LAND COMPENSATION BILL

HL Deb 05 April 1973 vol 341 cc447-511

4.53 p.m.

THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY of STATE, DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT (LORD SANDFORD)

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.

Moved, that the House do now again resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Sandford.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

House in Committee accordingly.

[The LORD JESSEL in the Chair.]

Clause 34 [Disturbance payments for persons without compensatable interests]:

LORD SANDFORD moved Amendment No. 49: Page 33, line 7, leave out ("(as defined in section 27(7) above)").

The noble Lord said: In moving Amendment No. 49, perhaps I may also speak to Amendment No. 55. These two, taken together, put the gist of what is at present contained in subsection (1)(b) into subsection (10) of this same clause, and there is nothing more to it than that. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE EARL OF KINNOULL moved Amendment No. 50:

Page 33, line 37, at end insert— ("(d) in a case where he holds a tenancy of a premises for temporary use pending demolition and redevelopment provided he is made aware of the future of the premises before he enters into a lease.")

The noble Earl said: This is a simple Amendment, perhaps unlike the Bill. This clause deals with disturbance payments for persons without compensatable interests. The purpose of the Amendment is to add to subsection (2), which lists those persons who would not be entitled to a disturbance payment under this clause, what is contained in the Amendment, which reads: in a case where he holds a tenancy of a premises for temporary use pending demolition and redevelopment provided he is made aware of the future of the premises before he enters into a lease".

The purpose of the Amendment is that it is felt that there may be occasions when acquiring authorities may acquire properties perhaps five years or ten years in advance of a redevelopment and may wish to let those premises on a temporary basis. It is felt that, if they are subject to this clause, they may feel that it would not be appropriate for them to let the premises because of the disturbance payment than they would ultimately have to pay. If this were so, one might find that premises became redundant, or were not used to their best purposes, quite unnecessarily. I therefore commend this small Amendment to my noble friend in the hope that he will give it a sympathetic hearing. I beg to move.

LORD SANDFORD

I am grateful to my noble friend. He is right in saying that this subsection of this clause requires further amendment to deal with situations of this kind, and there is an Amendment down in my name, No. 51, designed to deal with that. So, if my noble friend will agree, I will give him the arguments that I have ready to deploy in the case of my own Amendment, and I hope that by the time I have done that he will feel satisfied that it is not necessary to press his own. The Government Amendment deals with the situation in a slightly different way, and I think my noble friend will agree that it is satisfactory.

As drafted, the subsection provides only for the situation where displacement occurs shortly after acquisition, and although this may be the usual case we have to provide, really, for the situation whenever displacement occurs after acquisition; and, as my noble friend says, it may be some considerable time after. As he says, the redevelopment may occur some considerable time afterwards, and, in order to avoid any argument as to what it is that has actually caused the displacement, both circumstances of displacement are provided for in Clause 34, so that either one of them will apply. In providing for the exclusion from entitlement to a disturbance payment under the clause where displacement is in consequence of redevelopment, which this Amendment is designed to do, the same condition has been adopted as to the date of taking up occupation as is applied when displacement is in consequence of acquisition; that is to say, that the person must have been in occupation at the time the authority published notice of their intention to acquire compulsorily, or when an agreement to buy was made.

It is necessary to draw a line in this way to prevent an acquiring authority which lets property to a new tenant at any time after it has acquired it in the exercise of its property management functions from becoming liable to pay compulsory purchase disturbance payments terms whenever it decides for property management reasons to re-gain possession. I think my noble friend will recognise that, in those circumstances, the situation is quite different from when the authority takes over the property from the original owner. The only reasonable point at which to draw the line is the one adopted as a result of this Amendment. If authorities were required to pay compulsory purchase disturbance payments to people displaced otherwise than in circumstances corresponding to compulsory purchase, it would result in an imbalance of treatment between tenants of a private landlord and those of a public authority, and it would fail to recognise the two separate roles which an authority can have: one in which it is an authority exercising compulsory purchase powers, and one where it is an authority acting as a property manager.

I hope that my noble friend will see that this provides an explanation of why it is that I cannot accept his Amendment, because it would create this imbalance and unfairness between the two sectors. We must draw a distinction between what an authority does by way of compensation and disturbance allowance when exercising compulsory purchase powers and what it does when it is dealing with property as a manager of housing. I hope that that explanation is clear to the Committee, and that it will help my noble friend to see both the undesirable effect that his Amendment will have and how my Amendment will cover the point that is disturbing him.

THE EARL OF KINNOULL

I am grateful for that explanation. I accept my noble friend's assurance and I think I understand the imbalance and unfairness that would be caused by my Amendment. I am happy to beg leave to withdraw it.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

5.02 p.m.

LORD SANDFORD

I hope that the explanation that I gave in response to my noble friend will make it unnecessary for me to say any more. I beg to move Amendment No. 51.

Amendment moved— Page 34, line 3, leave out ("as is mentioned in paragraph (a)") and insert ("or redevelopment as is mentioned in paragraph (a) or (c)"). —(Lord Sandford.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD SANDFORD moved Amendment No. 52:

Page 34, line 5, leave out paragraphs (a) and (b) and insert—

1. ("(a) in the case of land acquired under a compulsory purchase order, at the time when notice was first published of the making of the compulsory purchase order prior to its submission for confirmation or, where the order did not require confirmation, of the preparation of the order in draft;
2. (b) in the case of land acquired under an Act specifying the land as subject to compulsory acquisition, at the time when the provisions of the Bill for that Act specifying the land were first published;
3. (c) in the case of land acquired by agreement, at the time when the agreement was made;").

The noble Lord said: I think we have had Amendments like this before; we shall have quite a few more. They are only technical and are required to allow for the case where certain authorities acquire property under powers they have tinder Private Acts and when they are not, technically, using a compulsory purchase order. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD SANDFORD moved Amendment No. 53:

Page 34, line 17, leave out subsections (4) to (6) and insert— ("( ) Where a person is displaced from land in circumstances such that, apart from this subsection, he would be entitled to a disturbance payment from any authority and also to compensation from that authority under section 37 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 (compensation from landlord where order for new tenancy of business premises precluded on certain grounds) he shall be entitled, at his option. to one or the other but not to both.")

The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 53 and with it No. 54. Together they pave the way for Amendment No. 56 which I should now like to speak to as the substantive one of the three.

Amendment No. 56 is a new clause which is an amalgam of subsections (4) to (6) of Clause 34, which it faithfully reproduces except for the omission of paragraph (4)(c), which has been revised and now forms subsection (3) of the new clause. The Amendment is thus partly technical and partly substantive. One advantage it secures is that a separate clause is now provided to deal with the amount of disturbance payment and so parallels Clauses 28 and 32, which deal respectively with the amounts of home loss and farm loss payments. Subsection (3) is the new substantive part on which I shall have to spend a moment. It deals with the assessment of the amount of a disturbance payment in the case of a dwelling modified or adapted to meet the needs of a disabled person. This is the first of two provisions in the Bill designed specifically to meet the special problems of disabled people who are displaced from dwellings which catered for their disabilities. The second is Clause 40, which deals with the compulsory acquisition of a dwelling which has been constructed or substantially modified to meet the special needs of a disabled person, and it thus provides for the disabled person who has a compensatable interest. Subsection (3), on the other hand, provides for the disabled person who has not got a compensatable interest and who is entitled to a disturbance payment under Clause 34.

The Amendment amounts to this. A displaced person in lawful possession of a dwelling, who is not otherwise entitled to a disturbance payment, will be entitled, like anyone else who qualifies, to a payment for disturbance under Clause 34. Under subsection (3) the amount of this will include, in a case where structural modifications had been carried out to meet the needs of a disabled person, the reasonable expenses incurred in making comparable modifications in a dwelling to which the disabled person removed. Modifications may have been carried out in the old dwelling which, though desirable, were not essential to the needs of a disabled person and it is therefore necessary to apply a yardstick by which to judge what modifications in the replacement dwelling should be paid for by the acquiring authority. The yardstick adopted is that the payment will be assigned to the cost of reproducing as necessary the modifications carried out in the old dwelling but only where those modifications were of a kind for which a local social services authority with functions under Section 29 of the National Assistance Act, 1948 provided assistance. The authority has a duty to provide assistance for modifications necessary for the special requirements of a disabled person. If modifications other than modifications comparable with ones made to the acquired dwelling are necessary, it would fall to the local social services authority to provide assistance for them in the normal way.

If any modifications made to the acquired dwelling are not of a kind for which asistance would have been given, the occupier must bear the loss of the cost of these in the same way as must any other occupier with no compensatable interest in property on which he has spent his own money.

I am afraid that we are dealing with a complex situation and all I can do is assure the Committee that this is a fair solution, in all the complicated circumstances, of the problem of a disabled person entitled to disturbance payment. I beg to move.

LORD GARNSWORTHY

May I thank the noble Lord for having made available the notes that on Tuesday we suggested would be very useful. I could have wished that they had been available before I reached the House at about noon. Nevertheless, I have no doubt they will be useful in later stages of the Bill. With regard to this particular clause, perhaps it is not taking too great a liberty to raise the matter here. As I understand it, subsection (2)(a) provides that a person is not entitled to disturbance payment unless he is in lawful possession of the land from which he is displaced. I gather that this excludes licensees. The noble Lord may say that a discretionary power is preserved in subsection (7). I shall be interested to hear what he will be able to say on that to enable the authorities to make payments to deserving cases.

There are many cases where small businesses occupy premises on a mere licence but have considerable security of tenure. I understand that it is the intention of the Government to compensate them according to the realities of their situation. It may be that subsection (7) is intended to cover that. I had not thought of tabling an Amendment on this matter, but I would suggest that the Government might consider making the position clear by a statement here this afternoon, which would put the matter on Record, or by themselves introducing an Amendment to meet it. Otherwise I can see that there will be much misunderstanding about this situation.

May I make a few comments on the new clause proposed by the noble Lord? In general, I think it is to be welcomed. Subsection (3) provides for comparable modifications in the new dwellings which are "reasonably required" for meeting the disabled person's special needs. Would the noble Lord consider amending that and instead of the words "reasonably required "substitute," no less good"? It seems to me that those three words would make the situation more clear. The word "reasonably" raises a query in one's mind as to what is regarded as reasonable. Having regard to the extremely sympathetic way in which the noble Lord put the new clause to the Committee, he may see virtue in my suggestion.

LORD SANDFORD

If the noble Lord, Lord Garnsworthy, will forgive me: as I had moved Amendment No. 53, I think he was a little out of order in asking a question about another part of the clause to which that Amendment does not refer. I will certainly write to him on briefly on the Question, Whether the clause shall stand part of the Bill? I will try to deal with it then. At the moment I think it would be more in order if I dealt only with those parts of his remarks referring to my Amendment. All I want to say now is that I take the point he has made. I think the form of words is the one which follows the usual practice, which the Lands Tribunal are used to and familiar with, and which will cause least trouble. But I will bear his suggestion in mind and consider it.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD SANDFORD

This Amendment is, as I have explained, paving for Amendment No. 56. I beg to move Amendment No. 54.

Amendment moved— Page 34, line 41, leave out ("subsections (4) and (5) above") and insert ("section (Amount of disturbance payment) (1) to (3) below.").—(Lord Sandford.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD SANDFORD

I beg to move Amendment No. 55. We discussed this Amendment when I moved Amendment No. 49. It is a drafting Amendment.

Amendment moved—

Page 35, line 6, at end insert— ("( ) In this section "a housing order, resolution or undertaking" and "redevelopment" have the same meaning as in section 27 above.")—(Lord Sandford.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

On Question, Whether Clause 34, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?

LORD SANDFORD

I have nothing further to say. I will get in touch with the noble Lord, Lord Garnsworthy, on the question that he raised.

LORD GARNSWORTHY

I am sorry if I went a little wide. I said I realised that I might have been taking a liberty, but I thought that I might save the time of the Committee. What is it that the noble Lord, Lord Sandford, is proposing to write about? Is it about the licensee or the displaced person? I gather that it is the licensee. Does the noble Lord want me to come back on the point about the disabled person?

LORD SANDFORD

I need not write to the noble Lord; I am now in a position to say that Clause 34 does not entitle licensees to a disturbance payment as of right. They may receive a payment at the discretion of the responsible authority under subsection (7). On the other matter, which I answered when we were dealing with the disabled person's right, I will consider the point that the noble Lord raised.

