HL Deb 14 December 1972 vol 337 cc778-807

4.29 p.m.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I beg to move that this Report be now received.

Moved, That the Report be received.—(Lord Drumalbyn)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

Clause 2 [Other acts endangering or likely to endanger safety of aircraft]:

THE EARL OF SELKIRK moved Amendment No. 1: Page 2, line 38, after ("interfere") insert attempt to interfere or threaten to interfere").

The noble Earl said: My Lords, I have two objects in moving Amendments here: one is to see that the Bill is as reasonably clear as it can be, and the second is to see whether we can sharpen its teeth so far as we can. I hope for cooperation from the Government Front Bench in doing this. I cannot say that this is the best drafted Bill I have ever met in this House. What I am suggesting is that in Clause 2 of the Bill, which deals with the destruction or damage of, or interference with, wireless installations, whether on land (which is in subsection (2)), or in the air (which is subsection (4)(d) it should be an offence, not only when damage or interference is taking place but also when it has been threatened or has been attempted.

I may say in general terms that no one has found an answer to hijacking or interference with wireless apparatus. We do two things: first of all, we set the penalty very high as a deterrent. Secondly, we must take preliminary action—no doubt some of it is administrative. I am suggesting that an offence is committed as soon as a threat, or an attempt to interfere or destroy, takes place. I find it almost impossible to believe that the noble Lord ought not to include the word "attempt". It comes out quite clearly in the Montreal Convention. A separate subsection deals with attempts to commit any offence. This is again repeated and referred to in Article 4(5), and referred to again in Article 5. It is therefore referred to three times in the Montreal Convention, but there is no reference whatever in this clause. The noble Lord says that the committing of a crime is the same as attempting the crime. I would refer him to the Hijacking Act, where one will find that it refers quite specifically in Section 2 to "the offence of hijacking committed or attempted". Thus in that sense this is a proper protection to take. None of us wholly knows the answer to this question, but it is a reasonable precaution, it is reasonable sense, that as soon as any attempt or threat is committed it should be an offence. I believe that would strengthen the Bill, and I think that if the noble Lord is wise he will accept it. I beg to move.

LORD JANNER

My Lords, I rise to support the Amendment which has been suggested, and I do so for this reason: we are dealing with a crime which is one of the most serious crimes that can possibly be conceived at the present time. The replacement of piracy, which was condemned throughout the world, by the attempts which are made, in some cases successfully, to interfere with aircraft, is something which must cause all civilised beings desperate concern. I use the word "desperate" because the situation is a desperate one once there is interference with aircraft. It seems to me that if people attempt to commit this crime and are stopped from committing it by some means or other, they themselves, should not be considered as having been the persons who have interfered with their own attempt to take this particular action. We must regard this type of action as something which must be stopped by whatever means we can conceive. In the circumstances, I hope that the Government will accept the Amendment that has been proposed.

VISCOUNT MONCK

My Lords. I should like to support my noble friend Lord Selkirk. As I understood my noble friend the Minister when we were discussing this matter in Committee, this issue arises from a Convention, and the nations who were present at the Convention agreed to make the same rules, or words to that effect. There might be a Convention where all the countries present agreed that a certain penalty would be imposed for anybody who_ beat his wife to death. That is good but does it prevent any one nation from saying, "So far as our laws carry weight, we wish to go further and impose a penalty on someone who attempts to beat his wife to death, or even, by telephone or otherwise, threatens to beat her to death". So long as one conforms to the minimum which the Convention demands, I cannot see why, for our own purposes, we should not go that little bit further. I heartily support my noble friend.

4.36 p.m.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for bringing this matter forward. We should be clear, first of all, on what we are talking about in this clause. The clause says: It shall, subject to subsections (4) and (5) of this section, be an offence for any person unlawfully and intentionally to destroy or damage any property to which this subsection applies, or to interfere with the operation of any such property, where the destruction, damage or interference is likely to endanger the safety of aircraft in flight The next subsection defines what is the nature of the property to which the previous subsection applies. It says: The preceding subsection applies to any property used for the provision of air navigation facilities… We are talking about property used for the provision of air navigation facilities

If I may, I will deal first with that part of my noble friend's Amendment which seeks to make it an offence to attempt to interfere with the operation of property used for the provision of air navigation facilities. I am assured that the Amendment is unnecessary. The Bill already provides for it to be an offence to interfere with air navigation facilities, and wherever a Statute makes it an offence to do a certain act, an attempt to do that act also, by operation of the common law, becomes an offence. By virtue of Section 7 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 the attempt is subject to the same penalty as the principal offence. As my noble friend knows better than I, the position in Scotland is similar. My noble friend Lord Monck says that the word"attempt" appears in the Convention. But as I attempted to explain at the Committee stage, we only need to legislate where we have not got the powers we require to have in order to implement the Convention. Therefore, because we already have powers we need not put the word "attempt" into the Bill. It does not make any alteration to the Bill whatsoever.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

My Lords, I raised the question of the Hijacking Act. In that Act it specifically says: committed or attempted by him. That does not look as if the common law applies everywhere.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I am not dealing with the Hijacking Act at the present time. That is an analogy; I am not sure whether it applies in this case exactly or not. Perhaps before I sit down I may have the answer to give my noble friend on that aspect. I am glad to see the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wilberforce, in his place because he knows a great deal more about these things than anyone else in the House.

