Lords Sitting of 7 December 1972

Preamble
The House met at three of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Leicester.
The Lord Norrie—Took the Oath.
The Lord Franks—Took the Oath.

UGANDA: SECURITY OF COMMONWEALTH NATIONALS
LORD HALE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the first Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government when and by what means Commonwealth consultation is taking place on the increasing urgent problems of the security of Commonwealth nationals in Uganda.
THE MINISTER OF STATE, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE): My Lords, we have no plans to raise this question in a Commonwealth forum. As recently as November 20 our Acting High Commissioner was assured by the Ugandan Foreign Minister that the Ugandan Government accepted full responsibility for the protection of the lives and property of all other nationals within their borders.
LORD HALE: My Lords, is the noble Baroness aware that I am very grateful for that Answer? In pursuing over these past few weeks, in a very difficult situation, a policy which has commanded overwhelming support and understanding, the noble Baroness has received from neighbouring Commonwealth countries forbearance, understanding and cooperation. In view of the news in The Times this morning that further discussions on these important matters are taking place on December 18, I propose, with wholly uncharacteristic restraint, to emulate that forbearance.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Lord for his remarks, and will convey them to my right honourable friend.

E.E.C. AND HEAVY VEHICLES ON BRITISH ROADS
3.6 p.m.
LORD HALE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the second Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government to what extent the problem of the use on British roads of heavy lorries and articulated vehicles far exceeding in size or weight the present normal limits was discussed at the preliminary negotiations for British entry into the Common Market; what decision was reached; and by whom future final decisions will be made.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT (LORD SANDFORD): My Lords, the size and weight of lorries was not discussed during the entry negotiations, the Community at that time having no legislation on the subject. Final decisions on the present proposals are for the Council of Ministers.
LORD HALE: My Lords, could the noble Lord say whether, when the Government won the "battle of the Bill" without the loss of even a semi-colon, they were aware that this would create a locus pœnitentiœ in which we could take no part in decisions, while others could take decisions which would bind us? Could he say whether it was by chance that this extremely important question affecting this country, Eire and Denmark, is tabled for discussion on December 18, and whether proposals for savage increases in the size of these juggernauts are on the agenda? Thirdly, can the noble Lord say whether he has received any assurance that this decision will be postponed until after January 1? If not, is this a subject on which Her Majesty's Government's advisers will say that they are prepared to renegotiate?
LORD SANDFORD: My Lords, I confirm that my right honourable friend will

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be present at the discussions on December 18 and 19 and he is reasonably hopeful that no final decisions will be taken.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, the noble Lord says, "reasonably hopeful". Is it not a fact that his right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary has raised this matter'? Did the hope the noble Lord expressed arise from the approach made by the Foreign Secretary?
LORD SANDFORD: My Lords, it was based on that and a number of other factors. We are making our position on this matter abundantly clear.
LORD HAWKE: My Lords, can Her Majesty's Government make it clear to the European Commission that if this proposal goes through and we are forced to accept these things on our roads, there are very few roads on which we shall allow them to travel?
LORD SANDFORD: My Lords, that point has certainly been very strongly made already.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that some of us, due to the weight of this locus pœnitentiœ, are worried? If we get dignitaries like Prime Ministers "blowing their tops", what will happen to Mr. Speaker and the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor?
LORD PEDDIE: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether it lies within the powers of Britain, as a member of the Community, to make an independent decision on this matter, regardless of what is the practice on the Continent?
LORD SANDFORD: My Lords, independent decisions on this matter are not practicable. We could not have two separate codes operating in this country, one applying to our own operators and another to foreign lorries. It would be quite unacceptable.
LORD POPPLEWELL: My Lords, when we are full members, will it be possible to exercise a veto in this matter?
LORD SANDFORD: My Lords, the Six are being left in no doubt at all as
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to how important this issue is to us. We cannot forecast how the situation may change, but there will certainly be a new Commission.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, do the Government agree that if this matter is settled the wrong way before January 1 it will send our membership of the E.E.C. off to the worst possible start and will turn millions of people who would otherwise have been for it, against it?
LORD SANDFORD: My Lords, all I can do in answer to that question is confirm that we have made our view known that a final decision in advance of entry would be a most deplorable outcome.
LORD BRECON: My Lords, would my noble friend agree that the whole question is whether one raises the axle weight from 10 tons to 11 tons, and not regarding the size of the vehicle?
LORD SANDFORD: My Lords, I confirm that the key issue in this matter is the axle weight.
THE EARL OF LAUDERDALE: My Lords, could my noble friend say whether, since this meeting is on December 19, a Statement will be made to this Parliament before we rise for the Recess?
LORD SANDFORD: My Lords, I will put that point to my right honourable friend.
LORD SEGAL: My Lords, if the Government view prevails in Brussels, may we have an assurance that the Government will not rest on their laurels but will go ahead with all despatch on a much more active and vigorous modernisation plan for our existing roads?
LORD SANDFORD: My Lords, I certainly agree that that matter opens up a whole range of very important issues, but it does not arise on this Question.
LORD SHINWELL: My Lords, is it not true to say that, during the frequent debates we had on the issue of whether or not we should enter the Common Market, it was stated over and over again that if we joined the club we must accept the rules? That was emphasised. What are we complaining about now?
LORD SANDFORD: We are not complaining, my Lords. My original Answer made it clear that on this issue there were no rules.
LORD SHINWELL: My Lords, I fail to understand this because, if we are not complaining, it is very mystifying, since I understand that even the Minister of Transport in the United Kingdom Government has grave doubts about these juggernauts. Is there not a great deal of controversy about this issue? I repeat: when we decided to go into the Common Market with our eyes open did we think about the possibility of trouble about juggernauts or anything else?
LORD HANKEY: My Lords, may I impress on the Government the very wise suggestion made by the noble Lord, Lord Segal? Would it not be very desirable to bear in mind the necessity for our imports and exports to enjoy equal facilities to reach the ports as are enjoyed by other countries? If we are going to increase axle weight, which looks rather probable, would it not be desirable for the Government to be giving consideration to the need for strengthening the roads that will be most involved'? Would not that be a great advantage for our industry?
LORD SANDFORD: I would not agree, my Lords, that it is in the least probable that we shall be increasing axle weight. The whole object of these negotiations is that we should not have to do so. As I said in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Segal, the problem of how to deal with heavy lorries in our own country is an enormous and complex issue which I shall be very happy to debate, but not on this occasion.
LORD HALE: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that he did not answer my last point? Assuming that his earnest hopes are not fully gratified, will Her Majesty's Ministers renegotiate?
LORD SANDFORD: My Lords, we are not even near the end of the present negotiations. I cannot answer a hypothetical question about renegotiations.

E.E.C. AND SPAIN
3.16 p.m.
LORD MILFORD: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will assure the House that they will never give encouragement to the present Spanish regime that Spain is welcome to join the E.E.C. until there is a democratic Government in that country.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, if and when Spain applies for membership of the E.E.C. this would be for consideration by the Community as a whole.
LORD MILFORD: My Lords, while thanking the noble Baroness for her reply, may I ask whether she can absolutely assure the House that the Foreign Secretary did not give any encouragement to General Franco during his visit to Spain?
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, my right honourable friend certainly made no public statement on the subject, but he said that he hoped it would be possible for Spain to have a successful conclusion to the adaptation of her existing trading agreement with the E.E.C.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, can the Minister say what meaning is to be attached to the words "democratic Government" in the Question? Would they include the Government of a country which either has no elections at all or has elections at which only Communists are allowed to stand?
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I think I would interpret this part of the Question by reminding my noble friend that the Paris Summit Communiqué clearly reaffirmed the democratic political basis for the further development of the Community.
LORD MILFORD: My Lords, are the Government aware that at this moment repression is increasing in Spain and that the T.U.C. International Committee are protesting to the Spanish Ambassador

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over the gaoling of 10 Spanish trade unionists, for whom the prosecutor is demanding a sentence of 167 years? Furthermore, with events of this kind taking place, is the noble Baroness aware that the apprehension of a great section of the British people—
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (EARL JELLICOE): My Lords, I must intervene, if the noble Lord will permit me. I have more than once reminded noble Lords who are representatives of majority Parties in this country that they should not read their supplementary questions, and I feel therefore, in fairness, that I must put the same point to the noble Lord, Lord Milford.
LORD MILFORD: Furthermore, my Lords, is the noble Baroness aware that there is great apprehension among a large section of the British people over this question because Her Majesty's Foreign Office is still headed by people who were responsible for helping General Franco in his war against the Spanish democratic Government by the policy of non-intervention?
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I could not accept the last comment made by the noble Lord. But I would say that if Spain applied for membership of the Community, unanimity in the Council would be required under Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, may I ask the noble Baroness whether she would say that the present Constitution of Spain is consistent with the Declaration at the Summit Meeting which she has read to this House?
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, the point is that the Spanish Government have not yet applied for membership of the E.E.C., and I said in answer to a question by my noble friend that of course we stood by the Paris Summit Communiqué on the democratic political basis for the further development of the Community.
LORD NUGENT OF GUILDFORD: My Lords, would it not be wise to try to forget objectionable acts in Europe, such
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as the Spanish civil war, the rape of Hungary and the rave of Czechoslovakia, in the interests of trying to make a better and more friendly Community?
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I quite agree with my noble friend.
LORD SHINWELL: My Lords, why should we object to an anti-democratic country being associated with the E.E.C. when we have the Commission of the E.E.C. which is itself anti-democratic?
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: I am sure that the noble Lord's point will also be taken into account.

NATIONAL PANEL FOR FILM FESTIVALS
3.21 p.m.
LORD HOY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what sum is paid annually to the National Panel for Film Festivals for its work on the propagation of British short films abroad; what staff is employed by the Panel; and how often does the Panel meet.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords. Her Majesty's Government provide £6,750 a year for the Secretariat of the National Panel for Film Festivals. The Secretariat has a full-time Secretary and ancillary services provided by the Central Office of Information. The Panel meets in general session twice a year, and for viewing sessions twenty times a year.
LORD HOY: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her Answer, but I think she will agree that that £6,750 does not reflect the total charge met by Her Majesty's Government. The Central Office of Information has to provide all the other services. Arising from that, may I ask the noble Baroness whether the Government are giving consideration to this particular form of film festival and promotion, and might it not quite well be undertaken, at even less cost

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and in a more professional capacity, by other film institutes which could undertake this work for Great Britain?
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, arrangements have been agreed upon and are in hand that the Secretariat, which is currently provided by the Central Office of Information, should be taken over by the British Council from April, 1973. That has been arranged for precisely the reason put forward by the noble Lord.
LORD HOY: My Lords, may I ask a further Question? Does the noble Baroness think that by simply handing this Secretariat over to the British Council the best opportunity is going to be taken to present in other countries short films on behalf of Britain? May I ask her to have a look at this matter again to see whether she can call in professional advisers in the film industry to have a look at the whole of this subject?
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I am sure that the British Council will consider this matter, but in actual fact the Panel has been very successful. It selects British short films for 16 major international festivals a year. Films so selected have won 16 major awards this year, so it has done good work.
LORD HOY: My Lords, I do not want to take this matter too far, but is the noble Baroness aware that the last selections were in fact made by one person who serves on the Council? The Panel were not consulted at all. While it may reflect good judgment on the part of that person, it does not reflect any credit on the Panel.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, the fact remains that it was a success.

THE CHRISTMAS RECESS
EARL ST. ALDWYN: My Lords, your Lordships may like to know that, subject to the progress of business, the House will rise for the Christmas Recess on Thursday, December 21, and resume on Tuesday, January 23, 1973. I think that it might be to the convenience of your Lordships if the House were to meet at 11 o'clock on the morning of Thursday, December 21.

PROTECTION OF AIRCRAFT BILL [H.L.]
3.25 p.m.
THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORT-FOLIO (LORD DRUMALBYN): My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The EARL OF LISTOWEL in the Chair.]
Clause 1 [Destroying, damaging or endangering safety of aircraft]:
On Question, Whether Clause 1 shall stand part of the Bill?
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: May I ask the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, his view on how subsection (3) of Clause 1 is likely to operate? If I may read that subsection, which is quite a remarkable extension of the criminal law of this country, and indeed of Scotland, it states that any act
"committed in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, whatever the nationality of the person"
becomes an offence under the Act. That means that in any part of the world, so far as I can see, where any aircraft is deliberately rendered incapable of flight, or where any act of violence takes place in the aircraft, that is part of the criminal law and can be pursued in this country. I suppose the Government would have the alternative of either pursuing it in this country or of allowing extradition to take place. I do not know what is in the Government's mind and how they intend to carry this out.
The second question I should like to ask on this matter is: if it is necessary in regard to the particular subject in this Bill, dealing as it does with violence and damage to aircraft, should it not equally apply to hijacking? The Hijacking Act is considerably more restrictive. It deals only with cases of aircraft which are registered in this country and where action is taken by a national of this country, or alternatively, takes place in this country. Can the noble Lord say whether he thinks that there is a case for

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bringing the act of hijacking under the same very broad principles which appear necessary in this Bill? These two run together and I think they should be viewed as one.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I am grateful to my noble friend for raising this point. The subsection is perhaps not very clear but, nevertheless, it is there to give effect to the almost essential element of the Montreal Convention; the whole objective being that the offender should have no place of refuge; that wherever the offence is committed and whatever the nationality of the offender he should be capable of being brought to book. That is what those parties who ratify the Convention will be agreeing to mutually. This will apply between the countries which do ratify.
My noble friend is, of course, quite right in that usually when a Statute makes an act an offence, that act is an offence only when it is committed in the United Kingdom or on board a ship or aircraft registered in the United Kingdom, or, in a few cases, where it is committed outside the United Kingdom, by a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies. But it is in order to implement Article 5 of the Convention that it is necessary to go further than this and to ensure that United Kingdom courts also have jurisdiction over offences wherever committed; when the aircraft in question lands in the United Kingdom with the offender still on board; when the aircraft is leased to a lessee who has his principal place of business in the United Kingdom; or when the offender is present in the United Kingdom and is not extradited from it. The last case really subsumes the other two because courts in the United Kingdom do not try persons on indictment in their absence, and so to implement the Convention it is necessary to ensure that United Kingdom courts have jurisdiction over any offender who is present in the United Kingdom. That is the effect of subsection (3).
So far as the Hijacking Act is concerned, I should like to look into that point. The Hijacking Act deals entirely with persons on board an aircraft in flight who unlawfully do this, that or the next thing. Therefore, such a person can be brought to book if he is present in this
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country, or alternatively, he can be extradited. It is not quite on all fours with the kind of offences that are provided for under this Bill.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: I am very grateful to the noble Lord. I personally should have thought that it was on all fours. I should be grateful if the noble Lord would look at it. I should have thought that it would not be unreasonable to have exactly the same rules as under this Bill. This type of action is very closely connected with hijacking.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I shall gladly do so, but my noble friend will have observed that it is an offence under subsection (1) of Section 1 of the Hijacking Act, to hijack, whatever the nationality of the hijacker and whatever the State in which the aircraft is registered, and whether the aircraft is in the United Kingdom or elsewhere. The fact remains that so far as the jurisdiction is concerned you have to catch your hijacker.
Clause I agreed to.
Clause 2 [Other acts endangering or likely to endanger safety of aircraft]:
3.30 p.m.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK THE EARL OF SELKIRK moved Amendment No. 1:
Page 2, line 38, after ("interfere") insert ("or threaten to interfere").
The noble Earl said: This is a small point. It concerns interference with the operation of property, including, of course, any radio or wireless equipment. What I am suggesting is that there should be an offence of threatening to interfere. This might conceivably take place in the case of the landing of an aircraft or something of that sort. So far as I can see, there is no offence in threatening to interfere. Although in fact such action may not damage the property, it may have serious consequences to the aircraft at certain stages of its operation. I beg to move.
LORD BESWICK: I should like to support the noble Earl in this Amendment, and I only regret that I did not think of putting it down myself. A good deal of the trouble we have had has been due not to interference, in the sense of putting anything on the aircraft, but to telephone calls threatening to do so. Whether this is actual interference or

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a threat to interfere, I would have thought, is a matter for some discussion. To make the position quite clear, I cannot see why the noble Lord should not accept this Amendment, and I hope he will indicate that he is ready to do so.
LORD TREFGARNE: I would like to support my noble friend Lord Selkirk. Like him, I, and I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, can quite easily envisage a situation quite unlike any of those that we are, regrettably, so familiar with, where an air traffic controller or somebody associated with the operation of the aircraft but not directly concerned with it is threatened, thus seriously jeopardising the aeroplane. I hope the noble Lord will be able to give a sympathetic response to this Amendment.
LORD DRUMALBYN: In reply to my noble friends and the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, I should first of all say—and in the course of the proceedings I may have to say it more than once—that the primary purpose of this Bill is to give effect to the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation. Article 5 of that Convention is reflected in Clause 2(4) of this Bill, and requires contracting States to establish jurisdiction over offences referred to in Article 1 of the Convention in circumstances where, under the ordinary rules of international law, a State could not properly assume jurisdiction. Article 1 of the Convention does not include the offence of threatening to interfere with the operation of air navigation facilities, and the United Kingdom would, therefore, be open to criticism from other States if the United Kingdom assumed jurisdiction over such an offence in all the circumstances set out under Clause 2(4) of the Bill.
Since the purpose of the Bill is to give effect to the Montreal Convention, to go beyond that is not so straightforward as it might appear at first sight. Many of the acts which would be covered by my noble friend's Amendment are already offences under our law. I hope, therefore, that with this assurance my noble friend will feel able to withdraw his Amendment.
LORD HAWKE: Could my noble friend say in what circumstances such a
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clause was left out when the Convention was being drafted, because it appears that it might have been a rather peculiar omission?
LORD DERWENT: Before my noble friend replies, may I say that I am not quite clear about this. I quite understand that this Bill is to carry out the terms of the Convention, but I cannot understand why he says that we cannot extend the Bill because it would give offence elsewhere. So long as the Bill covers the Convention I cannot see why it should not go wider.
LORD DRUMALBYN: Perhaps I may first reply to my noble friend Lord Hawke. I can assure him that this was not something overlooked during the discussions on the Convention. The fact is that agreement to include threats was not reached. If I may turn for a moment to the second question I have been asked, here we are really back at the whole notion of what one is trying to do in a Convention of this character, and that is to enter into reciprocal obligations. If we had a unilateral obligation, on the one hand, other countries which have ratified the Convention might object if we were to apply to one of their nationals more stringent penalties, or more stringent provisions of the law, than are included in the Convention. On the other hand, of course, we are also involved in the requirements of extradition for offences of this kind. We could not, on the one hand, get the other signatories to extradite our citizens for offences which were not included in the Convention, and, on the other hand, they would not be entitled to ask for extradition of someone who had committed an offence under our law which was not an offence under theirs. I hope I have explained satisfactorily to my noble friend Lord Derwent the sort of reciprocal obligations we are trying to assume in this Bill.
LORD BESWICK: I may be more dim than noble Lords on the other side, but I confess that so far as I am concerned the explanation has not quite cleared up the doubts I originally had. At first it seemed to me that the noble Lord was saying that what we seek to secure here could be secured under other legislation. He then said it would be wrong to have

