 1, and it may be for the convenience of the House if at the same time I speak to Amendments Nos. 2, 7 and 24. which are all basically on the same subject. The purpose of these Amendments is to remove any doubt about the scope of the present wording of Clause 4(3). It could be argued that the words "entrances" and "exits" do not include the passageways through which the public would pass in the normal course of entering and leaving a stadium. These passages would be included if they were a means of escape, but it is also important that the normal passageways should not only be clearly specified in the certificate but also be kept free from obstruction, so that no undue pressures build up in them. The Amendments do not specify passageways and the like, as such: rather, they express the idea that the important point is the utility of the passageways, and so on, in providing a means of movement from one part of the stadium to another.
§ It may be argued that the Amendments are open to ambiguity on the grounds that "means of access" may be regarded as including a public highway immediately outside the stadium over which the certificate holder could not be expected to exercise any control. So to meet this argument the later Amendment—that is, Amendment No. 24—will be moved, seeking to insert a new definition of "means of access" in Clause 16 which 1117 will make it clear that the responsibility of the certificate holder begins only when the public have moved from the highway into the stadium. My Lords, I beg to move.
§ LORD GARNSWORTHYMy Lords, we are appreciative of the explanation given by the noble Lord, Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal. We think the point that these Amendments cover is a very good idea, and that it is right and proper that they should be taken together. The noble Lord has made reference to Amendment No. 24. I suppose that in point of fact the pavement comes under the use of the word "highway", does it not?
§ LORD GARNSWORTHYI think that is the only query that I wished to raise, and with that assurance I express a welcome to this series of Amendments, which quite clearly hang together so well.
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§ LORD STRATHCONA AND MOUNT ROYALMy Lords, on behalf of my noble friend I beg to move Amendment No. 2.
§
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 36, leave out ("and exits") and insert ("exits and means of access").—(Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.)
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§ Clause 5 [Amendment, replacement, transfer, surrender and cancellation of safety certificates]:
§ VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS moved Amendment No. 3:
§
Page 4, line 9, leave out subsections (2) and (3) and insert—
("() A safety certificate may be amended or replaced either on the application of the holder or without such an application.
() Section 2(2) and subsections (1) to (4) of section 4 above shall apply on the amendment or replacement of a safety certificate.
() A notice under subsection (1)(a) above amending a general safety certificate shall specify the date on which the amendment to which it relates is to come into operation, and the date so specified may be a date later than the date of issue of the notice.")
§ The noble Viscount said: My Lords, this is a little complicated, and if the House will forgive me I will explain it, not because I think it is a matter of 1118 utmost fascination in itself but because people might want to study the details. So perhaps I may be forgiven for just a moment or so. The background to this Amendment—and I think it can be taken best with the following one, No. 4—is an awkwardness that we have found in applying Clause 5(3). That, as it stands at the moment, while specifically dealing with amendments to or replacement of a safety certificate when the local authority do this without application, applies subsections (4) and (5) of Clause 3, which lay down requirements to specify information and a nasty penalty if you do not. On further consideration, we have come to the conclusion that it is not necessary to apply those two subsections where the local authority themselves amend or replace the certificate without an application from anybody else. Nor do we feel it necessary for those two subsections to apply where an application for an amendment or replacement is made under Clause 5(2), as at present is provided. In both cases the power to amend or replace is discretionary in the local authority, and they may choose whether or not to do it. That is a choice which is different from the one open to them on the case of an original application.
§ In any case where they decide to amend or replace on their own initiative, it is right, we think, that they should know their own ground, the ground with which they are concerned, and rely on their power of entry and inspection under Clause 8. if an application for an amendment or replacement was made by somebody else and the local authority asked informally for more information, it would be in the interests of the applicant to supply it; otherwise the local authority would probably not choose to issue the amendment or replacement at all, in the absence of the information for which they have asked. So to try to clear this up we propose to delete subsections (2) and (3) of Clause 5, and this has four consequences, which are dealt with in the proposed three new subsections and in Amendment No. 4. Without the first of the new subsections there would be no reference in Clause 5 to the fact that applications for amendment or replacement could be made, and it seemed to me that we ought specifically to provide for that. So the first new subsection makes it clear that this facility exists; that 1119 is, applications for amendment or replacement by the club itself as well as on the initiative of the local authority. It is also necessary to preserve the first part of the existing Clause 5(2). So it is clear that the contents of the amended Order to replace the safety certificate, both in the general terms of Clause 2(2) and also in the specific terms of Clause 4, must be dealt with in the same way as on the issue of the certificate. But only those subsections of Clause 4—subsections (1) to (4)—which relate essentially to the content of the certificate need apply in these circumstances; we do not want subsections (5) and (6). Subsection (5) of Clause 4 is embodied in a new subsection; and that is Amendment No. 4. The operative date of the certificate, or of an amendment, is necessary only in the case of a general safety certificate, since a special safety certificate is valid only for the occasion to which it relates. It is unnecessary to apply subsection (6) of Clause 4 expressly in the case of an amendment or replacement because its terms do not require it.
