INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BILL

HL Deb 13 May 1971 vol 318 cc1202-65

3.35 p m.

THEMINISTERWITHOUT PORTFOLIO (LORD DRUMALBYN)

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.

Moved, That the House do again resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD SHACKLETON

My Lords, are we right in assuming that when we come to Divisions the new Division procedure will be in force? I think it will be. Noble Lords might like to remember this. And of course they have six minutes to get here instead of four.

EARL ST. ALDWYN

My Lords, the noble Lord is quite correct. Yesterday we passed the necessary Motion so that the new procedure could come into operation. I hope your Lordships will all bear with tolerance with each other and all milers to make sure that this procedure works. We may have a little teething trouble to start with, but I think it is well worth having a go at it.

On Question, Motion agreed to.

House in Committee accordingly.

[The EARL OF LISTOWEL, in the Chair]

Schedule 1 [Provisions as to certain closed shop agreements]:

BARONESS WHITE moved Amendment No. 143: Page 123, line 1, leave out ("reasonable").

The noble Baroness said: I beg to move the Amendment standing in the name of my noble friends. It might be for the convenience of the Committee if we took Amendments Nos. 143 and 144 together. These are really just probing Amendments. We are dealing with that part of Schedule 1 which outlines the terms of reference for the Commission on Industrial Relations if the Industrial Court refers to them an application for the establishment of a closed shop. All that we are trying to find out in these particular Amendments is how far the Government it propose that the words mentioned in Nos. 143 and 144 respectively add anything to these terms of reference. "Reasonable" is a word which can be open to a great many interpretations. We are concerned that in a Bill of this sort, which is going to affect people in their places of work, no words should be included which might be open to differing interpretations and lead to friction, unnecessary argument, feelings of resentment, or anything of that kind among those whose applications for examination might be turned down because the Commission on Industrial Relations did not feel that the conditions had been satisfied.

When we come to the word "stable", this again is open to differing interpretations, and I doubt whether it adds anything useful to this part of the Schedule. If one is "promoting or maintaining arrangements for collective bargaining", surely that is sufficient. What is meant by the word "stable" in this connection? It does not seem to make any real sense. In these two modest Amendments—I repeat, they are no more than probing—we are concerned only that we should not put in words which could be the subject of possibly rather tedious argument in the future. We shall be happy to know just what it is the Government have in mind, more particularly for the word "stable", which we think could be a matter of dispute and which really adds nothing useful to this particular part of the Schedule.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I willingly respond to the noble Baroness's probing on this subject, and I hope I shall be able to convince her that these words do add something. The removal of the word "reasonable" would remove from the reference the need for the Commission on Industrial Relations to have regard to the reasonableness of the terms and conditions of employment that prevail in the industry, and to the likelihood, or otherwise, of the proposed approved closed shop agreement being necessary for terms and conditions that are reasonable to be maintained. I hope that is quite clear. It seems to me that this is something that is well within the power of the C.I.R. to judge, and we think that it is desirable that the terms and conditions of employment should be reasonable. Indeed, in some of our discussions already emphasis has been laid on the need for terms and conditions that are reasonable to be maintained. Reference has been made, for example, to the low average salaries in the acting profession. Part of the object here is to ensure that there is no exploitation and to see whether it is necessary to have an approved closed shop agreement in order to permit reasonable terms and conditions of employment.

The second Amendment, also, would remove the need for the C.I.R. to have regard to the stability of arrangements for collective bargaining, for which the proposed approved closed shop agreement would provide, and to have regard to whether such an agreement was necessary in order to achieve that stability. The noble Baroness will recall that the stability of collective bargaining is one of the objectives of this Bill, and it is one of the tests to which those who are responsible for its administration will have regard. Both of these words really add something important.

LORD SLATER

Is the noble Lord aware that his observations are going to lead to a certain amount of nostalgia among workers in industry? I do not see why the Bill should refer to "maintaining reasonable terms". If one is in conversation with employees in industry one asks "What are your terms of employment?", not "what are your reasonable terms? Why introduce this word "reasonable"? I do not know whether this is a legal term. Then we come to "stable arrangements". We could twist this one around in so many ways. The word "stable" can cover a very wide area and, if we wished, we could argue about both it and the word "reasonable". I sincerely hope that the Government will give further thought to these words and will get rid of them. After all, we seek to negotiate with an employer of labour in order to reach agreement. The one who is making the application starts with the highest possible denominator, and the employer starts with the lowest, and they have to come together and reach agreement. I do not see why these words are included.

3.44 p.m.

LORD POPPLEWELL

I should like to follow up what has been said, because these are very important words. Under the new law it would be left to the Commission to decide whether or not an application was reasonable. But the Commission will have a law Lord, a judge, as its Chairman—

THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD HAILSHAM OF ST. MARYLEBONE)

The noble Lord is—

LORD POPPLEWELL

May I ask the noble and learned Lord to wait a moment? This ultimately goes to the Commission which at the present moment—

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I interrupted the noble Lord because I think he made a slip of the tongue. He said that the Commission had a legal Chairman. That is not the intention. What I suspect he meant to say was that the Court had a legal chairman. But I should like him to confirm that, because it will obviously alter the nature of the reply if I have misunderstood him.

LORD POPPLEWELL

I accept the correction which the noble and learned Lord has made. But this is so very important, and it takes away those human relations that we know so well. What is the interpretation of "reasonable"? We know that the Government have instructed various organisations, who are considering wage applications and applications for improved conditions, to take the national economy into account. Will the Commission have the same instruction and have to take account of the national economy? Will that be one of the rules laid down in the code of practice? When an application is submitted, an absurdly low figure might be put in by the employers, with a much higher figure put in by the trade unions, and in the majority of cases a compromise will be arrived at. What will be the position of the Commission? Will it not have to decide which figure is reasonable? There could be a very wide gap. Will the definition of the word "reasonable" be embodied in the code of practice? These are very ambiguous words, interpretations of them may be very wide, and the Commission may not have a free hand to decide what is reasonable.

What is reasonable in one case may be unreasonable in another. We have experienced what the Government consider reasonable in the public sector, but there is a different interpretation of the word when an application is made in the private sector. Will both the public sector and the private sector have the same rules? The Government must be a little more forthcoming in explaining what these words mean. Otherwise, we shall have to consider very seriously the effect of these words when the Bill becomes an Act.

LORD BERNSTEIN

May I ask the Minister whether he would consider these few clauses from the point of view of an employer? Assuming someone has decided to arrange for collective bargaining relating to workers would the word "stable" help or would it be difficult for them to overcome? I think that the clause would be better without the word "stable" which can have implications and decent industrialists and their personnel people would be confused in working out what it meant. Regarding the word "reasonable", we had an interesting debate on that last week but we got nowhere. Does it add anything to paragraph (b)? As an employer I would find those two words better removed than included.

3.50 p.m.

LORD DRUMALBYN

May I deal first with the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Popplewell. The Commission on Industrial Relations, as they have been in the past, will be people with special knowledge of industrial relations whether they have gained it in trade unions or by leaching or as employers. There may be other categories as well, but the Commission as a whole will have special knowledge of industrial relations. Subsection (1) says that "the Commission shall consider". This is a matter for the Commission to consider; it is not a matter for the employers to consider except in so far as they are considering, together with the employees, whether or not td make, an application for an approved closed shop agreement. The clause says— the Commission shall consider whether it appears to them, that it is necessary for those workers to be comprised in an approved closed shop agreement for the purposes"— and I take a particular criteria here— of maintaining reasonable terms and conditions of employment and reasonable prospects "— and it is not proposed to omit this second "reasonable"— of continued employment for those workers; and secondly— of promoting or maintaining stable arrangements for collective bargaining relating to those workers; Viewed in that context, I find it difficult to see why the Opposition should wish to leave out these words. I am not sure that the noble Lord, Lord Slater, really understands that the exclusion of the words "reasonable" and "stable" would make it more difficult for the C.I.R. to decide in favour of a closed shop application because under an agency shop agreement some terms and conditions and some bargaining arrangements could be secured. The words "reasonable" and "stable" here differentiate this kind of application and the kind of judgment that the C.I.R. has to make in this case, from others—from applications for an agency shop agreement, for example.

We are here talking about industries of a special character where special considerations apply, where there is a risk that there may be instability in the bargaining arrangements, where there is a risk that unless special arrangements are made the terms and conditions of employment will not in future be reasonable. It is in order to ensure that the terms and conditions will be reasonable and that the arrangements for collective bargaining will be stable that the C.I.R. has to be satisfied that it is necessary for a closed shop agreement to be approved.

LORD SLATER

The noble Lord referred to this Commission as having special knowledge of labour relations. Surely if these words have to be left in the Bill, as is proposed by the Government, are not the Government seeking to question the intelligence of those people, sitting as a Commission, in determining the factor in front of them at the time of the application. Is it necessary to have the word "reasonable" if these people are so far advanced in their knowledge of labour relations as he has already stated? Surely the noble Lord would not want that doubt to go out from this House—questioning the intelligence of a body to be set up—if they are to have this special knowledge of labour relations. "Labour relations" cover a very wide field. These few people—whatever the number may be—will not be so authentic in their judgment as the noble Lord tries to present to the Committee. When they examine an application they will say it is a reasonable form of application and the terms are considered to be reasonable.

LORD CONESFORD

The words do not question in any way the intelligence or competence of the Commission. The Commission is told that it has to examine the proposals before it to see whether they are necessary for these purposes; and the purposes under sub-paragraph (b) are— maintaining reasonable terms and conditions of employment and reasonable prospects of continued employment for those workers … In all the speeches made from the other side of the Committee concerning the difficulty of the word "reasonable", it is only the first use of the word "reasonable" in line I that has been questioned. The word "reasonable" also occurs in line 2, and in that instance it has not been challenged. Whether these words are necessary or not, there is nothing insulting to the Commission in having them in, and I cannot see why it is undesirable in line 1 but perfectly acceptable in line 2.

3.58 p.m.

LORD SHINWELL

Surely the Commission will make its decision on the facts presented by those making the application and not on adjectives. Recently in the course of one of our debates I ventured to remark that there was too much language injected into this Bill. It would seem that those responsible for drafting the Bill must have consulted the Oxford Dictionary of Quotations and seized upon every kind of adjective which they thought relevant and if they were not convinced of its relevance they thought it might be desirable to have put it in. I would not worry about this, and I will give the reason why: the more language there is in the Bill, the more adjectives which require interpretation, the more trouble there is going to be. It seems to me that if the Commission, considering an application, has to come to a decision, on the basis of the language embodied in the Bill—whether the purposes of an application are"reasonable"or "stable", it is likely to cause a great deal of resentment. Is this what the Government want? Do they not want this Bill to be implemented in a reasonable or stable fashion, in an orderly fashion, in a constitutional and co-operative fashion. Is that what they want? It is what I want. I dislike many features of the Bill; but if we are going to have the Bill, let us put a reasonable, orderly and stable proposition.

The Government are building up an awful lot of trouble for themselves. Something has been said about the intervention of members of the legal profession. I do not make any accusation as to whether members of the legal profession are going to have "pickings" out of this Bill. If they are going to have "pickings", good luck to them! Most people want "pickings" at some time or other. So I dismiss this consideration. But I would say to the Government: do not inject too much in the way of adjectives and odds and ends into this Bill. And I would say to my noble friends on the Front Bench: really, I would not worry about it at all. If the Government want these words, let them have them—they will have an awful lot of trouble in consequence.

BARONESS WHITE

I think we have demonstrated that there can be considerable argument about the two words which we have suggested might be left out, but I am very glad that the noble Lord explained, at any rate in part, the reasons for putting them in. They are extremely important. All this part of the Schedule is extremely important, because it contains the conditions which will enable the Commission to decide whether or no an application for a closed shop should be accepted, or whether in their view an agency shop agreement would be sufficient. Therefore, we are very much concerned about the actual terms of every one of these conditions. It is well known, of course, that we on this side of the Committee would prefer a very different arrangement indeed for closed shops than those which are proposed in the Bill, and that we do not care for the agency shop agreement; and therefore it is of great concern to us on what terms the Commission is to decide whether or no the closed shop is to be allowed, or whether the agency shop is to be preferred. In this Schedule, of course, the Government are raising every kind of hurdle, which is going to make the closed shop extremely difficult. For those of us—and this goes for employers as well as unions—who believe that in many circumstances the closed shop is preferable, this erection of one hurdle after another for any application for a closed shop is a matter of very considerable concern. Therefore, I make no apology at all for having raised this matter. I said at the outset that we regarded these as probing Amendments, and we would not divide the Committee on them, but it is something about which we feel we want to have the fullest possible explanation from the Government. We have had some explanation, at any rate, and in the circumstances I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

4.3 p.m.

