Lords Sitting of 9 June 1971

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Portsmouth.

BARONESS MACLEOD OF BORVE
Evelyn Hester, widow of the Right Honourable lain Norman Macleod, having been created Baroness Macleod of Borve. of Borve in the Isle of Lewis, for life—Was, in her robes, introduced between the Lord Grenfell and the Lord Butler of Saffron Walden.

HISTORIC BUILDINGS COUNCIL GRANTS
2.48 p.m.
LORD SANDYS: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they have formulated plans for increased assistance to historic towns and historic buildings.]
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT (LORD SANDFORD): My Lords, my right honourable friend the Secretary of State hopes that the increase from £700,000 to £1 million in the annual amount of grants he can offer on the recommendation of the Historic Buildings Council for England will make it possible roughly to double the level of expenditure on town schemes as well as increase substantially expenditure on individual buildings of outstanding historic interest. I shall be meeting the Historic Buildings Council to-morrow to discuss the way in which the increased allocation can best be apportioned.
LORD SANDYS: My Lords, while thanking my noble friend for that very encouraging reply, may I ask him whether he can say what co-ordination has been
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arranged between the town hall and Whitehall in town scheme grants, especially for historic towns?
LORD SANDFORD: My Lords, the local authority applies to the Historic Buildings Council. If the Council recommend that the buildings collectively are of outstanding historic or architectural interest, they are eligible as a group; they do not have to be outstanding individually. Buildings, whether in historic towns or elsewhere, which are individually outstanding are eligible for Historic Buildings Council grants in the normal way. The Historic Buildings Council make it a condition of a scheme that the area concerned should be included in a designated conservation area.
THE EARL OF LAUDERDALE: My Lords, can my noble friend say whether the improvements he has mentioned will apply also to the Scottish Historic Buildings Council?
LORD SANDFORD LORD SANDFORD: No, my Lords; that is another question.
LORD GISBOROUGH: My Lords, would not the noble Lord agree that the penalty for the demolition of scheduled historic buildings is still totally inadequate in relation to the benefit which a developer may receive for having a cleared site?
LORD SANDFORD: No, my Lords; I do not think I would agree that the penalty is inadequate, but that is a different subject. I will go into it, however, if the noble Lord will put down a Question.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, while all sides of your Lordships' House will welcome the increase of £300,000 a year in the H.B.C. money, could the noble Lord remind the House what was the annual rate of money for historic towns which was committed by the former Government and cancelled by this Government on January 1 of this year?
LORD SANDFORD: No, my Lords; I am not aware that we cancelled any grants for town schemes. We maintained the last increase which the Government had made, from £575,000 to £700,000, and we continued the town schemes which were then in force. There are 27 town schemes in force, and two are being

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negotiated at the moment. The point at issue between us, so far as I can recall, was whether immediately to introduce legislation for a conservation grant. This is rather a different thing and our decision will be subject to the pilot projects being carried out in Bath, Chester, York and Chichester.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, can the noble Lord remind the House what was the amount of central Government and local government money committed for the year 1973/4 by the last Government on May 20, 1970?
LORD SANDFORD: I think the noble Lord will probably remember that better than I can. But the proposal, which would have required legislation, and which we have not adopted without further investigation, was that the conservation grant, if and when it was introduced, would rise to about £11 million in 1973/4. The proposals we are making now are to increase the Historic Buildings Council grants to £1 million in this year.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, would the noble Lord endorse my memory: that it was to be £11 million central Government money and £12 million local government money, making £3 million annually, and that this was cancelled on January 1 of this year? And while it is very welcome to have a £300,000 increase in the central Government money, would the noble Lord join me in hoping that his colleagues may soon be able to restore the other nine-tenths of what they cut?
LORD SANDFORD: My Lords, I will gladly join with the noble Lord in seeking to find the best way of ensuring that our historic towns and historic buildings are safeguarded, preserved and, conserved. We could not have cancelled any of his conservation grants because it would have needed legislation to introduce them (it still will) and legislation had not been prepared, let alone introduced.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (EARL JELLICOE): My Lords, may I, very deferentially, remind noble Lords that the purpose of Questions and supplementary questions is to elicit information?
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, the noble Earl, as Leader of the House, is completely right; but is he aware that the House is in a difficulty when Members of the Government Front Bench are unaware of facts that are known to some of the rest of the House?

NORTH SEA GAS PRICES
2.55 p.m.
LORD BALOGH: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government how they reconcile Lord Denham's answer on Monday, May 24, 1971, according to which "the contracts for natural gas produced from the Continental Shelf are a matter for negotiation between the Gas Council and the producing companies" with (i) the Continental Shelf Act 1964, s. 9(2) and (3) and more especially s. 9(3)(a); (ii) the statement in the Conservative Party Manifesto (p. 11/2) according to which "we will subject all proposed price rises in the public sector to the most searching scrutiny. If they are not justified, they will not be allowed"; and (iii) the Prime Minister's statement on June 16, 1970: "taking a firm grip on public sector prices and charges such as coal, steel, gas …".]
LORD DENHAM: My Lords, the provisions of Section 9 of the Continental Shelf Act 1964 do not provide for the intervention of my right honourable friend in a situation where the Gas Council and the producer agree upon a price for the gas. As to the second and third parts of the question, these statements referred not to prices charged to public sector industries but by them.
LORD BALOGH: My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for his short reply to my long Question, may I ask some supplementary questions? First, is he aware of the fact that on the basis of the statements cited in my Question the Government have undertaken to investigate thoroughly each increase in price? Secondly, is he aware of the fact that the cost of gas to the Gas Council is an item of cost in the Gas Council's price to the

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public? Finally is he aware of the fact that his Prime Minister endorsed the previous statement given in the Communist manifesto—
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Oh!
LORD BALOGH: I plead guilty, my Lords; but I think that the noble Lord's Party is as destructive as the Communists. Finally, is he aware of the fact that his Prime Minister endorsed this? And does he think his reply really contributes to the credibility of the new-style Government?
LORD DENHAM: My Lords, I am aware of, and I would fully defend, the statements made by my right honourable friend and his right honourable friends: that they would investigate the charges by nationalised industries. I am certainly aware of that. The noble Lord, Lord Balogh, said that the actual price of the gas is an item of cost; but one ought to get this into proportion. If the additional cost of this gas were to be passed on to the consumer, the average price of gas would go up by 0·4 per cent. It is against that figure that I would ask the noble Lord to look at this matter.
LORD BALOGH: My Lords, I hope that the noble Lord will forgive me for asking how he got that extraordinary information; because so far as is known the cost of gas itself is roughly 40 per cent. of the price to the consumer and one old penny on the price is almost 40 per cent. of the price. Is the Minister aware that 40 per cent. of 40 per cent. is not 0·4 per cent?
LORD DEN:HAM: My Lords, I hesitate to argue with the noble Lord, Lord Balogh, in matters of mathematics, but I will tell him exactly how I worked out that figure. The additional cost of the gas is 0·3 of a new penny per therm. The gas in question is exactly one-eighth of the total gas available to the Gas Board (or will be when the field is in full production) and the average cost of gas to the consumer is 10·5 new pence per therm. If the noble Lord works that out he will arrive at the same answer as I did.
LORD LEATHERLAND: My Lords, while the noble Lord is quarrelling about percentages, can he give us an assurance
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that the figure of 8·5 per cent. for the increase in the price of food since the Government came into office is correct?
LORD DENHAM: My Lords, I think that that was another question; but I am not sure because I did not hear the noble Lord clearly. Would he care to repeat it?
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I would ask the noble Lord whether he would consider getting a new set of matchsticks—which we know are familiar and useful devices for calculation on the part of Conservatives—and see whether or not these studies have in fact been properly organised. He said that he himself did the sums; but have his own accountants looked at this matter?—because it is the most extraordinary approach to costing that any of us who has ever been concerned with accounting has heard of. May I ask whether he is aware that my noble friend perhaps committed a slight error when he referred to "his" Prime Minister? He is our Prime Minister, however much we may regret it.
LORD DENHAM: My Lords, I am quite aware that my right honourable friend is the Prime Minister of the noble Lords opposite as well; but I would stick to the fact that my sums are correct. I will certainly, at a more convenient time and place, justify them to the noble Lord.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, will Her Majesty's Government, when faced with a Question of this length, consider following the admirable example of the late Sir Stafford Cripps who, when asked a Question of approximately this length about how he did something or other, replied with a single word, "Easily"?

DESIGN OF POSTAGE STAMPS
3.0 p.m.
LORD SALTOUN: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government why, now that postage stamps of a design not unworthy of our original stamps have at last been produced, these must be spoiled by the addition of regional emblems on the background.]
LORD DENHAM: My Lords, the design of postage stamps is now primarily a matter for the Post Office.
LORD SALTOUN: My Lords, I accept the Answer given by the noble Lord. But may I ask him whether he does not find it regrettable that these stamps, which go all over the world, should convey an imputation of the taste of the population of the region when it is really the taste of the Post Office; and which, if I may explain it, to me resembles the taste of the urchins who deface the features of women in their school books with pencilled moustaches?
LORD DENHAM: My Lords, I cannot agree with what the noble Lord has said. Before submitting the designs to my right honourable friend, the Post Office consulted a number of authorities. For instance, in Scotland—in which I am sure the noble Lord will be most interested—both the Lord Lyon and also the Scottish Royal Fine Art Commission were consulted.
LORD O'NEILL OF THE MAINE: My Lords, is the noble Lord, Lord Denham, aware that many people in the regions of the United Kingdom are delighted to have their own emblem on the stamps and do not accept the strictures of the noble Lord, Lord Saltoun, who asked the Question?
LORD DENHAM: My Lords, I am most grateful to my noble friend and I quite agree with him that that is so. I am also certain, that if the Post Office came to the conclusion that regional definitive stamps were no longer wanted by the areas concerned it would take appropriate steps.
LORD SALTOUN: My Lords, in that case may I ask the noble Lord whether he and the Government will exercise their influence with the Post Office to enable people who share my opinion to buy undefaced stamps for their own use?
LORD DENHAM: My Lords, I do not think it would be appropriate for me or my right honourable friend to exercise influence in this way, but I have no doubt that the Post Office will take account of what the noble Lord has said.

SITTINGBOURNE TERRITORIAL DRILL HALL
VISCOUNT MONCKTON OF BRENCHLEY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will now allow the South-East Territorial Auxiliary and Volunteer Reserve Association to retain the Drill Hall, Sittingbourne, Kent.]
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: My Lords, the drill hall at Sittingbourne was transferred in 1968 from the Ministry of Defence to the then Ministry of Public Building and Works, for use as a reception and re-establishment centre for the Department of Health and Social Security. The need still remains. No other suitable building or site is available and I therefore regret that I am unable to agree that the premises should be returned to their former use.
VISCOUNT MONCKTON OF BRENCHLEY: My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that Answer. Is he aware that nothing has been done since 1968; that the drill hall was purpose-built for the Territorials; that recruiting in Kent is going extremely well; that the Cadet Force, the Sea Cadets and the Girl Venture Corps use the same site and that the people of Sittingbourne do not think it right that men of an unsettled way of life should be in the same area with their children?
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: My Lords, I am not quite clear how many of the words of the noble Viscount are statements and how many are questions, but I cannot accept the statement that nothing has been done since 1968. There has been planning, which takes time, to get the conversion plans right, and planning permission has now been obtained. A start is to be made later this year, and we hope that in about 18 months' time the place will be in use. I was very glad to hear what the noble Lord told your Lordships about recruiting and the Sea Cadets. I am quite sure that my noble friend the Secretary of State for Defence will, if he sees fit, come to the rescue of the Sea Cadets and the Territorials in the future.
VISCOUNT MONCKTON OF BRENCHLEY: My Lords, I am sorry to go on with this point, but is the noble Lord aware that the people of the area will not allow their children to go to the premises when they have gone into the new use? That is the trouble.
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: My Lords, we have to think of those gentlemen with an unsettled way of living who need somewhere to go. The Supplementary Benefits Commission have found this to be the only suitable building; they had been looking around for ten years before this building became available.

E.E.C. NEGOTIATIONS
EARL ST. ALDWYN: My Lords, with the leave of the House my noble friend Lord Lothian will be making a Statement on the Common Market negotiations at a convenient moment after 3.30 p.m.

ANGLESEY MARINE TERMINAL BILL [H.L.]
3.6 p.m.
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF LISTOWEL): My Lords, as several noble Lords have expressed a wish to speak on the Second Reading of the Anglesey Marine Terminal Bill, I propose, with the leave of the House, to postpone my Motion for Second Reading. I have tried to find another time that would be convenient for all noble Lords who have expressed a wish to speak, but I have failed to do so. Because I expect that a number of noble Lords have come to the House this afternoon in order to speak, seeing that the Notice for the Second Reading is on the Order Paper, I propose to postpone my Motion until about 7 o'clock this evening.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, may I ask whether there is any proposal to have a limited discussion, or is it likely to go on without any time being fixed?
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, my reply to the noble Lord is that we do not have a fixed time for any debate; but I can assure him that this will be a short debate and will not make a longer interruption than the normal interruption in the proceedings on the Industrial Relations Bill.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, in order to prevent any disagreement later on, I think it would be better if we had an understanding about this. If we could say that the debate would be terminated within the hour, or postponed after that time, I think that would satisfy most noble Lords.
EARL ST. ALDWYN: My Lords, in reply to the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, I quite agree that it would be better if we had a fixed time for the debate. I would propose that if the discussion is not completed by 8 o'clock we should adjourn the debate and conclude it next week.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, may I express my sense of disappointment, and indeed protest, at a proceeding whereby the business which is down for a certain time is changed from that time to a later time on the same day when certain noble Lords who wish to speak—including in this instance myself—cannot make it, and when there is only one and a half hours notice given? The Second Reading was on the Order Paper this morning as first business and it was on yesterday's Order Paper as first business. The Lord Chairman of Committees has said that he cannot find a time at which everybody who wishes to speak can do so. That surely must be within a certain number of days, and my question to the Lord Chairman is this: within how many days can he not find time? I appreciate that he cannot find time this afternoon, or perhaps next week. But surely a time may be found during the week after next when all Members of your Lordships' House who wish to speak could do so.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: My Lords, may I crave the indulgence of the House to support the protest of my noble friend? Some of us, who look upon this as a particularly interesting development in Anglesey, are not sure that the debate could be finished in a short time—not that one would wish to filibuster. The noble Earl tells us that the debate will be short. Speaking personally—not that my wishes and desires matter much—may I say that I had intended to say something in the debate and that, as it happens, I cannot be present at the time now signified. Consequently, will the Government in their magnanimity try to postpone this debate to another period to give us a little more time? I can assure noble Lords opposite that none of us

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wishes to trespass too much on Government time but we wish to put forward constructive views on this matter.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I wonder whether I may intervene. We do get into this sort of difficulty from time to time. It is not just a matter of the Government being unable to control the situation. It is a matter of the Chairman of Committees doing his best to achieve the impossible; that is, to suit everyone. None the less, we are confronted with this sort of situation at one time or another. It might be that between now and 7 o'clock the noble Earl the Chairman of Committees and the noble Earl the Government Chief Whip—who I know always try to consider the convenience of the Members of your Lordships' House—may wish to consult noble Lords who wish to speak on this matter. It looks as if the debate is likely to take more than an hour. I would entirely exonerate the Lord Chairman of Committees or the noble Earl, Lord St. Aldwyn, from doing anything other than trying to suit our convenience, but with no time rule it might just be possible that another time might be suitable. On the other hand, I can see some virtue, if that is what is proposed, in starting the business at 7 o'clock when at least some of the arguments could be put forward. But it might suit the convenience of those noble Lords who cannot speak and to whom this is important, if in the conversations he has between now and 7 o'clock the noble Earl would consider adjourning the debate. I only throw out this suggestion because I know how one can get into a jam in this way.
EARL ST. ALDWYN: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition. This is a difficult position. It is the normal custom that if noble Lords wish to raise any matter on the Second Reading of a Private Bill, they give notice to the Lord Chairman of their intention so to do. Late last night some noble Lords had given an indication that they wished to say something. To the best of my knowledge, I do not think that either of the noble Lords who have spoken so far this afternoon gave any indication of their intention.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: My Lords, I apologise to the noble Earl. I had not
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known that, maybe because I am practically new and have not yet caught up with your Lordships' procedures.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, I did, and I am on the list.
EARL ST. ALDWYN: My Lords, perhaps it will help noble Lords for the future if they know that on a Private Bill it is normal to let the Lord Chairman know that they wish to speak so that he can try to arrange that the Bill be taken at a convenient moment for all concerned. Certainly I shall be happy to look at this matter between now and 7 o'clock, but there are other considerations besides those of the two noble Lords who have spoken. Other noble Lords may not be able to find another time which is convenient for them. Those connected with the Bill are, I believe, travelling down from the North of Wales especially in order to hear the discussion. But as I say, I am very willing to look at this to see whether we can find a better time. If not, I would suggest that we proceed as planned at 7 o'clock until 8 o'clock and then postpone it, if necessary.

LAW REFORM (JURISDICTION IN DELICT) (SCOTLAND) BILL
Brought from the Commons; read 1a, and to be printed.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BILL
3.13 p.m.
THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (LORD DRUMALBYN): My Lords, I beg to move that the House do again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, That the House do again resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Drumalbyn)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The EARL OF LISTOWEL in the Chair.]
Clause 134 [Application to Industrial Court with a view to discontinuing or deferring industrial action]:
On Question, Whether Clause 134 shall stand part of the Bill'?
LORD CHAMPION: In our consideration of whether this clause shall stand part, we must once again I think range a little wide of the clause itself and impinge on subsequent clauses. We had to do this at an earlier stage in the Bill in relation to some clauses for which I was responsible and I am fairly sure that this resulted in a shortening of proceedings and of the time taken on the subsequent clauses to which a clause particularly related. We start our discussion of this Part of the Bill with the consideration that it is desirable, so far as possible, to prevent any industrial action of any sort that is
"… likely to be gravely injurious to the national economy, to imperil national security or to create a serious risk of public disorder, or to endanger the lives of a substantial number of persons, or expose a substantial number of persons to serious risk of disease or personal injury."
These are the words of subsection (2) of this clause.
If we agree to that proposition (and I imagine we all do) any area of disagreement that lies between us must clearly relate to whether these clauses will prevent the sort of industrial action envisaged in Clause 134, and whether the course of action to be pursued under this and subsequent clauses is likely to be effective in preventing such industrial action with the least possible delay and damage to our security, our economy or our health. But that is not all. We have also to consider whether such action would be fair to the parties in the dispute. Would it be fair to the workers? Would it in some circumstances be fair to the employers? Those matters, too, have to be considered in relation to this clause besides the national position and the national economy.
The clause places on the Secretary of State a heavy burden, that of deciding whether the conditions mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (c) of subsection (1) exist and, if they do, whether they are as represented in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (2). That is the sort of position taken by Government up to now only when considering the possibility of advising the Sovereign under the Emergency Powers Acts of 1920 and 1964 to issue a proclamation declaring that a state of emergency exists. These are powers that have been used on very rare occasions, but they have always been held in reserve for emergency conditions.
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The words in those two Emergency Powers Acts are very similar to those being imported into the Bill in this clause. The difference between those Acts and this Bill is that under those Acts action can be taken only by Royal Proclamation and the action applies mainly to the use of troops in agricultural or other work of national importance. Under this clause the Secretary of State, if he decides that the conditions I have mentioned exist, may apply to the Industrial Court for an order. If the Court is satisfied on the evidence, it shall direct by order that no person shall call, organise, procure or finance a strike or threaten to do so for a period of up to 60 days from the date of the order.
That is going far beyond what was contained in the Emergency Powers Acts, which place no bar at ail on striking or on peacefully persuading others to participate in any strike. Striking has been held to be lawful by Acts of Parliament, most of which were prompted by decisions of the courts. In so many cases these decisions have the effect of restricting the right to strike, for the courts, in their interpretation of various Acts of Parliament, have almost invariably gone far beyond what Parliament intended when passing its trade union and trade disputes and like Acts.
If some noble Lord cannot understand our objection to more legalism, to a greater use of the courts, even of an Industrial Court such as is proposed in this Bill, they clearly have not realised that in the past judges have mostly been very reactionary and have sprung from a class normally hostile to what trade unions stand for. They have almost invariably, in their interpretation of trade union legislation, been far more reactionary than Parliament itself. These clauses not only go far beyond what is contained in the Emergency Powers Acts but they also go quite a long way beyond the Taft Hartley provisions in America. Of course, the provisions now included in this Bill have been largely imported from America. As I understand it, in the United States when a strike threatens to cause a national emergency and before the strike may proceed, the Government have the power to invoke a procedure involving an independent inquiry and a vote by the employees on the employer's last offer.
The proposals in this Bill go beyond that. The only action before an order of

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the Industrial Court is made is the assessment of the situation by the Secretary of State and the consideration of the evidence put before the Industrial Court. No one would consider that the examination of evidence considered by the Court on the limited reference to it, which really is that it must consider whether the conditions referred to in subsection (2) of this clause exist at all, is in any way an independent inquiry into the merits of the dispute. It is nothing of the sort. So, despite the fact that these proposals are to a large extent an importation from the United States—and, I would add, not intrinsically any the worse for that—the Government have not even imported the element of an independent inquiry before drastic action is taken by the State against the workers.
If any noble Lord reminds me that these clauses may be used against employers as well as workers, I must reply that this Bill, with the exception of certain "sop" clauses, is anti-trade union legislation. I question whether the use of the compulsory ballot will improve industrial relations and brine a greater degree of peace and a lessening of days lost through industrial strikes or industrial action of any sort. I hope to say something on Clause 137 in due course.
The next point to which I should like to refer is that these clauses bring the Secretary of State into the industrial relations arena much earlier than has hitherto been the case. Up to now he has intervened in an industrial dispute only at the point at which he has considered that intervention would bring the parties together and would enable his excellent conciliation officers to assist in providing terms for a settlement. Under this clause he will, particularly if he is a Tory, be under very heavy pressure from his Party to set in motion these clauses in almost any dispute or threatened dispute which might be classed as "gravely injurious". This very loose terminology will cover a very wide range of industrial disputes, for almost any dispute to-day which results in a strike or in irregular industrial action short of a strike could be held to be injurious to the national economy.
I am bound to say that the State has best served the country when it has limited its intervention in industrial dis-
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putes to encouraging a willingness on both sides to negotiate. That explains why there is such great respect paid to the conciliation officers of the Department of Employment and Productivity and why their interventions are almost always welcomed by both sides to an industrial dispute. This clause, and the reference to the Industrial Court, are designed to lead without delay to the 60 days' cooling off period. The Ministry of Labour submitted written evidence to the Donovan Commission and they had this to say about the cooling off period:
"It has been found that the attitudes of the two sides are at least as likely to harden as the reverse during the cooling off period and every vote that has been held on the employer's final offer has in practice gone against acceptance."
They were talking about the United States' experience. If the noble Lord cares to look at the written evidence submitted by the Ministry of Labour to the Donovan Commission, he will find that something very similar was said by them about the experience in this country of anything comparable to a cooling off period and a ballot of the workers in connection with it.
We are against this clause and the immediately following clause, because the procedure may well bring the Government of the day into very nearly every industrial dispute at the wrong stage of the dispute. It will undermine the value of the Department's conciliation officers and their efforts to bring the parties together. It will almost invariably cause employers to drag out negotiations in the knowledge that the crunch will come towards the end of the cooling off period and no final offer will be made until then. Both sides in a particularly stubborn issue might use the cooling off period to augment their resources in an attempt to secure the defeat of the other side; and the result may well be to increase the bitterness that had already been engendered in an industrial dispute. It may well cause a comparatively small dispute but one that might be considered "injurious", to be blown up into something far exceeding its original limits.
The terms of the clause are open to a variety of interpretations of a difficult and, in many cases, of possibly a Party political nature which in their exercise could set trade unions unnecessarily

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against the State. The clause is objectionable, because complete and absolute discretion is given to the Secretary of State on the matters he may bring to the Court. The Court will have the power and will be expected to enforce any order it makes by sentences of imprisonment; and we may well have the spectacle of mass disobedience to an order of the Court, leading to the stupidity of another Betteshanger situation and bringing the law into disrepute. We all know what happened in that dispute in the coalfield and how stupid the whole thing was. The dispute had to he settled by the Minister of the day actually negotiating with the men who were in gaol because of what was done during that dispute.
I am positive that future industrial relations in this country would be best served by the well-tried and tested voluntary negotiation procedures which have resulted in fewer days being lost through disputes of a long and serious nature than is the case in the country from which these procedures have been imported. I suggest to the Committee that this clause could, with advantage, be left out of the Bill and that national emergencies might be dealt with under the procedures of the Emergency Powers Acts of 1920 and 1964, because it seems to me that the words "Royal Proclamation" are bound to have a much greater effect in an emergency situation than an order of an Industrial Court. As I hope I have indicated, I am very much against the procedures set out in Clause 134 and the subsequent clauses. I do not believe that they are right for this country. I believe that they will lead to more and greater difficulties than this country has up to now experienced in the industrial field.
3.30 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN: It might be convenient if I were to reply to the noble Lord at this stage, because I feel certain that the debate will continue afterwards and it might be better if I were to express the Government's views, which might act, to some extent, as a corrective to the views expressed by the noble Lord. The noble Lord started in the way one would expect him to start; namely, from the point of view of the national interest and our desire so far as possible to prevent disputes. That I am sure is a view that we should all share. He then asked whether these clauses would prevent this
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sort of industrial action, and whether they are likely to be effective. The noble Lord referred to the Emergency Powers Acts. I would remind your Lordships of the purposes of the Emergency Powers Acts. They are there to secure the provision of the essentials of life for the population—the supply of food, water, fuel, light and transport.
The one thing that the noble Lord did not mention is subsection (1)(c) of this clause: that is, that when the Secretary of State is considering whether to use these powers he is to have regard to all the circumstances of the industrial dispute, and where it appears to him that it will be conducive to a settlement of it by negotiation, conciliation or arbitration if industrial action were discontinued or deferred, then he may make an application to the Court. So the purpose of these procedures is twofold. Undoubtedly it is for the protection of the public, but it is also for the settlement of the dispute. I want to put that in the forefront of what I have to say, and I hope that the subsequent discussion will be conducted with that in mind. The Committee will have to make up its own mind on the question that the noble Lord has asked.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: I apologise for interrupting the noble Lord, but I am not quite clear. He used the words "with that in mind". But the noble Lord said a number of things.
LORD DRUMALBYN: The last thing I said—and "that" would normally refer to the last thing—was that the whole of these procedures are directed towards a settlement. That is one of the things that the Secretary of State must have in mind. He must have it in mind that a conciliation pause—and this is a phrase that has often been used—is likely to be conducive to a settlement in the circumstances of the case.
LORD SLATER: Can the noble Lord clear up one point in regard to his statement? Power is vested in the Secretary of State, and he passes the instruction to the Industrial Court. Are the Industrial Court accepting delegated powers from the Secretary of State whereby they are in a position to say "No" to the instruction from the Secretary of State?
LORD DRUMALBYN: Yes; that is so. The Industrial Court will have power

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to say "No" to the Secretary of State, just as the courts in America have power to say "No" to the President: and I believe that in 4 out of the 29 cases, or something of that kind, they did say "No".
This brings me to what the noble Lord said about what has been happening in the United States. I was glad he said that, while this was an importation, it was not necessarily the worse for that, because I think many people have regarded the mere fact that the procedures are derived from experience in the United States as in some way derogatory. Comparable procedures to those in the Bill were introduced under the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, but there are marked differences between them and those proposed in this Part of the Bill.
Before we consider the differences, I should like to refer to the noble Lord's reference to the way in which the Taft-Hartley Act has worked. The Act empowers the President, as the noble Lord said, to appoint a board of inquiry to investigate and report on any industrial dispute which imperils the national health or safety. It empowers him on receiving that report to apply to the Federal Court for a 60-day injunction against that strike or lock-out. It enjoins him to make available the Federal mediation and conciliation service, which the parties are obliged to use during the 60 days until a settlement is reached. Before granting an injunction the Federal Court must be satisfied on two grounds that the strike or lock-out affects an entire industry, or a substantial part of an industry, and will imperil the national health or safety. During the 60 days the board of inquiry must make a report which it must present before the expiry of that period if a settlement has not been reached. The report must include a statement of the employer's latest offer. In the 15 days following the end of the period the national labour relations board is required to hold a ballot of the workers involved on whether to accept that offer, and within five days after that they must certify the result of the ballot. If the ballot goes against the offer, the injunction is discharged and the strike or lock-out can be resumed.
The latest information available to us is that within the past 25 years there have been 29 instances in which the pro-
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cedure was invoked. In 25 of these injunctions were granted. In only one of the 25 cases was the stoppage not halted by the injunction. In 12 of the 25 cases a complete settlement was reached during the 60 days, and in 3 more a partial settlement was reached. Of the remaining 10 cases, in 4 a settlement was reached quite soon after the standstill period ended and without further industrial action. This could hardly be described as a record of failure. The salient points of the procedure are that an inquiry must precede the application for an injunction, and that a ballot must be held on the employer's latest offer at the end of the period if a settlement has not been reached during it.
How does that procedure compare with the procedure in the Bill? The period of the injunction under the Bill is to be limited to a maximum of 60 days, whereas the period in the United States of America extends in all to 80 days: and it is understood that the legislation before Congress would extend it a further 30 days. But on the two salient points to which I have referred there is a wide difference. The Bill envisages emergency action by the Secretary of State. Let me lay the greatest stress on the fact that this is an emergency procedure, and that is the reason why there is not a further inquiry before the procedure is invoked. I would also say to the noble Lord that this is not envisaged as in any way a substitute for the normal proceedings of the Secretary of State in conciliation and the like: it is definitely a last-ditch measure.
The Bill envisages emergency action by the Secretary of State. There is therefore no preliminary inquiry. The Secretary of State has to ask himself two questions. First, is the stoppage, whether it has already begun or is imminent, likely to injure gravely the national economy or national security, or to create a serious risk of public disorder? Secondly, is the stoppage likely to endanger the lives of a substantial number of people or to expose them to serious risk of disease or personal injury? The Secretary of State must also have grounds for believing that a discontinuance or deferment of the stoppage would be conducive to a settlement of the dispute. There are thus two concurrent objectives: the settlement of the dispute without further embitterment,

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and the protection of the public interest. If the Secretary of State is satisfied that the answer to either of the two questions is "Yes", he may then apply to the Industrial Court for an order, and he must satisfy the Court that there are sufficient grounds for making the order.
In applying for the order the Secretary of State must specify the person or persons responsible for initiating or threatening the stoppage. The person might be a trade union, or an organisation of workers, or a federation, or a company, or an association of employers. If the injunction is granted, then for the period of the order, which is limited to a maximum of 60 days (it may be less), to be tailored to the circumstances of the dispute, no person specified in the order may call, organise, procure or finance a strike or irregular industrial action short of a strike, or threaten to do so, or institute, carry on, authorise, organise or finance a lock-out or threaten to do so. The order may require any of the persons named to take steps within a specified period to secure the discontinuance or deferment of the industrial action.
Unlike the United States procedure, there is no ballot at the end of the period related to the employer's latest offer. The Donovan Commission drew attention to the filet that out of the dozen or so cases where a ballot was held, in not one was the employer's latest offer accepted in the ballot. Since these were all cases in which negotiation and conciliation had failed during the 60 days, that is hardly surprising. Logically the result throws doubt on the usefulness of holding a ballot in those particular circumstances, but not on holding ballots in general. The criteria by which the Secretary of State will judge the need for a ballot are the same as those by which he will judge whether to make an application to the Court for an order to restrain industrial action. There is one important addition: he must have reason to doubt whether the workers concerned really want a strike or the irregular industrial action, and whether they have had an adequate opportunity of indicating what they really want.
Before the Court makes an order for a ballot—if I may refer in advance to this matter because it is linked in the American procedure—it must be satis-
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fled that there are sufficient grounds for believing that the industrial action appearing to be imminent would endanger the national economy, national security, public order, or the public health. That in itself should help to bring home to the workers concerned the seriousness of the issue. The ballot will do no more than reveal the true wishes of the workers in relation to the question put to them by the Court, assisted by the Commission on Industrial Relations if need be. Their leaders will not be bound either to desist from further action if the ballot goes against them, or to proceed with it if the ballot supports them. Unlike other statutory ballots provided for under the Bill, the results will be indicative, not decisive.
The concept of a mandatory conciliation pause before or during a strike or lock-out in order to settle a dispute which would almost certainly have serious consequences for the nation surely is a sound one. It was first adopted in the United States of America nearly a quarter of a century ago, and has worked tolerably well. In introducing it here we have the opportunity of learning from the experience of our friends in America, and of not only adapting their procedures to our needs but of improving on the procedures themselves. For instance, what has given rise to a good deal of argument in the Federal Court is the meaning of "imperilling the national health and safety". The criteria in subsection (2) of Clause 134 are much more precise and relate to the national economy, national security, public order and to the avoidance of disease, personal injury or risk to life itself on a considerable scale. Secondly, the Bill does not enable the Industrial Court to issue an injunction against a strike or lock-out, but only to make an order restraining the leaders of a strike from taking further action to promote it, and requiring them to take steps to discontinue the strike in the area of employment defined.
We have sought to devise a procedure which is both realistic and more flexible. The order does not directly apply to anyone except the persons named in it. They, and they alone, can lay themselves open to the discipline of the law if they fail to comply with the order. If it is found that there are individuals fomenting

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trouble who are not covered by the order and ought to be covered, then the order can be extended to cover them. If not enough time for settlement has been allowed in the first instance, it can be extended. All this is absolutely necessary if you are going to try to reach a settlement within the period of 60 days. This is in line with the general tenor of the Bill. The noble Lord said that this was anti-trade union legislation; it is nothing of the sort. It is legislation designed to achieve settlements peacefully. Where the eruption or continuance of a strike or irregular industrial action is likely to impose serious hardship, loss of health or life itself for a considerable number of people, or to endanger the economy or the security of the nation, there is surely a special obligation on the Government to secure that it does not take place or is suspended until all possible steps to settle the dispute by negotiation and conciliation have been taken.
I ask your Lordships particularly to note that it is only where the Secretary of State is satisfied that a conciliation pause would be conducive to the peaceful settlement of the dispute that he is to be empowered to make an application for an order to the Industrial Court. The noble Lord said that the Secretary of State would be under perpetual pressure to exercise these powers. I hope I have made it very clear that these powers are expected to be exercised only in the last resort where there is a serious threat to the life of the community. In other words, strikes, lock-outs and irregular industrial action that will impose widespread hardship and endanger the wellbeing of the nation are not outlawed by the Bill, but it is surely right to do all that we can to ensure that they are absolutely the last resort.
It is true that, despite the Taft-Hartley Act, strikes last longer in the United States than they do here. I think the noble Lord, Lord Slater, said that they last four times as long. But they come at the end of an uninterrupted period of work. There are fewer stoppages per 100,000 workers in the United States than there are here. More people are involved in each stoppage in the United States than here, and stoppages, on average, last much longer. The Taft-Hartley Act was not directed against strikes as such, but
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towards protecting the public from those strikes and lock-outs that could be particularly harmful. Mercifully such events are rare. What is needed is an emergency procedure to deal with them when they occur, and that is what Part VIII of this Bill is all about.
LORD DIAMOND: I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord, for he was giving us some very interesting statistics. He gave us the statistics of stoppages per 100,000 workers. The relevant statistic is the number of days lost. I am sure he has those figures, and the Committee would be much helped by them.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I have those statistics. I have the number of working days lost per 1,000 through industrial disputes in mining, manufacturing, construction and transport, and the average for the year—the number of working days lost—over the ten years, 1960 to 1969 inclusive, is 268 in the United Kingdom and 977 in the United States. But we have said, time and time again, that our particular problem—the Donovan Commission brought this out—is the incidence of strikes; the fact that they occur suddenly. that they are frequent and unpredictable. This is what we have discussed at great length in the earlier stages of the Bill.
This Part of the Bill does not in any way conflict with the powers available under the Emergency Powers Act, which has been in operation for half a century. Under that Act a State of Emergency can be declared, as the noble Lord said, by Royal Proclamation, but that is in circumstances where the community or a substantial part of it is likely to be deprived of the essentials of life. That Act envisages the means of securing that the essentials of life will continue to be available. These provisions are directed towards a settlement of the dispute. In practice it is likely that an application would be made under this clause before a State of Emergency was declared under the 1920 Act powers. The application might well avoid the need for such a declaration.
In conclusion, may I stress four things. This Bill accords with the American procedure in leaving the Court discretion as to whether or not to issue an injunction on the application of the Executive. Mrs. Castle's plan also borrowed from the United States of America the idea of a

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conciliation clause, but the order was to be made by her, not by the Court. The noble Lord contrasted the possibility of an order's being made by a Minister and the order's being made by the Court. But if we have to choose between arbitrary government and legal process, we on this side prefer legal process, if only because, whatever may have been true a hundred years ago, the courts are far more widely regarded as impartial than any Minister can possibly be. When we are dealing with emergencies, speed is of the essence. I want to be fair about this. I recognise that arbitrary action has the advantage in the short run in the matter of speed; but in the long run acceptance is surely of greater importance and value.
These emergency procedures place no liability whatever upon the ordinary worker; they put nobody at all at risk of any penalty unless he wilfully and flagrantly flouts the order of the Court. And the order of the Court, let us bear in mind, is made in the interest of the whole public. An order to restrain industrial action implies no judgment on the merits of the dispute, no imputation of blame at all. And lastly, the procedures are designed, as I have said before, to achieve two objects: the peaceful settlement of disputes that could be harmful or dangerous, and the protection of the public and of the national interest, which, after all, is the prime duty of Government and Parliament.
With that explanation of this Part of the Bill, I beg to move at this stage that the House do now resume.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
House resumed.

E.E.C. NEGOTIATIONS: LUXEMBOURG MEETING
3.54 p.m.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN): My Lords, I should like, with your permission, to repeat a Statement made by my right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster in another place on
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the Common Market negotiations. The Statement is as follows:
" With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I should like to make a Statement about the meeting with the European Community which I attended in Luxembourg on the 7th of June.
" This meeting recorded agreement on three important matters, and made useful progress in discussion of a number of other outstanding questions.
" First, exports of sugar from the developing Commonwealth countries. The House will recall that when I reported on the previous Ministerial meeting with the European Community on the 17th of May, I said that the Community had made a proposal regarding the developing Commonwealth countries whose interests are at present covered by the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. I made it clear then to the Community that Her Majesty's Government would need to consult with the other Commonwealth Governments concerned before replying to the Community's proposal. A meeting of the Commonwealth Governments concerned was held accordingly in London on the 2nd and 3rd of June. I was able to explain to them that the firm assurance which the Community had proposed met their anxieties and interests, and the meeting agreed on a communiqué, which, with permission, I will circulate in the OFFICIAL REPORT. On the basis of the statement included in the communiqué, the Commonwealth representatives agreed to accept the Community's proposal.
" I informed the Community accordingly in Luxembourg on the 7th of June. At the same time, the Community made clear its position regarding imports of sugar from India, which is a party to the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, and whose interests will be covered under the arrangements agreed earlier for Commonwealth developing countries in Asia.
" These exchanges mean that the essential question of sugar from developing Commonwealth countries has been satisfactorily resolved. This represents a very substantial and satisfactory achievement.

