INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BILL

HL Deb 06 May 1971 vol 318 cc453-521

3.11 p.m.

THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (LORD DRUMALBYN)

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.

Moved, That the House do again resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD SHACKLETON

I wonder whether the noble Lord is ready yet to go into Committee. There seems to be rather a shortage of noble Lords on his side of the House. I wonder whether they are seeking to get their numbers more reasonably into relation to the size of the Opposition, or whether they are queueing up for the dinner break. I take it that, despite this, the noble Lord wants to make some progress, and it may be that he thinks that with fewer interventions from that side we shall be able to go on faster. But some of those noble Lords who are on the Minister's side of the House and who do stimulate the Opposition are present.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, as they used to say in another place, I think we had better see how we get on.

On Question, Motion agreed to.

House in Committee accordingly.

[The EARL OF LISTOWEL in the Chair.]

LORD DRUMALBYN moved Amendment No. 53: After Clause 5, insert the following new clause—

Modification of rights by agency shop agreement

".—(1) Where an agency shop agreement is for the time being in force, a worker to whom the agreement applies shall not have the right, as between himself an an employer to whom the agreement applies, to refuse to he a member of the trade union with which the agreement was made unless he agrees to pay appropriate contributions to the trade union in lieu of membership of it.

(2) In accordance with the preceding subsection, it shall not be an unfair industrial practice for an employer to whom an agency shop agreement applies, or for a person acting on behalf of such an employer,—

1. (a) to dismiss, penalise or otherwise discriminate against any such worker on the grounds that he is not a member of the trade union with which the agreement was made and has not agreed, or has refused or tailed, to pay appropriate contributions to it, or
2. (b) to refuse to engage a worker who, if engaged by the employer, would be a worker to Whom the agreement applies, on the grounds that he is not a member of that trade union and has refused to become a member of it and has also refused to pay appropriate contributions to it.

(3) In the application of the preceding subsection; to an agency shop agreement made with two or more trade unions, references in those subsections to the trade union with which the agreement was made shall be construed as references to one of those trade unions.

(4) In relation to a person who, in accordance with section 8 or section 9 of this Act, is permitted on grounds of conscience to pay contributions to a charity instead of contributions to a trade union, subsections (1) to (3) of this section shall have effect as if any reference to appropriate contributions to a trade union were a reference to equivalent contributions to that charity.

(5) In this Act references to an employer to whom an agency shop agreement applies shall be construed as follows, that is to say—

1. (a) in the case of such an agreement made by one or more employers, or made by an employers' association and expressed to be made on behalf of one or more employers specified in the agreement, any such reference shall be construed as a reference to that employer or any of those employers, as the case may be;
2. (b) in the case of such an agreement made by an employers' association otherwise than as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, any such reference shall be construed as a reference to any employer who is for the time being a member of that employers' association, whether he was a member of it on the date on which the agreement was made or not."

The noble Lord said: I do not think I need delay the Committee very long on this new clause, or give a lengthy explanation of its purposes, because I have already explained what it does. Subsections (1) and (2) reproduce subsection (3) of Clause 5, with minor amendments; subsection (3) is new, and covers cases where there is more than one trade union in agency shop agreements; subsection (4) reproduces subsection (4) of Clause 5 in virtually identical terms, and subsection (5) is intended to allow for the possibility that one or more employers or an employers' association may be parties to an agency shop agreement. The point is that the Amendments will permit an employers' association to make an agency shop agreement on behalf of its members, in the same way as an employers' association may enter into an approved closed shop agreement under the provisions of Part V of Schedule 1.

Clause 5 is reconstructed into two new clauses, with the addition of the new provisions. Clause 10 of the Bill allows one or more employers to be joint parties to an agency shop agreement, but the clause would not enable an employers' association itself to be a party to such an agreement and thereby bind all its members, present and future. The Amendment to Clause 10 and the provisions of subsection (5) of the new clause will enable agency shop agreements to be made between employers' associations and trade unions. This is important, because it will allow certain closed shop agreements at present in existence to be readily replaced by agency shop agreements. In some industries there are closed shop agreements which have been negotiated and entered into by the appropriate employers' association. The Amendment will avoid having to negotiate separate agreements, particularly where new members join an association which has a longstanding agreement.

Perhaps I should draw your Lordships' attention to the fact that these Amendments would not permit a trade union to apply for an agency shop agreement with an employers' association under the provisions of Clause 10(2) if the employers' association was unwilling to enter voluntarily into the agreement. Those provisions are restricted to unilateral application against the employer. Clearly an employers' association can and should act only with the consent of its members. If those members do not wish to enter into a voluntary agency shop agreement—that is, they do not want their association to act on their behalf in the matter—then the union should apply for the agency shop against the employers and not against their association. These new provisions are introduced in the Amendment to Clause 10 and to subsection (5) of the new clause. They are similar to the provisions relating to approved closed shop agreements which are contained in Schedule 1, paragraph 25. Employers' associations will be able to enter into voluntary agency shop agreements in the same way as they will be able to enter into and apply for approval of closed shop agreements. The other Amendments, as I have said, are mainly drafting, and I hope the House will agree to this new clause. I beg to move.

BARONESS WHITE moved, as an Amendment to the Amendment, No. 53D: Line 5 of subsection (1), leave out from ("unless") to end of the subsection and insert ("the agency shop agreement permits him so to refuse").

The noble Baroness said: We shall, I assume, have some further opportunity for more general discussion on this proposed new clause. My Amendment is put down simply to indicate the feelings of those of us on this side of the House and our dislike of the proposals in the new clause in so far as they affect the agency shop agreement. We had some discussion in the late evening and early hours of our last Committee proceedings as to the status of persons who do not wish to join trade unions, and we made it perfectly clear on that occasion, as we shall do later on the Bill, that we have sympathy with the very small number of persons who have genuine conscientious grounds for not wishing to join a trade union. But, frankly, we have no sympathy for those who are simply anti-union.

What we are suggesting in this Amendment is that it should be open to workers and employers, where they so wish—because this is referring to an agreement between the two sides—to say that, apart from the conscience clause, which, as I say, we would go along with, to put into their agreement that workers shall not have the right to opt out. I do not expect for a moment that the Government will accept this suggestion but it is only right that we should take the opportunity of making it plain that where there is an agreement between both sides, we prefer the closed shop to the agency shop, which after all is the kernel of this new clause, and the purpose of this Amendment is to indicate that. I beg to move.

LORD BERNSTEIN

I know that my noble friend Lady White does not expect the Government to accept this Amendment but perhaps the noble Lord will let the Committee know why.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I do not know whether the noble Lord was present when my noble friend gave a clear exposition of the purposes of the agency shop agreement. Perhaps I should say that the noble Baroness is quite right in saying that we are unlikely to accept this Amendment, because it would have the effect of destroying the compromise which the agency shop agreement should represent. We think it is right that the worker in an agency shop should have the right not to join the union and instead pay a contribution to the union. My noble friend clearly explained the reasons for this and I do not think your Lordships would wish me to go over the arguments again. The plan fact is that, having passed Clause 5, the provisions of which give the right to an employee not to belong, it seems to me to be wrong that we should then provide that the union and the employer should be able together to take away that right. Therefore I hope that your Lordships will reject this Amendment.

LORD POPPLEWELL

Will the noble Lord forgive my ignorance in connection with this matter? If a person refuses to join a union, according to this clause he will have to make a contribution to the union in lieu of membership. What does that contribution entitle him to?

LORD DRUMALBYN

He is either a member or not a member; therefore under the Bill he will be entitled to nothing at all. But of course he is entitled to the right not to be compelled to join, and he will be protected in the exercise of that right.

LORD POPPLEWELL

This is rather a phoney position, to say the least. There is going to be the power to compel a man to make a contribution to an organisation that he does not believe in. Obviously the reason is that he can keep in employment. I should have thought that the Amendment moved by my noble friend was the common-sense thing to do. If we have to deal with this agency shop business, which frankly I do not like, surely it is common sense to allow both sides to write into the agreement the basis which both sides would like to see working in their industry. Surely we should accept the words my noble friend wishes to insert in order to be able to write this into an agreement at the time when the agency shop agreement is being negotiated. That would be much better than being dictatorial and saying, "Look here, Tom Jones, you are going to work at Vickers and though you do not believe in unions, you are going to pay something to the union funds. But you will have no benefit."

LORD DRUMALBYN

If I may say so, the noble Lord is going back on the arguments he previously used. Obviously a worker will have the benefit of the negotiations that the union conducts on behalf of the union and that is the justification for retaining the words which are in the clause at the present time: …be agrees to pay appropriate contributions to the trade union in lieu of membership of it.

LORD POPPLEWELL

The noble Lord has just indicated the muddled thinking involved here, because when I first asked a question, he told me that such a man got nothing; now we are getting a new type of definition. I can appreciate the point the noble Lord is making, but I thought he would have stated it correctly at the start.

LORD DRUMALBYN

The noble Lord asked me what rights such a member has. In fact, he will enjoy the benefits but not the rights, except in so far as they are negotiated by the unions.

LORD POPPLEWELL

Surely it is not a question of rights or benefits. If a man can get the benefit of the negotiations of the union surely in that case he gets the rights with them? Surely this is splitting hairs. I think the noble Lord ought to accept this common-sense Amendment. If both sides have to negotiate in agency shop agreement, they should be allowed the utmost latitude in negotiation.

3.28 p.m.

LORD SHINWELL

I cannot understand why noble Lords opposite, in view of their sentiments about trade unionism and the right or absence of right to join a union and their sentiments on the matter of compulsion, should refuse to accept this Amendment. What does the clause which the noble Lords wish to retain in the Bill mean? There is to be an agency shop agreement; that is the first condition. If that agency shop agreement provides for the man contracting out of being a member of the appropriate union, he is to be called upon, according to the provision, to pay an appropriate contribution to the trade union.

I speak as an old trade unionist, not as a modern one. I would say that I do not want his money. I cannot imagine a self-respecting trade union, after having gone to all the trouble of promoting an agency shop agreement, wanting money from him. If there had been a provision that he should make a contribution to a charity—and a trade union is not a charitable organisation—one might have understood it; but even then, I do not think that that is a satisfactory solution to the problem.

The proposition made by my noble friend Lady White is a logical one. What does it mean? The noble Lord opposite said to my noble friend Lord Popplewell that he was going back on some arguments he had hitherto used. I have not used any arguments on this matter, so I come fresh to the subject. Perhaps that is a a good thing, because this matter is so intricate. I listened the day before yesterday to the legal wrangle, which occupied many hours of your Lordships' time, and in which the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor played a very prominent part, as one would expect. I remind myself of something he said, not in my hearing but I happened to read the OFFICIAL REPORT that on legal matters it was his expertise. What impresses me as being rather singular is that if someone is an expert on a subject he ought, with the necessary logic, to clarify the situation in a few simple words, instead of which he became completely confused and he baffled me. That may be my misfortune; nevertheless one is in the hands of these legal luminaries. Surely this is a sensible proposition.

I appeal to noble Lords opposite: what is it they want? They want a man to have the opportunity of joining a trade union. They have said that all along and we accept it. It is quite an appropriate sentiment, in the existing circumstances, in order to promote reasonable industrial relations. However, at the same time they do not want a man to be forced to join a trade union. That is their sentiment and I am able to understand it. Therefore there is a provision to have an agency shop agreement. I am unable to understand why the word "agency" should intrude into this matter. But I am able to understand an arrangement—call it what you like, "agency" or anything else—whereby the employers and trade unions come to some compromise or agreement which provides that the man within the ambit of the shop agreement should have the right to refuse to join a union. One can understand it; that is an agreement. Then he is asked to pay an appropriate contribution—conscience money.

If I may say so in the presence of the right reverend Prelates who know more about this subject than I do, I am able to understand conscience in a theological context or in a moral context, but why one has a conscience in the matter of whether one should join a trade union I do not know. I am bound to say that it seems to me to be more a political question than a matter of conscience. We ought not to beat about the bush in these matters. I appeal to noble Lords opposite: what would they prefer—an agency shop agreement? That is the beginning, and within the provisions embodied in the agency shop agreement a man has the right to refuse to join a union. That satisfies noble Lords opposite, and apparently we seem to be satisfied with that provision. But then the man who refuses to join has to pay an appropriate contribution. Who engendered this strange, fantastic and grotesque idea, that it is not necessary for a man to join the trade union but he must pay it a contribution?

I wonder whether the Registrar-General of the Friendly Societies, when he has to deal with the accounting of trade unions—and there is provision for that in the Industrial Relations Bill—will see amongst these items that a number of workers or persons have made a contribution amounting to so much. It could be ten shillings, it could amount to £10 in total. He may ask where this money comes from. It has just occurred to me to ask whether a trade union could use this money for political purposes. That is an idea. When any money comes in on the side from those who do not wish to join the trade union, probably because they are actuated by political bias, the trade union may decide to use it for political purposes. That is a remarkable paradox. This really will not do, and the noble Lord ought to look at the matter again. I cannot see why he does not accept this Amendment. There is nothing objectionable in accepting it. In the circumstances, it is not only appropriate, but it is logical in its common sense.

LORD LEATHERLAND

I am not a lover of the agency shop conception and I am a very simple and naÏve person. However, if we are to have the agency shop I should like to know what it means and what are its implications. Let us imagine that there is a factory employing 1,000 people, 900 of whom are good, loyal trade unionists, paying their contributions week by week. If there is a successful wage demand they will receive the reward of their loyalty to the trade union in the form of increased wages. Let us assume that there are 50 others who come in the intermediate class, who do not wish to join the union, who have been put off, perhaps by Conservative organisations, from taking that step, but who are willing to contribute to the funds of the union in the way that my noble friend, Lord Shinwell, has described. If there is a strike which leads to an increase in wages, will they receive the increased wages?