BARONESS WHITE moved Amendment No. 145: Page 123, line 16, leave out ("Industrial Court and shall furnish copies of it to").

The noble Baroness said: The object of this Amendment is to remove from this section of the Schedule the reference to the Industrial Court wherever we are able so to do. The reason for this, quite briefly, is that in our view the whole of this Bill is imposing far too complicated and legalistic provisions for the good health of industry. It means that at every step one is going to have dual references, where you have to bring in the Industrial Court as well as the Commission. Our own philosophy on this is, I think, perfectly clear, and we have expressed it at earlier stages of our deliberations. It is that industry should be left to manage its own affairs. The degree of intervention which the Government are seeking to impose in this legislation is, in our opinion, both unnecessary and harmful. In the particular area with which this Schedule is dealing—that of the establishment of the closed shop—again, in our opinion, it should be left to the employers and the trade unions to make up their own minds whether this is the sort of arrangement which they think is advantageous to themselves and to the industry. But, as I say, the Government have insisted on proposing to establish this complicated mechanism which is going to remove from the direct participants, from the principals in industry, responsibility for ordering their affairs. This is an interventionist philosophy which does not appeal to us. We feel, as I say, that those who are directly engaged in industry are the ones who are best able to judge whether or not, in the first place, they wish to work a closed shop agreement, and, secondly, whether they think it is practicable and desirable in their own particular industrial circumstances.

Now this Schedule insists upon the reference in the first instance to the Industrial Court, but the real work, if I may so put it, will be done by the Commission on Industrial Relations, and then they have to report back to the Industrial Court which, so far as we can make out, has to take their opinion. There is nothing in this Schedule, as far as I can understand, which enables the Industrial Court to query in any way the conclusions of the Commission on Industrial Relations. They do not cross-examine them, or anything of that sort: as I understand it, they simply receive the report. In those circumstances, we think that this whole business of transmitting the report to the Industrial Court and of bringing them in at various points is undesirable. We would very much prefer, if there has to be any sort of intervention by any external body at all, simply to keep it to the Commission. We feel, as I say, that this injection of legalism into industrial relations is undesirable and time-consuming. As I think one of my noble friends suggested, it may provide more jobs for lawyers. We have little doubt about that. If this is one of the objects of the Bill, I think it will surely be highly successful. But we really do not support the particular procedure in this Schedule, which includes the bringing in of the Industrial Court. I beg to move.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I hope to persuade the noble Baroness that her arguments are somewhat inconsequential in this particular instance. We have had this argument before, on Amendment No. 82, and it is only slightly different in context that I repeat it now. The basic arrangements that we are discussing, and which have now been passed in Clause 16, make exceptional provision for a closed shop. There is nothing intrinsically legalistic in this except the earlier provision, which we have likewise passed, that unless it gets over this hurdle the closed shop should be illegal. Now that is something about which we have differed, and, it may be, reasonably differed, but it is a subject which I think we may have exhausted. The point, therefore, is that, if you are going to allow an exceptional closed shop, you must have legal machinery of some kind by which it is recognised that it is an authorised closed shop. The functions of the Commission on Industrial Relations are advisory. It therefore follows that the Commission cannot be the source of authority. The source of authority must either be the Secretary of State or the Industrial Court. Because we do not hold an interventionist view, we wish it to be established through the authority of the Court, and not through the Secretary of State. The effect of the Amendment would be to have the report made to the Secretary of State and not to the Court. This is a question of policy, but I do not think that the noble Baroness's thinking about it is logical. Nor do I think that her charge in this instance, that we are pursuing a legalistic system, has any basis in fact.

BARONESS WHITE

This is one of those things on which I suppose we must agree to differ, because as the noble and learned Lord has quite rightly said, it stems from two completely different philosophies about industrial relations and really about the whole Bill. We object to this procedure in toto, and therefore we are objecting to parts of it seriatim, and this is one of those parts. I think we are perfectly entitled to do so. We are going to talk about the Secretary of State in one moment, I believe, so I will not refer to that at present. The noble Lord said that the Commission were entirely advisory. So they are, as at present constituted, but there might be something to be said for giving them certain authority in certain areas where the Commission is the body which has done all the examination of the position and where, so far as I can see, the Industrial Court has no real function other than just rubber-stamping the report of the Commission. If the Industrial Court had anything of substance to perform that might be another matter. We cannot see it. So far as we see it, perhaps the Industrial Court does not use a rubber stamp; may be it uses a very beautifully designed seal—I do not know—but the effect is the same: that it is not the Court that makes the investigation; it is the Commission.

If one had to have an external body of any kind we should rather have the Commission; and frankly in this sort of circumstance it is not very good for the Commission, it seems to me, to be put in a quasi-subordinate position to an Industrial Court when the Court itself does nothing. The Court just goes through motions; it does not do anything of consequence. It does not make up its mind about anything. It just accepts somebody else's report, and if the other body has come to a conclusion, then the Industrial Court, as we understand this Schedule, has to accept it. In those circumstances I should have 'thought it would be very much more dignified for the Commission if they were allowed to say at the end of the day, when they had made all the investigations according to the various terms of reference: "We are of the opinion and we so decree." I should have thought that this was something well worth considering. Why go through all this rigmarole of the Industrial Court?

On Question, Amendment negatived.

4.13 p.m.

BARONESS WHITE moved Amendment No. 146: Page 123. line 18, leave out ("and to the Secretary of State").

The noble Baroness said: Here we come to the Secretary of State. The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, in replying to the earlier Amendment, said that the Government were not interventionist and did not wish to bring in the Secretary of State. In that case why should you bother to send him the report? One could send it as a matter of courtesy. As it is going to be published, his private secretary could even obtain it from Her Majesty's Stationery Office. We are suggesting that the report should go to the applicants, obviously, who ask that their industry should be organised on a closed shop basis. After all, it was they who made the submission in the first place. But what is the significance, if the Secretary of State is not to intervene, of, by Statute, insisting that the report should be sent to him? This seems to us illogical. In some of the propositions that were put forward by the last Administration, the Secretary of State was brought in at various stages. We understand that the present Government are against the Secretary of State in intervening in these matters. All right; we accept that that is their point of view. We suddenly find in the middle of this Schedule that it is going to be a statutory obligation on the Commission to transmit their report to the Industrial Court. If you are going to keep an Industrial Court, that has some sense. You must furnish copies of the report to the applicants. That, again, is a matter of sense and courtesy. But why, by Statute, do you then have to send it to the Secretary of State if he is not going to do anything about it? If he is not going to do anything about it, why bring him in at all? Perhaps when the confabulations on the Front Bench have concluded we may know just why at this particular point the Government think the Secretary of State should be particularly mentioned.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I think I may be able to give a reasonably short answer. First, the Secretary of State has a legitimate interest in industrial relations, and therefore the report should naturally be sent to him in copy. After all, when a Secretary of State sets up an Inquiry and a report is published, it is a matter of courtesy that it is usually addressed to him. There seems to be nothing more in it than that. I do not think there is anything about which we need make an issue. It seems to me an extraordinary suggestion that he should not be the recipient of a copy.

BARONESS WHITE

I made no such suggestion. I said I thought he would naturally, as a matter of courtesy, expect to receive it, but I also suggested that if it was going to be published in any case there should be no great trouble over that. I am sure the noble Lord will appreciate that if one takes the trouble specifically to mention a Minister of the Crown in a Schedule of this kind one would suppose that it was for some purpose, I do not think the report of the Commission will be addressed to the Secretary of State. It will be addressed, I would assume, to the Industrial Court, and therefore again this seems to us to be a few words by which this Bill might be shortened.

LORD POPPLEWELL

In the event of these reports being submitted to the Secretary of State, will they be made public in the same way that most of the repoorts are?

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Yes, the clause provides that they will be published. Indeed that was the noble Baroness's point.

On Question, Amendment negatived.

4.18 p.m.

BARONESS WHITE moved Amendment No. 147: Page 123, line 21, leave out ("and (2)")

The noble Baroness said: This Amendment is to leave out sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 5 of this particular part of the Schedule, and we have chosen to do it this way as it seems to come properly here. What we are concerned about is the principle of this subsection; namely, that it is for the Commission to decide on the evidence whether an application for a closed shop shall be granted or whether, in the view of the Commission, an agency shop agreement would suffice. Again this stems from our whole attitude to this Part of the Bill. As I said on the earlier Amendment, in our view it should be for those directly concerned to decide whether or not they want a closed shop or an agency shop. One can make certain conditions and certain safeguards, but why should those who desire a closed shop, and who if they are to get it have to satisfy the various parts (a), (b), (c) and (d) of paragraph 5(1) of the Schedule be told by the Commission, "We believe that you could get on all right if you had just an agency shop. You do not need a closed shop?" That is what we object to.

However good the Commission may be—and I have no doubt that they will be experienced—they cannot have experience of all the industries of this country. It is unreasonable to think this, however learned they may be. It takes quite a long time to learn the ins and outs of two or three industries. The Commission are being asked to examine applications from various quarters; and these applications may be more numerous than the Government anticipate. There are closed shop agreements acceptable to both sides in a number of industries. The Commission are being asked to make up their mind whether a closed shop is the right thing for a particular industry or whether the watered-down version, the agency shop, would be sufficient. I can understand that the Government do not want closed shops at all. They have been driven to accepting them because they have been convinced that otherwise, in certain circumstances, industry would simply dissolve into chaos. That is not the point of view on this side of the Committee, or of a number of others who have nothing to do with the Opposition but who have great experience of industry. The object of this Amendment is to indicate that we do not think that this procedure whereby somebody else decides whether or not there should be a closed shop is satisfactory.

4.22 p.m.

LORD DRUMALBYN

The effect of this Amendment would be to say that although under paragraph 5(2) the Commission are obliged to consider whether it appears to them that in the circumstances the purposes specified in the preceding sub-paragraph could not reasonably be expected to be fulfilled by means of an agency agreement (although they are bound to consider that) this is not a matter in which the report of the Commission must indicate the results of their consideration. With respect, I think that that is not a very logical position to take. If the noble Baroness had wanted to object to the Commission considering this, then she should have put down an Amendment to leave out subsection (2).

BARONESS WHITE

I indicated that we might have moved to leave out subsection (2), but the substance of the argument is the same.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I recognise that. As to the main proposition, it expresses a point of view which is quite opposite to ours. The noble Baroness has correctly stated the position. We believe that it should not be made easy to get a closed shop agreement approved, because we believe that in most cases an agency shop agreement will do just as well. It is only where an agency shop agreement will not do just as well, and it is absolutely necessary to have a closed shop agreement, that we think there should be a closed shop agreement. That is the difference between us. It seems to me proper that one of the major things that the Commission should indicate in their report is whether an agency shop agreement would do just as well.

LORD SHINWELL

My noble friend suggested that the Government were opposed to the concept of the closed shop. I wonder about that. I should have thought that the Government would welcome the closed shop. Obviously there are preliminary arrangements before a closed shop is accepted: the Commission must be satisfied that everything is in order and is reasonable, and so on; that there is a prima facie case for such a closed shop. Does it not appear to the Government that if we had a succession of closed shops, with a right for somebody who has a conscientious objection to belonging to a trade union, or to paying contributions to a union, to make a contribution to charity instead, this would be to the advantage of the Government and also to the advantage of the general run of industry in this country? I should like a further explanation from the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, about this, for it might facilitate our progress, if we could understand that the Government have no objection to a corporate body associated either with the shop floor or with a particular section of industry—because a closed shop might avoid a great deal of trouble. Surely in these circumstances the Government would rather welcome this concept of a closed shop. I should like to hear more from the noble Lord.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I gladly respond to the noble Lord. The fact is that the Government do welcome a closed shop, when it is necessary; but only when it is necessary, and not when an agency agreement would do just as well. I hope that the noble Lord will forgive me if I say that we discussed this matter very fully on Thursday night and I do not think he would wish us to go over the ground again.

On Question, Amendment negatived.

BARONESS WHITE moved Amendment No. 148: Page 123, line 21, leave out ("not").

The noble Baroness said: I think it might be desirable to take this whole group of Amendments together. I am willing to move each separately; but that might take a little time and we are anxious to save time. I think it might be convenient to take Amendments 148 to 155. Is that agreeable?

LORD DRUMALBYN

We willingly accede to this. I wonder if the noble Baroness, for the benefit of the House, could read out the effect of the Amendments if they were all accepted.

BARONESS WHITE

If I thought that they were all to be accepted, I should read them out three times.