Finally, there remains the substance of Clause 3(3) by which a local authority is placed under a duty to send copies to and to consult the police and the building and fire authorities. The proposed Amendment to Clause 5(5), which is Amendment No. 4, will require the local authority to consult the three other authorities involved in any proposal for replacement as well as amendment or transfer. My Lords, it is a little involved, but I think it is plain, practical common sense to adapt the provisions that we have already to an application for amendment or replacement or transfer, made as well by the original club as by the local authority, and to follow this through with the necessary consequential statutory requirements to see that this is dealt with sensibly. I therefore beg to move Amendment No. 3.
§ LORD STOW HILLMy Lords, I think that noble Lords on this side of the House will have no objection to the changes which the noble Viscount proposes. As I listened to them I thought that they were clearly improvements. As I understood from the noble Viscount, the general objective is to distinguish between the case in which a local authority acts on its own initiative, and 1120 therefore could be expected to rely on its own powers of obtaining the information which it requires, on the one hand, and the case in which an application is made for a change by an individual applicant, on the other, and in which accordingly he may be reasonably expected, under the provisions of the subsection to which the Amendment refers, to supply certain information to the local authority. My Lords, that seems to me perfectly logical and reasonable. Naturally, I should have liked to consider the exact pattern which emerges. It was a little difficult to follow that pattern as the noble Viscount explained it, but I thought that he made perfectly plain the general purpose of his objective. I have no objection to the change that he proposes. On the contrary, it seems to me to make a much more tidy scheme and I welcome it.
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§
Amendment moved—
Page 4, line 25, leave out ("proposed amendment or transfer") and insert ("proposal to amend, replace or transfer such a certificate").—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§ 6.54 p.m.
§
LORD STOW HILL moved Amendment No. 5:
Page 4, line 31, at end insert ("or if a term or condition has been contravened").
§ The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, at this late hour I do not want to rehearse the arguments which we put forward from this side of the House on Committee stage. I still have not quite understood, although I considered the noble Viscount's arguments very carefully on this head, why it is that he will not accept a provision that a certificate, whether general or special, should be liable to be cancelled if—and it would seem that this would be a reasonable suggestion—its terms are not complied with. I can see from the other Amendments on the Marshalled List that he has gone to great trouble to try to consider the arguments which we put forward. But if I understand the various Amendments, none of them produces the result that the local authority can cancel a certificate if it finds that the terms and 1121 conditions contained in the certificate are grossly flouted. The certificate continues.
§ As we pointed out during the Committee stage, under Clause 9(2) the court has certain powers in the event of a person responsible for the conduct of a stadium grossly neglecting any attempt to comply with the terms of the safety certificate. It can say that the public is not to be admitted for a period specified by the court. I notice that an Amendment has been put down slightly to change the situation there. But still there is no Amendment enabling the court, under Clause 9(2), to cancel a certificate, which would seem to be the obvious result apart from the penalty of a flagrant and indeed criminal disobedience of the terms and conditions imposed in the safety certificate and designed to protect the public.
§ My Lords, the certificate continues in being. The only way in which the certificate may be brought to an end is under Clause 5(5), in the event of the applicant appearing to the local authority no longer to be a person likely to be able to secure the enforcement of the terms and conditions in the certificate. I said at the outset that I did not want to rehearse the arguments and I hope that I am not going back on my words. But it seems to me that the position as it is left in the Bill, amended as it may be in accordance with the Amendments on the Marshalled List is so extraordinarily illogical that I should like to hear from the noble Viscount, if he has made up his mind about this, as I am sure he has, why he is—I do not want to use a disrespectful term—to my thinking so very obstinate on this one point. Why on earth is not a local authority to have power to cancel a certificate if its terms and conditions, imposed for the safety of the public, are disregarded by the person who holds the certificate? Alternatively, why cannot the court do precisely that, supposing there is a criminal disobedience of the terms and conditions in the certificate?
§
So far as I am aware, the only other provision in the Bill which could conceivably relate to the topic is contained in subsection (4) of Clause 12, which enables the Secretary of State by Regulation to prescribe the procedure
for the issue, amendment, replacement, transfer and cancellation of safety certificates…
1122
I notice that there is an Amendment down to that. But I should have thought that could not possibly confer on the Secretary of State the power to prescribe by regulation that a certificate is to be cancelled. All he can do is to prescribe the procedure to be followed in the event of the power being exercised to cancel the certificate; namely, the power—the only power now contained in the Bill—that is contained in Clause 5(5). That seems to me an illogical situation. But the noble Viscount is a most conscientious Minister, and I am sure that he has thought about this. I should be grateful if he would enlarge a little on the reasons which have led him to adhere to the view which he originally put forward on this point during the Committee stage.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSSMy Lords. I hope that, even though we have not got to the end of all the thinking on the points raised during the Committee stage—and we have not, because there are still things going on—the noble and learned Lord may be satisfied that I have conscientiously thought about the points he made on this, and, I think, two rather closely linked subsequent Amendments. I think one has to take this—if this is not an illegitimate remark—a little broader than pure logic. As I, as a lawyer, speak to the noble and learned Lord, as a lawyer, perhaps we may both be forgiven if we do not both immediately appreciate the point. The point about football grounds—and we are talking primarily about them, though other sports grounds are involved—is that they have been going for a very long time; they are an extremely important and valued part of local life; and for the ground to be closed down for members of the public, unless there was a truly flagrant, gross, or whatever epithet the noble Lord suggested, disregard for public safety, would be a tragic disaster. We therefore considered that the cancellation of a certificate is not the sort of penalty that we should wish to build into the Bill if we can possibly avoid it. We want to try to make sure that those who run sports grounds, football grounds and that sort of thing will know that if they behave themselves, if they get their original certificate under the designation procedure, and what follows then with the local authority, they are not going to be in jeopardy by the 1123 cancellation of that certificate, which would spell complete ruin.
