Lords Sitting of 25 March 1971

Preamble
The House met at three of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Guildford.

SCOTTISH FARMS: HEREDITARY TENANCIES
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the first Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they intend to repeal Section 18(1) of the Agriculture (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1968 in order to abolish the hereditary element in Scottish tenanted farms.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE, SCOTTISH OFFICE (BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE): My Lords, we have no proposals at present to repeal that section of the Agriculture (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1968 which provides that a successor to an agricultural holding who is a near relative of the deceased former tenant may not be given a notice to quit the holding except in certain circumstances.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: My Lords, while thanking the Minister for that reply, may I ask her whether she would not agree that the existing legislation enacted by the last Labour Government, making Scottish agricultural tenancies to all intents and purposes a "closed shop", was both unwise and undemocratic, since such legislation—
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Oh!
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: My Lords, may I further ask my noble friend whether she does not agree that such legislation has made it very difficult for newcomers to enter the industry?
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, it does cause
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certain difficulties, and it is for these reasons that we are now undertaking discussions with the National Farmers' Union and the Scottish Landowners' Federation, to see how we could amend the Agricultural Holdings Act and also the particular Act to which this Question refers. But it will take a considerable time because many complex matters are involved.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend whether she is aware that after I had carried an Amendment, on the Committee stage of what is now the 1968 Act, doing exactly what my noble friend Lord Massereene and Ferrard is asking for now, I then withdrew it on Report because I had become convinced that its object, which was to encourage owners to relet vacant farms to people who needed them, would not anyhow be achieved once confidence in the continuity of the law had been destroyed? Moreover, is my noble friend aware that any improvement in the situation now could be brought about only through consultations between the Department of Agriculture, the National Farmers' Union and the Landowners' Federation?
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, this is exactly what we are doing at this moment. The complexity of the subject is great, and we want to try to obtain any amendment by agreement. This is important for the reasons which the noble Earl has expressed.
LORD BLYTON: My Lords, is the noble Baroness aware that, while I object to the hereditary principle here, I agree to the basis of the hereditary principle embodied in this Question; that I would sooner see the sons of farmers who have ploughed the lands for years follow their fathers, rather than brewers enjoying these farms in their retirement?
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, of course it is perfectly possible, as I am sure the noble Lord appreciates, for a son or, I am glad to say, a daughter, or a husband or a wife, to succeed. On the other hand, there are some difficulties on the landlord's side. This is why the particular Act referred to in the Question provides certain exceptions. For instance, one can claim that a tenant is not able

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by experience or training to farm a holding, and if that is established the landlord can regain possession.
LORD HOY: My Lords, is the noble Baroness aware that this part of the 1968 Act was inserted because of the appalling difficulties that existed for tenant farmers? Secondly, the noble Baroness said that she may enter into consultations with certain people, but she mentioned only the National Farmers' Union and the Landowners' Federation. If she is going to have consultations, is it not her intention to have discussions also with those who represent the agricultural workers?
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: Yes; certainly, my Lords. A great many other people have to be consulted, and that is why the matter will take some time.

COMPULSORY LAND ACQUISITION IN SCOTLAND
3.11 p.m.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the second Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government under what circumstances they envisage using their powers to acquire land compulsorily under Section 4(1)(b) of the Highlands and Islands Development (Scotland) Act 1965.]
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, my right honourable friend the Secretary of State would have to be satisfied that the case for a highly desirable project, which could not be carried out except by compulsory acquisition by the Board, outweighed any objection. Compulsion is regarded both by the Board and by the Government as a last resort.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: My Lords, while thanking my noble friend for that reply, may I ask whether Her Majesty's Government envisage using these powers to acquire land compulsorily for the creation of State farms for approved tenants in Scotland?
BARONESS TWEEDMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, not to my knowledge. In any case, my right honourable friend the Secretary of State would not acquire the land. The Board itself has to put forward proposals for compulsory purchase, which then have to be considered by my right honourable friend.

AIR SERVICES: ROUTE LICENCE TRANSFERS
EARL AMHERST: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they can confirm recent Press reports that the London-Lisbon air route is to be handed over to the new third airline B.U.A./Caledonian, and if so, when; and whether, since this route has been pioneered by B.E.A. with public money any compensation is to be payable to B.E.A.]
THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (LORD DRUMALBYN): My Lords, the Government are considering a number of possible routes which, together with the B.O.A.C. routes to West Africa, might satisfy the criteria announced on August 3, 1970. A Statement will be made shortly. With regard to the second part of the noble Earl's Question, no question of compensation for the transfer of air service licences from one airline to another arises, since air service licences are not a form of property constituting an asset.
EARL AMHERST: My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for that Answer, which I must say I find most unsatisfactory, may I ask whether he can give an assurance that if the third airline gets into difficulties there will be no further Government assistance by way of transfers of routes or of alterations of frequencies on certain routes?
LORD DRUMALBYN: Yes, my Lord; the Government have made it quite clear that the transfer of routes will represent a once-for-all exercise of this nature.
BARONESS BURTON OF COVENTRY: My Lords, may I ask the Minister whether, as B.E.A. were proposing from

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April 1 to allocate up to the 50 per cent. of capacity on these routes to tour operators, this will be the case under any new arrangements such as he contemplates, and, if so, whether he considers this equitable towards standard fare travellers in the summer months?
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, this is rather a different question from that on the Order Paper, which simply asks whether Her Majesty's Government can confirm Press reports, and then asks a further question in relation to the future. If the noble Baroness will put a Question down, I shall be glad to answer it.
BARONESS BURTON OF COVENTRY: My Lords, I think the noble Lord will agree that it is a relevant question.
LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE: My Lords, may we know when the decision is likely to come? With their summer programme coming on, the airlines are getting embarrassed in that they do not know where they are.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, my Answer said "shortly", but I can assure the noble Lord that it will be soon.
VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS: My Lords, can the noble Lord tell the House what profit has now been transferred from B.E.A. to these private airlines? And when B.E.A. has to balance its accounts, which it must do by law, can he say whether it will be done by increasing the fares or whether it will be a charge on the national exchequer?
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I find that question a little difficult to answer. So far as B.E.A. is concerned, of course none of the B.E.A. routes has been transferred.
VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS: I am sorry, my Lords, I mean B.U.A.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, B.U.A.? Does the noble Viscount not mean B.O.A.C.?
VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS: Yes, my Lords, B.O.A.C.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I thought the noble Viscount might have meant B.O.A.C. All I can say is that it is well within the criteria which have been set and that is why the transfer of
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some further routes is being contemplated within those criteria.
LORD PARGITER: My Lords, can the noble Lord say whether, in order to get a proper balance, some of the profit-making internal routes will be transferred to private companies?
LORD DRUMALBYN: No, my Lords. That would not be in accord with—
LORD SHEPHERD: Government policy.
LORD DRUMALBYN: Yes, my Lords, Government policy, based on the Report of the Commission set up by the Party opposite.
LORD WYNNE-JONES: My Lords, when the Government have succeeded in transferring all the national assets to their friends will they issue a balance sheet?
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, that is not the object. The noble Lord said, "have succeeded in transferring". Let me assure him that it is not the object of the Government to transfer assets away from the nationalised bodies except where it is in the national interest; and that in such cases they are transferred without regard to whether they are our friends or not.

CANNABIS: RESEARCH SCIENTISTS' REPORT
3.17 p.m.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether their attention has been drawn to the report of the Oxford research scientists, who have found strong evidence that cannabis is unsafe and in some cases may be highly dangerous, and whether they will take steps to make the danger widely known to the public.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE, HOME OFFICE (LORD WINDLESHAM): My Lords, my right honourable friend the

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Home Secretary has seen the recent reports about the research into the chemistry and pharmacology of cannabis that is being conducted under the direction of Professor W. D. M. Paton of the University of Oxford, and he has also noted certain papers published by Professor Paton and his associates which describe aspects of this research. The findings so far are preliminary, but Her Majesty's Government will be watching the future progress of this continuing research with interest. The possession of cannabis is already illegal.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for that Answer, may I ask him also to investigate the other statements that have been made by Professor Paton and also the research workers in Jamaica with regard to the possible effect on the fԓtus? He will see that in those papers it is suggested that cannabis and thalidomide may have the same effect on the fԓtus.
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, an interdepartmental co-ordinating committee on the misuse of drugs has been set up recently to facilitate the work of the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs which will be established under the Bill which is now before your Lordships. This body has a research sub-committee with a responsibility, inter alia, to ensure that the Advisory Council is kept fully informed of all research developments, and it will certainly include those to which the noble Baroness has referred.
VISCOUNT AMORY: My Lords, will my noble friend agree that this issue of the most authoritative evidence that can be obtained about the potentially harmful effects of this and other drugs is of very real importance?
LORD WINDLESHAM: Yes, my Lords. Although some of the results of Professor Paton's research to date appear to be significant, it would be premature to draw firm conclusions from them at this stage. But the research at the Department of Pharmacology at Oxford to which the Question referred will continue, with support from the Medical Research Council, for another three years, and it seems likely that this will make an important contribution to the total research
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on cannabis and its effects which has been carried out in several countries and which it is hoped will eventually illuminate the whole problem of cannabis taking.
LORD KILBRACKEN: My Lords, does the noble Lord know that, as a result of a report recently published in the United States of America, Governor Rockefeller of New York announced on Tuesday that he would recommend to the Legislature of New York that the penalty for cannabis possession should be reduced to one week; and does not this indicate a remarkable divergence of medical opinion on the subject?
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, I do not want to be drawn into a discussion on the penalties for the possession of cannabis: we are to discuss the Misuse of Drugs Bill on Third Reading later to-day. But I would say to the noble Lord that the Department of Health, Education and Welfare in the United States have recently set up a major research project on the subject of marijuana and health, and they will be reviewing across the whole field of social medicine as well as scientific research the effects of cannabis. From their research project social policies in the United States will flow.

ESSEX COUNTY COUNCIL BILL
Read 3a, with the Amendments, and passed, and returned to the Commons.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BILL
3.21 p.m.
Brought from the Commons.
EARL ST. ALDWYN: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be read a first time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a.—(Earl St. Aldwyn.)
LORD PARGITER: My Lords, while it may be unusual to object to a Bill's being read a first time, it seems to me that your Lordships' attention should be drawn to the fact that seldom has a Bill been brought before this House from another place so incomplete as this Bill. It should have been properly discussed.

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We are being called upon to consider a vast number of Amendments which have not been discussed at all and on which we have no guidance from the other House. We have no senior Minister concerned with the conduct of the Bill in this House to answer questions upon it, and it seems to me that our best course ought to be to send it back to the House of Commons and ask them to complete it, so that we may give careful consideration to their considered opinions on the Bill as a whole.
On Question, Bill read 1a, and to be printed.

BRITISH ALUMINIUM (SALTBURN PIER) ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1a, and (pursuant to the Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act 1936) deemed to have been read 21a and reported from the Committee.

MISUSE OF DRUGS BILL
3.25 p.m.
EARL ST. ALDWYN: My Lords, I have it in command from Her Majesty the Queen to acquaint the House that Her Majesty, having been informed of the purport of the Misuse of Drugs Bill, has consented to place her interest so far as it is concerned on behalf of the Crown at the disposal of Parliament for the purposes of the Bill.
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, I beg to move that the Bill be now read a third time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 31a.—(Lord Windlesham.)
On Question, Bill read 31a, with the Amendments.
Clause 25 [Prosecution and punishment of offences]:
LORD WINDLESHAM LORD WINDLESHAM moved Amendment No. 1:
Page 20, line 13, leave out subsections (4) and (5).
The noble Lord said: My Lords, it might be for the convenience of the House if we confined ourselves on Third Reading to discussing the narrow issues arising out of the two Amendments, the first, in my name, to Clause 25, and the second, in the name of the noble Lord,
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Lord Foot, to Clause 36, and left to the Motion, That the Bill do now pass, any final general observations on the Bill as a whole.
This Amendment, to leave out subsections (4) and (5) of Clause 25, has been introduced on Third Reading in order to help noble Lords who did not have sufficient time to study it before Report stage on March 9. I agreed to withdraw the Amendment on that occasion to allow time for it to be discussed further, and the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, speaking from the Front Bench opposite, said:
"I should like on behalf of noble Lords on this side of the House to thank the noble Lord for the step he has taken. I am certain that it is the right one, and it gives an opportunity for all noble Lords to consider the matter. I can assure the noble Lord that when the Amendment is re-presented on Third Reading we shall deal with it expeditiously."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 9/3/71; col. 30.]
May I remind your Lordships of the origin of this Amendment? In a debate on the Report stage in another place the Member for Wimbledon, Mr. Havers, moved an Amendment to leave out subsection (4) of Clause 25. The honourable and learned Member had support from both sides of the House for his contention that this subsection was
"an out-of-date and unnecessary restriction of the powers of the police and the courts."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, 9/12/71; col. 601.]
The Amendment was withdrawn on that occasion, on an undertaking being given by the Solicitor General that the proposal would be further considered.
The Government have carefully considered the views that were expressed by noble Lords during the debate in this House on March 9, and also by honourable Members in another place, and our conclusion is that, on balance, there are good grounds for continuing with this Amendment. I will state the balance as clearly and as briefly as I can. I shall do so at a little length because this Amendment was questioned last time it was raised. I think that there are a number of arguments which have not been touched on in our own discussion on Report or in another place.
The first is the factor of protection for the defendant. The provision corresponding to subsection (4) was first introduced in 1923, when the law to control dangerous drugs was quite novel