The remaining 50 of those people will belong to the third, the conscientious, class. They will not wish to have anything to do with the union at all; they will not even give it this conscience money. What will happen about the increased wages in so far as they are concerned? I have deliberately kept the three points of the question very simple. The point I have tried to make is that there will be three classes of people in the factory and I should like to know what will be the benefits which each of those classes will enjoy if there has been, first, an application for a wage increase which has been negotiated, and secondly, a strike which has led to a wage increase?

LORD DRUMALBYN

The noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, described the Amendment as a logical Amendment. Logic flows from certain premises. The premises from which the provision in this clause flows are two: the first is the principle in Clause 5(1)(b), the right to refuse to be a member of any particular trade union or other organisation of workers, or to be a member of no trade union or other organisation. The second thing it flows from is the feeling that has been so often expressed from the Benches opposite, that there should not be a free rider ". It is for that reason, and to meet what we regard as quite a legitimate point of view, that on the one hand a person is given the right not to belong to a union and on the other hand he cannot exercise that right as a free rider; he has therefore to pay a contribution. I should have thought that that was something that would commend itself to the noble Lords opposite, and I hope that for those reasons the Committee will accept it.

The noble Lord, Lord Leatherland, asked me what an "agency shop" means. We are going to come to Clause 10 and we shall have a full opportunity of discussing what an agency shop means, but I think I have already described it sufficiently in what I have already said. It say s quite clearly what is meant in Clause 10; that an agency shop agreement is made between one or more employers and one or more trade unions that the terms and conditions of employment of the workers covered shall include a condition that every such worker must be or become a member of that trade union or of one of those trade unions, as the case may be, or agree to pay contributions to that trade union. When something is written into a Statute of this kind, although noble Lords may not like it or accept it, it would surely be wrong and wholly illogical to allow a union and employer to get together and defeat the purposes of the agency shop agreement.

LORD SHINWELL

Would the noble Lord be kind enough to say whether, when these contributions are made by a man who has refused to join within the provisions of the agency shop agreement and he is paying a contribution to the trade union, there is to be any restriction on the use to which that money can be put? May it be used for political purposes in order some day to bring down this Government? Can that be done?

LORD DRUMALBYN

These funds cannot be used for political purposes, and the Bill so provides.

LORD LEATHERLAND

I thank the noble Lord for replying to my point and referring to Clause 10. Clause 10 provides that when the agreement between the workers, their unions and the employers is drawn up, it shall refer to "workers of one or more descriptions specified in the agreement". What, therefore, would be the position if the union, in entering into this agreement with the employers, specified in the agreement that the increased wages to be awarded should apply only to the fully paid-up members of the union?

LORD DRUMALBYN

That would not be "a description of workers" within the meaning of the term.

LORD LEATHERLAND

I do not want to appear discourteous, but I feel that I must press this point, because the clause says that this agreement between the workers, their union and the employers is in respect of "workers of one or more descriptions specified in the agreement". As I said, the agreement might well specify that the wage award granted should apply to the members of the Transport and General Workers' Union, and to nobody else.

LORD DRUMALBYN

The 1913 Act governs this, and it is not repealed in that respect, so far as this Bill is concerned. The political funds have to be separately subscribed. That is the answer to the noble Lord.

LORD PARGITER

I should like to ask the noble Lord about the position in the event of the situation arising to which my noble friends have referred; that is, that there is a strike which is officially recognised, but non-union members are not on strike, and perhaps one or two union members might not go on strike. In accordance with the union's rules, unless they are to be severely altered, the union would have the right to inflict fines on those members who refused to carry out the union's instruction. But what would happen to the non-unionists: would they have to pay a fine as well? This would be the appropriate thing for them to do, because they would then be making the same contribution as the member of the union. The noble Lord is saying that the contribution must be roughly the same as that of the members of the union. This would be a contribution. It seems to me that this would be a most unusual situation, if the union could properly inflict a fine on two or three members of the union who did not strike, yet could not inflict a similar penalty on the contributors to the union who were not members of the union but who equally were not on strike.

LORD DRUMALBYN

Plainly, if a man is not a member, he is not under the jurisdiction of the union, and therefore it would not be possible for the union to inflict a fine on the non-members.

LORD DAVIES OF LEEK

I heard the nine o'clock news and a nice little girl from Bristol University who said: "This is to be nice day. You should be nice to everybody". I am going to be very nice to noble Lords opposite, and if those who who are sleeping can hear the trumpeter calling, I hope for the moment they will attend to the logic of the tiny argument that I am going to deploy. First, the drafting of this Amendment, which has suddenly been plunged on the Committee by the noble Lord on the Front Bench opposite, is such that it should be taken back. It refers to "section 8 and section 9 of this Act". There is no such thing. We have Clause 8 and Clause 9. Is it referring to section 8 and section 9 or to Clause 8 and Clause 9? If your Lordships look at it, it is really referring to Clause 8 and Clause 9.

The other argument we are told by the noble Lord is that all this stems from Clause 5(1). The day before yesterday I had the opportunity of saying that I considered Clause 5 to be one of the most dangerous parts of this Bill. It is one of the most swingeing clauses in the Bill. In that clause are matters which are referred to later in the Bill. I used the phrase the other day that "we are asked to join a South Sea bubble". To-day, we have had an explanation of the Bill from noble Lords on this side. We are asking about agency shops, and we are told that when we get to five clauses later in the Bill we shall have an opportunity of discussing agency shops. But we are asked to-day to pass a clause implying acceptance of agency shops before we reach Clause 10 which asks us to accept agency shops. Is that correct? It is absolutely correct. I do not know what the Law Lords will say about it, but, so far as the English language and understanding of human affairs is concerned, that is correct. Now to look at the noble Lord's Amendment—

LORD DRUMALBYN

Perhaps I may bring the noble Lord back to the Amendment we are discussing. We are not discussing my Amendment, but the Amendment to the Amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady White.

LORD DAVIES OF LEEK

Certainly: if the Amendments were coherent and the language of the clause had meaning. This is the bewildering facts about the entire Bill. It is a miasma of foggy verbiage.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD HAILSHAM OF ST. MARYLEBONE)

What we are discussing is Lady White's Amendment. That may be a miasma of foggy verbiage, but it is not a miasma of foggy verbiage for which my noble friend is any way responsible. The noble Lord is discussing something which is not before the Committee.

LORD DAVIES OF LEEK

I beg to differ. Logically, I am diametrically opposed to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor. We are discussing an Amendment to a clause which is before the Committee. My statement was that this clause is a miasma of foggy verbiage, because the phraseology is loose and inaccurate. It refers to "clauses" when it says it is referring to "sections". That is my case.

I now come to the Amendment. In my humble estimation, we are not able intelligently to come to a decision on this clause in this Committee because we have not yet had a full discussion on the implications of an agency shop, the meaning of "unfair practices" in relation to an agency shop, and the fact that there has to be a vote in a trade union to establish an agency shop. Quite frankly, I think it was unfair to put in this Amendment before we have had the opportunity to discuss Clause 10.

BARONESS SUMMERSKILL

I should like to ask the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, one question. What would the penalty be for a non-trade unionist who failed to pay the contribution to the trade union?

BARONESS WHITE

Does the noble Lord refuse to answer? Apparently, he does. I think our brief debate on this Amendment has indicated the difficul- ties which we on this side of the Committee feel about this whole conception. We had a discussion in our last debate about the inadequacy of a money payment as a substitution for membership of a union. I appreciate fully the noble Lord's argument about this and about avoiding free riders; but I am sure that he will appreciate how distasteful we find this whole conception: that someone should be paying money towards an organisation in which he does not believe, which he does not like, and to which he does not wish to belong. It is a distasteful and rather humiliating situation for both sides, it seems to me. Although I am not sure to which part of the Bill the noble Lord was referring when he said that the political expenditure would not be permitted out of these contributions—it would be helpful if the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor could contain himself for a moment.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

The noble Baroness was asking a question, and I was trying to tell my noble friend the answer. Since the noble Baroness has got me to my feet, the answer is that she will see it printed in Clause 7(3). It is, as your Lordships know, the proposal, which has not yet been reached, that that should be moved out of the Bill at this stage and moved back into the Bill at a later stage. It is conveniently printed there for the noble Baroness to see.

BARONESS WHITE

I was asking, just to make sure, about where the Government proposed to bring this in. I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord for his explanation. I was not for one moment so sanguine as my noble friend Lord Shinwell in thinking that this money might be used for political purposes. Nevertheless, I have a shrewd suspicion that many unions will wish to put any such contributions not into their general funds, but into some special fund: and it may well be that they would like to use them for educational purposes, so that those who at present are so misguided as not to wish to join a trade union but take all the benefits of trade union action may be more enlightened in the future. I do not think at this stage of the Bill that we shall have any other opportunity of expressing our view on the agency shops. We do not wish to take the time of the House to divide on this Amendment, but I do not feel disposed simply to withdraw it. It represents a feeling which we on this side of the House have very strongly and of which your Lordships have now had some indication.

3.50 p.m.

LORD DIAMOND

May I ask the noble and learned Lord if he would be even more helpful than he has so far been with regard to Clause 7(3). The noble and learned Lord has quite obviously referred us to the right subsection, and he will recognise that what is troubling my noble friends is not the quantum of the payment but the appropriation by the union of the amount received to certain purposes. On a preliminary reading of the subsection to which the noble and learned Lord has been good enough to refer us, it seems to me that this merely determines the maximum amount which may be paid to the union. I know that this is a very complicated branch of the law, about apropriating a sum received from another party to one purpose or another, and I am not attempting to say what it might or might not mean. I am asking the noble and learned Lord whether he would be good enough to look at this again and tell us whether he is quite satisfied that the putting of an upper limit on the amount which a non-union member pays to a union automatically determines the way in which that union can use that money.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I will he helpful at the right moment, but I should be wholly out of order if I pursued that matter now. We are discussing now the Amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady White, which would enable an agreement, despite the other provisions of the clause we are discussing, to have a pre-entry closed shop. I do not want to lead the Committee astray in pursuing an argument which can be properly pursued at the appropriate moment.

LORD SHINWELL

A pertinent question was posed by my noble friend Lady Summerskill. She asked what happens if a man refuses to join a trade union within the ambit of the agreement and refuses to pay the contribution. Reference was made to Clause 7. I mention it merely because it was referred to, I think, by the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor. There is no provision there other than bringing a man before a tribunal. We might reach the paradoxical situation in which a man who refuses to be a member of a union and refuses to pay his contribution is brought either before a tribunal or the Industrial Court and penalised. Would the noble and learned Lord answer the question posed by my noble friend as to what happens if a man refuses to pay?

LORD DRUMALBYN

I did not reply at that moment to the noble Baroness, Lady Summerskill because we shall get on to this subject on the very next Amendment, and I hope that she will have before her the new clause. I did not want to be in any way discourteous but I was anxious to get on. I am not sure if I am right about this. If the noble Lords will look at page 143, Schedule 4, they will see in paragraph 20: The rules must make provision as to the purposes for which, and the manner in which, any property or funds of the organisation are authorised to be applied or invested.

On Question, Whether the Amendment shall be agreed to?

LORD DIAMOND

May I ask for guidance on a point of order as to what happens, whether there is a rule about the vote following the voice? The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, seemed by his voice to be quite content about this Amendment, yet I gather he is not proposing to pursue it. I do not know whether that is open to him.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I believe it is even possible to change one's vote if one has gone through the wrong Lobby.

LORD SHACKLETON

The noble Lord is not able to change his voice, and this is what he has done. Perhaps he would have a lesson, and his noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor, from his Whips.

THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES

Perhaps it would be for the convenience of the Committee if I put the Question again. The Question is, That this Amendment be agreed to.

LORD SHACKLETON

So far as I know, no Tellers have been appointed.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I understand no Tellers have been appointed on one side; we had two Tellers, the other side did not.

BARONESS WHITE

We were endeavouring to save your Lordships' time. I am afraid that when the Motion was put to the Committee the vehemence of the "Not-Contents" from the Government Front Bench caused some voices to be raised in other parts of the House when the Question was put. This has led to the present situation in which we have wasted a great deal of time.

THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES

The Clerk has confirmed that Tellers have not been appointed on one side. There cannot therefore be a Division. Amendment No. 53D is not agreed to, and the Not-Contents have it.

Amendment to Amendment negatived.

LORD SHACKLETON

I wonder whether I should rise and ask whether the Committee should now adjourn while the procedures that we follow may be considered. We have been doing our best to co-operate with the Government on this matter.

THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (EARL ELLICOE)

I do not consider that the Government have in any way not complied with the procedures, and I do not think it would be in the interests of anyone to adjourn. More seriously, I do not believe the Committee would wish to adjourn. I think we can pass on to the next Amendment quite easily.

BARONESS WHITE moved Amendment No. 53E: Line 4 of subsection (2)(a), after first ("or") insert ("having so agreed").

The noble Baroness said: It may be for the convenience of your Lordships if we took Amendments 53E and 53F together. These Amendments are to clarify the drafting on this very important clause. We must bear in mind throughout our proceedings that this is a Bill which will affect millions of workers in this country. One of their general objections to this Bill is that it is extremely difficult to envisage the ordinary person on the shop floor, the shop steward, following the intricacies of this legislation. It is essential that we should, on every possible occasion, make it as plain as possible.

Our reason for putting down these two Amendments is to make it quite plain that the person we are referring to as someone who has refused, or failed, is someone who is in default, having agreed in the first place to contribute. It is for the employers in such circumstances, if someone has agreed to pay the appropriate contribution, and then has subsequently refused, omitted or failed to pay, to dismiss, penalise or otherwise discriminate against any such worker. That is referring to somebody already in his employ. In subsection (2)(b) the employer may refuse to engage a worker, and in this case if someone, having agreed to pay, has failed to pay his appropriate contribution, or has refused to do so, this can only in the circumstances, refer to some previous employment.

