INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BILL

HL Deb 10 May 1971 vol 318 cc630-701

3.5 p.m.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.

Moved, That the House do again resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

House in Committee accordingly.

[The EARL OF LISTOWEL in the Chair.]

Clause 8 [Contributions to charity instead of contributions to trade union]:

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH moved Amendment No. 68: Page 7, line 7, leave out ("worker") and insert ("person").

The noble Lord said: Perhaps I may briefly recall to your Lordships that this Amendment was moved from this side of the Committee at the beginning of consideration of Clause 5. When the Committee proceeded to a discussion on it a number of points of detail were raised, and it became clear that it would be for the convenience of the Committee if the Government had an opportunity of considering it. There were points raised about the position of a number of categories of people occupied in industry, share fishermen, people who put themselves forward as self-employed in the construction industry, sub-postmasters and one or two others, and there were questions also put about the position of the members of the Armed Forces who are explicitly excluded from the definition of "worker" that appears in the Bill now before us.

I move the Amendment to this clause at this point in our proceedings because later in this present clause I think this point does not arise, or certainly, save in clause 9, we have no Amendments put down on it for some little time, and I should therefore like to ask whether it is convenient to the Government to make any comments on the points which were raised when we discussed Clause 5

THE MINISTER OF STATE, HOME OFFICE (LORD WINDLESHAM)

The noble Lord has recalled the very long discussion which we had on Tuesday of last week when we debated in Committee for nearly two hours whether the word "worker" in Clause 5(1) or the word "person" as proposed in the Amendment was the more appropriate. As the noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, has said, the position of the Armed Forces of the Crown was discussed and we have passed the conclusions of that debate on to the Ministry of Defence. I may say about that matter at this stage, that in general the position is that any member of the Armed Forces of the Crown is able to belong to a trade union but he is restricted in taking part in trade union activities, especially collective bargaining; and of course there is no right to strike, for the obvious reason that this exercise of trade union rights would come into conflict with discipline in the Armed Forces, but he can retain his membership.

We were asked in Committee whether this was an appropriate time to consider reviewing the existing restrictions that apply to members of the Armed Forces who are trade union members or who would like to become trade union members. I think the appropriate thing to do would be to return to this matter on Clause 158. In Clause 158(1) there is a very specific definition of the word "worker". It falls into three categories, on page 118, in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c). In paragraph (c) the Armed Forces of the Crown are specifically exempted. So if noble Lords feel that the members of the Armed Forces should be included, that perhaps would be the appropriate time to discuss an Amendment, when we shall also have completed our discussions with the Ministry of Defence.

The only other point I might add to what the noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, has asked, is that the position of sub-postmasters was raised and I explained that the crucial relationship in Clause 5 was between the worker and his em- ployer, and not between the worker and the trade union, which arises later on—in Clause 63 I think. But the noble Lord told us that there is an element of the income of some sub-postmasters which comes from the Post Office Corporation. Did this amount constitute employment or not? A meeting, I understand, is taking place shortly with the sub-postmasters to discuss this and other points.

LORD LEATHERLAND

May I thank the noble Lord for the Statement he has made about members of Her Majesty's Forces and their right to belong to a trade union. I raised this question at an earlier stage. I sought a declaration as to whether they were entitled to belong to a union. This is quite without reference to any rights that they may have in negotiating as trade unionists. The statement which the Minister has made answers my point. I am satisfied with it. That, of course, does not rule out the possibility of raising it at a later stage of the Bill.

LORD SLATER

I am pleased that the Minister has been able to inform the House that talks are now taking place in regard to the question raised by my noble friend Lord Delacourt-Smith. There are 20,000-odd of these sub-postmasters, some of whom work in a dual capacity, while others just run a sub-post office without any attachments or connections with anything else. The reply we have received is most satisfactory.

LORD SHEPHERD

May I also thank the noble Lord. There has been some criticism on radio, television, and in the Press, about the slow progress of this Bill. There was some special criticism that we spent some two hours discussing whether we should change "worker" to "person". There is a matter of considerable importance behind this, and I am sure that the noble Lord will agree that the two hours spent on it were well spent.

LORD WINDLESHAM

I am grateful for what has been said. I am afraid that we are not through with it yet, because there are further Amendments to change the word "person" to "worker".

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

I am grateful to the noble Lord for what he has said. So far as the Armed Forces are concerned, we take the point that it would be more orderly and convenient to discuss this matter at Clause 158. Am I right in thinking that there is, without any shadow of doubt, a civil right of members of the Armed Forces to belong to trade unions, even though there is not at the moment under this Bill proposed to be a statutory right? I must press the noble Lord more on the civilian aspect of his answer. It is my recollection—and the Record will show this—that there were other cases which were mentioned. I recollect raising the question of share fishermen—whether or not they were covered as workers by the Bill. There is also the case, to which reference was made, of the substantial number of people in the construction industry who put themselves forward as self-employed persons, and who work under a variety of arrangements in many of which it is fairly clear that when one looks at it as a matter of common sense the relationship with the person who provides the funds upon which they subsist is a person who has towards them an employer/employee type of relationship. The question whether or not they are covered by the Bill and have the rights in respect of trade union membership which are dealt with within this Bill, is an important one. I am conscious of the complexity of the issue in this situation in the construction industry, and I will not press the noble Lord unduly upon it if he finds it more convenient to reply to the point about the construction industry at a later time.

With regard to sub-postmasters, when I first raised the question there seemed to be a disposition to treat it as though it was something I was raising because I could not think of anything better to talk about. Examination has shown that there is a point of substance here. I am not clear what it is that is now being discussed between the sub-postmasters and the Post Office Corporation. Those are the bodies, are they not?

LORD WINDLESHAM

No. I understand that discussions are taking place with the Department of Employment to discuss with the sub-postmasters, or representatives of the sub-postmasters, the nature of the payments received from the Post Office Corporation and whether or not it could be argued that these amount to a relationship of employer/employee.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

It is accepted that there is an element of doubt upon this.

LORD WINDLESHAM

Not necessarily an element of doubt. The sub-postmasters feel that there are representations they would wish to put forward and my right honourable friend the Secretary of State naturally wishes to consider these.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

Does that mean that nobody at this moment can say one way or the other whether they are covered by the Bill before us? Do I understand that nobody at the moment can say or advise with certainty?

LORD WINDLESHAM

We should be able to give a much better answer to that question after the meeting has taken place.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

I am merely saying at this moment that nobody would care to say with certainty what the position is. We are not anxious to pursue this point at this stage. We have demonstrated that there are cases of doubt; that there are cases of considerable complexity. I have still left over the question of the construction industry, to which perhaps the noble Lord will reply. Reference was also made to policemen. What we have already established by the exchanges last Monday and to-day suggests that there is field for legitimate doubt about the adequacy of the terminology at present in the Bill.

3.17 p.m.

LORD SHINWELL

The noble Lord. Lord Windlesham, will no doubt recall that, during our rather prolonged debate on the clause in which it was suggested that "person" might be substituted for "worker", I suggested that we might compromise by substituting the word "employee". He has directed the attention of noble Lords to the definition clause, and in particular to page 118, which defines a worker as a person who engages in a contract for work, for employment. If the noble Lord looks at another part of Clause 158 he will find at line 30, on page 115, the word "employee". It states: 'employee' means an individual who has entered into or works under (or, where the employment has ceased, worked under) a contract of employment That is precisely the same language. The definition with which we are concerned applies in Clause 118 to a worker, but also applies, in similar terms, to an employee.

If the noble Lord refers to the pages of the OFFICIAL REPORT, he will discover that that was a suggestion I ventured to make in order to effect something in the nature of a compromise. Otherwise the language appears to be redundant. The term "worker" is used. It means, to be precise, a person, individual or employee who engages to contract for employment with an employer. The term "employee" on line 30 of page 115 describes the matter in similar terms. Would my suggestion not be advisable, in order to remove any possibility of misunderstanding—because a matter of this kind might have to be interpreted by the legal gentlemen, the Industrial Court, or whoever it may be—if a dispute should arise? Therefore, it might be better to use the term "employee", which everybody understands and about which there can be no misunderstanding whatever.

LORD WINDLESHAM

The first point which the noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, put was about the Armed Forces of the Crown. He asked: Is there a civil right, if not a statutory right? Well, we enter deep water, because of course many civil rights are given by Statute. The answer is that the Armed Forces of the Crown would be excluded under this Bill if it became law unamended; and there is no actionable right (let us use that term) at present because there is no one against whom a Serviceman could enforce it. So he has no right which is enforceable in a court of law. The noble Lord asked also about workers outside the Armed Services, and in particular those in the construction industry. I understand that labour-only self-employed sub-contractors are included in the definition "worker" in paragraph (b) of the definition of "worker" on page 118.

The answer to the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, is that the definition of "employee" a little earlier, two pages or so back, is not the same as "worker"; it covers paragraph (a) but not paragraphs (b) or (c) which are dealing with the person who performs "personally any work or services for another party"—the labour only sub-contractor is an example; and office holders, civil servants (the reference is to Armed Forces of the Crown) and so on, who are covered by paragraph (c). What we are talking about here is interpretation. The word "worker" is very clearly defined. It is spelt out in the interpretation clause. But of course when a new Bill goes on the Statute Book with such far-reaching implications as this, there are cases of interpretation. It is quite right and quite proper that these cases should be investigated. The noble Lord has raised one good example of the sub-postmasters, who are in this rather unusual position of being in the main self-employed people but in some cases receiving part of their income from the Post Office Corporation. That is what will arise in the future. I do not think there is any doubt in the Bill. What will have to be resolved is the meaning of these words applied to a whole range of activities once the Bill becomes law.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

I do not propose to pursue this matter further at this stage. I think noble Lords on this side remain of the opinion that the wider term which we propose has merit. As we see it, there can be no exclusions under it. Of course, it is no argument against it to say, as one noble Lord did—I think the noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack—that this would open rights which might theoretically be enforced by people who clearly would have no intention of enforcing them and have no one against whom they could enforce them; which is surely a better situation than having people who in common sense thought they had the right but who by the wording of the Statute may be deprived of it.

LORD WINDLESHAM

I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord but he is on the central point here: that "worker" implies that there is a relationship with an employer. The word "worker" is used in Clause 5 in that very specific way. So we are not speaking about a general liberty to join a trade union; we are talking about an actionable right with a remedy attached. If there is to be a remedy there must be somebody against whom the right can be enforced if it is breached. Therefore, the existence of an employer is crucial.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

It appears to me that if there is nobody who can in any way impede a person in exercising a right, there can be no person against whom the right can be enforced. This does not very much matter. It is much less serious to have categories of individuals who theoretically have a right, even though there is nobody against whom they would ever wish to enforce it, than to have people who are in fact and in common sense their employers but who, because of the wording of the Statute, are precluded from enforcing the right.

However, as I was about to say, in a sense the Government have recognised this because by the terms of the third subsection of Clause 158 they have given themselves a certain latitude in respect of office holders to bring people in by Order. We on our side can let the matter rest where it is at the moment. We should still like the Government to look at the wording in this provision to make sure that there is no way in which people who might wish to enforce a right will in fact be debarred from enforcing it by the wording of the Statute. As one of my noble friends said, we may wish to return to this matter on some later clause or at a later stage of the Bill. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

3.26 p.m.

LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEYmoved Amendment No. 69: Page 7, line 17, leave out from ("charity") to end of line 18.

The noble Lord said: I rise to move Amendment No. 69 standing in the name of my noble friends and myself. With this, it would perhaps be to the convenience of the Committee to discuss Amendments Nos. 70 and 72. This clause says that in an agency shop agreement a worker who objects on grounds of conscience both to being a member of a trade union and to paying contributions to a trade union in lieu of membership of it, may propose to the trade union that, instead of paying such contributions, he should agree to pay equivalent contributions to a charity to be determined by agreement between him and the trade union. The purpose of these Amendments is to make the designation of the charity to which such money is to be paid a matter for the worker alone and not for the trade union. The purpose of this is not to say that it is no business of the trade union—I think that to a certain extent it is—but a great deal of procedure has been put into this Bill which might be left out, and this is one of the most obvious bits. It is a complicated Bill with complicated procedures and many laws, tribunals and appeals dealt with in it, and I should have thought that without much loss we could get rid of this particular point.

It seems to me that in the first place it may lead to friction—and that is something we do not want. I remember one noble Lord on the Opposition Front Bench speaking about the friction which would arise if the ordinary trade union dues collector had also to collect dues from a man in an agency shop, who was not a member of the trade union but had to pay money to the trade union. I think that friction may be caused where they both have to agree upon which charity the money shall go to; and if someone was feeling a bit bloody-minded on either side—and in such a situation it would be surprising if there were not someone feeling a bit bloody-minded on either side, if not on both sides—there could be even more friction. There is a method of deciding this: there are appeal clauses, but that seems to me to be taking a sledgehammer to crack a nut.

The trade unions, obviously, may feel they have a slight claim to have a say. If you are a member of a trade union you pay to the trade union; if you are not a member of a trade union and in an agency shop choose not to be, you have to pay to the trade union; and that is right. Even though we have been told that trade unions may not wish to accept this money, nevertheless it is right that people should have to pay for the services they get from the trade union. But where it is laid down by the law—rightly or wrongly laid down—that the money should go to charity and not to the trade union, it seems to me that so long as it goes to a registered charity it cannot go to the workers' own particular purpose. That is laid down towards the end of the clause, and the laws on charity are already drawn very tightly. So long as it goes to a registered charity it really it not worth our while keeping this arrangement whereby it has to be agreed with the trade union, especially bearing in mind the number of difficulties and the amount of friction involved in the extra bit of machinery that we are setting up. If there is a chance to simplify the Bill, let us take it. I beg to move.

LORD SHINWELL

With the greatest respect to the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, in my judgment this Amendment "takes the biscuit". In fact it takes a whole factory of biscuits. I understood that it was the desire of the members of the Liberal Party in your Lordships' House to improve this Bill and certainly not in any fashion to weaken the power and authority and prestige of the trade union movement. The Liberal Party are always talking about the need for co-operation and conciliation. Here is an example of how to disrupt and weaken the authority and prestige of the trade union movement. Let me explain how I interpret this Amendment, and I shall read out the clause, because, quite frankly, it was difficult to follow the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, in his attempt to explain the Amendment. It reads as follows: may propose to the trade union that, instead of paying such contributions, he should agree to pay equivalent contributions to a charity to be determined by agreement between him and the trade union. The latter part gives the right to the trade union, deprived of the contributions, to a say as to the nature of the charity to which the contribution should be made.