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and there was no widespread drug problem. Though the relevant Parliamentary debate at that time was very short, the intention seems to have been quite clear: to safeguard an offender from suffering the full rigours of the law at the hands of an inexperienced Judiciary. We must ask ourselves how far that consideration is relevant to-day. At Report stage on the Bill now before your Lordships the noble Lord, Lord Foot, argued that:
"… in the consolidating Act of 1965, only six years ago, it was not thought fit to delete this provision from the law. So as recently as that it was decided proper to keep it in."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 9/3/71; col. 27.]
With respect, I think that that is overstating the case. The 1965 Act consolidated the Acts of 1951 and 1964. The 1964 Act was a measure introduced late in the Session to make such limited changes in the law as were necessary to allow Her Majesty's Government to become a party to the Single Convention. No consideration was given in that Act to the question whether or not the fiat of the Director of Public Prosecutions should be retained; nor was it considered, of course, in the 1965 Act, which was confined to consolidation. What will be generally agreed, however, is that during the past five years the numbers of convictions for drug offences have risen substantially; there is a greatly increased public awareness of the drug problem; and the general question of sentencing policy as regards drug offenders has been a frequent topic of professional and public discussion.
Whereas under the existing law the power may have been thought to be appropriate for the large-scale trafficker, the context of the argument has now changed. The Bill distinguishes between individual drugs; it distinguishes more clearly between offences of trafficking and offences of possession; it removes the element of strict liability which has caused difficulty and concern in recent years. So far as penalties are concerned, the maximum level of penalties for simple possession is reduced, while some penalties for trafficking are increased. The overall effect, in the Government's view, is to make the intention and the emphasis of the law more easily understood, while preserving for the courts a wide discretion to deal with the individual offender. On
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that basis, and taking into account the general increase in public awareness of drugs and their different dangers, it is the Government's view that the case for retaining the Director's fiat is very much weaker than before. If those who have doubts about the Amendment are moved mainly by their misgivings about the maximum penalties in the Bill, I would point out that retaining the Director's fiat gives very little extra reassurance alongside the ordinary right of appeal against sentence.
Closely connected with this is the second factor which I should like to raise for your Lordships' consideration this afternoon; namely, guidance to the police. It is of interest to note that there are some 45 statutes which contain provisions requiring reference to the Director of Public Prosecutions before legal action can be instituted. When one studies the list of these Acts, however, it becomes apparent that there is a principle lying behind this particular safeguard; that is, to ensure that prosecutions are not brought where the evidence is insufficient to support them. The circumstances in which these Acts indicate the desirability for the police to seek the advice of the Director of Public Prosecutions appear, for the most part, to relate to the degree of experience which the police are likely to have of dealing with the offences in question, either because they are likely to occur infrequently or because the law is new or somewhat obscure and experience of its working has to be built up. I have a number of examples, but I do not think I need trouble your Lordships with them.
So far as offences under the drugs law are concerned, the Government consider that the police generally now have sufficient experience to judge whether or not a case should be prosecuted in the higher courts, and so not be fettered by the express requirement for the Director's fiat.
Finally, there is a third factor, that of convenience, as to which there are two aspects: timing and work load. In another place it was argued that the requirement for the Director's fiat could cause delay. Delay can arise in two ways. Ordinarily magistrates have the power, if in the course of summary trial the facts of the case reveal it to be of a more serious nature than they consider

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appropriate to deal with summarily, to stop the summary trial and commit it for trial to a higher court.
In proceedings brought under the Dangerous Drugs Act 1965, magistrates must refer a case to the Director for him to initiate proceedings on indictment, the accused being remanded meanwhile, and most likely remanded in custody. Under Clause 25(4) of the Bill the Director has only to give consent to the committal to the higher court, but there may be much the same delay to the committal proceedings from his involvement in that way. Again, similar delays arise when several persons accused of drug offences are dealt with together by a magistrates' court and one of them elects to go for trial by jury. When this happens it is the custom for the magistrates' court, for obvious reasons, to commit all the defendants for trial.
As regards the work load, the prospective burden on the Director's Office cannot be overlooked. In each of the last three years, between 150 and 250 cases per annum have been referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions under the existing drugs legislation. Each case involves careful review, and we must ask ourselves the question: is this burden justified by the benefits?
In conclusion, it is the Government's view, having given much thought to this matter since it was first raised in another place, that when all these considerations are taken together the Amendment is reasonable, and is acceptable, because it removes an unnecessary complication from the administration of the law without a significant threat to civil liberties. My Lords, I beg to move.
3.36 p.m.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: My Lords, I very much regret that I was not able to be present at the Report stage of this Bill when this Amendment was first moved by the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham. I greatly appreciate his courtesy, in response to representations that were made by some of my noble friends, in agreeing to postpone the matter until the Third Reading. I could only wish that during the interim his second thoughts had led him to a different conclusion.
The noble Lord has argued—and he used this argument on Report stage—
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that the growing experience of the police and the courts makes it no longer necessary to have the intervention of the Director of Public Prosecutions in cases where the magistrates wish to commit for trial. If I may say so, I think that is very much a metropolitan view. There is great experience, I have no doubt, in Birmingham, in London, and in other large urban centres; and the police and the lay magistrates, as well as the stipendiaries, are very well versed in the present state of the drug scene. But the misuse of drugs is highly mobile: it is not evenly spread all over the country; it turns up unexpectedly in rural districts and small towns where neither the police nor the courts are accustomed to it, and I think it would be rash to remove this defence while that situation remains. It is also true, of course, that the drug scene changes, and it is not sufficient to be up to date with what are the dangerous drugs, the very dangerous drugs, and the rather less dangerous drugs at the moment. One has to keep pace with an ever-changing scene, and this puts a considerable tax upon the police and magistrates.
The noble Lord has suggested that we are putting a burden upon the Director's office, a burden of about 150 to 250 cases a year. But every one of those cases relates to an individual, who deserves the fullest consideration. It may also be said that even though there is delay—and we all hate delay—in the administration of justice, it is better to get the answer right in the end. If there is pressure on the Director's office I feel confident that it cannot be greater than the pressure on the courts. If the effect of referring these cases to the Director is in some degree, even a small degree, to reduce the number of cases that eventually go to the higher courts, there is at least a compensating gain.
The noble Lord has pointed out that this Bill will be making new law. It is, in effect, both consolidating and adding a number of new provisions. There are powerful reasons why this is not the moment to remove this defence. The first is the novel features of the Bill. It reclassifies drugs, and all the courts have to familiarise themselves with what this reclassification involves. It makes it much easier for new drugs to be added to the list of controlled drugs, and for

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other drugs to be taken off. It provides—and I think this is one of its better features—a highly flexible procedure for dealing with the drugs that are to remain on the controlled list. It distinguishes between trafficking and possession, and this is a distinction which in some cases is going to be a very nice one. We think of trafficking as being done by people who deal possibly even in tons—certainly in hundredweights—of certain drugs; but trafficking is also done on a very small scale.
All these new features have to be mastered by the courts and by the police, and—what I think is extremely important, and it has not been mentioned by the noble Lord—the Bill creates quite new offences. It also creates a number of new offences which intimately concern the medical profession—offences of over-prescribing, and prescribing in defiance of a direction from the Secretary of State. It is therefore, in many respects, a new and very complex law. That is my first reason—additional to the reasons which the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, gave—for saying that now is not the time to remove this defence.
My second additional reason relates to the penalties. The noble Lord has suggested that the fact that the penalties are actually raised by this Bill is irrelevant, but he is there in conflict with the Solicitor General. When this matter was raised in another place, the Solicitor General said:
"In view of the high penalties which the Bill provides for the major offences, it makes sense to preserve the requirement for the Director's consent to committal."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, 9/12/70; col. 602.]
However, the Solicitor General said that he would take the matter away at that stage, and would think about it again.
As the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, has said, this provision, in one form or another, goes right back to 1923 (when, admittedly, the whole situation was very different from what it is now), and it was re-enacted in the Dangerous Drugs Act 1965. In 1968, the Advisory Committee on Drug Dependence specifically recommended in their Cannabis Report that this provision should be retained. It was in the first version of this Bill as introduced by the late Government in the spring of 1970. It was in the
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identical second version of this Bill as introduced by the present Government in the summer of 1970. The provision emerged from another place untarnished. It remained in the Bill as it came from another place, and it passed unchallenged through the Committee stage in this House. I submit that this is not the moment to remove a provision which has successfully stood so many tests, and least of all is it the moment to remove this defence for people who may be unnecessarily sent for trial when the Bill raises penalties, creates new offences and very greatly extends the powers of the Secretary of State.
3.44 p.m.
BARONESS SEROTA: My Lords, for the Record I should like first to apologise both to the House and to the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, for the remarks I made on the Report stage of the Bill about the timing of the tabling of this Amendment. The recollection of the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, was correct and my information, though given I am sure in absolutely good faith, was incorrect, due, I am quite certain, to the communications difficulties that we were experiencing at that time. I am therefore particularly grateful for the noble Lord's generosity in withdrawing the Amendment at that stage, in order to give us further time to consider its implications.
Without wishing to go over again the ground that I covered last time, as the House will know I share some—though not necessarily all—of the doubts and misgivings which have been so well expressed by my noble friend Lady Wootton of Abinger. Having listened very carefully to the explanation to-day by the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, I wonder whether he would be prepared to give an assurance to the House that the proposal to leave out subsection (4) from Clause 25 will not in any way be used to encourage prosecutors or magistrates' courts to proceed by way of indictment, when summary proceedings would meet the needs of the case. If he were prepared to give that assurance, and also to make that very clear in any circular or guidance that he and his right honourable friend will be giving to the appropriate authorities when this Bill comes into operation, I could accept the case that

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he has made to-day. Like the noble Baroness, I too wish that this had come forward much earlier and I share her concern about the removal of this kind of check. But, in all the circumstances, I should be prepared to accept this Amendment provided that we received very clear assurances on the lines I have suggested.
BARONESS BIRK: My Lords, I should like to support what my noble friends Lady Wootton of Abinger and Lady Serota have said. Having listened very carefully to the Minister, and understood the points he made, I still feel very uneasy about the deletion of these subsections at this particular time. I say this as a magistrate because, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, will agree, whatever people are practising they usually like to have a degree of independence and do not like to pass decisions on to somebody else. At the moment, the drug scene is a very emotive subject and—with respect to my noble friend Lady Wootton of Abinger—there is still a great difference, even in the Metropolitan area and in the big cities, between one court and another. I do not believe that magistrates, and even the police, are as well informed, or are able to be as well informed, as they should be to deal with these matters at the present time.
As the new magistrates come on to the bench after the training which they will have received—which is a great improvement on the situation in past years—they will presumably be kept very much more up to date. But unless the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham and the Home Office are considering having refresher courses on this whole question for sitting magistrates, then the position is even more worrying. The number of cases which the noble Lord gave for a year do not seem to be too great for them to be dealt with by the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, and I still feel extremely uneasy that these subsections are being deleted.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Wootton of Abinger, speaks with so much experience as a magistrate and puts her case so cogently that we can be quite certain that we have had the case on both sides stated as well as it can be; and of course we are on a fairly narrow point. I think the noble
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Baroness made one remark in her speech which was a slip, when she talked about this Amendment abolishing a defence. I do not think it really—
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: My Lords, I did not of course mean a defence in the strict legal sense. Perhaps I should have used the word "barrier".
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, I think it may have given the impression in some quarters that some defence that would have been available if these subsections were not deleted would no longer be available. The noble Baroness has been good enough to make it clear that that was not at all her intention, but I think that the Minister is right, for this reason. It seems to me that to have this complication of a reference to the Director of Public Prosecutions, unless some really useful purpose were served thereby, would be a mistake involving unnecessary work, complication and delay. If I thought that there were any accused persons who would be liable to go to trial if this Amendment were carried, who would not be liable to go to trial in the end if this Amendment were not carried, I should have a great deal more sympathy with the objection to this Amendment. But it seems to me that it is going to make no difference to the accused person; that the reference to the Director of Public Prosecutions would not result in the case not going to the court for trial. In those circumstances, my Lords, I think the arguments of the Minister are very cogent on the grounds of convenience.
Let me finally come to the question of severe penalties. I cannot see, in spite of the respectable legal authorities who have used this argument as a defence for the clause as it stands, that the severe penalties are really very germane, because if the wrong penalty is imposed there is always the remedy of appeal. I cannot see that any injustice is risked if we delete these subsections, and I cannot really believe that the question of the size of the penalty is relevant when we are making up our mind.
LORD LEATHERLAND: My Lords, I have given some rather serious consideration to this question while the debates on this occasion and on the earlier occasion were proceeding, and it seems to me as though the issue before

1003
us is whether we have or have not confidence in the magistrates' courts, because nobody is likely to have a penalty imposed upon him unless he is found guilty. If he is found guilty, whether by a magistrates' court, by a court of quarter sessions or by a higher court, then he deserves that penalty; but if he is not found guilty the penalty will not be imposed upon him. If it is suggested that magistrates are not sufficiently intelligent and are not sufficiently unemotional in dealing with this rather emotional question, then, if we were going to allow magistrates to impose penalties instead of allowing magistrates to send these cases to a higher court, we might have a complaint; and if we are still lacking confidence in magistrates, then the fact that the magistrates decide to send the matter up to a higher court, where there will be a legally qualified chairman, seems to me to be a move in the right direction. I should have felt a little uncomfortable had the Bill been allowed to stand as it is. I shall feel very much more comfortable if, as the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, has suggested, we delete this particular passage from the measure.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: My Lords, I should like to say something at this stage. I took part in the debates at the other stages of the Bill and I believe that my noble friend Lady Wootton of Abinger felt that I spoke rather strongly when I appealed to your Lordships not to be tempted to deal too leniently with this class of offender and when I said that, on reading the 27 Amendments set down by the noble Baroness, in my opinion none of them should be supported at all. We are talking about an offence which somebody has now described as emotive and which was described at other stages of the Bill as something we knew little about. By a curious coincidence, in the course of the passage of this Bill investigations have been made by the only research group which is doing major research into this subject. Professor Paton is the Professor of Pharmacology at Oxford. He has, as we have heard to-day, of course, been supported by the Medical Research Council. He has just been given another £10,000 for three years. He has thought fit to give publicity to some of their findings, and, my Lords, we can no longer
1004
go on saying that we know nothing about this.
May I read to the House some of the information that is now emerging from this group?
"In one experiment, ten mice were given a daily injection of cannabis. By the end of a week all ten were dead—yet five times the amount of alcohol administered to other mice over the same period produced no fatalities.
This means that regular pot smokers are progressively building up high, possibly even dangerous, concentrations of THC"—
that is the main active ingredient—
"in their bodies.…
But one cannot ignore more general issues. If one were to view cannabis simply as a new drug which might be introduced into medicine, the evidence we already have of health hazards would rule it out.
If people are going to reject DDT, cyclamates and dieldrin, I certainly think they ought to reject cannabis.
Professor Paton said one major question that still remains to be answered is whether cannabis has a thalidomide-type action on pregnant women.
This is difficult to find out because the population using cannabis is not one which is available for scientific study.
But he added that what his team has discovered so far is consistent with the findings of two Jamaican scientists who treated rats with crude cannabis.
Their little-publicised experiments showed that when pregnant rats were given the drug during the vulnerable period of gestation, only 13 per cent. of the offspring were normal. Of the remainder, 57 per cent. were deformed, and nearly 30 per cent. were the quivalent of early abortions."
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: If my noble friend would—
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: I have finished the quotations, but, my Lords, when this Bill—
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: If my noble friend will give way, may I ask her what these admittedly important experiments have to do with the distribution of powers between the magistrates and the higher courts?
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: It has a great deal to do with it, because what we are talking about now, and what we were talking about at the other stages of the Bill, is precisely what penalties should be suffered by people who are trafficking in cannabis. We were told time after

