INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BILL

HL Deb 03 May 1971 vol 318 cc116-45

8.27 p.m.

House again in Committee.

LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 21: Page 3, line 22, leave out from first ("proceedings") to end of line 29.

The noble Lord said: Your Lordships will appreciate that the effect of accepting this Amendment would be that there would be no reference in Clause 4 to any of the courts or to the legal framework needed to give effect to legal decisions for enforcement. The clause would simply be left stating that the failure of any person to observe any provision of the code of practice for the time being in force would not of itself render him liable to any proceedings. We have had a full discussion of the impact of this clause, and that is one aspect of this Amendment. We are not satisfied with the clause as it stands. Indeed, there was a clear conflict of advice about whether breaches of the code of practice would be materially relevant in proceedings before the Industrial Court or industrial tribunal—by "materially relevant" I mean likely to affect the conclusion of the proceedings. That is one aspect, the aspect of scrutiny.

The other aspect is a much more fundamental one, which distinguishes the Amendment before us now from the previous Amendment—namely, that we are wholly opposed, in philosophy and in our approach to improving industrial relations, to the legal framework that will enable legal enforcement to take place. Accordingly, we are against proceedings before the Industrial Court or industrial tribunal because they will have reference to unfair industrial practices. Again we are in a position of not knowing precisely what the code of practice will provide. But the words in Clause 4(b) are: any provision of such a code of practice which appears to the Court or tribunal to be relevant shall be taken into account by the Court or tribunal in determining that question. It is not only the question of relevance but also the question of the machinery, and I want to make it clear therefore that we are opposing this part of this clause, not only for the same reasons that we had anxiety under the earlier Amendment but also because we are quite clear here that these methods of improving industrial relations are likely to fail, the machinery is likely to be counter-productive, and it would be a great mistake to introduce it into this Part of the Bill. Although we should be in a better position to remove some of the uncertainty, once the code of practice is before us, nevertheless, even with a code of prcatice we shall not be likely to change our view as to whether proceedings before the Industrial Court and so on are the best method of doing what your Lordships' House seeks to do—namely, to find some means of improving industrial relations in this country. It is a major Amendment, but the arguments for it are those two, which are quite simple. I beg to move.

LORD POPPLEWELL

It is most difficult to deploy many more new arguments in opposing the Bill as it now stands, but there are some very important fundamental ones which I think bear some repetition. To establish this new legal procedure to industrial relations within industry the Bill embarks upon, as we all know, an entirely uncharted field. As this clause stands, it says specifically: this Act shall not of itself render him liable to any proceedings, and then the two paragraphs, (a) and (b), become operative. I questioned the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor in regard to court proceedings in connection with this, and I specifically mentioned the totting-up proceedings under the Road Traffic Act, and I was very pleased to hear him reply that no totting-up was to take place here. But the practice will operate, as in many other offences in a criminal court, that when an adjudicator has decided whether a case is proved or not proved, he will naturally ask if the case is proved, what is known; and although there is not a strict definition as operated under the totting-up procedure it at once comes out if a person has been guilty or otherwise of a previous offence.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

May I dispose of this point straight away?—the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, mentioned it on the last Amendment. So far as I can see, there is no basis in it at all. The analogy with criminal proceedings wholly fails. There cannot be any basis for discussing previous disputes in relation to the same party in civil proceedings after verdict arrived at. Nor, so far as I can see (though perhaps one of the lawyers on the other side will point out if I am wrong) can it affect in any way the quantum of damage. The quantum of damage is based on actual loss and not on previous record. The previous record is irrelevant to any other possible issue.

LORD POPPLEWELL

I am very pleased to hear what the noble and learned Lord says, but may I read again paragraph (b) of Clause 4? It says: any provision of such a code of practice which appears to the Court or tribunal to be relevant to any question arising in the proceedings shall be taken into account by the Court or tribunal in determining that question. As I was saying, totting-up proceedings will not operate, but in proceedings in a criminal court, once the case is proved the question will be asked "What is known?", and the record will come out.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Reference to criminal proceedings has no bearing on this matter at all, nor could the analogy conceivably be drawn, so far as I am aware, in any proceedings which can arise under this Bill.

LORD POPPLEWELL

Then will the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor explain the words: shall be taken into account by the court or tribunal in determining the question."?

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I had not realised that the noble Lord was going to cross-examine me, but the question the court will be determining is not the question of quantum or the question of order but the question of liability. I tried to explain this at very great length on the previous Amendment, but I will, if I have an opportunity of addressing the Committee, try to explain it again if the noble Lord is wholly unsatisfied. The analogy is simply that if you are charging a person, or a union, or an employers' association, or an employer, with an unfair industrial practice, or with failing to disclose some information or with breach of some other duty imposed by the Bill, the fact that he has disregarded the code of industrial practice may or may not but may, if relevant, be of assistance to the court in determining the question of liability. For instance, there is no general law to say that you must drive on the left of the road, but if in fact you are driving on the off-side of the road and an accident happens you may have to explain yourself.

LORD POPPLEWELL

Again I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, but I am still looking at the wording that is there. Let me repeat it: any provision of such a code of practice which appears to the Court or tribunal to be relevant to any question arising in the proceedings shall be taken into account by the Court or tribunal in determining that question. The Lord Chancellor's mind appears pretty clear that this will not have any bearing on the case when the court has decided the case is proved. My suspicion on reading that paragraph is that once the case is proved the record may be asked for.

I hope that the Lord Chancellor will have another look at this point. If the clause is creating confusion like this, what is it going to do when it comes to being dealt with by both sides of industry which are not used to legal jargon but are used to the ordinary common sense application? I am certain that this will create a tremendous amount of confusion, therefore I sincerely hope that the Lord Chancellor will have another look at this, and that if he cannot do anything now he will give an assurance that at the Report stage he will make some reference to this. I am certain that this is a matter that needs clearing up considerably. We should hate to think that when a case is proved, when a decision is arrived at, only the bare record of what has happened is recorded. The circumstances that arise in unfair practice may be marginal or they may be great, but in a record that evidently will be produced there is no definition showing the seriousness or its nature, only the bare fact of conviction. This is how I read it. I hope I am wrong. Therefore it seems there is a possibility of inflicting a heavier punishment than would be done if it was just the actual offence. This I think needs clearing up. It is an ambiguity in the Bill which we find objectionable.

8.40 p.m.

