Lords Sitting of 18 May 1971

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Coventry.

FLOATING RATE AND THE POUND STERLING
LORD FRASER OF LONSDALE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the first Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government with reference to the Answer given by the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, on July 15, last, about a floating rate for the pound, whether the further consideration—which he then foreshadowed —has been given to " making the present system work more effectively and more flexibly "; and, if so, with what result.]
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (EARL JELLICOE): Yes, my Lords. The International Monetary Fund produced a major report on the present exchange rate system last autumn. This concluded that the fundamental principles of the Bretton Woods system, based on fixed but adjustable parities, were still sound. At the annual meeting of the I.M.F. in September this conclusion was endorsed by Governments, who also agreed that three possible minor modifications in the direction of greater flexibility, identified in the report, might usefully be further studied. These further studies have yet to be completed.
LORD FRASER OF LONSDALE: My Lords, will my noble friend represent to the Chancellor of the Exchequer that it is desirable to make the pound more flexible or even free, and that there could not be a better time than now when the situation is " bullish "?
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I will of course convey to my right honourable friend the feelings which my noble friend has expressed. But doubtless my noble friend will have seen the views expressed
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by the Chancellor in another place on May 11.
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, does the noble Earl agree that if the Government now came out in favour of a floating pound, it would hardly be likely to appeal to M. Pompidou?
LORD HANKEY: My Lords, will the Government consider whether it might be better to see what happens to the mark before we try the same experiment with the pound?
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, may I expand on the perhaps rather sibylline reply that I gave to my noble friend, for those who do not follow these matters in another place with the close attention of some of us? I must explain that my right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer made it perfectly plain in another place on May 11 that Her Majesty's Government were opposed to a general system of floating rates. I should make it clear that the views which he expressed at the I.M.F. annual meeting in Copenhagen, which were along the same lines, were shared by other Governments.
LORD FRASER OF LONSDALE: But, my Lords, does that necessarily mean that he is right or, indeed, that he has proved to be right these last 10 years?
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I would not claim infallibility even for myself, let alone for somebody else. But I think it is a fair presumption that he may be right.

MORECAMBE BAY BARRAGE STUDY
2.40 p.m.
LORD FRASER OF LONSDALE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the second Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what progress has been made in the feasibility study of the Morecambe Barrage scheme.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT (LORD SANDFORD): My Lords, the Water

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Resources Board, who are responsible for the feasibility study, have now received reports from the Morecambe Bay Economic Study Group, the consulting engineers (Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners) and the Natural Environment Research Council. The Board recently visited the area and discussed various possibilities of storage in the estuary with those immediately concerned. The possibilities, which include a full barrage right across the Bay, smaller barrages crossing the Kent and Leven estuaries and pumped storage reservoirs off the Cartmel Peninsula and Silverdale coast, are all described in the Board's Seventh Annual Report. They, and combinations of them, all have advantages and disadvantages. These are now being weighed. The Board hope to publish their Report in the summer.
LORD FRASER OF LONSDALE: My Lords, in view of the considerable shortage of water which now exists in the North-West, and the potential shortage which is likely to become a very real problem to this land, can the noble Lord say when the Government are likely to make up their mind to get on with this admirable plan?
LORD SANDFORD: Yes, my Lords. My right honourable friend the Secretary of State for the Environment expects to reach decisions next year on a programme for the development of water resources in the North up to the end of this century.
LORD POPPLEWELL: My Lords, will the Report which is to be published this summer give an indication of the likely cost, which will be the most important factor in deciding whether to go ahead? Also, will the Government give an assurance that they will look very sympathetically indeed at providing considerable financial assistance, in order to bring to fruition some of the projects that will be reported upon?
LORD SANDFORD: Yes, my Lords. Of course. the relative costs of all these schemes are among the advantages and disadvantages which will have to be weighed.
LORD INGLEWOOD: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend to bear in mind that, however admirable some of these
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schemes may be from an engineering point of view, there are a number of people who live in the area whose interests must not be overlooked when the interests of those who will need increasing supplies of water are being considered. There must be some balance found between the two.
LORD SANDFORD: Yes, my Lords. I think my original Answer indicated clearly that it is those who are immediately concerned who are alrady being consulted, and their interests will be borne in mind.
LORD WYNNE-JONES: My Lords, can the noble Lord tell us whether the Government are also carefully studying the problems of desalination, because it seems that one has a number of alternative ways of getting water which would be fit for use throughout the country? As this is so vital a matter for the whole country, it would be interesting to know what the Government are doing about it.
LORD SANDFORD: Yes, my Lords, I can confirm that; but if the noble Lord wants any further details, I should prefer him to put down a Question.

ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
LORD KENNET: My Lore s, I beg leave to ask the first Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows
To ask Her Majesty's Government what progress there has been towards an agreement on a system of safeguards to be operated by the International Atomic Energy Agency for the enforcement of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; and how it is proposed the system should be paid for.]
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN): My Lords, I am very glad to say that the International Atomic Energy Agency has recently reached agreement on the way in which safeguards will be applied in non-nuclear weapon States party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This agreement is a significant step towards the effective implementation of the Treaty. The arrangements

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for financing the cost of safeguards have also been agreed, subject to endorsement by the International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference. These are somewhat complicated, but, briefly, the Agency's safeguards cots will continue to be met from the Agency's regular budget, though the method of assessing the burden on individual States has been adjusted to take account of the position of countries with lower per capita incomes.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, are the system which has been agreed upon and the method of assessing finance which has been agreed upon published; and, if not, will they be? Subsidiarily, can the noble Marquess tell the House anything about the share of the cost which would fall upon, for instance, this country?
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, as to the first part of the noble Lord's supplementary question my impression, though I speak subject to correction, is that these will be published after the General Conference. As for the second part of the noble Lord's supplementary question, as I explained to him the financial arrangements are very complicated, but it is estimated that by 1975 the United Kingdom's share of the total budget of the I.A.E.A. will be something in the region of 6 per cent., or perhaps just over.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, can the noble Marquess confirm that the system of safeguards is, then, to be adopted bindingly by an international conference before any draft of it has been published?
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, I think I should require notice before answering that question, because I should not like to mislead the noble Lord on this point. But I will, if I may, let him know.

SOVIET UNION AND FISSILE MATERIAL PRODUCTION
2.45 p.m.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the second Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what pressure they are putting on the Soviet Union to allow the same international inspection of the production and distribution of fissile material as is allowed in this country and the United States.]
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, Her Majesty's Government naturally hope that the Government of the Soviet Union, which has been a staunch supporter of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, will offer to accept safeguards in common with the United Kingdom and the United States. However, this is a matter for the Soviet Union, and, as a nuclear weapons State, it has no obligation under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to accept safeguards.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, can the noble Marquess tell the House why this country and the United States should go beyond their obligations under the Treaty while another nuclear weapons signatory does not do so?
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, as I said, we are still hoping that the Government of the Soviet Union will take the same action in this matter as the United States and ourselves. We have done so because we are anxious to preserve unanimity and, indeed, amity among the States which are parties to the Treaty. As I say, it is still our hope that the Soviet Union will take the same action as we have taken.
LORD WYNNE-JONES: My Lords, does not the noble Marquess think that it is even more urgent to bring China into this agreement, and would not the admission of China to the United Nations be an important first step?
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, I think that this is really another question, although it is one of great importance.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, would the Government agree that there is a difference between hope and pressure, and that when a Government have been hoping for something for four or five years it may he time to change gear and go into a phase of pressure?
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: I will certainly undertake to take note of what the noble Lord has said on that point.

BUSINESS: INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BILL
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I do not know whether the noble Earl the Leader of the House or the noble Earl the Chief Whip can make a statement about business to-day. in particular about the domestic arrangements.
EARL ST. ALDWYN: My Lords, the Committee stage of the Industrial Relations Bill will be adjourned at 7 o'clock in order to take the Fire Precautions Bill, which I do not think will take very long, and we shall then resume consideration of the Industrial Relations Bill. Is the noble Lord really asking how late we are going to sit to-night? This is a little difficult to forecast at the moment. I am hoping that we may be able to conclude a reasonable number of Amendments before we rise, and perhaps we could discuss this through the usual channels.
LORD BYERS: My Lords, would it be possible to give the House some indication of what is expected of it? If we are really going to embark on all-night Sittings, it would make a great deal of difference to the convenience of the House if some indication could be given as to what the Government hope to achieve during the course of the evening.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I should certainly like to add my words to those of the noble Lord, Lord Byers. I think the noble Earl should remember that it is not only the convenience of noble Lords in the Chamber which should be considered. We have been supported by a most dedicated staff, and I am certain we should all like to pay a very great tribute to them, as they are working under terrible strain, and I think that strain is added to by the uncertainty as to when their hours will cease and in the
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decision as to the methods by which they are to get home. I should have thought that the noble Earl would ease their particular burden, which I think is perhaps in some respects more important than that of noble Lords in this House, if he could be a little more forthcoming about the time and the position he is aiming for in this Bill.
EARL ST. ALDWYN: My Lords, usually when we have been dealing with long Bills of this sort it has been possible to have consultations through the usual channels and to be able, as a result of those consultations, to announce what the House hopes to do. If we can establish that I should be only too happy to acquaint the House and everybody else with the result of those discussions.
LORD BYERS: My Lords, may I put it to the noble Earl that it would be useful if there could be an indication from the Government as to what they think is a reasonable target to achieve? And may I make a plea to the Opposition that they should do all they can within the powers of revising and improving the Bill, to try to hit that target by the time suggested?
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords. I should like to echo what the noble Lord, Lord Byers, has said. I fully recognise what is the convenience of the House.,; and I would endorse what the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd. has said about the staff. I think they have served us quite extraordinarily well these past weeks and I have already paid tribute to them, as has the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition. But I am glad to take the opportunity of doing so again. My own feeling, in default of the normal consultation which we have had in the past on this sort of matter—and I fully realise the difficulties in the case of this contentious Bill—is that it would not be an unreasonable aim that we should be able to tuck Clause 58 under our belt by the time we draw stumps this evening or to-morrow morning.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I am most grateful for that information. I intervened only because I could not accept on behalf of my noble friends an implied criticism of the noble Lord, Lord Byers. We on this side of the House have a job to do, and we intend to do it.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, both the noble Lord, Lord Byers, and I myself would like to echo those sentiments. Clearly this House has a very important job to do in connection with this Bill, and I think it is the duty of us all, and the inclination of us all, to do that job as thoroughly, within reason, as we can.
LORD ALPORT: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend whether, in view of the indication which came from the Opposition Front Bench, earlier this week or late last week, that there would be an opportunity for discussion through the usual channels in regard to a timetable, there has been any progress in regard to those discussions? Would not my noble friend agree that for the proper conduct and consideration of this Bill it is most important that discussions within this House should take place at a reasonable hour, when the Members of your Lordships' House are able to be here in reasonable numbers and when we are capable of dealing properly and thoroughly with subjects that were not properly discussed in another place. Would it not be possible to have an arrangement between the Government Front Bench and the Opposition for some timetable which ensures that we would be able to complement and carry out effectively the work on this Bill which has not been completed in the other House?
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, the sentiments which my noble friends have expressed are those which are held by a great many Members of your Lordships' House. I can only re-echo what I said before: that we, for our part, are very open to discussions with the Opposition, and indeed with the Liberal Opposition, as to how most rationally our future debate on this Bill can be organised so that the House can acquit itself as I am sure we would wish to see it acquit itself in the discharge of its functions.
LORD WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, may I ask the Leader of the House whether the Refreshment Department has been asked to serve breakfast to-morrow morning?
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, the precise position is that they have been asked to be prepared to serve breakfast.
LORD SLATER: My Lords, the noble Earl said that he expected to get to Clause 58. I think it would be as well to bring home to the noble Earl that, so far as this Bill has proceeded, Members on this side of the House cannot be charged with trying to filibuster on this particular Bill. As a result of the Guillotine procedure in another place, many of the clauses contained in this Bill were never debated there so that responsibility comes back on to this Chamber and the Members of this House.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I note what the noble Lord, Lord Slater, has said, and I would have thought that there was nothing in my remarks this afternoon which bore any implication of filibustering. But perhaps, in the context of the Anglo-French talks which are due to take place very shortly, I can only add, in French: Qui s'excuse, s'accuse.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, would the noble Earl please translate that into English. I am not aware that foreign languages, even French, are permitted in your Lordships' House.
LORD BYERS: My Lords, would it not be a reasonable translation to say, " If the cap fits— "?
LORD SALTOUN: My Lords, from time immemorial other languages, particularly Latin, have been permitted not only in your Lordships' House but in the Commons as well.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BILL
2.57 p.m.
THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (LORD DRUMALBYN): My Lords, I beg to move that the House do again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, That the House do again resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The LORD MERTHYR in the Chair.]
Clause 35 [Application to Industrial Court relating to procedural provisions]:
LORD CHAMPION LORD CHAMPION moved Amendment No. 238U:
Page 27. line 19, leave out ("Industrial Court ") and insert ("Commission on Industrial Relations").
The noble Lord said: Here we begin to examine a number of clauses with the fundamental principle of which we are in some agreement. Not only is the Opposition in some agreement but the T.U.C. also is in some agreement with the fundamental principles embodied in these clauses. This is not to say that either the Opposition or the T.U.C. necessarily favour the way the Government are proposing to set about taking remedial action where procedure agreements are non-existent or defective—to use the words on the heading of the appropriate clause.
On the statement of the attitude of the T.U.C. to this Bill, the General Council of the T.U.C. said in March last that the T.U.C. has never suggested that industrial relations are entirely satisfactory or that the Government could not help to improve them. The trade union movement is in favour of industrial as well as social change, and the Trade Union Congress has persistently drawn attention to the need for improvements in the machinery and the content of collective bargaining. Anyone, from the Donovan Commission down, who has had occasion to look at the machinery of collective bargaining in industry will be only too well aware that the picture is a very patchy one indeed. In some industries employers and trade unions have nego-
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tiated an elaborate machinery of negotiation which on paper seems to be perfection itself, and the only imperfect thing about it is the imperfection of the people who operate the machines. That cannot be a criticism of the procedural arrangements themselves.
In that category I would put the agreement of the British Transport Commission and the railway trade unions, an agreement covering negotiation from the station or depot level up through many stages to the topmost railway staffs national tribunal. That machinery of negotiation has been built up over a century of trial and error and gradually, as a result of experience, has been improved to its present high standard. That is not to say that there are not complaints from time to time about the slowness of its operation, but such delays as do occur are inevitable it circumstances in which appeals to higher bodies from decisions of lower bodies are possible, like the system of courts and appeal to higher courts, which are essential to justice. Delays are thereby caused, but the delays are a consequence not of failure of the system but, in so many instances, its very perfection.
On the other hand, there exist outmoded, outdated and inefficient procedural arrangements which are a hindrance to reasonable negotiations rather than a help. In this connection we must always have regard to the fact that perfect machinery in an industry in which the employer and the trade unions are continuously at loggerheads will never solve that industry's labour problems. Having said all that, I am bound to concede that the chances of securing good industrial relations are the better with efficient procedural machinery. That leads me and, I hope, the Committee, to examine the clauses which follow with a view to seeing whether they are the best that can be devised and, if not, what can be done to improve them.
The first Amendment we have put down to Clause 35 is one which seeks to leave out " Industrial Count " and replace those words by " Commission on Industrial Relations ". What is the procedure for the examination of negotiation arrangements in a given case under this clause? First, the Secretary of State, or the parties, or one of the parties, as defined in subsection (2) of the clause

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makes an application through the Industrial Court. It seems that the Court, with the tasks imposed upon it by the terms of this Bill, will be continuously employed and under very heavy pressure. If the Secretary of State makes the application it will already have been through the mill of examination by him in consultation with the parties. If one or more of the parties make the application, the Secretary of State will have been advised of the intention and all the steps outlined in subsection (4) of the clause will have been taken.
All this will result in all applications, before they reach the Industrial Court having gone through a lengthy and pretty thorough examination. I should have thought that the Court would have very little option but to submit the application to the second stage; namely, that of the Commission. The Court's decision will almost invariably be automatic. If the Government accept our Amendment, one stage in the procedure to be followed will be cut out and the application will reach the Commission very much earlier than would otherwise be the case.
Throughout all the progress of this Bill up to this point we have stressed the fact that the weight of legal machinery which will bear so heavily on employer-employee relations is bound to be inimical to this relationship. If I were the Secretary of State I would go through this Bill with a fine tooth-comb looking for a way of reducing the legal institutions and procedures which have to be followed under the Bill with a view to their drastic reduction. We shall have bearing down on industrial relations, if the Bill goes through in its present form, the Industrial Court, the Commission, industrial tribunals, the Industrial Arbitration Board and the Chief Registrar, to say nothing of the ordinary courts of the land from which employer-employee relationships will not be wholly free.
In my opinion, to lessen that number of institutions would be wholly advantageous. This Amendment is not designed to cut out those institutions at this stage, but to remove one of them from one of the stages to be followed under Clause 35. Under the Amendment the application would go directly to the body best fitted by experience and
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knowledge to decide whether the application should be entertained and the preliminary steps will already have been taken. This would result in a shortening of the proceedings leading to the formulation of proposals by the Commission. The question I wish to ask in moving this Amendment is: why not short-circuit the procedure by permitting the application to be made directly to the Commission and not having to go to the Industrial Court? This appears wholly reasonable. It would be an improvement in the Bill. I sincerely hope that we shall have a favourable reply from the noble Lord who is to reply to this proposal. I beg to move.
3.6 p.m.
THE MINISTER OF STATE, HOME OFFICE (LORD WINDLESHAM): It might be convenient for the Committee if I come in at this stage, but not to try to shorten the discussion. I think it might well be necessary to reply to detailed points, but Clauses 35 to 41 are not straightforward. They are designed to deal with a particular situation and, as the noble Lord, Lord Champion, has accurately described, a very carefully set out procedure is envisaged. In order to avoid the possibility of misunderstanding, it might be as well if I describe what this part of the Bill is trying to do and how it will work in practice.
The effect of this Amendment and of the whole series which are linked to it would be to remove from the Bill the special procedure which Clauses 35 to 41 provide to deal with particularly intractable problems in industrial relations. The Amendments would eliminate that procedure and revert to the present system under which a reference to the Commission on Industrial Relations can be made only when both sides agree. Both outside and inside Parliament a great deal has been made of the argument that Clause 35 could inflict damage on industrial relations in general and on the Commission in particular. I shall seek to argue that those allegations are without foundation.
The first point I make is that the provisions in Clauses 35 to 41 do not replace the present arrangements for voluntary references to the Commission. These have continued since the present Government came to office and the Secretary of

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State has made additional references. In Clause 116 there is provision for the Secretary of State to make voluntary references to the Commission where the parties are willing. So this procedure supplements the voluntary procedure in the later clause to which I have referred. The Government have no intention of abandoning the present method.
The procedure set out in Clauses 35 to 41 is to meet a different purpose. This is designed, first, for use only sparingly to deal with the unusually intransigent situations in which the normal processes of industrial relations such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration and so on have proved unavailing. Accordingly, the provisions of Clause 35 are very carefully drawn. The situations to which it applies are confined to those within a single firm or units of two or more closely associated employers who share the same procedural arrangements. We can discuss that further on Clause 41.
The problem must be one where the development and maintenance of orderly industrial relations is being seriously impeded or substantial amounts of working time repeatedly lost owing to the absence of agreed procedures or the existence of defective procedures in the sense of agreements the terms of which are disregarded. Situations of this kind are fortunately not common but when they do arise it is important that there should be some way of dealing with them. That is the aim, purpose and justification of this exceptional procedure to meet the exceptional case.
Let me explain how it will work. In doing so, I will, as the noble Lord, Lord Champion, did, go a little wider than Clause 35 because it will help to shorten our discussion on Clauses 36 to 41 which are consequential on it. Any trade union which is involved, or the employer or the Secretary of State, can apply. Before the employer or the trade union applies, subsection (4) of Clause 35 says that they must give the Secretary of State the chance to mediate and, where appropriate, to offer a voluntary reference to the Commission under Clause 116, but before the Secretary of State applies himself subsection (3) requires him to consult with the parties in exactly the same way. This means that, whatever the inadequacies, misunderstandings or other causes that may have provoked the problem, the
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Industrial Court will not have any role under this clause before the parties have had a chance to come together, and if they cannot see a mutually acceptable solution to their difficulties, at least to agree on seeking expert advice from the Commission or in some other way. Only if they are too widely divided even for that will the Industrial Court become involved.
This is my first answer—I think it will continue in our debate—to.the noble Lord, Lord Champion, of bringing in the Secretary of State, of bringing it the manpower and productivity services of his Department, of bringing in his conciliators at the earlier stage to see whether they can prevent the procedure from going any further at all; and, secondly, to offer them the opportunity of a voluntary reference to the Commission on Industrial Relations, which can be done under Clause 116 without bringing in this procedure in Clause 35 at all. So at this stage the role of the Court is still very limited. It must satisfy itself that the situation is in fact one serious enough to qualify for the Clause 35 pi ocedure; and if it is, then the Court must ask the Commission to examine it and to recommend remedies.
The next phase is that the Commission should formulate any recommendations it makes—that is, having looked at the plant, having tried to find out what is going wrong—in such a way that they are capable of having effect as a legally enforceable contract. But that does not mean at this stage that they will automatically become legally enforceable. The parties will be free to negotiate about this under Clause 37, in exactly the same way as in the ordinary course of collective bargaining. The only difference will be that under Clause 37(3) the Commission will have a duty to promote and assist their discussions on its recommendations with a view to securing their acceptance voluntarily. If it succeeds, the Commission will accordingly report to the Court, and there under Clause 37(4) the matter will rest; the procedure will be extinguished and will come to an end.
But even should the Commission's expert guidance fail at this stage to get one or both of the parties to see sense, they still have one further chance. The Commission must report its findings and

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its recommendations—what should be done to put the situation right—to the Court. Then, within six months any of the parties, but not the Secretary of State, may ask the Court for an Order imposing recommendations on both sides as a legally enforceable contract. So here again they have another six months in which to come to terms. Finally, before it makes the Order, the Court must satisfy itself that one is necessary to secure acceptance and observance of the Commission's recommendations. Then at any time after if one of the parties can satisfy the Court that the Order is no longer necessary, the Court may revoke it under Clause 40.
Let me repeat the assurance that has been given many times in the debates in both Houses by the Secretary of State and others, that the Government's aim is to strengthen the framework of collective bargaining by encouraging the proper exercise of responsibility both by managements and by unions; and, as I have shown, at every stage of the arrangements which this Part of the Bill provides there are opportunities for the voluntary adoption of procedures for settling disputes and grievances formulated under the expert guidance of the conciliation staff of the Department of Employment and of the Commission on Industrial Relations, so as to be, in the words of the Donovan Report, comprehensive, clear, effective and speedy.
Nevertheless, there are these problem areas which have to be faced up to if improvements are to be achieved. We are talking—I want to stress this again—about the particularly troublesome situations to which this Part of the Bill will apply, and these will inevitably include some where, despite the advice and expert attention and the other help I have described, irresponsible attitudes nevertheless endure. We can all agree, I think, with the Donovan Commission, and with the General Council of the T.U.C., to which the noble Lord, Lord Champion, referred, that sound procedures have a vital part to play in the reform of industrial relations; and we are confident that in most cases it will be possible to make the necessary changes by agreement. So this procedure is a last resort. It is where the parties are unwilling or unable to come together for this purpose.
3.17 p.m.
LORD SLATER: I thought that when the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, rose to reply to the speech of my noble friend Lord Champion he was rising to the occasion to say he was going to accept the Amendment. But what he has given is an exposition in regard to how effective the clause, as the Government see it, will be once it is brought into operation. and what the Government are attempting to do. The noble Lord made reference to the conciliation officers within the Department of the Secretary of State. When one looks at this particular clause and at the Amendment which has been submitted and is under consideration at the moment, I think the situation is this. I have always found that procedure is the root cause of the vast majority of problems inside industry to-day. I am more convinced than ever that if we had a better form of procedure many disputes would never arise. Up to now, I cannot see this Bill improving the situation. One of the difficulties, as I see it, is that the Government see procedure as being concerned simply with disputes, whereas really it is a two-way exercise.
Let me say to the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, that if management want to introduce a new system of working or, for that matter, to have a change in the pattern of working, or a variation in the labour force, the procedure should exist to enable the workpeople affected to be fully informed. Joint consultation is one of the most important aspects of the progress in or ratification of any agreement that may be drafted and entered into as a result of talks, bargaining or negotiation. As I see it, it is to the benefit of an industry—no matter what type of industry it is—that such a principle should apply. If it does not apply the situation can lead only to suspicion and discontent. It has to cope not with just wages, but with a wide variety of problems. It is concerned with human problems. People working in industry will have at the back of their minds that any stepping out of line could lead them into court.
I submit that in dealing with these human problems the less recourse one has to the law the better. If I had to choose between being forced—and that is what this clause means—or making an application to the Industrial Court and the Commission on Industrial Relations, then

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I would choose the latter. Provision is made, as I understand it, under Clause 3 that the Secretary of State consults first in relation to the parties who are seeking to make the application. But before such a stage is reached, I think it is only right and proper that the parties to the agreement should have consultation. How anybody can think, whatever type of conciliation machinery may exist inside industry, that by reverting to the Industrial Court before exploring all avenues good relations will come to pass, leaves me at a loss.
Whatever we do in the preparation of legislation of this nature, let us never forget that we are dealing with people. We all know that we do not think alike on many issues; nor do we act alike. Speaking personally, after much experience in negotiations, I have no room for disruptive elements. But even these can be contained when the right approach is made. One can appreciate that, if we are to have this type of legislation, some form of body must be set up and operated. But when the court is set up as it is in this Bill, then the ordinary individual becomes rather sceptical, and for different reasons. Rather than to allow such a Court to act, I should prefer the sentiments of the Amendment moved so ably by my noble friend. I could go on to develop the argument, but I will conclude by saying that, while the noble Lord made an effective reply to the speech made by my noble friend, I would still ask him, as representing the Government, to accept the Amendment.
3.23 p.m.
LORD TAYLOR OF MANSFIELD: I think the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, gave a reasonable explanation of what is in the mind of the Government. But did I understand him to say that the position in the event of a dispute between the parties has now been reversed? Did he say that. in the event of a dispute, any of the parties. instead of going initially to the N.I.R.C., will go to the C.I.R., who will then report to the N.I.R.C.? If that is what the noble Lord said—and I may have misunderstood him—that really is in conflict with Clause 35 of the Bill. Perhaps the noble Lord will clear that up when he comes to reply.
I support this Amendment. There is not a great deal in it, because it is only moving the onus of who shall decide on
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the terms of the dispute, wehter it should be A or B. The reason why I support the Amendment is quite simple, and it is equivalent to the stand tint I have taken all the way through since the Second Reading of the Bill in y our Lordships' House. I think the proposition, so far as the establishment of the N.I.R.C. is concerned, is a profound mistake. No doubt the Government are doing it in all good faith and, from their point of view, for every good reason, but, as I say, I think it is a mistake. I have not believed, and I do not believe—and I do not think there is much chance of my chz.nging my opinion on this point—that the proposed N.I.R.C. is the body to improve industrial relations.
I want to make my position on this matter abundantly clear. I believe, and have done so for many years, that industrial relations are best left to those who know most about them, and in my humble view, that will not be the new N.I.R.C. The best people to deal with the intricate and delicate problems concerned with industrial relations are those who are in daily contact with them. I have said previously that in this sphere of industrial relations there is the vital element of human emotions. I do not believe that this proposed new body, the N.I.R.C., composed as it will be, will deal adequately and satisfactorily with this delicate problem of human emotions.
This clause, like so many clauses in the Bill, is putting on a pedestal the efficacy that the law will have in sweetening industrial relations. What has been revealed ever since we debated the Bill on Second Reading is that there is a difference between the two sides of the Committee. This is not to be regretted: a difference of opinion is a good thing; if the world was all sunshine it would be all desert. But it is obvious during our debates that there is this conflict of opinion between the Government and noble Lords on this side of the Committee. This is not to be regretted; it is not to be criticised. But the mere I hear of it, as I see it it is not only a. conflict, but at the moment an irreconcilable conflict.
The purpose of this Amendment, as I understand it, is simply this, that if in the opinion of the Secretary of State or any other party, as the noble Lord indicated, something has gone wrong with a

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procedural agreement or any other kind of agreement, either party may bring the N.I.R.C. into the picture. The operative word, as I see it—and perhaps the noble Lord will give a little attention to this when he comes to reply—is "may ": the action of the Secretary of State is optional, not obligatory; he may do this, he may do that. I do not believe that this is the best way of resolving disputes of the kind that the Government have in mind in putting this clause in the Bill. I believe profoundly that the risk is, when a matter of dispute is brought before the N.I.R.C. with all its legal paraphernalia and setup, that all that they will be able to arrive at will be an imposed solution; and an imposed solution in circumstances of dispute in industry, as we all know, could well poison the atmosphere and do irreparable damage.
In the event of a dispute it would be much better to get an agreement between the parties. This is where I rather detect a shift by the Government in the light of what the noble Lord had to say, and, if I may say so, I enjoyed his observations on this particular matter. I am sure he agreed—it was implicit in what he was saying—that it is much better to get an agreement between the parties than to refer the matter to the N.I.C.I, too, agree with that.
May I, in conclusion, in supporting the Amendment of my noble friend say this about the C.I.R. I am sorry about one thing in the Bill, that the Government are seeking to alter the functions of the C.I.R. As it was laid down by the Donovan Commission, I thought it was an admirable subject, a great idea, something new in the field of industrial relations. In the short time that it has been in operation there is ample evidence of its willingness, of its capacity and of its success in improving defective industrial relations. With those few words, and thanking your Lordships for your patience, I have pleasure in supporting the Amendment.
3.33 p.m.
LORD WINDLESHAM: I am grateful for what the two noble Lords who have spoken have said and for the concise way in which they have put their views. This bears out the comment made by the noble Lord, Lord Slater, just before the Committee resumed. This Amendment
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and several others were tabled in the House of Commons and debated there very fully in Committee; some of the ground was covered again on Report when the new Clause 5 was debated. The noble Lord, Lord Slater. made the point that one must not become preoccupied, in considering this subject. with disputes. But this particular clause of the Bill does come into effect, of course, only where there is a dispute. It is quite clear in Clause 35 that this is a procedure which applies in a situation of dispute, and what is more, in a situation of serious and continuing dispute. In Clause 35(5) one of the criteria that have to be fulfilled is that
" the development or maintenance of orderly industrial relations in that unit has been seriously impeded, or there have been substantial and repeated losses of working time in that unit."
The noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Mansfield, asked me the procedure in a dispute situation when either party made an application to the Court. He asked, could they go first to the Commission. As Clause 35(1) says, the procedure is that either party can make an application to the Court, but he must consult the Secretary of State before he does so, and at that point the Secretary of State offers his conciliation services. That is the meaning of the words at the top of page 28 in paragraph (a): and, secondly, towards the end of paragraph (a) noble Lords will notice that the Secretary of State may refer any question to the C.I.R. Therefore, at this stage he can refer to the C.I.R.. but only if the parties are willing, because the only power by which he can do it is under Clause 116.
If they are not willing, we then go further to the next stage, which is the mandatory reference, and that mandatory refernce can only be made by the Industrial Court. This touches on perhaps one of the central points here: that we do think it is desirable to distinguish between the C.I.R., which has the function of investigating and advising, and the Court, which has the judicial function. As I explained, and I do not want to go over the ground again, this is the special procedure for these exceptional cases. The criteria in Clauses 35(11 and 35(5) both have to be fulfilled. We are, therefore, thinking about a situation bad and where, after a time, one or both where industrial relations are consistently

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of the parties will not agree to a voluntary reference. But, as I have explained, the procedure has been carefully evolved. It is somewhat complicated, but I think it is clear when it is studied. I think the best way to illustrate it is to liken it to a long straight road, well signposted, with several exits that can be taken by the parties if they wish to do so before they come to the final conclusion of a court order.
3.39 p.m.
LORD CHAMPION: We realise that this clause is going to have a very limited application, or at least we would expect it to have a very limited application, and that it would apply only in those cases where clearly there was so much dispute and trouble between the parties that there is no other way of getting a procedure agreement. That, as I understand the noble Lord, is in fact the case. This Amendment was an extremely limited one, although it did call from the noble Lord a Second Reading speech on this part of the Bill. I am rather glad my noble friends did not make it; otherwise they might have been criticised in all parts of the Committee had they dared to do that. But I am going to say I thought it was justifiable. I hope later on that I shall be making a Second Reading speech on the next clause that I shall be dealing with, Clause 42, and I hope the noble Lord will enjoy it. I think his answer has been reasonably satisfactory and I therefore ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD CHAMPION LORD CHAMPION moved Amendment No. 238V:
Page 27, line 27, at end insert (" has been had by one of the parties").
The noble Lord said: I shall move this Amendment briefly. Its purpose is to make it a condition that, before an application can be made to the Court under subsection (1), recourse to industrial action must have been taken by one of the parties to the agreement. If paragraph (b) were left as it is, an application could be made to the Court even though the parties to an effective agreement had honoured it. I hope that this brief explanation will enable the noble Lord to reply. I think that there is some substance in this Amendment, but I hope that he will give me a reply without too much
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of a Second Reading speech. I beg to move.
LORD W1NDLESHAM: I take the comments of the noble Lord in the friendly spirit in which they were intended. I think your Lordships will agree that when we start on a new Part of the Bill it is helpful to explain what it is all about and how it works. I will try to be as brief as the noble Lord in replying to his Amendment, which, alas, whether intentionally or not, is not so innocent as it looks. Of course, this procedure applies both to employers and to unions. Let us look at the wording of paragraph (b). A union can hardly impose a lock-out, while an employer cannot take strike action, so both are a comfort. But the effect of this Amendment, of inserting the words proposed by the noble Lord, would confine the operation of paragraph (b) to the parties to a procedural agreement, to the employers or the union or some other union if it became involved, but would exclude unofficial industrial action—wildcat strikes—where called without the authority of one of the parties; for example, without the authority of a union which was party to the agreement. Therefore it precludes unofficial strike situations, which many of these would be, and this would nullify the purpose of this subsection.
LORD CHAMPION: I am bound to accept the explanation which the noble Lord has given. This clearly has a limited application and having regard to that, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD CHAMPION LORD CHAMPION moved Amendment No. 238W.
Page 27. line 28, leave out from ('action ") to end of line 29.
The noble Lord said: This is another Amendment which I can move briefly. Its purpose is to cut down the time of an application which could he made where there lead not been strike action because of the definition of "regular action short of a strike ", which could include bans on overtime where there was a contract to work overtime. This could widen the field for the Secretary of State or the employers applying to enforce agreements. Paragraph (b) clearly ought

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to have the limitation that I am proposing placed upon it. It would do something, to which I can imagine the noble Lord may object; it would narrow the field here. But I think that in the circumstances this would be justifiable. I beg to move.
LORD WINDLESHAM: I do not think that there is a great deal between us here. The words " irregular industrial action " have a specialist meaning and are defined in the Interpretation Clause, on page 116. This refers back to Clause 31(4). which sets out the types of action included within these words. We believe, on the whole, that where we are talking about the exceptional procedure under Clause 35. it is better to be specific and refer to lock-outs, strikes or irregular actions short of a strike—which term also has a specialist meaning in the Bill—rather than use the general phrase of industrial action. This is one of the gateways, together with subsection (5), which will start off this procedure and we think it better to specify these one by one.
LORD CHAMPION: We have got what I was seeking. an explanation of this point on the Record, and I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
3.46 p.m.
LORD CHAMPION LORD CHAMPION moved Amendment No. 238X:
Page 27, line 30, leave out ("or intentions").
The noble Lord said: The purpose of this Amendment is to remove from paragraph (b) of subsection (1) the word " intentions ", because as the clause is now drafted, even if the industrial action had not breached an agreement, an application could still be made. On the one hand, the Government are making agreements legally binding, and for this they have exemption clauses like Clause 32; but now in this clause they are attaching importance even to the intentions that lie behind an agreement. It is always possible, I suppose. to say that certain intentions are implicit in any agreement. Perhaps I do not know as much about that as I ought to do; but I am not a lawyer. What I do know is that constantly in Parliament, in relation
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to Acts of Parliament and to Bills, we are reminded of the fact that what matters is what is in the Bill; not what the Minister responsible for the Bill said, and not what possibly were his intentions. That seems to me to make good sense, because eventually Acts of Parliament have to be interpreted by people who cannot see into the minds of Ministers who introduced them. And in the cases that we have here under review, people cannot hope to see what were the intentions of the parties who entered into the agreements. Surely what has been found to be the case in relation to Acts of Parliament must also apply to agreements.
It could be argued that to work in here the suggestion that a court should have regard to the intention of those who made an agreement which is legally enforceable would serve to improve a legally enforceable agreement. because a great deal of thought would have to go into it, to try to ensure that the wording would stand up to being interpreted in a court. Perhaps the noble Lord may put a different gloss upon the words. which may help me in my consideration of whether or' not to withdraw the Amendment. But certainly I do not like the paragraph in its present form, which imports into a Bill that is to become an Act of Parliament that somebody's intentions must be taken into consideration. I beg to move.
LORD SHINWELL: Would the noble Lord in replying explain the distinction between " terms " and " intentions "? In my interpretation, subject to any correction by the noble Lord, " terms " is a term which is more precise: it relates to facts. But " intentions " would seem to indicate something rather different. There may be something in the minds of the Government about this, and I think we ought to know what is behind it.
BARONESS GAITSKELL: When the noble Lord replies from the opposite Benches, would he use his best endeavours —another favourite phrase of the Government in this Bill?
LORD LEATHERLAND: This is an old hobbyhorse of mine. I recollect addressing your Lordships about a year ago during the course of one of the Matrimonial Bills before your Lordships'

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House, on which occasion it was proposed that the learned judges, in interpreting Acts of Parliament, should have the assistance of the relevant paragraphs in the report of the Law Commission; and I remember arguing at that time that in my view it was wrong. I was overruled, of course—I go through life being overruled—but I recalled that on many occasions in my younger days, when reporting cases in the courts, I had heard learned judges say, " We are not concerned with what the Minister had in his mind when he introduced this Bill; we are not concerned with what he said on the public hustings; we are not concerned with what he said in the House of Commons. We are concerned with the words that are in the Act of Parliament." The learned judges then proceed to try to the best of their ability to interpret the actual words that are in the Act of Parliament. Sometimes one judge can take one view, and on another occasion another judge can take another view; sometimes the Appeal Court overrules them. But if we are to depart from the actual wording of a statute we shall have absolute chaos when it comes to the interpretation of that statute.
LORD BURNTWOOD: Last night when we were dealing with Clause 32 I tried, unsuccessfully, to move an Amendment which would allow for the words " or construe " to be embodied in that clause, so that the court might exercise their right to place their own construction on the circumstances surrounding the signing of the agreement. Now it is proposed by the Government to allow the intentions to be taken into account, which I suggest is just as hazy a definition as was argued against last night. Where is the consistency in this?
LORD WINDLESHAM: In the cases we are discussing either there is no procedure agreement in existence, or there is a procedure agreement in existence which is defective and which is not working satisfactorily. Where this is the case I think noble Lords opposite with experience in the trade union movement would agree that it is often because the agreement itself is sketchy and inadequate. It may be the result of long custom and practice. Even in some quite large undertakings employing substantial numbers of workers some procedure agree-
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ments are little more than a few notes scribbled on the back of an envelope; and in another place the Secretary of State pointed out that many procedure agreemeats in British industry are wrongly phrased and consequently are inadequate in practice.
One of the recommendations of the Donovan Commission was that procedure agreements should be notified to the Department of Employment and Productivity, and since the implementation of this recommendation some 277 companies have been invited to notify their procedure agreements. These have been receiving careful study. I have inspected a cross-section and they vary from extremely full and clearly woreded documents in booklet form which are handed to each employee, to three sentences on a half-sheet of paper merely confirming what has been agreed over a period of years by custom and practice. Therefore, where there is a particularly inadequate procedure agreement—and this is the sort of situation which has been envisaged in this part of the Bill—it may be necessary to look to the intentiors of the parties to establish some crucial matters, such as what groups of employees it was intended that the agreement: should cover, and employees working in which parts were regarded as being covered or not being covered.
The noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, asked me about the meaning of the word " terms ". When the Bill refers to the terms of an agreement it refers to the contents of the agreement. When it refers to the intentions, the reference i; to what the parties intended at the time. The noble Lord, Lord Leatherland, spoke of the courts, but of course where the courts have something that it is difficult to construe in terms of wording, they do have to look at the intentions. The parallel I would offer to the Committee is the example of wills, where a testator produces a very badly drawn up will which is difficult to interpret and the court have to try.to look at the intentions behind it.
LORD LEATHERLAND: May I interrupt the noble Lord on that point? I am sorry to be so discourteous, but wills are not really a relevant comparison. The man who made the will is dead, and you cannot get at him to ask him.

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" What were your intentions? Was the phraseology defective or not? " In this case the men are all alive and still working in their factory, so I hardly think that to compare this with the interpretation of wills is justifiable.
LORD WINDLESHAM: I accept that, of course. There are differences in any analogy that is offered, but I hope noble Lords will try to follow the argument here because I think it is a point of substance and importance. The parallel is valid to this extent, that where there is a document which is in such general terms, which is so unspecific that it is really not possible from the wording to say what it means, one may have to look at the intentions. This brings me to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Champion, who spoke of interpreting Acts of Parliament. We know how much trouble is taken with the drafting of Acts of Parliament. The whole art of draftsmanship is to be precise, to remove any possibility of doubt; but in many procedure agreements, and particularly those which are giving rise to the situation which we are envisaging in this clause, there are literally three sentences.
Therefore I think it is wise to leave in the fact that the court can look to the intentions as well as the content of an agreement. But we must bear in mind that some of these procedure agreements can be oral. This was discussed at considerable length last night. Collective agreements may be oral, they may be arrangements of custom and practice, and here again it would be wise to inquire into the intentions of the parties if the words they have used—perhaps many years ago—to express themselves were not clear.
LORD SHINWELL: I am anxious to be convinced, because I do not think we ought to make heavy weather of some of these amendments, but I am bound to say that the reply given by the noble Lord is not convincing. Perhaps he will recall his original argument. My interpretation of what he said is that it is likely that an agreement may be inadequate in character. But then he proceeded to define the meaning of " terms ", and he said that " terms " means the content of the agreement. If the content of
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an agreement is inadequate, then possibly there can be no agreement about it. At some time one party or another will object to the agreement because of its inadequacy. Therefore why put in the word " intentions "?
In my view, what the noble Lord should do is to withdraw the word " terms " and leave in the word " intentions ", because then it is wide open: It provides for inadequacy it provides for something that is precise, or something that is imprecise. But to have both " terms " and " intentions " appears to me to involve a contradiction, and may give rise to a great deal of confusion. I am not sure that the noble Lord is convinced about this matter himself. I see he is nodding his head, so perhaps he will now give a reason, because so far none has been forthcoming.
4.0 p.m.
LORD CONESFORD: I should have thought that if the words were left as they stand at present, " terms or intentions of that agreement ", they would be inerpreted as meaning the actual terms or intentions, that were inevitably involved in the terms and could be deduced from the terms. I should not have thought that the word " intentions " would import something that could be derived from some other source than the terms. " Terms or intentions " is a very common legal expression, but I think the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, will bear me out when I say that the obvious way in which these words will be construed—I am not staying there is anything wrong with them—would be that terms or intentions are used in this sense, namely the actual words or what is involved in these words and can be deduced about intentions.
LORD LEATHERLAND: Far be it from me to argue with the noble Lord. Lord Conesford. He said that " intentions " is derived from the terms, therefore the terms include the intentions. If that is so, why complicate the situation by having the word intentions " in the measure?
LORD CONESFORD: With respect, I do not think it does complicate it; rather, it completes it. " Terms or intentions " is a very natural expression for conveying the meaning that I described
LORD CHAMPION: The noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, said, rightly, that sometimes these things—these documents, if they can be called documents, that set out the procedure agreements—are very sketchy and very inadequate. This gives point to the argument we have been having throughout the last three clauses of this Bill, about the difficulty of the language used. As I see this clause, these words may have to be interpreted, in the first place, by one of three parties, or more.
LORD SHINWELL: May I interrupt my noble friend? I am sorry to interrupt but I think I am on a point of substance. Now that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has arrived, he may be able to explain the matter more adequately and to satisfy the Committee. Will my noble friend direct the attention of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor to the subject, in order to obtain what might be called a high, legal interpretation?
LORD CHAMPION: If the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, wants to ask the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor something on this point I wish he would direct the question directly to the noble and learned Lord who is, of course, always capable of giving adequate replies, sometimes at very great length, to the points put, from this side.
I was saying before my noble friend interrupted me that three parties initially may very well have to interpret the word " intentions ". As I understand it, one party might be or would he the Secretary of State in some cases, it may be the employer, it may be a trade union, it may be more than one trade union involved here. I think that difficulties will inevitably arise as the result of leaving the word " intentions " in here. Unlike my noble friend Lord Shinwell, I prefer " terms "' to " intentions ". I think it is a little clearer. It would he more easily understood and easier to interpret. I do not want to continue this discussion overlong. This is a minor Amendment. But I shall want to study carefully what the noble Lord has said between now and the Report stage, because if I find on examination—and one cannot always get all that one would like out of an argument across this Table—that the answer
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does not satisfy me on this point, I shall have to return to it on Report. in the meantime—
4.3 p.m.
LORD SHINWELL: I am not interrupting. If my noble friend has completed his argument, I have been invited to direct the attention o the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor to a somewhat, hat confusing point. May I now take the opportunity and, with great respect to the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, who perhaps has not got the legal expertise that is in the possession of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, direct the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor to the point? Would he note in paragraph (b) that the argument is about the words on line 30 " terms or intentions ".
Now the argument that has been produced so far is that we should either rely on the word " terms " or on the word " intentions ", but that the word " terms " is preferable. We understand from what the noble Lord, Lord Windleshiam, said in the course of his argument that the difficulty is that an agreement may be inadequate in character and therefore the term " intentions " is required in order to ascertain whether there is something behind the application. I venture to suggest to the Committee that we can either have the word " terms ", which is precise, or we can have the word " intentions ", which is imprecise but is otherwise of a wide-ranging character into which anything could be injected. That is the position as I understand it, and I wonder whether the noble ant. learned Lord the Lord Chancellor can remove any such confusion as exists in my mind, if not in the minds of your Lordships?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (Lord HAILSHAM OF ST. MARYLEBONE): I do not think there is any confusion in the noble Lord's mind.
LORD SHINWELL: Do I urderstand the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor to be saying that there is no confusion in his mind, or that there is none in mine?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I thought there was none in the noble Lord's mind. I would add for good measure there is none in mine, either.
LORD SHINWELL: Well, this is a new development. The last thing I would wish to do is prolong the argument. I have established general assent to my submission. Questions have been directed to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor in the course of our deliberations, and in the knowledge of noble Lords he has been called upon to interpret the legal aspects of this proposed legislation. Now, when he is asked a simple question arising from what is confusion, at any rate in my own mind, he is convinced that there is no confusion in my mind and that, for him, is an adequate reply. If I may say so, that is treating the Committee with contempt and we ought not to tolerate that kind of behaviour. Indeed, I would hardly have expected that kind of behaviour from the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor. Or do I understand that he is not prepared to answer a question when it is put to him? If that is the position, what is the use of proceeding any further?
I do not know whether what I have said would persuade the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor to reply. If not, I shall have to consult the Law Lords who sit on the Cross Benches, as I understand the noble and learned Lord Chancellor is ready to do, because in the course of deliberations last night he offered to consult with the noble and learned Law Lords. I shall have to have recourse to that process in the absence of any reply from the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor. Does he wish me to proceed? If not, I will sit down and await his reply.
THE. LORD CHANCELLOR: I have replied to the question. The noble Lord asked if I would remove any confusion in his mind. I said on this occasion I thought there was none.
LORD CHAMPION: The noble Lord, Lord Shinwell casts a very pretty fly. The noble and learned Lord has not apparently risen to it in the way the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, would have liked. We can cast a fly. We cannot ensure that a salmon will rise to it. I was coming to the end of what I had to say and I was going to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
4.10 p.m.
On Question, Whether Clause 35 shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD CHAMPION: This clause decides the principle, and the following clauses up to 41, as the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, has said—or at least I understood him to say—are the machinery clauses stating how the Court, the Commission, the Secretary of State and the parties are to act in pursuance of the principle. The Government have included these clauses ostensibly in furtherance of the unexceptionable principle, which is to ensure that there shall exist within all suitable industries and services adequate procedures for the remedy of grievances and the conducting of negotiations on salaries, wages, conditions of service and other comparable matters. There is running under the surface of all that a belief—probably quite mistaken—that there is a lack of suitable machinery and negotiating procedures, which results in the short but often costly unofficial stoppage of work.
I must, however, qualify that by saying that in some cases the very slowness with which an otherwise suitable procedure agreement works results in frustrations and annoyances which, coupled with other frustrations, lead to short stoppages, usually at local level. Seldom, if ever, is there a strike at national level which could be laid at the door of procedure failings. As an instance of this, we have seen recently a short stoppage of work at a locomotive depot arising out of altered schedules for working the summer train services. The machinery of negotiation on the railways, as I told your Lordships last night and again to-day, allows for discussion of this kind of matter at local, departmental level—that is, at the locomotive depot level. Appeal from that body can be made to the regional council, which is the next stage up; and there may be a further appeal from that body to the highest level. Such a system of appeal is perfect on paper; but the anger of the drivers in that case was immediate, because they knew full well that by the time they could have gone to appeal the summer schedules would have been replaced by winter ones, and in the meantime they would have had to work objectionable hours.