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time by the noble Lord, Lord Foot—it is in Hansard, and I read it again to-day—
LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY: My Lords, is the noble Baroness aware that we are dealing in this Amendment with all the offences under the Bill, covering a very wide range of drugs, and that cannabis is a very minor part of it?
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: Certainly, my Lords, but we have been told over and over again that in this Bill we are talking about something of which we have little knowledge. I was inclined to agree. On the other hand, I thought that if we had little knowledge we should not proceed in a way which might treat too lightly those people who are guilty. The noble Lord, Lord Foot, in conclusion, said that it would be a complete break from the principle of categorising drugs according to their level of harmlessness if cannabis, which was not demonstrably harmful, was put into a higher category not because it was harmful in itself but because somebody asserted that it led on to heroin.
What I am saying now—and I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Foot, is fair enough to listen to and accept this—is that since he made that speech at the beginning of the passage of this Bill these investigations have been given publicity, and they have shown that cannabis is demonstrably harmful. Therefore, I say now, when we are discussing penalties, that I do not think that the old arguments which may have obtained when we knew so little about it should still obtain when we have this authoritative knowledge.
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who have taken part in the debate on this Amendment. What we have to make up our minds about is whether or not this procedure, that the Director of Public Prosecutions should give his consent before proceeding by way of indictment, is a safeguard for somebody who has been accused of an offence against the drug laws. That has to be weighed against the administrative burden. We have to be clear about this. The burden must not be over-emphasised. As the noble Baroness, Lady Wootton of Abinger, correctly said, if there were only one case in which
1006
injustice was prevented, a procedure would be justified. But the Government are not satisfied that in practice there is likely to be any lessening of safeguards.
The noble Baroness mentioned that this Amendment comes late in the proceedings of this Bill in this House. That is a point that can be put forward; but I would point out that the Amendment was first put down on Report in another place. It received all-Party support. She correctly quoted my right honourable friend the Solicitor General. He gave what appeared to the Government at that time to be a justification for the clause as the Bill then stood, but at the end of that debate, in the face of unanimous support for the Amendment from both sides of the Chamber and from the Opposition Front Bench in the person of Mr. Elystan Morgan, who spoke in support of the Amendment, the Solicitor General undertook to take it away and think again. I undertook to withdraw the Amendment which had been put down here because I felt that certain noble Lords might not have had sufficient time to study it.
For these reasons it comes late before your Lordships, but this time lapse has enabled us to go carefully into what I have admitted to be the balance of arguments involved. I should not regard the Director of Public Prosecutions as being excluded if this Amendment were accepted; his involvement would be secured in other ways. I should tell the House that the Director supports this Amendment; from his point of view, the only virtue of retaining in the Bill the provisions requiring his consent would be that they would ensure his having complete information of prosecutions in serious drug cases. But this is something that can be done administratively. Secondly, in those areas of the country where drug offences may not be so common or in those areas where they are frequent but the police are uncertain, they can, and do, consult the Director informally and obtain his advice. Thirdly, we cannot really assume that because somebody may proceed to the higher courts to have his case heard on indictment—and he has a right to do that already; he can elect to go for trial by jury—he will by that act be likely to get less fair treatment than he does in the magistrates' court. The balance of presumption must be rather the other way round.

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The noble Baroness, Lady Serota, speaking from the Front Benches opposite, made a very moderate and reasonable speech. She was concerned that the effect of dropping the procedure envisaged in the Bill might be to encourage the police or the magistrates' courts to proceed by way of indictment when a summary prosecution would be more appropriate. She asked whether I could give an assurance on that point. I am pleased to be able to do so. This is a fair point to put; we cannot be absolutely certain what every bench of magistrates will do in every set of circumstances. I can say that in any circular sent to the police or to the courts on this matter my right honourable friend will be willing to draw their attention to this point. With that assurance given at the request of the noble Baroness, I hope that your Lordships may be willing to accept this Amendment.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, can he tell us in how many of the 150 to 250 cases handled by the Director has committal been refused?
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, I had sat down, but I have the figures and and an explanation of them. It is a long and detailed explanation. What I shall do is give the House the figures and then write, or speak separately, to the noble Baroness about the interpretation I should like to put upon them, for they need to be interpreted. Altogether in 1968 the Director had 161 cases referred to him; in 1969, 154. In 1968 the Director brought 128 prosecutions; in 1969, 107.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 36 [Meaning of "corresponding law", and evidence of certain matters by certificate]:
4.6 p.m.
LORD FOOT LORD FOOT moved Amendment No. 2:
Page 25, line 23, leave out subsection (2).
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I should like to explain to the House first the context of this Amendment and then what it seeks to do. It has nothing to do with our views upon drugs and the misuse of drugs, and I do not intend to make any reply to the noble Baroness, Lady Summerskill, because I feel that if I did
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so on this Amendment I should be almost as irrelevant as she was when speaking on the preceding one. This Amendment has simply to do with the state of the law. Your Lordships will see that Clause 20 of the Bill says:
"A person commits an offence if in the United Kingdom he assists in or induces the commission in any place outside the United Kingdom of an offence punishable under the provisions of a corresponding law in force in that place."
In Clause 36 there is a definition of "corresponding law", and subsection (2) of that clause provides that where a prosecution is undertaken against somebody for assisting in the commission of an offence in another country, under Clause 20 the prosecution is enabled to prove what is the relevant law in that foreign country and what facts go together to make up an offence, not in the ordinary way with which we are all familiar—that is, by calling an expert in the foreign law to come and give evidence as to what the law is, which, so far as I know, is the method that we adopt in all other fields of prosecutions under a foreign law—but by getting from the foreign Government a certificate as to the meaning of the law.
At the Report stage of this Bill my noble friend Lord Airedale raised a matter even more objectionable than this. At that time it was provided that such a certificate from a foreign Government should be conclusive evidence and could not therefore be challenged by the accused person. As the result of representations made by my noble friend, the Minister was good enough to cut out that word "conclusive". That was a substantial improvement. But at the time of our debate on the Report stage, I suggested that this did not go far enough. I thought there was an inherent defect in the clause as it is drawn. The defect, as I see it, is that, as a matter of principle, the decision as to what any law means and what is the effect of any law is something which ought to be pronounced on by the Judiciary and not by the Executive.
I also suggested that in practice it would almost always be impossible for an accused person to call evidence to refute what was said in a certificate; therefore there was a considerable danger of miscarriages of justice if this procedure were ever adopted. The noble Lord,

1009
Lord Windlesham, was good enough to look into the matter after the Report stage and to write to me about it. I think it is permissible for me to quote from the letter, and I imagine that this may be the argument that the noble Lord will address to us in a moment; so perhaps I might say now what is the Government's view.
They say that after careful consideration they have come to the conclusion that the certificate procedure should be retained; that the Solicitor General had pointed out that the accused would not be at a disadvantage because the prosecution would still have to prove their case beyond reasonable doubt, and that once expert evidence had been given on behalf of the accused to refute the matters contained in it, the certificate could no longer be accepted as conclusive evidence. It would need to be supported by expert witnesses called by the prosecution. I do not think that is the correct interpretation. I think that manifestly the accused person must be at a very considerable disadvantage; because you would say that the certificate is prima facie evidence of what it states. Then you would say to the accused, "We are not going to prove this by calling a Witness, we are just going to produce a certificate; if you want to refute the certificate you have to find some qualified expert in the law" (a may be the law of Uruguay or Nicaragua) "to come and tell the court that the certificate is not in fact correct".
The difficulties which would face an accused who is invited to do that would be almost insuperable. Not only that, but also it is manifestly unfair to the accused that the onus of proof should shift to him from the prosecution immediately the prosecution produce the certificate. One of the basic principles of our criminal law is that the prosecution must prove every element in their case, and to prove it by calling witnesses. By this certificate procedure the prosecution are told: "No, you are released from that; the burden of proving that this certificate is incorrect is upon the accused person, and until he is able to produce evidence to challenge it, what is said in the certificate must be accepted."
The other matter, to which the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, referred on the last occasion, and which he confirmed to me in his letter, is that although
1010
this clause has been in existence since 1923 it would appear that there is no record at the Home Office—at any rate not in recent years—to show that a prosecution has been brought under the provisions contained in Clause 20 of this Bill. If that is so, if the content of this clause is a dead letter, if no one has ever had resort to it, is that not a good reason for getting rid of something which is bad in principle? If cases concerning persons doing something in this country which is an offence in foreign law have never been prosecuted, and if there is no record of any such case, why need we retain this system of certificate procedure which seems to me so objectionable in principle?
4.15 p.m.
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, I feel that I ought to support my noble friend Lord Foot on this matter, nothwithstanding that we succeeded, on Report, in at any rate improving this subsection which my noble friend now seeks to delete from the Bill. In my submission, this subsection is fundamentally objectionable because it offends against what is called the "best evidence" rule; which is that the prosecution must always produce the best evidence to support its case. Of course, the best evidence is always a flesh and blood witness who can be put into the witness box and have his evidence tested by cross-examination; and very second-best evidence indeed is a certificate signed by some faceless person who does not appear in court to have what he has said in the certificate tested by cross-examination.
I should have thought that Parliament ought to be very much on its guard against introducing into Acts of Parliament subsections which say that these or those facts may be proved, not by flesh and blood witnesses but by certificates signed by people who do not appear before the court. In my submission, that is the fundamental weakness of, and objection to, this subsection. I do not believe that the Government have made out a satisfactory case for this subsection.
My Lords, what is it that makes a certificate so necessary in this kind of case? Is it the question of public expense? Is it the expense of calling witnesses who are experts in the relevant foreign law to give evidence in person?

1011
I do not know how many prosecutions are expected under this part of the Bill. I do not imagine that there will be very many; but, few though they may be, they will be very important. I suppose that they would come under the general heading of international drug trafficking. They will, I should have thought, be the sort of cases that the prosecution ought to be prepared to go to a great deal of trouble to prove up to the hilt, using the best evidence available.
Finally, I would say that it is not very complimentary to the courts to offend against the "best evidence" rule, because then the courts are entitled to say, "If you do not bring before us the best evidence which can be tested, you cannot expect us to produce the best administration of justice". So if there is to be much proliferation of this kind of thing—proving things on behalf of the prosecution by means of certificates—I believe that in the end British justice will suffer. I do not feel that a case has been made out justifying the certificate procedure in this instance, and I shall be very sorry if this subsection survives and becomes law.
4.20 p.m.
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, says he does not think that a case has been made for allowing this subsection to survive. I would say to him and to the noble Lord, Lord Foot, that I think their objections are based on a misunderstanding of what is likely to happen. Now that we have had time to study Lord Foot's remarks with some care, and to consult the Law Officers of the Crown, we feel that he is attributing to the certificate far more significance than it will have in practice.
Apart from stating that the law in question is a "corresponding law", as defined in Clause 36(1), the sole purpose of the certificate will be to provide evidence to the court in this country dealing with an offender under Clause 20 of the Bill that particular facts constitute an offence under the terms of the law. The certificate will merely serve to demonstrate to the court that under the law of the country concerned there is an offence of a kind which is relevant to the proceedings before the court. The certificate, I must emphasise, would not be evidence
1012
that specific events had taken place in another country, or that an offence had been committed there.
It is true, as the noble Lord, Lord Foot, said, that if a person accused of an offence under Clause 20 wished to dispute an overseas Government's interpretation of its own law as given in the certificate, the onus would be on him to produce expert witnesses on his own behalf. But if the defendant raised an issue on a statement in the certificate as to the effect of the "corresponding law", the prosecution would then be required to bring evidence other than the certificate to prove, and to prove beyond reasonable doubt, that the person charged had assisted in or induced the commission of an overseas offence, and that that offence had in fact been committed. The certificate would not be evidence that particular events had taken place, only that, if they had taken place, they would be an offence under the law of the country in which it was alleged they had taken place.
Because the effect of the provision is difficult to bring to life and to visualise (and I have been attempting to do this since the noble Lord first expressed his doubts about this clause on Report) let me give your Lordships an hypothetical example. Suppose that a person in the United Kingdom helped to organise the smuggling of heroin into Spain. When that person was charged in the United Kingdom, under Clause 20, with assisting in the commission of an overseas offence, the prosecution would have to establish in court in the normal way, not only that the accused did the acts in the United Kingdom which assisted the commission of the offence, but also that heroin had in fact been smuggled into Spain. All that the certificate provided by the Spanish Government under Clause 36(2) would do would be to establish that the taking of heroin into Spain in the circumstances alleged by the prosecution constituted an offence under Spanish law. Of course, the procedure envisaged in this clause would be for use only in courts in the United Kingdom and not in courts overseas.
It is true, as the noble Lord said, that in recent years there has been no record of proceedings for an offence under the provisions of the existing law—that is, under Section 13(d) of the Dangerous

1013
Drugs Act 1965. This may be because until recently illicit international trafficking in drugs was not much of a problem so far as the United Kingdom is concerned. But the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, is right in assuming that international trafficking is growing, in step with the general international increase in the misuse of narcotic and other drugs. Your Lordships may have seen a report only this week that a load of cannabis from Pakistan has been detected by the police in this country, and is estimated to have a black market value of £500,000. The international bodies have called for greater collective efforts to deal with this traffic. We believe that it would be inexpedient for the United Kingdom to withdraw the possibility of help afforded by Clause 20, particularly as the Government do not accept the arguments which we have heard to-day that the provisions of Clauses 20 and 36 are in any way likely to prove prejudicial to a person dealt with by any court in this country.
I should point out, in conclusion, that the Government have already made a concession on this clause at the instance of the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, so I hope it will not be thought that we are being meaninglessly obstructive of the arguments that have been offered by the noble Lord, Lord Foot. As I explained in moving my Amendment to this clause, subsection (2), as amended, would no longer provide that a certificate is conclusive evidence as to the effect of a "corresponding law". The certificate now deals only with the existence of the law which is to be regarded as "corresponding" for the purpose of subsection (1) and its effect in particular circumstances, and, so far as its effect is concerned, it is open to challenge.
We have given careful thought to the noble Lord's Amendment to delete this subsection altogether but, for the reasons that I have explained, we believe that it ought to remain in the Bill. The noble Lord will be replying, as he is entitled to do, in a moment. I do not know whether it is his intention to press his Amendment, but if he does, I must advise your Lordships to vote against it.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: My Lords, it is still not clear to some of us—certainly to myself—what is the position if a person in this country gets
1014
a certificate which makes a bona fide error and wrongly states what the law is in his own country.
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, I am in a difficult position because I am not entitled to speak again on this provision but may I, with leave of the House, say just one sentence? The certificate would be granted by the Government of the country, not by an individual.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: My Lords, I fully understand that it would be the certificate of an official of a Government, but officials have been known to make mistakes.
LORD FOOT: My Lords, I am afraid that I am not persuaded by what the noble Lord has said, but I am grateful to him for giving the point so much thought. It is difficult to imagine how a certificate would come into existence which was not a correct interpretation of the law. But I did indicate on Report stage how this might work in practice, when I quoted the case of the girl who was concerned in managing premises on which cannabis was smoked and who pleaded that she did not know that the offence was being committed. She was duly sentenced, but appealed. Her appeal went to the Court of Appeal which decided that as she was concerned in the management of the premises, and that as cannabis was actually consumed on them, it did not make any difference in English law whether she knew or did not know that the consumption was going on. When the appeal came to your Lordships' House it took a different view. The case had to come right up to the House of Lords in order that the matter could be put right.
I put this question to the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, on the last occasion and I think it is an answer to what he has been saying. Suppose that in France there was a law similar to this one and suppose that a French prosecution applied to the British Government asking whether it was an offence under English law by a person concerned in the management of premises if cannabis were consumed on those premises though she did not know. If the answer to that had been given back in 1968, when this case came up, and a certificate had been sent to France saying what the law was then, the overwhelming likelihood was that the certificate would

1015
have misled the French prosecution and mis-stated the law of this country, because obviously the Government took the view, and the court took the view right up to the House of Lords, that this was an absolute offence. That is the sort of thing that can happen.
In that event, how could the accused person in France, with this certificate presented from the British Government saying, "This is the law in our country", possibly call evidence to show that it was not right?" The only way in which the accused person in France could seek to demonstrate that the certificate was inadequate would be by saying: "Send this back to England. Let the case be tried in the English court, and let the English court tell us what the law of the land is." The noble Lord may be aware that under the Foreign Law Ascertainment Act of, I think, 1859 or 1861 it was provided that if this country had signed a convention with another country
then the superior courts in this country, if they wanted to know what was the state of the foreign law in that other country, could send through and ask for an opinion from the superior court in that foreign country. That procedure has never come into existence, because we have never signed a convention; but at that time it was fully recognised that if you wanted to find out what the foreign law was, the proper thing to do was to go to the courts, and not to the Executive. I do not know what the will of the House is as to whether I should carry this matter to a Division, but I have a feeling that some of my misgivings are shared by others of your Lordships. It is not a Party point. Therefore I will carry the Amendment to a Division.
4.33 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 2) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 38; Not-contents, 105.

