EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES BILL (Hansard, 26 July 1972)

HL Deb 26 July 1972 vol 333 cc1358-77 1358

§ 2.51 p.m.

§ Debate resumed on the Motion for Second Reading introduced yesterday by the Lord Chancellor.

THE MINISTER OF STATE, HOME OFFICE (VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS)
My Lords, when we adjourned last night my noble friend Lady Tweedsmuir said that I would revert to some of the legal parts of the European Communities Bill and in the process seek to answer some questions on this aspect which were asked by noble Lords who spoke yesterday. I think it was my noble friend Lord Auckland who said that some of these legal points are not yet readily understood but that they are a vital aspect of the Bill. Therefore, although it may be somewhat dry, I think that my speech may be on important matters and I hope that it may do something to enlighten your Lordships upon those matters.
I would turn, first, to directly applicable law. The source of this—and it is to it that Clause 2(1) relates and gives effect, and on which my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor spoke yesterday—was referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, in the course of his speech. It was indeed the second point, I think. that he asked. In reply to him, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Diplock, gave the House, a very clear and brilliant statement of the situation with which I would not for one moment disagree. He pointed out that the source of directly applicable law would mainly be regulations made by the Commission, but that there were also parts of the Treaties themselves, and occasionally a directive, which fell into this category.
As to the Treaties themselves, I should like to add a word to what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Diplock, said. The noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, mentioned Article 189 of the Treaty of Rome as being, in his reading, the only real source of the law in this respect. But there are other parts of the Treaty as well. For instance, the clear implication in Article 177 is that this Article of the Treaty itself—and, indeed, the same applies to other Articles by their own internal wording—is directly applicable. If it were not so, there would be no requirement in 1359 Article 177 for the Court at Luxembourg to interpret the Treaty, and it is therefore a direct inference from the wording of the Treaty itself. For example, Articles 12 and 85—the latter referring to restrictive practices—have been held in case law to be directly applicable.
The decisions of the Luxembourg Court have been distilled to give some criteria which will guide all those interested in this to see which parts of the Treaties are directly applicable ; and the criteria which come from the cases of van Gend en Loos and Coster and others really provide the following four points. In order to be directly applicable an article in the Treaty must be complete and legally perfect ; that is to say, clear and precise in its content. It must be unconditional in the obligation imposed. It must require no further implementing action by a Community institution, and it must leave no real discretion on the part of the member States. My Lords, all four criteria, as I understand it, would be required. These same criteria are also capable of putting the decisions of the Commissioners addressed to Member States—and, in limited and occasional instances, directives too—into law which is directly applicable. But, having said that, I think that there are by now very few parts of the Treaties or of the other existing legislative matter in the existing material to which Clause 2(1) relates which have not been identified by the European Court as falling within these headings. I think we would know about practically all of them.
Now, my Lords, in what form would this sort of point arise? As my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor said yesterday, this directly applicable law is a new but not unprecedented source of law in this country, separate from our Common Law and Statutes. But it will be administered by our courts. The Luxembourg Court has powers, but they are fairly limited in their range in dealing with actual cases before it for decision rather than for advice. They can entertain claims by Member States against a Community institution or against another Member State, and they can resolve disputes between the Community institutions or between the Community and a Member State.
1360 They can deal with proceedings relating to wrongful acts by the Community or its servants—this has been strictly interpreted by the Luxembourg Court—and they can deal, and indeed must deal, under Article 177(b), with direct challenges to the validity of Community Acts, regulations and so on. For instance, they could deal with this en the sort of grounds raised and mentioned in the first paragraph of Article 173 of the Rome Treaty—this is on a question of validity—namely, that the Act of the Community was made without due competence, or that there was an infringement of essential procedural requirements such as failure to state the reasons, which requirement Article 190 lays upon the Community. They could say that an Act was invalid because there was an infringement of the Treaty itself ; and there are one or two other slight points upon which they can give direct decisions. Otherwise, it is for our courts to apply the new law in individual cases, in disputes between individuals that come before our courts or, indeed, in a criminal matter if it should so arise.
In doing this our courts will be interpreting Community texts. Of course, it is vital that there should be uniformity of interpretation in these matters, and so our courts are empowered—and if it is a court of final decision, such as your Lordships' House sitting in an appellate capacity, and possibly in some cases the Court of Appeal, too, it will have the duty—to refer a dispute relating to the interpretation of the Community law to the Court at Luxembourg. When such a reference is made, however, the Court at Luxembourg does not decide the matter, as it did in the list of points that I made a moment ago. It does not decide the actual case about which the reference was made. What it does is to rule in an abstract form, interpreting the Community law in generalised language. The decision then comes back to our court—and, of course, it is also applicable to the courts of all the other Member States—and it would be for our court to incorporate that decision in its particular judgment on the issue before it, together with all the other points of law and of fact which are relevant to that case.