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legislation of this kind because it is not reciprocal. He cannot have it both ways. We are not here legislating for other countries, but for action taken in this country, the United Kingdom. Although I can see that eventually to get reciprocity so far as the Convention is concerned it would be much tidier to have exactly the same Act here as is operative in other countries, I cannot really see why we should not take proper precautions to protect our own property in this country. Even though others may not go quite so far, surely we could extend this provision to that extent without upsetting anyone?
LORD DRUMALBYN: Surely the point here is that in so far as we already have legislation to cover this kind of point, then we have already taken the appropriate steps to protect our own nationals. Perhaps I could put it this way. We are at the Present time not putting into the Bill everything that is in the Convention. This is the other side of the coin. We are not putting everything in the Convention because a lot of these points are already covered by our law. The reverse side of that, of course, is that there are things already covered by our law which we might want to be covered by the law of other countries, but we cannot unilaterally put them into the Convention. But a threat to interfere with the operation of air navigation facilities unless a sum of money were paid would already constitute blackmail as defined in Section 21 of the Theft Act 1968, so that this goes some way to meet the point of the Amendment. Therefore I hope that noble Lords will not feel it necessary to press this Amendment.
LORD BARNBY: Referring to the remarks made by my noble friend Lord Selkirk in moving this Amendment and the widespread concern that has been felt and reported in the House with regard to the tardiness of other nations on progress on legislation in this connection, and the fact that my noble friend Lord Selkirk referred to the relationship between this and hijacking, can the Minister make any comment with regard to this and the penalties in this Bill? Are they as severe as those in the Bill which has already passed the Senate of the United States
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of America, which seems to be more comprehensive and much more fierce in regard to penalties?
LORD TREFGARNE: Before the noble Lord rises to reply, can he say whether we are restricted, as a result of signing the Montreal Convention, to legislating exactly in the terms of that Convention? Were we required under the terms of that Convention not to enact legislation more restricting than that laid down in the Convention? Did that Convention put any restriction on the rights of Parliament to enact what it likes in regard to what all of us consider to be a great menace?
VISCOUNT MONCK: In order to save my noble friend having a double barrel for this reply may I intervene now? The noble Lord, Lord Beswick, said that he might be a bit dimmer than some of us over here, but if he is dim my light has gone out altogether, because as it seems to me—I may have misunderstood my noble friend, and if so I apologise un-reservedly—he said that the burden of the Bill is to bring us into line with the Montreal Convention. He subsequently said that we cannot add anything to the Bill which is not in the Convention, and then he said that there are certain things in the Convention which we have not got in the Bill. Where do we go from there?
LORD DRUMALBYN: There are certain things that we do not need to put into the Bill because they are already covered by our law. For example, there is Article 6 of the Convention which relates to the arrest of offenders, and Article 7, which relates to the submission of offenders to competent authorities for subsequent prosecution. We do not need to put those into our law because they are already there.
With regard to the question put by my noble friend Lord Trefgarne, of course in this country we do not in practice ratify a Convention until we have brought our law into line with that Convention. The words "brought our law into line" are important for the reason that I have been explaining; that to some extent they are already in line and therefore we do not need to legislate on that. We can fill the gaps by our legislation, and when we have done that we can then ratify. My noble friend Lord Barnby asked

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about a Bill passed by the Senate. I think I am right in saying that that particular Bill fell, but the United States penalty for hijacking is a maximum penalty of death and a minimum penalty of 20 years' imprisonment.
LORD BARNBY: Do they then legislate in advance of the Convention?
LORD DRUMALBYN: No; the Bill to which my noble friend was referring was, I think, on a rather different subject, more akin to the next round. There is nothing to prevent a country legislating in order to stop something that is wrong at any time; they do not need a Convention for that. What we are trying to do is to get countries to bring in parallel legislation so that the same obligations will be accepted over the whole range of the contracting States and that they will have reciprocal obligations, such as extradition and so forth. This is the object of the legislation but there is nothing to prevent us, or any other country, at any time legislating to prevent an evil of their own, so long as it is limited to their jurisdiction.
LORD BESWICK: The noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, is sitting there very wisely and no doubt he is making up his mind what he proposes to do. For my part, I hope that he decides to press this Amendment because the explanations we have been given have not been very convincing. The noble Lord has now said that the particular point of threatening to interfere could be covered by the law of blackmail. I have no doubt that he is right; but if he is actually saying that there are other pieces of legislation upon the Statute Book that can be used to achieve these ends, I should have thought it would have been perfectly possible to point to something which would give us power to prosecute any person who intentionally destroys or damages any property. Why are we putting in those words if the test is going to be whether there is other legislation? We are apparently putting in those words because we feel very strongly about this problem and we are assembling all the contingencies and providing for them. One of those contingencies is undoubtedly the habit that has grown up of threatening to do damage to an aircraft if it takes off. This is probably one of the most
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serious of all the threats confronting us, and if the noble Lord is saying that we are not absolutely committed to the strict terms of the Montreal Convention why then cannot we go this much further forward?
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: I must say to the noble Lord that I do not think he has answered the point. If we fulfill the Montreal Convention, that is fine; but we can also strengthen our laws in this sphere. It does not interfere with the Montreal Convention. I think the noble Lord has frankly acknowledged that this strengthens the Bill and makes it more effective. I think there is no doubt about that. The noble Lord has said that we cannot legislate outside the Montreal Convention for other nationals, but Clause 2 does not apply to other nationals. If the noble Lord will look at subsection (4)(a) he will see that it is covered by the rules in Clause 1(5). Although this is complicated with nationality, by and large this means British citizens. Therefore there are no foreign citizens who would be covered by this at all. It applies to British aircraft, either registered or leased to those who operate in this country, or aircraft in this country. Therefore there is no question of our bringing any action against the nationals of other countries unless, of course, they happen to be in this country, in which case we should be fully entitled to do so.
I do not think that the answer with regard to blackmail will do, because it means that you have to prove two things: you have to prove blackmail and you have to prove threat. That makes it marginally more difficult. I am asking that the simple threat should of itself be an offence, and I think it is right that it should be. If the noble Lord will say that he will look at this point thoroughly, I should like to leave it there. Otherwise I really must ask the Committee to divide on this Amendment. I do not like doing so because we are really agreed on most points, but I think the noble Lord should look at this very carefully again to see whether some of the restrictions he put on are not, frankly, a trifle superficial. I do not think the question of extradition means anything at all. If this element is not in the extradition treaty of another country then obviously it does not apply. What it

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does is to apply it to this country, and I think everybody in this Committee wants it to. It is quite a small point, so perhaps the noble Lord will look at it again.
LORD DRUMALBYN: Yes, my Lords; I think I am right in saying that this is more complicated and has more ramifications than perhaps my noble friend realises. For that reason, I should be glad to take it away and have a look at it.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: I thank my noble friend. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
On Question, Whether Clause 2 shall stand part of the Bill?
3.51 p.m.
LORD BESWICK: On that Question, I wonder whether I may call attention to an Amendment down in my name which proposes to insert a new clause. It has been brought to my attention that it is going rather wide if I put into a Bill entitled "Protection of Aircraft Bill" a clause which concerns the protection of ships. I have listened to these arguments very carefully and have been convinced by them, even though I have taken the precaution of putting down other Amendments to extend the Title of the Bill. Nevertheless, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, will be good enough to deal with the point I would have raised had I gone on to move this new clause. Some time ago—rather more than a year ago now—when we were discussing the Hijacking Bill, I called attention to the fact that the same kind of threat that is directed at aircraft is also posed to shipping. As I have already pointed out, there has been one quite dramatic illustration that what I said was correct; there was the case of the Q.E.2. When I raised the matter on that Bill, the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, said that it was hoped that legislation would not be long delayed to deal with shipping. Then, when I raised it again on this Bill and suggested that this Bill really ought to cover shipping, he appeared to be retracting a little the assurance that he gave me on the previous occasion, because he said, on the Second Reading of this Bill, that it would
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seem that the difficulty that I had referred to was now resolved by the Tokyo Convention Act and the case in the Scottish court which saw a successful prosecution under that Act.
Although the noble Lord has said—and he was kind enough to write to me and fill in rather more detail than he gave me in his speech—that that undoubted difficulty is covered by the finding of the court in Scotland, nevertheless there are other people, including those who advise the Chamber of Shipping, who say that the law is not so precise as he would seem to have me believe. I am suggesting, therefore, that other legislation is necessary. If there is a doubt—and I have said that those qualified to judge these matters say that there is certainly a doubt—as to the relevance of the finding in the Scottish case, then it appears that we are back on the Statutes of 1698 and 1721, and it really is unsuitable in this day and age, when one can either interfere or threaten to interfere with shipping on the high seas by all sorts of remote control, to rely upon Statutes of 1698 and 1721. In any case, I am advised that in 1934 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council then declared, having had the benefit of studying those two Acts, that they were not themselves able to hazard a definition of "piracy". Therefore there is a requirement here to have things absolutely clear cut.
I do not believe that the noble Lord is saying that there is not a danger or a real problem, and certainly those concerned with shipping—and they are responsible people—believe that there is a problem. I am sure that we should all wish to deal with the problem. I therefore ask the noble Lord to give me an assurance that his Department will again consider this difficulty with the representatives of the Chamber of Shipping, and that he will undertake seriously to consider legislation and, if necessary, to bring something forward.
3.55 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I am grateful to the noble Lord for the restraint with which he has spoken on this question. I need hardly say that the Government share the noble Lord's concern for the safety of ships, but, as at present advised, we hold the view that no legislation is necessary and that the law, as it stands,

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is adequate to deal with a situation of the kind that he has spoken of. The noble Lord may have observed in my letter to him that the last paragraph made it clear that the question whether legislation should be introduced to bring the law up to date and to enact the law relating to piracy in statutory form is still under consideration. I think that that is exactly what he was asking; that we should bring it up to date, remove doubts if there were any, and have it in modern statutory form. I explained to him that the Law Commission are considering this issue as part of their review of the territorial extent of the criminal law with an eye to its codification.
It may help to relieve any anxiety that there may be on this matter if I explain that the situations which this Bill has to deal with are already offences, under one provision or another of the criminal law, so far as ships are concerned. In the first place, acts of violence, such as murder, assault, or malicious damage on board a British ship on the high seas, may be tried in the United Kingdom pursuant to Section 686 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894, to which I think the noble Lord referred. Non-violent threats to interfere with the operation of a ship with a view to gain, or intent to cause loss, would already constitute the offence of blackmail set out in Section 21 of the Theft Act 1968. Nor is this all. There remains the wider scope of the crime of piracy under the common law which, in some details, is supplemented by Statute. The crime of piracy covers offences committed by persons on one ship against another ship and also "hijacking", as we now use the term, by persons on board the ship concerned.
I believe that what has given concern to the noble Lord is the Act which I think he himself moved in this House, the Tokyo Convention Act 1967 and, in particular, Section 4 of that Act and the Schedule to it, and it is this which raised doubts in some quarters. I am advised that before the passing of the Tokyo Convention Act there was no question but that a person who hijacked a ship could be prosecuted at common law for the offence of piracy. I explained in my letter that after the passing of the Tokyo Convention Act 1967 some thought that the effect of that provision was to replace the existing common law by a new definition
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of piracy which limited the offence to illegal acts directed by passengers or crew of one ship against another ship or its passengers or crew, thereby excluding, by implication, such acts committed by passengers or crew against their own ship.
As I pointed out to the noble Lord on the Second Reading of the present Bill, the decision of the High Court of Justiciary in Edinburgh gave a ruling on this point. The case before the court, Cameron and Others v. H.M. Advocate, supported the view that the 1967 Act had not supplanted the common law. In that case the members of the crew of a British ship had unlawfully deprived the skipper of his command. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Wheatley, said that he disagreed with a submission made by counsel for the applicants, to the effect that the Tokyo Convention Act 1967, and in particular Section 4 and Article 15 in the Schedule, superseded the existing law of Scotland and redefined it in a restricted way. At the most, he said, these provisions were merely supplementary to the existing municipal law and did not supersede it. It is the view of the Government that acts of the kind described by the noble Lord are already punishable under the existing law. So I hope he will not feel that an opportunity is being lost by our not having made provision in this Bill for something which is really extraneous to it and which the Government, on their present advice, did not consider really necessary. But, as I have said, this matter is still being studied.
LORD BESWICK: The noble Lord said that something is being considered, which is not quite what I am asking for. He has called attention to the fact that the Law Commissioners are considering the codification of the present law and its geographical extension. The difficulty here is that the present law does not make the sort of reference that I am suggesting is needed in this special particular. Almost all the legislation to which the noble Lord referred—and there is a good deal of it—refers, in its definition of "piracy", to the element of robbery or gain for private ends. One has to prove that there is this element of robbery or gain for private ends, whereas to-day we are seeing something quite different. It is a new problem that we

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are dealing with here, of people who interfere, or threaten to interfere, with aircraft or with shipping, possibly for political purposes and not for robbery or gain for private ends. I need not refer to some of the recent tragedies which have been caused by those motivated not by private gain but by political purposes. I do not put myself forward as a legal authority in these matters, but I would ask the noble Lord whether he will promise me that the legal people in his Department will undertake to consider seriously, with the legal authorities and advisers of the Chamber of Shipping, to see whether they can come to some agreement as to exactly what is needed.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: May I ask my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn one question? He has said that the law is adequate, but can he assure us that it is adequate in respect of interfering with the land establishments or navigational procedures required for shipping, which could in certain circumstances be very serious? There may be provision for it, but I should be grateful if the noble Lord could give me that assurance.
LORD DRUMALBYN: Without looking up the authorities on the subject and consulting my advisers, I do not think I should be wise to give my noble friend the assurance for which he has asked, but I assure him that I will consult with them and see what is the answer. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, will be content with the assurance that this whole matter is being looked at, and of course I will see that the additional points which he has made are taken into account. But may I just say, in passing, that the particular case which he has in mind, arising in the case of aircraft, does not as yet seem to have arisen as regards shipping. But I do not say that it is something which ought not to be considered, and I will certainly take account of what he has said.
LORD BESWICK: I am sorry to press this matter, but I have asked the noble Lord twice whether he would give me the assurance that the legal people in his Department will be ready to meet with the advisers of the Chamber of Shipping to discuss this matter. The noble Lord has said that matters are being looked
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into. Is he evading my question, or is there some reason why I should not get an answer?
LORD DRUMALBYN: No, there is no reason why the noble Lord should not get an answer, but he knows that I am not the Minister in charge of the Department. May I simply say to him that I will convey what he has said to the Minister concerned?
Clause 2 agreed to.
Clause 3 agreed to.
Clause 4 [Penalties and proceedings]:
4.5 p.m.
LORD TREFGARNE LORD TREFGARNE moved Amendment No. 3:
Page 4, line 1, leave out ("Subject to the next following subsection").
The noble Lord said: Amendments Nos. 3 and 4 hang together. I propose to make a few remarks on Amendment No. 3, but shall not speak to Amendment No. 4. Subsections (1) and (2) of Clause 4 lay down the penalties for contraventions of this Bill. Subsection (2), in particular, reduces the penalty from life imprisonment, which is laid down in subsection (1), to a maximum of ten years' imprisonment for the two offences of giving misleading information to an aircraft, which is dealt with in Clause 2(3), and aiding and abetting, which is dealt with in Clause 3. I submit that this easing of the penalties is inappropriate. I suggest that anybody who deliberately sets out to destroy, or who threatens to destroy, an aircraft can easily do so, if he is ingenious enough, by giving misleading information.
I do not want to go into too much detail, because I shall be putting ideas into people's heads, but I hope that your Lordships will accept—and I am sure that those of your Lordships who have experience in this field, like the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, and others, will accept it—that it is really very simple to cause, or almost cause, an accident by arranging, by one means or another, for an aircraft to receive misleading information relating to its position or to weather conditions. Therefore I believe that there are no grounds for easing the penalties which would otherwise apply to the principal offences under this Bill. I beg to move.
LORD DRUMALBYN: In the case which the noble Lord has in mind, of offences of intentionally communicating false information—for example, perpetrating a bomb hoax or other similar activities—we are dealing with a rather different category of offence from the offences in Clause 1. Unlike the other offences contained in the Bill, offences under subsection (3) of Clause 2 would not normally be deliberate attempts to damage an aircraft or to endanger life. While such offences might be committed with criminal intentions, such as the extortion of money from airlines, they could also be merely irresponsible rather than criminal. It is for that reason that it seems appropriate to set a penalty for them lower than that for the other offences in the Bill.
There is some analogy here with offences under Section 2 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971, which deals with threats to destroy or damage property. Those who perpetrate threats to destroy or damage property are also punishable by ten years' imprisonment; whereas those who perpetrate actual destruction and where there was an intention to endanger life are punishable by life imprisonment. So this is the parallel here with the Criminal Damage Act: the threat to destroy or damage property is punishable by a lesser penalty than where the actual destruction takes place and there was an intention to endanger life. The argument here is that in this kind of case there is not an intention in most cases to endanger life, and the penalty is adjusted to a lower level accordingly.
LORD HARVEY OF PRESTBURY: May I briefly support the Amendment moved by my noble friend? Like him, I do not want to give examples of how this could be achieved but, unfortunately, we have not yet got to the end of the road on hijacking or the various means which are going to be applied in the months and years ahead. It is sad, but we have not yet reached that stage. I should have thought that my noble friend who has just replied ought to have the powers, even if they are not fully used. I would ask him to anticipate this in view of the various conferences which are coming up, both here and abroad—the International Pilots' Federation and ICAO—and to give
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himself the powers. I would ask, with great respect, that he has a look at this point again.
LORD BESWICK: I wondered if I misheard the noble Lord. I understood him to say that there would be cases where there was a deliberate intention, and there may be cases where there was a mistake. But, from my reading of subsection (3) of Clause 2, it refers to persons intentionally communicating information which they know to be false.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I am trying to draw a distinction between the intention to communicate the information and the intention to endanger life. They are not necessarily connected.
LORD BESWICK: But surely the crime here is the action? If the position is that they intend to endanger the aircraft but are not certain that it is going to endanger life, surely we are trying to draw a distinction which is not real? It is so—I was going to use the word "absurd", but I must not do that: it is such a difficult thing to say that a person can in fact seek intentionally to give false information to endanger an aircraft and yet, the noble Lord says, not intend to endanger life.
LORD DRUMALBYN: No.
LORD BESWICK: This is the implication of what the noble Lord is saying. I should have thought that the action contemplated in subsection (3) of Clause 2 was so potentially serious that it ought to attract the highest penalty.
LORD DRUMALBYN: The potential danger could be the same, but in the view of the Government there is far less likelihood that the safety of the aircraft in flight would be seriously threatened by this kind of action than would be so in the case of putting explosives on a plane or taking violent action on a plane, as contemplated in subsection (1). It seems to us that it is a different kind of quality of offence, and for that reason we were proposing that it should have a different maximum penalty. This is the view that the Government take: that we always have to try so to harmonise these penalties that comparable penalties across the hoard are imposed for comparable offences. We think, as I have explained, that this offence is similar to