CONTENTS

Addison, V.

Chorley, L.

Phillips, Bs.

Airedale, L. [Teller.]

Constantine, L.

Rea, L.

Amherst, E.

Darcy (de Knayth), Bs.

Ritchie-Calder, L.

Amulree, L.

Faringdon, L.

Royle, L.

Archibald, L.

Fiske, L.

Segal, L.

Ardwick, L.

Foot, L. [Teller.]

Silkin, L.

Arran, E.

Gaitskell, Bs.

Sorensen, L.

Beaumont of Whitley, L.

Grantchester, L.

Stonham, L.

Birk, Bs.

Henderson, L.

Walston, L.

Brockway, L.

Henley, L.

Wells-Pestell, L.

Buckinghamshire, E.

Monson, L.

Wootton of Abinger, Bs.

Carnock, L.

Norwich, V.

Wynne-Jones, L.

Champion, L.

Nunburnholme, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Aberdare, L.

Eccles, V.

Howard of Glossop, L.

Aberdeen and Temair, M.

Effingham, E.

Ilford, L.

Alexander of Tunis, E.

Emmet of Amberley, Bs.

Jessel, L.

Alport, L.

Fairhaven, L.

Kilmarnock, L.

Auckland, L.

Falkland, V.

Kinloss, Ly.

Balfour, E.

Ferrers, E.

Lauderdale, E.

Balfour of Inchrye, L.

Fortescue, E.

Leatherland, L.

Barnby, L.

Fulton, L.

Lloyd of Hampstead, L.

Belhaven and Stenton, L.

Gage, V.

Lothian, M.

Belstead, L.

Goschen, V. [Teller.]

Loudoun, C.

Berkeley, Bs.

Gray, L.

Lucas of Chilworth, L.

Beswick, L.

Greenway, L.

McCorquodale of Newton, L.

Bourne, L.

Greenwood of Rossendale, L.

Malmesbury, E.

Brooke of Cumnor, L.

Gridley, L.

Massereene and Ferrard, V.

Brooke of Ystradfellte, Bs.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

Merrivale, L.

Conesford, L.

Guildford, Bp.

Mersey, V.

Cork and Orrery, E.

Hacking, L.

Milverton, L.

Craigavon, V.

Hailes, L.

Mowbray and Stourton, L. [Teller.]

Croft, L.

Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Cromartie, E.

Moyne, L.

Daventry, V.

Hankey, L.

Napier and Ettrick, L.

Denham, L.

Hawke, L.

Northchurch, Bs.

Dundee, E.

Hives, L.

Nugent of Guildford, L.

Ebbisham, L.

Hood, V.

O'Neill of the Maine, L.

Platt, L.

Sandford, L.

Taylor, L.

Polwarth, L.

Savile, L.

Tenby, V.

Rankeillour, L.

Selkirk, E.

Teviot, L.

Rathcavan, L.

Sempill, Ly.

Teynham, L.

Rhyl, L.

Serota, Bs.

Thomas, L.

Roberthall, L.

Skelmersdale, L.

Trevelyan, L.

Robertson of Oakridge, L.

Somers, L.

Tweedsmuir, L.

Rochester, Bp.

Strabolgi, L.

Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, Bs.

Rockley, L.

Strang, L,

Vivian, L.

Ruthven of Freeland, Ly.

Strathclyde, L.

Windlesham, L.

St. Aldwyn, E.

Stratheden and Campbell, I..

Wolverton, L.

St. Oswald, L.

Summerskill, Bs.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

4.45 p.m.
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, I beg to move that the Bill do now pass.
LORD TAYLOR: My Lords—
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, before we hear from the noble Lord, in opening this short, final discussion may I say how nice it is to see the noble Lord back in his place again? One of the main functions of your Lordships' House is to revise legislation, and it is one that on this Bill we can agree has been well fulfilled. This is the sixth day on which the Bill has been debated, and we have had the benefit of many well-informed and thoughtful speeches at the various stages. I am glad that it has been possible for the Government to accept some of the arguments that have been put to us by noble Lords who have a particular interest in this subject, and that the House was able to agree to the Amendments which I put down to meet those points on Report, including the Amendment to-day. There have been some matters, particularly the classification of cannabis, the level of penalties for drug offences and the powers of the police, on which there have been strong differences of view, but those have resulted from personal conviction rather than from Party motives, and I should like to thank noble Lords for the cogent and tolerant way in which they have been advanced.
This Bill reforms and strengthens the law against drugs misuse in this country. Its main features, as noble Lords who have followed it through will know, are to distinguish between offences of trafficking and offences of possession, with an adjustment of penalties in each case; to classify drugs according to their potential danger and the extent of their misuse; and to curtail the over-prescribing of
1018
controlled drugs. It is interesting to note that, other than on Second Reading, when we had the benefit of a speech from Lord Cohen of Birkenhead in his capacity as President of the General Medical Council, this last aspect of the Bill has been the subject of very little further discussion and no Amendment.
We are not, of course, alone in this country in trying to respond, by way of legislation and social action, to widespread drugs misuse. As this Bill has been going through Parliament, a Conference convened by the United Nations in Vienna has drawn up a new Convention for the international control of psychotropic substances such as LSD, the amphetamines and certain sedatives. This treaty is intended to complement the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, and, in the same way as that Convention, will allow for new substances to be brought under control in the future. I may add that the international bodies are not relying solely on legal measures for strengthening cooperation in this field. Last year the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations asked the Commission on Narcotic Drugs to hold a special session to examine the short and longterm needs for co-ordinated action by the various United Nations agencies. That meeting gave a new stimulus to the planning of multi-disciplinary programmes and special projects about which I have no doubt we shall hear more in years to come.
If we are to handle the problem of drugs misuse in this country effectively and humanely, the Government, the professional and other interests, parents, doctors and social workers, must work together in counter measures. I think we may claim that the Bill provides a framework for joint action of this kind and has served to draw attention to the need for further efforts. Let us hope, in

1019
working together to help those who are tempted to experiment with drugs, or to express their own personality with the aid of drugs, or to register a protest, perhaps, against the standards of a material world by way of drugs, that we can present some ideals also, some vision of the present as well as the future which we can offer with confidence as an alternative that can be enjoyed without artificial stimulus. If I express a hope for the next few years (and it will be my last words on this Bill since I have already taken up many columns of Hansard on this subject), it would be to see the conflicting strands of public opinion come closer together on this issue, an intensification of research, social as well as scientific, and a deeper understanding so that we may better protect the vulnerable and help those who are already caught up in a tragic social problem. My Lords, I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill do now pass.—(Lord Windlesham.)
4.51 p.m.
LORD TAYLOR: My Lords, I am sorry that I was not here for the earlier stages of the discussion on this Bill. For nine years I was a regular attender in your Lordships' House—until four years ago, that is. It is an extraordinary fact, but during that time I do not believe there was a single debate of any magnitude at all on the problem of drugs, with the exception of the two Bills mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham. I have never taken part in a debate on drugs in your Lordships' House because I ceased to be a regular attender four years ago and, so far as I can see, the first mention of drugs as a major social problem was made by the noble Lord, Lord Sandford, on July 1, 1967, when he asked a Question about treatment centres. Yet in the four years since then this has become a major problem—an epidemic of world-wide proportions.
I have a friend, Dr. Padden, who is superintendent of a hospital in Happy Valley, which is not far from Goose Bay in Labrador. Not long ago he had admitted under his care the first two cases of LSD poisoning in Labrador. That it should have reached this stage in so short a time is indeed amazing. One
1020
of those admitted had picked up the drug in Toronto and the other in Montreal, and six months later they suffered typical psychiatric relapses which occur as a result of this particular drug. This is a man-made epidemic of tragic proportions. I fear that many people with good intentions have not helped to stop it. I hope that this Bill will do something towards that object.
4.53 p.m.
BARONESS SEROTA: My Lords, may I express very warm appreciation, which I am sure the House will share, to the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, for the care, patience and courtesy with which he has piloted this very important and, in parts, controversial Bill through the House. He reminded us of the many days we have discussed it, and it has finally been brought to birth after an exceptionally long period of gestation for it is exactly a year ago to-day when it first received its Second Reading in another place. It had two Second Readings there and almost completed two Committee stages. So no-one could begin to suggest that this Bill has been rushed through with undue haste.
I believe that its main contribution both now and in the future, apart from the fact that it replaces and consolidates our present fragmented drug legislation, will be those clauses, Clauses 13, 14 and 15, which the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, just mentioned and which are concerned with control of prescribing by doctors—clauses which I am glad to say have been included with the agreement and consent of the medical profession. All our experience in recent years during the development of what the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, has just called "the world epidemic" has indicated that availability in itself has been a determining factor in the ever-changing pattern of drug misuse. In discussions on legislation of this kind one is inclined to forget the medical use of drugs, which has been one of the boons and lifesavers of our society. It is to my mind a great tragedy that the immense proliferation of mood-modifying drugs in general circulation has contributed to so much unhappiness and indeed death in certain cases.
With the passing of this Bill there is still an urgent need to continue and to increase publicity about the dangers of drug misuse, and to encourage doctors

1021
to prescribe less potent substances to many people who are likely to be only psychologically dependent. In this context, I would urge the Government to press ahead with the greatest possible speed with their discussions with the medical and pharmaceutical professions on the measures we need to control "loose" and over-prescribing of barbiturates which we discussed during our Second Reading debate. The number of prescriptions in circulation—some 12 million a year, I believe—is in itself a clear indication of the level of availability of barbiturates in our society and they are still a major cause of suicide cases.
A further point which I press on the Government at this stage is to ensure that, with the passing of this Bill, the concern many of us have expressed in connection with the continuation of police "stop and search powers" should be met by the early publication of a code of practice which police forces throughout the country would follow. Recent correspondence in The Times on this matter has served to confirm the fears expressed by several noble Lords during the discussion of this particular clause of the Bill; and I would therefore urge the Government to complete their discussions with chief constables and publish a code of practice as quickly as possible.
Finally, my Lords, it is true to say that at this moment the main focus for the development of policy and social action in the field of drug-misuse will now pass to the new statutory Advisory Council on Drug Dependence. All of us would wish the Chairman-to-be and its members every success in their vital work. Once again I express the hope that in the arduous responsibilities which will fall to them under this Bill the Government will give the Council every assistance and support.
On Question, Bill passed, and returned to the Commons.

POLICE PENSIONS (AMENDMENT) REGULATIONS 1971
4.59 p.m.
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, I beg to move that the Police Pensions (Amendment) Regulations 1971, a draft of which was laid before your Lordships
1022
on March 4, be approved. These Regulations amend the Police Pensions Regulations 1971 by easing the conditions under which the pensions of certain police widows may be increased at the discretion of the police authority. Before 1948 police officers did not contribute to the State pension scheme. As a result, certain police widows are not entitled to contributory national insurance pensions. It has been the policy since 1948 that police authorities should have discretion to increase police pensions payable to these widows, so as to secure that they are not worse off than they would have been had their husbands' contributions qualified them for these national insurance pensions.
Entitlement to a national insurance pension, which is at present £5 a week, is subject to a number of conditions. One of these is that the marriage must have lasted for three years, and another that the widow had attained the age of 50, either at the date of her husband's death or at the time she ceased to receive a widowed mother's allowance. Under the National Insurance (Old Persons' and Widows' Pensions and Attendance Allowance) Act 1970, the stipulation for national insurance purposes about the length of the marriage is done away with, and the condition of having reached the age of 50 is lowered to the age of 40. But, at the same time, for the widow who benefits through the relaxed conditions, her national insurance pension will be the normal £5 a week scaled down by 7 per cent. for each year by which her age was under 50 at the material time. The Draft Police Pensions Regulations now before the House make corresponding relaxations in the conditions subject to which discretionary increases in police widows' pensions will be payable. They are expressed to come into operation on April 5, 1971, the same day as the corresponding provisions for national insurance become effective.
Finally, my Lords, I may say that the Draft Regulations have been agreed by the Police Council for the United Kingdom, on which the local authority and police staff associations are represented. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Draft Police Pensions (Amendment) Regulations 1971, laid before the House on March 4, be approved.—(Lord Windlesham.)
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, I simply want to thank the noble Lord for explaining the purpose of this Order so clearly and to say that this is one of the occasions when we are very glad indeed to support the Government. We are glad that it has been found possible to make these relaxations.