This, then, is the machinery by which the direct applicability of those parts of the Treaties and other matters that I have mentioned, and the criteria that I 1361 have referred to, is evolved. It is actually as a result of cases being referred in this way that those four criteria, which are of such great importance, have evolved out of the decisions of the European Court. My noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor yesterday expressed his conviction that upon our accession British judges and lawyers in future will be active and persuasive in their participation in this work of the European court in interpreting the matters before them.
My Lords, then there is the indirectly applicable European law. This covers such things as Part II of the Bill before the House and, later, regulations and Orders in Council made under Clause 2(2) and no doubt in future Acts of Parliament as well. All these things are necessary to bring our domestic law into line with the present and future Community obligations and rights. One of these points under Part II was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Brown, yesterday. He told me that he was not going to be here for my answer, but I hope that an OFFICIAL REPORT will be available so that he can read it in due course. He referred to Clause 9(7) and the requirement that the paid-up share capital should be printed at the head of the writing paper of companies. This is a requirement that arises from Article IV of the European Economic Community Directive No. 151 of 1968. The directive is designed to protect the interests of people dealing with companies and we therefore implement it in Clause 9. Paid-up share capital, which was a term that the noble Lord queried, is in fact something that will be readily understood by companies since it forms part of the information they are required to provide in their annual returns as laid down in the Sixth Schedule to the Companies Act 1948 with which Clause 9 should be read as a single unit. I would emphasise that the obligation to quote paid-up share capital arises only where the company itself decides to refer to that matter at all on their letters or stationery. I would suggest it is a wise and sensible provision because all noble Lords would agree that it could give a misleading impression of a company's worth if a nominal share capital of say £10,000 were quoted as share capital whereas only £10 had ever been taken up. For that purpose 1362 we are following their example in this respect.
More generally on the subject of bringing our law into line with that of the rest of the Member States of Europe, it is on Clause 2(4) that I should like to say a word because it is relevant and also because my noble friend Lord Massereene and Ferrard asked for an explanation of it. It really has three parts. The first part—this is from the bottom of page 3 down to the word "Parliament" in line 40—provides for the scope of the power to make subordinate regulations and Orders in Council under Clause 2(2). It also provides a second signpost to restrictions on this power in paragraph 1 of the Second Schedule upon which I will say a few words in a moment. The second part, from line 40 to line 43, provides that any future or past act or Statutory Instrument is to be construed in accordance with directly-applicable Community law ; it refers the courts back to the provisions of Clause 2(1). The last part, after the semi-colon, gives legislative effect (as one must in the body of the Bill) to Schedule 2, containing the restrictions which I have just mentioned, and also the Parliamentary procedure in paragraphs 2 and 3.
I was referring to Clause 2(2) and I think this merits a word of explanation. As time goes on, there is bound to be a need to make minor and consequential Amendments to our existing Statutes and sometimes to repeal them. The sort of thing involved can be seen in Schedule 3 because this is just the type of case that Clause 2(2) would go to meet. The power in Clause 2(2) is quite substantially limited. It is limited to action needed to implement Community rights and obligations as that is the overpowering requirement in law which governs its use. It will not be used outside that area. Indeed, I think it could not in law be so used if it was to be intra vires. Then it is circumscribed by the restrictions in the Second Schedule so, for instance under paragraph 1(1)(d) of that Schedule, this sort of subordinate legislation cannot be used to create a new criminal offence which is punishable with any penalty larger than that stated in that sub-paragraph. Parliamentary control is provided as in the case of all subordinate 1363 legislation. I think that my noble friend Lord Jellicoe may want to say more about Parliamentary control, perhaps in answer to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Diplock, when he comes to wind up at the end of the debate. Thus this subsection 2(2) is no carte blanche. Some things will be outside its scope and will need a Bill to be introduced in the ordinary way.
Part II is just such a collection of cases in point. Here in this Statute we are doing just the sort of thing that may have to be done in subsequent legislation, and Schedule 4 is in the same category. We have also powers under existing Statutes. My noble friend Lady Tweedsmuir mentioned some of these examples (on fishing rights and disabled persons) whereby we can regulate or amend the law under powers we already possess. These matters are not covered in the Bill.