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that under the Criminal Damage Act which involves the intention rather than that which involves actual results being achieved in those cases where an adverse result is achieved. The obligation of the Government under the Convention is to impose adequate penalties. We think that the penalty in this case, as a deterrent and as a punishment, would be adequate.
LORD HEWLETT: I support what my noble friend Lord Harvey and the mover of this Amendment have said. With respect to the Minister, a ten-year maximum, with the appropriate remission, does not make a very long sentence for what could be a most serious offence. I do not pretend to be a legal luminary or an expert in aircraft matters, but it would seem to me that there is sufficient feeling in your Lordships' Committee to warrant the Minister being kind enough to take the matter back to have one further look at it.
LORD DOUGLAS OF BARLOCH: This is dealing with maximum penalties, and the court always has a discretion to impose a much lower penalty. But is this not an offence which could conceivably result in loss of life; and, if so, should it not have a high maximum penalty?
LORD DRUMALBYN: It seems to me that the intention is really different here. The intention here is likely to be to hold to ransom: it might be a bomb hoax, or something of that kind, with the intention of extracting money. It is a different offence from the reality of placing a bomb on an aircraft and endangering an aircraft in flight in that way. But if it is the wish of the Committee, as it seems to be, that I should take this back and look at it again, of course I shall do so.
LORD TREFGARNE: One of the difficulties is that subsection (1) of Clause 4 simply lays down that, on conviction, the penalty is imprisonment for life; it does not give scope for any lesser penalty. If I were to press this Amendment at this stage, then I should be insisting that the only penalty for an offence under this Act was life imprisonment, and I cannot pretend that that is an appropriate solution. But I do suggest that the maximum penalty of imprisonment for
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life ought to be available to the courts. Because of the defect which I have myself seen in my Amendment I do not propose to press it, but I hope that the noble Lord and his advisers will be able to produce some other, better solution than mine, and perhaps we can consider this matter again at another stage. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 4 agreed to.
Clause 5 [Extradition]:
4.18 p.m.
LORD TREFGARNE LORD TREFGARNE moved Amendment No. 5:
Page 5, line 23, at end insert—
(" ( ) For the purposes of this section no offence or alleged offence under this Act shall be considered a political offence.")
The noble Lord said: Clause 5 of this Bill relates to extradition procedures and brings the offences under the Bill within the compass of the Extradition Act 1870. I believe that there is one enormous loophole in this Bill. As I understand it, anyone who claims that the offence that he has committed under this Bill was committed for political purposes—in other words, he was hoping to obtain political asylum, or some such thing—is exempt from the provisions of the Extradition Act 1870; and if the offender does so claim, we are precluded under that Act from extraditing him to the country of his origin. I should have thought that this loophole was so large and obvious as to have been plugged long before now, but it has not, and that is the purpose of my Amendment. I beg to move.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I quite understand my noble friend's feelings about this question. May I say first that it is not a matter of claiming to be a political offender which exempts a person from the risk of extradition; it is that in the view of those who have to judge, the Home Secretary or the courts, the offence is a political offence. Therefore he cannot, simply by saying that he is a political offender, escape from the rigours of the Bill. I should also say to my noble friend (and here I come back to the point at which I started) that this was a matter which was very hotly contested in the Convention itself.

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The Convention was drafted and agreed and people had started to append their signatures. It would not have been possible to reach agreement on the Convention as the noble Lord's Amendment would have altered it.
LORD TREFGARNE: May I interrupt for a moment? I am not seeking to amend the Convention; I am seeking to amend the legislation that we are enacting, which among other things gives force to the Convention.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My noble friend must realise that from their point of view, other countries would be in a much stronger position to demand the extradition of somebody if we were committed to the concept that the fact that an offence was a political offence would not be a reason for refusing extradition—which is what the noble Lord is seeking, as I understand it. Under the Fugitive Offenders Act it is not possible to extradite somebody who has committed a political offence. The only exception to that is the case of genocide. That is the only exception which is ever made in the matter of the extradition of political offenders, and that is because it is considered to be an offence so serious that the discretion of the Home Secretary should not apply merely because the genocide was a political offence.
I am afraid that I could not agree that we should introduce this Amendment, because any qualification of the present political safeguard in extradition would raise extremely difficult problems. All crimes other than genocide, however grave, remain subject to the political safeguard, notwithstanding that they may have caused widespread loss of life or injury to others and notwithstanding that they may have threatened serious danger to the life and limb of innocent persons. That is the position; and it would be wrong to alter it in this Bill. If we were to do so we should not be acting in accordance with the Convention.
LORD TREFGARNE: I am bound to say that I am not very happy about this position. Can the noble Lord give me more satisfaction as to what is going to happen to people who, for example, hijack an aircraft in flight and land in the United Kingdom and who say that they are doing it to get their friends liberated
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who happen to be in prison in some foreign country, in prison perhaps for what we would regard as something quite unobjectional, like belonging to some political Party unacceptable to a foreign Government? They have still committed the grave offence of hijacking; they have still threatened the safety of the aircraft and all the passengers and crew. If we leave this loophole, surely people who propose to perpetrate these crimes will not be deterred because they will be able to jump through this loophole. It may be they will be justified in claiming that they have political motives, but that does not make the offence of hijacking any less serious. We ought to extradite them just the same.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My noble friend is under some misapprehension about this matter. The fact that they are not extradited will not mean that they are not brought to justice. They will be brought to justice, but in this country. They will not go unpunished; they simply are not extraditable.
LORD TREFGARNE: I accept the point made by the noble Lord, but I do not think it alters the fact that the great deterrent is to extradite these people to the country under whose jurisdiction they would otherwise come. There are obvious examples. I do not want to dwell on them for that is not appropriate. However, I shall be making little further progress by pressing this matter, and I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment by leave withdrawn.
Clause 5 agreed to.
Clauses 6 and 7 agreed to.
Clause 8 [Interpretation]:
4.27 p.m.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK THE EARL OF SELKIRK moved Amendment No. 6:
Page 7, line 29, leave out from ("when") to ("until") in line 31 and insert ("the last passenger has left the aircraft or").
The noble Earl said: By this Amendment I raise the question whether the definition of "aircraft in flight" is not a little too rigid as the Bill is at present drafted. I know that the wording here is exactly the same as in the Hijacking Bill. I am sure that once the Government have certain wording in mind they will

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take a great deal of shifting to any other wording. Under the Bill there are two forms of offence. One offence can take place when the aircraft is in service. That starts from the time, I assume, when the engineers first approach it in the hangar until 24 hours after landing. If during that period the aircraft is damaged in any way, Clause 1(1)(a) applies. Within that period there comes a period known as "in flight". It is here defined as the period from "doors shut" to "doors open". Once the doors are opened, Clause 1(1)(b), that is to say, the "act of violence", no longer applies. I am asking the Government whether that is not too narrow a definition, and whether in fact any sort of action could still take place which would probably come within the ambit of the Bill although the aircraft is landed; and whether the situation should be completely changed by virtue of opening the doors of the aircraft.
To a certain extent the case is covered by the words "forced landing". One would certainly call it a forced landing in the recent case, when the aircraft landed in the desert. In that case the crime of violence would still apply until the competent authorities have taken responsibility. The term "forced landing" is a pretty vague one. Forced landings occur in a great many different ways, whether from technical reasons or from one of the passengers acting violently. I would suggest that this danger continues until the passengers are out of the aircraft. If anything takes place, let us say, at Heathrow; if the aircraft had landed, and the doors were open when the act of violence occurred, then that act would not in fact, as I see it, come under this Bill.
I am suggesting to the noble Lord that he should extend this definition. I base this argument on the assumption that the noble Lord will say that this is part of the Montreal Convention and therefore he does not want to alter it. But this is our own Act of Parliament. We are getting bothered by being driven about by Europe; but for goodness' sake! do not let us be driven about indefinitely by Montreal; otherwise we might just as well dissolve this Parliament and go somewhere else. It would be a waste of time. I think the danger con-
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tinues in any act where threats of violence take place, until the passengers are out of the aircraft. The safeguarding words "forced landing" are too indefinite. It is very difficult to say what is a forced landing and what is not. I should like the noble Lord to look at that point to see whether he can think of something better.
LORD HARVEY OF PRESTBURY: May I briefly add to what my noble friend Lord Selkirk has said. He is absolutely right in referring to passengers being out of the aircraft. I should like to consider also whether it would be appropriate for the crew to be out of the aircraft as well as the passengers.
LORD TREFGARNE: I should like to support my noble friend Lord Selkirk. I think there is a danger of too wide a definition being given to the expression "forced landing". I agree that my noble friend's suggestion is a good one, but I fear that there may be one or two problems about the wording of his Amendment. For example, it makes no reference either to the crew (which was referred to by my noble friend Lord Harvey of Prestbury) or to the cargo, which might be equally important. There might well be bombs in the cargo. I should also like to ask the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, what is the position about acts committed prior to what is here defined as "the commencement of flight". I have in mind contamination of the fuel supply before the fuel is put into the aircraft. Perhaps the noble Lord can say whether that would come under the heading of tampering with the aircraft in flight.
LORD DRUMALBYN: If I may deal first with the question put by the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, I should have thought that tampering with the fuel supply would certainly be liable to endanger the aircraft in flight, and I should be very glad to consult my advisers to see that this point is covered. My noble friend Lord Selkirk is quite right in thinking that the subsection he seeks to amend is not only reproduced from the Hijacking Act but also from the Convention itself. The words "forced landing" were not defined in the Hijacking Act, but that is not to say that it is not worth considering whether they should be defined, and I shall ask my advisers to consider whether that should be done.

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On the main point of the Amendment, here again we are up against exactly the same difficulty. To extend the definition as my noble friend suggests would have the effect of extending the scope of the offences created by the Bill. For example, as drafted, the Bill makes it an offence to damage an aircraft in service so as to be likely to endanger its safety between the time the doors are closed and the time when they are reopened. This Amendment would extend all the effects of offences that could be committed during that time. Perhaps I ought to make clear that if a person who has committed such an offence comes here, he can be tried even though he is a foreigner and committed the offence abroad, and even though the aircraft affected was a foreign aircraft. It is only because the Convention so provides that the United Kingdom can lawfully assume jurisdiction in such circumstances. If the danger occurred after the doors were open but before the passengers had all disembarked, the case would not be covered by the Convention and the State of which the offender was a national could well complain if we tried the offender here for a Convention offence committed abroad.
If an aircraft is destroyed, or damaged, here at any time while on the ground that is already an offence under Section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971. That is the case my noble friend obviously had in mind. An aircraft has landed, the doors have been opened, and while perhaps the passengers are getting out of the aircraft an offence is committed which seriously damages the aircraft and may well cause injury, possibly even death, to the people involved. This, as I understand it, is already an offence under Section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971, to which I have been referring, so I think that any gap in the legislation is more apparent than real in this matter. With that assurance, I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw the Amendment.
LORD BESWICK: I hope that the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, does not withdraw his Amendment as simply as that, because again the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, has not answered the points which have been made. Of course there may be other legislation; whether or not it provides for identical penalties I can-
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not say, and the noble Lord, who has had more advice than I, has not told us. But we are supposed to be dealing with a certain contingency, a problem or a threat to our normal lives. Here, as the noble Earl has said, that threat does not necessarily end when the doors are closed or when the doors are opened. Indeed there are a number of cases that come to mind where some of the most terrible hours of agony have been suffered after the aircraft has landed—not necessarily a forced landing—and negotiations and threats have gone on and demands have been made that somebody should be released from custody in some other part of the world. This is a situation with which we ought to be able to deal and for the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, to say that he can think of some Act under which we could get at these people is not good enough.
We ought to have some overall penalty in this Act which deals with this category of offence. I had discussed this with the noble Earl and I think that the formula he has devised is extremely good. But having listened to what has been said, I am wondering whether we could not improve even on his formula of leaving out all words up to:
"the competent authorities take over responsibility for the aircraft and for persons and property on board".
Of course the "competent authorities" could be the airport authorities in this instance. Certainly they take over responsibility for the passengers after the aircraft has landed. The authorities in the case of a forced landing would be other authorities, but they would be competent authorities. The words here may have been thought all right by some draftsmen at an earlier stage, but they are not all right now. Here we are up against what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor called plagiarism on the part of the draftsmen. Parliamentary draftsmen tend to go to previous legislation and take out en bloc what they can find in another Act and use it again, and they think that if that did for one Act it will do for another. That is wrong. We ought to look at each piece of legislation separately and in this case learn from experience, knowing the sort of incidents that have occurred. I think that we could improve on the Bill and I suggest that either we accept the Amendment moved

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by the noble Earl or at a later stage get even more refined wording to deal with all cases which arise until the passengers are all free from the aircraft.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: I readily accept what was said by my noble friend Lord Harvey of Prestbury about including the crew with the passengers. In subsection (1)(b), an act of violence applies during the flight and an act of violence cannot easily be shown against the cargo. So I do not think that it would be proper to include the cargo. The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, referred to damage. The crime of damage applies while the aircraft is in service. Certainly it would apply after it has landed and the doors are open; more or less until it gets back into the hangar, or for 24 hours, so the question of damage does not arise. Here we are dealing solely with the question of violence against passengers. I think the noble Lord must look at this point again. It is not good enough to say that other countries would complain. What do your Lordships think the legislation will be in other countries with regard to this? Will they copy us? They will have all sorts of variations in their legislation. Are we going to be confined to what we think is in the Montreal Convention? In any case, the Hijacking Act was written before the Montreal Convention. The noble Lord has admitted that this Amendment strengthens the scope of the Bill. We all want to strengthen the scope of the Bill as far as we can in justice, and I think we ought to insist on this being done. I would rather give my noble friend a chance to look at this again to see whether he can improve the words, and I hope that he will do so. It seems to me to be rather loosely worded at present.
LORD DRUMALBYN: Perhaps I may intervene at this stage to say that I do not think it is right to describe the use of these words as plagiarism. I drew attention to the fact that they are the same words as were used in the Hijacking Act, and that that was because they are in the Hague Convention; and the words in the Hague Convention are also in the Montreal Convention. They are presumably put there because those who conferred together thought that this was the
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best definition they could get of an aircraft in flight. What my noble friend is asking is something quite different. I think we are all agreed that we could not accept this Amendment as it is now, anyway, because it would not go far enough to meet what the noble Lord has in mind. What we are concerned with is to what penalties anybody who commits an offence of violence will be subjected if the period of the aircraft being in flight is over and then the offence is committed. That is the point that the noble Lord wants to get at.
I have already given information on an earlier Amendment about the Criminal Damage Act, and in the extreme case under that Act, where life is endangered there is the same penalty of life imprisonment. If someone were guilty of an offence after the plane was on the ground and the doors had been opened when the flight was over, then whatever his nationality (I think I am right in saying this, but with so many noble and learned Lords here I speak with a good deal of diffidence), he would be committing a crime on a British aircraft and would be subject to British law. I do not see that there is any great difference here. If he committed an offence, he would be amenable to the law; and a very severe law, too.
However, this is the Committee stage of the Bill, and I shall examine carefully what has been said and go into it to see how far we can meet the purpose my noble friend wants to achieve; that is, that a person who not only causes damage, but commits an act of violence after the doors are opened, will be severely punished.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: I am glad to accept my noble friend's assurance. But if what my noble friend says is correct, why does the second part about a forced landing come in at all? If this is an offence under some other Act, then the moment an aircraft lands the second part of a forced landing is not necessary. It is because that appears to be necessary that I think the wording, as it is at present, is not satisfactory. However, with my noble friend's assurance that he will look at it again, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 8 agreed to.
Remaining clauses agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported without Amendment.