Let us understand what this is all about. A person, a worker, an individual, an employee—however you care to define him—working on the shop floor, refuses to join a trade union. He is not expected to be a member; he can contract out. That is part of the proposal. I am not arguing the merits or demerits of the proposal for the moment, but the trade union having provided by collective bargaining and collective effort an improvement for every person working on the shop floor, whether he is a mem- ber of the union or not, is deprived of his contribution. According to this Amendment proposed by the Liberal Party, the trade union would not only be deprived of the contribution and of the membership of this particular person (or persons, as the case may be) but also would have no say as to the nature of the charity which is to receive the contribution. Is that not just asking too much? Indeed I regard it as an insult to the trade union concerned, and to the general body of workers on any particular shop floor.

They have to work alongside a person who is a non-union person, and they may dislike it, for one reason or another. I shall not enter into the merits or demerits of their sentiments for the moment, but over and above that when a person who is a non-unionist works on the shop floor and gains benefits derived from collective bargaining it is quite wrong that the trade union should have no further say in who should receive the contribution. I hope the Government will not accept this Amendment. I have not consulted with my noble friends on the Front Bench but it seems to me that they must resist this Amendment with all the power and strength at their command.

BARONESS GAITSKELL

I should like to support my noble friend Lord Shinwell, particularly as I regard this business, except on absolutely conscience grounds, of paying into a charity instead of paying into a trade union as being an absolutely ridiculous idea. It seems to me to be a real incitement to charities to try to persuade workers not to join a trade union. I can foresee that in the future charities may not get young people to go on long walks but may try to round up employees and simply persuade them not to join a trade union.

LORD BROWN

I am against this Amendment but it has one merit. As the Bill stands, the trade union and the worker have to agree. There may be a factory in which 200 or 300 people are making in-lieu payments to charities and in each case, presumably, there will have to be 200 agreements between the trade union and the workers as to which charity should receive each particular in-lieu payment. There may be differences in every case. The amounts are not very large, so that it has that as a merit. However, I am against the Amendment on the ground that the worker is getting services from the union which are otherwise free, and it is for the union to decide to which charity the money should be paid. I would ask the Government to consider placing in the hands of the trade union alone the right to decide which charity should receive the money. That might be done at the Report stage. It would simplify administration, because the sum would be paid over to the trade union, I hope, by the employer and there would be no argument. These are delicate issues in many factories, and the less argument there is about them the better.

3.39 p.m.

LORD CONESFORD

Although I think it is possible to exaggerate the importance of this Amendment, I should have thought there was a great deal to be said for the view put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley. The noble Baroness, Lady Gaitskell, said that she considered this whole business of the conscientious objectors and payments to charities to be a lot of nonsense. That is a view for which I have great respect, but it is not raised by this Amendment. For the purposes of this Amendment we have to assume that there is going to be provision for the conscientious objector and there is going to be a payment to charity. The question therefore remains: what is the simple way of deciding? The proposal made by the noble Lord, Lord Brown, at least has the merit of simplicity, as has the Amendment now before the Committee. Either of them would decide the matter one way or the other. But let us see how the Bill as drafted leaves it. In the end, the matter would have to be determined by the tribunal. I should have thought that every charity, as defined in subsection (3) of Clause 8, is a perfectly respectable body; and the point is, on what principles would the tribunal decide? I think there is a great deal to be said for a perfectly simple way of deciding. Of the two simple ways, shall the conscientious objector decide, or shall the trade union decide?—and I agree that those are both simple and workable—I think that the proposal of the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, has the greater merit.

I can fully understand the trade union wishing to contest the fact that the man is a genuine conscientious objector. Then, of course, that matter would have to go to the tribunal. But why on earth should not the man himself choose the charity to which his contribution is to go, if it is decided that he is a conscientious objector? I should have thought that, on the grounds of simplicity and avoiding unnecessary disputes there was a lot to be said for the Amendment put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont. I do not think the objection of the noble Baroness, Lady Gaitskell, to the whole clause, which I appreciate, really has anything to do with the merits of this Amendment. It seems to me that we want something simple and workable. I cannot see that anybody would suffer appreciably if this Amendment were accepted. Nor do I think the prestige of the trade union would in any way be affected if, provided that the man was a genuine conscientious objector, he himself chose the charity.

LORD LEATHERLAND

I feel that if the trade union is to be deprived of a voice here in determining the kind of charity that should benefit from conscientious objectors' contributions, we shall be letting ourselves in for a lot of extra trouble on the shop floor. The noble Lord, Lord Conesford, says that in the last resort the industrial tribunal may hive to settle cases such as this. I feel that the industrial tribunal will have quite enough cases to settle arising out of direct, vigorous conflicts on the factory floor without adding the burden of this kind of dispute. Let us imagine that I work in a factory which produces perambulators, that I am a conscientious objector to paying trade union contributions, that the union is not going to have any voice in the kind of charity to which I contribute, and that I say to the shop steward, "I am going to give my money to a family planning association". That hardly seems reasonable, does it? For I am cutting away the jobs from under my fellow workers' feet; and if we come down to the basic point, the conscientious objector who is contracting out so that he can give his money to charity, is going to benefit from the vigorous trade union activity that will take place and which will involve all the rest of the workers in that shop.

LORD SHINWELL

May I ask my noble friend to take note that it is not going to be confined to the trade union. The language of the clause is, … to be determined by agreement between him … that is the objector … and the trade union". So he is going to have a voice in it along with the trade union.

LORD LEATHERLAND

Yes, but this particular Amendment would cut out the trade union voice from determining the nature of the charity to which the contribution would be made. As I say, the whole of the worker/employer relations on the shop floor are conducted between the employer and the trade union, and it is distinctly unfair to the trade union to deprive it of a voice in connection with this particular matter.

LORD BROCKWAY

I do not propose to follow the discussion started by the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, and carried on by my noble friend, about conscientious objectors. We have already discussed that matter. This Amendment goes much further than the conscientious objector. It refers to any worker who on any grounds determines that he will not be a member of a trade union. As the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, has said, the trade unions obtain better conditions for all the workers; that applies to the non-union member as well as the union member. Surely, in the case of a worker who declines to be a member of a trade union, it is legitimate that there should be a discussion with the trade union which has gained for him all those advantages. On those grounds, with some regret—because I have some sympathy with the Liberal Party in its defence of the individual—I am opposed to this Amendment. May I just add that the Amendment refers to registered charities. At the present time Her Majesty's Government are seeking to restrict the number of registered charities, even declining registrations which were previously received. I would ask Her Majesty's Government in connection with these provisions to take a much more liberal view of the view of the charities which the trade unions and the individuals concerned might be able to consider.

LORD DONALDSON OF KINGS-BRIDGE

I find it difficult to differ from such elder statesmen as my noble friends Lord Shinwell and Lord Brockway, but I think a tremendous fuss is being made about nothing. It seems to me that once you agree—and many noble Lords on this side do not agree—that it is legitimate to contract out of being a trade unionist by payment on conscientious grounds to a charity, I cannot see why the trade union should wish to nominate that charity or have any hand in it. It seems to me that the individual is paying his blood money; he is paying the money for the work the trade union does. I think it is absolutely right that he should, but I see no point in confusing the issue by having a tremendous conference with two or three secretaries of trade unions to decide which of 150 charities he gives the money to. My own view is that so long as the money goes to the charity let the men paying it decide to which charity. I do not think this is a matter of tremendous importance, but that it is important that noble Lords who bring forward such interesting Amendments to the Bill should, where possible, be supported.

LORD SAINSBURY

I should like to seek guidance on the word "charity". I understood that there were two types of registered charity: the ordinary straightforward charity and educational charities. I can conceive that educational charities might take, for example, an extreme laissez faire interpretation of history and be critical of the role of the trade union. Therefore, I should have thought that the trade unions had a right to have a say as to which educational charity this conscience money went.

THE EARL OF DUDLEY

I want to make only a very brief intervention. Noble Lords on both sides of the Committee are talking as if this were something new. In fact there are already a number of closed shop agreements in industry under which contributions to charities are made by persons who are allowed to contract out on grounds of conscience. There is a reference to this in Professor McCarthy's book on the closed shop. I think it might be helpful to have information as to whether there is consultation or agreement between the parties on this matter at the present time.

3.50 p.m.

BARONESS WHITE

In dealing with this Amendment, I should make it clear that we on this side have certain doubts about the whole purpose of this clause. These doubts arise from the fact—and I say this with great respect to my noble friend Lord Brown—that we have no expectation that there will be large numbers of persons who will qualify as genuine conscientious objectors, in the sense in which we discussed them earlier. My noble friend Lord Brown mentioned the possibility of as many as 200 in one establishment, but I cannot go with him at all on that.

LORD BROWN

Two hundred in a firm which employs 40,000 is not a very large proportion.

BARONESS WHITE

With great respect to my noble friend, that would mean 200 persons who were Plymouth Brethren, Jehovah's Witnesses, or something of that nature. I should have thought it was highly improbable—unless one had a remarkable concentration in one neighbourhood—that there would be such a large number in one establishment. But we can discuss that point more advantageously on the Question, Whether Clause 8 shall stand part of the Bill?

We really do not feel disposed to go along with the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, in his Amendment. I think the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, was quite right in saying that one can take either one simple method or the other simple method. He inclined towards the Liberals' views, but if there are to be such payments at all we incline towards the other simple method. It is quite true that there is room in the Bill for endless friction, discussion, dispute and, finally, the cumbrous procedure of having to refer the lack of agreement to the industrial tribunal, and I should have thought that, on reflection, the Government might very well agree that it would be desirable not to have that situation if it can be avoided. In our view, if we are to avoid such an appeal to the law, with discussions before the tribunal and a decision passed down by it, then one must decide whether the matter is to he left entirely to the discretion of the individual or left to the straightforward decision of the trade union. In each case, the payment would be to charity after agree- ment by all that the person was a genuine conscientious objector.

Let us consider the circumstances in which these payments are to be made. They are to be made because a man does not wish to join a trade union. If they were simply contributions to a charity of his own choice, then he could pay them out of his ordinary income. It is of no concern to us whether he wants to support cats, budgerigars or educational or religious charities, because that is part of his own private life. What we are talking about is not a purely private matter: it is basically, an industrial matter, between himself and the union which, for conscientious reasons, he does not wish to join. I should have thought that in that kind of relationship it is the union that should receive the money from the person. After all, the appropriate amount of money will be decided according to the contribution which the man or woman would have made, as we discussed last week. Also, it is very important that the union should have records of the persons who are paying to charity as conscientious objectors. It would be very much better, and at least as simple, if the money were paid to the trade union, and in due course the union would account for those contributions as having been paid not into union funds but to a charity. No doubt they would have to produce receipts, and so on, in the normal and appropriate way.

We consider that this whole clause should be looked at again, and, if it is to stand at all (we have not put down an Amendment, but we shall if necessary be able to do so at a later stage), then the suggestion originally made by my noble friend Lord Brown, that the money should be paid to a trade union, which should pay it to a charity, is the more desirable course.

LORD CONESFORD

May I point out to the noble Baroness, whose treatment of the argument I appreciate, that there is a difficulty in her suggestion of adopting the proposal of the noble Lord, Lord Brown? As she herself pointed out, charities differ very much in their aims, and I do not suppose that any single person approves of all charities. It would be a little difficult, would it not, to compel a conscientious objector to give his contribution to a charity of which he might disapprove on conscientious grounds? That is why I suggest that the real alternatives must be between what the Government now propose under the clause and what the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, proposes in his Amendment.

LORD COOPER OF STOCKTON HEATH

May we get this matter into perspective? First of all, the number of people who will exercise their right under this clause is minimal. There is another law similar to this which affects trade unions: I refer to the law relating to the political levy. When the appropriate Act was introduced, everybody provided, very brilliantly, for contracting out; but you can count on your fingers the number of people who contract out. It is one of the peculiarities of democracy. On paper you can give people opportunities to do what seems right, but it is too much trouble for them to do anything. The only difference between this Bill and the law relating to the political levy is that, instead of our having to get hundreds of thousands of signatures agreeing to contract in, we shall have to get a few people to contract out. We shall not need big rooms to store records of people who contract out of the political levy, because they are very few in number and, in spite of endeavours to increase them, the numbers, do not increase. That is why I feel confident in speaking as I have done, and I should not have said that if I thought it would increase the numbers.

The Government have introduced an interesting principle about the right to choose whether or not to join a union. Forgetting the merits of the right not to join, with which I do not agree, there have now been created three types of trade union membership: the chap who is willing to join; the chap who is unwilling to join but is prepared to pay an adjusted contribution, and the chap who is a conscientious objector, perhaps not on anti-trade union grounds. It is now said that the last type will be dealt with on a charity basis, but once a person has to pay he will not bother about the charity or about anything else. Resistance to payment for services rendered is the basis of non-unionism in this country. I am sorry that the Liberal Party have moved this Amendment, because it is the old approach of absolutism which is inappropriate both in society and in trade unions. In making these special arrangements, the Government are compelling the second category of individual to accept collective responsibility. The Government are saying that you need not enjoy the fruits of cash benefits from a trade union, but you will enjoy the fruits of the negotiations and you will pay for them.

I ask your Lordships to imagine a workplace of 5,000 people, where there are rules and collective obligations—because this is the way it works; this is the way the employers want it to work, and this is the way the trade unions will have to work it: on a basis of collective responsibility. Therefore, while the man who feels that he has good conscientious grounds for saying he ought not to pay has a right to those opinions, the people who are working with him, who have created the collective situation, the situation from which he benefits, equally have certain rights.

LORD BYERS

If the noble Lord would permit me to interrupt him, may I say that this is really not the point of the Amendment. I should like to make it absolutely clear that what the noble Lord is dealing with now are the grounds for conscientious objection. These arise only when the conscientious objector has been proved to have a conscientious objection. All we are trying to do is to simplify the working of the Bill. There is no question of absolutism: we just think it would be much easier.