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" Secondly, the House will recall that I reported on the 17th of May that agreement had been reached on satisfactory arrangements for the continued import of certain important raw materials for British industry. The problem of alumina was the only one left outstanding. This has now been settled. With permission I will circulate the details in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
" The third question on which agreement was reached was monetary matters. The future of sterling is not strictly speaking an issue in the negotiations. The Six have, however, expressed interest in the problems which would arise from the inclusion of a major reserve currency in an enlarged Community progressing towards closer economic and monetary union. We on our side have made clear our readiness to envisage an orderly and gradual reduction of official sterling balances after our accession, but we have also made clear that three conditions would need to be satisfied:

(1) any proposal would have to be acceptable to official holders of sterling, who would need an alternative reserve asset;

(2) it should not impose an unacceptable burden on our own resources and balance of payments;

(3) it should promote the stability of the international monetary system.

" In my statement in Luxembourg I reiterated that we were prepared to envisage an orderly and gradual rundown of official sterling balances after our accession. I undertook that after our accession we should be ready to discuss what measures might be appropriate to achieve a progressive alignment of the external characteristics of, and practices in relation to, sterling with those of other currencies in the Community in the context of progress towards economic and monetary union in the enlarged Community. I said that we were confident that official sterling could be handled in a way which would enable us to take our full part in that progress. I also said that in the meantime we should manage our policies with a view to stabilising the official balances in a way which
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would be consistent with these longer-term objectives.
" The Community took note of my statement with satisfaction and expressed their acceptance of our suggestions about the way in which this matter should be handled. It is therefore no longer an issue between us.
" In addition to these matters on which agreement was reached on the 7th June, I took the opportunity to explain to the Community the very great importance which we attached to a satisfactory agreement regarding fisheries. What we have asked for is a categoric statement that the present common fisheries policy would be modified after enlargement to meet the circumstances and needs of a Community of Ten. In addition we want a clear understanding from the start that there would be adequate protection for our inshore fishing grounds in particular. We have proposed that this could be secured by reserving exclusive fishing rights within six-mile limits—drawn from the base lines that were agreed at the 1964 European Fisheries Convention—together with an establishment clause which would be worked out to ensure that only vessels genuinely based on our ports and fishing from them could operate within these limits.
" We consider this to be a safe and reasonable approach, given our existing position and that of the Six, who already possess historic fishing rights of one sort or another round our coastline within the six to twelve mile zone. The really important thing to remember is the base lines agreed in 1964 from which the six mile limit would be drawn, as this means protection of such important areas as the Minches, Moray Firth, Clyde, Cardigan Bay, Morecambe Bay, Solway Firth and the Wash.
" The Conference agreed on procedures for considering this question.
" Finally, I drew attention to the need to agree on machinery for the new member countries, if they were to join the Communities, to be closely associated with all aspects of Community development and activity in the period, which could cover a number of months, between the signature of an accession treaty and its entry

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into force. It is clear that all concerned have an interest in making satisfactory provision for this period, since both existing and prospective members of the Community will wish to ensure that the development of the Community's policies during this period will proceed in a manner acceptable to all.
" We confirmed that the next meeting with the Community at Ministerial level would take place on 2Ist-22nd June."
Following are the details of the Communiqué. and Alumina imports referred to in the Statement
Communiqué issued after Consultations with the Developing Member Countries of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, 2–3 June.
Representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom, Antigua, Barbados, Fiji, Guyana, India, Jamaica. Kenya, Mauritius, Swaziland. Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, British Honduras, and of the East Africa Community and the Caribbean Free Trade Association met at Lancaster House from June 2 to 3, 1971. In the light of consultations that took place, Commonwealth Ministers agreed on the following statement:—
" The Governments represented expressed their satisfaction at the Community's readiness to offer the Governments concerned a choice of forms of association or a trading agreement and also at the readiness to recognise the United Kingdom's contractual commitments to all the C.S.A. member countries up to the end of 1974.
" They noted that, in negotiations with the enlarged Community on association or trading agreements, it would be open to the Governments concerned to act individually or collectively. They further noted that the negotiations were due to be concluded by 1975, and that pending conclusion their existing patterns of trade with the United Kingdom would be maintained.
" There was a full discussion of the Community's offer made on sugar after 1974. The British Delegation assured other delegations that the Community's proposals constituted a specific and moral commitment by the enlarged Community, of which the United Kingdom would be a part. The British Government and other Commonwealth Governments participating regard this offer as a firm assurance of a secure and continuing market in the enlarged Community on fair terms for the quantities of sugar covered by the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement in respect of all its existing developing member countries. The developing Commonwealth countries will continue to plan their future on this basis."
On this basis, Commonwealth Ministers agreed to accept the Community's proposal and stated that they would proceed accordingly, it being further agreed that Mr. Rippon would so inform the Council of Ministers
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of the European Community at their forthcoming Ministerial meeting with the United Kingdom, and would communicate to the Community the text of the agreed statement.
In the course of the meeting, Mr. Rippon gave the assurance that it would be the firm policy of the British Government to ensure that the proposal of the Community would be implemented in accordance with the statement recorded above in the event of the United Kingdom joining the European Community.
While recognising that the present meeting was concerned with the arrangements to apply to the developing Commonwealth sugar producers after Britain's entry into an enlarged Community, the Government Representatives stressed the importance of a continuing and viable international sugar agreement to all sugar producing countries. They expressed the hope that the enlarged Community would participate actively to this end.
THE TARIFF TRFATMLNT OF ALUMINA
At the Ministerial meeting in Luxembourg on 7th June the Community agreed to the following arrangement on alumina. The Common External Tariff on alumina would be suspended from its current level of 8.8 per cent. to 5.5 per cent. Imports of alumina into the United Kingdom would be free of duty until 1st January, 1976, would as from that date pay half the suspended rate, and would from 1st July, 1977, pay the full 5.5 per cent. rate. But it has been recognised that in the particular circumstances of the aluminium industry we should be able at any time after entry to apply in advance for a duty free Community tariff quota for the period after 1st January, 1976.
4.3 p.m.
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Marquess for repeating that Statement made by his right honourable friend in another place. Before I put one or two questions to him. perhaps I may simply comment that in my view the essence of negotiations is that there should be concessions on both sides, and I express the hope modestly that perhaps we might one day hear a Statement which contains news of some concessions made by the other side. Also with the very best of good will, perhaps I may offer a word of advice which I hope will not be taken amiss. It might be better if the noble Marquess's right honourable friend did not make such resounding statements at airport Press conferences about the timetable of important political decisions which have not yet been placed before the Houses of Parliament.
Having said that, may I ask him a number of specific questions about the Statement which has been made to-day? First, can he clarify what is meant by,
" our suggestions about the way in which this matter should be handled"?

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That occurs early in the Statement, when the noble Marquess said:
" The Community took note of my statement with satisfaction and expressed their acceptance of our suggestions about the way in which this matter should be handled."
We are not told what those suggestions were, and I wonder whether we may have some clarification of that. Then there is a reference in the Statement to,
"an orderly and gradual run-down of official sterling balances after our accession".
May I ask the noble Marquess whether this means that we have undertaken to reduce our sterling balances by instalments? Is that the significance of the remark? If so, how does it square with the condition that it should not impose an unacceptable burden on our own resources and balance of payments? On the face of it, there seems to be a contradiction, and I wonder whether the noble Marquess can explain it.
Finally, may I make a comment on the reference in the Statement to the fisheries problem? We note, of course, that this is only an interim statement. No final solution has been arrived at. I am sure that Her Majesty's Government realise that this is a matter of considerable importance and concern to the fisheries industry in this country, and I am confident that they will bear that in mind in future negotiations.
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, once again we on these Benches welcome wholeheartedly the progress in the negotiations recorded by Mr. Rippon, and extend to him and to his brilliant and devoted staff our sincerest congratulations on his success. It seems to us, if I may respectfully say so, with regard to what the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, has just said, that the Six have in fact made very important concessions from our point of view, notably as regards sugar and sterling, on which points they have completely abandoned their previous position. If that is not a concession, I do not know what is.
From what we hear, it now looks as if there is a very good chance of an agreement before long on the other main outstanding points; certainly there should be if the Six accept Mr. Rippon's fishery proposals, and if our contribution to the Central Agriculture Fund is within the limits which have been rumoured in the
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Press. Even New Zealand now seems to present a much less formidable obstacle than it did. If an agreement satisfactory to us all on these points is shortly forthcoming it will be clear that the only real opposition, if I may say so, to our entry will come from those who oppose it on grounds of principle; namely, those who believe that it would in some way prejudice our national personality and integrity. Well, they are entitled to their view, which is often sincerely and passionately held, though how they can reconcile it with the fact that the proud French nation in no way shares it so far as they are concerned—or the Dutch, either, for that matter—is rather difficult to understand.
But, my Lords, there can he no doubt that this great issue does divide all the political Parties. So what we feel is that it cannot be decided on a purely Party basis but solely on the interests of the nation. We would therefore ask the Government to bear this consideration in mind when it comes, as no doubt it may shortly come, to getting at any rate the provisional agreement of Parliament to the arrangements for our entry which will have been reached after nearly a year's intensive negotiations.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: My Lords, we are all grateful to the noble Marquess for repeating the Statement, but having listened to it carefully it appears that all that is agreed upon in regard to fishing, for Cardigan Bay and elsewhere, is procedures for discussion. Secondly, if the noble Marquess will look at Le Monde for this morning, a copy of which is in the Library, he will find that there is not this wonderful solution of the sterling problem—far from it. And Le Monde is a paper of whose remarks most of us know the value. It points out the possibility.
I respect the ability and the thoughts of the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, who has had vast experience as one of our most excellent ambassadors in a number of countries abroad. Therefore, I hope that he will not think that I am in no position to talk in a deprecating manner about the point of view that the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, has taken. Nevertheless, I want to put forward a point of view which must be put to this nation. Parliament has no right to rush this through in this emotional manner—
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Oh!
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: I can put up with that quite easily, my Lords, because what I say is the truth. The people who are in favour of it are rushing it through just as emotionally as we who are against it are trying to stop it. That is all I mean, and it is quite logical. I want to make this clear: because 90 per cent. of this Parliament believes that a referendum may reveal an alternative point of view—
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Order! Speech.
LORD JELLICOE: My Lords, if the noble Lord could ask a question it would be more in accordance with our usual procedure.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: Yes, my Lords—those were just my introductory remarks. I want to appeal to noble Lords. I have already been frustrated once and stopped from making a speech because of the long answer made by the noble Lord on the Industrial Relations Bill, so I will finish with this. I hope that there will be some opportunity for a serious discussion about the possibility —I do not want to upset the noble Earl opposite—of some form of referendum before either House of Parliament comes to a firm decision.
4.8 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Lords who have so far spoken. I thought the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, were rather qualified but I took it that he was still basically in favour of joining the Common Market. I think the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, really answered his point about concessions being made on both sides. I believe this last meeting has shown, very properly, how far the Community has gone to help us.
LORD PARGITER: My Lords, does not the noble Lord really mean how far France has gone?
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, I said the Community: it is Community negotiation. The noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, asked me one specific question about the passage on page 4 of the Statement in regard to the way in which this matter should be handled.
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This does not refer to any detailed matters. This sentence refers to the paragraph above in general terms. Obviously these matters of sterling, when they come to be discussed after our accession, will be matters of great complexity. Indeed, they are really the province of my right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and I should prefer to leave it at that for the time being. I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, for what he had to say, and I will certainly see that his remarks are passed on to my right honourable friend. I do not intend to get emotional, any more than the noble Lord, Lord Davies, but I confess I have not read Le Monde this morning; perhaps he will translate it for me on some other occasion. But, of course, I cannot speak for my right honourable friends regarding the matters that he raised, concerning rushing or referenda and that type of thing. I have no doubt that they will listen to his remarks.
LORD ROYLE: My Lords, may I ask the noble Marquess two very short questions. First of all, will the official agreements on sugar and alumina be published in the OFFICIAL REPORT in this House as well as the OFFICIAL REPORT of the other place? My second question concerns sterling balances and sterling as a reserve currency. May we hope that one day money will cease to be a commodity for purchase and sale?
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, I hope not. I do not think so. As to the noble Lord's first remarks concerning the two agreements mentioned, I will certainly look into this point and make sure that the agreements are placed in the Library.
LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE: My Lords, on the matter of fishing, may I ask one question on the timetable? As I understand it, the Statement says that the Minister has asked for a categorical assurance that the present Six proposals are scrapped, and that he has put forward certain broad outlines for settlement. May we have an assurance that this matter will be settled as Her Majesty's Government consider satisfactorily, that it will be reported to Parliament as a specific proposal before the proposals are put forward as a complete entity, and that it is not left to subsequent negotiation in its final stages?
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, we do not want to leave this matter over until the final stages, Obviously, I cannot give the noble Lord a categorical assurance that the Six will be ready at the next meeting with their answer to our proposals. My right honourable friend has pressed them pretty hard about this, and indeed he hopes that they will be; but I cannot really say more than that.
LORD BLYTON: My Lords, is the Minister aware, in spite of congratulations from the Liberal Bench, that many of us think it is easy to get agreement if you are prepared to sacrifice every British and Commonwealth interest to the Common Market? Is he aware of the Press statement that it only took four minutes to settle the sterling problem, a huge problem to this country? Is he further aware that there was a King of England who received subsidies from the French to do their bidding, and that now this Government are doing the French bidding to make us a vassal State?
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, I do not think the noble Lord expects me to agree with any of those observations.
THE EARL OF LAUDERDALE: My Lords, may I ask two questions on the sterling agreement. First of all, are we to understand that the agreement, in the event of our entry into the Common Market, is that the sterling balances rundown would take place in advance of substitute arrangements for sterling balance holders in the primary producing countries of the developing world? My second question is this. Are we to understand from the communiqué that we are committed, in the event of our entry into the Community, to the target of progress to an economic and monetary union—this in advance of agreement on the defence of the countries so united?
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, I think that progress towards an ultimate total monetary system for the E.E.C. will be extremely slow, and I should not think that the danger that the noble Earl has in mind would come to pass; but at this stage of time it is very difficult to prophesy exactly what the position will be. Regarding the question of the run-down of sterling balances, as
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was said in the Statement, obviously any proposals that may be made will have to be agreed with the current holders of sterling. That is really the most important part, that we cannot make any alteration in the system as it is without full consultation and agreement with other sterling countries.
LORD SHINWELL: My Lords, does not the noble Marquess realise that all that his right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Duchy has accepted from the Community, but in principle from the French, is a series of assurances and promises and compromises, for which Her Majesty's Government have no mandate whatever, either in the other place or in your Lordships' House? In those circumstances, would he not regard it as treachery to the British democracy and to the Westminster Parliament that the Government should rush this matter unduly without careful and meticulous consideration, without giving the electors of this country an opportunity of coming to a decision, upon which mandate the Government can act?
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, I should have thought that this Government had a mandate to negotiate to see whether we can find terms satisfactory to enter the E.E.C. In fact this, I thought, was really following the policy of the late Government in this matter. I do not really think we can be accused of rushing matters. This has been going on for four or five years, if not more. I think talk of treachery really is not right.
LORD SHINWELL: My Lords, is the noble Marquess aware that I have taken part in every single debate on the proposed British entry? Perhaps it is just as well for your Lordships to know exactly what has happened. I took part in every single debate in another place on the proposed British entry into the E.E.C., ever since the first announcement was made by Mr. Harold Macmillan, and on no single occasion was a mandate given by the other place which would justify our entry into the Common Market. Is it not a fact—I am dealing with facts, and there is no emotion about this—that the only acceptance by the other place in all the debates that have occurred was in respect of whether the Government were entitled to proceed with

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negotiations, to engage in probing, but that no mandate whatever was ever granted by the other place to accept the assurances that the Chancellor of the Duchy now presents, not to the country but to the Press, and only in a very modified fashion to the other place?
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, I do not really think I can add to what I said before. We have a mandate to negotiate and that is what we are doing.
LORD SHINWELL: Why do you not answer the question instead of running away from it?
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Order!
LORD SHINWELL: My Lords, I am asking the noble Marquess why he does not answer my question; namely, did the other place ever grant Her Majesty's Government a mandate to proceed any further than negotiations?
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, that is what we are doing. We have not proceeded any further than negotiations.
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, may I put another question to the noble Marquess? I do not necessarily want an answer now, but perhaps we might take it up at a later date. Do I understand that the sugar agreement, as interpreted by the Commonwealth countries, has been positively accepted by the Six and not just negatively accepted, so to speak, by default'? I do not need an answer to that question now, but perhaps we might be enlightened on that at a later date.
I was surprised to hear the noble Lord, Lord Gladwvn, who, from his intervention, seems to be basically in favour of our entry into the Common Market, say that the Six had abandoned their position on sterling. This does not seem to me to be the position, but perhaps there is more than one way of looking at it. On the question of the translation of the article in Le Monde, if my noble friend Lord Davies of Leek is not available to assist with the translation, perhaps the noble Marquess might apply to his right honourable friend the Prime Minister.
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May I make my own position and that of my colleagues on the Front Bench here quite clear, as the noble Marquess said that my remarks seemed to indicate that I was basically in favour of entry into the Common Market. The position simply is that if the negotiations produce acceptable conditions for British entry, then we believe it would be advantageous for this country and for Europe. We are not yet clear what those conditions are. When those conditions are clear, then we shall be able to arrive at a clear position.
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, I entirely accept the noble Lord's point.
LORD FERRIER: My Lords, having recently visited the Orkney Islands and discussed the fishing problem with a prominent figure, may I ask whether the noble Marquess can confirm the report in the Press that the fishing industry interests and the Secretary of State for Scotland are going to meet, to confer again about the anxieties which exist over the importance of the 12 mile limit?
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, I am afraid I have not seen that report, so I cannot confirm or deny it. I think it is more than probable.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, can the noble Marquess indicate how soon it is hoped that a common unit of currency will be introduced? Much has been said about sterling balances. Because of the size of the sterling balances at the time, our recent devaluation cost those who had left their sterling with this country an enormous sum of money. That was brought about by variations in the balance of trade. Surely, until you get a common unit of currency, on the final unit, there must be economic imbalances between the different parties? Therefore, how can you avoid the likelihood of fluctuations in the value of the different currencies until you get a common unit of currency?
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, I cannot give an answer to the noble Lord at the moment. I do not anticipate that we shall get anywhere near common units of currency for some considerable time.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BILL
4.24 p.m.
House again in Committee.
Debate resumed on the Question, Whether Clause 134 shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: Because of the most important and necessary interruption of our discussion of this Bill, which none of us object to, I shall curtail what I wanted to say about one of the most vital clauses in this entire Bill. The entire Bill revolves on the hope of the Government of improving industrial relations, and this hope rests on this Industrial Court as much as anything. With all sincerity, and no vituperation at all, I beg the Government to think deeply before they include Clause 134. Under subsection (2) the Government may apply for powers to discontinue or defer an industrial action upon (a) the basis that the strike is gravely injurious to the national economy, et cetera, or (b), is likely,
" to endanger the lives of a substantial number of persons, or expose a substantial number of persons to serious risk of disease or personal injury."
We have known all that phraseology over 50 years of industrial action. We have known it under the 1920 Act and under the 1964 Act, which gave emergency powers to deal with this. Those of us who lived through periods of great industrial tension in the 1920s and the 1930s know that Britain can be very proud of its industrial relations, which have been worked out over more than 100 years of hard trial and error, and which are second to none in the world. I do not know why Tory policy has suddenly become so eclectic that it has to pick up little bits of philosophy from the Common Market or the United States of America about industrial relations. We can be very proud of the fact that intelligent, organised industrial relations sprang from the basic political common sense of the British people. It is one of the assets that this country possesses. This clause is flying in the face of that, and I will endeavour briefly to explain why.
First, I must make an apology to the Minister. I have never done this before, but I shall not have the pleasure of listening—and I do not say this in any
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facetious way—to the careful replies that he endeavours to give to the Committee. I have an engagement at 5 o'clock, and I am going to be a hit late for it as it is. Therefore, if I disappear, do not think it remiss of me. I want to be as short as possible, but I want to make the point that under the Acts of 1920 and 1964 we have these powers. Disputes sometimes arise where, whatever the merits and demerits of the case, the Government's prime responsibility is to protect the public interest. We acknowledge that, and so do all responsible leaders of the trade union movement. Why, suddenly, in this Bill, because of the wave of denigration of the trade union movement by the Press for the 12 months before the last General Election, have we produced a legal framework as ironbound as this? We already agree, and any responsible trade union leader agrees, that certain public interests have to be protected. Even in the pits, and the steel industry, during the major strikes in the 1920s those who had mining enginering ability, and the firemen, were allowed by the trade union movement to go down the pits in order to protect life and limb, and to see that flooding did not take place.
All that protection is there without this Bill. This new piece of phraseology, or jargon, which has been clutched out of the air and reproduced in this clause is, in a way, going to make it difficult for the judges. I have not been trained in the law, but I cannot see how on earth they will be able to apply Clause 134. As I have said, the Government at present have powers if a state of emergency arises. Obviously the Government do not regard these powers as satisfactory. I tried to listen to what the Minister said. He said that the Secretary of State must be given additional powers to intervene in disputes which may seriously threaten the national health, safety, or the economy, and that in this clause they are providing them. In other parts of the Bill there are other powers, too. Under these powers the Government can go to the Industrial Court, who will go through the motions of adjudicating on another issue. When the Court is adjudicating on that second issue is when it will make an order postponing any further strike action for 60 days or so.
The Minister hopefully said, "Ah, it will be of help if there is this stage.

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Tempers will cool, and we shall get them coming together for a reasonable settlement." But, in 99 cases out of 100, before a strike takes place there will have been long negotiations about wages and conditions. A strike does not appear like magic or like the dagger in Macbeth. It is something palpable which has grown up over 12 or 18 months between employer and employees. This clause seems to assume that a strike springs up overnight like a mushroom; and this is a type of mushroom clause that has been hurled into the Bill as an afterthought, to give the Secretary of State further powers.
I should have liked to develop this argument further, but that would be unfair. However, I should like the Minister to say that he will take back this clause and look at it, because it serves no function whatsoever and does not go beyond the rights which the Government already possess in existing Acts of Parliament. It will exacerbate industrial relations rather than temper them and heal them, and it will not make people co-operate. No Act of Parliament was able to deal with the Betteshanger situation at the height of the war, when this country was in a most terrible international and national situation. I do not think that this Bill could have dealt with it either, and I sincerely hope that the Government will listen to the appeals from these Benches.
LORD POPPLEWELL: I have listened very carefully indeed to the case put by the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, for the retention of this clause. I was surprised at some of his examples, and by his reference to the American set-up. He was asked about the comparative position of this country and America in regard to days lost through strikes, but the two systems are completely different. In America there is a legal set-up, and the Tory Government are now suggesting something similar for this country. One would have thought, on listening to the noble Lord, that the American record in regard to strikes was much better than ours, but noble Lords ought to know the difference between the two systems. The latest available figures I have were published in the D.E.P. Gazette in 1968, and show that then 1,590 days were lost in America for every 1,000 working people, compared with 370
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days lost in this country. Your Lordships will therefore see that the Americans lost nearly five times more days through industrial action than we did. Why should we change from our voluntary system to this legal system which has proved so disastrous elsewhere? As regards mining, manufacturing, construction and transport, where we have our major unofficial stoppages, we are sixth in the international table; Australia, Italy, New Zealand, Ireland and France are all well above us, Canada is just below, and the United States is below that. That has been achieved with our voluntary system, so why change it to establish these legal courts?
There is a completely new departure here, and under Clause 134 the Secretary of State can immediately apply to the Industrial Court for an order. The conditions are specified in the various subsections and paragraphs, and there is great potential for the Secretary of State to make an order. Paragraph (c) of subsection (1) states:
" that, having regard to all the circumstances … it would be conducive to a settlement of it by negotiation, conciliation or arbitration if the industrial action were discontinued or deferred".
That is turning the present position upside-down. The normal practice in industry is to negotiate freely and unfettered, concentrating on the demands of the workpeople for a higher standard, and on the position of management in regard to their commercial success or otherwise. That is the accepted procedure under which negotiations take place. But under this Bill the Secretary of State will be able to step in immediately he thinks that something is going wrong, before the conciliation boards have had a full opportunity of going through the pros and cons. Whether or not he interferes will depend upon his political complexion, because this is a political Bill and one knows the different rulings that are given when political questions arise. That is why I deprecate this clause, and I am certain that it will not improve industrial relations.
As regards the cooling-off period, in a number of cases in America it has not led to an easement of the trouble. In effect, it has hotted up the disputes between both sides, because before the position is reached of declaring a strike,

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or anything of that description, both sides of industry are a long time in negotiation, and this is the cooling-off period.
We shall not prevail, and the Government will carry this clause; but I think it is as well to get on record that we are changing from a voluntary system, which has kept a better and longer peace in this country than in the six other industrial nations which are above us in various types of legal procedures. They lose far more days per year per 1,000 people than we do with our voluntary system. It is as well to get that on record, because that is something factual that should go out to the nation, irrespective of the ideological approach that we are now witnessing in this Bill.
4.42 p.m.
LORD BERNSTEIN: Is there any strike except the most trifling one which is not either "gravely injurious to the national economy" or which creates "a serious risk of public disorder"? That is my first question. My next question is: does the Bill enable the Court to forbid practically any strike up to 60 days without any responsibility to Parliament? Why do not the Government, through the Secretary of State, have at least the obligation to consult with the T.U.C. and the C.B.I. before taking action under this clause? They appear to intend to do so under Clause 137. Is this interference with the freedom to strike not a violation of the international obligations which the Government have under the European Social Charter, where we undertake to respect that freedom?
My principal objection to the proposals as I see them is to page 97, lines 14 to 16. Under the Emergency Powers Act 1920, a Royal Proclamation of Emergency can be made if
" any action has been taken or is immediately threatened by any persons or body of persons of such a nature and so extensive as to be calculated, by interfering with the supply and distribution of food, water, fuel or light or with the means of locomotion …,"
and so on. Now we have that protection. Why do we want this further protection? There must be a limit to the exercise of the freedom to strike where human lives and human health are involved: I grant that. But the Emergency Powers Act gives you all that. It requires that at least a substantial portion of the com-
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munity must be in danger of being deprived of the essentials of life.
But no emergency provision that I have been able to find goes so far as Clause 134. It contains three elements: the likelihood of grave injury to the national economy; the likelihood of imperilling national security—I accept that one; and the likelihood of creating a serious risk of public disorder. My concern is with Nos. 1 and 3. First, grave injury to the national economy. It has been rightly observed that it is this point which distinguishes the Bill not only from previous legislation here but also from the Taft-Hartley Act, which has been constantly quoted here. Is there any major labour dispute which does not cause "grave injury to the national economy"? If, in the external economic relations of the country, it reduces exports, it obviously does. If it increases the need for imports, it obviously does. If newspapers, for instance, had to be printed abroad, it would affect the economy by affecting imports. So far as I can find, the formula goes further than any emergency provision in this country or abroad. It certainly permits intervention in any major dispute in which the Government choose to intervene without their going to Parliament.
On the third point, what is "public disorder"? Every transport strike, I should think, causes public disorder somewhere. More than that, any strike in any of the public services does. The dustmen's strike certainly did. Given the enormous scope of the emergency provisions, it becomes all the more important that the Government should be responsible to Parliament for the measures taken. In the Emergency Powers Act the powers of Parliament are most carefully safeguarded. So far as I can read them, if it is not in Session, Parliament must be summoned. within five days after a Proclamation of Emergency. Regulations must be confirmed within seven days by both Houses. No proclamation is in force for more than one month, though it may be extended. Under the Bill, as I read this clause, the Secretary of State must take the initiative, and for this he is no doubt accountable to Parliament. But the decision to impose sanctions goes beyond that. The decision comes from the Industrial Court, and cannot even be debated by either House.

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This is, in effect. a total reversal of policy compared with the 1920 Act. This clause is modelled on the pattern of the Taft-Hartley Act, but that Act operates in a Presidential and not in a Parliamentary democracy. I think this clause is wrong for this country, and will not produce the industrial peace which we all desire. I urge the Government to take it back.
4.45 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN: If I may answer the points which have been made, first of all, may I deal with what the noble Lord, Lord Bernstein, has just said. He has described this as a total reversal of policy. It is not that at all: it is the taking of complementary powers to cover an area which is not at present covered. The Emergency Powers Act, to which he referred, does not give power to order people to go back to work. The purpose of these particular provisions is to get people back to work while a settlement is being negotiated. The noble Lord made reference to what happens in America; but before I deal with that I would point out that the incidence of this kind of intervention (if the noble Lord would like to call it that) in America has, over the years,been roughly about one per annum and, as I said, in about half those cases a settlement was reached during the period of conciliation pause.
On the point of responsibility to Parliament, the Secretary of State is always responsible to Parliament for his conduct of industrial relations. In the normal way he does not have to go to Parliament to be authorised to take the steps that he takes in the course of industrial relations. He reports what he is doing; he does not need any kind of formal authorisation. It is only in regard to the Emergency Powers Act that confirmation is required. So that in this case he will be in exactly the same position as in any other case in relation to the conduct of industrial relations.
The noble Lord then asked, "Why not consult the T.U.C. and the C.B.I., or at any rate why should there not be a provision requiring the Secretary of State to do so?" These are emergency provisions, and the purpose of them, obviously, would be to bring people back to work as soon as possible in the conditions specified. The conditions specified
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must be that the strike has begun or is likely to begin—this is the first provision —and you either want to avoid a strike that is about to take place or to stop a strike that has already begun, with a view to reaching a settlement. These are the purposes; and this is something that is not provided for in the law at the present time. As I say, in America the experience is that it is not often used; but it is something of a last resort, to fill a gap that at present exists in the armoury of measures available to the Secretary of State.
It is not necessarily a question of introducing this measure before all conciliation has been exhausted. The point is that when a strike is just about to take place or has already begun and conciliation has already failed, he might be able to take these steps if he thinks that they are likely to lead to a settlement. I hope that will clear up the position at any rate to some extent. The noble Lord, Lord Bernstein, shakes his head; but in all the speeches I have heard him make here I have never yet found him to be convinced by anything. One of these days, I hope, we shall succeed.
LORD POPPLEWELL: Before the noble Lord sits down, will he deal with those figures which I quoted, regarding days lost in America and in this country?
LORD DRUMALBYN: The noble Lord is quite right. I quoted similar figures myself; but I took a ten-year average while he took a particular year. He is right about the number of days lost in comparison between the United States and here; but this is not the point. This involves a great number of stoppages in both countries over the years. In the case of America we are dealing with an average of one stoppage a year where there is a really serious danger to the economy.
LORD HUGHES: I have a point that I wish to raise. It is rather interesting that I should be doing so now, because yesterday, with the co-operation of the noble and learned Lord, my noble friend Lord Stow Hill was able to raise a point in relation to Sections 4 and 5 of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1875 which were related by him to Clause 134 which we are now discussing.

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I should like to ask the noble and learned Lord about the remarks he made in respect to that which do not seem to me to read in the way which I am certain he intended them to read. I will read from yesterday's Hansard, col. 102:
" Section 4 deals with strikes with respect to two named public utilities—gas and water. That was amended by the Electricity Act 1919, by adding a third public utility—electricity. So that Section 4 of the 1875 Act, as amended, protects by criminal sanctions strikes in breach of contract in respect of three named public utilities."
He went on:
" Section 5 does not relate to specific types of undertaking at all. It protects with criminal sanctions acts the effect of which would be to endanger human life…."
I will not continue reading, but it seems to me that either the noble and learned Lord used the wrong word or he has been misreported, because the word "protect" is a nonsense in this context. It would mean that Section 4 protects strikes in breach of contract and that Section 5 protects acts which would endanger human life. I am certain that that is the last thing the noble and learned Lord intended to convey, but it would be wrong that it should remain a record of what the sections mean.
I should like to go on to one other point. Later on, in referring to the sections, he said (col. 103):
" … though the deterrent of a £25 fine, the maximum at present existing, is not something which one might think would instill fear into the heart of the more determined criminals."
I looked up the 1875 Act, first to find out whether, by some peculiar legal caprice, "protect" in law could mean the opposite of what people would ordinarily take it to mean; and I found, in my reading, that in the Act of 1875 the provision was not for a £25 fine but for a £20 fine. There was also the alternative of three months' imprisonment to which the noble and learned Lord did not refer. It may be that a £20 or a £25 fine would not be a deterent; but three months' imprisonment might well be. What I want to ask is: was the £20 fine subsequently amended to £25, or was that an error? If so, was the three-months' imprisonment alternative removed at some time, and is there now no imprisonment? I think that this is rather important because we have been discussing in the last few days the possibility of imprisonment or
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the possibility of there not being imprisonment. I should like to be quite clear in my own mind whether this particular penalty of imprisonment has been removed.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The noble Lord is quite right in the first point he raised. The word "protects" should obviously read either "prevents" or "prohibits", as the context requires. Whether this was a misprint or a slip of the tongue I cannot charge my memory with saying; but I do not think that anybody could be misled by the printed Report, which is obviously in error, either because 1 was guilty of a slip of the tongue or that there was a slip by the shorthand writer or the printer who set up the type. With regard to the other point, I regret that I was wrong about the £25. I am afraid that I read from my brief without looking at the Act. The noble Lord was good enough to draw my attention to the point that the Act says £20 or three months. My brief said "£25". I should have looked it up. I am sorry.
LORD DONOVAN: I think it is right to say that the three months' imprisonment has remained unaltered.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR: They both remain unaltered.
4.56 p.m.
LORD CHAMPION: The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, earlier stressed the point that the conciliation pause which is contained here will be conducive to the settlement of a strike, or of industrial action short of a strike. Experience has shown that this sort of cooling-off period merely enables the positions taken up to harden. This appears to be the experience which comes to us from the United States: that during that period not only do positions harden but in some cases the extent of the strike becomes greater than it was initially. 'The noble Lord called in support of his argument some figures which I thought were those given in the Donovan Report, in paragraph 421, which says:
"In all but one of 24 cases in which injunctions were granted, a stand-still period was successfully imposed. In sixteen cases a settlement was reached during or shortly after the stand-still period, but in seven cases stoppages did take place or were resumed after it."

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The noble Lord might have gone on to read paragraph 423, which says:
"The record under the Taft-Hartley Act in the United States has been worse than the record in our country. We have been singularly free from strikes in recent years which would have come within the scope of a ' Taft-Hartley' kind of procedure."
Later, in paragraph 424, the Report says:
" However, account must also be taken of the occasions when strikes have been imminent but have been averted through our existing flexible proceedures If the more rigid arrangements of the fixed cooling-off period had been used in their place, strikes might have taken place which were in fact avoided. The 60-day period may be taken into account in advance by the parties and in any case fits more easily into a system where collective agreements expire on fixed dates, unlike the system here, where the timing of negotiations is less hard and fast."
On this part, the Donovan Commission conclude with these words:
"We think it preferable that the Government's present freedom of action should be preserved, and we do not think it has been shown that its powers need to be increased."
Anyone who has ever had anything at all to do with industrial relations is bound to support that point of view, which is here expressed by a body that spent so much time looking into the matter and with such great expertise.
The noble Lord talked about the figures. I must say that I find the sort of figures he gave not at all convincing. If we look at the table given on page 95 of the Donovan Report we see that the number of working days lost per 1,000 employees in the United Kingdom is given as 190; in the U.S.A., as 870. I believe that it is now the case that Canada has provisions of this sort operating. In the case of Canada, the figure is 970 days lost per 1,000 employees. The average number of persons involved per stoppage in this country is 340, and in the United States of America 470. It is true that the number of stoppages per 1,000 employees is smaller in the United States than here; namely, 13·2 in the United States and 16·8 here. What the noble Lord is trying to tell us is that the short, snappy strike that so often takes place in this country is more damaging to the economy than one that lasts much longer. I cannot accept that, and I will not, because I believe it is wholly contrary to the facts.
The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, also talked about emergency procedures; and
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so did my noble friend, Lord Bernstein. I agree wholly with my noble friend Lord Bernstein that, by the procedure under this Bill, we are taking important decisions out of the hands of Parliament and placing them in the hands of the courts. This is not something which I regard as satisfactory. What is the position under the Emergency Powers Acts? First of all, the Government manage to persuade the Sovereign to issue a Royal Proclamation. Under the terms of that Proclamation Parliament passes the necessary regulations, so it is necessary to come to Parliament for sanction to do anything under the Emergency Powers Acts. As I said in my original speech, this procedure has worked extraordinarily well in this country, and I should have thought it crazy to interfere with the Acts in the way in which the Government are doing here. If you take something out of the hands of Parliament and place it in the hands of the Court, as the Government propose to do under this Bill, it is inevitable that we shall be told that it is not right for Parliament to criticise the Court.
LORD DRUMALBYN: May I intervene for a moment? I tried to make plain that these powers were regarded as complementary. They are in no way conflicting; they deal with different things. It is also the case that the emergency powers can come into effect right away and lapse, unless they are confirmed by Parliament.
LORD CHAMPION: If the emergency powers deal with something entirely different, why do we get here words which seem to me very similar to those in the Acts? There are additions which I regard as wholly objectionable, but the main words appearing here seem to be lifted, with slight emendation, from the Emergency Powers Acts. I regard this as a matter of very great importance. The noble Lord says that in the United States of America there is, roughly, one intervention per annum in the cases of the instances that fall to be dealt with under Taft-Hartley. I believe that is what he said, and the noble Lord nods, so clearly he did say that. The noble Lord also told us that the powers in this clause are wider than those under Taft-Hartley. I understood him to say that—that these powers are wider.
LORD DRUMALBYN: They are more precisely defined than Taft-Hartley.
LORD CHAMPION: That may be so, but in my opinion they are very much wider than anything that I have read which it is possible to do under Taft-Hartley. If I am right, clearly the one intervention per annum is not in any way comparable to what might occur under the provisions of this Bill when it comes into force, as I fear that it will. Noble Lords opposite are determined to push it through, but it is right that we should point out the mistakes and errors contained in the Bill. I might live long enough to say one day, "I told you so", but I would not be too sure about that. But I shall always keep it in mind in case at some time I have the great pleasure of standing at this Box and telling the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, "I told you so on—" I forget what date it is, June 10, 1971.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: It is June 9.
LORD CHAMPION: It is June 9; I am one day in advance. I have another day to live before—
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I hope that the noble Lord will live a very long time and that he will be in a position to speak from the Opposition Dispatch Box for a very long time.
LORD CHAMPION: That is very kind of the noble and learned Lord. I reciprocate that wish, in respect both of the noble and learned Lord and also the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, whom I have always held in great friendship. But I think he is making a mistake in telling us that this is a good Bill; it is not, it is a bad Bill. For that reason I hope that the Committee will divide against this clause and defeat it, but I fear that may not be the case.
5.6 p.m.
On Question, Whether Clause 134 shall stand part of the Bill?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 139; Not-Contents, 49.

CONTENTS

Aberdare, L.

Dundee, E.

Macpherson of Drumochter, L.

Ailwyn, L.

Eccles, V.

Malmesbury, E.

Albemarle, E.

Elliot of Harwood, Bs.

Margadale, L.

Alexander of Tunis, E.

Emmet of Amberley, Bs.

Merrivale, L.

Amherst, E.

Falkland, V.

Merthyr, L.

Amory, V.

Ferrers, E.

Meston, L.

Auckland, L.

Ferrier, L.

Milverton, L.

Balerno, L.

Forester, L.

Monck, V.