I should like to turn to that part of my noble friend's Amendment which seeks to make it an offence to threaten to interfere with property used for the provision of air navigation facilities, where that interference is likely to endanger the safety of aircraft in flight. As I said at the Committee stage, a threat to interfere with air navigation facilities is not one of the offences covered by the Montreal Convention. The States which met at Montreal discussed in great detail what offences merited the very wide extension which is provided for in that Convention of the normal rules relating to the proper limits and jurisdiction of a State in dealing with foreign nationals in connection with offences committed abroad. They did not consider it appropriate to include among those offences threats to interfere with air navigation facilities. So, if we wished to provide in the Bill for a threat to interfere with the operation of air navigation facilities to be made an offence, we can only provide for jurisdiction over that offence to be assumed by our courts in accordance with the normal rules of international law. If the noble Earl's Amendment were adopted as it stands, our courts would have jurisdiction over it in all the circumstances set out in Clause 2(4) of the Bill. Clause 2(4) gives our courts jurisdiction, for example, to try an offence committed by a foreigner abroad if what he has done was likely to endanger the safety of a United Kingdom registered aircraft, or if he has committed his offence on hoard a foreign registered aircraft which has landed here with the offender still on hoard. We could not, in accordance with the rules of international law, assert jurisdiction over a foreigner in such circumstances unless the Convention so provided. The Montreal Convention enlarges the jurisdiction which a contracting State may exercise; it in no way diminishes it; it in no way inhibits a State's right to exercise jurisdiction over offences committed in its own territory.

It would certainly have been in accordance with international law to provide in the Bill that it is an offence to threaten in the United Kingdom to interfere with the operation of property used for the provision of air navigation facilities where the interference is likely to endanger the safety of aircraft in flight. But I think we should consider what such a provision would add to the existing law. First, it would apply to a threat to destroy or damage any air navigation facilities. But such a threat, if uttered in the United Kingdom, is already an offence under Section 2 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971; or, if money is demanded, it amounts to blackmail under Section 21 of the Theft Act 1968. Offences under Section 2 of the Criminal Damage Act are punishable by 10 years' imprisonment, and offences under Section 21 of the Theft Act by 14 years' imprisonment. I do not want to underrate the seriousness of any such threat, but I would suggest that these are adequate penalties for a mere threat, bearing in mind that if the threat is implemented and there is actual interference the offence would fall under Clause 2(1) as drafted and would be punishable with imprisonment for life.

Secondly, unless qualified by the word "unlawfully", which is defined in Clause 8(1) of the Bill as meaning "unlawful" under some other provision of United Kingdom law apart from the Bill, a provision making a threat to interfere with air navigation facilities an offence would cover a threat to use a radio or electronic device to jam communications between a control tower, beacon, or other navigation facilities, and an aircraft. I hope that the House will agree that the important thing is that the Bill makes the implementation of a threat an offence.

Thirdly, to make it an offence to threaten to interfere with air navigation facilities would, again, qualified as it is by the word "unlawfully", apply to a threat by air traffic controllers and others concerned with the provision of air navigation facilities to interfere with the operation of those facilities by threatening to withhold their labour in the course of an industrial dispute. I am sure that in a Bill intended to protect those who have operated with commendable skill and fortitude in the face of threats by hijackers and saboteurs, we would not wish to enter into the vexed field of industrial relations.

My Lords, I hope I have made it clear that we could not consistently with international law assume jurisdiction over the offence of threatening to interfere with air navigation facilities in all the circumstances covered by Clause 2(4) of the Bill, and therefore we could not accept my noble friend's Amendment as it stands. We are not inhibited in any way by the Montreal Convention from providing in the Bill that threats uttered in the United Kingdom shall be an offence, but if such an offence is created by the Bill and qualified by the word "unlawfully", as it is, we are doing no more than increasing the penalty for the offences already existing under Section 2 of the Criminal Damage Act and Section 14 of the Theft Act; and I hope that your Lordships will agree that the penalties provided in those Acts, as I said, are sufficient for a threat which is not implemented. If we go further and cover threats to interfere, whether or not they are unlawful as defined in the Bill, we enter into a field where I think the danger to aircraft is more apparent than real and which I think is largely outside the class of cases which my noble friend sought to cover by this Amendment.

I now revert to my noble friend's argument regarding the reference in the Hijacking Act to "attempt". The Hijacking Act does not provide expressly that an attempt to hijack is an offence. As in the Bill, that is left to the operation of the common law. There is a reference to an attempt in Section 2 of the Hijacking Act, but that is in quite a different context. I hope, therefore, that in the light of these arguments the noble Earl will not wish to pursue the Amendment further.

4.46 p.m.

LORD BESWICK

My Lords, before the noble Earl responds to the invitation, I am bound to say that we are grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, for the very full and careful explanation of the reasoning behind this drafting. I must say that in one or two particulars I found it less than satisfactory. But I should have thought that we, and certainly another place, will need to look into what he has said when we read it in Hansard. However, may I ask the noble Lord just one or two questions? Is he seriously saying that one objection to the noble Earl's Amendment is that it might apply to an industrial dispute? Surely it would be possible, if provision has not already been made in this wording, to ensure that an unlawful and intentional threat was required. To say that a threat of withdrawing labour was intended to destroy property or life is really going very far, and I hope the noble Lord really did not mean that. If the wording is such that the Amendment would leave this open, then I agree a further Amendment would be necessary, but it would be quite easy.

The other point I would make to the noble Lord is this. We are dealing with a situation in which a threat has been the real problem. In few of these cases has actual damage occurred—I will say, a minority of cases. There are one or two cases one can call to mind, but in the main the trouble has been created, the threat to life has been, from a threat, not from an actual physical interference. It seems very difficult to understand—does it not?—that in an Act which is supposed to meet problems that we have seen in the last few years there is no real provision for this part of the problem; namely, that of the threat. I would go further, and would say that if the Convention itself does not include a threat then the Convention is inadequate. I will say, as one of the noble Lord's friends opposite has said, that if the Convention is inadequate, that is absolutely no reason why our own legislation should be inadequate. What we need to be able to do if we are going to ratify the Convention is to go as far as the Convention. If we go further, then that is no bar to the actual ratification of the Convention; although we have got to look much more carefully into the reply the noble Lord has given. I cannot say that he has so far satisfied all my doubts.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

My Lords, I am grateful for the Minister's explanation, though I endorse what the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, said. It is quite ridiculous to draw in the possibility of a labour dispute. Is it suggested that responsible labour people would take action which would endanger the safety of an aircraft? I am not saying that nobody would do that but I think that very few would and I suggest that it is a slightly irrelevant point to draw in at this stage.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I did not suggest any such thing. I said that it might be one of the kinds of threat at which the Amendment might be aimed.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

My Lords, if anyone were deliberately to try to endanger the safety of an aircraft, even by the withdrawal of labour, he would deserve very severe punishment; but that would be very unlikely to happen. The Minister used the word "jam". This is one aspect I have very much ill mind. I think of radio control—what during the war we used to call "bending the beams," something with which I was loosely connected. This is probably a very sophisticated business nowadays, and it is just the sort of thing that might be attempted.