LORD WILBERFORCE

I am wondering if the noble Lord the Lord Chancellor can confirm or otherwise my understanding of this clause on one point. He has given us by way of analogy the provisions of the Highway Code. The section which he read out says that any failure to comply with the Highway Code may be taken into account. So that if you are in breach of the Highway Code, that may be referred to, and it may be against you, although not conclusively. Am I right in thinking that this clause is much milder? It does not refer to "failure": it simply says that any provisions of the code may be taken into account.

It would seem, to my reading, that this enables the code to be taken into account either way. If you are in breach of the code it may be taken into account against you as in the Highway Code; but if you come along and wave the code and say: "I only did what it says in this code of practice which the Secretary of State has drawn up", that is in your favour, and should be so taken into account by the industrial court or the national tribunal. If that is so, it seems a much milder clause than that relating to the Highway Code, and seems to be something which really cannot be considered very objectionable whatever may be in the code. The code, when drafted, will include either the possibility of inculpation or the possibility of defence. I should be grateful if the noble and learned Lord could say whether my understanding in that sense is right or wrong.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

May I, while his words are fresh in my mind, reply immediately to the question posed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wilberforce? I think that his reading of the clause is entirely correct, and that it would be open to either a pursuer or a defender (if I may use the Scottish terms so as not to obscure the issue here) to refer to the performance of the code in due ritual in his favour under the terms of the clause. Perhaps I had overlooked that in my former observations, although it was very much in my mind—and it will be within the recollection of the Committee that it was in my mind—that one can use the code to defend what one had done either in civil proceedings or in criminal proceedings under the Road Traffic Act, or in proceedings under this Bill. I said that.

But I think the point that the noble and learned Lord has made is a valid one, and that there is this distinction between the Road Traffic Act and this Bill, in that the Road Traffic Act refers in terms to "failure" as being referable under the Act in legal proceedings, and this clause does not even go as far as that, and would on its wording entitle someone to draw attention to his performance of the obligations of the code. So I think the noble and learned Lord is completely right.

I do not know what I can say to the noble Lord, Lord Popplewell. I have done my best to reassure him. As he knows, we have served together in many places, and the last thing I want to do is to make him feel that I am not anxious in every way I can to remove his anxieties. But I think that the person who ought to have another look at the Bill—as he put it—is himself. He has committed himself in my hearing over the past week to one fantastic proposition after another of what the Bill contains, and yet it is always he who is asking the Government to have another look at the Bill. I implore him to have another look himself, because that is what is needed.

I may be wrong—and goodness knows how fallible I am!—but I promise him that, so far as I know, his fears are groundless. They could not be more plainly groundless than in his present attempt to draw far-fetched analogies between procedure on conviction for a criminal offence in assessing a penalty, and looking at a long record of previous offences, with which we are all painfully familiar, and a question of relevance under this clause. So far as I can see at the moment, even when one is considering the far more sophisticated question of quantum of compensation, to which the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, referred, it is either impossible, or at least extremely unlikely, that a breach of the code could be relevant.

The first question that one would have to decide in proceedings likely to arise under this clause is whether either a breach of duty, as in Clause 54, to which I referred earlier, or an unfair industrial practice had been committed by either side—and I did point out that there were more clauses dealing with unfair industrial practices by employers than by employees. The second question is what you are going to do about it? What you are going to do about it—and again I am speaking generally, because there are, as I said, quite a number of clauses to be considered—either consists of a declaration of right in an order to disclose information, for instance, or, especially in the case of unfair dismissal, an order for compensation.

When you come to look at Clause 111, the compensation clause, you will come to the conclusion I think—and certainly this is the intention—that compensation is an award of damages without a solatium for injured feelings that is to say, it is an award of damages based on actual loss. If I am wrong about that we will discuss it when we come to Clause 111. But there is no set of circumstances in which somebody will be hauled before a criminal tribunal, and a finger of scorn will be pointed and it will be said: "This is a terrible breach of the code." It does not work like that even in road traffic offences, and it certainly will not work like that in this context.

I now come to the noble Lord, Lord Diamond. I must say that of all the points raised in this debate this one disappointed me most. We spent, I do not know how long, but a long time, discussing the deletion of the words "of itself" on the last amendment. All those advising me" All the King's horses and all the King's men"—could not think what the purpose of this Amendment was except as part of the last Amendment. The reason is rather a simple one when you come to think of it, because there would have been no purpose at all in spending all that time on the words "of itself" if what you were going to say at the end of the day was: "We do not care whether 'of itself' is in or out. We are against the whole thing." This is what the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, has now said.

In other words, the whole of the last debate has been time wasted by the Committee, because the noble Lord now says in terms: "Whatever you do, whatever you say, Aunt Agatha is going to tell us it is not the way." This is not the way to conduct Parliamentary proceedings. If I had known that the noble Lord was going to say at the end of the day that the words "of itself" did not matter, but that what he was against was a more fundamental thing, namely, "We are wholly opposed to a structure which would enable legal enforcement to take place before the industrial tribunal" and the rest, I really would not have taken the time of the Committee in explaining what the words "of itself" mean. Not at all; he kept his cards closely pressed to his chest. Now he tells us that the whole of our time for the last hour and a half has been wasted. I find that very disappointing indeed.

I must say this to the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, whose special pleading has been a great feature of this Committee to-day. He says that there has been a conflict of advice about the question as to whether a breach of the code of practice could be materially relevant. He says that that is a point of uncertainty, but we all know that there has been no conflict of advice about this. The noble Lord, Lord Gardiner, knows, the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill knows, the noble Lord, Lord Donovan and the noble Lord, Lord Wilberforce, know that a breach of the code of practice will be materially relevant in proceedings to the extent that the clause says, without any ambiguity at all, and which I have tried to explain about five times. There is no point there but now the cat is out of the bag and whatever we do or say Aunt Agatha will tell us it is not the way. I beg the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, to be more reasonable.

LORD ARCHIBALD

The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has told us that certain things are relevant to the code of practice. As we do not know what the code of practice is, could he define more particularly how these things are relevant to something we do not know?

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I have tried to explain that about six times, but I shall try again. The code of practice will have to be endorsed by both Houses of Parliament. It will have been exhaustively discussed by every conceivable body that may be interested. What is now proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, is that although it can be discussed before every conceivable body that may be relevant, although it will have been exhaustively debated in Parliament by both Houses, the one place where it cannot be referred to is the place which will enforce it—I mean in the sense which I have described where it is relevant to questions in actual practice; that is, the courts. If that is the proposition, I should think we have gone mad.