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I merely use that as an illustration of the fact that excellent procedure machinery cannot be expected to solve the very many difficulties that arise where, in the words of the clause, there has been—
" recourse to industrial action (whether consisting of lock-outs, strikes or irregular industrial action short of a strike) contrary to the terms of intentions of that agreement."
When it all comes down to brass tacks it is human relationships, tolerance with one another, and understanding of each other's difficulties that really comes into industrial relations and all the rest of it. Many of the industrial relations problems that beset industry to-day arise not from a lack of negotiating machinery but from the difficulties inherent in large-scale industry, where the top management is remote from the employee. This happens a great deal in large industries, as I know. I started my railway career with the Taff Vale Railway—a small railway. It is true we had troubles from time to time, but not as many as there would have been had we had the same sort of conditions as applied in the bigger regions. For example, when I was employed on the Taff Vale Railway I knew the manager, and the manager knew me by name. That is always a great help. When the Taff Vale was merged into the Great Western Railway we thought not in terms of " Mr. So-and-So at Cardiff " but " them so-and-sos up in Paddington "—and our thoughts about them, and about the whole system, were entirely different from when we were thinking about the man who was our real boss and a man whom we knew.
This is inevitable in large-scale industry. What I am saying is that no one should fall into the error of imagining that by passing a law you will automatically cure industrial ills. It is one of the pecular beliefs of legislatures and political parties—and certainly my own has never been free from it—that if you pass a law you have solved a problem. In many cases the only problem you have solved is how to frame a law, and not how to change what needs changing, namely, human behaviour. All the machinery that we are trying to create, pretty well throughout the whole of this Bill, is something that I think is bound to fail unless we can somehow get parties to agree without having recourse to the law. Although I am in agreement with
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the best of this principle behind Clause 35, I rather think we ought to register our protest at trying to enclose within a legal framework something which ought to be left outside it. Unless I get a very satisfactory reply from the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, I shall have to ask the Committee to divide.
4.17 p.m.
LORD POPPLEWELL: The noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, in opening the debate on one of the Amendments, referred to the fact that Clause; 35 to 41 were very complicated and he went on to give, as it were, four important provisions. He said, first, that they were aimed at dealing with the particularly intractable difficulties that arise; secondly, he stressed that they did not replace the present voluntary arrangements; thirdly, that they were designed to be used very sparingly; and fourthly, that a 3reat deal of time was lost under present conditions. He then proceeded to hinge the whole of his arguments relating to this clause on those four important principles.
It seems to me that his observations indicate the real position of the Government, which is that these clauses do nothing else but express the Government's fear—a fear not based on any facts but something which is inherent in framing many other clauses of this Bill —that the unions may refuse to sign enforceable agreements. This clause, as indicated by my noble friend Lord Taylor, gives power to the N.I.R.C. to force the unions to adopt procedural parts of agreements, as defined and crawn up by the Commission on Industrial Relations. Here is the real background of this particular clause, and it will result in an attempt to place impositions on the parties concerned, and, as such, will be resented by the people who are expected to make it work. If you impose something on a group of individuals without their free consent, you at once create difficulties.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Donovan, in his Report, devotes a whole chapter to this particular position, and I should like to quote from it. He says:
"A disputes procedure must be operated by the two sides of industry working together ".
Those are very important words. The two sides of industry work together if they have accepted the procedure. They

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cannot be expected to make the procedure work unless they have freely agreed to do so. If either side rejects it, it is likely to remain a dead letter. To impose a procedure on which two sides have failed to agree would be tantamount to using a kind of compulsory arbitration in order to compel the parties to cooperate in a settlement of grievances, and to do so through the force of law. But that is one of the things which no law can do. It cannot make people co-operate if they do not want to do so. Such imposed procedures are almost certain not to be used. This is the Report of the Donovan Commission. They spent all those years investigating, they interviewed some 430 witnesses of various kinds, knowledgeable in industry, knowledgeable in the needs of industrial relations, and those are their observations in consequence. I think this highlights the fact that this particular clause is nothing but a fear expressed; in other words, it is like members of the Primrose League, who fear that there are Communists under every blade of grass that grows. I think this is the type of procedure and this is the line of approach here.
The noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, said that there was no desire or intention to replace any of the voluntary arrangements at present existing in industry. They are words spoken in this House, but they are not contained in the Bill. If it was expressed in this Bill that the present voluntary arrangements with the trade unions must take place before this particular clause was applicable, there would be something in the noble Lord's observations. But just the expression of it in this House, as has been indicated on so many occasions, is not law and, therefore, it carries no weight. I appreciate the words of the noble Lord, and I think they were right, but I am surprised that they have not been embraced in the Bill. This clause ignores completely something to which we have referred so often; namely, the Bridlington Agreement, which was arrived at between the respective trade unions. It gives no credit at all to the number of disputes which have been settled quite amicably within the trades unions themselves, but it brings in this very heavy sledgehammer to crack something which has been done so amicably in the past.
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We have asked repeatedly for statistics to be supplied to us regarding the number of disputes which have arisen in consequence of procedural difficulties, and we have been told each time that there are no such statistics available, and it would be too costly to try to obtain them. If you want to justify changing the law in order to enforce something which is classed as an agreement which cannot possibly be an agreement; if you are going to force something on to respective parties within this human relationship in industry which has not already been ironed out between them, I think you are going to have considerable difficulty. The N.I.R.C. will have complete power to refer these matters to the C.I.R., who would then decide the issue as to which one of the unions would have to be recognised as the bargaining agent, and after following the usual procedure the N.I.R.C. could, on application by the employer, enforce their recommendations on the industry. Of course, it would have to follow the ballot and the recognised procedure, but they would be able to enforce it, and any challenge of their judgment by any organised group or by individuals would constitute an unfair action, according to my interpretation; and an unfair action may of course be liable to the full penalties involved in other parts of this Bill.
I think this development of a new chapter in English law, under which a person can be held legally responsible for an agreement to which he himself has never agreed, is very dangerous indeed, and, as I have indicated, the Donovan Commission gave considerable thought to this type of thing. I suggest that the Government ought to have another look at this point, because it brings in something which I think is entirely unnecessary. It is bringing something into industrial relations which can prove—to use Lord Windlesham's own words—a very intractable position, which can have very serious consequences. particularly when ultimately action works itself down through the machine. The principle becomes established on one side or another, and once that argument on principle develops we all know the serious consequences to which ultimately it may lead. If the noble Lord will not give the assurance that he will have another look at this matter, I wholeheartedly support the suggestion of my noble friend

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Lord Champion that we should divide and reject this clause.
LORD PARGILER: I wonder whether I may ask the noble Lord to tell me how this would apply in a particular case which I have in mind? There is in the engineering industry what is known as the York Agreement. This agreement is admitted on all sides to be unsatisfactory. According to the latest information, both sides at the moment are quite unable to agree what might be put in place of it. Let us assume that nothing is put in place of it. How precisely would those terms apply to the whole of the engineering industry and the agreement which exists at present, which is to be terminated anyway, between the Engineering Employers' Federation and the unions involved? It is an interesting point as to how that would be dealt with, and whether it could be dealt with by these means. I can imagine a great many problems arising if somebody tried to apply this particular section of the law, if it becomes the law, to the whole of the engineering industry.
LORD HANKEY: I think this clause is excellent and I hope that it will be adopted. We have heard a great deal about existing procedure agreements in the railway industry. Speaking as a customer, I am no longer able to use the early trains to London from Kent to catch an aeroplane because so often the engine drivers do not turn up, the guards are not there or something absurd happens and I have to take my car to London Airport, which I do not like. When one reaches London Airport, very often the loaders do not load the aeroplanes. All those things are in defiance of a procedure agreement.
I should like to raise two small points. First, I suggest that it is important that the settling of procedures under this clause, when it has to be applied, ought to be done slickly and should not involve endless delay, which causes great annoyance to people on both sides of industry. I hope that the code of industrial practice may be so drawn as to provide advice to the National Industrial Relations Court and the other bodies concerned, including the Commission, drawing attention to the importance of not evolving enormously complicated procedures such as we in England love whenever we get involved in anything legal.
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Secondly, arising out of what was said just now, I suggest to the Government that it would be a good thing to insert in the definitions in Clause 158 a reference to Clause 35(6) saying that for the definition of a " unit of employment " this particular subsection should be referred to, because it might not always be obvious to people when reading subsequent clauses that the definition is te. be found in that part of the text.
4.33 p.m.
LORD WINDLESHAM: I am sure that right honourable friends will take note of those last two points. If I reply somewhat briefly, it is because I made my speech on the Question that the clause stand part on the first Amendment, so I shall try to avoid repeating myself.
I thought that the noble Lord, Lord Champion, touched on one of the fundamentals of the debate on this subject, which goes very wide indeed, when he spoke about the personal relations between the employer and the employee in the context of his own early industrial experience with the Taff Vale railway, a name very well known in trade union law. The atmosphere in the workplace is of paramount importance; we can agree that all of us know that to be true. That is affected by the way in which disputes are resolved, because in any industrial relationship then; will be friction. There is bound to be friction in any human activity from time to time, so the way in which these disputes are resolved is of very great importance, and hence the need for procedures which have been agreed between the employer and the employees as to how they should set about it.
In many cases the atmosphere will be good and constructive and there are agreed procedures which are honoured, accepted and fulfilled by both sides, but unfortunately, in other cases that is not so, and as we know from our own experience there are instances where there is suspicion, resentment and ready recourse to unofficial industrial action. I do not say that that is true over the whole of British industry, but there are instances where it occurs.
What did the noble Lord, Lord Donovan, have to say about that in his Royal Commission Report? Incidentally, it is noteworthy that in the first sentences of the section from paragraphs 500 to 518

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the concern is with unofficial strikes. I quote from paragraph 500:
"It is imperative that the number of unofficial and especially of unconstitutional strikes should be reduced and should be reduced speedily."
That was three years ago.
"This is not only a serious, it is also an urgent problem, and our recommendations are designed to deal with it …
501. The problem is peculiar to this country. It has been created by a number of factors which are analysed in Chapter III. The most important among these is the inadequacy of our collective bargaining system, and especially the lack of clear, speedy, comprehensive and effective procedures for the settlement of grievances and other disputes such as exist in other countries."
The noble Lord, Lord Popplewell, quoted from the Report of the Royal Commission, but without wishing to mislead the Committee I think that he did not convey the full flavour of the recommendations of the Royal Commission in that respect. What the Royal Commission said was that many of the present procedure agreements in the form in which they are worded were incapable of being enforced and that therefore there was a need to reform procedure agreements. They then said—and I quote the words:
" Once these reforms are implemented there will be a new situation."
The recommendations were that, once they were capable of being enforced legally, procedure agreements would fit into a system of collective bargaining; they could be legally enforceable in certain very exceptional situations. That was the first thing. Secondly, there was a recommendation that there should be a case by case approach—and that answers the noble Lord, Lord Pargiter, who asked me about the York Agreement of the engineering industry. The answer is that the procedure contained in Clauses 35 to 41 cannot apply to a whole industry; it applies to a unit of employment. There is a somewhat special case of what is called the composite unit, which we shall come to in Clause 41, but it does not apply to the whole of an industry.
LORD POPPLEWELL: As the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, mentioned me, in saying that I did not quote in full the Donovan Commission's Report, may I say that I think he is guilty of an evasion and a distortion—probably in-
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advertently—because the Donovan Commission Report did not in any way recommend this type of new law. What Lord Donovan was referring to, and what the trade unions have accepted all the time, is that it is necessary for some change to take place, but not the institution of new law as suggested in this particular way. Also, the noble Lord referred to the unofficial strikes. This particular clause in no circumstances whatsoever deals with a spontaneous unofficial strike that has developed and will continue to develop, even when this law becomes an Act.
LORD WINDLESHAM: The noble Lord, Lord Popplewell, is mistaken on both those points. This clause deals with unofficial disputes. It will deal with more unofficial disputes, in my view, in present circumstances than with official disputes. I dealt with this on an earlier Amendment, and I have the Report of the Royal Commission before me. We speak in the presence of the Chairman of the Royal Commission and I shall not go through it at length, but I advise the noble Lords to look again at paragraphs 512 and 514 and to read what is contained therein.
I was making the point that the Royal Commission felt that procedure agreements should only be legally enforceable in exceptional circumstances: that there should be a case by case approach; that they should be legally binding only when a need for doing so had arisen and been proved; that the jurisdiction should be vested in the Industrial Court—a direct quotation from paragraph 512—and that before applying to the Industrial Court the Secretary of State should consult the parties and the Commission on Industrial Relations. That is precisely what Clause 35 does. I do not think we should prolong our discussion on this point.
LORD DIAMOND: Am I not right in saying that the Industrial Court the noble Lord was quoting, and giving noble Lords the impression that Lord Donovan's Commission was supporting it, was not in fact the N.I.R.C. at all?
LORD WINDLESHAM: No; it was the present Industrial Court, which continues under the form of the Industrial Arbitration Board under this Bill. The term " Industrial Court " which we use is of course a reference to the N.I.R.C.

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The noble Lord, Lord Popplewell, did not convey the full flavour of the Royal Commission's Report, I do not wish to argue that what is contained in the Bill is exactly what is contained in these recommendations. That is not the case I make. What I say on the central point is that where the parties have been unable to come to agreement, after all these attempts which I have described, step by step—conciliation by the Secretary of State, conciliation by the Commission on Industrial Relations, and attempts to bring the parties together voluntarily—have proved unsuccessful at the end of that road there should be some way of enforcement. The Royal Commission and the Government are on common ground there, and it is for that reason, among the ones that I have already given in the debates we have had on this clause, that I commend this clause to the Commitee.
4.42 p.m.
LORD CHAMPION: I am not quite clear about the reply of the noble Lord to my noble friend Lord Pargiter. My noble friend asked some questions about an industry as a whole. The noble Lord Lord Windlesham, in reply has pointed to the use of the words " unit of employment " which is contained in the clause. Subsection (6) says:
" In this section and in sections 36 to 40 of this Act ' unit of employment' means an undertaking or part of an undertaking."
Procedural agreements almost invariably apply to the whole of an industry, and not to a small part of it. I should have thought it rare for a tiny section of an industry to enter into some agreement which clearly ought to have been entered into by the industry as a whole. I think that there is something in this point. I am not really conversant with the York agreement, which apparently was entered into a long time ago and has long since ceased to be really workable and, indeed, ought to have been changed some time ago.
I think that if you are going to attempt to cure troubles in small sections of the industry, you have in some cases to take the industry as a whole; it is necessary to have a procedural agreement covering the whole of the industry, and not just a tiny part of it. This arises out of my own experience within an industry, where
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our procedural agreements are arrived at nationally and not in little bits and pieces to cover little bits and pieces of the industry.
The noble Lord, Lord Hankey, told us about the difficulties that he I as getting to and from the airport; and he said that these ware a result of breaches of the procedural agreement. But he then went on to support the clause. I ca mot quite understand this. There is a procedural agreement in being and apparently it is a good one, but it is breached at that level. Does he think that a change of the procedural agreement would give him the satisfaction that he wants? The simple fact is that you have to change the relationships that exist within the industry and try to ensure that those little difficulties are smoothed out.
The second thing I would say is that the noble Lord is well know:1 outside this country: he held an important post in a European context. The words that he says may well be heard outside this House and outside this country. I do not think he does any good at all to this country, to this House, or to industrial relations in this country, by the sweeping statements that he makes from time to time in this sort of context. I fee justified in saying that, having regard to the fact that I have heard him do this a few times. I like the noble Lord, and I am sorry to have to say this.
LORD HANKEY: The situation in this country has far passed the point where we can continue to sweep it under the carpet. It is high time that attention should be drawn to it. We In- ve lived with it much too long. As regards the procedural agreements, I should lot have referred to them, except that some noble Lords had suggested that all was fine in the railway industry. I wish it were. I am an enthusiast about the use of the railways. Noble Lords have no is ea what the commuters around London suffer as a result of breaches of agreements which ought to be kept.
LORD CHAMPION: I thought I made it clear that, although we say:hat we have a very good procedural agreement operating for the railways, we cans of hope by that procedural agreement to make sure that every little difficulty will be smoothed out. That applies to anything

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that is set up under this clause equally with the agreements that are at present in existence. I do not want to prolong this discussion any further. We have had an excellent debate. I do not like the procedure generally which this Clause 35 initiates, and, for that reason, I am
hoping that the Committee will divide against the clause.
4.46 p.m.
On Question, Whether Clause 35 shall stand part of the Bill?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 132; Not-Contents, 58.

CONTENTS

Aberdare, L.

Emmet of Ambarley, Bs.

Monck, V.

Ailwyn, L.

Essex, E.

Morrison, L.

Airedale, L.

Exeter, M.

Mowbray and Stourton, L [Teller.]

Allerton, L.

Ferrers, E.

Amherst, E.

Ferrier, L.

Napier and Ettrick, L.

Ashbourne, L.

Fisher, L.

Northchurch, Bs,

Atholl, D.

Fortecue, E.

Oakshott, L.

Auckland, L.

Fraser of Lonsdale, L

Ogmore, L.

Balfour, E.

Gage, V

O'Neill of the Maine, L.

Balfour of Inchrye, L.

Garner, L

Ranfurly, E.

Barnby, L.

Gladwyn, L.

Rank, L.

Beauchamp, E.

Goschen. V. [Teller.]

Rankeillour, L.

Belhaven and Stenton, L.

Grenfell, L.

Rathcavan, L.

Belstead, L.

Gridley, L.

Rea, L.

Berkeley, Bs.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

Reigate. L.

Blackford, L.

Hailes, L.

Rochdale, V

Bledisloe, V.

Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Rockley, L.

Bridgeman, V.

Rothermere, V.

Brooke of Cumnor. L.

Halsbury, E.

St. Aldwyn. E.

Brooke of Ystradfellte, Bs.

Hankey. I..

St. Helens, L.

Buchan, E.

Hanwortn, V.

St. Just, L.

Burgh, L.

Harlech, L.

Salisbury, M.

Burton. L.

Hawke, L.

Sandford, L.

Byers, L.

Hood, V.

Sandys. L.

Caccia, L.

Howard of Glossop, L.

Savile, L.

Clifford of Chudleigh. J..

Hurcomb, L.

Selkirk, E.

Clwyd, L.

Hylton-Foster, Bs.

Shannon, E.

Coleraine, L.

Ilford, L.

Sherfield, L.

Colville of Culross, V.

Inchyra, L.

Strang, L.

Conesford, L.

Ironside, L.

Strange, L.

Cork and Orrery, E.

Jellicoe. E. (L. Privy Seal)

Strathclyde, L.

Courtown. E.

Kemsley, V.

Swaythling, L.

Cowley, E.

Kilmany, L.

Swinton. E.

Craigavon, V.

Kilmarnock, L.

Tenby, V.

Crathorne, L.

Kinderstev, L.

Teviot. L.

Crawshaw, L.

Latymer, L.

Tweedsmuir, L.

Daventry, V.

Lothian,M.

Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, Bs.

De Clifford, L.

Loudoun, C.

Vivian. L.

Denham, L.

MacAndrew, L.

Wakefield of Kendal, L.

Derwent, L.

McFadzean, I..

Wigram, L.

Digby, L.

Mancroft, L.

Willingdon. M.

Drumalbyn, L.

Merrivale. L.

Windlesham, L.

Eccles. V.

Merihyr. L.

Wise, L.

Ellenborough, I.

Meston, I..

Wolverton, L.

Elliot of Harwood. Bs.

Milverton, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Addison. V.

Gaitskell, Bs.

McLeavy. L.

Archibald, L.

Gardiner, L.

Maelor, L.

Arwyn, L.

Garnsworthy. L. [Teller.]

Moyle, L.

Balogh, L.

Greenwood of Rossendale, L.

Noel-Buxton, L.

Bernstein, L.

Henderson, L.

Nunburnholme, L.

Beswick, L.

Heycock, L.

Pargiter, L.

Birk. Bs.

Hilton of Upton, L.

Peddie, L.

Brockway, L.

Hughes, L.

Phillips, Bs.

Buckinghamshire, E.

Jacques, L.

Plummer, Bs.

Champion, L.

Kennet, L.

Popplewell, L.

Crook, L.

Leatherland, L.

Ritchie-Calder, L.

Diamond, L.

Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, Bs. [Tetter.]

Royle, L.

Douglass of Cleveland, L.

St. Davids, V.

Faringdon, L.

Longford, E.

Samuel, V.

Serota, Bs.

Snow, L.

Wells-Pestell, L.

Shackleton, L

Sorensen, L.

White, Bs.

Shepherd, L.

Stonham, L.

Williamson, L.

Shinwell, L.

Stow Hill, L.

Wootton of Abingtr, Bs.

Sil kin, L.

Summerskill, Bs.

Wright of Ashton under Lyne, L.

Slater, L.

Taylor of Mansfield, L.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Resolved in the affirmative, and Clause 35 agreed to accordingly.
Clause 36 [Provision for extending scope of reference under s. 35]:
4.55 p.m.
LORD CHAMPION LORD CHAMPION moved Amendment No. 238LL:
Page 28, line 42, after (" may ") insert (" after consultation with the parties")
The noble Lord said: With the permission of the Committee, it might be well if we discussed with this Amendment Nos. 238Z, 238AA and 238BBand if many more Amendments are put down we shall run out of letters of the alphabet; already we are doubling them up. Clause 36 sets out what the Commission has to do if it feels that any deficiencies in the procedure in a given industry might be improved if the procedure arrangement were applied to a larger unit than the one referred to in the original application. Amendment No. 238LL seeks to ensure that in the formulation of proposals for the enlargement of the unit to which the Commission's recommendations may eventually relate the Commission shall fully discuss with, and of course take into account the views of, the parties about so enlarging the unit.
Clearly, if the Commission thoroughly examines the scope of the original reference to it, it must consider both the area of the unit to be covered and the parties to be affected, and how to deal with the matter if, in the case of an application by one trade union, another trade union's agreement might be vitally affected by any recommendation which the Commission may make. Obviously, in those circumstances the Commission must make the other trade union aware of what is happening and bring it into the discussions. Indeed, as I understand it, the Commission is charged under Clause 37 with the duty of determining what parties, in addition to the original party or parties shall be brought into the further proceedings on the matter. Clearly, with the observance of Clauses 35 and 37 every possible party who ought to be consulted, or who might have an interest in the
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eventual recommendation of the Commission, would be informed of what was taking place. If I am right about that, what is the purpose of the elaborate procedure which is set out in subsections (2), (3) and (4) of this clause?
It seems to me that what is envisaged in those subsections is a time-wasting procedure of the sort so beloved of those who would leave no stone unturned, no avenue unexplored, no loophole unclosed, and so on. But it is quite unnecessary in this connection for the simple matter of making an extension of the scope of a reference and ensuring that all possibly interested parties are made aware of what is going on. That, I take it, is really what is being done in these subsections to which I am referring: making sure that everybody is informed of what is going on. That is all right, but if you have already done it once there is not much point in doing it again. If you already have within the clause itself instruction to all the people concerned that they have to consult in the way set out at the beginning, there is surely no need at all to go through what I regard as the elaborate procedure set out in the subsections which I am proposing to delete.
If the Government were to accept the Amendment, the Commission might first decide that it would be advantageous to enlarge the unit to be considered; secondly, there would be discussion with all the parties that might be affected by such an extension; and, thirdly, after taking into consideration what emerged as a result of the discussion, the Commission would get on with the job without further ado. That procedure could be adopted with advantage. It may be said that by making this sort of proposal I am helping the Government to do something which to some extent we regard as objectionable. But it it always open to the Opposition to try to improve a Bill, no matter how bad it is. We think that this Bill is a very bad one, but we believe that it can be improved in some small particulars and I am proposing an Amendment and discussing some others which would very much improve the

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clause. I shall be very interested to hear what noble Lords in charge of this Bill have to say. I beg to move.
5.0 p.m.
LORD BROWN: May I very briefly support the Amendments of my noble friend Lord Champion in this way—and I will paraphrase certain sections of the Bill in my support. At present, the procedure is that the Commission may formulate proposals and cause notice of the proposals to be brought to the attention of the persons affected by them, and then any person claiming to be affected by the proposals would apply not to the Commission but to the Industrial Court. This is a circular procedure. The Commission formulates the proposals without consultation, publishes them to the persons affected, and the persons affected, instead of going back to the Commission, go to the Industrial Court, and presumably the Industrial Court go back to the Commission. A more circuitous way of doing things I cannot imagine. To formulate proposals for something as complex as these situations, without any reference to the people who are going to be affected—and there is no provision for the Commission to discuss it with the people affected—seems to me to be really an omission of a very serious nature leading to the rather foolish proposals for the matter to be dealt with by a circuitous route. I would therefore most heartily commend these Amendments, and I hope the Government will accept them.
5.2 p.m.
EARL FERRERS: I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Champion, for explaining the case for these Amendments, and I would say at the outset that I do not think there is a very great deal of difference between the views of the noble Lords, Lord Champion and Lord Brown, and those of us on this side. I think that the main difference arises when the noble Lord, Lord Brown, says that there will be no consultation; that the Commission will come up with these proposals without having first consulted the parties. In fact, the whole purpose and objective of the Commission is to consult, and they will of course be consulting with all the parties concerned before
256
they put forward their proposals. Therefore, the first Amendment, which—
LORD BROWN: Would the noble Earl excuse me? He says that, and I should be very glad to know that that is the case; but would he refer me to the parts of the clause which indicate that this consultation will take place? I think I am entitled to ask that if the noble Earl says that the proposals are in the Bill.
EARL FERRERS: The whole purpose of the Commission is to consult, and it is therefore considered unnecessary for the thing to be spelt out in the clause. The whole way through the Bill the Commission is obliged to consult with the parties and, before coming up with their report, they will have so consulted. The only reason why I would suggest that this particular Amendment should not be accepted as such is because it would be unnecessary, not because there is any difference between us.
LORD BROWN: Would the noble Earl allow me to interrupt again? I think it is useful to intervene in this way when he is making these statements. What the noble Earl says might well be valid if the procedure were not laid down so precisely in this clause; but in the light of the fact that the procedure is highly detailed and does not refer to consultation, the only interpretation of the clause is that the procedure is to be followed, and it would appear that the general direction that is implicit in the Bill will not apply in the case of this clause. If the clause had not been so very detailed, one might have accepted what the noble Earl says; but the clause says that the Commission shall formulate proposals, that it shall transmit them to the persons affected by them (which infers not consultation but mere communication) and, then, that if the persons affected by them want to discuss the proposals, they shall go to the Industrial Court. In view of these very detailed procedures it really is somewhat unacceptable for the noble Earl to say that all that this clause really implies is that the Commission should first discuss the matter with the people affected. The words of the clause indicate the reverse.
EARL FERRERS: I think that possibly the noble Lord is making the mistake of considering Clause 36 on its own,

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whereas, of course, it in fact follows on from Clause 35 and from the point where a reference has been made to the Industrial Relations Court. But before the Court can do anything, as we heard in the previous discussions, it has to be satisfied that the Secretary of State has been seized of the problem; and under Clause 35(4)(a) the Secretary of State must have done a variety of things, one of which may be to invite the Commission on Industrial Relations to consider this point. At that juncture, the Commission is bound, by the very nature of the processes, to have consulted the parties, and it is in Clause 36 only, where it is considered by the Commission to be desirable that the resultant proposals should in fact refer to a wider unit than that which was first referred to them, that the proposals are brought forward. Here a party which has a grievance as a result of the units being widened, and which feels that it will be adversely affected by the Commission's proposal, can object to the court, and the court is bound to consider its application.
Of course the Amendments, if we accept them in toto, would eliminate what I suggest would be a very sensible safeguard which the Bill provides, of a second opinion to which the parties may appeal if they dislike the Commission's proposals. I would suggest that this would be unwise, because it really gives a second line of defence: first, the Commission, having consulted, may come forward with proposals suggesting that the unit is wider, and, then, if any of the parties concerned so dislike the fact that they should be incorporated in this wider unit, they may refer the matter to the Court, which is then obliged to have yet another look at the problem. I would suggest that as it is in the Bill there are two safeguards, whereas if the noble Lord's Amendment were accepted there would be only the one safeguard.
5.7 p.m.
LORD BROWN: The noble Earl has just said that the Commission must consult with the parties affected, and he means it, I am quite sure. I believe the interpretation of this clause may lead to them not being consulted. That is the difference between us. The difference between us is that the noble Earl says that the Bill as a whole insists that the Indus
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trial Commission will consult with the parties affected. My content on, and I am sure that of my noble friend Lord Champion, is that this clause may lead to a process whereby the parties affected will not be consulted. That is the bone of contention between us. It is really quite easily solved, because if the Government accept the first of these Amendments, No. 238LL, and insert the words " after consultation with the parties ", that is quite consistent with the Government's views as expressed by the noble Earl. It may be a duplication, but that will not harm anybody. So on these grounds, why on earth not accept it, to satisfy us, who have genuine doubts and believe there is some substanee in our arguments?
I have stood at these Benches and accused some of my noble friends almost of intransigence on one or two occasions, and that fact has been welcomed by those on the opposite Benches. I now stand here and say that it is really intransigent to refuse to put in words to the meaning of which you have no objection at all; and merely to argue that some previous clause implies that something will happen when the words of the clause itself imply no such thing, and to refuse to accept an Amendment which makes it quite clear, really is intransigent. It is going to make this side more resistant; and it will prolong our debates if we feel that, whatever we say, we cannot get the Government to accept even a tiny Amendment like this—and I am talking about the first Amendment only at this stage. So why not do it? Or, if the noble Earl is not in a position to agree, why not say, " I have heard the argument; it has been clearly brought out and discussed, and I will consider it ". Why not do that?
EARL FERRERS: The last thing I should wish is to be considered intransigent over this, and I should like to meet the noble Lord's point where I can. We should have no objection in principle to the acceptance of the first Amendment, though some slight alteration in drafting may be necessary. I hope that the noble Lord will be pleased by the thoughtful way that we on this side are desirous of meeting his point, but I hope that he will not be too persuasive about asking us to accept the following Amendments.

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They involve a point of much more substance over which we fear it would be difficult to agree.
LORD CHAMPION: That is completely satisfactory to us. The noble Earl is going to look at it, and according to what he said is going to provide something which would be satisfactory to us under the first of the Amendments. I think the other Amendments have some substance but the whole thing is too top-heavy. Nevertheless, having regard to the fact that the noble Earl has replied to us satisfactorily I shall not move the following Amendments. I would only add that I hope the noble Earl, Lord Ferrers, will answer the rest of our Amendments to this Bill in the same way, and will give us equally forthcoming replies. I ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL of SHANNON): I must inform the Committee that if Amendment No. 238Z is agreed to I shall be unable to call Amendment No. 238PP.
5.12 p.m.
LORD WINDLESHAM LORD WINDLESHAM moved Amendment No. 238PP:
Page 29, line 6, at end insert (" in the opinion of the Commission ")
The noble Lord said: This is a technical Amendment aimed at improving the drafting. Clause 36(2) requires the Commission on Industrial Relations to send its proposals under subsection (1) to the Industrial Court. Subsection (2)(b) requires the Commission to give notice of or to publish the proposals, to bring them to the attention of persons affected by them. It has been recognised that the Commission might fail to identify a person who would be affected by the proposals. In such a case it has been suggested that the clause as at present drafted would make it possible to challenge the subsequent action taken by the Commission under Clause 37 or perhaps under Clause 38 in addition. The outcome of a successful challenge could be that the recommendations of the Commission might be quashed. Such a setback to achieving a sound basis for resolving the industrial situation under
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examination might add immeasurably to the task of the Commission. It is, we believe very unlikely that in practice anything of this sort would happen.
Clause 36 was drafted in its present form in order to avoid imposing on the Commission a positive duty to serve notice on anybody. The obligation was only to cause notice to be given or published. That was intended to leave the Commission with three options: the first to serve notice; the second to publish; and third, to serve notice and also to publish. In many cases, if not most, it would be impracticable for the C.I.R. to identify and serve individual notices on all the persons who would be affected. The Bill was drafted in its original form since it seemed to add little if anything to require the Commission to carry out its obligation in respect of persons who, in the opinion of the Commission, would be affected by the proposals. Accordingly it had been thought that either publication alone, or publication combined with a selective service of notice, would be sufficient to satisfy the requirement of what might appear to the Commission to be appropriate.
Nevertheless, it became clear to the Government that the provision as drafted was giving rise to some worry, and we are pleased to come forward to the Committee at this stage with this Amendment to allay the anxieties that have been put to the Government. I hope the Committee will accept this as an earnest of our willingness to meet our critics, as the noble Earl has just shown, wherever we consistently can without going against the main purpose of the Bill.
LORD TAYLOR OF MANSFIELD: Could I put it to the noble Lord that under subsection (2) a dual obligation is placed on the Commission. I take that to mean that an application has been made to the Industrial Court. The Industrial Court has asked the Commission to look at it, and now they are submitting their observations to the Industrial Court. The latter then says to the Commission, " We have finished our job; your obligation is now twofold. First of all you must cause the notice of the proposals that you have arrived at to be given or published, as may appear to the Commission to be appropriate to bring them to the attention of persons who would be affected by them." This

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Amendment, as I see it, would enlarge what is at present a dual obligation to a threefold obligation. The form of publication for informing persons who are affected by the proposals should be left to the opinion of the Commission. I know that the noble Lord cannot speak for the Commission in advance, but may I ask what is in his mind? Is publication to take the form of a notice in the newspapers, an announcement over the radio, by using the visual aid of television; or will it be by writing an individual letter to all the persons affected? The important point is that when the proposals have been arrived at there is an obligation to let people know. How will it be done?
LORD LEATHERLAND: I should like to follow my noble friend's point in one particular. This is very important, because one sometimes gets rival unions operating in one factory, or what is called here euphoniously one industrial unit: I am thinking of the trouble at Pilkington's, where some months ago there was a considerable difference of opinion between different groups of workers. It could conceivably happen that the main group of workers would be notified and some minority groups would not. May I ask how the word " publish " will he interpreted? Does it mean that there will be broadcasts and news items circulated to the Press? If so, that is all right; but I have a fear, a suspicion, that the Government might say that by publishing an announcement in the London Gazette they had complied with the terms of this clause.
We all know that the London Gazette is sometimes quoted by the newspapers, but much of the material in the London Gazette does not get through to the mass of the population. I therefore want to know whether the Government feel that in interpreting the word " published " they should go fair beyond the bounds of mere publication in the London Gazette.
5.20 p.m.
LORD SLATER: I wish to support my noble friends in this matter. I took down the words spoken by the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham when he referred to the phrase, " in the opinion of the Commission ". We have often argued in debates about the words " shall " and " may ". Why should it be " in the
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opinion of the Commission ": There is nothing then incumbent upon the Commission to do this or that; it is left as a matter for their opinion as to whether they ought to do something. I believe that the Government are trying to be helpful, and that they want everyone involved and interested, or in some way connected with an application being considered by the Commission, to receive the information. Instead of leaving it to the opinion of the Commission I should prefer to see the word " shall " used. That it should be incumbent on the Commission to ensure that all the parties concerned shall be so informed
LORD WINDLESHAM: It is very difficult for me to stand at this Box and try to speculate on how the Commission on Industrial Relations will fulfil the obligation placed on it by this Part of the Bill We must not overlook the fact that the Commission has a number of extremely experienced staff members. I believe that at the moment the staff is about 100 strong, and it will be larger when the Act comes into force. Those officials will have been down to the work place where a dispute is taking place and where this procedure has been implemented. So they will know not only who the parties to a dispute are who naturally would be notified—we can take it for granted that the Commission would notify the parties—but also othtr persons who would be affected in addition to the employer and the main union involved. I should imagine that he Commission would use selective forms of communication. It would find the representatives of particular groups of workers and of tile employers' association, and those persons would be informed officially in writing. I think that is probably how it would work out. It is a matter of common sense, and in the main it would he left to the Commission.
On the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Slater, I think the words " in the opinion of the Commission" are needed as a safety net. If there are some persons who might have an interest and the Commission do not know of their existence and do not therefore inform them, it could be argued—it has been put to the Government by Opposition spokesmen and others—that the Commission would be failing to perform its obligation and the whole process would

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therefore be thwarted. No one would wish that to happen. For these reasons, this Amendment has been proposed. As I say, it is not one of substance, but it is important to clarify the drafting.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: Although this may be a technical Amendment, and may be serving some purpose, we have to remember that when the C.I.R. was set up it was hoped to build up great expertise, and the Commission begged the Government that it should not have to deal with binding legal decisions and legalities. Because of the assiduous way in which noble Lords opposite are working night and day to look at this matter in depth, we are forced to take into consideration " Parkinson's Law ". This is " Parkinson's Law " to the nth degree. We shall have more people associated with the Bar, judges and barristers, working on these problems than there will be people working for productivity in Britain. We are getting out of our depth. I appeal to noble Lords to try to cut down these matters to realities, because this kind of thing will not work.
LORD LEATHERLAND: I do not want to deal with this matter in general criticism, but merely to go back to the point I mentioned a few minutes ago. I quite agree with the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, that there might be adequate channels of communication for the parties particularly and directly concerned. I am concerned about spreading that knowledge over a wider area to reach people who have a less direct interest. The noble Lord, Lord Windlesham replied to me in all other respects, but not on the specific point that I raised. I repeat the question: would the Government feel that they had fulfilled the obligation placed on them by this clause merely by publishing the announcement in the official London Gazette?
LORD WINDLESHAM: I should have thought that that would be a totally unreasonable thing to do. The Commission on Industrial Relations will have had its officers investigating and talking to the parties involved. I think it would be perfectly well aware that a steel foundry or smelting works would not be a place in which the London Gazette would circulate.
LORD LEATHERLAND: That is why I have a suspicion that it might publish in the London Gazette and nowhere else.
LORD CHAMPION: I do not think we need worry over much about where the Commission will publish. The noble Earl, Lord Ferrers, virtually accepted an Amendment which I moved to ensure that consultation would take place with the parties already concerned. The next thing is to ensure that anyone outside will somehow get the information that a proposal is in the air.
Having regard to the fact that the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, said that the unit of employment in this case is likely to be rather small in a given area, and not spread over the whole country, I should have thought that the Commission, which will be made up of sensible people knowledgeable about the whole area, would be bound to make some effort to consult those concerned. I should think the local Press could be used, but it would be up to the Commission, having carefully considered the matter, to decide what method it should use to ensure that the purpose of the Act was given effect. This Amendment is little more than a drafting change. Nevertheless, in my opinion it would improve the subsection.
On Question, Whether Clause 36, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD CHAMPION: As this clause deals with machinery, as I described it at the very outset, and a very useful piece of machinery, I do not propose to discuss it at any length. If my noble friends wish to do so, I am giving them the chance by rising at the invitation of the Deputy Chairman. Otherwise, I shall let the clause go.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: I think we ought to follow the Leader, which I do not do very often. In view of the fact that an Amendment was taken, and to show good will, in the hope that later on to-night and in the morning we shall have some further concessions, it is wiser now to keep silent and to move on with the Bill.
Clause 36, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 37 [Action by Commission for promoting settlement of question referred under s. 35]:
5.31 p.m.
LORD WINDLESHAM LORD WINDLESHAM moved Amendment No. 239:
Page 30, line 1, leave out from (" be") to ("parties ") in line 3, and insert—
(" (a) those appearing to the Commission to be").
The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 239 standing in the Order Paper in the name of my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn. With the leave of the Committee, I will also speak to Amendments Nos. 240 and 241, which are linked with it. I hesitate to say that these are drafting Amendments, in view of the interest evoked in the previous Amendment, but they are in fact a rewording, a redrafting, to remove a possible ambiguity. Clauses 35 to 41, which provide for remedial action when a procedure agreement is non-existent or defective or continually disregarded, as I have explained, are designed to deal with the very intractable problem areas of industrial relations; and under them the C.I.R. has the duty of identifying the underlying causes of trouble and coming forward with recommendations as to effective and suitable remedies. If it is to discharge these responsibilities successfully, the Government consider it should be allowed maximum discretion in framing its recommendations, including naming the parties to whom they will apply.
The Amendments remove the present ambiguity in the drafting and make it clear that the C.I.R., in framing its remedies, will be free to recommend new or revised procedures which may affect and involve persons other than those who are parties to any existing agreement. Then, when fulfilling the duty laid upon it by subsection (3) of the clause—that is to promote and assist discussion of its recommendations by the parties with a view to their agreeing to adopt them voluntarily—the C.I.R. is enabled to do so with all the parties and all the people it considers appropriate to do so, thus laying sound foundations for a better understanding among the parties as well as for better negotiating procedures. I beg to move.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: If I may jump in before the Front Bench do so, I would say that I have been looking at this provision. It does not seem much more than a drafting Amendment to me, and I do not feel in the mood to wrestle with noble Lords opposite. On a lovely afternoon like this, and in the hope that we are really going to obtain something concrete, I trust that noble Lords will not keep us very long on this point.
LORD GARDINER: May I ask whether the effect of this Amendment is the same as it would be if the word " either " were omitted? At the moment the subsection is worded, if have the right copy of the Bill:
"The parties so determined shall be those appearing to the Commission to be either— ".
Those words after " be " are to be deleted, and then there are to be put in seven of the eight words which are already there; namely, " those appealing to the Commission to be ". The only effect seems to be to omit the word " either ". Is that right? If that is righit, why is not the Amendment simply an Amendment to omit the word " either "?
LORD WINDLESHAM: I suggest that the noble and learned Lord locks at the three Amendments together and the effect they would have on the wording. This is a very small point. If he looks at subsection (2) he will see that we have " either … and"; and it:;hould be " either … or ". " Either … and " is undoubtedly ambiguous and the drafting is faulty. The wording proposed is shifting down "those appearing to the Commission to be " to the paragraph, rather than the subsection and is slightly clearer, and in the subsequent Amendments we get rid of the " either … and " and also have the very small change I have mentioned: instead of " my other persons " we have " such other persons (if any)".
LORD GARDINER: I am not objecting to it at all. Being interested in legislation, however, I would say that so far as the first two lines are concerned I wondered why, if what the draftsman wanted to do was to omit tie word " either ", he did not put down an Amendment to that effect, instead of taking out eight words and putting seven of them back again.
LORD WINDLESHAM: I do not think we should pursue this matter. It would have the effect of removing words from the main part of subsection (2). The Amendment would put the words down into the paragraph. I think this is a small matter of presentation and one we should not pursue.
LORD STONHAM: While on a small matter, as in the Amendment there is " (a)", does not that mean that you have to alter the lettering of the two paragraphs, otherwise you will have " (a)" twice?
LORD WINDLESHAM: I do not think so. It is dealt with by the printing. I think that the letters and numbers (I speak subject to correction) are not technically part of the Bill.
LORD LEATHERLAND: May I ask an innocent little question which is designed to draw some information? With reference to page 30, subsection (2)(b), the Commission is required to think about notifying various employers and trade union organisations. May we take it that in every case the Commission would notify the General Council of the Trades Union Congress? I mention that because some years ago there was what was called the Bridlington Agreement, whereby the Trades Union Congress endeavoured to deal with recruitment and poaching by one union from another. There will under this clause of the Bill be cases where perhaps some workers are advised that the proper union to be recognised in a plant is such-and-such a union, whereas they may belong to another. This is exactly the situation for which the Bridlington Agreement was arranged. and it would be courteous, if not just efficient, to notify the Trades Union Congress of any arrangements that were suggested by the Commission in this regard. I know that no question of an Amendment arises here. It is merely, as I say, an innocent inquiry in order to elicit information.
LORD WINDLESHAM: I think the noble Lord is touching a very soft spot with his friends and colleagues on those Benches who are members of the T.U.C. General Council, because he will remember that the T.U.C. is at present boycotting the Commission on Industrial Relations together with the other institutions referred to in the Bill. I have
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no doubt that that boycott will come to an end. I am quite sure that the General Council of the T.U.C. will be willing to co-operate with the Commission on Industrial Relations and the other institutions named in the Bill; and I am sure that at some stage, when the Bill has become law, the T.U.C. and the C.I.R. will sit down together and will be discussing practical arrangements of this kind.
LORD LEATHERLAND: Yes, but I hope the noble Lord will bear in mind that in many law suits the complainant and the defendant are both put in possession of information.
LORD WINDLESHAM: I beg formally to move Amendment No. 240.
Amendment moved—
Page 30, line 6, leave out (" any other persons ") and insert (" such other persons (if any) ").—(Lord Windlesham.)
LORD WINDLESHAM: This Amendment also is one of the series of three which we have discussed briefly on the debate on Amendment No. 239. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 30, line 7, leave out (" who ") and insert (" as in the Commission's opinion ").—(Lord Windlesham.)
5.40 p.m.
LORD CHAMPION LORD CHAMPION moved Amendment No. 241B:
Page 30, line 15, leave out from (" provisions") to end of line 18.
The noble Lord said: In this Amendment the words that we propose to leave out have reference to the legally enforceable contract. This we have discussed at some length, and our objections to them on previous clauses have been fairly forcibly put. Therefore I will not repeat them now. But I want to probe a little, and what the Committee ought to know and to be clear about in this connection is whether the parties, or one of the parties, to be consulted will be able to say to the Commission: " We have arrived at an agreement on new orally revised procedures, but we are definitely opposed to making such provisions into