LORD DRUMALBYN

Perhaps the noble Baroness will allow me to do so. I think I am right in saying that the result would be: If, on considering the matters specified in sub-paragraph (1) and (2) of paragraph 5 of this Schedule, the Commission are satisfied that for the purposes specified in sub-paragraph (1) of that paragraph it is appropriate for the workers in question to be comprised in an approved closed shop agreement, the report of the Commission shall indicate that fact.

BARONESS WHITE

That would be the text as amended. The purpose of all this is to indicate that we think the hurdles being erected in the path of employers and unions who wish to establish a closed shop are too high and too numerous. For one thing, we feel that the number and extent of the conditions laid down whereby the Commission has to make its recommendation are too great. There are four in paragraph 5: (a), (b), (c) and (d). We feel that any one of these could well be sufficient justification for the establishment of a closed shop, and that it should not be necessary that all four of them should be fulfilled in order to enable a closed shop to be acceptable.

After all, if a closed shop is necessary to maintain—I use the Government's words as they are here, unamended— reasonable terms and conditions of employment and reasonable prospects of continued employment for those workers"— if that is a condition which cannot be adequately sustained without the establishment of a closed shop, surely that should be sufficient. If without a closed shop you are not able to maintain reasonable terms and conditions of employment, and you do not foresee reasonable prospects of continued employment for the workers concerned, there must be something seriously wrong with the state and organisation of the industry. If a closed shop could remedy the matter, surely it would be justified. We do not see why the duty should be placed on the Commission to have to go through all four of these conditions when any one of them, in our view, might be taken to be sufficient in itself.

Any one of these conditions might be taken. Let us take the next one. If, to promote or maintain stable arrangements for collective bargaining in a particular industry it is essential to have a closed shop, surely that also should be sufficient in itself. Even though there may be reasonable prospects of employment without it, if, nevertheless, the arrangements for collective bargaining are chaotic and there may be considerable disruption and industrial unrest without a closed shop arrangement, again, surely a closed shop is justified on those grounds. Furthermore, if it is supposed that collective agreements which have been reached—I am referring now to condition (d)—may be frustrated unless there is a closed shop, again it should be sufficient justification for proceeding with a closed shop. Finally we suggest that sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 5 is one with which we are not in accord. The subject of the Industrial Court we have already discussed and I will not weary the Committee by going over that again. The only other Amendment we propose is that instead of using the word "necessary", the word "appropriate" would be sufficient; but we will not niggle too much about that. We thought that would be an improvement in the drafting in this paragraph. As I said, the nub of this is that we do not see that in their antagonism to the closed shop the Government should set up four hurdles where one is quite enough

4.33 p.m.

LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY

The noble Baroness, Lady White, has put forward a very strong case about what she called the nub of these Amendments; this question of the four different conditions and the necessity for all of them to be satisfied in order to get a closed shop. I will not weary your Lordships by repeating the arguments she made. I would just say that any one of those reasons would, I think, be a satisfactory one for having a closed shop agreement. It would not be too easy a way to obtain a closed shop agreement. It would take quite a lot to satisfy any one of these four conditions. For that reason, subject to the Government's reply and the course of the debate, we on these Benches would be inclined to support Amendments Nos. 149 and 150 which represent the nub of the matter. I do not think the others go to the heart of the matter or that a case has been made out for them. But Nos. 149 and 150 seem to me very reasonable Amendments.

LORD BROWN

I hope the Government will look at the drafting in the light of these Amendments. I should like to put the matter to them quite shortly. If the Bill stands as it is—and we have to remember that we are considering the conditions necessary for the Commission to decide whether there shall be an approved closed shop—the following circumstance could easily arise. The Commission are satisfied—this is an hypothetical circumstance—that an approved closed shop is necessary to allow workers to continue to be an organised body; to maintain reasonable and stable conditions of employment; to maintain stable conditions for collective bargaining and to prevent collective agreements from being frustrated. But they are not satisfied that there are reasonable prospects of continued employment. This being the case, however satisfied the Commission may be on the other counts, they cannot give their agreement to an approved closed shop.

This seems to me to be a result that no Government could have intended to arise from the drafting of this Schedule. It means in fact that there will never be an approved closed shop where there is any prospect of reasonably stable employment in the future. This means that the only industries or associations which could have closed shops are those which are threatened by redundancy or where trade is falling off. The Government may reply, "We are arranging for that in every industry by this policy," but I am not suggesting for a moment that they would with sincerity use such an argument. Therefore this matter must be looked at because, so far as I can see, that is precisely what this Schedule says. It simply means that if there is a reasonable prospect of continued employment in an industry, there cannot be an assent from the Commission for an approved closed shop, and I do not believe the Government intended that.

LORD SHINWELL

My noble friend Lord Brown is on a point of substance, and one which, moreover, is directly relevant to Government policy as we have experienced recently, and of which we may have even more bitter experience in the future. The recommendation by the Commission, which cannot give a definite decision but is advisory in character, would be conditional on whether the Commission is sa tisfied of continuation of employment. Can that be said of any industry in respect of any application for a closed shop, or even an agency? There can be no guarantee of continuation of employment because, I understand, the Government are very reluctant to give an assurance of continuation of employment at any time. Therefore, I canot understand why these words have been introduced. Are they relevant to the situation? Are they in line with the Government's prospects about the future? This is a matter of considerable substance which my noble friend has raised; indeed, he has raised the whole philosophy behind this Bill. because unless there is some understanding about employment, there is no purpose in having either a closed shop or an agency shop or anything of the sort. I think we ought to have a clear explanation of what the Government mean by these words, by this condition which must be accepted before the Commission can advise that a closed shop would be accepted.

LORD BERNSTEIN

I should like to support my noble friend, Lord Brown. The words we were discussing before under paragraphs (b) and (c) are relative. "Reasonable prospects" is the euphoriurn of business, as we can see from to-day's Stock Exchange. Maybe the times will be different when an employer (I know that it is for the employee but he can only go forward with the employer's consent) makes an application for an approved closed shop. If we take out the words "reasonable" and "stable", as suggested before, the Government would be in a better position to deal with this Amendment now. I support my noble friend in asking for a reconsideration of the drafting of this whole Schedule, which I think would be worth while.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I think we are once again on a major difference of opinion. We are anxious to ensure that there should not be closed shops except where they are necessary and when an agency shop will not do. I want to deal with the debate as it arose and come to the point of the noble Lord, Lord Brown, in due course.

LORD BROWN

The noble Lord has said that there is a major difference about the Bill. I am with the noble Lord in saying that an approved closed shop should be set up only in certain conditions. My argument does not rest on the basis that the noble Lord indicated.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I am grateful to the noble Lord for declaring the support he has indicated in this case. But I hope he will forgive me for saying that he was not the first speaker in the debate and I am trying to deal with the debate in the order in which it arose. I was saying that there is a real difference of opinion here. The noble Baroness is anxious to make it relatively easy for a closed shop agreement to be approved and wants any one of the criteria to be adequate to secure approval. We have devised gateways to meet special conditions. The mind of the noble Lord, Lord Brown, will no doubt go back to the Restrictive Practices Act, which provided that an applicant had to go through all the gateways. I think that it should be the same here and unless all these four provisions are met, then the probability is that an agency shop will do just as well.

I hope that the noble Baroness will accept this, because the agency proposals remove the possibility that a worker can enjoy the benefits of union bargaining strength without making a proper financial contribution towards the services provided by the union. We do not accept the proposition that there should be widespread and general exceptions to the principle that the workers should have freedom of choice as regards to membership or non-membership. This is the difference that exists between us.

I come to the argument that was put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Brown.

He argued that applicants might be able to go through all the other gateways but might be stuck through not being able to demonstrate that there was a reasonable prospect of continued employment. But this is not what is said. What the Commissioner has to do is to consider whether it appears that it is necessary for those workers to be embraced in an approved closed shop agreement for the purpose—and this is the purpose in question—of maintaining a reasonable prospect of continued employment for those workers. That does not mean absolute stability of employment for all the workers in the industry. What it means is that the prospects are reasonable and reasonable in all the circumstances. In other words, what he has to consider is whether the prospects would be more reasonable if there were an approved closed shop agreement than if there were not. That is what the words mean. They do not have the narrow meaning the noble Lord gave them of guaranteeing (the word used by the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell) continuation of employment. That is a complete bowdlerisation of the words in the Bill.

LORD BROWN

I really think that there may be a misunderstanding here. The Commissioner has to be satisfied that an approved closed shop is necessary to maintain reasonable prospects of continued employment for those workers. If the closed shop is not necessary for that purpose, because without it there is every prospect of prosperity and full employment, then he will not allow an approved closed shop. I did not quite follow the noble Lord, but I thought he had got it upside down. This means that wherever there is a growing industry, with every prospect of full employment and no danger of redundancy, the Commissioner will never be able to agree to an approved closed shop. That is what the Bill means. That is how it reads. I ask the noble Lord to look at this closely, because I do not think that the Government intend that to be the case.

LORD DRUMALBYN

Perhaps the noble Lord will allow me to amend slightly what he said. He said, "That is how the Bill reads". I would say, "That is how he reads the Bill". The point about the word "reasonable" is that it is a relative word, relative in the cir- cumstances of the case. The noble Lord has raised this point and of course we shall have a look at it to make certain that we are right in the interpretation put upon it and that the noble Lord's interpretation is wrong. The noble Lord's argument has been that he is afraid that this may make it impossible for a closed shop agreement to be made in circumstances where it ought to be made and where the only difficulty is that the general tendency of employment is downwards and therefore the C.I.R. would feel they were precluded by these words from approving an agreement. As the noble Lord has raised this question we shall look at it most carefully, but I must say to the noble Baroness that we are not able to accept this series of Amendments for the reasons which have been covered very considerably on earlier Amendments.

BARONESS WHITE

With great respect, I do not think that we have covered these particular conditions before, because it is only now in Schedule 1 that they are set out. I think that the Government should look carefully at the point raised by my noble friend Lord Brown, because I think it is open to considerable misunderstanding. Wherever this Bill is open to misunderstanding—and there are many places—that can lead to bad industrial relations and not good ones. After all, if the whole object of this great marathon of ours is to improve industrial relations, then the Government should be on the lookout for points such as that made by my noble friend Lord Brown, where, if he can misunderstand it, then the chances are that the shop steward on the floor will also misunderstand it.

I think I should be quite entitled to move every one of these Amendments (I shall move them, presumably, in any case) and divide on each one, but I think that would not be a reasonable use of our time. However, I must say that I am not in the least contented with the reply given by the Government. The noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, who was not mentioned in the reply by the noble Lord, was on the principal point of this group of Amendments; that is that the four conditions taken together and comprehensively we think are utterly unreasonable. Therefore, I propose to my noble friends, and to all noble Lords who have been listening to the argument and, I trust, are convinced by it, that we should press Amendments Nos. 149 and 150, because that is the real kernel of the argument that we have put forward. Whereas it is true—and we would not for a moment deny it—that we should like to make the conditions of the closed shop somewhat easier, I think that by insisting on all four of these conditions in their entirety the Government are making a closed shop virtually impossible. It is not a questiton of gates; it is a question of a maze with 10 foot hedges all round.

On Question, Amendment negatived.

BARONESS WHITE

I beg to move Amendment No. 149:

Amendment moved— Page 123, line 23, leave out ("all") and insert ("one of").—(Baroness White.)

LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY

should like to say just a word or two in expansion of what I said earlier. I would advise my noble friends to support the noble Baroness on this Amendment. I should like to make it clear that we do not think that the word "necessary" in line 25 should be replaced by "appropriate". We do not think that paragraph 7(1)(b) should be left out. We are not trying to widen to any considerable degree the possibility of getting a closed shop. We are, to paraphrase words used by the noble Baroness, just trying to stop it from being absolutely impossible, because if it is absolutely impossible, I do not see the point in having it in.

4.54 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 149) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 65; Not-Contents, 125.