LORD DIAMOND

"Bonkers" would be more appropriate.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Yes, it would.

8.53 p.m.

LORD DIAMOND

We are always stimulated and entertained by the helpful speeches of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor. One would have thought, however, listening to his last speech when he was beginning to work himself up into the same state of mind and fluency we have known on former occasions, and even other places, that he had never taken part in a discussion in Committee on a Bill when in Opposition. One would have thought that he had never had to think about what would happen if a particular Amendment the Opposition put forward was not accepted. I assure your Lordships that it occasionally happens that the Government are not prepared to accept every single Amendment the Opposition put forward. Indeed, on this Bill the Government have not accepted outright any Amendment, although some could have been accepted without difficulty, and the noble Earl the Leader of the House made quite clear that he would have wished to have at least the first Amendment, I think it was, accepted if that could have expedited matters and put the House in a good humour.

THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (EARL JELLICOE)

If the Amendment had been acceptable.

LORD DIAMOND

Well we all heard what the noble Earl said when he made his point. It was a very helpful comment, and to my mind I thought he was very wise in thinking of ways in which business could be expedited and made easier. These thoughts, I may say, are not shared by his noble and learned friend, who stimulates all of us into much more frequent and detailed explanatory speeches; but that is his responsibility.

I want to make it quite clear that not one word of the outburst we listened to with pleasure was at all relevant. I am assuming (and if I am wrong I shall be happy to apologise) that if this Amendment is pressed to a Division the noble and learned Lord will advise his noble friends to vote for the retention of this part of the clause and for the retention of the whole legal paraphernalia in the enforcement of agreements and so called good industrial relations. Because of that, one has to take into account what possibility of that remaining in the clause when one considers words such as "of itself". I repeat—and I hope that the noble and learned Lord will look at the words "of itself" again in this context—that we shall come back again to this clause and the words "of itself" on the assumption that the rest of this clause stands. One has to make an assumption, if one is in Opposition, of what the Government are likely to do. One would be stupid not to make such an assumption. We have to look at it from that point of view and with the benefit of the code of practice there. So I hope I have enlightened the noble and learned Lord as to why Oppositions sometimes assume that Governments stick to their form and do not accept every Amendment the Opposition puts forward.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Of course I am very familiar with the practice of Opposition. It is simply that one puts a more extreme Amendment first and a more moderate Amendment later, but the noble Lord has kept his bad wine to the last. He has put the more moderate Amendment first and then, finding it rejected, and not pressing it, he puts the more extreme Amendment afterwards.

That I regarded as preposterous in the literal sense of the word.

LORD DIAMOND

That is interesting. The Lord Chancellor has now changed his ground completely. He now objects to what we are doing in that we are moving from the major to the minor, instead of always from the minor to the major. I do not know which great composer he will call in aid to substantiate that point. I repeat, because this is serious and important, the reason I thought it right not to press the earlier Amendment to a Division. There is conflicting legal advice, and one requires to look at it again more carefully. There is lack of clarity. One would not know for certain what one was doing if one invited the House to divide and a certain result ensued because we had differing advice.

As to the second part, as I made absolutely clear we have the clearest possible view as to whether these last few lines from the word "proceedings" onward should remain in a Bill which seeks to improve industrial relations. We are satisfied that they would damage industrial relations, and we are satisfied from what the noble and learned Lord has said that he has no concept yet, in spite of speech after speech, of what we are really trying to achieve. So I can only advise the Committee to divide.

9.0 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 21) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 46; Not-Contents, 107.

CONTENTS
Archibald, L.	Gaitskell, Bs.	Popplewell, L.
Bacon, Bs.	Gardiner, L.	Rusholme, L.
Bernstein, L.	Garnsworthy, L. [Teller.]	St. Davids, V.
Beswick, L.	Henderson, L.	Serota, B.
Blyton, L.	Heycock, L.	Shackleton, L.
Brockway, L.	Hoy, L.	Shinwell, L.
Brown, L.	Janner, L.	Slater, L.
Buckinghamshire, E.	Lindgren, L.	Snow, L.
Burntwood, L.	Llewelyn-Davies, L.	Stocks, Bs.
Champion, L.	Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, Bs. [Teller.]	Stow Hill, L.
Chorley, L.		Taylor of Mansfield, L.
Collison, L.	Maelor, L.	Walston, L.
Davies of Leek, L.	Milner of Leeds, L.	Wells-Pestell, L.
Delacort-Smith, L.	Morris of Kenwood, L.	White, Bs.
Diamond, L.	Nunburnholme, L.	Wynne-Jones, L.
Fiske, L.	Peddie, L.
NOT-CONTENTS
Aberdare, L.	Amory, V.	Beaumont of Whitley, L.
Ailwyn, L.	Balfour, E.	Belstead, L.
Airedale, L.	Balfour of Inchrye, L.	Berkeley, Bs.
Allerton, L.	Beauchamp, E.	Bridgeman, V.
Brooke of Cumnor, L.	Glendevon, L.	Reading, M.
Brooke of Ystradfellte, Bs.	Goschen, V. [Teller.]	Reay, L.
Brougham and Vaux, L.	Gowrie, E.	Redesdale, L.
Buchan, E.	Greenway, L.	Redmayne, L.
Burgh, L.	Grenfell, L.	St. Aldwyn, E.
Byers, L.	Hailes, L.	St. Helens, L.
Chesham, L.	Hailsham of St. Marylebone, L. (Lord Chancellor.)	St. Just, L.
Clitheroe, L.		Sandford, L.
Clwyd, L.	Hankey, L.	Sandys, L.
Colville of Culross, L.	Hanworth, V.	Savile, L.
Conesford, L.	Henley, L.	Selkirk, E.
Cottesloe, L.	Hives, L.	Selsdon, L.
Cowley, E.	Hood, V.	Sempill, Ly.
Craigavon, V.	Inglewood, L.	Sinclair of Cleeve, L.
Crawshaw, L.	Jellicoe, E. (L. Privy Seal.)	Strathcarron, L.
Croft, L.	Kemsley, V.	Strathclyde, L.
Cromartie, E.	Killearn, L.	Strathcona and Mount Royal, L.
Cullen of Ashbourne, L.	Kilmany, L.
De La Warr, E.	Latymer, L.	Stratheden and Campbell, L.
Denham, L. [Teller.]	Lauderdale, E.	Swaythling, L.
Derwent, L.	Lothian, M.	Tcviot, L.
Drumalbyn, L.	Margadale, L.	Thomas, L.
Dudley, E.	Molson, L.	Townshend, M.
Ebbisham, L.	Monck, V.	Tweedsmuir, L.
Effingham, E.	Napier and Ettrick, L.	Tweedsmuir of Bellhelvie, Bs.
Elliot of Harwood, Bs.	Nucent of Guildford, L.	Verulam, E.
Emmet of Amberley, Bs.	O'Neill of the Main, L.	Vivian, L.
Essex, E.	Pender, L.	Wakefield of Kendal, L.
Falmouth, V.	Platt, L.	Waldegrave, E.
Ferrers, E.	Poole, L.	Westminster, D.
Gage, V.	Radnor, E.	Wigram, L.
Gisborough, L.	Rankeillour, L.	Windlesham, L.
Glasgow, E.