LORD STOW HILL

May I probe the Minister a little further about subsection (7)? With respect, is it not in a rather unusual form? The earlier parts of Clause 34 set out the circumstances in which a person who has been disabled is entitled to receive a disturbance payment. That is clearly set out, and one knows where one stands. When one gets to subsection (7), is not its effect that, although the displaced person does not qualify—the conditions specified earlier in the clause are not present—pnevertheless the authority can disregard all that and say to itself, "Never mind; the conditions are not present, but we think fit to make a payment to that disabled person"? That question arises in the context of the question asked by my noble friend Lord Garnsworthy. He asked, for example, whether a licensee would be within the scope of subsection (7), and the Minister said, "Yes, he would be." It seems to me an odd way to go about things; to say first in subsection (2) that the claimant must be in lawful possession, for example, as a qualifying condition, and then, when you get to subsection (7), to say that the authority can disregard all that, take not the slightest notice of it, and, if it thinks fit, make a payment based on the principles set out earlier in the clause to a person who does not qualify under the terms of Clause 34.

Generally, when I make this sort of point I am told that, years ago, when I was Solicitor General, I defended a clause in precisely the same form. That may well be so, but it does not mean to say that the clause is a good one. It simply means that the argument I probably used was a bad one. I should be grateful if the Minister would say whether there are precedents for giving an authority the right completely to disregard the provisions of a clause and say that it will act according to its own discretion as it thinks fit.

LORD SANDFORD

I am sure that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stow Hill, has never wittingly used an unsatisfactory argument, and when he hears the argument that I am about to produce I am sure that he will recognise it as one that he has used himself. It is desirable to have this discretion. In this particular case it would cater for the situation where an authority encouraged tenants to move out in advance of taking one of the listed actions which would bring the other parts of the clause into operation; but which, if it was complied with, would make a disturbance payment not possible strictly under the rest of the clause. It would also enable authorities to make disturbance payments where the authority considered they were justified, to licensees, as I have just said, and to others who, although displaced in consequence of one of the listed actions, did not possess an interest amounting to legal possession, but merely a permission to occupy. I think the strongest argument is the opportunity it provides for an authority to encourage tenants to move out in advance of their taking one of the statutory actions which brings the rest of the clause into operation. I am sure that the noble and learned Lord will recognise that this is a useful discretionary power.

LORD STOW HILL

I am grateful to the Minister. The only thing that occurs to me is that the clause might have been considerably shortened if one could simply give a discretion to the authority to make payments and cut out all the rest of the clause which deals in elaborate detail with the qualifications which the claimant ought to be able to fulfil.

LORD SANDFORD

I think that would lead to simple legislation but would present considerable difficulties in operation.

Clause 34, as amended, agreed to.

LORD SANDFORD

I beg to move Amendment No. 56. We have already discussed this Amendment in connection with Amendments Nos. 53 and 54.

Amendment moved—

After Clause 34, insert the following new clause:

Amount of disturbance payment .—(1) The amount of a disturbance payment shall be equal to—

1. (a) the reasonable expenses of the person entitled to the payment in removing from the land from which he is displaced; and
2. (b) if he was carrying on a trade or business on that land, the loss he will sustain by reason of the disturbance of that trade or business consequent upon his having to quit the land.

(2) In estimating the loss of any person for the purposes of subsection (1)(b) above, regard shall be had to the period for which the land occupied by him may reasonably have been expected to be available for the purposes of his trade or business and to the availability of other land suitable for that purpose. This subsection has effect subject to section 41(7) below. (3) Where the displacement is from a dwelling in respect of which structural modifications have been made for meeting the special needs of a disabled person (whether or not the person entitled to the disturbance payment) then, if—

1. (a) a local authority having functions under section 29 of the National Assistance Act 1948 provided assistance, or
2. (b) such an authority would, if an application had been made, have provided assistance,

for making those modifications, the amount of the disturbance payment shall include an amount equal to any reasonable expenses incurred by the person entitled to the payment in making, in respect of a dwelling to which the disabled person removes, comparable modifications which are reasonably required for meeting the disabled person's special needs. (4) Any dispute as to the amount of a disturbance payment shall be referred to and determined by the Lands Tribunal or, in Scotland, the Lands Tribunal for Scotland."—(Lord Sandford.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 35 [Duty to rehouse residential occupiers]:

LORD SANDFORD, moved Amendment No. 57: Page 35, line 10, leave out ("a dwelling") and insert ("residential accommodation").

The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 57, and at the same time to speak to Amendments No. 59, 61 and 63 which are linked together. They are technical Amendments and have the effect of consolidating a number of separate points. Clause 35 imposes an obligation, subject to certain conditions, on local housing authorities or, in certain circumstances, the Greater London Council, a development corporation or the commissioners of New Towns, to ensure that suitable accommodation is available for any person displaced from a dwelling by public action. This general rehousing obligation replaces varying rehousing obligations in a number of existing Statutes. This is where the consolidating function comes in. "Dwelling" is defined in Clause 77 of the Bill as: a building or part of a building occupied…or intended to be occupied as a private dwelling or in Scotland as a private house. Some of the existing obligations refer to persons displaced from residential accommodation. This is a less restrictive term than "private dwelling" and would cover, for example, lodgers who, because they live with a family, do not occupy a private dwelling. It is not wished to make the provision in this clause more restrictive in this sense than the existing rehousing obligations, and Amendment No. 57 is intended to achieve this. Amendments Nos. 61 and 63 are consequential upon Amendment No. 57. Amendment No. 59 is needed to make it clear that this obligation to secure the provision of alternative accommodation refers only to residential accommodation. I beg to move Amendment No. 57.

LORD AVEBURY

I did not quite follow the noble Lord, Lord Sandford, when he was talking about the wider meaning of the term "residential accommodation". I have looked quickly at the Interpretation clause, but I do not find it there. Could the noble Lord clarify this and explain to the Committee where the words "residential accommodation" are defined in the Bill?

LORD SANDFORD

"Residential accommodation" is not defined in the Bill. I think it is a quite recognisable term.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD SANDFORD

Amendment No. 58 is a paving Amendment for Amendment No. 64, which is no more than a drafting Amendment. I beg to move Amendment No. 58.

Amendment moved— Page 35, line 15, leave out ("as defined in section 27(7) above)").—(Lord Sandford.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD SANDFORD

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 59.

Amendment moved— Page 35, line 23, after ("alternative") insert ("residential").—(Lord Sandford.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to,

5.23 p.m.

LORD SANDFORD moved Amendment No. 60: Page 36, line 14, leave out ("as is mentioned in paragraph (a)") and insert ("or redevelopment as is mentioned in paragraph (a) or (c)").

The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 60. This is a rather technical Amendment. Subsection 6 of Clause 35 provides, briefly, that where a person is displaced following the acquisition of a dwelling he is not entitled to benefit from the rehousing provision under Clause 35 unless he was residing in the dwelling at the time the authority published notice of their intention to acquire it compulsorily or, in the case of an acquisition by agreement, when the agreement to buy was made.

As drafted, the subsection provides only for the situation where displacement occurs after acquisition in paragraph (a) of subsection (1). But situations could arise in consequence of paragraph (c) where property was temporarily occupied pending the redevelopment. One is that an authority could put the property to good use in the interim by installing occupants for that period. But if this were done, it could result in "queue jumping" by people who wanted to get local authority housing accommodation, because when the time for redevelopment arrived the authority would be obliged to rehouse them. Accordingly, the Amendment is designed to secure that, in a paragraph (c) situation, the obligation to rehouse applies only to the occupiers who were in residence at the time of acquisition. This is another Amendment to keep a position of equity between these two different classes.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD SANDFORD moved Amendment No. 61: Pages 36, line 15, leave out ("dwelling") and insert ("accommodation ")

The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 61, which has already been discussed.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD SANDFORD moved Amendment No. 62:

LORD SANDFORD

I beg to move Amendment No. 62. This is another of the Amendments that I describe as the Private Act Amendments.

Amendment moved—

Page 36, line 16, leave out paragraph (a) and (b) and insert—

1. ("(a) in the case of land acquired under a compulsory purchase order, at the time when notice was first published of the making of the order prior to its submission for confirmation or, where the order did not require confirmation, of the preparation of the order in draft;
2. (b) in the case of land acquired under an Act specifying the land as subject to compulsory acquisition, at the time when the provisions of the Bill for the Act specifying the land were first published;
3. (c) in the case of land acquired by agreement, at the time when the agreement was made;")—(Lord Sandford.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD SANDFORD

I beg to move Amendment No. 63. This is another of the four linked Amendments.

Amendment moved— Page 36, line 26, leave out ("dwelling") and insert ("accommodation")—(Lord Sandford.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD SANDFORD

I beg to move Amendment No. 64. It is a drafting Amendment to which I have already referred.

Amendment moved—

Page 37, line 10, at end insert— ("( ) In this section" a housing order, resolution or undertaking "and" redevelopment "have the same meaning as in section 27 above.")—(Lord Sandford.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

5.27 p.m.

LORD SANDFORD moved Amendment No. 65: After Clause 35 insert the following new clause:

Duty to rehouse certain caravan dwellers .—(1) Section 35 above shall, so far as applicable, have effect in relation to a person residing in a caravan on a caravan site who is displaced from that site as it has effect in relation to a person displaced from residential accommodation on any land but shall so have effect subject to the following modifications. (2) Subsection (1) of the said section 35 shall have effect as if for the words following paragraph (c) there were substituted the words "and neither suitable residential accommodation nor a suitable alternative site for stationing a caravan is available to that person on reasonable terms, then, subject to the provisions of this section, it shall be the duty of the relevant authority to secure that he will be provided with suitable residential accommodation". (3) Subsection (6) of the said section 35 shall have effect as if in the words preceding paragraph (a) for the words "unless he was residing in the accommodation in question" there were substituted the words "unless he was residing in a caravan on the caravan site in question". (4) The said section 35 shall have effect as if in any provision not modified as aforesaid for any reference to residential accommodation or land there were substituted a reference to a caravan site. (5) In this section "caravan site" has the same meaning as in section (Home loss payments for certain caravan dwellers) above.

The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 65, which I hope will be welcomed by the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, as well as by other members of the Committee. Put briefly, this clause brings caravan dwellers within the scope of the rehousing obligation in Clause 35 and achieves this by modifying that clause. If I may take this opportunity of doing so, I will bear in mind what the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, said when I was introducing another new clause on Tuesday in connection with caravan sites. Apart from that, I do not think there is anything more to be said on this new clause.

LORD AVEBURY

I am grateful to the noble Lord for explaining this posi- tion. There are only one or two remarks I want to make on this Amendment. First of all, the question of the definition of a caravan site does not apply here as it did on the compensation clause that we were discussing earlier, because there it was important that the compensation was tied to the rateable value applicable to the hereditament occupied by the caravan resident; that was the caravan together with the pitch on which it was based. Here we are talking about a person who is displaced from a site. He may have been anywhere on that site, because, as the noble Lord, Lord Sandford, knows, if you are a licensee, as caravan residents are, then the owner of the land is entitled to move you around from one place to another at his convenience. So I do not think we have the same problem here that I outlined on the earlier Amendment.

The only remark I want to make on the definition in subsection (5) is that I think it will be helpful if here, and if he retains the definition in the earlier clause, reference was made to Section 4(1) of the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960, so that it would be easy for anyone reading this Bill, when it becomes an Act, to know that we are using the terms in the same sense. The only other thing I would say is to point out to the noble Lord that when somebody is displaced from a caravan site and under this clause he is offered alternative residential accommodation by the local authority, he is in a worse position than somebody who has the same right who is living in a traditional house. The caravan is his dwelling at the moment. If he moves into permanent, traditional accommodation he has to dispose of his caravan, which may represent a substantial proportion of his total assets. Inevitably he will dispose of it at a loss because a caravan is not worth very much unless somebody has a site on which to put it. I make this point in connection with this clause and I hope the noble Lord will bear it in mind when he reviews the point I made earlier on compensation: that somebody in this situation will lose a substantial sum of money because he is selling the caravan to somebody who will have to find somewhere to put it and pay heavily for the privilege.

LORD GARNSWORTHY

I should like to add a word of welcome to this new clause and say how much I agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, has said. Gipsies and caravan dwellers have great reason to be grateful to him for the championship of their cause. One of the difficulties—and he referred to it in an earlier debate—is that a caravan dweller on an authorised site has had to pay a considerable sum of money to get on that site. He has had no opportunity to bargain; he has had to pay the price that the caravan operator asks. The caravan operator is able to demand exactly what he wants. We all know that the rate of depreciation on caravans is heavy. The caravan dweller would not be called upon to face this depreciation if his caravan were not being moved. It is because his caravan is being moved that he is forced to face the situation that heavy depreciation has occurred. Again I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, that if he has then got to sell his caravan off site he will have to take, in all probability, a sum below the depreciated figure.