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a legally enforceable contract or document ". The question that I am really asking here is: in such circumstances, would the Commission be able under subsection (4) to report to the Court that they are satisfied that the purposes of the original reference have been, or will be, adequately fulfilled; and would the Court permit the withdrawal of the reference, despite the fact that the agreement is so worded as to exclude its being a legally enforceable document? I put this point shortly. I think it is an important one, and I shall look forward to hearing what the noble Lord has to say about it. I beg to move.
LORD WINDLESHAM: I speak somewhat dangerously, without foreknowledge of this, but perhaps I can give what I think is the answer; and if I am wrong I will come back to the noble Lord again. I think the situation would be that if the parties had reached agreement between themselves at this stage, but did not wish it to be legally enforceable, then it would be a collective agreement which the parties had specifically agreed between themselves should not be legally enforceable. It would then be open to the Court to say: " Does it seem that this procedure agreement is likely to fulfil the qualifications which are necessary? Is it the type of agreement that the C.I.R. would devise to meet the problems of this situation?" If they felt that it was, then I should expect that that would be accepted and that the procedure would not go any further. That is the answer that I give to the noble Lord.
LORD CHAMPION: That reply is off the cuff: it is clearly not in the brief. I am wondering whether, if I talked for a little time, we might get, via the pigeon post, an answer to the question that I am asking. We know that these things actually operate, when a question is asked the answer to which is not already contained in the brief supplied to the Minister. I have myself been in this position many times, and I used to hope that somebody would get up and talk until such time as there was available to me, as a Minister, the answer to the question posed. I think that the question is an important one. We want, so far as humanly possible, to have a situation created in which agreement will be
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arrived at outside the too strict legal framework which to some extent is contained in these clauses to which we are now referring. They are machinery clauses. I hope that before we leave this Amendment I shall be able to get an answer to the point that I am putting to the noble Lord.
I am glad to see that the pigeon is now flying. I hope that it will come home to loft, and that as a result, off the leg of the pigeon, I shall get the reply I am seeking. This is t, common arrangement. I am delighted that it works. It ought to work, and I am sure that it is working in this connection.
LORD COLLISON: I should like to supplement what my noble friend on the Front Bench has said, becau;e I also picked up this point, which I believe is one that needs consideration. 'The wording is:
".… obtaining their agreement on new or revised provisions (such as are mentioned in subsection (1)(b) of this section) so formulated as to be capable of having effect as a legally enforceable contract."
I do not read that (I should like to be corrected if I am wrong) as meaning that it must be a legally enforceable contract. But what worries me is that the parties concerned may prefer—and this often happens in the trade union world—a broader type of agreement which could not be translated into legal terms. I think this is an anomaly that should be clarified. They should be able, with the assistance of the Commission, to reach an agreement which may not necessarily have to be in terms which can be translated into legal form.
LORD WINDLESHAM: That really brings us back again to the airs of this whole Part of the Bill. We are concerned with those situations where procedure agreements are quite inadequate and they are perhaps one of the sources of industrial unrest of a continuing nature as set out in Clause 35, which we discussed. Therefore the C.I.R. has the duty to try to set a standard; to send down experienced advisers to try to draw up a form of procedure agreement, on the standard of one of the model; which exist, which is capable of being fulfilled and is generally felt to be fair.
The noble Lord, Lord Champion, asked me—and he gave me some notice

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of the question—whether I wanted to have second thoughts on what I had said. I find that my reaction was right. There is no need for the agreement to be of a legally enforceable nature, provided that the parties have jointly accepted a procedure agreement which is highly recommended by the C.I.R., or is acceptable to the C.I.R., and which they feel is capable of solving the particular problem. Whether or not it is to be legally enforceable is not strictly relevant in that situation.
LORD CHAMPION: Having regard to that explanation, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD CHAMPION LORD CHAMPION moved Amendment No. 241C:
Page 30, line 24, leave out from (" effect") to end of line 27 and insert (" to the Secretary of State ").
The noble Lord said: The purpose of this Amendment is quite clear. It really follows what we were trying to do on Amendment No. 238U; namely, to cut out the intervening Industrial Court and make it possible for the Commission to make their report directly to the Secretary of State. What we said then applies with equal force here: that this would reduce the number of bodies to which a report of this sort would have to go, which seems to me to make good sense. There should be, first of all, the formulation of the Commission's recommendations; they would be carefully considered; the parties concerned would have been consulted. It seems to me to make sense that the report need not go back to the Industrial Court, but could go direct to the Secretary of State. I do not think I need add anything to that proposition, which seems to me to be a reasonable one. I beg to move.
LORD WINDLESHAM: I do not think that that would quite meet the point, because in the case of a mandatory reference the originator is the Industrial Court. Therefore if the reference is to be withdrawn, I think it must be withdrawn by the person who made it in the first place. However, I think that the Committee may go a long way with the noble Lord, Lord Champion, because we must remember that there is the voluntary reference. We hope that at an earlier stage, as I
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explained on Clause 35, the parties will be willing to accept a voluntary reference from the Secretary of State to the C.I.R. Therefore, where there was a voluntary reference it would be the Secretary of State who initiated the reference and it would come back to him to withdraw it. In the case of the mandatory reference, where we have the power of the court, I think it would have to be for them to withdraw it.
LORD CHAMPION: In the case the noble Lord postulates it would not have gone to the Secretary of State in the first place. It would be a matter for the Secretary of State considering that this is the sort of procedure which could then be adopted with advantage; it would go straight to the Commission and come straight back. That makes sense to me. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 37, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 38 agreed to.
Clause 39 [Order of Industrial Court on report under section 38]:
5.52 p.m.
On Question, Whether Clause 39 shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD CHAMPION: I want to be clear about what is to happen to the report of the Commission at the point at which it arrives on the table of the Industrial Court. The preceding clauses tell us how the application to the Court is to be made. Then we learn that the scope of the reference may be extended if found desirable by the Commission, to which the Industrial Court will have passed on the reference. Then the Commission has to try to obtain agreement of the parties to a procedure agreement which would satisfy the requirement of the Act, the Commission at that point acting in the role of mediator and conciliator. Following that, if the application is not withdrawn, the Commission prepares its report and sends it to the Industrial Court. It is from that point onwards that I am in some doubt about what happens to it.
Clause 39 tells us that it may lie on the table of the Industrial Court for a period of six months, but before the end of that period any employer or trade union included among the parties may

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apply to the Court for an order. The Industrial Court must then, unless it thinks an order is not necessary, make an order, which will have the effect of a legally enforceable contract which must be obeyed by the employer and the trade union alike. It will be noticed that until the employer or the trade union—not, as I see it, an organisation of workers but a trade union, which to be a trade union must be a registered organisation—can make an application for an order under this clause. What happens if neither the employer nor the trade union so applies?
Supposing the application is never made by either the employer or the trade union. Does the Industrial Court sit on the report for ever? What happens if the original application to the Court was made by the Secretary of State'? Where are the words which permit him to apply to the Court for an Order? Or, in that case, is there somewhere in the Bill an instruction to the Industrial Court to make an order and serve it on the parties as a legally enforceable contract without an application for an order by any of the parties? Is there something in the Bill covering these points? If there is, I must admit to having missed it—not a difficult thing to do in a Bill of this complexity.
On the legally enforceable aspect—and this is the main point of my rising on this clause, although I think the questions I have asked up to now ought to be answered—we had intended to spend a lot of time discussing 'subsection (3) of Clause 34, but the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, agreed with us that that subsection should not remain in that clause, so very little discussion took place on it. Up to that subsection in Clause 34 we had been discussing freely negotiated contracts in which no provision had been made for excepting the contract from the legally enforceable provision. I hope what I have just said is clear, that up to that point we were discussing something which had become a legally enforceable contract because the 'parties had not agreed that it should not so be. Any party making a legally enforceable agreement would be aware of the fact, and they would know perfectly well that they had to police it, to use the word used in the Donovan Report. Under this Clause 39 the Court may make an order
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for a negotiating procedure which, to quote the clause
"… shall have effect as a legally enforceable contract, as if a contract consisting of those provisions had been made between those parties."
As I understand it, under This clause it will be possible for the Court to impose, even on an unwilling party or unwilling parties, a negotiating procedure they do not want which will become an enforceble contract and as such attract the policing provisions under Clause 34. This is surely undesirable, will bring the whole procedure into disrepute, and cause trade unions in particular to shy off using the procedures in Clause 35 to 41. even if otherwise they might have thought some good might have accrued through such references. I think this is a really serious point, that Parliament is proposing, or at least the Government are proposing, in this clause of this Bill to do something which I would have thought is so undesirable that it ought never to have appeared in the Bill.
We are going to have this situation created where there can be forced on trade union or employer an obligation to police something which they have not of their own free wills entered into. This surely is not right, and I would hope the Committee would agree with me; but naturally I look forward to hearing what the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, has to say on this aspect of it, and also the questions I asked about what is t o happen to the recommendation once it does reach the table of the Industrial Court.
LORD COLLISON: My noble friend Lord Champion has indeed made the point again, and it will be clear, I think, that the same thought was in my mind when I asked the question on subsection (3) of Clause 37. Would the noble Lord opposite tell me if I am right in thinking this (and forgive me for referring back to Clause 37): the Commission brings the parties together and finds hat they are capable of reaching an agreement—and willing to do so—which they do not wish to be legally enforceable. Is the answer to that situation contained in subsection (4) of Clause 37, which says in effect that, where the Commission find that progress is being made and an agreement will be reached, they can withdraw the proceedings?

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I think this may be the answer to my first question, but I am certainly not sure what is the answer to the question just asked by my noble friend. It is an important matter. The situation would be as has been stated: that a willing employer and a willing trade union or trade unions, having reached a point where they are quite agreeable between them to have an understanding as to procedures on a voluntary basis, not wishing—either of them—to have it legally enforceable, will be told that they just cannot do it, unless we are wrong in our interpretation of this clause. It is important and needs interpretation, and maybe an amendment.
LORD TAYLOR OF MANSFIELD: May I ask the noble Lord whether, when the report is submitted by the Commission to the N.I.R.C., the N.I.R.C. can alter that report if they do not think it right? The main reason why I ask the question is that the C.I.R. is regarded as a conciliatory body and the N.I.R.C. as a judicial body. Could the noble Lord tell us categorically whether the N.I.R.C. is a judicial body with power to alter a report of the C.I.R., which has been endeavouring to conciliate between parties in dispute?
LORD WINDLESHAM: I think the answer to that question is contained in Clause 39 and it is what one would expect. The C.I.R. is a conciliatory body. It investigates, it advises and it draws up a report. Subsection (2) says:
"Where such an application is made, then, unless the Industrial Court is satisfied that an order under this section is not necessary for the purpose of securing acceptance and observance of the provisions recommended in the report, the Court shall make an order—

(a) defining the unit of employment to which those provisions are to apply, and

(b) specifying the parties on whom they are to be binding, …"

The reading of that suggests that the court would not alter the provisions of the report. It would be for the C.I.R. to draw up the report and the court would have the judicial function of applying that report, saying who the parties would be and withdrawing it, if necessary, if the parties agreed within the period of six months.
In reply to the noble Lord, Lord Collison, I think that my reading of
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Clause 37(4) is the same as his. The only point that needs further clarification is that of C.I.R. approval. That would depend on the form and content. If the parties came up with a procedure agreement which did not satisfy the C.I.R. and which in their view would not meet the situation in the particular undertaking, they might not be willing to agree. But I think that the question of enforceability is a separate one. I am advised that the answer I gave is the correct one. If the parties to an agreement wish it not to be legally enforceable, that would not happen. But with regard to the form and content, I think that the C.I.R. would have to be satisfied. The noble Lord, Lord Champion, asked about the Secretary of State's powers. He may not apply for a Clause 39 order because he is not a party to the dispute and so is precluded. The noble Lord also asked what happened if none of the parties made an application for an order. The answer must be, I think, that no order would be made. The court would take no action if none of the parties decided to apply for an order.
The noble Lord then turned to the general question of enforcement, which we discussed yesterday. What are the enforcement provisions at the end of this long path, which I described, with many exits to allow the parties to escape from ending up in court after the second stage? What would happen if the court made an order under this clause imposing a C.I.R. devised procedure on the parties is that the procedure agreement would have the effect of a legally enforceable contract, and if the collective agreement were breached, then the provisions of Clause 34 would apply. Those provisions we debated at some length last night and what the clause says, if I remember rightly, is that where parties breach a collective agreement which is legally binding, that is an unfair industrial practice. Then Clause 97 says what the remedies are. These include an order to restrain from taking a particular course of action or the award of compensation. So we go from Clause 39 to Clause 34 to Clause 97. I think that would be the Chain of enforceability.
I should like to end the discussion on this clause with the general thought, which has come up many times, that the Government feel that this is a wholly

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exceptional procedure to meet wholly exceptional cases. There will be many opportunities for parties to agree with each other before they end up in the Court and without the Court enforcing a procedure agreement upon a reluctant party. This is going to be the exception, not the rule, and the underlying justification why it is in the Bill is that where there is a serious loss of production through continuous industrial action, there is a wider interest. It is not only the parties to the dispute but also the public as a whole who have an interest. For that reason we believe that in the end, where it is absolutely required, the Court must take this action.
LORD TAYLOR OF MANSFIELD: I think that the Government are making a profound mistake, for this reason: they are going to shuttlecock !the parties in a dispute between the two organisations, the C.I.R. and the N.I.R.C. The noble Lord shakes his head. I may be under a misapprehension, but the clause says that the C.I.R. shall submit a report to the Industrial Court. We are going to impose on industry these two organisations and they will have different functions. I think that the parties will be shuttlecocked between the two. They just will not know where they are and the situation in industry as a result of the shift of responsibility from one body to another is not going to help industrial relations.
LORD CHAMPION: The noble Lord has told us that an order will not be applied for by the Secretary of State, only by the other parties, either the employers or the trade unions. This really is extraordinary. In Clause 35 we are told that the Secretary of State may make an application—that is, he may start the whole procedure. Having started that and gone through everything embodied in the subsequent clauses, we get to a position where the Commission has arrived at a decision, has made a recommendation and has sent it to the Industrial Court. At that point the whole thing dies unless the parties make an application to the Industrial Court for an order. That seems to me to be an extraordinary situation. The noble Lord shakes his head. Clause 35 says that:
"the Secretary of State, or any other party to whom the section applies, may make an application to the Industrial Court …".
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And then, in paragraphs (a) and (b), sets out what will govern the whole procedure. The application is then submitted and, as I say, having at this stage gone through the whole procedure. it is going to die at the stage of the Industrial Court unless an application is made for it to be made into an order. I am not particularly anxious for the Industrial Court to make an order, for the reason that I have already given, but it seemed to me to be rather silly that the Secretary of State should start a procedure which could peter out in this rather tame manner. I should be grateful if the noble Lord could reply on that point before I make my final decision whether to advise the Committee to divide on this clause.
LORD WINDLESHAM: I think it is quite logical, if we just reflect and analyse the situation for a moment or two. At the start of the procedure there is no workable agreement between tile parties, either no procedure agreement at all—Clause 35(1)(a), " the absence of a procedure agreement "—or as provided for in paragraph (b) a procedure agreement which is inadequate and the parties have acted contrary to it. It is in very vague terms; it may be, in the opinion of those such as the C.I.R. who have studied the subject, one of the reasons why the atmosphere in the workplace is very bad. So the Secretary of State has art interest in trying to bring the parties together. At each stage in this long procedure he has an interest to bring the. parties together to enter into an agreement. Right at the end of the day, if he has been unsuccessful and it ends as an order, or an application for an order to the Industrial Court, there are the two parties to the agreement. It is a bilateral relationship, and I think it is right that at this stage it should be for the parties to the agreement to apply.
I would just add an " off the cuff " reflection, which is that it might not be to the advantage of industrial relations—which is what we are talking about in this Bill—if the Secretary of State did have this particular power. The noble Lord, Lord Diamond, who is leading for the Front Bench opposite, was a member of the Cabinet in the previous Administration and he knows the very great pressures that Ministers are under front public opinion to take one course of action or

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another. Is it quite impossible to envisage circumstances in the future in which the Secretary of State might feel that, for reasons outside those which directly concern the parties, he must go ahead and make an application to the court? I should have thought, on the whole, that this would be better left as it is. Where there is an agreement, at the end of the day it is for the parties, whether they have accepted it voluntarily or not, to enter into this relationship and to make it work. That is the reason for leaving the Secretary of State out, and I think it is a good reason.
LORD CHAMPION: But they do not reach an agreement, as I understand it. They have a legally enforceable contract imposed upon them, which seems to me to be something entirely different from an agreement. For that reason I would say that the explanation given by the noble Lord does not really meet the point that I was making.
LORD WINDLESHAM: I accept that correction entirely. I was speaking in terms of a procedure agreement, which is the relationship that we are describing here, and the word " agreement " in these circumstances is not perhaps very apt, by the time we have reached Clause 39, to
what we have been discussing in this part of the Bill, namely procedure agreements.
LORD CHAMPION: That does not invalidate the point I was making. I am not particularly anxious to have the Secretary of State in a position to apply to the Industrial Court to have this imposed. I merely thought that the whole thing, as I read it, made something of a nonsense if the Secretary of State could not come into it at this stage. I believe the idea of the clause as a whole is absolutely preposterous. We are going to have a situation in which this sort of thing can be imposed on people, that they shall then have to police it under the terms of Clause 34 and with all the difficulties that can arise from that, and all the penalties that may flow from an unfair industrial practice being imposed on someone who did not want the thing at the outset; having had it imposed upon them, at the end they might find themselves in court for not having carried out in its entirety the terms of Clause 34. The Committee must divide on this point, and I invite them to do so.
6.15 p.m.
On Question, Whether Clause 39 shall stand part of the Bill?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 131; Not-Contents, 57.

CONTENTS

Aberdare, L.

Cottesloe, L.

Goschen, V. [Teller.]

Ailwyn, L.

Courtown, E.

Gray, L.

Albemarle, E.

Coventry, Bp.

Grenfell, L.

Allerton, L.

Cowley, E.

Gridley, L.

Ashbourne, L.

Craigavon, V.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

Atholl, D.

Crathorne, L.

Hailes, L.

Balfour, E.

Crawshaw, L.

Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Balfour of Inchrye, L.

Cullen of Ashbourne, L.

Barrington, V.

Daventry, V.

Halsbury, E.

Beaumont of Whitley, L.

De Clifford, L.

Hankey, L.

Belhaven and Stenton, L.

Denham, L.

Hanworth, V.

Belstead, L.

Derwent, L.

Harvey of Prestbury, L.

Berkeley, Bs.

Digby, L.

Hatherton, L.

Bessborough, E.

Drumalbyn, L.

Hawke, L.

Bledisloe, V.

Dudley, E.

Hood, V.

Brabazon of Tara, L.

Ebbisham, L.

Howard of Glossop, L.

Brecon, L.

Eccles, V.

Hylton-Foster, Bs.

Bridgeman, V.

Elliot of Harwood, Bs.

Word, L.

Brooke of Cumnor, L.

Emmet of Amberley, Bs.

Inchyra, L.

Brooke of Ystradfellte, Bs.

Exeter, M.

Inglewood, L.

Brougham and Vaux, L.

Falkland, V.

Ironside, L.

Buchan, E.

Ferrers, E.

Jellicoe, E. (L. Privy Seal.)

Burgh, L.

Ferrier, L.

Kemsley, V.

Burton, L.

Fisher, L.

Killearn, L.

Byers, L.

Foot, L.

Kilmany, L.

Clwyd, L.

Fortescue, E.

Kindersley, L.

Coleraine, L.

Fraser of Lonsdale, L.

Latymer, L.

Conesford, L.

Gage, V.

Lothian, M.

Cork and Orrery, E.

Garner, L.

Loudoun, C

Lyell, L.

Rankeillour, L.

Savile, L.

MacAndrew, L.

Rathcavan, L.

Selkirk, E.

Margadale, L.

Reigate, L.

Somers, L.

Massereene and Ferrard, V.

Remnant, L.

Strang, L.

Merrivale, L.

Rhyl, L.

Strange, L.

Merthyr, L.

Rochdale, V.

Swinton, E.

Milverton, L.

Rockley, L.

Tenby, V.

Molson, L.

Rothermere, V.

Teynham, L.

Monck, V.

St. Aldwyn, E.

Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, Bs.

Monckton of Brenchley, V.

St. Helens, L.

Verulam, E.

Mowbray and Stourton, L.

St. Just, L.

Vivian, L.

Napier and Ettrick, L. [Teller.]

St. Oswald, L.

Wakefield of Kendal, L.

Northchurch, Bs.

Salisbury, M.

Windlesham, L.

Oakshott, L.

Sandford, L.

Wise, L.

Orr-Ewing, L.

Sandys, L.

Wolverton, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Addison, V.

Gaitskell, Bs.

Royle, L.

Archibald, L.

Garnsworthy, L.

St. Davids, V.

Ardwick, L.

Greenwood of Rossendale, L.

Samuel, V.

Balogh, L.

Henderson, L.

Serota, Bs.

Bernstein, L.

Heycock, L.

Shackleton, L.

Beswick, L.

Hilton of Upton, L. [Teller.]

Shepherd, L.

Birk, Bs.

Hughes, L.

Shinwell, L.

Bowden, L.

Jacques, L.

Slater, L.

Brockway, L.

Leatherland, L.

Snow, L.

Brown, L.

Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, Bs.

Sorensen, L.

Buckinghamshire, E.

Lloyd of Hampstead, L.

Stonham, L.

Burntwood, L.

Longford, E.

Stow Hill, L.

Champion, L.

Maelor, L.

Taylor of Mansfield, L.

Collison, L.

Moyle, L.

White, Bs.

Crook, L.

Peddie, L.

Williamson, L.

Davies of Leek, L.

Phillips, Bs. [Teller.]

Wootton of Abinger, Bs.

Diamond, L.

Plummer, Bs.

Wright of Ashton under Lyne, L.

Douglass of Cleveland, L.

Popplewell, L.

Evans of Hungershall, L.

Ritchie-Calder, L.

Wynne-Jones, L.

Faringdon, L.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Resolved in the affirmative, and Clause 39 agreed to accordingly.
Clause 40 agreed to.
Clause 41 [Extension of ss. 35 to 40 to composite unit]:
6.24 p.m.
On Question, Whether Clause 41 shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD CHAMPION: This was a new clause inserted in the Bill on Report in another place, and it is one of the few clauses that received a reasonable amount of discussion in that place. So far as I am concerned, the principle of Clause 35 is acceptable and applicable to a particular unit of employment, which term presupposes a single employer. It is only a matter of common sense, therefore, in these days when groups of employers operate under similar conditions that the principles and the procedures of Clauses 35 to 40 should be applicable to such groups. The difficulty that might arise here is over the interpretation of the words "composite unit ". I suppose that
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interpretation of those words will be a matter for the Industrial Court. However, if the Secretary of State, thinking over the matter since the debate in another place, feels that there is anything that can usefully be added to what was said there, it may prove helpful to the trade unions and the interested employers to have it on the record. Therefore I invite the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, to tell me a little more than we already know about this matter at this stage.
As I say, this is a new clause, introduced in another place. It received some discussion but I must say, reading the Report of the discussion in the other place, that I am not wholly satisfied about it. I am not sure exactly how it will all apply, and in particular I should like some little further interpretation, or explanation perhaps, of the words "composite unit ".
LORD WINDLESHAM: I willingly respond to that invitation. The new clause was debated, as the noble Lord, Lord Champion, says, at some length in

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the Commons on Report stage, but the debate did go very wide because a number of other Amendments were taken with it. What I should like to do for the benefit of the Committee, and for the information of those outside the House who are interested, is to give a short, hypothetical example of a composite unit which is based on real-life situations. In the jargon, " this is regarded as a model ", which has been constructed by the Department of Employment and I think we shall see within it the features of what will be regarded as a composite unit coming within the terms of this clause and the reasons for it.
Let us refer to this engineering group by name. We could call it the Tankaster Engineering Group—it is a hypothetical one. It is made up of 14 separately registered companies. The total labour force for the whole group is over 10,000 people, and the end product and allied products of this group show little variation. Eleven of the companies are in one geographical area and the remaining three companies in different parts of the country. Despite this firm control from the centre over marketing and financial matters, each of the associated companies pursues an independent industrial relations policy. Plant management has almost complete autonomy, with rare intervention or advice coming down from group level on industrial relations matters. There is little variation between the methods of producion employed at the different companies, and in each case company managements negotiate with the same union. Although there are variations in the size of the labour force employed, each company follows the broad framework of the Engineering Industry Procedure Agreement. In all companies, there is a lack of formalised procedures to provide an orderly framework for collective bargaining to take place. Industrial relations in the 14 companies, as measured by the incidence of industrial disputes, varies: some are good. some indifferent; but a few are very poor, with a long history of unconstitutional action.
This situation, which is not unrepresentative of many large engineering groups, is an example of a composite unit under Clause 41 of the Bill where action might be appropriate under Clauses 35 to 40.
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In these circumstances it would be misleading to apply changes in industrial relations procedures and institutions to one of the companies only, without taking into account the other 13. The whole group, in effect, might justifiably be regarded as a composite unit where common procedures and institutions would apply and where positive direction over industrial relations policy and its implementation would be formulated at group level. That is, as I say, a hypothetical example but it is constructed from actual instances, and it shows the benefits of this particular procedure which was added after debate in another place.
I think that noble Lords opposite, and indeed the trade union movement, will find that this might well operate to their advantage in a group of companies, separately registered but linked in management and finance. Matters concerning marketing, finance, production and other aspects of the enterprise are often handled at group level by group executives, whereas industrial relations very often are not. These are left to someone in a particular plant who has to get on with it as best he can. The value of this process of joining particular companies where they have close links, both from the nature of the underaking and in their relationships with the unions, means that industrial relations policies will be considered at a higher level and perhaps a more consistent level across a range of companies than is the case at present.
LORD CHAMPION: We are grateful to the noble Lord for giving us that hypothetical model, which certainly helps us to understand the meaning of a " composite group ". This is a pretty big group with its 10,000 employees, spread fairly widely. The noble Lord said, regarding a question from Lord Pargiter, that there must be a limit on the size of the unit and that it must be within an area which was immediately identifiable and where all the people might be actually working closely together. I imagine that this hypothetical group is spread over the whole country, but they are going to have a single procedural arrangement arrived at to cover the whole lot. I think that in some cases this is sensible and the right thing to do. I should have thought that what the noble Lord

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was saying here would fit the wider circumstances posed by the noble Lord, Lord Pargiter, but it would be for the noble Lord to tell us whether that is so or not.
He said something about this hypothetical group: that their arrangements are patchy. That is what we are saying, and have been saying, and he has been saying all the afternoon now, that the picture of procedural arrangements, when looked at over the whole country, is a patchy one. In some cases it is an extraordinarily satisfactory picture: at least one part of the picture is, but the other part is certainly not. I do not wish to quarrel with anything the noble Lord has said, but I would ask him to direct his speech briefly to my point that this model seems to be spreading the group so widely that it might possibly be applicable even to the circumstances mentioned by my noble friend Lord Pargiter about the York agreement.
LORD WINDLESHAM: I will willingly do that. My right honourable friend, the Secretary of State, has considered this question very carefully. Representations have been made to him and he is at present of the view that it would not be appropriate for the procedure described in Clauses 35 to 41 to apply to whole industries. The composite unit may be perhaps a compact one. There was the Birmid Qualcast reference to the C.I.R., where three foundries were all on the same site in Smethwick and were producing very similar products indeed. That was an example of a composite unit—a very compact group, much smaller in terms of workforce. In the model which I gave, the workforce is larger—the figure of 10,000 was postulated—and the companies were in the main concentrated in one part of the country, but there were three others in different parts. The distinction, I think, has to be made between a group of this kind which is under single management control. There is one management which has in hand matters of finance and marketing, which can make a bargain, consider questions of industrial relations and implement any agreement they enter into, whereas in industry as a whole that situation does not apply and an employers' federation would not have direct control over its
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component companies that exist in a composite group of this sort.
LORD STONHAM: I believe the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, said that in the hypothetical case he quoted of a large company consisting of 14 seperate units, they would have a common procedure but any one could itself enter into an industrial bargain. Does that mean that under Clause 41, if one unit concluded a bargain, the bargain would then apply compulsorily to all other 13 units?
LORD W1NDLESHAM: No I did not make clear that this procedure is entirely discretionary. There no compulsion About it. It is only if those in the component companies agree that this is a desirable way of proceeding. So the others could not be carried along willy-nilly unless the group management, the owners of the business, from the employers' side, felt that it was desirable that there should be common agreement extending to all their factories—that is, the same agreement. They would then be treated as a composite unit instead of as 14 separate ones. But unless that was so, they would continue to be treated separately.
LORD STONHAM: There would be no compulsion?
LORD WINDLESHAM LORD WINDLESHAM: No.
LORD HANKEY: Would the Government consider putting the reference to the composite unit as a definition in Clause 158?
LORD WINDLESHAM: That seems a very good point and one that we should take account of. Perhaps I, or one of my noble friends, could follow it up when we reach the definition clause, No. 158. It is a quality of this Bill that there are a large number of definitions. I find, while reading through these expressions, that it is surprising how many of them appear in Clause 158, the interpretative one, even though one may then get referred back to some other clause in the Bill. I should like to thank the noble Lord for his suggestion, and we will consult with our advisers on this point and come back to it later.
LORD CHAMPION: There is one thing that the noble Lord must not do in Clause 158—and that is to put there the whole story of his model.
Clause 42 [Definitions relating to bargaining structure];
6.38 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN LORD DRUMALBYN moved Amendment No. 241D:
Page 33, line 7, leave out (" which will be binding on them ") and insert (" on their behalf ").
The noble Lord said: The purpose of this Amendment is quite simple. As the provision is drafted at the present time it would be limited to joint negotiating panels, by definition, and to those who were authorised to enter into collective agreements which were binding on the bodies which set them up. It is thought that that limitation is neither right nor necessary, and the purpose of this would be to modify the definition of a " joint negotiating panel " so as to allow it to cover also such panels as did not make binding agreements. I beg to move.
6.40 p.m.
On Question, Whether Clause 42, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD CHAMPION: This clause seems to me to be unexceptionable as starting a set of definitions for the consideration of Clauses 43 to 53. If Clauses 42 to 53, headed " Recognition of sole bargaining agent ", came to us as a separate Bill, we should probably on Second Reading spend a whole day on the debate, and I should think at least another day—and a long one at that—on Amendments set down to it. But in the circumstances in which this Bill came to us we had to devote a few cursory remarks to these clauses on Second Reading, and because of the way in which the Government are intent on driving this Bill through the Committee stage, by a process of exhausting the Committee—composed of elderly amateurs, of whom I am now one—we have kept our Amendments to these clauses to the absolute minimum.
A few Second Reading points are, however, necessary, and this clause seems to me to be the point at which to make them. I am doing very much what the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, did in relation to the last group of Amendments with which we dealt in the hope that by doing so we shall cut down debate on the subsequent clauses. I am sure that that would be the wish of the noble Lord,
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Lord Drumalbyn, who looks as though he is in charge of this particular Part of the Bill.
We are bound to ask here: what are the Government up to? What are they after? Are they trying by these clauses to produce a situation in which there is one industry, one trade union? Are they intent on imposing on industry a pattern of organisation of the employees, by fitting them and their organisations into a preconceived framework? Those of us who are members of an industrial unit might be predisposed towards the idea as a suitable one for all industries, but to attempt that would be to stir up the maximum of trouble for the minimum of advantage.
For the benefit of your Lordships, perhaps I should explain that an industrial union is one that caters for all the workers in an industry, and as such may be described as a vertical union. The Mineworkers' Union is an outstanding example of a union of that kind. The craft union is one which caters for workers having particular skills, and employed in jobs for which their skills are required in a number of industries, in a broad band, on a horizontal pattern, not catering for the unskilled, on the one hand, or for the white-collared workers, on the other. Then there are the general workers' unions, which cater for workers outside the ranks of the skilled workers but not confined to a single industry, as in the case of the industrial union. If all workers could be forced into industrial unions, it might make for administrative tidiness. There are many things one could do in the interests of securing administrative tidiness in many fields, but this is not one of them. To attempt it would be to ignore the long history of growth of the unions, their roots deepened by struggle and adversity, the growth which has gone into their making, to the point which they have now reached. The struggle, as I say. has created the unions and fixed ideas which will be difficult to move. If the Government think that, by a few clauses in a Bill, they are going to fit the many trade unions into a pattern foreign to their growth and history, they are vastly mistaken. If this was a Fascist or Communist State, we should probably do it. But it is not for Britain.

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I cannot remember whether it was Beatrice Webb or her husband who conjured up the phrase, " the inevitability of gradualism ", a phrase which was something of a counterblast to the young men of the period who were in a hurry, a phrase which was born of the knowledge that evolutionary changes are more fitting for an advanced society such as ours than revolutionary changes. That is an idea which seems to me to be fitting to the general tempo of this Committee, which is understandably conservative and cautious in its approach to change—and of course it is conservative both with a small "c" and very largely with a big " C " too, judging by the numbers who find their way through the Division Lobbies when we have a Division. Nevertheless, even those of us on this side of the Committee, who might have started out with different ideas, inevitably with age become somewhat conservative with a small " c ". So the evolutionary procedure and changes are more fitting to the general tempo of this Committee.
It was also the case with the trade union movement, fashioned by a century and a half growth, of ups and downs and much bitter experience, that it was disposed towards the evolutionary rather than the revolutionary rate of change. But change it is prepared to make. In 1939, the Trades Union Congress, with a view to closer unity and greater efficiency in trade union organisation and negotiation arrangements, adopted what is known as the Bridlington principles and procedures. What that is all about is set out in a brief description in paragraphs 686 to 691 of the Donovan Report. It is sufficient for me to say here that in an extremely difficult area there has been, through the use of the Bridlington principles, a check on the proliferation of unions. In the 30 years during which that agreement has been in existence, no less than 1,000 inter-union disputes have been succesfully dealt with, inside the movement, by a voluntary approach under the Bridlington agreement. As a result of Bridlington, therefore, the reform is coming from within and is not being imposed from outside, which is as it should be.
I think it would be infinitely better if the Government kept out of this field altogether, and did not attempt by these clauses to impose, through the medium of the C.I.R., bargaining structures
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foreign to the trade union conception of how reform should come. I an of course conscious of the fact that it is not the Government's intention (or I take it that it is not) to apply these clauses willy-nilly across the whole board of industrial relations, because when Clause 43 was added to the Bill on Report in another place, the Solicitor General said, at columns 1544 and 1545:
"The object of these proposals about bargaining structures and recognition disputes is to provide a machinery which is to he available when disputes arise. This is not intended to be an all-embracing solution applied right across the board, to disturb stable bargaining structures. That is far from being the intention of the Government."
Those are the words of a Minister, but I can find in these clauses nothing putting such a limit on their application, and I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn will refer particularly to this point when he comes to reply to me on the Question now before the Committee, that Clause 42 shall stand part of the Bill. It is the old story here: that it is what is in the Act that counts, not what a Minister has said about the Bill before it becomes an Act. The Solicitor General said something in relation to these clauses with which I am bound to agree, that it is not proposed to apply a solution right across the board. But I think that somewhere in these clauses the idea set out in the words of the Solicitor General ought to be included somewhere so that we may be satisfied that no attempt will ever be made by this or any subsequent Government, under the terms of a Bill such as we are now passing, to do what I fear might be in the minds of some Government in the future.
6.40 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Champion, for the way in which he has introduced the discussion to this Part of the Bill. He talked about the " elderly amateurs " in his opening. Nobody could describe him as an amateur, with the immense experience he has had both in Government and in the trade unions; nor has he in any way added to the exhaustion of the Committee to which he also referred, but he has given me an opportunity of saying something about this Part of the Bill.
The noble Lord has given expression to fears that seem to be widely held but are really quite inexplicable from the

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point of view of this Part of the Bill. He quoted what my right honourable friend the Solicitor General said about this Part of the Bill, and of course that is one of the things that it is intended to do. I should like to make it clear from the outset that this Bill is not intended to force the whole of industry into the straitjacket of a particular pattern—far from it. In fact, if the noble Lord will look at Clause 43—as I am sure he has—he will see the immense variety of situations which can be covered by that clause.
The bargaining unit may consist of a part of specified groups within a particular plant: it may consist of the whole plant; it may consist of associated plants, or some or all of the workers in those associated plants; or it may cover a whole industry. But the whole point of this section of the Bill is to establish, as the noble Lord rightly quoted, " a machinery for recognition where recognition is not already accorded by the employer ". I think that noble Lords perhaps do not realise the extent to which we are on common ground here; perhaps I ought to make that clear at the outset.
In the first place both sides are agreed that in this day and age it is just not right that an employer should be able to refuse recognition to a union even where this is the wish of a majority of his employees. Thus, the first piece of common ground between the two sides is that where a trade union has adequate support among a group of employees and is able to represent them effectively, it is acknowledged to be desirable that the union should be recognised for negotiating purposes by the employer concerned.
Noble Lords will recollect that one form of bargaining structure that we have been discussing is the agency shop. Noble Lords will remember that before the Industrial Court can allow an application to go forward, it must be satisfied that the trade unions making the application are recognised for the purposes of negotiating rights. Where they are not recognised, then use has to be made of the machinery in this Part of the Bill in order to see that recognition is accorded to a union or unions in accordance with the wishes of their members.
The second area of common ground is that there should be an established procedure for resolving recognition disputes
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without the need to use strikes or other industrial sanctions. This was also part of the Bill which was introduced in another place before the last General Election. We are all agreed that it is unsatisfactory that in the last resort the only way of negotiating such disputes should be through the use of industrial power. Of course I recognise that the Department of Employment has done, and will continue to do, valuable work in this field. But in the last resort it cannot compel an employer to recognise a union.
The third point of agreement is that once this procedure has produced a decision in favour of the union (however this decision may have been arrived at, and we have our differences here) that decision should bind the employer. That fact applied equally to the previous Bill. Finally, I think it is fair to say that it is also common ground between us that whatever procedure is established it should also be available for use where recognition disputes between unions are —or involve—disputes between unions. I say this, though, with a little more hesitancy because the emphasis in the previous Administration's Bill seems definitely to have been on settling simple disputes over an employer refusing to grant the recognition. But that is, all the same, a substantial area of common ground, and in our disputes and arguments over the details of this it is all too easy to forget it. I do not know how far the noble Lord is going to argue, but what we are arguing about, or may be arguing about, is the question of means, not ends. I recognise that that is not to say that there may be some disagreement regarding the means, and I should like to say something about the means here.
First of all, because the recognition procedure in our Bill is available only to registered unions, it is said that somehow unregistered unions will cease to exist for bargaining purposes. Those were the very words used in another place, and it was also suggested that registration provisions generally mean that unregistered unions will be denied the right to operate as trade unions at all. That is not so, as noble Lords by now will have appreciated. We can argue another time about whether the conditions for registration are right, but certainly it should be possible for us to agree that the principle of registration is

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right. After all, the Donovan Commission recommended that the registration should be a pre-condition of achieving trade status. It is a fundamental provision of our Bill that registration should be the means of obtaining certain important rights and privileges, and the right to compel an employer by law to recognise a union is one such right.
But of course that does not mean that unregistered unions will cease to exist for bargaining purposes. I feel I must stress at the outset that there is nothing whatever to stop an employer voluntarily recognising an unregistered union, and no doubt a good many will do so. What we are talking about here is the new machinery for use as a last resort where voluntary methods of solving disputes have broken down. In fact, I hope it will prove unnecessary to use the recognition procedure extensively. I stress that this is a last resort procedure, and I hope that most recognition disputes will continue to be settled voluntarily, as they are at the moment. I cannot stress that too strongly. Even here we have bent over backwards to give organisations which are not prepared to register a fair deal. It is true that they cannot initiate an application under Clause 43—that would be inconsistent with the philosophy of registration and the advantages which flow from it. But it is quite open to the C.I.R., under Clause 46, to recommend an independent organisation of workers which is not registered. Provided an organisation recommended in this way gets itself registered within six months of the C.I.R.'s report, then it can make an application for a ballot on the C.I.R.'s recommendations. In our view this is eminently fair.
Next, it is suggested that somehow the introduction of the Industrial Court into the procedure makes it less democratic or responsive to the needs of a particular industrial situation. We contest this strongly. In the previous Administration's Bill only the Secretary of State could refer recognition disputes to the C.I.R. In our Bill the Secretary of State can still initiate the procedure which can result in a reference to the C.I.R., but the parties themselves (employers and unions) can also make applications. It seems to us right, and consistent with the Government's general
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philosophy, that the parties,themselves should be able to do this. But given that applications can be made by the parties themselves, obviously there has to be some means of sifting applications to make sure that they are valid and that voluntary means of settling disputes have been used and have failed. Of course I know that noble Lords opposite are fundamentally opposed to the idea of the Industrial Court. But given that there is such a body it seems to us right that we should require applications for reference to the C.I.R. to be made to it first of all so that it can sift cases before they go to the C.I.R. The sifting criteria are strictly limited and factual in nature, and they are clearly set out in the Bill. It would be time-wasting for the C.I.R. to carry out the sifting itself (which would have to be the case if the Industrial Court were cut out of the process unless the Secretary of State were somehow given the power, which would be equally undesirable in our view). It will be far better for C.I.R. to concentrate its industrial expertise on the investigations entrusted to it.
But a more fundamental reason for having the Industrial Court in the procedure is that in the last resort there is the possibility of an order—and it is only a possibility,:because between the application and the order a great deal of conciliation, both by the conciliation officers and the C.I.R., will take place—compelling an employer to recognise a particular union. Whatever one thinks of,the idea of an Industrial Court, it is surely right that a legal order of this kind should be made by it. In the previous Administration's Bill it was the Secretary of State himself who glade the order. Moreover, he had discretion as to whether or not he made an order at all. This seems to us to be putting far too much power into the hands of the Secretary of State, with the possibility that the outcome of a recognition dispute would be dictated by political rather than practical considerations. I hope I have said enough to give a broad indication of the clauses that we are here dealing with, but it may be convenient for me to say something about the definitions in this clause itself.
LORD SLATER: Before the noble Lord gets on to that, may I ask him a question? He has made reference to

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registration, and I have listened most attentively to the whole of his speech. The right is given to an employer in regard to the recognition of a trade union and the forms of registration that arise from this particular clause, and this is going to be one of the weakest sections in the whole Bill. It will create more unions and more disruption inside industry than there is at the moment. Secondly, why have the Government introduced into this Bill a form of registration, when trade unions at the moment attached to the Trades Union Congress are already registered as trade unions in accordance with the regulations and also with the law of this country?
LORD DRUMALBYN: I think there is a limit to the latitude that is given in regard to discussion on the Question that the clause stand part. The noble Lord said that he was making something in the nature of a Second Reading speech in relation to these clauses. However, the noble Lord is in fact going well outside these clauses. I mention registration only from the point of view of showing that registration was not necessary before an employer could recognise the negotiating rights of a particular organisation of workers. That was the purpose of my mention of it. I think we ought to leave the discussion on registration until we get to Part IV of the Bill; we are at present on Part III.
I do not know how far noble Lords would wish me to comment on these definitions. In so far as " negotiating rights " are concerned—because I think this is important—I should like to say that in this definition there are no restrictions and no limitations on negotiating rights. There is no definition of the levels, local or national, at which negotiations are conducted, nor is there a description of the subjects appropriate to negotiation. Nor is it intended in the present definition that the should so lay down negotiating rights. But where there is a recognition order in force, it will be an unfair industrial practice for the employer not to take all necessary action to negotiate, and this might be alleged in relation to particular subjects that are alleged to fall within the negotiating rights. It will then be for the Industrial Court to decide whether, and
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in what respect, the employer has failed to negotiate.
So far as joint negotiating powers are concerned, I think I should say that the provision in the Bill that a joint negotiating panel may be recommended as a sole bargaining agent is intended to overcome problems that exist in this country, particularly through the multiplicity of unions in various plants. It is not intended to force them all together. It may be that the descriptions of " workers " to be covered by an application will cover a section of the workers in the plant, as I have said. The object will be that, where appropriate, unions representing as large a proportion of a company's employees as possible should negotiate jointly with the company within a set negotiating body. This will enable the advantage of multi-unionism to be preserved, without the disadvantages of fragmented bargaining.
I hope that explanation has been of some assistance to the Committee, and will perhaps enable us to proceed more quickly with the ensuing clauses.
LORD CHAMPION: I am grateful to the noble Lord. I think it will be of help to us to have 'had this explanation at the outset. I only regret that it is not already on the record so that I could read it when dealing with the subsequent clauses which I shall have to deal with after we have had a short break. Despite the area of agreement which the noble Lord has said exists between the two sides in relation to this whole matter—and he went back to the Bill that was introduced in the other place by the last Administration—there is still so much between us on subsequent clauses to which we shall be returning in the course of this long night that seems to stretch out endlessly before us, that I feel that, at this stage, we ought to register our protest about the whole of this Part of the Bill. I hope this will help to cut down the number of Divisions we should otherwise have had on each and every clause of the Bill. It might be helpful to the Committee and to everyone. I hope that if we go through the Lobbies now, we may then go on to the other business, which will give both the noble Lord and me a chance to get some sustenance.
THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (LORD FERRIER): The Question is that Clause 43 stand part of the Bill?*
7.10 p.m.
On Question, Whether Clause 43 shall stand part of the Bill?*
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 104; Not-Contents, 38.