Resolved in the negative, and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.

9.9 p.m.

On Question, Whether Clause 4 shall stand part of the Bill?

LORD DAVIES OF LEEK

We have listened carefully to this debate. Some of us may be wrong, and that is why we have asked for further advice. That is why some of us might have thought it worth while to move the Adjournment of the debate on this clause, or recommittal, while advice is obtained. The description of the clause says: Use of code of practice in proceedings under this Act. I do not want a lawyer to tell me what "proceedings" means. It means that legal action can be taken under this Bill, no matter what anybody says. It has been said that the purpose of this Bill is to provide a legal framework for the unions. We know that, by trial and error over 150 years, a certain amount of legal framework has been set up. Nevertheless, what we have been discussing for a number of hours now—and I hope not frivolously, but in a sincere effort to arrive at certainty about the meaning of words in this Bill—are the implications of Clause 4. We have been talking about a code, and noble Lords—and noble and learned Lords—have used legal interpretations about a code of which they know nothing.

What is this code supposed to be doing? We have had references to the Highway Code, but, so far as I am concerned—I think I could pick up some of this from the Donovan Report—the object is to whittle down quite a lot the present powers of trade unions. The object is to exclude sympathetic strikes. The object, partly, is to exclude inter-union disputes. I presume—I do not know that the code will try to deal with these things. I consider that Clause 4 is the hinge of the whole Bill.

What worries me in looking at Part III of this Bill—I will not delay the Committee too long; I am trying to be very brief and sincere—on collective bargaining, is this. Presumably—I stand subject to correction—the code of practice will have an effect upon the meaning of collective bargaining—or will it? Will it have any relevance to Part VI, dealing with the National Industrial Relations Court and the industrial tribunals? It obviously will. Will it affect the Commission on Industrial Relations and the Industrial Arbitration Court? Will it have any meaning when a workman is considered to have done some wrong? There are powers in this Bill by which he will be fined, and if he cannot meet that fine pretty well everything, except his tools and his bed, can be sold under them. It is no good saying that he could not be imprisoned under this Bill after it becomes an Act. Ultimately he could.

All I want to know—and this whole Committee should know it—is whether this code of practice, referred to in Clause 4—from which deductions are to be made by the Industrial Court, and others who are to make decisions about torts—will be applied to these punitive measures that can be put upon trade unions or members of a trade union? In some cases the fine can be colossal. Will the code of practice make it clear that in Clause 3 we are dealing with registered trade unions and not unregistered trade unions? If it seems that we are being stupid in our understanding of legal phraseology it is because we are in exactly the same position as the learned and trained lawyers who have spoken in this House. They know no more about the code of practice than we do. I believe we had a right to try—because that is our function—to extract as much information as possible.

I will now sit down, so as not to be too wearying to the House, but I hope noble Lords will believe all of us when we say we are trying to get the information as clear as possible. We are now to vote on whether this Clause stand part, and I shall willingly go into the Lobby against it standing part, because it would have helped us if this Clause had for the present been withdrawn and brought forward again when we could have had a deeper explanation, or withdrawn until the code of practice is published.

9.17 p.m.

LORD SHINWELL

The most striking feature of Ills debate on Part I of the Industrial Relations Bill is the remarkable silence from the opposite benches, apart from the occasional interjection which appeared to have little relevance to the debate. What was still more remarkable to me, as a comparative newcomer to this august assembly—a fact which certainly could not have escaped notice although, as far as I can ascertain, there has been no reference to it in the newspapers of the country which are assumed to inform the general public of what happens in Westminster—was the appearance of hordes of noble Lords who, at the critical moment when a Division was about to take place, suddenly appeared.

I am open to correction, and if any noble Lord cares to interrupt me I shall not regard it as a challenge, but as far as I can gather those noble Lords who deprive us of their presence during the course of the debate but suddenly thrust themselves upon us, as I have already remarked, at a critical moment, appear to have no knowledge whatever of what has been happening. They come in and under instructions—I will not say under pressure, because I would never dare to accuse Her Majesty's Government of exercising any kind of pressure on their supporters—but they come in without any knowledge, indeed it is questionable whether they are familiar with the Bill—at any rate if they are they have not exposed their views—they decide to vote. The question I ask myself, and I shall have to find the answer to the question myself, and perhaps I am more fitted to provide the answer to my own question than to leave it to the noble Lords opposite, even those on the Front Bench—

LORD HENLEY

The noble Lord ought to know the answer to his question. as he has asked himself the question so many times in the last fortnight.

LORD SHINWELL

I have great sympathy with the members of the Liberal Party. I am trying to think of a political expression, but for the moment my language is a bit impoverished and I just say what comes into my mind, but they are a "wash-out." They advertise themselves, no doubt at great expense. Where the expense comes from I am unable to ascertain. Perhaps they would be kind enough to inform me; perhaps they would let me know where their funds come from. Perhaps if we knew where their funds come from we would be better informed about the state of their minds and could understand their speeches.

As I was about to remark when I was interrupted, I ask myself why these noble Lords come in at a certain moment, and whom are they voting against?

BARONESS EMMET OF AMBERLEY

The noble Lord said that he did not mind being interrupted, so I should like to ask him whether he can put his hand on his heart and say that in another place he had not come straight into the Division Lobby before going into the Chamber?