CONTENTS
Addison, V.	Faringdon, L.	Rea, L.
Airedale, L.	Fiske, L.	Reay, L.
Amherst, E.	Gardiner, L.	Ritchie Calder, L.
Amulree, L.	Garnsworthy, L. [Teller.]	Sainsbury, L.
Archibald, L.	Henderson, L.	St. Davids, V.
Ardwick, L.	Henley, L.	Serota, Bs.
Bacon, Bs.	Hoy, L.	Shepherd, L.
Barrington, V.	Jacques, L.	Shinwell, L.
Beaumont of Whitley, L.	Janner, L.	Slater, L.
Bernstein, L.	Leatherland, L.	Snow, L.
Beswick, L.	Lindgren, L.	Sorensen, L.
Birk, Bs.	Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, Bs.	Stocks, Bs.
Blyton, L.	McLeavy, L.	Stonham, L.
Brockway, L.	Maelor, L.	Stow Hill, L.
Brown, L.	Meston, L.	Strabolgi, L.
Buckinghamshire, E.	Moyle, L.	Summerskill, Bs.
Burntwood, L.	Pargiter, L.	Swaythling, L.
Byers, L.	Phillips, Bs. [Teller.]	Taylor of Mansfield, L.
Champion, L.	Platt, L.	Wells-Pestell, L.
Chorley, L.	Plummer, Bs.	White, Bs.
Delacourt-Smith, L.	Popplewell, L.	Wootton of Abinger, Bs.
Diamond, L.	Raglan, L.
NOT-CONTENTS
Aberdare, L.	Clinton, L.	Eccles, V.
Ailwyn, L.	Clwyd, L.	Effingham, E.
Alport, L.	Colgrain, L.	Elliot of Harwood, Bs.
Amherst of Hackney, L.	Colyton, L.	Emmet of Amberley, Bs.
Ashbourne, L.	Conesford, L.	Exeter, M.
Balerno, L.	Cork and Orrery, E.	Falkland, V.
Balfour, E.	Cornwallis, L.	Ferrers, E.
Barnby, L.	Cottesloe, L.	Ferrier, L.
Beauchamp, E.	Cowley, E.	Fisher, L.
Belhaven and Stenton, L.	Craigavon, V.	Fortescue, E.
Belstead, L.	Cromartie, E.	Fraser of Lonsdale, L.
Berkeley, Bs.	Daventry, V.	Gage, V.
Blackford, L.	Denham, L. [Teller.]	Gisborough, L.
Boston, L.	Derwent, L.	Goschen, V. [Teller.]
Brecon, L.	Drumalbyn, L.	Grenfell, L.
Brooke of Cumnor, L.	Dudley, E.	Gridley, L.
Brooke of Ystradfellte, Bs.	Dundee, E.	Grimston of Westbury, L.
Carrington, L.	Dundonald, E.	Hacking, L.
Hailes, L.	Loudoun, C.	St. Just, L.
Hailsham of St. Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)	Lovat, L.	Salisbury, M.
	Lucas of Chilworth, L.	Sandford, L.
Hankey, L.	Lyell, L.	Sandys, L.
Harlech, L.	MacAndrew, L.	Sempill, Ly.
Harris, L.	Malmesbury, E.	Sinclair of Cleeve, L.
Hastings, L.	Mancroft, L.	Somers, L.
Hatherton, L.	Mansfield, E.	Stamp, L.
Hives, L.	Merrivale, L.	Strang, L.
Hood, V.	Merthyr, L.	Strange, L.
Howard of Glossop, L.	Milverton, L.	Strange of Knokin, Bs.
Howe, E.	Monck, V.	Strathclyde, L.
Hurcomb, L.	Mottistone, L.	Strathcona and Mount Royal, L.
Hylton-Foster, Bs.	Moyne, L.	Suffield, L.
Ilford, L.	Northchurch, Bs.	Swansea, L.
Inchyra, L.	Nugent of Guildford, L.	Swinton, E.
Jellicoe, E. (L. Privy Seal.)	Oakshott, L.	Teviot, L.
Kemsley, V.	Rankeillour, L.	Teynham, L.
Kilmarnock, L.	Rochdale, V.	Thorneycroft, L.
Kindersley, L.	Rockley, L.	Tweedsmuir, L.
Lansdowne, M.	Rothes, E.	Vivian, L.
Latymer, L.	Ruthven of Freeland, L.	Wakefield of Kendal, L.
Lauderdale, E.	St. Aldwyn, E.	Willingdon, M.
Lothian, M.	St. Helens, L.	Windlesham, L.

On Question, Amendment agreed to

5.3 p.m.

BARONESS WHITE

I beg to move Amendment No. 151:

Amendment moved— Page 123, line 25, leave out ("necessary") and insert ("appropriate").—(Baroness White.)

On Question, Amendment negatived.

BARONESS WHITE

I beg to move Amendment No. 152:

Amendment moved— Page 123, line 26, leave out from ("agreement") to end of line 29.—(Baroness White.)

On Question, Amendment negatived.

BARONESS WHITE

I beg to move Amendment No. 153:

Amendment moved— Page 123, line 30, leave out from ("fact") to end of line 32. —(Baroness White.)

On Question, Amendment negatived.

BARONESS WHITE

I beg to move Amendment No. 154:

Amendment moved— Page 123, line 33, leave out sub-paragraph (2).—(Baroness White.)

On Question, Amendment negatived.

BARONESS WHITE

I beg to move Amendment No. 155.

Amendment moved— Page 123, line 38, leave out paragraph 8. —(Baroness White.)

On Question, Amendment negatived.

5.5 p.m.

THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE (LORD BELSTEAD)moved Amendment No. 156: Page 123, line 39, after ("no")("effective").

The noble Lord said: With your permission, I will take Amendments Nos. 156 and 157 together. As it stands, paragraph 8 of the Schedule does not permit the court to approve a closed shop agreement if an application for a ballot is being made before the end of the period allowed, even though the application does not receive the required support of the necessary one-fifth of the workers concerned. Clearly that was certainly not intended by the Bill. As the Schedule stands, a single relevant worker could frustrate the approval of a closed shop agreement. The proposed Amendments remove that anomaly by ensuring that the court will only be prevented under paragraph 8 of the Schedule from approving an agreement, following a recommendation of approval by the court where an effective application for a ballot is made; and an effective application will be one which is defined in Amendment No. 187, which has the support of at least one-fifth of the workers concerned, so that a ballot on the issue may be approved under the provision of paragraph 11(1) of the Schedule.

I realise that there are differences of opinion between the two sides of the Committee on the necessity and desirability of balloting under this Schedule, but I hope that noble Lords opposite will agree that this is a move in the direction which they would approve, and it is certainly a move in the direction which the Bill intended.

BARONESS WHITE

Obviously the Government have woken up to a loophole in the Bill which they are seeking to close. We found it fairly confusing to try to understand the intention of this particular part of the Schedule. It seemed that it was a contracting-out procedure rather than a contracting-in procedure, but the fact that the Bill was drafted in this way (and it is only at this relatively late stage in this discussion that the Government have realised the effect of the Bill as drafted) is just one more indication of what a complicated Bill this is. If we did not have the complex machinery which is required for the establishment of a closed shop we should not have to worry about this particular Amendment.

We shall not oppose the Amendment; we can see the sense of it within the context of the Schedule and we are just sorry that we must have such a complicated piece of machinery in order to carry out the provisions of the Schedule; but even the Government's draftsmen had not realised that there was the possibility of one single individual frustrating the application.

LORD BERNSTEIN

In view of the fact that the Government have come forward, wisely, to stop a loophole and to deal with a piece of cumbersome machinery in the Bill, may we recommend to them that they should go through the rest of the Bill to see whether they can reduce the legal jargon and make the Bill clearer to laymen like myself?

LORD BELSTEAD

I beg to move Amendment No. 157.

Amendment moved—

Page 123, line 42, at end insert— ("( )In this paragraph "effective application" means any application which is not precluded by paragraph 10 of this Schedule from being entertained by the Industrial Court."). —(Lord Belstead.)

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (LORD AIREDALE)

Before calling Amendment No. 158, I should point out that it pre-empts Amendment No. 159; so that if Amendment No. 158 is agreed to I shall not be able to call Amendment No. 159.

5.9 p.m.

LORD GARDINER moved Amendment No. 158: Page 124, leave out Part II of Schedule 1.

The noble and learned Lord said: I beg to move the Amendment standing in the name of my noble friend Lord Delacourt-Smith. This Amendment is to leave out Part II of Schedule 1 of the Bill, that Part which deals with the holding of ballots. May I, to save misunderstanding, make two preliminary observations? First of all, I am in favour of an Industrial Relations Bill. The Government of which I was a member introduced one which went so far as they could get, depending upon co-operation from both sides of industry, the then Government rightly or wrongly taking the view that co-operation was essential for an Industrial Relations Bill. Secondly, that Bill contained provision for the holding of a ballot. Owing to the Election, it was not a Bill which was examined in detail; and it did not make any proper provision for what was to happen if there was a dispute as to the result of a ballot.

Of course—and this is the only point with which I want to deal, although others of my noble friends may have other points upon this part of the Schedule—a ballot may be extremely complicated. If we take, for example, the Engineering Federation, I think they have one and a quarter million members, and it must be realised that whoever is going to conduct the ballot has a very big administrative job on his hands. There may well arise a dispute as to what the result of the ballot is. We should all be very shocked if somebody suggested that the decision of the returning officer was to be final and no one could inquire into it. We recognise that returning officers are fallible. Even though they are people like town clerks and clerks of the peace, they may make a mistake. A wrong pile of papers may get into the wrong file for voting purposes or be counted wrongly; there can be arithmetical mistakes; there can be differences of view as to what is a spoiled paper, and so forth. So we provide a rather elaborate system of appeals to an Election court, and of course the court can order the returning officer to send the ballot boxes to the court and they can look at the papers themselves.

What is provided so far in this Schedule is that the Commission shall determine whether the ballot is to be taken by the Commission, or is to be taken under the supervision of the Commission by some other body—and we have had no real explanation as to what other body—and what the arrangements are to be, and should arrange for the ballot to be taken accordingly. Then it is provided: After the ballot has been taken, the Commission shall report the result of the ballot to the Industrial Court …".

Supposing somebody does not think that the Commission has the answer right, there is at the moment no means of appeal and no way of checking that; nor has the Industrial Court itself any power at all.

Moreover, although here we are dealing with closed shop agreement ballots, it must be remembered that this very complicated Bill provides in Clauses 11 and 12 for a ballot on agency shops; in Clauses 13 and 14 for ballots on the continuation of an agency shop agreement; Clauses 43 to 48, ballots on sole bargaining agents; Clauses 49 to 51, ballots on ending recognition, and Clauses 137 to 141, ballots on emergency conditions. And the Bill, whichever type of ballot it is dealing with, provides that, whatever the Commission says is the result of the ballot, the Court is bound to make an Order. So one might take for example an agency shop agreement which has existed for 25 years, with the full support of the employers and the trade union; they have never had any trouble and of course they want to continue with it. But if a limited number of disgruntled members object, then a ballot can be ordered. Then we have this remarkable provision. Whereas usually in our democracy a majority who vote decide, here this extraordinary provision lays down that the employers and the union must get more than 50 per cent. of those eligible to vote.

If in such a case the Commission report that they have not a majority, the Court is bound to accept that. But if it comes to the knowledge of the employers and the union, both of whom want the agreement to go on, that the Commission has been wrong about this— there is a factual mistake, or votes have been wrongly counted, as the case may be—no provision is made at the moment as to who can determine this dispute.

When I first raised this question and pointed out that of course in these circumstances the Industrial Court is a rubber stamp, the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said a word about its not being a rubber stamp, but he said nothing at all in answer to the question, "If there is a bona fide dispute as to whether the report of the result is right, who is to decide it?" I do not complain of that at all because I raised the question at half-past two one morning, and this is a frightfully complicated Bill and even noble and learned Lord Chancellors cannot be expected to know everything that is in it. I then raised the matter on a second occasion, and the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, very naturally, and if I may say so very courteously, said that this was not a point that he was familiar with but he would make inquiries about it. At a later point in the debate he received one of the pieces of paper which Ministers are apt to receive, and he said: The answer to the noble and learned Lord's question on which I had to receive advice is that there would automatically be a right of appeal to the Divisional Court if the C.I.R., as the noble and learned Lord quite rightly pointed out, exceeded its powers or erred or acted contrary to its statutory duty under this Bill. For this reason we think that there would be no need for a special appeal provision.

Of course, there is not a word in the Bill or in any Schedule about anyone having an appeal from the C.I.R. to a Divisional Court. If the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor was here I think he would agree with me that whoever wrote the piece of paper meant was that if a statutory body exceeds its statutory powers, then under the prerogative writs of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition one can go to a Divisional Court. But, of course, I was not speaking about a case of that kind at all. A Divisional Court does not decide disputes of fact. I was not suggesting any case in which the Commission would exceed its statutory powers; I was simply raising a case of what was to happen if it made a mistake. Elections are complicated matters, and we have had quite a large number of election petitions where a court has had to go into the question.

In any case, trade union ballots are not necessarily all that simple. I once spent between three and six weeks of my life to prove that the declared election result of the re-election of the Communist president of a trade union was wrong; that the election had in fact been manipulated by a fairly small number of Communist area organisers and Communist branch secretaries, accompanied by a good deal of fraud. My recollection is that I called 123 witnesses to prove that this was so. So these things are not always all this simple. If there is a dispute, therefore, as to whether the returning officer's report of who has won an election or a ballot is correct, one must provide who is to decide the dispute.