I would join with the noble Lord in asking that every possible consideration be given, because so often it is young people with small families who have been paying high rents, struggling hard to make ends meet, who find themselves placed in this situation. One of the difficulties of living in a caravan is that very often people have no furniture with which to move into a house if one is offered to them. Their situation is indeed a parlous one. On occasions, when cases come before the court in which I sit, I do not know how some such people make ends meet. I find it difficult, when considering a monetary penalty which would fit the charge of which they have been found guilty, to decide what that should be. I would therefore support the plea that there should be considerable generosity in dealing with this matter.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 35, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 36 [Power of relevant authority to make advances repayable on maturity to displaced residential owner-occupiers]:

5.34 p.m.

THE EARL OF KINNOULL moved Amendment No. 65A: Page 37, line 33, at end insert ("and so that the authority may fix the rate of interest at nil or any other rate notwithstanding that it may be less than an economic rate or may defer or suspend the payment of interest and add the instalments so deferred or suspended to the principal of the advance.")

The noble Earl said: Clause 36 deals with the power of relevant authorities to make advances repayable on maturity to displaced residential owner-occupiers. Subsection (3) deals with the conditions of the advances. Subsection (3)(b) reads: on such other terms as the authority may think fit having regard to all the circumstances.

The Amendment I am moving would read On: and so that the authority may fix the rate of interest at nil or any other rate notwithstanding that it may be less than an economic rate or may defer or suspend the payment of interest and add the instalments so deferred or suspended to the principal of the advance.

The purpose of the Amendment is to spell out that local authorities may not be obliged to charge an economic rent, that they may waive part or whole, or defer, the interest. That would be obvious in special cases where hardship could have arisen, where the property acquired differed substantially in value from the property to be purchased in its place. I hope that explains the purpose of the Amendment.

LORD SANDFORD

I understand the purpose of my noble friend's Amendment, but I have to say this to him: local authorities, under their existing general powers to grant mortgages, have a certain degree of discretion over the fixing of the rate of interest on mortgage loans, subject to such conditions as may be approved by my noble friend the Secretary of State, A similar degree of discretion is provided in Clause 36 as it is already drafted. However, I think my noble friend and the Committee will agree that a local authority must exercise its discretion in a reasonable and businesslike way, and therefore is obliged to fix an economic rate of interest. In terms of local authority financial operations this could, for example, establish a rate derived from its pool rate of interest, or current rate of interest for its external borrowing. But it would not be right to charge a nil rate of interest, or a rate of interest deliberately pitched well below the economic rate. In answer to my noble friend, I can say that there is a measure of discretion for the local authorities which it would certainly be right for them to exercise; but it would be wrong to go beyond the constraints already provided in the clause and in other enactments, and the conditions which are approved generally by the Secretary of State.

THE EARL OF KINNOULL

I am partly grateful to my noble friend for that reply. One does not have much luck with one's Amendments. I understand his reasoning, but I am sorry he feels unable to give the power of discretion to local authorities beyond the economic rent. As I understood what he said, local authorities would be obliged to charge an economic rent whether they thought the case was a good one or not.

LORD GARNSWORTHY

Before the noble Lord takes any action on this Amendment, may I say that I hope the Government will look at this again in the light of what has been said? As all of us do not want the Committee to go on too long, we are keeping our remarks limited. There is a great deal that could be said to support the principle advanced by the noble Earl. It would be encouraging for the Committee if the Minister could say that between now and Report he will look at the matter again. There is no doubt that the noble Earl has a good deal of support outside this House for the point of view he is advancing, and the Amendment he has tabled is one which commands support from a number of people who have given a great deal of thought to the situation.

LORD SANDFORD

I will look at it again, although the kind of discretion I have just described is about as far as it is right to go in all the circumstances of the case. But certainly I will look at it again and bear my friend's point in mind.

THE EARL OF KINNOULL

I am most grateful for that assurance and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 36 agreed to.

Clauses 37 and 38 agreed to.

Clause 39 [Compensation for injurious affection]:

LORD SANDFORD moved Amendments 67, 68, 69, 70, 71:

Page 41, line 4, after (acquired") insert (or taken") Page 41,line 9, after ("acquired") insert ("or taken") Page 41,line 11, after ("63") insert ("or 121") Page 41,line 12, after ("7") insert ("or 20") Page 41,line 22, after ("61") insert ("or 114")

The noble Lord said: Clause 39 makes an Amendment in the law relating to the measure of compensation for injurious affection of land held with other land which is compulsorily acquired. The courts have held that in assessing compensation for injurious affection regard can be had only to the effect on land retained by the claimant of the works carried out on the land taken from the claimant himself, and not to the effect of the whole of the works. The best known of these cases is Edwards v. Minister of Transport in 1964. Clause 39 amends the law exemplified in that case by providing that compensation for injurious affection shall be assessed by reference to the whole of the works and not only the part situated on the land acquired from the claimant. At present the clause is technically defective because is covers only injurious affection compensation arising under Section 7 of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 and the corresponding section of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845. These sections cover only the compensation for the acquisition of interests in land other than short tenancies. In the case of short tenancies, that is tenancies for no more than a year, or from year to year, the appropriate sections under which compensation for injurious affection may be payable are Section 20 of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 and Section 121 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845. This Amendment, together with Amendments Nos. 68 to 71, inclusive, is necessary to extend the benefits of the clause to such cases. I beg to move Amendments Nos. 67 to 71 inclusive en bloc.

On Question, Amendments agreed to.

On Question, Whether Clause 39, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?

LORD STOW HILL

May I direct the attention of the Committee to subsection (2)? I say in all sincerity that I think both Houses of Parliament and the public owe a big debt of gratitude to Parliamentary counsel for the remarkable work that they do. I cannot help thinking, however, that subsection (2) is not a felicitous example. It seems a model of a jigsaw puzzle. I do not think I shall be taking the time of the Committee unnecessarily if I read it. It deals with a simple concept; namely, injurious affection—an expression which speaks for itself. It is longstanding in our legislation and dates back to the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845, and possibly even earlier. This subsection defines what is meant by injurious affection in this context. It reads as follows: In this section ' compensation for injurious affection ' means compensation for injurious affection under section 63 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 or section 7 of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965, and subsection (1) above shall apply with the necessary modifications to such compensation under the said section 7 as substituted by paragraph 7 of Schedule 6 to the Highways Act 1971, paragraph 13 of Schedule 2 to the Gas Act 1972 (compulsory acquisition of rights over land) or any corresponding enactment, including (except where otherwise provided) an enactment passed after this Act. Surely it is not beyond the wit of the extremely experienced and skilful draftsmen who sit in the Parliamentary counsels' office to provide something simpler and more intelligible than that? What does the phrase, "as substituted by paragraph 7 of Schedule 6" mean? What is substituted for what, and by what process? Who has done it? In past years, I have always thought it not a good precedent for an Act of Parliament to start saying what Acts of Parliament which have not yet been passed are to mean. That is precisely what this does. The last two lines say, including (except where otherwise provided) an enactment passed after this Act". An enactment passed after this Act can itself say what it means. It carries its own language and it can direct the mind of the reader to its effect. I would ask the Minister to ask Parliamentary counsel to have another look at this matter. It is desirable that the subject, the liege, should, when he reads an Act of Parliament, know more or less what it means. If he ploughs through these lines he will be in an absolute maze of obscurity. I accept that this subsection is probably meant to be construed by experts; they will be foxed and they will have volumes and volumes on the table to see what it means. I think it is right that the Committee should express a view regarding that, and that the Minister should say that he will ask Parliamentary Counsel to look again to see whether they can make the subsection more intelligible and simple.

LORD SANDFORD

I share the noble and learned Lord's feelings. This is an extremely foxing Bill. I had to have my own notes on this clause completely redrafted because in their original form I could not make head or tail of them. We will see what can be done; but we are dealing with a complex matter and I do not think much can be done.

Clause 39, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 40 [Compensation for acquisition of dwelling specially adapted for disabled person]:

LORD SANDFORD

I beg to move Amendment No. 72. It is a drafting Amendment putting the interpretation of a disabled person in Clause 77.

Amendment moved— Page 41, line 42, leave out subsection (3).—(Lord Sandford.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

On Question, Whether Clause 40, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?

LORD STOW HILL

Would the Minister be so kind as to say what in terms of valuation expertise is likely to be the effect of subsection (2)? The claimant is given an option to ask that the dwelling be assessed upon the basis that there is no general demand or market for land for that purpose. What is the result in terms of valuation? It is important that we should know.

LORD SANDFORD

This is a Rule 5 case. Rule 5 reads: Where land is, and but for the compulsory acquisition would continue to be, devoted to a purpose of such nature that there is no general demand or market for that land fox that purpose, compensation may if the Lands Tribunal is satisfied that reinstatement in some other place is bona fide intended, be assessed on the basis of the reasonable cost of equivalent reinstatement.

Clause 40, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 41 [Compensation for disturbance where business carried on by person over sixty]:

5.48 p.m.

THE EARL OF KINNOULL moved Amendment No. 72A:

Page 42, line 7, leave out paragraph (b) and insert— ("(b) the average annual turnover of the trade or business during its last three complete accounting periods ended before that date did not exceed £50,000.")

The noble Earl said: I beg to move Amendment No. 72A. Clause 41 introduces a new, a special and a rather humane compensation for disturbance where businesses are carried on by persons over the age of 60. I am sure everyone welcomes this new clause. Any person of 60 or over will be entitled to compensation where his property is acquired and where he has been trading on that property. The compensation assessment is made on the assumption that it would not be reasonably practicable to carry on trade elsewhere, and it is made so long as the recipient agrees to certain undertakings. The purpose of my Amendment is to change the basis on which the property would qualify. It is simply to change the qualification from a limited rateable value to a limit based on turnover—in this case I suggest £50,000. It has been put to me that this would make a more practicable qualification, and I hope that my noble friend will be able to agree.

LORD SANDFORD

I am sorry not to be able to be more receptive to my noble friend's Amendments but I think he will agree that he is raising here a matter which was raised before and has been fully considered in another place. Nevertheless, I am glad of an opportunity to explain the reasoning behind the clause as we have already drafted it and to justify our conclusion. The definition adopted for this purpose in the Bill is the same as that used for limiting eligibility in the blight context. Eligibility for small business "under the blight provisions is now limited to those which are carried on in premises with a rateable value of not more than £2,250, and pitched at this level it covers the interests of people who are most likely to suffer personal hardship. Before revaluation the limit was set at £750. I think the Committee would agree that it is clearly desirable that there should be a consistency of definition for small businesses in provisions designed to relieve hardship. There is no evidence that the alternative method of defining a "small business by reference to its annual turnover, as proposed by my noble friend's Amendment, would have any advantage over the method of applying rateable value as the yardstick. Indeed, many businesses included within the scope of this and other provisions by virtue of a reference to rateable value would be excluded if a reference to annual turnover were used instead, since the annual turnover of firms of similar size varies enormously depending on the value of the commodity with which they are dealing.

I would ask the Committee to agree that rateable value as a criterion provides a readily ascertainable figure. Using it as a yardstick in the blight context has been well tried and tested and has proved to be a fair and workable method of defining what constitutes a "small business". Without firm evidence—and my noble friend has not brought any to bear—that some other yardstick would be fairer overall, or more easily applied, there seems no reason to depart from the present method of definitions. I hope that that explanation satisfies my noble friend that this matter has been looked into, and possibilities have been considered. But on the whole, for those reasons, we feel that the criterion we have chosen is going to be the fairest and the most practical. Therefore, having had this explanation, I hope that he will not feel it necessary to press his Amendment.

THE EARL OF KINNOULL

I am most grateful to the noble Lord. I am afraid I was not aware that this very matter had been raised in another place. I can only assume that one's advisers were not satisfied with the Government's answer. However, I am perfectly happy to withdraw this Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

LORD SANDFORD

I beg to deal with Amendments Nos. 73 and 74 together. They are no more than drafting Amendments. I beg to move No. 73.

Amendment moved— Page 43, line 23, leave out ("subsection (4)(b) of section 34") and insert ("subsection (1)(b) of section (Amount of disturbance payment)").—(Lord Sandford.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD SANDFORD

I beg to move Amendment No. 74.

Amendment moved— Page 43, line 29, leave out ("the said section 34") and insert ("section 34 above").—(Lord Sandford.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 41, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 42 agreed to.

Clause 43 [Compensation in respect of agricultural holdings]:

5.54 p.m.

LORD HENLEY moved Amendment No. 75: Leave out Clause 43 and insert:

Compensation in respect of Agricultural holdings ("43.—(1) This section has effect where in pursuance of any enactment providing for the acquisition or taking of possession of land compulsorily an acquiring authority acquire the interest of the tenant in, or take possession of, an agricultural holding or any part of it. (2) In assessing the compensation payable by the acquiring authority to the tenant in connection with any such acquisition of an interest or taking possession of land as is mentioned in subsection (1) above (hereafter referred to as "the tenant's compensation") there shall be disregarded any right of the landlord to serve a notice to quit, and any notice to quit already served by the landlord, if the notice would be or was effective by reason only of treating the use for the purposes of which the interest is acquired or possession is taken of the land as falling within section 24(2)(b) or 25(1)(e) of the Agricultural Holdings Act 1948 (land required for non-agricultural use). Provided that any compensation payable by the acquiring authority to the landlord for the acquisition of the interest of the landlord in an agricultural holding or any part of it, shall not be reduced or otherwise prejudiced by the assessment of compensation to the tenant under this subsection. (3) Section 42 of the Agriculture (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1968 (tenant's compensation to be assessed without regard to his prospects of remaining in possession after contractual date) and section 15(1) of that Act (effect on tenant's compensation of provision enabling landlord to resume possession for non-agricultural use) shall cease to have effect.")