The noble Lord in this Amendment and in a subsequent Amendment has suggested two possible methods of handling this matter. First of all, he suggests that the local authority, if there was, as he said, a flagrant breach—though the Amendment does not actually say "a flagrant breach" —of the conditions, should be able to cancel, subject of course to appeal to my right honourable friend, which is in the next Amendment. The alternative, in a later Amendment, is that if there is a conviction on indictment, and powers that the Crown Court or the equivalent courts in Scotland are given under Clause 9 (2) are brought into effect, not only do they restrict the entry of people into these grounds but they also cancel the certificate.
My Lords, let me take those in turn. I agree that the local authority which under this Amendment cancelled a certificate for a paltry reason, for some tiny act of omission or commission, would, under the noble Lord's second Amendment, be liable to be appealed against and there would be an inquiry; and so one may, as he pointed out on a previous stage, dismiss the argument which I then put forward that this would be purely subject to the whim of the local authority. It could be argued, but I suppose it would be argued in front of some sort of inquiry which had not the full panoply of the criminal law which is perhaps condign for so serious a disaster to a local sports ground as the cancellation of its certificate. I ask the noble Lord to consider how serious this cancellation would be for anybody running a football club or some other sporting club.
The other way of doing it, which the noble Lord suggests later on, is to let the Crown Court cancel the certificate. Why? It is true that in theory, in addition to preventing the people from going into the ground at all for such period as they think fit under Clause 9(2) after a conviction on indictment—and that would be as a result of flagrant disregard of conditions—they might add to the penalty of restricting people from the whole or part of the ground for such period as they think fit actual cancellation of the certificate itself. But what does that add to it? We think 1124 that if you are going to have a conviction for one of these gross and flagrant disregards of the certificate, it ought to be the subject of criminal proceedings under Clause 10. It ought to be brought out in the higher criminal courts, no doubt in front of a jury, and it ought to result in either an acquittal or a conviction by a jury. If it results in a conviction the court is then given a further power—and we go back to Clause 9(2) —which again can be argued, whereby they can impose a restriction for a certain length of time.
My Lords, what more do we want? We want to try to keep the idea of the certificate as being basically safe, but we also want to be able to protect the public against the activities of the rogue who will not pay attention to what he should be doing for the safety of the public. The way that my mind is working at the moment on this matter is not to give the powers to cancel the certificate to the court, or indeed to the local authority (I think it should be the court if it is either) but they should be able to exercise the powers under Clause 9(2) and in a bad case impose a restriction closing the ground to spectators—which is what hurts —but not necessarily to the players, for an indefinite period, I know not what. They do not cancel the certificate. There is no reason to cancel the certificate, because what we ought to provide in a case like this—and it may not be football; it may be some other sport—is for the position where somebody decides that he has become so embroiled in a dispute With the local authority that it is time he gave up his management of this sports ground or stadium. Suppose he then sold it to somebody else: well, the certificate can be transferred, or a new certificate can be applied for and obtained. Then what we want is the opportunity for the new person to come along and persuade the court that has restricted the access of the public that it is no longer necessary so to restrict it; that he will now comply with the terms and conditions; that he will now behave himself and run this stadium properly and see that people are safe; and that the conditions which resulted with the conviction of his predecessor in title no longer apply. What, therefore, I am thinking about is whether we should not allow an application by somebody—whether to the reformed 1125 rogue or to a successor—whereby he can go back and resuscitate the life of the ground and allow people back in, subject to proper compliance with conditions.
I do not think that for the purposes of this sort of control you need the cancellation of a certificate. All you need is this control in the courts, which is there in Clause 9(2)—although I think it needs to be modified to the extent of an application to have it rescinded being made in a proper case to the Crown Court. If we are going to keep this matter in the way in which we have always tried to approach it—that we do not want to stop grounds from being open to the public; we do not want to stop sports from being played and we do not want to stop people from watching them; all we are concerned to do is to try to lay down minimum statutory requirements for them to be perfectly safe while we do so—then we think the psychology to adopt is that the certificate ought to be adequate. It ought to be able to be restricted in its use, but not cancelled, either by the local authority, even with an appeal, or by the Crown Court.
We think that the alternative machinery which we have laid down here is really a satisfactory safeguard for the public. It will prevent somebody from exploiting and behaving thoroughly badly in the sort of circumstances the noble Lord has in mind. I do not think the purest logic is really necessary to solve the problems we have, I believe, solved already in the Bill. It is really a matter of "feel". It is not a matter of what might be the tidiest way of doing it. We think the possibility of the ground continuing to be open does matter for sporting organisations. We also think that there should be strict control in the hands of the Crown Court. We think we have both in the Bill as it stands. I do not know whether I have convinced the noble Lord; I have certainly convinced myself, and I hope that I have convinced your Lordships.