It may well be that an employer may be contemplating engaging someone, but the unions may have a record of this person and say, "He is now applying for a job with Brown; we know when he was employed by Smith and Co. he said he did not want to join the union, he undertook to make certain payments, but our records indicate that he was a defaulter. Therefore on our information, which we can present to you, we object to your engaging such a person because he will not, on past experience, keep his undertakings." It is for those quite straightforward reasons that we feel it would improve the drafting of this part of this clause if these two Amendments were made.

LORD DRUMALBYN

The purpose of the clause, as it stands, is to deal with the actual application subsection (2)(b): to refuse to engaged a worker who, if engaged by the employer, would be a worker to whom the agreement applies, on the grounds that he is not a member of that trade union and has refused to become a member of it and has also refused to pay appropriate contributions to it", The word "failed" will not be appropriate because a person could not have failed to pay a contribution in the circumstances here envisaged until the person had been engaged. The noble Baroness has raised an interesting point in her first Amendment. We shall wish to look at that again. The noble Baroness will also have seen the following Amendment, and perhaps we will have a little more elucidation when we consider that. If she will be good enough to withdraw this Amendment we will gladly look at it again to see whether it is absolutely necessary in the light of discussion on the next Amendment.

BARONESS WHITE

I am willing to do that insofar as the first Amendment is concerned. The second Amendment, subsection (2)(b), is something I should like to take up because I think we should provide for circumstances which I thought I had clearly described. Although it is perfectly true that, at the point of the engagement, the man could not have failed to pay in that particular job, it may well be—and I repeat this—that the union could have a record of this person in other employment. This is a fair point, and something which could lead to a great deal of irritation and controversy at the place of work if the union said, "We have told you, we can prove that this chap has a record of default, and that therefore he is not likely to be within the terms of the agency shop agreement as made between us". We ought to provide for that situation, where a union can come in perfectly good faith, and with well authenticated information, and say to the employer, "This chap is not a person that you can trust to keep his engagement."

LORD DRUMALBYN

I understand the noble Baroness' point, but it surely cannot be said to follow that because a person have refused to pay before he will necessarily refuse to pay again. This really comes back to the question of the noble Baroness Lady Summerskill. The whole purpose of the provisions here is to remove the protection against dismissal of a worker who refuses or fails to pay. Therefore, this is the point here. We did not, and we do not, intend that it should be possible to refuse to engage a worker because on some previous occasion, and possibly with some different union, he had failed to pay his dues.

BARONESS WHITE

I have tried to help the noble Lord. I can only say that I am quite sure that a situation of this kind is going to lead to trouble in the future. The trouble will be on your own heads. In view of what the noble Lord has said about the subsequent Amendment which I think the noble Lord, Lord Gray, wishes to move, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.

Amendment to Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

4.11 p.m.

LORD GRAY moved as an Amendment to Amendment No. 53: Line 4 of subsection 2(b), leave out ("has refused") and insert ("refuses").

The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 53A and I hope that it will be for the convenience of the Committee if in doing so I speak also to No. 53B. We have already heard something of these Amendments. The two Amendments together seek to change from past to present the tense in the fourth and fifth lines of subsection (2)(b) of the new clause. I am inviting noble Lords to look at a relatively narrow point but one which I believe is important in itself because it touches the intention of a paragraph which in effect spells out an exception to what might otherwise be an unfair industrial practice.

Subsection (2)(b) of the new clause, as I think my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn has already pointed out, allows that it shall not be an unfair industrial practice if where an agency shop agreement is in force an employer refuses employment to an individual on the grounds that he is not a member of the relevant trade union—and here I quote: and has refused to become a member of it and has also refused to pay appropriate contributions to it. I believe these words as they stand are capable of retrospective interpretation. I do not think that is, or should be, the intention of the provision; but rather, as I think my noble friend has already said, they should apply only to what occurs and transpires during negotiations for a particular job. I hope noble Lords will agree that, if we substitute for the words "has refused" the word "refuses", and in place of the words "has also refused" put the words "also refuses", we shall have clarified the intention and secured it. I hope noble Lords will agree that this will improve the new clause as it stands, and the Government may perhaps he able to accept my Amendment. I beg to move the first Amendment standing in my name.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I am bound to say to the noble Lord that he has here found something and has put down an Amendment that makes our intention clearer than apparently it was to noble Lords opposite. I am sorry that the noble Baroness should have taken a different meaning from the words, but so far as the Government are concerned they are grateful to the noble Lord for having pointed out this difficulty and I should be glad if your Lordships would accept this Amendment.

I should perhaps point out that there will be several consequential Amendments necessary if the noble Lord's Amendments are accepted. The same applies, for example, in subsection (2)(a), with the words: or refuses or fails, to pay appropriate contributions to it". But I do not think even the noble Baroness would have any objection to that one. There may be other places also where we should have to make Amendments; for example, in Clause 16(5)(a). But we shall look to see whether any further Amendments are needed in order to preserve consistency through the Bill.

LORD GRAY

I thank the noble Lord for what he has said and for his acceptance of my Amendment. In regard to subsection (2)(a), however, I do not think the point arises, since dismissal would follow as a consequence of refusal in that particular employment. But I am very happy with what the noble Lord has said.

LORD DRUMALBYN

The noble Lord may well be right. We shall have to look at this. I was merely warning the Committee that there might be some further Amendments.

On Question, Amendment to Amendment agreed to.

LORD GRAY

I formally beg to move Amendment No. 53B.

Amendment to Amendment moved— Line 5 of subsection (2)(b), leave out ("has also refused") and insert ("also refuses").(Lord Gray.)

On Question, Amendment to Amendment agreed to.

BARONESS WHITE had given Notice of her intention to move Amendment No. 53F, as an Amendment to Amendment No. 53: Line 5 of subsection (2)(b), after ("refused") insert ("or having so agreed has failed").

The noble Baroness said: I have explained our view on this matter, which is diametrically opposite to what has just been agreed to by the Committee. In the cirumstances, I do not move Amendment No. 53F.

4.16 p.m.

BATONESS WHITE moved, as an Amendment to Amendment No. 53: Line 4 of subsection (3), leave out ("one of those trade unions") and insert ("the trade union in respect of workers of the description of the worker concerned").

The noble Baroness said: I apologise for what I must admit is the rather inelegant language of this Amendment (No. 53G on the List), but we are somewhat concerned about what we feel may be a loophole in subsection (3) of his new clause. If one looks at Clause 10, to which the words in our Amendment relate, one will see that care is there taken to describe the type of worker who will be covered in these agreements. We are somewhat concerned that in the clause as it row stands it would be open to an employer, possibly, to manœuvre (to put not too fine a point upon it) between (shall we say?) a trade union and an organisation which we know in history is a company union, and so on, and that this could leave a certain loophole; and it would thus be possible for a worker to join an organisation which did not in fact fit his description of work as provided for in Clause 10.

I repeat, if a more elegant form of words can be found to meet the same object, we should have no hesitation in withdrawing this Amendment; but we should like to know that the Government are aware that we have this apprehension. We do not suppose that it will be a frequent occurrence, but it is possible; and we think therefore that the provision should be rather more tightly drawn so that it is in consonance with the kind of provisions made in Clause 10, the main agency shop clause. I beg to move.

LORD DRUMALBYN

With respect, I do not think this Amendment is desirable. Perhaps the noble Baroness has, for one thing, overlooked once again the words as between himself and an employer in line 3 of the new clause.

BARONESS WHITE

I beg the noble Lord's pardon, but that is precisely what we have not overlooked; that is what we are afraid of, as between the worker and his employer.

LORD DRUMALBYN

The situation envisaged is that there may be several trade unions in the agency shop agreement. But what the noble Baroness's Amendment fails to recognise is that there are circumstances in which two unions may represent the same descriptions of workers—not the same workers, but the same description of workers—so that there may be a real choice there.

There may, for example, be workers of the same description represented by different unions because they happen to be employed in different parts of the plant. In such cases the agency shop agreement can specify which union is to receive the contributions. The Bill does not lay down any rule as to which agency union, when there is more than one, shall receive the contributions. The Government feel that it is better for the parties to the agency shop agreement to decide that. The Amendment to the Amendment, however, could produce an unworkable requirement and could cause difficulties where none at present exist. It goes without saying that in general the agency agreement will provide that certain descriptions of workers shall join a certain union which caters for such workers. It is unnecessary to add to this and to take away the flexibility which the present wording provides.

LORD POPPLEWELL

I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, will not dismiss this proposal out of hand but will have another look at it. I confess that the wording of this Amendment is not attractive, but there is something behind it. One can visualise a set of circumstances developing in an industry where a new union is attempting to break through and increasing the difficulties which often arise in consequence. The employer and employee could agree which union an individual should join. There may be a disturbing influence in that shop. The object is to see that the man joins the union to which his particular skill and craft applies.

I agree that the wording is somewhat clumsy but I hope that the noble Lord will agree that there is something in the fear we express and that, without committing himself unduly, he will not turn down the proposal out of hand but will have another look at it to see if he can find something more fitting with which to meet the fears we have over a possible development.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I shall certainly respond to that suggestion. After all, this Amendment to the Amendment appeared on the marshalled list only to-day. I do not in the least blame the noble Baroness, Lady White, for that, but obviously we have had to look at it in a certain amount of haste. I have given our immediate reaction. I admit that her Amendment would ensure that the worker joined the appropriate union, where there is more than one union. I have pointed out that there may be more than one union that he might join, but in such a case certainly it would be possible for the agency shop agreement to provide which union he should join in the particular circumstances of the part of the plant to which he goes. I do not anticipate any difficulty here, but I will very willingly look at the matter again.

BARONESS WHITE

I appreciate that my Amendment appeared late on the marshalled list and that the noble Lord did not have much time for consideration. In view of the assurance he has given, I beg to ask leave to withdraw my Amendment to the Amendment, and I ask him to look at it again, because we have a genuine apprehension on this matter.

Amendment to Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

4.22 p.m.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH Moved as an Amendment to the Amendment: Leave out subsection (4)

The noble Lord said: The new clause we are discussing is notable, among other things, for two features. It represents, as some of my noble friends have already underlined, the first appearance in the Bill of the concept of the agency shop, which is a very new, controversial and, some of us on this side of the House think, a very undesirable introduction into our industrial relations law. It also marks the first appearance in the Bill of the provision for giving a measure of statutory protection to conscientious objection as a ground for refusing to join a trade union. The right not to join has already been asserted in an earlier clause, but now we have a provision where even that right not to join is in various ways qualified and that there shall be a right on grounds of conscience to a statutory entitlement to remain outside a trade union.

I put this Amendment to your Lordships, not for the purpose of reaching a conclusion on this important and somewhat complex development, but to give noble Lords and the Committee an opportunity of giving preliminary consideration to it so that perhaps at a later stage we may reach a more definitive conclusion. Therefore, if it is not possible for the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, to reply in full detail on every point I raise, perhaps he will consider those points and reply to them later.

I want nothing I say in discussing this point to be regarded as in any way suggesting that my noble friends or I do not attach great importance to providing in our legal arrangements, in appropriate cases, protection for the individual conscience. Where there is no adequate protection in appropriate cases for the individual conscience one lives under a monstrous tyranny. I am very conscious that even when this country was fighting for its life the rights of conscience in respect of military service were respected, and respected not only by the law but by public opinion. This was one of the many features which distinguished this country from the monstrous tyranny we were then fighting. But, my Lords, it is appropriate, I think, to ask whether we are right to enshrine this particular statutory form. There are not, I think, in our legal code very many safeguards for the individual conscience. The right on conscientious grounds to make an affirmation rather than to take an oath comes to mind. The right on conscientious grounds to refuse military service is perhaps the most significant right of all in this regard. This was the right which was established by men of great courage, including my noble friend Lord Brockway, who played such a great part in establishing that right in the First World War. There are rights for the protection of conscience by medical men in connection with the performance of abortions.

These clearly are all cases where an individual is being called upon to make a most serious personal decision which touches the very foundations of his ethical beliefs. He is being asked, in respect of the oath, to make the most solemn declaration which his conscience permits and it is very much in the interests of society that a man should feel himself bound by such a declaration. In the other cases he makes a declaration that he cannot face the responsibility for destroying the life of another human being.

These are great ethical questions in which our law, in my view rightly, gives protection to the conscience of the individual I am a member of a Party in which conscience has always played an important part. Indeed, a former Member of this House, a former Leader of the Party, Lord Attlee, once had occasion to remind the House that conscience was a still, small voice. One is allowed, and has traditionally been allowed, in the Labour Party to have conscientious scruples on matters affecting teetotalism. Perhaps the views on this matter are not quite so strong as they were in the past, but one can well understand individuals who in their personal experience have seen homes and families wrecked by intemperance and who take the strongest and deepest views on that subject.

But when I turn from considerations like that to the question of whether the law should provide a statutory protection for the conscience in respect of becoming a trade unionist, I am bound to say that I experience a sense of a change of scale. The Royal Commission on the Trade Unions remind us—and indeed the noble and learned Lord referred to this point the other night—that there are people who take the view (and they do so on the basis of the Second Epistle to the Corinthians, that believes are enjoined—and I quote: That they be not unequally yoked with unbelievers. If I may say so, that is a slightly pejorative account of joining a trade union, especially when one remembers—and I think this is a fact within the knowledge of the Committee—the great and profoundly religious men who have played a part in the creation of the trade union movement, and the many churchmen and men of religious beliefs who have extended their sympathy to it.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

If I may interrupt the noble Lord, I absolutely agree with what he is saying, but he will remember that these particular people—two groups of whom were mentioned by the right reverend Prelate the other day—count as unbelievers almost everybody. Even if one took it in the strictest sense, it would be difficult to say that there were not some unbelievers, either in the trade unions or the Conservative Party, and the fact is that these particular people think it is wrong to join any association whatever which has in it a person whom they regard as an unbeliever. That makes it very hard for them, poor dears!