The noble Lord said: This Amendment in the name of myself and the noble Viscount, Lord Davidson, seeks to substitute a new clause in place of the existing Clause 43. Clause 43 seeks to improve the compensation to the tenant of agricultural land. It does this by recognising that the tenant's year-to-year interest is in fact tantamount to a life interest provided that he does not commit one of the seven agricultural deadly sins. To that extent, both the noble Viscount, whose name appears on the Amendment with mine, and I welcome the attempt of the Government to improve the tenant's compensation, which has long been recognised as being inadequate.

This is a very complex provision in a very complex Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Sandford, has already said how foxing a Bill it is and how difficult he found it to understand his own notes. This particular clause has already been debated in another place for nearly two hours, after it had come out of Committee stage. So your Lordships will see that it is indeed a very difficult one. The answers which I think were given in another place have not been at all satisfactory. Indeed, I think everybody welcomed the clause as being something desirable, but it was a case of gift horses being looked at very closely in the mouth, and when one looks closely at this gift which the Government are proposing to hand out to the tenants of agricultural land it immediately becomes apparent that the gift is not a gift of the Government or of the acquiring authority; the gift is being made by the landlord to his tenant and the improvements in the tenant's compensation are being met out of the landlord's share of compensation and not by the acquiring authority. Perhaps I may quote what the Government spokesman in Standing Committee in another place said: I advise the Committee that it will be necessary to adjust the compensation payable to landlords in many cases in a downward direction.

I think that that speaks for itself.

My new clause leaves in that provision which is designed for improving the tenant's compensation; that is to say, subsection (3), and it adds a proviso to safeguard the tenant's position. But it strikes out subsection (2), which provides that a part of the landlord's right under Section 24(2)(b) of the 1948 Agriculture Act should be disregarded. My Amendment also strikes out subsections (5) and (6), which settle the compensation paid to the tenant under this clause against compensation paid for a different aspect of his loss under Section 12 of the 1968 Act. When the Minister answered at the end of his fairly long debate on the clause in another place he said the landlord and tenant were not in competition for compensation. At Second Reading I said that I would raise this matter again because I felt it was one thing for the Minister to say so and another thing for it to be demonstrably proved to be so.

What I am asking the Government to do to-day (and I believe it is the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, who is going to answer me) is to give us a very clear demonstration as to why it is thought that the landlord and tenant are not in competition for the same compensation. I should also like him to tell me why he feels that it was necessary for the decision in your Lordships' House of the Rugby Joint Water Board v. Shaw, Fox and Foottit to be reversed by this Bill By all means let us see that the tenant's provision vis-a-vis Section 24(2)(b) of the 1948 Act is made good; but why should it be done at the expense of his landlord instead of at the expense of the acquiring authority? I feel there is a manifest injustice here, and I hope that the noble Viscount can show me why, in his view or at any rate in the view of his right honourable friend, this is not so. If he cannot do that, I feel we should have an unequivocal admission from the Government that this is what the Government intends; namely, that some part of this improved compensation to the tenant should come out of the landlord's pocket.

It is difficult enough nowadays to persuade landlords, when land comes in with vacant possession, to let it again. There are so many inhibiting factors; so many factors which encourage landlords to hold on to the land themselves and not to let it, that this is just one more (admittedly very small) nail in the coffin of the landlord and tenant system which has in fact served the agricultural industry very well and is far from finished yet. So I hope the noble Viscount can give me a more satisfactory answer than his right honourable friend gave in another place. I beg to move.

6.0 p.m.

LORD MIDDLETON

What most of the debate in this Committee has been about is the balance which the Government are trying to achieve in the Bill between generosity to the dispossessed on the one hand and responsibility to the taxpayer on the other. But so often we see a new or extended idea for compensation proposed and then the Government seem to shiver at the thought of the quantity of development that lies ahead and they pull back their hand. We have, for example, Clause 27, dealing with the qualifying period of home loss, and Clause 32, dealing with the measure of compensation for farm loss, and so on. I fully recognise that my noble friends have agreed to look again at both these points and of course a balance has to be kept, but I hope I am not being unfair in saying that one gets a general impression of caution whittling away at the excellent broad intentions of the Bill, and in some cases there emerge proposals as to the measure of compensation that do less than justice to the dispossessed.

As the noble Lord, Lord Henley, said, we have a very good example in Clause 43. I do not wish to repeat the noble Lord's arguments, but I have a feeling that my noble friend may resist this Amendment. If so, it may be on the grounds of inconsistency in that, if one accepts that it is right to assume that the tenant's interest was a continuing one and could not be extinguished under Section 43(2)(b) of the 1948 Agriculture Act, then one must make the same assumption when compensating the landlord. But we are not valuing the same interest. For the tenant, the Bill recognises that in 1973 and onwards it is very unlikely that a dispossessed farm tenant will be able to get the tenancy of another farm. We must do better for him, as this Bill recognises, than compensate him on the basis that he merely loses a year's right to farm.

The landlord's interest is entirely different and will be valued differently. It will be valued on the market value of the land, and of course the compensation will be liable to capital gains tax—subject to the "roll-over" provisions. The landlord would have had the land subject to an agricultural tenancy, and under the Agricultural Holdings Act of 1948 it was open to him at any time to give a notice to quit; but such a notice could successfully be contested by the tenant unless it fell under Section 24 or Section 25 of that Act. Section 24(2)(b) made valid a notice to quit where planning permission had been granted for development. The landlord could then hand over his land unencumbered by a tenancy and thus ready and vacant for whatever development was required. An acquiring authority would pay him compensation on that basis; and this principle was upheld, as the noble Lord, Lord Henley, has said, by their Lordships in the case of the Rugby Joint Waterboard v. Shaw Fox and Foottit.

Clause 43 of the Bill, as it stands, asks us in effect to reverse this House of Lords decision, to ignore this right of the landlord and to compensate him on the basis that he could only hand over his land for development with an immovable tenant. Yet, had he obtained planning permission for some purpose independent of the purpose for which the acquiring authority dispossessed him, he could claim compensation on the basis that a notice to quit to a tenant under Section 24(2)(b) was incontestable. This is quite unreal, and manifestly Clause 43 fails to put him back for compensation purposes into the position he was in before notice of compulsory purchase by the acquiring authority. It fails to achieve one of the main purposes of the Bill. As the noble Lord, Lord Henley, has said, in rightly trying to help the tenant farmer it does less than justice to the landlord. The acquiring authority undoubtedly receives the land with vacant possession. Why should it not compensate the owner accordingly? After all, this Bill is trying to improve compensation.

Hammering landlords is a popular sport, but I am sure the Government did not intend to create this anomaly when they framed this clause. In thinking that, I am encouraged by the Minister's words in another place, already quoted by the noble Lord, Lord Henley, that the landlord and tenant will not be in competition for compensation". I hope my noble friend will take another look at Clause 43 and will consider care- fully the case that this amended clause will improve the Bill by removing the injustice while retaining the improved basis of compensation for the tenant.

6.7 p.m.

THE EARL OF KINNOULL

As we are having a general debate on Clause 43 I should like to speak on that and then on the Amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Henley. Undoubtedly there has been general concern, both in and out of Parliament, in regard to the present drafting of this clause. The words that caught my eye in the OFFICIAL REPORT of another place were from the speech made by Sir Frederick Corfield, the honourable member for Gloucestershire. South. Sir Frederick Corfield, as the Committee will know, is an eminent Q.C. and also has considerable experience of planning and compensation matters. In fact he has written a book,Corfield on Cornpensation. The view he took of this clause was this: First, he asked the House how were they to judge whether the clause dealt adequately with compensation. The reason he asked that was because he thought it unclear as to how a valuer would assess the compensation. He then went on to describe the problems that a valuer would encounter. Perhaps I might briefly remind the Committee of them. As the clause is drafted, the valuer would have to assess the compensation without regard to the present security of tenure under the 1948 Act. On the one hand, he has to disregard the right of a landlord to get vacant possession of the farm on grounds of alternative user; on the other hand, he has to take into account the fact that the tenant may well lose the farm, due to either non-payment of rent or a State management scheme, or a case of hardship under the 1968 Act. In other words, he has to balance both something that he disregards and other matters which he has to take into account. Also the valuer has to assess the working life ahead of the farmer because of the expectation of the lease.

Sir Frederick Corfield went on to say that he regarded the task of the valuer as impossible. He then asked a question which I should like to ask of my noble friend: what is the valuation principle of this clause? The reply given by the Minister in another place at that time was, first, It is not for the Government to tell the valuer how to write this —which of course one would accept; and then he went on to say, I believe that members of that profession in most cases will be able to cope". I think it rather disturbing that he felt that only a few could cope.

I have tried to check with members of the profession—and perhaps I should declare my interest here as I am a member of the profession—and I have come across the answer that it is such a complex valuation that it will have to be settled by the Lands Tribunal. I feel that that is a very unsatisfactory situation. The effect of the clause on compensation to which the noble Lord, Lord Middleton, has referred, as I understand it is that in the first place the landlord will lose possibly between 25 to 20 per cent. of what his previous compensation would have amounted to. The reason for that is, as the noble Lord, Lord Middleton, has said, that he will get investment value compensation for his farm and not vacant possession value deferred one year.

The tenant's claim is very obscure, as I have tried to point out, and one does not know to what extent he will benefit. The acquiring authority would seem to gain from all this, because it seems doubtful that the tenant's claim will equal what the landlord will lose. The essence of this clause, as I understand it, was to improve the legal responsibility of the landlord to pay compensation to the tenant. That came about, as the Committee will recall, during the Committee stages of another place, when they were talking specifically on the farm loss pay. ments—the business loss payments, not the land loss payments. I emphasise that, because this would, in other words, not create a breach of market value, which I know my noble friend who shouted out "Heresy!" two days ago feels very strongly about. I would ask my noble friend whether he would consider taking back this clause and redrafting it to allow the farm tenant to come within the farm loss payment clause and to adjust the present compensation he receives under the 1968 Act.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

I am always prepared to look at these things again, but the debate on this Amendment and the slightly more general remarks made by my noble friend Lord Kinnoull show what happens when one starts tinkering about with the perfectly ordinary rules of compensation. In the case of agricultural tenancies there has been a great deal of tinkering and I am afraid that we are continuing the process today. I am not altogether certain why it was that my honourable friend in another place said that landlords and tenants were not in competition for compensation, because the ordinary rule which applies to compensation on compulsory acquisition where there are two interests, a freehold and a leasehold, is that the leasehold is valued in accordance with the length of the lease and the value is capitalised and turned into a capital sum. There are various elements in that and it is usually the profit rental or something of that sort which is valued. The freehold is valued subject to the lease which actually exists. Of course, the longer the lease the longer time it will be before the freeholder will be able to deal freely with the land in the market and therefore the longer his capital payment will notionally have to be deferred. That means that the valuation of his interest is lessened. The moment one starts putting any artificial additions into this, one gets into trouble. My noble friend Lord Middleton talked about the question of consistency and he is quite right. One has to be consistent about this matter.

Against the general background that I have just tried to describe, we have in law, both for agricultural tenants and for business tenants in general, artificial securities of tenure. I do not wish to say anything about those. They are there and everybody approves of them. They have been there for a very long time. What one has to look at is what the effect of those artificial securities of tenure may be on the valuation process In 1968 there was a case called The Minister of Transport v. Pettitt where it was apparent that in the case of an agricultural holding the question of the security of tenure and what account should be taken of it was going to be crucial to the whole of the valuation. Section 42 of the 1968 Act was passed to make it perfectly plain that where an agricultural tenant was dispossessed by compulsory acquisition and he would otherwise have had security of tenure if it had not been for the fact that the highway authority, in that case, was going to buy his farm to make a road on it, his compensation was to be assessed as if he had lost his security of tenure because of the coming upon the scene of the road.