§ LORD GARNSWORTHYI am grateful to the noble Viscount. I do not wish to give the impression that I am any kind of lawyer, and I do not want to come between the noble Viscount and my noble friend. I would say, first of all, that I am sure we appreciate the desire 1126 that the noble Viscount has expressed to ensure that grounds will keep open for sporting activities. I could have wished that he had been a little more forthcoming on another matter that we dealt with in Committee.
§ LORD GARNSWORTHYBut I should like to say this. I am grateful, as I am sure my noble friend is also, that we shall have on the Record what the noble Viscount has said this evening. I do not know how many other Members of the Committee will understand fully what the noble Viscount has said, though I am sure that my noble friend will have understood it. We on this side are disturbed about this matter, but the noble Viscount has said that there is still something going on.
§ LORD GARNSWORTHYAm I right in assuming that this matter is not closed and that thought is still being given to it? I think that this is something to which we shall have to return at a later stage unless we can be satisfied that the Government are prepared to consider this matter further. I am sure that my noble friend will have understood all that the noble Viscount has said, but I have the impression that there is still a considerable difference between us and that the noble Viscount has not perhaps appreciated that we still have some anxiety on this matter. It is something that we should like to see tidied up in a way that the layman could understand.
§ 7.12 p.m.
§ LORD WYNNE-JONESMy Lords, the noble Viscount has taken up a position that reminds me a little of the situation that used to exist with regard to the appointment of professors in Scottish universities. When a professor was appointed, certain conditions were laid down and it was made clear that he was expected to do certain things—in fact, his duties were roughly laid out. But it turned out that there were only two ways in which a professor could be removed. One was by that somewhat drastic act of death (which is also mentioned here); and the other was if he committed some gross immorality. No other reason was 1127 regarded as sufficiently cogent for removing a professor from his chair. Mere incompetence, the mere fact that he never did his duty, or that he broke all the regulations did not matter. It seems to me that the noble Viscount defends a somewhat similar position here: that the mere fact that the terms of the certificate have been violated is not regarded as important. What is important is that the person to whom the certificate was awarded must die.
It seems to me that my noble friend Lord Stow Hill has an important point here. If a local authority issues a certificate it does so with certain conditions, which means that certain things have to be done. If there is flagrant disregard of conditions, surely this is a reason for withdrawing the certificate. I cannot understand why the noble Viscount takes no other point at all on this: it seems to me so clear that the certificate is issued provided that certain conditions are complied with. If those conditions are not obeyed, then surely the certificate should no longer be valid.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSSMy Lords, I wonder whether I might, by leave, say one more word about this point, because it is obviously of importance to noble Lords opposite. Would the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, just allow me one more word on this?
§ LORD STOW HILLCertainly.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSSI think we are dealing in semantics. I do not wish to suggest that there is any lack of feeling on this. I think that what we are all after is exactly the same. We want to prevent a ground which is unsafe from being open for the admission of the public in conditions where they will be endangered; and all we are talking about is the machinery.
The certificate itself is a valuable document because it involves an application to the local authority and negotiation with it concerning the arrangements inside the ground (and this refers to the whole of Part I of this Bill, and the provision of safety precautions, barriers, doors and signs on gangways, together with numerous other matters which are set out in the green book. The certificate will describe what, in any given condition 1128 of the ground, will be the number of people legitimately allowed in; and of course it will contain conditions about the number of people allowed in and the type of construction of barriers and other devices necessary for this purpose. Indeed, it will be a criminal offence to allow people into the ground without a certificate—and the certificate has to be negotiated.
What I think the noble Lord, Lord Wynne-Jones, has overlooked, however, is the fairly formidable recourse that the law has under Clause 10(1)(c), because if those terms and conditions are contravened a criminal offence is committed. It can involve two brands of severity. It can be a summary offence under Clause 10(3)(a), which provides for a moderate penalty. It can also be an indictable offence under Clause 10(3)(b), where there is a very severe penalty, with unlimited fines. It is this Clause 10(3)(b) offence which carries the powers of Clause 9(2) whereby the court says, "For a given period or over a given part of a ground, or both, or in any combination, there will be no people allowed in for such time as we think fit." I believe that we have here, as the result of a conviction on indictment, the centrols which will have exactly the safeguarding effect that the noble Lords opposite wish to see. How we differ and what we are talking about is how exactly we are to set about it.
§ LORD WYNNE-JONESMy Lords, can the noble Viscount tell us how long he thinks it would take for such a legal process to work through?—because it might be that the ground remained in a dangerous state and was being used in that dangerous state for the whole of a season while the case was being tried.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSSdo not think so, my Lords. I have looked, in an entirely different capacity, at the length of time required for trial in the Crown Court, and on the whole, as the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack will be pleased to tell the House, the waiting time for trials has been very much reduced since the Courts Act was brought into effect. I do not think there would be a wait for a whole season before such a trial took place.