Balfour, E.

Fortescue, E.

Monckton of Brenchley, V.

Balfour of Inchrye, L.

Garner, L.

Morrison, L.

Barnby, L.

Gisborough, L.

Mowbray and Stourton, L.[Teller.]

Beauchamp, E.

Grenfell, L.

Beaumont of Whitley, L.

Gridley, L.

Napier and Ettrick, L.

Belhaven and Stenton, L.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

Northchurch, Bs.

Belstead, L.

Guest, L.

Norwich, V.

Berkeley, Bs.

Hacking, L.

Nugent of Guildford, L.

Bessborough, E.

Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Oakshott, L.

Blackford, L.

O'Neill of the Maine, L.

Bledisloe, V.

Hankey, L.

Orr-Ewing, L.

Boston, L.

Harris, L.

Poltimore, L.

Bradford, E.

Hatherton, L.

Rankeillour, L.

Brecon, L.

Headfort, M.

Rathcavan, L.

Buccleuch and Queensberry, D.

Henley, L.

Rea, L.

Byers, L.

Hives, L.

Reay, L.

Caccia, L.

Hood, V.

Reigate, L.

Clwyd, L.

Howard of Glossop, L.

Rennell, L.

Coleraine, L.

Howe, E.

Rhyl, L.

Conesford, L.

llford, L.

Robbins, L.

Cork and Orrery, E.

Inchyra, L.

Robertson of Oakridge, L.

Cottesloe, L.

Inglewood, L.

Rochdale, V.

Courtown, E.

Jellicoe, E. (L. Privy Seal.)

Rothermere, V.

Craigavon, V.

Kemsley, V.

Ruthven of Freeland, Ly.

Crathorne, L.

Killearn, L.

St. Aldwyn, E.

Crawshaw, L.

Kilmany, L.

St. Helens, L.

Cromartie, E.

Kindersley, L.

St. Just, L.

Daventry, V.

Kinloss, Ly.

Salisbury, M.

Denham, L. [Teller.]

Lothian, M.

Sandford, L.

Derwent, L.

Loudoun, C.

Sandys, L.

Drumalbyn, L.

Lyell, L.

Sempill, Ly.

Dudley, E.

MacAndrew, L.

Sherfield, L.

Sinclair of Cleeve, L

Strathcona and Mount Royal, L.

Trefgarne, L.

Somers, L.

Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, Bs.

Stamp, L.

Swinton, E.

Vivian, L.

Strang, L.

Tan law, L.

Wade, L.

Strange, L.

Teviot, L.

Ward of Witley, V.

Strange of Knokin, Bs.

Teynham, L.

Windlesham, L.

Strathclyde, L.

Thorneycroft, L.

Wolverton, L.

Wrottesley, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Addison, V.

Hoy, L.

Ritchie-Calder, L.

Archibald, L.

Hughes, L.

Royle, L.

Balogh, L.

Leatherland, L.

Segal, L.

Bernstein, L.

Lindgren, L.

Shinwell, L.

Blyton, L.

Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, Bs.

Silkin, L.

Brockway, L.

Lloyd of Hampstead, L.

Slater, L.

Brown, L.

McLeavy, L.

Sorensen, L.

Buckinghamshire, E.

Maelor, L.

Stonham, L.

Champion, L.

Mais, L.

Stow Hill, L.

Diamond, L.

Moyle, L.

Summerskill, Bs.

Douglas of Barloch, L.

Noel-Buxton, L.

Taylor of Mansfield, L.

Douglass of Cleveland, L.

Pargiter, L.

Walston, L.

Gaitskell, Bs.

Phillips, Bs.[Teller.]

Wells-Pestell, L.

Gardiner, L.

Plummer, Bs.

White, Bs.

Garnsworthy, L.

Popplewell, L.

Williamson, L.

George-Brown, L.

Raglan, L.

Wynne-Jones, L.

Hilton of Upton, L.[Teller.]

Moved accordingly and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

Resolved in the affirmative, and Clause 134 agreed to accordingly.
Clause 135 [Order of Industrial Court on application under s. 134]:
5.14 p.m.
LORD CHAMPION LORD CHAMPION moved Amendment No. 277F:
Page 97, line 38, leave out from second ("Court") to ("that") in line 40 and insert ("if it is satisfied on the evidence").
The noble Lord said: The situation here is that the Secretary of State, using his absolute discretion, brings a matter to the Industrial Court on an application which will, I presume, tell the Court that the Secretary of State is of the opinion that there is existing in this country a grave risk of injury to our national economy or to our security or a risk of public disorder or that the lives of people are in danger by reason of a strike or a threat of a strike or other industrial action. The Court then, under subsection (1) of this clause, will have to be satisfied on the evidence that there are sufficient grounds for believing that those conditions exist, and if it is satisfied, the Court shall make an order.
The Court has to be satisfied, not that the situation is gravely injurious to the national economy, et cetera, but that there are sufficient grounds for believing that this is the case. It will be obvious to your Lordships that I am not a lawyer,
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but it has been represented to me that this believing (with "believing" underlined) that a condition is fulfilled is about the lowest standard of proof required anywhere by an English court of law. In civil law, as many of your Lordships will know, it is necessary to prove matters on a balance of probabilities. In criminal law, it is necessary to prove matters beyond reasonable doubt. I think it fair to ask here what is the sort of evidence that will be presented to the Court. What evidence will be called for? What State documents will be presented to the Court and what State documents might be withheld by the Secretary of State, claiming privilege? Certainly it ought not to be sufficient, as some people have suspected might be the case, for the Minister's affidavit to be accepted by the Court. The course that the Court might follow is the serious one of bringing the law into an industrial dispute, and it must satisfy itself on the evidence before it that the condition alleged by the Secretary of State really does exist. It ought not to be enough for the Court to believe that the condition exists; the Court ought to be completely satisfied on the evidence adduced before it that the conditions exist beyond a peradventure.
One is entitled to ask what sort of hearing the Court will be expected to ensure before it makes an order. I take it—and I hope that the noble Lord will answer this point when he comes to

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reply—that here there is no question of a judge of the Court, or a judge and one appointed member, granting an order in chambers restraining a person or persons from certain,actions. What I am getting at here is that it ought to be and must be done in open court and not in camera, as I understand happens in certain actions which take place in some courts in our land. Upon whom will the Court call to give evidence of the existence of the conditions set out in Clause 134(4)? As I have said, it ought not to be enough for the Secretary of State to say that the conditions exist. It ought not to be enough for him to go along and say, "I am positive that these conditions exist."
I think that under this Bill a number of arbitrary actions will be taken by the Secretary of State. This may well be an arbitrary action, but the Court must not accept that any arbitrary decision which the Secretary of State may make necessarily proves to the Court that the conditions postulated in this clause in fact exist. Appearing before the Court there ought to be witnesses giving evidence, in the case of a strike, of its extent and probable effect if continued, and, in the case of a threatened strike, how many firms or undertakings will be affected, the products of the firms or the nature of the services provided by the undertakings, and certainly, in the difficult area of the contemplation of an irregular industrial action, competent witnesses as to the possible effect of such action if the contemplation turns into action.
The Court in any case will have a very difficult task, and I would have thought that before it has heard all the evidence it ought to have any emergency would be over. Certainly the Court, before making an order, ought to be satisfied on the evidence—and "being satisfied" seems to me to be a lot more than "believing" that something is the case. It would be disastrous if the Government's assertion that a national emergency was threatened were to be accepted almost without question. The experience in the United States under Taft-Hartley has been that no court has ever been willing to override the judgment of the Government on such a matter. As George Meaney, President of the American
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Federation of Labour and Congress of Industrial Organisations, puts it:
" In practice under Taft-Hartley a national emergency is any labour dispute that the Government decides to so label."
That is the experience of the United States. I hope it will not be the experience here. But one is inclined to think that the system of justice in that country is very similar to the system of justice here, and it would be a very bad thing if, after a few years' experience here, we should have to say precisely this.
It may well be that the Court may find itself so ham-strung that almost inevitably it will be forced to believe what the Secretary of State has told it. I would have thought that this would be contrary to anything this Committee would want, and anything that Parliament would desire. For that reason I hope the Minister will be able to satisfy me on this point of "believing", and if he cannot we must try to do something about removing it from the Bill. I beg to move.
LORD TAYLOR OF MANSFIELD: I support my noble friend Lord Champion in all that he has said. May I ask the noble Lord to tell us whether a system of case law will be built up on the decisions arrived at by the Industrial Court?
5.23 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN: The noble Lord is seeking to substitute here for the the words
"the Court, subject to its being satisfied on the evidence"
the words
" if it is satisfied on the evidence".
LORD CHAMPION: And it leaves out the word "believing".
LORD DRUMALBYN: I beg the noble Lord's pardon. I was referring to the wrong line. In fact he is really asking for a very high standard of proof.
LORD CHAMPION LORD CHAMPION: That is right.
LORD DRUMALBYN: The wording would then be:
"… the Court, if it is satisfied on the evidence that the condition specified in subsection (2) of that section is fulfilled, shall make an order under this section."

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We are not here dealing with a criminal situation, nor would we expect a standard of proof such as is required in criminal proceedings; but we are dealing with an emergency situation. Obviously the effectiveness of this clause would be seriously altered if there were to be a long wrangle in court as to whether the condition specified in subsection (2) of the previous clause was fulfilled—that is involving a question of grave injury to the national economy, and so on. The function of the Industrial Court is not to decide whether there has been a breach of law by any of the parties in the circumstances of an industrial dispute: that is not the standard of proof required. The function is to impose a statutory restraint on a party organising industrial action which is seriously damaging to the national interest or likely to be seriously damaging to it. That restraint is for a limited period and for a specific purpose: for the purpose of negotiation or conciliation.
The Court also has the further function of acting as a watchdog to ensure that the Secretary of State, in his anxiety to avert a damaging strike or lock-out, or to see that a strike which is or is likely to be damaging is desisted from, does not invoke these procedures without having sufficient grounds for believing that a national emergency exists or is likely to exist. One has to envisage the circumstances that may arise here. The Secretary of State, before he makes his application, has to be convinced that he has a duty to the nation to bring to an end a dispute which is already running into the strike area. It would be quite wrong to change the burden of proof in the manner suggested. As I said, this is a burden of proof that is more appropriate to criminal jurisdiction, when a court has to be satisfied on the evidence before it can convict. But to apply that formula to the circumstances of an industrial dispute could mean industrial action continuing for days or even weeks before the Court reached a decision, with the parties accumulating evidence and counter-evidence, while the situation was deteriorating in the meantime.
By the time the Court reached a decision in such circumstances, the hope of averting an emergency might have gone, and an application for a restraint order might have been rendered quite futile. It
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is no good suggesting that the Court could make an interim order in these circumstances, because it would still have to be satisfied on the same criteria before doing so. Therefore that would not work. If the substantive order were to require the burden of proof suggested by the Amendent there is no doubt that considerable time would elapse before the evidence which would enable the Court to make that substantive order had been presented. This is not to say that the Secretary of State will not have to make a convincing case to the Court on the basis of sound and sufficient evidence. It is simply to recognise the needs and realities of a potential emergency situation. I understand—I am subject to correction on this—that this is a unique formula to meet a unique situation of the utmost importance. It is not appropriate to an emergency situation that the Court would make an order if, and only if, it were satisfied that there were cast-iron grounds for deciding that the condition existed or was likely to exist. There is a matter of judgment involved here. I hope I have not shown an undue lack of sympathy for this Amendent.
The noble Lord asked what documents would have to be produced. Obviously, here the same rules would apply as apply in general so far as the production of State documents is concerned. This will certainly not be done on an affidavit of the Secretary of State. The Court will be able to test the evidence and to hear counter evidence. But if, as I say, the standard of proof were made as high as the noble Lord seeks to make it, it would defeat the purpose of meeting the emergency which it is designed to meet. Therefore we consider that the words that have been suggested to meet these special circumstances are the right words. The Court must be satisfied that there are good grounds for believing that these conditions exist or are likely to exist, and the Court will have to be satisfied by the Secretary of State on the evidence that that is so.
LORD SLATER: The noble Lord said that the Court will be set up as a kind of watchdog, and I want to pose these questions. The Secretary of State must be in a position to present his case to the Court on the basis of having information in regard to the two parties engaged in negotiation through the conciliation machinery

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that exists between them. Do I take it that the evidence to be submitted by the Secretary of State to the Industrial Court for an order to be made will be evidence that has been collected by his conciliation officers? If this information is collected and is to form the basis of his application for an order, does one take it that it is submitted in memorandum form to the Court, and they examine the evidence without any consultation with the Secretary of State on the memorandum that he has submitted?
Secondly, will the two parties involved in a dispute be called in front of the Court, collectively or separately, to give reasons why they are unable to agree? And will a decision be given as and when they present their case? Will the Court, after sitting for some time, bring in a form of judgment whereby the order is brought into operation? Is that to be the position? If so, I can see great dangers. I do not know whether noble Lords realise that what is being done is the transferring of delegated powers away from Parliament which ought to remain with Parliament. They are being passed on to another body outside Parliament to form a judgment in regard to an emergency in which the State may be involved because of the action taken. When emergency powers are taken they cover more or less everything in regard to the State, and it is a decision that must be taken by Parliament, not by an outside interest. By these clauses I think we are seeking to remove powers from Parliament which should remain with Parliament.
LORD TAYLOR OF MANSFIELD: Before the noble Lord replies to my noble friend, will he say something about the point that I raised? In case he did not get it, I will repeat it. Will a system of case law be built up as a result of the decisions of the Industrial Court?
5.35 p.m.
LORD STOW HILL: The broad question of policy has already been argued, and the Committee came to a decision on it in the last Division. But, having entrusted the Secretary of State with this duty and having involved the Industrial Court in participation in the discharge of their duty, it is, I should think, the bounden duty of this Committee, as a revising Chamber, to see whether the scheme is likely to work in practice and
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exactly what is involved in the provisions of the two relevant clauses as they are drafted. The immediate observation of the Minister which brings me to my feet is that which he directed to the question of interim orders. If he will look back to Schedule 3, which I have no doubt he has well in mind, he will see that there is specific provision there for the making of interim orders. Regulations will have to be formulated stating exactly in what circumstances interim orders can be made, but there is obviously to be a genuine power to make interim orders.
How is this to work out in practice? We are, in the assumed circumstances, dealing with an emergency situation. Obviously tempers are going to be high, emotions will be running strong, and there will be keen controversy, perhaps ranging over large areas of the country, as to the rightness or wrongness of particular industrial action. One is examining this question against that background. I should have thought that in terms of the powers to make interim orders what is very likely to happen—and, indeed. what would be done by a Secretary of State if he were impressed by the critical nature of the situation, with which he had to deal—is that the Secretary of State will, as one now does in the case of the ordinary common law courts, go straight to the Court and ask for what in common law parlance is described as an interim injunction.
What has he to do in order to obtain an order from the Court for the equivalent, in terms of Clause 35, of what is in common law known as an interim injunction? Under the provisions of Schedule 3 he has to give notice to the persons whom he wishes to be affected by the interim injunction—if I may use that term for want of a better; it describes pretty closely what the Court can do under the terms of Clause 135. He can do that, normally speaking, in the course of a single hour. He has to serve a notice, which no doubt will be a written notice, and he can have that done almost immediately. In order to approach the Court, what has he to do? He has to satisfy the Court that there are sufficient grounds for believing that the conditions specified in subsection (2) of Clause 35 are present. He has to prove nothing. All he has to show is what again in the

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parlance of the ordinary courts is described as a prima facie case. I suppose that in practice it means that his department will draft an affidavit, perhaps 10 or 15 paragraphs long, setting out the circumstances, and it may be that those circumstances unexplained undescribed, unexamined, give rise to the view that there is a prima facie case for supposing that the conditions specified in subsection (2) of Clause 134 are present. The Court can make an order straight away.
You will have a situation where 5,000 or 10,000 workers may be on strike. Passions run high and a situation may arise in which the people in the country as a whole may begin to think that they are in an emergency situation. Is it practical politics to entrust the Minister with that most drastic power? Is it desirable and wise in constitutional terms to put the court of law at risk? Remember that it is a court of law and that the public must retain trust in its impartiality. Is it wise for the Court to be called upon in the course of half an hour to make such a drastic order, as it is empowered to make under Clause 135, bringing that strike to an end—unless, of course, the order is disregarded? We like to think that we are a law-abiding people, and if the order is obeyed by those concerned the strike comes to an end at once. That is the most drastic power one can conceive. Is it really wise, in the first place, to involve the Minister and, far more seriously, to involve the Court in that situation?
This is a country in which the rule of law is supreme and the courts are highly respected. It would be tragic if the public confidence in the impartial administration of our justice were ever undermined even to the least degree. A court cannot help but make that order; it is in duty bound to do so if it thinks that there are sufficient grounds disclosed in the affidavit put before it. If one assumes that that is being done in the situation I have described, is one not and I use a phrase I used in a previous debate on this Bill—putting the Court at serious risk of having its decisions misunderstood, resented and gradually, with the passage of time, seriously mistrusted? In recent times we have had quite enough said about arbitration tribunals being not
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sufficiently impartial to inspire confidence in industrial disputes. It would be a first-class disaster if a tribunal set up under this Bill, over which a High Court judge presided, was open to the same criticism. That is what the Government are doing. If this Amendment is not accepted by the Government—and the object of the Amendment has been clearly explained—that is the situation the Government are bringing about.
I have said that it will be a great tragedy if the confidence in the courts were undermined. It will also be a great tragedy of a similar character if the law begins to be treated with contempt. If an order is made in that critical situation, when tempers are high, people do not obey it and it is impractical to get it obeyed. I venture to intervene in this matter because I have had some personal involvement in the operation of what used to be called Order 1305. I know just how difficult it was when that order was broken—as this order may be disregarded in the future—to maintain respect for the law. It will be very said if legislation is put upon the Statute Book which produces a situation in which Ministers and the courts themselves are thought to be frightened of doing their duty. It is a situation which anybody who has ever heard of the office of the Attorney General has very much in mind, and in any legislation which is put upon the Statute Book we should be most careful not to produce the making of orders by courts which cannot be enforced, or which may produce the result that the impartiality of the court is suspected by large numbers of people.
5.45 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN: May I deal with Lord Stow Hill's point first. He has referred to the possibility that an interim order may be made, and has gone so far as to say that if an affidavit were made an interim order would have to be made by the Court. The noble Lord will be aware that under paragraph 22 of Part II of Schedule 3 it also says:
"The rules shall not enable any interim order to be made by the Industrial Court against any person unless all reasonable steps have been taken with a view to securing that notice of the application for the interim order, and an opportunity of making representations relating to that application, have been given to that person".

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He perhaps has not realised entirely what the effect of any such interim order would be. The order would affect persons, and the persons in question who would be affected would be the strike leaders. If an interim order were made, it seems to me that the strike leaders could well be affected and it would be their duty then to cease to promote the strike, if that were already in operation, or to defer any further action if the strike were not already in being. I am advised that in this particular case the Court would still have to be satisfied, before it made even an interim order, that there were sufficient grounds for believing that the conditions specified in subsection (2)—
LORD STOW HILL LORD STOW HILL: So I said.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I did not understand the noble Lord to say that.
LORD STOW HILL: I am sorry; I certainly said that. They have to be satisfied that there are grounds for believing that the situation has arisen in which the order can be made.
LORD DRUMALBYN: That the specific grounds referred to in subsection (2) of Clause 134 existed. In other words, the Secretary of State would have to satisfy the Court in the case of an interim order that there was reason for believing that the condition existed in exactly the same way as if it were making an order.
LORD SILKIN: It would be only the one side that would put up the case. The Court would not have the advantage of hearing the other side.
LORD DRUMALBYN: That is precisely what is not so, if the noble Lord will look at paragraph 22 of the Schedule. An ex parte interim injunction of that kind could not be given. It does not seem to me that there is very much likelihood of an interim injunction in a case of this kind at all. An order will be made, and the question we are discussing is whether that is not something like an interim injunction, and whether we should not have a very much higher standard of satisfaction of the court. That is the question we are discussing. I have been asked about the kind of things the Court has to be satisfied on. If I may say so to the noble Lord, Lord Slater, I do not think he is right in the points that he made. Perhaps I ought to answer
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the questions he asked. He asked whether the evidence to be submitted is the evidence collected by conciliation officers? The answer to that must be, "No" because where a strike is likely to begin, or has begun, the question of whether it would be conducive to a settlement of it by negotiation, conciliation or arbitration, if the industrial action were discontinued or deferred is not a matter for the Court. The matter for the Court is dealt with in subsection (1)(b) and the conditions specified in the next following subsection—
LORD SLATER: The noble Lord has misunderstood me. I asked whether the conciliation officers of his Department, in view of what is likely to happen, will be responsible for getting the evidence or information whereby the Secretary of State would be in a position to make application for an order because of the emergency that might arise owing to the action that might be taken by the two parties.
LORD DRUMALBYN: Clearly, the Secretary of State will have to be satisfied by his conciliation officers in order that he may make up his mind on paragraphs (a) and (c) of subsection (1) of Clause 134. Obviously, in this he will be helped by his conciliation officers. All I am saying is that this is a matter for the Secretary of State to make up his mind on before he makes his application to the Court. What he has to satisfy the Court about is that the condition specified in subsection (2)—which is the provision dealing with whether there is risk of grave injury to the national economy and so on—is fulfilled.
I am not certain whether I misunderstood a previous question of the noble Lord about an affidavit. Obviously, affidavits will be made in cases such as this. But I understood him to ask whether the Court was going to act simply upon an affidavit. It would of course be a matter entirely for the Court to decide at what point it is satisfied by the evidence that the Secretary of State has supplied, and what further evidence it will require and so forth. But the Court must be satisfied, on the evidence, that there are sufficient grounds for believing that the condition referred to in subsection (2)—that is about the risk of grave injury to the national economy

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and national security, public disorder, public order and so forth— is fulfilled.The difference between us relates to the standard of proof. This is all that is between us. if the Amendment which the noble Lord, Lord Champion, has put forward were accepted, then the standard of proof would be practically the same as in criminal proceedings. We do not believe that this would be either practicable or sensible in the situation of an emergency. The Secretary of State will obviously have access to figures as to the economy and as to the production of the factory, enterprise, undertaking or whatever it is, that is involved how long supplies are going to last, and all the rest of it. All this he will be able to show to the Court, in very much the same way as a Minister might show it to Parliament to satisfy Parliament also.
I was coming on to the noble Lord's next point regarding transferring powers away from Parliament. At the present time, Parliament has no power in any way at all—this is the very point—to arrest a stoppage, or to get people to go back to work. It has no power to do that. It is in circumstances where a stoppage is going to result in this grave injury to the economy, or possibly to security, or is going to cause injury to persons, or will be likely to cause injury to persons or to health, or where there is an imminent risk of that happening, that the application will be made. I should have thought that one could rely on any Secretary of State, who after all is in the long run responsible to Parliament, to exercise this responsibility himself of deciding when to make an application to a Court, in the full knowledge that he will have to satisfy the Court that he has reasonable grounds for believing that these serious results will ensue.
If one had to prove—this is the problem here—that the conditions specified in subsection (2) of the last clause were involved; if one had to prove that
" the industrial action in question has caused, or … would cause, an interruption in the supply of goods or in the provision of services of such a nature,"
and so on, up to the standard of criminal proof, it might take a very long time.
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The application might be hotly contested; there might be a great deal of opposition from the parties concerned, and this would obviously defeat the whole purpose of the application. In the meantime, as I have said, the situation would be likely to deteriorate, and the whole purpose of these emergency procedures would be defeated. I am sure that that is not what noble Lords really want. What they want is some check upon the complete liberty of action of the Secretary of State in this matter. This is what we believe ought to happen. We believe that the Secretary of State ought to have to convince the Court that the grounds he thinks he has for considering that a serious situation is going to arise are good grounds. This is what is provided by the wording of the clause as it now stands, and I hope that the Committee will be prepared to accept it.
LORD TAYLOR OF MANSFIELD LORD TAYLOR OF MANSFIELD: What about case law?
LORD DRUMALBYN: On case law, each application is going to be made in different circumstances. Obviously, the Court will learn from its own experience as things go by. But the Court would obviously not be bound by previous decisions in circumstances of this kind. In any event, the circumstances are likely to be different in each case. I am not quite clear what the noble Lord expects from the Court's being bound by building up case law in a matter of this kind, but I should have thought that in these particular circumstances of an emergency situation the circumstances would be likely to differ in each case and that the Secretary of State would have to convince the Court in each case of the ground he has for the belief he holds.
LORD TAYLOR OF MANSFIELD: What the noble Lord is saying is that it is very unlikely that a system of case law will be built up.
5.58 p.m.
LORD SLATER: I am sorry that the noble Lord has skipped over the point I put to him in regard to the emergency powers when he said that Parliament has no power to deal with problems of this type with which the Court will have to deal. My goodness! he must have a very short memory. Emergency powers have

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been passed by Parliament on numerous occasions. Once case I shall never forget is that of 1926, when it had to introduce emergency powers because of the miners' strike at that particular time—or, rather, it was not a strike but a lock-out. Emergency powers operated as a result of Parliament's introducing them at that time. I cannot see any reason why Parliament should break itself, as it were, in two in dealing with certain emergency power regulations on one side here, while hiving-off certain emergency regulations governing certain issues or circumstances which might occur within a particular type of industry to the Judiciary outside Parliament, when Parliament itself ought to be responsible through the relevant Department. I cannot understand it at all.
LORD DRUMALBYN: This is obviously a difference of opinion between us.Under In Place of Strife it was the Minister who, without reference to any court, was going to make the order. We think it is better, in order to avoid controversy, to place this above politics by taking it to the Court, and the Court should decide, on the evidence submitted to it, whether or not there is an emergency situation in being or likely to occur.
LORD POPPLEWELL: Do I understand the noble Lord correctly, because he seems to imply that there would be no case law built up?
LORD DRUMALBYN: Obviously, lawyers always have regard to what has been decided in previous cases. But I do not think that case law, in the sense that one understands it in the ordinary way, would apply. If the noble Lord is referring to having regard to precedence this is one thing, but I understand case law to have a special sense, and it was this that I was suggesting would not apply in these circumstances.
LORD POPPLEWELL: I think that is a better answer than the one which the noble Lord gave to my noble friend Lord Taylor of Mansfield. I have mentioned this matter of case law on more than one occasion because, despite what may be said by the noble Lord, case law built on certain principles will gradually accumulate. If the noble Lord feels that this is a difference between the criminal
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and the industrial courts, that is his opinion; but this has now been brought within the ultimate power of the Judiciary and one can reasonably foresee that case law on certain given lines will be laid down.
LORD CHAMPION: It seemed to me that towards the end of his first reply to this debate the noble Lord expressed the fear that delays might be caused by opposition from the parties concerned. As I understand Clause 134 of this Bill, "the persons so specified"—that is, specified in the preceding subsections—" together with the Secretary of State "are to" be the parties to any proceedings on that application". I hope no suggestion is going from this Committee that anyone who can be party to proceedings on anything will be in any way excluded from the proceedings of the Industrial Court. Clearly, they must be there; they must be invited to be there, or at least they ought to be there if they indicate their willingness to attend that Court and to appear in the proceedings. That will mean that there will have to be a careful examination by the Court itself of the things that are said to the Court by the witnesses who are parties to the proceedings.
I hope that it will never go from this Committee that a quick answer must necessarily be given, an answer which has not taken in all the evidence that may be available, just because the Minister feels that the action ought to be immediate. The noble Lord has said that the standard of evidence required ought to be different from that required in the criminal courts, which means that he is telling us that it ought to be of a lower standard. I cannot for one moment accept that. The idea here is that the Court will impose a statutory restraint by issuing an order. The noble Lord said that as though this were a rather trifling matter. It is not. It is a statutory restraint, and if the order is disobeyed the result to the parties concerned may be much more disastrous than some criminal proceedings might be. If the order is of a nature which is objectionable to the parties concerned, this result may flow from it; and certainly in the case postulated by my noble friend Lord Stow Hill the circumstances may well be much more disastrous than actions which take place from time to time in the criminal courts.

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I feel that the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, is still thinking in terms of the Court's acting almost on the "say-so" of the Secretary of State. But that would be absolutely wrong and contrary to everything we should expect from a Court set up under this Bill which, as I understand it, is to be a court of justice. It must be just to the parties who will appear before it and to the parties that will be named in the order which will eventually be made. I do not regard the reply as being satisfactory. I certainly did not quite understand—and I must read it again—the answer given to my noble friend Lord Stow Hill about the interim orders. It seemed that there was some suggestion that interim orders would require a different standard. I should have thought not. I should have thought they would have had the same effect on the people, although one would be for a much shorter period than the period of 60 days contained in Clause 135.
LORD DRUMALBYN: The noble Lord has exactly repeated what I said: that both in effect and on the evidence they would be very much the same.
LORD CHAMPION: I thank the noble Lord for that. I am bound to say that I cannot regard the answers that we have received on this side of the Committee as being completely satisfactory. However, it is a matter which deserves the most careful consideration. The noble Lord has made points to which I would wish to give a considerable amount of study, as would my noble friend Lord Stow Hill, whose knowledge in this sort of matter is perhaps unsurpassed in your Lordships' House. Therefore I am not proposing to ask the Committee to divide on this Amendment, but I shall seek to withdraw it, always bearing in mind—and I hope the Minister will bear in mind—that it is my intention to go through his remarks with a fine toothcomb before the Report stage.
LORD DRUMALBYN: Before the noble Lord actually withdraws the Amendment may I clarify one matter? If I may say so, I thought he summed up very fairly, but there is perhaps a slight misunderstanding. We are of course talking only about what the Court has to be satisfied about before making the order. That is
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one thing: the other thing is. whom the order will affect, and of course the parties to be affected will have the right to be there and to make their representations. There will be no short-cutting on that.
LORD CHAMPION: I would expect, too, that, because this would be a part of the proceedings before the Court, the parties would be present at the proceedings taking place on the part of this clause that we are now discussing. However, I will not continue with this discussion but will ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
6.9 p.m.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE (LORD BELSTEAD)THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE (LORD BELSTEAD) moved Amendment No. 277H:
Page 98, line 27, after (" section') insert (" made on an application relating to a strike, or to irregular industrial action short of a strike").
The noble Lord said: In moving this Amendment I would ask the agreement of the Committee to discuss with it Amendments Nos. 277J, 277K and 277L. These four Amendments deal with the powers of restraint against promoting or threatening to promote industrial action which is causing an emergency situation. As it now stands, Clause 135(4) requires the Court to make an order directing that no specified person shall promote the particular industrial action to which the order applies. In saying that, I am referring to the phrase "as the case may be" which is to be found in line 30. If, therefore, a specified person decides to organise some other form of industrial action than that contained in the order, he could do so without breaching the order so long as he refrained from continuing to organise the action to which the order applies. Thus there would be nothing to stop the organisation of a go-slow in breach of contract of employment while obeying a Court order to refrain from organising a strike.
It may be suggested that such a person could be prevented from doing this by a supplementary order under the next clause, Clause 136. But this, I would submit, is not so. That clause, in subsection (3), applies the supplementary order to persons not covered by the principal orders, and not to actions. The

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supplementary order applies the provisions of the principal order to those additional people.
So the purpose of the first three Amendments which I am asking permission to take together is to ensure that where an application by the Secretary of State relates to a strike or irregular industrial action short of a strike, the Court's order will prevent any person specified in the order, or in a supplementary order, from taking any action to promote a strike or irregular industrial action or to threaten to do so. That is, of course, within the area of employment specified. I hope your Lordships will agree that this is a really much more sensible way of dealing with this difficulty than the alternative, which would be to make the supplementary order provisions a great deal more cumbersome. It harmonises in fact with Clause 139(1) relating to a strike ballot order.
The last of these four Amendments relates to restraint against promotion of a lock-out and is largely consequential on the last three. Again it applies the procedure already laid down for the strike ballot order in Clause 139. Obviously the promotion of a lock-out by an employer is a different form of activity than promoting a strike or irregular industrial activity. A restraint order applies, however, either to the one or the other. We have simply dealt with this by deleting the present paragraph (c) of subsection (4) and placing the general restraint powers against promoting a lock-out in a new subsection. The general powers of restraint are, however, the same. I hope that in those circumstances there may be support for these four Amendments. I beg to move.
LORD DIAMOND: We are all very grateful to the noble Lord for his very clear explanation of the group of Amendments we are discussing, and I do not wish to raise any question on the merits. I should, however, be grateful if the noble Lord could tell us of the genesis of the alterations. Under what circumstances did the Government come to the view that the proposals now being made are better than the proposals earlier made? I do not know what representations have been made, and I should be grateful, therefore, if the noble Lord could enlighten us on that.
LORD BELSTEAD: I should have thought in all reasonableness that the Government reflected that what they wanted to do was to secure particular objectives, and the way to secure those objectives was to move these four Amendments.
LORD DIAMOND: I do not wish to delay the Committee. I am sure that what the noble Lord said is accurate, and of course I take it completely. Therefore, what he is saying is that the Government had second thoughts, and it is not the case that any particular interest has been promoting a particular point of view.
LORD BELSTEAD LORD BELSTEAD: No, my Lords, not that I am aware.
LORD LEATHERLAND: One of the provisions of this particular subsection is that the Minister may apply to the Court for an order to prevent somebody financing a strike. I wonder whether the Government have taken into account the extent to which that might be an interference with ordinary business procedures. Let us assume that a union, thinking of embarking on a strike and preparing itself for the struggle that lies ahead, goes to its bank manager and says, "Will you give us an overdraft?" I have known unions to do that. Will the Minister be able to ask the Court to make an order prohibiting the bank from giving an overdraft? I have known similar circumstances where a union has gone to its stockbrokers and said: "We hold half a million pound's worth of such-and-such stocks and shares. We want to sell in order to grapple with the strike that lies ahead". Will the Minister be able to ask the Court to tell the stockbroker not to deal with the union?
There is also the question of supplementary benefits payable to the wives and families of strikers. That money will be used indirectly to fortify the man thinking of coming out on strike and will probably prolong the strike if it is begun. Will the Minister be able to go to the Court and ask them to make an order telling the Supplementary Benefit Commission not to advance money to the families in those circumstances? There may be a union which goes to its solicitors and says, "We should like to mortgage our head offices", or some other property. Will the Minister be able to

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go to the Court and ask for an order prohibiting such a transaction?
We have the further question of public collections, public functions that are promoted in order to support strikes. My mind goes back to the strike of 1926, when on behalf of the miners many very respectable people organised public collections; letters were written in respectable papers like The Times soliciting subscriptions. Will the Minister be able to go to the Court and ask for an order prohibiting the organisation of such collections or other money-raising functions? As I read the Bill as it stands at the moment, the Minister could do that and the Court could do that. I sincerely hope that that is not what is in the mind of the Government. If I should be mistaken in thinking it is in their mind I hope they will consider the matter and come forward with Amendments at a later stage.
LORD BELSTEAD: May I say to the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, that he bowled me a slightly fast ball and I did not mean to seem discourteous in my reply. It may be worth while repeating the point made several times by my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn, that we are not talking here about the concept of sanctions against specified people. What we are talking about, as I understand it, is the desire which is to be found I should think, in all parts of the country, that where there is a dangerous emergency situation there should be the chance to hold up matters for a time to try to get a solution by arbitration or conciliation. It was with that in mind, in the context of that thought, that I gave my reply to the noble Lord, Lord Diamond. The Government felt that they were not achieving the objective they had set out to achieve and so in order to achieve it they put down these four Amendments.
I think it was in the debates yesterday —or perhaps it was the previous week—that the matter of provident funds and the use of such monies was threshed out at very great length in your Lordships' House, and I do not think I can say any more on that particular subject to the noble Lord. Lord Leatherland. But the noble Lord raised, of course, a great many other points about finance. Again as I understand the Bill, this is not going to be for Parliament to decide: it is
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going to be for the Court. If the noble Lord would like to delve any further into that matter, we have the Report stage ahead of us and he can table Amendments.
LORD LEATHERLAND: I know it is not for Parliament to decide, and therefore I have raised it in Parliament long before it gets to the Court. I think it would be disastrous if applications like that were to go to the Court, and therefore I hope that the Minister will look at it again.
LORD BERNSTEIN: Do I take it that under the Bill as it now stands the Industrial Court will have power to apply an injunction against the selling of securities or the borrowing of money in the legitimate operation of a trade union?
LORD DRUMALBYN: Anything in the way of a commercial transaction of course would not be covered here. If the noble Lord looks at Clause 134(3) he will see at whom the orders are likely to be directed. In the main it will be, in the case of a strike, the persons appearing to the Secretary of State to be responsible for "calling, organising. procuring or financing the strike". In other words. normally it will be the trade union. If it is irregular action, then it may be persons or some body other than a trade union. I was using "irregular action" not in the technical sense, as in the Bill. In the case of a lock-out, it will be the employer, or the employers' association. It is as simple as that. It certainly cannot go as far as the noble Lord suggests.
LORD BERNSTEIN: It is not quite equal. A large industrial organisation might have more funds in its bank than a trade union, so that it would not be comparable in the way the noble Lord is suggesting. Where in the Bill does it say that the Industrial Court would have the same powers over a commercial company—not an employers' organisation, but an employer—in the same way that they have over a trade union?
LORD DRUMALBYN: It says:
" where it relates to a lock-out, shall specify the persons … appearing to the Secretary of State to be responsible for instituting, carrying on, organising, procuring or financing the lock-out …"
This means the employer or the employers' association.
LORD LEATHERLAND: I am afraid that the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, has not answered the point which I raised. He has said that the Court's attention would be directed to certain people who would be named. It may very well be that the Minister in his letter to the Court, would not name the bank and would not name the stockbroker. He certainly would name the general secretary of the union, and the union as a corporate body. One of the instructions that the Court might lay down in its order is that this particular union, having £2 million in stocks and shares, shall be prohibited from cashing those stocks and shares in order to fight the strike. That is the kind of point I am getting at. It may prohibit the union from going to the bank and saying, "We should like an overdraft of a million pounds or so for the next two or three months." Similarly, the union might be inhibited under an order of the Court, on the application of the Minister, from raising money in many other ways to conduct a strike.
LORD SHINWELL: May I ask a question on a somewhat similar point, because I understand we are dealing with a group of Amendments? When I look at Amendment No. 277L, which refers to a lock-out, I read that an order relating to a lock-out is not dissimilar to an order relating to a proposed strike. I read towards the end of the Amendment,
" of this section shall institute, carry on, authorise, organise or finance a lock-out, …"
What is meant by financing a lock-out? I can understand what is meant by preparing to finance a strike, but what is meant by financing a lock-out? Would the noble Lord be kind enough to define what a lock-out is? What does it actually mean? It is possible to understand this, because we have had lock-outs in the history of industry in this country on several occasions, but I cannot follow what is meant by financing a lock-out. I think we ought to understand the meaning of this proposed Amendment.
LORD DONOVAN: May I say one word from a purely neutral aspect? I refer to the analogy of unemployment benefit under the National Insurance Acts. One of the disqualifications from receiving unemployment benefit arises when someone is thrown out of work through someone else's
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strike: they are not entitled to unemployment benefit if they are financing the strike. Those Acts have been consistently operated on the theory that if any one of those persons so thrown out of work belongs to the union which is organising the strike, and is paying his current subscriptions, he is thereby financing the strike. We recommended in our Report that that theory should cease to be practised. I understand that the Government have decided not to implement that recommendation. I also have reason to believe that the Chief Insurance Commissioner either has decided, or is about to decide, a case on the question whether merely paying your subscriptions to the union which is running the strike is financing the strike. What decision has been come to, or will be come to, I do not know, but I think this goes to show that the noble Lord, Lord Leatherland, has raised not only an important question but a difficult question. Those matters to which I have referred may be of some assistance to the noble Lord if he is going to consider this matter on Report.
6.27 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord. We will certainly look at the point. I would just suggest to him that the numbers of people who can be specified in an order are undoubtedly limited under Clause 134(3) and again Clause 135(2), which says,
" Any such order shall specify—
(b) the persons who are to be bound by the order, …
It is undoubtedly the intention of the Government that the persons to be bound by the order are primarily, if it is a strike, the trade union itself—we shall come to the Amendments concerned before very long—because anybody acting within the scope of his authority will then be covered there. In the case of an unofficial strike, then of course it would be particular persons, but it would be the strike leaders, the leaders of the unofficial strike. To that extent I think that his fears that this net would be cast very wide are perhaps not wholly well founded.
In the light of what I have just said, I do not think that the points that other noble Lords have made have any very great substance. So far as a lock-out is