BETTING, GAMING AND LOTTERIES (AMENDMENT) BILL [H.L.]
5.2 p.m.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I beg to move that this Report be now received.
Moved, That the Report he received.—(Lord Stonham.)
Clause 1 [Amendments of Betting, Gaming and Lotteries Act 1963]:
LORD STONHAM LORD STONHAM moved Amendment No. 1:
Page 1, line 7, leave out from ("5(1)") to end of line 8 and insert ("at the end there were inserted "or"")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 1. I very much regret that at the Report stage it is necessary to introduce a number of Amendments to this quite small Bill, but they are all drafting or administrative points, which I hope can be shortly explained and quickly disposed of. The general principles of the Bill are not by any means affected. This particular Amendment, for example, is purely drafting. Clause 1(i) of this Bill adds a new paragraph to Section 5(1) of the Betting, Gaming and Lotteries Act 1963, and it is the amendment of that Act which is the principal purpose of this Bill. This entails inserting the word "or" at the end of the existing paragraph (b) of that subsection of the 1963 Act. I beg to move.
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, for the benefit of noble Lords who were not present during the earlier stages of this Bill, I should like to repeat that the attitude of the Government towards the proposals of the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, is one of benevolent neutrality. The noble Lord has described his Bill
1024
in modest terms as a "small Bill", and although it has attracted a fair number of Amendments, both on Committee and on Report, these are aimed to ensure that the Bill fulfils its purpose of helping to relax to some extent the present restrictions on greyhound racing, and to do so in the most effective way. My Department have been consulted throughout and I think I can shorten the proceedings by saying at the outset that all the Amendments in the noble Lord's name on the Marshalled List to-day are acceptable to the Government and have our full support.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 2. This is another drafting Amendment. The words "period of" are unnecessary. By Section 3 of the Interpretation Act 1889 "month" means "calendar month", and the revised wording completely conveys our meaning. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 9, leave out ("period of").—(Lord Stonham.)
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 3. This is a paving Amendment to make way for an Amendment to Clause 2 which I shall move later. It has the effect of omitting the whole paragraph (b) of Clause 1(iv). That paragraph deals with the total number of special betting days, which will now be dealt with in Clause 2. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 6, leave out from ("1971"") to end of line 11.—(Lord Stonham.)
LORD STONHAM LORD STONHAM moved Amendment No. 4:
Page 2, line 17, after ('1971") insert ("; and"; and").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 4. This also is a drafting Amendment. The repetition of the word "and" is intentional; it is not a printer's error. The first "and" is made necessary by the amendment made by Clause 1(5) of this Bill to Section 16(1) of the 1963 Act, which is the principal Act. Clause 1(5) substitutes a new paragraph for the first three paragraphs in

1025
that subsection. The paragraph must end with "and" to lead on to the next paragraph. The second "and" is necessary because Clause 1 of the Bill comprises a list of six amendments or provisos and the second "and" really leads on from the fifth item in the list to the last item. It could have been explained, in other words, that the first "and" goes inside the quotation marks in line 17 and the second "and" goes outside them. I beg to move.
Clause 2 [Notification of Betting Days]:
5.10 p.m.
LORD STONHAM LORD STONHAM moved Amendment No. 5:
Page 2, line 27, leave out from ("authority") to end of line 40 and insert—

"(a) specifying not more that fourteen days in that month as days which are to be betting days for the track, that is to say, days on which betting facilities may be provided on the track; and

(b) stating whether any one or more of those notified betting days is to be a special betting day for the purposes of section 7(2) of the Betting, Gaming and Lotteries Act 1963 and, if so, specifying which.

(2) For any particular track, not more than four days in any one year shall be special betting days for the purposes of the said section 7(2); and accordingly where for any track there have for those purposes been four such days in any year, no other day in that year shall for those purposes be a special betting day for that track, notwithstanding that it may have been notified as such under this section.
(3) If in the case of any day notified to the licensing authority under this section as a betting day for a particular track—

(a) the occupier of the track notifies that authority in writing before that day that, notwithstanding the earlier notification, the day in question will not be a betting day; or

(b) no betting takes place on the track on that day and the occupier notifies that authority in writing of that fact within seven days of the expiry of that day,

the notification of that day under this section as a betting day (and, where applicable, its notification thereunder as a special betting day) shall be disregarded for all purposes of the Betting, Gaming and Lotteries Act 1963.
(4) In this section—
"the licensing authority", in relation to a licensed track, means the authority by whom the track was licensed;
"year" means a period of twelve months beginning with 1st July."
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 5. Its effect is virtually to re-write Clause 2, but there is only one change of substance. The other changes involve a rearrangement whereby the maximum number of special betting days are dealt with in this clause instead of in Clause 1, and the Amendments are of course consequential Amendments. If this Amendment is accepted, subsection (1) of Clause 2 will provide for the advance notification of both betting and special betting days, thus dealing in one subsection with what is dealt with in two subsections in the Bill as it now stands.
Subsection (2) of the clause as it will appear if the Amendment is made contains the main rearrangement of the Bill. It deals with the limits on the number of special days, which we have already agreed to delete from the Bill by accepting an earlier Amendment, and also with the reinstatement of a special betting day if one is cancelled by the operator. Under the existing law, special betting days are fixed by the local authority for the whole of the year. In future, they will be fixed from month to month by notification from the track operator. If the day notified is cancelled, it obviously should not count as one of the four, and this is achieved in the Amendment by the device of imposing no limit on the number of notifications but providing simply that once there have been four special betting days in the year for the track there shall be no more.
The change of substance that I mentioned is in the new subsection (3) of the Amendment. Under the Bill as it stands, if a day has been notified in advance as a betting day and is then cancelled, the track operator is required to notify the licensing authority of the cancellation within the period of 35 days from the end of the month in which the day occurred. But nothing is said in the Bill as to the effect of such notification, and it is left to be inferred that the cancelled day does not count towards the maximum of 130 in the year; nothing is done about it. The Amendment tightens up the procedure by providing that cancellation may be notified either in advance or within seven days—not 35—of the expiry of the cancelled day. In either event, the effect of such a notice is specified to be that the day shall

1027
thereby be disregarded as a betting day or special betting day. This is an improvement to the Bill; it ensures that cancellation is notified either in advance or within a week, while the facts are still fresh in people's minds. For example, the cancellation may well be due to extremely bad weather conditions, and in that event seven days is quite enough for an operator to advise a local authority. The subsection also makes it clear that the effect of a notice of cancellation is that the notification of the day in question shall be disregarded, and thus the day lost can be used later in the year.
Subsection (4) of the Amendment, the last subsection, defines "licensing authority" for the purposes of the clause. In doing so it also has the effect of defining the licensing authority mentioned in the provisions in subsections (3), (4), (5) and (6) of Clause 1, which the Bill substitutes for other provisions in the 1963 Act, since these provisions all refer to this clause. The subsection also defines "year" for the purposes of subsection (2) of this clause. I beg to move.
Clause 5 [Short title and citation]:
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, this is a purely drafting Amendment. The word "together" is inserted for greater clarity. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 3, after ("cited") insert ("together").—(Lord Stonham.)
LORD STONHAM LORD STONHAM moved Amendment No. 7:
Page 3, line 4, at end insert—
("( ) This Act shall come into force on 1st July 1971; and as respects the giving of notice of betting days and special betting days for July 1971 section 2(1) of this Act shall have effect as if for the reference to twenty-eight days there were substituted a reference to fourteen days.")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 7. This Amendment provides that the Act shall come into operation on July 1 this year. This is necessary because the licensing year under the 1963 Act runs from July 1 in each year. The Bill changes the number of betting days a year that a dog track will in future be allowed, and if
1028
this change did not come into effect at the beginning of a full year complicated transitional provisions would be required, which the Amendment avoids. The Amendment does in fact make one transitional provision by allowing the notification of betting days and special betting days in the month of July, 1971, alone to be made only 14, instead of 28, days in advance. This will give an opportunity for all tracks to be given the longest notice possible, after passing of the Bill, of the changes it makes before they have to start operating the new procedure. I beg to move.
LORD STONHAM LORD STONHAM moved Amendment No. 8:
In the Title, line 2, leave out from ("to") to ("tracks") in line 3 and insert ("days on which betting is permitted on").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 8. I should like to express somewhat belated but nevertheless very sincere thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, for his eloquent, self-imposed, but very effective silence; also to thank him and his Department for their very great help throughout all stages of the Bill: without such help I should not have proceeded thus far. This last Amendment is a minor Amendment to fit the Title to the revised scope of the Bill. The Bill deals not only with the procedure for the fixing of betting days but also with the maximum number allowed annually to dog tracks, and this Amendment enlarges the Title slightly so that it covers both those points. I beg to move.

CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA BILL
5.20 p.m.
LORD DIPLOCK: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a second time. It is, I think, a non-controversial Bill; at any rate, in another place it went through "on the nod" without a word being said about it. If our Parliamentary processes are to work, I apprehend that something should be said about its subject matter and its purpose before it goes upon the Statute Book.

1029
Its subject matter is the rather technical subject of bills of lading. Although it is technical, it is of very considerable importance to the trade and commerce of this country and of the world. The purpose of the Bill is to enable the United Kingdom to ratify a protocol amending the international Convention generally known as the Hague Rules. The Protocol was signed by this country and by 20 other countries in Brussels in 1968. Your Lordships will be aware that the bill of lading is a document which, for many years, and indeed for several centuries, has lain at the base of much of international trade. It is a document of title to goods, and contains also the terms of the contract between the carrier and the owner of the goods. It is a negotiable instrument which enables the goods to be sold, and money to be raised on them, while they are still in transit.
In order that it may play its role effectively in international trade, it is essential that the contract of carriage should contain standard terms regulating the mutual rights and liabilities of the shipowner and the persons interested in the goods, so that it may be known by everyone concerned in international trade and commerce, by sellers and by buyers, by insurers and by bankers, exactly where they stand and what the liabilities are. Those standard terms were settled in the Hague Rules at the Brussels Conference of 1924, which passed the international Convention commonly known by that name. They were incorporated into United Kingdom law by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1924.
That Convention has probably been the most successful and the most widely accepted of international Conventions relating to overseas trade. The majority of the great commercial countries of the world are parties to it, and also the rules are used voluntarily in a great portion of the trade between countries which are not parties to the Convention. I believe that the success of this original Convention stems from the fact that it originated from the International Maritime Committee, which was composed of national associations which, in turn, consisted not of theoretical lawyers but, in the case of the British Maritime Law Association
1030
at any rate, all the interests concerned in international trade.
The Amendments to the Hague Rules which are contained in the Protocol of 1968 originated, to a large extent, from the same source, but it so happens that the major Amendment relating to the limits of liability of the carrier comes not from the International Maritime Committee but from the Brussels Conference itself, a very much larger body in which the Amendment was first proposed. It was considered for many months while the Conference was adjourned, and was ultimately passed at the Conference, at which 52 countries were represented, in February, 1968.
As leader of the United Kingdom delegation at the conference, and as chairman of the drafting committee, I am in a position to say that the Protocol has the approbation of all commercial interests involved in this country: shippers as well as shipowners; insurers of cargo as well as the clubs and bankers, and others who are interested in the export of goods. The Protocol does not come into effect until it has been ratified by ten nations, five of which must have a gross tonnage of shipping of one million tons or more. At both the original Conference in 1924 and at the Brussels Conference of 1968, and in the negotiations which led up to it, this country took a leading part, and it is, I venture to suggest, fitting that we should take a leading part in ratifying it. The shipping and commercial interests in this country have been pressing us to do so, but we cannot until the necessary legislation is passed. A Bill in similar form to this was introduced in another place last year but was a casualty of the Election, and now it comes before your Lordships for the first time as a result of its being re-introduced.
The Bill replaces the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1924. It makes the amended rules set out in the Schedule part of the law of this country instead of the original rules scheduled to the Act of 1924. This has been done in the interests of clarity instead of amending the 1924 Act, so that you can turn to a single document, the Schedule, in order to find out the standard form of terms of carriage of goods by sea.

1031
I think it is right at this stage that I should refer to the two major amendments which result from the Brussels Protocol. The first relates to the limit of shipowners' liability, and it is to be found in Article IV (5) of the Schedule. The limit of liability was originally fixed in 1924 and embodied in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1924 at £100 sterling gold value per unit or package loaded. That limit is unsuitable to-day for at least two reasons, and has indeed in one respect been unsuitable for quite a time. The first reason is devaluation, the fall in value of money. Although the Hague Rules contain a gold value clause this is in a very elementary form and has not been adopted, at any rate uniformly, among the many countries which have adopted the rules.
Because the £100 had got out of scale as long ago as 1950, the shipping interests in this country entered into what is known as the "gold clause agreement", by which they voluntarily undertook to pay up to an increased limit of £200. But this is an unsatisfactory way of dealing with the problem because, while this may be done voluntarily in this country, the same voluntary steps are not taken elsewhere and the Hague Rules fail in their purpose of having standard terms from whatever country the goods are shipped. Furthermore, that agreement has become unsuitable, because it was based upon conventional stowage in 1924 and, broadly speaking, the size of the unit or package then was what one stevedore could hump upon his back. As your Lordships know, a large proportion of the sea trade is now done in containers, which are of a size which makes a £100 limit quite out of scale with the nature and grandeur of the damage which can be done.
The Protocol deals with the problem in this way. It provides two forms of limitation. First, there is the limitation by unit or package, and that has been raised to 10,000 gold francs. There is now a sophisticated gold value clause, the value of which at present in sterling is £270. In addition, there is a weight limitation of 30 francs per kilogram, which in sterling is 80p per kilogram, and the relevant limitation is whichever of these figures is higher. So that if you have a small and valuable package
1032
shipped by traditional methods, the package limitation will be the higher. If, however, the weight of the unit is over 6⅔ tons, you cross the bridge at which the weight limitation becomes the higher and is available.
The Article contains also a clause known as the "container clause", which was designed to solve the difficulty which arose once containers were introduced. The difficulty was knowing whether the container itself was the package, so that the shipment was a single package, or whether the various packages within the container were individual packages, which would of course affect the limitation of liability of the shipowner. The way in which the difficulty has been dealt with is to leave it to the option of the parties whether to enumerate in a bill of lading the number of packages in a container, in which case they will count as packages for the purposes of the limitation; or not to enumerate them, in which case the container will count as the unit and will obviously count in the weight limitation. No doubt that option gives to the parties the opportunity of deciding whether to insure the extra risk with their cargo underwriters, or whether to rely upon recoveries from the shipowner. As before, the Protocol, like the Hague Rules, leaves it open to the carrier and the shipper to agree higher limits of liability of the shipowner if they wish. What it forbids is any agreement for lower limits.
The next Article to which I ought to draw attention is Article IV bis, which is an Article inserted as a result of a decision of the courts in this country. I do not think the same problem applies to other countries. It was held in the "Himalaya" case that if, instead of suing the shipowner, the carrier, you sued the master of the ship or the agent of the carrier, then he was not as a matter of law entitled to avail himself of the limitation of the Hague Rules. Since in these days owners cannot allow their employees to be made bankrupt by being parties to large claims for damages, this provided a way of driving a coach and four through the relevant provisions of the Hague Rules. Article IV bis is intended to deal with this, by providing that the limitations shall be available to servants or agents of the carrier if they are sued.