Your Lordships may ask whether all the same there will be a mass of subordinate legislation arising under this provision. I think the answer to that is, No! The Community, after all, has been going on for i3 years ; yet this Bill and the exercise of the other powers that we already possess is all that is necessary to bring us into line at the moment. There is a mass of Community law, but a great deal of it has no practical effect here in terms of Statute law. For instance, there are over 100 directly applicable regulations which relate to conditions and pay of Community staff. There are 40 decisions or directives on Community committees ; there are many decisions and directives, for instance, on the freedom of establishment in various occupations or the free circulation of goods, or the maintenance of fuel stocks, with which our administrative practice and laws already comply. So when the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, yesterday mentioned the various volumes, a good deal of them does not have to be reproduced in any of our legislation. All the same, there will be things that we shall have to deal with. I take a random collection. There are things like the marketing of eggs, textile appellations, protection against ionizing radiation, control of additives in animal foodstuffs, the application of social security schemes to workers and their families who are moving about inside 1364 the Community, motor insurance, and things like this which I think would be susceptible to being dealt with under Clause 2(2).
Then, just as a rough guide, we have taken the Community's activities in 1971 as a case in point, working on the basis that this Bill had been law and that this country was a full Member of the Community. If that had been so, only 2 per cent. of the Community Instruments would have needed subordinate legislation in the United Kingdom. Most of these could have been implemented under the existing powers, anyway ; and we think that Clause 2(2) would have had to be called into use only in less than a dozen cases. That gives us some measure of the amount of Parliamentary time that would be involved. These things that I have been talking about will be our own indirectly applicable Community law.
The noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, asked what happens in practice in the courts. That was his fourth point, which was divided into two sections. He suggested for instance, that someone might be sued in the British Courts under Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome on restrictive practices. I will not remind the House of his exact points ; I am sure they are fresh in noble Lords' memories. The noble Lord suggested that the courts would interpret Article 85 according to the English rules of interpretation. That is not so. That is the point of Clause 3(1), if the noble Lord cares to look at that provision. It provides that the European Court's rules of interpretation will apply. There cannot therefore be a conflict of interpretation between the British courts and the European Court. The noble Lord shakes his head, but this is indeed the case. If there is a Community decision of the Court of Luxembourg on this point there is no difficulty, but even if not, the British court has to interpret the matter in accordance with the rules and practice laid down by the Court at Luxembourg.
Furthermore, if there is no decision directly on the point, there is the power, which I have already mentioned, whereby the court can refer the matter—and on appeal to the final court in this country must refer the matter—to Luxembourg. But if there is no appeal or reference the case will be decided as best the British 1365 court can. It will then be res judicata between the two parties concerned, if subsequently there is a decision in Luxembourg which shows that that interpretation was wrong. That would be no different from any domestic case where the matter is not taken to appeal but is decided between the two parties and later, on precisely similar facts, there is an appeal decision by a higher court showing that the earlier decision was wrong. Therefore, there is absolutely no difference in practice between what would happen in these circumstances and the situation to which we are already very well used.
The noble Lord went on to deal with a case of plain invalidity of a Community regulation, using, as he said, an extreme case. Of course it would be possible, in an extreme case of the sort mentioned, for the British Government to raise the matter directly under Article 173 with the European Court. Individuals cannot do this but Governments can, so there is instant recourse there. But then the noble Lord suggested, rightly, that the question of invalidity might be raised indirectly in the English courts by an individual. This applies just as much to law which is directly applicable as to law which is indirectly applicable.
One could get the case of regulations made under Clause 2(2) to implement a directive from the Commission, which is then said by one of the parties in the litigation to result from an ultra vires directive in the first place. That is a perfectly possible situation. It would primarily be a matter for the domestic courts in this country to deal with. They could decide if they wished—and if they were rather rash—that the original directive or the directly applicable law was ultra vires, but I should think that such a decision would almost inevitably give rise to an appeal, and there is the power of reference to which I have already referred. It is likely, therefore, that in such cases the matter will go in the end to the European court. But it need not ; the courts here are entitled, if they wish, to make up their own minds on it.
Then there was what was perhaps the noble Lord's culminating point: What if the English courts, having referred the matter to Luxembourg and heard the answer, decided that it was repugnant to 1366 them? I am afraid they cannot do that under this Bill, because a combination of Clause 3(1) relating to interpretation, and Clause 2(1) which gives directly applicable law the force of law in this country, would make it imperative to follow the judgment of the Luxembourg Court applying its general principles to the facts of the case before them.
That is a comparatively short speech: there were comparatively few points of law raised yesterday.