CONTENTS

Aberdare, L.

Ebbisham, L.

Molson, L.

Albemarle, E.

Eccles, V.

Monck, V.

Allerton, L.

Falkland, V.

Monckton of Brenchley, V.

Balfour, E.

Ferrers, E.

Monson, L.

Balfour of Inchrye, L.

Ferrier, L.

Mowbray and Stourton, L.

Barrington, V.

Fisher, L.

Napier and Ettrick, L.

Beaumont of Whitley, L.

Fraser of Lonsdale, L.

Netherthorpe, L.

Belhaven and Stenton, L.

Gage, V.

Northchurch, Bs.

Belstead, L.

Goschen, V. [Teller.]

Oakshott, L.

Berkeley, Bs.

Gray, L.

O'Neill of the Maine, L.

Bledisloe, V.

Grenfell, L.

Piatt, L.

Brecon, L.

Gridley, L.

Rankeillour, L.

Brooke of Cumnor, L.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

Rhyl, L.

Brooke of Ystradfellte, Bs.

Hailes, L.

Rochdale, V.

Brougham and Vaux, L.

Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Rockley, L.

Buchan, E.

Rothermere, V.

Burton, L.

Halsbury, E.

St. Aldwyn, E.

Byers, L.

Hanworth, V.

St. Helens, L.

Clifford of Chudleigh, L.

Hatherton, L.

St. Just, L.

Clwyd, L.

Hawke, L.

Sandford, L.

Coleraine, L.

Hood, V.

Sandys, L.

Colville of Culross, V.

Hylton-Foster, Bs.

Savile, L.

Conesford, L.

Inglewood, L.

Selkirk, E.

Cork and Orrery, E.

Jellicoe, E. (L. Privy Seal.)

Sherfield, L.

Cottesloe, L.

Kemsley, V.

Somers, L.

Courtown, E.

Killearn, L.

Strang, L.

Cowley, E.

Kilmany, L.

Strange, L.

Craigavon, V.

Lansdowne, M.

Strathclyde, L.

Crathorne, L.

Latymer, L.

Tenby, V.

Cullen of Ashbourne, L.

Luke, L.

Thorneycroft, L.

Daventry, V.

Lyell, L.

Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, Bs.

Denham, L. [Teller.]

MacAndrew, L.

Verulam, E.

Digby, L.

Margadale, L.

Vivian, L.

Drumalbyn, L.

Massereene and Ferrard, V.

Windlesham, L.

Dudley, E.

Milverton, L.

Wolverton, L

NOT-CONTENTS

Addison, V.

Faringdon, L.

Plummer, Bs.

Archibald, L.

Gaitskell, Bs.

Ritchie-Calder, L

Balogh, L.

Garnsworthy, L.

St. Davids, V.

Bernstein, L.

Greenwood of Rossendale, L.

Serota, Bs.

Beswick, L.

Henderson, L.

Shackleton, L.

Bowden, L.

Hilton of Upton, L. [Teller.]

Shepherd, L.

Brockway, L.

Hughes, L.

Slater, L.

Buckinghamshire, E.

LeatherJand, L.

Stonham, L.

Champion, L.

Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, Bs. [Teller.]

White, Bs.

Collison, L.

Wootton of Abinger, Bs

Crook, L.

Lloyd of Hampstead, L.

Wright of Ashton under Lyne, L.

Davies of Leek, L.

Milner of Leeds, L.

Delacourt-Smith, L.

Nunburnholme, L.

Wynne-Jones, L.

Diamond, L.

Resolved in the affirmative, and Clause 43 agreed to accordingly.*

LORD DRUMALBYN: I beg to move that the House do now resume.

Moved accordingly, and on Question Motion agreed to.

"The references to "clause 43" should have been to "clause 42 as amended".(see columns 533–4 of the OFFICIAL REPORT, FOR Thursday, May 20, 1971.)

FIRE PRECAUTIONS BILL
7.18 p.m.
THE MINISTER OF STATE, HOME OFFICE (LORD W1NDLESHAM): My Lords, I beg to move that this Report be now received.
Moved, That the Report be now received—(Lord Windlesham.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
Clause 8 [Change of conditions affecting adequacy of certain matters specified in fire certificate, etc.]:
LORD CROWTHER LORD CROWTHER moved Amendment No. 1:
Page 11, line 17, at end insert (" or consists of premises of any other description prescribed for the purposes of this subsection ").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, we turn now from In Place of Strife to what I hope will be sweetness and light on the subject of fire precautions. With the permission of the House, I should like to make a very few remarks on the first four Amendments taken together. These are paving Amendments to Amendment No. 14 which is in my name, and which is a complete redraft of Clause 19. I call these paving Amendments because, although they come in the Bill before Clause 19, logically they are dependent upon the Amendment to Clause 19 which I shall move in due course. When that moment comes, I shall attempt to explain to your Lordships how it comes about that such a long and technical Amendment stands in my name on the Marshalled List. I do not want to anticipate more than a very small part of what I shall say then, and it may be enough to say now that, through the courtesy of the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, I have had the benefit of the expertise and drafting skill of the officials of the Home Office.
I do not wish in any way to suggest, either now or later, that Amendment No. 14 will turn out to be acceptable to the noble Lord. I do not know what he is going to say on it. But I think I can assure noble Lords that if Amendment No. 14, when its turn comes, is accepted, then the words contained in these first four Amendments will be necessary in Clause 8 in order that the Bill shall hang together. The course that I would suggest to your Lordships, and which may
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meet with your Lordships' approval, is that these four Amendments should be accepted at this stage. If, in due course, Amendment No. 14 is accepted, then these Amendments will prove to have been necessary. If, on the other hand, Amendment No. 14 is rejected, then it will always be possible on Third Reading to take these Amendments out and to restore the Bill to its present wording. I think that is the only explanation that I need give of all four Amendments, and I therefore beg to move.
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, these Amendments, Nos. 1 to 4, as the noble Lord, Lord Crowther, has explained, hang together, and pave the way for the proposed new Clause 19 which stands in his name on the Marshalled List as Amendment No. 14. As the noble Lord has said, we thought it right to undertake the drafting of these Amendments ourselves, partly in order to assist the noble Lord and partly to ensure that if the Amendments proved acceptable to the House they would be in a form which satisfied the draftsman.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CROWTHER: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 2.
Amendment moved—
Page 11, line 18, leave out (" a part so used ") and insert (" such a part ").—(Lord Crowther.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CROWTHER: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 3.
Amendment moved—
Page 11, line 21, leave out (" so used ") and insert (" in question ").—(Lord Crowther.)
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, before the Question is put I think it would be helpful if the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, could indicate whether, having given these facilities to the noble Lord, Lord Crowther, he thinks it is advisable, on balance, that we accept the Amendments. He ought to give us some guidance, surely, even though he does not take responsibility, or his Department does not, for these Amendments.
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, I am proposing to speak at a little length on the new Clause 19 and to spell out the Government's attitude then, but it is one of neutrality on this particular clause and the consequential Amendments, both

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before it and after it, which are down in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Crowther.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CROWTHER LORD CROWTHER: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 4.
Amendment moved—
Page 11, line 21, at end insert—
(" For the purposes of this subsection a description of premises may he framed in any of the ways mentioned in section 1(4) of this Act.")—(Lord Crowther.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
7.26 p.m.
LORD WINDLESHAM LORD WINDLESHAM moved Amendment No. 5:
Page 11, line 23, leave out (" the occupier proposes").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, with the leave of the House I propose to speak to Amendments Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 together, since all hang together. Noble Lords may remember that in Committee my noble friend Lord Colville of Culross tabled a number of Amendments which would have placed on " any person ", rather than the occupier, the duty to inform the fire authority of proposed changes concerning premises having a fire certificate. He explained that this was intended to close what he considered to be a loophole enabling people to get round this obligation. The occupier, for example, might get someone else to do the work for him, and so avoid the obligation to notify the fire authority.
After further consideration and discussion with my noble friend Lord Colville of Culross, I think we can amend the Bill so as to meet his point. The effect of these Amendments now proposed is to place on the occupier a duty to give notice to the fire authority " if it is proposed " (that is, by anybody) to make any of the changes under Clause 8(2)(a) or (b). It is difficult to conceive, however, that an occupier would be unaware of such substantial changes in his premises no matter who proposed to make them, and it is therefore right that the duty to notify should still rest on him. But the changes of the kind envisaged in Clause 8(2)(c) are somewhat different, because the occupier of the certified premises would not necessarily know if someone else in the same building were to begin storing large quantities of
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inflammable materials, and the risk to the means of escape from the certified premises could well be considirable. We therefore propose that the duty to notify this kind of change should rest not only on the occupier, where he is responsible, but also on any other occupier in the same building who has accepted contingent responsibilities under the fire certificate by virtue of Clause 6(5), which deals with people who have a contingent responsibility of this nature. Such a person, too, will now be under a duty to notify the fire authority direct of any change he makes in his own part of the relevant building of the kind envisaged in Clause 8(2)(c).
This new arrangement will not catch an occupier of another part of the relevant building with no contingent responsibilities under the fire certificate. It would be unreasonable, if not impractical, to lay a duty on an occupier who has no concern whatsoever with the part of the building needing a fire certificate. But the lire authority will doubtless watch out for possible risks of this kind in the course of routine inspections; they have the necessary powers of entry to the whole building for this purpose. My Lords, this is an improvement to the Bill. It is strongly supported by the largest fire authority in the country, and I hope that it will commend itself to your Lordships. I beg to move.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, it is only right that I should say a word of thanks to my noble friend for this series of Amendments. It is one of the privileges of a Member of your Lordships' House that one can have access to noble Lords in their Departments, and there was indeed a very full and extraordinarily helpful discussion with my noble friend and his officials in which I took part. It is as a result of that that these Amendments have been put forward, and I most heartily endorse them. They meet I think not only one but about two or three of the points that I raised at Committee stage. and they seem to me to be a balanced proposal which tighten things up a little bit without, on the other hand, laying any intolerable burden upon somebody who in substance should not be subject to it. I should therefore like to endorse what my noble friend has said, and I very much hope that the House will agree with

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these Amendments. Once more I would thank my noble friend for his co-operation in seeing that they have been brought forward.
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, before we leave this Amendment (we are on Report, but I think that as the mover of an Amendment I am enabled to speak a second time) perhaps I may say that representations have been made to my right honourable friend the Secretary of State by the British Hotels and Restaurants Association on the subject of what constitute or do not constitute " material alterations " under this clause of the Bill, Clause 8. This matter was discussed in Committee on an Amendment put down by my noble friend Lord Crowther, but I should just like to repeat that we are anxious that occupiers affected by the Bill should not be burdened with unnecessary notifications to the fire authority of changes in the furnishings and decorations of their premises. A Government Amendment to Clause 8 in another place had the effect that any changes have first to be considered in relation to the premises as a whole and in relation to the normal conditions of use as explained to and seen by the fire authority's inspector at the time the fire certificate was issued. Furthermore, these changes have to be " material ", that is to say, they must affect the means of escape and related fire precautions approved by the fire authority for the purpose of the fire certificate.
Since the occupier will have a copy of the fire certificate, which carefully defines these matters, we do not think there should be any difficulty in practice in deciding what is a material change for the purpose of Clause 8. We do not think that the refurnishing of hotel bedrooms would be a material change since this would not affect the ability of guests to reach the door of their bedrooms in an emergency and so gain access to the corridor outside. Normal redecoration of the premises to the same specification as before would not seem to be material. On the other hand, if a ballroom were redesigned internally, with substantial new screens and so on to create a particular effect, which in some way obstructed the means of access to exits, this would be a material change on which
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the fire authority would like to be consulted. But if there is any doubt in the hotel industry, or elsewhere, we hope that the fire authorities will be notified so that their advice can be taken.
LORD CROWTHER: My Lords, I am much obliged to the noble Lord for this explanation. I agree that it is quite impossible in a Bill, or in any document, to define every way in which a change might be material. I am sure that the words the noble Lord has just said will be helpful in deciding doubtful cases.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
7.32 p.m.
LORD WINDLESHAM LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 6.
Amendment moved—
Page 11, line 24, after ("(a)") insert (" it is proposed ").—(Lord Windlesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD WINDLESHAM LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 7.
Amendment moved—
Page 11, line 26, after ("(b)") insert (" it is proposed ").—(Lord Windlesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD WINDLESHAM LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 8.
Amendment moved—
Page 11, line 30, after ("(c)") insert (" the occupier of the premises proposes ").—(Lord Windlesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD WINDLESHAM LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 9.
Amendment moved—
Page 11, line 39, at end insert—
(" (2A) If, while a fire certificate is in force with respect to any premises not constituting the whole of the relevant building, any person who as occupier of any other part of that building is under section 6(5) of this Act responsible for contraventions of any requirement imposed by the certificate proposes to begin to keep explosive or highly flammable materials of any prescribed kind anywhere under, in or on that building in a quantity or aggregate quantity greater than the quantity prescribed for the purposes of this subsection as the maximum in relation to materials of that kind, that person shall, before the carrying out of the proposals is begun, give notice of the proposals to the fire authority; and if the carrying out of the proposals is begun without such notice having been given, that person

305
shall be guilty of an offence.")—(Lord Windlesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD WINDLESHAM LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 10.
Amendment moved—
Page 13, line 23, after (" (2)") insert (" (2A)").—(Lord Windlesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 12 [Power of Secretary of State to make regulations about fire precautions]:
7.35 p.m.
LORD WINDLESHAM LORD WINDLESHAM moved Amendment No. 11:
Page 20, line 25, leave out first ("section") and insert ("subsection ").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, with the leave of the House, it might be convenient to speak to Amendments Nos. 11, 12 and 13 which are grouped together on the Marshalled List. These are technical, drafting Amendments concerning the Cinematograph Act of 1952, and the Cinematograph (Safety) Regulations of 1955. The first two Amendments enable Clause 12(11) Ito be brought into operation on a date different to the rest of Clause 12. The object of this is to preserve, for the time being, the application of the Cinematograph (Safety) Regulations 1955 to the cinematograph exhibitions to which they at present apply.
The third Amendment amends the Cinematograph Act 1952. Clause 12(11), by implication, repeals Section 2(1)(a) of that Act. However, other provisions of that Act refer to regulations made under Section 2(1)(a). Paragraph (a) of the new subsection clarifies the effect of Clause 12(11) by repealing the references to Section 2(1)(a) or regulations made by virtue of that provision. Regulations made under Clause 12(11) will be able, if so desired, to preserve the application of the existing Cinematograph (Safety) Regulations 1955, so that the effect of the repealed provisions can be preserved or changed in the light of future policy.
Paragraph (b) of the new subsection has the effect of ensuring that the licensing authorities powers under Section 4(2) of the 1952 Act in relation to the imposition of special requirements relating to cinematograph exhibitions for
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children will be exercised, inter alia, with regard to any relevant fire safety regulations made under Clause 12 of the Bill.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, can my noble friend tell me whether it is intended that, under the appointed day provision at the,end of the Bill, the present subsection (11), and the new subsection to be inserted by Amendment No. 13, should be brought into force at a different date from the rest of the clause? Is that the point of Amendment No. 12?
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, it is to enable that to happen if is is desirable to do so.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD WINDLESHAM LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 12.
Amendment moved—
Page 20. line 27, leave out (" section") and insert (" sub-section ").—(Lord Windlesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD WINDLESHAM LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 13.
Amendment moved—
Page 20, line 29, at end insert—
(" () In consequence of subsection (11) above—

(a) the following provisions of the Cinematograph Act 1952 (which relate to the power of the Secretary of State to make safety regulations) are hereby repealed, that is to say section 2(1)(a) and, in section 5(1), paragraph (c) from the words "and regulations" onwards, paragraph (d) from the word " except" onwards, and the proviso; and

(b) in section 4(2) of that Act (control of cinematograph exhibitions for children), after the word "1909" there shall be inserted the words "and any regulations made or having effect as if made under section 12 of the Fire Precautions Act 1971 ".")—(Lord Windlesham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 19 [Powers of Inspector]:
7.38 p.m.
LORD CROWTHER LORD CROWTHER moved Amendment No. 14:
Leave out Clause 19 and insert the following new clause:
Powers of inspectors
("19.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, any of the following persons (in this section referred to as " inspectors") namely an inspector appointed under section 18 of

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this Act and a fire inspector, may do anything necessary for the purpose of carrying this Act and regulations thereunder into effect and, in particular, shall, so far as may be necessary for that purpose, have power to do at any reasonable time any of the following things, namely—

(a) to enter any such premises as are mentioned in subsection (2) below, and to inspect the whole or any part thereof and anything therein;

(b) to make such inquiry as may be necessary for any of the purposes mentioned in subsection (3) below;

(c) to require the production of, and to inspect, any fire certificate in force with respect to any premises or any copy of any such certificate;

(d) to require any person having responsibilities in relation to any such premises as arc referred to in paragraph (a) above (whether or not the owner or occupier of the premises or a person employed to work therein) to give him such facilities and assistance with respect to any matters or things to which the responsibilities of that person extend as are necessary for the purpose of enabling the inspector to exercise any of the powers conferred on him by this subsection.

(2) The premises referred to in subsection (1)(a) above are the following, namely—

(a) any premises requiring a fire certificate or to which any regulations made under section 12 of this Act apply;

(b) any premises such as are mentioned in section 10(1)(a) of this Act;

(c) any premises to which section 3 of this Act for the time being applies;

(d) any premises not falling within any of the foregoing paragraphs which form part of a building comprising any premises so falling; and

(e) any premises which the inspector has reasonable cause to believe to be premises falling within any of the foregoing paragraphs.

(3) The purposes referred to in subsection (1)(b) above are the following, namely—

(a) to ascertain, as regards any premises, whether they fall within any of paragraphs (a) to (d) of subsection (2) above;

(b) to identify the owner or occupier of any premises falling within any of those paragraphs;

(c) to ascertain whether, in the case of any premises to which section 3 of this Act for the time being applies, any person has the overall management of the building constituting or compromising the premises and, if so, to identify that person;

(d) to ascertain, as regards any premises falling within any of the said paragraphs (a) to (d), whether the provisions of this Act and regulations made under section 12 thereof are complied with, and, where a fire certificate is in force in respect of any such premises, whether the requirements imposed by the certificate are complied with.

(4)An inspector shall, if so required when visiting any premises in the exercise of powers conferred by this section, produce to the occupier of the premises some duly authenticated document showing his authority.
(5) In the case of premises used as a dwelling or premises of any other description prescribed for the purposes of this subsection, no power of entry conferred by subsection (1) above shall be exercised as of right unless twenty-four hours' notice has been given to the occupier; and for the purposes of this subsection a description of premises may be framed in any of the ways mentioned in section 1(4) of this Act.
(6) A person who—

(a) intentionally obstructs an inspector in the exercise or performance of his powers or duties under this Act; or

(b) without reasonable excuse fails to comply with any requirement imposed by an inspector under subsection (1)(d) above,

shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding £50.")
The noble Lord said: Those of your Lordships who were present when the Bill was considered in Committee will remember that the noble Lord, Lord Foot, and I moved between us no less than ten Amendments to this clause. It was made clear then, and I should like to make it clear again, that our purpose was neither to be hostile to the Bill in general, nor wrecking to this clause in particular. It is obvious that the purpose is to extend the general system of regulation and certification of premises, which already applies to a large part of the industrial and commercial world, to a number of additional premises of which perhaps it is generally accepted that hotels are the most important. This is a necessary and, as tragic events since the Committee stage have illustrated, an urgent problem. Perhaps I may venture to claim that I have more reason than any Member of your Lordships' House or, indeed, of the other place, to know how necessary and urgent it is, because I have been in the agonising position of finding myself carrying the responsibility in-chief for a company that owned an hotel which burned to the ground. and in which a large number of people lost their lives. I know when that happens with what agony of mind one searches one's conscience and asks oneself whether there was anything done that should not have been done, or left undone that should have been done and might have prevented such a tragedy. Had one done one's duty? It would have been an enormous

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comfort in circumstances of that kind to have had a clear definition of the minimum duly—and one would always hope to go further—and a clear definition and certification of where one's duty lay.
I have reason to believe that soon after this Bill is enacted into law regulations will be prescribed by the Home Secretary for hotels; and, so far as I am concerned, the sooner the better and the more stringent the better. There was a distressing report in one of the Sunday newspapers to the effect that in the course of consideration the proposed regulations for hotels had been somewhat watered down out of consideration for some sections of the hotel trade who claim that they are unable to incur the necessary expenditure. I sincerely trust that that report is incorrect. I urge the noble Lord. Lord Windlesham, and his colleagues at the Home Office, not to be too tender on those sections of the hotel industry that claim that they are unable to meet necessary expenditures for the purpose of safeguarding human life. The most stringent regulations, within the rules of reason, that the Home Secretary sees fit to promulgate will be accepted and welcomed by the greater part of the hotel industry. Nor was it the intention of the noble Lord, Lord Foot and myself seriously to alter this particular clause. The purpose is to deal with the powers of inspectors. It is clear that these powers must be effective for their purpose. It is also necessary to assert that in that process they should interfere as little as possible with the essential rights and liberties of the citizen.
This is the more necessary because the premises to which this Bill are to be applied include a number of premises that are used for domestic and semi-domestic purposes—it is the homes of people with which we are concerned. We felt that, with his eye very properly on effectiveness, the draftsman of the Bill in its original form had been a little too careless of the rights of individuals. We thought it was possible to re-draft these powers of inspection, without any reduction in their effectiveness, so that they would set limits on some of these dangerous potential invasions of liberty. It is, after all, the certainty of regular inspection that is going to lead to compliance in the overwhelming majority of cases, and not the battery of legal powers
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with which the inspector may be armed. None of our ten Amendments was acceptable to the noble Lord, none of them was passed; but the noble Lord undertook to consider the arguments that we had advanced and to see whether the Bill could be, or should be, amended to take account of them. I should like to pay tribute to the spirit of accommodation and liberality in which that consideration has been carried out.
There are two separate points. First, how, if our arguments are to he accepted, could they best be embodied in the Bill? After consideration by those skilled in these matters the conclusion was arrived at that the best way was not to amend words here and there but to substitute a fairly complete new drafting of the clause for the original, and that in so doing it would be possible to accept the purpose of—I think I am right—nine out of ten of the Amendments. I must make it clear that the purpose of this Amendment is that of the noble Lord's and myself, but the language is that of the experts to whom, through the courtesy of the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, I have been given access. I do not know what the noble Lord is going to say; but I am sure that he will agree that, if it is to be done, this is the way to do it. The second part of the consideration that the noble Lord has given is to whether it should be done at all, whether the arguments should be accepted. I am not privy to the conclusions that he has reached except for the remark: that he made a minute ago, that his attitude was one of neutrality. I shall wait and see.
I hesitate to detain your Lordships longer, but I think it is necessary that I should save you the trouble of collating these two clauses and say briefly how the new draft differs from the old. In the new draft, subsections (1), (2) and (3) replace the old (1). In the main that is simply for clarity of drafting. In the new draft the operative words are put in subsection (1) while the application provisions are separated into subsections (2) and (3). In the original they were all in the same subsection. There are also some substantive changes in these three new subsections. One is in the introductory words. The original said:
" for the purpose of the execution of this Act ".
These words were criticised by Lord Foot as being a little imprecise. They have been changed in the new draft to
"so far as may be necessary for that purpose "
which I think is satisfactory. Another change is that the words " at any reasonable time ", defining the time at which the inspector may use his powers, which originally covered only the power of entry, is now applied to all his powers. That seems to be an improvement. The old subsection (1)(c) disappears. This is the subsection that empowered the inspector to take a police constable with him in certain circumstances. We criticised that as being likely in some domestic or semi-domestic situation to cause unnecessary alarm and terror to some people. In the new drafting that has disappeared.
The old subsection (1)(d) has disappeared entirely. This was the subsection which provided detailed and far-reaching provisions as to the conduct of interrogation. It seemed to be unnecessarily detailed, and to embody two provisions which seemed to be objectionable: one was the power of the inspector to require answers to be given, statements to be made, under penalty; secondly, it gave the fire inspector powers to require that nobody other than the person he was interrogating should be present at the time. The noble Lord said that that particular clause had been put in to protect, as it might be, a subordinate employee of the hotel from being intimidated by the presence of the manager. I see the strength of that; but the clause could also be used in the opposite sense of depriving the person interrogated of help to which he might be entitled from, say, his legal representative. The old subsection has now disappeared. The new(c) is the old (e) without change; the new (d) is the old (f) without change. The old (g) has disappeared since the words contained in it are now the opening words of the new clause. That deals with subsection (1).
Subsections (2) and (3) I have already mentioned. They are now separate, and they do not differ in content from parts of the old subsection (1). Subsection (4) in the Amendment is the old (5) without change. The new proposed subsection (5) is one of the most important. It replaces and widens the scope of the former sub-
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section (2). This is the requirement of notice before an inspection can be carried out. The original draft required 24 hours notice to be given when the premises to be inspected were a dwelling. I moved an Amendment in Committee in an attempt to extend that to everything in use as sleeping accommodation. The noble Lord resisted that Amendment on the ground, which I now readily accept, that that was too wide; that it would make it cover, say, a dormitory in a boarding-house of a school where it is particularly necessary that there should be the power to inspect without notice and where the amount of privacy disturbed is minimal.
One can compile an ascending scale of rights to privacy with dormitories at the bottom. Next would come staff accommodation which is shared, and for which, since it is provided by the employer, the employer has the responsibility and can reasonably be expected to inspect without notice. Next comes the hotel room let by the night; there is some right to privacy, but usually there is little private property in the room and therefore the consideration that arises in connection with possible disturbance to property does not arise strongly. Next comes the hotel room let for longer periods, which to some extent approaches in status the occupant's home. Finally, at the top of the scale would be the residential club, in which a room may be the only home that the occupant has and where the whole of his personal property is to be found.
Clearly nobody would claim that those categories at the bottom should be subject to notice. Most noble Lords would agree that when you get to the top of the scale of invasion of privacy it is a very serious matter and should not be permitted lightly. The difficulty is to know where along that scale to put the requirement of notice. During consideration of this matter it was thought that it would be almost impossible to import words into the Bill that would define adequately where the distinction should be made. The solution that the Amendment proposes is to empower the Secretary of State to prescribe whether or not, and whether to some of them and not to others, this requirement of 24 hours' notice before privacy is invaded should be necessary. I am indebted to the noble

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Lord and his colleagues for that solution to the problem, but I am entirely happy with it.
The new subsection (6) replaces the old subsection (3). This is the offences clause. The old clause created three offences. One of these disappears—the offence of trying to prevent anyone else from answering questions and that is adequately covered in the general provision against obstruction. The other two offences remain—the one of intentionally obstructing is unchanged; the one of failing without reasonable excuse to comply with the requirements remains, but omitting the words in parentheses in the original, the words in parentheses after "excuse " being " proof of which shall lie on him ". Both the noble Lord, Lord Foot, and I took objection to that. I have had my attention drawn to the fact that under Section 81 of the Magistrates' Courts Act of 1962 the onus of proof in a magistrates' court is in any case on the defendant, so it would not matter whether the words in parentheses were in or out. But appeals may be taken, and it seems to me better that if any individual citizen is taking a matter of this sort on appeal to a higher court he should he able to rely on the general rule of law that a man is innocent until he is proved guilty and he should not have these words in the Statute staring him in the face.
The old subsection (4) disappears entirely. That is consequential upon the disappearance of the old subsection (1)(d) to which it referred. But in disappearing, it disposes, I hope, of a legal point about the admissibility of evidence that troubled the noble Lord, Lord Foot, but about which I am far too inexpert to be able to give an explanation. I apologise for taking up so much of your Lordships' time in this brief interlude in other matters. I commend this Amendment to your Lordships as being one that does not, to any extent that is worth mentioning, diminish the likely effectiveness of these powers of inspection, but does, I hope, successfully avoid any unnecessary trespassing upon the essential rights and liberties of the subject. I beg to move.
LORD BESWICK: If the noble Lord, Lord Crowther, and the noble Lord, Lord Foot, are now satisfied that the liberty of the subject is adequately pro-
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tested, and the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, thinks that the powers of the inspectors are adequate for the job they have to do, who are we to complain? I shall not go into the merits of this new clause at all except to ask one question relating to the figure of £50 which is brought from the old clause. The noble Lord, Lord Crowther, said that we should not be too tender on those who neglect their duties and endanger human lives. If they are awkward, or if they intentionally obstruct an inspector in the exercise and performance of his duties, they are liable to a fine not exceeding £50. I ask the noble Lord whether he is satisfied that this figure in all the circumstances is the right one. I see that in Clause 21 if a person improperly discloses information there is a fine not exceeding £100. In Clause 22 if there is any question of falsification of documents there is a fine not exceeding £400. Then in Clause 22(2) if a person with intent to deceive pretends to be art inspector he is liable to a fine of £100. It occurs to me that, bearing in mind what the noble Lord, Lord Crowther, said about not being too tender on those people who deliberately obstruct the inspector in carrying out his duties, £50 as a maximum is probably too low.
LORD FOOT: May I say to the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, that I art relieved to hear him say that the Front Bench of the Opposition will not b e offering any opposition to this Amendment. I think it was on the Second Reading of this Bill that I said something about the noble Lord which he did not take very well, and I should like to take tie opportunity, if I may, of trying to make it up to him and express my great satisfaction that we have got at any rate his neutrality upon this Amendment. I do not want to say much more, because I am hopeful that there is not going to be any opposition to this Amendment, and if the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, is going to maintain this position of neutrality I hope we can get this Amendment through to-night.
Might I mention one matter which I raised in the earlier stages of the Bill and which is not met by this Amendment? I urged that in two particular cases it was desirable that something should be

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written into the Bill which would require that inspectors on certain occasions should give a warning to people whom they are interrogating that if those people fail to answer the question and remain silent, or if they give false answers to questions, they are rendering themselves liable to prosecution. I sought to draw some analogy with the Road Safety Act 1967, where, as your Lordships will remember, when a person is called upon to give a urine or blood test in a police station it is required that the police officer who is demanding the specimen shall warn the person concerned that if he fails to provide it he is committing an offence. The officer is required to give a warning lest that person should unwittingly commit the offence of failing to give the specimen.
I suggested that in this Bill there ought to be a comparable warning where there was a failure on the part of the person being interrogated to answer a question properly addressed to him by the inspector; or, where he gave information, that if the information he gave was false he rendered himself liable to prosecution. It was pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, that the general rule of law in this country is that everyone is assumed to know what the law is and ignorance of the law is no defence. I accept that as a general principle. It is inevitable in practice that one has to apply that rule in all ordinary cases. It would be intolerable if a person were entitled to say, " I did not know it was illegal to steal ". In all ordinary cases the presumption of law that a person knows what the law is should not be rebuttable; but there is one identifiable class of case where this presumption that a person knows what the law is, is neither necessary nor, I suggest, desirable.
That class of case is one where an official is conducting an inquiry, and the failure of the person being interrogated to assist in that inquiry is itself an offence. That is in a special category. It has two characteristics. The first is that in circumstances where a person is committing an offence if he does not answer a question, there is a particular likelihood that he will not realise that he is committing an offence in failing to answer the question. The second characteristic in this class of case is than it is very easy
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in circumstances of a confrontation between the interrogator and the person being interrogated, for the interrogator to give a warning that if the person being interrogated does not answer the question, or does not answer accurately, he is committing an offence.
I would have preferred that there should be something in this new clause which dealt with that point. The noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, was good enough to say when we were discussing this matter before that he would consider whether guidance could be given in the directions from the Home Office to inspectors in fulfilling the provisions of the Bill about this business of giving proper warning in suitable cases. If the noble Lord will confirm that that will be considered, I shall be content to accept this amended clause as it stands. If the noble Lord to-night feels able to take a position of complete neutrality towards this Bill, or possibly a position of benevolent neutrality towards it, all is forgiven and we shall no longer have any cause for complaint.
8.4 p.m.
LORD WINDLESHAM: I am grateful for what noble Lords who have spoken on this Amendment have said. The powers of inspection in the Bill as drafted are similar to provisions which are contained in the Factories Act, 1961 and the Offices, Shops and Railway Premises Act, 1963. As I explained in Committee, the exercise of those powers, in the main by the same inspectors, has not given rise to any complaint. I do not think I carried the noble Lords opposite, Lord Foot and Lord Crowther, with me in that argument, but I still believe it has some validity.
The noble Lords who have just spoken argued with some force in Committee that this Bill is different from those earlier pieces of legislation in that, although private dwellings are excluded from the scope, it nevertheless applies to a substantial number of private homes in the form of flats in high buildings. The noble Lord, Lord Crowther, developed in some detail discussion on a second category of residential accommodation; namely, private rooms whether in hotels, clubs or residential hotels, which have taken on the character of a home. The new Clause 19 therefore redefines the

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powers of inspectors. Twenty-four hours' notice now needs to be given for premises in the second category—rooms in residential premises. Those in the first category, flats, are already covered.
The main changes, as the noble Lord, Lord Crowther, explained in moving this Amendment, concern the formal interrogation procedure and the presence of a police constable in addition to a fire inspector.. As I have said, no complaints have reached us on the way in which the existing powers of entry and questioning have been used, but in some instances (in the domestic or semi-domestic situation) we must accept that the formal interrogation procedure might appear to be unduly intimidating, particularly when applied to people in their own homes, even though in the case of some old and lonely people their home may amount to no more than a single room. In practice, an inspector's inquiries are normally conducted in a spirit of friendliness and cooperation, and in the rare cases where someone wished to be obstructive, the chances are that whether the formal interrogation procedure existed or not, such a person would persist in his obstinacy. In such a case I must point out that the new clause provides ample grounds for proceedings by virtue of subsection (6).
The other consideration is that the effect of the interrogation procedure in the original clause was to enable the inspector to arrive at the truth. The consequential Amendment to Clause 22 standing in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Crowther, takes care of this point by adding to paragraph (c) the offence of wilfully giving false information in reply to an inspector's inquiries. There is admittedly a tactical advantage in having in the Bill itself a statement of the formal interrogation procedure, and it must also be conceded that there is no longer an express power for the inspector to ask an overbearing employer to leave while he speaks to a member of staff who might otherwise be intimidated. But I think the resourcefulness and tact of the Fire Service will probably serve to outweigh these practical difficulties.
As for the police constable, it is only in rare cases that an inspector would exercise the power to take a police officer with him, and it must be admitted that in cases of serious obstruction the pre-
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sence of a police constable might not be conclusive. If the owner of a shady night club, say, still refused to adrait the inspector, albeit accompanied by a con-table, then neither would have power to force his way in and other means of enforcing the law would still have to be found.
Inspection is of course a crucial feature of this Bill and the powers of inspectors remain very considerable indeed. Under subsection (1) of Clause 19 as redrafted the inspectors
" may do anything necessary for he purpose of carrying this Act and regulatiorn thereunder into effect … at any reasonable time ".
They may do any of the following things:
"enter any such premises … mentioned in subsection (2), … make such inquiry as may be necessary … require the production of, and to inspect, any fire certificate …"
and so on.
The noble Lord, Lord Beswick, asked me about the penalties for obstructing an inspector. I believe the situation is that under the Magistrates' Courts Act £50 is the standard level of penalty applied on summary conviction, but there is a whole range of penalties for obstruction. Obstruction is not a substantive offence. Where there is an offence of obstruction, which should not, incidentally, in itself of course lead to greater fire risk, the penalty is set at this standard level.
However, what we are concerned with here is one of the hardest problems of politics: of getting the right balance between the extent and exercise of powers by officials in the interests of the public good and the rights of the individual to privacy and not to be intimidated by officials, who should be given by Parliament only such powers as are absolutely necessary for the peformance of their duty. In the context of the wide range of fire safety precautions which the fire authority can impose under the Bill, I do not think there is any significant weakening that would be noticed by the Fire Service in practice; and if the House finds the Amendments acceptable, the Government are content to agree. Our position therefore, as I explained earlier in answer to an intervention from the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, is one of neutrality. The Amendments have been drafted by Parliamentary Counsel in

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order to assist the noble Lord, Lord Crowther, and to ensure that they are in an acceptable form. I can give the noble Lord, Lord Foot, on the Record the assurance that he asked for: we do intend in the Notes of Guidance which will be circulated to fire authorities with the Bill to make a reference to the desirability in certain circumstances for a warning to be given.
My Lords, at the back of all our minds, I think, as we debate the Report stage of this Bill is the recent hotel fire in London in which a number of people tragically lost their lives. We cannot claim that this Bill will prevent fires from occurring, whether they are in hotels or elsewhere, in the future. But it can make a considerable contribution, especially as regards means of escape. However, I might at this point say to the noble Lord, Lord Crowther, that as soon as the Bill goes on the Statute Book we shall be consulting first with the Central Fire Brigades Advisory Councils and then with representatives of the hotel industry on the making of a designating order. There already exists a voluntary code of practice which has been agreed by the hotel industry. A Working Party has been sitting for some 18 months and their deliberations 'have now been concluded. A great deal of the spadework will, therefore, already have been done when the Central Fire Brigades Advisory Councils come to consider as a matter of urgency the question of hotels.
My Lords, we can all agree, therefore, on the need for urgency; and if it is the wish of the House, as I hope it will be, assuming that we finish the Report stage without any further need for reconsideration to-night, we would hope to take the Third Reading of this Bill on Thursday, the day after to-morrow, and return the Bill with Lords' Amendments to the Commons by the end of this week.
LORD CROWTHER: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, defined his attitude to this Amendment as one of neutrality. He was evidently unwilling to attach the adjective " benevolent " to it, but I should like to attach that adjective, if not to his neutrality, at any rate to his course of action between the Committee stage and to-day. It would have been so easy for the noble Lord to do nothing. He was under no political or any
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other pressure that amounts to anything. It was simply a few lone voices on these Benches which led him to reconsider this matter; and we are—I and those who think with me in particular—most grateful indeed to him. We must not exaggerate the importance of this matter but I think it will stand as a good example, a small but good example, of productive co-operation in this House between individual Members of the House, the Minister in charge of a Bill and his officials; and if that be a good thing I would make it clear that the credit belongs exclusively to the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 20 [Exercise on behalf of fire inspectors of their powers by officers of fire brigades]:
8.12 p.m.
LORD CROWTHER: My Lords, I beg to move this Amendment. It is purely consequential.
Amendment moved
Page 27, line 41, leave out (" (3) to (5) ") and insert (" (4) and (6) ").—(Lord Crowther.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 22 [Falsification of documents, false statements, etc.]:
LORD CROWTHER: My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, explained, this Amendment also is consequential. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 28, line 24, inquiry ("Act,") insert (" or in response to any inquiry made by virtue of section 19(1)(b) of this Act,").—(Lord Crowther.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 28 [Power of county court or sheriff, where notice under section 3 is in force, to modify agreements and leases and apportion expenses.]:
THE MINISTER OF STATE, SCOTTISH OFFICE (BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE)THE MINISTER OF STATE, SCOTTISH OFFICE (BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE) moved Amendment No. 17:
>Page 31, leave out lines 18 and 19 and insert (" to section 12 of the Rent (Scotland) Act 1971; ").
The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 17; and, if it is convenient to the House I should

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like to take with it Amendment No. 18. These Amendments, like those which I hope to move later, are necessary in order to relate this Bill to the Rent (Scotland) Act 1971, a consolidation measure which received the Royal Assent only last week. These Amendments might have been moved at the Committee stage but it had not by that time received the Second Reading in another place. Subsection (5) of Clause 28 of the Fire Precautions Bill as at present drafted is in terms of the older Scottish rent legislation. The Amendments repeat the same provisions as are already in the Bill in terms of the new 1971 Act.
The Rent (Scotland) Act 1971 does not come into operation until three months after it is passed; that is, until August 12, 1971. During this transitional period the old Statutes will remain in force. The references to them in the Fire Precautions Bill are maintained by the proviso which is contained in the latter part of the Amendments. My Lords, I beg to move.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend, if it is the case that all the rest of the Amendments are simply consequential and transitional and result out of the consolidation Act now becoming law, whether it might be possible to move them en bloc?
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, it is certainly true that they are consequential, but I felt it only right to the House to try to explain the Amendments in a little greater detail.
LORD HUGHES: My Lords, I would certainly have no objection if the noble Baroness wished to move the Amendments en bloc. I have previously been in the position she is in, of having to move Amendments because another Bill has become an Act in the interval, and having to follow on by amending the Act which has just been passed in order to make the two measures agree. I am quite willing to he as helpful as possible so that the noble Baroness does not feel any embarrassment at all.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, with the permission of the House, I will put the current Amendment separately, and the rest en bloc.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I beg to move the remaining Amendments, Nos. 18 to 22 inclusive.
Amendments moved—
Page 31, leave out lines 21 and 22 and insert—
(" 133(1) of the Rent (Scotland) Act 1971; (d) subsection (4) shall be omitted:
Provided that until the said Act of 1971 comes into force this subsection shall have effect as if in paragraph (b) for the reference to section 12 of the Rent (Scotland) Act 1971 there were substituted a reference to sections 15(1) and 16(2) of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act 1920, and in paragraph (c) for the reference to section 133(1) of the Rent (Scotland) Act 1971 there were substituted a reference to section 39(I) of the Housing (Repairs and Rents) (Scotland) Act 1954.")
Clause 34, page 34, line 32, leave out (" and")
Clause 34,page 34,line 33, after (" effect") insert (" until the Rent (Scotland) Act 1971 comes into force")
Clause 34,page 34,line 36, at end insert ("; and the provisions of Part III of that Schedule shall have effect after the Rent (Scotland) Act 1971 comes into force for purposes of the modification, in connection with certain provisions of this Act, of the said Act of 1971.")
In the Schedule, page 48, line 37, at end insert—

PART III MODIFICATIONS OF RENT (SCOTLAND) ACT 1971
Steps mentioned in certain notices under this Act to count as improvements for certain purposes of Rent (Scotland) Act 1971
1.—(1) The following provisions of this paragraph apply where a dwelling-house which is let on or subject to a regulated or a controlled tenancy consists of or is comprised in premises with respect to which there has been issued a fire certificate covering (in whatever terms) the use of the dwelling-house as a dwelling.
(2) Subject to the following provisions of this paragraph, the amount of any expenditure incurred by the landlord in taking in relation to the relevant building a step mentioned in a notice served in connection with the premises under section 5(4), 8 (3) or (4) or 12,(8)(b) of this Act shall be treated (whether or not apart from this paragraph it would be so created)—

(a) in the case of a dwelling-house let on or subject to a controlled tenancy, is expenditure on the improvement or structural alteration of the dwelling-house for the purposes of paragraph 1(3)(a) of Schedule 8 to the Act of 1971, and

(b) in the case of a dwelling-house let on or subject to a regulated tenancy, as an amount expended on an improvement effected in the dwelling-house for die purposes respectively of sections 20(5) and 24(1) of the Act of 1971.

(3) If from the taking in relation to the relevant building of any such step as is referred to in sub-paragraph (2) above there accrues benefit not only to the dwelling-house but also to other premises of the landlord comprised in the relevant building, the amount to be treated as mentioned in that sub-paragraph shall be so much only of the expenditure as may be determined, by agreement in writing between the landlord and the tenant or by the sheriff, to be properly apportionable to the dwelling-house, having regard to the benefit accruing, from the taking of the step to the dwelling-house and to the other premises.
(4) Any apportionment made by the sheriff under sub-paragraph (3) above shall be final and conclusive.
(5) For the purposes of this paragraph the amount of any expenditure shall be treated as diminished by the amount of any grant paid in respect of that expenditure under any enactment.
(6) Any such step as is referred to in subparagraph (2) above shall, for the purposes of section 24(3) of the Act of 1971 (right of tenant of regulated tenancy in certain circumstances to challenge amount of expenditure on improvements), be treated (whether or not apart from this paragraph it would be so treated) as an improvement; but no application shall be made under the said section 24(3) on the ground that an improvement consisting of such a step was unnecessary.
(7) No application shall be made under the proviso to paragraph 1(3)(a) of Schedule 8 to the Act of 1971 on the ground that the expenditure on such a step as is referred to in sub-paragraph (2) above was unnecessary.
(8) The power of the Court of Session under section 124 of the Act of 1971 to make an act of sederunt and give directions for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of that Act shall extend to the provisions of this paragraph.
(9) Expressions used in this paragraph and in the Act of 1971 have the same meaning in this paragraph as in that Act.
2. In relating to a dwelling-house consisting of or comprised in premises—

(a) with respect to which there has been issued a fire certificate covering (in whatever terms) the use of the dwelling-house as a dwelling; or

(b) which are the subject of an application for a fire certificate specifying as a use of the premises which it is desired to have covered by the certificate a use such that, if a certificate covering that use were issued, it would cover (in whatever terms) the use of the dwelling-house as a dwelling.

section 41 of, and Schedule 7 to, the Act of 1971 (which relate to certificates of fair rent) shall have effect as if in subsection (1)(a) of that section the reference to making improvements in the dwelling-house included a reference to taking in relation to the relevant building any steps mentioned in a Notice served in connection with the premises under section (4), 8(3) or (4) or 12(8)(b) of this
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Act; and any step mentioned in such a notice shall, for the purposes of the said section 41 and Schedule 7, in their application to such a dwelling-house be treated (whether or not apart from this paragraph it would be so treated) as an improvement.
Modification of Rent (Scotland) Act 1971 in cases where rent is increased by virtue of section 28(3)(b) of this Act.
3.—(1) Where, in the case of any premises consisting of a dwelling-house let on a regulated tenancy, the rent payable in respect of the premises is increased by an order of the sheriff made by virtue of section 28(3)(b) of this Act and that increase takes effect while a rent for the dwelling-house is registered under Part IV of the Act of 1971, being a rent that was so registered before the completion of the alterations or other things falling within section 28(3) of this Act of which the expense was taken into account by the sheriff in making the order, then—

(a) the contractual rent limit for any contractual period beginning while the registration of that rent continues to have effect shall be what it would be for that period under section 19(2) of that Act if the rent so registered had been simultaneously increased by the same amount (and the reference in section 43(3)(a) of that Act to the limit imposed by section 19(2) shall be construed accordingly); and

(b) if the regulated tenancy of the dwelling-house becomes a statutory tenancy, section 21(2) of that Act (limit of rent during statutory periods of regulated tenancy, and provision for increase up to that limit) shall have effect, in relation to any statutory period of that tenancy beginning while the registration of that rent continues to have effect, as if the rent so registered had been simultaneously increased by the same amount.