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

I appreciate that and I was indeed going on to say that people who take that view are entitled to take it, of course, but they are very few in number. I am involved in a middling-size trade union and I have myself encountered literally only a handful of them over a good many years. It has been my experience that the genuine conscientious objector who shows, not only by his relationship with his fellows at work but in all the relationships in life, that he holds a particular coherent set of opinions and follows a particular and rigid set of moral standards has, invariably, the understanding, sympathy and respect of those with whom he works. It seems to me to be strange that we feel it necessary to make statutory provision. After all, it is not as though trade unions were responsible for deaths. I do not know that the trade union movement has ever been charged, even by its severest critics, with ruining as many homes as I think drink can be regarded as having ruined. Yet this particular relationship in the trade union movement is being singled out to be enshrined in this Industrial Relations Bill and a particular protection and provision made for it.

I am bound to say, with the greatest respect for the conscience of individuals, and knowing as I do the problem of a man who follows a particular creed as exclusive as this, that he commands the respect of his fellow-workers and indeed often reciprocates respect for the trade union, though he will not join it. I really think we are to some extent exaggerating the significance of this matter, and I should have thought that this particular situation could be dealt with by some kind of declaration by the trade union movement—some kind of understanding—which I believe would be widely observed. The difficulty really is that once we have enshrined in a Statute a protection for the conscience of the genuine conscientious objector, one never quite knows where one is going to stop or what kind of frictions or difficulties one will get into. I ask myself whether it is the intention of the Government to embody a similar provision protecting people's consciences in other aspects of our industrial legislative arrangements.

Let me take one or two examples. which are not far-fetched. Let us take a man who is employed in an engineering works and who has normally been engaged in quite peaceful, satisfying work. He suddenly finds that his firm has entirely turned over to production for defence purposes. He might find this a great shock to his conscience. Or let us take a man who has perhaps worked hard and become the manager of a supermarket, and suddenly he learns that not only in the supermarket of which he is the manager but in all the others run by his employers, a drinks counter is to be started. He may say, "This is something completely foreign to my conscience. I have spent my life selling provisions and other foodstuffs but I have the greatest objection to being involved in selling drink to anybody". These are not frequent occurrences, but I suspect that they are quite as frequent as the individuals who have this deep conscientious objection to joining their fellows in a trade union. What is the position? Think of the man who says, "Because this firm is making armaments I will no longer work for it", or, "Because this shop is selling drink I will no longer work for it". That man cannot be accommodated by his employers elsewhere. Is he entitled to have this conscientious objection respected when, for example, he goes to claim unemployment insurance money? I am not sure. Perhaps the noble Lord, not necessarily on this occasion but on some other occasion, can tell us.

I would invite the Committee to look at this question. I should not like anything I have said, either on my own behalf or on behalf of my noble friends, to cast doubt either on the genuineness of the tiny number of genuine conscientious objectors, or upon the importance of a complete respect in our Statute Law for conscience, where it is appropriate. But I cannot escape the feeling that to some extent, especially when one sees the complexities into which one is led by this policy, we are perhaps taking a steam-hammer to crack a rather small nut.

I put this Amendment forward, as I have said, neither to ask for a definitive reply from the Government nor to invite the Committee at this stage to come to a definitive conclusion, but because I believe that this is a matter which is of importance—which the Government have made of great importance by giving it its place in the Bill—but which can perhaps lead on to difficulties, because others will claim a right which involves a somewhat elastic definition of conscience. We may run into difficulties as a result of that. I wonder whether there is not some other way. I suggest, and I do so quite on my own responsibility and without any consultation with anybody, getting some general declaration and understanding about the position of the genuine conscientious objector. It is perfectly clear that, rightly or wrongly—and I am not at this stage making a point of this and stating it as a fact in many provisions of this Bill the Government are in fact obliging individuals to become trade union members or to become a rather peculiarly penalised kind of non-member. Perhaps this matter might be looked at by the Committee. I beg to move.

4.40 p.m.

LORD BROCKWAY

May I first express the deepest appreciation of the spirit in which the noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, has moved this Amendment. I was deeply moved by his reference to myself. But what is much more important is the truth of his statement that this country does now practise, in the case of objection to military service, the most tolerant treatment of conscientious objectors in any part of the world. I recognise that, and it is of some reference to what my noble friend has said that that treatment now extends beyond religious objectors and even beyond absolute pacifists; it now extends to political objectors to a particular war. And this is a quite extraordinary tolerance on the part of the Government. I see that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor is indicating some doubts about that. May I just say to him that I have represented at tribunals objectors who have been political objectors and who might have been prepared to take up arms in certain circumstances, but because the military service Acts applied to a particular war the ruling of the tribunal was that an objection to that particular war had the authority of the law. I tremendously appreciate the fact that in relation to military service this country has the broadest and most tolerant acceptance of the right of conscientious objection of any country in the world.

My noble friend indicated the very wide area over which recognition of conscientious objection has now been extended. One has it not only for military service; one has it, rightly or wrongly, for vaccination; one has it for the right of affirmation rather than taking an Oath. It has gone very far indeed, and in many of those cases we must find it extraordinarily difficult to understand the basis of that conscientious objection or to recognise that it has validity. But the whole case for recognising conscientious objection is that one should appreciate that an individual can have a moral sense of right or wrong even if one cannot understand it. It may so easily be that deep in his being he may have a sense in that direction and yet, logically and by all grounds of reason, it cannot be accepted. The highest form of a civilised society is to recognise the rights of an individual to disagree even if one does not understand and accept that disagreement.

I apply that to this particular case of membership of trade unions. Why anyone should have a conscientious objection to belonging to a trade union I do not begin to understand. But while I do not begin to understand it, I recognise that there are a small number who have such an objection. My noble friend Lord Shinwell remarked during his speech that he wondered where this fantastic idea had its origin. I am not sure that I can tell him. But I can tell him this: it was held within the Ministry of Labour 31 years ago and it was held by Mr. Ernest Bevin, the trade union leader, who was then the Minister of Labour. I went to him on behalf of conscientious objectors, and he made to me the very proposal which is now in this Bill: the proposal that conscientious objectors should be exempted from military service without penalties if they were prepared to contribute to a charity the difference between a soldier's wage and the salary they were earning. I shall be very interested to know whether that was the beginning of this idea. In fact the Central Board for Conscientious Objectors rejected that concession on the ground that they disliked the idea of purchasing freedom for their conscience. If I may say so, I disagreed with them on that matter.

In relation to this Bill I am confident that the majority of those who would refuse to join a trade union would agree to pay a similar contribution to a charity. The number who would decline to do so would be infinitesimally small. They belong to strange little religious organisations, other wordly, which one can hardly accept in any social arrangement at all, but there they are. And I was interested, in that conversation with Mr. Ernest Bevin, to hear him say, "Yes, in our trade union we have one or two like that. We take no notice of them. We take no action against them. To do so would cause more trouble than to impose a penalty upon them. They are so few". I believe that is broadly still true. But I would just say to the Minister, in response to the appeal which has been made from our Front Bench, that it may be possible, because the number of conscientious objectors would be so small, to find a solution to this problem by the method of declaration, the method of an agreement which is not necessarily statutory. But having said that, though I cannot agree with and cannot understand, objection to membership of a trade union, nevertheless believing that wherever there is legal compulsion which involves individual decision or action there is the right for the expression of a moral sense of right or wrong, and that that right should be accepted by a provision for exemption, I welcoming the fact that there is that provision in this Bill. However, I ask the Minister whether he would consider the proposal that there might be a method of dealing with this problem other than by the actual clause which is now before us.

4.48 p.m.

LORD DRUMALBYN

We have listened to two very thoughtful and serious speeches, and the question has been put; should the law provide statutory protection on grounds of conscience? It has been suggested that this might lead to friction, and it is suggested that it might lead to extension in some way or another, as, for instance, in the examples that the noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith mentioned, of a firm that turns over to manufacturing armaments, a supermarket that starts a drinks counter. I think it is better to look at the positive side of this to start with, and the reasons why this provision is in the Bill. I think one could sum up the reasons quite simply in the two words "fairness" and "uniformity". I have mentioned uniformity, but of course there is a lot of flexibility, in the sense that in the first place the application for exemption, if that is the right word, from trade union membership on grounds of conscience will be a matter for discussion with the trade union itself. If there is no agreement, then the matter goes for decision by a tribunal and that, overall, should ensure a measure of uniformity of application and a general fairness. The noble Lord put forward the suggestion that it might be possible to do this in another way. I will willingly see whether this is possible, but perhaps the noble Lord will not mind my saying that it would have been simpler for us if he, when he put this Amendment forward, had made some suggestion for an alternative solution of this very difficult problem.

The other aspect is the question of fairness. The Bill states quite clearly that a person has a right not to join a trade union. It goes on to indicate the circumstances in which he should join a trade union or, failing that, pay contributions, either to the trade union or, if it is a matter of conscience, to a charity. It is felt that a person who has a conscientious objection to joining a trade union will probably equally have a conscientious objection to paying to union funds. The mere fact that he has a conscientious objection to joining a trade union should not disqualify him, in our view (and I think I could say also in the view of noble Lords opposite) from earning a livelihood in accordance with his skills and abilities.

Therefore, what is the fair thing to do? I do not like the expression "free rider", but it illustrates this concept, that there should be an equality of contribution in this respect, whether or not a man becomes a member of the trade union, in these limited circumstances that the Bill envisages. I should have thought that this was right. I quite agree with the noble Lord who moved this Amendment that, in order to secure fairness in this case, one has to have some fairly elaborate provisions. The noble Lord may say, "Well, considering the small numbers involved, surely this is taking a sledge hammer to crush a nut". But where one is dealing with individual freedom, where one is dealing with conscience, one wants to make quite certain that one achieves the objective that one sets out to achieve. It is difficult to see how that could be done with fairness to the other workers, and in a way that will secure uniformity of treatment, except by the provisions in the Bill. The noble Lord may have some better ideas. I can only say that I am closing no doors; that we shall certainly go on looking at this, and shall be glad to hear of any ideas the noble Lord may have.

In all seriousness, we appreciate the point that the noble Lord has put, but we think this is a matter of great importance to the individuals concerned. The noble Lord, Lord Brockway, used the phrase "purchasing freedom for the conscience". I do not particularly like that expression. The test of conscience here is willingness to pay a contribution to charity. It seems to me that this is reasonable. We will gladly talk to the noble Lord if he wishes us to do so, or examine any suggestions he wishes to put forward. I appreciate the spirit in which he has moved this Amendment, which is in no way contentious, and obviously deeply felt. I am afraid that I cannot—and I do not think he expected us to—accept the Amendment at this stage. I hope the noble Lord will regard that as an adequate answer, at any rate for the time being.

While we are talking about conscience, I regret to say that I misled the Com- mittee on the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell. There is nothing in the Bill which limits the purposes to which a union may put contributions made by non-members. The ways in which union funds are spent are, I understand. a matter for union rules, as I referred to in my answer before, and there is a Schedule that deals with union rules. I hope noble Lords will accept my apology.

4.55 p.m.

THE EARL OF MANSFIELD

It is greatly to be hoped that Her Majesty's Government will resist the blandishments of the noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, even though he has put them forward in his usual very reasonable and persuasive way. Whatever the noble Lord may say, if this provision is not enshrined in law there is not the slightest doubt, to my mind, that a considerable number of trade unions will seek to evade it, and to crush the individual right of a worker to keep out of a trade union. The noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, mentioned that it seemed to be taking a sledgehammer to crush a nut. The older among your Lordships may remember a ditty of our youth called "It ain't gonna rain no mo'". which contained a number of rather amusing verses. One of them was: A peanut sitting on the railroad track, Its heart was all a flutter. The train came roaring round the bend— Toot, Toot!peanut butter! I am afraid that the individual worker will find himself "peanut butter" unless there is statutory provision, enshrined in a code of law, for his conscientious objections. It is for this reason that I hope the Government will not weaken.

The mere fact that these conscientious objectors may be a very small number—although I think their number will be considerably more than the noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, is willing to admit—is surely no reason why those very few should not be given the right of conscientious objection which, as the noble Lord, Lord Brockway has said, was so generously given to conscientious objectors during the two World Wars, even though there is no doubt that some of them were straining their consciences, if they existed, a long way. It is for that reason that I hope the Government will stand firm.

LORD CONESFORD

The noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, moved his thoughtful Amendment in the admirable way we expect from him, and I agree that it raises a very serious subject. I agree with the Government that provision must be made. Whenever you provide for conscientious objection, you must also provide for some way of determining whether it is genuine, and the Government attempt to do that when we come to Clauses 8 and 9 of the Bill.

The point that I should like to make here is that the conscientious objector may be of the type that has made a strange interpretation of a scriptural text, and thinks he cannot join any sort of organisation. I do not think the conscientious objector need be limited to that. Speaking for myself, I have not the slightest objection to a man joining a trade union, and in many instances I have advised men to do so, but that does not mean that I could not have a conscientious objection to joining a particular trade union. The noble Lord, Lord Brockway, who has so much knowledge of this subject—and though it was news to me, I am not prepared to say he was wrong—said that we recognised conscientious objection to taking part in a particular war. In exactly the same way, we should recognise a conscientious objection to joining a particular union. A man may be so convinced that the work of a particular union, as shown by its conduct over a period, is evil that he would do anything rather than join it. I only want to make it quite clear that, in my view, the right to be a conscientious objector is not necessarily confined to the man whom most of us would consider a "crank". I think that this is already sufficiently provided for by Clause 8, though of course we are not arguing that now. But speaking for myself—and I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, on this—although I do not think the numbers that will, be involved under this clause will be very large, I think they are people for whom we are bound to make provision.