I raise this point with some reluctance because if you have a Bill to which, for one reason or another, you are opposed, and you see that it is literally unworkable, it is politically tempting if you sit on this side of the Committee to say, "For goodness' sake don't raise that! Leave it alone." But then I feel very strongly that, particularly in a case where the Government have prevented the other Chamber from considering the details of a Bill by a guillotine, it is essentially the responsibility of this House which we have no right to shirk to fulfil our duty as a revising Chamber. Here I am doing something to improve the Bill because that is part of our duty; and this is obviously a point which the Government simply have not thought out. There simply must be someone to determine who is to decide if the employers and the trade union say, "We have received information which leads us honestly to believe that the return of the Commission saying that we have lost the ballot is not right." Some of these ballots are going to be very large indeed, and these matters may not come to the notice of those concerned until they know what the report of the Commission is. It may be that some people, where large numbers are involved, say they never received their ballot papers.

The conduct of ballots is not all that easy, and this will never work unless appropriate machinery is provided. This is why for the third time I venture to ask the question, what is to happen if the Commission make a mistake? I am not suggesting they will act in bad faith or exceed their statutory powers, but suppose they say that the employers and the trade unions have lost the ballot and therefore the Industrial Court has no power to do anything except to extinguish the agreement, and it is said "But that is wrong, because if you recount the votes and do it properly this time you will find that in fact we won". For the third time, I venture to ask this question.

5.21 p.m.

LORD CONESFORD

Though my approach to this part of the Schedule differs horn that of the noble and learned Lord who has just addressed the Committee, I am very glad that this Amendment gas been put down, because it will enable me to make probably my only speech on this Schedule, to make my point of view clear, and to make the strongest possible appeal I can to the Government to consider certain matters before the Report stage. I have not myself set down any Amendments, and therefore it is an appeal to the Government. I will tell them what I think is wrong with a paragraph of the Schedule and what lies behind it. I think the noble and learned Lord was thinking particularly of paragraph 15 of the Schedule.

My objection—without saying anything about his point on paragraph 15; on that, with him, I look forward to hearing the reply—is to paragraph 14. Paragraph 14 says: If the result of the ballot, as so reported, is that a majority of the workers eligible to vote in the ballot have voted in favour of the proposed agreement, the Industrial Court shall make an order approving the proposals embodied in the draft agreement which accompanied the initial application. They are given no alternative whatsoever, nor can argument, so far as I can see, be addressed to them that they should not approve the scheme. I take the view — it may be I am the only one that takes it, although I am not certain—that Clause 16 of the Bill, saying that in the circumstances outlined a man shall be compelled to join a trade union, is a breach of an express provision of paragraph 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. I think that matters, for the reasons I gave in an earlier intervention. I know it would be hopeless to try to leave out Clause 16 altogether; it has passed another place; it has a large measure of approval in both Houses, though I would point out that it was passed by a majority of only two in another place.

What I beg noble Lords to consider, wherever they sit in this Chamber, is whether there ought not to be a chance, somewhere, for the court to consider an objection on these lines: that the trade union (which, if the application is granted, will be the only trade union and a compulsory trade union in the place concerned) has shown by its conduct that it is quite unworthy to be given this universal authority and to command this compulsory membership. I beg members of the Committee, wherever they sit, if they will, to dismiss from their minds Equity and the Seamen's Union. They may be convinced that they know enough about those two unions to be sure that no such objection would be likely to be put forward or to be successfully maintained to either of them. But this goes much wider. We have already passed the clause. If we pass the Schedule, and this part of the Schedule containing paragraph 14, whatever trade union is proposed in a future closed shop, provided it has passed these tests that have already been laid down, ballot and so on, then no matter how oppressive it may have been in its past conduct, either to its own members or to people it has sought to compel to become members or to people with whose rights and freedom it had proposed to interfere, whatever its conduct had been, there would be nobody who could go to the Court and say "We object on these grounds".

As I said, I have not put down any Amendment, but I implore the Government to consider this objection to the universal closed shop, from which the only escape is to be conscientious objection, and to ask themselves whether the Court ought not to be entitled to consider objections when the matter comes before it. I have not drafted the grounds of the objection, nor who should be entitled to object, but I beg the Government to realise that I am raising a serious point that concerns individual liberty, and indeed a 0liberty enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. I beg the Government—if, as I know, they believe in the Clause sufficiently to insist on its being in the Bill, and have in mind, I know, two particular industries—to realise that there are these potential evils if it is sought to extend the privilege to other industries. The right protection, in my submission, is for the Court to have some power to entertain objections.

LORD POPPLEWELL

I feel this is a most peculiar argument advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Conesford. His premise is that possibly a ballot taking place like this may result in a majority vote in favour of a closed shop, and, it is suggested, this may give power to certain unions which would not be fitted to hold that power. Who is to decide this? The noble Lord says someone else must decide. But surely the very principle involved in this particular clause indicates, first that 20 per cent. must make the request in writing, and then over 50 per cent. of those eligible to vote must record their vote in favour. Are not they the correct people to decide? The noble Lord suggests that someone may object. No matter what law, what regulation we have in this free society of ours someone may, and will, object. Lots of people object to paying the education rate; lots of people object to paying various local government rates or taxes; but it is the law of the land. The majority must decide on this matter, and on a democratic basis these other people, for the time being, must accept it. This is the position with this clause.

Some unions to-day have a system of ballots before finality arises on certain decisions; other unions have not. You find that such as the miners, for instance, where it is comparatively easy for them at a meeting to take a ballot. There are organisations with a scattered membership, and the seamen are supposed to be exempt because of their scattered membership. There are various transport organisations, and the railways, where it may be difficult to get a ballot quickly and a decision quickly. It also means that before a strike is declared a ballot must take place, and the people negotiating naturally arrive at certain difficulties or conclusions which they have to accept or reject. Now this clause takes away the final decision of those people who are bargining. Once a ballot has taken place, does it mean that another ballot has to take place if the full terms of reference of the first ballot have not been maintained? This increases the difficulties, and one can see that, instead of leading to quick settlements, from time to time negotiations may go on for a longer period than necessary.

Another difficulty that arises is that the Commission will have to conduct the ballot. They will have to do it themselves, or see that someone else does it. What powers will be vested in the Commission so far as the actual conducting of the ballot is concerned? We have some of our mining friends here. One remembers that at one particular time in the mining industry the controversy was so great that they could not conduct any union business on the pit premises. Therefore, to arrive at some decision people had to go round to their homes, or conduct a ballot outside the particular industrial undertaking involved. Will powers be given that, where a ballot has to be taken, the employer has to provide facilities for taking that ballot? I suppose this difficulty can be overcome all right, but I think some reference to it ought to be made to enlighten us on the subject.

The next point that arises has been referred to far more adequately than I can hope to do by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner. What is going to happen so far as ballot rigging is concerned? It is not entirely unknown, and the noble and learned Lord referred to that extremely difficult case he had to deal with. These are some of the problems where, instead of attempting to enforce these particular provisions, further discussions ought to have taken place with the Trades Union Congress, representing the organised trade unions affected, in order to go into more detail as to what is the best applicable for any given industry. This subject bristles with difficulties, and far more thought ought to be given than just thrusting it across and saying that a ballot, under these particular terms and conditions, must apply in these circumstances.

THE EARL OF DUDLEY

This Bill is about balance. In view of the earlier remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, I should like to introduce what I believe to be a little balance into this argument about the closed shop. Naturally I accept that we all dislike being associated—whether in legislation or in practice—in an activity which seems to carry with it the threat of excluding a man from a job. It offends against our sense of fair play. As the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, said, it is written into the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Noble Lords may not remember that in this House in 1901 there was a majority decision of noble and learned Lords in which the view was taken that individuals had an equal right to choose with whom and where they should work. That was the view taken 70 years ago in this House.

Of course, a closed shop is a majority decision, or the view of a majority of workers, that they do not wish to work with a minority who have chosen, or who decide for one reason or another, not to be members of the majority's union. In taking that choice they may carry it through to the point of downing tools and walking out, unless their wishes are acceded to. If they do, not only will the particular industry, or company, be disrupted, but the national interest may well be affected. I leave it to the individual consciences of noble Lords to decide, when this conflict between the national interest and individual rights takes place, where and which policy noble Lords would uphold. I shall not keep noble Lords much longer. I well understand that this compulsion might be objectionable if people were being compelled to do something which was, in itself, had, but I cannot—and I have had a number of years in industry—see that there is anything particularly bad about a man's being asked to join a trade union. On the contrary, very often the employer will consider it beneficial that he should do so. It will certainly be in the workers' interest, and it may well be in the national interest.

LORD BYERS

May I interrupt the noble Lord for a moment? Are we not discussing Part II regarding the ballot, and not the principle of the closed shop?

THE EARL OF DUDLEY

I accept that, but I felt it was necessary to say this in view of the remarks about human rights, and individual rights, in connection with the closed shop which were made by the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, not only the day before yesterday but also to-day. I feel that in this context, and in the context of Schedule 1, some reply should be made from this side of the House to show that not all of us are in agreement with him. I have listened patiently for several days, and I felt I ought to reply.

LORD BYERS

The fact that the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, was out of order does not justify the noble Earl in being out of order.

LORD CONESFORD

I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Byers, took the view that I was out of order. Will he read paragraph 14 of Schedule 1, which the Amendment of the noble and learned Lord proposes to leave out? I am criticising a particular provision in the Schedule which it is proposed, by this Amendment, to leave out. I do not think that the noble Lord, Lord Byers, who is a very old friend, can really argue that that is out of order.

LORD BYERS

I apologise; if the noble Lord was out of order, it was only slightly.

5.40 p.m.

LORD DIAMOND

I do not know whether the noble Lord would prefer to reply to the debate at this stage? I have further comments to make which are complementary to what my noble and learned friend said, and relate to the whole of Part II. Perhaps it would be convenient if I explained to your Lordships why this Amendment goes even wider than the matters to which my noble and learned friend referred. My noble friend made it quite clear that he was opposed to Clause 15, and the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, is opposed to Clause 14. I am opposed to Clauses 13, 12, 11, 10 and 9. If all those oppositions are upheld, then Part II will be removed and I am suggesting that the sensible course would be for it to be removed.

I am particularly grateful not only to my noble and learned friend who made, with the complete and full authority of the distinguished office which he previously held, what everybody must realize to be a most penetrating case and one that must shock all of us who believe in the dignity of the courts, but also to the noble Earl, Lord Dudley, for what he thought it right to add to put the matter in context. I thought he was absolutely fair and objective in making clear that this is not a simple matter. This is a very difficult matter of individual liberty and national interest, and nobody wants to override individual liberty, however odd it may be, however curiously an individual may want to behave, unless it has to be overridden in the national interest. I understood very much what he had to say, and I should not have thought there was much difference between his approach and mine on this difficult issue. But having said that on the philosophical approach, I am bound to say that, be he right or not, there is no need for all this paraphernalia. That is what I am inviting the Committee to agree to.

Here is this enormous paraphernalia which, however detailed, notwithstanding that it is 15 clauses long, is as my noble and learned friend made clear, incomplete, and incomplete in a most material respect. If one wanted to do the job properly, one would have to go into much more detailed paraphernalia affecting the relationship between an employer and his employees, the background being that both the employer and the employees are satisfied with the arrangements which they have reached between themselves and happy, as we know, means productive; the background being that, notwithstanding that happy and productive state of affairs, it all has to be interfered with and several hoops, impossibly narrow and jagged, have to be got through in order for their wishes to be carried out, which wishes could be most easily upset as could industrial relations between that employer and his employees.

I do not want to spend time in dealing with the interesting speech of the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, except to say that I think his principle is that he is against any union which has Communist domination for the time being. He feels that any union which has acted as Communists are liable to act would therefore be a union to which nobody should be compelled to belong. All I am bound to say is that I regard the present Government as the worst Government this country has had to endure this century, but that I uphold democracy, notwithstanding the results that it has produced. I believe that the way to deal with that situation is to fight against it by persuasion, and not to have appeals to the courts and so on.

LORD CONESFORD

May I ask the noble Lord one question? Does he think that Clause 16 is a breach of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or does he not?