That is one way of looking at it. One can say that, as in any other case, a landlord can get rid of an agricultural tenant if he gets planning permission to use the land for something else, under the ordinary machinery of the Agricultural Holdings Act. So when a highway authority comes along and gets its deemed planning permission to build a road, in exactly the same way the agricultural tenant has lost his security of tenure and he does not get anything like so much compensation. The other side of the coin at that stage was—and this was what the Rugby Water Board case said—that where you have a situation of this kind the landlord is entitled to the valuation of his interest on the basis that he has got rid of the tenant, because by the same reasoning that you have a method of getting an agricultural tenant out by the notional granting of planning permission for the road—or the reservoir, as it was in the Rugby case—the landlord can cash in on this and has an unencumbered freehold to sell, and his interest will be valued accordingly. That is a perfectly consistent approach and it is the approach that is at the moment the law.

What the Bill is doing in Clause 43 is to reverse it and to reverse it in relation to both parties. Clause 43 says that the tenant shall no longer be considered to have lost his security of tenure by virtue of the deemed planning permission which constitutes the scheme for which his land is being acquired. He may of course—and this is the more difficult valuation point about which my noble friend Lord Kinnoull was talking—be liable to lose his security of tenure because of some other planning permission, totally divorced from the scheme, but that is another matter.

So far as the scheme itself is concerned, we are now saying that he does not lose his security of tenure and he must have his interest valued as if he was not going to be "hove" out because of the road or reservoir. I cannot see how in those circumstances in logic you can do anything but turn the coin over and say that the landlord accordingly must have his interest valued as if the tenant still had that security of tenure. If that means, as it does, that in some cases the landlord is going to get less compensation, that is the only logical way one can do it. What the Amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Henley, does is to give the best of both worlds to both of them. It assumes that the landlord has vacant possession and it also assumes that the tenant has security of tenure. That goes against all known principles of valuation where you have two interests that you have to share out, because you cannot have two different and contradictory assumptions as to the hypothesis on which you value those two interests. I am talking simply about values of the interest in land—I am not talking about disturbance, and that sort of thing. That is what this Amendment does. No doubt it is simply glorious for the purposes of the tenant and the landlord, because they both enjoy the most favourable possible hypothesis in order to get money out of the acquiring authority. But I do think my noble friend Lord Middleton (I think it was he) was right when he said that even if we are trying to improve the law on compensation, we have to balance what is given to the dispossessed member of the public with what the public in the larger sense pays out of the taxpayer's or ratepayer's pocket. I am afraid I can see no difference between agricultural tenancies and tenancies of any other sort, houses or businesses or anything else, where you have got to look at the respective interests of the landlord and the tenant; you have got to look at them against the same hypothetical background, and not set up the one against the other, so that they both get a favourable hypothesis at the expense of the public. That is the reason why I would suggest to the Committee that this Amendment is wrong.

By all means, if the noble Lord, Lord Henley, wishes to go back to Section 42 of the 1968 Act, whereby the landlord gets the benefit of vacant possession and the tenant is done out of any security of tenure, which is the existing law, let him say so. Alternatively, one can say what one does in Clause 43: that the landlord has got to accept the tenant's security of tenure and get less money. This benefits the tenant since he, of course, is entitled to his security of tenure. But you cannot have a mixture of the two. I would suggest to the Committee that it is totally illogical and wrong to try to mix them. That is what the Amendment does.

As for the more general point raised by my noble friend Lord Kinnoull, I am not surprised to hear that the valuers are having problems, but I think that his experience—and indeed mine—of the Lands Tribunal is such that one sensibly relies on them. After all, Governments have relied on the Lands Tribunal in very difficult cases, such as leasehold enfranchisement, where they did not like the first result; they do rely on the Lands Tribunal to sort out complex and difficult matters of valuation. I have done lots of these cases in front of the Lands Tribunal, and I have the greatest respect for the sophistication and powers of analysis of the members who sit in Hanover Square to deal with the sort of points that my noble friend has mentioned. I should have thought—though I stand to be corrected—that if you leave out the particular impact of a road scheme or anything else that happens to be a cause of compulsory acquisition; if you have to value land subject to the possibility that the landlord will get planning permission for something else, or that the tenant will turn out in a few years' time to be a terribly bad farmer, or the possibility of any of the other agricultural seven deadly sins; then you have a situation that has to be dealt with now in valuation practice. I cannot see, and I have no reason to suppose, that valuers are incapable of dealing with this or that the Lands Tribunal would be incapable of dealing with it.

Finally, he mentioned that we should really re-think the whole question of whether tenants from year to year, shorter term tenancies, should come into the farm loss payment scheme and should not be dealt with as we are dealing with them, under Clause 43. I have thought about this again. We did have a debate about this on Tuesday. But I think that when one analyses it very carefully the system in this Bill is right. What is more—and, of course, this is an important point on the Amendment itself which the noble Lord, Lord Henley, specifically mentioned, though I am not sure that he did full justice to the horrors of it from the tenant's point of view—the effect of Clause 43, subsections (5) and (6), is that whatever changes Clause 43 may make at least the tenant will never get less than he does under the existing law on compensation, plus the four times rent payment. If you do away with subsections (5) and (6), a very valuable part of the compensation for a dispossessed yearly tenant is being abandoned; extremely important protection is being abandoned. I am prepared to explain this to the noble Lord, Lord Henley, though I think he probably understands fully how the thing works. It is an extremely complex piece of drafting because of the background taxation situation. The effect of it is that no tenant will ever get less than he does now, and the probability, or possibility, is that he will get more. But part of it will continue to consist of the four times payment under Section 12 of the 1968 Act, with the particularly attractive consequence that that form of payment possesses at the moment, and which I do not think people would wish to abandon, certainly not tenant farmers.

There are details like that which I think are quite important. There is the whole matter of principle that I have attempted to explain. I would have suggested to the Committee—and I hope the noble Lord, Lord Henley, and others who have spoken will agree—that what we have produced is consistent and fair. It may be different from what the law is now, but it is good valuation practice and something that we really ought to have in the Bill. If there are drafting or other complications which noble Lords wish me to look at again, of course I will do so, but as to the principle, I am convinced it is right.

THE EARL OF KINNOULL

Before the noble Lord, Lord Henley, winds up his Amendment, may I say that I entirely agree with regard to the Lands Tribunal? Of course, they are a very fair-minded body and I am sure they will come to a satisfactory conclusion. This is the very point that I was asking my noble friend about. On Tuesday he suggested that Clause 43 was really quite an additional "sweetener" to the tenant. The point I want to put to my noble friend is: do we know what "sweetener"? And will it be equal to what the landlord will now lose?

LORD BURTON

I wonder if it has been considered that in Scotland we have a different tenancy regulation between landlord and tenant. There has been constant reference throughout this debate to the 1948 Act, which is an English Act. It seems to me that if this provision is passed as it stands at the moment there will have to be a different form of valuation in Scotland. That again seems to me unsatisfactory.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

There are indeed Scottish adaptations of some of the provisions put in at the later stages in the Commons which have still to be dealt with, and which will be the subject of Government Amendments at the next stage of the Bill. I should think that Clause 43 is almost certain to be one of them. Perhaps we could deal with the point raised by my noble friend Lord Burton when we come to Report Stage with the Scottish adaptations.

Regarding the last two questions of my noble friend Lord Kinnoull, he knows that he is asking questions which are not susceptible to a straight answer. He knows as well as I do that it is quite impossible for me to stand at this Despatch Box, or for him to stand up on the Back Benches, and say what is going to happen upon the valuation of any particular case. I cannot tell him how many pounds, shillings and pence any hypthetical or any generalised tenant is going to get under Clause 43. I should have thought it perfectly obvious that if you added to the tenant's assets, as it were, a security of tenure which he does not at the moment possess, he is likely to be better off than he is now. By how much, I do not know.

The other question my noble friend asked was whether it would be equal to what the landlord would lose. I am not a valuer, and so I hesitate to answer specifically. But my idea of how valuation works, as I explained earlier, is that if you have two interests which you value together, one being a tenancy and the other a freehold, they inter-relate with each other. The longer the tenancy, the more the tenant gets and the less the landlord gets. I should have thought there would have been a very close inter- relationship in this case between any gains that the tenant would achieve under Clause 43, and consequent smaller compensation payments which the landlord would get as a result. But, after all, the landlord has to remember that, had it not been for the fact that the acquiring authority came along with a public works scheme, he would not have gained possession of the land at all, because the tenant would have stayed; unless there was some other action because of which he would be able to give to the tenant a valid notice to quit. Under Clause 43(3), that sort of reason divorced from the scheme of public works is still available to the landlord. He does not lose any rights that he has at the moment, or that he will have in the future under this Bill, in relation to anything other than the actual scheme for which the land is being acquired. So I do not think he is being treated very unfairly. With that, I hope my noble friend Lord Kinnoull will be satisfied, because he knows how difficult are the questions which he has asked me to answer in specific terms of pounds and pence.

THE EARL OF KINNOULL

I am sorry if my noble friend thinks I have been unfair. May I ask this much simpler question? Does he agree that a tenant would much prefer a simpler form of compensation, such as something to do with the rental value which is the basis of most disturbance claims, rather than having to understand a clause of this nature which is a valuer's bonanza?

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

The answer is perfectly simple. He would prefer whatever was most beneficial to him, taking account of the tax situation.

THE EARL OF KINNOULL

Would my noble friend agree that at the moment he cannot judge what is better?

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

Yes, he can, because the four times payment is in no way derogated from by Clause 43. All that will happen is that if there is any more to come he will still get that extra. But he will still get his four times payment with the tax advantages that it at present carries.

LORD HENLEY

I asked for an alternative and I have had a very straight answer. The Government have "come clean" and they have said in terms that they intend that part of this compensation should be met not by the acquiring authority, but by the landlord. My Amendment was designed to get the best of both possible worlds—and why not? I think that both landlord and tenant are very inadequately compensated in many cases. What I was asking for was that the status quo as regards the landlord should remain; that is to say, we should not seek to reverse the decision in Rugby Joint Water Board v. Shaw Fox and Foottit, but that the tenant should be safeguarded so that he is not at risk under Section 24(2)(b) of the 1948 Act.

The noble Viscount, Lord Colville, said that it would be quite illogical to have the best of these two worlds. I am not at all sure that I agree. It seems to me that this illogicality is in no way at the expense of the public. It would prevent what I still see as a certain unfairness, in spite of what the noble Viscount said. In effect, as the noble Lord, Lord Middleton, pointed out, compensation falls under two heads, and what I see happening is that compensation will be paid for fixed equipment and buildings on the land, and some part of the compensation for things in those buildings on the land will be paid for out of the compensation for the land and buildings. That is what I felt was an injustice, and it seems to me that the illogicality—if that is what it is—of trying to get the best of both worlds was a reasonable way out of it. So much for the first part of my Amendment. With regard to subsections (5) and (6), I agree that it is possible that I have not fully understood the taxation implications. I shall read the report of what the noble Viscount has said, and I may find that it was an adequate explanation and that I was wrong to want to delete both subsections (5) and (6). Nevertheless, it is a sad state of affairs when, in a Bill which is supposed to be improving compensation, the best the noble Viscount can say is that a tenant will never get less and he might even get more. I do not think much of subsections (5) and (6) if that is the best the Government can do.

Last of all, there was one point raised by the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull. He asked whether the tenant would prefer an altogether more flexible system of compensation than what is proposed. I entirely agree, and that is what I have battled for on several occasions. For example, there was the Trent River Authority Bill, which took over provisions in a Welsh reservoir Bill, whereby the acquiring authority was enabled to enter into a perfectly ordinary, straightforward bargain with the person whose land was to be acquired. That suited everybody very much better. It was quicker, it saved public money in the long run, because delays were avoided, and we ended up with someone who felt he had been reasonably adequately compensated, instead of with a disgruntled and dispossessed tenant. I think I can say no more with regard to my Amendment. I am glad that the Government have come into the open and have admitted that this means a diminution of the landlord's compensation, because I think it is right that that should be said in terms. But I am disappointed that the Government do not see a way of getting the best of both worlds, because it is far from illogical and not unreasonable that we should have the best of both worlds in this respect. I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

On Question, Whether Clause 43 shall stand part of the Bill?

6.38 p.m.

TIM EARL OF KINNOULL

I wonder whether I may ask my noble friend a question? During the Third Reading of this Bill in another place, the Minister said that he would look again at whether this whole clause could be drafted more simply and said that the matter would be carefully considered. May we have an assurance from my noble friend that this clause will be looked at again, or is he really satisfied that as at present drafted the clause will do?

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

My difficulty is, I suppose, that I am used to reading this sort of clause. I have been battling with this sort of point in compensation legislation for rather a long time and I think I understand it. I also think that valuers and other practitioners in the field of compensation will understand it. As I have said, compensation is perfectly all right until you start tinkering with it. When you superimpose one set of legislation upon another, and then another set on top of that, you get complications which cannot be avoided and they come out in the drafting. I cannot say, plainly, that there is no other way of expressing what you want; there is always more than one way of expressing anything. But I am satisfied that Clause 43, as it stands, does what it is intended to do and I have already tried to explain the merits of what it intends to do. If my noble friend will draw attention to particular things that he does not like about it, or obscurities or anything else, I shall of course look at them again. But I am satisfied that the clause is effective and accurately drafted, and does the job that it is intended to do.