(2) Where, in the case of any premises consisting of a dwelling-house let on a regulated tenancy, the rent payable in respect of the premises is increased by an order of the sheriff made by virtue of section 28(3)(b) of this Act and that increase takes effect while no rent for the dwelling-house is registered under Part IV of the Act of 1971, then for any contractual period for which the contractual rent limit is that specified in section 19(3) of that Act, the contractual rent limit shall be increased by an amount equal to the increase effected by the order in the rent payable for that period.
(3) Where, in the case of any premises consisting of a dwelling-house let on a regulated tenancy, the rent payable in respect of the premises is increased by an order of the sheriff made by virtue of section 28(3)(6) of this Act, the contractual rent limit shall not be increased under section 20(5) of the Act of 1971 by reference to any expenditure taken into account by the sheriff in making the order.
(4) Part III of the Act of 1971 (rents under regulated tenancies) shall be amended by the insertion of the words " and paragraph 3 of

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Part III of the Schedule to the Fire Precautions Act 1971"—

(a) in section 19 (limit of rent during contractual periods), after the words " section 43(3) of this Act " in subsection (2), and after the word " below " in subsection (3);

(b) in section 21 (limit of rent during statutory periods), after the words " section 43(3) of this Act " in subsection (2), and after the word "below" in subsection (3);

(5) Expressions used in this paragraph and in Part III of the Act of 1971 have the same meaning in this paragraph as in that Part.
4.—(1) Where, in the case of any premises consisting of a dwelling-house let on a controlled tenancy, the rent payable in respect of the premises is increased by an order of the sheriff made by virtue of section 28(3)(b) of this Act then—

(a) the rent limit under any controlled tenancy of the dwelling-house for any rental period beginning with or after the date on which that increase takes effect shall be increased by an amount per annum equal to the amount per annum of the increase effected by the order in the rent payable in respect of the dwelling-house; and

(b) the increase effected by the order in the rent payable in respect of the dwelling-house for any rental period shall, notwithstanding anything in section 58 of the Act of 1971 (notice of increase of rent), be recoverable without the service of any notice of increase.

(2) Where, in the case of any premises consisting of a dwelling-house let on a controlled tenancy, the rent payable in respect of the premises is increased by an order of the sheriff made by virtue of section 28(3)(b) of this Act, the rent limit shall not be increased under paragraph 1(3)(a) of Schedule 8 to the Act of 1971 by reference to any expenditure taken into account by the sheriff in making the order.
(3) Expressions used in this paragraph and in Part V of the Act of 1971 (rents under controlled tenancies) have the same meaning in this paragraph as in that Part.
Meaning of " the Act of 1971
5. in this Part of this Schedule, " the Act of 1971 " means the Rent (Scotland) Act 1971." —(Baroness Tweedsn,uir of Belhelvie.]
On Question, Amendments agreed to.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BILL
8.18 p.m.
House again in Committee
THE DEPUTY CHAIR MAN OF COMM ITTEES (BARONESS WOOTTON OF AB1NGER): Amendment No. 243: The Lord Drumalbyn.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I beg to move the Amendment standing in my name on the Order Paper, to leave out clause—
LORD CHAMPION: Are we not rather jumping the gun here? I think we divided on Clause 42. We now have to discuss Clause 43.
Clause 43 [Application to Industrial Court for reference as to recognition of sole bargaining Agent.]:
THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES: Clause 43: That the clause stand part of the Bill? The Lord Champion.
On Question, Whether Clause 43 shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD CHAMPION LORD CHAMPION: This.clause—
LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY: I think it should go on the Record that the Lord Chairman did actually put to us at the end of the debate before we adjourned, That Clause 43 stand part of the Bill? That is therefore, presumably—I thought it was a mistake at the time—what we voted on, because that is what he put to us.
LORD CHAMPION: Having regard to that fact, clearly we cannot now discuss Clause 43, which is what I had proposed to do. I understood that immediately after the Division on Clause 42 we were going, without further ado, to the Fire Precautions Bill. Clearly that did not happen. I understand that a decision has already been taken on Clause 43, and therefore we must pass to Clause 44.
LORD DRUMALBYN: As a matter of record, it was I who moved the Motion, That the House do now resume, and I moved it immediately after the Division had been announced.
LORD CHAMPION: All I can say about that is that I thought the understanding was clear; that we should have

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the Division, then immediately resume the House, and after that—
LORD DRUMALBYN: That is exactly what happened. I moved the Motion, That the House do now resume, immediately after the Division was announced.
LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY: I may say that I listened with slight shock, and what happened was that when we had finished discussing Clause 42 the Lord Chairman put the question, That Clause 43 stand part. That obviously was a slip of the tongue. I do not know what the effect of it is, but that is what happened. Therefore, according to him, we voted on Clause 43 immediately after discussing Clause 42.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I think I speak now probably with the approval of the Committee. If there was simply a slip of the tongue, then the Committee know what happened and we can treat it as a slip. I think the effective question now before the Committee is whether Clause 43 shall stand part of the Bill.
LORD CHAMPION: I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor and other noble Lords for having cleared up that slight misunderstanding. These things will happen in the best regulated families. They occasionally happen here; we straighten them out, and that is how it should be.
Clause 43 is the first of the clauses designed to implement the Government's decision to import into our industrial relations the conception of the United States of America of the recognition of one trade union or a joint negotiating panel as the only union or panel to conduct negotiations on behalf of the workers in a given industry. On the principle, we expressed our doubts about this importation on Clause 42. Here we should like to be satisfied on some of the wording of the clause, and some of the things said about it when it was being discussed in the other place on Report.
I want to be clear about subsection (2), in which we are told who may make an application to the Court for recognition as a sole bargaining agent. Subsection (2)(a), tell us that this applies to " one or more trade unions ". Am I to understand by that that only a registered trade union will be able to make such an appli-
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cation, and that any other organisation would be barred? I wonder about this, because when discussing the possibility of the Secretary of State making an application and having to consult before doing so the Solicitor General said:
"… it is at least right for the Secretary of State, before he makes a reference, to consult any worker's organisation, even a company union, because it is on the ground representing workers and it is entitled to have its members taken into account like an unregistered organisation." — [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons 17/3/71, col. 1547.]
If a company union is entitled to have its views taken into account, in addition to an unregistered organisation, why is it apparently barred from taking an initiative under subsection (1)? I have no room for company unions, and I am not here supporting what the Solicitor General said about them in this context. But I want to clear up this matter of the relationship of the unregistered organisation of workers.
It is another instance of trying to force trade unions into becoming registered trade unions. I must add here that on reading what the Solicitor General said at various points of the discussion on this Bill, I find it quite confusing, because, further to the point about the company union, he said at column 1550:
"The C.I.R. has to be satisfied that the organisation, or if it is a joint negotiating panel every organisation represented on it, is an independent organisation of workers".
This apparently refers to Clause 46(4). I wonder what the Solicitor General was getting at. First, the company union is to be consulted by the Secretary of State; then, to include such a body on a negotiating panel the C.I.R. has to satisfy itself that it is an independent organisation of workers. What a muddle the whole thing is as between company union, organisation of workers and trade union. The whole business of the organisation of workers and the registered trade union itself, without introducing the company union, is such a muddle that the Government really ought to clear it up by a series of Amendments eliminating the distinction they are trying to make throughout the Bill between the unregistered trade union and the trade union.
If I may point out one of the ambiguities caused by the distinction, under Clause 42(c) an unregistered organisation of workers can be a sole bargaining

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agent; that is to say, can have, in relation to a bargaining unit, negotiating rights to the exclusion of all other organisations. An employer can apply to the Court to refer to the Commission the question whether or not a registered organisation of workers should be recognised as the sole bargaining agent for a given unit, and provided it is an independent organisation of workers, the C.I.R. may make an order that it should be so recognised. But, as I understand it, under Clause 48 the Court cannot make a binding order for recognition unless the organisation is a registered union, and the order in that case remains binding only for as long as it is so registered. It surely is incomprehensible why an unregistered workers' association should not be able to set the procedure in motion, but can be brought into the procedure at a later stage.
These are points which I regard as of some importance. The last point that I wish to make about this clause and what lies behind it is that it appears to me to be a breakaway unions' charter. It is an invitation to disciplined groups to make a mockery of sensible, responsible collective bargaining. This whole business is really in a muddle, and if it cannot be cleared up to-day (clearly it cannot be, because it will necessitate Amendments to a number of clauses). then I hope that between now and the Report stage the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, will look at what I have said, and, if possible, come up with Amendments which will put the whole matter right, and so ensure that the Bill, so far as it is possible, will be in a decent condition when finally we get to the end of it.
8.30 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN: The noble Lord has put to me a number of questions which I will attempt to answer. I think his main question related to the position of the unregistered worker in relation to this procedure. I shall try to explain the position to the noble Lord. He asked whether this was another example of trying to force organisations of workers to become trade unions. He quoted what the Solicitor General said:
"… it is at least right for the Secretary of State, before he makes a reference, to consult any workers' organisation, even a company union …".
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This, of course, is so. I think the difficulty that the noble Lord has is simply this, that although the application in the first place can be made only by a trade union, the C.I.R. may recommend that an organisation of workers should be either the sole bargaining agent or should be a member of the joint negotiating panel which would act as the sole bargaining agent. As I tried to explain, perhaps unsuccessfully, before dinner, it is thought right, however, that before the application is made for a binding order on the employer that organisation of workers recommended by the C.I.R. as the sole bargaining agent should, within the next six months, make application to become a trade union.
This makes clear the distinction between those who are trying to work in accordance with the guiding principles that are laid down, and to have rules as laid down in the Schedule, and the organisation of workers which is not prepared to make application for registration, whether or not it complies with those rules. We think that this is right, that the special privileges.thould be enjoyed only by the registered trade union; and it is really a very special privilege to apply to the Court to have an order made in your favour which is going to be binding on the employer. I do not think there is any muddle here at all; I think it is quite clear, and I hope the noble Lord will accept it.
As for the allegation that this is a breakaway union's charter, I can only say this. What this procedure provides for is that any union or group of unions can make application to the Court to be recognised as a sole bargaining agent for a bargaining unit which they themselves specify in the application. Noble Lords will see that it is open then to the C.I.R., in investigating this, to widen the scope of the application, if it thinks fit, and in such a case it will make a report to this effect. There will be an opportunity for the Industrial Court to consider this, and in due course the Industrial Court will decide whether or not the scope should be so widened. But how this can possibly enable a breakaway union to be encouraged in any way I fail to see.
It is, of course, true that once a bargaining agent has been set up—as we

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shall see when we come to it—it is possible, where there is a real and substantial undercurrent of discontent, for an application to be made for recognition to be withdrawn from the bargaining agent. But I cannot see that this is an encouragement to a breakaway union, because what it is doing is simply to apply the reverse side of the proposition that recognition in cases of this sort is going to depend upon the wishes of the majority, and if the majority no longer want that recognition to apply, and are dissatisfied with the conduct of the union, then the recognition can be withdrawn. This is just the reverse side of the same coin. I really cannot see how this could possibly be regarded as a charter for breakaway unions. I hope I have answered the noble Lord's questions. I do not suppose I have answered them entirely to his satisfaction, but at least I hope I have succeeded in explaining what the clause provides.
LORD CHAMPION: The noble Lord's remark that he has not explained it to my complete satisfaction or indeed understanding, I completely accept. This is perhaps not due to him, but partly due to me and partly to the fact that the whole Bill is in a muddle, and particularly this clause and the related clauses. When I was talking about a breakaway union, what I was suggesting was that if an unregistered union is in a certain position in relation to an industry it would break away from the union, not from the panel, not from the recognition as the sole bargaining agent or anything of that sort: a union is in existence, it is normally conducting negotiations with an employer, a number of people decide to break away to form a union, they then manage to get it registered by going to the registrar, they would then be in a position to start a procedure under this clause. I wondered if I had it right. If not, I should be grateful to the noble Lord if he would put it right.
LORD DRUMALBYN: This could happen, and of course it can happen now. It is perfectly possible for a body to break away and form a separate union; they may be in membership of another union at the same time, but it is perfectly possible for them to break away and form a separate union. If in such a case the members who are dissatisfied
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with the union then form a new union, it is quite true that that body, provided that it is then registered with the registrar, can make application under this clause. But I do not see that the position is very different from what it is now. A union can build up—and indeed in certain circumstances unions do build up, in spite of the Bridlington principles—its strength against the union that is in possession, so to speak.
That can happen, and what this provision is aimed at is to ensure that there will be one sole bargaining agent recognised. But if that bargaining agent loses the confidence of those whom it represents, then in such a case, of course, it may be that another union may be able to step in, have the recognition withdrawn, and itself become recognised. I would not have thought that this would happen very often, because I do not really believe the unions are likely very often to lose the confidence of their members to that extent. But where it does happen it can only be because the union that is recognised as sole bargaining agent has lost the confidence of its members, and it is difficult on any democratic principle to see why, in that case, the kind of situation the noble Lord has envisaged should not arise.
LORD TAYLOR OF MANSFIELD: May I ask the noble Lord a question about what he has just said? If a majority decide to go to another union, what is to be the measuring rod of a majority—a show of hands, or the collecting of voices There is no mention in this clause. Could the noble Lord enlighten the Committee about this?
LORD DRUMALBYN: An application can be made to the Industrial Court for a ballot for the recognition of the sole bargaining agent under Clause 47, and an application with a view to withdrawal of recognition can be made under Clause 49. In that case, under subsection (3)(b), the court has to be satisfied that
"… not less than two-fifths of the employees for the time being comprised in the bargaining unit have signified in writing their concurrence in the application."
That is where there is already a statutory sole bargaining agent. It is another thing where no order exists; under subsection (2) the requirement is one-fifth

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of the employees. This is the measure of initial support that has to be given to make an application. It does not follow that this is the strength of the union making the application. It is simply the number of signatures that have to be obtained in support of an application.
LORD CHAMPION: The noble Lord said that there would be little difference after this Bill is passed from what the position is now vis-à-vis a breakaway union, or the possibility of one. I think there would be a very great difference. If we pass this Bill, a sole bargaining agent will be created as a result of an Act of Parliament, and certain things will flow from that. Things could be done by organised workers which might be deemed unfair industrial practices, leading in turn to penalties. These are part of the difficulties I see. I cannot accept that there will be very little difference, or no difference, between the position to-day and the position after the Bill becomes an Act, and this procedure is in force. I was going to suggest to the Committee that we should divide upon this but, having regard to the explanation the noble Lord has given, and to the fact that it is almost impossible to grasp all the implications of what he said in the few minutes available to us on this clause, I propose not to divide the Committee, but I shall study deeply what has been said during the time between now and Report Stage.
LORD SLATER: I hope my noble friend will forgive me intervening, but I posed a number of questions about this situation in a previous debate and I still hold to the view I expressed at that time, that this clause is one of the most devastating in the Bill in relation to the legislative approach to the trade unions. I pose these questions to the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn. Supposing there is a factory with 2,000 people employed, and the negotiating bodies recognised by the employers are two distinct unions. Because of some happening—say, they do not like the leadership appointed to office—a number of the workpeople wish to form their own union, and they go through this procedure with the object of starting another union. When I was at the Post Office, we had no fewer than 21 unions, in certain cases with around 150 members. There is nothing whatever in the Bill to say what shall be the mini-
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mum, or even the maximum, membership of a union which would enable it to be recognised for negotiating purposes. We could finish up in that factory with five, six or seven negotiating bodies, where at present there are two unions carrying out the negotiations.
The noble Lord and other members of the Government have been propagating for a long time the view that there are far too many trade unions in this country. The Trades Union Congress has endeavoured to bring unions together to amalgamate, and many unions have come together as a result of their efforts. One of the great dangers in the Bill is the lack of conciliation machinery operating in such a way that it would be effective in stopping the setting up of such new bodies. I would take a lot of convincing that this clause will not cause more trouble than ever within the trade unions if it is allowed to go through. The noble Lord and his colleagues say that they want to help the unions, to make them stronger, to make them more viable and so on, but I see danger in what could happen here. My noble friend on my left knows what happened when the Spencer Union started up against the Miners' Union. We will have a repetition of that. It will happen in all kinds of industry, in the shipyards, in (engineering works, and in factories. I am giving noble Lords opposite and the Government this warning. That is what will ultimately happen if this clause goes through.
8.50 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I really do not think I should allow those observations to pass without attempting to make some answer to them because, if may say so, I do not think the noble Lord, Lord Slater, has really understood what this group of clauses is all about. The questions that have to be put under Clause 43 are, whether there should be a separate bargaining unit as defined in Clause 42 and, if so, should here be a sole bargaining agent for that unit? In one plant there may be two or more, or there may be only one bargaining unit; there may be a bargaining unit for a group of associated plants, or several bargaining units for a group of plants. The purpose behind this is to make certain that there is a clearly defined sole

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bargaining agent for particular descriptions of employees recognised by the employer.
The question that was put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Champion, was, what happens if somebody else starts up another union catering for the same descriptions of workers? There is nothing to prevent a new union being set up under the Bill, any more than there would be at the present time; but it does not follow that because a new union is set up it will be recognised by the employer. The question that was put in fact went rather further, and before I leave that I should say that under the Bill it is not necessary to have a ballot to set up a new union. I think the noble Lord, Lord Slater, rather misunderstood that point.
The question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Champion, was quite a different one; namely, if such a new union were registered it could then make application under Clause 49 for the withdrawal of recognition of the union that is at present recognised, and presumably subsequently obtain its own recognition. This is a simple question and I think it has a perfectly simple answer that indeed I thought I had given, but I hope I have succeeded in making the matter rather clearer to the noble Lord. The purpose of these provisions is to have orderly bargaining procedures, clear recognition by an employer of the descriptions of workers forming the bargaining unit, with one union or a joint panel of unions representing the workers in that bargaining unit.
I hope I have made this clear. There could be any number of separate unions in a joint negotiating panel. The noble Lord suggested six or seven; there might be six or seven separate unions but there would be only one bargaining agent recognised, which in that case would be a joint negotiating panel.
8.54 p.m.
LORD SLATER: I have the highest regard for the noble Lord and for his former association over the years as a Parliamentarian and as a Minister in various Governments. But I must repeat what I have already said. I cannot get this out of my system in regard to labour
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relations. Some of us have lived with this problem all our lives and we know what can happen. The human element is in operation all the time, and more so now because younger people are coming into industry and are taking a different view of the situation. It will need more speeches than the noble Lord has delivered to give answers to the questions that have been posed by my noble friend Lord Champion, with his long experience in the trade union world. What the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, has said will not convince me in the face of what I have already stated. I know what will happen. Despite the smile on the face of the noble Lord I reiterate that it will happen.
May I just say, in conclusion, that I have given my experience in regard to the 21 unions inside the Post Office when it was under Ministerial responsibility. At that time trying to get these organisations together, to work under the operation of one unit or two units or three units for negotiations, caused more trouble than anything else. This Bill will cause more trouble, and it will leave the door wide open for people who are engaged in some types of industry to take a line of approach which can be detrimental not only to The employers of the labour but to all the people engaged within that type of industry.
8.58 p.m.
LORD STONHAM: I am afraid this discussion all stems from the Government's proposals in these clauses to interfere with what is written into the agreement. As my noble friend Lord Champion has said, this has been responsible for resolving, over 30 years, more than a thousand inter-union disputes. That is a magnificent record. It is a machinery which the unions have created for themselves, to settle disputes between one union and another about membership, about poaching members, and so on; and for this the Government have devised an elaborate machinery for compelling—instead of agreements being reached voluntarily according to the written formula, the unions will be compelled to arrive at conclusions, and the end result will not be any better.
Here we have this Clause 44, which is just part of the proposed machinery; again, it will not be any better. My noble friend Lord Champion, it seemed,

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was disposed to accept what the Government said in this matter; but judged by the experience of my noble friend Lord Slater, and also what is within the knowledge of all of us on this side of the Committee, I am convinced that this clause is, as it were, especially designed to foment and create trouble. It will cause a great deal of trouble. It may weaken some unions; it may destroy what they have painfully built up over the years. If that is the Government's object it is an unworthy one and a wrong one; but in any case it is not in the interests of the country as a whole. Of course I know that when the bells ring the troops will muster and a hundred-odd people will come in and again we on this side will he demolished. That does not matter. I think we should stand up for what we think—no, indeed, for what we know is right. I shall oppose the Government on this clause.
9.0 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN: The noble Lord, Lord Stonham, is a very intelligent man. I really do not think that he can so have misunderstood these provisions as he has just indicated. We are primarily concerned in these provisions with the case where an employer will not recognise a particular union, or perhaps any union at all, as having negotiating rights. That is the primary case with which we are concerned, and the Bill will ultimately give powers to compel that employer to recognise a union as appropriate sole bargaining agent for the bargaining unit.
The second case is where there is a dispute between unions. It may well be that the Bridlington arrangements can settle this. I hope they can. The Bill is not going to stop that or interfere with it in any way at all. What is more, at every stage there has to be conciliation. The parties have to have attempted conciliation, will have to notify the Secretary of State before they can make an application, and the Secretary of State attempts conciliation at that stage. The dispute goes to the The N.I.R.C. can then again provide opportunities for conciliation. It may be that as a result of this conciliation the employer will concede the sole bargaining rights, the recognition of negotiating rights voluntarily, and will enter a voluntary agreement. It is only in the extreme case where this result cannot be achieved, that an application can
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be made by one or more trade unions, by the employer himself, by the employer jointly with the trade unions, or by the Secretary of State. It is only in the last resort that this machinery is put into operation.
I hope the noble Lords will realise that the primary object of these provisions is to ensure that there exists a bargaining relationship between the employer and the unions. That is the primary objective of these provisions. In many cases bargaining relationships do not exist just now; in many cases they are hampered by inter-union rivalry. The object of these provisions is to overcome these two disadvantages. I think perhaps I have explained the matter more clearly than I did before.
LORD CHAMPION: I rise only to correct something the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, said. I do not accept this clause. That does not mean that I am prepared at this stage to advise the Committee to divide. I previously said the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, had given an explanation which took a lot of studying; it still does by his last remarks. It is an extremely difficult matter, and I think it is right that we should study it, having regard to the fact that we still have more stages on the Bill when we could introduce Amendments. Having said that (and I hope my noble friend is under no misapprehension of where I stand in relation to this clause) I still hope we shall be able to pass this clause without a Division.
Clause 43 agreed to.
Clause 44 [Reference to Commission on application under section 43.]
9.4 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I will now proceed to move what erroneously I was about to move before.
LORD DRUMALBYN LORD DRUMALBYN moved Amendment No. 243.
Leave out Clause 44 and insert the following new clause—
Reference to Commission on application under s. 43.
"44.—(1) If on an application under section 43 of this Act the Industrial Court is satisfied—

(a) that it is not precluded b3 section 51(5) of this Act from entertaining the application;

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(b) that the employer or employers to whom the application relates, and the organisations of workers appearing to the Court to have, or to be seeking, negotiating rights in respect of the whole or part of the specified group of employees, have endeavoured to settle the questions proposed to be referred to the Commission and, for that purpose, have made adequate use of any facilities for conciliation available to them, whether in pursuance of section 43(4) of this Act or otherwise; and

(c) that reference of those questions to the Commission is necessary with a view to promoting a satisfactory and lasting settlement of them,

the Industrial Court, subject to the next following subsection, shall refer those questions to the Commission.
(2) The Industrial Court shall not be required to refer any questions under this section to the Commission on an application relating to a group of employees if it appears to the Court that—

(a) a reference under this section relating to that group of employees or relating to a group of employees which in the opinion of the Court does not substantially differ from it, was under consideration by the Commission within the period of two years ending with the date of the application, and

(b) in the circumstances a further reference on that application after so short an interval would not be justified."

The noble Lord said: Perhaps I owe the Committee a little explanation of this. These Amendments are consequential on the restructuring that took place on the Report stage in another place on Clause 43. The Amendments were tabled at that time, but for reasons of which your Lordships are no doubt aware they were not actually moved. The main object of the restructuring of Clause 43 was to make its provisions more flexible and appropriate. In particular, the questions which the have to consider were amended so that they are the same whichever party makes application under that clause, and it was made clear that the C.I.R. would always have to examine both the questions of the bargaining unit and of the bargaining agent.
This last Amendment is particularly important because clearly it would not be sensible for the C.I.R. to examine one question without the other. But this restucturing in another place meant that a number of consequential Amendments to Clauses 44, 45 and 46 were necessary. For instance, your Lordships will notice that there are a number of references in all these clauses to the examination of a question by the C.I.R. All these have
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to be amended to make it clear that the C.I.R. are always examining more than one question. There are other minor consequential Amendments; for instance, reference to conciliation in Clause 44(1) which needs to include a reference to the Secretary of State's conciliation required under Clause 43(4)(a), a provision which was inserted on the Committee stage in another place. As there were as many as eight such consequential Amendments to Clause 44, we thought it would be more convenient for the Committee to table a new clause embodying those Amendments rather than to set them all out separately.
Subsection (3) of the existing clause is not necessary since the groups of employees, which applicants are claiming should be recognised as a separate bargaining unit (or units) will have to be specified in the application in accordance with subsection (1) of Clause 43. I beg to move.
9.7 p.m.
LORD CHAMPION: The doubt I would express here is perhaps a rather small one; namely, as to whether the two-year period mentioned in subsection (2)(a) is a sufficient period to prevent the disrupting, intentionally mischievous applications being made to the Court. The very fact that an application has been made will have an unsettling effect on the bargaining unit previously decided upon on the original application. That is the first point.
Then, on the other hand, it has been put to me by someone very knowledgeable in that type of industry, that there is a doubt as to whether the two-year period is in fact too long and not too short. One reason for objection to the two-year period is that there can be industries and situations—for example, building sites—where the workers would be changing continuously, so that within two years a situation could easily arise where recognition ought to be accorded but is excluded by the two-year exclusion clause —that is subsection (2) of Clause 44. My difficulty here is that a company may be caught between the two ideas of this period. The first idea is that which has been put to me by someone knowledgeable about these things, that two years is not long enough. But it has also been put to me that two years is too long. I

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should be grateful if the noble Lord would tell us why this period has been decided upon: whether it has been generally agreed to, or whether it occurred anywhere; was it a recommendation made to the Government, or was the period just conjured up somewhere as being the best period that could be devised for putting into the Bill in this new Clause 44?
LORD DRUMALBYN: I think the noble Lord is right in his last supposition. Obviously, to some extent the choice of the period has to be arbitrary and it is just a question of exercising the best judgment one can summon as to what the right period is. If I may say so, the noble Lord has almost made the case for the two-year period—some people think it is too long and others think it is too short. Possibly there are arguments both ways, and therefore we might as well stick to the middle course.
LORD WYNNE-JONES: Might it not be possible that it is both too long and too short?
LORD DRUMALBYN: The answer is " Yes " in certain circumstances and we have to make it fit all the circumstances.
On Question, Amendment agreed to. New Clause 44 agreed to.
Clause 45 [Withdrawal of extension of reference under s. 44]:
9.10 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN LORD DRUMALBYN moved Amendment No. 244:
Page 35, line 11, leave out (" question has been referred ") and insert (" reference has been made ").
The noble Lord said: Clauses Amendments Nos. 245, 246 and 247 are consequential on the Amendment which has just been discussed.
On Question, Amendment agreed to. Amendment (No. 245) moved
Page, 35. line 15, leave out (" question ") and insert I" questions in issue ").—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Amendment (No. 246) moved—
Page 35, line 19, leave out from (" after ") to (" and ") in line 20 and insert (" such a reference has been made ").—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Amendment (No. 247) moved—
Page 35, line 22, leave out (" question ") and insert (" questions in issue")—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD DRUMALBYN LORD DRUMALBYN moved Amendment No. 247A:
Page 35, line 30, at end insert (" in the opinion of the Commission ").
The noble Lord said: This is a small technical Amendment, similar to the one already made to Clause 36. It is conceivable that under Clause 45(2)(6) as at present drafted, the C.I.R.'s proposals to extend Clause 44 reference would be null and void if a party claiming to be affected did not specifically have his attention drawn to the proposal. The purpose of this Amendment is to avoid that danger by making it clear than the obligation is to inform the people it considers would be affected by the propasal. The C.I.R. could clearly be relied on to exercise great care to notify all parties interested, and the matter is likely to come to the attention of all concerned, even if they do not receive notification. This is a very common Amendment in cases of this kind, and I beg to move.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD DRUMALBYN LORD DRUMALBYN moved Amendment No. 248.
Page 35, line 33, leave out from (" employer") to end of line 36 and insert (" unless he is an associated employer in relation to the employer or employers' to whom the reference originally related ")
The noble Lord said: Amendments Nos. 248 and 252 are also consequential on the new Clause 44.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 45, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 46 [Report of Commission on reference under s. 44]:
LORD DRUMALBYN: This; Amendment (No. 249) is consequential. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 36, line 13, leave out (" a question ") and insert (" any questions, ").—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I beg to move Amendment No. 250.
Amendment moved—
Page 36, line 15, leave out ((" that question ") and insert (" those questions ").—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I beg to move Amendment No. 251.
Amendment moved—
Page 36, line 19, leave out (` on that question ").—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I beg to move Amendment No. 252.
Amendment moved—
Page 36, line 19, leave out (" on that to and ") in line 27 and insert (` comprised in the reference, either as originally made or as extended ").—(Lord Drutnalbyn.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD BELSTEAD LORD BELSTEAD moved Amendment No. 252.
Page 36, leave out lines 29 to 34 and insert (" appearing to the Commission to be directly concerned in the questions specified in the reference ")
The noble Lord said: The purpose of this Amendment is to require the Commission on Industrial Relations to send a copy of its report on Clause 46 not only to the recommended bargaining agent; that is to say, recommended in the C.I.R.'s report, but also to any other organisations of workers which appear to the Commission to be directly concerned in the questions considered by the Commission. This seems to the Government to be a sensible and desirable change, and it is in accordance with the C.I.R.'s present practice. For instance, it seems right as a matter of courtesy that any organisation of workers whose claims to recognition were considered in a Clause 46 report should receive a copy of that report, rather than to read about it afterwards in the Press or to purchase a copy themselves. I beg to move.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE EARL OF HALSBURY THE EARL OF HALSBURY moved Amendment No. 252A:
Page 37, line 1, after (" and ") insert (" professional or other ").
The noble Earl said: In rising to move the Amendment which appears in my name in the Marshalled List, I shall try to be as brief as possible. It is the
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third of four interlocked Amendments distributed throughout the List, and the first two are associated with my noble friends Lord Platt, Lord Byers, Lord Nelson and others. I withdrew the first Amendment and did not put the second, by agreement with my noble friends, following an extended discussion—I thought, a very high quality discussion—of the principles involved in the protection of the professional man. I believed, as I said when asking your Lordships' leave to withdraw the first of these Amendments, that the sympathy of the whole Committee was on the side of what I was trying to do, but the means of doing it were agreed to be difficult within the structure of the Bill.
The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, himself expressed sympathy and promised sympathetic consideration for this Amendment, or something like it —which was then well forward of the point which we had reached. He did not commit himself to a precise form of words. The object of rising to move this Amendment instead of withdrawing it is to give the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, a chance of telling us whether his thinking has advanced in the interim; whether this subject continues to engage his sympathy, and whether he is yet ready with a form of words. In this connection I would say that, in view of the relatively short time since this matter first arose, I shall not press him for anything more than an assurance of his continued sympathy. He may well need until Report stage to decide exactly how he will express that sympathy, and if that is his view I shall be content, and ready to ask your Lordships' leave to withdraw the Amendment.
In the interim, I have had an afterthought as a possible solution to the problem in mind, and although I am not going to ask the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, to comment on this, I would merely like to put it into your Lordships' minds as a possible means of expressing the end with which you have shown so much sympathy. Everybody seemed to agree that it is unfair to put a professional man between two fires. A great deal of this Bill is concerned with what is fair and unfair. Surely, it ought not to be beyond the wit of man to find a form of words which would express what is unfair to the professional man within the code

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of what is fair or unfair within this Bill. I do not intend to follow up this matter myself, or to ask the noble Lord to comment on it at this stage. It is just an afterthought which occurred to me quite recently. I beg to move.
LORD PLATT: May I just say a few words in support of my noble friend Lord Halsbury? I think we are now on page 37 of this Bill, and I think one looks in vain through the first 36 pages to find any mention of professional workers—perhaps there may be a mention somewhere. But there are such people, and it would be very nice if it were recognised that their problems are not solely those of employer and employee, master and servant, and all the tremendously important matters about which we have been arguing, but that they have certain other duties, certain other loyalties, and this might possibly be acknowledged. But I would agree with my noble friend Lord Halsbury that we should not push this at the present time, provided that we have some recognition that this point of view is accepted by Her Majesty's Government.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I readily respond to the noble Lords who have spoken. I assure the noble Lord, Lord Platt, that we are very well aware of the great value that the professional conscience has in the quality of our life. It is something that we wish to make quite certain we shall preserve. It is certainly no part of this Bill in any way to affect that adversely. Secondly, may I say that the noble Earl, Lord Halsbury, has made a very interesting suggestion about the introduction of the concept of unfair industrial practice into this sphere, and we shall naturally be glad to consider it and discuss it further with him.
Thirdly, the noble Earl asked whether our thinking on this had advanced. I may say to the noble Lord that it is advancing. but I am not yet in a position to say anything more than I did on the last occasion. I only say quite specifically that the undertaking I gave to him on that occasion stands and that we shall introduce an appropriate Amendment on Report.
BARONESS WHITE: We are delighted to know, amid the stresses and strains of this marathon debate, that Lord Drumalbyn's thinking is advancing. I
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should have thought that it would require at least the Whitsun Recess to solve what is— —and I am speaking seriously now—a very difficult problem. As I indicated at an early stage of our debates, this is a difficulty where there is a question of dual loyalties, as the noble Earl, Lord Halsbury, and the noble Lord, Lord Platt, have reminded us.
On the other hand, certainly on this side of the Committee, we should be reluctant to acquiesce in anything which really deflected a loyalty from a union to which one might belong, because there is a genuine dual loyalty, both to the professional association which is not a trade union and, if someone is a member of a trade union—and after all it is such persons whom we are discussing in this Bill—to his union. Even if one is a professional person one can still be loyal to one's union if one is a member of it, and one should play one's part and try to make sure that the union's activities are in the best interests of the whole body of workers in the enterprise or organisation for which one is working. Therefore, it is most important that in any solution which the Government may find, both of those considerations should be given the fullest weight. However, I entirely agree with the noble Earl, Lord Halsbury that we must give the Government time, and we should not dream of pressing them to-night.
LORD BOWDEN: May I ask whether the noble Lord the Lord Chancellor could help, in view of the extraordinarily eloquent speech which I heard him make in the Festival Hall either yesterday or the day before on the tremendous importance of the professions in our current society? This seems to me to be the fundamental point which determines the difference between the professional man and the nonprofessional man. Therefore, I should have thought that we could leave the drafting of this clause with confidence to the noble Lord who sits on the Woolsack when he is not sitting on the Front Bench.
LORD WYNNE-JONES: I am sure that the suggestion which the noble Lord, Lord Bowden, has put forward is one to which the Government will pay attention. I feel that it is very important to take that into account. As the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, will understand, there are not

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large numbers of people involved but those involved have very clear standards and they wish to maintain those standards.
I have discussed this matter with some of my industrial trade union friends and, so far as I am able to understand it, they would not object to this provided it was properly worded. There is an obvious difficulty in wording in these matters, because if one simply leaves it in the sense of professional qualification without some further definition, there may be many people who would claim that they have certain professional qualifications. In other words, someone would have to decide what was accepted as a professional qualification. But if this be done —and I can see no reason at all why it should not be done—then surely this is something which would appeal to the heart of any Conservative (I am glad to see the noble and learned Lord nods in agreement) and it would certainly be something that they would feel desirable.
On the other hand, it might be argued that on this side of the House it might be regarded as undesirable, but I think this is not so, provided it is made clear that one is in no sense, first of all, setting up a special privilege, but rather that one is defining certain clear conditions; secondly, that it is not used as a method of evading belonging to a trade union. It seems to me that if this is done, then there should be no problem involved in accepting the general principle. I hope that the noble Lord will accelerate the thinking on the Government side. One realises that it may be difficult to accelerate their thinking, but I have little doubt that his persuasiveness could make the thinking move just a little more rapidly and bring us to a point at which an acceptable solution can be reached.
BARONESS GAITSKELL: I feel we are on somewhat dangerous ground here, particularly after hearing the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, talk about " professional conscience ". If we are going to talk about " professional conscience ", why should we not talk about " industrial conscience ", or " manual workers' conscience "? I feel we are here on rather a slippery slope. I think this is slightly divisive in our society.
9.28 p.m.
LORD STONHAM: I think all sides of the Committee support this Amendment, at least in principle. The noble Earl's suggestion that he was not going to press his Amendment was perhaps a little premature. It is scarcely conceivable in any circumstances that the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, would not give satisfactory assurances on a matter of this kind. As we have heard again and again, assurances from the Minister are not words in the Bill. You can quote them, but you cannot quote them with any effect in a court of law. I should have thought that this should be a matter which the noble Earl ought to press but for my understanding of what the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, finally said; as I understood it, he said that he would undertake to produce an Amendment from the Government between now and a later stage. If that is the position, I should regard it as entirely satisfactory. I hope he will confirm that that is the understanding.
LORD DRUMALBYN: Yes, my Lords, that is what I said.
THE EARL OF HALSBURY: Unless anybody wishes me to give way, I will express myself content with what I have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn. I would thank the noble Lord, Lord Wynne-Jones, for his support. To the noble Baroness, Lady Gaitskell, I would only say that she can see in the last of my Amendments in the list that I am talking of very tightly defined professional bodies, who publish an ethical code and have disciplinary procedures for enforcing it. I am not using these words loosely. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 46, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 47 [Application to Industrial Court for ballot as to recognition of sole bargaining agent]:
9.35 p.m.
LORD BELSTEAD LORD BELSTEAD moved Amendment No. 252V:
Page 38, line 11, leave out (" an employer ") and insert (" one or more employers ")
The noble Lord said: This is a drafting Amendment and its purpose is

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simple. Clauses 42 to 46 are drafted in terms of a reference that may concern either a single employer or a number of associated employers, where associated " is used in the sense of financial association. Clauses 47 to 53, on the other hand, are drafted in terms only of a single employer. Clearly, consistency is necessary and desirable, and the Amendments which I now submit to your Lordships would achieve the Government's intention of carrying the concept of associated employers right through the recognition provisions. I beg to move.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CHAMPION LORD CHAMPION moved Amendment No. 252D:
Page 38, line 12, leave out from (" employer ") to end of line 21 and insert (" the Commission may at its discretion hold a ballot ").
The noble Lord said: Under this clause, if an employer or worker applies for a ballot the Court may request the Commission to hold one. The objection to the ballot procedure is that the union's claim may be swamped by organised non-unionism, although on the merits there is a good claim for recognition. An example would be, for instance, a recognition claim for shop workers against a firm which had a high turnover of labour and a good many non-unionists working for it. There are very many industries where women work for short times and do not join the trade unions. Their votes could operate to the detriment of long-serving members of the staff who did belong to a trade union. The purpose of the Amendment, therefore, as in the Labour Party's own proposals which it submitted to the other House and then did not proceed with, is to make the calling of a ballot discretionary. It leaves to the Commission the discretion to call or not to call a ballot, and I should have thought that this discretion ought to be given to a body which will be of considerable importance. I beg to move.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I do not know whether the noble Lord who proposed this Amendment with such commendable brevity really wishes to press it. As the Committee will know, in the view of the Government the ballot procedure is essential, throughout the
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Bill, to cases where employes affected by certain types of recognition procedure or exclusive shops are directly concerned. This would make it entirely within the discretion of the Commission whether or not a ballot should be held; in other words, whether or not the workers should he entitled to express their views. I can understand that in some cases one may question the value of individual votes, but for those who believe in a democratic procedure it is a difficult case to sustain. We believe, of course, that the voluntary solutions to recognition problems are best.
In the end, a recognition order will be issued by the Court. A ballot is a necessary preliminary to an order, to establish the approval of the employees concerned. We therefore think it appropriate than an application for a ballot should be made to the N.I.R.C., and the N.I.R.C will have the duty of confirming that any conditions attached to the recommendation have been, or are being, complied with. A recognition order affects the parties directly and, in our view, it is therefore right that the initiative on enforcement should lie with them.
I would therefore respectfully submit to the Committee that a ballot following automatically on a reference of this kind should be an essential preliminary to an order, and it should not be made discretionary on the part of the Commission. I do not know how far it is an essential tenet of the Party opposite that it should be discretionary, but it is in our view essential to our case.
BARONESS WHITE: I think we are in some difficulty over this, for the reason which my noble friend Lord Champion described, in employments in which there is a very considerable turnover and also because in a different part of the Bill the Government refused to accept the principle—to put it very briefly—that part-time employees should not count the same as full-time employees. I think all of us can envisage situations in which really it would be very desirable to have recognition, but in which you just do not have that kind of homogeneity in your employee-force to be sure that the ballot would correctly express the desirable industrial solution.
The distributive trades are a case in point, where, as my noble friend Lord

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Champion remarked, there are a great many women who regard this as a sideline. They want to make some money from time to time, according to their family situation for the time being, but they do not regard it as the main object of their lives; and many of them work part-time, or they work seasonally, in the Christmas rush, or a holiday period at a seaside resort, and so on and so forth. They do not feel the same kind of interest and obligation towards the fortunes of the establishment in which they work as a person whose entire working life is devoted to it might be expected to feel.
It is for this kind of reason, which we find very difficult to express in legal language in a statute, but which we know very well from our experience is valid, that we are suggesting that there are certain circumstances where, if one insists on having part-time people in (and one may be in an occupation where there is a very considerable turnover), the Commission should be allowed an element of discretion, and it should not be absolute. I appreciate that this is not an easy thing. If one tries to legislate for all these situations then of course one gets oneself into this kind of difficulty; but it is a very genuine difficulty, and I would ask noble Lords who have any experience at all—particularly, as I say, of things like the distributive trades, the seasonal trades in holiday resorts, and so on—to reflect that we are pointing to something which is a very genuine difficulty, and we would really ask the Government to think carefully about this again.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I do not want to repeat myself, but the noble Baroness cannot but be aware that we had this argument before, and I replied—
BARONESS WHITE: It makes it none the less valid.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: No, but it does make it rather more boring for me to repeat the arguments I made in reply to it, with which the noble Baroness has not dealt. So far as regards part-time employees, she must be aware that the argument we presented before was this. If you want to impose a recognition order in respect of full-time employees only, all right; then you make your application in respect of full-time employees only, and no one will complain
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if the part-time employees do not have a vote. But if you want to impose it on part-time employees as well as full-time employees—that is to say, if you want to say that the sole bargaining agent shall be the same unions for part-time and full-time employees so as to cover both—then they are affected by it, and they ought to have a vote. It is really as simple as that. There may be cases where it is more appropriate or less appropriate, but the Amendment proposed is that we should in all cases give the Commission a discretion. There is nothing in the Amendment about part-time employees or a shifting population of workers. Our view is that if you want to impose a sole bargaining agent on employees, before you do it they ought to have a say as to whether it ought to be imposed or not. I do not know how far this distrust of what we regard as a democratic process is inherent to the Labour Party, or whether they want to divide on it. But we have had this argument before and I do not want to repeat myself more than twice.
LORD CHAMPION: Every Amendment that is moved from this side is not necessarily one of the tenets of this Party. Quite often they are probing Amendments. This Amendment is clearly, to a large extent, a probing Amendment. It was designed to cover some of the points in the probing that my noble friend, Lady White, has made. You cannot legislate for every set of circumstances that may come up in such a diverse field as industrial relations. That is one of the difficulties about trying to legislate for them, and one of the difficulties about the Bill as a whole; you are trying to legislate for something which is so diverse in character as industrial relations. As I have said about something else, I would not go to the stake over this Amendment; it is only a probing Amendment. Therefore, I ask leave of the Committee to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD BELSTEAD: I beg to move Amendment No. 252W. This Amendment is consequent on Amendment No. 252P.
Amendment moved—
Page 38, line 16, after (" employer ") insert (" (or, if more than one, any of the emloyers)").—(Lord Belstead.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
9.43 p.m.
LORD CHAMPION LORD CHAMPION moved Amendment No. 252E.
Page 38, line 22, leave out subsection (2).
The noble Lord said: Once again we are calling attention to the fact that the Government by this subsection are putting on the screw to force organisations of workers to register. If we have called attention to it before and we do so again it is because we regard it as being of such importance that it is right that we should do so. We may have to call attention to it even more as we get to the clauses on registration. I do not want the discussion that we might have on this particular clause and subsection to pre-empt in any way the discussions which will take place on the next part of the Bill which deals with registration.
There is no doubt that what the Government are up to here is once again, in the course of these clauses, trying to put the screw on unions to do something which they regard as inimical to their wellbeing and to their interests. This Amendment highlights the point touched on before that applications cannot be made to the Court under this subsection except by a registered trade union. If, therefore, any organisation of workers, for example the Transport and General Workers Union, or the A.E.F., fail to register, they could not make applications for recognition. That would be a ludicrous situation in which you would have bodies of that size and importance not being able to submit an application, but you could have on the body recognised as the sole bargaining agent a professional organisation which did not cover any considerable part of the workers in that particular unit of employment. We regard this as absolutely wrong and I think it would be right for the Government to reconsider this whole nonsense of trying by means of this Bill to force the unions into registration. I beg to move.
LORD BELSTEAD: The point made by the noble Lord is that well-known large trade unions will be unable to apply for recognition if they do not register. This point has been made many times. We on this side have said all along that we feel that the requirements for registration—they have been mentioned many times although the clauses referring to them have not yet been reached—when
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we come to the relevant clauses will be found not to be onerous. They will be no more than the functions and duties fulfilled at present by responsible trade unions— and not least by the trade union to which the noble Lord particularly referred The Government have repeatedly made it clear that it is a fundamental principle of this Bill that the substantial rights it proposes for trade unions should apply to those which by registering accept the statutory minimum standards. These standards are not onerous.
The right to apply for a ballot on the C.I.R. recommendation under Clause 46, which results in an enforceable recognition order in the event of a majority vote in favour, is one substantial new right. We cannot accept that it should be available to an organisation of workers which is not prepared to accept the fair, reasonable and not onerous requirements of registration. But it is true that under Clause 46 the C.I.R. can recommend as a sole bargaining agent an organisation of workers which is not registered. This may be the appropriate recommendation in some cases. There is nothing to stop an employer voluntarily accepting the recommendation and recognising the recommended bargaining agents. Also, as my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn pointed out, the unregistered organisation has six months in which to become registered and to have its status transferred through the machinery we are discussing into that of a sole bargaining agent. But it is a clear and consistent plank of Government policy that enforcement of the C.I.R. recommendation should be available only to registered unions.
May I reply to the noble Lord's opening remarks? It has been id (and greatly stressed in another place) that because the recognition procedure in our Bill is available only to registered. unions, the unregistered unions will cease to exist for bargaining purposes; and I felt that this was the burden of the noble Lord's remarks. But this is not so. We can argue on other occasiom about whether the conditions of registration are not right; but surely it should be possible for us to agree that the principle of registration is something which could be looked upon as very probably being right. The Donovan Commission recommended that registration should be a