LORD COOPER OF STOCKTON HEATH

The Bill lays down, as to the treatment of the objector, that he shall pay to a charity, and all we are arguing about is: who decides to which charity the money shall go? The objector could choose the charity. The most charitable people in the country probably are the working people, when you get to know them, and I would find it difficult to think of a charity at this moment to which working-class people would object; but there could possibly be some offensive ones, and the objector could be a difficult character who might easily cause trouble in the workshop. I think the basic principle is the one which relates to the second category; that is, you have got to pay. You are entitled to the privileges of freedom, you are entitled to your conscientious objection, but in the last resort you have got to pay; and in the paying I think the trade unions, who are creating the very thing for which you are paying, should have some say in who you pay the money to.

4.2 p.m.

LORD WINDLESHAM

These Amendments would, as the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, explained clearly at the beginning of the debate, prevent a trade union being able to challenge the conscientious objector's decision as to which charity should benefit from the financial contribution he makes in lieu of membership; and although the trade union would have to accept the conscientious objector's right to opt out of union membership and therefore lose his financial contribution towards the union's bargaining services from which he would benefit, the Amendments would not allow the union any say on the matter of which charity the contributions should be paid to—and the Government consider it reasonable that the union should have some say. Only in an extremely small number of cases is there likely to be any dispute as to which charity a contribution should be paid. The noble Earl, Lord Dudley, reminded us that under a number of existing closed shop agreements there are provisions of this sort already where the conscientious objector, the unions and the employers have jointly agreed on the charity to which payments should be made; and we think that in most cases there will be agreement. But in the interests of good and orderly relations in the workplace, which is what this Bill is trying to achieve, it is obviously preferable that there should be voluntary agreement. But in those cases—and there will be a few cases, I hope and believe—where the union and the worker cannot agree on the charity to which the contribution should be paid, it seems better for peaceful co-existence if the problem could be taken out of the workplace, where it would only serve to poison the relationship on the shop floor, and be determined by an independent third party, in this case the industrial tribunal.

In the course of this debate we have heard the extremes of view, in a sense. This is not a major issue, of course, but there are diametrically opposed views on this point. There are those who, like the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, feel that it would be better if the individual who exercises his right not to be a member could determine for himself the charity to which the payment is made. On the other hand, there are those—Lord Shinwell, Lord Leatherland and Baroness White—who feel that it would really be a better system to leave it to the union, for them to decide on the charity. What the Government are doing here is to reconcile these two conflicting interests. We accept that both the union and the individual have an interest here. The noble Lord, Lord Brown, told us quite clearly why the union have an interest: because they are negotiating wage increases and other matters which benefit all employees, whether they are conscientious objectors or not. Therefore, to that extent the union have a legitimate interest. And the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, told us why he regarded this as being within the sphere of decision of the individual. So this is a reconciliation, and I believe a reasonable one, between these two conflicting forces.

I was asked by the noble Lord, Lord Brockway (whose interest in this matter is well known) and Lord Sainsbury about charities, and how the charity would be selected; what would amount to a charity for the purposes of this clause of the Bill. Noble Lords will see that in the Bill there is a rather tautologous statement which says: In this Part of this Act 'charity' means any institution or other organisation established for charitable purposes … In order to help noble Lords and the Committee, I have looked further into what "charitable purposes" means, and I find that there is—

LORD CONESFORD

My noble friend left out the important word, "only".

LORD WINDLESHAM

I beg my noble friend's pardon: that should be added, certainly. I find that there is no statutory definition of "charitable purposes". It is for the High Court to decide in the last resort what purposes are or are not charitable; but in practice the Charity Commissioners, and in certain cases the Department of Education and Science, consider applications from bodies which seek to be placed on a register, and in doing so they investigate the purposes for which the charity was set up they examine its constitution and they consider whether or not these purposes are likely to be regarded as charitable in the light of a very substantial body of case law going back, I believe, to the year 1601. I do not think I need deal more fully with this point (although I am equipped to) other than to say that this applies to England and Wales only, and that the position in Scotland is different.

BARONESS WHITE

Before we leave this point, could the noble Lord perhaps elucidate this a little further? What will be the terms of reference of the industrial tribunal in these circumstances? Is it going to be a purely arbitrary choice, with the members of the industrial tribunal just picking their own favoured charity, or will they have to choose between two conflicting proposals which may be put before them? It seems to us that, on practical grounds, there may well be a good deal of friction on a thing of this kind; and it seems a little difficult to know what the principles will be on which the industrial tribunal will be required to make its determination. This was one reason which inclined us to the simpler proposition that really in all these circumstances it would be much easier if the trade union were given discretion. Perhaps I may also ask the noble Lord—he tells us that he is well armed—whether a public school would come within the definition of "charitable purposes only", because that is the kind of thing which might lead to certain discussion on the shop floor.

LORD WINDLESHAM

The purpose of looking to the industrial tribunal in this particular case is to try to bring the parties together, and we hope that this will happen, as the noble Lord, Lord Cooper, said, very seldom. He told us that in his experience—and we should pay attention to it—there will be very few conscientious objectors anyway, because there will be a larger group of people, presumably, who will accept that they should pay an appropriate contribution to the union itself. Although they are not members, they will pay the contribution, so the number who will exercise this particular right to object will be small.

The industrial tribunals have been selected because they are already in existence. They have been rather suc- cessful; they are somewhat informal, not requiring lawyers to appear before them; the individual may sometimes be represented by a trade union member if he wishes. Many noble Lords are familiar with them from first-hand experience. They have had many cases of industrial training, of redundancy, of selective employment repayments, and so on. They try to get the parties to agree. It will be remembered that this dispute will not reach the industrial tribunal until the individual and the union have already failed to agree. On the question of whether or not a charity would be regarded as a suitable one, or whether a public school would be regarded as a charity, that will really turn on the purposes and the constitution of the charity or institution in question. I think it is very unlikely that that will arise.

The question upon which the noble Lords have not really touched, but which I think is really the true one, is: will the union benevolent funds benefit? I do not think it is a question of distressed gentlefolk or of public schools, which would tend to be included in closed agreements. Whether or not an institution is recognised to be charitable is in the last resort a matter for the High Court but in the first resort it is a matter for the Commissioners to see whether conditions for registration are fulfilled or not.

LORD SLATER

The noble Lord did make reference to the two sides, the trade union and the conscientious objector, having to agree on the contribution. But has thought been given to the time factor involved? No doubt the noble Lord will remember that I cited a particular instance: in so far as the trade unions are concerned, if it goes beyond a certain period of time the individual becomes out of financial commitment, and therefore is not due for any form of benefit; he cannot get the benefit because he has become a non-financial member. What is the time factor here between the two parties, in determining what the charity should be to which his contribution should go? Is it to be two, three, or four months, and then passed on to the Industrial Court for a decision upon it? If that could be clarified we should know where we were; but at the moment I am at a loss to know where we stand if the contribution is to go to a charity on agreement between the two parties, because they have to carry out a form of negotiation.

LORD BROWN

This is an extremely trivial issue. I am with Lord Conesford and the noble Lords here. This rag-end should not he left lying about; it may cause a great deal more trouble. The Minister has made a long speech envisaging the industrial tribunal and even the High Court being brought in on an issue which, I should say, will involve a very small number of people. It seems unnecessary to envisage all this happening over such a trivial thing. I wish to see the unions make the decision, but if the Government are not prepared to accept that, then I would go along with the Liberal amendment and make the workman decide. But the decision should not to be left between the two, so that the opportunity is open—even if only a trivial number of people is involved—for legal proceedings. It would be a terrible thing to do that for such a trivial issue.

LORD WINDLESHAM

It is all very well announcing that that is not the way to do it. The Government have given a great deal of thought to this and have tried to pay careful attention to both points of view. They have come to the conclusion that both the individual worker and the union have a legitimate interest in practice. My feeling is that the voice of the noble Lord, Lord Cooper, is the one to which we should listen here. People are prepared to be firm, and they are prepared to be reasonable. They are prepared to agree upon what should be a suitable charity without going through a long procedure with the industrial tribunal, and so on. But if there is the one case in a thousand where people cannot agree, there really must be some way of resolving the difference. That is what this part of the Bill does.

The time factor is not really within the control of the industrial tribunal. If the individual will not agree with the union and is prevaricating—he is playing for time—we must remember that he is then in breach of contract with his employer, in an agency shop situation. Under Clause 10 the employer has agreed with the union that all his employees in a particular unit of employment will either be members of the union or will make an appropriate contribution in lieu of union membership. That may be by way of a payment to the union funds or it may be—in the small number of cases we have been discussing—a payment to charity. He has agreed upon that with the union and furthermore he has agreed that it will be an explicit term and condition of employment with each individual workman that he will either join the union or make an appropriate payment in lieu. Therefore, if the individual prevaricating and has not done either of those two things, he is in breach of contract of employment, and it is through that avenue that the matter may be pursued.

LORD BYERS

It is surprising what difficulties one can get into by trying to be helpful. I do not think that the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, was in any way justified in the outburst he made. He got it right in one part of his speech when he said that he thought that it was the aim of the Liberals to improve the Bill and not to weaken the prestige and power of the trade unions. That is exactly our situation, but I thought the outburst revealing when he went on to say that an example of how to disrupt and weaken the authority of the trade union movement was to deprive the trade union movement of the right to have a say in the vital policy decision as to where these contributions should go. That is giving this particular Amendment an importance it does not deserve. The noble Lord, Lord Brown, is quite right. We looked at this procedure and thought that it was a very heavy one and that it would be much easier, in the very few cases there would be, for someone to make the decision, and that that decision should be made by the man who has to pay the contribution to the charity.

However, that was an effort at simplification. We should be quite prepared to look at the other proposition: it might well be better—although we think it is marginally worse, on the face of it—that the union should make the decision. But it seems fantastic to consider the effort that might be involved over one of these cases going to appeal and so on, when in fact it could be decided by the worker or the union. We should be prepared to withdraw this Amendment and look at it from that point of view. I assure the House that this was merely an attempt to simplify what we consider to be very unwieldy procedure.

LORD SHINWELL

If the noble Lord, Lord Byers, imagines that my moderate observations may be described as an "outburst" he has not heard anything yet.

LORD BYERS

I listened to the noble Lord for many years in another place and I have known for many years exactly what was going to come. My purpose at the moment is to withdraw the Amendment before the Committee.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

4.20 p.m.

On Question, Whether Clause 8 shall stand part of the Bill?

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

We have spent some time on an Amendment which has drawn attention to complexities which some noble Lords have suggested might well be proved in the event to be exaggerated. But on considering whether this clause shall stand part of the Bill I want to draw the attention of the Committee to a more fundamental point. It is whether we are wise in leaving in the Bill this provision to deal with the problem of conscience in the way that it stands. Last week I ventured to raise this issue with the Committee and to initiate a preliminary discussion on it—because it is an important issue, from the points of view of both principle and its practical effects. I am bound to say that last week's debate and further consideration of the Hansard record of it have strengthened my belief that the Government ought to look very much more closely at this issue if they are to avoid real difficulties arising on its operation. I hope that the Government will look closely at this for reasons that I shall try to set out.

I do not want to cover all the ground that I covered last week, but will briefly summarise what I then said. I began by emphasising that nothing that I said, nothing that was said on behalf of my noble friends, ought to be taken as suggesting that we did not attach the greatest importance to the safeguarding of the individual's conscience in all appropriate cases. I pointed out that in general the statutory safeguard for the individual's conscience arose on matters either of great public importance, when a man was making a most solemn declaration on oath or by affirmation, or when it was a question of his embarking on some act involving the destruction of a human life which inevitably went to the very foundation of his ethical beliefs and personality. I suggested that, when looked at against such a background, to bring in the consideration of conscience over a matter of joining a trade union involved an appreciable change of scale.

The noble Lord who spoke for the Government on the previous Amendment laid particular emphasis on the speech of my noble friend Lord Cooper of Stockton Heath. I agree entirely with what Lord Cooper said: that this is a situation well known to industry and one which I think nobody would suggest has ever given rise to any real difficulty. The essence of it is that there are individuals belonging to certain religious groupings who have an objection to joining a trade union, or to joining any association of people not entirely of their religious beliefs. I am sure that the experience of my noble friend Lord Cooper is the same as mine: that those very small groups are respected by their workmates, and invariably they have great respect for the trade unions. In many cases, with a little prompting, they will make a donation, not to charity but to the funds of the union, to show their good will. So this is not a problem which, on the face of it, necessarily requires statutory provision. One would think that it might be a question of trying to meet the situation of these folk in some other way which, in the light of experience, would prove as satisfactory—for I think that our debate so far has indicated how very much wider this can go if we start to put it on the basis of a statutory provision.

The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Blackburn—and I refer to him with some hesitation, for he does not appear to be in his place—is on record as taking the view that it would be possible to have a conscientious objection if the union to which an individual belonged took a particular course in regard to registration under the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Conesford, made the point that in his view it would be permissible to have a conscientious objection to joining one trade union but not to joining another. He took as an example the conscientious objection that he would feel in circumstances where he was under some pressure to join a union which he regarded as being Communist-dominated. If one reflects for a few minutes, one sees that we are going very much wider than the group of people or characters of opinion or difference with which most of us thought we were dealing when we initially looked at this clause. For instance, a difference of opinion over a conscientious objection of the kind to which the right reverend Prelate and Lord Conesford referred might be expressed in an atmosphere far more acrimonious than that in which one is considering a case of what I may call, for purposes of simplicity, the genuine conscientious objector or religious conscientious objector. I am anxious that the Committee should consider very carefully whether we want to put on to the Statue Book words which (if members of the industrial tribunal took the same view as expressed by the right reverend Prelate or the noble Lord) would substantially widen this group of people and, moreover, completely transform the character of this group and its whole relationship with the trade union movement.