§ LORD DAVIES OF LEEK
My Lords, it was a short speech with long implications.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS
My Lords, I am very much obliged to the noble Lord. I was just about to say that it occurred to me that some noble Lords might wish to follow up some of these points later, but I think that in what I have said there are answers to all the questions which were asked. Neither in law nor in practice, I suggest, will these provisions be oppressive ; nor will they lack the checks of scrutiny in Parliament. Moreover, as a member of the Community we shall have national audience at the European Court. We shall have our own participants in its proceedings and, above all, we shall have our representatives there when the decisions are being made, and indeed before they are being made. In that way we can protect British interests to the utmost.

§ LORD SHEPHERD
My Lords, may I ask a question about the European Court and our representation? I take it that it is a majority decision by the members of that Court ; not, as in the case of the Council of Ministers, a unanimous decision.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS
My Lords, without going into a massive reading of papers, I do not know. But I will find out and, if noble Lords want to refer to the matter again, we can discuss it later.

§ LORD SHEPHERD
My Lords, perhaps the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, could deal with it. It is an important matter. The noble Viscount rested his case on the presence of British representation at the Court. It is therefore very important whether the decision is unanimous.

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§ LORD DIPLOCK
My Lords, may I suggest that the answer to the question is that it is a majority decision.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for coming to my assistance. That is what I suspected, but I did not want to give it as a definitive answer without looking the matter up. I did not rest my case on the presence of an English Judge or a Scottish Advocate General at the Court. I merely said, as my noble and learned friend said yesterday, that such people would help to shape the decisions of the Court and guide it in a helpful and fruitful direction.

§ BARONESS WHITE
My Lords, will there be an official solicitor to help us out in these cases?

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS
My Lords, I suspect that we should have to await a European decision on that matter.
I will now sit down, but I want to make a personal apology. A long time ago I promised to take the chair at a conference in the Isle of Man tomorrow morning and I must now leave the House. This is not to say that nothing I have said is susceptible to much criticism later in the debate.

§ 3.19 p.m.