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concerned, the noble Lord will find the definition of "lock-out" in the definition clause, Clause 158. Who actually finances a strike from an employer's point of view must be a question of fact, and I am afraid I must just leave it there.
LORD SHINWELL: Is that a complete reply? I accept what the noble Lord says about the definition of a lockout, but let us assume that one of a group of employers decides to institute a lock-out for some reason or other, which may be quite a valid reason, but then, because he is well aware that this may involve him in financial difficulties because it means a loss of production, he goes to his bankers and informs them of the projected loss that is likely to be sustained, and asks for assurances about an overdraft. Does that mean that the Minister can make an order to the bankers preventing any assurances about finance in order to prevent any loss that is likely to be sustained? I am merely raising the point because it is necessary to understand the purpose and meaning of the Amendment—that is all.
LORD LEATHERLAND: The noble Lord's latest reply seems to indicate that, when the Minister applied to the Court for an order against somebody who was thinking of a strike, that would be against certain persons. He said that it would be against a limited number of persons, and that it would be the officers of the union or the leaders of an unofficial strike. If I may refer to Clause 134(3), the word "persons" is very strictly defined by the words in brackets which state:
"(whether they are organisations of workers, officials of such organisations or other persons)"
So that when the Minister asks the Court to rule against a certain union, he is not only asking the Court to rule against the general secretary, the president, and the executive of that union, but also against the hundreds of thousands of members of that union.
LORD STOW HILL: In view of what has been said, may I intervene shortly? It is important to try to get this right. The question that has been asked is: who are the persons who can be specified in the application? In order to find that out, one looks first at Clause 134(3)(a). There one finds certain persons set out.
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Having done that, one then has to look at Clause 135(3)(a) and (b), and one finds a whole lot of people taken out of the previous paragraph. The question is: who has been left in? I should be grateful if the Minister would be so kind as to see whether this is the position.
First, if you look at subsection (3) of Clause 134, you find that the notice may
" specify the persons (whether they are organisations of workers, officials of such organisations or other persons)".
"Person", I suppose, includes an incorporated body and therefore there would be included in that category of people: first, unions who are registered under this Bill and who have therefore become corporate entities; secondly, unregistered unions who are not corporate entities but who are still aggregates of individuals; and,thirdly, officials of both registered and unregistered unions. That is where subsection (3) of Clause 134 leaves the matter.
Then one looks at paragraph (a) subsection (3) of Clause 135 to see who has been taken out. So far as I can make out, the following people are taken out: first, everybody—members of both registered and unregistered unions—who has no other responsibility for the strike except that he is included among the strikers. That is the first category, and it would take out an enormous number of people. It would take out all the members of the registered and unregistered unions of whom it could be predicated that their only participation in the strike is that they are strikers. Then one looks at paragraph (b) and one finds a number of other people taken out; there you find that everybody is taken out except somebody who has a responsibility beyond his responsibility as an official. You take out all officials if their sole responsibility in the strike is as such officials.
Then one proceeds to see what is meant by an "official". I always thought I understood what an official of a union was, until I began to look at the definition that one finds at page 177 of the Bill, which is really an extremely wide definition. "Official" is there described in the following terms:
" ' official ', in relation to an organisation of workers or an organisation of employers, means any person who is an officer of the organisation or of a branch …".
That is what one ordinarily understands as an official—a regional organiser or

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somebody of that sort. But then the definition goes on and becomes greatly widened. It states:
" … or who (not being such an oficer) is a person elected or appointed in accordance with the rules of the organisation to be a representative of its members or of some of them, including (in the case of an organisation of workers) any person so elected or appointed who is an employee of the same employer as the members, or one or more of the members, whom he is to represent";
Does that include the president, the general secretary, and the national executive committee'? Prima facie, I should have thought that all of those people came within that definition. If that is right, and one looks back at subsection (3) of Clause 135 in relation to an official strike, all those people will presumably come out. None of them can be served with a notice, as I read the subsection. The only categories of persons who can be served with a notice are: first, the officials of an unregistered union—because the only officials who are taken out are officials of a registered trade union, so that the officials of an unregistered union are left in—and, secondly, persons who have taken part in a strike, but who are not officials and who have some responsibility for it other than merely being strikers.
It is very important to know exactly who are the people against whom an order can be made, because an order can only be made against those who are specified in the notice. It seems to me that they would be officials of an unregistered union—not officials of a registered union—and members of a registered or of an unregistered union whose participation in the strike went beyond simply being a striker; and, also, the official registered union itself, because that would be a person; it is an incorporated body. I hope I have understood correctly, but I should like confirmation from the Minister because it is very important when one is seeing what is the effect of this clause.
6.37 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN: It is a little difficult to follow exactly what the noble Lord said, and I am afraid I shall have to say to him that I must look at what he said to see whether he is right. But my impression is that, in the main, he
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was right. Trade unions as such will be named and, as I said before, it will not be necessary to name the general secretary or any of the officers or officials acting within the scope of their authority. It might be that one would name an official who was not acting within the scope of his authority, and who was continuing to foment a strike after the union had ceased to do so. He might be named and might be one of the people to be added. Secondly, there are the organisations of workers that are unregistered. There, as the noble Lord said, it will be those who are leading the strike—presumably, the officers or officials—and any other persons who might come in from outside and who are not connected with the strike.
But I am not quite certain that the noble Lord and I agree on the interpretation of paragraph (b) of subsection (3) of Clause 135. That states that those excluded shall not include any person who
" has no responsibility for calling, organising, procuring or financing the strike or other action in question, or for threatening to do so, except in his capacity as an official of a trade union"
All those are taken out. So that all who take part except those who are leading a strike are taken out. That is the general effect.
LORD LEATHERLAND: I am grateful to the noble Lord for having explained the situation and for narrowing the field of people who might be named. But is there not another category of people who might be named? Let us imagine that there is a strike at Dagenham—which does not require very much imagination. A shop steward is holding forth to a crowd of a thousand workers at the factory gates. Let us imagine that, at the end of his inflammatory remarks, he says, "Hands up all those who want to strike" and 998 hands go up. Two hands do not go up. Those two men are obviously excluded from liability under the terms of this clause. But it seems to me, as those 998 people have instructed their leaders to call a strike, that that is a very positive act. It looks to me as though Lord Drumalbyn's little pack of guilty people will have to be enlarged to cover that vast concourse.
LORD BERNSTEIN: May I ask one more question? Whatever may be the Government's intention, I think they will wish to give in the Bill the appearance of equality. Take Ihe case of two factories in any one town doing a similar job. In one factory there is a strike, and the union have £200,000 in their account. There could be an injunction to restrain them from using that money. In the other factory there is a lock-out, and the owners of that factory have £200,000 in their bank account. They can use that £200,000 in cash for their outgoings. That surely cannot be equality. That surely cannot be the intention of the Government, if they wish for equality.
LORD DRUN1ALBYN: It is always difficult to get exact equality in the case of people starting from different circumstances. I would only say to the noble Lord that the object is to get as close to equality as the circumstances permit, with the object of achieving a settlement. But perhaps I ought to say, more generally, that noble Lords, quite rightly —I do not complain about it—are thinking all the lime in terms of the order being broken. Our expectation and hope is that an order of this kind, which is made in the public interest, will be adhered to, and so I hope that only in the most exceptional circumstances will the kind of difficulties which noble Lords have in mind ever arise; namely, the kind of difficulties where individuals who are specified in an order fail to comply with the order and some kind of disciplinary action has to be taken.
6.42 p.m.
LORD GARDINER: Without wishing to prolong the discussion, may I say that I hope the Government will consider the points which have been put forward, and particularly this difficult question of financing a strike. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Donovan, has reminded me that I once appeared for a man who was not on strike. It was partly a demarcation dispute within a union, and the object of the strike was because certain men wanted certain kinds of work. If they had got that kind of work there would have been less work for my client, so he was naturally against the strike and he voted against it. He was thrown out of work by the strike, and was denied
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unemployment pay, simply because he was naturally, as a member of the union, subscribing to the union, and it has been held by the court, as the noble and learned Lord has said, that if you are a member of a union which is paying out strike pay you are financing the strike and are therefore not entitled to unemployment pay, although you yourself were entirely against the strike.
It has to be remembered that this Bill will, I suppose, be construed in the light of the existing law as to what financing a strike means—and this is a point which I should have thought deserved serious consideration. My recollection is that the Government of which I was a member was going to deal with this point in accordance with the recommendation of the Commission of which the noble and learned Lord was Chairman, and I understand that this Government are not going to. So this particular thing, which is a plain piece of injustice, is apparently to go on. I think that the whole concept of what is meant by "financing a strike" needs consideration, and when one comes to "financing a lock-out" I find that even more difficult to understand. I suspect that the word "financing", when we come to a lockout, is simply there so that in the Bill it may appear that, word for word, the employers are being treated the same as the unions.
LORD DIAMOND: I was about to ge up twice on the same point and I an happy to say that the words were taker out of my mouth by both the noble and learned Lord, Lord Donovan, and my noble and learned friend Lord Gardiner; therefore I feel in unusually good company. I am returning to what the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, said. I think that on this very point of financing he said to my noble friend Lord Leatherland, who I agree has raised a most important point, that if this subject was going to be raised he hoped it would be raised at Report stage. I want first to make a preliminary comment: that the only way in which your Lordships' House and this Committee can function satisfactorily is for the ground to be covered fully on Committee stage—for matters to be pointed out and for them to be polished on Report stage. Therefore it is necessary to know the Government's view as far as possible on Committee stage.

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I am therefore asking the Government now whether they can help us a little more on this question of financing. The ground has been very largely cleared by what the two noble and learned Lords to whom I have already referred have said. I supplement it by saying that I am a person who goes round raising money for good causes, as I conceive them to be, and I have raised money for a number of political and semi-political causes as well as charitable ones. It may well be that in the future I shall wish to raise money to help the continuation of a strike in support of a principle which I hold dear and which the strikers hold dear.
Let us suppose that that is the case. Not being a member of the union and not being an official of the union, I should not, I suggest, be excluded by any of the exclusions referred to in Clause 135, and should therefore be one of the other persons referred to in Clause 134(3)(a) who is responsible for financing a strike. That would be my intention: that I should be responsible for financing it and would be going to try to collect a great deal of money from your Lordships, for example, on all sides of the House because I thought the cause was dear and proper to be supported. Now am I a person who can be ordered by the Secretary of State to desist; and, if so, how far does this order go? How many other persons, not being members of the union— be they financiers, be they bank managers, be they mortgage brokers, stockbrokers or anything of the like—who would wish to facilitate the strike by providing money for it, can be stopped by the Court from doing so? I should be greatly helped if the Government could tell us now how we stand, so that we can consider their answer in order to enable careful thought to be given at Report stage to any Amendment that might be appropriate.
6.48 p.m.
LORD HANKEY: I think perhaps the point has come when something might be said from these Benches on this subject, because it seems to me, with all humility, that we are rather getting away from the original point. We are going along working out who is going to be restrained and who will not be restrained. But I must say: do not let us forget that
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we are faced in these clauses with a situation where a major national emergency is at hand. I hope that a great many people will be restrained. I do not like the Tweedledum and Tweedledee situation that we have in industry. I think that both sides should be restrained, and I hope that during the 60 days, or the period up to 60 days, when strikes are at any rate postponed we shall do as much as we can to stop the parties concerned whetting their knives and getting ready. If they have at the end of that period to start again with their financing, so much the better. We then have a little more time at our disposal to see that neither side of industry is too ready to bash the other.
Personally, speaking as a diplomat, I have always thought that force was a remarkably poor way to settle things. It never settles anything on its merits, and I really think that in the years we live in we ought to find a better way to do this; and if we can give ourselves a little more time for the conciliation officers to get busy, to postpone the moment when the thundercloud breaks over Tweedledum and Tweedledee at the end of the period, so much the better.
Finally, I should like to say—and I do so with some apology—that I find these clauses a little obscure, with the exceptions to negative statements. I am not clear whether the actual officials and shop stewards of a registered trade union are or are not to be prevented by the Industrial Court from sharpening their knives. I think that they ought to be, whether they are officials of trade unions or not. Similarly, I believe that people in an employers' association in the circumstances of an impending national emergency ought also to be prevented. I hope that the exclusions on the employers' side will be just as rare as those on the other side. When the Government reconsider these clauses I hope they will make sure that they really are able to work as effectively as possible in holding off the thunder clouds.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I welcome the intervention of the noble Lord to bring us back to the realities of the situation. So far as the exclusions on the employers' side are concerned, the powers to prevent the employer locking out are just the

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same, but the circumstances are not exactly similar. That is why they have been put into a separate clause. It is really rather extraordinary that we have had this long debate on what was virtually, as I think my noble friend supposed when introducing it, a purely drafting series of Amendments. However we are no doubt wiser after it.
On the subject of financing, the noble Lord is perfectly right to ask us exactly what we mean by "financing". I think I am also entitled to say that I should like to consider 'what is the meaning of the word in the light of the comments from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, and the noble Lords, Lord Stow Hill and Lord Diamond. I ought to add that this is very much in line with what has just been said: that if anybody deliberately sets out to defeat an order of the Court I do not think he ought to expect very much leniency from the Court. I think it would be possible to add names to those specified in the original order if it transpired that there were other people—for some might have obeyed the order and some might not have done so—whose actions are frustrating the effectiveness of the order. Their names could be added to the order. With that explanation, I should like to have a further look at the word "financing".
LORD DIAMOND: I take it that the noble Lord was going on to add that he would propose at the earliest possible convenience to write to those who have raised these matters so that consideration can be given to them well before Report stage. It is conceivable that over the next three months we may finish the Committee stage of the Bill and therefore the time may be approaching when one has to consider carefully what Amendments are appropriate for Report. It would be a matter of convenience and courtesy if the noble Lord could give an answer prior to the Report stage.
LORD DRUMALBYN LORD DRUMALBYN: Yes, willingly.
LORD BELSTEAD: I beg to move Amendment No. 277J.
Amendment moved—
Page 98, line 30. leave out (" (as the case may be)").—(Lord Belstead.)
LORD BELSTEAD: I beg to move Amendment No. 277K.
Amendment moved—
Page 98, line 34, leave out from ("so") to end of line 36.—(Lord Belstead.)
LORD BELSTEAD LORD BELSTEAD: I beg to move Amendment No. 277L.
Amendment moved—
Page 98, line 39, at end insert—
(" ( ) An order under this section made on an application relating to a lock-out shall be an order directing that, during the period for which the order remains in force, no person specified in the order in accordance with paragraph (b) of subsection (2) of this section shall institute, carry on, authorise, organise or finance a lock-out, or threaten to do so, within the area of employment specified in the order in accordance with paragraph (a) of that subsection or any part of that area ").—(Lord Belstead.)
LORD BELSTEAD LORD BELSTEAD moved Amendment No. 278:
Page 99, line 2, leave out ("any instructions issued by") and insert ("or securing the withdrawal of any instructions issued by or on behalf of").
The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 278. It is the intention of the Government that not only should those specified in an order have to withdraw any instructions previously given to their members involved in an industrial dispute, but also that steps should be taken to ensure that these instructions, whether issued by the persons specified or on their behalf by other persons who may not be specified in the order, are actually withdrawn. The responsibility for ensuring withdrawal is thus deliberately placed on the persons specified in the order. If it were necessary for the persons or organisations specified in the order merely to issue instructions cancelling previous advice without any obligation to ensure that any instructions were acted upon, the likelihood of industrial action being deferred would be reduced and the possibility of evasion of the terms of an order by the persons specified would be increased. We believe that withdrawal, and action taken to ensure withdrawal, of instructions issued either by the persons named in an order or on their behalf must be a prerequisite for the deferment of industrial action causing an emergency situation.
This is what the Amendment seeks to ensure. This applies particularly in the situation where instructions to take industrial action have been given to and passed on by an authorised union official acting on behalf of a trade union and therefore exempted under Clause 135(3). The Amendment will make it the responsibility of organisations specified in the restraint order to take all steps specified in the order to ensure their officials withdraw any previous instructions to take the industrial action now restrained by the order. That is the objective in view.
LORD DRUMALBYN: It may now be a convenient moment for us to break. I beg to move that the House do now resume.

ANGLESEY MARINE TERMINAL BILL [H.L.]
6.59 p.m.
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF LISTOWEL): My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a second time.
Moved, that the Bill be now read 2a.— (The Earl of Listowel.)
LORD OGMORE: My Lords, I should like to say a few words on the Second Reading of this Bill. In my view it is a very important Bill, and it is not one that ought to go to a Committee at all; but in the event that it does go, it ought to go with a definite indication of the views of this House. Anglesey is a small island in the North West of Wales, some 270 square miles in area, and thus one of the small counties of Wales and the United Kingdom. It has a population of some 60,000. Its main industries are agriculture and holidays. The holiday industry is becoming very popular, and it has an expanding income which last year was computed at 7 million. Those of your Lordships who have been there will know that it is an island of great beauty with a mild climate, and with sea shores at Amlwch and elsewhere. I particularly stress Amlwch, the little fishing town and holiday port, with a great attraction to many people, not only from
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Wales but also from England. Noble Lords who are not Welsh will not know that Anglesey has a very special place in Wales. It is in fact what we call Mon Mam Cymru—the "Mother of Wales"—because from there came a great deal of the one-time culture: I will not say the present way of life, but the way of life at the time. It was in Anglesey that the Druids made their last stand when they were wiped out by the Romans, who objected to them because, it was alleged, they ran the "resistance movement", not only in Wales but also in Northern Europe— particularly in France and Belgium— where Celts were situated. Whether they did or not, the Romans, like many other occupying Powers, in order to justify their aggression had to wipe out any part of the local population which was felt to be a danger to them. Unfortunately, this tendency did not end with the Romans. We have seen, only too obviously, that it still exists at the present time; not only in Europe but also in the East.
Perhaps what is more interesting to your Lordships is that from Anglesey came that great race of Monarchs, the Tudors; the three Monarchs, Henry VII, Henry VIII and Elizabeth, about whom we have seen so much on television lately. They brought England, kicking and screaming, out of the Middle Ages into the modern world. In my view, to them more than to any other Monarchs we owe the greatness of this country. I refer not only to our past greatness but also to the present and future greatness; because we are only in the middle of the stream. We are still a great country. In spite of everything that is said about it. Britain, in my view, is the greatest country in the world. I have lived in a large number of countries and this is the only one where I would wish to live.
To this little island of Anglesey, as to other parts of rural Wales, come large numbers from the North-East of England, from the Midlands, and indeed from all over the world. They come for rest, refreshment and re-creation—I stress the word "re-creation"—as well as recreation. It is so necessary in these days when there is precious little rest or recreation anywhere else. The object of the Bill is stated in the Preamble and in the Long Title. If I may read the

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Long Title, I think it sets out the position fairly well. It states that this is
" An Act to provide for the vesting in the Anglesey County Council of the harbour undertaking of the Amlwch Urban District Council; to authorise the said county council and Shell U.K. Limited to construct works and acquire lands; to confer powers on the said county council with reference to the undertaking vested in them or authorised by this Act …"
and that in fact is what it does. It provides:
" For the safely of navigation and the efficient and economic importation of such crude oil and petroleum products …"
and in order to do so, the Bill states:
" it is expedient to authorise the construction of a marine terminal off the north coast of Anglesey to accommodate vessels (including large tankers)"—
I wish your Lordships especially to note that—
" and to receive and convey to and from such vessels such oil and products and in connection with and as part of such terminal the construction of breakwaters and other works in the harbour of Amlwch."
So in this little seaside town, this little port where the main traffic is holiday traffic, with people bathing, fishing and going out in little boats, there is to be planted down on it this enormous oil terminal with large tankers; that is the object of the Bill.
When Private Bills come before your Lordships' House—and I have dealt with many during the 20 years or more that I have been here—one is told one of two things. On Second Reading one is always told. "You must not say anything about the Bill because it is to be considered in Committee." On Third Reading one is always told." You must not say anything about the Bill because it has been considered in Committee." And so one cannot win. In the normal way that is all right and I do not object—although I may say that I have objected from time to time. But I think it is reasonable, because when it is a matter of detail, a question whether a road should be on this or that side of a valley or something like that, it is a matter for a Committee to decide. But when it is a matter of great principle it is, to my mind, for the House to decide and not a Committee. This is a matter of outstanding principle; that is to say it is, as I have described, a question whether, in this little rural area, there is to be a vast marine terminal
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with large tankers. I say that that is not a matter to be decided by a Committee; it is a matter for your Lordships' House.
Why do I object to this proposal? First, because in my view, and surely in the view of every noble Lord, these works are bound to be seriously detrimental to the holiday and tourist industry. Secondly, they would grievously affect the amenities that I have mentioned, such as yachting and bathing. Thirdly. they would, irretrievably and irreversibly, destroy the quality of the nearby coastline—all the little bays and beautiful stretches of sand around that part of the coast where people may take their families. I think this is too big a decision and responsibility for a small council.
As I have said, my Lords, the population of Anglesey is only 60.000. Soon, and whichever Government are in power, Anglesey will cease to exist as a County Council because both Government and Opposition have decided that Anglesey shall be part of Gwynedd, a much larger area; in fact it will be one of five districts in Gwynedd. It is likely that Gwynedd, the new and much larger authority, will take—or certainly some of them will—an entirely different view. I do not think for one moment that they will agree to this. But whether they do or not, if this Bill becomes law they will not have the opportunity of objecting. It is Government policy that county councils like Anglesey are not big enough to carry out these duties. That is why they are merging Anglesey with a number of other counties to create this large new county. But what is most important of all—I hope this will appeal to your Lordships; it certainly appeals to me—is that, with the increasing industrialisation and urbanisation of England—I stress "England"—and to a lesser extent industrial Wales; the bit in the North East corner and South Wales, we must have some parts of the Island—I mean the Island of Britain —which are entirely different from the urbanised and industrial areas. That is the strongest point of all that I would make, and I seriously press this on your Lordships and on the Government.
Anglesey is not in Mid-Wales but it is nearby; and the present population of Mid-Wales is smaller now, in the reign of Queen Elizabeth II, than it was in the time of Elizabeth I. Other than during the tourist season, you can go for mile

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after mile and see not a house, or car, or a man, or a dog. Where else can you do that? It is an area of great beauty, which we ought not to lose. People from the Midlands, the industrial North and London come there to see the country as it was before industrialisation. I am not suggesting that everybody in Wales will agree with what I am saying— they never do anyway—but this is a vital point. Recently I put a question to the Government on the proposals for mineral prospecting in the Snowdonia National Park by United Kingdom, South African and Canadian companies. There is also a suggestion to erect a great marine barrage near Barmouth, where they want to dredge for minerals. Where is it going to end'? Where are people to go to see Britain as it used to be, if we are to have these industrial works in our beauty spots and National Parks? I remember the discussions when the National Parks were set up, and at that time we never assumed that this sort of thing was going to happen.
This is not just a problem of Wales. The House, on January 31, 1968, rejected on Second Reading my Bill for a domestic Parliament; therefore it is the duty of this House to decide what is best for Anglesey and for Wales—and for the residents in and visitors to Anglesey, because I am not making this a nationalist plea, I am looking at it from the point of view of both England and Wales and also from the point of view of visitors to our shores from overseas. The proposals in this Bill have aroused a storm of protest and a Petition has been signed by no fewer than 17 opponents of the Bill, including the Council for the Protection of Rural Wales. the North Wales Naturalist Trust, the Anglesey Residents' Association, the Amlwch and District Residents' Association, the Wildfowlers' Association, the Amlwch Chamber of Trade, the Llandudno Chamber of Trade, the Welsh Yachting Association, the Holyhead and District Angling Club and many hotel and restaurant owners and others—I have not mentioned them all by any means—all of whom feel that this is an attack on the interests of this part of the world.
This Government have made their position quite clear. In Command Paper No. 4506, The Reorganisation of Central Government, in paragraph 31. they say:
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" Accordingly, the Ministries of Housing and Local Government, of Public Building and Works and of Transport will be unified in a single Department of the Environment under a Secretary of State. Except in Scotland and Wales, where the Scottish and Welsh Offices will continue to play the major part, the new Department will be responsible for the whole range of functions which affect people's living environment. It will cover the planning of land—where people live, work, move and enjoy themselves. It will be responsible for the construction industries, including the housing programme, and for the transport industries, including public programmes of support and development for the means of transport. There is a need to associate with these functions responsibility for other major environmental matters: the preservation of amenity, the protection of the coast and countryside, the preservation of historic towns and monuments, and the control of air, water and noise pollution: all of which must be pursued locally, regionally, nationally and in some cases internationally."
Those are brave words, but I want the Government to put them into force. It is all very well to put them in a declaration of Government intention. Anybody can intend anything. What we want is that the Government should carry them out.
What must Parliament and the Government decide? I think they must decide how Wales, other than the industrial South and the North-East, must be treated. Up to now, successive Governments have tried to cajole industry into Wales by offering them expensive carrots in order to settle there. This must now cease. In the comparatively vast area of rural Wales no more industries should be maintained except those that are already there and the tourist and holiday industries. Local authorities, instead of being badgered by the Government to attract industries, should be instructed—or badgered—by the Government not to maintain industry and should be compensated for having to refuse industries, if any should want to go to their areas, which is unlikely. I am speaking of rural Wales but I know that exactly the same problems are to be found in Cumberland and Westmorland, in Cornwall and in Devon—in the Western parts of the country, in what were the old Celtic areas. It is only in this way, by stopping industrialisation, that we shall retain some part of our country in a state of natural beauty, free from industrial slums and subtopia. Once there are these extensive works in an area, the beauty of it is gone for ever and we can never put it back.

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I could take your Lordships to many places in South Wales which I have seen destroyed in my own lifetime. I could take you to Lord Aberdare's own part of South Wales, which is still a lovely spot but not so lovely now as it was in my young days.
I would refer particularly to Swansea, because many eminent people, including His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh, have referred to it. At the end of the 18th century it was intended to make Swansea a beauty spot, a watering place, because it was so lovely, set in Swansea Bay with the rivers coming down from the mountains. Instead of that they industrialised Swansea, especially out towards Morriston to the East and now nothing grows there. Nothing has grown there for a hundred years. Swansea College, of the University of Wales, has made experiments to restore the area and has had some slight success, but it is still a sort of moon landscape. That is what I say we are going to have if we let this Bill go through and it is something we cannot afterwards reverse. Once a rural area has become industrialised, its beauty is gone for ever and nothing will restore it. That is all I intend to say, my Lords. I feel that the time for platitudes, bromides and waffling is past. What we want from the Government and from Parliament, if they mean what they say about this environment problem, is "Action this day"—now.
7.20 p.m.
THE MINISTER OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SECURITY (LORD ABERDARE): My Lords, I shall be very brief. Despite what the noble Lord. Lord Ogmore, has so eloquently said, I hope that your Lordships will give this Bill a Second Reading in the knowledge that it will go to a Select Committee and, if passed by that Committee, will return to this House and go through various other stages, and indeed through the Parliamentary procedures in another place. However, this being a Bill which is sponsored by the county council in conjunction with a very major oil company, I think we should go through our normal procedures and refer it to the Select Committee in the normal way.
Perhaps the most useful thing I could do would be to fill in the picture in so
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far as it goes beyond the Bill itself. I would like to make two points. The first is that the Shell Company have submitted to the local planning authority two applications for planning permission. One is for the construction of a tank farm and transfer pumping facilities at Rhyd y Gwyn, Rhosgoch, and the second is for the construction of facilities for the reception of submarine pipelines, booster facilities, associated tanks and equipment at Amlwch Port. These applications were referred to the Secretary of State by the planning authority, as they are substantially out of accord with the approved development plan, and as they affect the whole of the neighbourhood the Secretary of State has called them in and decided that a public local inquiry should be held before he makes a final decision. The arrangements for that public inquiry are now in hand. The second point worth adding is that the Shell Company also propose that from the tank farm they will lay pipelines for some seventy-five miles, going under the Menai Strait to Stanlow. The actual route will have to be surveyed and negotiated with landowners and other interested parties, and it will be subject to the procedures laid down in the Pipelines Act 1962 which is administered by the Department of Trade and Industry.
Therefore the picture I would like to leave with your Lordships is three-fold. First of all there is the Bill, which deals principally with the offshore works; there are the two planning applications; and there is the pipleline to Stanlow. All these are separate parts of one main proposal and they are subject to separate procedures. Each of them is going through the appropriate routine, and it would not be right for me to comment on their respective merits. The Government is naturally fully aware of the conflicting interests involved, but we feel the proper procedures are there and should be followed, giving an opportunity for all sides to be heard before final decisions are made.
7.24 p.m.
LORD INGLEWOOD: My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for adding to the information to be gathered from reading the Bill or from looking at the deposited plans, which I hope all noble Lords will have looked at. What he has

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said confirms my feeling that the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, is right and that this Bill contains a great deal which is really too important for us just to say, "These are Committee matters and we will let them go through on the nod, because a Committee will consider them." There are great considerations here which I think we, as a House, ought to consider, and hope that if we give the Bill a Second Reading the Committee will have regard to what is said here this evening.
The first point that struck me concerned the large number and the very wide range of objectors. The objectors are not just small groups and societies who might be expected to be opposed to any form of change. On the contrary, there are two chambers of trade; there are strong tourist interests, which one might suppose would he attracted by the idea of such additional business as might come from a development of this kind; and there are also natural history and conservation societies. I was interested to see the objections from the two societies with hotel interests, because I am president of a regional tourist board in another area and I know that these objections are not put in without good reason. In addition, some years ago I used to know Angelsey well, and particularly this corner of it, Amlwch.
The second reason why I feel we should look closely at this Bill is that when a small local authority is teamed with a large public company, no matter how high the reputation of that company may stand, we should look closely at what is proposed in order to check that, as time goes by, the public authority will remain the master in its own house and will not become the weaker partner. In such cases our local authorities are notoriously bad judges in their own cause, and they are often at a disadvantage. Councillors become excited at the idea of developments on a large scale. They think in terms of greatly increased rateable values and feel that something is at last going to happen in their distant neighbourhood; while their officials tend to become even more excited. But most of them have had little experience of industrial development. It can well be that they have in the short term the prospect of some advantages which, as
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the years go by, will be outweighed by the far larger advantages accruing to their partner from the industrial venture. I am not accusing anybody of doing anything underhand or dishonourable: this is just part of the facts of life. Hence, I think we should look most carefully at these proposals, because in the end a public company of the size, nature and scope of that which we are considering here has resources which are far greater, and an influence which is far stronger and wider, than that of the council of any small county.
My third point refers to planning. Much of our coastline has already been spoilt for all time, and what is left is surely precious. I had hoped that, even though this process of spoiling the coastline was still going on in some countries abroad—notably Italy—we had checked it here. If planning means anything at all, it means establishing great installations of this kind near other industrial development and away from areas where it is bound to be the dominating feature of a stretch of coastline which at present is entirely different in character. If I remember rightly, this coast is important to the tourist trade, which is probably the biggest industry in the area. The coast is also important from the point of view of conservation, and although Conservation Year is now over, that surely does not mean we should forget it. Further, this part of the coastline would seem to be where we should think of establishing smaller-scale industries more appropriate to the population and scale of the neighbourhood.
I do not know what the Shell Company's reasons are—it could be the deep water—but perhaps the noble Lord, speaking for the Promoters, will tell us. Certainly I think that we should be given some explanation. I say that in the knowledge that there are other places along our West Coast where old-established industries on a big scale are now shrinking and where there is hence substantial unemployment, so that industry on this scale would be welcome. Why has this particular area been chosen? The development proposed is apparently unwelcome to many people, even though not unwelcome to the county council. It would indeed be welcome elsewhere. I can only speak for the area

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of England that I know best. Barrow-in-Furness is a place where an installation of this sort might be welcome. There is the small town of Millom a little further up the coast, and there is Whitehaven, and also Workington. I deserve to be told why it is necessary for an installation of this kind to go to an area where it is entirely out of character when there are industrial areas in the North-West where some development of this sort would be welcome.
7.30 p.m.
LORD BOSTON: My Lords, originally I did not intend to speak in this debate, but as I am possibly the only Member of this House who lives in Anglesey I felt bound to say a few words in view of my personal knowledge of the island. I have known Anglesey since about 1910 when I first used to go there as a small boy, so I know it pretty well. I now have a house, which I had built not long ago, within 50 yards of the sea, and it will be within five miles of this new terminal. If anything goes wrong with the oil of that terminal, the strong currents which run along there will no doubt mean that I shall be smothered in oil. That is what I have to face. That coastline used to be rather like the Mediterranean. You go along its cliffs, 50 feet to 150 feet high, and look straight down into clean, pure sea-water, because there is a strong current and the water is very deep: incidentally, that is why the terminal is going there.
Unfortunately, there has been a series of developments along that coast. The North coast is divided between these rocky stretches and pleasant bays, and on the other side of the island there is an area of nothing but sand dunes. It is within full sight of Snowdonia. The tourist has a bit of everything—the sea for sailing, Snowdonia for climbing and so on—and it is an area where tourists should be able to stay and enjoy themselves. Instead of that, first of all along came a factory connected with rubber. That was close to the Menai Strait. The smell from that factory is well-known for up to ten miles away. Not far from where the oil terminal will be there is a high octane spirit factory. That is dependent upon good clean sea-water from which to extract the chemicals required,
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and the owners at least will keep the water clean. But, unfortunately, again this produces an unpleasant odour. So it goes on all along the coast.
Recently the county council, partly due to unemployment difficulties, admitted an atomic station, which is progressing rapidly. There are dangers again over a fairly large area. Then, not far away from the atomic station they have put an aluminium works. So your Lordships can see that the county has been more and more encroached upon, and I feel it is time to stop it. If an oil terminal is required we should at least be assured that other places have been looked at. I am not qualified to say what places, and I cannot make any suggestions. I think that covers all that I have to say, other than to express the hope that during the course of the passage of this Bill all the aspects of preservation will be considered.
7.35 p.m.
THE. EARL OF LAUDERDALE: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Inglewood, asked just now that whoever spoke for the Promoters should answer various questions and give various explanations. I do not appear for the Promoters. I am speaking in this debate because I am generally interested in the issues raised by this matter, which I believe, in United Kingdom terms as well as regional development terms, we ought to treat with the greatest sympathy and, I would add, balance. Just as you cannot carve satisfactorily in butter, so I believe you need a measure of wellbeing to be able to afford the luxury of indefinite and unlimited amenity protection. What I would plead for is a regard for this matter with a sense of balance and perspective.
My real reason for intervening is that I believe that the deep waters off the coast of Britain offer a superb opportunity for the recovery of Britain's industrial prosperity in the future, without any damage whatsoever to amenity. I see the berthing of the very large crude carriers as offering in this country a means for keeping industrial fuel costs low by giving us the chance to make the most of the economies of scale which the very big tankers provide. That would give us a head start over our European competitors. It may not be generally known that the net price of motorists' petrol at the pump before duty to-day,

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despite the rise in crude oil prices thanks to the operations of the OPEC—the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries—is much the same to-day as it was in 1959, owing largely to improvement of techniques in producing and transporting it.
One-third of the oil tanker capacity now at sea is in the range above 100,000 tons displacement. Something like 520 ships in this class are now afloat, totalling more than 48 million tons out of a total of about 150 million tons of tankers altogether. More than 90 per cent. of the current tanker building is in the class above 100,000 tons. There are now 660 such ships on order, or being built, which total 65 million deadweight tons, out of total tanker orders throughout the world of 70 million tons. The expectation is that these ships are going up to half a million tons and even one million tons. I submit seriously to your Lordships' House, not least because this is the Parliament of Wales as well as of the United Kingdom, that we must look at this matter in the widest possible and most sober sense, bearing in mind that Britain alone in Western Europe has undredged deep water deep enough to attract these mammoths, thus enabling Britain to intercept the European bulk trades and to keep her basic industrial fuel costs below those of her European competitors.
It may not be generally known, but at the risk of telling some noble Lords something which they know already may I remind your Lordships that British demand for oil fuel, whether petroleum or crude, distilled in one way or another, is rising at 7 per cent. per annum, and it doubles every seven years. The very large crude carriers are the main hope of enabling us to satisfy this demand—and I beg your Lordships to pay careful attention to this point—without needing to encroach on a multiplicity of new refinery sites, on new virgin sites, with a fresh affront to amenity elsewhere.
There is a fashionable environmental litany in our day which is easy to make the most of. Somebody said:
"To make a name for learning
"When other roads are barred
" Take something very easy
"And make it very hard."
I sometimes wonder whether those who care so much for the countryside fully
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appreciate the problem that we are up against, unless of course we want to turn our industrial civilisation backwards. I sometimes think that people are using a quiverful of outdated concepts; that they are armed with bows and arrows in the atom age.
Noble Lords may well ask why I, from Scotland, speak about Wales. But this is not simply a parochial or regional matter. I regard the deep waters all around the West and North coasts of Britain as being valuable assets. I realise that those that are closest—and perhaps this answers Lord Boston's point—to the industrial markets of Britain are likely to come into use first. Objections by the Council for the Preservation of Rural Wales, and I believe also by the National Trust, can be thrashed out at the public inquiry later this summer or the autumn. The noble Lords, Lord Ogmore, Lord Boston and Lord Inglewood, seemed to speak with some confusion about what is proposed. The noble Lord, Lord Boston, saw his home and surroundings being smothered in oil. The noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, told of an enormous oil terminal with large tankers, a vast marine terminal—I quote his words. He said it would be something which would be bound to be detrimental to holidaymakers and tourism; something that would irretrievably destroy the nearby coastline. These were the words he used.
LORD OGMORE: My Lords, may I say that I was not under any misapprehension at all. In view of what the noble Lord has just said I will quote from what is proposed. I did not say this in my speech because I did not want to talk for too long. As a necessary corollary to the marine terminal contained in the Bill (which is the main subject of this debate) it is, and I will quote:
"… proposed initially to construct adjacent to the harbour of Amlwch displacement, surge, and bunker fuel tanks the largest of which will be 46·50 metres in diameter and 18·50 metres in height, heaters with chimneys approximately 20 metres in height, an electrical substation and a radio mast approximately 30 metres in height, hereinafter called the shore installation ', and inland at Rhosgoch a tank farm, hereinafter called ' the tank farm ', which will consist inter alia of eight large crude oil storage tanks 78 metres in diameter and 22 metres in height, together with six smaller tanks 17 metres in height, the main pump-house, heaters with chimneys 20 metres in height, and smaller works including control equipment and electrical transformers".