THE EARL OF KINNOULL

I thank my noble friend for that assurance.

VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD

May I ask my noble friend a question with regard to Scotland? When do the Government intend to introduce into the Bill provisions regarding agricultural tenancies in Scotland, because, presumably, we shall finish the Committee stage this evening and there will then be only the Report stage and Third Reading? It is rather surprising that provision for Scottish agricultural tenancies was not made in the original Bill because they are quite different from England, as my noble friend knows. Scottish agricultural tenancies are hereditary and they are quite different from those in England.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

I touched upon this matter a few moments ago, and it may be that my noble friend Lord Massereene and Ferrard was not here. May I invite my noble friend to look at, for instance, Clauses 47(5), 47(6), 48(8), 49(5), 50(4) and so on? What has happened is that we have got all the Scottish adaptations of what was originally in the Bill on agriculture as on everything else. What is missing is the Scottish adaptation provisions for things which were put in on Report stage in another place: and that is what I promised would be put right on Report stage here. Most of it is here: it is just the new provisions which at the moment have not been altogether adapted for Scotland.

Clause 43 agreed to.

Clause 44 agreed to.

Clause 45 [Compensation where land is in area designated as site of new town for purpose of public development]:

6.42 p.m.

LORD NUGENT OF GUILDFORD moved Amendment No. 75A: Page 45, line 36, at the beginning insert ("or where the Secretary of State proposes to approve the inclusion in a development plan of an area defined as an area of town development").

The noble Lord said: In moving Amendment No. 75A, perhaps I may speak to the subsequent Amendments in my name. As my noble friend Lord Sandford will know, Clause 45 did not receive a great deal of debate in another place, unlike Clause 43, which has just been debated here at some length, as indeed it was at even greater length in the Commons. Clause 45 was introduced at the end of the Committee stage and was really very little debated. For that reason, I have put down this Amendment, which has some interest to some public authorities outside, rather as a probing Amendment, to find out how far my noble friend might be inclined to go, and whether he would be disposed to go further than Clause 45 as now drafted. In particular, my Amendment is concerned to suggest that the limitation on compensation incorporated in Clause 45(1)(a) and (b) should be applied to schemes of general town development under the Act of 1952. I should mention that an extension of this kind would have a particular value to the G.L.C. when promoting their overspill schemes, which they do from time to time in different parts of the country in connection with their rehousing projects. If my noble friend considered that my Amendment went further than he could accept, perhaps he would indicate in his reply whether he can see any halfway house rather than perhaps going the whole hog, as my Amendment would indicate.

The justification for such an extension is that, where it is proposed to acquire relatively undeveloped land on the outskirts of a town in order to make a major redevelopment, it is contended that it is unreasonable that the compensation to be paid should be related to the value of the land inflated by the public services already provided; for instance, roads, sewage and so on. The effect of this Amendment would be to take such development under the 1952 Act out of such an inflated situation and provide that it should be treated on the same basis as land for a new town; that is to say, that the compensation to be paid for land should disregard the enhanced value relating to the development itself. I beg to move.

LORD SANDFORD

I am glad to respond to the request of my noble friend for a rather fuller exposition of the thinking behind this clause. It is designed to secure that, when New Town Corporations come to acquire land within New Town boundaries and any enhancement of the value of that land is attributable to the influence of some other specified public works, then the Secretary of State shall have power to direct that that enhancement shall be disregarded. The reason for this is that, under a fundamental and long-established principle, compensation is based on the loss to the claimant and not on the value to the acquiring authority; otherwise, authorities would have to pay extortionate prices or compensation greatly enhanced as a result of expenditure of public funds on the scheme for which the land is wanted. It follows, and is equally well established, that compensation must not include any increase in value which is entirely due to the scheme underlying the acquisition. Circumstances may arise, however, where a New Town or a New Town extension is itself a direct consequence of, or is connected with, some major public development which is outside the actual site of the new town. Such major public development and the New Town would then, in effect, together be tantamount to the same scheme.

Clause 45 is designed to deal with that kind of situation should it arise, and to ensure that the major public development, although outside the site of the New Town or its extension, shall be treated as part of the same scheme for compensation purposes. I hope that, with that explanation, my noble friend will see that the purpose of a town development scheme, in contrast to the purpose of some New Towns, which have had different purposes, must, under the terms of Section 1(1) of the 1952 Act, be primarily for the purpose of providing accommodation, et cetera, for the relief of congestion or over-population else- where. That is its main purpose, whereas some other new towns have had other purposes. It is difficult, therefore, to visualise circumstances in which a town development scheme could meet this requirement and at the same time be associated with some other public development in such a way that a direction under the clause would be appropriate. This is the sum total of the whole matter, and I hope my noble friend will see that, that being so, it would not be appropriate, even if it were possible, either to accept his Amendment or to seek to find any halfway house, because the circumstances as between a New Town and a town development scheme are different in this respect.

LORD NUGENT OF GUILDFORD

I thank my noble friend for his reply. It followed lines which I had anticipated and, as he will recognise, it does not go any distance to meet a general problem of which both he and I are well aware. I hope and believe that perhaps some means will be found to solve the situation, in that the local authorities concerned are having to pay higher and higher prices to acquire the land they require on the outskirts of existing towns. This probing here was to inquire from my noble friend whether he could see any possibility in this concept of the extension in connection with New Towns being more generally applied. His answer, I am afraid, was a rather discouraging one, but I hope that it will leave him with a clear sense of obligation that he has got to find some other way. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 45 agreed to.

Clause 46 agreed to.

Clause 47 [Notice to treat in respect of part of agricultural land]:

6.50 p.m.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS moved Amendment No. 76:

Page 50, leave out line 31 and insert— ("(3)Subject to subsection (4) below, "other relevant land" in subsection (1) above means—").

The noble Viscount said: This is a paving Amendment for Amendment No. 77 and the same two points turn up again under Clause 49 in Amendments Nos. 81 and 82. The point of this is that we are dealing with counter-notices where you have to decide whether other relevant land left to the farmer (either the owner-occupier under this clause, or the short tenant under Clause 49), is reasonably capable of being farmed without the piece of land that is being compulsorily acquired. The short point of these Amendments is that it will be unfair to say, "Yes, you can go on farming the rest of the land", when in fact some totally different authority has put another separate compulsory purchase on some part of the remaining land which you do not take into account in order to see whether the farmer can reasonably carry on with what land has been left to him. We are making provision whereby in these circumstances you look at the situation with the super-added other compulsory purchase order made by some other authority for some other purpose. If that is in existence, it adds greatly to the argument that the remaining land cannot be farmed and would strengthen the case for a counter-notice. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

I beg to move Amendment No. 77.

Amendment moved—

Page 50, line 41, leave out subsection (4) and insert— ("( ) Where an acquiring authority have served a notice to treat in respect of any of the other agricultural land mentioned in subsection (1) above or in respect of other relevant land as defined in subsection (3) above, then, unless and until that notice to treat is withdrawn, this section and section 48 below shall have effect as if that land did not form part of that other agricultural land or did not constitute other relevant land, as the case may be.")—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 47, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 48 [effect of counter-notice under under Section 47]:

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS moved Amendment No. 78:

Page 52, line 13, leave out paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) and insert—

1. ("(a) the authority shall offer to surrender the lease to the lessor on such terms as the authority consider reasonable;
2. (b) the question of what terms are reasonable may be referred to the Lands Tribunal by the authority or the lessor and, if at 492 the expiration of three months after the date of the offer mentioned in paragraph (a) above, the authority and the lessor have not agreed on that question and that question has not been referred to the Tribunal by the lessor, it shall be so referred by the authority;
3. (c) if that question is referred to the Tribunal the lessor shall be deemed to have accepted the surrender of the lease at the expiration of one month after the date of the determination of the Tribunal or on such other date as the Tribunal may direct and to have agreed with the authority on the terms of surrender which the Tribunal has held to be reasonable.")

The noble Viscount said: We are tidying up here. Under Clause 47, to which this clause is an appendage, an acquiring authority that serves notice to treat in respect of part of an agricultural unit can, in the circumstances set out in subsection (1), be required by the landlord or owner-occupier with an interest in the land to acquire his interest in the remainder of the land. This is the counter-notice procedure. If the person who serves the counter-notice is only a lessee, the authority are required to surrender the lease to the landlord if they have not already acquired his interest as well; and Clause 48 and particularly subsection (6) deals with the terms under which the lease is surrendered. We are improving the machinery; this Amendment requires an authority to offer to surrender the lease on such terms as they think reasonable. If the lessor does not agree, then it goes to the Lands Tribunal. We provide in the new paragraph (c) that the lease is to be deemed surrendered to the landlord at the expiration of a month after the Lands Tribunal has determined what the amount is, unless the tribunal suggests an alternative date in certain particular cases. This is an improvement on what is already in the Bill. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS moved Amendment No. 79:

Page 52, line 28, at end insert: ("(6A) Where the lessor refuses to accept any sum payable to him by virtue of subsection (6) above, or refuses or fails to make out his title to the satisfaction of the acquiring authority, they may pay into court any sum payable to the lessor by virtue of that subsection; and subsections (2) and (5) of section 9 of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 (deposit of compensation in cases of refusal to convey etc.) shall apply to that sum with the necessary modifications.")

The noble Viscount said: On the same point in the circumstances I have been talking about, there may be liabilities which the lessee who has been compulsorily acquired had under his lease for restoring the land or buildings. When the lease is surrendered by the acquiring authority to the lessor, the landlord, somebody must pay for it. We therefore must provide that where a landlord re-refuses to accept the payment, or where he refuses or fails to make out a title to the land, there is some method of resolving this. We deal with it in accordance with a long-standing provision under the compulsory purchase code by payment into court. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS moved Amendment No. 80: Page 52, line 44, leave out from ("and") to end of line 4 on page 53 and insert ("in paragraph (c) for the word "surrender" there shall be substituted the word "renunciation"").

The noble Viscount said: Those of my Scottish noble friends who have been asking Scottish adaptation will be interested to know that we can now greatly shorten the Scottish adaptation. Only one word is left to be turned into Scots as a result of the Amendments which have just been accepted. This Amendment provides for this one. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to. Clause 48, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 49 [Notice of entry in respect of part of agricultural holding]:

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS moved Amendment No. 81:

Page 53, leave out line 25 and insert: ("(3) Subject to subsection (4) below, "other relevant land" in subsection (1) above means—").

The noble Viscount said: This Amendment and Amendment No. 82 I have already spoken to when dealing with Amendments Nos. 76 and 77. They cover the same points but in this case for the short-term tenant. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

I beg to move Amendment No. 82.

Amendment moved—

Page 53, line 33, leave out subsection (4) and insert— ("(4) Where an acquiring authority have served a notice to treat in respect of land in the agricultural holding other than that to which the notice of entry relates or in respect of other relevant land as defined in subsection (3) above, then, unless and until that notice to treat is withdrawn, this section and section 50 below shall have effect as if that land did not form part of the holding or did not constitute other relevant land, as the case may be.")—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 49, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 50 [Effect of counter-notice under section 49]:

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

Amendments Nos. 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, and 88 are all drafting Amendments. With permission I will move them en bloc.

Amendments moved—

Page 54, line 22, leave out ("acquired") and insert ("been authorised to acquire"). Page 54,Line 24, leave out ("acquired") and insert ("subject to compulsory purchase"). Page 54,Line 27, leave out ("acquired") and insert ("subject to compulsory purchase"). Page 54,Line 30, leave out ("acquired") and insert ("subject to compulsory purchase"). Page 54,Line 41, leave out ("accrue on") and insert ("arise on or out of"). Page 55, line 3, leave out ("acquired") and insert ("subject to compulsory purchase").—(Viscount Colville of Cuirass.)

On Question, Amendments agreed to.

Clause 50, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 51 agreed to.

Clause 52 [Determination of material detriment where part of house etc. proposed for compulsory acquisition]:

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS moved Amendments Nos. 89, 90, 91, 92 and 93.

Page 56, line 20, after ("8(1)") insert ("or 34(2)"). Page 56,line 25, after ("detriment") insert ("or damage"). page 56,line 37, leave out from ("determination") to end of line 42 and insert—

1. ("(a) under the said section 8(1) as substituted by paragraph 8 of Schedule 6 to the Highways Act 1971 or paragraph 14 of Schedule 2 to the Gas Act 1972 (compulsory acquisition of rights over land): or
2. (b) under any provision corresponding to or substituted for the said section 80) which is contained in, or in an instrument made under, any other enactment including (except where otherwise provided) an enactment passed after this Act.")