EDUCATION BILL [H.L.]
4.45 p.m.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE (LORD BELSTEAD): My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Belstead.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The Lord FERRIER in the Chair.]
Clause 1 [General provisions as to educational trusts]:
LORD BROCKWAY LORD BROCKWAY moved Amendment No. 1:
Page 2, line 45, at end insert—
(" (6) In the law of charity it shall be a charitable purpose to promote by education mental, moral or social improvement.")
LORD BROCKWAY: During the Second Reading of this Bill I indicated that I should like to have included some definition of "a charitable organisation". In a sense, I am moving this Amendment, I will not say on the invitation of the Minister, but on his indication that if I were able to get it on the Marshalled List he would consider it. The noble Lord was a little doubtful whether I should succeed in tabling an Amendment which would be in order. I have no doubt that this Amendment is in order. I have the highest authority from legal quarters that it is. I submit that in the longer Title the reference to "replacing the powers possessed by the Secretary of State", and later, "enlarging certain other powers" indicates that the Amendment is in order.
The purpose of the Amendment is to define what a charitable organisation shall be in order to gain the privileges which are now allowed to registered charities. I should have much preferred it if we had had a Bill before us which was reviewing and reforming the whole law in relation to charities. The law at pre-
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sent is utterly obsolete. It dates from a Preamble to a Statute of Queen Elizabeth I, 350 years ago. I accept at once that if we had before us a Bill which was dealing with the whole law, the Amendment which I am moving defining a charitable organisation would be more appropriate. Nevertheless, I submit that in the present situation we should take advantage of this Bill to define a charitable organisation. At the moment, it is open to a judicial decision without any leadership in terms by Parliament. The judicial decisions are complex and confusing, even if one does not say that they are contradictory. I submit to the Committee that it is very desirable that Parliament itself should give a definition of a charitable organisation which is receiving the benefits allowed under the law, so that this confusion may be ended.
We are proceeding under the Act of 1960 which contained four categories of charities which were to receive benefits and advantages regarding gifts and bequests and, much more important, taxation relief. Those four categories were: first, religious organisations; secondly, organisations for the relief of poverty; thirdly, organisations engaged in education; and fourthly, organisations of general public benefit. Those terms are very vague. Their vagueness has led to the difficulties of the present situation.
May I take first the category of charitable organisations based on religion? I accept the fact that the Churches are rendering a very great service indeed in the contributions that they make to dealing with the effects of poverty, the needs of the old and other social injustices. The Churches have been giving that lead not only by the Archbishops, Bishops and Moderators but by the dedicated service of thousands of members of those Church organisations. I should be the last to suggest that the benefits of registered charitable organisations should be denied to them. But when we are looking at this question we have to ask ourselves whether the aid given to registered charitable organisations should be extended to other organisations which are also engaged in these charitable activities but which, under present registration, are denied such benefits. They are denied those benefits because of a contribution

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which the Churches are making in this field.
The main object of the Churches is not charity; it is to present the Christian religion and the theology of that religion. Even those of us who are Humanists and do not accept the theology of the Churches recognise their absolute right to do that, and we are not complaining. But they are adding to their authority as a charitable organisation the presentation of a theology which is additional to their work for charity, a theology which is not accepted by a large proportion of our community. We now have the additional difficulty in our community of a multiracial society, with sections which accept other religions—perhaps Hindu, Moslem or Sikh. I do not want to limit the right of Churches to be regarded as charitable organisations; but as, in addition to their work for charity, they have the right to advocate a particular philosophy, other organisations engaged in charitable effort should not be declined registration simply because they are advocating a different philosophy.
Secondly, I welcome the fact that Churches to-day are quite definitely, in addition to their charitable work, engaging in political activity. I applaud the way in which they are applying the social ethic of Christianity to racial issues; the way they are standing for the equality of the African population of Rhodesia: the way they are standing against apartheid in South Africa, and the way they are standing for racial equality in this country. We all applaud that. But when we come to look at their right to these privileges as a charitable organisation, Parliament must not deny to others who are engaged in charitable activities the right of those advantages on the grounds that they are engaged in political activity.
I want immediately, as I have done before, to reflect my interests in this matter. I am a member of the Humanist Association and I am raising this matter particularly on the part of the Humanist Trust. The Humanist Trust was first recognised as a charitable organisation. It had all the advantages in respect of any requests or gifts, or taxation relief, which a charitable organisation gains. Then, subsequently, the Department of Education and Science withdrew those rights. I want to recognise that the
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Department made a very generous apology for having made what they regarded as a mistake in the first place. If the Churches have the right, having regard to their work for charity, to obtain these advantages while they preach a particular philosophy and while they take part in political action, the Humanist Trust, which also is engaged in charitable efforts, should not be denied those rights on the ground that it also has a particular philosophy and also is engaged in political activity for the Humanist proposals that it is now urging.
Incidentally, I never felt that I could associate with agnostic or atheist organisations while their main effort was the negative one of being against the Churches. I associate myself with the Humanists to-day because their main concentration is that those of us who do not believe in supernatural intervention have a special duty to dedicate our lives to human service. Therefore anyone who has watched the development of the Humanist movement sees that it is changing from a negative attitude to one of great constructive personal service by its individual members for the benefit of mankind. I read the actual terms of the Deed of the Humanist Trust:
… the moral and social development of the community, free from theistic or dogmatic beliefs and doctrines."
The Humanist Trust is rejected as a charitable organisation because it is associated with that particular philosophy, while other organisations, in addition to carrying out their charitable activity, are at liberty to hold philosophies and theologies.
My last point in urging this very simple definition of what a charitable organisation should be,
"a charitable purpose to promote by education mental, moral or social improvement"
is this. We have organisations such as Oxfam; War on Want; Shelter; the Child Poverty Group. Those organisations are beginning to realise to-day that it is not enough to give charitable aid to those who are hungry throughout the world, to those who are homeless and to those who are in poverty. They are appreciating that, as a result of their desire to aid those who are in those conditions, they must begin to make certain political demands. Is this House going to say that as soon as they make

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political demands for the ending of those conditions in the world which they attempt to succour, they shall no longer be regarded as a charitable organisation? I am suggesting in this Amendment that we should lay down a definition of what we regard as a charitable organisation which should receive advantages concerning bequests and gifts, and, more importantly, taxation; and that that definition should apply to any organisation which is making a contribution to our society in efforts to assist those, in our own nation and in the world, who are suffering most from conditions which now apply. I beg to move the Amendment.
5.5 p.m.
LORD PLATT: May I begin with an apology in that I had thought that this matter would come up for discussion at least half an hour before this time and I have, unfortunately, an important engagement which I must attend as soon as I have said my very few words on this subject. If it is a fact that the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, is in order in moving this particular Amendment to this particular Bill, then I should like to support it very strongly indeed. I myself, as I am sure are the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, and nearly every other Member of this House, am a believer in religious toleration. To me, religious toleration means that those who seek to teach ethics and morals, and a better way of life outside the confines of orthodox religion, whatever it may be—Catholic, Church of England, Hindu, Jewish, and so on—should have equal privileges with those who are teaching them within those particular confines. Therefore, I strongly support this Amendment, if it is in order, and I apologise once again for having to leave at this moment.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER:: I should like to add just a few words in support of this Amendment. The effect of this Amendment is simply to generalise the conception of "charity", and not to tie it to any particular doctrine. I do not want to press the claims of any particular doctrinal section of belief or of any particular organisation. But we must recognise that at the present time social improvement in the widest sense is equivalent to charitable action; and that if this Amendment is accepted then any organisation. whatever its ethical or
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religious or social basis, which in fact seeks to effect social improvement will have to establish that it is doing just that, and will not have to make any kind of claim on any other ground. On those grounds, I should like strongly to support this Amendment.
LORD CHORLEY: I also should like to say a word or two in support of this Amendment. I found the decision of the Department completely unintelligible and certainly very upsetting. I cannot see how the activities of the Humanist Association differ very much, except that a theological basis is obviously absent here while it is present in the case of Churches, from many of the charitable activities of the Churches. It is not very long ago that I was opening a Humanist hostel which had been built for the purpose of looking after people in their old age, providing them with accommodation and giving them some assistance. This is of course one of the great problems of the age and it is one which is continuing to grow from year to year. It is the sort of activity which ought to attract, and it is essential that it should attract, the episcopal advantages that are conferred by the law of this country upon charities.
At the time when this money was being collected and this valuable work was being done by friends in the movement, it was thought—and indeed those people who contributed did so on that basis—that it was charitable work and that it would have the same advantages as if a similar building for old people had been opened by the Church of England or one of the other Churches, who took similar steps to alleviate the difficulties to which I have referred. Now we are told that this is not a charity which can attract these advantages. I have been a lawyer for a long time and accustomed to hearing my friends quote the famous remark from Dickens about the law being an ass, and sometimes I have replied jokingly; but when one finds a decision of this kind, and a decision not taken by a court of law but by a Department of State, one begins to wonder whether the Dickens quotation is not in fact true. This situation can and must be put right eventually, and it can be nut right at the present time, because the ruling is that this Amendment is in order. Could we

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not take this first opportunity of putting the matter right and supporting the Amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Brockway?
LORD ARCHIBALD: For many years I have been on the committee of a housing society which is concerned with the building of hostels for elderly people. It is a non-denominational society; it is not associated with the Church; it is not associated with any theological or political point of view. It is just an ad hoc society in which people have come together for the purpose of building hostels for elderly people. No question has been raised as to the charitable status of that society. Quite recently I visited one of the hostels built by the Humanist Society near to where I live. I am bound to say, with some sadness, that it is a better building than that which we put up and provides better amenities for the old people, and I cannot see any sense whatever in a ruling which says that the Humanist Society, doing a better job than the society with which I am associated, should not be a charity, while the one with which I am associated is a charity. Surely this is a matter of common sense which ought to be remedied as quickly as possible?
LORD BOOTHBY: I entirely support the noble Lord, Lord Brockway. I think his Amendment stands on the side of tolerance, and more than anything else, I have always believed in tolerance. I think it is intolerant to ban the Humanist Society from these benefits and therefore I support this Amendment.
LORD BELSTEAD: This Amendment would add a new subsection to Clause 1 of the Bill if it were agreed to by the Committee. Its effect would be to extend the concept of charity by making a charitable purpose the promotion of social improvement as well as the promotion of mental and moral improvement.
If I may draw the attention of the Committee to Clause 1 in its present form, it has two purposes. Subsection (1) deals with the termination of the functions of the Secretary of State for Education and Science and the Secretary of State for Wales under the Charities Act 1960, leaving the Charity Commissioners with exclusive jurisdiction under that Act; and
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in addition the Endowed Schools Acts of 1869 to 1948 are to be repealed because they are obsolete. In subsection (2) there is a very slight extension of the powers of the two Secretaries of State under the Education Acts of 1944 to 1971, to modify for the purposes of those Acts instruments regulating educational trusts.
I think I owe an apology to the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, because on the Second Reading of the Bill I was certainly in error when I spoke about the scope or ambit of the Bill in any sense relating to the procedures of your Lordships' House. The sense which I feel I should have tried to convey is that the clause in which this Amendment would come is really not concerned with the substance of the law of charity, whether educational or otherwise. There is, moreover, no provision in the Bill dealing with the substance of the law of charity. I realise, though I am not a lawyer, that the legal concept of charity is a difficult problem, raising wide issues and causing concern, quite obviously as this debate has shown, to many noble Lords. It was considered in depth by the Nathan Committee on the Law of Charitable Trusts which reported in 1952. That Committee, although recommending a statutory definition of charity, reported:
"We accept the view that there is no case for an alteration of the content of the law of charity"
and concluded that the statutory definition they recommended
"should leave untouched the existing case law".
I confess I was a little surprised that some noble Lords who have spoken—and I realise their concern on this subject—have not at least alluded to those conclusions which came from the Nathan Committee. The subject was debated in both Houses of Parliament when the Bill which became the Charities Act 1960 was being considered, and Parliament endorsed the conclusion of the Nathan Committee that the content of the law of charity should be left unaltered. The matter was debated again, very fully indeed, on a Motion for Papers by the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, on June 29, 1971, and on that occasion the views of the present Government were put forward by my noble friend Lord Windlesham, and also by myself. In addition, the noble Lord, Lord Brockway,

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tabled an Unstarred Question on the case of the Humanist Association on February 25, 1971.
I submit to the Committee that this Bill does not obviously—at least not obviously to me—present the occasion to debate the matter again. The Amendment really has very little to do with the clause to which it would be added, and very little to do with the Bill in which that clause is included. If I may try to substantiate what I have just said, as I understand it the question of whether education is to be regarded as charitable is determined by principles laid down in decisions of the courts, and of course there is an appeal on a decision which goes to the High Court. In the circumstances, I find it hard on this Bill to accept an Amendment altering the substance of the law of charity, but perhaps your Lordships would allow me to observe in passing that the promotion of mental and moral improvement which comes into this Amendment, whether by education or otherwise, is already regarded by the law as a charitable purpose. But the promotion of a social improvement is a concept capable, I think it is fair to say, of several meanings, perhaps not all of them readily acceptable as beneficial in the context of the law of charity.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: The noble Lord will forgive me if I venture to point out that the question of moral improvement is also of somewhat ambiguous meaning.
LORD BELSTEAD: Indeed, but it is something with which over the years the courts have found they are able to deal. As I understand it, the noble Baroness is suggesting an entirely new concept, that we should not look to the courts for the judgment but that we should lay down by Statute a ruling from Parliament.
May I conclude by saying that the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, said at the end of the Second Reading of this Bill that he would like to see the law on charities more clearly defined. It was at that moment that I ventured to suggest that it might not have a close association with the Bill, and for that I have apologised. But I am in a difficulty here. This Amendment does not in fact define the law of charity. It does not define it either clearly or otherwise. It alters the
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substance of it and it does so, I would submit, in one respect most obscurely. The noble Lord is asking a Government Department to give a view on the interpretation of "charity" or "charitable purposes", a subject which Parliament has consistently refused to interpret hitherto, except of course in Sections 45 and 46 of the Charities Act.
LORD CHORLEY: May I say that that is what the noble Lord's Department has done in this case? We are just trying to get it put right.
LORD BELSTEAD: No, we have interpreted the law as we found it, and from our interpretation there is an appeal, as the noble Lord very well knows. In addition, as I have said, the Amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, would introduce a concept of charitable purposes which could be interpreted in a variety of different ways. In these circumstances we may disagree between the two sides of the House, but what is certain is that the noble Lord has set me a difficult task. I hope that at least I have carried out one half of my undertaking, and that was to give the noble Lord a full reply. I am only sorry that at the moment, particularly in this Bill, it is not possible to give the noble Lord the satisfaction he is seeking.
5.22 p.m.
LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY: I initiated the debate on this particular subject some little time ago, as the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, has mentioned, and we had a fairly full discussion of this point. In substance, I certainly support the Amendment by the noble Lord, Lord Brockway. I believe that the time has come for a change in the law. It was not apparent that the time for change had come when the Nathan Committee reported. Things have moved very fast in the charitable field since then and there is a considerable case for a change. I did not think that some of the arguments which the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, put forward really held water. The original statement of what charitable aims are stems from Statute and, as he said quite rightly, the courts over a period of time have been able to interpret sensibly, or sometimes not so sensibly, very difficult concepts, such as that of moral improvement. There is absolutely no

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reason why they should not also, over a period of time, be able to interpret sensibly or not so sensibly, social improvement. I see no real difficulty in giving them that particular task.
There are two small points mixed up here: there is the point about the discrimination which seems to attach to Humanists or non-religious bodies as such; and there is the wider point about political action. I am myself in favour of a change in the law on both these matters and this appears to be a very good Amendment. May I urge some noble Lords who have spoken not to over-egg the pudding of their argument on this issue? The objection to the Humanist Trust as a charity has nothing to do with hostel keeping; it is because of the educational clauses in its main objects. If the Humanist Trust were to set up a charity merely for running hostels or the alleviation of the poor, it would undoubtedly have to be accepted by the Charity Commissioners. The Humanists are not being discriminated against in this particular way, although they are being discriminated against in other ways. I have great sympathy with the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, in the position in which he finds himself, because I see that an Amendment to this very small Bill dealing with nuts and bolts is possibly not the right way to change the definition of the law at the moment. After the full discussion here and perhaps some more enlightenment about what the substantial arguments of the Government are—and we have not had a very full answer about that—I wonder whether the best advance would not be that this would be a good subject for a simple, one-clause Bill, introduced possibly by the noble Lord, Lord Brockway.
5.25 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY: I should like to say that it has been quite evident from this debate, from all sides of the House, that there is a deep concern about this issue and the registration of charitable organisations should not be determined by the particular philosophy which they hold. The plea for tolerance has come from all sides and I appreciate that immensely. I hope that it will not just be frozen at the end of this debate. The second thing that I should like to say is
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this: I recognise at once that this is not the most appropriate Bill upon which this issue could be raised. I have raised it, and I think with some effect, because it was the only occasion on which this important issue could be put to the Committee. I am very grateful for the extraordinary width of support that I have had for this Amendment.
I have now to decide whether or not I press the Amendment. That will depend upon what the Minister says in reply to what I am now going to ask him. It will have been very evident to him from the debate this afternoon that there is a general opinion in this House that this matter has to be reconsidered. The only effective argument which he could urge against my Amendment was that this was not the suitable Bill for it. I therefore ask him this question. If this is not the suitable Bill for this Amendment, will Her Majesty's Government, as soon as the timetable of their legislation allows, consider carefully the introduction of a Bill which will consider the whole basis which is now so unsatisfactory, of our definition of charitable organisations? Will they even consider the appointment of a Select Committee or other means by which this issue could be considered? I would say to the Minister that after this remarkable debate to-day, in which overwhelming expression of opinion has been exerted, those of us who are in favour of this Amendment do not want to allow it to be brushed aside. If the Minister can give me any assurance at all that this matter wig not be allowed to die but that consideration by some committee and by his Department will be directed to it, and that at some point (it may even be by facilities for a Private Member's Bill) this issue will be regarded as one of importance with which Parliament should deal, I should be prepared to withdraw the Amendment. If he cannot give me those assurances, then I shall have to ask the Committee to divide.
BARONESS PHILLIPS: May I support the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, in this plea. In the Charities Act we learn that "charitable purposes" mean,
"purposes which are exclusively charitable according to the law of England and Wales."
Since that seems such an ambiguous statement. I should think that the Minister has very wide opportunities to clarify