I must emphasise that the purpose of this Bill is not to smite with the sledge 1129 hammer of justice the people who run sports stadia. It is intended to do what needs to be done by persuasion, by non-statutory codes, by good common sense and by negotiation. It is only in the end, as a last resort—when dealing with people who will not see sense and who are determined to disobey all the regulations, who are intending to defy the local authority and all the canons of good conduct—that we are going to get into the situation in which anybody will be prosecuted or any certificate will be cancelled.
If noble Lords can tell me why they are dissatisfied with the powers of the Crown Court, or the Scottish equivalent, under Clause 9(2) and why they think that the only possible way of doing it is to provide that the Crown Court, say, for the sake of argument, should be entitled to cancel the certificate, then I will look at it again. But it seems to me that we have here the essence of this matter and that we are at the same time protecting the confidence of the people who provide and run the stadia and look after sporting activities that they are not going to be at the whim of either the local authority or the Crown Court and are not going to have their basic certificate—the certificate on which everything depends—cancelled. They may have the certificate suspended; they may have it suspended in part or over a period of time. Or, for a great sin, the stadium may be closed; but they will not lose the basic certificate.
I believe that, in a climate of what I hope will be negotiation, common sense and discussion, and this type of approach to this whole problem, which, after all, has been the subject of negotiation and discussion for 25 years before the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wheatley, mentioned it in his Report, we ought to play this gently and not go in for swingeing penalties when we can do it rather more subtly in the way I have suggested. It is a matter of opinion. I am suggesting that we have this power in a slightly less obvious form, yet a form which is going to he just as effective. It is for that reason and because of the psychological undercurrents in this matter that we ought not to be too purely logical, too juridical and too perfect in our understanding about it. This is why I suggest the arguments that I have put forward are well worthy of 1130 further thought. I will of course listen to reasons why we should have the purity spelt out; I am not closing my mind about this though I am pretty convinced by what I have said. Certainly if I can be shown why we must have the stringency imposed that noble Lords would like I will look at it again. But at the moment I do not see that there is a better argument than the one I have attempted to put forward.
§ 7.22 p.m.
§ LORD STOW HILLMy Lords, the noble Viscount has really thought this problem out carefully and has come to a conclusion on the balance of considerations. I thought at times that it was difficult to express. He spoke about his anxiety over the whim of local authorities and then, I think incautiously, he talked about the whim of the Crown Courts. I am not sure that we generally attribute whims to learned judges who sit in our courts. I am surprised to hear such a distinguished lawyer attribute to them that characteristic—perhaps it was per incuriam.
§ LORD STOW HILLMy Lords. I do not want to prolong the discussion. Think of the simple, honest citizen who happens to be a football enthusiast and who has a little smattering of the law. He goes with his companion, learned in the law, to a football stadium and asks on the way whether the Government have taken precautions for his safety. He is told that a kindly Government have indeed passed an Act which provides for designation and safety certificates and take a lot of trouble over his safety. He gets to the stadium and wants to go in but is told he cannot do so. He says, "Is there a safety certificate in being in relation to this stadium?" He is told that certainly there is. He asks, "May I not then assume that it is safe for me to go in?" The answer is, "No, it is very dangerous; you cannot possibly go in." He then says, "What is the purpose of the safety certificate?" He is told that the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, having carefully considered the whims of the Crown Court thought that it would—
§ LORD STOW HILLHaving, per incuriam, considered the whims of the Crown Court, and still, having been reminded that the Crown Court is not generally susceptible to whims, treating the Crown Court as if it were susceptible to whims, not per incuriam but after mature reflection, requires the man's learned companion to say to him, "There is a safety certificate here, but it has been flagrantly disregarded and those who flagrantly disregarded it have gone broke because they had an unlimited fine imposed upon them." The public cannot go in when the safety certificate is there but it is called a safety certificate. More than that, it is called a general safety certificate and it is going to stay there because there is no way of cancelling it unless it can be shown that those who asked for it are not likely to be able to enforce it.
My Lords, we have great respect for the system of law in this country, and I hope we always shall have. We may begin to engender a sense of puzzlement at some of its provisions when they emerge after such careful and prolonged gestation as the provisions contained in this Bill have emerged. I am genuinely grateful to the noble Viscount for giving us the grounds on which he has managed to arrive at the conclusion he so firmly holds, and I certainly would not ask the House to divide upon the Amendment. We have, in effect, on this Amendment also argued the pros and cons of Amendments Nos. 6 and 14. Therefore, when we reach those Amendments I shall not seek to trouble the House by moving them.
§ Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
§ Clause 7 [Duties of holder of safety certificate and exclusion of other statutory' requirements]:
§ LORD STRATHCONA AND MOUNT ROYALMy Lords, on behalf of my noble friend I beg to move Amendment No. 7. It is consequential on Amendment No. 1 and I have already spoken to it. I beg to move.
§
Amendment moved—
Page 6, line 24, after ("emergency)") insert ("or the means of access to any such entrances or exits").—(Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.]
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
1132§ Clause 8 [Powers of entry and inspection]:
§ 7.22 p.m.
§
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: moved Amendment No. 8:
Page 7, line 29, leave out ("stadium) and insert ("ground").