Page 57, line 6, after ("(2)") insert ("(a)"). Page 57,line 9, leave out from ("1972") to end of line 11.

The noble Viscount said: These are nil drafting Amendments. There is a particular provision in Section 34(2) of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 which deals with some Housing Act provisions and one has to adapt the phraseology which would otherwise apply in general terms so as to make it applicable to the Housing Act context. These Amendments have this effect. With the permission of the Committee, I beg to move them en bloc.

On Question, Amendments agreed to.

Clause 52, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 53 [Notice to quit agricultural holding: right to opt for notice of entry compensation]:

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS moved Amendment No. 94: Page 57, leave out lines 22 and 23 and insert (",being an authority possessing compulsory purchase powers, have agreed to acquire his interest in the holding; and").

The noble Viscount said: In subsection 1(a) of this clause we have a provision that the clause shall have effect where a yearly agricultural tenant is served with a notice to quit after a specified date in the proceedings by the authority who acquires the landlord's interest whether by agreement or by use of compulsory purchase powers. But the Bill as drafted in this subsection provides for cases of acquisition by agreement only where the authority has been authorised to acquire compulsorily. This is unnecessarily restrictive, because sometimes they do not have to be authorised; they can do it by agreement despite the fact that they possess compulsory powers in the background. We therefore broaden the protection of the tenant in this way by this Amendment. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

This is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move Amendment No. 95.

Amendment moved— Page 57, line 30, leave out ("in pursuance of section 24(2) (a) of that Act").—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

This is very much a drafting Amendment. I beg to move Amendment No. 96.

Amendment moved— Page 58, line 26, at end insert ("and the termination of the tenancy").—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

moved Amendment No. 97:

Page 58, line 27, at end insert— ("( ) A person served with a notice to quit part of an agricultural holding shall not be entitled, in relation to that notice, both to make an election under this section and to give a counter-notice under section 32 of the Agricultural Holdings Act 1948 (tenant's right to cause notice to quit part of holding to operate as notice to quit entire holding)").

The noble Viscount said: This again deals with the rather complicated interrelationship between the Bill and the Agricultural Holdings Act. In Clause 53 we have a provision for a yearly agricultural tenant on whom notice to quit has been served to choose, if he wishes, to have the notice of entry compensation, that is the compulsory purchase brand, in certain circumstances where the superior interest, the landlord's interest, is being acquired by an authority under compulsory purchase power. Where the tenant has opted in this way, and only part of his holding has been acquired, he also has the right to treat the notice to quit as the notice of entry for the purpose of widening the notice to relate to the entire holding—the sort of counter-notice procedure we were talking about a little earlier. Provision already exists in Section 32 of the Agricultural Holdings Act of 1948 which enables the tenant to widen the notice to quit part of his holding to operate as the notice to quit the entire holding. But in that section there are no conditions attached to his rights, except for a time limit.

If we did not deal with this matter the tenant could use that provision under the 1948 Act to turn the notice to quit part of his holding into a notice to quit the whole, and then elect, under Clause 53 of the Bill, to treat the notice as a notice of entry and get the compulsory purchase sort of compensation. This would allow the provision relating to the whole point of viability of the remaining land to be by-passed and one would not have the protection that the Bill otherwise provides for this sort of value judgment in agricultural terms. In order to avoid this clash of two particular pieces of machinery we move this Amendment to make sure that he can choose only one or the other.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 53, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 54 [Notice to quit part of agricultural holding: right to serve counter-notice under section 49]:

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS moved Amendment No. 98:

Page 58, line 32, leave out from ("notice") to end of line 42 and insert ("or, if later, the decision of the Agricultural Land Tribunal, he may also within that period serve a notice on the acquiring authority claiming that the remainder of the holding is not reasonably capable of being farmed, either by itself or in conjunction with other relevant land, as a separate agricultural unit. (2) If the acquiring authority do not within the period of two months beginning with the date of service of a notice under subsection (1) above agree in writing to accept the notice as valid, the claimant or the authority may, within two months after the end of that period, refer it to the Lands Tribunal, and on any such reference the Tribunal shall determine whether the claim in the notice is justified and declare the notice valid or invalid in accordance with its determination of that question. (3) Where a notice under subsection (1) above is accepted as, or declared to be, valid under subsection (2) above then, if before the end of twelve months after it has been so accepted or declared the claimant has given up to the acquiring authority possession of the part of the holding to which the notice relates, section 20 of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 and section 12 of the Agriculture (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1968 shall have effect as if the acquiring authority had taken possession of that part in pursuance of a notice of entry under section 11(1) of the said Act of 1965 on the day before the expiration of the year of the tenancy which is current when the notice is so accepted or declared. (4) Subsections (2) to (4) of section 49 and subsection (3) of section 50 above shall apply in relation to subsections (1) to (3) above and to a notice under subsection (1) above as they apply in relation to those sections and a counter-notice under subsection (1) of section 49, and shall also apply with the necessary modifications and as if any reference to the notice of entry were a reference to the notice to quit.")

The noble Viscount said: The purpose of Clause 54 is to enable the yearly tenant farmer who is entitled to opt for the notice of entry compensation under Clause 53 to benefit also from Clause 49, as I have explained, by the counter-notice procedure so as to get rid of the whole of his holding if it is not reasonably possible to farm the rest. The clause as it is drafted at the moment entirely achieves the purpose in rather a complicated field, and we are amending it. It looks rather copious, but what we are doing is to set out rather more fully what is meant to be in the Bill. There is no change of substance here. It is spelt out rather more accurately and fully.

On question, Amendment agreed to.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

This is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move Amendment No. 99.

Amendment moved— Page 59, line 1, leave out ("counter-notice") and insert ("notice").—(Viscount Colville of Culross)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 54, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 55 to 58 agreed to.

7.5 p.m.

LORD NUGENT OF GUILDFORD moved Amendment No. 99A: After Clause 58 insert the following new clause:

Repeal of site value compensation provisions. .—(1) Where land is purchased compulsorily, the compensation payable by the acquiring authority shall in all cases be assessed in accordance with the Land Compensation Act 1961 (as amended by this section) without regard to any statutory provision restricting compensation to the value of the land as a site cleared of buildings and, accordingly, the following provisions, namely sections 12(4), 29(2) and 59(2) of and Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1957, section 10 of and Schedule 2 to the Land Compensation Act 1961, section 20 of the Housing (Scotland) Act 1966 and section 10 of the Housing (Scotland) Act 1969, shall cease to have effect. (2) The Secretary of State may by order make such transitional, incidental, supplementary or consequential provision as he considers necessary or expedient for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of the foregoing subsection including provision modifying this Act or modifying or repealing any other enactment or instrument. (3) This section shall apply to every compulsory acquisition of an interest in land in pursuance of a notice to treat served after the 1st April 1974.

The noble Lord said: The purpose of this new clause and Amendments Nos. 108A to 108F in the Schedule is to remove a source of continuous friction between acquiring local authorities and private property owners and tenants in areas which have been declared as clearance areas. The effect of this new clause and the Amendments would be to make the basis of compensation in these clearance areas the market value simply. The normal basis of compensation when property is compulsorily acquired is of course market value; but where a clearance area has been declared Parliament has established certain exceptions to the rule which requires the houses in such an area to be treated as of no value and compensation to be solely on site value. The three principal mitigations are, "well-maintained payments" either to the landlord, or to the tenant, or to both, and these mitigations arise where a house in a clearance area which, by virtue of its being in a clearance area, has been declared statutorily unfit, has in fact been well maintained, either by the landlord or the tenant or both of them. The regulations have laid down precise conditions as to how these payments are to be made, and, inevitably, these create as many anomalies as the benefits they confer.

If I may give one example, it will serve to illustrate the sort of difficulty which arises. When, in a clearance area, a site value is very high because the land is going to be redeveloped not for residential purposes but for commercial purposes, say, for an office block, the site value may very well exceed the market value of the house and the site together. In such a case there is no payment in respect of the good maintenance of the house, however well it has been maintained. The result is that where a good tenant in such a clearance area has maintained his house exceptionally well he can reasonably expect the payment because, he would be notified by the local authority that one may be due; and inevitably there is great disappointment and resentment against the acquiring authority when it is revealed that no payment can be made for good maintenance.

That is one example; there are other variations on this theme. Inevitably they lead to friction and disappointment, and naturally, local authorities dislike this kind of situation very much. I should be the first to recognise that all this arises out of various sincere attempts by Parliament to rectify the injustices which have arisen in acquisitions where clearance areas have been designated. Certainly in the view of the Greater London Council, which has a great deal of experience with this sort of situation, the solution would be to change the law in this respect. It thinks that much friction and disappointment might thereby be saved and very little extra public money would be expended. Their advice to me, therefore, is that this whole complex structure of compensation should be abolished and be replaced by the simple basis of valuation on the market value. This is the effect of this new proposed clause and the subsequent Amendments. I beg to move.

LORD SANDFORD

I can assure my noble friend that the proposition he is putting forward has been thoroughly and carefully considered. As he says, with one exception the situation is that all land and buildings compulsorily acquired are paid for at full market value; and the one exception is the unfit house. Here the compensation code recognises no value in a structure which has been found unfit for human habitation. Where local authorities are acquiring unfit houses in order to demolish them, compensation is limited, as my noble friend says, to the value of the site. Where the local authority do not acquire, and where it is the owner's responsibility to close or demolish the house, no question of compensation even at site value arises.

Over the years it is perfectly true that successive Governments have introduced some qualifications to this site value rule, with the effect that virtually all owner occupiers now receive market value. It is only landlords of unfit houses who are restricted to site value on the acquisition of their property. However, when a tenanted house which is being compulsorily acquired has been kept in good repair, a well-maintained payment equal to eight times the rateable value is paid if the whole of the property has been well maintained, or one half of this amount if only either the exterior or the interior is well maintained; and the payment, as my noble friend has said, may be apportioned between the landlord and the tenant according to who has undertaken the maintenance work. This payment is double the amount which was payable up to last November. The Government increased this payment then to recognise the efforts made by people to keep even unfit houses in decent repair and to encourage such good maintenance until such time as the local authority were able to take action. Well-maintained payments at this level would in many cases close the gap between site level and market value. Therefore, here again the equivalent of market value is, in practice, already being paid. The only cases that clearly receive no more than site value on acquisition are those tenanted unfit houses that have not been well maintained.

When, therefore, my noble friend puts it to me that we should do away with the long-established principle of site value as the basis of compensation for unfit houses, I must ask him this question. Taking into account the exceptions that have been made over the years and the level of supplementary payments that have now been made available, should we now be justified in asking the community to pay more for a house that is not only unfit for human habitation but on which little or no effort has been made to keep it in reasonable repair? Bearing in mind particularly the raising in last November of this payment for well-maintained houses, I hope the Committee will be satisfied that we are maintaining a position of equity in an area which I agree has been difficult and still remains difficult. Nevertheless, I would claim that this system is a reasonable one, and I hope my noble friend will agree.

LORD NUGENT OF GUILDFORD

I must thank my noble friend for his reply. Let me say immediately that I recognise that both he and his right honourable friends in this Government, and indeed in previous Governments, have tried by the system of litigation to meet the various injustices which arise in these cases. But the fact is that some still do arise of the kind which I illustrated in my example, and they are extremely tiresome to everybody. It is true that there would be a marginally bigger payment if my Amendment were accepted, but, as my noble friend has explained, by the possible doubling of the payment last November the gap between market value and this basis of valuation has now been closed. So there really is not very much in it. There is no doubt that for major urban authorities there is now much tiresome friction and unhappiness with tenants who are disappointed.

I had rather hoped that I should get a more sympathetic reception from my noble friend, because I noted that his right honourable friend, Mr. Graham Page, in another place supported a Private Member's Bill for just this purpose some nine years ago. Therefore I thought there might have been greater sympathy for it in Government circles. So perhaps my noble friend will think about this problem again and see whether it has more merit than I, with this explanation, have been able to give to it. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clauses 59 to 62 agreed to.

Clause 63 [Land affected by orders relating to new towns]:

7.17 p.m.

LORD GARNSWORTHY moved Amendment No. 100: Page 65, line 22, leave out subsection (6).

The noble Lord said: I should like to dispose of this Amendment quickly, but I do not think I shall be able to do so because it deals with a matter of some importance and one that is causing a great deal of concern. Subsection (6), the subsection that I seek to leave out, would clearly deprive some people of a right which they enjoy under Section 11 of the 1965 Act. Under that section, any owner of property in a New Town is enabled to require the development corporation to acquire it at any time from seven years after its designation—that is to say, the designation of the New Town. After that period that entitlement is automatic. There is no obligation to prove blight, and the development corporation cannot serve a counter-notice. That applies, I understand, to a property of any value, and it is regarded as a valuable right. The repeal of Section 11 puts property owners in a similar position to property owners elsewhere. That may be a welcome change for people living in recently established New Towns, but not so welcome for people living in the New Towns established more than seven years ago.