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How do the bathing parties, yachts and so on, and the holidaymakers, fit into all that? That is what I should like to know.
THE EARL OF LAUDERDALE: My Lords, I am much obliged to the noble Lord. Lord Ogmore, for spelling out what he has just spell: out. I wonder whether some time he would come with me to Finnart—
LORD OGMORE LORD OGMORE: Where?
THE EARL OF LAUDERDALE: He has never heard of it, but it is on Loch Long and there is a marine terminal much more complicated than this, with greater tanks than are now proposed and greater pipelines than are now proposed. We will go there together, if the noble Lord will give me the pleasure of his company, and I will show him that by means of screening and sinking tanks partly underground it is possible to reduce what I will call the eye-sore menace to very limited proportions.
LORD OGMORE: My Lords—
THE EARL OF LAUDERDALE: I have given way to the noble Lord, we have only a limited amount of time, there is a Committee ahead. So may I be allowed to continue? To describe these as extensive industrial works, and as industrialising a rural area, suggests that in one critical respect the noble Lord has not fully grasped all that is proposed. The terminal consists of what is called a single buoy mooring, that is, a buoy which physically is about as big the the Arundel Room of our Library. The buoy floats in the sea and only the top is visible. There is then a pipe which goes down from that, which is buried in the seabed, comes to the booster station, and is again buried all the way to Stanlow refinery on the Mersey. There is little that is visible. The buoy has a swivel top enabling the tanker to swing and head into the winds and tides to the best advantage, and it is not a very large undertaking.
My noble friend Lord Inglewood asked: can we know why this site has been chosen rather than others? I do not speak for the company, but my own observation is that this is the deepest water close to the industrial Midlands, and that is why it commends itself to the company; and as to planning, I am sure my noble friend Lord Inglewood
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will have studied the document, "The Planning of the Coastline" by the Countryside Commission, and will have seen the passages from paragraphs 184 to 189, which bear very largely on this problem. The document recognises that terminals of one form or another are desirable and can be managed perfectly reasonably. There has been a good deal of fear that the existence of these large ships would be a hazard and would lead—
LORD INGLEWOOD: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lord? I thank him for what he said about the deep water; I had guessed that, and he will understand that I am not against the developments that he spoke about. I am against putting them in places where people do not want them when there are more suitable places available. Could he say anything about the other industrialised sites on the West coast where an installation of this sort might be welcome?
THE EARL OF LAUDERDALE: My Lords, I cannot do so without notice, although I have given some time and trouble to the study of deep water sites and I am aware that there are a number ranging from Falmouth to the Severn, to the coast of Anglesey, the Lune Estuary in Lancashire, the West coast of the Lake District, and to the West, North and East coasts of Scotland. I frankly hope that proper use will be made of all of them in due time. Obviously it is for the entrepreneur to decide which of these is most suited to his needs.
I do not want to take more time than is necessary, but I want to point out first of all that this kind of undertaking should diminish the hazard of pollution which may well arise through collision in the crowded, narrow Mersey. The single-buoy mooring allows the ship to stay safely moored in all weathers, free to swing its full circle and to lie at all times in the best position for wind and tides; and if people object to the sight of a ship may I say that to the viewer the only difference between a very large crude oil carrier and any other ship is simply that the carrier is bigger. My observation is that tourists like looking at ships, and I have yet to meet one that does not. The smaller the tanker, the greater the risk, because its crew is inevitably less experienced; more crews are required

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for smaller tankers because there are more of them. Most accidents, for example in the Dover Straits, have occurred with the smaller tankers. The bigger the tanker, the more expert the crew is likely to be per volume of crude oil, and therefore the less the hazard.
There are more than 50 of these single-buoy moorings in the world and so far there has been no pollution from any of them. More than 16, I understand, are owned by the company in question—Shell. They have handled more than a thousand ships, more than 50 million tons of oil, for over seven or eight years without pollution. There is a settled blanking-off routine for the fuel hose after discharge, so that no dangers arise there. Two of the most knowledgeable local bodies, I understand, are satisfied; namely, the Mersey Pilots, whose advice led to a modest re-siting of this proposal, and who considered this an immense improvement, from a safety point of view, to bringing these big ships into the Mersey; and secondly, the Lancashire and Welsh Fisheries Joint Committee, who apparently also believe that this would be a great protection rather than a hazard to fishing.
There are those who say: why not dredge the Mersey deeper? The answer is that playing with Nature has a way of bringing you a "hit-back", as Rotterdam has found. The danger of navigating these big ships in the narrow waters is a very serious one. There are the objections by the urban district council of Amlwch. May I just call your Lordships' attention to one or two points in regard to Anglesey, which has a high unemployment rate at present, of between 8 and 9 per cent. This proposition would bring 35 to 40 permanent new jobs to the local people, about 20 or so maintaining the two launches and the S.B.M's. and about 15 to 20 on the tank farm. There would also be a slight spinoff in local services. All this would arise in a rural area whose population is less than 4,000, where the rateable value is less than £150,000 and where an old penny on the rates would not raise much more than £600. In addition, the company in question seem to have read the maxims of a favourite of mine, Lord Halifax, who in his Maxims of State wrote in the 17th century:
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" A wise prince will not oblige his courtiers who are birds of prey, so as to disoblige his people who are beasts of burden ".
The client company in this case, the applicants, Shell, eager to set people's minds at rest have made a very serious proposal which is to be found in Clause 50. They offer an ex-gratia payment of one new penny per ton of crude oil passing through this pipe per annum, offering Anglesey an eventual revenue in altogether new money of something like £250,000 per annum—this, when the rateable value of the county is not more than £1·5 million and an old penny on the rates there does not raise more than £6,500. The fund or the revenue would be under county council control as things are, and would be used—I quote from the Bill
" for the benefit of the Island and its (60,000) inhabitants."
When this Bill goes to Committee, as I pray it will, I feel sure that all that has been said and objected to in this House will be considered by the Committee. All I would say, in wishing the Bill a fair wind, is that to refuse it would be a wilful waste of natural resources. And wilful waste, my Lords, makes woeful want.
7.53 p.m.
BARONESS WHITE: My Lords, I shall not detain your Lordships for any length of time because I appreciate that we have some ephemeral legislation coming a little later on. But what we are now discussing is more permanent legislation, namely, the landscape and the amenities of the Island of Anglesey. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Aberdare, that this is a matter which will come back to this House and which we can discuss at a later stage, after the Bill has been fully examined by the Select Committee. On the other hand, I have some sympathy with the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, in, as it were, giving notice to the Committee that this is a really important Bill.
I know that Select Committees are always conscientious in regard to their duties. Nevertheless, the proposals in this Bill have given rise to considerable concern in the Principality—partly, of course, because this is not the only project for some kind of industrial development in North Wales. I think all of us are deeply concerned about the proposals in respect of the Snowdonia National

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Park. That is quite a different proposition, and we must not confuse the two. Nevertheless, it adds to the apprehensions. This is a complex matter. As the noble Lord, Lord Aberdare, explained, there is this Bill, but there are also the planning applications and matters concerning the pipeline. As I know well from my own experience as a Minister in the Welsh Office, this kind of multiple situation is difficult for those who are protesting, in all good faith, that they have to prepare material for the proceedings in Parliament as well as for the public inquiry, for planning and so on. It puts a great burden on the amenity societies when we, no doubt, for good constitutional reasons, have these multiple situations. I am not in any way blaming the Government for that, but I am making the point that it adds a great burden to societies which had to go through all this process for the Rio Tinto application in Anglesey. Also, as the noble Lord, Lord Boston, remarked, there is the Wylfa power station, and the Valley Airport, and so on. Therefore this proposal has to be looked at in the total complex of a very small and beautiful island. It has to be seen partly against the matter of scale.
I want to make clear to the noble Earl, Lord Lauderdale, that I am not opposing the Bill as such; it is too early to take a stand one way or the other until it has been fully examined. But I would ask him to bear in mind that there are matters of scale involved, and however well the tank farm may have been camouflaged at Loch Long, it may nevertheless be obtrusive on a much smaller scale on the landscape on parts of the Island of Anglesey unless very stringent conditions are laid down. The noble Earl mentioned, for example, tanks being partly sunk in the ground. Everything of that kind, I would respectfully suggest, should be borne carefully in mind before any agreement is given to the proposals as described by the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore. I must also dissociate myself from the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore. He said that he did not wish to see any further industry at all in rural Wales. This is really praising the plumage and forgetting the dying bird.
LORD OGMORE: My Lords, if I may intervene, what I intended to say, and
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what I hope I did say, was that I did not want any industry of this kind. Agricultural industries pertaining to rural areas— something concerning milk or something of that kind—are all right. What I meant was that we have had enough of industries coming from industrial areas into Wales, and I do not want any more.
BARONESS WHITE: My Lords, I am afraid that I cannot agree with that view, because it very much depends on the way in which the buildings are designed, erected and so on. With great respect to the noble Lord, I feel that he somewhat exaggerated when he referred to the appalling landscape of Llandor and Morriston, to the moonscape there and, by implication, suggested that these proposed installations would have anything in common with that. After all, we want to keep people alive on Anglesey, and it is a question of judgment as to how far the tourist interests and possible industrial development can best do that. I am sure that the noble Earl, Lord Lauderdale, would agree that, welcome as it is, the additional employment is a very small advantage. We have had this before in regard to Milford Haven, where we have deep-water oil concerns and where the degree of local employment in relation to the capital investment is vestigial. One should not overplay the advantages to Anglesey. One ought to weigh them very carefully in the balance in comparison with the possible detrimental effects which could follow from this development.
The EARL OF LAUDERDALE: My Lords, if the noble Baroness will allow me to intervene for a moment, surely the relationship that should be looked at in terms of jobs is not that between jobs for Anglesey and the Shell company's money but between the jobs for Anglesey and whatever disfigurement of the environment there may be. How much Shell care to spend on it is their business.
BARONESS WHITE: My Lords, I am entirely at one with the noble Lord on that. Sometimes one is apt to speak of these enormous investments as though they are going to bring some comparable local advantage, which of course they do not. We have had ample experience of this in another very beautiful part of Wales, in Pembrokeshire, where I urged the oil companies to do

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more with local processing. I am not suggesting this for one moment in regard to Anglesey; but welcome as this employment is, it is not as great as all that. I was interested to hear about the present, which I assume is going to be free money, this one penny on the— is it ton or gallon?
THE EARL OF LAUDERDALE: My Lords, as I understand it—I am not speaking for the company—this is an ex gratia payment by the company to the local authority, and it is per ton.
BARONESS WHITE: My Lords, is it in relation to rates? Does this mean that the local authority are going to lose precisely the same amount in the rate-support grant? Is this, or is it not, a gift to Her Majesty's Treasury? If it is free money, then it is welcome. I do not wish to detain your Lordships' House further, except to emphasise again that this is a very important matter in the context of both industry and amenity in North Wales, and we hope that we may have a further opportunity at a later stage to discuss the matter in greater detail.
8.0 p.m.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, I have listened with very great interest to all the speeches which have been made this afternoon, and I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Inglewood, and all the other noble Lords and the noble Baroness who have spoken that their remarks will be carefully studied in the OFFICIAL REPORT by the Select Committee to which this Bill will be referred if your Lordships give it a Second Reading. I think all I need do now is to remind your Lordships that it is customary for the House to give a Private Bill a Second Reading so that it can be referred to a Select Committee to hear evidence on behalf of the Promoters and the Petitioners against the Bill. Having done this, the Committee will be in a position to report to the House whether or not the Bill should be allowed to proceed or be amended. The House will then be able, if the Bill proceeds, as the noble Baroness, Lady White, and the noble Lord, Lord Aberdare, pointed out, on the Third Reading to consider the Bill with the benefit of the views of the Select Committee.
This is an opposed Bill and three Petitions have been deposited against it.
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They will be considered by the Select Committee to which the Bill is referred, and they raise, I think, almost all the points that have been made in criticism of the Bill in the speeches of noble Lords this afternoon. The Committee will, of course, pay the closest attention to everything that your Lordships have said. I commend the Second Reading of the Bill to your Lordships.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and referred to the Examiners.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BILL
8.2 p.m.
House again in Committee.
On Question, Whether Clause 135, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD CHAMPION: We have to a great extent discussed this clause on Amendment 277F and the Government Amendments. I must admit that I thought the discussion on the Amendments ranged rather wide, but I have no fault to find with that. But quite clearly it relieves me of any responsibility of putting, on the Question, That the clause shall stand part?, the points I had in mind which have been adequately covered on the Amendments that we have dealt with. Some of the points I wished to put related to the words "or finance", but they have been so much better deployed by my noble friends—in fact very much better deployed than I could have hoped to deploy them myself. That applies also to some extent to the meaning of the exclusion of persons under paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (3). But I should like to put a question on the exclusions.
As I understand it, under that subsection, while orders can be made under the terms of Clause 134 against organisations of workers, the protection provided for under subsection (3) of this clause applies only to officials of a trade union, which presumably means a registered organisation of workers. As I understand it, this will mean that officers and shop stewards of an unregistered trade union may be subjected to orders under this clause and to the penalties if they contravene them. I shall be grateful if the noble Lord will tell me whether I am

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correct in this supposition or not. Even if I am not, I shall not be unduly abashed because, quite clearly, better minds than mine have applied themselves to this Bill and have not been wholly satisfied with some of the things they have read or some of the answers they have received.
The discretion which the Court may exercise is very wide indeed. If we take the phrase in paragraph (a) of subsection (2) "the area of employment", while the Secretary of State must in his application specify the persons against whom the order is made, the area of employment is to be determined in the course of the proceedings before the Court without any previous commitment on the part of the Secretary of State. It seems to me that this is wholly within the purview of the Court itself and the Secretary of State will not have to commit himself as to that area before he submits his application. I am not too sure about that, but I hope the noble Lord will be able to satisfy me on the point because there is some importance in this definition of "the area of employment" which arises from the fact that the Court may issue prohibitions on a narrow or on a very wide scope. The Court may, for example, it seems to me, make its order applicable to the maintenance of a full or only an emergency service. Is this so? I should very much like to know.
Everything that was said on the Amendment convinces me that the procedure in Clauses 134 and 135 will produce no way to secure reasonable industrial relations in this country. Altogether, this clause and the preceding clause introduce factors into our industrial law wholly out of keeping with what has grown up and worked reasonably well in an area full of potential difficulties, which this certainly is. I do not like the clause; I do not like the clause that preceded it. But, before asking my noble friends to divide upon it, I should much like to hear the answers to the questions that I have put, and answers to the questions which I believe my noble friend Lord Stow Hill wishes to put on this clause.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I gather that the noble Lord has already dealt adequately with his noble friend's points on this clause. The noble Lord. Lord Champion, with his customary modesty, has suggested that others have dealt with
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this question better than he has, but he has put his points extremely clearly, as usual. My understanding so far as organisations of workers are concerned is the same as his; namely, that particular officials of organisations of workers can be specified in the order; and of course so long as they comply with the order they have no trouble. As to the area of employment, no doubt the Secretary of State will have to indicate to the Court what the area of employment is, but he may not be able to do it with sufficient accuracy, and in this the Court will have the assistance of the Commission on Industrial Relations. It can call on them if it needs to do so.
I did not quite understand the point about full or emergency services. I did not quite understand the noble Lord's question. Perhaps the noble Lord would like me to write to him on that point when I pick it up.
LORD CHAMPION: The point was merely this. Clearly, "the area of employment being left to the Court will enable them to decide the extent of the order, when made: whether there shall be a limited or a very full emergency service. Is that clear to the noble Lord? It would be possible for the Court to order in such a way that only a part of the service needs to be maintained in order to avoid what is feared, or would be feared, under Clause 134. The very fact that they may themselves decide the area of employment would enable them to decide just what the extent of the service should be. Is that reasonably clear to the noble Lord? I hope it is. It is fairly clear to me.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I am not quite certain that the noble Lord is entirely with us on this point. We are talking of emergency procedures and I think he is still confusing the case somewhat with the other legislation. the Emergency Powers Act. The definitions of the areas must to a large extent follow the persons, officials and such organisations as are responsible for calling or procuring or financing the strike. As the noble Lord will see from subsection (2)(a), the areas concerned may be
one or more industries … or one or more undertakings or parts of undertakings … or one or more descriptions of workers so specified.

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This is what is meant by the areas. From what I gathered from his question I think the noble Lord was really asking how many people have to be got back to work in order to supply the services that are basic. I do not think that is really the relevant question; the relevant question is how to get people back in the works so that normal work can be restored during the period when a settlement is being sought.
LORD CHAMPION: Yes, but an order has to be made, and there should be stipulated in the order the extent of the employment to be covered in that order. That is what I feel is fair in the question that I was asking. What I really wanted to know, and rather suggested, was that the importance of the area of employment to be defined by the Court would actually cover this very point, and they
Resolved in the affirmative, and clause 135, as amended, agreed to accordingly.
might then decide, when deciding the area of employment, the extent to which the order shall in fact spread. That is what I was seeking here. If the noble Lord feels that I have not been clear enough on it to satisfy him, and I am not particularly clear about the answer that he has given, perhaps we can have a word about it between now and the Report stage. There is certainly a point here that I would like to have elucidated before we part with this Bill altogether.
LORD DRUMALBYN: Broadly speaking, the area to be covered is the area affected by the dispute.
8.14 p.m.
On Question, Whether Clause 135. as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 72; Not-contents, 31.

CONTENTS

Aberdare, L.

Falkland, V.

Nugent of Guildford, L.

Albemarle, E.

Ferrers, E.

Oakshott, L.

Alport, L.

Ferrier, L.

O'Neill of the Maine, L.

Amherst of Hackney, L.

Gisborough, L.

Rankeillour, L.

Auckland, L.

Goschen, V.

Reading, M.

Balerno, L.

Gray, L.

Redmayne, L.

Balfour, E.

Greenway, L.

Rochdale, V.

Balfour of Inchrye, L.

Grenfell, L.

St. Aldwyn, E.

Barrington, V.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

St. Helens, L.

Beauchamp, E.

Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)

St. Just, L.

Belhaven and Stenton, L.

Sandford, L.

Belstead, L.

Hankey, L.

Sandys, L.

Berkeley, Bs.

Hatherton, L.

Sempill, Ly

Bolton, L.

Headfort, M.

Skelmersdale, L.

Boston, L.

Henley, L.

Somers, L.

Buccleuch and Queensberry, D.

Hives, L.

Strathcarron, L.

Byers, L.

Inglewood, L.

Strathclyde, L.

Conesford, L.

Kemsley, V.

Thomas, L.

Cork and Orrery, E.

Latymer, L.

Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, Bs.

Craigavon, V.

Mar, E.

Vivian, L.

Crawshaw, L.

Milverton, L.

Wade, L.

Cullen of Ashbourne, L.

Monck, V.

Wigram, L.

Denham, L. [Teller.]

Mowbray and Stourton, L.[Teller.]

Windlesham, L.

Drumalbyn, L.

Wolverton, L.

Dundee, E.

Netherthorpe, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Addison, V.

Douglas of Barloch, L.

Raglan, L.

Archibald, L.

Gaitskell, Bs.

Ritchie-Calder, L.

Bernstein, L.

Gardiner, L.

Segal, L.

Beswick, L.

Hilton of Upton, L.

Slater, L.

Blackett, L.

Hoy, L.

Stonham, L.

Blyton, L.

Janner, L.

Stow Hill, L.

Buckinghamshire, E.

Lloyd of Hampstead, L.

Strabolgi, L.[Teller.]

Champion, L.

Milner of Leeds, L.[Teller.]

Taylor of Mansfield, L.

Collison, L.

Phillips, Bs.

Wells-Pestell, L.

Cooper of Stockton Heath, L.

Platt, L.

Wynne-Jones, L.

Diamond, L.

Popplewell, L.

Clause 136 [Supplementary provisions where order made under s. 135]:
8.22 p.m.
LORD BELSTEAD LORD BELSTEAD moved Amendment No. 278D:
Page 99, line 23. leave out from ("to") to ("the") in line 24.
The noble Lord said: With the agreement of the Committee I think with this Amendment we might also discuss Amendments 278E and 278F. The essential purpose of these Amendments is to harmonise the procedure for the making of a supplementary order more closely with that of the principal order to which the supplementary order relates. The purpose of this clause, to which this Amendment relates, is to enable the Secretary of State to apply to the Court for a supplementary order to specify additional people not specified by the principal order and to apply the provisions of the principal order to them, restraining them from promoting any form of industrial action to which the principal order applies as causing or being likely to cause a serious emergency.
Thus, if a trade union and its officials have, for instance, been restrained by the principal order from organising a strike likely to lead to an emergency, a supplementary order can be made applying this restraint to a person or a group of people not specified in the principal order who, despite any union instructions to the contrary, continue to organise industrial action. The real purpose of these Amendments is to make it clear that persons who are to be specified in a supplementary order have the same rights to make representations to the Court as those in the principal order, and that the exclusions from specification laid down in Clause 135(3) apply to them.
The effect of the Amendments is that the Secretary of State must specify in an application to the Court the persons against whom he wishes a supplementary order to be made, and those people are then to be joined with the Secretary of State in proceedings before the Court. Those persons can then make representations, either that they have no responsibility for the industrial action in question (and must therefore be covered by Clause 135(3)(a), even though they are participating in the industrial action. Or they may claim exclusion under Clause
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135(3)(b) on the grounds that their action was taken as an authorised official of a registered trade union. Or they can claim that a supplementary order cannot be made against them at all because the period of the principal order has in fact expired. These Amendments therefore make it explicit that people whom the Secretary of State wishes to be restrained by supplementary order from promoting industrial action which could continue or worsen an emergency situation have exactly the same rights as those carried by the principal order to make representations to the Court as parties to the proceedings. We feel that is only natural justice. On those grounds I hope that the Committee will approve of this group of Amendments. I beg to move.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD BELSTEAD: I beg to move Amendment No. 278E:
Amendment moved—
Page 99, line 31, leave out from (" the") to end of line 34 and insert (" Secretary of State may make an application to the Industrial Court, specifying those persons and applying for the principal order to be extended to them: and the persons so specified shall, together with the Secretary of State, be the parties to any proceedings on that application.
(3A) Subject to the next following subsection, on any application made by the Secretary of State under subsection (3) of this section the Industrial Court shall make an order specifying the persons who were specified in the application and directing that, in relation to any time after the order under this subsection takes effect, the principal order, while it remains in force, shall have effect as if those persons had been included among the persons specified in the principal order in accordance with section 135(2)(b) of this Act.
(3B) The Industrial Court shall not make an order under subsection (3A) of this section after the end of the period specified in the principal order, and, where it makes an order under that subsection, shall not include in it any person required to be excluded in accordance with section 135(3) of this Act").—(Lord Belstead.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD BELSTEAD: I beg to move Amendment No. 278F:
Amendment moved—
Page 99, line 36, leave out (" (3)") and insert ("(3A)").—(Lord Belstead.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD STOW HILL LORD STOW HILL moved Amendment No. 278L:
Page 99, line 39, leave out (" 126(5)") and insert (" 135(5)").
The noble Lord said: I think this is a plain slip, and I believe it has now been covered by a corrigendum. Whether it is consistent with the rules of your Lordships' House to correct the text of a Bill approved by another place by a corrigendum addition I do not know. The context of my Amendment deals with the erroneous numbering, and I do not want to take any time about it. I do not believe that Ministers would be committing a very serious contempt of the proceedings of this House if they did seek to correct an obvious slip by corrigendum. But perhaps the simplest way out of the difficulty, if I am right about this matter, is for the Government to say that they accept the Amendment. I beg to move.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I am grateful to the noble Lord. I willingly adopt the simplest way and accept the Amendment.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
On Question, Whether Clause 136, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD DIAMOND: I do not want to delay the Committee on this clause, because we touched on it when we were discussing the previous clause. I merely wanted to ask the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, who was good enough to say that he would write to those of us who raised questions regarding the persons who might be affected and the extent to which persons might be affected who were financing a strike, whether he would be good enough to take into account Clause 136 as amended. If it is easier for him to specify those persons who could not be sent to goal, that would be just as good. Perhaps he would either let us know who would be affected and could be sent to gaol or who would not be affected and could not be. In either case, would he be good enough to include Clause 136 as amended?
LORD DRUMALBYN: I shall be glad to do so.
Clause 136, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 137 [Application to Industrial Court for order for ballot relating to industrial action]:
8.30 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN LORD DRUMALBYN moved Amendment No. 278G:
Page 100, line 34, at end insert—
(2A) Any application under this section shall specify the persons (whether they are organisations of workers, officials of such organisations or other persons) appearing to the Secretary of State to be responsible for calling organising, procuring or financing the strike or other action in question, or for a threat to do so; and the persons specified in the application in accordance with this subsection shall, together with the Secretary of State, be the parties to any proceedings on that application.
The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 278G. Your Lordships will have noted that under Clause 134 the application made by the Secretary of State has clearly to identify those persons against whom the Secretary of State seeks an order. Persons thus become parties to proceedings before the Court, and have every opportunity to hear and rebut the case presented to the Court by the Secretary of State. The purpose of this Amendment is to make similar provision in relation to an application for a strike ballot under Clause 137. As at present drafted, Clause 137 does not, in terms, require the Secretary of State to specify the parties who may be bound by ballot order, although he is, of course, required under subsection (3), so far as is practicable to consult the employer or employees, and the union or unions, concerned in the dispute. It seems only right. and in accord with natural justice. that Clause 137 should incorporate the additional safeguard which this Amendment provides. I therefore commend it to your Lordships. I beg to move.
LORD CHAMPION: This is a matter upon which, over the last weekend, I prepared a number of considerable broadsides that I was going to fire at the noble Lord, but he sneaked up on me and spiked my guns. This Amendment was put down very late. I did not see it until yesterday morning, as indeed is the case with a number of other Amendments which have been put down, some of a very important character. I shall not complain too much about that because I know what can happen within a Ministry, but it is difficult for anyone who has not the advantage of the help of a considerable staff to follow things when they are placed on the Marshalled List as late as this one was. It appeared there yesterday morning, and indeed a later and massive sort of Amendment

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that we shall deal with subsequently was placed there at the same time.
This is a sensible addition. It brings into Clause 137 something which is already in Clause 134, and, as such, I have not the slightest objection to it. As I say, my only objection is to the fact that the Amendment went down so late, so that I spent much time over the weekend which might have been used to better advantage to myself.
LORD SLATER: May I ask a question in regard to this Amendment? The Amendment says,
" procuring or financing the strike or other action in question,…
The noble Lord will be aware, as will other noble Lords, that where there is, or has been, a strike, finances in support of those engaged in that strike have not just come into the strike fund from people within the borders of this country, but also from outside. What is the position of the Government in respect to that kind of support? The reason I ask the question is because when I paid a visit to Moscow I was reminded by Mr. Khrushchev that in the 1926 strike he had been assigned by the Dombas miners to get money and to send it to the British miners who were on strike —or what I always call a lock-out. Many people inside the industry at that time would not accept it because they said that it was "Red money", and they did not like the Communist attitude. Nevertheless, that money came into the country, and it was disbursed among the miners at that particular time. What would be the current position with regard to anything like that? I do not know whether the noble Lord is in a position to give me an answer to that question. That is something that could arise, and there will be questions asked about it inside trade union branches.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I think I would need notice of the question which the noble Lord has just asked. My first reaction is that it would be difficult to show that these people were within the jurisdiction of the court, if I understand him correctly. If I can obtain any further information I shall be glad to write to him.
I apologise for the lateness in putting down these Amendments. This is partly
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because of our procedure. I think they actually went down on Thursday, but of course they only permeate to the Marshalled List at a later time. I am very sorry for the hard work that the noble Lord had to do to no purpose over the weekend.
LORD TAYLOR OF MANSFIELD: Would the noble Lord enlarge on his reply to my noble friend Lord Slater? I agree with him about the details of what happened in 1926. The money was very welcome to the miners and their families, and particularly to their children. The noble Lord said it would be impossible to bring the donors of money from Russia, or any other foreign country, within the jurisdiction of the Court. Could any other action be taken to stop the money being paid for the purpose for which it was sent? Could there be, say, an embargo at the bank, or something like that?
LORD DRUMALBYN: I must say that I think we are going a little wide of this particular Amendment. May I also write to the noble Lord about that? I think we should perhaps be out of order if we were to follow that question up on this Amendment.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
On Question, Whether Clause 137, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?
8.37 p.m.
LORD CHAMPION: Here in this clause we have the idea of the compulsory ballot being introduced. Under this clause the Secretary of State may apply for an order requiring a ballot to be taken where there exist conditions very similar to those we have been discussing in relation to Clause 134 and Clause 135, but with the additional alternative condition, so far as the Secretary of State's assessment of the situation goes, of his doubts as to whether the workers' wishes, desires and intentions have been sufficiently taken into account before a strike or other industrial action has been decided upon. The additional consideration is that in the opinion of the Secretary of State the result of such action is likely to be
" seriously injurious to the livelihood of a substantial number of workers …"
That means that in the case of action by the Secretary of State under Clause 134, in making an application to the Court for

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an order under Clause 135, he could, as I see it, at the same time make an application to the Court for an order under Clause 137 requiring a ballot to be taken.
The additional condition that would have to apply in that case would be that one of his doubts is as to whether the workers concerned had been able adequately to express their wishes before the decision of the organisation of workers had been taken. The question that immediately springs to mind in that connection is, on what sort of evidence the Secretary of State acts before he arrives at the conclusion that there are reasons for doubting whether the workers have been adequately consulted. Under this clause will the Secretary of State act on the complaint of a disruptive minority which might succeed in planting a doubt in his mind? If so, it will be only just one more case or instance under the Bill of opening the door to the disruptive minority.
This is of considerable importance, for although the Secretary of State shall consult, so far as appears to him to be practicable in the circumstances, the parties to the dispute, his decision on the matter of the application arising out of his doubt as to whether the workers concerned have been adequately consulted will not fall to be questioned by the Industrial Court. It will not be up to them to ask a single question on this matter of the doubt which apparently exists in the mind of the Secretary of State, as to whether or not the workers have been adequately consulted. This is a factor to which attention will be drawn again when we come to consider Clause 138.
Altogether this clause is even wider in the conditions formulated under it than the sweeping conditions of Clause 134, for in addition to the doubt in the mind of the Minister which I have mentioned there is the additional and alternative condition that the Minister may apply for an order for a strike ballot if he is of the opinion that the effects of the industrial action are likely to be seriously injurious to the livelihood of a substantial number of persons employed in the industry. It will be seen that under the terms of subsection (1) an application may affect an unregistered trade union, but the Secretary of State will not be under any obligation under subsection (3) to try to consult such an organisation before submitting an
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application to the Court, as he would in the case of a registered trade union. This again is a distinction which is clearly going to add enormously to the difficulties of operation of this Bill. We have called attention to it many times in this connection.
What we really have to consider here, on the principle of the clause, is the possible efficacy of the ballot combined with the cooling-off period as a strike-stopper, as an adjunct to a greater degree of enforced democracy in unions, whether registered or unregistered. The chief consideration in the mind of the Government is clearly that the ballot will serve to check the number of strikes that occur in this country. The argument for the clause springs from the premise that if only the workers could express their wishes, and not be led by the nose by their trade union leaders, there would be everlasting peace on the industrial field. Such a belief is pathetic, and contrary to all the evidence available from the United States of America and such evidence as springs from our conditions here. Certainly, the evidence that springs from our conditions here is far from reassuring.
In paragraph 428 of the Donovan Report there appear these words:
"There is little justification in the available evidence for the view that workers are less likely to vote for strike action than their leaders; and findings from our workshop relations survey, already cited, confirm this."
Anyone who has ever sat on the executive committee of a great trade union will be conscious of the tremendous pressures that build up behind anyone occupying that sort of position, or the position of general secretary to a trade union. Almost invariably the pressures are such that it is extremely difficult for the trade union leader to resist them. Pressures for increased wages, pressures for decreased hours, pressures for longer holidays—they all build up; and it is very seldom that the trade union leader has to lead the trade union members by the nose in order to get them to agree to action on the industrial field, whether strike action or action of some other kind. That simply does not happen.
I was on the executive of a trade union during the war years when, clearly, conditions were such that we did not want to see any disruption occurring which might interfere with our effort in the war. But

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I remember the tremendous difficulty we had, even then, to resist the pressures which from time to time built up behind us. It is true that in the main we did resist them, and that was because we did not wish to exploit the situation of tremendous power in which we found ourselves at that time, and we did not want to cause any difficulty when the country was fighting for its very life. What I am saying here is that it is very seldom that trade union leaders want to be in advance of those people whom they lead, but the pressures behind them are enormous at this or any other time. The written evidence submitted on this point by the Secretary of State's own Department to the Donovan Commission concludes with these words:
" In general, there is no sound reason for supposing that compulsory secret ballots would reduce the number of strikes."
That is a conclusion of one of the sanest and most capable Departments of Labour in the world and I am rather proud of this Department of Labour, or this Department of Employment and Productivity, which happens to be ours. That is their considered view, and that was in the written evidence which was available to the Donovan Commission.
I am bound to conclude by condemning the procedure commenced in this clause, for it would tend to bring the Secretary of State into the industrial relations arena at a much too early stage of a dispute. He would be subjected to Party political pressures which would be hard to resist, even against his better judgment and against the advice of his Ministry. He would be flying in the face of all the evidence to the contrary, both here and in the United States, that it would not be practicable to use the procedure in an unofficial stoppage and dispute, and if that were attempted it would be only one more instance of unenforceable laws bringing the whole system of our laws into disrepute.
The difficulty that would arise in dealing with the unofficial stoppage which, as I understood the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, this afternoon, is one of the stoppages which he fears is seriously injuring our economy, is a very strong point. I do not believe that this compulsory ballot procedure would do anything to stop an unofficial strike. The
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Government best serve the nation when they limit their intervention in industrial disputes to encouraging a willingness on both sides to negotiate— which, I may add, is a reason why in present circumstances such great respect is paid to the Department's conciliation officers. I do not like this clause, and I did not like Clauses 134 and 135. This clause will to some extent be unenforceable, and if an attempt is made to enforce it there will be greater trouble in industrial relations than there would have been without this Bill.
8.48 p.m.
LORD STOW HILL: I hesitate to follow when my noble friend Lord Champion, from the wealth of his great personal knowledge and experience, has deployed such an extremely formidable case, but I should like to emphasise from the point of view of the lawyer who possibly looks at this matter legalistically a few of the many points he made. First, why on earth is it necessary for the Government to be so provocative as to require the Secretary of State to consult employers' associations and registered trade unions, but not unregistered trade unions? If one is trying to find some way of bridging over difficulties between both sides of industry, why throw such a provocative ingredient into the potage as that? It is quite unnecessary. Two words added to subsection (3) would cure the trouble and their addition would, in many cases, avoid bitterness which is otherwise most probable, as my noble friend has pointed out so forcibly.
On the second point, again I speak from the point of view of a lawyer. If at the outset one looks at what has to be thought by the Minister before he can take action, one sees that it has to appear to him that there are reasons for doubting whether the workers have been adequately consulted, and so on. His view cannot be challenged. if he thinks that there are reasons for doubting, it is no good trying to say when you get before the Industrial Court that there were no such reasons. His view is supreme: it is his ipse dixit. That aspect of the matter is much the more serious, if one is trying to think again of accommodation between two opposing sides and when one bears in mind, as the noble and learned Lord and his Commission pointed out and as my noble friend has

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reminded us from the wealth of his experience, that in the great majority of strikes the leadership of the union do not goad their members into strike action: the impetus comes from the members themselves. When, as we know from experience widely gathered, that is the position with which the Minister will in fact have to deal, is it not asking for trouble to make his ipse dixit on the matter of law. unchallengeable? That is the second point.
The third point I wanted to make was this. My noble friend pointed out that the Secretary of State can approach the Court in one, two or three situations. One situation is where the condition described in Clause 134 is present; namely, that there is danger of injury to the State and to people's lives. That is one situation. The other is where the condition is present that the livelihood of workers may be impaired as the result of strike action. That is the second situation. The third is where there is a combination of both those situations. What I want to emphasise is that you are dealing with one of those situations in which I should have thought this clause would be particularly unworkable. That situation is the situation in which the Minister wishes to establish before the Court—and I quote from paragraph (b) of subsection (2)—
" that the effects of the industrial action in question on a particular industry are, or are likely to be, such as to be seriously injurious to the livelihood of a substantial number of workers employed in that industry ".
Now if that condition alone is shown, without the other, that is enough to justify the Secretary of State, if he thinks there are reasons for doubting whether the wishes of the workers have been adequately taken into account, to approach the Court. He has to satisfy the Court (to quote the words of the next clause) that there are "sufficient grounds" for supposing that that condition is present. What on earth is the criterion that the Secretary of State, in the first place, and the Industrial Court, in the second place, are to impose in order to determine whether in the case of a given strike the effect on a particular industry is likely to he such as to be seriously injurious to the livelihood of a substantial number of workers? How do you test it? Can a more flabby, indeterminate formula possibly be con-
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ceived? And it is to the resolution of that formula, and its application to a given strike, that the unfortunate Court is in duty bound to address its endeavours.
I would ask the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn: how would he approach a question of that sort? Take a strike in which 5.000 workers are involved. They are under a sense of grievance. They and their leaders take the view that the particular industry or undertaking concerned could easily afford to pay them increased remuneration. Perhaps the management take an exactly contrary view. Perhaps they take the view that the wage bill which would result over the years would be too high. They may take the view that as a result they would have to reduce their programme of capital expenditure. There is a sharp, flat conflict of view between both sides. Both sides have obviously considered it and taken counsel about it. If the management's view is correct, then it may well result from the strike that over a period of time redundancies on a large scale will develop, and if that should happen I suppose it could be said that the livelihood of a substantial number of workers in that particular undertaking would be impaired.
But how is the Court to determine whether the view of the management is right or whether the view of the union and the workers employed is right? By what criteria is it to judge? What evidence is it to have? Is it to summon before it the directors? Is it to summon before it the programmers of the capital investment plan on which the company may be embarked? Is it to try to estimate the future progress of our economy —the balance of payments, and all the rest of it? I should have thought that what the Court was being called upon to do here was to undertake the resolution of a question which is so utterly indeterminate in form as really to be beyond the scope of resolution except by a parade, an almost interminable parade, of expert witnesses—expert accountants, economists and all the rest of it. That is what the Secretary of State is to be entitled to ask the Court to do. If he succeeds in getting the Court to accept the view that there are sufficient grounds for believing that the management view in that situation is right, then it makes the order.