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the matter, even if it means bringing forward a small Bill. I should like to support the noble Lord, Lord Brockway. We need clarification.
LORD FRASER OF LONSDALE: May I intervene, with an apology to the Committee because I did not hear the whole of this debate, and, therefore, I am unable personally to judge whether there really was such widespread support for the philosophy which the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, has been enunciating. I am bound to say that in the absence of the evidence of my own senses, which would have resulted from my being here, I should be very much inclined to doubt whether a set debate on this wide subject could have produced the result which Lord Brockway assures us it seems to him to have produced. I wonder whether one could ask Lord Brockway not to hold a pistol at the Minister's head—in effect, "We will divide the Committee unless you promise to do something about this". It is a very wide subject which ought to be promulgated and widely dealt with and discussed before Governments say that they are going to deal with it. Whether there is a case for a new Nathan Committee I would very much doubt. Not so long ago it covered the field very widely. We have had the debates initiated by the Liberal Peer, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, and by others, all within the last year or two. I would doubt whether the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, does himself justice in saying "I will divide unless". I ask him to think again.
LORD BROCKWAY: May I say in reply to the noble Lord that I am not holding a pistol. All I am after is that the Government should give some opportunity for discussion of this issue, with a view, after that discussion has taken place, to bringing proposals before Parliament.
LORD BELSTEAD: If I may reply to the debate once more, we are, it seems to me, discussing an absolutely basic amendment to the Charities Act 1960. I will certainly accede to the requests of the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, to this extent; I will promise to draw this debate to the attention of my right honourable friend the Home Secretary, and I will certainly get in touch with the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, to tell
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him that I have done this. I am wondering whether perhaps I had better draw the attention of the Shadow Home Secretary, Mrs. Shirley Williams, to this debate as well. She may be a little startled to see what has been said on behalf of her Party, with the attention that has been given to this matter since 1960.
The noble Lord also asked specifically that this matter should not be allowed to die. I do not know that I am really competent to pronounce about the moment of death, but I must say that I do not think I can give an absolute assurance this evening about resuscitation. There is, however, absolutely nothing to stop discussion in either House of Parliament, provided it can be arranged through the usual channels. Further than that—with an assurance that I will get in touch with the Home Secretary personally on this point—I cannot go.
LORD BROCKWAY: As a result of that reply, I am prepared to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment. As I understand it, the attention of the Minister will be drawn to this matter; there will be some communication, not merely with me. I can distribute it, and then possibly I can find an opportunity in this House to raise the matter again. Tit those circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
On Question, Whether Clause 1 shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD BRECON: I should like to ask my noble friend a question. Under this Bill, what is the position of an endowed school which was founded by gifts of money to provide teaching of grammar, Latin and so on (I think those were the words he used at Second Reading) and is now a direct grant school? Will this type of school cease to be answerable to the Ministry of Education under the new Act?
LORD BELSTEAD: I think the answer to my noble friend's question is that the school will be dealt with in the exercise of charity jurisdiction by the Commissioners under this Act. As the law now stands, my right honourable friend's Department would deal with it under the

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Charities Act; and, of course, it is precisely this power that is being transferred under Clause 1(1)(a). The Department could act, however, under Clause 1(2)(c) if the trusts of any particular school which the noble Lord has in mind are required to be modified to enable the governors to comply with the requirements of direct grant schools legislation. But in fact I am advised that in practice this would be unlikely.
Clause 1 agreed to.
Remaining clauses and Schedules agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported without amendment; Report received.

NORTHERN IRELAND (FINANCIAL PROVISIONS) BILL
Read 3a, and passed.

NORTHERN IRELAND (BORDER POLL) BILL
5.38 p.m.
THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND (LORD WINDLESHAM): My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Windlesham.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER in the Chair.]
Clause 1 [Holding of border poll in Northern Ireland]:
LORD KILBRACKEN LORD KILBRACKEN moved Amendment No. 1:
Page 1, line 13, at end insert ("and the result of the poll shall be announced for each constituency as though such an election were being held.")
The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 1. I believe it can be inferred from the Bill as it stands at present that the result of this poll will be returned for the entire Province. I infer this from the fact that the word "poll" is used in relation to it in the
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singular, while the word "polls", in the plural, is used when referring to General Elections to Parliament. But in any case the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, on Second Reading, indicated that it was the intention that there should only be one figure returned for the whole Six Counties. My Amendment would mean that, instead, the votes would be counted in each of the constituencies which, between them, used to return fifty-two members to Stormont, so that it would be possible to have an idea how sympathies are distributed on the two sides throughout the Six Counties.
In another place an Amendment was put down in quite different language. My language may be faulty—I cannot speak to that—but when the Amendment was debated in the other place it was refused by the Minister largely on the grounds that it was implicit in the Amendment that there would be a move in those areas in which a nationalist majority existed, for those areas immediately, or in the near future, to be handed over to the Republic. As my honourable friends said in another place, but I wish to repeat here, that is absolutely no part of this proposal. It has never been suggested by anyone who favours the abolition of Partition that this should be done piecemeal, and that at any time certain parts of the Six Counties should be joined with the Republic leaving the remainder in Northern Ireland.
I do not think that it takes very much understanding of the situation to accept that that must be the case, because if there were such a change, and if most of Fermanagh and Tyrone, and parts of all the other counties except Antrim could, by some strange jigsaw puzzle technique, be united with the Republic, one would be left with a very small three or four county Province, or part Province, which would have virtually a 90 per cent. or 95 per cent. Unionist or loyalist content. That, of course, is the last thing that we would desire, because it would mean that if it remained a viable State, and could continue in existence at all, it would always remain loyalist, and the never-ending hope of a 32-county Republic would come to an end. Therefore, there is no suggestion at all contained in this Amendment that if, for instance, in Fermanagh there was found to be, as I believe there would be, a

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strong majority in favour of unification any pressure would be brought to bear for that single county, or other areas, to be joined with the Republic of Ireland.
The case was well argued in another place, and there are just two points I want to make here. First, I feel that it would be a matter of immense interest to everyone concerned to know how these loyalties lie in the Six Counties; where they are located, and in what areas the sympathies for the two sides are strongest. A large sum of money is to be expended in collecting information which is absolutely useless. I can tell your Lordships at this moment more or less what the result will he. If this extra work were done, it would cost very little more, and it would give us a most interesting picture of the composition of society in the Six Counties.
That is not the only point. What is more important is that the minority would be encouraged to come out and vote. This would discourage the boycott that is extremely likely at present, and which all Parties at Westminster have agreed should, if possible, be avoided. It stands to reason that if you were a Catholic or, I prefer to say, a Nationalist living, in a county—
A NOBLE LORD: A Catholic?
LORD KILBRACKEN: If you were a Catholic, or a Nationalist, or a Republican, or an anti-Unionist—I will use whatever terminology is most suitable to the noble Lord—as things are at present you would say, "What is the point of coming out to vote to-day; I am going to be one figure in a minority in the entire Province. I will boycott it. "But if it were done on a constituency basis, as I am proposing, the position would be different, because at once the minority would say, "Come on, boys, let us go out and show them here in Fermanagh that we are in a majority". The same applies in Tyrone, or wherever it might be. Therefore, you would get a better turn-out, and you would have less opposition from the minority. In any event, what has been described as a farcical and, I believe, useless procedure would at least give us some information that we should like to have. I beg to move.
5.46 p.m.
LORD SHINWELL: The Amendment moved by my noble friend is no concern of mine. My concern is with the principle embodied in the first clause of the Bill. Hitherto, I have refrained from intervening in any of the debates associated with the Ulster problem, but not because I am unacquainted with the history of revolt and oppression, and the various allegations and counter allegations associated with the Irish problem. I was in fact brought up in Glasgow among members of the Orange Order and members of the Ancient Order of Hibernians. At the age of 15 I had to listen in my father's workshop—I do not want to indulge in an autobiography, but I simply recall it for the purposes of illustration—when they were discussing whether England (and it was England at the time; there was no reference made to Britain) should have gone to war against the Boers, and of course the Irish problem was under review. I recall the controversy, the passion, and the heat engendered in the course of those discussions.
I have had further association with Ireland in the South and in the North. I was acquainted with many of the rebels before the First World War: the famous Jim Connolly, the not-less-famous Jim Larkin, Will O'Brien, Cathal O'Shannon, and Dick Corrish, and all the rest. I knew them all. I was similarly acquainted with many members of the Orange Order in the North. I was associated with the sea, and I had to visit the various ports of Ireland, and I was therefore able to make their acquaintance, so I know something about the problem.
The other day we had a debate on the general history of the problem, and here I should like to interpose one observation, which I think one ought to indulge in, and that is to express our regret that the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, should be placed in this extremely difficult situation. From time to time Ministers are pitch-forked into a situation not of their own making. In this particular instance, one can understand the nature of the responsibility that is imposed upon the noble Lord, and I must say that his is an unenviable task. Whatever may be the outcome, one wishes him well personally and in the interests of Ulster and Ireland,

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and the United Kingdom. I think that ought to be said. It has been said by others, and I have ventured to say it in the past, and I do so now.
When I listened to the debate the other day, I waited for some Member of your Lordships' House to propound a solution to this problem. Your Lordships will forgive me for expressing myself in this fashion. I do not mean any offence. But we Members of your Lordships' House went "round and round the mulberry bush". There were emotional and illogical speeches, but nothing realistic, and no solution was propounded for the obvious reason that there can be only one logical solution; that is, at some time or other, the reunification of the whole country. But having said that, may I say that I recognise all the difficulties associated even with an approach to that solution. Anyhow, why argue about it at this stage when it is obviously unacceptable?
But when the Government decide to have a referendum, in the course of which they ask people in the Six Counties to express an opinion as to whether they want to retain their association with the United Kingdom or to associate themselves with a United Ireland—which means association with the Republic—it is a different story altogether. Why is it necessary? I look at the Schedule and I am staggered by the language that is embodied in it. The electors (and of course there will be electors, because this is a kind of General Election; a referendum is not unlike an Election) will be asked, first of all, the question: "Do you want Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom?" I ask Members of your Lordships' House: what are the majority likely to say in reply to that question? Obviously, they will reply in the affirmative. It would be completely unrealistic to think that they will say otherwise. We know it to be a foregone conclusion that they will reply in the affirmative. If that question had been supplemented by some reference to ensuring that the rights and privileges which are available to the majority should also be vested in the minority; that there should be no discrimination whatever as regards employment, the provision of housing or the effects of local authority administration, then I could have under-
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stood it. It might also be more acceptable to those who are asked to record their vote.
On the other hand, we have the second question: "Do you want Northern Ireland to be joined with the Republic of Ireland, outside the United Kingdom?" If that question had been supplemented by the words "at any time in the future", not with any intention, if it proved acceptable, that it should be immediately imposed, but with the intention that it should be a subject for discussion, for negotiation, for a rational approach to a solution of the problem, I could have understood it. One might as well have posed the question in this fashion: Do you believe that two and two makes four? It is obvious what the answer will be. We know what the majority will say, and we have a fair idea of what the minority will say. No doubt some of the Catholic minority who, in the circumstances of the terrorism, the murders which have been perpetrated, and all the horrors associated with the Ulster problem over the last few years—apart from the historic features of the problem with which most Members of your Lordships' House are familiar—may be inclined to say, "Yes, let us be associated with the United Kingdom". I have not the least doubt that that might happen. There might even be a few of the majority who might say that, in the long run—not in the foreseeable future—they could be associated with the Republic of Ireland. They might say that there could be reunification, provided that the circumstances were propitious and that there was no discrimination whatever. They might feel that they should all live together, and I could understand that. But are these questions—I put it very simply—really necessary?
I think I am justified in asking this further question. At the end of the day, what will happen? Let me furnish an illustration. Let me take the second question: "Do you want Northern Ireland to be joined with the Republic of Ireland, outside the United Kingdom?" I would ask the noble Lord, who will no doubt reply, to suppose that in reply to that question there is an affirmative answer. Let us suppose that, as a result of the plebiscite, a majority indicated their desire to be associated with the Republic. Are we to understand that

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the United Kingdom Government would immediately, or in the foreseeable future, take steps in order to implement that decision?
LORD KILBRACKEN: Yes.
LORD SHINWELL: My noble friend thinks that they would. But I have grave doubts about it, knowing some of the political history associated with this problem. In any event, in my opinion, it is most unlikely to happen. Therefore, once the plebiscite has been undertaken and a decision given, what will the Government do? It appears to me land the noble Lord may correct my impression if I am mistaken in this view) that if the decision is, as I expect it will be, in favour of continued association with the United Kingdom, it will emphasise the determination and resolution of those who are called the Loyalists in Ulster to hang on like grim death and never give way. It will rather harden their resolve not to give way on any account. Therefore it seems to me that this is a mistaken line of policy and one that should never have been undertaken. I do not suppose that the Government will respond favourably to the point of view that I am venturing to put to your Lordships, but that is how I regard the matter and I take a very realistic view of the whole situation.
I want to add one further point, in case there is any misunderstanding. I have no feeling of sympathy or compassion for those who have been responsible for the horrors which have been committed—none whatever. In my view, the bestiality has been horrific. My noble friend Lord Kilbracken said the other day that he thought it might lead to reunification, but I do not know. It sometimes happens that violence makes a contribution to progress, but I am not sure that it will happen on this occasion. But I ask the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, first: was it really necessary to embark upon this undertaking; and, second, having decided to embark upon it, what is to happen at the end of the day? I should like the noble Lord to furnish me with an answer which will clarify my mind, and the minds of other Members of your Lordships' House who are finding it very difficult indeed to understand whether this journey was necessary.
LORD SHACKLETON: I think we should debate the Amendment, because I regard it as a serious one. I explained my views at great length the other day and I hope that we shall take this Amendment seriously. My dislike of the Northern Ireland (Border Poll) Bill is such that I do not really see very much point in tampering with it at all, but there are certain obvious advantages in what is proposed in my noble friend's Amendment. We particularly pointed out the limitations of this particular set of questions, and we shall come on to that later. But it is arguable that something, if not exactly my noble friend's Amendment then something like it, might reveal some useful information. Where I have doubts—and I would say this to my noble friend—is that I am not sure whether taking the constituencies is not too blunt an instrument. My noble friend will correct me if I am wrong, but I take it that he means the Parliamentary constituencies.
LORD KILBRACKEN: The Stormont Parliamentary constituencies.
LORD SHACKLETON: I take it that they are smaller. Could my noble friend tell me the size of the electorate in each of the typical Stormont constituencies?
LORD KILBRACKEN: Not without notice.
LORD SHACKLETON: Well, there it is; we are in a slight difficulty. But I can see an advantage if the areas are reasonably small. Taking the Parliamentary Elections, if my recollection is right each county, so to speak, elects two Members, and these areas are very large indeed. There would be advantage in relation to the point which my noble friend Lord Beswick made; namely, that if there were to be small boundary changes necessary this might provide some useful indication. I happen to be rather against tampering with the Border. I am inclined to think that it is all or nothing at this moment. But this could come later; there could be such adjustments. And I think my noble friend's argument that this might mean more people taking part in the poll is of some interest. But as I said when we debated the whole principle of this Bill, I suspect that the Government are really anxious to get—I was going to say "the damn thing

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over". They realise it is very embarrassing, but they are committed. We know that they will not achieve anything other than to irritate and upset a large number of people, which may lead to violence; and, of course, we know what the result will be at the end of the day. It may be that my noble friend Lord Kilbracken can even give precise figures.
But having said all that, once again I say that I appreciate the Government are committed on this; and, therefore, attractive though in some ways I find my noble friend's Amendment, I suspect that at this late hour there is not very much more we can do about it. It may well be that when we come to the later Amendments, or the Question, Whether the clause shall stand part?, we shall be able to press the points made particularly by the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, and others, that the Government should publish their proposals as soon as possible. But I am very conscious that we shall be coming on to the Detention of Terrorists Order, which is a very important Order, and I observe the noble and learned Lord, Lord Diplock, and my noble and learned friend Lord Gardiner, who really will be able to give us some help on this, and therefore I do not think I will say any more at this moment.
LORD KILBRACKEN: May I give my noble Leader the information which I said I was unable to give him without notice? He will gather it from pages 90 and 91 of the Green Paper. There is a proposal for 75 constituencies, each having about 13,000 electors; so if there were 50 constituencies—
LORD SHACKLETON: Are these the proposals by the Northern Ireland Labour Party or by the Ulster Liberal Party? At any rate, I take my noble friend's point, and I am grateful to him.
LORD WINDLESHAM: I am in the hands of the Committee entirely. As the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition has said, we have still to come the debate on the Detention of Terrorists Order, which has not been debated by either House of Parliament and which is a matter of very considerable importance, and I know that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, and the noble and
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learned Lord, Lord Diplock, are hoping to speak on that Order. It would therefore seem to me that perhaps I should not engage in a protracted debate with the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, who has raised very wide and interesting considerations on this Amendment. In the debate on Tuesday I explained, within the context of the Government's policies as a whole, the reason why we believe it is necessary to hold the Border poll, and to hold it as soon as possible. The Amendment before the Committee in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Kilbracken, is on the much narrower point as to how the votes should be counted and the results announced.
The purpose of the Bill is to hold a poll to enable the people of Northern Ireland, and the people of Northern Ireland as a whole, to make known their wishes as to whether Northern Ireland, within its present boundaries, should remain part of the United Kingdom or should be joined with the Republic. It is the view of Her Majesty's Government, as I explained on Tuesday, that it would be undesirable to declare the results by individual constituencies or any other areas, and the Secretary of State is not planning to do so. The votes cast throughout the Province will be collected and taken to one or more central points for counting, and for the results to be declared. In our judgment, a declaration of the count by particular areas, whether Stormont constituencies or other areas, would very probably be taken by many people—even though I appreciate that it is not the intention of the noble Lord, Lord Kilbracken, that it should be taken in this way—as an indication that there was a possibility of redrawing the Border; and this, as he said, correctly, would be unacceptable to a large number of people in both communities in Northern Ireland, and would serve only to keep the Border issue alive.
Moreover, most responsible opinion—including, I believe, the Government of the Republic of Ireland—is against any redrawing of the Border, which would serve only to perpetuate a divide which they want to see bridged. I appreciate that the noble Lord. Lord Kilbracken, is not arguing along these lines himself. We believe that it would have that effect: he believes that it would not.
LORD BESWICK: The noble Lord is emphasising the unwisdom of declaring results. Is there any reason why the Government should deprive themselves of the information as to what the disposition of the different views is? Is it necessary to declare? Would it not be reasonable to have the information for the Government, at any rate?
LORD WINDLESHAM: As I mentioned on Tuesday, it is so difficult to understand, in the calm of this House, the intensity of feeling in Ulster on this issue. This is an article of faith to the majority community, that there would be a vote over Northern Ireland as a whole in which the people of Northern Ireland as a whole could vote on the Border, and nothing else. That pledge was given by the Prime Minister and was accepted by Parliament in March as part of the package of direct rule. It has been repeated on a whole number of occasions by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, and if he went back on that now, which he does not intend to do, the chances of him getting the confidence of the Protestant majority at a time when we depend on getting enough confidence to reach a settlement would be greatly negated. It is for that reason that we do not think it would be right to accept this Amendment.
LORD KILBRACKEN: I am grateful to the Minister for his reply, which I listened to with interest. I hardly expected that he would accept my suggestion. It may indeed be helpful to him in getting the confidence of the majority to keep the voting conditions as they are. I myself should have thought that it would help to gain the confidence of the minority, which is not without importance, if he changed the question along the lines I have suggested. But having been given this opportunity to ventilate this matter and having heard what noble Lords have said, I have no intention to press the Amendment to a Division, and I beg leave to withdraw it.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
6.10 p.m.
LORD KILBRACKEN LORD KILBRACKEN moved Amendment No. 2:
Page 1, line 14, leave out ("questions") and insert ("question")
The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 2. Amendments Nos. 2 and 3 are paving Amendments for Amendment No. 4. I hope that these three Amendments may be considered together. The effect of these Amendments would be to substitute a new, much longer Schedule for the existing Schedule which gives the form of the ballot paper on which the men and women of the Six Counties are going to vote at this poll, whenever it takes place. I know that we have an important debate to come and I do not want to keep distinguished noble Lords waiting, but I feel that this is an extremely important matter. I have already said at Second Reading that I regard this poll as being disastrous, largely because it is going to result in the complete polarisation of the people of Northern Ireland; it is going to drive the nationalists on the one hand, the loyalists on the other hand and those at present in the middle to the two extremes, because they are being presented with this completely stark, unqualified two-part question: Are you going to stay as part of the United Kingdom or are you going to join the Republic of Ireland? There are various ways in which the question could be modified so that it does not present such a stark alternative. It is those stark alternatives which I fear are going to lead to violence and resentment throughout the Six Counties.
My noble friend Lord Shinwell has already referred to the inadequacy and unsuitability of the questions as they exist at present. There are many people who will not feel inclined to reply "Yes" to either of them. The wild men on the extreme Protestant side who want a form of U.D.I. in the Six Counties cannot say that they want Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom, and certainly they do not want Northern Ireland to be joined with the Republic of Ireland. All they can do is to hand in a blank ballot paper. In order to modify it to some extent it might be possible to put instead a question of this sort: Do you want Northern Ireland to be united with the Repubilc of Ireland at some future date under conditions to be decided by the whole Irish people? Answer "Yes" or "No". At this point I want to mention that it seems to me to be wrong to have two questions, with the voter having to choose to which of those