I am dissatisfied with the whole of the Minister's answer. He said he felt certain that this part of the Bill, which applies all over the world,would be understood by people all over the world. But it does not mention the word "attempt", something that is so frequently referred to, and deliberately countersigned by this Government, in the Montreal Convention. I am surprised that the Minister should be satisfied with this. I appreciate that he follows the advice he is given, but frankly it seems a little complacent to assume that the international statute which we have signed should be ignored.

I will not press the Amendment to a Division at this hour. I am grateful for the noble Lord's explanation, but having said that I am not entirely satisfied I hope that he will between now and the Bill's reaching another place go into the matter again. With those remarks I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK moved Amendment No. 2: Page 2, line 41, after ("applies") insert ("equally").

The noble Earl said: This Amendment is designed to establish that we are dealing in Clause 2 not only with navigation facilities on the ground but also with navigation facilities in the air. I wish to include the word "equally" in order to make quite sure that it is not purely ground establishments that this clause is intended to cover. If one were to read subsections (1) and (2) one might at first glance think that they applied only to ground establishments and I wish to make it clear that they apply equally, at any rate in certain cases, to wireless installations in the air. I beg to move.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I confess that when I saw this Amendment down I was puzzled by it, and I am grateful to my noble friend for explaining its intention. I understood him to say that it would mean that the preceding provision would apply equally to any property for the provision of air navigation facilities, whether that property was in the air, on the land or on the sea. Frankly, I do not see that the adding of the word "equally" would make any difference whatever. The clause as it stands is perfectly clear in saying that it applies to any property for the provision of air navigation facilities. It is very wide indeed. I find the word "equally" rather puzzling, and I think that others will be puzzled by it as well. However, I am quite willing to look at the matter again and perhaps my noble friend could have a word with me about it. As at present advised, I do not see that the addition of the word would add anything to the clause and might even give rise to some doubts.

LORD BESWICK

My Lords, one reason which probably prompted the noble Earl to table this Amendment is that it is not absolutely clear, at any rate to me, whether subsection (1) refers only to property on the land. If the term "property" does not include aircraft, I am at a loss to find—I am ready to believe that someone could find it for me—any reference to interference with an aircraft. There is nothing in Clause 1 which says that it is an offence to interfere with the operation of an aircraft. It says that it is an offence to have a device or to seek to destroy or damage an aircraft and so on, but to interfere with its operation in terms is not included in Clause 1. I understood that Clause 2(1) covered not only property on the ground but property in the shape of an aircraft. If that is the case, then it seems that the addition of the word "equally" in subsection (2) is necessary.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

I find myself entirely in agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Beswick. The Minister must realise that he reads this Bill with an enormous brief in front of him whereas we poor, ignorant chaps are unable to do that. We must try to understand what the mysterious Government Department which he represents is really trying to say. I spent quite a lot of time trying to find out whether or not these provisions apply to aircraft and I tabled an Amendment to include the word "equally" to make the position quite clear. If the Minister says that the position is already quite clear, I will accept that, but I should like him to look at the matter again to make absolutely sure that it applies to navigation installations anywhere, whether on the land or in an aircraft. If that is the position, something should be inserted in the Bill to make that clear. The clause says that it applies to certain things and goes on to say that the preceding clause applies to certain things. It is really saying that the preceding provisions apply inter alia. I thought that the use of the word "applies" in Clause 2 meant that the whole of that clause would apply to Clause 1. However, if my noble friend is quite satisfied with the existing drafting I will not press the matter further, and I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

4.58 p.m.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK moved Amendment No. 3: Page 2, line 42, at end insert ("ship").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I have tabled this Amendment to enable my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn to answer a question which I raised in Committee but which at that stage he was not able to answer. Do these provisions apply to ships and the navigation equipment installed on them, or are ships specifically excluded? This is very important because, as I have said, all sorts of things can be done to-day, with the use of electronic equipment, in the way of guiding or misguiding people. I shall therefore be interested to know whether this provision will apply to installations on ships. I beg to move.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I am advised that subsection (2) does apply in this case. That is the intention, subsection (2) spelling out what is in subsection (1)—-the property to which the subsection applies. When it refers to any property used for the provision of air navigation facilities it means exactly what it says, and would include ships. Navigation facilities that could be used for aircraft are used on ships. I am not in a position to-day to say whether we should like to include the word "ship", because it raises a rather difficult problem, in that there are weather ships and we should have to find out the position there and the extent of the jurisdiction before we could include that word. We could make it apply to our own weather ships (I believe there are nine such vessels in existence in our area, three of which we provide while the others are provided by other nations). but I am not sure whether, if we included the word "ship" the provision would apply beyond our own ships. I should therefore need to clear up this point. Although I think my noble friend is on a good point, I would ask him to withdraw the Amendment at this time on the understanding that we will look into the matter further.

LORD BESWICK

My Lords, I was going to suggest to the noble Earl that this is one Amendment he really should press and not be satisfied with an assurance. For the noble Lord to come along and say that his noble friend is on a good point and that he cannot give us the elementary information as to whether "property" includes a ship, or whether our own weather ships, British weather ships, are covered, seems rather strange.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, it happens that this is a Starred Amendment and we have not had much time to consider it.