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pre-condition of achieving trade union status. It is a fundamental principle that registration should be the means of obtaining certain important rights and privileges. For example, the right to compel employers by law to recognise a union is one such right. This does not mean that the unregistered unions will cease to exist for bargaining purposes. There is nothing whatsoever to stop an employer voluntarily recognising an unrecognised union and my noble friends and I have no doubt a good many employers will do so. We are talking about new machinery for use where the voluntary method of solving disputes has broken down.
I hope that it will prove to be unnecessary to make very much use of the recognition procedures. I earnestly hope that most recognition disputes will continue to be settled voluntarily as they are now. Even here we have bent over backwards, so far as we can under the Bill, to give a fair deal to organisations not prepared to register. However, it remains true that such organisations cannot initiate an application under Clause 43 because we say that that would be inconsistent with the philosophy of registration and the advantages that flow from it, but it is quite open, as we have said, to the C.I.R. under Clause 46, to recommend independent organisations of workers which are not registered. Of course, provided an organisation recommended in this way goes on and gets itself registered, it can use this machinery and go forward via the ballot to the sole bargaining agent status. On those grounds, which I hope do not go entirely against what the noble Lord, Lord Champion, has said but meet some of the points he has made, I hope that your Lordships will resist this Amendment.
LORD SLATER: The noble Lord mentioned during the course of his speech a period of six months for registration. Then he said that those unions who have not registered may negotiate with any employer if they feel so disposed. This is a paradox; you either can or you cannot. Why make provision for a position whereby a trade union must register in accordance with the Act, and at the same time assert that other trade unions, although they do not register, still have
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the right of their bargaining power with an employer? How is this going to work? Is it right that certain trade unions must register while other trade unions are excused from registering and yet will be allowed to negotiate with the employers on behalf of their membership?
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: No union is forced to register, but any union which has any sense will register. I do not understand the noble Lord's argument. There will be great advantages for unions to register. An employer has to acknowledge a union if it is a registered union. I cannot see the noble Lord's objection to this.
LORD SLATER: The unfortunate part about this is that noble Lords on the other side do not find the time whereby we can object and put forward a point of view. We have listened to this form of debate on two or three occasions. Noble Lords who are leading for the Government on this issue of registration, and the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, said that this would come up at a later juncture. Now the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, in reply to a speech made by my noble friend Lord Champion, speaks of a period of six months in which registration can take place. What happens if they go beyond the six months? Secondly, the Government make provision whereby trade unions which do not register will still be allowed to negotiate on behalf of their membership. It may be that one of the reasons why these statements are being made at this time is because of what was said at the T.U.C. Congress, where certain white collar unions find themselves in a position where they will have to register, whereas other trade unions such as the E.T.U. and the Transport and General Workers Union say that they will not register. This may be one of the reasons why the Government are making these statements at the present time.
LORD BELSTEAD: All I was seeking to do, although I am afraid I did it badly, was to draw the attention of the noble Lord, Lord Slater, to subsection (6)(a) of the previous clause, Clause 46, where of course the organisation has to have " a substantial proportion " of support. It is the same, it seems to me whether the organisation is a registered organisation

357
or not. After that it is up to the organisation whether it wishes to become a registered trade union or not.
Here I am afraid there is a difference of opinion between thet wo sides of the Committee. We think the requirements of registration are not onerous and could easily be applied to almost any trade union. The noble Lord opposite is saying that this may be so, but nevertheless some unions, even great trade unions, may not wish to avail themselves of registration. On this we may have to wait and see. The period of six months mentioned in Clause 47(1) is the maximum period which can elapse before the ballot can be applied for. I do not think there is anything particularly magical about that; it is simply written into the Bill.
LORD CHAMPION: The noble Lord, Lord Belstead, has suggested that the terms of registration will not be onerous. It seemed to me that on this point he was reacting a lecture to the trade unions. I should have thought it was for unions of the calibre and size of the Transport and General Workers' Union, the A.E.F., the N.U.R. and the rest, to decide for themselves whether or not the conditions laid down in the Bill will be onerous for a trade union. It it for them to decide whether it is proper to appear to he giving support to a Bill as stupid as this, and to register under the terms in the Bill.
It seems a very peculiar position in which the Commission on Industrial Relations may recommend that an organisation which is not registered may be the sole bargaining agent. That is what the noble Lord told us, and what we know as a result of reading the Bill. We have the position in which they may be recommended by the Commission, but on the other hand they cannot make an application. This situation which is being created by the Bill in relation to unions of the calibre of which I have spoken is ludicrous.
I am bound to say that the reply of the noble Lord does not in any may satisfy us on this side of the Committee. He said that we had made the point a million times. Sometimes it is necessary to make a point two million times to drill it into heads not capable of absorbing what is being directed at them. I am sure this Bill is a mistake, and that equally these clauses are a mistake. The very fact that we are here talking in terms on the one hand of giving the Commissim power to decide that an unregistered body can be the sole bargaining agent, and on the other that they cannot make an application, is so ludicrous that we are bound to ask the Committee to divide on this Amendment.
9.59 p.m.
On Question, Whether the sail Amendment (No. 252E) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 32; Not-Contents, 94.

CONTENTS

Archibald, L.

Gaitskell, Bs.

Nunburnholme, L.

Ardwick, L.

Gardiner, L.

Ritchie-Calder, L.

Beswick, L. [Teller.]

Garnsworthy, L.

Serota, Bs. [Teller.]

Bowden, L.

Henderson, L.

Shackleton, L.

Brockway, L.

Heycock, L.

Shepherd, L.

Champion, L.

Hilton of Upton, L.

Slater, L.

Collison, L.

Janner, L.

Stonham, L.

Cooper of Stockton Heath, L.

Lee of Asheridge, Bs.

Stow Hill, L.

Davies of Leek, L.

Mais, L.

White, Bs.

Delacourt-Smith, L.

Milner of Leeds, L.

Wynne-Jones, L.

Diamond, L.

Morris of Kenwood, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Aberdare, L.

Barrington, V.

Burgh, L.

Ailwyn, L.

Belhaven and Stenton, L.

Burnham, L.

Alexander of Tunis, E.

Belstead, L.

Burton, L.

Allerton, L.

Berkeley, Bs.

Byers, L.

Amherst of Hackney, L.

Brecon, L.

Conesford, L.

Amory, V.

Brooke of Cumnor, L.

Cottesloe, L.

Auckland, L.

Brooke of Ystradfellte, Bs.

Cowley, E.

Balfour, E.

Brougham and Vaux, L.

Craigavon, V.

Balfour of Inchrye, L.

Buchan, E.

Crathorne, L.

Davidson, V.

Hankey, L.

St. Just, L.

Denham, L. [Teller.]

Harvey of Tasburgh, L.

St. Oswald, L.

Drumalbyn, L.

Hood, V.

Salisbury, M.

Ebbisham, L.

Inglewood, L.

Sandford, L.

Eccles, V.

Jellicoe, E. (L. Privy Seal.)

Sandys, L.

Elliot of Harwood,Bs.

Kemsley, V.

Savile, L.

Emmet of Amberley, Bs.

Killearn, L.

Scarbrough, E.

Essex, E.

Kilmany, L.

Selkirk, E.

Exeter, M.

Landsdowne, M.

Selsdon, L.

Falkland, V.

Lothian, M.

Sempill, Ly.

Ferrers, E. [Teller.]

Lyell, L.

Sherfield, L.

Ferrier, L.

Margadale, L.

Somers, L.

Fisher, L.

Massereene and Ferrard, V.

Strang, L.

Fortescue, E.

Mersey, V.

Strange, L.

Gage, V.

Mowbray and Stourton, L.

Thorneycroft, L.

Gowrie, E.

Napier and Ettrick, L.

Thurso, V.

Gray, L.

O'Neill of the Maine, L.

Tweedsmuir, L.

Grenfell, L.

Pender, L.

Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, Bs.

Gridley, L.

Rankeillour, L.

Verulam, E.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

Rochdale, V.

Vivian, L.

Hailes, L.

Ruthven of Freeland, Ly.

Windlesham, L.

Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L. (L.Chancellor.)

St. Aldwyn, E.

Yarborough, E.

St. Helens, L.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

10.6 p.m.
LORD BELSTEAD LORD BELSTEAD moved Amendments Nos. 252X and 252Y:
Page 38, line 23, leave out (" by ") and insert ("in respect of a recommendation relating to ").
Page 38, line 25, leave out (" by ") and insert (" in respect of a recommendation relating to ").
The noble Lord said: With your Lordships' permission, I would move Amendments Nos. 252X and 252Y together. The Bill as originally brought to another place did not allow for the fact that an organisation of workers recommended as bargaining agent by the C.I.R. might choose to register in order to apply for a ballot on the recommendations—a point to which I tried to refer on a previous Amendment. An Amendment was therefore made in another place to allow for this possibility, but in doing so it has inadvertently been made possible for the employer to apply for a ballot in respect of a recommendation relating to an organisation of workers which at the time of application
360
is not registered. I am bound to point out to your Lordships that this would be inconsistent with the aims of the Bill. and the purpose of these two Amendments is to rectify this point. I beg to move.
LORD BELSTEAD: Amendment No. 252Z is a consequential Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 39, line 3, after (" employer ") insert (" or employers ").—(Lord Belstead.)
Clause 47, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 48 [Order of Industrial Court with a view to withdrawal of recognition].
LORD BELSTEAD: Amendment No. 252AA is consequential on Amendment No. 252B. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 39, line 11, after (" employer ") insert (" or employers ").—(Lord Belstead.)
10.10 p.m.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 252J:
Page 39, line 11, after ("union") insert (" or independent organisation of workers ").
The noble Lord said: As I understand it, this is almost exactly the same point as was discussed a little earlier in relation to this clause, the previous one having been discussed in relation to a previous clause. if the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, agrees with me I will continue with my speech. If I misunderstood this, the noble Lord of course is better informed on these clauses than I am, and I should be grateful for a correction. As I understand it, however, we are dealing with exactly the same point that we dealt with before.
On the previous occasion, the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, explained to us his views about the comparison of the benefits and disadvantages of registration. He went on to say that he had told us it many times. He has told us it many times. He was good enough to say that we have not yet reached the clauses dealing with registration, and I am bound to say that in that he was accurate also. But if he will forgive me saying so, those are the only two respects in which he was accurate, namely that he has said it many times and we have not yet reached the clause.
I must make it clear to the noble Lord and the Committee that we take a very different view indeed of the comparative advantages and disadvantages of registration. And inasmuch as the principle we are discussing stems entirely from whether it is on the whole advantageous or disadvantageous to register, I am bound to make this clear, even though we have not yet reached the part of the Bill which deals with registration, and therefore it would not be right or proper for me to explain in detail why we take that: view. It is right and necessary that I should explain to your Lordships why those who are being asked to register take that point of view.
The first thing I must make plain is that at this moment three-quarters of all trade unionists are in unions which are registered under the relevant Acts, in particular the 1871 Act. I do not bother your
362
Lordships with that date without reason. It is exactly 100 years ago. Therefore, I am right in saying to your Lordships that 'registration has been available for a century, and that trade unions have availed themselves of that to such an extent that at the moment three-quarters of them are registered. So I can answer the question which the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, put to us very simply indeed. He wanted to know whether it was a fact that we are opposed to the principle of registration. Of course we are not, three-quarters are registered at this minute.
What we are opposed to is such penalties being attached to registration, such removal of rights being forced upon trade unions who do not register, that trade unions are being put in the position of either going into the frying pan to which they are invited to go, the registration frying pan, or else being told by this far-sighted Government, " Well, you have your alternative. You need not register. There is always the fire outside the frying pan ". That is the present situation. I hope I am making it quite clear to the Committee, and particularly to the Government, that registration is not objected to in principle. What is objected to strenuously is the Government's method of removing the rights of trade unions by two actions: first, getting them into their control by registration and then denying them certain rights and inflicting on them certain liabilities; and, secondly, forcing them into that position by making life as near as they can intolerable for them if they do not register.
The reason I mention this is that both the last Amendment and this one demonstrate that point with utter clarity. For what are the Government saying? They are saying, through the mouth of their spokesman, the noble Lori,Lord Belstead, " We have no object ion to a voluntary agreement under which a non-registered body, a non-registered trade union, is appointed a sole bargaining agent. We think that is a perfectly proper state of affairs. We even have no objection to a decision by the Industrial Court that a non-registered trade unit n should be appointed as sole bargaining agent. We think that that is a proper state of affairs. But, of course, it cannot continue, because so long as the trade union is not

363
registered we have not got it under our control. Therefore, we are going to make it clear that although it is a prefectly proper state of affairs, and one which might be desired by both parties and which will achieve good industrial relations, we shall destroy that position within six months. We will see to it that, if within six months the union has not moved from a non-registered situation into a registered situation, in which it can be controlled and compelled to do what we want it to do, then it will lose its right as sole bargaining agent ".
This means making life intolerable for the union. It cannot do the job which it is created to do. Therefore, it is not surprising if we take a very different view indeed from that which the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, put forward with regard to registration. In so far as this Amendment repeats the same point, I thought it was not unreasonable that I should repeat the arguments made so persuasively by my noble friend, Lord Champion, and explain to your Lordships why we take such a serious view of this unfair malpractice on the part of the Government.
LORD BELSTEAD: The noble Lord, Lord Diamond, has told your Lordships that at least three-quarters of the trade unions to-day—
LORD DIAMOND: I was most careful in my wording. I did not say that. What the noble Lord is on the point of saying is not accurate. What I said was that three-quarters of the trade unionists are in trade unions which are registered.
LORD BELSTEAD: I am grateful to the noble Lord. I apologise for misrepresenting him. The statistic which the noble Lord has just made plain to us makes clear the point, made from this side by my noble friend and by myself on the prevous Amendment, that the conditions of registration under this Bill will not be unduly onerous.
LORD SHACKLETON: The noble Lord has suggested that the argument my noble friend has used, that three-quarters of the trade unionists are in trade unions —I must be careful not to misinterpret my noble friend either—which are regis-
364
tered, means that it will not be difficult for them to come under the Government's registration scheme. Is that the argument the noble Lord is using, because it is rather important?
LORD BELSTEAD: Unfortunately, the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, in moving his Amendment is seeking to lead us on to Clause 63 and on into the nineties. Except for the point which I have made in passing, which I think I have every right to do, I do not think I could follow the noble Lord in detail on this point which is not really in order for another 10 or more Amendments.
LORD SHACKLETON: Would the noble Lord repeat the argument he has just used in relation to the point of my noble friend Lord Diamond? This is one of the purposes of a Committee stage, to probe the arguments used.
LORD BELSTEAD: We do not believe on this side that the registration duties are going to be any more onerous than the duties which are undertaken by trade unions to-day, and the noble Lord has given us statistics of the trade unionists who are registered. The point I do not feel the Committee will allow me to go into is the details of the different duties of registration to prove my point, because the principles are in Clause 63 in Part IV and the details are in the Schedule at the end of the Bill, but we are discussing Part III. The noble Lord, Lord Diamond, then said, as he had every right to do, that the Government are taking away rights from the trade unions. I may be wrong, but it seemed to me, as I listened to the noble Lord, and read the Donovan Commission's Report, and the White Paper of the previous Government, In Place of Strife, that they all led to the same conclusion in the way that we should deal with matters of recognition.
What this Bill is offering to registered trade unions is the prize of being able to apply to be the sole bargaining agent. Thus, matters which have been so worrying in the past, namely, recognition disputes, can be resolved. Therefore on this side of the Committee we do not feel that we are taking away a right from the trade unions. We feel that in return for registration we are giving a prize which

365
will be of the greatest possible use to trade unions, a prize which many of them have not had before and which will also be of the greatest use in achieving one of the first principles of this Bill, namely, the promotion of good industrial relations.
LORD SHACKLETON: The noble Lord really has not dealt with the point. Some noble Lords think that this may not be the right moment to do it, but he has called in aid arguments which can only be demonstrated in relation to the clause which he will not discuss, namely, in relation to the duties and, in particular, the penalties and the constraints that will affect unions that are registered. I say this quite seriously. I could not believe that the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, could believe in the arguments he used on the previous clause, namely, that it was all fine and dandy because if people who were in an unregistered union, if they were recommended by the C.I.R., all was well. Now in relation to my noble friend's speech the noble Lord has implied that there is nothing in being registered against which trade unions can object. He knows that that is not so. Although the Government have a consistent position from their point of view, their arguments in meeting our different points of view do not stand up. It would be much better if they were to accept the full consequencies of their Bill. It would be much better if they were to say that they are imposing constraints on registered trade unions and that they are exposing unregistered organisations to all sorts of pains and penalties. It would be much better if they would say so, but they will not say so, and I hope that my noble friend Lord Diamond will continue to press this point. This is one of the crucial points where we may as well at least recognise what the consequences of the Bill are, and that is one of the purposes that the Committee stage should achieve.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I do not think the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, has quite understood the position. In the first place I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, is perfectly entitled to argue the point that he is arguing, but he must realise that the Amendment itself would not be particularly effectual. We are speaking here about the result of a
366
ballot taken under Clause 47. As only a trade union can apply for a ballot in any case, only a trade union or a joint negotiating panel could come up in that ballot on that side, and therefore this Amendment is technically—and I emphasise " technically "—wrong. The noble Lord apparently recognises that. He is quite entitled to argue the case again, although I should have thought that as we have just had a Division on this matter it was hardly necessary to go over the whole case again. The point here is quite a simple one: that the right to apply for a ballot resulting in a compulsory order on an employer to recognise is a substantial right. We think it should be confined to those who accept t le responsibilities of registration. That is the narrow point, and I hope the noble Lord will accept it.
LORD DIAMOND: I am sorry; if the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, is on the very narrow point, notwithstanding what his noble friend earlier said about the power of the Industrial Court to order that a non-registered union should be an appropriate body to be a sole 'bargaining agent—notwithstanding that, it is not technically possible for a non -registered union to apply for a ballot and therefore the result of a ballot in that case, but not in all cases, could only be in favour of a trade union. If he is on that very narrow point, I will hand that to him immediately.
LORD DRUMALBYN: If I may say so, it is not quite the point. It is the C.I.R. and not the Industrial Court which can recommend an organisation of workers, but before any organisation of workers can apply for a ballot, and so bring about the process that leads 'to the compulsory order, it would have to become a registered union.
LORD DIAMOND: We really must not go round in circles. I do understand that, but I am trying to elucidate the point at issue between the two sides, which is this: the Government think it is right for a non-registered union to be put in the position of being a sole bargaining agent —am I right?
LORD DRUMALBYN: By voluntary agreement.
LORD DIAMOND: By voluntary agreement: that adds to the point. The Government consider it is right that a non-registered union should have these responsibilities, but it does not consider it right for them to continue to have these responsibilities without registering as a trade union within six months, and it therefore compels a body, being a non-registered trade union which wishes to exercise its function as a trade union, to be registered if it wants to continue those responsibilities. I am saying this is an impossible position for the Government to take up; it is an impossible position for the Government to say that merely because a trade union has not registered it is incapable of carrying out the functions which the C.I.R. thought it capable of carrying out. And I say that the Government are taking it up purely to get unions into their control—that is to say, registered, so as to enable the Government to see that unions are burdened with the additional responsibilities and restraints which come from registration and, in order to prevent unions not being registered, are making life intolerable for them if they remain unregistered.
This Amendment which we are discussing, if it remains unaccepted, will be an example of the Government's determination to see that where a union does not register then it cannot carry out the function for which it was created. Its existence and its whole purpose is denied because, although it is acceptable to the Commission on Industrial Relations—the body which lays down and exercises the greatest authority as to what is and what is not appropriate in this area of industrial relations—it is not acceptable to the Government unless it registers and comes into their clutches. That is precisely what I mean, and that is the point of this Amendment. With respect, neither the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, nor the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, have dealt with this Amendment, except that the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, dealt with it on a very narrow point indeed. I
will give him that immediately if he wants it, but both he and I are anxious that the truth behind this matter should come out, and that noble Lords on both sides of the Committee should be aware of the principle we are arguing about. I hope that I have made the principle clear. That is why we insist on using every power we can to demonstrate the force of our views behind this Amendment.
LORD SHACKLETON: Is the noble Lord not going to give me any answer on this? He has received a piece of paper—
LORD DRUMALBYN: I really think the noble Lord intervenes a little too often on these matters. Quite plainly the noble Lord had invited the Chair to put the Question. It was perfectly plain to us on this side, and it did not seem to me that there was anything more to be said. We had given the answers to the questions. I could go on and give many more answers. It would not persuade the noble Lord, and in those circumstances it seems perfectly right that we should have a Division, as the noble Lord intended.
LORD SHACKLETON: I was about to interrupt the noble Lord to make my apologies to him. I had in fact thought, since he received a piece of paper, that he was going to give an answer. But he is perfectly entitled to his opinion, and I apologise.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I accept that apology willingly. The paper merely says that the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, is wrong in one particular, but I need not bore the Committee with that.
LORD SHACKLETON: I would have liked to pursue this, to ask what the particular was.
10.31 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 252J) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships' divided: Contents, 20; Not-Contents, 91.

CONTENTS

Beswick, L.

Gardiner, L.

Serota, Bs. [Teller.]

Bowden, L.

Hilton of Upton, L. [Teller.]

Shackleton, L.

Champion, L.

Lee of Asheridge, Bs.

Shepherd, L.

Cooper of Stockton Heath, L.

Mais, L,

Stow Hill, L.

Davies of Leek, L.

Milner of Leeds, L.

White, Bs.

Delacourt-Smith, L.

Nunburnholme, L.

Wynne-Jones, L.

Diamond. L.

Ritchie-Calder, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Aberdare, L.

Emmet of Amberley, Bs.

Napier and Ettrick, L.

Ailwyn, L.

Essex, E.

O'Neill of the Mair e, L.

Allerton, L.

Falkland, V.

Pender, L.

Amherst, E.

Ferrers, E.

Rankeillour, L.

Amherst of Hackney, L.

Ferrier, L.

Redesdale, L.

Amory, V,

Fisher, L.

Rochdale, V.

Auckland, L.

Fortescue, E.

Ruthven of Freeland, Ly.

Balfour, E.

Gage, V.

St. Aldwyn, E.

Balfour of Inchrye, L.

Gowrie, E.

St. Helens, L.

Barrington, V.

Gray, L.

St. Just. L.

Beaumont of Whitley, L.

Grenfell, L.

Sandford, L.

Belhaven and Stenton, L.

Gridley, L.

Sandys, L.

Belstead, L.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

Savile, L.

Berkeley, Bs.

Hailes, L.

Scarbrough, E.

Bessborough, E.

Hailsham of St. Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Selkirk, E.

Brecon, L.

Selsdon, L.

Brougham and Vaux, L.

Hankey, L.

Sempill, Ly.

Buchan, E.

Harvey of Tasburgh, L.

Sherfield, L.

Burgh, L.

Hood, V.

Somers, L.

Burnham, L.

Inglewood, L.

Strang, L.

Burton, L.

Jellicoe, E. (L. Privy Seal.)

Strange, L.

Byers, L.

Kemsley, V.

Swaythling, L.

Conesford, L.

Killearn, L.

Terrington, L.

Cottesloe, L.

Kilmany, L.

Thornevcroft, L.

Cowley, E.

Lansdowne, M.

Thurso, V.

Crathorne, L.

Lothian, M.

Tweedsmuir, L.

Cullen of Ashbourne, L.

Lyell. L.

Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, Bs.

Davidson, V.

Massereene and Ferrard, V.

Vivian, L.

Denham, L. [Teller.]

Mersey, V.

Westminster, D.

Drurnalbyn, L.

Mowbray and Stourton, L. [Teller.]

Windlesham, L.

Elliot of Harwood, Bs.

Yarborough, E.

Resolved in the negative, and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.

10.40 p.m.
LORD BYERS LORD BYERS moved Amendment No. 252B:
Page 39, lino 12, at end insert—
(" and
(c) requiring the employer and the agreed sole bargaining agent to negotiate a procedure agreement within a period of time to be specified by the Commission,")
The noble Lord said: Subsection (1) of Clause 48 states:
" Where the result of a ballot taken under section 47 of this Act, as reported by the Commission to the Industrial Court, is that a majority of the employees voting in the ballot voted in favour of the proposal that the recommendation should be made binding, the Industrial Court shall make …"
two orders; one
"… defining the bargaining unit ",
and the other
" specifying the employer and the trade union or joint negotiating panel, as the case may be ".
To this we propose to add a third paragraph,
" requiring the employer and the agreed sole bargaining agent to negotiate a procedure agreement within a period of time to be specified by the Commission."
This is not a Party point. We believe in the importance of procedures, and that it is essential that procedures should not be delayed in being framed once the various agreements have been come to. If there is delay it will cause frustration. and we believe that it would be a matter of good practice for the Commission to set a term to the time during which a procedure agreement can be agreed. If there is some good reason for tardiness, there is no reason why this should not be reported by the parties to tie Commission or to the Industrial Court. We feel that this Amendment would be an improvement to the Bill, because: if there is no term set to the framing of procedures there can be interminable delay which, as I said, will cause frustration. If the Government are not prepared to accept this Amendment in principle, I would ask them what sanction there would be against delay in the framing of such procedures. I beg to move.
LORD DRUMALBYN: As the noble Lord rightly said, this is not a Party point and there is some substance in what he has said. Obviously, once the Court has announced the result of the ballot we want to see the bargaining unit defined and the other necessary machinery

371
gone through, and the negotiating of a procedure agreement should start as soon as possible. He has made it clear that what he is talking about is not the starting of the negotiation on the procedure agreement, but its completion. I think he will agree that it is a little difficult to lay down a time within which a procedure agreement must be negotiated. It is a matter of both parties negotiating here, and it may take a short time or a long time. Procedure agreements very often take quite a long time. They are rather apt to take longer than substantive agreements, to negotiate, and the length of time will vary very much depending on the size of the sole bargaining agent and the unit covered. So I do not think that it would be very easy to specify the time.
In a sense, this is almost holding a pistol to the heads of both parties. On the other hand, I think that what we really have to guard against is an employer who, by definition in this case, did not want to recognise the union. He would obviously still be reluctant to recognise the union after the direction had been given, and he might demonstrate that reluctance in the form of an unwillingness to negotiate. But that can be guarded against by a complaint on the part of the union, on the grounds that the employer is not carrying on the collective bargaining, or taking such action —this is in Clause 53—
"… by way of or with a view to carrying on collective bargaining with that trade union or joint negotiating panel, as might reasonably be expected to be taken by an employer ready and willing to carry on such collective bargaining ".
So that all the union has to do is to say, " Six months have gone by ", or whatever it is, " and the employer has shown no signs of being willing to negotiate; he has not even passed the subject to his personnel manager, for example ", and cite all the evidence that the employer is obstructing the negotiation of a procedure agreement.
It seems to me that this is the proper course to take; and then, of course, an order can be made by N.I.R.C. upon the employer to negotiate with the trade union. It seems to me that this is the proper course to adopt; in other words, the remedy to apply to N.I.R.C. is in the union's own hands in this case. I think
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it is probably better to leave it in this way. I do not think there is any certainty about this. I would not say that; but I think that the Bill as drafted at the present time really makes this Amendment unnecessary. I would not go further than that.
LORD DIAMOND: I was merely going to say that this is the most interesting Amendment. In interest, it is exceeded only by the interesting statement just made by the Minister, who likened this, and not without reason, to holding a pistol to the heads of both parties. I gathered from what the Minister said that he does not think that that is a good thing to do, and that is what I want to pursue for a minute or two. Because so far the whole of the Bill is based, so far as trade unions are concerned and so far as concerns making agreements binding, on holding a pistol to the head of one party.
What I want to get from the noble Lord is whether his philosophical position is that he does not like holding a pistol to the heads of two parties but likes holding a pistol to the head of one party —namely, the trade unions—or whether he has changed his mind on the whole of this question of holding pistols. This I would be delighted to hear about, because as he well recollects we had a long discussion one evening about shot-gun marriages, and one of us got confused and started talking about gun-shot marriages; so really that is the thing I am interested in. I know this is not going to be tremendously helpful to the mover of the Amendment, but I am bound to say that I thought the Amendment was something which we on these Benches ought to leave to be argued between the Liberals and the Government. We felt we really could not make a great contribution to this discussion; and I should really leave it at that. So I would be grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, if he would enlighten us on the progressive thinking which has taken place with regard to holding pistols to heads.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I can answer that very easily. It is not much good holding pistols to heads if people have to use their heads and reach a procedure agreement. Perhaps it would have been better if I had said, " lock the two of them up in a room until they have reached agreement."
LORD BYERS: I do not think the Liberal Party is likely to be the subject of a shot-gun wedding with either of the Front Benches, certainly not during the course of this Bill, but I thought we would get to this question of the shot-gun wedding on this particular Amendment. The real point of this is that we do not believe that there should be too much delay in coming to a conclusion on these procedure agreements; and if the noble Lord assures me that this position is covered by Clause 53, then we feel that we have done our job in probing it. But I do not believe that, if Clause 53 is not satisfactory, we should avoid taking action by asking the courts to take a great interest in this, and by setting a time by which a report should be made either to the Commission or to the Court, so that this can he kept under some sort of regular review. There are not just two parties to this, the unions and the employers. There are also the workers to be considered. Quite often you can get dilatoriness between the two negotiating parties to the detriment of the workers themselves. But in the circumstances, and with the assurance that we have had about Clause 53, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
On Question, Whether Clause 48, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?
10.51 p.m.
LORD GARDINER: Clause 48 is a clause under which the Industrial Court is compelled to make a rubber stamp order. I. call it a rubber stamp order because the Court has no discretion at all. It is compelled to make an order, not according to what the result of the ballot is, but according to what the Commission reports the result of the ballot to be. No provision is made for a case in which the Commission's report is incorrect; nor has any provision been made if the Commission, after making its report, and before the Court makes an order, finds out, as a result of evidence put before it, that its report is wrong. It has no power to ignore or amend the report.
As the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, knows, I raised this on previous occasions, and ultimately I was told that the Government would consider this with a view to amendment. There has been
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time since then to put down an Amendment on this clause. Exactly the same point will arise again on Clause 51. I appreciate the difficulties of Ministers, with long hours of working at night, having quite enough to do to keep up with the next day's work without worrying about the implementation of the various undertakings that they have given. But the question is whether the Government are going to allow themselves enough time between the Committee stage and the Report stage to apply their minds to and work out the consequences of the various undertakings that they have given. I do not know whether, since I raised this a week or more ago, anybody has thought about it any more on the Government side, or come to any conclusions. thought that as it arises again on this clause I would ask whether they have done so, and if so whether they have come to any conclusion.
LORD DRUMALBYN: The question that the noble and learned Lord put is very clear, and he put this very fairly. He said there has been time, but I am afraid we have not had it. The noble and learned Lord knows how these things work. I personally have not thought about this since last week. I shall get the opportunity to think later. He makes the point that we must give ourselves time to think of these things. I cannot say more, I am afraid.
LORD GARDINER: Could the noble Lord give any indication, because we will all have a lot to do between Committee stage and Report stage, apart from the short holiday we are going to have, how much time there will be between the conclusion of the Committee stage and the start of Report stage?
LORD DRUMALBYN: I am afraid this inevitably depends on when the Committee stage ends. I cannot answer that question.
LORD GARDINER: Ought it to depend on when the Committee stage ends? Ought it not to depend on what is the necessary interval which both the Government and Opposition ought to have have between the time they return after the short holiday and the commencement of the Report stage.
LORD DRUMALBYN: It depends not only when the Committee stage ends, but also on how many things there are to

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reconsider. I do not think the noble and learned Lord could expect me to give an answer to that now.
10.55 p.m.
LORD DIAMOND: I wonder whether I might underline what my noble and learned friend has just said; because there will be a number of matters to be dealt with on Report, and as we have been going through the Bill the Government have been good enough once or twice—I almost said " from time to time " —to promise that they will look at what we have been saying about it on Report. We are grateful for that, but as we go through the Bill and the same point comes up more than once I had hoped that it would be possible to make some progress at a later point in the Committee stage—because the noble Lord is even more familiar than I with the difficulty that the Report stage, though not the final stage, is a late one for making alterations if you have not by then reached agreement. It is better to get some idea of the Government's reconsiderations during the course of the Committee stage so that the next stage can be more fruitful. I shall be grateful if the noble Lord and his advisers will be good enough to bear that in mind on the Question of this clause standing part of the Bill.
I had wanted to say a few things about the terms of the ballot (which appear in subsection (1)) but I am anxious to be right in what I say. Therefore I invite the noble Lord to carry out the normal process of describing the purpose of this clause. I hope then to be on stronger ground on the points I wish to raise. On a previous occasion I prefaced my comments by saying that I was basing them on certain suppositions. I asked for correction if I was wrong. I was not corrected; but the noble Lord subsequently said that I was not entirely right. It would be advantageous if the noble Lord could tell us now the effects of Clause 48—the effects other than the one point we have considered—and in particular if he could tell us what are the voting provisions and why they are such. I would then address to him one or two comments.
LORD DRUMALBYN: The purpose of the clause is really to bring to finality
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the processes/ that have been set in motion by the ballot's having taken place. Where a majority of the employees have voted in the ballot—and it is a majority of the employees and not a majority of those eligible to vote, which I dare say is a point that the noble Lord had in mind—in favour of the proposal, the recommendation would be made binding; that is, the Industrial Court would make the order defining the bargaining unit.
LORD GARDINER: That is not so. The Industrial Court does not make the order because the majority voted in the ballot. They make the order only according to the results of the ballot as reported by the Commission—which may be a very different thing.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I thank the noble and learned Lord for that correction. He raised this point on a previous occasion and he has raised it again now. He is a quite right to correct me in that way. The Industrial Court then makes the order defining the bargaining unit. It answers two questions by defining the bargaining unit and by specifying the sole bargaining agent and the employer, and makes directions that for two months from the date of the order and so long as the order continues in force, the trade union or joint negotiating panel shall be recognised as the sole bargaining agent for that bargaining unit. That closes this process. Then subsection (2) gives two examples where the order automatically ceases to have effect. the first is where
"an organisation specified in the order as being a trade union ceases to be a trade union "
and the second is where
"a joint negotiating panel specified in the order ceases to be a joint negotiating panel of trade unions,".
The noble Lord has paid due attention to the weight of those words. These purposes seem to me to be perfectly self-explanatory, and I do not quite know why he wanted me to explain the purpose in this way. Finally, subsection (3) says:
"Where the bargaining unit defined by an order under this section is the same as, or includes the whole or part of, the bargaining unit defined by a previous order under this section which is for the time being in force, the Industrial Court, on making the subsequent order, shall revoke the previous order."
Again that seems to me to be self-explanatory.
LORD DIAMOND: I am grateful to the noble Lord for what he has said, and I agree that the words seem to be self-explanatory. The words incorporate the views of the Government as to how these matters should be ordered, and there are two major respects in which the noble Lord must recognise that we are at odds with the Government and cannot see why this clause should pass.
The first is the question of voting. Here the voting is a majority of the employees voting in the ballot. The noble Lord did not offer any explanation as to why it was right in the Government's opinion that the majority should be determined by reference to the employees voting in the ballot, and not the employees eligible to vote. Secondly, he did not attempt to explain why the order should cease to have effect upon (2)(a) or (2)(b) happening—(2)(a) being " an organisation specified in the order " ceasing to be a trade union; and " trade union " here means a registered union. Why is this order to cease to have effect? It was a perfectly good order at the time it was made, in the view of those making it; helpful to industrial relations, in the view of those making it. Why should it cease to be a beneficial situation merely because the union in question had not registered within the period of six months, or de-registered, or whatever circumstances these words cover? Those are the two points on which we are anxious to understand why the Government are following this particular course.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I do not see the noble Lord's difficulty in this—the majority of those voting and not those eligible to vote. This is purely a question of whether a majority of the employees voting consider that this union or joint negotiating panel should be recognised as the sole bargaining agent. It is quite distinct from the other cases of the agency shop or the closed shop where there is a question of a surrender of the individual rights of each person voting, and it is for that reason, as we explained on earlier occasions, that a majority of those eligible to vote is required in the case of the agency shop and the closed shop. Here a straight majority of those voting is considered sufficient for the question. of recognition.
LORD DIAMOND: Before the noble Lord goes on to the other point, may I
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say that I am grateful to him, but he will understand that we are anxious to pursue this matter. We regard it not, as he understands, in this case but in the other case, as of fundamental importance and we are anxious to know the way in which the mind of the Government is moving. Here is a case where the noble Lord is justifying the normal process of employees voting and a decision being taken according to the majority of the employees actually voting. He says that this is distinguished from the other case in which certain rights are forgone. That is the case here, because it is a question of the sole bargaining agent and other employees, members of other unions, wish to have those unions representing them and they regard this as a fundamental right. They envisage a method whereby in the interests of industrial relations affecting the group as a whole individual rights have to be forgone.
That is the usual situation in which the individual has to forgo some of his liberty in the interests of the community to which he belongs, in this case the community of the workshop or factory. It is a very familiar situation. comparable with any other situation when individual rights have to be forgone in the interests or efficiency of the community. I cannot see any distinction between these cases and any other case. What I can see is that the Government have here the normal practice of making a decision according to the majority voting as distinct from those eligible to vote.
LORD DRUMALBYN: The noble Lord, Lord Champion, explained the four different types of union. It may be that a general union or a craft union or something of that kind was involved. The point here is that where theme is a multiplicity one would expect to find the Commission on Industrial Relations recommending a joint negotiating panel. Where there is one union to which virtually all the employees in the factory belong, one would expect the one union to be the sole bargaining agent. There is no question here of requiring people to join a particular union or of any loss of rights. The C.I.R. seek to achieve a solution by means of negotiation; and it has to be satisfied under Clause 46(5) that its proposals are likely to be supported by a substantial proportion of

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employees in any case. I do not think that this situation is on all fours with that of the agency shop or the closed shop. The issues involved are quite different. To mark that difference we have a different requirement concerning the majority necessary to carry the ballot, if that is the right expression, in the two different sets of cases. I hope that that is intelligible, even if it is not acceptable.
LORD DIAMOND: It is quite intelligible and quite unacceptable.
LORD DRUMALBYN: Well, that is something. The other point is of course equally unacceptable to the noble Lord. We think that once this decision has been made and an employer has been compelled to recognise a union or a joint negotiating panel and where he remains compelled to do so, then if during the period of the order the trade union ceases to be a trade union, and is removed from the register, and operates simply as an organisation of workers, then the basis upon which it has received recognition is removed. That being so, it is only
natural that the compulsory order should cease to have effect. I think this is a quite clear case.
LORD DIAMOND: I do not want to take up the time of your Lordships any more. We do not accept that there is this great distinction with regard to the loss of individual rights and liberties such as would justify an entirely different method of determining whether the ballot has been carried. We hope the Government will be good enough to bear that in mind in the reconsideration they have undertaken to give in respect of the phrase " eligible to vote ", which we have already dealt with. On the second case, the noble Lord is quite right in saying that we strongly dissent from the view and the philosophy embodied in this clause; and therefore I can only invite the Committee to support our views in the Division Lobby.
11.11 p.m.
On Question, Whether Clause 48, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?
Their Lordships Divided: Contents, 82; Not-Contents, 19.

CONTENTS

Aberdare, L.

Essex, E.

Platt, L.

Ailwyn, L.

Ferrers, E.

Rankeillour, L.

Allerton, L.

Ferrier, L.

Redesdale, L.

Amherst, E.

Fisher, L.

Rochdale, V.

Amherst of Hackney, L.

Fortescue, E.

St. Aldwyn, E.

Amory, V.

Gage, V.

St. Helens, L.

Balfour, E.

Gowrie, E. [Teller.]

St. Just, L.

Barrington, V.

Gray, L.

St. Oswald, L.

Beaumont of Whitley, L.

Gridley, L.

Sandford, L.

Belstead, L.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

Sandys, L.

Berkeley, Bs.

Hailes, L.

Savile, L.

Bessborough, E.

Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Selkirk, E.

Brook of Cumnor, L.

Selsdon, L.

Brougham and Vaux, L.

Hankey, L.

Sempill, Ly.

Buchan, E.

Harvey of Tasburgh, L.

Sherfield. L.

Burnham, L.

Hood, V.

Somers, L.

Burton, L.

Inglewood, L.

Strange. L.

Carrington, L.

Jellicoe, E. (L. Privy Seal.)

Swaythling, L.

Clifford of Chudleigh, L.

Kemsley, V.

Terrington. L.

Conesford, L.

Killearn. L.

Thorneycroft, L.

Cottesloe, L.

Kinnoull. E.

Thurso, V.

Cowley, E.

Lansdowne, M.

Tweed smuir, L.

Cullen of Ashbourne, L.

Lothian, M.

Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, Bs.

Davidson, V.

Lyell, L.

Vivian. L.

Denham, L. [Teller.]

Mowbray and Stourton, L.

Westminster, D.

Drumalbyn, L.

Napier and Ettrick, L.

Windlesham, L.

Elliot of Harwood. Bs.

O'Neill of the Maine, L.

Yarborough, E.

Emmet of Amberley, Bs.

Pender, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Beswick, L.

Gardiner, L.

Serota, Bs, [Teller.]

Bowden, L.

Hilton of Upton, L. [Teller.]

Shackleton. L.

Champion, L.

Lee of Asheridge, Bs.

Shepherd, L.

Cooper of Stockton Heath, L.

Mais, L.

Wells-Pestell, L.

Davies of Leek, L.

Milners of Leeds, L.

White, Bs.

Delacourt-Smith, L.

Ritchie-Calder, L.

Wynne-Jones, L.

Diamond, L.