LORD DIAMOND

The noble Lord should ask that question of his noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor, because he has asked that question four times and I do not know what answer he has had. I should be most interested to listen to him asking it time and time again, and I am bound to say to the noble Lord that he should have no doubt whatever that his message has got over. I have heard it, the Committee has heard it and I am sure that the Government are apprised of it. But the Government are not saying that, because of that, they are proposing to scrap these provisions. What I imagine the Government have in mind—though they have not disclosed it—is what the noble Earl, Lord Dudley, fairly disclosed; namely, that anybody looking at this matter with objectivity will be bound to recognise that there is a difficult conflict between individual rights and conflicting interests, which dogs us in all our steps of trying to devise sensible community relationships and rules. This is a problem of living together, which we all well understand and with which we have to cope. That is why we have to try to deal with it in this place and in the other place. So I come back to the Schedule, and say that, for those reasons, and for one other which I shall give, it is to be hoped that the Government will not insist on this paraphernalia.

The other reason I want to give is this—it is one that I have mentioned before in another context, but it is something that I hold to be very important indeed. The more union members are directed to turn their attention to courts and commissions and ballots and other outside activities to settle their union disputes, the more you disrupt unions, the more you reduce the natural loyalty which holds union members to their union; the more do you make it impossible for unions to deliver the goods which the employer wants and which the national interest requires. This is a disruptive process that is being carried on through clause after clause. Union members are being invited and directed to look outwards the whole time, instead of getting around the table, in the canteen or wherever it is, with their fellow members and arguing out their difficulties within the trade union. That is the only way to strengthen a union and to strengthen the factor which is of the greatest value within a union—the sense of loyalty which would enable men to do what this Bill wants; namely, with a bargain having been entered into it will be kept as a matter of loyalty, not as a matter of law, because union members do not enter into bargains; it is the unions which propose a sort of price list which the union members are invited to accept.

Therefore, I say that, in a very profound way, this is a continual weakening of union solidarity, which will in turn be a weakening of the union's ability to produce and deliver the goods. I am saying that for those reasons we ought not to be cluttered up with the whole of this legalistic paraphernalia, in order to determine a matter which employer and employees are able, with ease and mutual understanding, to solve themselves.

5.49 p.m.

LORD DRUMALBYN

This debate has ranged from the particular to the general, but I do not complain about that. The general points which the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, has been making are points on which there is obviously a difference between the two sides of the Committee.

LORD DIAMOND

Not only between the two sides.

LORD DRUMALBYN

This is certainly a question of emphasis. But the essential point here is very difficult for anybody to deny. Where a union and an employer together make an arrangement, it is by no means certain that that arrangement will be for the benefit of the workers. In a case of that kind, where the workers are losing some of their natural rights, it is not in any way a bad thing that they should be given the opportunity of expressing their own opinions. This is what the Schedule allows. The union and the employer can make their joint application. The Commission will sift the application after it has been referred to it by the Industrial Court, to see whether it complies with the conditions laid down in Schedule I. Once that is done it still remains possible, and it still should remain possible, even though the Commission thinks that it is necessary for the purposes indicated, for the members of that union, or the unions covered, to express their opinion as to whether or not they should consent to the loss of these rights.

Perhaps I may say this to the noble Lord, Lord Popplewell— and this is very much related to the remarks made by my noble friend Lord Conesford, who expressed doubt, if I understood him correctly, in the first place, as to whether the majority has the right to take away the rights of a minority, rights which are written into the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These are rights which this country has undertaken, on behalf of its citizens, to observe. If I understood my noble friend correctly he was arguing that before the Court actually made the order there should be a chance for people to make representations in the Court as to the fitness of the particular union or unions to exercise these rights. This is something which I think we should look at again. It is a legitimate thing for the noble Lord to raise. I personally had not considered it before and it is only fair to the noble Lord to say that we shall look at this again.

Next is the point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, about the possibility that, in the course of conducting an appeal, the Commission on Industrial Relations might make a mistake. I am advised that it still remains our opinion that the aggrieved parties may have redress under the Common Law prerogative writ procedures—that is, to the Divisional Court. We see no reason for a special procedure to deal with this kind of problem, which is not confined to this particular statutory body; but since the noble and learned Lord has pressed—if I may say so, very reasonably—for this to be looked at again, of course we shall be ready to do so. As he said, it is the third time he has done so but the noble and learned Lord will recognise that everybody is having quite a job to do the job in hand. We hope for an interval, once the Bill has gone through the Committee Stage, in which we can look at these points at a little more leisure than is possible now. Certainly the noble and learned Lord's point deserves to be looked at in that spirit.

The noble Lord, Lord Popplewell, raised a point about the power of the C.I.R. to require the employee to provide facilities. So far as ballots are concerned, if he will look at paragraph 36 of Schedule 3, he will see that the C.I.R. has pretty extensive powers to get names and addresses of persons employed and such particulars as the position held by each of them, if they be specified and so on. We have already dealt with the question of the provision of premises so I need not go over that again. Finally, may I say once again to my noble friend, Lord Dudley, that we believe that in the agency shop we are providing a means of satisfactory organisation which will preserve the liberty of the individual in its entirety and at the same time promote good industrial relations. We do not think it will be difficult for existing closed shops to enter into such agency shop agreements, and we think that compulsion would be objectionable except in those circumstances where it is absolutely necessary.

To the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, I would simply say that he waxed very eloquent on the particular points that he raised. These, I think, are points that have been covered already, and I do not think he will expect me to answer them in detail again. If that is not so, I can deal with them at greater length, but I am sure he will agree that these are points we have covered previously, although he summarised them extremely well.

LORD DIAMOND

I am most grateful for the courteous closing remarks of the noble Lord. The least I can do to reciprocate his courtesy is to support his plea to his noble friend the Leader of the House that more consideration should be given to the need for leisure. I thought he made a very good point which was extremely far-sighted and foresighted with the noble Earl the Leader of the House sitting here during the course of that eloquent plea.

EARL JELLICOE

I do not think I can let the noble Lord get away with that. If I understood my noble friend correctly, he was suggesting that it would be highly desirable, if we could so manage to order things, that we got through our Committee stage with reasonable expedition, and this would permit your Lordships' House, departmental officials, "Uncle Tom Cobley and all", to have a reasonable period for reflection and to work on Amendments as necessary between Committee stage and Report stage.

LORD BYERS

Before we come to a decision on this may I put it to the Government in the light of what the noble Earl the Leader of the House has said, that it would expedite our proceedings if, when the Government are going to be conciliatory, they would announce it at an early stage in the debate.

LORD GARDINER

I understood the noble Lord to say that, with all the things that have to be considered, we must have a reasonable interval between the conclusion of the Committee stage and the Report stage. I think that is absolutely right. As your Lordships know, I have been advancing arguments to try to improve the Bill because I feel strongly that this really is the responsibility of your Lordships' House as a Revising Chamber, particularly where the guillotine has been in operation and some provisions have not been looked at by the other place. We must have time to do this. Most of the Members of your Lordships' House have to earn a living; we are part-time; we are unpaid; most of us have reached a certain age—

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

We have all reached a certain age.

LORD GARDINER

Some have reached a more certain age than others, and therefore we hope that, in the conduct of the House and the hours we have to sit, and the vacations we get the Government will take those things into account.

LORD DIAMOND

May I say how I welcome these two interventions? May I suggest, with respect to the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, that he should not lose heart by this first refusal. After all we had to ask a question three times before we received a satisfactory answer. He should keep trying, and no doubt his noble friend the Leader of the House will take a more sympathetic view on the third appeal. That reminds me: it would be helpful to us, in preparing for the Report stage, if we knew during the course of the Committee stage what the answers to these questions were. I do not want to make too much of this, but my noble and learned friend has raised this point three times and we have now got to the stage when we are told that an answer will be considered.

The noble Lord, Lord Conesford—I will give way in one moment, because I am on exactly the same point—has made the same speech three times, within my hearing, and has asked: is Clause 16 in conflict with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or is it not? Although my view is that it is not—he once read it out to us, and I formed the very clear view that it was not—I should have thought it was up to some noble and learned authority on the other side of the Committee to answer that question. Therefore it would be much more helpful if we could know as we go along what the attitude of the Government is, so that we need not take up an unnecessary amount of time on Report stage by putting down the same Amendments to enable us to ask the same questions to get the necessary information. I do not know whether the noble and learned Lord would like me to give way.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

All I was going to say was that it is a matter of great regret to me that I was not in the Chamber when the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, spoke. Had I known that he was going to speak I should have made it convenient to be here, but in the circumstances perhaps I may be excused from providing an answer to his questions at this moment. I do not know quite what they were, and I do net know whether I should have been fully armed to meet him. I apologise to him for not having been present, but I did not know that he was going to speak.

LORD DIAMOND

I am sure my noble and learned friend does not require any apology, and of course the noble and learned Lord did not know. But, if I may just return to the question, my noble and learned friend's question was the same as that which he asked on the two previous occasions, so that should make the position a little easier.

LORD DRUMALBYN

Will the noble Lord forgive me? What I said was that my legal advice remains the same as it was before. It has of course been considered. What I said was that it can be considered at greater leisure in between the two stages of the Bill, but the advice remains the same as it was before. That is the answer.

LORD DIAMOND

My noble and learned friend will be very disappointed to hear that answer, and will have his own views as to whether it is a satisfactory one, and whether he is persuaded about it. May I now return to the Amendment itself, which seeks to remove Part II? The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, did not attempt to answer the fundamental points. We are totally dissatisfied with Part II, with the whole of the procedure, and I am bound to invite my noble friends to show their dissatisfaction in the ordinary way.

6.1 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 158) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 56; Not-Contents, 135.

CONTENTS
Archibald, L.	Garnsworthy, L.	Ritchie-Calder, L.
Ardwick, L.	Greenwood of Rossendale, L.	Sainsbury, L.
Bacon, Bs.	Henderson, L.	St. Davids, V.
Bernstein, L.	Hoy, L.	Serota, Bs.
Beswick, L.	Jacques, L.	Shackleton, L.
Blyton, L.	Janner, L.	Shepherd, L.
Brockway, L.	Leatherland, L.	Shinwell, L.
Buckinghamshire, E.	Lindgren, L.	Slater, L.
Burntwood, L.	Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, Bs. [Teller.]	Snow, L.
Champion, L.		Sorensen, L.
Chorley, L.	McLeavy, L.	Stocks, Bs.
Collison, L.	Maelor, L.	Stonham, L.
Delacourt-Smith, L.	Moyle, L.	Stow Hill, L.
Diamond, L.	Nunburnholme, L.	Strabolgi, L. [Teller.]
Evans of Hungershall, L.	Pargiter, L.	Summerskill, Bs.
Faringdon, L.	Phillips, Bs.	Taylor of Mansfield, L.
Fiske, L.	Plummer, Bs.	Wells-Pestell, L.
Gaitskell, Bs.	Popplewell, L.	White, Bs.
Gardiner, L.	Raglan, L.	Winterbottom, L.
NOT-CONTENTS
Ailwyn, L.	Brougham and Vaux, L.	Emmet of Amberley, Bs.
Airedale, L.	Byers, L.	Exeter, M.
Alport, L.	Carrington, L.	Falkland, V.
Amherst of Hackney, L.	Clinton, L.	Ferrers, E.
Amulree, L.	Clwyd, L.	Ferrier, L.
Arran, E.	Colgrain, L.	Fisher, L.
Ashbourne, L.	Cork and Orrery, E.	Fortescue, E.
Balfour, E.	Cornwallis, L.	Fraser of Lonsdale, L.
Barnby, L.	Cottesloe, L.	Garner, L.
Barrington, V.	Cowley, E.	Gisborough, L.
Beauchamp, E.	Craigavon, V.	Goschen, V. [Teller.]
Beaumont of Whitley, L.	Cromartie, E.	Grenfell, L.
Belhaven and Stenton, L.	Daventry, V.	Gridley, L.
Belstead, L.	Denham, L. [Teller.]	Grimston of Westbury, L.
Berkeley, Bs.	Derwent, L.	Hacking, L.
Blackford, L.	Drumalbyn, L.	Hailes, L.
Bledisloe, V.	Dudley, E.	Hailsham of St. Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)
Boothby, L.	Dundee, E.
Boston, L.	Dundonald, E.	Halsbury, E.
Brecon, L.	Effingham, E.	Hankey, L.
Brooke of Cumnor, L.	Ellenborough, L.	Harlech, L.
Brooke of Ystradfellte, Bs.	Elliot of Harwood, Bs.	Harris, L.
Hastings, L.	Malmesbury, E.	Salisbury, M.
Hatherton, L.	Mancroft, L.	Sandford, L.
Henley, L.	Mansfield, E.	Sandys, L.
Hives, L.	Merrivale, L.	Sempill, Ly.
Hood, V.	Milverton, L.	Somers, L.
Howard of Glossop, L.	Monck, V.	Stamp, L.
Howe, E.	Monckton of Brenchley, V.	Strang, L.
Hurcomb, L.	Mottistone, L.	Strange, L.
Hylton-Foster, Bs.	Moyne, L.	Strange of Knokin, Bs.
Ilford, L.	Northchurch, Bs.	Strathcona and Mount Royal, L.
Inchyra, L.	Nugent of Guildford, L.
Jellicoe, E. (L. Privy Seal.)	Ogmore, L.	Suffield, L.
Kemsley, V.	Platt, L.	Swaythling, L.
Killearn, L.	Rankeillour, L.	Swinton, E.
Kilmarnock, L.	Rea, L.	Teviot, L.
Kindersley, L.	Rhyl, L.	Teynham, L.
Lansdowne, M.	Rochdale, V.	Thorneycroft, L.
Latymer, L.	Rockley, L.	Tweedsmuir, L.
Lauderdale, E.	Rothes, E.	Verulam, E.
Lothian, M.	Ruthven of Freeland, Ly.	Vivian, L.
Loudoun, C.	St. Aldwyn, E.	Wakefield of Kendal, L.
Lucas of Chilworth, L.	St. Helens, L.	Willingdon, M.
Lyell, L.	St. Just, L.	Windlesham, L.
MacAndrew, L.	St. Oswald, L.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

6.10 p.m.

LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 159: Page 125, line 2, leave out ("eligible to vote") and insert ("voting").

The noble Lord said: I recollect that we have discussed this matter before. Therefore I will not do more than give a little extra push at what I hope by now is a slightly open door. I know that the Government said they would look at this point, and therefore we need not trouble either to have a Division on such an important issue or to have a long discussion, although it is not for me to determine that. However, I wish to refresh the memory of the Government that we feel that this is so extraordinary and so unusual a situation that it will be impossible for any fair-minded person to put any other interpretation on this request than that the Government are anxious to make the achievement of an approved closed shop impossible, because in those circumstances, as everybody knows, it is quite impossible to get people to vote in adequate numbers, even though they have views. People are apathetic when it comes to voting. We shall have our memories as to that refreshed when we find the results of percentage polling to-day throughout the borough elections, where I suspect that something like 30 per cent. to 50 per cent. will vote.

We are all aware of this apathy and I am bound to say that it is an extra ordinary situation that you should have a Government proposal to do this when the Government themselves are sitting here with less authority than they would requite of workers under this particular scheme. Such a Government cannot produce that authority. They have been returned, and there are democratic processes. They of course have proper power and authority. Nobody disputes that. All I am saying is that our normal democratic processes are that those who vote determine the matter, not those who do not vote. We assume that if a Government gets a majority at the polling booths out of the numbers voting, presumably those who did not vote are content that this should be so. Those not wholly opposed presumably would feel broadly in the same proportion as those voting. At all events, that is a situation we completely accept. It is a situation under which the Government sit there, and yet, in order to get through this particular hoop, that Government is proposing that workpeople should vote not with a majority of those voting, but with a majority of those eligible to vote. It is a ridiculous situation—so ridiculous that you do not need words from me demonstrate it. The Government have been good enough to say that they will look into it. I invite them to say that they will look into it with even more enthusiasm than they said on the previous occasion.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I cannot accept the parallel that the noble Lord has made between General Elections and this kind of matter. General Elections, we all know, involve a very wide range of problems before the country, with several Parties also. Here you have one question and one question only, so that it is certainly not on all fours. But I confirm what I said before, that the Government will be looking at this matter, and that they hope to be able to put down an alternative arrangement, which we think will represent a compromise on this matter, at the next stage.

LORD DIAMOND

I am grateful for what the noble Lord has said. I recognise that he is not able to come the whole way. I recognise that he must have a variety of reasons for trying to find some formula which would represent a compromise. I repeat my gratitude. With your Lordships' permission I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

6.15 p.m.

LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 160: Page 125, leave out Part III of Schedule 1.

The noble Lord said: I do not want to try your Lordships' patience, and therefore I will not repeat the arguments which I adduced for the removal of Part II, except to say that in Part III—which refers to a continuance of an agreement and to the approval of the original agreement—the lack of necessity for this legal paraphernalia becomes all the greater. Whereas you might, in certain circumstances, have justified quite a long procedure in order to approve an agreement, in order to continue the agreement (having gone through the hoop, and having achieved a situation which is satisfactory all round) surely it is quite unnecessary and, indeed, quite ridiculous, to go to all these lengths in order to continue the agreement. If one looks at paragraph 20 of Part III one finds here again that a majority of the workers eligible to vote is needed. As to this, I would merely say again that if it was thought that in certain circumstances a majority of those eligible to vote had to vote, then nobody would surely suggest that where you are merely dealing with a continuance of an agreement, this enormous requirement, this requirement of probably something like more than 100 per cent. of those actually voting, should be required to vote in order to satisfy this test.

The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, looks at me as though I am referring to something which is utterly ridiculous. I am. I am saying that supposing 30 per cent. vote, as is likely to vote in Slocombe-over-Slush this evening in their local council elections, he is requiring under this clause for the continuance of an agreement 50 per cent. of those eligible to vote, and if 30 per cent. vote, he is requiring more than 100 per cent. of those who have voted to vote in order to satisfy this test. It is a ridiculous situation, and I therefore hope that he will say, certainly so far as Part III of the agreement is concerned— notwithstanding any arguments that might be put for retaining Part II—there is no reason to have this enormous paraphernalia, and there is certainly every reason to exclude this rule about workers voting.

LORD GARDINER

This also raises the same problem of the ballots as in Part II. I also do not want to take up time by repeating anything that has been said. May I just add two things? First. I do not share the view of the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn. I think he is wrong in his law in saying the prerogative rules exist to correct what may be quite small mistakes of fact. Anyhow, it is the most cumbersome procedure, as we all know. It is right to say that there is nothing in the law at the moment for resolving a dispute if there is a dispute as to whether or not the return made by the Commission is erroneous.

If I may further assist the Government, I cannot understand why you do not put into the clause a provision that if there is a dispute as to whether the return made by the Commission is erroneous, this dispute is to be decided by the Industrial Court. You have the Court there. At the moment it is a bit of a rubber stamp. It would give it something to do. The same thing would apply if there were a dispute about any form of election or ballot return. The proper body to decide is a court which sits in public. There is a further point which may deserve consideration. It is that if the Commission itself found out before the court had made its order that it had made a mistake and that it was the other party who had won the ballot, should it not itself be able to recall its report or amend it? At the moment the Schedule contains no provision for this at all.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

May I deal with this? Clearly if the matter is of sufficient likelihood and importance it is something that I should consider. The noble and learned Lord is correct in saying that if it is worth making judiciable at all then there is a strong case for making it judiciable by the court. I doubt whether it will ever happen. The prerogative writ is available if a gross error of principle or law is made. If it is an error of fact that is made the writ is not available. I do not anticipate that this is more than a theoretical possibility. If it is, and if it is thought to be, then the noble and learned Lord has a strong case.

I do not want to deal with the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, except to say that in America, where I understand there is a comparable provision, they usually get an 80 per cent. poll. As the Americans do about 10 per cent. worse than we, we should get about 90 per cent. I would not agree with his analogy with local elections. This does not increase his prospects of success in the argument; but I do not want to detract from the promise which my noble friend has made. Clearly, if one compromise is arrived at for the agency shop and the same compromise is arrived at for the entry into the approved shop there is an a fortiori case for the same compromise in respect of exit from the approved shop—although I do not think that the noble Lord has improved his argument by repeating it in a slightly more ridiculous form. At the same time, the assurance stands.

LORD BLYTON

Part III of this Schedule to me is a very regressive one and is against the union. The union will expend money and will get its agency shop and then every employer could incite some of the workers to apply to enter the agency shop. Moreover, it encourages men and women who want to dodge their social obligations to their fellow workers. How can the unions, with all these disadvantages, ever get the trade unions organised? The Government say they want to help us. Part III contains the machinery by which, even when you establish this agency shop, it can always be put in jeopardy. Trade union leaders often have to take an unpopular stand against their members. If this happens in an agency shop and the members wish to get their own back against their leaders they simply say, "We will apply under Part III and will get 20 per cent. signatures of the work force and see if we can upset the agency shop for which the union has been fighting for so long."

It may surprise some noble Lords on this side of the Committee that under this Part, in an agency shop, part-time workers will be on an equal basis with full-time workers. Everyone in industry knows that part-time workers are generally not in the union; yet these people are to have an equal vote in these circumstances to determine whether an agency agreement is to continue after a union has spent money to establish it. Mr. Carr, the Minister, says in a letter to an M.P. on this subject: As drafted, the agency shop provisions draw no distinction between full-time and part-time workers. Having gone through all the obligations of getting an agency shop established, are we to leave it open to mischief-makers to abolish something which has cost the union so much money to establish? This particular Part proves that the Toiy Government are intent to smash the unions from within rather than to help them negotiate a reasonable standard of life for their people.

LORD TAYLOR OF MANSFIELD

May I put a question to the noble Lord? As I understand Part III, if there is any grievance about the approved closed shop it can be resolved only by a ballot. The conditions for such a ballot are laid and the duties of the Commission prescribed. But nothing is said about the expense involved in taking a ballot. My experience is that the cost of all the ballots that have been taken in industry have been found by the union. Can the Minister tell us who will bear the cost of the ballot?

LORD BROWN

I am not in favour of deleting Part III of this Schedule. I believe that an approved closed shop introduced by a ballot sanctioned by Statute should not be left without any visible means, similarly backed by Statute, from changing the situation. Without making any reference to the method of voting which has been fully discussed already, I should like to make a comment on the matter of the two year period. In certain conditions I think that it is easy for anybody in a factory, if they so choose and are zealous, to collect 20 per cent. signatures for some change. I do not agree with my noble friend Lord Blyton that employers could incite union members to do this. As an ex-employer, I think it would be dangerous and difficult practice and not one that they would indulge in.

LORD BLYTON

If Lord Brown had lived in the days when we lived he would have seen more than I have been talkinng about.

LORD BROWN

I do not yield to the noble Lord on experience in this matter. I have experience of a good many industries. I know that he is experienced; but I do not think that his can outbalance mine. I should like to put to the Committee that the period of two years is a short period in which to introduce an approved closed shop by lengthy and expensive procedures and then to leave it open for the whole issue again to be raised with the possibility of a further ballot. After a period of only two years, the whole recently-introduced procedure may not yet have settled down. I think this would be a mistake. A period of two years is too short; it should be something more like five years, and I suggest that the Government should consider the two-year period.

6.30 p.m.

LORD PARGITER

This sort of thing will do more harm to industrial peace than anything else. If there is a ballot the faction which wants to end the closed shop may be big enough to win, and the closed shop would go. What sort of a set-up would there be then in the factory between the employer and the sections of his workers? —because there will be sections, let us have no doubt about that. People who were in favour of a closed shop would be emphatic in their desire to retain the closed shop and would quarrel severely with those people who did not want a closed shop. The employer would be in the middle of it all, whether he likes it or not. Under those circumstances, what is he to do?

He may say, of course, "A plague on both your houses!" But he will not get on very well, because bad relations between one side of industry and another interfere with production, and always will. Unless there is harmony among the work-people in the factory, production is affected. There could be production with harmony among the workpeople, with a quarrel between them and the employer; but there will be a mess if there are two sets of workpeople at loggerheads with each other. This method is far too sudden. At any time in a factory there may be an issue upon which there is a division of opinion, and a quarrel may result.

In other connections, the Government talk about the need for a cooling-off period. That is what we want here. If someone makes an application, or if the necessary 20 per cent. apply to get rid of a closed shop, I would say that that should be noted and if the application is renewed after, say six months, or after a period, it might be thought that the problem involved was sufficiently serious to justify a ballot. But this proposal means that on every issue that arises, when there is a quarrel between sections of the workers, someone will make an application to the court and there will be the whole procedure of a ballot. Probably in the end there will be a closed shop, but there will be all that procedure in order to deal with the matter.

It seems to me that the Government are making very heavy weather of these proposals and that it would be far better to let a situation work itself out. If they feel that they must have a counterbalance, a ballot for a closed shop, then for goodness sake let there be a little breathing space after an application for the abolition of the closed shop, to see whether the application is genuine and essential for the proper operation of the factory.

LORD POPPLEWELL

Surely my noble friend Lord Brown does not appreciate an important point in this connection. He is an employer. If any of his workers felt that they wanted an agreement to end without having a word with him or the trade union, they could ignore him and apply direct to the Court. Surely that would not be in the best interests of anyone. Paragraph 16 states: …any worker to whom the agreement applies may make application to the Industrial Court for a ballot as to the continuance of the agreement. There is no reference to the employer or to the employee. Surely that omission is fantastic, in a Bill which is supposed to establish good relations. What would an employer think about a worker who applied directly to the Industrial Court?