I referred to the fact that in other aspects of industrial life there are grounds which I should regard it as permissible to call conscientious, but which, so far as I am aware, do not have statutory protection. I gave the example of a manager of a supermarket who finds suddenly that he is going to sell alcoholic drinks; or a man, a strict pacifist, who finds that the engineering firm in which he works has turned itself over to defiance contracts. I take now another example to which I did not refer earlier and which I think can be used to show that there are individuals who have very strong convictions, even though they do not always refer readily to their consciences to justify them. A few months ago there was an industrial dispute in the electricity supply industry. During the dispute a London newspaper published a cartoon purporting to show an electricity supply worker. I do not wish to elaborate on the cartoon; I believe that it will be in the memory of many. I think that the most sensible thing was done by the electricity supply workers. They invited the cartoonist to meet them to see how far they resembled his caricature. But the putting forward of that cartoon for publication roused very strong feelings on the part of the production workers who were required to process it. I make no bones about saying that if I had been one of the workers required, for example, to make the block for that cartoon I should have felt the strongest and most bitter objection to doing so. I should have felt it was a prostitution of my skills as a worker to be required to do that, but not that I was entitled to advance a conscientious objection to doing the work that had been assigned to me.

I give that as an example of so many cases which can arise where as individual might feel intensely upon an issue and could propose, if he were so disposed, to represent it as an issue of conscience; yet we have not thought it right—and so far as I know nobody proposes to think it right—to give statutory protection to that sort of individual conviction. But we are well on the way to giving to strongly held convictions on particular points of trade union policy the status of a right or the status of "conscience" for the purpose of withdrawing from a trade union.

I think that we shall run into difficulties if we do not look at this matter closely. One difficulty we shall run into is a cynical treatment of conscience itself or of the claim to resist an action on grounds of conscience. I do not relish the propect which could arise if we go along the path that we seem to be disposed to take. My noble friend Lord Cooper of Stockton Heath, or I or some other general secretary will be rung up by a branch secretary who says: Five of my members are troubled in their consciences about the speech you made last week, or the decision which the conference took, or the article which you wrote for the union journal and will go on to say "I am trying to do something about their consciences."

Within a trade union strong differences of opinion do arise: it is quite inevitable. They have to be argued out in a good spirit, and I think we are in danger of complicating the situation greatly if we do no try to confine the operation of this clause in a fairly strict and rigorous manner. Already under the Bill the Government have insisted on conferring a statutory right to be non-unionist. I hope we are not in danger of going further and casting some kind of moral lustre on being a non-unionist. I trust that we can examine this matter. I am sure there is a serious point here which merits close examination.

4.32 p.m.

LORD PEARSON

It has been said that some attempts to contribute to this discussion from these Benches would be welcome, and it is for that reason that I venture to make certain suggestions not about matters of general policy or substance but about matters of form and the requisite statutory machinery. It seems to me that these three clauses, Clauses 7, 8 and 9, have certain weaknesses in that respect. A new system— I think it is a brand new system—is being introduced, of workers being allowed under a certain form of proposed agreements, to make contributions in lieu of membership. It is a fairly simple idea, and one would have thought that if the idea were right it ought to be possible to devise suitable, clear-cut statutory machinery for implementing the proposals. It might be a considerable advantage if that could be done, and possibly if it were successful it would have two advantages. One would be to shorten the Bill to some extent. I am sure we should all like, if possible, to shorten and simplify this Bill, even if only by the substitution of one clause for three. Another possible advantage, if it is an advantage—and that is a policy question—would be that at the moment, so far as I understand this clause, everything is left over to be negotiated and agreed ad hoc in relation to each particular agency shop contract that may be concluded in the future. That will need a good deal of time and may generate a certain amount of friction, whereas if you could have hard and fast, clear-cut statutory machinery for the assessment, collection and payment of these proposed contributions, a good deal of time and friction might be avoided.

The first step—and, I would have thought, not a difficult one—would be to have a statutory formula defining what the amount should be. That does not seem difficult, subject to certain possible qualifications. The basic principle would be that the man who opts for this relief should pay by way of contributions the same sum as he would have paid by way of subscription had he been a member of the union. It may be that some deductions are required. One seems to be included at the end of Clause 7(3), excluding any such contributions which (subject to his giving any requisite notice) he would not be obliged to pay. It may be that any optional subscriptions or contributions ought to be left out of account. Otherwise it does seem possible to have a clear definition in the Bill as to what the amount is to be; and that would be an important first step which would not then have to be left to be negotiated for each separate agreement made afterwards.

Then there is a further step. Whether it can be taken or not is a matter of policy, but if it can it would greatly simplify the machinery. If it were possible to authorise or require the employer to deduct from the worker's wages the amount of the particular contributions—. I think it would be for the union to assess what the amount should be in the first instance: but only in the first instance, because there would be some possibility of raising the question afterwards—the rest would follow very easily. The employer, having deducted those sums, would pay them over to the appropriate recipient. The appropriate recipient would normally be the union: but if the worker, for reasons of conscience—and I will say something about that in a moment—claimed that his contribution should not be paid over to the trade union but to some charity named by him, then the next step would be easy and the trade union would either acquiesce in or object to his request. If they acquiesced, the money would be paid over without more ado to the charity named by him. On the other hand, if the union raised an objection and persisted in it, then the dispute would have to go to the industrial tribunal.

In the meantime, the money would have been paid. That is an important point, because as I understand the provisions as they stand in the Bill at present, there is great scope for the astute and not too conscientious worker who may raise some dispute, to spin it out for weeks and months and, in the meantime, not to make any payment. If before the end of that period he chooses to transfer to some other employment, how are you going to get the money out of him? Therefore, I would venture to put forward this idea of firm, hard and fast statutory machinery to avoid those disadvantages. If the two steps that I have mentioned can be taken in the sphere of policy, namely, to define in principle what the amount should be; and, secondly, if it is possible to impose upon the employer the burden (if it is not too severe a burden) of collecting the money by deduction from wages, then the rest follows quite simply and easily.

The other point I want to make is that if something is going to depend on the worker's grounds of conscience, it is very important, at any rate from the judicial point of view, to have some definition of 'what is meant by those grounds of conscience. What kind of conscience is it to be? Is it to be religious conscience only? That would be one easy formulation; and, if so, it could be said that that is the only kind of conscience which is admissible. Does it include political conscience; and, if so, how far does it go? It would be very difficult, I think, for the courts, if they did not have any statutory definition to guide them, to know where they are. They would have to make guesses; and if different courts made different guesses, that would not be at all surprising. So I ask: if it is admissible to bring in matters of political conscience, how far will it go? Many examples have been given already, hut there are two that occur to me. First, someone might say that he was not willing to contribute to a union because he reasonably believed that for the moment the union was controlled by people of the Communist persuasion. He might reasonably believe—or, whether reasonably or not, he might genuinely believe—that there might be some outside interference with the affairs of the union. That is one case. Then there is the other case, where a man is a very keen politician; he may be a true blue Conservative politician, and regards his union as supporting the Opposition Party. Even though he may not have to contribute directly to the political levy he may nevertheless think, "If my money goes to this union, the union will be helped, and it will be giving general support to the Opposition Party; and therefore, indirectly, I shall be supporting the Opposition Party and supporting a cause in which I do not believe." I am not for a moment suggesting what the answers to these questions ought to be, but I suggest, in fairness to those who ultimately will have to decide what is meant, that some further statutory guidance, by way of definition, ought to be given.

4.43 p.m.

LORD CONESFORD

I think the whole Committee will agree that our debate has been enriched by the contribution of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearson, and I am sure that it was universally welcomed. I wish only to give my point of view on this clause. The matter was stated with great fairness by the noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, and I think it my duty to the Committee to make my view, which is sincerely and very strongly held, equally clear. I am not, of course, disputing for one moment the plea of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearson, that there should be more guidance to the tribunals and the court; though I want to say quite clearly that I do not think that the conscientious objection can be limited to religious grounds. I hold strongly, from the parallel of an argument of the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, that it is possible to have a respectable conscientious objection to joining a particular union, and I think it only right to give some indication of why I take this view.

It had not been very important, until we got to these questions of closed shops and so forth, and I know how members on both sides of the Committee desire, very naturally, to avoid discussing clauses in advance. Nevertheless, we all know that there is, later on, a clause for a strict closed shop in which membership of a particular trade union is to be universal, and from which the only escape is this conscientious ground. I ask fair-minded members of the Committee to picture an attempted compulsion of a man to join a particular trade union. I do not think that many would have difficulty of conscience if the union were engaged in ordinary trade disputes. But suppose that the union is under Communist domination—and some trade unions have been, and probably still are, under Communist domination. May I say that in my long interest in Communism and its dangers I have received the greatest assistance from trade union leaders, who have great knowledge of this subject? But what are some of these Communist-dominated trade unions doing? One thing they do from time to time is to indulge in political strikes. They may be short strikes, but they are strikes to overrule the will of Parliament—no less. Others are engaged in activities which, in the opinion of those best able to judge, are designed and calculated to bring lasting injury to this country. All these things may be in the mind and experience of a man invited, or told, that he will be compelled to join a particular union if he is to carry on a particular occupation.

LORD PARGITER

I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, does not wish to be unfair. A man may carry on his occupation in more than one place. It is a question of his occupation in a particular place; therefore the matter should not be confused. He is not denied the right to carry on his occupation; he may be denied the right to carry it on at a particular establishment.

LORD CONESFORD

I welcome that intervention, which I know is honestly intended. But, of course, it all depends on whether the occupation happens to be in a monopoly. Take a man engaged in the transport industry in London, for example. If he is excluded from one particular union (I am not saying that the particular union concerned is of the type I have just described), if it is the union controlling a monopoly occupation, it could deny a man his livelihood. I say that if we recognise conscientious objection at all—and I believe that the Government are right to do so—that conscientious objection must extend to joining a particular trade union. A man can have such a conscientious objection although he does not subscribe at all to any of those crank sects that prohibit him from joining any body of any sort. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, that under this clause we are discussing a most important issue; and I want to make it absolutely clear that in my view the conscientious objection must extend to an objection to joining a particular trade union.

4.50 p.m.

LORD SLATER

I am sorry that this clause is part of the Bill. I am also sorry to have had to listen to the speech made about Communists by the noble Lord, Lord Conesford. May I impress on noble Lords that we had, as a national union, two General Secretaries who were members of the Communist Party in this country, but they were the most outstanding trade union leaders in this country, and negotiated on behalf of their membership to the best of their ability and arrived at agreement without any trouble inside the industry. It appears therefore that the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, has fallen into the same trap as did some members of his own Party in the other place: that every time they look under the bed they are looking to see whether there is a Communist underneath. That is the unfortunate position so far as people like Lord Conesford are concerned, when we are talking about Communism.

I was delighted to hear the speech made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearson, from the Cross-Benches. It was full of fruit, full of ideas, full of proposals, trying to ease the position so far as the Government were concerned, and suggesting what should be done to improve upon this particular Bill. But the purpose and object of trade unions in this country is like that of a political Party. The purpose and object of a trade union is to try for 100 per cent. membership, if that is at all possible; but it does not always happen in that way. It is true that conscience can be flexible, and people can exercise their conscience in so many ways that they will find an outlet, even if this Bill goes through in its present state. In the same way, the C.B.I. tries to get 100 per cent. membership from industry.

I should like to conclude on this note: the clause talks about charitable causes and charitable organisations. The trade unions in this country have religiously contributed over the years to charitable organisations, whenever it has been possible, from the finances at their disposal, and this will continue. I know that the noble Lord who is in charge of this particular clause has given serious thought to all its aspects, and wishes to be as reasonable as possible. But when we have members who have spent their lifetime within the trade union world, we feel that we must defend its position and its membership, when we have to listen to observations made by certain people up and down this country, who say that, because the stand that a trade union leader may take is not the stand that ought to be taken, we ought to be moving in a different direction altogether and trying to give support to the Government when they seek to introduce legislation of the type we have in front of us at the moment. Therefore I support my noble friends, Lord Delacourt-Smith and Lady White, who are in my opinion putting forward very constructive arguments as to why this particular clause should not remain in the Bill. It would be better for everyone if it were deleted from the Bill.

BARONESS GAITSKELL

I am absolutely against this clause, and I think the Bill would be much better without it. I wish to comment on the utterly sincere speech by the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, with which I do not wholly agree, though I sympathise with some of his reasons for making it. But what does the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, suggest is the way of overcoming or changing a trade union where the leadership is completely Communist and may be destructive? We have had leaders who have been Communist and who have changed, and who are great leaders—Les Cannon was one of them, I believe—so the whole subject is very complicated. I believe that there was also a time when the Electrical Trades Union was Communist-dominated. Then there was a movement to get more moderate people to attend the meetings and to vote, and they changed the leadership. The only way for workers to act, in a situation where they feel that the men at the top are not the people they want, is to go to the meetings and vote, and to change the leadership.

I wish to add only one more thing. My noble friend Lord Cooper of Stockton Heath made a very trenchant contribution when he said that this clause deals with three types of worker: the worker who belongs to a trade union; the worker who by this Bill is allowed not to be a member of a trade union, and the worker who has real conscientious objection to belonging to a trade union. These represent three different aspects of the subject, and this Bill really gives a license to print consciences—if noble Lords understand what I mean. Anybody will be able not to join a trade union and, instead, to pay to a charity, and it need not be a case of real con- science. I am therefore absolutely against this clause.

THE EARL OF MANSFIELD

The late Henry Ford had a stock reply which he gave to any customer who was rash enough to wish to choose the colour of the Ford car that he proposed to buy. That reply was: You can have a car of any colour you like, provided it is black." This, I suggest, is almost exactly the attitude adopted by the Opposition in regard to this excellent clause. The person who belongs to a particular industry is to be compelled either to join a union or, if he does not join it, to pay the dues to a union, or to have chosen by the trade union the charity to which he will have to pay the equivalent of his dues. That, to my mind, does not exactly amount to liberty. I am in the fullest agreement with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearson, in thinking that if there is to be any alteration made to this clause at later stages of the Bill—and some alteration may well be desirable, if not indeed necessary—it should be to widen tile basis of exemption rather than to narrow it, because on the Benches opposite, despite all the suavity of the noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, there appears to be a pretty grim unanimity in decrying the liberty of the individual. I do not agree with my noble friend Lord Conesford, if I am right in understanding that he would like conscientious objection to be valid only if applied to membership of one particular union—am I mistaken?