LORD SHINWELL

I regard any reference to the other place, whether it is critical or complimentary, as being irrelevant, and I do not care to discuss it. I am asking myself a question and I cannot get the answer to it because of the interruptions—and now there is another one.

THE EARL OF DUDLEY

May I also ask the noble Lord whether he will put his hand on his heart and say that neither he nor his noble friends will come in at an unexpected moment, as he calls it?

LORD SHINWELL

I suggest that our attendance proportionately is much higher than the attendance on the other side of the Committee.

A NOBLE LORD

Rubbish!

LORD SHINWELL

I am really surprised at the noble Earl, who I believe is a person of some intelligence, interrupting quite unnecessarily and gratuitously. Unless there are further interruptions, I must address myself to my own question. Why is it that noble Lords who thrust themselves upon us at a certain moment decide to vote against the Amendments proposed from this side of the Committee? Can the reason be that, having gathered what it is all about, they feel so strongly against the Amendment that they decide to vote against it?

VISCOUNT DAVENTRY

May I interrupt for a moment? I left this Committee at about half-past seven, when the noble Lord was speaking. I returned at twenty minutes past nine, and I find that he is still speaking. Have I missed anything?

LORD SHINWELL

Observe what has happened as a result of my intervention. There have been more speeches—short, it is true—from the other side of the Committee since I rose than we have had during the whole course of our proceedings. It is a tribute to my persuasive powers. I should be delighted if there were more speeches, perhaps a little more prolonged and more to the point and related to the Bill, with which I presume the noble Viscount is familiar. I presume that the members of the Government read the newspapers and the comments about the turbulence which is a characteristic of all trade unionists in the country, the comments on wildcat strikers and official strikes, and so on, and therefore they dislike them intensely. Indeed, there are some noble Lords—and again if I am corrected I shall be glad to accept it—who just hate the trade union movement. It is still more remarkable that, despite their dislike of the trade union movement, they are so anxious to strengthen it. It is what some turkey farmers do some weeks before Christmas; they fatten the turkeys to kill them. It is a very interesting exercise, but that is not the sort of thing we would expect from noble Lords in this Assembly.

Well, what is to be done about it? Already we have had several debates on Amendments, every one of them rejected. As my noble friend who is leading for us (and if I may say so, leading with great skill; and as one who is an admirer of oratory and political skill I say that with great pleasure) said, we have had all these debates and so on; and not a single Amendment has been acceptable. It is true that one or two items have been gathered to the Front Bench opposite for consideration. My suspicion is that there will be precious little consideration. I know people in the Government much better than some of those who have not been associated with Governments in the past. I am familiar with their tricks and their evasions and their subterfuges, and all the rest. I suspect that we are going to get no consideration at all.

I am speaking personally, not for my Party. It does not seem to matter two hoots—I would venture on an expression I used many years ago that got me into a heap of trouble; it would not matter a tinker's cuss whether this legislation passed or not. You can have all the law relating to trade unionism you can devise; you can have all the legislation. But at the end of the day, legislation, and more, will not prevent turbulence among the workers of this country unless the legitimate claims of the workers are understood and fully met.

At the end of the day what is going to happen? Take, for example, this code of practice—and here I must say, almost in parenthesis, although it is clearly related to the question that the clause stand part, that I have never, in all my association with Westminster, which I think goes back much further than that of anybody on the Front Bench opposite, or indeed in the other place, experienced an occasion when legislation was introduced and when one of the principal topics of debate was an item about which even the Government had to admit in the course of the debate they knew little or nothing—namely, the code of practice. They have debated it in a vacuum. We asked: what is this code of practice; what will it embody; how will it be relevant to the proposed legislation? And there is no answer, no answer at all.

All we are asked to do is to wait and see. We are told that in due course the code of practice will be presented to both Houses of Parliament. There may be consultation with bodies outside, consultation with Parliament; but at the present, when we ought to be discussing, and indeed are discussing, the vital principles associated with this legislation (and that is admitted by the other side) we are told that the Government are unable to say a word—or perhaps unwilling to say a word—about the content, the embodiment of the code of practice. This is what we have been debating, and yet there is not a word. I do not think it matters very much if the Government push their legislation through. They will; they have the body of the Press behind them, and they have noble Lords, who are unfamiliar with the subject but are ready to vote in favour of the legislation. They carry all the big guns, and they are going to use them with all their might and strength—I was about to say with all their soul, but I do not think that they have a soul. At the end of the day they will believe that they have gained a victory. I assure them they will have gained no victory. The only victory that is relevant to industrial relations of the kind that every right-thinking person desires is co-operation. That is precisely what the Government have failed to achieve. Indeed, they have not only failed to achieve it, but failed to attempt it. I notice that the noble and learned Lord indulged in an interjection, which was inaudible to me.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I only said that the noble Lord has invented the nearest thing to perpetual motion I have ever heard of.

LORD SHINWELL

I have watched the noble and learned Lord very often in the other place. He perpetrates what he believes is a jocular remark and laughs uproariously at it. Indeed, he infects others around him. They are a bit reluctant to be infected, but they cannot help themselves; being what he is, they have to follow. I advise him not to try that sort of thing on me. He knows me better than that. So I come to the conclusion—no, I did not mean I was coming to my conclusion. I can assure your Lordships I can go on like this for hours. Do not be surprised if some night I do go on for hours. I used to do it in the other place frequently. The noble and learned Lord agrees with me. It is a kind of refresher course.

It must not be thought that what I am saying is irrelevant to the subject, or that I am indulging in a few jocular observations. I am very serious about this, and I shall tell your Lordships why. I recognise, and have recognised for many years, that there are defects in the trade union movement of this country. I was associated with the trade unions for a long time, and I recognise that there are defects and there is need for reform. But the reform we require is not the kind of reform that is likely to develop as a result of this legislation. I believe that every responsible trade union leader—even some who indulge in observations which seem to be disagreeable to noble Lords, or employers' organisations—recognises that some reform is necessary; amalgamation of unions, and, perhaps what is more important than anything else, to restrain malcontents, the intransigents, the people who fly off the handle, the people who become bored on the shop floor. I do not know whether noble Lords have read an article which appears, strangely enough, in the new Daily Mail. I am not going to charge them for that advertisement, but there is an article by somebody in to-day's Daily Mail which I advise noble. Lords to read. It is by somebody who managed to obtain employment, as a result of which he worked on the shop floor for several weeks or months. He writes of the boredom, of the attitude of foremen and under-managers, and those "drest with a little brief authority". He writes about men anxious to work, and because they cannot obtain components are unable to work. He writes about the effect of productivity resulting in redundancy on a large scale. Trade union leaders arc aware of this, and noble Lords ought to make themselves aware of it.