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questions he can answer "Yes". That is not the normal, way in which a referendum or poll is taken. Normally, there is one question put to the voter; and he answers "Yes" or "No". That is the way I should like to see it here.
My own Amendment (which is probably worded wrongly) brings out certain points of principle which I hope your Lordships will consider. To begin with, it is far longer; but I do not think that that matters. I hold in my hand my polling card for the referendum which is taking place at this moment in the Republic of Ireland and on which I would be voting to-day if I were not speaking here. The most important question is being put to the people of the Republic is whether in Article 44 of the Constitution, Sections 2 and 3 should be deleted. In that case the question has to be written in two languages, English on the left and Irish on the right; and it takes up the whole of one page. It starts by telling you what Article 44 of the Constitution, Sections 2 and 3, says at present and how Article 44 will read if those sections are deleted. It then says that if you approve of the proposal, et cetera, mark "X" opposite the word "Yes" which is printed on the paper. The question occupies two complete pages of the yellow polling card.
My question is not as long as that, but in it I am trying to make it possible for people to see this issue in terms other than black and white; that there are various alternatives; that we are trying to find out which is the best one; and that the solution lies somewhere in the middle. I begin by a statement which I am sure the Minister cannot object to:
"The Government has pledged that no change shall be made in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland"—
and these were the words used by the then Mr. Attlee in the original undertaking given to the North—
"unless this has been shown to be the desire of the majority of its citizens."
Then I state:
"One way in which its Constitutional status could be changed"
Of course, there are many others
"is through political union with the Republic of Ireland."
I emphasise that governing such a union there will be conditions that we do not know about at present, and that these will be decided by the "whole Irish people".
Your Lordships will note that I have inserted the hypothesis,
"if the people of the Republic of Ireland agreed"
because I feel that whatever the Republic of Ireland may say in Article 2 of the Constitution claiming jurisdiction over the whole island of Ireland, it is still a little presumptuous to have a poll in the North in which one of the alternatives is political union with the Republic of Ireland. There has been no discussion, so far as is known, with the Republic of Ireland as to what they may think about this proposal. I should not like to presume that much; and so I put in the hypothesis that the conditions would be decided by the whole Irish people so long as the people of the Republic of Ireland agreed that such a course be taken.
Then in paragraph 4 of my Amendment I put forward some of the alternative ways in which this political union might take place. There may be many others. But I say that it is the whole Irish people who would decide on these details once it had been established that the majority of the people wanted such a union. The whole Irish people would decide whether the new State should be part of the United Kingdom. I do not know whether there is any reason why a 32-county Republic should not be part of the United Kingdom. I do not think it is very likely; but I do not know of any constitutional reason why it should not be if the majority of the people desire it.
They would decide whether the new State would be inside or outside the Commonwealth. That is a very much more serious suggestion. Of course, the Six Counties are already part of the United Kingdom, even more than being in the Commonwealth; but this is the kind of concession that might be given if it were going to lead to the possibility of reunification. In a month's time the Republic of Ireland is going to be in the E.E.C. The Republic of Ireland has always enjoyed enormous economic preferences in this country as though she were a member of the Commonwealth.
When bargaining is going on, each side must give a little, to try to find the middle course. I am not a member of any political Party other than the Labour Party in this country, but I should have thought that if reunification were on the cards, one of the easiest things to agree would be that this State might be inside the Commonwealth, if that is what the majority of the people wanted.
Then I go on to point out that it does not necessarily mean a sudden transfer to a single State capital in Dublin with complete and absolute powers, but that there are all kinds of halfway houses that might be inhabited. I point out that the new State might have a single seat of government which might be in Dublin or in Belfast. It might have regional governments in both existing capitals, with a National Government in one of them, or elsewhere. This is a federal solution of the kind which I have often thought might be the most promising; regional government in Belfast and Dublin, with a Federal Government somewhere on the Border, on the lines of Canberra in Australia or the District of Columbia in the United States of America.
Then there would be:
"such other legal and constitutional changes as might be found desirable."
I have already drawn attention in my Second Reading speech to the kind of things in the Irish Republic constitutional law which the North might find disturbing and things in the North which the Republic might find disturbing. Finally, having shown that there are different possibilities, I am able to put the matter simply, as a question:
"Do you approve of seeking such an eventual union?"
Union would not be immediate, but would occur at some time whenever it became possible.
"Put an X in the box marked, 'Yes' or 'No' as appropriate."
Nothing in the world would surprise me more than if my Amendment were accepted. But I think that points of principle have been raised which have been worth debating in this Committee and I beg to move the Amendment.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: I cannot agree with the
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noble Lord, Lord Kilbracken—I shall speak only for about three minutes. The Amendment is not compatible with the times in which we live. I agree with the noble Lord's sentiments with regard to the future advantages of having two regional governments which may eventually come together, and all that. What could be approved—of course this would be entirely up to Mr. Lynch—supposing we had a plebiscite in Northern Ireland and it was found that a large majority of the people wished to stay in the United Kingdom, would be a plebiscite in the South of Ireland, the question being, "Do you want to have the North of Ireland in the Republic of Ireland against the wishes of the North of Ireland?" I think that my noble friend Lord Dunleath suggested something like that the other day. Such a plebiscite would be possible: it is up to Mr. Lynch. But in the times in which we are living I do not think that Lord Kilbracken's Amendment is practicable.
LORD WINDLESHAM: I do not think that I should go over too much of the same ground in replying to this Amendment. I appreciate the careful thought which the noble Lord, Lord Kilbracken, has given to drafting this alternative schedule. I had an opportunity to talk with the noble Lord at length earlier in the week, and I think that I now understand better what is in his mind; and perhaps he understands better what is in the mind of the Government. I cannot say that we reached agreement because the noble Lord's outlook is necessarily different from our own. All I can say is that I can well understand, from his position, living in the Republic of Ireland and with his links with the nationalist community, that he is aware of that strain of thought in Irish politics which is a very strong one and has existed for many centuries. We are aware of it, too. When we debate the next item of business, the Detention of Terrorists (Northern Ireland) Order we shall be discussing the major source of grievance on the minority side and how we felt that we had to get over that hurdle.
As I explained on Tuesday, in the speech I made in opening the debate then, this is a matter which concerns the confidence of the majority community.

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In Stormont Castle, where the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has been for the last eight months, he or his Ministerial colleagues meet members of the majority and minority communities, actively engaged in pursuing some political objective or other, every day. In that time we have come to form a judgment. My right honourable friend has said repeatedly in the House of Commons that he does not claim that his judgment is any better than that of anybody else. But he has to make up his mind. He has been given the responsibility of trying to help to resolve this appalling conflict, and he has concluded that two of the essential prerequisites are, on the minority side to take account of internment, and on the majority side to have this plebiscite on the Border in the simple clear-cut way in which it has been presented to Parliament. The House of Commons accepted that argument and I hope that your Lordships' Committee also will accept it.
LORD KILBRACKEN: I am grateful to the Minister for his reply and, following his words, I should like to express my appreciation not only for everything that he and Mr. Whitelaw have done, always, I know, with great sincerity, but also for the time the Minister was able to give me in the discussion that we had earlier and the correspondence we had. There was one little surprise to which I would allude and which was perhaps unexpected. I think we understand one another: we are trying to find solutions in different ways. The noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, is on the Government side of the House and I am on this side; he is a Catholic and I am a Protestant—or at least mine has been a Protestant family since the time of Cromwell. I do not intend to press the Amendment, and with those remarks I beg leave to withdraw it.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Remaining clauses and Schedule agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported without amendment: Report received.
6.28 p.m.
Then, Standing Order No. 44 having been dispensed with (pursuant to Resolution):
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, I beg to move that the Bill be now read a third time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 3a.—(Lord Windlesham.)
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I do not propose to prolong the proceedings, but I think it ought once again to be on record that many of us do not like this Bill and we look forward to the package. Perhaps I might say to the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, who has the very difficult task of trying to balance things out and may not succeed in pleasing everybody—and sometimes may not please anybody—that the rest of the package proposals will also be of the very greatest importance to the minority and, one hopes, acceptable to the majority as well. We shall undoubtedly need to debate Northern Ireland again at no very distant date. Passing this Bill so quickly through these stages is not due to any lack of appreciation of the importance of the subject on the part of your Lordships' House. I think that we ought to regard this in the sense of a continuing dialogue.
LORD KILBRACKEN: My Lords, I do not want to intervene for more than a moment, and I do so with some reluctance. I have already expressed my deep-felt opposition to the Bill. I feel that it is highly divisive and, above all, is liable to cause increased violence in the North. For that reason, I very much regret that I cannot accept that the Third Reading should go through "on the nod", and I am going to oppose it.
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, I appreciate what the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, has said. I can assure him that there will be many further opportunities of debating Northern Ireland. The Secretary of State has made clear that this is a continuing flow of policy. There will be, as early as possible in the New Year, a White Paper, and the Temporary Provisions Act will run out at Easter. Northern Ireland is bound to occupy a good deal of time in our calendar next year.
I do not claim that the Bill before us will by itself solve the problems of Northern Ireland, but I do claim that it can contribute towards a solution by offering reassurance, and it should help

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to clarify minds. Some people will welcome it as an opportunity to reaffirm their wish that Ulster should remain part of the United Kingdom; others may want to indicate that it should become part of the Republic of Ireland. But either way, democratic expression of this kind is deserving of respect and attention. Moreover, the Bill honours a specific undertaking by the British Government. It is therefore important in itself, and as part of the process of reconciliation, which means working by persuasion and assurance rather than by continued confrontation.
On Question, Bill read 3a, and passed.

DETENTION OF TERRORISTS (NORTHERN IRELAND) ORDER 1972
6.32 p.m.
LORD WINDLESHAM LORD WINDLESHAM rose to move, That the Detention of Terrorists (Northern Ireland) Order 1972, be approved. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move the Order standing in my name on the Order Paper. In introducing this Order I am conscious that its provisions may cause unease in the minds of some noble Lords, in particular those who have been concerned with the administration of justice and those who have devoted much of their time to upholding personal liberty. It is particularly important, therefore, that I should explain the circumstances that have given rise to this Order. All along there has been in our mind the necessity to strike a balance between the right of the individual citizen to his liberty and the need to take steps to safeguard the lives and homes of people in Northern Ireland, for whose protection we have a responsibility.
When this Government took over in Northern Ireland earlier this year the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland assumed the powers that had been vested in Northern Ireland Ministers under the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 1922 and its Regulations. Among the powers were those under Regulations 11 and 12 which permitted detention and internment of persons by the Executive. My right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland decided not to exer-
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cise the power of internment. Indeed, he was able to release very substantial numbers of internees—something in excess of 700 people. He recognised, however, that the circumstances of Northern Ireland were such that the normal processes of law were inadequate—I shall say more on this later. My right honourable friend therefore reluctantly made use of—and made sparing use of—the power then conferred by Regulation 11 of the Special Powers Act to detain persons suspected of being terrorists. At the same time, we recognised the emotiveness of this issue, a primary source of grievance on the minority side, and were anxious to find a system that could be put in its place.
After much consideration the Government decided that on such a crucial matter expert and objective advice should be sought. Consequently, a Commission was set up, under the chairmanship of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Diplock, to consider what arrangements for the administration of justice in Northern Ireland could be made in order to deal more effectively with terrorist organisations. Since the Commission needed time to investigate and report, the Government were faced with the alternatives either of continuing to operate the provisions of the Special Powers Act until the Commission had reported and any recommendations could be embodied in law or to devise some interim measure which would remove some of the most objectionable features of the regulations made under the Special Powers Act. As I explained on Tuesday, we chose the latter course of action. The Detention of Terrorists (Northern Ireland) Order 1972 was made by Her Majesty the Queen in Council on November 1, and came into effect on November 7.
The Commissioners appointed under the Order, of whom there are three, each with judicial experience, began hearings on November 10. All cases of men already interned or detained under Regulations 11 or 12 of the Special Powers legislation, toalling 242 persons in all, were referred to the Commissioners by the Secretary of State, in addition to any new cases arising since that date. In the last month—that is, from November 7 until yesterday, December 6–43 interim custody orders have been signed, and the Commissioners have heard a total of 104

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cases. This has resulted in 37 person being released, and 67 persons being detained, with 13 cases adjourned for further hearing. It has therefore been possible in Article 12 of the Order before your Lordships this evening to revoke those parts of the Special Powers Acts which provide for detention and internment. Internment, as such, is now a thing of the past—and this cannot be said too often or too loudly.
My Lords, the remainder of the Order provides a system in which a case against an alleged terrorist is heard by an independent Commissioner whose decision, subject to appeal, is final. This is a far cry from internment by the Executive. It may nevertheless be asked: why is a procedure for detention needed at all? There is, first of all, the problem of intimidation of witnesses. I do not think I need describe specific instances to indicate the prevailing climate of fear. There have been cases when witnesses have been killed, and others when they have been beaten up. Is it really reasonable to expect a person who witnesses an act of terrorism to go to the police; to make a statement; to give evidence before the accused in a court of law, knowing that by so doing there is a risk that he might be murdered or that his wife or children might be harmed; or, if he is lucky enough to escape personal injuries, that he might suffer no more damage than his home being attacked? Nor can evidence be given in open court without prejudicing the sources of information, including intelligence services, informers, or any other source from which information may come.
Then, my Lords, there is the problem of dealing with those who organise terrorism, those who plan or direct operations but who do not themselves engage in terrorist acts—in firing the shots or in planting the bomb. In theory, they might be charged with conspiracy or membership of illegal organisations, but noble Lords will know the difficulty of obtaining convictions for such charges. The Order is drafted so that hearings before the Commissioners are in private, that the respondent and his counsel may be excluded during parts of the proceedings, that the normal rules of evidence need not be applied, and that hearings shall be before a Commissioner who has held judicial office or is a bar-
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rister, advocate or solicitor of at least ten years' standing in the United Kingdom. I must emphasise that the primary aim of the appropriate authorities is, wherever possible, to bring alleged terrorists before the courts.
If there are strong grounds for believing a person to have been implicated in terrorism, but the nature of the evidence is such that, for reasons that I gave earlier, it cannot be adduced in a normal court of law, an application may be made to the Secretary of State under Article 4 for an interim custody order. If granted, this will permit a person to be detained for a maximum of 28 days, although provision is made under Article 9 for the Secretary of State to release him earlier. If a person is referred to a Commissioner, the person must be so notified in writing, and he may continue to be detained until a Commissioner has determined his case. In addition, Part III of the Schedule requires a respondent to be served, not less than three days before the hearing, with a statement in writing as to the nature of the terrorist activities which are to be the subject of the hearing. This is another substantial improvement on the previous system, as is his right to be represented by counsel or a solicitor.
Article 5 of the Order sets out the matters on which the Commissioners have to satisfy themselves. Noble Lords may notice that there are two counts: first that the person has been concerned in the commission or attempted commission of any act of terrorism or the direction, organisation or training of persons for the purpose of terrorism; and, second, that his detention is necessary for the protection of public. Both of these conditions must be satisfied. In this way it can be said that the Commissioners do not exercise a punitive role but exercise a preventive role.
At this stage it may be convenient to say a few words about the definition in the Order of terrorism. Your Lordships' Special Orders Committee pointed out that this is a term new to the Statute Book. It is important that the definition should be wide enough to cover all acts of terrorism with which we are so familiar in Northern Ireland, yet not so wide as to be unacceptable in a Statute. Political ends have been included as an ingredient, but we have also thought it necessary to