LORD CONESFORD

Yes, quite mistaken.

THE EARL OF MANSFIELD

I am glad to hear it.

LORD CONESFORD

The conscientious objection mentioned in the clause can be to joining a particular trade union.

THE EARL OF MANSFIELD

I am grateful to my noble friend. There should also be grounds rather wider than religious grounds, although the religious grounds themselves are very important. At earlier stages of this Bill the case was mentioned of the Closed Brethren, who are fairly numerous in the North-East of Scotland. They carry what some people would call religious convictions to the point of fanaticism, but still, are they not to have those convictions considered? They carry them to the point of refusing to eat with persons of other denominations; they do not vote, and they will not join any association, even a gardening society or something of that kind. All this may seem to us on both sides of the House to be rather ridiculous.

LORD COOPER OF STOCKTON HEATH

I am sorry to interrupt the noble Earl, but, so far as I am aware, they do take wage increases.

THE EARL OF MANSFIELD

I am afraid that I cannot see the relevance of that. Are they going still to be permitted to follow their consciences, how-ever inconvenient it may he to a certain number of their fellow citizens? If we do not have liberty of conscience, which appears to be denied by the Benches opposite, then we are rapidly leading towards a Hitler-like régime. Therefore I think that the Government are very properly insisting on the right of the individual not to belong to a trade union, although they are equally rightly insisting that if he does not wish to do so, he cannot make money out of his refusal to do so. I hope that the Government will not in any way give way on this clause and that the Committee will ensure that it is retained in the Bill. As I say, any alteration that may be found necessary at a future stage of the Bill ought to be rather in the direction of widening the opportunities for not belonging to a trade union than of restricting them.

LORD PARGITER

I wonder whether the Government are really sincere in their desire for industrial peace, because there is nothing more likely to create friction than widening this clause. If we are going to have conscientious objection on religious grounds, that is fairly narrowly drawn and can be fairly interpreted and I am sure that most trade unions would be happy to do so. But if we are going to allow anyone to object to a union because it has a Communist member on its executive, I wonder where we are getting. It does not matter who are members of the executive, whether they are members of the Communist Party, the Labiour Party or even the Conservative Party; they are all bound by the rules of the union, and under the Bill the union would be registered and the rules approved by the Registrar. Members of the executive, whatever the complexion of their politics, will have to operate in accordance with the rules. If we are going to get under the bed and find out the religious and political opinions of members of a trade union executive and make that an excuse to say, "I have a conscientious ground for objecting to joining the union" then there is going to be trouble.

The best way of ensuring industrial peace is to draw this clause as narrowly as possible. If it is drawn narrowly, then it can be operated, but if it is drawn widely there will be disputes upon every occasion. Let us have some sense about this. There have not been many difficulties in the past. I know that members of two organisations—the Plymouth Brethren and the Jehovah's Witnesses—generally object to belonging to any other organisation. We are not objecting to that; but if we are going to widen it to almost any person on almost any ground, where are we going? If the matter goes to the union and then to the tribunal, what sort of guideline will there be to deal with cases of this kind? It is in everybody's interest that this clause should be narrowly drawn. In fact, it would be much better if it were not in the Bill at all.

5.2 p.m.

LORD DIAMOND

Before the Government reply, may I raise a matter of which I have given the Government notice and which arose out of the previous clause? I think this would be the most convenient time to clear up the difficulty relating to the Government's expressions of opinion, which are many and varied, as to the right of a trade union to use money received from a non-member for political purposes. This question was raised by my noble friend Lord Shinwell. I quote from Hansard, because the last time I raised the matter it was suggested that we ought not to rely on our memory. I quote from col. 462, where my noble friend said: May it"— this kind of contribution— be used for political purposes …".

"LORD DRUMALBYN

These funds cannot be used for political purposes, and the Bill so provides."

"BARONESS WHITE

… I am not sure to which part of the Bill the noble Lord was referring."

"THE LORD CHANCELLOR

… the answer is that she will see it printed in Clause 7(3)."—[Col. 466.]

I looked at that subsection while my noble friend was replying and it did not seem to me, in my ignorance, that the proposition was self-evident. I therefore asked [col. 467]: I am asking the noble and learned Lord whether he would be good enough to look at this again. … Then, after an appropriate passage of time, when no doubt an opportunity of consultation was taken, the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, said: While we are talking about conscience, I regret to say that I misled the Committee on the: question asked by the noble Lord. Lord Shinwell. There is nothing in the Bill which limits the purposes to which a union may put contributions made by non-members. And he added: I hope that noble Lords will accept my apology.—[col. 486.] One would have thought that the position at that point was pellucidly clear. The reply and apology of the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, explained two matters: (a) why the wrong information had been given in the first place, and (b), why a wise Minister like the Secretary of State for Defence should show hesitation, as he did to-day, in confirming the legal view of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor. But then unfortunately there was a later intervention by the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, who doubted the proposition that had previously been made and who said: I was saying that I was not present when that was discussed with my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn and I think that he and I ought to get together and sort it out."— [col.605.]

LORD WINDLESHAM

I have done so, too, and, in doing so, as I should explain to the Committee, I find that I was dealing with a separate point. I was dealing with the political levy and whether or not that would be included in the appropriate payment. The noble Baroness, Lady White, and I were correct in agreeing that it would be excluded. I was then told by noble Lords opposite that what I said contradicted what had earlier been said by my noble friend, and that turned out not to be the case.

LORD DIAMOND

I myself rose after the noble Lord's intervention to suggest that this was a matter which ought to be cleared up, and the noble Earl the Leader of the House said: I think noble Lords opposite may have a point here. What I would suggest is that we should look at Hansard tomorrow… [col. 606.] et cetera. All I am asking for is final clarification. I am not asking for anybody's view to be withdrawn, if it referred to a different matter. I am not seeking any apologies. But this is a matter of considerable importance. We on this side think that the Bill is absolutely clear and we should not like any lack of clarity to be introduced, however unintentionally, by speakers opposite.

LORD WINDLESHAM

As I was listening to the earlier part of the debate, before the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, spoke, mainly about conscience, I recalled the words of Richard III: My conscience hath a thousand several tongues, And every tongue brings in a several tale. The noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, in his opening speech—a very reasonable and, indeed, profound opening speech—touched on some of the underlying worries of the trade union movement about this Bill. He was not confining himself to the narrow interpretation of this clause, but to the wider issues which it raised. I should like to reply in the same way, because I do not think it is right, if we are to look at what really lies behind the Bill, to confine ourselves to the arguments which arise on what is, after all, a relatively detailed aspect of the Bill.

So what is the present situation? It is that in perhaps 40 per cent. of British industry there are closed shop arrangements. These are very often of convenience to both sides, the employer and the trade union concerned, and that is why they have been agreed. So there are reasons of industrial convenience in some cases, though not all, leading to greater stability which are brought into the balance in favour of this arrangement. But, at the same time, there are on the record cases of hardship where individuals have suffered substantial harm and have had no means of redress. In a number of these closed shop arrangements there are conscience clauses.

I referred earlier to a recently entered into closed shop agreement by British Rail with three railway unions which has exactly this clause, and indeed uses the word "conscience" in the clause. I also said that only 5 people out of the total work force of 207,000 had established grounds of conscience. As a result, a number of employers, some of them with up to 44 years' service, have either been dismissed or have been threatened with dismissal. We do not believe it is right that somebody's employment should be made conditional on whether or not he joins a union. We believe that in an overwhelming majority of cases the individual worker will want to join a trade union; we hope that he will; and indeed this Bill in subsection (5) of Clause 5, which was added on Report specifically for this purpose by the Secretary of State, is a declaration of intent that the Government wish people to act upon their right to join a trade union. That is the existing situation.

But here we have in the Bill a completely new approach. It is difficult where there is a new concept to get to grips with it; to visualise what it is, how it will work, and what are likely to be the advantages and disadvantages. What this part of the Bill is doing is to bring together three strains. It is bringing together the right of the individual to join a trade union of his choice, or not to join; the fact of his social responsibility as a member of a group whose standard of living is likely to benefit from the negotiations which are carried out by the trade union on his behalf: and the need for stable and collective bargaining throughout industry. The solution to this is provided by the agency shop. It is a completely new concept; we have not had anything like it before.

The agency shop, as the noble Baroness, Lady Gaitskell, and my noble friend the Earl of Mansfield reminded us, contains within it these two categories of people. We must not allow ourselves to get into the position of thinking that it is only on grounds of conscience that a man can stand outside the union: not at all. By far the larger number are going to be the men who say: "I do not wish to join the union because I have objections to doing so". A man need not say what those objections are. There is nothing for him to prove. All he need say is: "I do not wish to join the union". And then he must make an appropriate contribution in lieu of his trade union due, which will normally be the same amount that the trade union member is paying, less the optional element.

So we are left only with this final residual category of the man who says: "On grounds of conscience, I am not even willing for the amount of money that I am to pay to go to the union. I do not think that is right; I have objections of conscience and of principle to that being done." So we now arrive at this difficult question of what is meant by "conscience". We have established, I think, that it is going to be a narrow ground, because it is not the first man who says, "I want to join"; it is the one hundredth man. The tribunal will look into a fundamental question—and this answers a question that has been raised by a number of noble Lords in the debate. It will look at the question: is the objection to joining a union, or is it an objection to what the union do? The noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, touched on this and suggested that some union members may say: "I do not like what my union general secretary or president has been doing, and my conscience is such that I ought to opt out." I do not think that considerations of that sort will arise.

The system of industrial tribunals has worked well. There is a lawyer as chairman, a solicitor or barrister of several years' standing as the representative of employers, and a representative of the trade union movement. They are informal bodies, and have been regarded generally as fair minded on issues of redundancy, industrial training and other matters that they have to consider. What they will have to address their minds to, in the light of their industrial experience, first, and in the light of the particular case, secondly, is: what is equitable in the circumstances? We can look at what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has told us on a number of occasions, and repeated in his speech at Aviemore to the Law Society of Scotland over the weekend: the law is not something archaic and mysterious; the law is merely codified common sense.

We have here the well established concept of what is regarded as reasonable, and this is the test that will be applied by the industrial tribunals. They will be in touch with one another. I understand that they have periodical conferences, so that these matters can be discussed. A body of case law will be built up.

Let me say, I think on behalf of all noble Lords in the Committee, how grateful we were to hear from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearson. As he said, the Law Lords have a considerable contribution to make to our consideration of this Bill. The noble Lord asked about the method of collecting the contributions which are made in lieu of trade union subscriptions, the amount and questions arising from those two points. Let me say a word or two about the method. This will be a matter for agreement between the employer, the worker and the union, and may be included in the agency shop agreement under Clause 10. In the case of the man we are discussing at the moment, who has conscientious objections, there will be three alternatives. The first would be that the employer would deduct the appropriate amount and pay it over to the charity direct, notifying the worker and the union that he had done so, perhaps quite informally by sending a copy of the bank transfer; secondly, the worker might pay the money to the union which would pass it on to the charity, notifying the worker that it had done so; or the worker himself might pay to the charity direct, obtaining a receipt to show to the union and the employer. While the obligation to make payment is clear and specific, with appropriate enforcement provisions in the Bill, the method by which payment is made is a matter for mutual convenience between the parties, so an analogy could be made perhaps between the way in which these payments are made and the way in which a man's remuneration is paid. It is a term of his contract of service that he should receive remuneration at an agreed rate. This is a binding legal obligation. But the method of payment, whether it shall be in cash, by bank transfer, 'by Giro, and weekly or monthly, is not a matter for statute but for mutual convenience.

On the question of the amount, the noble Lord felt that there was a case for settling the amount in some way in the Bill, but there is a fairly clear-cut formula in Clause 7 which sets out in some detail (we discussed this on Thursday night) what the maximum amount will be. It cannot be in excess of the normal union subscription. The difficulty about defining precisely in the statute is that one would have to try to put a figure on the benefits the non-unionist had obtained from collective bargaining. This would vary considerably from one case to another, but I can tell the noble Lord—and I hope this will go some way to meeting him—that on the question of collection, which seems to us crucial, the method by which payment is made will vary. I have already said, in answer to an earlier Amendment concerning lists of non-union members, that the Government intend to look into the possibility of introducing a provision which will meet the noble Lord's second point, and will consider automatic deduction of the appropriate contribution from wages and salaries of a non-member where he agrees that this would be appropriate That undertaking was given to my noble friend Lord Amory and to the noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, in the course of the debates last week.

I have spoken, I am afraid, for some little time in reply to this general debate. I could reply now to the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, on his somewhat separate point about the political purposes to which contributions might or might not be made. It is a lengthy and detailed answer; there are complicated points of law here. Alternatively, I could answer him on the Question, That Clause 9 stand part. Since the point arises out of Clause 7 we should be no more out of order in discussing it on Clause 9 than we are now. But I am in the hands of the Committee.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

Before the noble Lord sits down, and without prejudice to anything my noble friend Lord Diamond may wish to say on the point he was raising, may I ask a question, arising out of what he has told us? I understood him to say that in the case of some closed shop agreements recently made, which covered, I think he said, 207,000 people, there were five people who had conscientious objection to joining unions and that conscientious objection was sustained.

LORD WINDLESHAM

That is not exactly what I said. I think we should get it right. I think the figures given to us previously were 131 applied and 5 were confirmed.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

This is exactly what I was going to ask the noble Lord. Did he give us a figure for the people who I understand were dismissed as a result of this? Would he care to give us the figure? I did not pick up the figure of 131.

LORD WINDLESHAM

The position—and this is the point I am seeking to make—is that there have been only five employees of British Rail who have established conscientious grounds before the tribunal. There have been a substantially larger number of applications, and a considerable number of appeals are pending, so one must not read too much into the figures. We would not wish to debate details of the agreement without full information in front of the Committee. I was using it in the relative sense of saying that this is a very narrow gateway for the man who does not wish to join a union to go through since only five out of 200,000 people have gone through it in the case of this particular agreement.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

I fully understand the point, and the figure. I did understand the noble Lord, after he had given the figure of 5, to refer to people—I think he said some with 44 years' service—who had been dismissed as a result of this; and it is that figure that I should like to have.