THE LORD BISHOP OF BLACKBURN

I am very grateful for the way in which the noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, moved this Amendment, and I am very interested in the debate which has taken place. I hope very much that the Government will look at this question on grounds of conscience. I should like to explain that when I moved a previous Amendment, which was defeated, I was not looking at grounds of conscience from this very limited point of view, because there are other possible grounds of conscience. The noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack accused me of being lacking in logic when I suggested that, if the General and Municipal Workers' Union refused to register—I think that that will be a very wrong thing for them to do if this Bill goes through, because it seems to me very important that they should register—on conscientious grounds I should not want any longer to be associated with the union. I agree that this raises all kinds of problems and difficulties to which I do not know the answer. I suggested the other day that it might be possible to look again at this question of grounds of conscience, to see how it can best be interpreted and applied. I think that the reference to the agency shop comes in the right place, but there are other grounds of conscience which have to be looked at and I hope that they will be looked at by the Government.

LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY

I think that the right reverend Prelate has raised a very important point here, and it becomes even more important in the context of the approved closed shop. In that context, the conscience clause is the only way out for someone who seriously objects to something which the union is doing. Something more than is already in Schedule I will have to be provided, when we get to that part of the Bill. So I wonder whether the Government will look at the possibility of widening the conscience clause generally.

LORD DRUMALBYN

The Government have been invited to reconsider this, and of course we shall reconsider it. But, on the one hand, I am scolded rather for the length of the provisions, and, on the other hand, I am invited to extend them. But that is the way of life, I am afraid, and we shall have to look at the whole matter again.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

As I said, I did not seek to press this Amendment to a Division, but merely sought to raise this important issue in a preliminary way with a view to asking the House to come to a more definitive view at a later stage. I think that the brief debate which we have had has justified my action, because the speeches have illuminated some of the very real problems that are going to arise under this clause. I emphasised how important it was to ensure that a man did not genuinely have to violate his conscience, and I addressed myself particularly to those who are very widely accepted as genuine conscientious objectors, genuinely entitled to respect, and often showing respect for the trade unions. I have known of men who had a very strong religious objection, and who, because they respected their fellow workers, actually made a voluntary donation to a union. They might in future even be hailed as pioneers because they might be regarded by the Government as forerunners of the agency shop, for being willing to make a contribution equivalent to a union contribution although they did not wish to become members.

The speeches we have heard surely indicate that people will make a wider interpretation, and I am concerned because this could give rise to the whole issue of conscience becoming treated with cynicism, which would be unfortunate. For example, I can imagine individuals who might say that they had a conscientious objection to joining a trade union, because its headquarters were in a foreign country—to wit, England—and because its proceedings were exclusively conducted in a foreign language—to wit, English. Thee might be very strongly held views, but they would not be issues of conscience I can equally understand that an individual may disagree very strongly with what he believes to be the course of action of a particular trade union, of which by definition he is not a member.

The right reverend Prelate has given an example of a man who feels that his union has done something with which he profoundly disagrees. But I am extremely surprised to hear that the right reverend Prelate should think that, when a union has done something with which a member disagrees, it is appropriately dealt with—on conscience grounds, above all—by resignation. Surely, with a democratic organisation—and trade unions are far more democratic than the vast majority of noble Lords on the other side are prepared to give them credit for—one stays in and tests a decision and argues to the contrary. I have seen many cases where what has started as very much a minority opinion in the trade union movement has become the majority opinion. So we are now seeing the very real difficulties to which the word "conscience" can give rise, and how widely the interpretation can go beyond what some of us would regard, and respect, as a genuinely conscientious objection. I cannot understand how one can have a conscientious objection to one trade union, but not to another. That seems like having, in the middle of a war, a conscientious objection to serving in the Brigade of Guards, but not to serving with the Lancashire Fusiliers.

LORD CONESFORD

May I put one point 10 the noble Lord? He mentioned—and it brought out very much what I had in mind—a democratic body. I would say at once to him that my inclination, even in a minority, would certainly be to do as he said and remain in the trade union and seek to make my view prevail. But there is such a thing as a trade union that has fallen under complete Communist domination, and in that case I should have a strong conscientious objection to joining. It would be a conscientious objection from my deepest convictions, and nothing would induce me to join a trade union that was, in my view, carrying out evil intentions under Communist domination.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

I am extremely surprised to hear the noble Lord say that and to take that particular example, because as he will know there has been an example in the recent history of this country of a trade union which fell under that kind of domination. It fell under that domination initially in a perfectly democratic way, but the domination was maintained by methods which were shown in the courts to be fraudulent and dishonest. I was most surprised to hear the noble Lord say what he did, and I wonder whether, on reconsideration, he would really sustain that point of view. We surely all know, and the trade union movement recognises, the debt which is owed to the people who did not leave the union but who remained in it and, by a very long, very courageous and determined campaign, secured a change in the policy and organisation. So this illustrates, if I may say so—and I say it with great respect—the great danger of people confusing a deeply held conviction, a very strong conviction, with what one is entitled to claim is a conscientious objection to a particular form of action.

LORD CONESFORD

I do not differ from the noble Lord in thinking that many people in that trade union behaved well, and eventually a remedy was found; but what I ask him to consider is the position at an earlier stage, before a remedy has been found, when it is proposed to compel a man to join the union. That, I think, is the thing to which I should certainly have a conscientious objection, and I think many others would.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

I think these are matters which perhaps require a further debate. There is the question of joining and there is the question of leaving once one has joined, and I am bound to say that, in the case which the noble Lord has taken, I do not see a very deep distinction between the two. But this exchange illustrates the difficulties that can arise and into which one can get when dealing with what was originally intended as a concept to protect people who have a particular consistent pattern of conduct which shows in every aspect of their lives. One does not want them to be required to do something which genuinely conflicts with their deepest ethical convictions, but one has to draw what I agree may be a difficult line, but what is nevertheless a very real line, between such people and those with a very deeply held conviction on some particular political or social policy. I think this demonstrates the danger that, first of all, we run the risk of claims being established on grounds of conscience which could lead to a degree of cynicism about conscience—the kind of cases I quoted of possible claims which might be made against foreign organisations.

There are the difficulties, too, which can arise if people feel that they have a proper justification, though not on grounds of conviction. Conviction is important, but surely there is a line which divides conviction from conscience; which divides people who, on grounds of conviction, feel strongly about a particular trade union situation, and those (I should have thought very limited number of people) who take the position that, irrespective of the union, irrespective of its leadership, irrespective of its policy, as a fundamental ethical matter they cannot join an association of that sort. Really, I think we shall get ourselves into difficulty, and we shall contribute some difficulties to industrial relations, if we do not try to clarify this point.

THE LORD BISHOP OF BLACKBURN

I think I ought really to postpone this, but the remarks the noble Lord made in suggesting that my best method would be to stay in the union—I should certainly try to persuade my branch secretary to do what he could—led me to think: Is this the attitude that you would approve, of the T.U.C. advising their constituent unions not to join in the Commission on Industrial Relations? Their advice, it seems to me, runs away from something which is essential to the working of this Bill.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

It is probably the sense of the Committee that in general we have pursued this matter as far as we reasonably can at this stage, and, that being so, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment to Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

5.16 p.m.

On Question, Whether Amendment No. 53, as amended, shall be agreed to?

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

On the Motion which has just been put to the Committee, I should like to offer some observations in the light of our discussion. As I said earlier, this is the first appearance in this Bill of the agency shop, and this again is an issue to which we shall have to return. But here I must say that my noble friends and I feel, and have little hesitation in feeling and saying, that the agency shop is not a device which we believe ought to be introduced into the industrial relations of this country. If indeed the Government intend to press forward with this concept, we shall, of course, as the discussions on the Bill proceed, have to try to make ameliorations and modifications to minimise the inadequacies and unsatisfactory characteristics of this device. But we cannot pretend that we like it.

The agency shop really derives from this unwise principle that the Government have so insistently pressed, and so unnecessarily pressed, of erecting into a constitutional right, almost, the entitlement not to join a trade union. Having taken up that unwise and unnecessary position—because to assert the right to Join a trade union does not of itself lead to any kind of compulsion at all—they leave the issue of whether people do or do not join, do or do not exercise their right to join, a neutral one; but having asserted the right not to be a trade unionist, the Government then had to face the brutal facts. They had to face the fact that, first of all, this would produce, as they themselves have recognised, a bonus, a justification, for those individuals who were willing to accept the results of other people's effort and the benefits derived from the spending of other people's money. Therefore, having made the initial error, they have had to involve themselves in these increasingly complicated arrangements for the agency shop and in the increasingly complicated provisions to govern the closed shop.

They have withdrawn very far, of course, from their fine assertion that nobody is under any compulsion of any kind whatsoever to join a trade union. They have had to withdraw from that because the facts of industrial life as they are recognised by both sides of industry mean that the individual right of decision, the individual complete freedom of decision, has to be qualified. Almost every right which we enjoy is not only an individual right but a social right. Every assertion and exercise of a right by an individual in a greater or less degree has its effect upon the exercise of the rights of his follow citizens, and we have to try to find a proper balance.

The Government have made their own task far more difficult by the way they have insisted on drafting and sticking to Clause 5. I must frankly say that to assert, on the one hand, this great principle of freedom, and then go on with the successive degrees of qualification, is a pretty nonsensical arrangement, and might in the case of some people he regarded as a dishonest arrangement. For what is being said to the worker in the agency shop is: "Yes, you are perfectly free to join or not to join a trade union. But if you do not join you must in effect pay what is probably the basic contribution that the union imposes by its rules on its members. But, of course, you will not receive the individual, as distinct from the collective, services which the union provides. You will be a contributor; you will be taxed by the union; but you will have no representation in the union. You will not have an individual service from the union." If the union assists with the protection of an individual's dependents if he should be killed or injured, as do most unions, then the services given, the legal representation and so on, which are of great value to the individual worker, will not be available to a man under this agency shop agreement.

That is a very strange way of giving a man a right. If we are going to follow this method of giving people rights, then any Government of any kind in any sort of regime can subscribe very happily to the most liberal declaration of human rights. They can say, "You have complete freedom of speech, and freedom of every kind, provided that you do not mind if after the first time you exercise this freedom you find yourself in prison for the rest of your life." I am not suggesting that benevolent noble Lords on the Benches opposite are in that position. But really there is an element of humbug in saying that you are safeguarding a person's rights and then imposing a penalty on him when he takes you seriously.

This clause comes before the Committee in a rather new form. Some parts of it are old friends and we have down Amendments to delete them; but other parts are new. The change introduced by the new clause is that an employers' association can now enter into agency shop agreements, whereas previously this was restricted to one or more individual employers. This is not altogether a new idea. If I am not mistaken, the Engineering Employers' Federation have been pressing for a modification of this sort since the Consultative Document was published in October of last year. Can the noble Lord when he comes to reply say why the Government have now met their views after such a period of resistance? It would be useful if he could develop the effects of this change in industrial terms. Is the change being introduced so that employers collectively can enter into agency agreements at a national level for the purpose of negotiating matters of industry-wide concern? Or is it being done so that employers' associations can at national level enter into agency shop agreements that will be binding at the local level? Or is the intention twofold? I am bound to say that it seems more likely that it is the second consideration that is principally in mind.

Does this mean, for example, that the Engineering Employers' Federation could, at national level, enter into agency agreements that would mean, say, that all welders employed by the firms in the Federation should belong to one specified union, or in lieu of membership should pay contributions to that union? If that is the intention, then I should have thought that quite a degree of disruption and/or rearrangement would ensue. Perhaps this sort of thing is not what the Government intend, but it seems to me that it would follow. The Engineering Employers' Association normally negotiate with the Confederation of Engineering and Shipbuilding Unions over the whole of the industry. I suppose that, theoretically, there can be an agency agreement in the terms provided by the Amendment between the Engineering Employers' Federation on the one hand and the Confederation on the other; but this seems to me merely to be putting existing arrangements on a more formal and legal basis, for there is nothing in the Bill at present (and there was nothing in the Bill as previously drafted, as I understand it) that would disrupt the present arrangements. It would therefore be useful to know why, if my presumption is correct, it is necessary to provide in the statute for formal ratification of what already seems to both sides to be a satisfactory bargaining arrangement. I make the digression that I suppose the Confederation would be eligible for registering as a trade union but only if all the constituent unions were registered. If one or more of them were not, then the Confederation would not be able to register as a trade union.

These are some of the questions which are bound to arise in our minds, and which lead me to put a point to the Government that I hope that they will answer now or later. I began to put this question during our discussion of the Amendment to Clause 5 to omit that subsection which gave the right to be a non-unionist. We are bound to continue pressing this sort of question as the proceedings go on. What really are the Government aiming at? We have generalities by the bucketful about bringing law and order and all sorts of other desirable things into industrial relations; but we cannot get answers to the simple practical questions that really matter. I put again the question that I put the other evening: is it the desire of the Government to promote collective bargaining? If so, I think they are going an odd way about it. Is it their desire to see the present arrangements, which apply over the greater part of industry, gradually (or evenly speedily) disappear, and to replace them with an over-all pattern of agency shops, agency agreements and closed shop agreements? We really ought to know. Do the Government regard the agency shop system as superior to the voluntary collective bargaining which at the moment covers most of industry? Or are they neutral on that point? Do they think that the agency shop is rather an unsatisfactory substitute for the present arrangements, the agency shop agreement being necessitated by this doctrinaire desire to assert the right to be a non-unionist?