§ The noble Viscount said: My Lords, we can consider, if the House is agreeable, Amendments Nos. 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 22 and 23 together. These are Amendments which I hope will make the noble Lords, Lord Stow Hill and Lord Garnsworthy, happy, because they meet the points that both noble Lords were arguing about in Committee. They said that if you have a grave emergency and a totally unsafe stand, say at some arena or sporting ground which was not a designated football ground, it was unnecessary to go through the rigmarole of making reservations to extend the Bill and designating the ground before you could invoke the emergency procedure under Clause 9. Upon further thought, we think they are absolutely right and so we do away with all that and we amend vast quantities of provisions in the Bill, in this case in Clause 8, to give powers of entry to see whether the stand is dangerous, and in subsequent provisions to deal with all the other inevitable consequences of this. I hope noble Lords will now think that in the case of a dire emergency we have a first-aid procedure of going to the magistrates' court or the sheriff's court in Scotland to get the ground shut down until somebody does something about it. This is a group of Amendments which meets the points put forward in Committee. I beg to move the first Amendment, No. 8.
§ LORD STOW HILLMy Lords, the noble Viscount has met the point my noble friend Lord Garnsworthy and I sought to put forward in Committee, and I should have thought the result is a very much better scheme. I am most indebted to him.
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§
Amendment moved—
Page 7, line 32, leave out ("stadium") and insert ("ground").—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
1133§ Clause 9 [Court's power to prohibit or restrict use of stadium]:
§
Amendment moved—
Page 7, leave out lines 36 to 38 and insert ("at a sports ground, other than a sports stadium in respect of which a general safety certificate is in operation,").—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§
Amendment moved—
Page 7, line 41, leave out ("stadium") and insert ("ground").—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§ 7.30 p.m.
§
LORD STRATHCONA AND MOUNT ROYAL moved Amendment No. 12:
>Page 8, line 3, leave out ("prohibit or restrict to the extent") and insert ("by order prohibit or restrict, to the extent that the court considers").
§ The noble Lord said: My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend, I beg to move Amendment No. 12. This is really a drafting Amendment but there is slightly more meat in it than that. The essential point is making it abundantly clear that the decision rests with the court throughout. There are two points here, my Lords. The purpose is basically to show that the decision lies with the court as to whether the restriction of the admission of the public would be appropriate if the magistrates' court, or in Scotland the sheriff, were to make an order under the emergency power in Clause 9(1) on application by the local authority. It will be up to the court making the order to decide the extent of the restrictions to be imposed by the order. The Amendment does not, therefore, do more than clarify the position; but it brings line 3 into conformity with line 6, where it is specifically stated that it is for the court to decide the extent of the measures that might be needed to reduce to a reasonable level the risks which led to the court order being made.
§ The other point, my Lords, is a Scottish one which makes it clear that the court's decision is to be implemented by order. This is to remove doubts which 1134 might otherwise exist in Scotland as to the manner in which the court should proceed. I beg to move.
§ LORD STOW HILLMy Lords, I should like to ask one question on this Amendment. When the noble Viscount was addressing the House on the Amendments relating to cancellation, if I caught him correctly I thought he said that the Crown Court could enlarge the time for which the public were excluded, by which I understood him to mean that the court, having fixed upon a time for, say, a year, an application could subsequently be made to the court asking them to enlarge the term when that year had expired, and decide that the public should not be admitted, say, for a further six months. He shakes his head, and no doubt I misunderstood him. I was rather doubtful when he said it. This would be the Amendment which could confer that power. But if I understood him correctly, does the noble Viscount say that it is not the intention of the Government that there should be this power to enlarge by a further application? I doubted whether this language would confer such a power.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSSMy Lords, I ought to clear up this point. I was really thinking aloud about an Amendment which is not on the Order Paper but is still being considered. It is really the other way round from what the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, said. I do not think one would find precedents for extending a prohibition of this sort by way of application. The analogy that I had very much in mind was disqualification from driving. Although it is not an exact analogy, it might help. I was suggesting that, for instance, if the wicked man who had so flagrantly disregarded the terms and conditions convinced the Crown Court or the sheriff court that he had mended his ways; or perhaps more likely had decided that the whole thing was a lost cause and sold out to somebody else who was honest and respectable, a long period of restriction might, on application, be cut down so that a new and good holder of a certificate would no longer, when he put his ground in order, be subject to the Crown Court restrictions upon allowing the members of the public in. There is no Amendment down on the Order Paper on this point at the moment. The noble Lord was thinking about something else.
1135 My noble friend Lord Kinnoull raised another point on appeals on Clause 9. Neither of these is in here at the moment. This is certainly not intended to affect it. It is, in fact, a purely technical Amendment, as my noble friend has said. We may very well see in future other Amendments which deal with the sort of topics that the noble Lord mentioned.
§ LORD STOW HILLIf I may have the leave of the House, I would thank the noble Viscount for that explanation, and ask him whether, when he gives further thought to this matter, he would not take into consideration the question of whether a power should be conferred upon the court that upon a further application being made to the court it could enlarge the time. In other words, to have it both ways round, give the court the power to abbreviate the time, and in a suitable case, also to enlarge the time. I am much obliged to the noble Viscount.
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: moved Amendment No. 13:
>Page 8, line 5, leave out ("stadium") and insert ("ground")
§ The noble Viscount said: My Lords, we go back to the Amendments I know are welcome to the noble Lords opposite. I beg to move.