THE EARL OF DUDLEY

May I remind the noble Lord that the writer also writes of a chargehand who refused to allow bad work to be rectified?

LORD SHINWELL

I can understand that happening. I did not require to be informed about that. I do not think that was a necessary intervention. We take that for granted. Of course that sort of thing happens on the shop floor. But I direct attention to this very interesting article in a newspaper from which one would not have expected it, certainly not in the first issue of the new Daily Mail. These are the things that are happening, and trade union leaders are anxious to correct these defects. So are we all: but they are not going to be corrected as a result of this legislation.

My conclusion is this—and I think it is a logical conclusion: what is going to be the use of such legislation unless, at the end of the day, we are going to develop a better understanding between those who work on the shop floor and, through their representatives in the trade unions, the employers and their organisations? In other words, and I admit this is repetition, we have to ensure effective cooperation and (to use the term which has appeared more often than not in the legislation and in the speeches of noble Lords on the Front Bench opposite) an understanding of what is desirable in the national interest.

One of the strange things about some of the speeches I have heard, and some of the articles I have read, in relation to this subject is the assumption that those on the trade union side are not concerned about the national interest. All I have to say is: anybody at all, whether in a trade union or an employers' organisation, or whether in the other place or in your Lordships' House, who is not primarily concerned with the national interest ought to be ashamed of himself. We are bound to be concerned about the national interest, because if we discard considerations affecting the national interest then all else is just a thing of shreds and patches. That is the position. These are the assumptions which I think are guiding noble Lords on the other side, and which make them vote against quite logical and reasonable Amendments.

After all, what is it that my noble friend Lord Diamond is seeking to achieve, along with his colleagues on this side of the Committee, particularly those who come from the trade unions and who not long ago came from the mines and from the benches and the rest of it in industry? What is it they are trying to achieve? They are trying to reach some kind of arrangement so as to satisfy the general order of trade unionists in the country, and to give to the general public some assurance that, one of these days, there will be conciliation based on cooperation and on justice. That is all they are trying to achieve—and I am speaking not with any desire to orate or anything of that sort, because I feel this sort of thing keenly.

Here I venture on a really personal note. In all these discussions that have taken place, in all the wildcat strikes that have been troubling us for many years now, in all the dangers of an industrial and economic recession and all the rest of it, the one thing that concerns me is: what is going to happen to our country? There is too much of the defeatist attitude; too much of the "Stinking fish!" cry. I do not like it at all. I believe—and here I indulge in a few clichés which can be understood, even if the rest of my speech is misunderstood—that there is much character and quality, skill and talent residing in the people of this country that can be harnessed in co-operation and with good will to preserve the best interests of the country. This is what is wanted. This legislation will not achieve it, of that I am assured. All right: let the Government go on and defeat our Amendments.

In other words, I say to noble Lords—and I say it in no spirit of malice—enjoy yourselves at our expense. Bring in the backwoodsmen. Bring them in and vote us down. Go on doing it. That sort of thing has happened before. I have seen it happening during much of my political life. But the trade unions of the country will survive in spite of it, and the spirit of trade unionism will survive in spite of it. I say to noble Lords: "Vote us down! Go on doing it! In the long run you will gain very little as a result—and perhaps you will lose a great deal." I ventured to remark the other day that the Government in your Lordships' House have won many of the battles and have not yet won the war but that one consideration and should be uppermost in their minds as a result of this legislation is that they are unlikely to win the peace. I believe that we are right on this side of the House and are justified in voting against this clause.

LORD HANKEY

The noble Lord who has just sat clown is absolutely right. We are going to vote them down on this. This is one of the best clauses in the Bill, and I am impressed with the assurances that the Government have given on it. I believe that with the help of many trade unionists and people all over the country we shall succeed in putting into the code of industrial practice everything which is good for both sides of industry in this country. I believe that for the first time we shall have a really forward look in our trade union legislation and I hope that we shall vote it to success.

LORD BLYTON

I have never heard a more reactionary speech than that from the noble Lord on this side of the House, a noble Lord who has never had any experience in industrial affairs. One can expect that from one who has lived in the academic world. I happened to read his pedigree and I know what I am talking about. I would say this about Clause 4. I listened to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor very carefully to-day when I moved my Amendment, and he did not deny that in the civil law under this particular clause it is possible for men who refuse to pay the fines—or the "compensation", as he called it—to find themselves in gaol. This is the awful effect of the civil remedies in the civil courts. I have been five times in court for breach of contract, and I remember when they used to fine us thirty shillings a day damages and the attachment order was made by the county court judge to take two shillings a day off your wages. The horrible thing was that to have this deducted from your wages by an employer with whom you had been in dispute created the worst possible industrial relations after the court had settled the case. This clause will take away from the worker the right to dispute with their employers in court. This right is to be conferred on them as a privilege if they register as a trade union.

I want to say to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor that, with all his fine words, this clause must penalise the trade union movement for taking action that has been normal practice in all the 52 years that I have been connected with the trade unions. I shall support my friends to-night in voting against this clause.

9.44 p.m.

LORD GARDINER

We are now at the end of Part I of this Bill, and I think your Lordships will agree that, while I have listened a great deal, I have said virtually nothing. I should like in three or four minutes to make a few observations about Part I of the Bill. My noble friends have expressed their political objections to the Bill, which naturally I share; but I should have thought that any lawyer would agree that the Bill suffers from three grave defects. It is far too long, far too complicated, and it is trying to do much too much. There are some well-drafted Bills and I am not suggesting that this is not well-drafted-and there are many ordinary Bills, which one can discuss perfectly well clause by clause. If they are logically set out, one is not necessarily dealing with one clause in order to deal with a later clause. But as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Donovan, stressed on the Second Reading of the Bill, one of the great difficulties is the way it hops about: in one Part some tribunal is appointed and in other Parts you learn what its jurisdiction is and then what course it can take and what order it can make. For this you may have to go to some remote Schedule. That is why it is quite impossible to discuss Part I of the Bill, for example, without referring to any other Part.