These are questions that we are bound to put. It is not clear whether the Government want to see the existing arrangements replaced by agency shop agreements or whether they are quite neutral on the matter. I am bound to say that it seems to me there are many features of the Bill which, if it is enacted in its present form, will make it difficult, even in those places where the arrangements are working to everybody's satisfaction, for the voluntary arrangements to remain unimpaired and unaltered. We really ought to know from the Government what they are aiming at. Are they aiming at covering industry broadly by agency shops and closed shops, or are they satisfied with the voluntary form of organisation, where that is working well and to the satisfaction of both sides? Here again I do not expect definitive answers to these questions. We are extremely reasonable people on this side of the Committee; but we do expect, if I may say so, some indication that the Government understand the anxieties and the questions which we believe, for the guidance of people on both sides of industry, ought to be more clearly answered.

I am bound to conclude with this point: that whatever advantages or disadvantages the agency agreement principle may have—and I am inclined to think that the disadvantages outweigh the advantages—it is profoundly bad from one point of view. It does nothing to encourage—and on the whole does something to discourage—the ordinary individual worker from believing he ought to play a part in the collective regulation of his industry and to play that part through his trade union. The Government, and the noble Lord in particular, always say, "We understand, of course, why the trade unions object to the free rider'". Of course we object to the "free rider" but I must emphasise very strongly that so far as the non-members are concerned, I believe it is true of the vast majority of trade unions that it is not just their money that is wanted. Indeed, on this I agree with my noble friend Lord Shinwell (and I speak only for myself) and shall be very surprised if self-respecting trade unions will be very happy about receiving money from people who do not care to take up the obligations and the rights of membership.

Trade unions are not insurance societies. The trade union is not a vast firm of solicitors which collects money. A trade union is a living fellowship of workers, and if it loses that concept it loses a great deal of its value to the social and industrial life of this country. The fundamental reason why I object to this agency shop concept is that it puts all the emphasis on the financial contribution which the worker must make, and it leaves out of account the fact that we (and when I say "we" I am talking of the community here and not of the trade union movement alone) want to see workers in their trade unions, because that is the only way in which the individual worker can have any degree of influence upon the way the industry in which he works is conducted and the way its affairs are collectively regulated. Trade unions do not want to be treated as some kind of business agency which is satisfied with having the shillings—I should really say new pence—it does not want; because what we want is the contribution that every individual worker has it in his power to give to make the industry in which he works a better place.

5.33 p.m.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I do not want in any way to interfere with the way in which the Committee wishes to discuss this subject, but I would point out I am not complaining in the slightest about the remarks made by the noble Lord, because this is a preliminary fusillade, if I may put it in that way. But the main debate on the agency shop ought, of course, to come on Clause 10, when we come to it; and I hope the noble Lord would agree with me that this is so. I am quite prepared to answer the specific questions which he asked, but I would ask tie Committee to exercise restraint at this stage because it would not he reasonable to debate the broad principle of the agency shop several times over when there are specific provisions from Clause 10 on which to deal with this matter. I am sure this would be the advice that would be given if there were a chair here which gave advice.

The noble Lord has asked me the specific question as to why we have made these changes in this Amendment, and that is a question which is, of course, very relevant to the new clause. It was not the Engineering Employers' Federation who asked for this: they pressed for the extension of bargaining right provisions to the employers' associations and the like; it was the recognition and bargaining rights, which are the preliminaries to agency shop agreements, for which they pressed. The reason for this was that we believed the words, "one or more employers", when we first tabled the Bill, would have allowed agency shop agreements between employers' associations and unions; but apparently this gives rise to legal difficulties about the word "agent". Some federations, including the Shipping Federation, have asked for the extension of the provision specifically to employers' associations in order to leave no doubt about the intention and application of the provisions. The noble Lord also asked a specific question about whether this was intended to alter the whole area of industry or particular plants. The answer is, both: it could cover the one and it could cover the other. It depends primarily on the recognition provisions in each case. But before you can get an agency shop arrangement you must have a condition in which the employer recognises the particular union for the descriptions of workers concerned. It does not follow that it will cover the whole area for which the trade union represents those descriptions of workers. It can be limited or it can be wide. This is a pretty flexible provision, as I think we shall see when we come to Clause 10. Perhaps, with that short explanation, the Committee may now be prepared to let us have this new clause.

LORD SHINWELL

In almost every Amendment and on every clause in the process of our deliberations we have been advised, "What is the use of deploying further arguments? Had we not better wait until we come to the subsequent clause?" We have now had another example. The only reply to my noble friend Lord Delacourt-Smith has been, "Wait until we reach Clause 10, and then we can get down to brass tacks and we can get our teeth into the argument about the agency shop." Is that what the noble Lord said?

LORD DRUMALBYN

Will the noble Lord allow me to intervene? The reason for this lies in the structure of the Bill. We start talking about the rights of the individual. Here in this Amendment we are concerned with how the rights of the individual are affected by the agency shop. But how agency shops can be formed, and in what circumstances, and so on, we shall come to when we reach the provisions in Clause 10.

LORD SHINWELL

The noble Lord might have waited until I had reached some subsequent sentences and observations; I was not complaining about him. I am concerned about the chronological order of debate. We want an orderly debate—to take point No. 1, point No. 2, and so on. That is what we should have done. The noble Lord has just told us that in this particular clause we are dealing with one aspect of the problem. When we come to Clause 10 we shall have to cover the ground again, because it is quite impossible to divorce one aspect of the problem from the others. They are all telescoped, whether we like it or not. But that was not the reason why I rose to address your Lordships. My noble friend Lord Delacourt-Smith asked the Government what they were aiming at. I should have thought that by this time, because of our somewhat prolonged deliberations, and in particular the long period of discussion and disputation that has taken place at the end of the corridor in the other place, we should be able to make up our minds about what the Government are driving at.

I put it in a sentence. Noble Lords opposite may disagree and dislike what I say, but I believe that the Government want to curb the trade unions. They may have good reason in view of the various episodes, events, turbulences, wild-cat strikes and all the difficulties which have occurred in the last few years, but they want to curb the power of the trade union movement; it is as simple as that. I know that sometimes noble Lords on the other side of the Committee—as indeed have right honourable gentlemen and honourable Members in the other place—have declared that their purpose is to strengthen the trade unions. They have a remarkably strange way of reaching that objective. Again, that is not the reason why I rose to speak; I want to put a question to my noble friend, Lord Delacourt-Smith.

I understand that he rose to ask a question to ascertain the views of noble Lords opposite, but at the same time to initiate a debate on the Motion whether the clause shall stand part of the Bill. I am anxious to make my contribution in this matter about whether it is desirable or otherwise to have the agency shop, the closed shop, and all the other paraphernalia that has been injected into this remarkable piece of legislation, or proposed legislation. But, frankly, I do not see much purpose in deploying arguments at this stage, and I will give the reason why. What is the purpose of it, unless at the end of the debate we are going to indicate our resentment, our disagreement, on what is undoubtedly a fundamental issue, a vital part of this potential legislation—and divide?

After a previous discussion, when I thought that we had without doubt gained the better of the argument, my noble friends on the Opposition Front Bench decided not to proceed and to withdraw the Amendment under discussion. Either these Amendments have been carefully and meticulously examined in order to ensure that they are worth while presenting to the Committee, or they are put down simply for the purpose of a preliminary discussion. I like to know where I am in matters of this sort. Having had a long discussion on the previous Amendment, it seemed to me that we ought to have displayed our resentment and gone into the Division Lobby. If we are going to argue about the defects, errors of judgment and the like, embodied in this clause, which is now Clause 5, I want to know whether we are going to divide at the end. If we are merely going to ask some questions, I do not want to proceed at all—not at this stage. I say that because I am wondering when we are going to come to some conclusion about this matter.

I noticed the other day—I discovered this only by reading the OFFICIAL REPORT—that the debate on this Bill continued one morning until a quarter to two. That is not the way to conduct proceedings in an Assembly of this kind. We had a lot of it in the other place, in my experience over the years, but I expect something different from this august Assembly; a more orderly proceeding; a more logical approach; the presentation of a case in as few words as necessary, and then for noble Lords to come to a decision. But that is not what we are doing, and I want to know whether we are going to end this somewhat sordid and squalid affair before next Christmas. I want to know whether it is going to interfere with my holiday period. I think we ought to know. Can we get some conclusion about this? That is the question which should be addressed to the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, to find out what is in his mind. Perhaps the noble Lord would ascertain the views of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor who I know—although he regards himself only as a legal luminary with expertise on legal matters—can spread himself all over the place when he is in the mood. The noble and learned Lord might be asked for his opinion also. Can we get some opinion about this before we proceed with our discusison?

On the other hand, if my colleagues on the Opposition Front Bench, supported by their Back Benchers, are determined to proceed to a Division, I am quite prepared to take part in the discussion and expose this iniquity of the proposed agency shop and the closed shop which has been injected into this potential piece of legislation. I observe that the Chairman is looking round at me and asking himself how long I am going on——

SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS

Hear. Hear!

LORD SHINWELL

Exactly. I was right; I could see it in his eyes. I will go on as long as I feel that I am in the mood to go on; but that is not why I rose to address your Lordships. It was for the purpose of ascertaining not only the opinion of the noble Lord on the Government Front Bench, but also the opinions of my own colleagues. What are we driving at? I heard one noble Lord say this afternoon that we are seeking co-operation with the Government. Well, I am not. They are a nice lot of people, I agree, and they are very friendly people; but I do not want to co-operate with them in matters of this sort. I want to oppose them, tooth and nail; hook, line and sinker. That is why we are here. But ought we not to be properly informed so that we know what we are going to do in the subsequent discussions? I am sorry to have intervened in this fashion, but I have been sitting here wondering what it is all about, and it is about time we were told what is the intention. We know what the Government's aim is: what is our aim? Are we going to fight the Government every inch of the way? If so, I am with my noble friends. But if we are not going to fight the Government, I do not see that there is much purpose in preceeding.

5.50 p.m.

LORD POPPLEWELL

I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, did not answer the pertinent question put by my noble friend Lord Delacourt-Smith: what is the reason for this new clause. Is it that the Government are not satisfied with the present voluntary basis on which trade unions operate? If so, what is wrong with it? Where are the weaknesses? Why are we not told before we are asked to approve such radical changes? Is it that the trade unions are too powerful? Surely we are entitled to ask that, failing any reason being given. If they are too powerful and if they exercise their power in an unreasonable way, we should be told. We have been assured, times out of number, that the Government supporters and the Government as a whole are seeking, somehow, to strengthen the trade unions. In what way does the movement want strengthening? Where are the weaknesses? Surely these are questions that we are entitled to ask. We have been told that we have the finest trade unions in the world—I think it was the Minister of Employment who said that only a little while ago. If that be so, why introduce Clause 5 in this way, and why introduce this particular clause dealing with the rights of the individual to join the union? The unions and the organised workers do not seek legislation for that. They will do it; they will join into organised ranks. They fought that battle very many years ago, and they have gone from strength to strength. as the Donovan Commission Report indicates.

Therefore this question of the right to join a trade union is a lot of baloney and nonsense; let us face it. The men on the shop floor will tell anyone whether they are going to organise or are not going to organise. I have no idea why the Government should attempt to make so many definitions of these rights, because when we get to the point of trying to define this and define that, we know how great are the difficulties that arise. Therefore I just cannot understand the reason, unless we return to that old theme: that it is a question of bashing the unions and the Government are determined to do it. If not, tell me why. We have asked this question repeatedly. The Trades Union Congress have wanted discussions with the Government, and what has been the Government's reply?—" Accept the basic principles of what we tell you, and we are prepared to listen to what you have to say." It has not been a question of, "Let us meet and see whether there is anything wrong. Can we make a joint effort?"

I thought it was very intriguing, having in mind that line of approach of the Government, when we heard the noble Lord who was just speaking on behalf of the Government state quite categoric- ally that the reason why it was necessary to bring in this new clause dealing with employers' associations was that the request had come from the employers' associations; but still they did not talk with the T.U.C. boys. They said: "Let us discuss these things in principle", but according to the noble Lord's own words it was a request which came from the employers' associations—in other words they were prepared to accept and discuss in principle these items of the Bill, yet refused to do so with the T.U.C. It just is not good enough to speak about industrial relations in this way.

When this Bill ultimately becomes an Act—and I think it will be a long time before it does—when the Government ultimately decide to implement it, I am afraid they will find that both sides of industry will be involved in so many difficulties, not of their own seeking, that it will not be in the best interests of our country as a whole. I think that Clause 5 and everything it stands for is bad, and I sincerely hope that our Front Bench is going to vote against it.

LORD PARGITER

In view of the fact that we are unlikely to get a straight answer to the question my noble friend has just put, as to the reason for Clause 5, possibly I can give him the answer as to why Clause 5 appears. We all know that before this Bill was introduced in the Tory propaganda up and down the country the closed shop was anathema, the one thing they were determined not to have; they were going to have a free-for-all, with no question of a closed shop. They called it an agency shop in order to get over calling it a closed shop, because they do not like the words, but it comes to pretty well the same thing. They found of course, when they got down to drafting legislation, that in certain industries they could not do without it, that the very function of the industry made it necessary that there should be some formal kind of organisation which could be dealt with. Therefore, we have Clause 5 which provides for an agency shop, and the further Amendment which brings in the associations, because in certain cases they cannot deal with it without certain associations.

These are the facts of life so far as the Tories are concerned. They have been driven to this, not because they like it, but because their original propaganda was so out of touch with the facts of life—we do not expect Members on the other side to know much about the trade union movement or closed shops, and things of that kind. The facts of life came very clearly not only from the trade union side, not only in another place, but to an extent that the Government, much against their will, have been forced to accept the principle of trade union recognition in a closed shop form. Those are the real reasons why the Tories have got this clause in the Bill. They will not want to admit it, but so far as I can see that happens to be near the truth of the matter.