§ LORD BESWICK
My Lords, as the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, ended his speech so I begin mine—with an apology, in my case for not being present at the debate yesterday. I too was prevented by a prior engagement from attending. However, I have read with great profit the Report of the debate, and I would particularly congratulate my noble friend Lord Greenwood of Rossendale, the effectiveness of whose speech was equalled only by its good temper. I would also congratulate the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, especially for his extremely successful self-discipline in curbing that quite unique capacity for being " non-controversially provocative ".
We are also grateful for the exposition to which we have just listened from the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross. We shall need to read very carefully what he has said. On the surface, much of it was extremely convincing, but, if I may 1368 say so, the balloon of confidence which he put in the air appeared to be punctured at the end when he confessed that it did not much matter what we believed ; it was what the European Court said that would count. He also, in an exercise of great persuasive powers, explained to us why it was wise on business notepaper to put the paid-up capital of a company. I am sure we can all agree with him that that was an extremely wise order, but what would happen if we did not agree, if we thought it was an unwise order? The fact of the matter, again, is that it will not matter at all what we have to say, because the thing would have to be done in that way.
As I said, it was in the main a good-tempered debate yesterday, although I was sorry to note that the word " despise " crept into the comments made by my noble friend Lord Chalfont, and he appeared in some of his fastidious phrases to be suggesting that he was in some way superior to those of us who disagreed with him on this matter of our relationship with people of other lands. Certain other noble Lords challenged the so-called nationalism or, as the noble Lord, Lord Alport, phrased it, the " veiled nationalism " of those who are opposed to this Bill. My own approach to this Bill is that of an internationalist. I have always been ready to surrender sovereignty in those areas where individual and national dignity and wellbeing are not impaired. In the supreme case of world peace-keeping I have in particular advocated substantial surrender of national sovereignty. I still believe firmly that the work done by the Commission, of which the noble Earl, Lord Longford, was the chairman and I was a member, on the Constitution of a World Peace Keeping Force, admirably chartered the path which one day the world must follow. It so happened that yesterday the reason for my absence from your Lordships' House was that I had a prior engagement in Brussels with Signor Spinelli to discuss the possibility and implications of European collaboration in the aerospace industry, a goal which for many years I have sought. It is therefore not profitable to discuss who is an internationalist and who is not.
The practical questions we have to try to answer relate to the areas, the functions, the rights, which it is proposed to 1369 pool or share with others. What are the most effective boundaries for particular functions? As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Diplock, said, what is the most efficient and democratic form of authority to carry out those functions? These are the real issues, and there could be complete national unity if we were approaching our future in that spirit.
For those who speak so confidently about the future of Europe there is the larger issue, too, as to whether we are right or wise in agreeing to the transfer of economic power before we have set up any effective form of democratic political control. I ask the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, who is to wind up this debate whether he can give me one other case in history where economic control has been ceded or merged to an authority not answerable to a sovereign political authority—and I shall be surprised if the noble Earl can think of one case. Some words spoken many years ago have crossed my mind more than once in recent months. It was said, " Render unto Ceasar the things that are Caesar's." This Bill proposes to render to the Caesars of Brussels far too many things that should be for the decision of the people's representatives in this country. That is our case to-day.
Even if we were united about immediate objectives, it would not be surprising if we failed, as this Bill undoubtedly fails, to get the right answer at this stage to the undoubted need in the modern world to whittle away unnecessary restrictions imposed by national boundaries. Look at the false starts we have had in local government. Think of the long debates, the changes of plans and policies about boundaries and functions which successive Commissions and Parliaments have had in the general area of local government—responsibility for roads, sewers, schools, housing. Yet when we come to the entire economy, the economic control of our total national life, decisive matters of trade and currency and taxation, issues which will settle whether we can afford schools, roads and other essentials, the Government come up with this " smart Alec " piece of legislation and say, " Take it or leave it! No compromise is possible ; we must get it before the House rises." My Lords, can this possibly be right?

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SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS
Yes.