LORD WINDLESHAM

I do not have the statistics. I speak with some previous preparation; I have a number of examples, though I do not have the actual figure. The instance referred to was not a fictitious one but the case of a man who has been dismissed. He was a man aged 61, a train guard, with 44 years' service, who was dismissed because he refused to join the union. It is not a hypothetical case, it is a real one.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

I was not suggesting for a moment that it was hypothetical; I was asking how many people were involved.

LORD DIAMOND

In reply to the noble Lord's question, I should have thought it might be convenient if Lord Windlesham is the Minister who is going to reply, and he is here, and as I am the individual who asked the question, and I am here, and those noble Lords who were good enough to listen to the question are mostly here, that we should have the reply now.

LORD COOPER OF STOCKTON HEATH

Before the reply is given, may I raise a point about the political law? I do not see the difficulty at all. Under the present law, if people do not contract out—you know how many there are and what the contribution is and you know what the political income is, and under the law a trade union has the obligation to set up quite separately a political fund. As for the chap who does not want to join a union though not on conscientious grounds, but pays a contribution, I should be amazed if he was of such a nature as not to want to join a union yet was willing to pay the political levy. But if he was willing to pay the political levy that, too, could be collected and could be put into the political fund. I do not see the difficulty, simply because the two funds have to be kept very distinct—an industrial fund and a political fund. The industrial fund can be spent only for industrial purposes, but, strange to say, the political fund can be spent for industrial purposes as well as for political purposes.

LORD WINDLESHAM

I hope I shall not infringe on the patience of the House. This is a complicated subject of law as well as of practice. Two separate but related questions arose last week, and they became confused. One was first raised by the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, who asked whether the appropriate contributions paid by a non-member in an agency shop could be used by the union for political purposes. The other question was raised by the noble Baroness, Lady White, who asked whether the words in Clause 7(3), excluding any such contribution which (subject to his giving any requisite notice) he would not be obliged to pay excluded the possibility of the nonmember being compelled to pay the political levy as part of his appropriate contribution in lieu of membership.

If I may be allowed to answer the second question first, I would confirm that Clause 7(3) excludes the non-member in the agency shop from contributing any political levy. Both the noble Baroness and myself were under the impression that it did so exclude such a person.

LORD PARGITER

If the man chooses to contract in he pays a political levy. If a person does not belong to a trade union and is asked, in making the contribution in lieu, "Do you wish to contract in or out of the political levy?" he can please himself.

LORD WINDLESHAM

The noble Lord is on the wrong point. I would appreciate it if I can make this explanation and we can discuss this afterwards. The noble Baroness and I were discussing Clause 7(3), which is concerned with what is called the "appropriate contribution" in lieu of trade union membership made by somebody who has exercised his right not to be a member of a union in an agency shop. Clause 7 deals with the amount of that payment, and it says that it should exclude the optional elements. I was asked whether or not the optional elements included the political levy. The answer is that they do, and therefore the amount the man pays does not include the political levy.

Moving on to the Trade Union Act 1913, which is applied to this Bill by Amendments in Schedule 8, this requires trade unions which adopt Party political objects to keep a separate fund for Party political expenditure, and to adopt political fund rules approved by the Registrar of Friendly Societies. Where a union has adopted political objects the rules must provide, inter alia, for the exemption of any member of the union from the obligation to contribute to the political fund if he gives notice, in accordance with the Act, that he objects to making such a contribution. The Act imposes on the officials of the union, at the time it adopts political objects, the duty to give notice to existing members of their right not to contribute. For a new member, subsequent to adoption of the political fund rules, the obligation to contribute to the political fund does not operate until the expiration of one month from the time the member is supplied with a copy of the union political fund rules, and only if he does not claim exemption meanwhile. It will be clear to noble Lords that since the member of a union cannot be obliged to pay the political levy, the political levy cannot, under the provisions of Clause 7(3), be made part of the appropriate contribution paid by the non-member.

The Trade Union Act of 1913, which is crucial, established that any organisation satisfying the definition of a trade union in that Act may pursue any lawful object included in its constitution. However, with respect to certain political objects the Act imposed special conditions. The objects to which these conditions apply are "Party" political objects, in the sense of either supporting political candidates or furthering some political purpose outside the regulation of relations between employers and workers and the other related statutory objects of trade unions. They are listed in Section 3, subsection (3), of the Act as being the expenditure of money: (a) on the payment of expenses incurred by a candidate or prospective candidate for election to Parliament or any other public office: (b) on the holding of meetings or distribution of literature in support of such a candidate or prospective candidate; (c) on the maintenance of a Member of Parliament or person holding a public office; (d) in connection with the registration of electors, or the selection of candidates for Parliament or any public office; (e) on the holding of political meetings or distribution of political literature except where the main purpose is the furtherance of the union's statutory objects. Any union, whether registered or not, must, if it is to apply its funds either directly or indirectly to "Party" political objects satisfy the conditions set out in Sections 3 to 6 of the 1913 Act, which provide that: (a) the pursuit of such political objects has been approved as an object of the union by a ballot vote of the members, held under special ballot rules approved by the Registrar; and (b) the union has adopted political fund rules, also to he approved by the Registrar, providing for the keeping of a separate political fund and for the free exemption of any member who does not wish to contribute.

It may be seen, therefore, that the nonmembers' contribution could not be added to a union's political funds or expended on "Party" political objects. The expenditure of money, including the appropriate contributions of non-members, from the general funds of a trade union on Party political objects could form the subject of criminal proceedings. But the 1913 Act leaves the union free to draw on its general funds, which would include the appropriate contributions of nonmembers, for expenditure on other political objects, if so authorised by its constitution. The scope of the "Party" political objects contained in Section (3) of the Act has never been interpreted by the counts, but the Registrar of Friendly Societies is understood to interpret the Section as not extending to the wide range of activities which can be grouped under the heading of "politics": for example, propaganda in favour of objectives which cut across domestic Party lines. I apologise for the length of that explanation, and its complexity, but it is useful to have it in Hansard in the light of the questions and discussions that we have had.

5.36 p.m.

LORD DIAMOND

I am sure the Committee is grateful to the noble Lord for that full explanation. There is nothing in what he said which contradicts the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, when he said that there is nothing in the Bill which limits the purposes to which a union may put contributions made by non-members. The noble Lord has referred to other enactments outside the Bill which are not before us. All we have power to deal with is the Bill which is before us. There is no need to dwell further on this topic because both noble Lords—and this is a very happy occasion both for the Government and the Committee—are now agreed that there is nothing in the Bill which limits the purposes to which a union may put contributions made by non-members. I express my own appreciation, and I am sure the appreciation of the Committee, for that full reply.

BARONESS WHITE

I should like to ask one more question. In company with my noble friend, Lord Pargiter, I am not entirely clear. Could we be enlightened as to the position about the political levy? One can see under Clause 7(3) that any such matter would not be included in the payment which would be an obliga- tory in lieu payment for someone who wished not to be a union member. But is there anything to stop a person who does not want to belong to the particular union in question in the agency shop, but who still might have some affection for a political Party, from contracting-in if he wishes to for that particular payment?

LORD WINDLESHAM

I do not think anyone would be precluded from paying more than they were required to pay if they wished to do so for any purpose whatever.

VISCOUNT AMORY

I take it that this announcement is the 5.30 "late night final" on this point?

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

After that interesting discussion on the applicability of the monies paid by non-unionists, I must seek to bring your Lordships back to the grounds on which I suggested that this clause ought not to stand part of the Bill. Those grounds were that the clause as drafted, with the reference to "conscience", was such that, especially in the light of the discussion earlier in the Committee, there was a danger that "conscience" might be interpreted much more widely than it has hitherto been, and that this might give rise both to difficulties and to friction which need not arise, and to a certain degree of undermining of the genuine attention and protection which ought to be given to conscientious objection.

I was a little surprised by the views attributed to me and my noble friends by the noble Earl, Lord Mansfield. I do not think that anything I have said this afternoon or when I spoke in the presence of the noble Earl on the same subject last Thursday gives any justification whatsoever or in the slightest degree for suggesting that we are not concerned about individual liberty and that we are not concerned about the proper protection of conscience. Incidentally, if I may say so, I did not understand the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearson, to be arguing in the direction which the noble Earl attributed to him—arguing that there should be a widening of the exemption on conscientious grounds. If I understood Lord Pearson correctly, he was suggesting that there should be a closer definition—whether wider or narrower I do not think he indicated. He felt (and I am completely at one with him; this was indeed the essence of much I was saying) that this matter ought to be much more closely defined for the benefit of all of us and for the avoidance of friction and difficulty which will do no good and which is avoidable.

As I understand it. we are all completely at one in agreeing that hitherto nobody has had any serious complaint—certainly nobody has voiced any serious complaint—about the treatment by the trade union movement of those individuals who reject the idea of joining a trade union because their religious beliefs lead them to the conviction that they ought not to join associations of any kind with people who do not share their religion. I think that this applies to the Close Brethren in the Northern parts of Scotland. Indeed, I know there are one or two who are employed in the occupation which I myself am concerned with and who, as I undersand it, are in happy understanding and mutual respect with the trade union. This, I believe, is the general situation: that their convictions are respected; that they, for their part, understand and appreciate what the union seeks to do, and, so far as I am aware, this is not a situation which gives rise to animus or friction. It is accepted on both sides.

The essence of my point to the Committee was that we are in danger of moving into a quite different situation where not only do we widen considerably the concept of conscience but we change the whole character of the relationship between the trade union and the individuals who claim on conscientious grounds to reject union membership. This is a point which I believe has been quite fairly established. The noble Lord said it was difficult to visualise how some of these things would happen. I agree, it is very difficult indeed to visualise how many of the features of the Bill will operate in practice, which is what makes it such a tragedy that the Government have conducted themselves in a way which has made proper discussion with the trade union movement upon this Bill impracticable. The noble Lord gave his belief and his impression about what the tribunals would do. He told us that they would consult together; that there would no doubt be uniformity, and all sorts of desirable things would happen. What he did not do was to give us any justification at all for believing that the unfortunate consequences which can result from widening the whole definition and concept of conscience would not arise if in fact the words in the Bill before us remain as they are at present.

Further, noble Lords repeatedly refer to this question of conscience as though it applied or had bearing only where there is an agency shop or a closed shop. They take the same view about the statutory right to be a non-unionist. They imply that it does not matter except where there is an agency shop or a closed shop. If I may respectfully say so, this again reveals the remoteness of so much of the drafting of this Bill and of so many of the arguments put forward in respect of it from the actual problems of day-to-day life in industry; because the vast majority of our industry—perhaps not the vast majority, but certainly at least 60 per cent. of it—is covered, not by closed shops or anything like them; it is covered by arrangements whereby people, join trade unions on a perfectly voluntary basis, and trade unions have to keep up a constant programme of explanation, education and propaganda to maintain their trade union membership.

What the Government are doing in Clause 5 and in this clause, quite apart from the other problems and difficulties to which they are unnecessarily giving rise, is to make the job of the trade union more difficult in those fields where voluntary arrangements and voluntary recruitment are the order of the day. As my noble friend Lord Cooper of Stockton Heath said on an earlier debate, there are manifold reasons why a non-unionist will refuse to pay union contributions and why, if he possibly can, he will resist being enrolled into the ranks with his fellow s. And the Government have given him two splendid new arguments. First of all, he can say, "I have a statutory right to be a non-unionist". It is quite irrelevant, but it is another argument; it is an answer. Then, if he is not satisfied with that, he will say, "I have a conscientious objection. I read something which the general secretary said or which the union resolved and I did not like it. It offended my conscience", and that will be another argument he will apply to the chap who is trying to recruit him into the union on a voluntary basis. That is what I meant when I said that not only are the Government giving a statutory right to the non-unionist; they are in danger of putting a moral halo around his head.

Nothing I say, and nothing my noble friends have said, in any way underestimates the importance of the individual who, it is common ground, should be excluded from union membership and whose conscience should be respected. I am not referring to that. We are conscious, too, of the strong views which individuals hold about trade unions, their policies and the personalities involved in them. But the place to give expression to those strong convictions is inside the trade union; and it is a thousand pities that the Government, instead of encouraging these people in every way to join trade unions, are giving them every possible excuse and every possible shred of justification for refusing to do so. It is a very great pity indeed. I know the Government will say that they do not intend this, and they will point to admirable speeches which have been made by various Ministers to the contrary. Then I do wish they would make their measures as set out in this proposed Statute coincide with their intentions, if their intentions indeed are to promote collective bargaining. However, I hope the noble Lord will be able to tell us, even at this last minute, that he will take this matter back; that he will take note of the anxieties which have been expressed, I trust in a constructive way, from this side of the Committee. If he does not feel able to do so, I shall have no alternative but to ask my noble friends to divide the Committee on the issue.

5.48 p.m.

LORD DAVIES OF LEEK

I apologise for being late, but it is sometimes very difficult to follow what is going on in this House, even if one is early. We seem to be discussing Clause 7. We have had a very helpful explanation, as we did in the last debate. We then went back to Clause 8 and I now take it that we are saying that Clause 8 should be excluded. We have come back to that, and that is what I wish to speak about. First of all, I was delighted to hear the noble Lord speaking for the Government say that this is something new. I happened to be in the United States of America some years ago when all this business was going on there about the agency shop and about making contributions to charities. It is not new at all; it has been plucked out of a burning bush. The idea is, however, something absolutely foreign to all that is going on. The true fact is that when the Donovan Committee were discussing this matter they said that the legal right not to be a unionist was designed to frustrate the development of collective bargaining. Let us face it—that as much as anything is one of the consequences of these clauses which we have been discussing. All one wants to look at is what happens when there is an agency shop system and a registered trade union. We cannot go into the question now because it would be out of order, but we must remember that there are many hurdles to overcome to get the registered trade union and there may be delays of two years; but We have not yet reached that frustrating debate.