This Bill is based on a White Paper, Putting People First, yet this subsection, if it remains in the Bill, means that people who live in New Towns established more than seven years ago are losing well-established rights. As was said in another place, no one in the New Town gains except the development corporation, and the development corporation is the Department of the Environment wearing another hat. The Minister will know that the matter was raised in another place by my honourable friend Mr. Terry Davis, the Member for Bromsgrove. There was a debate, and it is because a number of questions were asked and not answered on that occasion that I think the matter needs to be pursued here. He raised it as a result of the public health inspector at Redditch seeing something that apparently no one else had seen, and the questions that were then raised are matters of quite serious concern. My honourable friend Mr. Davis instanced a situation at Redditch, a town that I know very well. I have visited it a number of times and have stayed there. Indeed I was there only last week. As I understand the position under Section 11, the owner of property in a New Town does not have to prove blight; that is to say, that his property has been adversely affected or will be adversely affected. The designation of a New Town such as Redditch is itself enough. Hitherto, as I have said, after seven years owners have known that they could require the development corporation to acquire their property. That for them ensures a guaranteed market if the owner wishes to sell. Under the Bill as drafted, that exising right is taken away. Under the Bill the owner will be required to prove blight. Therefore, whereas the designation of a New Town has meant automatic proof of blight, it would seem that now the onus is placed on the property owner. Having regard to the possibilities of fluidity in the rates and the planning of development, this may well be a very difficult and uncertain calculation.

I think I am right in saying that Redditch was designated as a New Town some ten years ago. Yet I understand that it is only as recently as six months ago that some new proposals were tabled by the development corporation for that town. There is concern in many quarters. The Urban District Councils Association have sought consultation with the Department on this matter. They have not been able to persuade the Department to have those consultations, but I understand that the Development Corporations Association has had the advantage of discussions with the Department.

I should like the Minister to say whether, under the Bill, designation of a New Town automatically is regarded as blight. I should also be grateful to him if he could state the position with regard to counter-notices which may be served by the development corporation. I shall be further grateful if he can indicate the full implications of the subsection as it now stands, and ask whether in point of fact the application is intended to be universal. As I am advised, the subsection restricts the right to compel the purchase of properties by the corporations to owner-occupiers, owners of small businesses and agricultural interests. Can the noble Lord inform the Committee what is a "small business"? Just how large can it be? What about social organisations with premises—clubs, religious bodies, and that sort of organisation? May I invite the Minister to state what the position of the churches is in a town like Redditch? I appreciate that they are not rated buildings, but how is their position secured under this present Bill? They can easily lose congregations following development. They can face huge rebuilding costs.

What about social clubs, and even political clubs? I have taken the trouble to get one or two figures with regard to rateable values. Let me give, for instance, the rateable value of the Conservative club. The old rateable value was £472 a year: it is going up to £1,805. The Bridley Moor and Batchley club had a rateable value of £867 which is going up to £3,772. How will those clubs be affected? Because, let us face it, it may be said that if the club is a successful one and people like it they will continue to use it: but the club could quite easily be blighted by a new road and could lose its membership almost overnight. It would be extremely useful if the Minister were able to indicate what was likely to happen to that kind of social building.

The situation seems to me to have been made more difficult by the fact that plans have been revised many times. The Ridge area at Redditch has been the subject of various proposals from time to time. One wonders what will happen with regard to such things as petrol stations which depend largely for their success and their continuance and their prospects on road proposals. They can again lose their business pretty well overnight.

May I ask for guidance on 'two specific points which I would put to the Minister? I shall try to put the first clearly and I have probably touched on it already. Under the Bill, will a draft designation order constitute blight? Will any responsibility rest on development corporations to prove no blight? May I quote what the Minister stated in the other place on 22nd February at columns 917 and 918. He said: We are depriving certain owners who have had a right previously—a right which is exceptional to thern—but we are giving the ordinary dwellinghouse owner, small business owner and agricultural owner the right to serve blight notices at any time during those seven years after the designation of an area. This is a package deal and I think that it will bring satisfaction all round, although in any compromise of this sort there may be some who feel hard done by because they may have just been going to take advantage of some benefit which they have under Section 11.

It is a strange package deal for property owners in those New Towns—such as Redditch, Hemel Hempstead and Northampton—which have already been in existence for more than seven years. A number of authorities are feeling strongly, and I should like to quote from what the county borough of Northampton has had to say about the application of this suggestion: The council feels very strongly that a legislative measure which they have pressed for to improve the position of residents affected by public works is in this instance being used as a vehicle to detract from property owners' existing rights and privileges.

These people are undoubtedly losing an established right, and one asks what justification there is for the loss, what justice there is in their being deprived of this right which has accrued over the years—a right that has given them a certain expectation. I would ask that the matter be looked at again and, in the meantime. I shall listen very carefully to, and read very carefully, what the Minister has to say in reply. I hope he will be able to deal with the point I have raised, because I think that largely these are matters which were raised in the other place and, as far as the public record goes, stand unanswered.

LORD SANDFORD

I am glad to respond to the noble Lord's request and expand on the intentions behind this clause and this subsection in particular. The proposal to do what is done here was mentioned in the White Paper, and there were no representations about it by any of the local authority associations. But the matter was raised in another place and my right honourable friend undertook to look into it. He has done so and he does not consider that there is any reason to alter the original decision.

I cannot answer off the cuff all the noble Lord's questions about what will happen and what is the situation about petrol stations and church halls in Red-ditch, but if there are particular cases there which I can write to him about, I will. I shall be glad to deal with the general points that he has raised.

Section 11 of the New Towns Act, which this subsection deals with, has been criticised from two points of view. First, it does not give owners of blighted property in New Towns any statutory rights until after seven years have elapsed from the date of designation. The second criticism is because it imposes an open-ended obligation on development corporations to bring in any property within their area regardless of whether it is genuinely blighted. Now that we are looking for 50 per cent. private enterprise in New Towns the need for corporations to buy almost all the land in designated areas no longer exists, and the provision as it has stood is wide open to abuse. For example, there have been cases where house owners moving from New Town areas use Section 11 to offload their property on to the development corporation so as to avoid legal costs. That must be stopped.

It seems sensible to take the opportunity to repeal Section 11 as part of the package to extend the national blight provisions, which are substantially improved by this Bill, to New Towns for the first time. The first benefit is that those people who are most likely to suffer real hardships as a result of blight—owner-occupiers of houses, owners of small businesses, owners of agricultural units—will enjoy the benefits of the national blight provisions from a much earlier stage than before: that is, from the publication of the draft designation order rather than waiting for seven years. This is a considerable gain for them. Development corporations will be expected to deal sympathetically with any reasonable cases of blight which fall outside the new statutory framework. They can do that; they have already had a circular from my Department making this clear to them. Instructions have also been issued to corporations that any assurances that have been given at New Town designation order inquiries about the purchase of property within the seven-year period specified by Section 11 should continue to be honoured. So that point is met.

I can assure the Committee that it is not the Government's intention that anyone whose property is genuinely affected by blight in New Towns should suffer hardship as a result of this clause and subsection. On the contrary, we believe that the overall effect of these changes will be that more equitable and more expeditious arrangements will be available to people whose property is genuinely blighted for relieving the effects of the blight on them which arise in New Towns. I hope that having heard that explanation the noble Lord will see that many of his fears are unfounded and that in several respects many people will be considerably better off under this arrangement than before.

LORD GARNSWORTHY

I am grateful to the noble Lord: I hope he will not feel that I have deliberately unduly kept him from an appointment which I know he has. I ought to have been at another function myself. I am appreciative of the information he has given and welcome any information that he is able to give me. I need to read carefully what he has had to say and to consult with those with whom I have already been in contact on this matter to see what they have to say. Regarding the 50 per cent. private enterprise development, I am not at all sure that this is as good as it sounds. I am not altogether sure that the point is as strong as it may appear. I understand that in Redditch the land to be developed by private enterprise is going to be dealt with by way of leasehold, and the development corporation will therefore without any doubt at all keep a tight hold on the manner of development. I would have thought it was desirable that development corporations should check and approve and, if necessary, control the development by private enterprise. I may have to come back to this matter at the Report stage, but for now I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 63 agreed to.

Clause 64 [Land affected by slum clearance resolution]:

7.35 p.m.

LORD SANDFORD moved Amendments Nos. 101, 102 and 103:

Page 65, line 28, after ("which") insert ("(a)"), Page 65,line 30, at end insert (";or (b) is land surrounded by or adjoining an area declared as aforesaid to be a clearance area, being land which a local authority have determined to purchase under section 43 of that Act.") Page 65,line 39, leave out ("this section") and insert ("subsection (1)(a) above").

The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendments Nos. 101 to 103 en bloc. Clause 64 extends the blight purchase provisions to cover land within a clearance area declared by resolution under Section 42 of the Housing Act 1957. At the same time as they declare a clearance area many local authorities resolve to purchase the land within it; and they may also resolve to purchase "added lands"—that is, land surrounded by the clearance area which is reasonably necessary to secure a cleared area of convenient shape and dimensions, and land adjoining the area which is reasonably necessary for the satisfactory development or use of the cleared area.

As the Bill stands, owner-occupiers of houses which the authority have determined to purchase as "added lands" which are not unfit are unable to serve blight notices until the authority submit a compulsory purchase order for confirmation (when Clause 61 applies), whereas owner-occupiers in the clearance area itself will be able to require the authority to buy their houses as soon as the area has been declared. The combined effect of the Amendments is to remove this anomaly by enabling owner-occupiers of "added lands" to serve blight notices without having to wait for a compulsory purchase order to be made. I beg to move all three Amendments en bloc.

On Question, Amendments agreed to.

Clause 64, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 65 and 66 agreed to.

LORD SANDFORD moved Amendment No. 104: After Clause 66, insert the following new clause:

Land affected by new street orders .—(1) Section 192(1) of the Act of 1971 shall have effect as if the land specified therein included land which—

1. (a) is within the outer lines prescribed by an order under section 159 of the Highways Act 1959 or section 30 of the Public Health Act 1925 (orders prescribing minimum width of new streets); and
2. (b) is, or is part of—
1. (i) a dwelling erected before, or under construction on, the date on which the order is made; or
2. (ii) the curtilage of any such dwelling.

(2) The grounds on which objection may be made in a counter-notice to a blight notice served by virtue of subsection (1) above shall not include those specified in section 194(2)(b) or (c) of the Act of 1971. (3) In relation to land within subsection (1) above "the appropriate authority" and "the appropriate enactment" for the purposes of sections 192 to 207 of the Act of 1971 shall be the authority who made the order mentioned in that subsection and section 214(8) of the said Act of 1959 respectively. (4) This section shall not enable a blight notice to be served in respect of any land in which the appropriate authority have previously acquired an interest either in pursuance of a blight notice served by virtue of this section or by agreement in circumstances such that they could have been required to acquire it in pursuance of such a notice.

The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 104. Amendments Nos. 105 and 106 are consequential upon it. The new clause introduced by this Amendment gives effect to undertakings given by my right honourable friend during the Report stage of the Bill in another place. The new clause brings within the blight provisions all those dwellings on new streets which were under construction or were already in existence at the time when the respective New Street Orders were made. Owners of such properties who wish to sell but find that they cannot do so, or can do so only at a price substantially lower than that for which they might reasonably have been expected to sell, will be able to require the appropriate authority to buy them out. There is more that could be said, but that sufficiently sets out the general purpose of this clause, and the two consequential Amendments.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 67 agreed to.

Clause 68 [Power of personal representative to serve notice]:

LORD SANDFORD

I beg to move Amendment No. 105.

Amendment moved— Page 68, line 42, after ("64(2)") insert ("and (Land affected by new street orders) (2)").—(Lord Sandford.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 68, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 69 to 71 agreed to.

Clause 72 [Supplementary provisions for Part V]:

LORD SANDFORD

I beg to move Amendment No. 106.

Amendment moved— Page 73, line 3, leave out ("and 65(2)") and insert (",65(2) and (Land affected by new street orders)").—(Lord Sandford.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 72, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 73 to 76 agreed to.

Clause 77 [General interpretation]:

LORD SANDFORD

I beg to move Amendments Nos. 107 and 108, which are both drafting Amendments.

Amendments moved—

Page 74, line 17, at end insert: (""disabled person" means a person who is substantially and permanently handicapped by illness, injury or congenital infirmity;"); Page 74,line 21, leave out ("sections 27 and 35") and insert ("section 27").—(Lord Sandford.)

On Question, Amendments agreed to.

Clause 77, as amended, agreed to.

Remaining clauses and Schedules agreed to.

House resumed: Bill reported, with the Amendments.