LORD BESWICK

My Lords, I know the difficulties under which the noble Lord works; burdens are put on him which no human being ought to be allowed to carry, and he is overworked. Nevertheless, we are here dealing with a Bill and we are entitled to expect a question of that kind to get an answer. I should have thought that the noble Earl would be justified in pressing this Amendment to a Division. If the word "property" is said to include ship, why do we take the trouble to say "including any land, buildings, apparatus or equipment ", but exclude the word "ship"? I could have understood it if "property" was so all-embracing that we did not say it included these things, but to say it includes these things and leave out "ship" weakens it. Like the noble Lord and others, I have seen a certain amount of legislation in my time, and I have always been told that once you start describing in detail what you are covering you have the effect of excluding things; those things which are not included in the list are held td be excluded. If we intend, as I understand the noble Lord to say we do, to cover ships, I do not see why the word "ships" should not be included in this list.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

My Lords, if the noble Lord had put a full stop after the word "facilities", then I would have agreed with him, but, as Lord Beswick says, the clause includes "land, buildings, apparatus or equipment", and under the normal rules this would not include a ship. The clause continues: other than any apparatus or equipment on board an aircraft". Are those words even remotely necessary? If it is intended to include apparatus on an aircraft, why exclude them? I am putting this Amendment forward because I think something should be done about the drafting of this Bill. It is very bad.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I think, if I may say so, that we are getting a little disorderly, because the noble Earl is now referring to his next Amendment. It is a little difficult for us to deal with two or three Amendments at the same time if we do not start by dealing with them together.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

My Lords, I apologise to the noble Lord if he thinks I am being disorderly—it is the last thing I wish to be in this House—but I am trying to explain why I think the meaning of this clause is obscure. I do not intend to press this Amendment, as the noble Lord has said that he will look at it to see whether the point should be covered. I think it should be covered. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK moved Amendment No. 4: Page 2, line 43, leave out from ("used") to end of line 44.

The noble Earl said: My Lords, this Amendment really goes with No. 2, to make it clear that the whole of Clause 2 in fact applies to installations which are on land or in the air. In these circumstances, I find it difficult to see that the words I am moving to omit are necessary at all. I do not feel strongly about the matter, one way or the other, but perhaps the noble Lord would look at it and see whether these words are redundant. The next subsection undoubtedly refers to equipment on aircraft. I find it difficult to see that these words add anything whatsoever to the Bill. I beg to move.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, perhaps I should begin by explaining that the reason why I did not seek leave to reply to the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, on the point he raised was because it is covered by the present Amendment. My noble friend is seeking by this Amendment to make it an offence under this clause to destroy, damage or interfere with the operation of apparatus and equipment which is on board an aircraft and is used for the provision of air navigation facilities, where the destruction or damage or interference is likely to endanger the safety of the aircraft in flight. That is the effect of his Amendment. But such acts are already offences under Clause 1 of the Bill. Where any apparatus or equipment on the aircraft is damaged so as to endanger the safety of the aircraft in flight, it is an offence under Clause 1(1). Where any device is used on board an aircraft to interfere with its navigational equipment, it is an offence under Clause 1(2). So I hope that in this case, at any rate, the noble Earl will agree that his Amendment is not necessary.

LORD BESWICK

My Lords, the noble Lord seems now to be confirming our worst fears, that in Clause 1 of this Bill there is no reference to interference or attempted interference with the operation of an aircraft. What the noble Lord is saying is that if you damage the navigational equipment in a supporting aircraft, or if you place a device in that supporting aircraft with the intention of damaging it, you are caught by Clause 1. But we are dealing here in Clause 2 with the additional menace of interference or a threat of interference. If someone in a ship or aircraft upon which another aircraft is dependent for navigational information says, "You shall not pass this information", then apparently he is not caught by the clause. It is not necessary to damage the equipment; one can prevent it from being used by the use of threats. In those circumstances, would it not be preferable simply to exclude these words? There is nothing to be gained by their inclusion.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, as I understand it, what the noble Lord is arguing is that since it is already covered elsewhere it will not do any harm to put it in again, or there may be just a small residual point which is not already covered.

LORD BESWICK

No, my Lords. I specifically said that according to the noble Lord's definition of Clause 1 this point is not covered. The noble Lord himself referred to damage or the placing of a device. There is nothing in Clause 1 about interference. I am saying that in Clause 2 there is this additional reference to interference, and therefore it cannot be covered by Clause 1.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I am afraid I can only say once again that I think I shall have to look at this point again. I think we should look at all three points together, and I shall be very glad to do this.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

My Lords, I was only trying to be helpful. I really do not understand what the noble Lord is trying to say. He is saying that if I were to take out these words it would in fact be bringing the offence into Clause 1(1)(a). If I may go on to subsection (4), this subsection applies to acts committed on board a civil aircraft.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, what I am saying is that these words are taken out in the Bill. It says "other than any apparatus or equipment", because they are covered by Clause 1.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

My Lords, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

5.9 p.m.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK moved Amendment No. 5: Page 3, line 24, leave out subsection 5.

The noble Earl said: My Lords, I beg leave to move the omission of subsection (5) of Clause 2. I do so for the simple reason that I do not understand what it is trying to say. I should have no idea at all if I had not got a crib, and the crib is in the form of the Montreal Convention. This comes from a clause in the Montreal Convention, which in fact says: In cases contemplated in paragraph (b)"— that is, damage to navigation facilities— …this Convention shall apply only if air navigation facilities are used in international navigation. What I should like the noble Lord to do, if he would be so good, is to explain what he is trying to cover by this particular subsection.