Let us suppose that I have a conscientious objection and I am working beside trade union members in a busy factory or mine, and there is a major accident. Many noble Lords seem to think that the only function of a trade union is collective bargaining but, as I said the other day, over the past hundred years there has grown up, by trial and error, a massive amount of expertise in the trade union movement. They may be "sea lawyers", as they are sometimes disparagingly described, but they have a massive amount of information about the working of Acts of Parliament and about industrial injuries and industrial diseases. On the shop floor we shall have two types of animal, one a bona fide member of the trade union movement and the other with a conscientious objection. It has never been explained how we can guarantee that the man who has a conscientious objection to joining a union will not be looked upon disparagingly by his comrades on the shop floor. None of these points has been considered in depth.

The pity about this is that in the euphoria of winning the General Election the Party opposite, with hundreds of years' experience of government, with the wise people and the judges in it, did not stay the hand of the young Poujardists who have entered the Party and let them wait to get some practical experience before this mish-mash of verbiage was thrust upon the House; before we had this mix-up of ethics and jurisprudence. I frankly say to the Committee that this will not work in practice. It will lead to all kinds of differences, and far from helping productivity and a peaceful approach to industry and between the two sides of industry, I believe in the long

Resolved in the affirmative, and Clause 8 agreed to accordingly.

run it will be frustrating. My only hope is that we shall have a General Election before this Bill is put on the Statute Book.

5.54 p.m.

On Question, Whether Clause 8 shall stand part of the Bill?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 110; Not-Contents, 50.

CONTENTS
Aberdare, L.	Eccles, V.	Monck, V.
Ailwyn, L.	Effingham, E.	Monckton of Brenchley, V.
Allerton, L.	Emmet of Amberley, Bs.	Mountevans, L.
Alport, L.	Exeter, M.	Mowbray and Stourton, L.
Amherst, E.	Ferrers, E.	Norwich, V
Amory, V.	Fortescue, E.	Nugent of Guildford, L.
Ashbourne, L.	Fraser of Lonsdale, L.	Oakshott, L.
Atholl, D.	Goschen, V. [Teller.]	Ogmore, L.
Balerno, L.	Gray, L.	Radnor, E.
Balfour of Inchrye, L.	Grenfell, L.	Rankeillour, L.
Barrington, V.	Grimston of Westbury, L.	Rea, L.
Beauchamp, E.	Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)	Rothermere, V.
Belstead, L.		St. Aldwyn, E.
Berkeley, Bs.	Halsbury, E.	St. Helens, L.
Birdwood, L.	Hankey, L.	St. Just, L.
Blackford, L.	Hanworth, V.	St. Oswald, L.
Boston, L.	Harlech, L.	Sandford, L.
Bridgeman, V.	Hawke, L.	Sandys, L.
Caccia, L.	Henley, L.	Selkirk, E.
Carrington, L.	Hood, V.	Sinclair of Cleeve, L.
Chandos, V.	Howard of Glossop, L.	Somers, L.
Clwyd, L.	Howe, E.	Stamp, L.
Cottesloe, L.	Ilford, L.	Stonehaven, V.
Courtown, E.	Jellicoe, E. (L. Privy Seal.)	Strang, L.
Cowley, E.	Jessel, L.	Stratheden and Campbell, L.
Craigavon, V.	Kemsley, V.	Sudeley, L.
Crathorne, L.	Killearn, L.	Swaythling, L.
Croft, L.	Latymer, L.	Teviot, L.
Cromartie, E.	Lauderdale, E.	Teynham, L.
Cullen of Ashbourne, L.	Lothian, M.	Tweedsmuir, L.
De Clifford, L.	Lucas of Chilworth, L.	Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, Bs.
Denham, L. [Teller.]	McCorquodale of Newton, L.	Verulam, E.
Derwent, L.	McFadzean, L.	Vivian, L.
Drumalbyn, L.	Mancroft, L.	Waldegrave, E.
Dudley, E.	Mansfield, E.	Willingdon, M.
Dundee, E.	Merrivale, L.	Windlesham, L.
Ebbisham, L.	Milverton, L.	Yarborough, E.

NOT-CONTENTS
Archibald, L.	Fiske, L.	Plummer, Bs.
Balogh, L.	Gaitskell, Bs.	Popplewell, L.
Beswick, L.	Gardiner, L.	Ritchie-Calder, L.
Birk, Bs.	Henderson, L.	Sainsbury, L.
Blyton, L.	Heycock, L.	St. Davids, V.
Brockway, L.	Hilton of Upton, L. [Teller.]	Serota, Bs.
Brown, L.	Hoy, L.	Shackleton, L.
Buckinghamshire, E.	Hughes, L.	Shepherd, L.
Burton of Coventry, Bs.	Jacques, L.	Shinwell, L.
Champion, L.	Janner, L.	Slater, L.
Chorley, L.	Leatherland, L.	Snow, L.
Collison, L.	Lee of Asheridge, Bs.	Sorensen, L.
Cooper of Stockton Heath, L.	Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, Bs.	Strabolgi, L. [Teller.]
Davies of Leek, L.	Maelor, L.	Taylor of Mansfield, L.
Delacourt-Smith, L.	Movie, L.	White, Bs.
Diamond, L.	Nunburnholme, L.	Wootton of Abinger, Bs.
Faringdon, L.	Pargiter, L.

Clause 9 [Reference to industrial tribunal of dispute relating to contribution]:

6.4 p.m.

LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 71A: Page 7, line 28, leave out ("person") and insert ("worker").

The noble Lord said: This Amendment is the kind of amendment which in fact my noble friend Lord Delacourt-Smith is rather better equipped to discuss with your Lordships than I am, and if it is convenient to your Lordships I will now introduce him to you.

BARONESS WHITE

It is I who have to apologise to the Committee for not being here to move the Amendment; this new method of voting means that it is difficult to return to the Chamber after the Division. This is a probing Amendment because we were a little puzzled as to why the Government, having refused our suggestion in a number of other places to substitute the word "person" for "worker", in this particular place and in a following Amendment, No. 71C, themselves use the word "person" instead of "worker". This is done in a context which, to us at any rate, does not make it at all clear why in this particular clause they are quite happy to have the word "person" used, whereas in the various clauses where we thought the word "person" more appropriate they insisted on using the word "worker". Possibly the noble Lord can give us a simple explanation why they use the other term here.

LORD WINDLESHAM

The distinction between the use of the word "worker" and the use of the word "person" is as follows. "Worker" is the expression used only in relation to an employer, as I explained several times in the debates on Amendments Nos. 22 and 68. In Clause 5(1) the worker is given specific rights to which remedies are attached against the employer. The definition of the word "worker" is in Clause 158(1). The word "person", on the other hand, is any private individual, and is the term used in Clause 63 and elsewhere vis-á-vis the individual and trade union membership. It thus includes anyone, such as the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Blackburn, who, we heard, is a member of a trade union. There was a debate between my noble and learned friend, the Lord Chancellor and the noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith about a five-year old child; all these would be persons who would not be workers, in that there would be no relationship with an employer.

However, as the noble Baroness has pointed out that there might be possible inconsistencies in the wording of this part of the Bill, concerned as it is with agency shop agreements, we have looked again at this point. As noble Lords opposite know, we are anxious to be as reasonable as possible, as accommodating as possible, in meeting points of view, and having taken a second look at it we are inclined to agree that there may be something in the argument of inconsistency. The Government have strongly resisted the argument to delete the word "worker" and substitute "person", and we are pleased to know that our counter arguments are being accepted in this Amendment. I am most grateful to the noble Baroness for pointing to these two unauthorised "persons"—there is another Amendment in a moment—and shall be glad to ask your Lordships to accept the Amendment.

LORD BROWN

May I point out to the noble Lord that the inference of what he has said is that the Bishop of Blackburn may find himself involved in an agency shop agreement. It is an illogicality. I merely point it out; I do not wish a reply.

BARONESS WHITE

I want to express a certain degree of gratitude that on this particular point the Government have for once shown themselves flexible rather than rigid. I must say that as the person concerned would be paying in accordance with an agency shop agreement in that particular context, it seemed to us curious and illogical not to use the word "worker." which was insisted on in another place. We are happy to accept the Government's agreement to the Amendment.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH moved Amendment No. 71B: Page 7, line 32, leave out from ("or") to end of line 37.

The noble Lord said: I think I can move this Amendment very briefly, because it may be there is an explanation. What puzzles us is how it is possible for a situation to arise under subsection (1) (c), that is representing an arbitrary or unreasonable discrimination by the trade union against the individual, if it is not already contrary to either subsection (1)(a) or subsection (1)(b). If, indeed, there are no sets of circumstances which could arise under paragraph (c) which would not already arise under either paragraph (a) or paragraph (b), then it appears to us that the words in paragraph (c) are unnecessary, and we move to delete them. I beg to move.

6.10 p.m.

EARL FERRERS

I am grateful to the noble Lord for moving his Amendment so briefly, and I shall try to emulate him. The Government have taken note of this Amendment and have looked at this point again. When the Bill was first drafted, it was considered that there might be occasions when an individual could be unreasonably discriminated against by a trade union in regard to the payments for an agency shop. But as the noble Lord has put down his Amendment we have looked at this point again even more closely and, rather like the noble Lord himself, have come to the conclusion that possibly the provisions of paragraph (c) are, in fact, covered by paragraphs (a) and (b). The only trouble is that we could not accept the noble Lord's Amendment as it stands, because I do not think he has put in his Amendment quite what he intended. He has moved to leave out from the word "or" to the end of line 37, which means that paragraph (a) would read, is not payable in accordance with the agreement, or as it does now, but the word "or" would be left, as it were, hanging in the air. Also, he has excluded paragraph (b), which he probably did not mean to exclude. But if the noble Lord will be good enough to withdraw the Amendment, we shall see that an Amendment is moved at Report stage to eliminate paragraph (c) which he really wants to eliminate.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

I am very happy to receive the noble Earl's assurance. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

BARONESS WHITE

I beg to move Amendment No. 71C.

Amendment moved— Page 8, line 1, leave out ("person") and insert ("worker").—(Baroness White.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

On Question, Whether Clause 9, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?

6.13 p.m.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

I think I suggested when we were discussing Clause 5 that, as a result of the terminology of that clause, we had at some stages provided a series of steam hammers to crack nuts, and a good deal of Clause 9 also merits that description. We see it as a direct consequence of the provisions to which we have already raised objection. We object to the arrangements proposed for the agency shop agreement, and Clause 8 seeks to give what is potentially a very wide definition to an arrangement to safeguard the position of those who have genuine conscientious objections. Clause 9 follows so naturally from the preceding clauses which we have sought to remove from the Bill, that we feel it quite right to seek to signalise our objection to its provisions by dividing the Committee against its inclusion.

LORD BROWN

I rise to ask my noble friends on the Front Bench not to press this Amendment. If we are going to have agency shop agreements—and we all know that we are—then there are going o be in lieu payments. If there are in lieu payments then, unless you can lay down the exact amount in the Bill, there is bound to be some tribunal which will decide what they should be in cases of dispute. You cannot leave a trade union, whose rules are not clear on what the in lieu payment should be, to name any figure it likes, because I fear that some of the less responsible unions may seek to victimise those who take advantage of their rights under the Bill and the end result will be a furious squabble between the person and the union. We on this side object to all sorts of aspects of the Bill, but, obviously, the agency shop agreement has been decided in another place by the elected representatives, and if we cannot get the Party on the other side to agree to delete this whole business, then we shall have to face it; and if we have to face it then we shall have to have an appeals mechanism. I am afraid that we shall argue about the deletion of this clause for a very long time, and I do not want to listen to hours of argument which it will be really impossible to end and which will be illogical in the face of the Bill as it is going to be.

I know that many people are going to say to me, "You do not understand politics". Many people on both sides have said that to me many times since I entered this House, but my opinion is that I do understand politics. I understand them now to be something which very frequently wastes a hell of a lot of time—and not only on this side of the House. I have sat on the other side and have had to face barrages of discussions which were obviously not cogent, and I have had to do it patiently because I was a Minister and one cannot get irate when one is a Minister. I always resolved when I faced those barrages that one day, if we had to cross the Floor of the House, I should not indulge in the same sort of activity, and I am asking my noble friends on the Front Bench not to proceed with this Amendment. They know that they are going to lose the Division, and they know that if they won it a host of other changes would be necessary to the Bill. In fact, it would mean the deletion of the agency shop agreement. So why go on with it?

LORD DAVIES OF LEEK

I apologise—

LORD DIAMOND

Will my noble friend forgive me? I am bound to say to my noble friend Lord Brown, whose normal opening to a speech is "I appeal to my Front Bench to withdraw their Amendment", that he has now picked on a peculiarly inappropriate occasion to do it. First of all, we are not discussing an Amendment. Secondly, we have moved three Amendments, each one of which in turn could have been subjected to the same point of view, but each one of which in turn has been accepted by the Government—the second one in principle, and the first and third in precisely their words—as improving the Bill. So I hope that my noble friend will return to that frame of patience and good humour which I gather he exhibited throughout the period when he was a Minister.

LORD SHINWELL

There is one point which I should like to make and, afterwards, my noble friend Lord Davies of Leek can take charge with my consent for as long as he likes. I am bound to take exception to one point which my noble friend Lord Brown made. My noble friend has told the Committee that he knows all about politics, but, speaking as an apprentice myself, perhaps I may offer an observation on what is a constitutional issue—and I understand constitutional issues. I have been a long time experimenting with constitutional issues. My noble friend asked: if in the other place the elected representatives have come to a decision, why should we go any further?

LORD BROWN

I said nothing of the kind. I said that if the elected representatives in the other place have come to a decision and we on this side have not convinced the Government to go along with us, then why should we spend a lot of time arguing it?

LORD SHINWELL

In that case, we should adjourn and be done with it. That is really what my noble friend is saying. I can understand the impatience. I am sometimes a little impatient myself. I have to listen to a great many speeches.

SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS

Oh !

LORD SHINWELL

It is a fact. There is only one thing worse than listening to one's own speech, and that is having to listen to those of others. My noble friend has told us that he sat on the other side of the House for quite a long period of time and had to listen to arguments, some cogent and some hardly cogent. I have had that experience myself, on both sides of the other place, and for a much longer period than my noble friend Lord Brown.

A NOBLE LORD

You have worn very well !