Resolved in the affirmative, and Clause 48, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 49 [Application to Industrial Court with a view to withdrawal of recognition.]:
11.19 p.m.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE moved Amendment No. 252BB:
Page 39, line 33, leave out (" a trade union ") and insert (" an organisation of workers ").
The noble Baroness said: If it is convenient to the Committee, perhaps we can take with this Amendment the Amendments Nos. 252CC and 252 DD. The purpose of these Amendments is to enable the provisions for withdrawal of recognition in Clauses 49 to 51 to apply to an organisation of workers not registered under the Bill, as well as to a registered trade union. The first reason for doing this is that if recognition is to be withdrawn it surely is only fair that it should be able to be done from an unregistered organisation as well as from a registered organisation. The second reason is that the Amendments would enable the negotiating rights of an employer-dominated house union to be challenged. I beg to move.
LORD CHAMPION: I was getting up because, of course, one can only move one Amendment at a time the others have to be moved separately except in those cases where there has been an arrangement made that a certain number of Amendments shall be moved en bloc, I merely say that to explain why I was getting up before the noble Lord the Deputy Chairman had finished his remarks.
On this Amendment immediately before us—and, of course, we can discuss the others at the same time—I am in some little difficulty, because the noble Baroness said they wanted to apply exactly the same thing to an organisation of workers as to a trade union. Is it the case that for this purpose and it seems to be the only place where there can be withdrawal of sole bargaining rights—an organisation of workers embraces a trade union? Are they both embraced in this particular part which is now to be amended? What causes me to put this point is that in Clause 47, for example, it is made quite clear:
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" No application under this section shall be made—
(a) by an organisation of workers, unless at the time of the application it is a trade union …."
In this clause, which is a withdrawal of the recognition of sole bargaining agent, " trade union " is to be struck out and " organisation of workers " put in in its stead. I am not being carping about this, but it does seem to me a little queer that we should be changing the words and making it appear that the words " organisation of workers " in this instance are words that embody within them " trade union" for this purpose. I shall be grateful if the noble Baroness Mill explain before we leave this Amendment.
THE LORD CHANCELLCR: I think the noble Lord will find the answer to his question in Clause 59. Tie situation is that all trade unions are organisations of workers, but not all organisations of workers are trade unions. This is set out in Clause 59(1) and (3). I hope that answers the noble Lord's question. Clause 59(1) deals with " organsation of workers " and 59(3) deals with " trade union ", and the posititon is that the relationship between the two phrases is that of genus to species.
LORD CHAMPION: That is at the beginning of Part IV. I must admit I have not been in charge of that yet. I rather fear I might have so nothing to do with it before the end. I lad missed that point. Of course the Amendment is completely acceptable.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: I beg to move Amendment No. 252CC.
Amendment moved—
Page 39, line 41, leave out (" trade union ") and insert (" organisation of workers ").(Baroness Tweedsinuir of Belhelvie.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CHAMPION LORD CHAMPION moved Amendment No. 252L:
Page 40, line 3, leave out subsection (2).
The noble Lord said: I wonder whether we might discuss with this Amendment No. 252M; the second one relates to something which is contained in this subsection. This subsection raises the whole

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question of the dangers to orderly industrial relations in bargaining procedures, for it seems to me deliberately to invite disruption by a tiny minority. Under the preceding clauses a great deal is made of the safeguards that have to be satisfied before an order for the recognition of a sole bargaining agent is made. A ballot may be held and a majority of employees may decide the issue. Also in the preceding clauses there are embodied many precautions to try to ensure that no one, including the court or the commission, takes precipitate action or takes action on an application before the Court or the Commission that has not had full consideration by all possible parties, including the Commission and even the Court itself. Despite all these precautions, we get in Clause 49 a situation created in which a single employee may set in motion the procedure to secure a withdrawal of the recognition of a sole bargaining agent.
The Government have, throughout consideration of the Consultative Document and their every approach to the laying of this Bill, stressed the country's need of strong trade unions capable of negotiating on behalf of their members and of controlling their militants and C.P. elements. Yet in this clause the Government are positively inviting disruption by a comparatively small group of dissidents, inviting them to upset what has resulted from many months of patient negotiation by the Commission with the union or unions associated in the panel. We know what can happen in this sort of instance. Somebody with a glib tongue comes forward, the sort who could settle any dispute—if only, only, only. I have met them. I know them. They are always ready with telling phrases—" That lot is letting you down," " Look what is happening in that factory down the road." Then the approach and the application under this clause, followed by the agitation and organisation designed to get the one-fifth of the workers to support an application under the terms of this clause.
The point here is that under subsection (2), if the Commission makes a report
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under the terms of Clause 47 and a ballot is held, if the ballot favours the recommendation of the Commission, then under Clause 48 the Court will make the necessary order, but there will be a period of two months under Clause 48(1) before the order becomes operative. That means that during that period one-fifth of the employees could upset something agreed previously by a majority of the workers employed in that unit. We say by our Amendment that it ought to be at least two-fifths—that is all I am saying in the second Amendment—and I am in some doubt as to whether we have put that figure high enough, having regard to everything that has gone before in the making of this order that there shall be a sole bargaining agent. We shall listen with great care to what the noble Lord has to say about this subsection and the figure of one-fifth and see whether we shall divide on the Amendment, but I find the subsection a little difficult in the context of everything the Government have been talking about—namely, trying to secure strong trade unions and preventing little groups of militants from upsetting reasonable negotiating procedures. I beg to move.
LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY: May I be allowed to say, if I am not totally out of order, that I think that the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, allowed himself to be easily put down by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor on the last Amendment. He knew perfectly well what was in Clause 59(3) and before we come to discussing whether the clause shall stand part, perhaps he may look again. I thought that he asked a very pertinent question, to which he did not get a totally pertinent answer. But to move on to these two Amendments that we have been asked to discuss, I am baffled because they appear to me to be totally in opposite directions. I can see the point of No. 252M, which changes one-fifth to two-fifths, but No. 252L, which is to " leave out subsection (2) " would have the effect that there would not have to be any minimum amount for the Industrial Court to entertain an application. If this subsection were taken out, it could entertain an application if one person applied.
We on these Benches would certainly oppose No. 252M, because although we take the view that it is important that

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we should not encourage the fragmentation of unions, we also take the view—and I notice that I beat the noble Lord, Lord Platt, by a very short head to this speech—that minorities need considerable protection in this Bill. There are a great many minorities in bargaining positions who will not even make one-fifth, and two-fifths is a very large number indeed. Therefore we would oppose Amendment No. 252M. For the same reason, I think we are in favour of No. 252L, but I cannot believe that the noble Lord, Lord Champion, really means to press this Amendment. If he does he will have our support, but I suspect for the wrong reasons.
LORD PLATT: I think the noble Lord, Lord Champion, has not made it easier for us by putting these two Amendments together, which, as the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, has said, really work in rather opposite directions. But I want to call attention to one point. At the end of subsection (1) we have the position that the claimant may be making out that the union or bargaining unit does not adequately represent a particular section of it. In other words, the noble Lord, Lord Champion, is thinking of a few militants trying to upset the apple cart, and I would go a long way with him in saying that that is an undesirable state of affairs. On the other hand, it may be that the particular section of it to which the applicant belongs is in fact a very important minority, and in that case it seems to me reasonable that that particular section should be able to try to upset the arrangement that has been made.
In that case, when we come to line 8 on page 40. where it refers to " one-fifth of the employees ", whether or not we agree that it should be two-fifths I would personally agree that it should be one-fifth in the bargaining unit. It should surely read, " the bargaining unit or with a particular section of it ", if in fact the first part of the clause is still going to make sense. I would like that clarified.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: I have some sympathy with the noble Lord. Lord Beaumont, who found it perhaps a little confusing that the noble Lord, Lord Champion, wished us to take Amendment No. 252L together with No. 252M, because they do rather different things. It seems to me that if by the first Amendment one left
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out subsection (2) a rather peculiar situation would result, because under subsection (2) there is a situation where there is no Clause 48 order in force and an application is made under this clause by an employee in the bargaining unit. If this subsection were left out it seems to me that just one employee would be able to make the challenge to tilt particular bargaining agent; and I am sure that is not what the noble Lord had in mind.
The noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, said he would oppose Amendment 252M, which seeks to raise the requirement from one-fifth to two-fifths, and I got the impression that the noble Lord, Lord Platt, would also prefer the qualification of one-fifth because particularly it affects minorities. While we certainly want to have stable bargaining positions, nevertheless I would suggest that we should try to get a balance whereby a minority is able to challenge a sole bargaining agent if they can, in these circumstances where there is a voluntary agreement, get one-fifth of those concerned which is quite a large proportion. Therefore I would suggest that the Committee should not accept Amendment 252L for the reasons that I have given; and if we are going to discuss—though it will not be moved at this moment—Amendment 252M, it would have been in the interests of minorities, and would have struck a fair balance, had we left the provision of one-fifth as it is in the Bill.
LORD CHAMPION: The purpose of moving this Amendment was to some extent exploratory, to find out what the Government had to say about this. Despite the fact that the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, would support us if we went into the Division Lobbies on this, and despite the fact that he has offered such generous help to us—and I may say we are glad to see him at this late hour, and to hear his voice on this occasion—I am bound to say that I hope to consider between now and Report what has been said, and we might return to this very point on Report. But I am certainly grateful to the noble Baroness for what she has said. I beg to move.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: I beg to move Amendment No. 252DD.
Amendment moved—
Page 40, line 6 leave out (" trade union ") and insert (" organisation of workers ").—(Baroness Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CHAMPION LORD CHAMPION moved Amendment No. 252M:
Page 40, line 8, leave out (" one-fifth ") and insert (" two-fifths ").
The noble Lord said: I do think there is a lot in this Amendment. Despite the words of the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, I think that two-fifths, rather than one-fifth, ought to be the figure, because one-fifth might create a disturbing element that surely ought not to be brought into this. It would be comparatively easy for a dissident group, or a small group who were trying to break away from a union or trying to upset everything a union has been trying to do, to secure the support of one-fifth of the employees to bring about a situation of the kind that subsection (2) provides for. I am bound to say that one-fifth is a very small number in the kind of arrangement that is being set up under this Bill.
I do not know if the noble Baroness has any more to say on this. She has to some extent covered it, but I must at least invite her to say a few words before deciding whether or not to vote on it. I am rather keen on this.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: I had some personal sympathy with this Amendment when I first saw it on the Marshalled List, and I took some trouble to try and explain to myself why the Bill should say one-fifth and not two-fifths, or some other figure. But I think that under this provision, where this is a voluntary agreement and not concerned with a Statutory Order—because this comes later, and I see there is another Amendment to it—on reflection perhaps one-fifth is fair.
It is a question of judgment. I think we must try and get the right balance between getting the stable bargaining arrangements, which I think we all wish to achieve, and on the other hand also make it possible for minorities to be able to challenge a bargaining agent on their behalf. This was said earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Platt. I think it is for that reason that, after having given it a lot of consideration myself—because
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I think it is a question of judgment—I would recommend the Committee to leave it as the Bill stands.
LORD PLATT: In that case, would the noble Baroness clarify my point: is it one-fifth of the whole of the employees in the bargaining unit, or one-fifth of the particular section who had made the application?
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: It is one-fifth of all the employees concerned.
LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY: In spite of the kind but cutting words of the noble Lord, Lord Champion,—who, I may say, has sitting on the Front Bench the majority of his colleagues who go into the Division Lobby—he presumably can appeal to a very great deal of back-up power for this Bill, in the way of the research which has enabled them to table the number of Amendments that they have tabled. I have been here earlier in the evening, and I will be here later in the evening. This question of minorities is a very tricky one, and I do not think the Government have really faced up to it yet. The point which the noble Lord, Lord Champion, made, and the point which the Opposition Front Bench is making about the fragmentation of unions, is a very real and proper one.
The point which is being made by the noble Lord, Lord Platt, and other people who know the problems of minorities, is also a very real and proper point. If you have a largely homogenous work force, of course, one-fifth is not a very great many, and two-fifths might well be the right number to have. But where you have a totally unhomogenous work force, with minorities of very different kinds, one-fifth could easily be too many in itself. All I am saying at this stage is that, in spite of the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, who has I think gone to considerable pains to try and face up to this problem, the Government have not yet met it. They have merely said: " One side has got a point and the other side has got a point, and if we go through the middle and find a compromise, that ought to be all right."
Well, it is not all right. We are laying down industrial law now for a considerable period of time. The Opposition Front Bench may not agree on that, but I believe this is absolutely so, and we

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ought to get this right. When I say " we " I mean the Government. The Government ought to be able to find some way of drafting this Bill so that it is possible on the one hand to guard against the fragmentations of unions, which would be a very bad thing, and on the other hand to give a totally proper and satisfactory safeguard to minorities, who may find themselves in difficult positions. I cannot support the noble Lord, Lord Champion, in the Lobby on this particular Amendment, but I do hope that, between now and Report stage, the Government really will look at this very major problem, which they have not yet basically faced up to.
LORD PLATT: Since we so often go on to other clauses, may I call attention to the very next clause, Clause 50, in which it is quite clear that the Commission has to consider whether the ballot should extend to all employees or be limited to a particular section of the bargaining unit? Therefore, I should have thought that the words in Clause 49 meant one-fifth of the particular section and not one-fifth of the total bargaining force.
LORD CHAMPION: I am, of course, in complete agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, that we have to try to get this matter right. I agree with
him that one cannot always guarantee that there will be a change of Government at the next Election. Of course it is a probability, judging by recent local government results, but things can change in a wry short time, and the electorate tend to be a little bit fickle. It seemed to me that the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, wanted to have it both ways; you cannot In a Bill of this sort you cannot fix it so that in one type of organisation you have two-fifths, three-fifths or four-fifths, and in another type of organisation only one-fifth. The Government here have to try to legislate to cover the broad spectrum of the trade unions, industrial negotiations, and the sort of thing they are trying to set up. The noble Baroness said that she had to try to explain this to herself. She must have had a good and charming audience. When I try to explain something to myself, I think have a sensible audience. In this connection I think that my good sense causes me to ask the Committee to go into the Division Lobby in support of two-fifths as against one-fifth.
11.47 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 252M) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 18; Not-Contents, 79.

CONTENTS

Beswick, L.

Hilton of Upton, L. [Teller.]

Serota, Bs.

Champion, L.

Hughes, L.

Shackleton, L.

Cooper of Stockton Heath, L.

Lee of Asheridge, Bs.

Shepherd, L.

Davies of Leek, L.

Miiners of Leeds, L.

Wells-Pestell, L.

Diamond, L.

Phillips, Bs. [Teller.]

White, Bs.

Gardiner, L.

Ritchie-Calder, L.

Wynne-Jones, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Aberdare, L.

Cottesloe, L.

Harvey of Tasburjh, L.

Allerton, L.

Cowley, E.

Hood, V.

Amherst. E.

Cullen of Ashbourne, L.

Inglewood, L.

Amherst of Hackney, L.

Davidson, V.

Jellicoe, E. (Lord Privy Seal.)

Amory, V.

Denham, L. [Teller.]

Kemsley, V.

Balfour, E.

Drumalbyn, L.

Killearn, L.

Barrington, V.

Elliot of Harwood, Bs.

Kinnoull, E.

Beaumont of Whitley, L.

Essex, E.

Lansdowne, M.

Belstead, L.

Ferrers, E.

Lothian, M.

Bessborough, E.

Ferrier, L.

Lyell, L.

Brecon, L.

Fisher, L.

Mancroft, L.

Brooke of Cumnor, L.

Gage, V.

Mowbray and Stourton, L.

Brougham and Vaux, L.

Gowrie, E.

Napier and Ettrick, L. [Teller.]

Buchan, E.

Gray, L.

O'Neill of the Maine, L.

Burnham, L.

Gridley, L.

Pender, L.

Burton, L.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

Platt, L.

Carrington, L.

Hailes, L.

Rankeillour, L.

Chelmer, L.

Hailsham of St. Marvlebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Redesdale, L.

Colville of Culross, V.

Rochdale, V.

Conesford, L.

Hankey, L.

St. Aldwyn, E.

St. Helens, L.

Selsdon, L.

Tweedsmuir, L.

St. Just, L.

Sempill, Ly.

Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, Bs.

St. Oswald, L.

Somers, L.

Vivian, L.

Sandford, L.

Strang, L.

Westminster, D.

Sandys, L.

Terrington, L.

Windlesham, L.

Savile, L.

Thorn eycroft, L.

Yarborough, E.

Selkirk, E.

Thurso, V.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

11.54 p.m.
LORD CHAMPION LORD CHAMPION moved Amendment No. 252P:
Page 40, line 16, leave out (" two ") and insert (" three").
The noble Lord said: Much of what I said on Amendments Nos. 252L and 252M applies with even greater force to this Amendment. I said on the earlier Amendments that I feared that the majority that was required was so low that it would be easy for dissident groups to upset the sole bargaining agent procedure. In this connection we are dealing with two years, and they are two years in which there will inevitably be time to work up steam on the inability of the sole bargaining agent to satisfy everybody employed in the unit. Two years is all too short a period really to test out the value of a decision which has caused a definite order to be made under Clause 49. Three years, even, might be too short a period, as those of us who have had experience of bargaining procedures and have been parties to collective bargaining will know, to test out thoroughly such procedures and the results which might flow from them. It is too short a period, I think. But it could very well be extended to three years; and I believe we ought not to include in this Bill too much to make it too easy to upset the procedures which we are now agreeing to in all the clauses which have now gone through the Committee. I beg to move.
LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY: The noble Lord, Lord Champion, accused me of trying to have it both ways on the last Amendment, but he was slightly unfair about that, because I think it is the Government's job to make certain that in this Bill all parties are taken care of. I think that one of the ways to do that is probably to give more discretion to the Industrial Commission and to write smaller proportions into the Bill. It could be done in that way. But if the noble Lord accused me of trying to have it both
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ways on that Amendment, I certainly could accuse him of having it both ways on this one, because the Opposition Front Bench has been arguing that two years is far too long on applications going the other way.
It seems to me that we ought to have one rule for both sides. That is why I think the Opposition Front Bench and the Liberal Benches are in agreement on the question of eligibility to vote on agency shops, because we say that, whatever the rules are, they should be the same both ways. It seems to me that on applications, and the gap between applications, one way or the other, one may say that two years, which is the time which the Government have put forward all the way through as a gap for different kinds of applications, is too big, or one may say it is too small; but I do not think one is really entitled to say that it is too large in the set of circumstances where it is felt that it is to the detriment of the closed shop, or the agency shop, and that it is too short when it comes to the question of breaking up such a situation—a bargaining agency, or whatever it may happen to be. It seems to me that two years all the way through is a perfectly good figure. But whatever is decided, I am quite certain it should be the same all the way through the Bill. What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, and this really is not an Amendment which we should support.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: I think the brief interventions by the two noble Lords have shown clearly that the Bill is right, because the noble Lord, Lord Champion, felt that the period should be longer—three years instead of two—and the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley. was I think right to point out to the Committee that it is really a question of getting the right balance, and that if possible the provisions should be fairly balanced right through the Bill. It is as it was on the previous Amendment, a question of judgment, but I would say to the Committee that to increase the period from two to three years, as is suggested in the

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noble Lord's Amendment, is really too long, and I would commend to the Committee that we keep the Bill as it is.
LORD CHAMPION: I am sure that the Government Front Bench must be rather satisfied with the position in which the Liberal Party and the main Opposition are at variance, and they can sit back and decide to come in between us and strike a balance between the two points of view. I do not regard this as the type of Amendment on which we ought to divide, and I therefore beg leave to withdraw it.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 49, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 50 [Action in pursuance of application under s. 49]:
On Question, Whether Clause 50 shall stand part of the Bill?
12.2 a.m.
LORD CHAMPION: We do not like this clause, and might have to vote against it. We oppose it for what is now the familiar reason that it involves the Court in the process of recognition and de-recognition, and also because it involves the Court in ordering a ballot to be taken, instead of having the matter considered by the Commission on the merits of the application. As the clause stands, it puts a premium on encouraging non-unionism and encouraging a multiplicity of unions. In subsection (6) a ballot can be limited to whether a trade union should cease to be the sole bargaining agent for a section of the bargaining unit. It contemplates one trade union, or a professional body, approaching the members of another trade union. We believe that this will not make for the best interests of the sole bargaining agent procedure, for the setting up of such a sole bargaining agent, or for ensuring that it works for a period. Therefore, we are opposed to this clause.
BARONESS TWE EDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: I can understand why the noble Lord, Lord Champion, does not support the clause as a whole. I am sure he must be aware now, from the long debates in another place and in this we feel that it is only just that we should Committee, that the Government are well aware of the importance of stable bargaining arrangements. At the same time not have fixed arrangements for all time. It is for this reason that certain provisions
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have been put in in Clauses 49 and 51 which make it possible to alter the particular bargaining agent, if necessary, and to do so under these procedures. It is not that we wish to encourage what the noble Lord would call " splinter unions "; we wish to have a stable situation certainly but we do not think it fair to say that a bargaining arrangement must be right for all time.
Clause 50 agreed to.
Clause 51 [Order of Industrial Court on report under s. 50]:
LORD BELSTEAD: I beg to move Amendment No. 252EE.
Amendment moved—
Page 41, line 29, at end insert (" of employers ").—(Lord Belstead.)
12.4 a.m.
LORD CHAMPION LORD CHAMPION moved Amendment No. 252S.
Page 41, line 33, leave out paragiaph (b).
The noble Lord said: With the permission of the Committee, and the acquiescence of the Government Front Bench I thought we might discuss Amendments Nos. 252S, 252T and 252U together. I should have thought it was quite unnecessary to tie everyone's hands to a period of two years here. Circumstances may change quite soon after the result of a ballot becomes known, and the court makes the appropriate order. In this connection—
LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY: Are we talking about 252U.A?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: In my copy the " A " has been deleted. I think we are talking about 252U, "A " deleted.
LORD CHAMPION: I am talking about " A " deleted. I think it is the same thing: page 42, line 24, leave out subsection (5). This I am including in those Amendments which I asked permission to discuss together. I must ask the question on subsection (2): What steps will be taken to ensure that a ballot is conducted in such a way as to ensure that the vote is not restricted in any way? Clearly a majority here is the important thing. I imagine that the Government have thought out this point carefully, and that the Commission will be expected to conduct the ballot in such a way that all

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employees will have the opportunity of participating in it. This is something that was raised and discussed briefly on a previous Amendment, but I think it ought to be brought out here. I am hoping that whoever replies for the Government will satisfy me that there will never be any possibility of a ballot, or of the people participating in a ballot, being restricted in such a way as to cause the ballot to go one way or another.
I cannot see any reason why, for a period of two years, no recognition of the party which was the sole bargaining agent shall be granted, no matter how much the position has changed. It is true that no group of employers, or a single employer, want to be under the instruction of the Court as to the sole bargaining agent, one day and then, as a result of the ballot, to be told that the order has been cancelled and within a very short period to go through the process all over again. I must admit that I am not too sure about this. I am anxious to hear what the Government have to say in favour of the retention of these paragraphs. The clause is important. The paragraphs I am talking about may or may not be important, but I want to hear what the Government have to say about them. I beg to move.
LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY: I am filled with admiration at the way in which Lord Champion has skated over what must be the main object of these Amendments. He is trying to have it both ways. Obviously, the main object of this Amendment is to do away with the two-year period, which he was trying to extend to three years in a different situation. Now he is trying to do away with it altogether. I think that there is a real point here, which was also raised when we talked about one-fifth and two-fifths.
It seems to me that at this stage we are trying to legislate in far too much detail for the cases that are likely to come up. If we have an Industrial Court and a Commission which are going to be the serious and high-powered bodies that everyone accepts they are to be, we are trying to tie them down too much. I think they should have more powers and more discretion about the proportion of the employees concerned in applications. I think also that they should have more
396
discretion about time—not about the basic two years, which I agree is all right; but this business about how a section of the employees who are involved in an application may not then be involved in another application. You may have situations where two or three different classes of employees try to get a sole bargaining agent position, and it does not appear to work out, but it becomes obvious in the course of time that a slightly different combination of the various forms of workers in a rather loose industrial situation might have a better chance of succeeding. It seems a pity that it is tied down as much as it is, is as complicated as it is. I feel that there should be more discretion left to the Industrial Commission on questions such as this.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: The effect of these Amendments, as I am sure the Committee is well aware, would be to remove the requirement that the employer must not recognise a union from whom recognition has been withdrawn after a ballot under Clause 50, for a period of two years. I should have thought that the two-year prohibition on recognition is necessary to allow the situation in the bargaining unit to settle down. I am sure that this is important. The first Amendment deals with ballots, which extends to the whole bargaining unit, and the second with ballots which extend only to a section of a bargaining unit. The provisions have been very carefully thought out, and I would suggest to the Committee that withdrawal of recognition can happen only if a substantial proportion of employees is dissatisfied with the bargaining agent. Also withdrawal can only take effect after the C.I.R. has tried to settle the matter on a voluntary basis and where those efforts have failed after a majority vote by secret ballot. If recognition is withdrawn from a union after all these processes have been gone through, I suggest that it should indicate some real dissatisfaction.
If these Amendments were accepted, and the related Amendment which the noble Lord said that he wished to discuss. No. 252UA, a dispossessed union would be able to make a fresh application for recognition under Clause 43 at any time after the employees on whose behalf it had been negotiating had said that they

397
were dissatisfied with its performance, and for this reason I would advise the Committee not to accept the Amendment.
LORD CHAMPION: I am grateful to the noble Baroness for that explanation. I think she is on a good point in connection with it, and if I am permitted by the Front Bench to withdraw it, I shall be happy to ask leave to do so.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I beg to move Amendment No. 252FF formally.
Amendment moved—
Page 42, line 3, at end insert (" or employers ").—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE moved Amendment No, 2520G.
Page 42, line 26, at end insert—
(" () the application is made by the organisation of workers in respect of which the order was made, or, where the order was made in respect is a joint negotiating panel, the application s made by an organisation of workers represented on that panel.").
The noble Baroness said: The effect of this Amendment is to relax the existing ban in Clause 51(5) on Clause 43 applications so that it applies only to an organisation of workers from which recognition has been withdrawn in accordance with a Clause 50 order. I beg to move.
Clause 51, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 52 [Unfair industrial practices relating to pending questions as to recognition of sole bargaining agent]:
On Question, Whether Clause 52 shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD CHAMPION: I have nothing particular to say against this clause because, frankly, I do not understand it. I do not know who has tried to read the clause and to understand it. I can well imagine that some of your Lordships have done so. This is one of the clauses under the label "Supplementary ". My dictionary tells me that " supplementary" means adding something that was lacking. I hope that in the course of discussion someone will add something supple-
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mentary to my understanding of this clause, because I must admit that there is something lacking in my understanding of it. It occupies 55 lines of the Bill, and in subsection (1) there are references back to subsection (4) of Clause 43 and to Clause 45 in paragraph (c). We learn that:
" A question to which this section applies, and which falls within paragraph (e) but neither within paragraph (b) nor within Paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of this section, shall for the purposes of this section be taken to be pending at any time … "
and:
" At any time when a question to which this section applies is pending in accordance with subsection (2) or subsection (3) of this section it shall be an unfair industrial practice— …"
et cetera.
I have read the clause a few times and I vaguely feel that here we have another reference to the phrase so obviously loved 'by the Government, that if this, that or the other is ever done or not done, somebody will be " done " lot an unfair industrial practice. I honestly believe that I have sorted the thing out in that last effort. I should be grateful if some noble Lord opposite can now tell me in simple terms what the convolutions, the twists and turns, the reference; to things that have gone into the Bill and been passed and so on are all about.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I will try to make it clear. What this clause sets out to do is to make it an unfair industrial practice to take industrial action while a question is pending. This, seems a sensible thing to do. A quest on can be pending from the time when a notice is given to the Secretary of State of an intention to make an application. That is the first stage. The second stage is when the application has been made to the N.I.R.C. to refer questions to the C.I.R. The third stage is when the C.I.R. is investigating the issue. I think that while any of these matters is before the Secretary of State for conciliation, or before the Court for decision, or an application, is being studied by the Commission, it is reasonable that influence should not be brought to bear by way of a strike or lock-out or other industrial action. It would be an unfair industrial practice to bring such influence to bear.

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This is the purpose of the clause. I hope I have explained it briefly and clearly to the noble Lord, Lord Champion. It would be possible to go into each convolution as he calls them, but I hope that explanation satisfies him.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: I do not think it is quite so easy as that. We have had a very busy night and some of us feel as fresh as daisies. We have had a very easy night and have gone through things easily and there is quite a lot of pleasure on the Benches opposite. That is as it should be, because we do not want too much asperity at this time of the morning. Nevertheless, this is quite a new concept, introduced for the first time in the history of trade unionism. It now gives us a wide variety of clauses of this Bill which can be related to " unfair industrial actions". So far as I can understand the matter at this early hour of the morning, it would be an unfair industrial action, as the Minister has just said, if an action were taken while discussions were pending about all sorts of (and I use the word used by my noble friend) convolutions—which is a beautiful word.
The courts would come in—this is the trouble. How clear are these definitions? This is serious. Am I not right (I ask this question interrogatively and not didactically) in saying that these courts could award damages or make orders—we have heard a lot about this during the two or three weeks we have been working on this Bill—and the remedies could apply against anyone who put pressure on an employer, or even on an employee. Could hearsay be used in this case? It is no good laughing at this, because at certain times when a nation feels in danger or when there is an isolated feeling because a great industry is at a standstill, or there is a lock-out or a strike, gossip in the village pub, or on the local Rugby field or elsewhere, can be repeated. Can things like that be used as evidence? Are we quite sure that the snooping element is not going to be used against this great trade union movement?
Finally, in regard to vague phrases, I use this axiom that should be understood in semantics: never let an abstract noun be the agent of a verb. This Bill is full of abstract nouns. One of them has
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been (although we have forgotten it; it was many clauses back), " to his best endeavours ". That was a vague phrase we dealt with somewhere in the middle of a morning a day or two ago. There are all kinds of vague phrases which a young barrister and others could use to absolutely blind with semantic and legal science a shop steward or leaders of the trade union movement. I think noble Lords on the Front Bench have been going far too easily. I am glad I came into the Chamber at this early hour. We have been going too easily in accepting these provisions " on the nod ", with very difficult explanations of legal phrases. I can see that to-night the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor is in a cheerful mood. God forbid that I should make him irascible! But I would beg of him now to try to make the position a little more clear than it was a moment or two before I spoke.
12.24 a.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I would say only one word. I do not understand what the noble Lord has been saying about the danger of snooping. This is not a question of snooping; this is industrial action. There is no question of snooping about that. It will be for all to see.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: I come back on the question of " an unfair practice ". Who decides what an unfair practice is? Can anybody report that an unfair practice has been done? If I am a member of the steel industry or work in a pit, and am a local scrum half for the Rugby club playing for my industry in South Wales (it was a game I enjoyed in my youth), I may talk about these things in the local club after a match. I might report on A, B or C because he has committed what I consider to be unfair practices. Is silly gossip of that kind going to be taken into consideration when we are trying to arrive at a decision in a very difficult situation about unfair practices? I think it is a fair question. When the noble Lord says he does not understand it, the truth is that nobody understands what this phraseology is in crystal clear English.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I will give a short answer to the noble Lord. The answer is, No.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: That at least is clear.
Clause 52 agreed to.
Clause 53 [Unfair industrial practices in connection with collective bargaining procedures]:
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: Amendment No. 253 is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 45, line 4, leave out ("relates") and insert ("related ")—(Baroness Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie.)
LORD CHAMPION LORD CHAMPION moved Amendment No. 253A:
Page 45, line 26, after ("lock-out") insert ("either individually or in association with other employers").
The noble Lord said: This Amendment is merely intended to add the plural to the threats contained in the subsection. It could be considered as drafting, and I am going to move it briefly, despite the fact that I might get into trouble with my noble friend Lord Davies of Leek, who is not a little bit satisfied with his Front Bench. I am sorry about that. First of all I got into trouble with the Liberal Party, and now with my own Back Bench. I must try not to do this. My idea is to keep these things sweet and smooth in every Committee that I participate in. I beg to move.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: I should not like the noble Lord, Lord Champion, to be in trouble with anybody in this Committee, and I might say to him that the easiest way to avoid that would be not to press this Amendment. It is unnecessary, because if the noble Lord looks at the definition clause, Clause 158, at page 116, he will see that " lock-out " is defined, and it covers action by one or more employees. Therefore, I suggest the noble Lord would keep happy by not pressing the Amendment.
LORD CHAMPION: The definition clause, Clause 158, will be the death of me. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
On Question, Whether Clause 53 shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD CHAMPION: This clause I find comparatively clear and understandable in comparison with the preceding one. Once again I find in this clause that where penalties might be inflicted the
402
organisation of workers is ranged alongside a trade union. This is in contrast, for example, to Clause 43(2), under which only a trade union is permitted to make an application to the Court for recognition as a sole bargaining agent. Once again it seems to me that the attempt is being made to apply pressure on the organisation of workers to apply to the registrar for registration as a trade union. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Donovan, told us on Second Reading that there are some 170 references in the Bill to an " unfair industrial practice ". When I get time I must try to count the number of instances in the Bill of the attempts by the Government to apply pressure on organisations of workers—trade unions, properly so called, I would say—by such means as are included in this clause: because this clause contains the sort of references that we first met in Clause 34. I am bound to say that I am very much against this clause, and unless I get a satisfactory answer to these briefly put points, I shall have to ask the Committee to divide against it.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: I hope that I shall be able to satisfy the noble Lord, Lord Champion. The idea behind this Clause 53 is our belief that, where the N.I.R.C. has made an order concerning bargaining structure, that order must be enforceable, and that the bargaining structure established as a result of the C.I.R.'s investigation should be protected from disruption by a third party; that is why this clause describes as unfair industrial practice actions which would contravene those principles. I do not expect that at this time of night the Committee would wish me to go into every subsection of this clause, but this is the general thinking behind it, and I would suggest to the Committee that it is fair in its concept.
Clause 53, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 54 [General duty of employers to disclose information]:
12.32 a.m.
LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY moved Amendment No. 254B:
Page 45, line 29, after (" of ") insert ("consultation and").
The noble Lord said: When one of your Lordships starts proposing an Amendment with the idea that it will be

403
acceptable in all parts of your Lordships' House he is usually trying to " pull a fast one ". In this case I really am not. I am delighted to see the noble Lord, Lord Champion, has put his name to it, which is consummating the rapprochement between the Labour and Liberal Benches. I hope the Government Front Bench will accept this Amendment, because it seems to me it is very much a part of their thinking, one of the points where we all come together; because we have on occasion all come together, and this was true during the Second Reading debate, which is now difficult to remember.
I think one of the things we were concerned about in all parts of the House was that there should be consultation and partnership between both sides of industry, and the giving of more information from the employers' side to the employees was regarded as a very great step forward. This clause, as at present drafted, says that:
" For the purposes of collective bargaining between an employer and trade union representative, it shall … be the duty of the employer to disclose … "
Our Amendment would say " for the purposes of consultation and collective bargaining ". I do not know whether this is perfectly drafted, but the object of it, it seems to me, is perfectly clear: that it is not just when collective bargaining comes up on a particular issue that the employers have a duty to give information about what is happening in the firm. It is a continuing process, and if it is not a continuing process it will not be an effective process; it will not be an effective process even at the stage of collective bargaining. What we want to see is a continuing flow of partnership, consultation, information between the two sides of industry. It may be said that this can all be written into the code of practice, and I have no doubt it could. But it seems to me it is worth while writing it into the Bill; if you are saying it for the purposes of collective bargaining, I think it is worth seeing that for other purposes it is written into the law of the land that it shall be the duty of employers to disclose information to their employees. I beg to move.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: I think I would like to support this Amendment. I
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agree with what has been said. Much of the weight of the discussion that has been going on for days seems to be based on the impression that, generally speaking all that is necessary is to get some form of straitjacket for collective bargaining. But before you can get that on a sensible plane I think an air of consultation needs to be developed, and one of the factors that seems to be standing high and paramount where we have peace in industry is consultation; where you have concultation between management and men there there is less likely to be friction.
I see no reason why this Amendment could not be accepted, because there are other things besides wages, conditions and consultations. I gave an example earlier of a shop, with the temperature well below zero, where metal had to be cut very accurately for submarines. It was not a matter of stopping the shop, but of bringing heat into the shop; it was only a matter of intelligent management and shop stewards getting together. Without delaying the Committee, and extending the debate, I wish to support the Amendment moved so ably by the noble Lord on the Liberal Benches.
EARL JELLICOE: I do not wish to argue for a moment that regular exchange of information between management and trade union representatives is not good industrial practice. Clearly it is a good thing. This is going to be provided for in Clause 2(2)(b) by the code of practice, and it will include practical guidance to employers about the establishment and maintenance of effective means of communication with their employees. Here we are all agreed. But I must disagree with the noble Lord about his Amendment. We see a real danger in extending the forms of consultations which are provided in Clause 54 beyond collective bargaining as defined in the Bill itself. We do not think this is a good idea. Indeed, we think it could be counterproductive.
I would remind the noble Lord that Clause 54 lays serious obligations on employers, and their failure to fulfil these may take them before the Industrial Court or the Arbitration Board. It is our belief that if we extend the umbrella of the clause to cover not only formal negotiations of collective bargaining but also informal consultations, this would discourage employers from engaging in

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just those informal consultations we believe they should engage in. Although I am not at all unsympathetic to ideas which would encourage consultations in industry, I do not believe that this Amendment is one which the Committee should endorse. Perhaps I should remind noble Lords opposite that their Bill, Mrs. Castle's Bill, was as tightly drawn in this respect as this Bill is, and I think for much the same reasons.
LORD DIAMOND: My first pleasurable duty is to welcome the noble Earl to the night shift. May I now turn to the Amendment, which has the support of both Liberal and Labour Benches? I have listened carefully to what the noble Earl had to say. I am not sure that I am going to agree with him completely, but I am going to press the Amendment a little further. The noble Earl seemed to be distinguishing between consultation and collective bargaining, and to be envisaging two separate processes.
By " consultation " I think he was envisaging what he said was informal consultation, which as I understood it did not finish up with formal collective bargaining. I do not know precisely what was in the mind of the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, but what I particularly had in mind was that the total negotiating process should work as smoothly and happily as possible, and for that purpose I think the information is needed at an early stage rather than at a final stage, and I think an early stage might well be called the consultative stage as opposed to the hard collective bargaining stage.
I do not wish to dissent from what the noble Earl has said about putting unnecessary responsibilities on employers where a failure to carry out those responsibilities unfortunately, and by no desire on this side of the Committee, leads to difficulties and court procedures. But I am not absolutely clear what the words " for the purposes of " mean. Therefore I am not absolutely clear whether the information could be required prior to the collective bargaining proper taking place, on the ground that it is needed " for the purposes of ", and therefore in advance of the actual time of collective bargaining. I hope I have made my position clear to the noble Earl.
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I am anxious that the total negotiations should proceed smoothly. For those reasons informal bargaining is a necessary precursor to formal bargaining. The information should come as early as possible. I am saying, therefore, that even though the noble Earl might wish to use language which would say " where you are just having a process of general consultation which is not intended, even, to lead up to collective bargaining, it is not a condition that the employer should supply this information ", nevertheless where you are having discussions which are preliminary to and intended to lead up to final collective hard bargaining, the information ought to be available at the earliest possible stage. Does the noble Earl think he can meet us by reconsidering that aspect of it, so as to produce the most hopeful atmosphere and circumstances to a successful outcome of collective bargaining?
LORD BEAUMONT OF WIIITLEY: I am grateful for the words of the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, but I am surprised that he was so self-restrained; that he did not take advantage of the opportunity to point out to the Government how peculiarly their attitude on this Amendment fits in with their attitude on the rest of the Bill. A complaint, and to a certain extent a justified complaint, of the Opposition Front Bench has been that the Government wish to put shackles on that which would better be done voluntarily.
At this stage the Government are suddenly saying that if they put in a very mild addition to this clause it will somehow stop. Not only will it not actually ensure that what the Amendment seeks to do is done; it will actually in same ways stop it. The fact that it is written in the Bill that consultations should happen for this particular purpose will stop consultations happening. I find it difficult to accept that the giving of information for collective bargaining really will be of much use unless there is a continuing situation where the representatives of the trade unions know what is going on in the firm. The Government have spoken of this clause as if it laid some rather onerous obligations on employers. I do not think that they are onerous at all. I think this is probably the absolute minimum of what one would expect from any decent employer or from any employer with a good idea of labour relations. It

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is a situation in fact which exists already in a good many firms and industries. I look forward with interest to what the noble Earl will say in response to the noble Lord, Lord Diamond. But unless the answer is the peak of precise satisfaction, I sincerely hope that the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, will stand by his Party on this Amendment and that we shall press this to a Division.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: If I may just say a word or two in reply to the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, and also in reply to the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, this is not a question of an onerous obligation: it is a legal obligation imposed by Clause 54 and for which definite legal sanction is applied by Clause 98. For that purpose, it is absolutely necessary that the nature of the obligation should be defined with sufficient precision to be applied by the Court; otherwise it is meaningless.
The words " collective bargaining " are terms of art which are used in the Bill because they are the subject of precise definition in Clause 158. I mention this with trepidation lest I should again prove to be the death of the noble Lord, Lord Champion! But there is in fact, if noble Lords are sufficiently interested to look it up, a precise definition referring to negotiations on terms and conditions of work in subsection (1) of Clause 158; and therefore the obligation as drawn is a precise obligation, capable of being enforced by the Court. " Consultation " is not precise: it means anything that may be chosen between the parties and it would not, at any rate in my judgment —and I submit that this is a reasonable judgment—be right to ask the Court to decide what was necessary for the purpose of consultation. Anything may be necessary for consultation: it all depends on what you want to consult about.
Having said that, the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, asked what is the meaning of " for the purposes of ". I do not propose to paraphrase that, but I would say to him that as negotiations proceed, quite clearly more and different information may be desirable at different stages of a negotiation. Probably in the early stages information is forthcoming without much difficulty: as the negotiation becomes closer, it may become more difficult to
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extract the information. But at any stage when the union feels it is required for the purpose of collective bargaining and that the employer is not performing his duty, its remedy is to go to Clause 98 or, as the case may be, to Clauses 97 and 101, to enforce the duty on the employer imposed by this clause or by Clause 53. The Industrial Court can then impose the appropriate remedy.
Clause 54, of course, also contains a reference to the code of practice which will illuminate to some extent the kind of information that is required. What is quite clear is that the range of information will be extraordinarily wide and must necessarily vary with the type of negotiations that are contemplated. If you make the " triggering off " point anything so woolly as the word " consultation " rather than " collective bargaining ", I think you would ultimately reduce the clause to meaninglessness. My noble friend is quite right: without any kind of desire to cast doubt upon the desirability of consultation of the fullest and most continuous kind, it is not acceptable to insert the word here as part of the legal obligation imposed by the section.
LORD DIAMOND: I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord. I obviously cannot speak entirely for the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, but so far as we were concerned consultation was put in not as a separate process by itself, but as the process leading up to collective bargaining. From what the noble and learned Lord has said, in conjunction with what the definition clause says, it seems to me to mean that at whatever point this information is thought to be necessary, however early in the negotiations, it can be asked for; and if the union is asking for it right at the start and thinks it necessary, and there is a disagreement whether it is necessary, it could—one would hope that it would not be necessary to do this—get substantiation for its point of view from the proper authority. Therefore the collective bargaining would not be held up or denied through lack of the appropriate information. In those circumstances, I think what the noble and learned Lord has said has been very helpful indeed.
LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY: I think the fears of the noble and learned Lord are groundless, because it is quite

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clear from the clause as it would be if amended, and as I hope it may be, that the interpretation of it is exactly as the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, said our intention was, because it is still governed by paragraphs (a) and (b). These are the criteria of the kind of information which must be produced. The fears of the noble and learned Lord, that no one might be able to decide exactly what was necessary for consultation, I feel are groundless. He may then come back on the other tack, which I think has probably more substance, that in that case consultation does not add anything. But I do think it adds something psychologically. I think it adds something to the kind of industrial relations we want to see. I think the dangers are guarded against, and, if the Labour Front Bench would be in agreement, I would still like to press this Amendment.
On Question, Amendment negatived.
12.53 a.m.
LORD TERRINGTON LORD TERRINGTON moved Amendment No. 254A:
Page 46, line 17, at end insert—
(" or
(c) being a body corporate to disclose information which it is not required to make available to members of the undertaking.").
The noble Lord said: I would like to speak very briefly to this Amendment. Its object is a simple one, to try as far as we can to arrive at equality of treatment on this whole question of disclosure of information. I would like to make quite clear that it is not designed in any way to try and withhold information from trade union representatives, and I would very much like to underline this point. The difficulty I find at the moment is that I do not know what sort of information is going to be involved in subsection (1). Presumably that will come with the code of practice. I imagine that certain information which will be given to the trade unions would not be of any particular interest to shareholders, and here I see no problem. On the other hand, I think there could well be matters of which the owners of the undertaking ought to be informed at the same time as the trade union representatives, and here I think perhaps there might be difficulties.
I originally tabled an Amendment which I thought would take care of this point, but I was subsequently advised that I was becoming involved with the Com-
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panies Act, and I therefore put down this alternative, although I realise that its wording is probably too restrictive for acceptance by the Committee. However, my purpose remains the some as it was, and as we are considering statutory disclosure of information I feel we ought to make quite certain that we are dealing with it in the fairest way to all people concerned. I beg to move.
LORD CONESFORD: I should like briefly to support the noble Lord. It seems to me that the idea behind his Amendment is sound. I have no doubt that a trade union and a company may very often give each other the fullest possible information quite regardless of what the law may require, but I cannot see quite why it is particularly necessary that one party should give a great deal of information to the other party which, if it were the other way round, would be described as " snooping ". I have no doubt whatever that to give a great deal of information is right, but I cannot see why the prospective employee should have more right to know about the company that is going to employ him than the shareholder has. I think there should be some relation between the two, and for that reason I support the noble Lord.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: I do not know that all that much more is being asked for than is being given to the shareholders. In American practice it is quite common for the trade union movement, when making demands in collective bargaining, to make suggestions as. to how a shop or plant could work more efficiently. Where the union has responsible accountants and others representing it, the information can be kept professionally, so long as the trade union side has its professional representatives and the employer's side has its professional representatives. There is no need for a leakage of information.
When the professionals representing the trade unions know the financial position of a firm they are able to judge it and come to a sensible idea regarding collective bargaining or on wages. This will be helped by the fact that the trade union has, through its lawyers, information of a professional nature which could be divulged to them, and some of which at least may still be kept secret. This information, far from clogging the wheels of