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add the inclusion of any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public, or any section of the public, in fear. I do not believe that the definition is so wide as to put persons who are not terrorists at risk. There are the further safeguards. The House will accept that it is not likely that my right honorable friend the Secretary of State would make an interim custody order in inappropriate circumstances; nor will there be doubt in the minds of the Commissioners about what is intended by the definition of terrorism in this Order. Paragraph (2) of Article 5 provides that if a Commissioner is satisfied on the two grounds I have already mentioned, he shall make a detention order or shall direct the person's discharge. A Commissioner's decision is final, subject to an appeal by the respondent.
I should also draw your Lordships' attention to the fact that the provisions of Part III of the Schedule also contain safeguards for the person whose liberty is at risk. I have mentioned that a person may be represented by counsel or a solicitor. He may also give and adduce evidence and make oral or written representations to the Commissioner. The Commissioner has wide powers to receive evidence; to question any person, including the respondent; to summon witnesses; to require the production of documents and cause inquiries to be made. With these wide powers and sources of information, a Commissioner will have ample opportunities to determine the truth of allegations of terrorism. In Part III of the Schedule there is one other important safeguard for a respondent. If, for any of the reasons given, evidence is heard in the absence of the respondent, the Commissioner is required, so far as the needs of public security and the safety of persons permit, to inform the respondent, or his representative, of the substance of the matters dealt with during that part of the proceedings. A Commissioner is also allowed to order the payment of costs or expenses, including legal costs, to the respondent.
There is, my Lords, a right of appeal. Provision is made for a Detention Appeal Tribunal to consist of three (or a greater uneven number) members who, like the Commissioners, shall have held judicial office or be a barrister, advocate or solicitor of at least ten years' standing
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in the United Kingdom. We have been most fortunate in that a former Lord Justice of Appeal has agreed to serve as Chairman of this Tribunal. Under Article 6, a person may appeal to the Tribunal within 21 days of the making of the detention order against him. If he does so, a copy of the record of the proceedings before the Commissioners is passed to the Tribunal, and the appellant is entitled to receive a copy, excluding any part of the proceedings that took place in his absence. Provisions for the proceedings of the Tribunal are in line with those in the Commissions; fresh evidence may be permitted with the consent of the Tribunal, and the appellant may be represented by counsel or a solicitor. The Tribunal is a decisive body and, having heard the appeal, may either allow it and direct the discharge of the appellant, or dismiss the appeal.
I shall not describe in detail the other provisions of the Order, but I shall be glad to deal with any points which may arise in debate. This measure is not one that I take any particular pleasure in presenting to your Lordships. But most people believe that the special circumstances in Northern Ireland call for some special measures. As I have said, this system replaces internment by the Executive in the form in which it has been known in Northern Ireland for nearly half a century. The Order substitutes independent legally qualified persons to assess allegations of terrorism in place of the Executive, and gives those persons the necessary powers to enable them to reach the truth. This is a real advance.
My Lords, there is a temptation to think that any departure from established judicial principles must be a retrograde step. But terrorists in Northern Ireland, by using fear and brutality, torture and murder, have created conditions in which the courts cannot always operate effectively. We cannot, if we have any compassion or any sense of responsibility for the people of Northern Ireland, allow justice to be left on one side and countless innocent people put in physical danger or fear. The purpose of this Order is to get away from internment, which it does; to provide an alternative procedure where the courts cannot meet an acknowledged threat to society; and to do so in a way which permits the maximum possible safeguards to individual liberty. It

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is because I believe that the Order represents a step forward and, consequently, a step towards an eventual settlement in Northern Ireland, that I ask your Lordships—and with some confidence—to approve it this evening. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Detention of Terrorists (Northern Ireland) Order 1972, be approved.—(Lord Windlesham.)
6.50 p.m.
LORD DIPLOCK: My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, for permitting me to interrupt at this stage in the debate. I have spent most of the past seven weeks examining the nature and consequences of terrorist crime in Northern Ireland. I have nevertheless hesitated whether or not to intervene at all. But the Commission of which I had the honour to be Chairman has now presented its unanimous Report to the Secretary of State. Before it is published, it would be quite improper for me to anticipate its findings; and anything that I say to-day is based upon my personal experiences, not all of which could be shared by my colleagues on the Commission. It is said on my personal responsibility alone. It is not my intention to advance any arguments for or against this Order, but I thought it might be helpful for a consideration of its merits if I were to explain how, as it appears to me as a lawyer, the procedures contemplated by the Order differ in legal character from the former procedures under Regulations 11 and 12 which it replaces, and how they would operate in practice in the present pattern of terrorist violence in Northern Ireland.
To a layman, as to a lawyer too, it is easy to over-simplify; to suppose that in an emergency which threatens the life of the nation there are only two procedures for dealing with politically motivated crime: on the one hand, there is what is commonly thought of as internment, the imprisonment by arbitrary order of the Executive of those whom the police suspect of being a danger to the State; on the other hand, there is trial and sentence by a regular court of criminal justice applying ordinary rules of evidence and procedure to those who are proved actually to have committed a specific criminal offence. But these are two extremes. Between them there lies
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a whole gradation of procedures of which it is no more true to say, "This is internment under another name" than it is to say, "This is trial under another name".
May I try briefly to list what seem to me as a lawyer to be the essential characteristics of trial by a regular court of criminal law, and to examine to what extent they were absent in the old Regulations 11 and 12 and are present in the new Order. First: in a trial the accused must be proved to have done something which was a criminal offence when lie did it. This was not necessary under the former Regulations. Suspicion that he might be about to do any act prejudicial to the preservation of the peace or to the maintenance of order was enough. It is necessary under the new Order, since the detention order can only he made if the Commissioner or the Detention Appeal Tribunal is satisfied that the accused has been concerned in the use, or attempted use, of violence for political ends or in the direction, organisation or training of other persons for the purpose of so using violence. Any act which falls within this description is a well-established offence in criminal law, quite apart from any state of emergency.
Second: in a trial the guilt of the accused must be proved to the satisfaction of an impartial person or a jury who are independent of the Executive. This was not the case under the former Regulations, though it is right to say that there was an Advisory Committee to hear applications by internees for their release. It was under the chairmanship of Judge Brown, a county court judge of Northern Ireland whose reputation for integrity and sturdy common sense is quite outstanding. I should do less than justice to the work of his Committee if I did not put on record my conviction that in practice it did a great deal to mitigate the arbitrary character of the Regulations. In contrast, the new Order places the responsibility of deciding whether the guilt of the accused is proved on a Commissioner, on a Detention Appeal Tribunal, the composition of which my noble friend Lord Windlesham has stated. I would also pay tribute to some of those who have been appointed as Commissioners and whose great experience in trying criminal cases is something which it is very valuable to have.

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Third: in a trial the appropriate sentence is determined by the judge. This was not the case under the former Regulations. Under the new Order it is true the only sentence that can be passed by a Commissioner is one of detention, but it can be passed only if the Commissioner is satisfied that it is necessary for the protection of the public, which is itself a stringent test of its appropriateness. Fourth: in a trial the accused is informed in advance of what he is alleged to have done; is entitled to legal representation in the conduct of his defence, and can call evidence in support of it. None of these safeguards was provided for in the former Regulations; all are expressly laid down in the new Order.
Finally, in a trial the guilt of the accused must be proved to the satisfaction of the court by evidence adduced in accordance with the technical rules and procedures familiar in English and Northern Irish criminal courts. The new Order, in contrast, gives to the Commissioners a wide discretion to depart from these rules. Many of the rules which we follow in our criminal courts have no place in the criminal procedure of other European countries. Most European and at least some English lawyers would say that some of them are weighted too heavily in favour of the guilty and are not necessary to protect the innocent; but that is a general question which this House will no doubt debate when the Report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee on the law of evidence is considered. I express no view about it now, but this House ought, I think, to realise the practical impossibility of applying some of those rules in terrorist crime in Northern Ireland to-day.
One of those rules—the rule against hearsay—requires that the prosecution should prove the criminal acts of the accused by direct oral testimony in open court of witnesses who may speak only of what they observed themselves, not what was told about it to them by others; and they can be cross-examined widely on behalf of the accused. This is not practicable unless those who would be able to give this kind of evidence can be sure that to do so would not expose themselves or their families to risk of death or injury, or their homes to risk of destruction.
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My Lords, let me, as dispassionately as I can, give one example of the extent to which this can be guaranteed today in Northern Ireland. A bus was hijacked by three terrorists. The driver was able to identify them. Two days before he was due to give evidence at their trial two hooded men called at his house. The door was opened by his little daughter. They asked her "Where is your Da?" She called him. He came downstairs. As he came down they shot him dead in front of the little girl, who was wounded. In common humanity one has to use some method of proving guilt which does not risk disclosing to any member of the terrorist organisation the identity of those who provide the security authorities with information about terrorist crimes.
What this necessarily means is that the Commissioners must rely upon reports and information received from sources the identity of which cannot be disclosed to the accused or his lawyer, or indeed to the Commissioners themselves; and secondly, that there must be excluded from those reports any detailed information from which the accused might be able to guess at the source. This would not prevent the Commissioners from putting questions to the police officers by whom the reports were obtained, directed to ascertaining the reliability of the source, short of disclosing its identity, although such questions might sometimes have to be put in the absence of the accused.
I made it my business to study the kind of material which is available to the Commissioners in the form in which it is presented to them. My position as chairman of the Permanent Security Commission for the United Kingdom enabled me also to inquire, as the Commissioners cannot, into the actual identity of the individual source of each report. The principal offence for which detention orders are sought is the organising, directing and training of members of terrorist organisations in the use of violence. The identity and the functions of the officers responsible for these activities in each of the battalions and companies in which the I.R.A. is organised are widely known. In each of the cases that I examined, the information that a particular person was an explosives

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officer, training officer, quartermaster or, it may be, of a particular company, came from a number of separate sources. In one case it came from as many as 16, and it was possible to check that these sources were independent of one another and did not derive from a single common source. That check could, I think, adequately be made by putting questions which could be answered without disclosing the actual identity of any of the several sources.
In the great majority of cases the cumulative probative value of this material can, I believe, carry as much conviction of the guilt of the accused as that which I was accustomed to have after hearing the direct oral evidence given in open court on a charge on which a jury found a defendant guilty. I would not suggest that it can always be so great a safeguard against mistaken convictions as a trial in open court. Certainly since the hearing has to be in private and part of it perhaps in the absence of the accused himself, it can never appear to be so. But I am satisfied that a procedure of this kind can be worked in practice so as to make the risk of unjust detention very small indeed; and against this risk there has to be balanced the risk to the lives of witnesses who would be involved in public trial by ordinary procedure of some terrorist crimes in courts of criminal law.
7.6 p.m.
LORD GARDINER: My Lords, I speak as one who in general supports the policy of the present Government in relation to Northern Ireland. I do not trouble your Lordships' House very much in these days, but I thought that as I am the only surviving Member of Parliament who was a member of the Committee of Privy Counsellors who had to inquire into matters in Northern Ireland a little time ago and had to say that what was being done there was contrary to the law of England and contrary to the law of Northern Ireland and must be stopped, I should perhaps say something this evening.
In the first place, I think one cannot approach legislation of this kind, whether it is primary legislation or subordinate legislation, without considering
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those aspects of human rights which are law. Whether the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is part of the customary law of nations or not, we are, of course, bound by the Geneva Conventions and by the European Convention on Human Rights, but I think we should be well advised to pay heed in addition to the general temper of human rights which is happily, I think, increasing in the world, particularly in the developed countries. Last week saw the first conference called by the new British Institute of Human Rights whose constitution is in itself an advantage to this country and of whom I have no doubt we shall hear a good deal in time to come. This week, on Monday and Tuesday and last night, there were meetings in this building organised by the United Nations Association of those of informed opinion on three human rights subjects—immigration, the dependent territories and the status of women.
One of the things I think we must recognise is that all those concerned with human rights are no longer prepared to accept the old doctrine, very useful to Governments, that it does not matter how a Government treats its own citizens because it is a domestic matter which other countries and other people are not entitled to criticise. On Monday, Amnesty is starting a year's campaign against the increasing organised use of torture by Governments, both in the East and in the West, of their prisoners, particularly, though not exclusively, prisoners on religious or political grounds. This is an example of a case in which it is quite impossible for any country rightly to say, "This is of purely domestic concern".
Certainly a couple of years ago the Christian Churches held a consultation representative of all the Christian Churches, and among their conclusions was this:
"There is today a growing concern with the frequency with which some authorities resort to the torture or inhuman treatment of political opponents or prisoners held by them. There exists at the present time in certain regions of the world, regimes using systematic methods of torture carried out in the most refined way. Torture itself becomes contagious. The expediency of the moment should never silence the voice of the Church authorities when condemnation of inhuman treatment is called for."

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In the same year at the World Conference on Religion and Peace, which was a conference representative of all the world's religions, they said:
"The torture and illtreatment of prisoners which is carried out with the authority of some Governments constitute not only a crime against humanity but also a crime against the moral law."
It is bearing in mind the provisions of human rights that I approach this Order to-night. One thing which it expressly covers is how prisoners who have not been convicted of any offence are to be treated. The first observation I must make is that these regulations are, of course, an immense improvement on the existing situation, from the point of view of human rights. I need not go into detail about that, because the noble and learned Lord, Lord Diplock, has made it clear how great an improvement they are. We have, in effect, returned to the rule of law. I am particularly glad to note that so far as the position of prisoners is concerned, whether detained for the first 28 days or thereafter, their conditions are to be the equivalent of the condition of prisoners on remand. My Lords, that being so, I do not propose to take up your Lordships' time further—although there are points of detail—because an Order of this kind cannot be amended.
There is just one point to which I would refer. The noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, said on Tuesday:
"Certainly this is intended as an interim measure until the basic problem can be considered in the light of the Diplock Commission's Report when that is received."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 5/12/72, col. 237.]
Both as to that and as to any reconsideration of the details of this Order, there is one thing which disappoints me, and that is this. In the type of situation that we have in Northern Ireland, as in other emergency conditions, the view has been expressed by the International Commission of Jurists—of which I must make it plain that I am both a member and on their executive committee—that Governments may be well advised to allow on an emergency court or tribunal of some outside representation. They have specifically said this about Northern Ireland; they have given the same advice to the Government of Bangladesh in relation to war crime trials which they are contemplating and have urged them not to repeat Nuremburg in simply having a trial of the vanquished by the victors.
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I was glad to notice that on Tuesday both the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, and my noble friend Lord Shackleton, made complimentary references to the article or thesis by Professor Twining and Professor Palley and other members of Queen's University, Belfast. On page 26 of that document, dealing with the constitution of emergency courts, the learned authors said:
"This is clearly dependent on the wider issue of the control of security of law and order, but insofar as Northern Ireland is coscerned there would be clear advantages in ensuring the impartiality of any emergency court by the appointment of an external presiding judge, whether from Britain, Europe, or the Commonwealth, and in providing that all cases should be heard by a Bench of at least two judges or magistrates."
I do not know—perhaps the noble Lord can tell us—what number of judges it is proposed to have. For obvious reasons, I do not think that a Bench of two judges is ever very satisfactory; one would rather hope that there might be three. But if we are to have emergency courts and when the Government have time to review the existing Order, perhaps they will take this point into account.
The Order provides that all the Commissioners and all the members of any review tribunal must be United Kingdom lawyers. I believe that it would increase our repute both with the European Commission of Human Rights, and possibly too in America, if it were otherwise. I am not saying that in every tribunal the Commissioners should always have some external judge there at all, but if that limitation were removed, it would still be open to the Secretary of State to have nobody but United Kingdom lawyers. But why bind himself in advance? In the Commonwealth we have some judges not only of high standing in the Commonwealth itself but internationally well regarded. If one of them was available, I should have thought that it might be a good thing to have him as a member of an emergency court and possibly even of a tribunal review. I hope, therefore, that the Government will reconsider this point. My Lords, subject to those points—and properly concerned as I am for human rights—in the conditions which exist in Northern Ireland, apart from matters of detail, I see no objection to this Order.
7.17 p.m.
LORD KILBRACKEN: My Lords, in so far as this Order enables the Government to depart from the policy of internment, which has been the most serious mistake they have ever made and which in particular has prevented any conversation between them and the S.D.L.P., this Order represents some small progress forward and to that extent is to be welcomed. It is replacing internment and I should be grateful if the noble Lord could tell us now what is going to happen to those who are still interned under the previous regulations. I assume that in every case either they will be released or interim custody orders will have to be issued and the procedure set forth in this Order will have to be followed.
My noble and learned friend Lord Gardiner was able to say that he thought we had in effect returned to the rule of law. It is, of course, a step in that direction, but I wonder whether that view is not something of an exaggeration. There are certain aspects of the Order which still cause me very great apprehension. In the first place, it is clear that a suspect may be detained for 28 days without his case even being referred to a Commissioner. It cannot be said that this is a return to the rule of law because normally in any other part of the United Kingdom a person must be charged as soon as he is apprehended. Under this Order he can be detained, as I say, for a month without even being told anything about his alleged offence. If during those 28 days his case is referred to a Commissioner, the adjudication may be delayed for an indefinite period. It is nowhere laid down in the Order that adjudication must take place within a certain set period of time. Under ordinary conditions of law there may be delays, but surely it is particularly important when no particular charge has been laid that the case should be heard within a set time. Then again, if a man is found guilty, or is found by the Commissioner to be a suspect and appeals, the hearing of his appeal may also be delayed indefinitely. So the person may have to wait an indeterminable length of time before he gets even the diminished justice that he is given under this Order—diminished, that is, as compared with the ordinary procedure, though it is greater
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justice than he has been getting up until now.
What gives me greater cause for concern is the provision in paragraph 14 of the Schedule which allows the Commissioner to receive evidence,
"notwithstanding that such evidence would be inadmissible in a court of law."
I listened as carefully as I could to the very elaborate exposition made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Diplock, and he was comparing in great detail the differences between this procedure and the normal legal procedure. But the only point I thought he raised on this was that under this Order hearsay evidence would be admissible, and he thought that was justified. I have always accepted, much against my will, that in the present situation in Northern Ireland it may be necessary to permit certain legal procedures because of the dangers of intimidation, and for no other reason. I regret it, but I can see that the Government feel that to be necessary, and therefore I accept it. But I do not see any reason why evidence, that would otherwise be inadmissible, should be permitted unless it is in some way connected with intimidation; and I do not see why hearsay evidence, for instance, should be permitted in these courts. I am wondering—I have mentioned it in advance to the Minister—what other forms of otherwise inadmissible evidence it is intended to permit in these courts.
I have only one other small point, which would normally be a Committee point, but we shall not be having a Committee and we cannot move Amendments. It seems to me that the Order has a flaw which may be an embarrassment to the Government. Under paragraph (12) of the Schedule a respondent can be removed from the proceedings before a Commissioner owing to his disorderly conduct but he cannot be removed for disorderly conduct when his case goes up to appeal. Under Part IV (paragraph 25) only paragraphs 14 and 19 "with any necessary modifications" have any effect in relation to appeals. Therefore, I very much hope that none of the alleged terrorists who comes up before the appeal court misbehaves himself, because there is no way of removing him. That is a minor point compared with the principles involved. I hope the noble Lord will be able to