LORD SHINWELL

I am not sure whether he was born when I started. I was almost an elder statesman before the First World War; so my experience counts for something. No; I disagree entirely, fundamentally, vitally and wholeheartedly—and I cannot go beyond that at the moment because of the time limit.

BARONESS EMMET OF AMBERLEY

I rise merely to say I wonder whether it is in order for the noble Lord to be discussing what he is discussing, which is a difference with his noble friend, instead of the Question, Whether Clause 9 shall stand part?

LORD SHINWELL

I have the greatest respect for the noble Baroness, Lady Emmet. She is an old colleague of mine from the other place. But I do not hear awfully well, and she will perhaps forgive me if I do not respond. Anyway, I will not take up much more of your Lordships' time. The point is that the mere fact that the other place have come to a decision—and the Government naturally accept the decisions of the other place: that is a foregone conclusion—is no reason why we should not debate every issue. Nor is it any reason why we should not divide on every issue. That was done in the other place. Indeed, when a subject is transferred from the other place to your Lordships' House, surely the obvious thing to do is to debate, argue, probe and carry on until we reach firm and reasonable decisions.

LORD BROWN

My noble friend really must no go on any longer distorting what I said. I am merely making a plea that we should not debate in a non-cogent fashion. I am not suggesting that we should debate nothing; of course we should. My plea is entirely based on the particular Motion before the Committee now, the argument for which is not, in my humble submission, a cogent one.

LORD SHINWELL

My noble friend is getting deeper and deeper into the ocean. He has not only put his feet in: his whole body is immersed now. This simply will not do. He says that because he is not satisfied with the nature of the arguments, the arguments are not cogent, and therefore we should not proceed. Are we to understand that every argument that is adduced here, on either side of your Lordships' Committee, must be regarded as being cogent? We have to speak as we feel. It is far better to speak as one feels than to read elaborate treatises carefully and deliberately prepared.

THE EARL OF KINNOULL

Would the noble Lord like to divide on this issue?

LORD SHINWELL

What is happening now is this: I would not be faced with this interruption or with the interruption from the noble Baroness, Lady Emmet, had it not been for the observation of my noble friend. I did not initiate this row—not at all. I am merely responding to it, trying to calm things down; to hold my temper. That is what I am trying to do. Now I come to my conclusion, and I hope that noble Lords will not mind if I do, to satisfy my noble friend Lord Davies of Leek, because I can see that he is straining at the leash. My noble friend Lord Brown pleaded with cur Front Bench to withdraw and not to divide on this Question. I take the opposite line: I make a strong, urgent appeal to my noble friends on the Front Bench not to withdraw but to divide in order to show the strength of our feelings and the urgency of the subject.

LORD DAVIES OF LEEK

May I—

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES

The Question is, Whether Clause 9 shall stand part of the Bill?

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

Are we not to have any reply from the Government justifying the insertion of this clause?

LORD DAVIES OF LEEK

I have given way with courtesy instead of using the number of decibels that I very well could. Having learned to be a little more elegant in this place, I decided not to shout down my noble friend Lord Shinwell, which would be very difficult, and I certainly should not like to overcall anyone else. I just want to be brief but, I hope, apt. The apt point I want to put is this. We have a perfect right to explore what these 'tribunals are going to do, and we have a perfect right to say that Clause 9 shall not stand part of the Bill. Part of the purpose of our opposition is to get such wonderful explanations from the Front Bench opposite as we had half an hour ago from the noble Lord who spoke on Clause 7 and Clause 8 at the same time, which was of inestimable value to the understanding of the Bill and which clarified things which were not clarified in the other place.

Now let me come to the nub of this little argument—and I assure noble Lords I shall not be very long. The purpose of this clause is to establish industrial tribunals, and to enable references to them of disputes relating to contributions. Subsection (3) of the clause reads: Any matter determined by the decision of an industrial tribunal … shall have the like effect for the purposes of this Act as if it had been agreed between the worker and the trade union". Now, that tribunal having made a decision, in come the unfair practices—and God knows how many of those are there! There is the possibility of unfair practices now creeping in between the worker, the union and the employer. We are told that members with relevant industrial experience will be on these tribunals, and that there will be this system of local courts. Some are in existence now. These will be the existing industrial tribunals which at present deal with appeals concerning claims for redundancy payments and the application of contracts under the Employment Act. Now we are adding a further burden. That is why, the other day, I said that this is a young barrister's bonanza. This will make a fortune for a young barrister. I wish I had bothered a few years ago in the other place, to spend a couple of years sitting for law. Perhaps my noble friend Lord Shinwell and I are not yet too old. I think I will discuss this prospect with him. It is a good sideline.

LORD SHINWELL

No, heaven forbid! We have got enough legal gentlemen without having any more.

LORD DAVIES OF LEEK

Let me come back to the point at issue. The broad intention of these systems, then, is that they will deal with these appeals. All I want to ask is: am I right about these tribunals? Is it right that they increase the area of the possibility of punitive action if unfair practices are so designated after the decision of a tribunal? My last question—and I thank noble Lords for listening so patiently to the whole of the debate from my noble friends—is this. Are we going to extend this system of tribunals, and is there somewhere in the Bill later on (I think there is) a point at which, instead of delaying your Lordships now, we shall have the possibility of discussing and deciding the set-up of these tribunals, together with their purpose, in greater depth?

6.30 p.m.

EARL FERRERS

I should like to apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, if he thought he was being given a slight sign of discourtesy by the Government not having replied earlier, but it will not have escaped his attention that there was a certain degree of competition on the Benches behind him to take the floor, and it was only in deference to that competition that I failed—it is not that I did not attempt, but failed—to rise a little earlier. The noble Lord moved that the clause should not stand part with a degree of brevity which, again, I shall do my best to emulate, because, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Brown, said, this particular clause follows so clearly and so obviously on the earlier clauses that it would be, as I would suggest, quite wrong that it should be eliminated.

The previous clauses have dealt with the matter of the agency shop and the payments that have been made by people who do not wish to become members of a specific trade union. Clause 8, dealt with people who make payments on the grounds of conscience. All that this clause says is that if, after all the normal courses of discussion have been gone through (we believe that the majority of these agreements will be undisputed) and there has been a failure to reach an agreement, then there will be recourse to the industrial tribunal to try to make a decision fair to both sides in resolving the problem.

I really think this is a last resort. The noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, described this as a sledge-hammer to crack a nut. That description is possibly a little unfair, but it is correct that the nut will only be a very small one. As noble Lords have sought, not unsuccessfully, by three Amendments to amend this clause, I therefore suggest that the clause should remain in the Bill.

LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY

The noble Lord, Lord Brown, is absolutely right. Clause 8 has been accepted by the Committee. Under Clause 8 there will, unfortunately, from time to time be disputes; some method of solving them must be found. That could be done by accepting Clause 9 as it stands, or by amending it. It cannot be done by throwing Clause 9 out, and it is a waste of your Lordships' time if this matter is taken to a Division.

6.32 p.m.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

It is a feature of this Committee that there are differences of opinion within it. However, since there has been so much adulation poured upon this clause and the necessity for it, let us really look at what it does in two parts. First, in relation to the agency shop situation, apparently one has to have an industrial tribunal to resolve whether or not something is payable in accordance with the agreement. The only issue that can arise there so far as I can see, is whether a man is a member of the trade union or not. If he is a member of the trade union he pays whatever contribution. If he is not a member of the trade union he pays whatever contribution is appropriate under the agreement. I am unable to see what great issues can arise which will turn on whether the payment is payable under the agreement or not. Then there is the amount of payment. Almost a page is devoted in Clause 7 to setting out in great detail what the contributions are which a non-member shall pay. If we really have to go to industrial tribunals to decide whether the amount is to be two shillings or two shillings and sixpence a week, and we are building up this issue into something so great that, without knowing that there is a tribunal to go to, ordinary men of common sense cannot resolve it, I really do not know what we are coming to.

The second part relates to the position of the individual who claims exemption on conscientious grounds. We have already made it quite clear that we are exceedingly concerned about this concept and the danger of its being widened. It is proposed that we should have industrial tribunals to pronounce on whether the individual's conscientious objection is sound or not. As to providing for tribunals to decide that issue, it would be very much better if we in this Committee, as part of the legislative process, gave a much closer, clearer and less ambiguous definition, rather than pass it to a tribunal. Indeed, we would much regret a term so nebulous as this being allowed to stand in that form in the Bill, and the possibility of a considerably wider interpretation being given to it by the tribunals.

Then we have to determine to which charity the money goes—whether, for example, to the Queen Alexandra Rose charity or the National Society for Children's Welfare, is it seriously expected that there are going to be such great disputes over this issue that we must have a tribunal in the background to resolve them? What contributions will be equivalent to the appropriate contributions to the trade union? I should have thought that, here again, we are casting doubt upon the common sense approach which legislation proposed in this Bill—even under some of the fantasies of legislation proposed in this Bill—if we think we must have an industrial tribunal to resolve the great disputes which arise on these matters. As I suggested, we are putting into the Bill a great sledgehammer to crack a nut; we are puffing up these issues which, if they are to arise at all, ought to be susceptible of speedy settlement between reasonable men.

The only issue of serious importance is that of determining the degree of conscientious objection, and whether it is valid or not. For the reasons we have already explained, we on this side do not believe that it is appropriate to put the issue in such broad terms into the Bill in its present form and pass the matter to the industrial tribunals to interpret. Those are the grounds on which we have moved the deletion of the clause. I should have thought: they are sufficiently clear to anybody, and in particular to my noble friends who have read the clause in the context of the Bill.

6.36 p.m.

On Question, Whether Clause 9, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?

Resolved in the affirmative, and Clause 9, as amended, agreed to accordingly.

6.46 p.m.

LORD DRUMALBYN

This may be a convenient moment for me to move that the House do now resume.

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 125; Not-Contents, 42.

CONTENTS
Aberdare, L.	Emmet of Amberley, Bs.	Monckton of Brenchley, V.
Ailwyn, L.	Essex, E.	Mountevans, L.
Allerton, L.	Exeter, M.	Mowbray and Stourton, L.
Alport, L.	Ferrers, E.	Napier and Ettrick, L.
Amherst, E.	Fortescue, E.	Nugent of Guildford, L.
Amory, V.	Fraser of Lonsdale, L.	Oakshott, L.
Ashbourne, L.	Gisborough, L.	Radnor, E.
Balerno, L.	Glendevon, L.	Rankeillour, L.
Balfour, of Inchrye, L.	Goschen, V. [Teller.]	Rathcavan, L.
Barnby, L.	Gray, L.	Redesdale, L.
Barrington, V.	Greenway, L.	Redmayne, L.
Beauchamp, E.	Grimston of Westbury, L.	Rhyl, L.
Beaumont of Whitley, L.	Hacking, L.	Rockley, L.
Belstead, L.	Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)	Rothermere, V.
Berkeley, Bs.		St. Aldwyn, E.
Boston, L.	Halsbury, E.	St. Helens, L.
Bridgeman, V.	Hankey, L.	St. Just, L.
Brooke of Cumnor, L.	Hanworth, V.	St. Oswald, L.
Brougham and Vaux, L.	Hatherton, L.	Sandford, L.
Caldecote, V.	Hawke, L.	Sandys, L.
Carrington, L.	Henley, L.	Selkirk, E.
Chandos, V.	Hood, V.	Sempill, Ly.
Clwyd, L.	Howard of Glossop, L.	Sinclair of Cleeve, L.
Cottesloe, L.	Ilford, L.	Somers, L.
Courtown, E.	Jellicoe, E. (L. Privy Seal.)	Stamp, L.
Cowley, E.	Jessel, L.	Stonehaven, V.
Craigavon, V.	Kemsley, V.	Strang, L.
Crathorne, L.	Killearn, L.	Strange, L.
Croft, L.	Lansdowne, M.	Stratheden and Campbell, L.
Cromartie, E.	Latymer, L.	Sudeley, L.
Cullen of Ashbourne, L.	Lauderdale, L.	Swaythling, L.
Daventry, V.	Lindsey and Abingdon, E.	Teviot, L.
Davidson, V.	Liverpool, E.	Teynham, L.
De Clifford, L.	Lyell, L.	Thorneycroft, L.
Denham, L. [Teller.]	McCorquodale of Newton, L.	Tweedsmuir, L.
Derwent, L.	McFadzean, L.	Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, Bs.
Digby, L.	Malmesbury, E.	Verulam, E.
Drumalbyn, L.	Mansfield, E.	Vivian, L.
Dudley, E.	Merrivale, L.	Ward of Witley, V.
Dundee, E.	Milverton, L.	Windlesham, L.
Ebbisham, L.	Molson, L.	Wolverton, L.
Eccles, V.	Monck, V.	Yarborough, E.
Effingham, E.

NOT-CONTENTS
Archibald, L.	Gardiner, L.	Plummer, Bs.
Ardwick, L.	Garnsworthy, L.	Ritchie-Calder, L.
Beswick, L.	Henderson, L.	Sainsbury, L.
Blyton, L.	Heycock, L.	Serota, Bs.
Brockway, L.	Hoy, L.	Shackleton, L.
Buckinghamshire, E.	Hughes, L.	Shepherd, L.
Champion, L.	Jacques, L.	Shinwell, L.
Cooper of Stockton Heath, L.	Leatherland, L.	Slater, L.
Davies of Leek, L.	Lee of Asheridge, Bs.	Snow, L.
Delacourt-Smith, L.	Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, Bs.	Stow Hill, L.
Diamond, L.	Maelor, L.	Strabolgi, L. [Teller.]
Evans of Hungershall, L.	Noel-Buxton, L.	Taylor of Mansfield, L.
Faringdon, L.	Phillips, Bs. [Teller.]	Wells-Pestell, L.
Gaitskell, Bs.	Popplewell, L.	White, Bs.

Moved, That the House do now resume.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD BESWICK

Before starting the next Business I wonder whether the noble Earl, Lord St. Aldwyn, will make it clear that we are resuming the Committee stage of the Industrial Relations Bill after spending one hour on the Education (Scotland) Bill.

EARL ST. ALDWYN

My noble friend Lady Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie was going to start her Second Reading speech by saying that we should discuss the Bill until 7.45 p.m.

On Question, Motion agreed and House resumed accordingly.