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progress and the wheels of collective bargaining, would help. I consider that the producer is just as important as the entrepreneur who is in the lucky position of being able to invest. If we want this partnership, collective bargaining and this machinery to be successful, I believe that information should be given.
Without pressing it at this early hour, hope that note will be taken of the need for an absolutely honest approach to the trade union movement so far as the financial or other situation of a firm at a moment of difficulty when demands are made. I feel that both sides of industry have the right to access to the most honest information, provided that a formula can be found where there will be no undue use made of that information for private gain by any of the parties concerned. I know it is a very difficult question.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Terrington, would think that it might be convenient, at the same time that we discuss this Amendment which he has moved, also to refer to the other two Amendments which he has down on the Order Paper in the same sense, Nos. 286A and 287A, which amend Clause 151. If that is convenient to the Committee, I could perhaps refer to them. Did the noble Lord want to say something?
LORD SHACKLETON LORD SHACKLETON: See how it goes.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: It is merely a question of referring to Amendments which are of the same sense, though they will naturally have to be moved separately. The noble Lord, Lord Terrington, was supported in his views by my noble friend Lord Cones-ford. It seemed to me that, in the case of bodies corporate, these Amendments would restrict the employer's obligation to disclose information to trade union representatives in collective bargaining under Clause 54, and to employees generally under Clause 55, to information which he is required to make available to shareholders and other members of his organisation. If we refer to the three Amendments together, the first relates to the type of information which can be disclosed. That is repeated in the second
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Amendment, which sets the same limits on the information which is to be disclosed by employers in annual statements to their employees.
The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Leek, seemed to have a little doubt about this Amendment, and thought that in some ways trade unions might not be given sufficient information. As I understood what was said, and the way in which the Amendment is framed, I should have thought that all it did was to ensure that only so much information was given as was given to the shareholders of a company or an undertaking. Certainly it would be, in the words of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, " an honest approach ", and adequate information would be given. There is a real point here and, if I may, I should like on behalf of the Government to say that we should like to consider these Amendments —perhaps not exactly in their present form, but certainly in their sense—and see what we can do at a later stage.
LORD TERRINGTON: I should like—
LORD DIAMOND: I do not want to anticipate what the noble Lord, Lord Terrington, is going to say, but I think the Government would like to know our views about this Amendment. The noble Baroness was of course very careful to say that, although she was disposed to regard the Amendment with some sympathy, the precise words were to be considered. The precise words are:
"… to disclose information which is not required ".
I imagine that the words " not required mean not separately required under the Companies Act. Therefore, I am bound to say that if that is what is in the mind of the noble Lord, Lord Terrington, it would be such a limitation of the information required to be given that it would mean, when added to the various limitations included in Clause 151, that the supply of information would be virtually worthless. All this would mean is that the workers or unions acting on behalf of the workers could go and look at the balance sheet, in the same way as everybody else could go and look at the balance sheet—
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: By paying for it.
LORD DIAMOND: Did my noble friend wish to speak?
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: I merely said as anybody could see it under the Companies Act, by approaching it. I want something more than that, and I am expressing gratitude to my noble friend for making the point.
LORD DIAMOND: I am grateful. As usual, we are saying the same thing, only I am saying it a little less interrogatively than my noble friend is saying it. But they could either do that, or go to a shareholders' meeting by the simple process of buying one share on the market —assuming that it is a public company and is quoted—and ask questions in the same way as shareholders ask questions. That is giving no information at all for these negotiating or collective bargaining purposes. It merely means giving the same information as is normally given when a board supplies its shareholders with information. It means giving it at a time which may be convenient for the company but totally inconvenient, and probably wholly irrelevant, for the purpose of the collective bargaining.
Therefore I must say that if it were interpreted literally in that way we should be bound to say that this was a wrecking Amendment. The noble Lord understands that I do not mean this in any pejorative sense: just that in effect it would be a totally wrecking Amendment in the sense that what started off as a helpful way to improve collective bargaining and to bring up to the level of good companies which already supply the information the practice of those which do not supply it, by statutory requirement, would finish as being a mere nothing. So I hope I am making it clear to the noble Baroness that that would not be of any help at all. In fact, the more one thinks of it and the more one considers Clause 151, which is somewhat ahead of us but is referred to in the third line of this clause (I am sure the draftsman was wise in drafting his Bill in this way, but if the draftsman puts the provisions in a clause which is 100 clauses away instead of putting them at the bottom of the clause itself, it is inevitable that I should have to look somewhat ahead) and the rubric of which is "Immunity of confidential information ", one sees that it provides a pageful
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of protection and safeguards in respect of the information that can be required under the clause and under the Amendment we are now considering.
So the present position already is that there is ample protection, in our view. It is proper that there should t e protection, but there is ample protection. Coupled with the penalties which are provided somewhere else in the Bill for those who disclose information improperly there is already adequate protection. So although it is always pleasant to hear the Government say a hat they will consider sympathetically what has been put forward, I want them to understand—and I hope the noble Baroness will understand—that we are very concerned indeed about what she has said. We hope that nothing is going to be done to damage in any way at all—and this Amendment would damage fundamentally—the hopeful start that has been made in this clause to giving information and enabling collective bargaining to go ahead on the basis of both sides knowing the facts.
THE EARL OF BALFOUR: I should particularly like to draw your Lordships' attention to the importance of this clause in the fact that I feel it will encourage workers in an industry to take an interest in that industry. One of the terrible things in this country is the apathy that exists; men's complete lack of interest in their union, their works or anything else. I feel that the way Clause 54 has been drafted is an attempt by Her Majesty's Government to encourage workers to take an interest in what is going on. I like the drafting, and I should not like it to be amended in any way which has been put forward. I cannot support this Amendment, and I do not think that the Committee should support it.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR. OF BELHELVIE: I think the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, gave a valuable comment to this Committee in trying to put the other side of the case as he saw it. He will recall that when I said that we would consider these Amendments sympathetically I said that we could not accept the wording as the Amendments now stood. Of course, he is quite right, because the Amendments as they are drafted at the moment include limited and

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unlimited companies, some chartered bodies, public corporations and also trade unions as defined in the Bill. Members of companies, who may be shareholders, are entitled to receive information specified in the Companies Acts. That kind of information is not really the kind that was in the mind of my noble friend Lord Balfour when he said how important it was that in this whole process of collective bargaininc, as much genuine information as possible should be given to each side and there should be, if possible, an attitude of genuine partnership. I would agree with the importance of this.
The code of practice itself will give guidance about the kind of information which it would be correct for employers to disclose in collective bargaining, and regulations will lay down what should be included in annual statements to employees under Clause 55. I am sure that the Committee will realise from the way the clause is drafted that an attempt has been made by the Government to try to improve the method of giving information. I have sympathy with the views put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Terrington, and we will certainly look at what he has said and see whether we can put forward some provisions which are not as restrictive as is feared by the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, but which will meet his point.
LORD TERRINGTON: I am grateful to the noble Baroness for the sympathetic reply and the interesting discussion we have had on this point. I should like to reaffirm that it is in no way my intention to try to withhold information from trade union representatives. I am merely concerned about the method of its handling and the equity between the various people concerned. Having said that. I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (VISCOUNT HOOD): Is it your Lordships pleasure that this Amendment be withdrawn?
LORD SHACKLETON LORD SHACKLETON: No.
On Question, Amendment negatived.
1.12 a.m.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 254D:
Page 46, line 20, leave out (" or ") and insert—
(" () an official of an independent organisation of workers, or ")
The noble Lord said: Here we are dealing with subsection (5) of the clause, which is the subsection in which the trade union representative is defined in such a way as to include an official of a registered trade union, or any other person authorised by or on behalf of a registered trade union. A trade union representative is referred to as being entitled to certain information. This Amendment wants to make it clear that the Government have in mind, and that the Bill will so provide, that an official of an independent organisation or a worker who has the identical problem of conducting collective bargaining on behalf of his members with the employers, or employers' association, will have the same rights to information so that collective bargaining can go on in exactly the same way.
EARL JELLICOE: As I understand it, this Amendment would require employers to disclose information for the purpose of collective bargaining to officials of an independent organisation of workers not registered as a trade union. I do not wish to go into any very long discussion about this, because the principle embodied in the noble Lord's Amendment has already been debated at considerable length in this House and in this Committee—not least this evening. It will not surprise noble Lords opposite if I reaffirm that registration is a central feature of this Bill.
A NOBLE LORD A NOBLE LORD: Shocking!
EARL JELLICOE: The noble Lord says. " Shocking! " The noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, must have been aware that this was the case.
LORD SHACKLETON: Since the noble Earl has mentioned my name, did he not hear the speech of his noble friend, Lord Belstead, concerning the interim period? When the C.I.R. have recommended the approval of an independent organisation there is an interim period between then and the need to register. What happens then?
EARL JELLICOE: I am aware of that; but the noble Lord must be equally aware that it is in our view a fundamental

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principle that the privileges and rights that the Bill confers should be restricted to those organisations which have accepted the responsibility implied by registration. Among those rights is the very important right in Clause 54 giving trade union representatives access to information relevant to collective bargaining. To put it plainly and simply, I am convinced that there is no good reason for excepting the provisions of Clause 54 from this general concept. In view of this I cannot advise the Committee to accept this Amendment.
LORD DIAMOND: I really am shocked by the noble Earl's reply. Noble Lords may be amused: I am sure they are genuinely amused; but I am utterly shocked. It never occurred to me for one second that the Government would be openly expressing the view that it was right so to penalise the trade unions. which were not registered as to make it impossible for them to carry out their tasks. Nowhere else in the Bill is such a punitive attitude taken. Noble Lords who did laugh, and those who are still smiling, fill me with surprise because we are all interested in the same thing, improving industrial relations.
We all have a sense of fair play. I do not know how the Government can attempt to justify the claim that it is right for a trade union which has gone through all the formalities of registering to be enabled to conduct collective bargaining on behalf of their members, but that it is wrong that a trade union that has not done so should be unable to conduct them. This is absolutely spiteful determination to destroy those trade unions which do not register. I now take a totally different view of the Government's intentions. I am now satisfied, because nobody could have made it clearer than the noble Earl speaking on behalf of the Government, that the Government are determined to smash the unions who do not register—knowing that the T.U.C. is proposing to advise all its member unions not to register. The Government have now sounded the knell for a complete head-on clash with the unions.
I do not imagine it will be possible for any of us to help with bridging the difficulties. This is a mistake of the first magnitude, an absolutely astonishing mistake. It is totally impossible to reconcile—even if the Government took the
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view that this was right—with those provisions of the Bill to which my noble Leader referred. This is why I am so astonished at what the noble Earl has said. It is regarded as proper, it is regarded as right, that a non-registered trade union should be not only in existence but should be a sole bargaining unit. I hope that information will be welcome to the noble Lord who is still sniggering. He is entitled to snigger. I doubt if he has given sufficient thought to the seriousness of what we are now considering.
The Government have laid down in the Bill that a non-registered trade union is not only a responsible institution but should have the sole bargaining rights, and should have them up to a period of six months—no longer. Under this provision that union is not going to be able to conduct bargaining on what the Government have accepted in this clause is a fair method of bargaining, namely, a system under which both the employer and the employees—for the first time—have the necessary information to be on all fours in bargaining, so that bargaining means that both start off on level pegging. Although that is accepted in this clause, it will not be capable of being put into effect. Any negotiations during that period of six months will have to be held over. I am astonished at the response of the Government.
LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY: We cannot let the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, get away with this one. He is mixing up two entirely different questions. I was not either laughing or sniggering; I think it is an important question. The two questions he is mixing up are whether an official of an independent organisation of workers should be able to have this information during the transitory six months, or always. What the Amendment says is nothing to do with six months. It just says that such a person should be empowered to have this information and to exercise his rights, and not within six months; if it did say that it would be a good Amendment; one ought to support it, and if the Government turned it down he would be right to be shocked. But it is not actually what the Amendment says. If he is carrying on his s lock to say that an independent body of workers has this particular right all the time, then I think the shock becomes slightly less, shall we say—
LORD BESWICK LORD BESWICK: Shocking!
LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY: —acute. The point is that at the moment no trade union representative, no trade union official has such a right. The Government are introducing a Bill to produce certain laws and to give certain rights to certain people; they are not taking any rights away from an independent body of trade unionists, an independent organisation of workers, by excluding them. If the noble Lord cares to come back on Report stage with a slightly different Amendment I should be happy to support him, but I think this is a little mixed up.
LORD SHACKLETON: I do not think the Government and the noble Earl have quite understood the import of this particular Amendment. I do not want to take very long, but I want to ask the Government to think again about this. It is clear that they are not going to give us anything tonight, and we shall vote on this. This is a difficulty which we have found elsewhere in discussions on this Bill. The logic of the Bill at certain points takes the Government into a position which seems to us wholly intolerable. We have had arguments on other matters, such as Equity, which I do not propose to go into now, but the reply by the noble Earl showed no sign of recognising the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley. It was a flat denial, and seemed wholly inconsistent with what was said by his noble friend, Lord Belstead, and did not recognise the transition stage,
One of the things which this debate has brought out is that it is not generally appreciated that in addition to all the pains and penalties in relation to a registered trade union they are also to be denied—although I acknowledge that the Government have tried in this matter—certain of the important arrangements designed to help trade unions. They are to be driven out—I am not sure what we should be driven out of at this time of night—of the paradise which the Government think exists for trade unions. In these circumstances, unless the Government can make a gesture, even considering the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, we shall have to vote on this Amendment. We want to get on and the sooner we bring this matter to a decision the better.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: I think this is a crucial point, and the case has been made by the Leader of the Opposition. It is relevant to point out that under the constitution of the International Labour Organisation Britain has a binding obligation to apply the conventions which Britain has ratified at Geneva. Convention 87, which was ratified in 1949, says:
" Workers' and employers' organisations shall not be liable to be dissolved or suspended by administrative authority."
The International Labour Organisation committee ruled in 1955 that deregistration could mean dissolution in circumstances when registration is essential for a union's existence, as under the plan put forward by the Tory Government.The proposed new registration set-up is totally different from that in the International Labour Organisation Convention which we ratified in 1949. We are confronted here with a problem. At this time of night, when tempers may be frayed a little, we do not want this debate to become raucous, but I think we on this side of the Committee have an important point here.
LORD DRUMALBYN: There is no substance in what has been said about dissolution of an organisation of workers who do not register. There is no problem here at all.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: May I add to dissolution a point about impotence? Under this provision the impotence of the unregistered union would become obvious, but I do not want to labour that point.
LORD DRUMALBYN: The point I was going to make was simply this. There are of course a great many unions now called trade unions which will become organisations of workers, and which have negotiating rights at the present time. They will continue to exist and to have negotiating rights. It is up to the organisation of workers itself to decide whether or not it becomes a trade union. It is up to it to weigh the benefits that it will derive from becoming a trade union against any disadvantages that may be conferred. One of the benefits it will get is that under this clause a duty is laid upon the employer to give the information. That does not mean that if they do not register they will get no information; it merely means that the employer will

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not be under a duty under the Bill to give them the information. But it is right that we should understand this position quite clearly.
May I add just one other point? There seems to be some magic importance attached to the six months. The six months comes in twice, I think, or it may be more, in the Bill. There is a six months' interval on the provisional register. Secondly, there is the six months within which an organisation of workers or a trade union—which is recommended by the for recognition and where there has to be a ballot of workers and all the rest of it, and the Industrial Court has made a direction—may ask for a ballot. This is the point—they have six months within which to ask for the ballot, and unless they are registered they cannot ask for that ballot. There seems to be some magic being attached to this period of six months, but this is all there is to it. I think that at one point the noble Lord said that if a recommended bargaining agent which is unregistered does not register within six months, then it loses its negotiating rights. It does not lose its negotiating rights: it merely cannot get an order for negotiating rights from the Industrial Court.
1.32 a.m.
LORD DIAMOND: I am sorry I must return to the point. I think we both understood the position correctly, and that what I said was a fair description; that is to say, that when an organisation is appointed a sole bargaining unit as a result of a recommendation of the C.I.R., then that cannot be confirmed unless it registers in order to enable itself
to apply for a ballot. So the first step is that it will have to register, and there is a maximum of six months in which to do so. If it does not it ceases to be a trade union, and any order which would have been made would be revolved. But if it were a trade union it ceases to be one. The practical effect is that its sole bargaining rights are withdrawn from it.
As my noble friend Lord Davies of Leek said, the practical effect in terms of negotiation is that it will no longer be able to represent its members fully and adequately, as the Bill thinks a trade union ought to be enabled to do. That is the point. Therefore, I repeat: if it is not to have the right to the information to enable it to carry out its job of negotiating on behalf of its members in the same way as a registered union is, this is a vicious, punitive provision.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: That is right; it is punitive.
LORD HANKEY: I venture to think there are other considerations here. Before information of great importance to a company, and incidentally to its employees, is released to organisations which do not see fit to be registered and turn themselves into proper trade unions, some thought ought to be given to this. I personally support the idea that there should be privileges for registrat on, and the divulging of information should be one of them.
1.35 a.m.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 254D) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 15; Not-Contents, 64

CONTENTS

Beswick, L.

Gardiner, L.

Shackleton, L.

Champion. L.

Hilton of Upton, L. [Teller.]

Shepherd, L.

Cooper of Stockton Heath, L.

Hughes, L.

Wella-Pestcll, L.

Davits of Leek, L.

Milnersof Leeds, L. [Teller.]

White, Bs.

Diamond, L.

Serota, Bs.

Wynne-Jones, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Aberdare, L.

Burton, L.

Ferrers, E.

Amherst of Hackney, L.

Carrington, L.

Ferrier, L.

Balfour. E.

Chelmer, L.

Fisher, L.

Barrington, V.

Colville of Culross, V.

Gowrie, E. [Teller.]

Beaumont of Whitley, L.

Conesford, L.

Gray, L.

Belstead, L.

Cottesloe, L.

Gridley, L.

Bessborough, E.

Craigmyle, L.

Grimston of Westbury L.

Brecon, L.

Davidson, V.

Hailes, L.

Brooke of Cumnor, L.

Denham, L. [Teller.]

Hailsham of Saint Maryle- bone, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Buchan, E.

Drumalbyn, L.

Burnham L.

Dudley, E.

Hankey, L.

Harvey of Tasburgh, L.

Rankeillour, L.

Strange, L.

Hood, V.

Redesdale, L.

Terrington, L.

Jellicoe, E. (L. Privy Seal.)

Rochdale, V.

Thorneycroft, L.

Kemsley, V.

St. Helens, L.

Thurso. V.

Lansdowne. M.

St. Just, L.

Tweedsmuir, L.

Lothian, M.

St. Oswald, L.

Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, Bs,

Lyell, L.

Sandford. L.

Vivian, L.

Mancroft, L.

Sandys, L.

Westminster, D.

Mowbray and Stourton, L.

Savile, L.

Windlesham, L.

O'Neill of the Maine, L.

Selsdon, L.

Yarborough, E.

Pender, L.

Sempill, Ly.

On Question, Amendment agreed to. Clause 57, as amended, agreed to.

1.42 a.m.
BARONESS WHITE BARONESS WHITE moved Amendment No. 254H:
Page 46, line 25, at end insert—
(" (6) The duty of employers to disclose information under the provisions of subsections (1) to (5) of this section shall also extend to the employers' side of a joint negotiating body or statutory committee set up under any enactment to deal with the remuneration of any description of workers.")
The noble Baroness said: The purpose of this Amendment is to discover what thought, if any, the Government have given to the proceedings of the Burnham Committee. Your Lordships will appreciate that the last Amendment which we discussed faced us with the problem of a trade union which was not a trade union. The problem we face in this Amendment is the employer who is not an employer. We should be glad to know how the Government are proposing to deal with this matter. I suppose they have given it some consideration. Your Lordships will appreciate that in the teaching profession the negotiations on salaries and conditions are conducted through the Burnham Committee, and the management side of that Committee is not the employer; the employers, of course, are the individual local education authorities. What we wish to know is what is the position of the teachers' trade unions in this situation, because plainly it would be entirely unjust and inequitable if they did not, as trade unions negotiating about their terms of employment, have the same privileges and safeguards in the matter of disclosure of information as any other trade union or body of workers. But as we understand it, the management side of the Burnham Committee would not come under the definition in Clause 158 covering an employer. Therefore, that body would be under no obligation, as the Bill now stands, or at any rate as we read it. to
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disclose the type of information which any normal employer would have to disclose. I think this is a quite simple proposition. We should like to know how the Government intend to deal with the position.
The position at the moment, as I am informed, is that the local education committees give a good deal of information to the management side of Burnham which is not in fact transmitted to the teachers' side, and naturally enough they feel they ought to be in a position when they are negotiating to have the fullest possible detail of the representations made by the local education authorities to the management side of Burnham. The Amendment, as drafted, is rather wide, because there may be other instances comparable with that of the Burnham Committee. I will be quite frank with your Lordships; I do not know of any, but there may be other Members of your Lordships' House who may be aware of some comparable position. I would, of course, make it clear that at the present stage of our deliberations at any rate this is no more than a probing Amendment. We just want to know what the Government propose to do about Burnham. I beg to move.
LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY: We think that this is an important Amendment. It brings up the whole question of what is an employer. While I join with the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Garnsworthy, and possibly with the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Leek, in wanting to know the Government's reaction to this Amendment, I should also like to draw the Committee's attention to the possibilities of more carefully defining what is an employer in the interpretation clause. There are all sorts of awkward situations, particularly with reference to professional and semi-governmental employers, and I think the whole question wants to be looked into much more deeply.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: What I had to say has been said. There are professional and semi-professional and other types of employers who are sometimes represented by national and, in other rare cases in the scientific field, by international organisations which look after their special standards. There is an echelon in the fields of biochemistry and other modern sciences. I think that the definition in Clause 158 needs extension. The impact of the Amendment is obvious to noble Lords opposite without long and involved speeches from this side.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: This is a very interesting Amendment, but I am afraid that I cannot say to the noble Baroness that we feel able to accept it. I should like to try to explain why not. The effect of the Amendment would be to extend the duty to disclose information from individual employers to employers' representatives on joint negotiating bodies or on statutory committees established under an enactment dealing with workers' remuneration. As the clause stands, the duty of employers to disclose information cannot extend to the employers' side of representative negotiating bodies in either public or private sectors. This, I think, is the question which the noble Baroness particularly posed about the Burnham Committee. Employees' representatives are not entitled under the clause to receive information from individual employers. The noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, thought that perhaps we should amend the interpretation clause, Clause 158, as it relates to the term " employer ", but I think that at this hour we do not want to consider a clause of this nature so far ahead. No doubt the noble Lord will bring this up when we come to it.
The clause as it stands requires employers to disclose to trade union representatives the information which they need for collective bargaining and which satisfies the conditions specified in subsection (1)(a) and (b). The reason why the clause does not require employers' representatives to divulge information in joint negotiating situations is because all they can be required to disclose is information about the individual firms they represent, and where the negotiations are taking place on a wide front, with possibly thousands of employers involved, and perhaps in some cases the whole
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industry, information about individual employers is not of such importance. The Amendment also deals specifically with statutory committees which are set up to deal with the remuneratim of any description of workers, which is the point that the noble Baroness, Lacy White, particularly made. But in negotiations about an individual employers' liability to meet the demands, the sort of information that will be required is Principally about his ability to pay. This is particularly so when it comes to negotiations on teachers' pay, of which I happen to know a good deal North of the Border. But I would say to the noble Baroness that I recognise this is a probing Amendment to find out our views on it and why the clause does not go as wide as her Amendment seeks to make it go. I hope that I have explained to her why we feel we cannot accept this Amendment.
BARONESS WHITE: I am sorry, but this is most unsatisfactory. I was in my most conciliatory mood when I moved this Amendment, but I am conciliatory no longer. Surely the Committee can appreciate the position. Why should the representatives of the teachers' trade unions go into negotiations without having any right whatever to the disclosure of information, which would be afforded them if they were in other occupations? This is a quite monstrous position. It is completely unjust and, with great respect, I would ask the noble Baroness to put herself in the position of someone on the other side of Burnham who had to negotiate on behalf of her or her members and who went, to use z. famous phrase of the late Nye Bevan, " naked into the conference chamber ", because they would not have been given the type of information they sought.
The noble Baroness referred to the ability to pay. If by that she means the ability of Her Majesty's Government so to organise the affairs of the nation that they can pay a decent salary to the teachers, that might be a matter which would be rather difficult to disclose—I grant her that. But there are other matters of information which, I repeat, we understand are placed at the disposal of the management side of Burnham by the individual local authorities who are the employers of the teachers concerned. If such information is made available

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to the management side, we contend that it should also be made available to the trade union side. This is the case that they have put to us, and it seems to me this is a matter of plain justice.
I am sorry, but I do not think the noble Baroness can expect us to be content with the reply that she has given. I am quite certain that if she were on this side of the Committee she would be saying exactly the same as I am saying. I do not think she can for one moment expect us to accept the entirely unsatisfactory explanation which she has given. She has not met what I think we all agree is a perfectly justified request by the teachers' organisations that they should be treated for this purpose like any other employers. It is not their fault that the statutory Burnham provisions entail their negotiating with persons who, under the definition of this Bill, are not classed as employers. After all, Her Majesty's Government are not employers of teachers, either. They may have to pay something towards their salaries, but they are not themselves employers. My noble friends may not feel disposed at this early hour of the morning to divide on this Amendment, and I had not intended to press it to a Division. But having heard the noble Baroness I have doubts.
1.54 a.m.
LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY: Nor am I particularly satisfied by the reply given by the noble Baroness. She has a point when she says that Amendment No. 158 is a long way off, but the question that all of us who have spoken have agreed is the important question is that of the definition of " employer". If that definition were drawn much more widely it would cover the whole point put forward by the noble Baroness. At the risk of being slightly ungallant, I would suggest that possibly one of the difficulties is that the noble Baroness is not going to answer for that clause when we come to it. Perhaps one of her colleagues may possibly come to her help. If we may be told that serious consideration is to be given to the definition of " employer "—and I believe there are quite a number of rather anomalous cases of this kind—so that bodies like the teachers are covered and able to be given information, I imagine that noble
428
Lords on the Labour Benches would be more satisfied, as we should. But honestly, we have not got any kind of answer at the moment.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: We are entitled to a less " dusty answer," although it was delivered so politely, and I feel rather ungallant in challenging the noble and beautiful Baroness at this time of the morning on this issue. But the teaching profession, and other professions, want to know exactly where they stand. We have thrust upon us the reply, " We can come to this when we arrive at Clause 158 ". But we shall by then be almost at the end of this tunnel. Before we get to Clause 158, may we ask the Government to try to clarify the position regarding the Burnham Committee and other people similarly affected? I think I have said enough: it has been said briefly and reluctantly, but politely. I hope that the Government will say, " We will have another look at this."
LORD SHACKLETON: May I ask whether the noble Baroness will respond to the gallant appeal of my noble friend and others? This is an occasion when the Government could, and should under-stake to reconsider this problem. I am sure the noble Baroness is sympathetic.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: I hesitated in rising to my feet only in case any other noble Lord wished to speak. I certainly found the noble Baroness conciliatory, and I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Leek, felt that he had been given a very " dusty answer ". It was not intended to be so. However, I do not know that I could alter the view which I gave to your Lordships when replying in the first sense. To widen the clause, as is suggested in the Amendment, would create considerable difficulties. It is not only a question of the Burnham Committee, although that may be the particular concern of the noble Baroness. One also has to imagine that this clause was being widened to include all employers' representatives to whom information would have to be given, which in another context might be commercially damaging to each other. I think that this may go wider than perhaps the noble Baroness may have thought, and it is for that reason, and for the reason that I

429
gave in the beginning that I am afraid that I cannot accept her Amendment.
BARONESS WHITE: I can only repeat that this is a most unsatisfactory state of affairs. I freely grant that the Amendment may not be as clearly drafted as it might be. It was not intended, for example, to cover normal commercial negotiations; it was really meant for statutory bodies of one kind or another, and people in that situation. At the moment—it is nearly 2 a.m.—I do not propose to press this Amendment but I fully reserve our position to raise the matter again at a later stage. Having said that, I ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
On Question, Whether Clause 54 shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD DIAMOND: We on this side of the Committee are in the rather difficult position that this is a clause which on the whole sets out to be helpful, although we have discovered that it has within it a most ghastly blemish. However, there are one or two questions that I should like to ask as to the meaning of the clause. First of all, subsection (1)(a) refers to:
"… information without which the trade union representatives would be to a material extent impeded …"
I cannot see why there should be the words about the trade union representatives having to be materially impeded, and why it would apparently be satisfactory for them to be impeded. I think we could well do without the words " to a material extent impeded". I should have thought that if the trade unions were to any extent impeded in carrying out collective bargaining they would be entitled to the information. So I should be grateful for some information about what the Government intend by the words " to a material extent impeded".
As for the rest of the clause, it is impossible to pursue it without knowing what the Government have in mind with regard to the code. Subsection (1)(b) refers to " good industrial relations practice ". It is in accordance with that practice that information should be given, and in determining that, one must have regard to the principles set out in the code of practice for the time being
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in force. I should have thought therefore that this was a convenient opportunity to ask the Government when we are going to be able to see the code of practice, and whether they have any idea what is going to be in it with regard to the provisions applicable to this particular clause.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: I hope that at some juncture, before we come to the end of this Bill, a little information will be given to this Committee on the relationship of these independent unions—the unions which are not registered—to the International Labour Organisation agreements which have been made. Have this Government been in touch with the I.L.O., for instance, to discuss some of the points which have arisen in British trade unionism, which were never there before, and some others which were taken for granted over the years, at Geneva and the Internationational Labour Organisation. I once had a chance to see this at work. It was a very proud boast of this country that we could give a lead to the rest of the world in international labour organisations. This may not be the appropriate moment, but I should like to know at some juncture whether the point at which I hinted this morning, on the International Labour Organisation and its relationship to this new Bill, and the relationship of these unregistered unions, has been taken into account.
It is important for people in t lis country to realise the implications of this matter. There are some helpful points in the Bill. None of us is lumpen enough to deride the entire thing. Nevertheless, at this juncture (I do not know what we are going to do on the Front Bench at the moment, and I do not want to encourage them at this early hour), the issues are of such vital importance that I believe it would be a good thing to register our protest against the Motion, That the clause stand part. But I will take the lead from my Front Bench: if they do not feel like that I am not going to be adamant about it, because this is the wrong time of the morning to be truculent.
EARL JELLICOE: May I briefly respond to Lord Diamond's ques ions by explaining that the main purpose of the

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requirement placed upon employers to disclose information is to try to make certain that union representatives, in carrying on collective bargaining, are not unreasonably handicapped by lack of the information which they require. That is the point of the word " material ": that information should be something of significance. The second criterion governing this requirement is that of good industrial relations practice, and this will be set out in the code of industrial practice referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, which I anticipate would lay down guide-lines for employers in this particular area. This is specifically spelled out in Clause 2(2)(b), of which the noble Lord is very well aware. All I can do in reply to his search for information about the timing of the publication of this code of practice is to say that I think this long anticipated code will be with us very shortly indeed. This is my understanding. The weeks we have referred to in the past are rapidly shrinking, and I think that they may fairly soon become a matter of days. The points put by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Leek, went rather wide, but I will look at what he said and, if need be, I will drop him a line about them, or come back to them at a later stage in our discussion.
Clause 54 agreed to.
Clause 55 [Disclosure of information to employees by major enzployers]:
2.6 a.m.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE moved Amendment No. 254J:
Page 46, line 26, after (" which ") insert (" on any date within a financial year of the undertaking ").
The noble Baroness said: I beg to move Amendment No. 254J. I wonder whether it would be convenient to the Committee at the same time to consider Amendments Nos. 254K, 254L, 254M, 254N and 254P, because they are very closely linked? If that is convenient perhaps I may say that the effect of the Amendments is to make it clear that the clause covers all employers who employ more than 500 people at any one time in the financial year, and to specify those employees who are not entitled to a statement and are not included, and to ensure that a statement is issued annually in respect of each financial year. It is the
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last Amendment which gives the exclusions which really are those who are employed under a contract which normally involves employment for less than 21 hours weekly, or who have been employed in the undertaking in question for less than 13 weeks, or who is outside Great Britain and is a person who, under his contract of employment, ordinarily works outside Great Britain. Therefore, the main effect of these Amendments is to clarify the position. I beg to move.
LORD DIAMOND: I am grateful to the noble Baroness for what she said, and I appreciate her desire, which is shared, to deal with these Amendments as quickly as possible. For that reason she no doubt thought it right to discuss them all at the same time. She has dealt with them very shortly, and I am afraid I shall have to come back to them individually to make clear the difficulties we have on this side. Quite apart from these excepted person—that is to say those in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of 254P—the purpose of Amendment No. 254L is to achieve the situation under which, instead of having periodical statements, we are going to have statements once per financial year. I do not understand why periodical statements should not be supplied if they are available.
Here we come back to what a noble Lord was earlier saying about not giving information beyond what is given to the shareholders. If you have a situation under which the shareholders are given information every six months (in some cases it is every three months), why on earth should it not be made available for these purposes? Nobody is suggesting that the employer, if he be a company, should have the responsibility of collecting information more than once a year if that is not the normal practice; but if it is the normal practice I cannot see why that information, which is normally prepared for the ordinary purposes of the company and which is in due course published, should not be made available in the same way that the annual statement, or the statement every financial year, is made available.
Coming to the excepted persons, a person is an excepted person on any date if, on that date, he is
"… employed under a contract which normally involves employment for less than twenty-one hours weekly ".

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We had a reference earlier on to this same principle, and the noble and learned Lord said that if a partly employed person was affected, that person was entitled to have whatever were the rights involved.. I think that was with regard to negotiation rights. I cannot see why, under the same philosophy, if a person is affected by the bargaining and that person is normally employed for less than 21 hours weekly, he or his agent should not receive information which is available to those who are employed for more than 21 hours weekly.
I cannot see the argument about the person who has been employed in the undertaking for less than 13 weeks. A person may have been employed for only 12 weeks, but the assumption is that that person will continue to be employed for a further long period. Therefore, as the negotiations will presumably take place only at long intervals of a year or two, that person is going to be affected by the negotiations and ought to be supplied with the information.
There is less of a case with regard to a person who is
"… outside Great Britain and who … ordinarily works outside Great Britain."
But I should like to know why the Government think that in that case a person ought to be excepted. As I said,this is a less pressing case, but I see no reason why an employee should be excepted from the information under paragraphs (a) and (b).
2.14 a.m.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: The noble Lord asked first why the word periodical " should be deleted and why an annual statement should be required. The reason is that " periodical " has a very wide definition. It could mean every two or three years or any odd moment, and we feel that it is too imprecise. We chose a financial year because that is a customary time when statements are sent out.
The noble Lord then asked about the provisions in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c), and why those who have been employed in an undertaking for less than 13 weeks—
LORD DIAMOND: I am sorry to interrupt, but before the noble Baroness turns to that may I say that I am grateful
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to her for explaining why she thought that " periodical " was a vague word—which I well understand—ane why she thought that an annual statement was better—which I also well understand. But why should they only be annual statements? Why, if there are statements prepared every six months or every quarter, should they not be made available?
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: One can of cot rse debate at length whether to have six-monthly statements or annual statements. Indeed, there is nothing in the clause which prevents statements being issued more than once a year, which is often done in large enterprises. It is done, in fact, every six months; but we felt it was reasonable, if you are taking into account large and small enterprises, to put it down as one year, although some large companies certainly do it more often. But in his question the noble Lord said he hoped that certain employees would be able to work for longer than 13 weeks. Of course, he will recognise that there are many who work in, for example, agriculture or in the hotel and caterir g industry who move around a great deal and who are in some respects seasonal workers, and it is for this reason that excluded them in this Amendment No. 254P. It is for the same reason that hose who work outside Great Britain, ar.d who we had in mind would be resident outside Great Britain, would therefore perhaps not be quite so much in need of the information although possibly I would have thought they could be more in need of the information than the seasonal worker.
2.16 a.m.
LORD SHACKLETON: I do not want to prolong this debate, but I would ask the noble Baroness to take ow or two points into account. There may be some noble Lords still left here to tight who have in fact been employers of labour on a large scale. In many industries it is usual to employ a certain number of part-timers, who are in fact very loyal and important members of the firm, and may be loyal members of the trade union. What bothers me—and I quite see why the Government are doing this, but I am wondering whether it is really necessary—is that they are singled out as being somehow less privileged. The

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same thing applies to people who have been working for only 12 weeks. It conveys the idea of a sort of probationary state. I think the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor disagreed. He told us the other night that he had never employed more than five people. Anyone who has employed 20,000 people—and there are noble Lords who have—will know differently. I put this point quite generally. I do not ask the noble Baroness to say any more now, but would she and her officials take this into account, as I think the responsible employer will in fact continue to issue the information to them; but there is an objectionable aspect to the matter.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: I beg to move Amendment No. 254K.
Amendment moved—
Page 46, line 27, after (" persons ") insert (" other than excepted persons ").—(Baroness Tweedsmuir of Bellielvie.)
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: I beg to move Amendment No. 254L.
Amendment moved—
Page 46. line 30. leave out (" periodical statements") and insert ("in respect of that financial year a statement"). (Baroness Tweedsnutir of Belhelvie.)
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: I beg to move Amendment No. 254M.
Amendment moved—
Page 46, line 32, leave out from (" shall") to end of line 34, and insert (" be issued not later than six months after the end of the financial year to which it relates ").—(Baroness Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie.)
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND rose to move Amendment No. 254E.
Page 46, line 40, leave out from (" relates ") to end of line 5 on page 47.
The noble Lord said: I do not think there would be any point in pursuing this point unless it is the practice of the Committee for me to move the Amendment purely formally and then to seek to withdraw it. To avoid that perhaps I
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may say a few words. I do not think, in view of what the noble Baroness said on the rest of the Amendments, that it would be possible to pursue this particular Amendment. I just give notice that I regard the replies that we have received as either unsatisfactory or very unsatisfactory, and we shall have to seek to put down Amendments at Report stage to elucidate the position in an attempt to make further progress.
2.20 a.m.
EARL JELLICOE: I do not dissent from what the noble Lord was saying about progress, although I would dissent about the alleged unsatisfactory nature of the replies. One point I should like him to bear in mind when considering this matter between now and the Report stage is that there is an analogy with exclusions—
LORD SHACKLETON: I wonder if I may interrupt the noble Earl. I am not sure whether the Question has been put. I was not quite sure whether my noble friend moved his Amendment; I take it that he did.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I thought the noble Lord said he was explaining his reasons why he was not going to move it. If he wants to change his mind, I am not taking advantage of him; but to my understanding that is what he said.
LORD SHACKLETON: The Committee would deplore noble Lords making speeches and then not moving the Amendment, because it denies other noble Lords the chance of replying.
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES: Amendment proposed:
Page 46, line 40, leave out from (" relates") to end of line 5 on page 47.
EARL JELLICOE: I think we are now in order, and I am grateful to the noble Lord, the Leader of the Opposition. One point the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, might like to bear in mind in considering the matter of exclusions between now and the Report stage, is that there is an analogy in the exclusions in this clause of the Bill, and exclusions which are similar so far as paragraphs (a) and (b) are concerned in the Contracts of Employment Act 1963. When we were considering the Amendments to the Contracts of Employment Act earlier (I think

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it was on Clause 17) those exclusions were found acceptable to noble Lords opposite. I merely put this forward as a thought which no doubt he will wish to bear in mind.
LORD DIAMOND: I am grateful to the noble Earl. They are there, but for somewhat different reasons. However, we will take full account of them. As the Question has been put may I seek leave to withdraw the Amendment?
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: I beg to move Amendment No. 254N.
Amendment moved—
Page 46, line 40, leave out from (" relates ") to end of line 5 on page 47, and insert (" and who is not on that date an excepted person ").—(Baroness Tweedsmair of Bellielvie.)
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: I beg to move Amendment No. 254P.
Amendment moved—
Page 47, line 36, at end insert—
" () In this section " financial year ", in relation to an undertaking, means a period for which the accounts of the undertaking are made up (including any such period part of which is before and part after the commencement of this Act); and for the purposes of this section a person is an excepted person on any date if on that date—

(a) he is employed under a contract which normally involves employment for less than twenty-one hours weekly, or

(b) he has been employed in the undertaking in question for less than thirteen weeks, or

(c) he is outside Great Britain and is a person who under his contract of employment ordinarily works outside Great Britain."—(Baroness Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie.)

On Question, Whether Clause 55, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?
2.24 a.m.
LORD SHACKLETON: At this late hour it would be futile to attempt to mount a debate on the serious question of disclosure of information. It is a fact that there are many channels, and as somebody who was, like the noble Lord, Lord St. Oswald (who has now left the Committee, although he was here fairly late) a former President of the British Association of Industrial Editors—and I was once responsible for editing about 20 journals—I hope that we
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shall have an opportunity in the passage of the Bill to have a debate on the whole question of information for employees. It has been referred to on a number of occasions. When we see the code it will he possible perhaps, to discuss it against that.
A great deal of work has been done, and the best employers set a very good example, and in the noble Earl's Department he will be aware that strenuous efforts are being made, which will go far beyond what the Bill provides. This is unavoidable. One hopes that the Bill will not unconsciously set a ceiling. I do not think it will. I will make my usual tribute to the noble Earl's responsibility in the matter of one journal, Works World now changing it; name to, I think, the Department of t/i Environment. There is a wide range of information and there is the work of bodies like the Industrial Society and many of the employers' organisations. It is a subject on which we should have a debate. When I say I am not too happy about this clause it is because I think it is difficult to cover all the eventualities. But it is; a matter of such prefound importance to industrial relations that I would not want the clause to pass without having made a few comments.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: This is an important clause. I think there are a number of hinges on the door of this Bill and that Clause 55 is one ol them. I am delighted to hear that very soon we shall be seeing the code of industrial practice so that guidelines will be given on the disclosure of information by employers to the trade unions. What is to happen if the employer refused to disclose information in accordance with the code? Will the N.I.R.C. grant the union the right to refer their claim for improved terms to the arbitration boars, or will additional powers ultimately be given to the Secretary of State? Various points have been made in the discussion and I hope that they will be borne in mind.
EARL JELLICOE: I think that the only requirement on me is to say " Amen " to what has been said; because I endorse the views of noble Lords who have spoken about the importance of this clause and of better communication, consultation and exchange of information within industry. This has

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always been important but is more important than ever now, at this time of rapid technological change. It is important from the point of view of industrial harmony and avoiding disputes, important from the point of view of introducing new methods and of keeping ourselves up to date and, above all, important from the point of view of spreading the area of participation within industry. I would gladly welcome a further discussion on this at a later date.
Clause 55, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 56 [Notification of procedure agreements]:
2.28 a.m.
LORD CHAMPION LORD CHAMPION moved Amendment 254F:
Page 47. line 37, after (" State") insert (" after consultation with the General Council of the T.U.C. and with the Confederation of British Industries ")
The noble Lord said: This is a very simple Amendment. Clause 56 gives the Secretary of State extensive instructions as to the regulations he has to make under the clause. Paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d) of subsection (1) seem to be likely to cover all matters that need to be embodied in regulations of this sort, but I am not sure about this. I think it would be an advantage if the Secretary of State, before he gets down to make these regulations, were to consult with bodies able to put their exceptional experience and knowledge at his disposal. The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, earlier in the Committee stage gave me an undertaking that he would look at a similar Amendment, although not on this point.
In that case clearly the T.U.C. and the C.B.I. would be able to give some information to the Secretary of State which might very well be useful to him and improve the Bill. In this case it is not so much a matter of improving the Bill but rather that the Secretary of State may glean help from the bodies I have mentioned in framing the regulations. The instructions contained in paragraphs (a), (b), (c) (d) and the remaining subsections are extensive, but I think that if he accepts our Amendment it will be worth while. It will bring them into consultations which are very close to
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them. I beg to move the Amendment standing in my name.
EARL JELLICOE: I understand the point put very reasonably by the noble Lord, Lord Champion. All I would say in reply is that I am convinced that, in practice, the views of both bodies mentioned, the T.U.C. and the C.B.I., would be taken into account. As the noble Lord is aware, since companies with more than 5,000 employees were invited to notify their procedure agreements to the Department of Employment two years ago, there has been a voluntary scheme operating, with extreme success. I think that in all 277 large companies with over 5,000 employees were asked to notify their agreements. Of those, only eight have refused, and four had failed to reply by last month. Both the bodies mentioned, the T.U.C. and the C.B.I., have been co-operating in that voluntary scheme to the fullest possible extent.
Perhaps I may draw the noble Lord's attention to the fact that the regulations which will be required under this clause provide a safeguard in that they will be subject to the Negative Resolution Procedure. Therefore there will be an opportunity for specific approaches by or on behalf of those concerned at that stage. I do not think the specific requirements spelt out in this Amendment are at all necessary. I am prepared, if this will help, to have another look at it, without commitment, to see whether it might in fact be desirable. I do not think it is necessary, but I have an open mind on this. I should not like to make an absolute commitment, other than a commitment to look at it hard between now and Report stage.
LORD CHAMPION: That undertaking to look at it beats me completely. It is true that, having regard to the fact that there is already a voluntary scheme working, and having had negotiations with the parties concerned, the Secretary of State must already have a considerable body of information as to what is required. Having regard to the undertaking given by the noble Earl I am happy to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 56 agreed to.
Clause 57 [Offences in connection with regulations under s. 56]:
LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY moved Amendment No. 254Q:
Page 49. line 19. after (" false") insert (" in a material particular ")
The noble Lord said: This Amendment and the following Amendment, which it might be convenient to consider together, are on a very small point. We are dealing here with the furnishing of false particulars. When Amendments on these lines were tabled in another place I thought it worth while tabling Amendment No. 255 on the ground that I did not much mind if it were an offence even in a small matter, if people made statements which they knew to be false; but I thought it would be a little hard if it were not a material particular that it should be an offence if they recklessly made a statement about something they did not know because it was unimportant and they had not bothered to find out about it. However, I have been advised that it would be more acceptable to table both Amendments. I think it right, as I am sure the Committee will agree, that people should not be penalised for mis-statements which are not false in a material particular. I have some hope that this Amendment might be accepted, and I beg to move.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: The noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, will be glad to know that it is with great pleasure that I accept both these Amendments, because we think they are useful. They prevent the possibility that an employer who is required to notify a procedure agreement to the Secretary of State by regulations made under Clause 56 might be prosecuted just because some minor and perhaps unimportant detail of his statement was not correct. I am grateful to the noble Lord for pointing this out, and we are glad to accept the Amendments because they improve the Bill.
LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY: I beg to move Amendment No. 255.
Amendment moved—
Page 49, line 20, after (" false") insert (" in a material particular ").—(Lord Beaumont of Whitley.)
On Question, Whether Claw e 58 shall stand part of the Bill?
2.39 a.m.
LORD GARDINER: At this late hour I could not allow this clause to go by without expressing the hope that on Report the Government will come forward with an Amendment. The clause says:
" This section applies to any enactment (not being an enactment contained in this Act) by virtue of which a body corporate, either directly or through any subsidiary body corporate, is required to take any steps with a siew to the establishment of machinery for the settlement by negotiation of terms and conditions of employment."
I cannot think that the clause was designed unless the Government knew to which Acts they were referring. If they do know, they ought to say what they are. Is the citizen supposed to hunt through the whole of the Statute Book to find what are the Statutes concerned? It goes on to say:
" In so far as any enactment to which this section applies is inconsistent,"
and they do not know which they are—
" with an order made by the Industrial Court under this Part of this Act which is for the time being in force, the order of the Industrial Court shall prevail and the enactment in question shall have effect subject to it."
I hope to enlist the sympathetic response of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, because I do not think this is the right way to legislate. People should not be left to hunt through the Statute Book to find to which Acts the Government refer. I hope that when we reach Report the Government will produce an Amendment showing which are the Acts to which they refer.
2.40 a.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I do not know why the noble and learned Lord assumes that an Order includes ultra vires Orders. I think this is an assumption which, without further consideration, I would not be able to share with him. It is necessary to give Orders made by the Industrial Court precedence over previous Statutes since some previous Statutes, particularly the various nationalisation Acts, have included requirements about negotiating procedures. For example, Section 46 of the Coal

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Industry Nationalisation Act 1946 requires the National Coal Board to set up machinery for consultation and negotiation; gives discretion to the Coal Board as to which unions are brought into the machinery. It would I think be undesirable for such constraints to continue to exist when the machinery of Part III is invoked. Moreover, if the Statutes in question could not be overruled by Order of the Industrial Court, then the nationalised industries would be in a privileged position compared with the private sector.
Having said that, I will of course make further inquiries. This is not a field in
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which I claim any particular expert legal knowledge. My information is that it refers to the nationalisation Acts. I am not aware of any others it refers to. But I had far better not commit myself finally. I take note of what the noble and learned Lord says and I hope that, with that explanation, he may be content to let the matter go at this stage.
Clause 58 agreed to.
House resumed.
House adjourned at eighteen minutes before three o'clock, a.m.