So far as I know, what he is saying is that if navigation facilities are damaged outside the United Kingdom no offence will lie unless (a), they are used for international purposes, and then an offence will lie in this country against any citizen of any country; or, (b) they are used for any purposes (that includes domestic purposes) and are committed by a British citizen. That is what I think he is trying to say. If that is true, could the noble Lord not try to write it a little more simply, so that it is a little more comprehensible to those of lower intelligence? I should be grateful if he could look at it with this object in mind.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I think that the noble Earl has got it right. If he thinks that this is particularly obscure, we shall be glad to look at it again. Perhaps I should just spell it out once more. What the subsection does is to ensure that it shall not be an offence to destroy, damage, or interfere with the operation of air navigation facilities which are not used in connection with international air navigation, unless the act is committed within the United Kingdom or by a British subject. The only effect of removing the subsection—and I do not think that this is what my noble friend wants, but he merely wants it looked at again—would be to make it an offence under our law for a foreigner abroad to damage, destroy, or interfere with air navigation facilities which were used solely in connection with domestic air navigation in a foreign State. These acts were deliberately excluded from the Montreal Convention because a majority of the States represented at the Convention in Montreal last year considered that, where an act affected air navigation facilities which were used only for domestic air navigation, this was a matter to be regulated by domestic legislation and could not be properly dealt with in an international convention. It does not mean that we cannot deal with it so far as our domestic legislation is concerned in this Bill. If the noble Earl would like me to look at it again to clarify it—and he seems to have understood it himself—we will look at it again.

LORD BESWICK

My Lords, I was interested in what the noble Lord said. As I understand it, he says that we want to make it absolutely certain that this Bill does not apply to damage done to property abroad by people who are not British nationals. In what conceivable circumstances can we legislate in this country for property abroad damaged by people who are not British nationals?

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, we could legislate for it if there was a common convention and agreement that we should legislate for it on a reciprocal basis. Only in those circumstances could we do it. This matter was debated at the Conference. It is not an impossible task, but the idea was not accepted. This was thought to be going too far. For that reason, we are restricted to dealing with our own nationals.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for what he has said. This clause includes a double negative and the word "unless", and it really needs a very great deal of construing. If I had not had a copy of the Montreal Convention I am sure that I should not have got the answer. I think that this point should be looked at, and if the noble Lord would look at it I should be very glad. I beg leave to withdraw this Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 4 [Penalties and proceedings]:

5.14 p.m.

LORD TREFGARNE moved Amendment No. 6:

Page 4, line 1, leave out subsection (1) and insert the following new subsection— ("(1) Any person who commits an offence under this Act shall be liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for life, or such lesser period as the Court may decide.")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 6.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, may I, with deference, suggest to my noble friend that we might take these Amendments together, because they all relate to the same point?

LORD TREFGARNE

My Lords, I am not sure that that is going to be possible, because my Amendment No. 6 is not the same as Amendment No. 7. Of course Amendment No. 8 will follow if either Amendment No. 6 or Amendment No. 7 is carried. I will certainly speak to Amendment No. 6 now, and listen to the noble Lord, and speak to Amendment No. 7 in a moment.

Clause 4 of the Bill lays down the penalties for the various offences created by the Bill. Clause 4(1) provides, in general, that the penalty is imprisonment for life, while subsection (2) provides that in certain cases (principally the conveying of misleading or incorrect information), the penalty is a maximum of ten years' imprisonment. At the Committee stage I suggested to your Lordships—and I think that I found a good measure of agreement from both sides of the House—that this distinction was invidious. and that it would be better to provide for a maximum penalty of life imprisonment for all offences under the Act. The Amendment that I now propose seeks to do just that. If I had pursued, or persevered with, my Amendments at Committee stage, I would simply have provided for one penalty only for offences under this Act, which was imprisonment for life, and it was clearly not appropriate that some of the lesser offences should carry that penalty. I have accordingly done my best to draft a more reasonable Amendment, which provides that the maximum sentence shall be imprisonment for life but that the courts may sentence for a lesser period if they so decide. Accordingly, I beg to move.

LORD BESWICK

My Lords, I should like to support what the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, has said, that there was a wide measure of agreement from all sides of the House for the intentions of his original Amendment. If the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, is going to tell us that his Amendments Nos. 7 and 9, will secure for us what we really wanted in Lord Trefgarne's original Amend- ment, then certainly he will have our support.

LORD DRUMALBYN

Yes, my Lords, I am going to do exactly that. We have accepted the principle of my noble friend's Amendment. I think that he is still under a slight misapprehension about what the Bill means. He seems to think that the words— any person who commits an offence under this Act shall be liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for life"— mean that he must be sentenced to imprisonment for life if he is convicted, otherwise I do not see what the words that he has added— or such lesser period as the Court may decide"— are intended to mean. Of course, "liable to imprisonment for life" does not mean that he has to be sentenced to imprisonment for life. It leaves to the discretion of the court the appropriate sentence. Therefore, the words he seeks to add— or such lesser period as the Court may decide"— are not really necessary.

The Amendments standing in my name meet exactly his major point, which was that the results of the lesser offence of communicating false information might in the end, be just as fatal as the actual causing of the damage. We accept that. It might well be that somebody who was guilty of what appears to be the lesser offence of communicating false information would cause just as much damage, and would therefore be just as deserving of imprisonment for life, as someone who actually caused the damage. For that reason we have accepted the principle of my noble friend's Amendment, and the words contained in Amendments Nos. 7 and 9 meet exactly the point that he had in mind. I hope he will agree that they are to be preferred.

LORD TREFGARNE

My Lords, I am quite prepared to accept that the legal advice available to the noble Lord is better than my own legal knowledge, which is confined to an abortive attempt to get through the Bar examinations some ten years ago. Accordingly, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I think I need only say that I beg to move Amendment No. 7.

Amendment moved— Page 4, line 1, leave out ("Subject to the next following subsection").—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD DRUMALBYN moved Amendment No. 8: Page 4, line 4, leave out subsection (2).

The noble Lord said: My Lords, the purpose of this Amendment is simply to deal with the Scottish situation. I am advised that the provision was necessary in Scottish law, though not in English law, to ensure that the courts did not impose—

LORD TREFGARNE

My Lords, I wonder whether I may interrupt? I think the noble Lord is speaking to Amendment No. 9.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I am sorry, my Lords. I beg to move Amendment No. 8.

On Question, Amendment agreed to

LORD DRUMALBYN moved Amendment No. 9: Page 4, leave out lines 31 to 34.