One of our difficulties has been that although we have asked questions (I think it was the noble and learned Lord, Lord Donovan, who first raised the question in relation to inducement to break a contract) as to why the ordinary common law defence of justification had been left out, we did not get any answer. When you are dealing, as in Part I, with its effect on Sections 92 and 94 and you have again raised the question, you are told "That is a later clause in the Bill." It is a very confusing Bill to discuss from that point of view, because it is so spread about and each Part is related to every other Part. We had, inevitably, a particularly difficult time over Part I, because I do not recollect any other legislation which has ever been before Parliament where so much depends on what I gather will be itself a very lengthy and complex document which nobody has yet seen but which is constantly referred to in the Bill—the code of practice. One understands the Government's desire to get the legislation through as quickly as possible, and I should have thought the most sensible course would have been to postpone consideration of the Bill until September, or until such time as we have seen the code of practice; because until then none of us can possibly know what we are talking about.

The only other observation I would venture to make, and I do so, in particular, seeing that the noble Earl the Leader of the House is here, is this. I am personally very disappointed with the course this Bill has so far taken. I understood—I am not sure that the Government have not said this publicly elsewhere—that the Government were going to take seriously any Amendments to this Bill made by the House of Lords. Now if that was the intention, that could not possibly have meant if, but only if, the Conservative Whips slipped up in some way by not providing at least three times as many hereditary Peers as are necessary to oppose every Amendment. So far we have moved 21 Amendments, of which none has been accepted. This is simple, of course, but it is not what I understood to be intended. I must frankly say that I did not share the strong view expressed by some of my noble friends about the words, "of itself". It is difficult to see that any court would construe that clause in a different way, whether or not the words "of itself" were there. Why on earth, in a case like that, the Government cannot accept the Amendment, I do not know. Of course, if they are determined to resist every Amendment, then of course there will be no House of Lords Amendments; we all know that. However, I understood that the Government's intention was to reject some Amendments and accept others. All I can say is if their conduct continues as it has done through Part I, we are really going through a charade.

THE EARL OF BALFOUR

I feel there is one thing which is very important in this connection and that is that the code is a two-edged sword. It affects both employers and trade unions. But in particular I feel it is important that the Industrial Court should be able to use the code of practice (a) as evidence, particularly in the case where the employer has failed to observe the code of practice, and (b) where it appears to be relevant to any question, in setting out that question. In my opinion this question is much more likely to concern an employer than a trade union. Also, as the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said, the code of practice could be used in the defence of any claim, which I feel would be much more likely to help the trade unions than to hinder them. As the whole structure of the code of practice was stated in Clause 2(2), which places the responsibility for the code on management, and not on unions, I feel that this clause is bound to be to the benefit of the unions. To weaken it would be much more likely to do harm to an efficiently run union. The one thing I hope that it will do is "clobber" bad management, and that is exactly what the code of practice will achieve.

LORD GARDINER

Before he sits down, would the noble Earl tell us how he knows that, when he does not know what is going to be in the code of practice?

THE EARL OF BALFOUR

I have read Part I very carefully. To me it makes absolute, straightforward common sense.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I do not want to take up the time of the Committee, but there have been a series of Second Reading speeches—indeed, that of the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, could hardly have been less than a "Queen's Speech speech". It had nothing to do with the Bill at all. The rest of the speeches were all Second Reading speeches, except that of my noble friend Lord Balfour, who spoke to the Motion that the clause stand part of the Bill, and I think I agree with every word he said. But, out of courtesy to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, I should like—

LORD BESWICK

What do you mean, "courtesy"?

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

What do I mean by what? The noble Lord asked me a question.

LORD BESWICK

Yes. I simply thought the way in which the phrase was used was a little offensive.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I wonder whether the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, thought that. I thought that it would have been discourteous not to reply to his elaborate "Second Reading speech". If the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, does not feel it is worth a reply, he may very well be right. But I certainly do not mean any discourtesy to the noble and learned Lord. I simply wanted to say this. He complained that the Bill was too long. He complained that it was too complicated. He complained that it attempted too much. Those were the three criticisms—all Second Reading criticisms; none of them relating to the Motion, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

To the charge that the Bill is too long, I would say that the Bill of the Government of which the noble and learned Lord was a Member, had no teeth at all and contained 100 clauses and eight Schedules. Ours has only 161, and it has teeth and nine Schedules. So that is not bad. The Bill is much less long than the Companies Act; it is much less complicated than the Companies Act and it attempts much less than the Companies Act. It attempts to provide, in the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Donovan (who spoke from the Cross-Benches) on Second Reading. a more appropriate occasion, what has been wanted for very many years—a comprehensive, legal code for industrial relations. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Donovan, thought that we need that; and so do I. Apparently, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, differs and in that respect I differ from him.

As regards his slighting reference to hereditary Peers, I would only say, as one who now has no interest in the matter, that I very much resent this reference to my noble friends. My noble friend, Lord Carrington, who is an hereditary Peer, did his very best to reform the House of Lords in the former Parliament, and his efforts were very much appreciated by many. But they were defeated, very largely by the efforts of the extreme wing of the Party of which the noble and learned Lord is a member, and which tries to conceal its divisions by attacking the Conservative Party. But, if I may say so respectfully, in the meantime we have our constitutional duty to perform. It is true, of course, that they have not listened to all the speeches of Lord Shinwell and Lord Davies of Leek as I have. I am not sure how much they have missed, but what I would say to them both is this. I expressed the hope that we should manage at some stage in the Committee stage of this Bill to discuss those parts of the Bill which had not been formally discussed in the other place, but in fact all we have done is to spend a week reiterating the Amendments which were exhaustively discussed in the other place; and not even discussing those with any degree of rationality, but discussing them in the context of misrepresentation of what the rest of the Bill contains, and in the context of Second Reading speeches on mere generalities which are hardly worthy of reply.

LORD DIAMOND

I sense that your Lordships would wish to come very shortly to a conclusion on this clause, as to which we are not going to reach agreement and as to which the noble and learned Lord has made the differences between the two sides greater than before—as I am bound to say he mostly does in the interventions which he has made to us. May I make one procedural point, as we have the pleasure of the company of the noble and learned Earl the Leader of the House? I make this point clearly out of ignorance and not out of knowledge. I have some experience of another House, where the Solicitor General and the Attorney General regard themselves as law officers, able and open to advise the House, another place.