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It is not only that sort of situation. Suppose there is talk of a productivity agreement. Productivity agreements may have two results. The optimists hope that they will greatly expand the scope of the industry, and improve the condition of the workers over a period of years. Others may say that the result, and indeed the object, of a productivity agreement is to reduce the numbers of the necessary labour force, with the result that a number of workers will lose their livelihood. If that is the situation, is that within the ambit of the condition which is being postulated here? I ask again and again: how on earth is the Court to address itself to this subject?
When I said that I approached this issue rather as a lawyer than as a person versed in industrial relationships, I did so having in mind again, as I have had on a previous occasion, the position of the unfortunate Court and the Judge who presides over it, and the really distressing consequences which would ensue if the decision of the Court was misunderstood; if the consequence—and I repeat it because it is incapable of excessive repetition—was that confidence on one or both sides of industry, or by the public at large, in the completely impartial and effective administration of justice by our courts began to wane. I take the view that the information which was presented by the Donovan Commission as to the likelihood of workers' wishes not being taken into account in ordinary strikes, reinforced by the experience of Members of your Lordships' House well-versed in trade union law, in trade union history and in trade union situations, shows that in any event it is unnecessary to have this highly provocative clause. It is a dangerous clause. It is unlikely to result in the resolution of strikes, and it is likely over the years to result in an impairment of confidence in the Industrial Court. I hope that, in the circumstances, the Committee will decide that this clause ought to be excised from the Bill.
9.0 p.m.
LORD STONHAM: I should like to support what my noble friend Lord Champion said, but I want to concentrate on one aspect—I think the weakest —of this clause. This is where the Minister takes a decision, in effect, to arrange a ballot where it appears to him
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that a certain proportion of the workers have not been sufficiently or properly informed about the situation to enable them to form a judgment. The immediate question that occurs to me is: how does he get these opinions? On what evidence? Does he base his decision, which of course will be made in his office—he will not go down to the works and interview the workers—on what his officials tell him? They in turn will not go down to make first-hand inquiries. They, too. will have to rely on very questionable information.
For example, a strike of this kind creates a lot of public attention. Above all, it comes to the notice of the television people. It is a very simple matter for the camera team to get hold of a few people, sometimes two or three, who state their views on particular aspects of the subject. They may be asked whether they want to strike. Inevitably they say, "No". Of course they do not want to strike; nobody in his right mind wants to be deprived of his livelihood; and the worker's wife is particularly concerned about this. Or take the case of the Press reports. The Press reports usually reflect the policy of the newspaper—which almost inevitably is pro-Government and anti-strike. Such reports are selective in the extreme. The newspapers get somebody to say what suits them. Or they allege that they do. What other evidence is the Minister going to rely on if he or his officials do not go down and report, as it were, on the job—as they cannot? This seems to be the crux of the matter. As my noble friend Lord Stow Hill said, the Minister's say-so is the ipse dixit to the Industrial Court. His decision must inevitably be based on the most questionable information. It is not the kind of decision that a Minister would take in other circumstances. Therefore I feel that unless the Minister has an answer to this point, unless he can show me that my anxieties on the matter are groundless, we are right to ask for this clause to be deleted.
LORD POPPLEWELL: I should like to support my three colleagues in opposing this clause. It seems evident to me that it has been drafted by people who have very little knowledge of what takes place in industry. My noble friend Lord Stow Hill has rightly pointed out all the legal difficulties raised by the clause. My noble friend Lord Champion and I, and

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others with experience in dealing with this type of suggested ballot can visualise the difficulties that may arise for the Secretary of State who can apply to the Industrial Count for an order requiring a ballot to be taken. In some industries a ballot can easily be arranged; the rules of some of the unions concerned will stipulate that a ballot must be held before industrial action can take place. But there are various other organisations in which it would be very difficult to arrange for a ballot.
I feel that the Government have inserted this clause because they have accepted so much propaganda from the public media that they are convinced that the situation in industry is much more difficult and critical than it is. We have all seen on television groups of agitated people, housewives and others, expressing mixed opinions about a strike or the prospect of one. If we accept that type of thing unquestionably, then every strike that is envisaged gives power to the Secretary of State to apply to the Industrial Court for an order requiring a ballot. The significant words, as pointed out by my noble friend Lord Stow Hill are,
" that the effects … are, or are likely to be, such as to be seriously injurious…"
But every strike is injurious—particularly to the strikers; because when they lose their regular wage and go on to strike pay their livelihood is seriously injured. Therefore the Secretary of State is given complete power in every dispute that is likely to take place. If he gathers his information solely from the Press or the other media, he will use that power on every occasion. I should like to know what steps will he taken by the Minister to assess the real feeling among people who will contemplate withdrawing their labour.
There is another serious factor which I do not think is appreciated on the other side of this Chamber. Arranging a ballot to decide whether a strike should take place is calculated to create more strikes than if the matter in dispute had been left to responsible trade union leaders to negotiate. Pressure for industrial action usually comes from the shop floor level, and goes up by various stages of negotiating machinery until ultimately it arrives at the national executive, the ruling body of the union. At that stage difficulties
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often arise. The ruling body realises the difficulties involved and refers matters back, and pressure is built up among the rank and file. If a ballot is to take place before responsible people can arrive at any decision, I visualise that there will be more strikes than at present.
The provisions of this clause give wide scope to the Secretary of State and I do not think that is justified. It would be much better that the position should be left as it is, and that both sides of industry should meet the conciliation officers of the appropriate Ministry to assess the position. There will be difficulties over this clause, because it is possible that some trade unions will not be blackmailed " into registering, and therefore they will no longer be trade unions according to the provisions in this Bill. Some organisations whose income tax concessions on their provident funds may be in jeopardy may register, because many thousands of pounds will be involved. But other organisations may take a chance and refuse to register, and the provisions of the Bill will come into force. That seems to me an entirely wrong approach. This appears to me to be something which has been brought about by people with little or no knowledge of industrial matters. I am certain that had the opinions of many employers and the C.B.I. been canvassed completely different advice would have been given to the Government. One can only assume that this is one more effort at "bashing" the trade unions.
BARONESS GAITSKELL: This is a political clause which will prove a nightmare for lawyers and not a paradise, because they will find its provisions so difficult to deal with. It brings out the persecution mania of the Government in regard to strikes in general. The Government really believe that strikes are brought about only by a small number of "firebrands". If that view is held you do not believe that strikers ever have any grievances. It follows logically that the Government do not believe that there are any problems, and if there are no problems there are no strikes. It seems to me that this clause underlines the superficial attitude of the Government towards industrial relations. They would not bring forward rules of this sort if they looked far deeper into problems to discover what are the grievances.
THE EARL OF BALFOUR: I feel that if this Bill had been on the Statute Book the critical position of the wonderful Tyneside shipbuilding firm of Swan Hunter and Wigham Richardson might have been different. In this sort of industry a small section of a huge number of employees can bring the whole works to a standstill. No one section of an industry or the community should ever be allowed to hold the rest of that industry or the community to ransom. I feel that in many large industries, when a small section takes industrial action that affects all the other employees a cooling-off period of only 60 days might improve our economy and prevent hardship. Therefore the Secretary of State, whichever Government are in office, should have the power to take action in these clauses which cover emergency procedure. "Emergency" is the really important word here. The Secretary of State is not going to take action over any tinpot strike or any strike that is not going to create tremendous hardship or affect the health of the nation or the livelihood of a vast number of other people. I stress this to the Committee: we are talking of clauses that affect emergency procedure and nothing more.
9.15 p.m.
LORD BERNSTEIN: We have heard from this side of the House statements dealing with major points on this clause. I should like to highlight some other aspects. I would refer the Committee to the introductory Part I of the Bill, where it says
"The provisions of this Act shall have effect for the purpose of promoting good industrial relations in accordance with the following general principles, that is to say,—
(a) the principle of collective bargaining freely and responsibly conducted; "
I doubt whether this clause allows that. It says at the beginning:
" Where it appears to the Secretary of State—
(c) that there are reasons for doubting …"
Governments can be wrong in their doubting. Not many years ago—it affected my life—the Government of the day were wrong about their doubting of Hitler. Later, the Government of the day also affected all of us by being wrong in their doubting of Nasser. We do not know what would the Secretary of
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State's reasons be for doubting. I do not know how one works out in any sort of rigid terms what is a reason for doubting. No psychiatrist could help us. True, the Secretary of State may consult every employer, trade union and employers' association appearing to him to be a party to an industrial dispute. But note this: he is not required to consult an unregistered organisation. Further, even registered trade unions and registered employers' associations need not be consulted—only in so far as the Secretary of State thinks practicable in the circumstances. There is nothing in the Bill requiring him to consult the T.U.C. or the C.B.I., who might help in a case of emergency.
My questions, therefore, are these. Can the Secretary of State act on the mere reason of doubting whether a union is properly representing its members? Why does the Secretary of State have no obligation to consult the T.U.C. or even the union concerned, and if he does consult, only
" so far as appears to him to be practicable in the circumstances"?
Should the Court be concerned with this point and only examine the matters mentioned in subsection (1) of the clause?
I find it difficult to see how all this can be reconciled with
" the principle of collective bargaining freely and responsibly conducted;"
written so bravely, or so hypocritically, in Part I of the Bill. What evidence does the Secretary of State seek before he arrives at a decision that there are reasons for doubting—gossip, newspaper talk, television commentators, what? This is another godsend—not the only one in the Bill—for a disruptive minority of which we have heard so much. I repeat that what Clause 1 of the Bill says:
" the principle of collective bargaining freely and responsibly conducted"
is the basis of this Bill. If this means anything, then I say to the Government that they have made a psychological mistake and should change this clause.
LORD TAYLOR OF MANSFIELD: This clause empowering the Secretary of State to seek powers from the Industrial Court to take a ballot is a complete

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innovation. I think that it is dangerous. I think it will create more difficulties and more problems than it will solve. To me, it presupposes that ballots in connection with industrial disputes have never been heard of—"Why should we not start now?" I should like to ask the indulgence of your Lordships in order to say a few words about the procedure followed during all my lifetime in the mining industry. I remember three national mining stoppages in 1912, 1921 and 1926. I would draw attention to the fact that they could not take place without a ballot of the men. Furthermore, there had to be a two-thirds majority.
I should like a little information from the Minister about subsection (3). May I read the words to your Lordships?
"Before making any application under this section"—
that is to the Industrial Court—
"the Secretary of State shall "—
not "may"—
" so far as appears to him to be practicable in the circumstances, consult every employer, trade union or employers' association appearing to him to he a party to the industrial dispute in question."
What I am saying is that in my view this clause is out of touch with reality. I doubt very much, whatever the intentions of the Government may be, whether it will work. May I put this supposition to the noble Lord who is to reply: when the consultations between the employer and the trade union and the employers' association have taken place, and they have discussed the dispute or the threat of a dispute from every angle, the trade union, for example, may say to the Secretary of State "We have heard all that you have had to say but we are still convinced that the course upon which we propose to embark is completely and fully justified." The Secretary of State may reply "All right: if that is your attitude we cannot finalise this situation. I am going to the Industrial Court for an order for the taking of a ballot." The employer or the trade union, or both, may also say" Our co-operation on the taking of a ballot will not be forthcoming."
Suppose also that the trade union says to its members, "We are going to embark upon a propaganda campaign because what we are asking for is completely justified, and our campaign will be to
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advise all our members not to take part in the ballot." Then suppose that that campaign is successful, and the members of the trade union act upon the advice of their officials and tear up the ballot papers in the yard. Your Lordships may laugh, but this is a serious matter, and it is not an impossible situation. If that does happen, the trade union has had no part in the matter. What happens then? You have not the consent of the trade union, or of the individual workers, because they have boycotted the ballot. What then is the situation? In my view it will be a completely ridiculous one, and that is why I say that this clause, because of the possibility of those circumstances arising, is really out of touch with reality.
9.26 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I think we have to start from the beginning and see how this situation can arise. The first thing is that there must, in the belief of the Secretary of State, be an emergency situation or the threat of one. I believe that everybody would take this seriously, and that if there were any doubt as to what the members of the union wanted everybody would regard it as justifiable that the matter should be put to the test. I cannot see why anyone should disagree with this. Here is an emergency situation, and there is some reason to doubt whether the strike would have the full support of the workers concerned. This is the situation that is predicated. Noble Lords say: "How will you know that? Where will you get the information?" Obviously, it will not be obtained only from one source. It will be checked and crosschecked, time and time again. There will be the conciliation officers, the Press and all the things that have been mentioned. All kinds of people are gathering information all the time.
It has to be borne in mind that this is not something that will emerge suddenly. There will be an emergency arising, but it will not as the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Leek, would say, arise out of the air: there will no doubt have been attempts at conciliation and all the rest on the way. It is impossible to say how we will know. All I am saying is that what is predicated here is that there is some reason for doubt. Everybody knows that this will be a rarity. For one thing emergencies, thank goodness, do not spring up every day, and the life

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of the country is not threatened every day. The viewpoint of the Government is that where that happens there ought to be no doubt whatsoever where the workers stand, and that if there is doubt, then there is justification for putting it to the test. I should have thought that what I have said so far would not be in any way contentious.
The noble Lord, Lord Stonham, talked about television and the Press, and he used words which I should not myself have used about "trying to get someone to say what suits them". I do not think this is what the television and the Press seek to do in these circumstances. Undoubtedly they like to get contrary expressions of opinion. But simply because the television interviewer asks three people for their views, and two say one thing and one says another, they are not going to conclude from that that the division of opinion in the industry as a whole is two-thirds to one-third.
The noble Lord, Lord Champion, then raised the question of subsection (2)(b), which says:
" the condition that the effects of the industrial action in question on a particular industry are, or are likely to be. such as to be seriously injurious to the livelihood of a substantial number of workers employed in that industry."
The noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, asked what is going to be the criterion for determining that the effect on the industry is likely to be injurious. One cannot draw up a list of the various circumstances that can arise. The noble Lord has a very fertile imagination; he produced one or two circumstances, and asked: "Is this what is meant?" Until the situation arises you do not know. To tax my rather de jure imagination, for one thing it may be that the industry referred to here would be very much larger than the actual area of the dispute. One has only to think of an industry like the motor industry, where a strike among a small number of workers can throw a great many workers out of work. It may permanently damage that particular enterprise or undertaking. It may permanently damage their livelihood; it may lead to redundancies. The strike may cause the undertaking to price itself out of the market; it may have to go completely into liquidation. This is one thing that could happen. I am not saying that it is likely to happen very often,
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but we are thinking only of the very rare emergency occurrence. The noble Lord referred to the question of capital expenditure and investment, that where there are strikes the proprietors may not be prepared to invest and so keep up to date and competitive. All these things could happen.
We are trying to paint the broad picture to cover the case of an emergency situation where there is some doubt as to whether the workers really want to create it. The fact of having a ballot will bring to the notice of the workers the nature of the emergency, the danger that can occur to the national economy, to national security, possibly health and even life itself. The noble Lords, Lord Champion and Lord Stow Hill, both referred to consulting the trade union. The noble Lord, Lord Champion, referred to this in moderate terms, and the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, in unusually sharp terms, and pointed out that this would leave out an organisation of workers. I am not certain why "trade union" was put in, and we are prepared to look at that again, especially as the words in the clause are:
"…so far as appears to him to be practicable in the circumstances ".
One of the difficulties of organisations of workers is that they may be purely temporary and it may be difficult to identify and consult them. But we will look at that point again.
The noble Lord referred to the efficacy of the ballot. Let us remember what we are trying to do. I said earlier that the ballot would be indicative and not decisive. It is to show what the opinion is not only to the union leaders, and the union itself, but also to the public as a whole. I should not have thought that this was to the disadvantage of the trade union. If the ballot showed a tremendous majority in favour of the strike then the public would be bound to deduce that there was something wrong. They would think: "Something should be done about this". I should not have thought that this was necessarily in any way against the trade union. On the other hand, it might be that the trade union leaders had been wrong—even trade union leaders can be wrong. The Secretary of State might be wrong, too. All I would say is that if the Secretary of State had

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to be certain before he applied for a ballot it would not be worth applying for the ballot at all: he would know in advance. The whole point is that there is doubt.
The noble Lord, Lord Champion, also spoke about pressures on trade union leaders. We are well aware of this, and the noble Lord will agree that they do not always come from one quarter. There can be "hawks" and "doves" and other sorts of birds and reptiles as well. One does not quite know where the pressure may be coming from. The union itself may genuinely be uncertain where the balance of opinion will be. The noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Mansfield, mentioned—and it is of course true—that many unions have their own procedures for holding ballots, and this is very important. But not all unions have them. I would not imagine that, where it is the regular procedure according to the rules to hold a ballot, this provision would arise. But not all unions have these procedures. The mere fact that some unions have them and others have not is an indication that this would be a useful power to have.
LORD TAYLOR OF' MANSFIELD: On that point, is not the noble Lord aware that those unions that do not have procedures for ballots are in that position because of the almost physical impossibility of conducting a ballot? Take the seamen, for instance, or the agricultural workers. One can quote a number of unions in which it is almost a physical impossibility for a ballot to be taken. The Secretary of State will be no more successful than have been the leaders of the unions I have mentioned.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I am not so certain about the seamen. I think my noble friend Lord Balfour might say more about that. I do not want to argue particular cases. I am merely saying that there are gaps that could be filled by this kind of procedure in particular circumstances.
I do not want to pursue the point that the compulsory secret ballot would reduce the number of strikes. We could have provided in this Bill that there should be a compulsory ballot as exists in the National Union of Mineworkers: that there should be a compulsory ballot before any strike. We have not done so,
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and one of the obvious reasons for that—although a great many people thought it should be done—is that it would be very difficult to enforce. It is much better that the unions should do this themselves where they think it right. But where the livelihood and life of the country as a whole, and the safety of the country, are involved, then surely there is a case for this kind of procedure. I would not for one moment say it is likely to arise often. It relates to emergency conditions. It comes in the Part of the Bill dealing with emergency procedures. My noble friend Lord Balfour was quite right to point this out. I would not disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Gaitskell, in saying that what we have to do is to find out the problems and solve them; but that also is part of what is provided for in the Bill. We are here dealing with what happens when, despite everything we have tried to do in the Bill, the situation breaks down.
I believe I have covered the points which the noble Lord, Lord Bernstein, raised. The fact is that anybody may be wrong, for both the Secretary of State might be wrong in his doubt and so might the trade union leaders be in their certainty, if they were certain. The noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Mansfield, generally succeeds in picking difficult questions, and he asked what would happen if everybody tore up the ballot papers: what would be the situation then? No one will go to prison for that, so far as I can see; but if people did this the workers themselves would have to consider what would be the effect on public opinion. Part of the object of this particular provision is to open the cupboard, so to speak, and to show the public what really is the opinion of the workers in a particular case. I would have thought that the workers would be very anxious to show what their opinion in this particular case would be. So I really do not think this clause need be opposed.
BARONESS GAITSKELL: I should like to ask one question. Apparently there is to be an army of people going around, trying to get information and finding out whether the workers really want to strike. May I suggest that it would be much better if there were an army of informers and of people going around and finding out where the grievances lay, which would stop the strikes?
LORD DRUMALBYN: We have already passed a clause dealing with conciliation officers, and conciliation officers will be spread pretty well round the country. They will be well informed, and one hopes that they will be in at the early stages of any dispute.
LORD POPPLEWELL: Do we understand from that remark that there will be special conciliation officers appointed to go up and down the country assessing the position. as distinct from the present type of conciliation officers?
LORD DRUMALBYN: No: conciliation is a different thing. and I was not suggesting that they would form a kind of Gestapo, which I believe is what the noble Lord was getting at. Of course this is not the intention. What is intended is quite clear: it is the closest possible cooperation between the conciliation service, to which a great many people have paid tribute, and industry so as to prevent strikes arising; and when disputes do come on the horizon to try to settle them before they become damaging or dangerous.
LORD BERNSTEIN: I am much obliged to the noble Lord for his attempt to answer my questions, and I claim the privilege of waiting until to-morrow when I receive the OFFICIAL. REPORT to see whether my questions have in fact been answered.
9.38 p.m.
LORD CHAMPION: If I thought the ballot would serve the purposes which the noble Lord has suggested I should be in favour of it; but I am not. In the course of his remarks the noble Lord did not refer to the fact that the ballot in this case is to be associated with the cooling-off period which is to be enforced under the next clause of the Bill.
LORD DRUMALBYN: May I intervene for a moment? If by "cooling-off period" the noble Lord means the period during which the ballot is held, then he is correct in saying that that is what the next clause does; but I should make it clear that it is not the 60-day cooling-off period.
LORD CHAMPION: Of course I was quite aware that it was not the 60-day
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period, and when we come to that clause I shall have to point out that the cooling-off period may be well in excess of 60 days. Sixty days happens to be the limit under Clause 135. This may well be a much longer period, for no period will be stated by the Court. except that it will be the period necessary for the conduct of the ballot. As my noble friend Lord Taylor of Mansfield pointed out, there will be tremendous difficulties in taking the ballot in some industries. For instance, we shall look well, having a cooling-off period for seamen who might be in Singapore or somewhere else during the 60-day cooling-off period. I know that is stretching the point rather far: nevertheless, it will apply to many other industries as well.
The noble Lord said that the Secretary of State will take his action only in those cases where there is an emergency which threatens the life of the country. Surely he is not right about that. Paragraph (b) of subsection (1) says it shall he where it appears to the Secretary of State
" that either or both of the conditions specified in the next following subsection are fulfilled … "
The conditions there are, first, the conditions specified in Clause 134(2); namely, the ones to which we were referring under Clause 134, the real emergency conditions, and, secondly,
" the condition that the effects of the industrial action in question on a particular industry are, or are likely to be, such as to be seriously injurious to the livelihood of a substantial number of workers employed in that industry".
You can have a strike of that character without its being a national emergency or creating a national emergency. Those are alternatives under (a) and (b), so I do not think the words of the noble Lord apply here in both cases.
But the main thing about this ballot, and the cooling-off period associated with it, is that we do not think it will have the effect which the noble Earl, Lord Balfour, rather thought it would. If I thought he was right. I should be wholly in favour of this ballot, associated with the cooling-off period. But I am not, for the reason that all the evidence seems to be against it. For example, an outstanding observer of our industrial relations in this country said of Labour Party

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proposals on this matter of the secret ballot:
" Employers reacted with mixed feelings. Many of them disliked compulsory strike ballot, which, with reason, they saw as likely to increase, embitter and prolong strikes."
I am sure that he was absolutely right about this. This was the point made by my noble friend Lord Popplewell.
The Government, and indeed many people in this country, are very mixed up about this whole thing. There is often inconsistency among those who make such proposals for strike ballots. They assume that in unofficial strikes the union officials know better, yet that in
Resolved in the affirmative, and Clause 137, as amended, agreed to accordingly.
official strikes the rank and file members may possibly know better. One can see the inconsistency that lies there between what is thought about the official and the unofficial strike. This runs through the whole of the thinking of the Tory Party in this connection. One could talk quite a long time about this. I do not propose to. Time is getting on. I think we ought to vote against this objectionable clause, and I hope we shall do so immediately.
9.48 p.m.
On Question, Whether Clause 137, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 84; Not-Contents, 29.

CONTENTS

Aberdare, L.

Emmet of Amberley, Bs.

Pender, L.

Ailwyn, L.

Exeter, M.

Platt, L.

Albemarle, E.

Ferrers, E.

Rankeillour, L.

Alport, L.

Ferrier, L.

Reading, M.

Balerno, L.

Fortescue, E.

Redmayne, L.

Balfour, E.

Gisborough, L.

Rochdale, V.

Balfour of Inchrye, L.

Goschen, V.[Teller.]

Ruthven of Freeland, Ly.

Barrington, V.

Gray, L.

St. Aldwyn, E.[Teller.]

Belhaven and Stenton, L.

Greenway, L.

St. Helens, L.

Belstead, L.

Grenfell, L.

St. Just, L.

Berkeley, Bs.

Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Sandford, L.

Boston, L.

Sandys, L.

Brabazon of Tara, L.

Hankey, L.

Sempill. Ly.

Buccleuch and Queensberry, D.

Harvey of Prestbury, L.

Skelmersdale, L.

Burton, L.

Harvey of Tasburgh, L.

Somers, L.

Conesford, L.

Headfort, M.

Stamp, L.

Cork and Orrery, E.

Henley, L.

Strathcarron, L.

Craigavon, V.

Hives, L.

Strathcona and Mount Royal, L.

Craigmyle, L.

Inglewood, L.

Crathorne, L.

Kemsley, V.

Swansea, L.

Crawshaw, L.

Kilmany, L.

Terrington, L.

Cromartie, E.

Kinloss, Ly.

Thomas, L.

Cullen of Ashbourne, L.

Latymer, L.

Tweedsmuir, L.

De Ramsey, L.

Macpherson of Drumochter, L.

Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, Bs.

Denham, L.

Monck, V.

Vivian, L.

Drumalbyn, L.

Mowbray and Stourton, L.

Wigram, L.

Dudley, E.

Netherthorpe, L.

Windlesham, L.

Dundee, E.

Nugent of Guildford, L.

Wolverton, L.

Elliot of Harwood, Bs.

O'Neill of the Maine, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Archibald, L.

Gardiner, L.

Phillips, Bs.[Teller.]

Bernstein, L.

Garnsworthy, L.[Teller.]

Popplewell, L.

Beswick, L.

Hilton of Upton, L.

Ritchie-Calder, L.

Blackett, L.

Hoy, L.

Slater, L.

Buckinghamshire, E.

Hughes, L.

Stonham, L.

Champion, L.

Janner, L.

Stow Hill, L.

Collison, L.

Lloyd of Hampstead, L.

Taylor of Mansfield, L.

Cooper of Stockton Heath, L.

MacLeod of Fuinary, L.

Wells-Pestell, L.

Diamond, L.

Maelor, L.

White, Bs.

Gaitskell, Bs.

Milner of Leeds, L.

Wynne-Jones, L.

Clause 138 [Order of Industrial Court on application under s. 137]:
9.57 p.m.
LORD BELSTEAD LORD BELSTEAD moved Amendment No. 278H:
Page 101, line 20, at end insert—
(3A) Any order under this section shall indicate the scope of the industrial dispute in consequence of which the Order is made, in such manner as may appear to the Industrial Court to be sufficient to indicate the area of employment affected by the dispute and the extent of the matters to which the dispute relates."
The noble Lord said: We have tabled this Amendment for the express purpose of harmonising the provisions for making a ballot order with the provisions for making a restraint order, and your Lordships will see that the wording is exactly the same as the wording in subsection (6) of Clause 135. I beg to move.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
On Question, Whether Clause 138, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD CHAMPION: Our doubts about the compulsory ballot proposals were expressed on the Question, Whether Clause 137 shall stand part of the Bill? But there are some features of this clause which we must bring to the notice of the Committee. The first of these is the limitation in subsection (1) to which my noble friend Lord Stow Hill adverted earlier. This is concerned with matters about which the Court has to be satisfied before making an order under the clause. It seems to me that a very important matter which ought to be brought under review by the Court in taking its decision under subsection (1) is whether the Secretary of State was correct in deciding that a decisive condition contained in Clause 137(1)(c) was at all fulfilled. Under the terms of Clause 138, all the Court has to be satisfied about is whether there are sufficient grounds for believing that the conditions specified in Clause 134 are present, and/or whether the industrial action may be such as seriously to injure the livelihood of a substantial number of workers. But there is nothing in subsection (1) about the doubt which has actuated the mind of the Secretary of State. Surely that is a serious omission, particularly when the application stems from a doubt in the mind of one who may well be the subject
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of considerable Party political pressure and who has to take a subjective and not an objective decision.
We have heard a lot about the independence of such a Court from the Executive, and this is surely the sort of instance where the Court should be allowed to exercise its independent judgment on a very important matter. It was a serious omission from the Bill that the persons affected were not to be parties to the proceedings on the application, as was the case from the outset under Clause 135. That defect has now been remedied. But even though the parties will have a statutory right to be parties to the proceedings in the Court, it seems to me that the first and obvious question an organisation of workers will wish to raise will be whether the doubt of the Secretary of State was justified about whether or not the workers had an adequate opportunity to indicate their wishes in this respect. This is surely a matter which an organisation would be expected to raise with the Court, and they ought to be able to. Yet, so far as I can see, they will be precluded under subsection (1) from doing anything of the sort. Under subsection (1), the Court has to satisfy itself on two counts only before making an order, and those two counts do not include the vital one in connection with this and the preceding clause, namely, the question of the doubt in the mind of the Secretary of State. I still do not think that this clause is good enough, despite the alteration to Clause 137 as to satisfying the Court before it makes an order.
The other matter to which I would call the attention of the Committee is the fact that so far, under this Part of the Bill dealing with emergency procedures, there has been no mention of the Commission; but here, in subsection (4), we learn that the Court may if it thinks fit invite the assistance of the Commission in formulating an order under this clause. Incidentally, I must point out that there is not a word here, as is the case with the rest of the Bill, about consultation with either the T.U.C. or the C.B.I.—the people who know something about all this. Be that as it may, I would have thought that in every case of an order by the Court, the Commission, which under the Bill is expected to be the body most closely in touch with the problems

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of industrial relations, ought by statutory provision to be brought into consideration of the possible order by the Court, so that it would be mandatory to consult the Commission, and not permissive.
I believe that the Commission is such a body that it ought to be brought in on matters of this sort; and particularly is this the case when the Court is considering the question on which the ballot is to be taken. If I had moved the previous Amendment, I should have had to spend some time on this particular aspect of it. The simple fact is that the question could be loaded. It ought not to be by any responsible Court; but the best people to advise the Court on a matter such as this would surely be the Commission, the body which, as I have previously said, is adjudged by the Government whose Bill this is to be the group most closely associated with the problems of industrial relations. Taken altogether, this is a clause which is bound to have the effect of exacerbating the troubles that led to the dispute, for action under it will inevitably be regarded as anti-trade union, for a decision of the Court will be taken in a wholly arbitrary way—mainly, I fear, on the "say so" of the Secretary of State, based on his judgment of the doubt which we have been discussing under the previous clause. I do not think that this clause, either, should remain within the Bill.
LORD DRUMALBYN: The trouble about asking the Court to decide whether the Secretary of State is right to have doubts or not is that it is very difficult to prove a matter of this kind in a Court. In any case, surely, this is something which is eminently within the responsibilities of the Secretary of State himself. As I said before, the sources from which he might learn that there are doubts might be very wide and varied. For example, the T.U.C. might be a source; but I do not know whether one would want to bring them into the Court and indicate that there were doubts about it. All kinds of matters might arise on this. I think it would be extremely difficult to get any kind of certainty about the doubts in the Court. This is something about which the Secretary of State must make up his own mind. He is responsible for the expenditure and
318
all the rest. I must say that he would look rather silly if he took the matter to the Court on the basis that he had reasons for doubt and it turned out that he was 90 per cent. wrong. So, clearly, he is going to be careful about this. He is going to be answerable to Parliament and I should have thought that that was enough.
The noble Lord said that he thought the C.I.R. should be brought in mandatorily. I should have thought it sufficient to say that the Industrial Court may invite the assistance of the Commission. I agree with the noble Lord that the Court will be well advised to ask the views of the C.I.R. in the framing of the question. Whether there will be any difficulty about the framing of this question, one cannot be certain. It may be a very obvious question. On the other hand, the Industrial Court may want to have the advice of the Commission; and on the whole it is better to say to an independent body that they "may" consult rather than they "shall" consult. Obviously the whole reason for putting this matter of framing the question of the ballot into the hands of the Industrial Court is to avoid the possibility of the question being loaded. I am sure that the Court is eminently equipped to see that the question is not loaded. It may not be quite so well equipped to say that the question is right. So far as that is concerned, it will have to decide whether or not to consult the C.I.R. I understand that the noble Lord does not like this provision—that is clear from the discussion on the last clause. But perhaps that explanation will answer the points which he has raised.
LORD GARDINER: While my noble friend Lord Champion is considering what the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, has said, may I say that this is the first of three or four clauses which refer to the results of a ballot? We have had in the earlier Parts of the Bill other groups of clauses which raised the same question. When discussing those, I pointed out that the Court has to accept what the Commission says is the result of a ballot. The Bill makes no provision for a perfectly bona fide dispute about what is the true result of the ballot. After those discussions, the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, wrote to me saying that the Government had given serious attention

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to this and that if I would raise it again when we came to this group I might learn something to my advantage. I accordingly now do so.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I regret that I am not yet in a position to give an answer to the noble and learned Lord. I am sorry to have raised his hopes only to dash them. But I hope to be able to answer him later.
LORD CHAMPION: Does that mean that the noble Lord wil not be able to answer my noble and learned friend at all on this group of clauses, and that he must wait until we get to later clauses which specifically deal with how the ballot is to be taken? The noble Lord shakes his head. I take it that my noble friend must wait until the Report stage or near it.
The noble Lord said that it would be difficult for the Court to decide this matter of doubt. I cannot see why it would be particularly difficult for the Court, with the evidence that would be placed before it, to take a decision as to whether doubt existed or not. I cannot see that there is or would be the slightest difficulty about the Court deciding a matter of that sort. I think the Court ought to be in a position to check the Secretary of State. It is true that in this matter the Secretary of State might eventually have to justify his decision to Parliament; but that might be after a long time, after a decision had been taken. and after the ballot had been taken. The noble Lord suggests that the ballot might show, one way or the other, whether there ought to have been a doubt. I feel that this is a bad clause, but, in order not to waste the time of the Committee, I propose to allow it to be carried.
Clause 138, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 139 [Provisions pending result of ballot ordered tinder s. 138]:
10.11 p.m.
LORD BELSTEAD LORD BELSTEAD moved Amendment No. 278J:
Page 101, line 29, after ("workers") insert ("or other person")
The noble Lord said: With the permission of the Committee I beg to move Amendment No. 278J and with it to dis-
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cuss Amendments No. 278K, 279B, C and D and Amendment No. 280A. The first and most significant of the points concerned is the identity of those who, under a strike ballot order, are required not to take any action to call a strike while the order is in force and are required to use their best endeavours to have such strike discontinued. Subsection (1)(a) of this clause refers to four different categories of persons: an organisation of workers, an official, any other person specified and any person falling within a specified description. The first two Amendments, Nos. 278J and K. and the fourth and fifth, Nos. 279C and D, seek to reduce those four categories to two; namely, an organisation of workers or any other person.
The purpose of these Amendments is not only to simplify, it is also to ensure that any person or organisation bound by an order to refrain from calling a strike is identified by name in the order; as indeed he will have been identified by name in the Secretary of State's application. The second point covered by the third of this group of Amendments, No. 279B, is the application of a ballot order to a lock-out. It is conceivable —I put it no higher—that an employer might wish to forestall a union by locking out his employees at a time when a ballot order was in force. It would clearly be wrong to permit an employer to conduct a lock-out in these circumstances. The Amendment proposed to line 38 on page 101 will therefore make it clear that it would be a breach of the ballot order for any person to lock out employees who are being balloted while the ballot order is in force.
Finally, the last of this group of Amendments, in line 5, page 102, refers to what I think is now a familiar point. It sometimes happens that where a union is supporting a strike, strike instructions have been issued by the shop stewards. Where this is the case the strike ballot order would require the union to withdraw any instructions it had issued under its authority, and to ensure that its stewards withdrew instructions which had been issued without union authority. I feel that this point has been argued in some detail on Amendment No. 278, and I beg to move the first Amendment.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD BELSTEAD: I beg to move Amendment No. 278K.
Amendment moved—
Page 101, line 29, leave out from ("order") to first ("shall") in line 33.—(Lord Belstead.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
10.15 p.m.
LORD BELSTEAD: I beg to move Amendment No. 279B.
Amendment moved—
Page 101, line 38, leave out from ("employer") to ("shall") in line 41 and insert ("organisation of employers or other person").—(Lord Belstead.).
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD BELSTEAD: I beg to move Amendment No. 279C.
Amendment moved—
Page 102, line 1, after (" organisation") insert ("or other person").—(Lord Belstead.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD BELSTEAD: I beg to move Amendment No. 279D.
Amendment moved—
Page 102, line 3, leave out from beginning to ("to") in line 4.—(Lord Belstead.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD BELSTEAD: I beg to move Amendment No. 280A.
Amendment moved—
Page 102, line 5, after ("withdrawing") insert ("or securing the withdrawal of").— (Lord Belstead.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD STOW HILL LORD STOW HILL moved Amendment No. 281:
Page 102, line 10, at end insert—
(" (3) The provisions of subsection (3) of section 135 of this Act shall with any necessary modification apply in relation to an order made under this section.")
The noble Lord said: Clause 135(3) provides that persons who merely take part in a strike and officials who have no responsibility for it except in their capacity as officials of a registered trade union cannot be included within the order for the 60 days' pause. Clause 139 also deals with an order for a suspension of strike activity so that the ballot can be taken. One would have thought that inasmuch as it has been thought proper to exclude ordinary strikers and officials from the order for the 60 days' pause, they should also be excluded from the order which requires a pause so that the ballot should be taken. The object of the Amendment is to exclude them from the scope of that order. There seems to be no reason in justice why they should be excluded in one case but nevertheless made liable in the other. They seem to be in equal case and it seems illogical to make that distinction between the effect of the operation of Clauses 135 and 139 on those persons.
That consideration seems to me, unless I am mistaken, to be equally applicable to Clause 139 in its amended form. The only change that is made is to describe in more simple and compendious terms those categories of people who can be included in the order. Those who are excluded by the provision in Clause 135 to which I have referred are still included in the amended Clause 139.
The way in which my noble and learned friend Lord Donovan, and my noble friend Lord Taylor of Mansfield, seek in this Amendment to achieve that change is by making applicable to Clause 139 the provisions of subsection (3) of Clause 135. If that subsection were made applicable, with necessary changes, to Clause 139, it would exclude from the ambit of an order relating to a ballot both the categories of persons who are excluded from the order for a pause which can be made under Clause 135. I hope the Government will accept that the same situation should apply to those categories of persons under both
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clauses, and that they will indicate that they are prepared to accept the Amendment. I beg to move.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I am grateful to the noble Lord. I wonder whether he has examined Amendment 281A. I was under the impression that subsection (6) of this Amendment to Clause 139 covered the point he had in mind. If that is not so, we shall certainly give consideration to the point he has made. My impression, however, is that it is covered by Amendment No. 281A.
LORD CHAMPION: It seems to me to be so.
LORD STOW HILL: I am grateful to the Minister. When I looked at it I thought not, but it has only recently been put on the Marshalled List. Perhaps I might look at this again. However, the noble Lord has kindly intimated that this point might be looked at again, and if I am right in so understanding him, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
10.22 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN LORD DRUMALBYN moved Amendment No. 281A:
Page 102, line 10, at end insert—
(" (3) Subject to the following provisions of this section, the persons (whether organisations of workers or other persons) specified in the order in accordance with subsection (1)(a) of this section shall be the persons specified in the application in accordance with section 137(2A) of this Act.
(4) If at any time during the period mentioned in subsection (1) of this section it appears to the Secretary of State that persons other than those specified in the order (in the following provisions of this section referred to as "the principal order") in accordance with paragraph (a) of that subsection are at that time responsible as mentioned in section 137(2A) of this Act, the Secretary of State may make an application to the Industrial Court, specifying those persons and applying for the principal order to be extended to them and the persons so specified shall, together with the Secretary of State, be the parties to any proceedings on that application.
(5) Subject to the next following subsection, on any application made by the Secretary of State under subsection (4) of this section the Industrial Court shall make an order specifying the persons who were specified in the application and directing that, in relation to any time after the order under this subsection takes effect and before the result of the ballot to be taken under the principal order has been reported to the Court, the principal order shall have effect as if those persons had been included

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among the persons specified in the principal order in accordance with subsection (1)(a) of this section.
(6) The persons specified in the principal order in pursuance of subsection (1)(a) of this section, and any persons specified in any order under subsection (5) of this section, shall not include any person who in the opinion of the Industrial Court (notwithstanding that he is specified in the application for the order)—

(a) has, or (as the case may be) would have, no responsibility for the strike or other action in question beyond that of being included among the persons taking part in it, or

(b) has no responsibility for calling, organising, procuring or financing the strike or other action in question, or for threatening to do so, except in his capacity as an official of a trade union acting within the scope of his authority on behalf of the trade union.