The noble Lord said:My Lords, I should perhaps explain why, as a consequence of making the offence of communicating false information punishable by imprisonment for life, it is necessary to delete paragraph (b) of subsection (4) of Clause 4. I am advised that that provision was necessary in Scottish law, though not in English law, to ensure that the courts did not impose a higher penalty for an attempt to communicate false information, than could be awarded for the actual communication of false information. If the penalty for communicating false information is increased to life imprisonment, the question does not arise as no court in the United Kingdom can award a higher penalty than that. These lines can therefore be left out. My Lords, I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 8 [Interpretation]:

5.23 p.m.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK moved Amendment No. 10: Page 7, line 28, leave out from beginning of line to ("until") in line 31 and insert ("any of the passengers or crew enter the aircraft for the purpose of flight until all the passengers and crew have left the aircraft after landing or").

The noble Earl said: My Lords, we now come to the interpretation clause. Certain particularly serious offences depend upon whether an aircraft is in flight or in service. An aircraft is in service from the time the mechanics first start looking at it until 24 hours after it has landed, and I am examining here the definition of the term "in flight". The words in the Bill are taken straight from the Montreal Convention, and indeed from the Hijacking Conference before it, so it might he said that they are enshrined to such a degree that they should not be changed. But I do not think we should take that view, and we should look carefully at them. I have rather special reasons for saying that. First of all, opening the doors of an aeroplane is a purely artificial action and what happens immediately before may be very little different from what happens immediately afterwards. We have recently had an example in Germany of what can happen—and many things can happen in a hijacking. Having loaded up with passengers, the aeroplane was unloaded because someone was thought to be acting suspiciously. Everyone was taken off, except for one stewardess, whereupon another man who had nothing to do with the flight got on to the aeroplane and held the stewardess to ransom. Your Lordships may say that that was an unusual case and one that would not happen very often. You may say that the man was slightly "cracked" as he undoubtedly was, since most people who behave in that way are probably suffering from something. But in many cases the sole purpose of hijacking is advertisement. We had a clear example of that in what recently happened over Ethiopia, when certain students from the University of Addis Ababa simply wanted to draw attention to themselves and were nearly all shot.

I consider that this definition in the Bill is a little too rigid. I would say that the moment anyone gets on to an aeroplane he is, as it were, in a cage. He is, as it were, locked in and cannot get out. He is sitting on extremely valuable material and no one will be very willing to take violent action to get hold of it. The Bill itself recognises how unsatisfactory the position is, because it refers to the case of a forced landing. I do not think anyone will define a "forced landing". I asked the noble Lord, Lord Drumablyn, whether he would look at this definition, but I see that he has stuck to what was in the Bill. I do not blame him for that, because I believe that a forced landing permits of no definition. You can force land on an aerodrome and you can force land off an aerodrome. I do not think it is really possible to get an effective and clear-cut definition of a "forced landing". I therefore suggest that we should try a wider proposition, and the proposition which I put forward is that, from the time the crew or the passengers enter an aircraft, Clause 1(1)(b) should come into operation, because from then on the passengers are exposed to peril.

I should like to ask the noble Lord this question. If a hijacker goes to some well-known airport, such as Heathrow, and demands that an aircraft be refuelled when the doors are open, is that a forced landing or a regular landing? I am talking about a landing with all the navigational aids and with all the assistance of modern equipment. Which is it? If it is not a forced landing—and I do not see how it can be—then Clause 1(1)(b) will not come into operation, because the doors are open. I should like to know whether the noble Lord can answer that question satisfactorily. My Lords. I beg to move.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, in answer to my noble friend's first point, I think that if the event in Germany, to which he referred had taken place here it would have been covered by Section 1(1) of the Hijacking Act. In fact it was covered in any case, because, unless I am mistaken, Germany has subscribed to the Hague Convention. That Convention states: A person on board an aircraft in flight, who unlawfully by the use of force or by threats of any kind seizes an aircraft or exercises control of it, commits the offence of hijacking. So it would appear that that offence, which apparently influenced my noble friend to put down this Amendment, is already covered. He asked me to find out what is meant by the term "forced landing". The phrase is of course also used in the Tokyo Convention Act and the Hijacking Act without being defined in either. But I am advised that the phrase covers a landing forced by a hijacker, or by weather, or by technical difficulties, or for any other reason and that nothing would be gained by defining the term. It is a very wide term, and means exactly what it says—a forced landing.

My Lords, the position here, as I explained in Committee, is that the words which appear in the Bill are the words which appear in the Hijacking Act, and the term "an aircraft in flight" is used in the definition of every offence referred to in the Montreal Convention and in every offence created by the Bill. Noble Lords will note that the phrase is used in both paragraph (a) and paragraph (b) of Clause 1(1), in Clause 1(2), in Clause 2(1) and in Clause 2(3). If the definition is extended as my noble friend has proposed, every offence created by the Bill would be correspondingly extended beyond the scope of the offences covered by the Montreal Convention. So far as it concerns dealing with offences outside our own jurisdiction at the present time, it would not be possible for us to extend our jurisdiction in the way that my noble friend proposes unless we had another Convention that would allow us to do so.

My Lords, the definition of "an aircraft in flight" in the Bill as drafted exactly reproduces the definition in Article 2(a) of the Montreal Convention, and my noble friend's Amendment seeks to extend that definition quite a long way. I would remind my noble friend that at the Committee stage he said, in connection with Clause 1(3), that that provision, is quite a remarkable extension of the criminal law of this country, and indeed of Scotland, it states that any act 'committed in the United Kingdom or elsewhere whatever the nationality of the person' becomes an offence under the Act. That means that in any part of the world, so far as I can see, where any aircraft is deliberately rendered incapable of flight, or where any act of violence takes place on the aircraft, that is part of the criminal law and can be pursued in this country ".—[OFFICIAL. REPORT, 7/12/72, col. 374.] I agree with my noble friend that this is indeed a remarkable extension of the criminal law. It is one which can be made only because an international Convention makes provision for it. But that Convention makes such provision only in respect of certain offences. If we widen those offences by extending the definition of "an aircraft in flight" beyond the Convention definition, we cannot justify giving our courts jurisdiction over the offences, due to the words of Clause 1(3) whether…committed in the United Kingdom or elsewhere. whatever the nationality of the person committing the act and whatever the State in which the aircraft is registered ". My Lords, I do not want to weary the House by repeating yet again at length that the Convention does not, of course, inhibit us from making it an offence to destroy or damage an aircraft on the ground in this country, or to kill or injure passengers or crew while they are embarking or disembarking from an aircraft here. The existing law already caters for this. I have already referred several times to the Criminal Damage Act. I can assure the House that I have looked closely into this, and that this Act makes it an offence to destroy or damage an aircraft here. To kill a passenger or a member of a crew here amounts to murder, and to injure any such person constitutes an offence under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, in Scotland as well as in England and Wales and Northern Ireland. I hope that, in these circumstances, my noble friend will feel able to withdraw his Amendment. Perhaps I need add only that he asked me what the Addis Abbaba offence would constitute in English law. That would have been hijacking. The German offence would have amounted to assault or kidnapping. I am sorry that I made an error in confusing the two incidents.