1033
I should now like to draw attention to Article X, which deals with the application of the Rules. Under the 1924 Act the Rules applied to bills of lading issued in this country. That was not, in fact, a complete compliance with the requirements of the Convention itself. We ought to have applied them to bills of lading issued in any contracting State. I think the reason we did not do so was that we passed the 1924 Act before the final draft of the Convention was made in Brussels, and were working upon an earlier draft. However, the object of Article X is to give as wide a scope to the Rules as is possible, and they will be applied as a matter of law in this country where the bill of lading is issued in a contracting State—that is to say, not only in this country, but in every country party to the Convention—or where the carriage is from a port in a contracting State, or where the contract itself voluntarily provides that the Rules shall apply to it.
As to the Bill itself, Clause 1 is the important clause. It provides that the Rules shall have the force of law, and, also, that the Rules shall be applicable to coastal shipping and to shipping between this country and the Republic of Ireland in cases where the contract requires the issue of a bill of lading. I should perhaps be frank and say that that is unlikely to have any wide commercial importance, because it is very rare for the contract of carriage on these short sea carriages to require a bill of lading. A different kind of document is normally used, because nobody really needs to deal with goods which are on so short a transit as that. Clause 1 has been agreed by all the interests concerned in the coastal and Irish trade.
Finally, my Lords, Clause 6 provides for the repeal of the 1924 Act and for the coming into effect of the new Act upon a date appointed by Order-in-Council. That date will of course not be until the ten countries have ratified the Protocol so that it comes into force. When it comes into force, it may be necessary to make some transitional provisions for the case of long-term charter parties which provide for the issue of bills of lading. Provision is made in Clause 6(5) for Orders-in-Council to be made to deal with transitional provisions of that kind. That will give time for
1034
discussion between the interests concerned.
My Lords, it is, I venture to think, important to the commerce of this country and of the world that this Bill should pass into law as soon as possible. As I have said, it is, I think, not controversial, and I hope that it will commend itself to your Lordships' House. I beg to move that this Bill be now read a second time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Diplock.)
5.41 p.m.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, I am sure the whole House will be most indebted to Lord Diplock for the great thoroughness with which he has explained this dry but important measure, and also for the amount of work which we all know he has done over the years in getting drafted the Protocol which is appended to this Bill. The House will understand me if I say that I feel we should not attach too much importance to the fact that the Bill went through the House of Commons "on the nod". In recent days and weeks many items which would otherwise have attracted attention in the House of Commons have been doing that, but I am fully with Lord Diplock in saying that that is all the more reason why we should have a good look at the Bill here.
The fact that this ratification Bill has been introduced by a noble and learned Lord who, though the most distinguished and learned of judges, is a private Member of this House, I take as an indication that the Government are not absolutely committed to the Bill, or to its timing, and that they do not as fiercely wish it to go into law at once as they would have done had they themselves introduced it, as is probably more often done than not in the case of ratification Bills. I do not entirely share Lord Diplock's view that the Bill is uncontroversial, and I propose to put a number of questions, mainly to the Government. They are on foreign policy and on the shape of the world, and not on the commercial details of this Bill.
The Bill introduces this Protocol of 1968, which amends the Protocol of 1924. There is one respect in which it is of considerable international interest to the nations of the world, and it is this. If I

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understand it aright, the 1968 Protocol shifts the balance of liability as between the cargo owner and the shipowner. This is very natural and right, and such things need shifting from time to time. The 1968 Protocol, which is before the House, improves the position of the cargo owner as against that of the shipowner. This is only part of it, but it is the part that gives rise to political considerations. The underdeveloped countries are predominantly cargo owners, not shipowners; the developed countries, and particularly this country, are more shipowners than cargo owners. Therefore, if one amends or disturbs that balance, one is ipso facto making an adjustment which amends or disturbs the balance of prosperity as between developed and underdeveloped countries.
The 1968 Protocol was submitted to and endorsed by an international body, the Brussels Diplomatic Conference, on which underdeveloped countries are in a minority. Whether it is for that reason or for another, I do not know, but it is a fact that two bodies on which the underdeveloped countries are in a majority—namely, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD and the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL—are seized of the question. UNCTAD has referred the matter to the Commission on International Trade Law and requested its opinion, and has specifically requested an opinion on the desirability of a fundamental revision of these matters. These two bodies, I understand, have been convinced by their underdeveloped members, who are in the majority, that although the 1968 Protocol redresses the balance between cargo owning interests and shipowning interests slightly in their favour, it does not do so nearly enough, and they will probably wish to see a further-going change of the same sort. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Diplock, said that the Protocol which is before the House has the approbation of all the concerned commercial interests in this country. I am sure it does. But the point is that it does not have the approbation of all the concerned commercial interests in all the countries of the world, and especially those in the countries which we must be
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particularly solicitous of, the underdeveloped countries.
My Lords, there is another fact. It was in 1968 that this Protocol was approved by the Brussels Diplomatic Conference. It is now 1971. Not a single country has yet ratified it: we are the first to do so. Why is this? Is it because other countries know that those two United Nations bodies are seized of the matter, and have objections to the Protocol and want to go further? Or is it for another reason; and, if so, what? I should like to ask Lord Lothian quite specifically: have any communications been made by UNCTAD or by the Commission on International Trade Law, either to the Brussels Diplomatic Conference as such or to any of its sub-groups, or to the Government of this country or to the Government of the United States, for instance, which is another great shipping country? Have any communications been made by the Governments of underdeveloped countries singly to the Brussels Conference or to the Government of our country, asking that the matter be stayed, that the Protocol be not ratified and put into effect, until the examination proceeding in the U.N. is complete? I think the House would wish to know what the answers to those questions are.
Why do we have to ratify ahead of any other country? May it not appear a gratuitous slap in the face for the underdeveloped countries if we do so? I may be wrong about all this, but I believe that the Government ought to explain in what way I am wrong, if I am, and I look forward to hearing a lot more about this political background. If the answers we get do not seem to noble Lords on this side of the House as satisfying on the political level as Lord Diplock's exposition was on the commercial and legal levels, then we on this side shall want to reserve the liberty of action which we naturally have as regards later stages of this Bill.
5.49 p.m.
LORD CHORLEY: My Lords, should like to speak for a few minutes on this Bill. It is, of course, a highly technical Bill, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Diplock, has pointed out, and, looking round, one sees that quite obviously

1037
a long speech on such a highly technical subject would be far from welcome. On the other hand, the so-called Hague Rules just about span my career as a maritime lawyer and I have been interested in them ever since Sir Henry Duke, an eminent lawyer who became President of the Admiralty Court and a Member of your Lordships' House as Lord Merrivale, presided over a conference at Gray's Inn—I think it was in 1920—when this standard form of contract for the carriage of goods by sea was agreed upon. It was a mere accident that they came to be called the Hague Rules; they should have been called the "London Rules." Their existence was due entirely to the initiative of this country at the end of the First World War.
Eventually after conferences at The Hague, from which the Rules got their name, it was the Brussels Conference and Convention of 1924 which finally brought them into play. But it was interesting, as the noble and learned Lord pointed out, that the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act was passed into law in this country before the Brussels Convention was carried through in Brussels. This marked the interest and enthusiasm which this country and the British Commonwealth of Nations had in getting this international system of rules for the carriage of goods by sea made into law. This was really the first important international maritime convention. There were earlier ones in respect of such matters as salvage; but there was nothing as important as this. I have always thought that it was a matter of great prestige for English shipping and forwarding interests that they should have succeeded in hammering out this very important international branch of shipping law.
The question of how the Convention has worked, how far The Hague Rules have succeeded, is a difficult one to answer with any confidence. The noble and learned Lord said that The Hague Rules worked remarkably well. That is, on the whole, my own view of the matter; but the profession itself, the commercial lawyers, are very much divided about it. As the noble and learned Lord knows, the present editor of Carver's, the well-known book on the carriage of goods by sea, devotes pages to showing how ineffective and almost futile The Hague Rules are, a view which other lawyers
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hold, too: although I think the majority of commercial and maritime lawyers consider that on the whole The Hague Rules have worked reasonably well.
They survived for a long time without being altered. A number of rather controversial decisions have been made, particularly the one to which the noble and learned Lord referred—the one about the masters being held liable—but probably the most controversial of the decisions was that on the "Muncaster Castle", in which the basis of the original compromise between the shipowners and the forwarding interests was wrecked by a decision in your Lordships' House. But I do not want to go into the pros and cons of that problem. The shipowners have tried to get the matter put right al an international conference held at Visby, in Sweden, at which the draft Rules were drawn up. They are often referred to as the Visby Rules.
I refer to this because—and here I have a great deal of sympathy with what fell from the lips of the noble Lord in front of me—this shows the real difficulty, once you get an international convention of this kind, of getting it amended. I do not think that this upsets the balance at all. It hardly does anything apart from adjusting the problems which arise from inflation and from the fact that the original limited liability had become completely ridiculous by the time the Wisby Conference was held. Indeed, as the noble and learned Lord pointed out, it has been put right by a conventional agreement between shipowners, shippers and insurance interests in London, by the so-called "gold clause".
This Convention is almost completely colourless. The obvious thing to do was to put the monetary side of it right. It contains this other clause, special to this country, which arose from the fact that the English courts took a different view of the responsibilities of the master of a ship from that taken by the courts of other maritime countries. My complaint about this Convention is the same as that of my noble friend in front of me: that it really hardly alters the position. It is not as if these discussions had not been going on: they have been going on since the end of the last war. The Wisby Conference was not the first conference at which these matters were discussed. If one works through the records of these

1039
various conferences, particularly the Wisby Conference, one finds a really astonishing amount of work put into them. Very able arguments were put forward on both sides. The result is that what one might call a ridiculous mouse came out of these labours.
The essential matter raised by this Bill and this Conference is the quite extraordinary difficulty of getting international conventions of this kind amended. When my noble friend Lord Kennet says that the undeveloped countries have a grievance, he is right. Of course they have: but they are not in a position to get it put right. I shall be surprised if the spokesman for the Government can explain, to-day or later, how that would happen. Unless you carry all these countries with you you cannot get an amendment. The noble and learned Lord, who has been through all these things, will confirm that it is almost impossible.
I think that one of the real difficulties in the way of international legislation in acting for the maritime commercial and overseas trade generally is the fact that you must get unanimity on the part of all the nations engaged in the matter. I find it difficult to see how this could happen. I do not think that we have any alternative but to accept this Bill ratifying this Convention. It is true that we shall be the first to do so; but in 1924, with the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, we were in advance of the Convention. It is true to say that something like 10 years passed before any other important maritime country ratified the original Brussels Convention. I think that one of the first to ratify was that important maritime State, Hungary. Certainly, it took the United States of America and others of the great maritime nations 10 years to do so; and I should not be surprised if at the end of 10 years, ratification of the present Convention will have been compartively small. Therefore, the sooner we get on with the business of ratifying this Bill, the better. I must say that I shall see it pass without an enormous amount of satisfaction.
5.59 p.m.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN): My Lords, I
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should like briefly to thank noble Lords who have spoken, particularly the noble and learned Lord, Lord Diplock, and on behalf of Her Majesty's Government to welcome this Bill. I would make it plain to the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, that the fact that this Bill has been moved by a private Member, although a very distinguished private Member, in no way indicates that the Government are unenthusiastic about it—any more than I think were the previous Government with their Bill which unfortunately was a casualty of the Election.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Diplock, not only for putting his Bill forward to-day but also for the most valuable work he put in at the 1968 Brussels Conference where he led the United Kingdom delegation with great distinction and, as noble Lords know, filled the crucial role of Chairman of the Drafting Committee. The noble and learned Lord has explained with great clarity the purpose of his Bill. I would add only that the Brussels Protocol—which the Bill, if enacted, will empower the Government to ratify—provides a real improvement in The Hague Rules relating to bills of lading. As the noble and learned Lord said, all sides of industry—carriers, shippers and the underwriters—wish to see it enacted, and have asked the Government to support it; and this we are pleased to do.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, raised the question of the undeveloped countries and, I think, implied that there was no great hurry to ratify this Protocol because of the activities in UNCTAD and UNCITRAL. It is perfectly true that UNCITRAL is now considering how to deal with this problem, but Her Majesty's Government, feel that so far it has concerned itself with procedure and, whatever the result, it will be a very long time before any real agreement on revised rules can be expected. Therefore we think that we should go ahead at present. I should like to make clear that this does not in any way prejudice any future work done by UNCITRAL. Having said that, my Lords, I would like once again to extend a welcome to the Bill and I hope that the House will now give it a Second Reading.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, can the noble Lord not tell us why nobody else

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has ratified in three years, and whether there has, or has not, been any communication from the developing countries as grouped in UNCTAD or UNCITRAL, or indeed singly, on this question?
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, so far as I am advised, the British Government have not received representations. I cannot answer for the Brussels Conference on this point. The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, asked why no other country has so far passed a Bill to ratify the Protocol. I suspect that that question should be asked of other countries, but we feel that it is time to give a lead.
6.3 p.m.
LORD DIPLOCK: My noble and learned friend Lord Chorley has pointed out—and I can endorse his remarks—the extreme difficulty in getting agreement on international conventions. I would venture to say that the moral of that is, let us take advantage of the agreement that we have managed to get, amending The Hague Rules, which, so far as I can see, everyone agrees is an improvement. If we do not take advantage of it by ratifying the Convention, the same unrealistic limits of 1924 will continue. I think everyone agrees that the new limits are better than the old.
I am familiar with the work now being started by UNCTAD and UNCITRAL in the sense that I have seen the papers. They are embarking on a study in depth of the whole problem of international transport of goods. I can speak only as an outsider, but one with some experience in this field, when I say that I agree with the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, that it is likely to be many years before any international agreement comes out of that. The Brussels Conference does not continue its session throughout. I can tell the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, that, so far as I know, the International Maritime Committee, which is the moving spirit of the Brussels Conference, has had no communication from the developing countries. It is true that UNCITRAL has been writing round to the maritime associations asking for their comments and views in the study which is being dome on international transport. I would say that at the Brussels Conference 52 nations were represented, and although the developing countries were in a minority,
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at any rate there were 23 which were clearly developing countries.
Finally, my Lords, I should like to say this. I do not think it right to look upon these Rules, and changes in them, as being some struggle between shippers, cargo owners and shipowners for shifting liability here and there. The risks involved in sea carriage are part of the cost of carriage, and what the Hague Rules are about is whether it is cheaper and more economic to cover that risk in the cargo insurance premium or to cover it by the higher rate of freight involved by the premium which the shipowner pays to his protection and indemnity club or insurer. As the trade is arranged now, I think that it is cheaper and more economic to do it through cargo insurance. It is essential to insure the cargo anyway, because there are other risks; and it is cheaper to put this additional risk into the insurance premium.
I venture to think that the practical demonstration of that is this: over all the years that have passed since 1924, or shortly after, when the Hague Rules came into effect, there has been a right of the parties, if they wish, to declare a higher value of goods and to raise the limit to that higher value. That option has always been available. Naturally, if the parties exercise that option, they pay a higher freight for the higher risk. But I think that over those years it would be difficult to find more than a handful of cases each year in which the parties had exercised that option. The reason for that is that it is cheaper to insure that risk, cover that risk, in your cargo insurance than to pay for it in the freight and for the shipowner to cover it. That is what the Hague Rules are about. They are about commerce and industry in real life and the way it can be most economically conducted. I venture to think, my Lords, that this Bill will assist in enabling it to be conducted efficiently. The Bill has the approval and the approbation in this country just as much of cargo owners and shippers of goods as it has of shipowners.
My Lords, I should not like to close without thanking my noble friends for the kind remarks which they have made about my introduction of this Bill. I feel that I ought to apologise for introducing it as a Private Member. I do not think that this is unusual in this case, because

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when this Bill was introduced in the last Session of Parliament it was also introduced by a Private Member.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

POWERS OF ATTORNEY BILL
LORD HODSON: My Lords, I beg to move that this Report be now received.
Moved, That this Report be now received.—(Lord Hodson.)