(7) On and after the date on which the principal order takes effect, the Industrial Court shall not (whether before or after the date on which the result of the ballot is reported to the Court) entertain any application under section 137 of this Act in respect of the same industrial dispute, or in respect of any other industrial dispute in so far as it appears to the Court that its scope falls within the scope (as indicated in that order in accordance with section 138(3A) of this Act) of the industrial dispute in consequence of which that order was made.")
The noble Lord said: I must apologise for the lateness of this addition to Clause 139. I hope its purpose will be reasonably welcome to noble Lords opposite, and indeed to the whole Committee. Its purpose is to secure for trade unions and their officials and members the safeguards which are already provided in Clauses 135 and 136. Perhaps I might go very quickly through the subsections.
The new subsection (3) ensures that a strike ballot order will in general only extend to bind those identified in the Secretary of State's application—that is, those who are parties to the proceedings before the Court. In short, the order cannot go wider than the Secretary of State's application. The new subsections (4) and (5) cover the situation where, after a ballot order has been made, a person not bound by the order calls or procures a strike through the workers involved in the statutory ballot. It would make nonsense of these provisions if such a person were free to organise industrial action without let or hindrance. While therefore he cannot be held to have broken the Court's order, it is proposed that the Secretary of State should be able to have the new strike leader's name added to
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those who are bound by the original or principal order.
The purpose of the new subsection (6) repeats mutatis mutandis the provisions of subsection (3) of Clause 135. It would prevent the Court making an order specifying a person who was no more than a participant in the strike, or who was a union official acting within his authority in calling a strike. I should make it clear that throughout the Bill the Government have consistently maintained the principle that sanctions should only be imposed against strike leaders or organisers and not against those who participate in a strike. The Government have also been concerned to ensure that, wherever a union official takes action within the limits of his authority, his union must be responsible for the official's acts. It follows therefore that if a union official calls a strike in circumstances in which the Secretary of State considers it desirable to invoke the emergency powers, the consequential order is made against the union and not the official. When, on the other hand, the union official has no authority for strike action, the strike ballot order may name him personally rather than his union, or possibly in addition to his. union.
Finally, the new subsection (7) makes it clear that the Secretary of State may not apply for a second ballot order in respect of the same industrial dispute. He may seek to add further persons to the list of those bound by the original order, but he cannot under the terms of the proposed new subsection (7) defer the strike for a further period while another ballot is held. I do not think I need to explain to your Lordships the need to protect trade unionists in this way. I beg to move.
LORD CHAMPION: This massive Amendment was put down, as the noble Lord has said, very late, and we have not yet had time to study it thoroughly. This seems to me to be particularly so in the case of my noble friend Lord Stow Hill. whose grasp of these things is so immediate that it rather surprised me that he was not absolutely au fait with subsection (6). It appears to be an importation into this clause which ought to be accepted by the Committee if they accept the principle of the clause itself. It ensures that the persons to be specified

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shall be parties to any proceedings on the application, and it also seems to me that subsection (6) extends to persons the same sort of thing as is embodied in Clause 135, which I would regard as wholly desirable. There is one question that I should like to have answered by the noble Lord, and it is this. Clause 137 (3) says that before making any application under that clause the Secretary of State shall, as far as practicable.
" consult every employer, trade union … appearing to him to be a party to the industrial dispute in question."
Under this Amendment the scope of the application may be considerably widened, perhaps bringing into its scope trade unions not included in the original application. Ought there not to be in this Amendment a similar provision to that in Clause 137(3), so that the trade unions or others are consulted before the application is made by the Secretary of State? I certainly should not advise my colleagues to divide against this Amendment, but it will have to be further studied between now and the Report stage, for the fact is that we have only seen this so recently that we have not had an opportunity to study completely this massive Amendment, as I think I rightly called it. Certainly we shall not divide against the Amendment. We think it embodies some improvements into the clause.
LORD DIAMOND: Before the noble Lord replies to my noble friend, I should like to ask him a question the answer to which I have not been able to spot, although I frankly admit that I have not read the Amendment with the care that my noble friend has. I am referring to what the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, said about the persons against whom an order will not be made, one of those persons being an official of the union who acted within the authority of the union. What I am concerned with here is the same principle that I was concerned with elsewhere; namely, a shop steward acting outside the authority of his union, but in anticipation of subsequent confirmation, where that subsequent confirmation takes place. Is that shop steward to be named in the order, notwithstanding that subsequent confirmation takes place of
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his action which at that point of time is unauthorised?
LORD DRUMALBYN: I am grateful to the noble Lord. To deal with the second question first, I should have thought that here we are in a rather different sphere from the one which we were considering earlier. To defy a court order is rather a different matter from the kind of situation the noble Lord was raising earlier on. I should not have thought that there could be any question of endorsement later, because if you defy an order outside the scope of your authority you obviously do it on your own responsibility, and even though later the union, an organisation of workers, itself decides to defy the order, I do not see that you can endorse a defiance of a court order.
As to Lord Champion's point, I wonder whether he is right. Obviously, he has not given me notice of this question because he has hardly had notice of the clause; but we are here dealing with persons, not an area. He used the words "scope of the order". We are dealing with particular persons acting in defiance of the order. I should not have thought that there was any question of consulting any trade union about it. I am quite willing to look at the point.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
On Question, Whether Clause 139, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?
10.32 p.m.
LORD STOW HILL: The submission I would make with regard to Clause 139 as a whole is that it is quite unnecessary and that it does harm which could be avoided. This Part of the Bill really contains two separate sections. Clauses 134 and 135 provide for the order to suspend a strike for 60 days where there is a national emergency. Both clauses are carefully framed to ensure that the total period for which the strike is suspended does not exceed 60 days on the first order. There may be more than one order, but in the aggregate they must not extend for a period in excess of 60 days. When one is dealing with the ballot clauses, Clauses 136 onwards, the object presumably of the Government is to find out in the case of any given strike whether or not those who are taking part in the strike really are in

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sympathy with it. I take it that that is the sole purpose of the Government. They feel that if the result of a ballot showed that there was a majority against the strike it would come to an end. In the nature of things it is impossible to lay down any time limit within which the ballot has to be taken. It is impossible to formulate any idea as to how long the strike is going to be suspended.
What has to take place? The Secretary of State has to make up his mind to approach the Court. When he gets to the Court he has to satisfy it that the necessary condition, or both the conditions, are present: either that there is a national emergency, or a likelihood of the workers' livelihood being impaired, or both. It is very important to consider in this particular context that the ballot can apply where there is no national emergency at all. It can apply in the case of any strike with regard to which the Minister can say to himself honestly that he has doubts as to whether the majority of those taking part in it are in favour of it. So this can apply virtually to almost any strike. One can doubt about any strike whether that is the case or not. One has only to doubt: that is all. So, in the case of any strike, without any emergency, this procedure can be applied.
If the Government's object is really to find out whether the strikers are with the strike or not, what on earth is the need, if the strike has already started, to have it stopped while the ballot is taken—from the time the Court makes its order, while the ballot is taken, until the result of the ballot is reported to the Court, a period of time which is quite indeterminate but which may be at any rate some weeks? These things cannot be arranged at five minutes' notice. During that time it seems to me, so far as the Government's purpose is concerned it does not make the slightest difference whether the strike goes on or stops. One always hopes that the strike will stop, but let it stop of its own momentum, rather than as the result of this arbitrary order which it is contemplated will be made as a result of the application to the Court.
The reasons which impel the conclusion that I urge upon the Government are these. It has been pointed out over
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and over again from this side of the Committee that where you have the case of a strike, particularly where there is no national emergency behind it, it is going to exacerbate the position very badly if the Minister can obtain from the Court this order suddenly stopping it; and not only suddenly stopping it, but stopping it for an indeterminate period. In that respect the situation is more aggravating, from the point of view of the strikers and the union leadership, than when an order is made in the case of a national emergency, which order cannot exceed 60 days.
The question that I put to the Government Front Bench is this. Is it really necessary to cause the strike to be suspended while a ballot is taken? The ballot can be taken while the strike goes on. There is no need for the men to have to go back to work in order to take a ballot; it does not affect the position one way or the other. I would respectfully submit that the whole procedure would be far more acceptable, from the point of view of the union side of the table and from that of those taking part in the strike, if this compulsory return to work were omitted and if the clauses which provide for it were removed from the Bill.
10.38 p.m.
LORD COLLISON: One point has not been made which I think ought to be made and which the Government should consider. If the Secretary of State is in doubt and requires a ballot, and a ballot is decided upon by the Industrial Court, it could well happen that the majority of workpeople concerned would vote for the strike. The strike would then continue, and the union would negotiate with the employer with a view to reaching a settlement. It might be that the employer and the trade union would arrive at a settlement which they would want to recommend to their people. But, having been compelled to hold a ballot to determine the actual participation of the workers in the strike, if there were a dissident element among the workers might they not then use the situation to demand a further ballot before a return to work? It seems to me, knowing trade union people, that this is a natural course of events and a sequence of thought which could take place in the minds of people involved in the strike.

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My view is that this is quite a serious proposition which ought to be looked at very carefully by the Government if they are really seeking to avoid unnecessary strikes and also to avoid an undue delay in a return to work when a trade union has been able to negotiate what they feel to be, as an executive maybe, a proper settlement with the employer concerned.
LORD CHAMPION: I shall be most anxious to hear the reply which the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, will make to my noble friend Lord Collison on his important question. I must admit that it is a question that had not occurred to me. It appears as though there may be circumstances such as he has mentioned in which a strike may be prolonged unnecessarily, and I would hope that the Government would pay some attention to the words of one so experienced in trade union matters as is my noble friend.
The noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, has made some of the points that I proposed to make in relation to the number of days during which the cooling-off period may operate in association with the taking of a ballot. What may be a maximum of 60 days in relation to the national emergency orders finds no comparable period or limitation under this clause, or indeed any maximum at all. I am far from sure, as yet, that the Amendment to which the Committee has just agreed might not have the effect of lengthening an already lengthy cooling-off period during which the ballot is being taken.
Under the clause as it now stands, despite the Amendment made to Clause 137, the Court wil lhave to define the area of employment and the question of who is to be eligible to vote. In any event that will require a set of complicated but very important definitions that will have the effect within the terms of the clause of making the persons coming within those definitions liable to be sent to prison for contempt of court should they contravene the order of the Industrial Court.
The difficulties of definition will really be enormous when there is. as is so often the case, a dispute involving a limited group of workers within an undertaking. This was the case at the Port Talbot steelworks a few years ago, where a group of maintenance workers within a very large undertaking held up the whole
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of the works by their action. The whole business of the cooling-off period, started by a doubt in the mind of the Secretary of State, seems to me to be very much the making of a charter for the splinter group or dissident minority. This is so, for all that is needed is for a minority group, acting in a dispute about recognition, for example, to create a doubt in the mind of the Secretary of State, and from such a doubt the whole machinery of these clauses may spring into action.
Again, this clause perpetuates the stupidity of the distinction between the registered and the unregistered trade union, and I understood the noble Lord to say that they would be looking at that and perhaps altering it before the Report stage, but we shall have to look at this most carefully. I do not like this clause a little bit. What we do on this side of the Committee will depend very largely on the Government reply to the points so well put by my noble friends, and I very much look forward to hearing the reply of the noble Lord. Lord Drumalbyn.
10.45 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN: Perhaps I should clear up a point straight away on one of the last things said by the noble Lord, Lord Champion. The actual point on the distinction between a trade union and an organisation of workers that we were dealing with was on the question of consultation only. I do not think I can hold out any hope in other respects. There are obviously difficulties about the strike period. The noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, drew attention to these, and in particular to the fact that no maximum period is specified. Of course the area of employment to be covered will vary very much indeed from circumstance to circumstance, and plainly the time required for the ballot will have to vary accordingly, and there will be other circumstances involved, such as dispersion, and so forth. But the period within which the result of the ballot is to be reported to the Industrial Court has to be determined by the Court. Of course it could be reported very much sooner. In that case the standstill, so to speak, is, I think, discharged.
The noble Lord raised the much wider question of whether it is necessary to defer the strike, or indeed to interrupt

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the strike in order to hold a ballot at all. Our view on this is that it is much better, for a number of reasons, to bring the workers back to work. From the point of view of the actual conduct of the ballot alone, of course, it is very much easier. Secondly, in an atmosphere of worklessness I am not at all certain that you are likely to get the best results. I think that probably it is much better that people should be together at their normal jobs when the ballot is conducted. I recognise at once that it is not in all cases going to be very easy to achieve this object and to bring people back to work in those circumstances, but I believe that the publicity that will be given in these circumstances will be sufficient to bring them back. I remember in the debate on In Place of Strife quite a lot of stress was laid upon the status quo ante, and I think a restoration of the status quo ante in a case like this is probably desirable.
The question of demanding a further ballot was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Collison, who was, of course, a member of the Donovan Commission. He has enormous experience, and I think he was quite right to do this. But the Government decided that this was not really on, and indeed subsection (7) of the subsections that I have just moved into this Clause would make it impossible to have a second ballot on the same subject. So that if there was a demand, I would suggest that it would be for the union to conduct it, as unions so often do conduct ballots for a return to work. I hope I have dealt with the various questions that have been raised.
I must make it plain this is an experimental area, and one cannot be absolutely dead sure that one has got everything right here. That is why I have dealt in that spirit with the points the noble Lords, Lord Stow Hill and Lord Champion and Lord Collison, have raised. But we have done the best we can on this question, and on balance we think that it is better to bring everybody back to work, partly, of course, because of the very factor that the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, referred to, that the time that the Court will have to allow for the ballot may vary very much
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in certain circumstances, and that it would be rather stupid to prolong the strike in order to hold the ballot.
It was suggested, either by the noble Lord, Lord Collison, or the noble Lord, Lord Champion, that holding a ballot might in any case prolong a strike. But we believe it is better to bring everybody back for the ballot and to hold it in that way. The ballot will not necessarily determine whether a strike takes place or continues or does not take place at all. What it will do is to show what the workers want. We believe that that is a good thing in itself, in circumstances where there is a doubt.
10.50 p.m.
LORD COLLISON: I apologise for continuing this discussion, but I am quite serious about it. I think there is a point that ought to be looked at quite carefully. This is meant to be helpful. If a ballot is demanded by what the trade union people will see as State intervention, I think they will equally well demand, and with justification, that, before they accept their union's decision as to the acceptance of a settlement which some of them may not like, there should be a further ballot. But I do not want to appear to be overstressing the point. Obviously, the question as to who pays for the ballot comes into this. In the first instance, it can be paid for from outside union resources. If the union are put into a position that they have to conduct another ballot in order to satisfy their membership, and to meet a real attack by people who may be considered as being not very loyal trade unionists, in the sense that they are trying to disrupt the union—and this happens, as we all know—a real problem arises. I intervened simply because the point had not been previously made. I think there is a great deal of substance in it. If an answer could be found, it should he looked at. There might be difficulty about this.
LORD DRUMALBYN: When someone with the experience of the noble Lord, Lord Collison, raises a point of this description, of course I should certainly want to give it further consideration, and I will clearly do so. But I cannot, of course, make any commitment.
10.52 p.m.
On Question, Whether Clause 139, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?
Resolved in the affirmative, and Clause 139, as amended, agreed to accordingly.
Clause 140 [Conduct of ballot]:
10.59 p.m.
LORD BELSTEAD LORD BELSTEAD moved Amendment No. 282K:
Page 102, line 28, after ("conducted") insert ("either")
The noble Lord said: With your Lordships' agreement, I should like to discuss Amendments Nos. 282L and 282M with this Amendment. The provisions of Clause 140, to which we now move, envisage that the C.I.R. will ordinarily conduct a strike ballot, except where the workers concerned in the ballot are members of a trade union which has approved balloting rules, and which is willing to conduct the ballot itself. This group of Amendments do no more than permit the C.I.R. to delegate the work of conducting a ballot to some body other than the union concerned, provided that the C.I.R. retains responsibility for supervising the ballot and for ensuring that it is conducted according to the proper rules.
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 72; Not-Contents, 15.

CONTENTS

Aberdare, L.

Goschen, V.

Rochdale. V.

Amherst of Hackney, L.

Gowrie, E.

Ruthven of Freeland, Ly.

Balerno, L.

Gray, L.

St. Aldwyn. E.

Balfour, E.

Greenway. L.

St. Helens, L.

Belhaven and Stenton, L.

Grenfell, L.

St. Just, L.

Belstead, L.

Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Sandford, L.

Berkeley, B.

Sandys, L.

Brabazon of Tara, L.

Harvey of Prestbury. L.

Selkirk. E.

Buccleuch and Queensbury, D.

Harvey of Tasburgh, L.

Sempill, Ly.

Burton, L.

Henley, L.

Skelmersdale. L.

Conesford, L.

Hives, L.

Somers, L.

Cork and Orrery, B.

Inglewood, L.

Stamp, L.

Crathorne, L.

Kemsley, V.

Strange, L.

Cromartie, E.

Kilmany, L.

Strathcona and Mount Royal, L.

Denham, L.

Latymer, L.

Drumalbyn, L.

Lauderdale, E.

Swansea, L.

Dudley, E.

Lucas of Chilworth, L.

Terrington. L.

Dundee. E.

Macpherson of Drumochter, L.

Thomas, L.

Elliot of Harwood, B.

Mowbray and Stourton, L.[Teller.]

Thorneycroft. L.

Emmet of Amberley, B.

Tweedsmuir, L.

Exeter, M.

Nugent of Guildford, L.

Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie. B.

Ferrers, E.[Teller.]

Pender, L.

Vivian. L.

Ferrier, L.

Rankeillour, L.

Wigram, L.

Fortescue, E.

Reading, M.

Windlesham. L.

Gisborough, L.

Redmayne, L.

Wolverton, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Bernstein, L.

Gardiner, L.

Milner of Leeds. L.[Teller.]

Beswick, L.

Garnsworthy, L.[Teller.]

Ritchie-Calder. L.

Champion, L.

Hoy, L.

Stow Hill, L.

Collison, L.

Hughes, L.

Wells-Pestell, L.

Diamond, L.

MacLeod of Fuinary, L.

Wynne-Jones, L.

This brings this clause into line with the rest of the Bill, and I hope that your Lordships will see no reason why the C.I.R., as in the rest of the Bill, should not enjoy this discretion in respect of strike ballots. I beg to move.
LORD CHAMPION: The noble Lord said that under the Bill the Commission would be expected to ask, and in fact would ask, a trade union whose rules had been approved by the Registrar under Part IV of the Bill to conduct the ballot. It says here that the Commission "may" request the trade union to conduct the ballot in relation to those workers. There is nothing obligatory about this. It does not say "shall"; it says, "may". So I would have thought he was not quite right when he told the Committee that the trade union would in fact conduct the ballot if the rules had been approved by the Registrar. That is really what it amounted to.
The other point about which I wanted to ask in this connection concerns the second Amendment to which the noble

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Lord has spoken. What is meant by the words proposed to be added to the clause, "by some other body"? Does this mean that in some circumstances the Commission may ask an unregistered organisation of workers to conduct the ballot? As I see it, an unregistered trade union would be a body other than the body mentioned in subsection (2), and would appear to me to fall within the terms of the Amendment. I wonder if I am right about that. I hope the noble Lord will be able to give me an answer on this before we part with the first of these Amendments.
LORD BELSTEAD: I must apologise for perhaps not sticking as closely to my brief as I should have done. I should have said "would normally", and the noble Lord was quite right to pull me up. I should have thought the answer to the noble Lord's second point was that this surely is within the C.I.R.'s discretion. Obviously, from previous discussions on the Bill, what the Government have in mind on this is a body like the Industrial Reform Society. Apart from saying that this is within the discretion of the C.I.R I. do not think I can give the noble Lord any more information on this point at this moment.
LORD CHAMPION: I should not like to see anything added to the Bill which would exclude an unregistered trade union, but I have some doubts as to whether the noble Lord is right about this. I should have thought the words "a body" used in this connection would ensure that the unregistered trade union could be brought in under the terms of the clause and of the Amendments which the noble Lord has moved. But perhaps he will look at this point further between now and Report if he feels that he has made a mistake about it.
LORD BELSTEAD: We shall he only too pleased, of course, to do this, but, once again, at the discretion of the C.I.R. —and I think I have been right in the intention which I imputed to the Government in this particular subsection.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD BELSTEAD: I beg to move Amendment No. 282L.
Amendment moved—
Page 102, line 28 after ("Commission") insert (" or by some other body under the
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supervision of the Commission, and in either case shall be conducted ")—(Lord Belstead.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD BELSTEAD: I beg to move Amendment No. 282M.
Amendment moved—
Page 102, line 29, at end insert ("for the purpose of securing that the ballot will be properly conducted and that the voting in the ballot will be kept secret")—(Lord Belstead.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 140, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 141 [Supplementary provisions as to conduct and result of ballot]:
On Question, Whether Clause 141 shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD GARDINER: This is the last clause which refers to the result of a ballot. When I raised this question on Clause 135 I expected to be told what precise Amendment the Government were going to put down at a later stage. One must consider the Report stage. It is three weeks since the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, wrote to me. I hope now that we have reached this clause he may be able to give me at least some indication of the thinking of the Government on this point.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for giving me yet another opportunity to reply. I hope he will be indulgent for I am afraid I am not yet in a position to answer him. I hope to he able to write again to the noble and learned Lord before Report stage.
Clause 141 agreed to.
Clause 142 [Conciliation officers]:
On Question, Whether Clause 142 shall stand part of the Bill?
11.7 p.m.
LORD STOW HILL: This is an important clause, in the sense that it provides for the appointment of conciliation officers. I think one ought not to part with the clause without some statement by the Government as to their intentions about, broadly. how many conciliation officers will be appointed. What, in general. should be their functions? Where shall they operate? Shall they have different appointments in various parts of the country? Shall they

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have special areas under their responsibility'? In particular, I should like to know roughly the number which the Government estimate it will be necessary for them to appoint.
If one looks at the Bill, one finds they are given extremely important functions. Let us take one function, that of intervening in cases where claims are advanced under Clause 102 of the Bill in respect of unfair dismissals under Clause 20. The Schedule that we have already passed, as the Government will know, enables the case which is brought before the industrial tribunals for compensation for unfair dismissal to be adjourned in order that a conciliation officer may intervene and offer his services to try to bring the parties to an accommodation. That is a very important and valuable function. It is the more so when we bear in mind the discretionary nature of the jurisdiction conferred on industrial tribunals. A feature of this clause which I think requires some explanation is subsection (6) which says that anything communicated to a conciliation officer may not be used in evidence (except with the consent of the person who made the communication) in any proceeding before either the Industrial Court or an industrial tribunal that is to say, it may not be given in evidence without that consent before any of the courts that are set up under the terms of this Bill.
I suppose that: in the case of any other court there is nothing to stop anyone serving a subpoena upon a conciliation officer who, if he is put into the witness box, can be asked questions (which he will certainly be obliged to answer if the learned judge thinks an answer would be relevant) about anything communicated to him. It seems to me that this double standard of confidence is very difficult to explain. It is difficult to understand how it can be sensible that his mouth can be closed by lack of consent in any of the tribunals set up under this Bill, whereas he is bound to say everything imparted to him by any person who spoke to him in confidence if he is subpoenaed to appear in any other court.
It is undoubtedly the case that he must be subpoenaed to appear in another court. If one looks at Clause 108, one finds that the Lord Chancellor is given
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powers to transfer to the industrial tribunals jurisdiction which at the moment would be largely invested in county courts, and in some cases in the High Court. It seems very difficult to understand how the obligation of the conciliation officer either to keep his counsel or to disclose what was said to him could depend on whether the Lord Chancellor exercised his power to transfer proceedings to the Industrial Court, and upon the accident of whether the officer was called as a witness before an industrial tribunal or before a county court. That seems to be rather an unjustifiable anomaly. One would have thought that his obligation to maintain silence would apply either in all courts or in none.
I feel very reluctant to extend in any sense the right of persons who are brought before courts of justice to refuse to answer questions. Legal professional privilege, the secrecy which attaches to what passes between a client and his solicitor and the barrister who represents him, is, I should have thought, absolutely essential. The question of what could be disclosed by, say, a priest or a doctor or someone of that sort, or what must be disclosed by a journalist, has frequently been discussed in the courts. My general approach is that disclosure should be complete, because without disclosure injustice might result. It is for that reason that I regard this question which arises under subsection (6) as one of principle and of importance. Before we part with this clause I should be very grateful if the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, would give me the Government's views on this, and in particular the reason which he thinks justifies the secrecy which in some circumstances is imposed upon the conciliation officer.
LORD DIAMOND: There is one further point that I should like to add to what my noble friend Lord Stow Hill has said, and perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham. could deal with it at the same time. I see that under subsection (5) the Secretary of State may direct a conciliation officer to perform services in relation to claims for damages. Conciliation officers should be conciliation officers. Nobody who becomes involved in assessing damages as between the parties will ever remain an independent conciliation officer able to carry

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out his full functions of conciliation. He will be regarded with suspicion or hostility by one side or the other, and conceivably by both sides. Is it not therefore a pity that these duties are put upon conciliation officers?
11.14 p.m.
THE MINISTER OF STATE, HOME OFFICE (LORD WINDLESHAM): I welcome the opportunity to make a short statement on the subject of conciliation. As the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, rightly says, this is one of the central features of the Bill; indeed, it is included in the general principles in Clause 1. A little later in the Bill, where an application has been made to the N.I.R.C. under Clause 35 about a non-existent or defective procedure agreement, or under Clause 43 for recognition as the sole bargaining agent, the Secretary of State again is enjoined to promote agreement between the parties. This means by recourse to conciliation. Under Clause 80 the Registrar also must promote a settlement of complaints referred to him without the matter becoming the subject of complaint to the tribunal. And of course the tribunals and the Courts will afford the parties the opportunity for conciliation, and in practice will encourage this.
The reason for this emphasis on conciliation is that we believe conciliation is one of the best available methods for settling disputes. It has the added advantage of avoiding unnecessary litigation, as we have said on a number of occasions. The legal institution, the tribunals and the Court is there as a last resort, when the parties have not been able to reach agreement between themselves.
The noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, asked about numbers. The explanatory financial and staff memorandum at the beginning of the Bill estimates a figure of 190 extra staff of the Department of Employment; but how many of the 190 will be conciliation officers will depend on how the work builds up. The noble Lord asked whether they would be centrally or regionally distributed. I can tell him that some will be based on central London and others will be regionally based in each of the nine regions.
The noble Lord went on to ask me about subsection (6), which says that the consent of a person who gives information to a conciliation officer must be obtained before that information is used in court.
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The reason for this is quite straightforward. It is to try to avoid the case reaching the tribunal, to allow the conciliation officer to talk as early as possible and to have as much information as possible, in the hope that the dispute will not need to go before the tribunal. It was felt that if the parties to whom the officer is talking are worried all the time that what they say may be reported verbatim to the court, they will wait until they get to the court and then say what they have to say in front of the members of the tribunal. It was felt that the provision in the clause would make the task of the conciliation officer easier to perform.
The noble Lord, Lord Diamond, asked me about subsection (5), and he expressed some doubt whether it was desirable to involve the conciliation staff in breach of contract of employment cases under Clause 108. I am informed that at the moment, although it is on an informal basis, conciliation does take place on breach of contract of employment cases, most frequently on entitlement to notice and accrued holiday pay on termination of employment. These lend themselves to conciliation, and the staff have had some success in these areas. We think it would be rather anomalous if in future conciliation officers dealing with cases of unfair dismissal were prevented from dealing with breach of contract of employment claims arising out of the same circumstances.
LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY: We are deeply indebted to the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, for the points he has raised under subsection (6) and it does not seem to me that the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, has begun to answer the points raised. I am not a lawyer, but I have been involved in the Convocation of Canterbury, where the whole question of whether anyone under the law of England could be allowed to refuse to give evidence came up time and again on the question of the secrecy of the confessional. The compromise which has been arrived at in practice seems to be one which casts the utmost discredit on both Church and State. Neither of them has faced up to the real problem involved.
The noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, will correct me if I am wrong, but I have always understood that one of the main

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problems in this situation, and in a number of other situations which have arisen with regard to journalists and others, is that it has never been written into the law of England that any evidence can be inadmissible in a court of law. That this should be written into a subsection of a clause in the Industrial Relations Bill seems to me to be totally extraordinary. If I am wrong in my major assumption—and I gather from the gestures of the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, that I am not absolutely wrong—this is a very new departure in the law of England. I would be very interested if we could be told in what other circumstances and what other Statutes such provision is made that communications should be private and not produced to the courts of the country, and whether this particular exception which seems to be here is as grave as it seems to me, and as I think it also seems to the noble Lord. Lord Stow Hill. I think we are entitled to a very serious answer on this point.
LORD WINDLESHAM: One might think from listening to this discussion that we are debating subsection (5). There was an Amendment on the Marshalled List to leave out subsection (5). The noble Lord did not move an Amendment on subsection (5), though the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, referred to the substance of it; but instead he asked a number of questions about subsection (6). I gave what I believe to be a perfectly common-sense answer—that it will make the task of the conciliation officer easier. If the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, feels that there is a great issue of principle here, I should need notice of it. I take his point: I think we should look into this carefully and tell him in a little detail what the position is. But I think he will appreciate that it is a little difficult to do that when there has been nothing at all about this subsection on the Marshalled List, although there was a previous one in the Amendment which has been withdrawn.
LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY: I entirely take the point put by the noble Lord that it is a little difficult for him, particularly in the absence of the noble and learned Lord Chancellor, but I put to him that although he is, in my view, absolutely right in saying that this is absolute common sense—and I would
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entirely agree with him on that—I still believe that it is a completely new departure in the whole of the law of England, as I have understood it, and that therefore we are entitled to an explanation of it whether or not we have given notice—not at this particular moment, but at some fairly near moment in the course of the Committee stage of this Bill.
LORD DIAMOND: May I say one word to the noble Lord, because I am sure he was speaking out of his knowledge of precedents of your Lordships' House of which I am ignorant. But if he were to say to me, in relation to a question I raised without notice on the Question, That the clause stand part, which is in plain English and which raises a totally new issue, that he was not prepared to deal with it because I had not given him notice that I wanted to raise it, then I should regard that as one of the major differences—and expected differences—between the two Houses. That is putting it extremely bluntly. I have already indicated that an Opposition is unable to do its job properly if, when towards the end of the Committee stage, the Government have not yet disclosed their mind with regard to issues raised in the Bill so that an Opposition can point its required Amendments precisely and with polish at the Report stage. The noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, is as usual generous and chivalrous to a degree. I regret that I do not rise to his heights of chivalry or generosity.
LORD WINDLESHAM: The noble Lord may not rise to Lord Beaumont's heights, but I think he is a little harsh in his remarks. I have not refused to give an explanation: I gave quite a full explanation of what I am informed is the purpose of this clause. If I may say so, it seemed to me rather a good explanation of the basis of conciliation and how it will work. The noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, feels that there is a new departure in the Common Law. I am just doubtful when I hear these words in Committee—"a new departure in the Common Law". I think he will find very similar words in a Statute very close to my heart, the Race Relations Act 1968, Section 24. So I do not think it can be a completely new departure. However, I take the noble Lord's point. I

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think this is something that we should look at. I will certainly do that and will communicate the results to him and to other noble Lords.
Clause 142 agreed to.
Clause 143 [Effect of strike notice ]:
11.25 p.m.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 282C:
Page 104. line 33, at the beginning insert (" Neither )".
The noble Lord said: In moving this Amendment it might be convenient to discuss at the same time Amendments Nos. 282D, 282E, 282F and 282G; they all deal with the same point. It is an important point, but it is quite straightforward and I can put it shortly. This clause gives, I think for the first time in a Statute, some definition, although a bit of a backhanded one, of the right to strike. It is excessively limited, and we seek to widen it by the plain and simple words of the Amendment. We hope that the Government will share our view. I beg to move.
LORD WINDLESHAM: I am afraid that this is not a straightforward clause, and the Amendments which have been tabled, for reasons that I will explain, will not make it any better: indeed, they would have the effect of adding confusion. I think I am right in saying that these Amendments are the same as those which were moved in another place, but not debated, before the new subsections (2), (3), (4) and (6) were inserted by the Government. The drafting is defective, because it confuses the effect of giving notice to strike with the effect of actually going on strike. These are two different concepts. If noble Lords look at Clause 143, on page 104, they will see that they are separated. The first one is in subsection (1), and the second in subsection (2). We believe that this is much clearer than trying to wrap up in one single section a concept that is already none too straightforward. Perhaps I should therefore explain what this clause is all about.
The purpose of subsection (1) is merely to set out the legal effect of giving due notice, which is defined in subsection (5), of intention to take part in a strike; that is, that such notice, unless expressly
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provided otherwise, shall not be construed as a notice to terminate a contract of employment or of repudiation of that contract. This arises out of the decision of the Court of Appeal in the well-known case of Morgan v. Fry. The Master of the Rolls in that case said that a notice to strike could not be unlawful in circumstances where a similar notice to terminate a contract would be lawful.
The noble Lord in moving this Amendment has spoken to the other Amendments, and perhaps I should comment briefly on them. Amendments Nos. 282C and 282D merely seek to do in subsection (1) what is already contained in subsection (2). That the approach advocated by the Amendment is not workable is shown by the fact that a strike may or may not be a breach of contract, but it cannot possibly be a notice to terminate a contract, as the wording of Amendment No. 282D implies. That is why subsection (1) of the clause deals purely with the effect of giving due notice of intention to strike, while subsection (2) deals separately with the effect of going on strike, after due notice has been given, by removing the words "not, unless it otherwise expressly provides".
Amendment No. 282E would establish that a due notice to strike can never be construed as a notice to terminate a contract or as a repudiation of the contract. This would apply even if the notice stated explicitly, "We give you due notice to terminate our contracts by going on strike" or, "We give you due notice that we intend to repudiate our contracts by going on strike". While it is true that this is not the usual intention of people going on strike, in the occasional instance where it is the purpose there seems no reason why this clause should over-rule it.
Amendments Nos. 282F and 282G would also be out of place in subsection (1). There cannot be a breach of contract as a result of a notice of intention to take part in a strike although there may be repudiation. The proper place for references to breaches of contract is in subsection (2), dealing with the situation when an employee takes part in a strike. Noble Lords will see that breaches of contract are referred to in subsection (2).Subsection (2) along with subsections (3), (4) and (6). was added in another place after the Amendments were

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tabled, and it is understandable that the Amendments do not fit the clause as it has been re-drafted. I hope with that explanation noble Lords will see what this particular clause is concerned with, and how it takes into account the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Morgan v. Fry.
11.33 p.m.
LORD DIAMOND: I am grateful for what the noble Lord has said. I should like to seek further clarification at this stage and then I will have it on the Record, consider it carefully and take advice about it. I am seeking a very clear statement by the Government that the Bill means, and is intended to mean (or it has to be altered in order to mean) that a notice to strike by itself (not in-including, as the noble Lord read out in his examples, a notice to strike and terminate the contract, but a pure notice to strike) does not mean in any case a breach of that contract. If the noble Lord can say that in those simple terms I shall be grateful.
LORD WINDLESHAM: What I can say in simple terms is that a notice to strike cannot be a breach of contract. The act of going on strike can be a breach of contract, but not giving notice. In subsection (2) the Bill says that where somebody, having given due notice of their intention to strike, actually comes out on strike no action can then be taken against him for breach of contract or any proceedings in tort, or under Clause 5 of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1875, or under Clause 92 of this Act.
LORD DIAMOND: I am grateful for that assurance. What I further understand from what the noble Lord is saying is that the act of striking cannot be a breach of contract leading to these proceedings unless it was an express term in the contract which is, I take it, what Clause 143(3) means.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD HAILSHAM OF ST. MARYLEBONE): After due notice.
LORD WINDLESHAM: After due notice.
LORD DIAMOND: Unless it was a breach of an express term of the con-
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tract without giving due notice; and if it is without giving due notice then the act of striking can be a breach of that contract, but not otherwise?
LORD WINDLESHAM: The whole of Clause 143 refers to where due notice has been given, not otherwise. Subsection (3) is a little stiffer. It says that in certain contracts there is an obligation to do more than give due notice. There may be certain procedural steps to be gone through. Furthermore, there may be a no-strike clause for a period of, say, two years. Therefore there may be additional requirements beyond giving notice, and that is what subsection (3) refers to.
LORD DIAMOND: I repeat my gratitude to the noble Lord. I shall consider carefully what he has said. I seek leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (LORD HENLEY): Before I call Amendment No. 282P, I should draw your Lordships' attention to the fact that if this Amendment is agreed to I cannot call Amendment No. 282A.
11.36 p.m.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 282P:
Page 105, line 7 leave out subsection (3).
The noble Lord said: I move Amendment No. 282P for the sake of probing and getting further information on the important aspect which the noble Lord just referred to. I do not think any Member of your Lordships' Committee would doubt that he was dealing with a very important issue indeed. It is one which has, I am informed, not previously been given statutory effect or description. What the noble Lord has just said was that this is a stiffer provision under subsection (3), and I understood exactly what he was referring to. What I now wish to raise is the question where a collective agreement is an "agreement" in inverted commas; that is to say, the new type of agreement which the Government have created whereby one is deemed to have agreed to something which one totally disagrees with. That is, where an agreement is imposed on one, which can happen under previous clauses of the Bill, and it is deemed to be an agreement. In those circumstances, could it arise that

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such an agreement included a term of the contract referring to a period of service without striking, so as to make the act of striking a breach of that agreement?
LORD WINDLESHAM: The whole of this clause refers only to contracts of employment; that is, the individual relationship between the employer and the employee. It does not affect collective agreements as such. Therefore, any provision which has been negotiated in a collective agreement or any Clause 39 order which is an enforceable contract, has to he taken in, as it normally would be I think, to the individual contract between the employer and the employee. So this clause can come into effect only when there is a contractual relationship between the employer and the employee. On the Government Amendment—that is, the next Amendment—I shall have a little more to say about this matter, because we are proposing to remove the words in parenthesis from subsection (3) for a reason which I can explain.
LORD DIAMOND: In the hope that what we are about to hear will be welcome or helpful news, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD WINDLESHAM LORD WINDLESHAM moved Amendment No. 282A:
Page 105, line 10, leave out from (" agreement") to ("excluding") in line 12.
The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 282A in the name of my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn. The substance of Clause 143 is not altered by this Amendment. The clause provides that due notice to take part in a strike is not to be taken as notice to terminate or repudiate the contract of employment, as I have explained. Subsection (3), to which this Amendment relates, withholds protection afforded by subsection (2) if the strike action is in breach of a no-strike clause incorporated in an individual contract of employment, including one incorporated by a legally enforceable contract so constituted by a Clause 39 Order. This Amendment is consequential on the Government Amendment No. 287B, which provides for the introduction of a new clause after Clause 157, which defines "collective agreement" and "procedure agreement". Subsection (3) of the new clause provides that wherever "collective agreement" occurs in the Bill it will be taken to include any provisions
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which are regarded as a legally enforceable contract by reason of an order under Clause 39. The separate reference to such contracts which is at present in addition to the reference to "collective agreement" in subsection (3) of Clause 143 will thus become unnecessary.
The Committee will recall that the Government are moving the definition of "collective agreement" out of Clause 32, where it is at the moment, into the definitions part of the Bill because some people found the original location in Clause 32 confusing and difficult to find. So that is the reason for removing the reference in this part of the clause under discussion. I beg to move.
LORD DIAMOND: If I have understood the noble Lord right it is not welcome news at all; it is merely removing what would be otherwise redundant. It has been said elsewhere, so there is no need to say it here, and certainly there is no need to say it twice. Redundant, otiose or supererogatory: in none of those three cases is it welcome news. What the noble Lord is saying is what I feared was the effect of this subsection; namely, that an "agreement" (in inverted commas)—meaning an arrangement imposed upon you—can include (I shall be delighted if the noble Lord will tell me I am wrong) a provision, under which a no-strike clause is involved, as a result of which it is a breach of that contract to strike. What I am concerned with is getting a clear statement from the Government of the limitations on the freedom to strike. It is a very important issue and one wants to know exactly what the Bill has to say and what the Government wish it to mean. Am I right in my construction of what the position will be, arising out of this Amendment?
LORD WINDLESHAM: No, I do not think this alters the position at all. If we go back to the earlier part of the Bill we recall that the imposed procedure is at the end of a very long road. The words, I think, are "non-existent or defective procedure agreement", and various steps, including conciliation, that we have just been discussing, have to be gone through. The C.I.R. are then asked to come up with a proposed agreement to which they hope that the parties will agree. if the parties do not agree, the C.I.R. make their recommendation to the Court, and the Court can impose that