LORD BESWICK

My Lords, I do not know what the noble Earl is going to do here, but again doubts remain after the explanation given by the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn. He says that the Amendment would extend the law considerably. In fact, it would extend it only by a matter of a few yards—the few yards difference that there would be between a passenger seated in an aircraft and a passenger who was outside on the tarmac having got out of the aircraft.

The noble Lord's other point was that if we accepted this Amendment we should be providing powers which would go very much further than those at present existing for a particular offence. But is the noble Lord really saying that if an aircraft is on the ground and certain things are done to it then it shall be caught by these provisions if the doors are closed but shall not be caught by these provisions if the doors happen to be open? What the Bill in fact says is, when any such door is opened for disembarkation It says nothing about actual disembarkation. If the door is open for disembarkation then the application of this Bill ceases. We have seen examples of trouble in cases where the aircraft has sat on the tarmac or on some landing strip and quite clearly the door has been open, but the passengers have not been free, and the crew has not been free, from molestation. Surely, anything which applies when the passengers are seated there under duress should equally apply if the passengers are seated there and the doors happen to be open for the purpose of allowing some ventilation or for lowering the temperature. As the noble Lord speaks, it seems to me that where we really should have pressed this point is in the Hijacking Act itself. The definition is even more important as far as the Hijacking Act is concerned. That his slipped through, but it having been allowed to slip through I think that the noble Lord might have made an effort to meet the point which is now being made to him by the noble Earl.

LORD JANNER

My Lords, I listened very carefully to the answer given by the noble Lord, but I still cannot understand why he cannot accept this wording. Surely the wording which is now suggested makes it perfectly clear that when all the passengers and crew have been allowed to leave the aircraft, or have in fact left, is the time at which the offence cannot be regarded as having been committed. Surely it is reasonable to expect that all of the persons in the aircraft shall have had the opportunity to leave, and that any act which is performed before they have done so would come within the hijacking operation.

There is one thing of which I should like to have an explanation. I cannot quite understand why the noble Lord keeps repeating that we cannot go beyond the Montreal Convention. It seems to me that we can, and should, take additional precautions within our own legislation, which might lead at a later stage to the acceptance of a further Convention, in addition to the provisions of the Convention which exists at present. It does not in fact damage our case in so far as adhering to the Convention or ratifying the Convention is concerned. But it is time, I think, that we ourselves were in a position to indicate to the world that we are prepared to go even further than that, with a view to additional steps being taken for the protection of passengers. Hijacking is a terrible crime, and anything which can he done to make it more difficult, or even impossible, for a hijacking to take place at any particular time or at any particular stage ought to be considered by us, irrespective of what may be done under international conventions. It ought to be considered by us as essential and as indicating perhaps an example to the rest of the world in respect of what precautions should be taken. I do not see why these words cannot be accepted.

LORD WILBERFORCE

My Lords, perhaps I may try to enlighten the House a little on this matter. I have taken part in some of the discussions. We are concerned with a demarcation provision. The object of Clause 8(2) is to separate the period of the international jurisdiction (what one might call Convention jurisdiction) from the domestic jurisdiction. One has to test it in relation to Clause 1(1)(b), which gives the substantive offence to which it relates. It is important to see what that is. It is not just hijacking in general; but to commit on board an aircraft in flight any act of violence which is likely to endanger the safety of the aircraft. What Clause 8(2) is trying to do is to say when, on the one hand, the State where the aircraft is should assume jurisdiction under its domestic law and when, on the other hand, this is to be treated as an international matter to be dealt with internationally under the Convention. One must think of it at each end and in relation to our own interest.

You have an aircraft on a British airstrip. It is about to take off. You have to decide at what point British law is to give up and international law is to take over. It would be unacceptable that we should allow other States professing to act under the Convention to apply their law to an aircraft sitting on the tarmac at Heathrow before what one may call the aircraft begins to be in flight. Equally it would be, one would think, surprising if British law were to attempt to assert its jurisdiction over an aircraft on Kennedy Airport unless the aircraft were to be treated as "in flight". Clause 8(2) is a very extensive definition of the expression "in flight" and is more extensive than it used to be. Under some of the old Conventions an aircraft was treated as in flight only when power had been applied for the purposes of take off and until the landing roll ended. That was the dividing line. Clause 8(2) is more extensive because it was thought desirable to impose the Convention jurisdiction up to a later point—at an earlier point on the one hand and up to a later point on the other hand: namely, from the time the doors are closed until the time when the doors open. The period outside that period, before the -doors close or when they have been opened, is considered, I should suggest appropriately, as one for the exercise of domestic jurisdiction.

In relation to British law, the noble Lord said that it seems inconceivable that British courts and British law would not want to deal with and would not be able to deal with an act of violence likely to endanger the safety of an aircraft if the aircraft were on a British airfield with its doors open. To carry the international jurisdiction beyond that point to the point, as the noble Earl's Amendment would suggest, when either one passenger has got off or one passenger has left, with respect, would seem to be excessive.