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§ Clause 10 [Offences—general]:
§
Amendment moved—
Page 8, line 30, leave out ('stadium") and insert ("sports ground")—(Viscount Colville of Cuirass.)
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§
Amendment moved—
Page 8, line 35, at end insert ("or other sports ground in question")—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§
LORD STRATHCONA AND MOUNT ROYAL moved Amendment No. 17:
Page 9, line 23, after first ('or") insert ("without reasonable excuse").
§ The noble Lord said: My Lords, here again is a drafting Amendment which slightly qualifies the circumstances in which a person commits an offence for non-co-operation with someone making an entry and inspection under Clause 8. It seems appropriate that allowance should be made for reasonable excuse for failure to answer a question. Let us suppose, for instance, that there was a difficulty or a delay in the postal service. The Amendment also brings subsection (5)(d) into line with paragraph (a) where the words "without reasonable excuse" are already used. I beg to move.
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§ Clause 12 [Regulations]:
§ 7.38 p.m.
§ LORD STOW HILL moved Amendment No. 18:
§
Page 9, line 42, at end insert—
('(2) The Secretary of State may by regulations specify considerations which are to be taken into account together with other relevant considerations if any in determining whether a sports ground has accommodation for more than 10,000 members of the public.")
§ The noble Lord said: My Lords, I can move this Amendment very shortly. The noble Viscount knows the broad argument here. The Bill when an Act may apply to grounds as distinct from stadia. The object of this Amendment is to secure some kind of uniformity to prevent the sort of feeling that everyone experiences if he sees that one ground seems to be treated differently from other grounds, there being an appearance of uniformity. Therefore it was thought by my noble friend and myself that it was desirable to give the Secretary of State, if he thought right, a power to formulate, by Regulations, the sort of considerations that would influence him and which should be generally taken into account. That is the point of the Amendment, and the case was argued before. I put it down again to see whether the noble Viscount had had further thoughts about this matter; and whether he would be so good as to indicate what further thoughts he has had, as I am sure he has.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSSMy Lords, I have thought about this again very carefully. On the last stage, the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, was really looking for general criteria which 1137 would apply, I think, to different sorts of sports ground or structures in them, not necessarily on the same basis as applies to a football stadium. But one would have different rules for race courses, if the measure were ever extended to them; and again different rules for motor racing tracks, and that sort of thing. I have thought about this. The truth of the matter is this. This really is a legal point and I now reverse the roles and go back to what is rather a technical matter. Since my right honourable friends, the two Secretaries of State, will be alone in their decision as to whether or not a ground falls within the minimum number of capacity that requires it or enables it to be designated (and this is the point I made about Clause 1(2)), any regulations that are made would have the effect only of directing my two right honourable friends as to what they themselves were to do. So they would be making regulations applying only to themselves, saying: "I make a regulation saying that I must take into account this, that and the other, and I am the only person in fact who is affected by this". As a matter of law there is only one result of this, which is to open the designation of a particular sports ground to challenge in front of the Divisional Court by way of one of the prerogative orders; and I do not think there is any point in this.
What I think the noble and learned Lord wants to know, and is entitled to know, is how in fact this would be done. I do not know whether he has his little green book. If he has, I would draw his attention to one or two things in it. I say this by way of example, because I am not saying that the decision on what is the capacity of the ground would necessarily be laid down in strict accordance with one of these little green books. We may have another little green book for racecourses and another one for motor race tracks, and goodness knows what! in due course. But if you want an example of how it would be done, let us look at section 15 of the little green book for football grounds. There we have estimation of safe ground capacity. I am not going all the way through this —it is on pages 19 and 20. For instance, you find, if you are dealing with terraces, that if you have a terrace where the 1138 viewing slope is in a good condition you reckon you can get 54 people in per 10 square metres, but if it is not in such good condition you get in only 27 persons per 10 square metres. What is or is not a good condition is looked at by relation to section 7, where one of the things found is: "How steep is the slope of the terrace?" If it is steeper than 1:6, then it is not as good as if it is 1:6, which is supposed to be the maximum.
I am suggesting that one can work out —indeed, a code has been worked out with the football authorities—a voluntary code, a code capable of being changed, but which, not necessarily for this specific purpose, gives guidance about the number of people who can safely be fitted into any terrace or stand. I am not saying that my right honourable friends will be permanently and exclusively guided by this. This is not the purpose of a non-statutory code: it is only guidance. But it gives an indication of how the situation will be calculated. They will not be susceptible to being taken to the Divisional Court, because if you work this matter out by the strict letter of the law and slide rule, you find there are two people short and therefore the ground cannot be designated, and therefore the safety requirements cannot be imposed at all—and that is not what anybody wants.
What I am saying is that we do not need to give powers to my two right honourable friends for making regulations which are only for their own benefit, when they will have the advantage of codes such as this worked out in conjunction with the sports concerned, backed up by their own technical advisers and a great deal of technical advice in the Civil Service, so that they will be able to make a fair and reasonable judgment about what is the capacity of a sports ground. I understand that the noble and learned Lord wants things to be fair. I am sure he is right, but I think we are going to be counter-productive if we try to do it by force of law. This sort of document—the little green book—is likely to be a better guide to my right honourable friends in the execution of tasks of this kind, not only in football (that is not what this Amendment is about) but in other sports where we still have other equivalent little green books to come. 1139 That is really the outcome of my considerations, and I hope that the noble and learned Lord will be satisfied.