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reassure me on the points that do worry me. If he cannot, I am afraid I must express my opposition to the Order.
VISCOUNT AMORY: My Lords, I remember, when it was originally decided that internment had become necessary, that the whole idea was so repugnant to many of us that we felt very unhappy about it. Most of us recognised that there could be a situation where the defence of law and order might be in such danger that such a measure might be necessary. It was very difficult for a layman to decide whether the conditions that then existed were such as to make is absolutely necessary or not, but we gave the benefit of the doubt to the Government. Even now, with hindsight, it is very difficult for a layman to judge. What internment inevitably did was to provide a new grievance which was only too easy to exploit. We must all rejoice that now internment by decision of the Executive alone is to be a thing of the past. I think we are all extremely interested in what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Diplock, had to say to us just now, and also what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, said to us. It seems to me that the new arrangements have been devised in a spirit of great pragmatic good sense, and personally I should like to congratulate the Government on the Order they have brought before us this evening.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, in the light of the full and careful speeches we have had, there is really little for me to say. I have never concealed my objection to internment. My objection has been, if anything, more from the practical point of view of the disastrous political consequences, which I must admit I did foresee, although once internment was introduced I knew we could not get rid of it easily. I believe that this is perhaps the most crucially serious mistake that has been made. Therefore I am bound to welcome this Order, and I can welcome it a little more warmly than my noble friend Lord Kilbracken did, although I shall be exceedingly interested to hear the answers of the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, to some of his questions. As I see it, the problem with regard to removing the disorderly appellant does not arise, because, if I am correct, an appellant is in attendance
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before the tribunal only when the tribunal call for his attendance. Perhaps we shall get an answer to that question.
Bearing in mind that this is a careful set of proposals and that it represents a real improvement, I certainly should not wish to oppose this Order or to recommend any of my noble friends to oppose it. I am fortified in my view not only by the speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Diplock, but especially by the speech of my noble and learned friend Lord Gardiner, whose standing in the matter of human rights is as high as that of anybody in your Lordships' House or indeed in this country. The fact that he is prepared to welcome this Order seems to me to indicate that one could almost say that that is good enough for all of us, because he, after all, did stand up for the rule of law very strikingly when the question of interrogation methods came forward, and it was his Minority Report which the Government, wisely, accepted.
I can see certain possible difficulties, and in particular it would be useful if the Government could give an indication of how speedily this procedure will operate. We know that delays occur in the ordinary courts and that people may be locked up on remand for months; we have had one recent case to this effect. As I understand it, all the present internees are automatically in the position of someone with regard to whom it is deemed that there is already an interim custody order. It would be interesting to know how soon some of these cases will come for adjudication by the Commissioner. A great deal will depend on how speedily the new procedure is worked. It will be absolutely disastrous if there are delays which give rise to a feeling that this is just the old internment under a new name. I happen to believe that it is a great thing that at last the Regulations mentioned in paragraph 12 of the Special Powers Regulations are hereby revoked. I think we should not fail to emphasise that this Order is in fact a revocation of the internment provisions of the old Special Powers Regulations.
I am sure the House will echo the tributes to Judge Brown, and indeed, to all those who are carrying out the enforcement of law in Northern Ireland. I would just leave one further point with

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the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham. This Order is already in force, and has been for a considerable number of days. In fact I assume that interim custody orders are in force against everyone who was already in custody or in internment, and that all the cases of those in internment must already have been referred to a Commissioner, even if the Commissioner has not inquired into the case. But if in the light of this discussion and experience there are further improvements that can be made, I hope that the noble Lord will not hesitate to come to Parliament with an amending Order. I would urge particularly that the Government should give careful consideration to what would be a very small amending Order to make provision for what my noble and learned friend Lord Gardiner asked for in the matter of perhaps a Commonwealth judge, or some judge from abroad. It is this sort of act that is of such importance—of much greater importance than is sometimes apparent to those who are desperately coping with the situation, doing what they know to be right, but sometimes missing the important presentational angles.
I did not know that the Diplock Report had yet been announced, and it was unusual, if enjoyable, to have it announced by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Diplock. It would be interesting to know how quickly the Government can proceed on this, because it is of the greatest importance—and we stressed this in our debate the other day—that we should move into a position which is fully consistent with the law (I am not saying that this is inconsistent), and with the sort of provisions that are proposed in the Fabian pamphlet, to which tribute has been paid, and incorporated as a regular part of the law of the land. Any indication that the noble Lord can give with regard to that will be welcome.
7.32 p.m.
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who have spoken in this debate and for the reception that has been given to this Order. We have heard two notable speeches, if I may say so, from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Diplock, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner. In the light of the special study that the noble
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and learned Lord, Lord Diplock, has given to this subject in recent weeks, I suppose that he has greater wisdom in this matter than anybody else in your Lordships' House, and perhaps anyone else outside it.
As the noble and learned Lord said, he submitted his Report to my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland yesterday. We are most grateful to him for the remarkable speed with which he has considered a problem of great importance, and made recommendations for changes in the administration of justice in Northern Ireland. The intention is that the Report shall be published so that this House and another place can have an opportunity to consider the proposals it contains but, as noble Lords will appreciate, it is rather too soon for me to say when publication will take place. It will be as soon as we can arrange it. I take the spirit of what the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, has said; this is a matter of considerable public importance and political significance in Northern Ireland, and urgency certainly attaches to it.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, put the Order squarely in the context of human rights. He set a fairly stiff standard, and I was wondering how the Order was going to measure up to the yardstick he laid down. He said that he believed the new procedure to be a considerable improvement on the old one, and that in the main he felt that the safeguards contained in the Order were on the right lines.
The noble and learned Lord raised one point of detail in particular. That was the requirement in paragraph 2 of the Schedule to the Order, that a Commissioner should hold or have held judicial office in some part of the United Kingdom, or be a barrister, advocate, or solicitor of not less than ten years' standing. Paragraph 5 applies the same requirements in relation to the appeal tribunal. Clearly, in relation to work of this kind it is essential to employ the services of people with wide experience in a common law justicial context. This is particularly the case where, as here, evidence inadmissable in a court of law may be received.
As the noble and learned Lord said, the authors of the Fabian tract entitled,

453
Emergency Powers; A Fresh Start, which we had an opportunity to study well in advance of publication, made the suggestion, as others have done, that there might be advantage to be gained by drawing in people from overseas, perhaps from the Commonwealth, who have had judicial experience. We have been most fortunate in this respect in being able to secure the services as one of the Commissioners of a member of the Bar in the United Kingdom, but who has served as Director of Public Prosecutions, Solicitor-General and Attorney-General in the Northern Region of Nigeria, and subsequently as a judge of the Supreme Court of Nigeria. I appreciate that an appointment of this sort might not go quite as far as the noble and learned Lord is suggesting, but it helps to broaden the experience of the Commissioners. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, also asked me how many Commissioners there were. At the moment there are three, who sit separately, but there is no fixed number laid down in the Order.
The noble Lord, Lord Kilbracken, was good enough to give me advance notice of the questions which he raised and I am therefore in a position to reply fairly fully. Before he moved on to ask this series of questions he put one preliminary question which received art answer from his own Front Bench. As the noble, Lord, Lord Shackleton, said, the 242 people who on November 7 (the date on which the Order came into effect) were already interned or detained under Regulations 11 and 12 of the Special Powers Act were referred by the Secretary of State to the Commissioners. So all are now within the procedure set out in the Order. Indeed, something of the order of 100 cases have already been heard by the Commissioners in the four weeks during which the new system has been in operation.
The noble Lord's first question referred to the fact that a person could be detained for 28 days without his case being referred to a Commissioner. It is true that any system of criminal justice must make provision for the interim custody of the accused between arrest and trial. In the case of a criminal charge, this is dealt with by successive applications for the accused to be remanded in custody while the police investigations continue.
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Under the Order, the problem is dealt with by allowing the Secretary of State to make an interim custody order. The chief constable then has a maximum of 28 days to complete his investigations and decide whether he can prove his case before the Commissioner or not. If he then decides he has the necessary evidence he will refer the case to a Commissioner, and the date for the hearing is then in the hands of the Commissioner. If the chief constable decides that notwithstanding his suspicions he cannot produce the necessary evidence in the trial, he will not refer the case to a Commissioner, and the prisoner will be released in any event not later than 28 days from the making of the interim custody order.
I might add that the interim custody order will usually be made within 72 hours of the person's arrest, and a person cannot be detained in right of his arrest for more than a day or two. I should also say, although this is no part of the Order but an administrative safeguard, that applications for interim custody orders are by no means automatically granted by the Secretary of State. There is a thorough process of scrutiny before he, or anyone on his behalf, decides whether or not to sign one at all.
The second question related to a case being referred to a Commissioner and then possibly being delayed for a protracted period, or for an indefinite period. The noble Lord said that throughout this whole period the man may not know on what grounds he is being detained other than that he was suspected of terrorism. This is not the case. It is not true to say that the adjudication can be delayed indefinitely where a case has been referred to a Commissioner. It has to be referred to a Commissioner or not referred within the period of 28 days. Article 5(1) provides that where a case is referred to a Commissioner, a Commissioner shall inquire into it. If there were any undue delay in complying with this obligation, the High Court could then intervene by mandamus to compel compliance. It is inconceivable that any Commissioner would allow a trial to be delayed without some good reason. In practice, the work of the Commissioners is likely to be at least as expeditious as that of the criminal courts, and no such provision has ever been

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thought necessary with the ordinary courts of law.
Perhaps I might interject a reply here to the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, who correctly raised the question of this procedure working swiftly. There is always a period between arrest and trial where proceedings take place in the courts, and such is the volume of business and the burden on the higher courts in Northern Ireland at the moment that in Belfast the average period between arrest and trial on indictment—which covers all the more serious charges, such as explosives, firearms and so on—is five months. The new procedure should be much quicker than that. We hope that there will be no possibility of any period of that sort of time elapsing, and the fact that the Commissioners have in four weeks handled over 100 cases is an indication of the speed at which the new procedure can work.
The noble Lord's third question related, rather in the same way, to the possibility that if a man appeals the hearing might be delayed indefinitely. But the same considerations apply here as in the case of undue delay in adjudication by a Commissioner. Any unwarranted delay would be unlawful and could be stopped by the High Court. The noble Lord's fourth point concerned the question of inadmissible evidence, and I understand that the main category of inadmissible evidence is likely to be hearsay evidence. The rule against hearsay evidence was explained so cogently and fully by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Diplock, that I do not think it requires me to read out the explanation that I have here, which does little more than go over the same ground.
The noble Lord, Lord Kilbracken, asked whether there is any other form of inadmissible evidence. I understand that the hearsay rule is the most important point, and the noble Lord might like to read in Hansard the report of what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Diplock, had to say about it. But there are a number of other matters, such
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as the reception of a copy of a document instead of only the original. The final point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Kilbracken, was that a respondent's removal might be directed by a Commissioner on the grounds of his disorderly conduct, but not by the tribunal at times when he is entitled to be present. Paragraph 12(2) of the Schedule is much more emphatic than paragraph 23. It states not that the respondent shall be entitled to be present, but that he shall be present. It is therefore necessary in paragraph 12(2) to qualify this provision to exclude the case of disorderly conduct. By the same token, it does not apply the entitlement to be present for the purpose of being disorderly.
The noble Viscount, Lord Amory. who took part in our debate on Tuesday and whose contribution I know the Secretary of State has noted with interest, put his finger on the central political aspect of the change which Parliament is being asked to approve to-day that is, that internment in the form in which it had been, known before had become the central grievance of the minority community. So it was essential, as I explained earlier in the week, to break this particular log-jam if we are to reach a position in which we can hope to obtain sufficient confidence from the minority community to reach a settlement next year. I have covered the main points which the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition made in his closing speech. I hope I have not replied too fully, but the noble Lord, Lord Kilbracken, gave me advance notice of the points which he raised. All of us recognise that we are concerned here with highly delicate issues, such as the powers of the courts and the rules of procedure and evidence which exist to safeguard the interests of the individual and the liberty of the subject. We have to try to strike the right sort of balance. That is what this Order attempts to do, and I am grateful for the reception which it has had in your Lordships' House this evening.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

ROYAL ASSENT
7.45 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD HAILSHAM OF SAINT MARYLEBONE): My Lords, I have to notify the House, in accordance with the Royal Assent Act 1967, that the Queen has signified her Royal Assent to the following Acts:

Northern Ireland (Financial Provisions) Act,

Northern Ireland (Border Poll) Act.

WATER AND SEWERAGE SERVICES (NORTHERN IRELAND) ORDER 1972
7.47 p.m.
LORD WINDLESHAM LORD WINDLESHAM rose to move, That the Draft Water and Sewerage Services (Northern Ireland) Order 1972, laid before the House on November 21, be approved. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I should explain that this draft Order is a further part of the programme of legislation which it is necessary to carry through for the reorganisation of local government in Northern Ireland. We have already considered education and libraries, health and personal social services, and a number of other matters which arise out of the recommendations of the Macrory Review Body.
At present, the responsibility for water supply and sewerage services in Northern Ireland rests on 79 local authorities which vary greatly in size. Unlike the rest of the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland has not seen in recent years any major regrouping of water supply authorities. This fragmentation of responsibility provides little incentive to encourage the build-up of qualified teams of professional and technical staff; the economic use of expensive capital works; the introduction of modern automatic control processes, and the establishment of comprehensive maintenance programmes. It also leads to variations in the cost of services. It is for reasons of this kind that the Macrory Review Body recommended that water supply and sewerage services should become the direct responsibility of the Northern Ireland Ministry of Development.
Article 3 of the Order implements this proposal. It is the Ministry's intention to
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administer water services on the basis of four Divisions based on the major catchment areas in Northern Ireland. Each Division will be divided into a small number of sub-divisions which will deal with day-to-day matters. There will in future be an office of the new water organisation in nearly every major town in Northern Ireland, and these offices will work closely with the offices of other regional and local services. Although executive responsibility for water and sewerage services will be vested in the Ministry of Development from October 1 next, Article 5 requires the Ministry to consult with the new District Councils, and Article 6 provides for the Ministry to be advised by the Northern Ireland Water Council which will shortly be set up.
The existing law in Northern Ireland with respect to water supply and sewerage services dates back to the middle of the last century. The rest of the Order is, therefore, largely concerned with consolidating and updating the legislation which is necessary to ensure the proper provision of water supply and sewerage services. Parts III to VIII of the Order give the Ministry the necessary powers to acquire land and water rights and to carry out works. They deal with the provision of services to new consumers and new development, and set out the procedures which will govern the making of discharges of trade effluents to sewers. These provisions follow closely on the parallel legislation in Great Britain and pave the way for a considerable improvement in the organisation of water services in Northern Ireland. My Lords, I beg to move.
Moved, That the Draft Water and Sewerage Services (Northern Ireland) Order 1972, laid before the House on November 21, be approved.—(Lord Windlesham.)
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord. I must admit that when I was sitting on the Government Front Bench I found on occasion that I was called upon to explain policies with which I was not very familiar, and I found it a very educational experience. But I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, is getting a quite exceptionally broadly based education and will become an expert on many

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subjects. I am sure that he is helped in this by the excellence of the explanations with which he is provided to give to the House, not only in his speeches but also in these explanatory documents, such as the Proposal for a Draft Water and Sewerage Services (Northern Ireland) Order. It is extremely helpful to those of us who feel that we ought to show at least some interest, and see whether there is some very obvious point to which we should draw attention. Once again, of course, we are confronted with what is virtually a Bill. I do not know how long this process will go on, and I should not wish to claim that there is anything very much that one can do about it. But, as I say. I am impressed by the thoroughness; and, of course, a great deal of this follows very closely on the experience with regard to water legislation in Britain. So I certainly welcome the Order.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

MINES AND QUARRIES (VALUATION) (AMENDMENT) ORDER 1972
7.50 p.m.
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON rose to move, That the Mines and Quarries (Valuation) (Amendment) Order 1972, be approved. The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Order is of a technical nature. It corrects an omission in the Mines and Quarries (Valuation) Order

£ thousands

1968

1969

1970

Gross disbursements of financial aid

Bilateral Grants (including technical assistance)

939

835

1,286

Loans

8,601

10,313

9,332

Total

9,540

11,148

10,618

Outstanding debt on official loans at 30 June 1972

(a) Disbursed and still outstanding

81,655

(b) Arrears of principal and interest

4,883

In accordance with arrangements agreed by the creditor members of the Pakistan Consortium, Britain and Pakistan concluded an agreement on November 30, 1972, whereby payments due on official debt between May 1, 1971, and June 30, 1973 (which include the arrears referred to above) have been rescheduled for re-
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1971 for the purposes of the coming revaluation for rates. Like the Members of another place, I do not think your Lordships will desire a long explanation. Accordingly, I commend the Order to your Lordships. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Mines and Quarries (Valuation) (Amendment) Order 1972, be approved.—(Lord Mowbray and Stourton.)
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I fear I cannot do adequate justice to the eloquence and clarity of the noble Lord. Anything he proposes so winningly to us we accept without any doubt.
On Question, Motion agreed to.