LORD BESWICK

My Lords, I am grateful for the explanation, but the noble and learned Lord keeps referring to international jurisdiction. The international jurisdiction which would bite here would be the international jurisdiction which would follow from the Convention when we have ratified it. We are now talking about a piece of British legislation. What the noble Earl is suggesting certainly goes beyond the definition which appears in the Convention; nevertheless, it is one which we could accept for our nationals defined here or our property as defined here. The point about not allowing other countries, signatories to the Convention, to have jurisdiction over this more extended definition does not arise unless the Convention itself is extended.

LORD WILBERFORCE

My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Lord, but one is considering on the one hand the scope of this Bill to aircraft on foreign airports, and, on the other hand, the jurisdiction which other States may seek to apply to their aircraft on our airports. Outside that period, so far as action within this country is concerned, there is no difficulty: we simply apply British law. You do not need a further extension of it in order that British law may apply.

LORD BESWICK

My Lords, can the noble and learned Lord tell us in what part of the Bill provision is made for jurisdiction over British aircraft in foreign airports?

LORD WILBERFORCE

My Lords, it is the period while the aircraft is in flight. That is what we are talking about. We are seeking to define the period during which it is to be a crime within Clause 1(1)(b): to commit on board an aircraft…any act of violence…. That is the crime for which a man can be prosecuted under this Bill so long as the aircraft is "in flight". We must find out when it ceases to be in flight. It is on a foreign airport. It is a very extensive clause. It gives us jurisdiction while an aircraft is at a foreign airport (or has force landed, if it is somewhere else) right up to the time it may have stopped, perhaps landing at Kennedy Airport. According to this Bill, jurisdiction is given to prosecute under British law a person until the "door is opened". That is a very extensive jurisdiction. It is all right, because it is agreed to under the Convention which other States have agreed to accept. I suggest to the House that it would be excessive to go beyond it. It goes as far as one would reasonably expect to go and further than any Convention which extends the jurisdiction only up to the time when the landing roll ends; the aircraft was treated as being in flight when on a landing strip but until it began taxi-ing round. This carries "flight" further to the period after taxi-ing, when aircraft gets to the landing bay, when it comes to a halt, when the engines have been switched off and before the doors open. I would suggest that it is not necessary to take that any further.

LORD BESWICK

My Lords, I was going to ask "before the noble and learned Lord sits down"—because this being Report stage we may not interfere again—whether he could make clear that what we are saying in this piece of British legislation will not apply to foreign aircraft or to foreign airports unless they are included in the Convention. If -they are not in the Convention when we ratify that Convention, it will not apply to foreign aircraft or foreign airports.

LORD WILBERFORCE

My Lords, I would sooner that the noble Lord in charge of the Bill should answer that; but this clause has nothing to do with whether the other States ratify the Convention. This applies, in any case at which it applies, so long as the aircraft is "in flight". It is only not a breach of accepted international law in so far as other States accept the Convention. The Bill defines its own limits. The Bill says that so long as the aircraft is in flight, you may exercise in British courts jurisdiction under Clause 1 and treat the offence as a crime. I suggest that Clause 8 already goes very far and that it would be unwise, and in some cases unjustifiable, to carry the jurisdiction beyond that point. We in this country would be unwilling to see foreign States interfere beyond that point.

LORD JANNER

My Lords, before the noble and learned Lord sits down, may I ask again what objection he has? Is there really any reason why, in view of what he has already admitted (that we are going beyond what appears in the Convention at present) people should not be protected against this heinous offence until they have actually left the plane? What reason is there why he does not feel that a person should be so protected?

LORD WILBERFORCE

My Lords, perhaps by leave of the House I may be treated as if I were still on my feet, though I think that this is the moment when the noble Lord should take over Perhaps I did not make it as clear as I might have done that this definition in Clause 8(2) which extends the period of "in flight" is the period fixed by the Montreal Convention. It was in earlier Conventions that the period was less. So this is strictly in accordance with the Convention.

If one asks, "Is it desirable that the period should be more extensive?", then I would say that that is a matter of policy, and I would sooner that the noble Lord who is in charge of the Bill should answer. So far as I can answer, I would say that it is desirable to keep in line with the Convention, otherwise we get outside International Law. Secondly, so far as we are concerned, we can under our own criminal law deal adequately with cases occurring on our airports, either under the provisions of the Criminal Damage Act or, if it is an act of violence, under the Offences Against the Person Act. We can deal quite adequately with such cases, and, I suggest, would want to deal with them under the ordinary provisions of the criminal law. I think that at this point the noble Lord had better take over.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

My Lords, I feel very happy that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wilberforce, has been forced to his feet. I am very tempted to ask him a number of questions, but I think that it would be a little unfair to press him too far. I see the noble Lord's point. This is an international Convention and so far as the international aspect is concerned we have to stick to the terms of the Convention. On the other hand, we could of course legislate for British aircraft and British personnel on British territory. If we wanted to make our own rules rather more strict there is nothing to stop us from doing so. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Berwick, is not interested in that; he is concerned with only one thing and so his mind is blank to other subjects, apart from the Convention. I am glad that he corrected himself in respect of Section 1 of the Hijacking Act because I should have pulled him up about that. But he has not answered the point about what is a "forced landing".

One has to remember that there is at the outset, besides the closing of doors, a "forced landing". No one knows what that means. The noble Lord did not answer the question that I put: if a hijacker landed at Heathrow and opened the doors, would that be a forced landing? I should not think that it would be; I should think it was a perfectly normal landing. Perhaps the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wilberforce, may at some time have to answer that point in a judicial capacity. It is a difficult term to define. I have landed an aircraft on an aerodrome when the fact that I had to do so was my own fault because my petrol was exhausted, and the circumstances were certainly those of a forced landing; but that was on an aerodrome. I am a little concerned about this loose phraseology and that is why, primarily, I should have liked to extend the first definition. I think that the term "forced landing" is bad and may cause difficulty in some circumstances. How ever, I will not press the point now, and I am grateful for the trouble which has been taken to answer this Amendment, which I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.