5.55 p.m.

LORD DAVIES OF LEEK

I understand we are now discussing that this proposed new clause stand part. Consequently, I ask the question, why was this clause introduced? We are told in the rubric the purpose behind the moving of this new clause by the noble Lord opposite namely Modification of rights by agency shop agreements. But if one reads the words at the beginning of the Bill—I will not read them out because most of them are in Clause 5—the right is there given to form independent unions, and there is evolved the system of agency shops.

I pointed out earlier to-day the illogicality of this Bill. This sort of thing is happening all along. First of all—and I have never before seen such a thing in my Parliamentary career—the first clause mixes ethics and jurisprudence. That makes it an impossible clause; it should have been a Preamble. To-day, every time we ask a 64,000 dollar question, "What does this mean?"—and I have used the phrase that this is like the South Sea Bubble—we are told: "Agree to this, because later on we will tell you what it is all about, when we teach you what the agency shop is." The entire Bill is like this in its phraseology and draftsmanship.

As the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, has just pointed out, Clause 10 is miles away from the clause we are discussing to-day; consequently, this Committee are in the position of all the time talking all round the question. This is because of the courtesy and decency of your Lordships. In another place we should be ruled out of order in 90 per cent. of the speeches which are being made on this matter. But your Lordships are unable anyway, to keep yourselves in Parliamentary order in this discussion because of the distances between the relevant parts of the Bill.

When I am asked to-day to approve of this clause standing part, I am against it. I will not talk about the agency shop now. The opportunity will arise to talk about it when we reach Clause 10. I want to try to be fair to the Committee, and not to bore them. I think it would be unfair practice on my part to discuss Clause 10, which is an effort to undermine the traditional trade union movement, by inventing the agency shop. We shall discuss the agency shop later on, a few months from now.

Therefore I sincerely hope that we on this side of the Committee, without any asperity, will indicate to the trade union movement that we feel this modification has been discussed with the employers. I hope that the question my noble friend has asked will be answered. I want to put a corollary to that matter. Maybe my noble friend did. If this modification was discussed with the C.B.I. or with the employers, was it discussed with the T.U.C? I should like to know that as well. In any case, if not (and even if it were) I feel sincerely that we on this side of the Committee should vote against this modification of Clause 5 as presented to us to-day.

6.0 p.m.

Loan DRUMALBYN

I hope that I may now be able to satisfy noble Lords on the points they have raised. Let us first get this clear. We believe in principle that. whatever is right or wrong, the pre-entry closed shop is wrong. We hold that view firmly, because it will deny a man the right to employment if he is not a member of a particular trade union. The second point is this. In general, we think it is right that a worker should have the right, as between his employer and himself, to chose which union to belong to or to belong to no union at all. These are fundamental rights.

But, of course, that does not mean that he has the right to join any trade union at all. This is a matter between him and the union and also a matter for arrangement between his employer and the trade union.

Noble Lords have made a certain amount of play with the fact that we have given way on this. This was always envisaged, that there would be circumstances in which it would be right, where it was appropriate in agreement between an employer and trade unions, that there should be an arrangement under which workers would have to belong to a trade union or else pay equivalent contributions. What we are here discussing is simply whether your Lordships want the right to belong or not to belong to a union to be absolute, or whether there are circumstances in which an employer may or must insist that all workers of specified descriptions should belong to a union or else pay contributions equivalent to union dues. I cannot think that noble Lords would want to disagree with that as an objective, however it is achieved. We shall come to the way in which it is achieved when we discuss Clause 10.

The noble Lord, Lord Popplewell, asks, broadly, what is wrong with the present system. My goodness! We set up a Royal Commission years ago—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Donovan, is sitting here and he told us what was wrong with the present system. Basically what we are seeking to do—I am not talking about the means—is to achieve improved plant bargaining, better procedure agreements and the removal of causes of friction. These are things with which we would all agree.

LORD DAVIES OF LEEK

I think it is an unfair practice to drag in the noble and learned Lord, Lord Donovan. Did he suggest the agency shop and its inclusion in Clause 5?

LORD DRUMALBYN

No. I know that one gets tired at listening to what is said, but I think that the noble Lord did not listen to what I was saying. Here we are simply asking noble Lords to agree to the principle of the agency shop, which will mean that workers do not have an absolute right to refuse to belong

to a trade union and should either belong to a union or else pay an equivalent contribution. I do not think that noble Lords would feel inclined to disagree to the clause on those terms.

The noble Lord, Lord Popplewell, asked the reason for the new clause. I hope that I have given him the reason. It is simply that it was thought better to separate out what are called the modifications, the particular circumstances, in which a man would not have an absolute right of joining a union into a separate clause and, secondly, to ensure the original intention that employers' associations should have the same power of dealing with agency shop agreements in conjunction with the trade unions as have individual employers. We thought that the original phrase "employer or employers" covered that situation, but it was pointed out to us that it might not do so. We looked into it and agreed with the observation that was made. But to say that that was because we were negotiating on basic principles with particular federations, with the C.B.I. and all the rest, whereas we did not negotiate with the T.U.C., is an absolute travesty of the facts, as the noble Lord knows very well indeed.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

We appreciate the point of the noble Lord that the agency shop as a conception is really embodied in Clause 10 of the Bill but, in view of the way the Government have chosen to construct the Bill, we encounter it for the first time in this clause. As I think I made clear when I addressed the Committee, following our return to Amendment No. 53, this is something we may seek to modify in subsequent proceedings, but we cannot pretend that we like the agency shop or the proposals in this new clause. In these circumstances, I have no alternative but to invite my noble friends to divide the Committee.

6.6 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 53) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents 132; Not-Contents, 48.

CONTENTS
Abergavenny, M.	Amory, V.	Barrington, V.
Ailwyn, L.	Balfour of Inchrye, L.	Beauchamp, E.
Airedale, L.	Barnby, L.	Beaumont of Whitley, L.
Belhaven and Stenton, L.	Garner, L.	Milverton, L.
Belstead, L.	Geddes, L.	Molson, L.
Berkeley, Bs.	Gisborough, L.	Monck, V.
Bessborough, E.	Gladwyn, L.	Monckton of Brenchley, V.
Blackburn, Bp.	Glasgow, E.	Napier and Ettrick, L.
Braye, L.	Goschen, V. [Teller.]	Northchurch, Bs.
Brecon, L.	Gray, L.	Negent of Guildford, L.
Bridgeman, V.	Greenway, L.	Ogmore, L.
Brooke of Cumnor, L.	Grenfell, L.	Orr-Ewing, L.
Brooke of Ystradfellte, Bs.	Grimston of Westbury, L.	Rankeillour, L.
Burgh, L.	Hacking, L.	Rathcavan, L.
Byers, L.	Hailes, L.	Reading, M.
Carrington, L.	Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)	Reay, L.
Chesham, L.		Remnant, L.
Clwyd, L.	Harcourt, V.	Roberthall, L.
Colgrain, L.	Harvey of Tasburgh, L.	Rockley, L.
Conesford, L.	Hatherton, L.	Rothes, E.
Cork and Orrery, E.	Henley, L.	St. Aldwyn, E.
Cottesloe, L.	Hives, L.	St. Helens, L.
Courtown, E.	Hood, V.	St. Just, L.
Cowley, E.	Howard of Glossop, L.	St. Oswald, L.
Craigavon, V.	Hurcombe, L.	Sandford, L.
Croft, L.	Hylton-Foster, Bs.	Savile, L.
Cromartie, E.	Ilford, L.	Selkirk, E.
Daventry, V.	Inchyra, L.	Sempill, Ly.
De Clifford, L.	Kemsley, V.	Sinclair of Cleeve, L.
Denham, L. [Teller.]	Killearn, L.	Somers, L.
Derwent, L.	Kilmany, L.	Stamp, L.
Drumalbyn, L.	Kinnoull, E.	Stonehaven, V.
Dudley, E.	Lauderdale, E.	Strange of Knokin, Bs.
Dundonald, E.	Lloyd, L.	Sudeley, L.
Dunleath, L.	Lothian, M.	Swinton, E.
Eccles, V.	Loudoun, C.	Templemore, L.
Effingham, E.	Lucas of Chilworth, L.	Tenby, V.
Ellenborough, L.	Lyell, L.	Teviot, L.
Elliot of Harwood, Bs.	MacAndrew, L.	Thurlow, L.
Emmet of Amberley, Bs.	McCorquodale of Newton, L.	Vivian, L.
Falkland, V.	McFadzean, L.	Willingdon, M.
Ferrers, E.	Margadale, L.	Windlesham, L.
Ferrier, L.	Massereene and Ferrard V.	Wise, L.
Fortescue, E.	Merrivale, L.	Wolverton, L.
Fraser of Lonsdale, L.
NOT-CONTENTS
Archibald, L.	Gaitskell, Bs.	Sainsbury, L.
Ardwick, L.	Gardiner, L.	St. Davids, V.
Balogh, L.	Garnsworthy, L.	Segal, L.
Bernstein, L.	Hilton of Upton, L.	Serota, Bs.
Beswick, L.	Jacques, L.	Shepherd, L.
Birk, Bs.	Janner, L.	Shinwell, L.
Brockway, L.	Kennet, L.	Snow, L.
Brown, L.	Leatherland, L.	Stonham, L.
Buckinghamshire, E.	Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, Bs.	Stow Hill, L.
Champion, L.	McLeavy, L.	Strabolgi, L. [Teller.]
Collison, L.	Moyle, L.	Summerskill, Bs.
Davies of Leek, L.	Pargiter, L.	Wells-Pestell, L.
Delacourt-Smith, L.	Peddie, L.	White, Bs.
Diamond, L.	Phillips, Bs. [Teller.]	Williamson, L.
Donaldson of Kingsbridge, L.	Plummer, Bs.	Wootton of Abinger, Bs.
Douglass of Cleveland, L.	Popplewell, L.	Wynne-Jones, L.

On Question, Motion agreed to.

Resolved in the affirmative, and Amendment agreed to accordingly.

6.18 p.m.

Clause 6 [Pre-entry closed shop agreements to be void]:

LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY moved Amendment No. 54: Page 5, line 39, at end insert ("save that the Secretary of State may provide for the exemption of certain agreements from the provisions of this subsection through affirmative resolution of Parliament, and that such agreements as exempted, will be legally enforceable contracts not subject to subsection 1(b) of Clause 32 of this Act. Such agreements exempted by the Secretary of State shall be subject to investigation by the Monopolies Commission prior to an exemption resolution being laid before Parliament.")

The noble Lord said: I beg to move the Amendment which stands on the Marshalled List in the names of my noble friends and myself. At this stage of the Bill this Amendment should be regarded as a probing Amendment. I have not yet taken the step of putting down the Amendments which would be consequential upon its passing, and I apologise to the Committee for the fact that I think that in the middle of the Amendment there is somewhat slapdash drafting. However, I think that its purpose is clear. It is common ground, I think, in most parts of the Committee that the principle which the Government are putting forward against the closed shop, and which basically we support, needs one or two, and possibly more, exceptions. This became obvious in another place when the case for Equity as one of these exceptions was put forward. Another union for which a case was put forward strongly was the Seamen's Union. The Government have gone a certain way towards meeting these points by tabling the new Clause 16 and Schedule 1.

I do not think that this new clause is entirely satisfactory. There are fairly obvious objections to it. First of all, there is no provision for the union to apply unilaterally for the approval and enforcement of the closed shop; and it is to be an unfair practice to put pressure on an employer or an association of employers to induce them to join in an application. There is no provision or procedure whereby an agreement can be made binding on non-member employers; any approved closed shop agreement can be made only with the registered association of employers; and it is far from clear that employers' associations are to become registered associations under the Act. These are defects that I think are in Clause 16 and Schedule 1. There are a number of Amendments down in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Archibald, and one or two other noble Lords which I think would go a long way to rectify these defects.

We are putting forward what we think is a simpler solution, rather than these long new clauses and schedules and the various Amendments which will be necessary to them. We are putting forward in this Amendment the proposition that the Secretary of State may provide for the exemption of certain agreements from the provisions which ban the pre-entry closed shop by Affirmative Resolution of Parliament. Obviously, there will have to be regulations, and some consequential Amendments following on this. We think it is basically a much simpler solution. It was put forward and slightly discussed in another place, but the Government spokesman did not choose to answer on this when he was replying to Amendments that were being discussed together. It is for this reason that we put forward the Amendment.

I can see that one of the major objections to this which may come from the Government is that a future Labour Secretary of State, if they are prepared to envisage the possibility of such a thing, may decide to exempt many trade unions from this part of the Bill for no particularly good reason. We have put in two provisions in this respect which we think are both safeguards and deterrents. The first is that any application to be exempted from this part of the Bill should have to go before the Monopolies Commission, to make certain that it is not establishing a monopoly situation of labour against the national interest. At the same time, we are hoping to lay down—and this is where I think I may have included an error of drafting in the Amendment—that any bargaining contracts entered into by a union which is exempt from this part of the Bill, and therefore has an approved pre-entry closed shop, should be enforceable; that they should not be able to take advantage of the let-out which they will have and claim that it is not enforceable by agreement.

The reason for this is that, first, we think it is a deterrent for those unions which would be ant to claim exemption on unnecessary grounds; and secondly, it seems to us logical that, where you have a pre-entry closed shop, and therefore every person involved in the agreement is a member of the union, the union should be able to bargain on their behalf completely; it represents them, and therefore is entitled to say: "This is what we all believe." There is a much greater case for enforceability where there is a closed shop than where there is not. On the whole, we think that enforceability of contracts is one of the weaker parts of the Bill, and we have said so often. But in this case we think it could be used as a safeguard.