Mention has been made of industrial spies, and we know, because of action taken against trade unions from time to time, that the source of their finances is suspect. One could easily visualise that in difficult circumstances trouble could be stirred up, and workers persuaded to obtain the 20 per cent. of signatures unknown to the employer or to the trade union concerned. This would tend to bedevil industry instead of bringing peace, and I hope that the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, will indicate that he will look at this matter again.

LORD BERNSTEIN

May I tell the Committee of an experience in a company in which I am involved? It occurred about a year ago. We were given proper notice by the union, after the usual discussions, about a difference of opinion regarding the wording of an agreement. There was a vote: 143 workers voted to return to work, and 141 voted not to return. They returned to work, but the relationship between those two groups was pretty blue for a few weeks. Because they worked so closely together the situation cleared. A similar situation is presented here to-day in your Lordships' Chamber. Perhaps we need a "marriage guidance council" more than a clause which the Government wish to put into the Bill. Every attempt should be made to try to persuade two groups among employees to work together, and I think that it could be done.

LORD BROWN

I should like to make one comment which is addressed to my colleagues. I do not like this Bill any more than they do. I think it a pity that the pre-entry closed shop has gone, but I am glad that we have "half a loaf" in the form of an approved closed shop; and no doubt my noble friends are satisfied that we have something. I know very well, as do they, that the whole philosophy of the Party opposite is to protect the individual to the very hilt against the collective rights of groups. It seems to me sensible in these circumstances to attempt to persuade the Government to accept small Amendments to the Bill when there is some possibility that they might accept them, rather than to go full tilt at them on every clause, knowing that we are going to lose, and missing an opportunity to persuade the Government to modify these things. Surely my noble friends would rather see a five-year period before a ballot than two years. But because everyone is so obsessed with trying to attempt the impossible, and clear the ballot out of the way altogether, no one has seized on a possible point of agreement with the Government.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

If a "marriage guidance council" is desirable, as was suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Bernstein, I suggest that one is needed between the noble Lord, Lord Brown, and the rest of his colleagues; because there have been almost constant ructions between them throughout this Committee stage. It is not for me to say which among them represents the true soul of Labour. May I say, regarding the other points which have been raised, that we have to make up our minds about rather a simple proposition. Part III of the Schedule assumes that an approved closed shop is in operation.

According to my noble friend Lord Conesford, the approved closed shop is a serious derogation from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—though perhaps at an appropriate moment I might challenge him on that point. At any rate, a lot of people do not like it, and the reasons are very apparent and have been very well stated. But whatever else the approved closed shop is to be, it is not a sacramental marriage. The whole argument of the noble Lords, Lord Blyton. Lord Popplewell and Lord Pargiter, betrays their belief that it should be not only "till death do us part" which is the limit imposed on a sacramental marriage, but also that it should be for ever and ever. If an approved closed shop is not to be for ever and ever, there must be some mechanism for bringing it to an end, and the mechanism is provided by Part III, a mechanism which we think altogether reasonable; namely, that there should be a ballot of the workers involved as to whether it should continue. This, for some reason, is something which noble Lords opposite think deleterious to the trade union. But we simply do not agree with that. If there are more than 50 per cent., either of those voting or those eligible to vote, against the closed shop, I should have thought it was manifestly more democratic to bring the marriage discreetly to a close as having irretrievably broken down or at any rate broken down for the time being.

The noble Lord, Lord Pargiter, assumed (I think unfavourably for his own case) that two factions, the proclosed-shop-ites and the anti-closedshop-ites, among the workpeople were about equally poised. I think that once there is that situation the burden of proof that we should impose even upon a very large minority a situation which some people think is a derogation from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, must be on those who wish to preserve the closed shop rather than on those who wish to bring it to an end. The next thing the noble Lord asked for was a breathing space. That is what the Bill provides—a two-year period. We do not think that there should be two breathing spaces, but the-noble Lord says that a two-year period is too long.

LORD PARGITER

I should like to make it clear that when I was referring to factions, I did so in the context that at any time an issue can arise of a temporary nature on which factions appear. I was not talking about factions existing at all times but of the sort of thing that happens in factories, about which the noble and learned Lord knows nothing. If there was a breathing space, that would give time for tempers to cool a little, but the idea of a two-year break for this is quite ridiculous and quite unacceptable. After the period of two years, even a day after, an issue might arise and somebody might make an application to the court. I should have thought that we wanted to avoid that.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I gave way to the noble Lord not in order that he should repeat his entire speech, because I apprehended it the first time, but to allow him to correct any error I was making. I do not think that he would be wise to assume, because I have never worked in a factory, that the secrets of factory life are wholly concealed from me. As a common law barrister I have sometimes advised trade unions and sometimes employers, and in 44 years of work at the Bar one gradually acquires a smattering of what one is talking about.

I turn to the noble Lord, Lord Popplewell, who complained once more, in the same terms as he complained before, that one applicant could bring the application to the court. As was explained by one of my noble friends, it is precisely this grievance that the 20 per cent. provision is designed to meet. There have to be 20 per cent. behind the applicant before the application can even get off the ground, and as the Bill is now drafted there has to be a majority of those voting or eligible to vote in order to sustain it. This second point is one we discussed and agreed to consider further. But the idea that one applicant can upset the apple cart against all the organised forces of the union seems to me to be remote from reality. It has been discussed fully already and I am afraid that I do not take it extremely seriously as an argument against Part III.

That brings me to the noble Lord, Lord Brown, who thinks that five years is better than two. I agree with him on one thing. If the Labour Party had put down five years as an Amendment and said that they might be concerned to regard that as a reasonable period, it might have been a suitable subject of debate. They have not done so. I agree with the criticisms of the Labour Party in the noble Lord's speech, but I go even further with him and agree that I will report what has been said by him to my right honourable friend. I do not know in the least what he will say. Here I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pargiter, in his criticism of my own limited knowledge and say that I am not qualified to give an opinion about this myself. But the noble Lord has made this suggestion and I think that it should be passed on.

The noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Mansfield, asked me a question about the cost of the ballot. The answer is to be found in Clause 156(1), where it says that it will be borne out of public funds. The noble Lord, Lord Blyton, indulged in his usual melancholy rodomontade against the bad motivation of the Conservative Party. Well, if he thinks that we are insincere, he thinks that we are insincere, and he is entitled to say so, but that is not my own frame of mind. We think that a free society, with free unions and free members, is on the whole better than one in which membership is compulsory, and we think that the unions will be stronger in that condition. But we are discussing this Amendment on the assumption that a closed shop is desirable in the conditions defined in Part I and is not only desirable but is in existence on the conditions defined in Part II. The question is whether there would be any possibility of a divorce as provided in Part III or whether the marriage should be indissoluble. In this case, I am all for divorce.

LORD SLATER

The noble and learned Lord did not reply to the question asked by my noble friend Lord Blyton, which is very important. I should like to know this from the noble and learned Lord: if he was in the position of a trade union leader within a factory of say 2,000 people and there was a system of working within that factory for part-time workers, of women going into the factory at 6 o'clock and working for four hours till 10, who had become members of the trade union, and he was making an application, what would he do?

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

The answer has already been given to the noble Lord when this subject was fully discussed the other night, but broadly the answer is that either a closed shop is limited to full-time workers, as it can be under the provisions in this Bill (or, at least, I am so advised), just as an agency shop can be under the provisions (so at least I am advised), in which case the part-time workers do not come into it and therefore do not have a right to vote; or the closed shop and the agency shop do cover the part-time workers and therefore they are compelled to join the union or, in the case of the agency shop, are compelled to contribute towards it, whichever happens to be in force. In this case we are limited in our discussion to the closed shop, but,mutatis mutandis, the same considerations apply. If they are in the closed shop then they are entitled to vote. If a union does not want to be cumbered with part-time workers it should not include them in the closed shop. But if it includes them in the closed shop, then it should not deprive them of the right to vote about it.

THE EARL OF DUDLEY

There is one question that I should like to put on Part III before we leave it. If the agreement of a closed shop is brought to an end, as is described in the Bill, does that mean that the whole negotiations that have gone to build up this closed shop agreement come to an end, or does it revert to an agency shop agreement? It was only as the discussion went on in this Committee that it suddenly occurred to me that by the whole thing collapsing by a vote being taken, we might have considerable industrial unrest. If there was no agency shop, there might be disquiet with the union and everything else. Yet on the wording of this clause it appears to me that workers in a closed shop might decide that, although they were quite satisfied with their union and the arrangements that existed, they just did not want to keep it as a complete closed shop.

THE EARL OF BALFOUR

There is one not think the answer to that is quite so simple as perhaps my noble friend supposes. Unions can go for a closed shop under this clause and Schedule without having an agency shop at all. They do not have to go through the agency shop hoop first and then ask for a closed shop. It follows that if they have a closed shop and the closed shop agreement closes owing to a hostile ballot, that is the end of that agreement; although of course any agreements as to terms and conditions would stand until they were altered. If there were an agency shop in existence prior to that, it would be perfectly possible the very next day for the union and employer to agree to an agency shop agreement, mutatis mutandis, in the same terms, under the terms of, I think, Clause 10.

LORD DIAMOND

We have had a very full discussion and there are only two points I want to make about this subject. The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor in his last comment referred to "a hostile vote". This harks back to the logical argument that he put forward for bringing the continuance of the agreement to an end. It was not a slip of the tongue; it was his clear, logical argument, and it is reinforced by his recent reference to a hostile vote. What he was saying in the first case, and mentioning in the second case when he used the word "hostile", was a majority vote against continuance, which is not what the clause provides. This is one of the things that we are complaining about. What the clause provides, as we all know, is that if a majority of the workers (which majority we leave open for the moment) have not voted in favour of the continuance, then the agreement comes to an end. It says: The agreement shall thereupon cease to be an approved closed shop agreement". So it is not simply what the noble and learned Lord said on two occasions; it is quite a different thing.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I do not think so. I made it very plain in my remarks that I was seeking not to revive the issue which we have now discussed three times and as to which assurances have been given by the Government. I quite agree that the noble Lord has an extremely small point as to the possible case of equality of votes. But I do not think that is quite a different thing; I think it is an extremely small point.

LORD DIAMOND

We do not think it is an extremely small point and we do not think that the pattern of the noble and learned Lord's replies to our debates are helpful to the speedy and convenient transaction of our business. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his many interventions, because I am compiling a dictionary—a guide to the normal courtesies of the House of Lords by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor. I shall not misquote him. I have only to pick out of Hansard those relevant comments. They make most interesting reading and I expect I shall make a fortune.

I clearly made one deep error of judgment in saying at the start of the debate that as we had discussed a similar principle on the previous Amendment I would not seek to trouble your Lordships with an unnecessarily long speech or with a Division at the end of the debate. The views put forward by my noble friends have made it clear that that was a mistake in judgment. They have said, and I repeat, that we are going to have an enormous task in trying to educate (I have given up any hope of educating the noble and learned Lord) the Government and their supporters as to what goes on in the minds of trade unions, their feelings and their relationships towards one another. But I did say that we would not trouble the Committee with a Division, and that is that. I want to make it clear, however, that the reason why we are not troubling your Lordships with a Division is not that we do not hold strongly to our views, both on Part II and Part III. But we have expressed our views as strongly as we can in the Division on Part II, and we fear it would be taking up time unnecessarily to repeat the process on Part III.

On Question, Amendment negatived.

6.58 p.m.

LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 162: Page 126, line 23, leave out ("(with the necessary modifications)").

The noble Lord said: I hope that this Amendment can be dealt with quite quickly—it is purely a probing Amendment. We really do not know the effect of the words "with the necessary modifications". I should be grateful for an explanation. I beg to move.

LORD DRUMALBYN

The explanation is quite simple. The provisions of subsections (5) to (7) in Clause 7 are replaced for the purposes of approved closed shop agreements in the new clause that has been inserted after Clause 16. The provisions which require to be modified are those in subsections (2) to (4) where there are references to the agency shop agreements. These references should be understood to be references to approved closed shop agreements where appropriate.

LORD DIAMOND

I am sure that that explanation will be clearer when I see it in print. I am grateful to the noble Lord and beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I beg to move that the House do now resume. It may be convenient if I say that it is proposed to resume consideration of the Industrial Relations Bill at eight o'clock.

Moved, That the House do now resume. —(Lord Drumalbyn.)

On Question, Motion agreed to, and House resumed accordingly.