§ LORD BESWICK
Several noble Lords have referred to the fact that there was never before a Bill which affected so profoundly, the future of Britain, and I cannot readily recall any legislation, of even less importance, about which the Government have been quite so adamant that they cannot accept Amendments. My Lords, I support strongly everything that my noble friend Lord Greenwood said on this point yesterday. One cannot expect a Government to give an undertaking to accept changes which run contrary to the purpose of the Bill, but one can expect them to fulfil undertakings given in order to secure Parliament's approval to the purpose of the Bill. I ask the noble Earl who is to reply to make absolutely clear that if on Committee stage an Amendment is shown in debate to improve this Bill, or to be one that clears up obscurity, or for other reasons commends itself to the majority of those who actually listen to the argument, then the Amendment will not automatically, by prior decision be rejected. Parliament has never previously accepted or applied to legislation the doctrine of immaculate conception. It is inconceivable that human lawyers can be quite so word perfect. I do therefore press this point and ask for a categorical assurance that Amendments are not, by edict, ruled out. It will be quite offensively intolerant to Parliament if that assurance is not forthcoming. And, my Lords, it will be contrary to pledges given in the debate on the Treaty of Accession. I say that as strongly as I can, and especially in the light of the undeniable division of opinion on this issue, both in Parliament and in the country.
It is true—and we have been reminded of it—that there was a majority in the other House and a gross majority in this House on the debate on the White Paper. But it is also true that on any Amendment to this Bill in another place the Government never achieved their full majority, which sometimes went down to single figures, and on the Third Reading they were unable to poll a majority of Members of that House. It is also true that the Government have no mandate for this Bill. It is true that the majority of people in the country are 1371 against this Bill. My Lords, it is absolutely incontrovertibly and chillingly true that the full-hearted consent of the people, which the Prime Minister said was essential, is not forthcoming.
My noble friend Lord Wigg gave a serious and timely warning yesterday about the implications of this in the context of current industrial strife. It is also true that many who once talked hopefully and with certainty about the economic advantages are now less vocal, if not apathetic, or in some cases hostile, to the prospect now before us. Gone are those arguments about the superior growth rates. No serious students would now say that the fact prove the proposition that membership means more growth. We never hear in these troubled days on the Continent that mystical phrase about " the dynamic effect of membership and the benefits it will bring ". We do hear, however, a good deal about such things as the price of butter. My noble friend Lord George-Brown used to make the fashionable point that the destiny of Britain must not be determined by the price of butter. But at one stage in his career he would have argued, equally forcefully, that for many working people in Britain it was the price of bread and butter which determined their destiny in life and which settled the question as to whether they had a decent life or not.

§ LORD GEORGE-BROWN
My Lords, if the noble Lord is moving on from that, since he has chosen to involve me in this can he tell me at which stage in my life I argued such a most implausible proposition?

§ LORD BESWICK
My Lords, it so happens that in our early days we did not have reporters to take down our words.

§ LORD GEORGE-BROWN
My Lords, the noble Lord is very lucky.

§ LORD BESWICK
My Lords, the noble Lord is very lucky. But if he asks me to say that all his early life was not spent in the attempt to improve the material conditions of the working people then I do not know what he was doing in the British trade union movement.

§ LORD GEORGE-BROWN
My Lords, the noble Lord must give way 1372 again because that was not what he said. To improve the material position of the working people, yes ; to find more jobs for them, yes. Going into Europe will do that. But I never said what the noble Lord said I said, and I think he had better withdraw and simply apogolise.

§ LORD BESWICK
My Lords, I am not withdrawing a word of what I said.

SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS
Hear, hear!

§ LORD BESWICK
I suggest also that if the noble Lord reads what I said he will see that I was talking about the importance of bread and butter in the lives of the working people of this country. I have yet to come across a supporter of this Bill who will give unqualified support to the Common Agricultural Policy which it imposes upon us. The noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, I suppose came nearest to that when he said that " even the C.A.P. would be tolerable "—but he added, " if it would work ".

§ LORD GLADWYN
My Lords, so far as I know I did not say that the Common Agricultural Policy would be tolerable. I said that we should generally find the situation tolerable if we went in because we should be able to plead our case.

§ LORD BESWICK
My Lords, I suggest that the noble Lord should read not my speech but his own, and he will see what he said. What the noble Lord and others go on to say is that when we are actually in the Community we can get this Common Agricultural Policy amended.

§ LORD GLADWYN
Yes.