§ LORD STOW HILLMy Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Viscount. I see the force of those arguments, which are obviously cogent, and I ask the permission of the House to withdraw my Amendment.
§ Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
§
Amendment moved—
Page 10, line 8, after ("procedure") insert ("(subject to the foregoing provisions of this Act)").—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§ 7.46 p.m.
§
LORD STRATHCONA AND MOUNT ROYAL moved Amendment No. 20:
Page 10, line 13, leave out ("prescribe") and insert ("authorise the local authority to determine, subject to such limits or in accordance with such provisions as may be prescribed by the regulations,").
§ The noble Lord said: My Lords, it gives me real pleasure to move Amendment No. 20 on behalf of my noble friend Lord Colville, and, with the permission of the House, I will speak to No. 21 at the same time. These Amendments seek to meet the pleadings (if that is the right word) of the noble Lord, Lord Garnsworthy, at the Committee stage. We know that they will meet with the approval of the County Councils Association. They would remove the power to prescribe fees, which is set out in the present Clause 12(4)(b) and replace it with the power to prescribe the limits of such fees in Clause 12(5). In other words, the local authority is to be given flexibility to charge fees for certificates within prescribed limits. The local authorities will, I am sure, welcome this flexibility.
§ Since we should in any case have been able to use the power in the present Clause 12(5), nothing is lost by dispensing with the more restrictive power at present in Clause 12(4)(6). The drafting of the provision in respect of these will now differ from the parent provision which inspired it: that is Section 5 of the Pools Competition Act 1971. But this seems a small price to pay for Amendments which 1140 do not weaken the discretion of the Secretary of State in any way and will at the same time be welcomed by the local authorities and, I am sure, happily be welcomed by noble Lords opposite. I beg to move.
§ LORD GARNSWORTHYMy Lords, I am very grateful indeed to the noble Lord, not only for what he has just said but because I am satisfied he has had real pleasure; and it is probably the first time that he has been able to stand at that Box and say that something which has been suggested from this side has been accepted. I realised the other evening, when he said that I had made a heartrending plea, that I had touched at any rate his heart, and I am delighted that this Amendment has come from the Government this evening. It completely meets the point I endeavoured to make at the Committee stage.
This is probably the last Amendment we shall need to discuss at any length, so I should like to take this opportunity of saying how much we on this side have appreciated the great care and, almost throughout the Committee stage, kindliness with which noble Lords on the Government Front Bench have dealt with the arguments we have advanced from this side. I would not suggest that we are wholly satisfied with the reception given to our arguments at all times—indeed, I do not think we can claim we have secured any large concession. But of such concessions as the Government have made, indeed we are appreciative. May I say that, if the noble Viscount has not conceded very much, he has nevertheless given generously of his knowledge; he has given detailed advice and given extensively from his legal expertise.
May I, for my part, say that I feel indebted to my noble and learned friend Lord Stow Hill because this Bill has required a legal mind, which, as I have said on a number of occasions, I do not have? I am aware of how much I owe to my noble and learned friend. It has been a pleasure to work with him on this Bill. I am sure we have been helpful to the Government in what we have said, at any rate to some extent, otherwise we should not have been considering most of the Amendments that have been before the House to-night.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSSMy Lords, I think the noble Lord is quite right. We shall not have to discuss any of the other Amendments. All I can say is that if I have to pilot Bills through this House, and particularly as the first House, which I think is welcome to us all, I cannot wish for a more constructive collection of Opposition Amendments than those that have come from noble Lords who have taken part in this series of debates. That is, after all, the purpose of the exercise. We may not agree; we may not be able to meet noble Lords on every point. I turned them down flat on finance and so did the House on a Division, but where we are dealing with matters of detail and matters of common sense and matters of machinery I am delighted that we have been able to come to agreement with noble Lords opposite. If our hearts are tender then it is nice to know that the local authority associations possess a similar organ—or a series of organs—of this sort. It is really very pleasant to finish the Report stage of this Bill. I cannot guarantee that I shall not be able to meet some more points on Third Reading.
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§ LORD STRATHCONA AND MOUNT ROYALMy Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 21.
§
Amendment moved—
Page 10, line 19, leave out subsection (5). —(Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.)
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§ Clause 14 [Power to extend Act by order]:
§
Amendment moved—
Page 10, line 40, after ("Act") insert ("which are not expressed to apply to sports grounds other than sports stadia").—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§
Amendment moved—
Page 10, line 42, leave out ("sports grounds other than sports stadia") and insert ("such
1142
sports grounds").—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§ Clause 16 [Interpretation]:
§ LORD STRATHCONA AND MOUNT ROYALMy Lords, on behalf of my noble friend I wish to move Amendment No. 24, which we have already discussed in conjunction with Amendment No. 1. I beg to move.
§ Amendment moved—
§
Page 11, line 43, at end insert—
(" "means of access" includes means of access from a highway").—(Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.)
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.