I know that we all, including the Government, want to do the best we can by Equity, the Seamen's Union, and any other union which may find itself in this peculiar position of really needing a closed shop. The Government have gone a long way towards this already. Lord Archibald's Amendments will, I think, improve the position a lot. But I should like the Government to have a look at this proposal which we nut forward, to see whether it does not have some merits as being a simpler solution to the whole problem. I beg to move.

EARL FERRERS

As the noble Lord has explained, this Amendment certainly has far-reaching effects on the Bill as it stands. It is really an attempt to modify the provisions terminating the pre-entry closed shop. I think the Amendment has two limbs to it. First, it gives the Secretary of State power to grant exemption of agreements; and secondly, it incorporates the Monopolies Commission. I should like to consider those as two separate things.

The exemptions would be proposed by the Secretary of State, and this would give him a pretty clear run to use his discretion on whether to grant exemptions or to withhold them. Admittedly, he would have to submit his proposals to the Monopolies Commission, and thereafter they would have to come to Parliament for Affirmative Resolution. But it gives the Secretary of State, and him alone, the discretion whether the exemption should be granted or not. The Amendment provides no criteria on which such exemptions should be granted: indeed, the decisions could be—and I think the noble Lord hinted that they might be—political decisions. This of course would make the whole Amendment at variance with the general concept of the Bill, which aims to make the Bill—once it becomes law—subject to civil law, and to be interpreted by the courts, and that the Government should not interfere. For those reasons, we feel that it would be undesirable for the Secretary of State to have these particular powers.

Then the noble Lord suggests in his Amendment that such exemptions should be subject to the Monopolies Commission, as a sort of longstop against any extreme examples. But the absence of criteria for exemption would make it difficult for the Monopolies Commission to comment on this. They could only offer evidence to the Secretary of State, and eventually to Parliament, of the likely effect of the closed shop versus the consequences of having no such agreement. They could not properly formulate a view whether the advantages would outweigh the disadvantages. I suggest that possibly the biggest objection—if one can call it an objection, in the nicest sense of the term—to the idea that the Monopolies Commission should be incorporated is that it insinuates that the principles applying to the assessment of commercial monopoly power might be the same as the principles which apply to the assessment of labour monopoly power. I would think therefore that the Monopolies Commission is really an unsuitable body to be used in this particular way. Both sides of industry would realise, as a result of this, if this Amendment were to be passed, that real power lay with the Secretary of State, and they would inevitably try to secure his support for their particular case. It is our desire, once this Bill becomes law, to keep the Government out of these arrangements, and for that reason I would hope that the noble Lord would not press his Amendment.

6.30 p.m.

BARONESS WHITE

If I might comment briefly on this proposed Amendment, we have a certain sympathy with the reasons which, so far as I can understand him, have led Lord Beaumont of Whitley and his noble friends to put it upon the Paper. In particular, we, too, are very much concerned about the position of Equity which, although the Government appear to think they have gone some way towards meeting their difficulties, is nevertheless still, I have just been assured, extremely anxious and concerned. They have made full representations; I do not think any union could have done more to try to inform the Government of the true nature of their problems. As they have pointed out, unless they can have some special arrangements of a pre-entry nature it will be impossible for them to carry out the casting arrangements which are current in the industry, and in certain parts of the film industry, too, which have the entire support, as I understand it, both of the management and of the unions.

We are dealing in the theatrical and cinematograph professions with very badly overcrowded professions with high unemployment. There are no objective qualifications for being a theatre or film actor other than being engaged by an employer, and if one does not have some kind of regulation by agreement in the profession there will be a completely chaotic condition. This is not only in the star parts in the play or film—they can more or less look after themselves—but many actors and actresses depend for their bread and butter on having a fair chance of employment, and unless the employers and the unions are allowed to make arrangements for this they feel that the whole arrangements that they have built up over the years will crumble. They do not, as I understand it, feel happy that the proposals in Clause 16, and various other proposals, are really going to be sufficient. They are particularly concerned about this Clause 6, and although we shall be coming later to some proposed Amendments, the Amendments will make it even more difficult for them. If anybody has been refused a job and can call this clause in aid, it will make it even more difficult to have any ordered entry into the profession, or any ordered arrangements for employment. I know that we shall be discussing Equity and their problems again, but I think it is right, as the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, has mentioned them in this Amendment, to bring them in here too. We feel that the Liberal Amendment has some substance.

On the other hand we feel some sympathy with the Government on the suggestion of bringing in the Monopolies Commission. We feel that in any case there is going to be enough interference with trade union arrangements in all parts of this Bill, but to bring in the Monopolies Commission, which was established in quite a different context and for different purposes, does not seem to us to be entirely appropriate. We can appreciate the difficulties of noble Lords who have supported this Amendment. They feel that there should be some kind of investigation, some kind of safeguard, but I think the problem they had to face is just inherent in the Bill. If one is going to have all this kind of statutory regulation and limitation of agreements which can be voluntarily reached by both sides, one is under some obligation to think up some equally complicated mechanism for countering some of the proposals in the Bill. Before we dispose of this Amendment we would like to have some further information from the noble Earl, Lord Ferrers, about the position of Equity in relation to this Amendment.

LORD SHINWELL

I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, in moving this Amendment was primarily concerned about Equity or the theatrical profession. I rather suspect that he was concerned about the possibility of a collective agreement, an agreement between an employers' organisation, or an employer and a trade union, or a body or group of trade unions which might be against the national interest and might assume a monopolistic form. I gather that is what is in his mind. Obviously the reference to submission to the Monopolies Commission seems to indicate that that is his purpose. it is possible, if this is what he has in mind, that an agreement could be entered into, one of a collective character, which would be subversive of the national interest. It could be an agreement between the members of the printing unions, and particularly newspaper organisations or a group of newspapers, which might lead to some form of monopoly to the detriment of other sections of the newspaper industry. That would be one example.

Indeed, for several years in the past suggestions have been made of the possibility of employers' organisations coming to agreements of a collective character with trade union organisations, irrespective of the needs of consumers. I can understand why the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, is anxious to avoid that, if that is his purpose. Quite frankly, I think that asking that there should be a submission to the Monopolies Commission is asking too much. This Bill is cluttered with all kinds of organisations—industrial courts, industrial tribunals, commissions of various kinds, and no doubt as a result of the creation of a central commission there will be various regional commissions and the like, and in the long run there are the courts of justice to be taken into account. I think that is as much as the country can stand, and to add to that this proliferation of organisations responsible for supervising the implementation of this legislation would be asking too much; it is going too far.

I should be inclined to advise my noble friends to support the purpose of the Amendment if the intention is to prevent the formation of collective agreements which could be subversive of the national interest. I mean by that something which might affect the export trade, for example, or lead to an increase in imports to the disadvantage of our balance of payments, or perhaps more likely the raising of prices which would be detrimental to the interests of the general body of consumers. It can be left to the Secretary of State, or some department of the Secretary of State, to ascertain whether any item in the collective agreements is inclined to be subversive to the national interest. If the Secretary of State of a Government Department, like the old Ministry of Labour or the Board of Trade, does not have the ability, wit and knowledge to deal with situations of that kind, then the matter can be raised in Parliament.

Reference is made to an Affirmative Resolution. We have to be careful about this legislation because there are bound to be regulations of various kinds and these will require Affirmative Resolutions in both Houses of Parliament. We have enough legislation already, and if there is going to be a proliferation of legislation enactments, Statutory Instruments, and the rest of it, it will be more than both Houses of Parliament can tolerate. We are crowding both Houses of Parliament with an excess of legislation, and we have to be careful. I doubt whether the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, has given thought to these aspects of his Amendment and the possibilities arising from its acceptance. I suggest that this Amendment should be considered and probably be brought again at a further stage in our proceedings, but it is hardly acceptable at this stage.

EARL FERRERS

I was interested to hear what the noble Baroness, Lady White, said about this Amendment, and about Equity in particular. I was also glad to hear that the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, agreed with us, at least on one point: that he did not think that the inclusion of the Monopolies Commission would be the wisest course to take. We are fully aware of the problems of the acting profession. They have made real representations to the Government in the past, as the noble Baroness, Lady White, knows only too well, because of their peculiar circumstances. They were concerned that they should be allowed to operate a closed shop and, in particular, a post-entry closed shop.

BARONESS WHITE

A pre-entry closed shop.

EARL FERRERS

As I understand it, they have been concerned that they should be allowed to operate a closed shop, and it is for the reasons which have been put forward by the noble Baroness, and others who have been engaged on their behalf, that various arrangements have been made so that when the time comes and this Bill is law provision is made so that they can try to operate in the way that they have in the past reasonably been operating. Clause 16 is a clause which is so framed as to enable certain spheres of workers who will be caught by this Bill to operate the closed shop principle. It is part of the Government's view that the pre-entry closed shop is not necessary or desirable, for the reason that we believe it is not necessary that somebody should have to show, on application to a person for a job of work, that he ha, first become a member of a union.

We will certainly take the points which the noble Baroness has raised and have a look at them, because I know that she is concerned to see that Equity is adequately provided for. I suggest that this Amendment would not have the best results possible because of the reasons which I have already given: it gives a power to the Secretary of State which must, necessarily, up to a point, be a political power, which we believe to be wrong, and it incorporates the Monopolies Commission, which it would be equally improper to incorporate in this type of legislation.

LORD DIAMOND

I understood the noble Earl to say that the purpose of the Government in this clause, and I think in Clause 16, is to enable organisations, such as Equity, to carry on their existing practices. Would he confirm that that is a correct understanding of what he said?

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

It is rather a wider question. What the noble Earl said was that the kind of situation which Equity had in mind they were already doing. There are other organisations involved, and until one knew exactly what those organisations were one might be going widely beyond the scope of what my noble friend said. The object of Clause 16 is to provide for a post-entry closed shop, on the conditions set out in Clause 16, to enable Equity to do what they have been doing.

BARONESS WHITE

Within the past hour I have been told by a spokesman of Equity that Clause 16 is not adequate, and they are very much concerned about Clause 6.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My information—and it has also come within the past hour, although it has not been so direct from the horse's mouth as that of the noble Baroness's—is that Equity are more interested in the conditions of a post-entry closed shop, and I understand that what they are doing at the moment does not amount to one. Whether it does or does not is something we cannot discuss on this Amendment. My information is that their whole case is that it does not amount to pre-entry closed shop. Whether they consider Clause 16 is adequate, and whether it is adequate, does not arise on this Amendment. This Amendment is about the pre-entry closed shop, and that we are opposed to.

6.48 p.m.

LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY

There is one question I should like to ask, and it is whether or not what Equity is seeking is a post-entry closed shop or a pre-entry closed shop. I do not see how, in view of this clause, the Government can say that they are against pre-entry closed shops. I am sure the noble Earl can put me right. The description of Clause 6 is: Pre-entry closed shop agreements to be void. There are two subsections. The main one, subsection (1), is presumably saying that they are void. The second says: Subsection (1)…shall not apply… to agreements under, Section 16 of this Act. That must mean that agreements under Clause 16 are pre-entry closed shop agreements, or could be, yet the Government say they are totally against them. I do not understand this. If the noble Earl is unable to reply at the moment, perhaps he would think about it before we get to the Amendment of my noble friend, Lord Archibald.

Before I ask permission to withdraw this Amendment, there are some points which have been raised to which I should like to reply. I am always grateful for the generalised good will of the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell. I was thinking of Equity when I produced this Amendment, and I do not think my Amendment could have quite the construction that he put on it, because it is dealing with the setting up of pre-entry closed shops and not with any agreement which would happen after they are set up.

I do not accept the irrelevance of the Monopolies Commission. This has obviously struck both Front Benches as being extraneous, and there was a certain suggestion that it was something I had thought up just because one had to think up some kind of safeguard. It is nothing of the sort. It has always been the view of the Liberal Party, or at least it has been its view for a very long time, that monopoly situations in labour, just as monopoly situations in commerce, are functions of the Monopolies Commission and that this is something the Monopolies Commission should be dealing with. Therefore, when we put this Amendment in this form it is not just a case of thinking up a special piece of machinery; it is going back to a basic principle of our thoughts on monopolies and industrial relations.

However, having said that, and not accepting the arguments against it, I would say that I do not accept the argument of the noble Earl about the Secretary of State. This is possibly not the right way to tackle the problem, in a Bill which quite rightly is trying to keep Government rather off the scene and making everything subject to Civil Law. In view of that, and with the hope that we shall receive a straight answer to the question that I put about the pre-entry closed shop a little later on, I beg your Lordships' leave to withdraw this Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

LORD DRUMALBYN

Perhaps this is a convenient moment to ask for the House to resume. In the circumstances we could perhaps give the little extra latitude until 8.30. I beg to move that the House do now resume.

Moved, That the House do now resume. —(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD BESWICK

I wonder whether we could get some understanding. Is this another 10 minutes off the time to be taken on the Industrial Relations Bill; or is it intended that we should resume 10 minutes earlier?

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

If I have been in some way responsible for this I would apologise, but I think it is for the convenience of your Lordships. It struck me as quite impossible that the next Amendment would be finished in 10 minutes. What my noble friend said was 8.30 firm for resumption. I think that that is fair because the Law Reform Bill is likely to take all of an hour and a half, and it is far better to give a definite time on the clock for it, even if it does involve 10 minutes off this Bill. I much regret that, but I think probably this course is for the convenience of your Lordships. If it is not, we can go on until 7 o'clock, as originally proposed.

LORD BESWICK

So long as it is understood that it is not this side of the Committee that is delaying progress on the Industrial Relations Bill, and we are not expected to go later in the evening as a consequence.

On Question, Motion agreed to, and House resumed accordingly.