RECOGNITION OF DIVORCES AND LEGAL SEPARATIONS BILL [H.L.]
6.12 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD HAILSHAM OF ST. MARYLEBONE): My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a third time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 3a.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Bill read 3a.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR had given Notice of five Amendments:
Clause 2, page 2, line 2, leave out ("6") and insert ("5")
Clause 6, page 3, line 10, leave out ("overseas divorces and legal separations") and insert ("divorces and legal separations obtained outside the British Isles")
Clause 8, page 3, line 28, leave out ("an overseas divorce or legal separation") and insert ("a divorce or legal separation obtained outside the British Isles")
page 4, line 7, at end insert ("and, subject to subsection (1) of this section, the grounds stated in this subsection shall be the only grounds on which recognition may be refused to the validity of any other divorce or legal separation obtained outside the British Isles")
Clause 10, page 4, line 26, after ("separations") insert ("and other divorces and legal separations obtained outside the British Isles").
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, I have put down a number of Amendments which I think can conveniently be discussed together. I rise to move the first Amendment, but I would propose that by leave of the House they be taken en bloc, because, I hasten to say, they are all connected with the same object. If I were sufficiently unscrupulous,
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I think I could say that they were very highly technical Amendments designed to remedy a minor defect in the Bill; and I do not think that they are controversial. However, I think that I should spend a couple of moments explaining in a little detail what they actually do because, though they are highly technical, they do extend the Bill so as to complete the code of practice contained in the Bill for the recognition of foreign divorce proceedings; and to rule out the influence of the court rule in the Indyka case, which depends on common law. The difficulty was basically in the drafting, and this is remedied by the group of Amendments which I propose.
An "overseas divorce", which is the phrase used in the Bill, is defined in Clause 2 as one which has been obtained "by means of judicial or other proceedings in any country outside the British Isles and" is "effective under the law of that country." These words are entirely apt to cover every divorce obtained by proceedings which are part of the municipal law of the country concerned. By the phrase "municipal law" lawyers will recognise that I mean the law of the country; it has nothing to do with local government. But these words will not cover any divorce obtained in a foreign country under some other system of law. That seems complicated. May I take a concrete instance? If we take a Jewish Get, which is a rabbinical term for a divorce under the Mosaic Code obtained before a Beth Din—a rabbinical court of the Jewish faith—in France, as distinct from a Beth Din in England, French law may, in accordance with its own rules of private international law, either treat that divorce as effective or refuse to recognise its effectiveness. That is a question of French law.
Let us consider both the alternatives. If the French law recognises that divorce, there is no problem under the Bill, because the divorce itself becomes, under the definition which I have given under Clause 2, an "overseas divorce", having been obtained in France and effective under their law. But if we take the alternative position and suppose that French law does not recognise the Get obtained in the rabbinical court, there would be a difficulty here in recognising that proceeding.
In such a situation, the divorce would not be an "overseas divorce" within the meaning of Clause 2 because, although it had been obtained abroad, it would not be effective under the law of the country where it had been obtained: the law of France. Thus it would not be covered by Clauses 6 or 8 as they now stand, with the result that it would fall to be recognised, if at all, by the common law of this country—under the rules of private international law, which I explained at greater length on Second Reading; that is to say, under what we call by a sort of legal shorthand the Imdyka rule. Thus it would be arguable that the divorce would be entitled to recognition in England not only if the spouses were domiciled in Israel but also if they had some substantial connection with Israel. All the uncertainties of the Indvka rule (and it is one of the principal objects of the present Bill to eliminate these) would be preserved, in what is admittedly not a large (but sufficiently large to be significant) class of divorces obtained outside the British Isles. I think that this would be a most unsatisfactory position.
The Bill was intended to contain a complete and exclusive code for the recognition of divorces obtained abroad, and that is why the conclusion of Clause 6 provides that
"… save as aforesaid, no such divorce or legal separation shall be recognised as valid except as provided in this Act."
A divorce obtained in the circumstances which I have tried to describe would not be an "overseas divorce" and would not be caught by those words. The Amendments cure this defect. I need not go into them in detail, because I should be troubling the House unduly, but the Amendments do not affect the validity of any divorce obtained in the British Isles, whether by our own procedure, by Jewish Get, by Muslim Talak or by a Greek Orthodox form of divorce, in circumstances where such a divorce is effective under the law. As I say, it is all rather complicated, but I have tried to set out the unusual circumstances and have done my best to make them intelligible, though I am not sure if I have succeeded. I beg to move.
6.19 p.m.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: My Lords, may I ask the noble and learned
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Lord a question? He has told us that this is a complicated subject, so he will forgive me if I display an ignorance of the law. The Bill says,
"if its recognition would manifestly be contrary to public policy."
What is public policy in this context? Is not the recognition of Talak against public policy in this country? I am sure the House will forgive me, because I am going to take an extreme case. In the last century the burning of widows in India was part of the rituals of marriage. The British decided that this was contrary to public policy and took a strong line and abolished it. Are we not helping to perpetuate a grave injustice if we allow Talak to continue? Where do we draw the line regarding the ill-treatment of women in our own country? Does this encourage good race relations? If it does not encourage good race relations, then it is against public policy.
Let us think of a crowded road where 90 per cent. of the people are monogamous and have the customs of Britain, and the rest of them are polygamous and practise Talak. If, for instance, a Muslim decides to divorce his wife summarily by saying, "I divorce thee" three times, then marries an Englishwoman and divorces her in the same way, does this encourage good relations in the road? Her relations and friends must feel strongly about this. In view of the fact that this element in our population is increasing, one would have thought that we should face up to this problem. Again, we try to instruct our immigrants—and we spend a lot of money doing it—how to adapt to the British way of life. If in one essential way of life, the taking of marriage, and divorce, their life is entirely different from that of their neighbour, surely we are not helping them to adapt to the British way of life. I should like to ask whether Talak is compatible with the attitude that we are adopting in Britain.
My final word is this. We are of course helping to educate, and emphasising the importance of educating, the next generation of our immigrants. But are we going to allow a new generation to be encouraged to treat their women in this unjust manner? Again, I should have thought that that was contrary to public policy. That is why I link everything that I say to the words "public policy"

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in line 7. If my interpretation is entirely wrong, I apologise for wasting the time of the House, but I should like to hear the views of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor on this subject.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I confessed that this was a complicated matter and that I was not absolutely sure that I had succeeded in explaining to everyone's satisfaction the Amendments which I was moving; but I was not aware that I had failed so completely as the noble Baroness's speech indicates that I have. I thought that if there was one thing I had made absolutely plain about these Amendments it was that the practice of Talak in this country has nothing to do with them, and that they have nothing whatever to do with the practice of Talak in this country.
If I may, outside the scope of the Amendments that I have moved, make one or two observations which may—and I hope will; though again they may not—comfort the noble Baroness, I should like to go over quite briefly some of the ground which I tried to cover on Second Reading, and which was the subject of protracted debate on the Committee stage, when I thought that I had the ear of the House. On the second occasion I was supported by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Simon of Glaisdale, whose experience on this subject is enormous and whose particular experience was enriched by the fact that he had decided the leading case of Qureshi which gave rise to a great deal of the discussion.
The first point is that we are not, for the purposes of this Bill or indeed for anything in this Bill, concerned with the morality of Talak, which is a form of repudiation under Islamic religious law, modified in the case of Qureshi by Pakistani secular law to the extent that I tried to explain before. What we are concerned with is in what circumstances, if at all, it is juster to recognise its existence and its having taken place than not to recognise its existence. It is not a question of whether or not we allow it, any more than it is a question of whether we allow the Jewish Get or the Orthodox Greek divorce in the court of the Archbishop of Thyateira, both of which are relevant in this discussion. It is a question in what circumstances it is wise to recognise as
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being terminated rather than subsisting a marriage which that process purports to termniate.
It is not, therefore, primarily a question of the recognition of foreign divorces at all, or the permission or otherwise which you give to extra-judicial proceedings purporting to terminate the marriage. It is quite clear that where the parties are domiciled in this country the practice of Talak cannot terminate the marriage. It may or may not have, some civil effect upon property—I do not know: I have not considered it—but it cannot terminate a marriage. If parties are domiciled in this country and living here, you cannot terminate the marriage except by going to the divorce court. That must be absolutely plain.
For certain purposes such people do use Talak, because if they are Moslems, then having got a civil divorce they still have to get a religious divorce for the purposes of their own religion; and they have to make some rather peculiar arrangements about property, which I should be the last person to try to expound because I have not studied that particular religious law. Similarly, if you happen to be an Orthodox Jew and get a divorce in the civil court here, it is necessary for some purposes for you to go to the Beth Din for a Get. I have had in my professional life a number of cases where this was sought and refused, or sought and obtained: and indeed any competent practitioner who has to deal with Jewish parties to a marriage here warns them about this particular religious ceremony which, if they are Orthodox Jews, they have to carry out. But whether the marriage is terminated or not depends, in the case of Jews or of Moslems domiciled here, not upon the Rabbinical court of the Islamic court (or if they are Greek Orthodox, upon the Thyateira court) but on the divorce court which for all ordinary purposes is the county court or the High Court.
Therefore, the noble Baroness need not be concerned about people who are domiciled here. If people reside here they go to the divorce court in the ordinary way to the extent that the present laws of divorce in Britain entitle them to do so. There is a residence qualification of which a wife is entitled to avail herself to go to the divorce court

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here. But the question is, what happens if her husband (or vice-versa, but I will take it in the case of the wife petitioner, because I cannot go on saying the man or woman or wife or husband) gets a divorce by means of a Rabbinical decree?
All that was decided in Qureshi was that if you have two domiciled Pakistanis and the man gets a Talak decree in Pakistan or in Britain, it makes no difference: that marriage is at an end provided, so the learned President said in Qureshi, that no basic injustice has been committed. I am not quoting his actual words, because the noble Baroness gave me no notice that she was going to raise this point, but if she wants the actual words she will find them in the previous debates on the same subject. What the learned President meant by, "basic injustice being committed" would be something connected with property: for example, if the Talak decree deprived her of maintenance or something of that kind which could not be remedied in any other way. However, that is the effect of the Qureshi decision.
The effect of the Qureshi decision we discussed at great length in Committee, again trying to point out that it raised serious problems both in the case of wives who remain here and of wives who do not. But the arguments are not at all on one side, because the object of the Qureshi decision—and, I think, of most people connected with public policy—is not to allow a "limping" marriage; that is to say, to prevent the situation arising when the poor girl, besides being deserted by her husband who is probably by that time living in Karachi, and being deprived by him of maintenance, is not even able to contract a new union with an Englishman who will support her, and the fact that she has a "limping" marriage is much to her disadvantage. If one is going to argue about the merits of this case in terms of justice for women or for men, one must recognise the injustices that arise from "limping" marriages. All this has nothing to do with these Amendments, but it does not do to say, "I do not like Talak, I do not like Get, I do not like the Archbishop of Thyateira, and therefore we are not going to count it here. "You are faced with a human situation of a woman living in this country who cannot get a new marriage, cannot
1050
contract a new and decent union with an Englishman, and cannot get maintenance out of her deserting husband, who by that time may be in any part of the world he likes to name. So the arguments from the point of view of justice are rather on the other side.
I told the noble Baroness that I think there is something to be said—and so do the Law Commission—for assuming jurisdiction in these courts in the case of polygamous marriage from which these courts at the moment withdraw precisely because of this problem of maintenance. What the exact terms of public policy mean in this Bill I was careful not to define. The learned President said in Committee that he would have preferred his injustice formula. I am bound to use the public policy formula, because the purpose of this Bill is to ratify a Convention, and the Convention uses the words which are in the Bill and not others. Personally I disagreed with the learned President—as I made quite plain—when he said that public policy could not cover everything which was covered by injustice. It was that point which I undertook to go into with him, and certain other points about which I gave an undertaking to the noble Baroness, before the Bill went through the other place.
On the other hand, I must emphasise—and I come back to the point from which I started—that all these complicated questions we threshed out on Second Reading and in Committee, and they have nothing whatever to do with the purely technical Amendments which we have been discussing now on Third Reading. The technical Amendments which I am discussing have nothing to do with public policy; all they do is to say that where a Rabbinical divorce or an Islamic divorce is obtained in a foreign country it shall be an "overseas divorce" for the purpose of recognition in this Bill; that is to say, it will not depend upon common law, which is both uncertain and occasionally unjust, but will depend upon the code laid down in the Bill which this House has already approved.
I am sorry to speak at such length in this matter, but I hope that what I have said clears up the difficulty that is troubling the noble Baroness, at least to the extent of explaining that there is much to be said for the other point of view

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on the point which interests her, and secondly that the point which interests her is not touched by the Amendments that I am now proposing.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The other Amendments are all bound up with the first Amendment; I beg to move the remaining Amendments, Nos. 2 to 5.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I beg to move that the Bill do now pass.
Moved, That the Bill do now pass.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
Bill passed, and sent to the Commons.