I had, but I was obviously wrong, the impression that we were to be similarly assisted here. Obviously I was wrong. I have checked and I find that there is no such clearly established tradition here. Therefore your Lordships will not be surprised when I say that, as to the two questions about the law on which I was going to ask the benefit of the advice of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor I shall not trouble him, because obviously what we are being supplied with are very skilful debating points, irrespective of whether they fit in with an accurate and objective view of the law or not. It is beyond the capacity of anyone both to be a very active political debater, concerned with making skilful debating points, and at the same time to be an objective cool-headed legal adviser on matters of difficult and deep controversiality. I therefore do not think it would be right for me to delay your Lordships by questions on the law iteself. I am bound to say however that on the clause which is before us, which gives legal effect to the code of practice, the more I think about it the more I think we were wise at an earlier stage on this side of the House to withhold discussion until we have a code of practice in front of us. I say this the more so because we have had speeches, including the speech from the noble Lord, Lord Platt, about the effect of this clause on non-industrial employees.

One only has to refer to the most recent statement by the right honourable gentleman, the Secretary of State, to realise in what an absurd position we are being placed. He said as recently as April 29: The code will be universal. We want trade union membership to increase and believe that it will. But this is a code of practice for industrial relations and for every company in every centre of employment in the economy and therefore it must be universal and apply to non-trade unionists as well as to trade unionists. That is to say, the number which is affected is not of the order of 12 million but of 25 or 26 million persons in the

land. We are being seriously asked to define the position in the legal framework of a code designed to affect the conduct of some 26 million people and have not been given any idea of what is to be in the code.

Coming back to the suggestion made earlier, it would be stupid for us to attempt to reach a sensible conclusion on this when we have not the code in front of us. I think we would be wiser to recommit this clause until the code is before us, so that we can see to what extent the code affects the provisions; but in so far as this clause contains provisions referring to the industrial court and other machinery in which the code of practice will be taken into account, we are wholly opposed to it, because we are satisfied that this is the wrong way of going about improving industrial relations. This has been well said by many of my noble friends in this debate and therefore I will leave it at that.

The way to influence public attitudes and public opinion to better and more understanding of industrial relations is by persuasion and by an agreed code of conduct, which represents the past experience of employers and employees throughout the country. The way to put the clock back and to destroy such co-operation as has been effected is to have at the end of the day the enforcement of legal provisions such as we have discussed. Just think what a mockery they would make of industrial relations. I hope, therefore, that noble Lords, both those who have heard the debate and those who have heard only a part of it, will support us in the Division Lobby.

10.4 p.m.

On Question, Whether Clause 4 shall stand part of the Bill?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 116; Not-Contents, 41.

CONTENTS
Aberdare, L.	Belstead, L.	Clitheroe, L.
Ailwyn, L.	Berkeley, Bs.	Clwyd, L.
Allerton, L.	Blackburn, Bp.	Colville of Culross, V.
Amherst of Hackney, L.	Bridgeman, V.	Conesford, L.
Amory, V.	Brooke of Cumnor, L.	Cottesloe, L.
Arran, E.	Brooke of Ystradfellte, Bs.	Cowley, E.
Balerno, L.	Brougham and Vaux, L.	Craigavon, V.
Balfour, E.	Buchan, E.	Craigmyle, L.
Balfour of Inchrye, L.	Burgh, L.	Crawshaw, L.
Beauchamp, E.	Carrington, L.	Croft, L.
Beaumont of Whitley, L.	Chesham, L.	Cromartie, E.
Cullen of Ashbourne, L.	Inglewood, F.	St. Helens, F.
Daventry, V.	Jellicoe, E. (L. Privy Seal.)	St. Just, F.
Denham, F. [Teller.]	Kemsley, V.	St. Oswald, F.
Derwent, L.	Killearn, L.	Sandford, L.
Drumalbyn, L.	Kilmany, L.	Sandys, L.
Dudley, E.	Kilmarnock, L.	Savile, L.
Eccles, V.	Lansdowne, M.	Selkirk, E.
Effingham, E.	Latymer, L.	Selsdon, L.
Elliot of Harwood, Bs.	Lauderdale, E.	Sempill, Ly.
Emmet of Amberley, Bs.	Lothian, M.	Sinclair of Cleeve, L.
Essex, E.	Lyell, L.	Strathcarron, L.
Exeter, M.	McCorquodale of Newton, L.	Strathcona and Mount Royal, L.
Falmouth, V.
Ferrers, E.	Margadale, L.
Ferrier, L.	Merthyr, L.	Stratheden and Campbell, L.
Gage, V.	Molson, L.	Swaythling, L.
Gisborough, L.	Mowbray and Stourton, L.	Templemore, L.
Glendevon, L.	Napier and Ettrick, L.	Teviot, L.
Goschen, V. [Teller.]	Nugent of Guildford, L.	Thomas, L.
Gowrie, E.	O'Neill of the Maine, L.	Townshend, M.
Gray, L.	Pender, L.	Tweedsmuir, L.
Greenway, L.	Platt, L.	Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, Bs.
Grenfell, L.	Radnor, E.	Verulam, E.
Hailes, L.	Rankeillour, L.	Vivian, L.
Hailsham of St. Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)	Reading, M.	Wakefield of Kendal, L.
	Redesdale, L.	Waldegrave, E.
Henley, L.	Redmayne, L.	Westminster, D.
Hives, L.	Rothermere, V,	Wigram, L.
Hood, V.	St. Aldwyn, E.	Windlesham, L.
NOT-CONTENFS
Archibald, L.	Fiske, L.	Popplewell, L.
Bacon, Bs.	Gaitskell, Bs.	Rusholme, L.
Balogh, L.	Gardiner, L.	St. Davids, V.
Bernstein, L.	Garnsworthy, F. [Teller.]	Serota, Bs.
Beswick, L.	Heycock, L.	Shackleton, L.
Birk, Bs.	Hoy, L.	Shinwell, L.
Blyton, L	Janner, L.	Slater, L.
Brockway, L.	Lindgren, L.	Snow, L.
Burntwood, L.	Llewelyn-Davies, L.	Stow Hill, L.
Champion, L.	Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, Bs.	Taylor of Mansfield, L.
Collison, L.	Maelor, L.	Walston, L.
Davies of Feek, L.	Milner of Feeds, L. [Teller.]	White, Bs.
Delacourt-Smith, L.	Morris of Kenwood, L.	Wynne-Jones, L.
Diamond, L.	Nunburnholme, L.

Resolved in the affirmative, and Clause 4 agreed to accordingly.

House resumed.