§ LORD BESWICK
The question that I should like to raise is: can we get it amended? Here we come to part of the confidence trick which is being played upon the British people. From time to time Government spokesmen use the argument that once inside we can protect vital national interests. " We have seen to that ", they say. " We can, if necessary, veto orders or regulations which can damage us ". But the trick is that this applies only to certain future legislation. The present legislation—all of it ; all 42 volumes and five Treaties as I understand it, but I am open to correction by the experts here—will apply 1373 directly if this Bill is put upon our Statute Book unamended. It is the present unamendable legislation which establishes the Common Agricultural Policy. It was tailored specifically to satisfy the French farmers. Is it seriously suggested that they will voluntarily forgo the favoured position which for them was the whole core and purpose of the Community?
There is no possibility, as the Bill now stands, of our having the legal right to set aside any piece of present legislation, even if it affects a vital national interest, if it also affects in a different and beneficial way the national interest of any of those who drafted it in the first place. I accept, my Lords, that the signing of Treaties involves commitments which must be provided for in this Bill. But we shall invite the House to accept an Amendment which makes it clear that the British Parliament should have the opportunity of agreeing or disagreeing with any provision which imposes taxation, or which is contrary to a vital national interest, or which endangers our national security. This, surely, is not an unreasonable request for any civilised country to make.
While as it stands the Bill makes no provision for our Parliament even to look at, let alone amend, an enormous mass of existing legislation, it is not satisfactory for new legislation either. The noble and learned Lords, Lord Stow Hill and Lord Diplock, both pointed out that as things now stand there is no provision for the United Kingdom Parliament to be shown the draft regulations before they are imposed upon us. And it is no good the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor saying that it is agreed that (how did he phrase it?) these regulations should be issued under Parliamentary authority, if by " Parliamentary authority " he means simply that we are to have in this House a negative regulation which we can only rubber-stamp. That is not a Parliament ; it is a Reichstag! We hope the Government will have no difficulty at all in accepting an Amendment which will require the prior publication in draft of proposed new legislation, with proper provision for debate.
My noble and learned friend Lord Stow Hill, in a powerful speech, called our attention to other areas of essential improvement. I listened with great 1374 interest to what the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, said in reply but I did not, for example, hear him tell us the implications of unenforceable obligations, although my noble and learned friend Lord Stow Hill posed this question very clearly. We shall want to know much more clearly what we are accepting when we agree to be ruled by laws contained in any treaty included in Part I of Schedule 1 " with or without any other country." How do we agree a treaty " with or without any other country "?
My Lords, the scope for legislative confusion here is enormous. Much is currently being said about the law of the land. It is said: " We must accept the law of the land."

SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS
Hear, hear!

§ LORD BESWICK
But one does not need to be a lawyer to realise the confusion of conflict which now exists between, on the one hand, we will say, the Industrial Relations Court and, on the other hand, the superior courts, as to what is the law of the land. That will be as nothing when it comes to the conflict between what is the law of the land as explained and interpreted by the English courts as against the superior court in Luxembourg. The kind of confusion which will arise, unless we amend our Bill to avoid it, is illustrated by the recent row over German representations in Brussels over the provisions of the United Kingdom Industry Bill. That incident also illustrates the confusions or lack of candour of Government spokesmen, who intend, come what may, to get this Bill through. The Industry Bill is in the main one of the better Bills brought forward by this Government: it can be most useful in regional development. The Germans apparently have doubts about the Bill contravening our incipient obligations under the Treaty of Rome.
I asked the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, whether it would not have been sensible to discuss the Industry Bill with the Brussels Commission, to make certain that in the event of our passing it we should be able to implement it. The noble Lord clearly look this idea of submitting a draft of British legislation to Brussels as being a critical, if not a humiliating idea, because he replied with some asperity that there had 1375 been no discussion on the Bill. Knowing the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, I know that this represented an excess of confusion and not a lack of candour, but it was unfortunately the fact that at the same time in another place a Ministerial colleague was trying to say that all was well by explaining that, and I quote: The White Paper and the Industry Bill were shown to the Commission as soon as they were available. This contradiction is not all. The Government have tried another defence. When it is pointed out that specific assurances to British industry apparently run counter to our obligations—and certainly the Germans appear to think so—the British Minister for Industrial Development says that the way Article 154 of the Treaty of Accession will apply is not even known, and that—and I quote: negotiations will take place on the working out of Article 154 and will be conducted in the middle of next year. How, then, can we be so dogmatic that everything will be all right and that what we are doing in this Parliament will not be upset by the Commission? Probably the noble Earl will also give me a reply on that.