LAND REGISTRATION AND LAND CHARGES BILL [H.L.]
6.35 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
House in Committee accordingly.
[The LORD AILWYN in the Chair.]
Clauses 1 to 8 agreed to.
Clause 9 [Exclusion of certain land charges from Land Charges Act 1925]:
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved Amendment No. 1:
Page 7, line 37, after ("than") insert ("a land charge falling within subsection (2) below or").
The noble and learned Lord said: This is a paving Amendment, and is one of a group of three which I could almost conscientiously call "technical", but my perhaps undue scrupulousness leads me to explain a little more what it is about. The Amendments correct a defect in Clause 9 by providing that land charges created in deeds necessitating first registration of title are not excluded from
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the Land Charges Act 1925 if they do not affect the land subject to first registration. Clause 9 inserts into the Land Charges Act 1925 a new section which, if agreed to, will be called Section 23A. This provides that land charges created in deeds inducing first registration of title are not registerable under the Land Charges Act. I explained the reason for that on Second Reading.
The new Section 23A is wide enough to exclude from the Land Charges Act land charges which are imposed by such deeds on land other than the land conveyed by the deed. This is a manifest drafting error. For example, under the clause in its present form a restrictive covenant benefiting the land conveyed and burdening the land retained by the vendor would not be subject to the Land Charges Act. That is clearly not the draftman's intention. Moreover, if (as will usually be the case where the title of the land sold off is required to be registered) the land retained by the vendor is unregistered, land charges burdening the retained land will not be recorded on the register of title until the retained land itself comes to be registered, and that may not be for many years later. It is therefore clearly desirable that land charges burdening the retained land in these circumstances should continue to be registerable under the Land Charges Act, and the Amendments have this effect. In my opinion, they are purely drafting for that reason, because they affect the purpose which I explained on Second Reading.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The same remarks apply to this Amendment. I beg to move Amendment No. 2.
Amendment moved—
Page 7, line 44, at end insert—
"( ) Subsection (1) above shall not apply to a land charge created as there mentioned if the estate owner whose estate is intended to be affected is not the grantee within the meaning of subsection (1) of the said section 123."—(The Lord Chancellor.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I beg to move Amendment No. 3.
Amendment moved—
Page 8, line 5, after ("excludes") insert ("certain").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
Clause 9, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 10 to 13 agreed to.
Clause 14 [Repeals]:
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved Amendment No. 4:
Page 9, line 2, at end insert—("( ) the Land Registry (Middlesex Deeds) Act 1891;
The noble and learned Lord said: This, and all the subsequent Amendments forming a second group, are a new feature of the Bill, and as I see them they are unimportant and uncontroversial. They are part of the law revision exercise and are designed to repeal spent enactments relating to the obsolete Middlesex Deeds Registry. This is no longer used. It was started by an Act of 1708, and it still remains, with certain other spent enactments, as part of the useless/umber on our Statute Book. The purpose of these Amendments is to get rid of it. I beg to move.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I beg to move Amendment No. 5.
Amendment moved—
Page 9, line 14, at end insert—
"(v) section 18 (Middlesex Registry Act 1708 not to apply to certain instruments);
(c) section 2 of the Land Registration Act 1936 (closing of Middlesex Deeds Registry)."—(The Lord Chancellor.)
Clause 14, as amended, agreed to.
Remaining clause agreed to.
Schedule 1 agreed to.
Schedule 2 [Repeals]:
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I beg to move Amendment No. 6. It is on the same point as the last Amendment.
Amendment moved—
Page 13, line 5, at end insert—

("54 & 55 Vict.c.64

The Land Registry (Middlesex Deeds) Act 1891.

The whole Act."

—(The Lord Chancellor.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I beg to move Amendment No. 7, which is on the same point.
Amendment moved—
Page 13, line 11, column 3, at end insert ("Section 18.")—(The Lord Chancellor.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Amendment No. 8 is on the same point. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 13, line 12, column 3, leave out ("Section") and insert ("Sections 2 and").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
Schedule 2, as amended, agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported, with the Amendments.

HIGHWAYS BILL
7.43 p.m.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF me ENVIRONMENT (LORD SANDFORD): My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a second time. This is a substantial Bill—81 clauses and 13 Schedules—but not, I would guess, a Bill which need engage your Lordships' attention deeply or for long. Much of it was prepared by our predecessors and there is little in it about which I would judge there need be much controversy. Only a few clauses are in themselves of great importance, but taken together the Bill's provisions form a most useful body of highway legislation. Out of all the 81 clauses I propose, your Lordships will be relieved to hear, to deal with only four in my opening remarks; but I shall be glad, to-day or at a later stage, to respond to comments or to answer questions on any of the other clauses which your Lordships may wish to raise.
Perhaps I should first say why we now need a Highways Bill at all. The reason is clear when one considers the rate at which Government expenditure on major roads has increased over the last 15 years. Fifteen years ago central Government expenditure on the road programme in England and Wales was no more than £5 million per annum; ten years ago it was £55 million and last year it was no less than £274 million. So far, to cope with

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this vast increase in highway planning and in highway building the only major legislation we have had was that introduced in 1946, and that introduced in 1949 to make possible the initial motorway progamme. We cannot now easily continue any longer to plan and to provide the highways needed for the 'seventies and the 'eighties with the legislation of the 'forties. This Bill provides what is now needed.
I turn to the purposes of the Bill. There are four main objectives running like threads through all its diverse clauses. The first is to make it easier for highway authorities to manage and administer their roads. This involves such measures as the power to exercise control over builders' skips in urban areas—that is Clause 28—to control planting in the verges of highways, which is dealt with in Clause 39, and so on. The second, broader purpose is to improve the environment by helping to take traffic that has no business there out of town centres, and particularly out of the centres of historic towns—places which were never created for the heavy lorries of to-day and the great flow of fast, noisy, smelly motor vehicles; cities and villages which cannot and ought not themselves to be altered or redeveloped to accommodate more traffic than is essential for their own prosperity.
The third aim of the Bill is to increase safety and to reduce accidents and casualties on the road. The research and statistics which were deployed in your Lordships' House in the course of the recent debate of Lord Ferrier on road safety showed strikingly how the incidence of road accidents falls most heavily on pedestrians in towns where congestion and conflict in the use of the highway is greatest; they showed also how good, modern road design and new and improved roads have helped, and will continue to help, to keep the accident rate down. If new roads, better designed on better lines, have these beneficial effects, then clearly there is much to be said for providing them with all reasonable despatch. This is the fourth aim of the Bill—to do this and yet at the same time to ensure that all those whose interests are affected by the construction of a new road should have their interests properly considered and protected, and feel satisfied
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that they are so protected and considered. It is on this last point that I should like to dwell for a while, and invite your Lordships' attention particularly to Clauses 14, 15, 16 and 17—the only four on which I want to spend any time.
The present statutory arrangements for the planning and the construction of roads, particularly new roads, are too rigid, and Clauses 14 to 17 will make them more flexible. These clauses make it easier for the Secretary of State, the Department of the Environment, the road construction units, the divisional road engineers and the highway authorities to get on with the job, unfettered by needless delays, red tape and formality, where the going is straightforward. But the same clauses retain, and indeed in several respects extend, the scope for objectors to state their case, to be heard at public local inquiries, to have schemes adjusted and modified and to receive compensation for private rights where these have to give way to the public good. These twin objectives are reconciled in a better way than before in these four clauses, and it is done in two main ways. The length of time for the receipt of objections after the publication of a draft scheme is reduced from three months to a minimum of six weeks—the normal time for an ordinary planning case. But, of course, if the scheme is a large one involving a long stretch of road, or likely to be controversial, the objection period can be, and will be, made longer—longer even than the present three months if necessary.
But the controversy and the objections to which a road scheme sometimes gives rise may not apply to the whole length of a proposed new road: the objections may focus upon only a part—perhaps two or three miles out of a length of 25 miles. To cater for this eventuality three options are open. The proposal can be put forward, as it sometimes is now, in three, four or five separate parts—separate draft orders. Or—and this is one of the innovations—the Secretary of State can now decide, in the light of the objections he has received to a single draft order, to divide the scheme into parts so that one part to which there is no objection can go ahead, while another part goes to public inquiry.

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Or—and this is another innovation, and the one likely to prove most useful—the whole scheme, after objections have been received, can go to inquiry for the objections to be heard, and then in the light of that and the inspector's report on the inquiry the Secretary of State will be free to approve one part of the scheme which he feels able to approve, while withholding his confirmation of another part, so that it may be further examined and if necessary modified or replaced by another scheme. Thus, three alternative ways are provided of combining the need to get on with the job expeditiously with the need to protect and safeguard the rights of objectors and private interests to the full.
Clause 17 introduces another element of flexibility: scope for adjusting the line of a road by up to 55 yards from the centre line after the scheme has been confirmed. The intention is to have recourse to this when, for example, at the request of an individual affected by a new road, it is found feasible to make some small alteration to the approved line for his benefit. At present any such deviation is illegal once the main line is approved, unless a further order is obtained. The need for this, and all it involves, often rules out any such adjustment in practice, however desirable and sensible it may be. The new clause is, therefore, I submit, greatly to be welcomed.
I hasten to add that there are two safeguards to prevent the Secretary of State from making undue use of this flexibility in his own interests against those of other parties. First, the Secretary of State's right to use his power under Clause 17 has to be written into each particular order, and can itself be objected to at an inquiry. Secondly, the use of the power to vary the line of a road in any particular case must be with the agreement of all affected by the ensuing modification, or else if there are objectors they will have a right to be heard, over and above the right they already have to appear at any inquiry into the compulsory purchase order. I believe that the provisions in these four clauses will prove to be of benefit all round: to those whose job it is to get on with the roads, to those who have their own rights to defend, and to those, both local authorities and amenity societies, who have important public and local interests to safeguard and to defend.
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My Lords, without going into any further clauses at this stage, I would, if I may, take this opportunity before I close to pay a tribute to two of the principal parties involved in these highway exercises: first, to the road construction units, for the growing care and skill with which they choose the line of new roads, and the sympathy with which their staff, and their landscape artists in particular, design and build the roads themselves. I welcome very much, as I believe many of your Lordships do, the growing public recognition and appreciation of their work. I should also like to acknowledge the part that amenity societies and others have played and will, I hope, continue to play by their constructive criticisms of the major highway schemes. Particularly to be welcomed is the trend towards the broadly based widely representative society which takes on the responsibility of presenting the case at a public inquiry for a wide range of public opinion and private objectors. While one would not, of course, dream of inhibiting any individual or ad hoc group from coming forward at any inquiry, there is clearly an advantage if the main case can be put forward by an established organisation which has experience of the statutory procedures, a grasp of all the local relevant facts and a clear understanding of who it is they are representing.
I also hope that highway authorities and amenity societies fulfilling this role will both feel that they can welcome these particular provisions of the Bill on which I have enlarged somewhat, and find in it an opportunity to extend the growth of the mutual respect which is so necessary if each side in these inquiries is to fulfil its respective role. I beg to move that the Bill be now read a second time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Sandford.)
6.57 p.m.
BARONESS PHILLIPS: My Lords, on behalf of Her Majesty's Opposition I should like to welcome this Bill which has been so clearly explained by the noble Lord, Lord Sandford. The Bill was, of course, on the stocks during the period of the last Administration, and we are glad to see that the present Government are carrying on our good work. I understand that my noble friend Lord Shepherd has given to the noble Lord,

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Lord Sandford, some points which were raised by the Association of Municipal Corporations and which seem to be worthy of attention. While I should not expect the noble Lord to reply now, nor indeed would there be any purpose in delaying the House, my noble friend Lord Shepherd would like to return to those points during the Committee stage of the Bill. I am delighted to welcome the Bill.
6.58 p.m.
Loge AIREDALE: My Lords, I have one point I should like to raise and it is rather a detailed one. Let us suppose that there is a road widening scheme, that part of the land earmarked for that scheme is privately owned and that the owner would otherwise wish to develop the land. He is denied his rights to develop it by reason of the road widening scheme. The question arises, is he entitled to compensation or not for being denied his right to develop his property?
This question of compensation arose in a case which came on appeal to the House of Lords last year. It was a case concerning the Westminster Bank Limited. I suppose this was just before the Westminster Bank became, so to speak, "nationalised". It was the case of Westminster Bank Ltd. v. Minister of Housing and Local Government. I think I can best quote from the part of the summary of the judgment where their Lordships decided that Parliament had chosen to set un two different ways of preventing development which would interfere with schemes for road widening:
"… it must have been aware "—
that is to say, Parliament must have been aware—
"that one"—
scheme—
"involved paying compensation but that the other did not; since"—
Parliament
"had expressed no preference and imposed no limit on the use of either, the use of one method rather than the other could not, in the absence of special circumstances, be said to be an abuse of power."
My Lords, I suggest that that illustrates a somewhat unsatisfactory state of affairs, because what it means is that it is quite outside the control of the owner of the
1060
property involved. The question whether or not he received compensation for the loss of his right to develop depends not upon anything which he does but upon which method the authority concerned chooses to adopt. Not only is this uncertain and unsatisfactory for the particular landowner, but it is surely unfair as between one landowner and another, because the landowner in one local authority area may get the benefit of compensation because of the method that authority adopts, but another landowner in exactly the same position but in opposition to a different local authority may be denied his compensation because of the method which his local authority adopts.
This is not a question to which I can possibly expect the Minister to provide any sort of answer now, but it is a matter which, in my submission, we ought to consider between now and the next stage of the Bill, in order to try to get into the law some uniformity, so that there shall be equality of treatment for people in similar circumstances who will either not get or lose compensation simply according to which method happens to be adopted in their case by the particular local authority with whom they have to deal.
7.2 p.m.
LORD SANDFORD: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Phillips, for her reception of this Bill on behalf of the Opposition. May I assure her that I indeed have the document to which she referred. Although we should have liked to have it even sooner, we will nevertheless have it looked at and reopen consultations with the A.M.C. before the next stage, so that any good points they make can be incorporated in Amendments.
The noble Lord, Lord Airedale, asked me some questions about compensation. He rightly surmised that I would not attempt to answer them now without notice, but I should like to say that all questions of a similar nature to the one which he has raised have deliberately been left out of this Bill, because, as I think he will know, Her Majesty's Government are currently engaged in a very comprehensive review of the whole compensation code. So although I take the point that he may want that matter looked at—and I agree that it should be

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looked at within this comprehensive code—my first reaction is to resist his suggestion that it should be looked at within the context of this Bill, for the reason I have just given. I hope that he will accept and understand that point.
LORD BROUGHAM AND VAUX: My Lords, could the noble Lord give some idea of the questions the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, has asked in this document on which negotiations may be reopened?
LORD SANDFORD: My Lords, I do not think so; it would be tedious and laborious. There are four pages of minor technical points. My reason for saying that we should have liked to have them sooner is because I think they could easily have been disposed of by our officials. I am sure that if the noble Lord will get in touch with the A.M.C. they will be glad to draw him into their discussions.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, the noble Lord will bear in mind that it is not intended to take this Bill in Committee for another four or five weeks, and there will be ample time to look at all these points.
LORD SANDFORD: I agree, my Lords.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

LANCASHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL (GENERAL POWERS) BILL [H.L.]
The CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES informed the House that the opposition to the Bill was withdrawn: the Order made on February 16 last discharged, and Bill committed to the Committee on Unopposed Bills.
LONDON TRANSPORT BILL
Brought from the Commons; read 1a, and referred to the Examiners.

BRITISH WATERWAYS BILL
Returned from the Commons with the Amendments agreed to.
House adjourned at four minutes past seven o'clock.