§ LORD GEORGE-BROWN
My Lords, could I just intervene to ask—

§ LORD BESWICK
If my noble friend does not mind, I would rather continue.

§ LORD GEORGE-BROWN
Well, I do mind.

§ LORD BESWICK
The noble Lord is going to have ample time to make his own speech in his own time.

§ LORD GEORGE-BROWN
Could I just intervene on one point?

SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS
Order, Order!

§ LORD BESWICK
My Lords, one has only to read Article 154 and its reference to other Treaties and communications to realise how absurdly tangled are the commitments which are being undertaken in our name. The noble Viscount, Lord Colville, said—and I think I quote him correctly—that the criterion must be that Articles which we accept should be clear, perfect and precise. Let us just look at Article 154. It says: Notwithstanding Article 3(3), the principles concerning the general arrangements for 1376 regional aid, elaborated within the framework of the application of Articles 92 to 94 of the E.E.C. Treaty and contained in the communication of the Commission of June 23, 1971 and also in the resolution of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting in Council, of October 20, 1971, shall apply to the new Member States on July 1, 1973 at the latest. If we interpret all that, can we be absolutely certain that there is not going to be confusion if much more care is not given to the legislation that we are accepting? Ought we not to have much more of the good, tried and proven British Parliamentary method of scrutiny before such legislation is actually acepted? We shall try to ensure that the terms of this Bill facilitate such scrutiny. We shall be ready to co-operate with all members of all Parties in this House in a constructive attempt to achieve this desirable end. I hope that the House of Lords, the Upper House of Parliament, the revising Chamber, will show its readiness and its ability to examine the Bill in that spirit. I know there are colleagues of mine, including my noble friend the Leader of the Opposition, a sincere and staunch supporter of the Community, who will be ready to play their part in that spirit. I hope, however, speaking for my Party and without in any way damaging the partnership which I believe we can demonstrate on Committee stage, that I can voice again wider objections to this Bill.
I am told that as a Party we supported the principle of European collaboration. I most certainly do, but I honestly do not know where the principle ends and the terms begin. I am against the principle of economic control of my national life without proper political control. I am against the principle of taxation without representation. I am against the principle of an agricultural policy which is designed to featherbed the farmers of another country and to damage the industry of my own. I am against the principle of a value-added tax which will be expensive to collect, hit the poorer harder as against the richer, and which in part will be spent for purposes which I cannot control and do not approve.
My Party has said that the British people should have been consulted before decisions are taken on this Bill ; others have said that they know best. But in the end, my Lords, it will be the people 1377 who decide. I think of the clever Constitution for the South-East Asian Federation which came to naught ; there was also the Central African Federation which the African people opposed. There was the union which bound West and East Pakistan and which after much bloodshed the people there untied. There was the very interesting case of the humble people of Anguilla against the power and over-cleverness of the people of Whitehall. If we take this step without the full-hearted consent of the British people we may well see the Bill going on to the Statute Book, but in the end it will be the people who will decide whether the Act survives.

§ LORD GEORGE-BROWN
My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down may I ask him the question that I wished to ask him earlier? Was he aware when he " wondered " whether the question the present Government had put to the Chairman of the Commission was exactly the question which Mr. Wilson and I put not only to the Chairman of the Commission but to every Prime Minister and every Head of State on the tour we made? And was he aware also that we got perfectly satisfactory answers?

§ LORD BESWICK
My Lords, I am not going to intervene in a controversy between the noble Lord, Lord George-Brown, and my right honourable friend Mr. Wilson. What I do know is that my right honourable friend Mr. Wilson has invited the noble Lord, Lord George-Brown, to go to the records and see—

§ LORD GEORGE-BROWN
I have done so.

§ LORD BESWICK
—and as yet he has not responded to that challenge.

§ LORD BLYTON
May I say to my noble friend that the noble Lord, Lord George-Brown, is uncertain on the speech that Harold Wilson made at the Vienna Conference of the Socialist Party?