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on the parties as a legally enforceable agreement.
As I was saying earlier, if the terms of that agreement were then taken into the contract of employment between the individual employee and the individual employer, they might well have the effect that the noble Lord says. It would depend upon whether or not the C.I.R. had recommended that a term of this sort was in their view necessary. If they did, and if it was then taken into the individual contract of employment, as one would assume it would be, it would then have the effect that the noble Lord has referred to in subsection (3). But that situation is not altered by the Amendment that. I have moved.
LORD DIAMOND: I am very grateful to the noble Lord, because the position is now quite clear: it is not altered by the Amendment. I raise it on this Amendment, and. I did not raise it earlier, as I did not know what the noble Lord was going to say on this Amendment. What is absolutely clear is that the right to strike can be limited by an arrangement imposed upon a body of workers which is euphemistically called an agreement. That is what the noble Lord has just said.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am not sure this is quite right. Perhaps I am talking out of turn, but I think the difficulty lies in the difference between the two phrases "collective agreement" and "procedure agreement". I find it more convenient to look at the text as printed because it happens to be to my hand. A collective agreement is one of two things: it means an agreement which is either an agreement prescribing, wholly or in part, terms and conditions of employment, or a procedure agreement, or both. Under Clause 35 the Secretary of State's powers, which set in train the particular course of events which the noble Lord is referring to, relates to procedure agreements and not to collective agreements as such. The outcome of it therefore remains a procedure agreement, and in order to look at what can be in a procedure agreement one looks at the definition clause. I am not quite persuaded— I will see that this is considered—that the noble Lord has not put more into the Bill than is intended to be there, or is there, because the sequence of events
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prescribed in Clause 35 is, as I understand it, limited to defective or unobserved procedure agreements and not to collective agreements as such.
LORD DIAMOND: I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord because he is helping us to do our job of finding out what is in the Bill and in the mind of the Government. I am not at all surprised to be told that a procedure agreement which can be imposed upon one cannot, in the nature of things, include a term of employment such as I am complaining about.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I see the point.
LORD DIAMOND: But the noble Lord. Lord Windlesham, used words which seemed to me to say it could. The noble Lord may have misled himself, or misled me, or may have been quite right, but certainly what he said in his last speech but one, as I understood it, was that it could in certain circumstances if the Court thought right and appropriate. The agreement which would then be subsumed into a collective agreement could include, for example, a term of no strike for three years, under which circumstances a worker would have imposed upon him a severe limitation on his right to strike by an arrangement which, so far as he was concerned, was no agreement but was something imposed. I do not want to pursue it any further unless the noble and learned Lord wants to say anything. I am grateful for what has been said, and I would like to read about it in Hansard and come back to it at a later stage.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I intervened, possibly wrongly because I think my noble friend may have been better acquainted with this than I am, but my understanding of it was that a collective agreement can contain terms of employment as such. A procedure agreement does not; it is confined to the definition clause which is contained in Amendment No. 287B:

"(a) machinery for consultation with regard to, or for the settlement by negotiation or arbitration of, terms and conditions of employment;

(b) machinery for consultation with regard to, or for the settlement by negotiation or arbitration of, other questions arising between an employer or group of employers and one or more workers or organisations of workers;

(c) negotiating rights; "

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I do not think this is altogether easy, and this is why I am not being dogmatic. As I read that, I understand a procedural agreement as excluding the kind of term in which the noble Lord, in the questions that he is putting, is particularly interested. If he looks back at Clause 35, he will see that the sequence of events which the Secretary of State sets in train, and which is ultimately sanctioned by an order of the Court, relates to a defective or unobserved procedural agreement and not to a defective or unobserved collective agreement. Having said that, I would rather look at it again in order that I may be able to retract if I am wrong. I think that the noble Lord has got my point, and I think I have got his.
11.51 p.m.
LORD GARDINER: It is probably too late at night. There was a time when I thought I understood what the Bill was saying. The position at the moment is that trade unions continually enter into agreements on behalf of their members. Indeed, that is one of their main tasks. At the moment, no trade union, in the eye of the law, has any power to do anything of the kind. That is right, is it not? It has always been held by our courts that no agreement made by a trade union on behalf of its members is binding on its members. The reason is a very simple one. If you want to know whether something a limited company has done is infra vires or ultra vires, you look at its articles of association; and the courts have always said that if you want to know whether what a trade union has done is intra vires or ultra vires you look at its rules. I speak with deference to those who know a great deal more about this than I do. I have seen a great many rules of trade unions, and I have never seen rules of a trade union which gave them any authority to enter into any agreement binding on their members.
There was a case which came before the Court of Appeal which is rather typical of everything we are discussing here. It was a case of an employer who decided to follow up his legal rights, and it shows the difficulty you get into when you try to bring the law into these matters. It was a very simple case in which the miners had been promised during the war that if they did a six-day week during the war they would do a five-day week after the war, and so the
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members of the N.U.M.W. did. But the deputies, the safety men, who gave orders to the miners, being a small union, got a rather poor agreement. The miners were told that they need not work on Saturdays, but if they did they would get overtime. They said that was all right. So far as the deputies were concerned, they were told that they had to work on Saturdays; and that they would work at an inclusive flat rate; and they got no overtime at all. They put up with it for 15 years, and then the deputies in a pit in Derbyshire said, We are fed up, and we refuse to work on Saturdays any more.". There were 84 of them. Thereupon the National Coal Board took out 84 High Court writs, and sued them for damages for the loss of the profit they would have made on Saturdays, because without the safety men the whole pit could not work.
Sensibly, both the N.U.M.W. and the National Coal Board agreed to take one test action at Derby Assizes. There were many issues, but one of the issues was whether the agreement made by the Union was binding on the man who was chosen as a test case, because he voted against it at his branch meeting. The Court of Appeal found that it had never been held that any trade union could make an agreement binding on its members, and they declined to do so. The judge at Derby had found for the National Coal Board and awarded damages, which I think were something just over £100. The Court of Appeal, while upholding the judgment, said the measure of damage was wrong, and the National Coal Board on the evidence could have found a deputy, so they reduced the damages to the cost of a deputy for a day, which was £2 18s. 3d. Whether the miner ever paid his £2 18s. 3d., I do not know. The union no doubt paid the costs. I never heard any more of the other 83 actions. That shows what happens when people try to decide industrial disputes by law. I draw attention to it here only because the Court of Appeal were clear that the trade union had no power to make an agreement.
If I understand Clause 33 rightly, its effect is that a trade union, which so far in the history of our law has had no power to make a contract on behalf of its members, is to be presumed when

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it makes a procedure agreement irrevocably and conclusively to have the authority of somebody to make a contract to bind him, when in fact it does not have that authority. Now when we come towards the close it appears that if there is a procedure agreement, and it is a term of that procedure agreement that there shall be no strike for two years, or no strike until the procedure agreement has gone through, that also is to be incorporated into a contract which will bind the members.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: With respect, that is not what I said. It is the opposite of what I said, and I think it is also the opposite of the fact. I think the noble and learned Lord is really blinding himself with science. If he looks at the proposed definition on page 9 of the Marshalled List, he will see the definition of "collective agreement which is approximately the same as it was in the old Clause 32. It is of course an essential part of that definition that, in addition to being an agreement between a trade union and an employer or an employers' association, collective agreement must be prescribing
" the terms and conditions of employment of workers of one or more descriptions, or an agreement or arrangement relating to one or more of the matters specified in subsection (5)",
which refers to a procedure agreement. In other words, it really means the same as the old definition in Clause 32. So I was right in saying that a collective agreement can be one of two kinds. Either it can be in relation to the terms and conditions of employment, or it can be a procedure agreement.
Taking the first case first, I will assume for this purpose that the noble and learned Lord was entirely right when he said that, if all that happens is that a union agrees with an employer that the rate of wages shall go up to £10 a week, that is not at that stage an agreement of employment between the employer and his individual workmen. If, thereafter, that agreement is kept and wages are raised to £10 a week, instead of remaining at £5 a week, to use ridiculous figures, and a workman works at that different rate, then obviously a new contract of employment on those terms is made. So far so good. This must be
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plain, and this is the same with hours and other conditions of work.
On the other tack, if you look at the definition of "procedure agreement", your Lordships will see that it does not relate to that sort of case at all. It relates to the machinery for negotiation between the employers and the union, or between the association of employers and the association of unions; and that, in the nature of things, is not something which is imported into the individual contract of employment, because the individual workman does not necessarily work on those terms. Although I cannot immediately point to the clause in the Bill, it fits in with that Part of the Bill which points out that, when a procedure agreement which will be binding if this Bill goes through is made, whether it is made by negotiation between the parties or is imposed by an order of the Court, then all that the union is bound to do is to do its best to see that its members perform the agreement. But it is not at that stage, and cannot be in the nature of things, as I have so far said it—and it was at that point that I said I hoped I would be given a chance to correct myself if I turned out to be wrong—a term of the individual workman's contract of employment.
I hope that I have made my point plain. As I say, I am not always sure that I am right, but I believe myself to be right. I think I have got the point which is made on the other side, and I hope that now the other side have got the point I was trying to make to them. If either of us turns out to be wrong, perhaps we shall be told as these pieces of paper pass to and fro whether what I have been saying is nonsense or not.
12.1 a.m.
LORD STOW HILL: I really do not want to prolong this fascinating discussion except for one purpose. Would the noble and learned Lord be so good, when considering the particular question which has been raised, to consider with it this further point? If I am right in the suggestion I make, it may be that the Government do not achieve their purpose. If you give due notice that you are going to take part in a strike, you do not by so doing commit a breach of contract. That is subject, as we have been saying, to subsection (3), which says that if there is a

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term in your contract which either expressly or impliedly says you are not to strike, then you do commit a breach of contract. My noble friend Lord Diamond pressed the noble Lord, Lord Wind le-sham, to say whether he was saying that subsection (3) related only to an express term. The noble Lord did not say "Yes", and I should have thought he could not have said"Yes" because there is no limitation to an express term that can be an implied term.
I can put quite shortly to the noble and learned Lord the point that I should like him to consider. It is that if you engage anybody to work for you for, say, a month, it is an implied term that he will work, not that he will strike. That is the short point. If that is so, when he strikes in that situation does he not automatically conflict with an implied term of that contract? As I said, I do not want to prolong this discussion, but I should be grateful if the noble and learned Lord would consider that point. If I am right it means that the Government may not have achieved their purpose by the language they have used in subsection (3), and I feel sure the Government will be ready to change it.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Obviously, that is basically a question of drafting. It may be that the drafting is imperfect, and I will see that the point is considered. I think that is all I can say about that. I think it is not a good point, but I need not go in detail into why because ultimately it is simply a question of using the right words.
LORD STOW HILL: I quite agree, and I am much obliged for what the noble and learned Lord has said.
LORD DIAMOND: May I add just this? I hope that the noble and learned Lord will find it convenient to give this matter fairly early consideration so that he can write to me as soon as possible having regard to the rapid progress of the Bill.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I think the best course would be for either myself or my noble friend who started this discussion to write to the noble Lord as soon as we get a proper view as to the extent to which, if at all, I am right.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 282Q:
Page 105, line 14, leave out subsection (4).
The noble Lord said: Subsection (4) requires a very full explanation. It says:
" Nothing in subsection (2)"—
which was, as I might call it, the relieving subsection—
" shall be taken to exclude or restrict any right which an employer would have apart from that subsection to dismiss (with or without notice) an employee who takes part in a strike."
It seems to me that this is a very plain subsection, and makes the matter utterly unacceptable. It gives the employer a new right, which he previously did not have; and far from the clause continuing on what I thought was to be its happy course of giving statutory form to the workers' right to strike, it proceeds first of all to limit their right to strike in a number of ways—and possibly the way we have just been discussing in addition —and then proceeds to reiterate the employer's right and to give him yet a new right. It does not even say that nothing shall restrict his right to give notice to terminate an employment. But it gives him a right to dismiss (or does not restrict any right he has to dismiss) an employee who takes part in a strike. Before getting over-heated, may I ask the noble Lord to be good enough to tell us what this subsection means; then I will tell him what I think of what he has told us.
LORD W1NDLESHAM: I will certainly do that because I think the noble Lord has approached this whole clause with a misconception. He spoke earlier, and again just now, in terms that suggest he thinks the earlier subsections of the clause in some way give statutory recognition of the right to strike. That is not so. Subsection (1), which is the substantial subsection of the clause, is concerned with the effect of the strike notice. As I mentioned there is a decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Morgan v. Fry that a notice to strike could not be unlawful in circumstances where a similar notice to terminate the contract would be lawful; and that is what Clause 1 states. In another place these additional subsections were added to spell out what happens when somebody acts on subsection (1); and subsection (2) describes what happens

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when somebody actually goes on strike. Subsection (3) refers to these additional terms and subsection (4) refers to the right of the employer to dismiss.
Let us now dwell on this point. Subsection (4) states that nothing in this clause over-ride,; the employer's rights in relation to dismissal which are contained in Part II of the Bill (in Clause 24) and elsewhere. We need to distinguish between the legal liability of an employee who goes on strike as regards civil action of the type mentioned in subsection (2) and the question of dismissals. The two are separate, and have to be kept separate in our minds if we are not to become confused. Where an employee has given due notice of his intention to take part in a strike and subsequently does so, he is then protected as regards proceedings for breach of contract and a number of other respects by subsection (2). But by withdrawing his labour, he is in effect refusing to fulfil his obligations under his contract. Thus, as a corollary to the right of the employee to say he refuses to work, we have the right of the employer to terminate his employment. This is the present situation. It is not affected by the Bill.
I should emphasise that subsection (4) does not assert that in each and every strike situation an employer necessarily has the right to dismiss. The legal immunity established by subsection (2) of this clause must not be presumed to over-ride any right the employer may have to dismiss a striker in a particular situation. The Committee earlier considered, on Clause 24, what would amount to an unfair dismissal in connection with a strike. What this subsection does is to make clear the underlying principles as regards dismissal; what constitutes unfair dismissal is not affected by this clause of the Bill.
12.10 a.m.
LORD DIAMOND: I take it that what the noble Lord was saying in his last two sentences meant that nothing said earlier in the Bill about the employees' rights in relation to unfair dismissal is affected by subsection (4) of this clause. That being so, I will do what I said I would do on previous occasions, and consider carefully what the noble Lord has said, and ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment. by leave, withdrawn.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 282H:
Page 105, line 19, leave out from ("than") to end of line 21 and insert ("one week").
The noble Lord said: I beg to move this Amendment to line 19 which is in effect to substitute a notice period of one week. Whether the Bill as it stands is fair or not could be a matter of opinion, but whether or not it is workable cannot be a matter of opinion. As it stands, it is totally unworkable. It says in line 19: that
" due notice ', in relation to an employee, means notice of a duration not less than that which…he would be required to give to terminate his contract of employment."
Take a normal factory where there are different categories of employees with different terms of employment and different terms of due notice, and consider how you are to have a strike. First you have to find out from every employee exactly what are the terms of employment, so as to find the person with the longest notice. That is virtually impossible. Then you have to give notice in respect of people whom you can reasonably expect to be entitled to one week's notice. Then you have to give notice to a person who may have entered into a contract under which he has agreed not to strike for three years; and so you have to give three years' notice in respect of the whole factory. It may not be quite so far-fetched as that, but there would be totally different periods.
So you would be in an impossible position, (a) to find out, (b) to give effect, and (c) to hold the position. Because what would happen would be that those with the shortest notice would press on those with longer notice that the strike should take place after giving the minimum notice in respect of the categories of employees with the shortest term of notice. It would be an impossibly difficult situation. The industrial atmosphere would be poisoned and the whole thing would be totally unsatisfactory. Therefore it is proposed that there should be a workable and sensible period, which seems to be one week. I should have thought that to give notice for one week was reasonable, and that is why I am moving this Amendment.
EARL FERRERS: Clause 143 provides what we consider to be reasonable protection to employees who go on strike

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after having given due notice of their intention to do so. Under the clause employees would not be liable for civil or criminal proceedings in respect of breach of contract. Nor would the organiser of the strike merit any liability under Clause 92. Subsection (5), to which the Amendment relates, imposes what we believe to be a reasonable qualification, that is that the "due notice" to be given of an intention to participate in strike action should not be less than that required to terminate a person's contract of employment.
The Amendment seeks to ensure that in all cases this should be a week. The Bill itself provides in Clause 17, by amending Section 1 of the Contracts of Employment Act 1963, that the minimum period of notice required to be given by an employee who has been continuously employed for more than 13 weeks should be at least one week. Therefore, in subsection (5) of this clause due notice has been defined as not less than the notice required to terminate the contract of employment. The great majority of employees anyway will only need to give due notice of a week under the provisions of the Bill. In that respect, therefore, I would suggest to the noble Lord that the Amendment is unnecessary. But for the employees who have less than 13 weeks' employment the Amendment would in fact seem to be restrictive, since it applies a minimum statutory period of due notice where at the moment none exists for the purposes of this clause.
We think it right that the clause as a whole should relate to the requirements of the employee's contract of employment. Subsection (2) refers to due notice which is given by or on behalf of an employee, and due notice should therefore in our view relate to that notice which an employee must give to satisfy the terms of his own contract of employment, whether this is applied by statutory enactment or whether it results from a voluntary agreement, and regardless of whether this may be for a greater or lesser period of notice than is envisaged by the Amendment. We believe it is correct and fair in this case that the terms of a strike notice should be in the same terms as those applying in contracts of employment.
12.16 a.m.
LORD DIAMOND: I am most grateful to the noble Earl for having said what is perfectly plain to everybody and adds nothing to the argument at all. He has not dealt with the point at all. Of course, I recognise that if a man is engaged for more than 13 weeks, he is entitled to a week's notice. What I am trying to put to your Lordships is that we are not talking airy-fairy stuff, but about a factory of people going on strike, and we cannot have individuals giving strike notices which work out at different periods. That is not a strike. If the Government say that that is the way it must happen, they are restricting by another way the right to strike. If that is what the Government want, let them say so. In a strike, the workers have to walk out together. It is not a case of the workers on one bench walking out in one week and those working on a second bench not walking out until a week after. That is not a strike. There has to be the same period of notice for all concerned. The question is. what that period shall be. The Amendment suggests the very reasonable period of one week.
The noble Earl is quite right in saying that those working for less than thirteen weeks are presumed, in the absence of an agreement, to give less than a week's notice. Some people would have to give only one day's notice of a strike. No doubt the vast majority would have to give a week's notice; but there are others who would have to give much longer periods, up to a very considerable time indeed. That makes an impossible situation, so the noble Lord must see our point that unless all can walk out on one date the Government are effectively preventing a strike from taking place, at all events on the basis of the benefits which attach to strikes where due notice has been given. Unless the noble Lord meets that point, he is not dealing with the Amendment at all. If he wants to suggest a different period, say three days instead of a week, well and good; but we must have one period for all.
12.20 a.m.
EARL FERRERS: I wonder whether the noble Lord is under a misapprehension—no doubt it is my fault if he is. He said that if this subsection stands as it does at present, the Government

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are inhibiting the right to strike. That is not so, because the right to strike is clearly laid down in the Bill, and also in Clause 124 it is laid down that nobody is compelled to work against his will in circumstances which he feels to be objectionable. He has, therefore, an absolute and implicit right to strike, and this particular subsection does not alter that at all. What it does is to say that in certain circumstances if a person strikes without due notice he may be caught for breaking his contract.
Let us take the example of a registered trade union and an official of that union who calls a strike, acting on behalf of his union. He may call a strike, and his people may come out on strike, irrespective of their contract of employment; and that is one of the benefits of registration, because if you are registered you can call your men out on strike and you cannot be sued for an unfair industrial practice. The case which the noble Lord may have in mind is that of an unregistered trade union. In many respects, this would be exemplified by a "wildcat" strike. The noble Lord shakes his head, but in fact if people who are not members of a registered trade union, and are not prepared to accept the protection which is given under this Bill, are prepared to call people out on strike, then under this clause they may find themselves held by their employers to be liable for breach of contract. But this does not inhibit their right to strike: all it means is that if they are a registered trade union they cannot even be sued for breach of contract.
LORD DIAMOND: The noble Earl is not advancing the argument at all. There is no point in pursuing it. The present position is that a worker could be sued for breach of contract for striking without having given notice corresponding to the term of his contract; but it never happens, as far as I know—never. The proposal in the Bill means that an unregistered union would effectively be denied the right to strike—that is the right to strike without incurring the damages resulting from a breach of contract, which would not apply to a registered union, because there is no period necessarily which corresponds to the due notice for all the individual workers in a factory and it would not be possible
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to bring all the workers out at one and the same time. That is no strike
That is the position, as I understand it. I do no want to delay the Committee by causing unnecessary walking through the Division Lobbies—indeed, I see that noble Lords opposite are not very numerous: I have no eyes in the back of my head. However, I want to make it perfectly clear that I regard this as a very serious matter, and were the hour a little earlier I should press the matter further.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Perhaps I may be allowed to say this to the noble Lord. What he says is completely fallacious, because he overlooks that in subsection (5) which he is attacking, as it stands, the notice must be not less than that which is the minimum notice for each employee. He probably has not much more experience of this matter than I have. The great majority of employees have relatively short notices. If he in fact has to make a simple case, two classes of employees who want to strike, one on a fortnight's notice and one on a week's notice, it is perfectly simple that they all give a fortnight's notice, and that is all right. But to pretend that that is to deny them the right to strike is absolute rubbish.
On Question, Amendment negatived.
12.26 a.m.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND: moved Amendment No. 282J:
Page 105, line 21, at end insert—
(" ( ) Where due notice has been given by an employee of his intention to take part in a strike he shall have a right to strike and his action shall not he regarded as an unfair industrial practice.")
The noble Lord said: This Amendment seeks an explicit declaration it may be implicit in the Bill; I do not know—that a strike after due notice is not caught elsewhere in the Bill as an unfair industrial practice. That is the short point. I beg to move.
EARL FERRERS: If I understand the noble Lord correctly, he wishes for a clear undertaking that anyone who takes part in a strike will not be guilty of an unfair industrial practice. If that is so, I can give the noble Lord that assurance, because the question of an unfair industrial practice in relation to participation in a strike by an individual does not

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arise, as all unfair industrial practices refer to the inducement of a strike and do not refer to the practice of an individual taking part in a strike. I hope that with that the noble Lord will be satisfied.
LORD DIAMOND: I am grateful to the noble Earl, and would ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
On Question, Whether Clause 143, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD DIAMOND: I do not wish to delay your Lordships, but merely to underline the fact, that must be obvious, that we are very unhappy about this clause. We shall read carefully what has been said, and particularly carefully what the noble and learned Lord is going to write to some of us, and will seek to put the matter into much better perspective on the Report stage.
Clause 143, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 144 [Race Relations Act 1968]:
On Question, Whether Clause 144 shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD BROCKWAY: I wish to ask certain questions on this clause before we pass it. I hope I summarise the clause correctly in this way. If a complaint is made to the Secretary of State, or the Race Relations Board or one of its conciliation committees, which has been, or could have been, presented to an industrial tribunal, if it goes to such a tribunal and the tribunal finds that there has been an unfair industrial practice on the ground, it may be among others, that the unfair practice was taken because of colour, race, or ethnic origin, the matter may then be referred to the Race Relations Board. It can only be referred in those circumstances. As a consequence of this clause, there is a confusion that two separate authorities are given the duty of deciding whether race discrimination has taken place. We have the Race Relations Board, and its conciliation committees, which have been established for this particular purpose, and which now have long experience; and it has been shown, particularly in the case of the conciliation committees with a personnel which is accustomed to this problem, that they have served a very useful purpose.
Now it is suggested that an industrial tribunal should intervene in the circumstances which I have described, and that a complaint would go to that tribunal rather than to the Race Relations Board or the committees of conciliation. I appreciate that other elements than racial discrimination may be one of the factors when a complaint of this kind is made. May I ask Her Majesty's Government to consider the suggestion that if racial discrimination is the only ground of complaint it should go directly to the Race Relations Board, or one of its conciliation committees, and that if there are other grounds the industrial tribunal concerned should ask the Race Relations Board to consider the complaint, and convey its decision to the industrial tribunal before the tribunal comes to a conclusion?
There is also the danger of the delay which appears to be involved in this procedure. A complaint must first go to the industrial tribunal and only if the complaint is not dismissed, or if it is found to have good grounds then it will proceed to the Race Relations Board. The time of that procedure must be long. This is recognised in subsection (3), which extends the time within which anything may be done under the Industrial Relations Act. It is quite clear that the delay of the complaint may be for a very considerable period indeed. I want to submit, first, that this may cause grievous frustration; but secondly, and more important, a serious injustice. Frustration by the procedure, by the delay, may be particularly felt by Commonwealth immigrants who are unfamiliar with our administration, and bewilderment may be caused among them. It may also be severely unjust. A worker may be demoted or dismissed. A man may be demoted if he proves his case before the industrial tribunal. Is there any provision by which he should not only be reinstated, but be given compensation for the period when he had been demoted wrongly? If he is dismissed, is he to receive compensation and be given the opportunity of reinstatement? I ask Her Majesty's Government seriously to look at the points which I have raised, and between now and the Report stage to consider whether this clause should not be reworded and amended in a way which can deal with the problems which I have put.
LORD CHAMPION: My noble friend has put some extremely important points in connection with this clause. I want to put a different one. The Consultative Document issued by the Department in connection with this whole Bill said that some of the proposals in this Document overlap with the Race Relations Act 1968 in relation to claims that dismissal by an employer, or discriminatory action by a trade union, whether registered or not, was due to colour, race or ethnic or national origins. Where the remedies to be provided by the Industrial Relations Bill are more generous to the aggrieved individual than those provided by the Race Relations Act, it is intended that the Government's proposals should take the place of the Act. It is proposed, however, that in such cases the Race Relations Act machinery should still be available for securing an assurance of no further acts of discrimination and for dealing with breaches of such assurances.
The only question I wish to ask in this connection—and I am hoping to get a satisfactory answer on the Record—is this. Does this clause completely give effect to paragraph 64 of the Consultative Document? I ask this because I can find nothing in the clause which appears to give effect to the Document's words about more generous remedies when a complaint is treated under this clause. This is a very short point, but I certainly feel that it ought to find its way into the Bill if it is not already there, because clearly the Government's original intention was to be generous in this matter. I think this, too, has some importance to add to those points which have been raised by my noble friend.
12.38 a.m.
LORD WINDLESHAM: I think I can give the noble Lord, Lord Champion, that assurance. When it investigates complaints of discrimination under the 1968 Act, the Race Relations Board attempts not only to find a suitable remedy, where the complaint is upheld, but also to ensure that there will be no further acts of discrimination by the same employer. Neither the industrial tribunal nor the Industrial Court will have powers to obtain an undertaking of no further discrimination on the grounds of race or colour, or ethnic or national origins. So this clause enables the Race Relations Board, where a tribunal or a court up
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holds a complaint and finds that the reasons for the action involve the complainant's race, colour, ethnic or national origin, to entertain a complaint with the limited object of securing a written assurance against any repetition of the act of discrimination, or to bring proceedings under the Race Relations Act where such written assurance has been broken. Therefore, the powers of the Race Relations Board to require the employer to cease to practise will not be overridden by this Part of the Bill.
I want to come back to what the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, said, because I listened with great attention and great sympathy to it—I always would listen in that way to him and to other noble Lords on this subject—and I find myself in the end coming down on exactly the opposite side to him. There is a real issue of the way in which we treat immigrant workers here. A good deal of thought has gone into this matter and I should like to explain our thinking. The object of this clause, as he and the noble Lord, Lord Champion. correctly said, is to avoid overlapping jurisdiction between the Race Relations Board machinery and the new industrial tribunal machinery in respect of complaints of unfair industrial practices. The cases where such overlapping would be most likely to arise in practice are complaints of unfair dismissal, but complaints of unfair treatment in respect of trade union activity are also covered. The clause provides that the Race Relations Act machinery shall not be used if the complainant is eligible to proceed under the new industrial tribunal machinery. If it is decided under the industrial tribunal machinery that racial discrimination is an element in a case of an unfair industrial practice, subsection (2) of this clause provides that the Race Relations Act machinery can be used, as I have just said, to obtain a written assurance from the employer against a repetition.
There are two reasons for this decision for taking the choice whether or not somebody should proceed via the Race Relations Act or what will be the Industrial Relations Act of 1971. The first is that the remedies available under the Industrial Relations Bill are somewhat more generous than those under the Race Relations Act. The noble Lord mentioned compensation; he mentioned re-engagement: he will find that the powers

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in this Bill are greater than in the Race Relations Act. But the second point—and this is the point of principle where I part company with him—is that where minorities in our society can be properly protected under legislation which is of general application to everyone, there is no great advantage to be gained in seeking to treat them as a special case. Public policy must move in this direction. We cannot in the future continue to say that there must be special procedures and special tribunals for minority groups. At the time when the two Race Relations Acts were passed that special protection was needed, but here there is an alternative. If an immigrant worker feels that he has a grievance—and it can only be an unfair industrial practice under the Industrial Relations Bill—and says "I have been unfairly dismissed", and it is on grounds of colour, he can go to the industrial tribunal; he can argue his case in the same way as his mate who is objecting to an unfair industrial practice on some other grounds.
It is for that reason that I feel on grounds of principle that it is very much better to approach this in the way the Government suggest in this Bill, rather than forcing the immigrant worker hack to his own procedure under his own Act, and tell him that that is where he must pursue his remedy, while other members of society pursue theirs in a different way.
LORD BROCKWAY: I appreciate what the noble Lord has said and the spirit in which he has said it. He has not dealt with one point; that is, to decide an issue of racial discrimination requires an extraordinarily sensitive person. They must be people who are selected for that purpose, and the members of the conciliation committees of the Race Relations Board have had experience which adds to their original capacity in this direction, and what I am suggesting is that the members of the industrial tribunal will not necessarily have that quality which is desirable when a person is judging cases of discrimination. It may be dismissal, it may be demotion in the job: they are unfair practices but they are based, if the complaint is on the ground of discrimination, on the fact that the complainant is of a particular colour or a particular race, and that judgment has to be made not by the kind of
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membership which you have in industrial tribunals. Surely it is much better that that judgment should be made by men and women who have been selected for that purpose because of their qualities, and who have had long experience of it.
LORD CHAMPION: I am not quite sure that the noble Lord answered my point. Under the Race Relations Act 1968, Section 22, damages may be awarded to someone appearing before the court, and the court
"…if satisfied that the act was done and was unlawful, may award—

(a) special damages or, in Scotland, damages for any expenses reasonably incurred by him for the purpose of the transaction or activity out of which that act arose; and

(b) such damages as the court thinks just in all the circumstances for loss of opportunity, that is to say, loss of any benefit which that person might reasonably be expected to have had but for that act."

All I was asking at the very outset was to be sure that Clause 144 of the Bill is actually more generous to a person in the position visualised than Section 22 of the Race Relations Act. I want to be sure that the Bill is more generous than the Act to the person who might appear before the tribunal.
LORD WINDLESHAM: I think the noble Lord will find that in practice it will be the same. The Race Relations Act talks about damages and the Bill about compensation, but the principles for estimating compensation and damages—I say this without taking counsel on it—would, I think, be the same. The common law principle behind the estimating of putting a financial sum on what somebody has suffered I would expect to be the same. But the noble Lord has put this detailed question to me and perhaps I should confirm in writing—and also to the noble Lord, Lord Brockway—what the position is. May I say to the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, that we must not overlook, and he certainly would not, the importance of conciliation in this and other fields. The Race Relations Board have been most notable in the way that they have taken a tiny number of cases before the court; they have managed to settle by conciliation in almost every case. In our long discussion on this Bill—we had an Amendment on this point earlier this evening there is great emphasis on conciliation, and the noble

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Lord will know from his own experience that the Department of Employment has a very high record in the conciliation field. These are the people we are talking about who would be engaged in conciliation where complaints have been made, and one would hope that in the majority of cases they would be able to settle the grievance before it ever went to the industrial tribunal.
Clause 144 agreed to.
Clause 145 [Redundancy payments.]:
12.48 a.m.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE moved Amendment No. 282N:
Page 106, line 36, leave out from (" complaint") to ("is") in line 37, and insert (" relating to dismissal").
The noble Baroness said: If it is convenient to the Committee, perhaps we might also discuss, because it covers the same point, Amendment No. 284C which is to Clause 146. The purpose of these two Amendments is akin to similar Amendments which have already been agreed by the Committee to Clauses 102 and 111. What they were designed to do, and what these Amendments are designed to do, is to give the same treatment to complaints about dismissal whether they are under Clause 5 or Clause 20, which is covered by Clause 102, which is referred to in subsection (1) of this clause. At the present time Clause 145 and Clause 146 only covers the provisions of unfair dismissal under Clause 20. Therefore, the first Amendment will ensure that when the Secretary of State is making regulations to deal with overlapping claims for redundancy payment under the Redundancy Payments Act and unfair dismissal complaints under this Bill, he will be able to apply them to dismissal complaints under both Clause 5 and Clause 20.
The second Amendment will enable the Secretary of State to make regulations in connection with the preservation of continuity of employment of a dismissed employee who has been re-engaged following a complaint about dismissal to a tribunal under either Clause 5 or Clause 20. I trust that noble Lords will agree that dismissal complaints arising under these two clauses should receive the same treat-
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ment. I therefore commend these Amendments to the Committee. I beg to move.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
12.51 a.m.
LORD STOW HILL LORD STOW HILL moved Amendment No. 284:
Page 107, line 17, at end insert—
(" (4) No regulations shall be made under this section unless a draft of the regulations has been laid before Parliament and approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.")
The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 284. Its object is to provide that regulations made under Clause 145, which can have the effect of altering an existing statutory provision, should be made only after they have been affirmatively approved by Parliament. I hope that I need not argue this particular provision at length, because a similar Amendment was proposed at an earlier stage of this Bill, I think at Clause 109, and the Government then accepted it in principle as being appropriate. I hope that, with that explanation, the noble Baroness will be able to say that the principle of the Amendment is equally applicable to Clause 145. and that the Government are prepared to accept it.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: I am sure that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stow Hill, will be glad to hear that I am delighted to accept the Amendment, because I think that it does improve the Bill. We are glad that he has been able to put it forward.
LORD STOW HILL: I am grateful to the noble Baroness.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
On Question, Whether Clause 145, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD DIAMOND: I seek only one short explanation. Under subsection (2), any such regulations—the regulations to be made by the Secretary of State—may make such modifications of the Redundancy Payments Act 1965 as the Secretary of State may consider appropriate, including,
" (a) provisions excluding the right to a redundancy payment or equivalent payment,…"
This seems to me to be fairly Draconian, and I wonder whether the noble Baroness could explain what is in the Government's mind.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: I do not think that it is at all Draconian, and I hope the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, will not think so when I try to explain what is in the Government's mind. The protection provided by the Redundancy Payments Act 1965, and that provided by these provisions, are alternative safeguards for the employee. Therefore the employee entitled to compensation under the Redundancy Payments Act should not be entitled to the remedy provided by unfair dismissal provisions, or vice versa. The clause therefore enables the Secretary of State to provide, by regulations, for the recovery of redundancy payments that have been made in respect of a dismissal that is found to be unfair, and where no redundancy payment has been made in respect of an unfair dismissal none should be made. The same provision can be made for the recovery of rebates, which is referred to in the Redundancy Payments Act, in respect of dismissals that are subsequently declared unfair by the tribunal.
I should explain that we feel it would not be right to debar any worker from appealing against unfair dismissal just because he had received a redundancy payment in respect of that dismissal, as it is possible that an employer trying to dismiss unfairly might find it a less costly dismissal if his view of its being redundancy could not be challenged. It might result in a smaller payment to the employee, and the employer would receive a rebate in respect of it from the redundancy fund. It is for these reasons, in order to ensure that you cannot have it both ways under unfair dismissal and under the redundancy payment provisions, that this clause is inserted, and I suggest that it is not Draconian.
LORD DIAMOND: I am always gladly prepared to be persuaded by the noble Baroness, but not immediately. I can well understand that the noble Baroness's principle that you cannot have it both ways is one which would meet with approval, and by, "You cannot have it both ways" I take it that she means that you can have it one way or the other. Therefore, if you are going to get damages for unfair dismissal and you would otherwise be entitled to a large sum by way of redundancy payment, then the amount you get by way
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of compensation should be deducted from the amount you get for redundancy, so that you receive the same amount all over. Perhaps that is in her mind.
But the clause does not prevent the following circumstances from arising; namely, that an employee who is aged 61, and who has been for 40 years in a particular firm and suffers an unfair dismissal, would by way of redundancy payment be entitled to a very substantial sum. Let us suppose that he has been a foreman for a long time and his average wage is very high. Whichever court it is decides that he has been unfairly dismissed and is entitled to compensation, may say, "He is 61 and is not very well now, and could look forward to perhaps two years further engagement." It may assess damages on that basis, so the amount of damages will be very small. Under this clause, as I see it, there is nothing to prevent regulations from being made, the result of which, because the foreman in question has been given compensation for unfair dismissal, is that he loses the whole of his redundancy payment. He might get a very small sum and lose a very large sum. Is that the intention of the Government and, if not, where in this clause is that prevented from happening?
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: It is certainly not the intention of the Government. It is the tribunal which would have to decide and, as the noble Lord knows very well, there are certain very clear regulations laid down about assessment in which age, years of service and weekly pay, for example, are taken into account. That is all assessed. The point of this clause is that in some cases where there has been a dismissal the employee may be in doubt as to whether he has been unfairly dismissed or has become redundant, and he may want to make a claim on both counts. This clause enables the Secretary of State to provide for the tribunal to make an award in respect of one of the claims to the exclusion of the other It is left to the tribunal to do this, and as they have definite criteria—I believe, for instance, that after the age of 41 the multiplier is one and a half times—I think it would be a fair award.
LORD DIAMOND: I think I must press the noble Baroness to say that she will be kind enough to look at these words,

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"such modifications as the Secretary of State may consider appropriate", because the Secretary of State may consider appropriate modifications which the worker in question and which we on this side of the Committee might not consider appropriate, and we do not know what they are at the moment. If it is merely a matter of exchanging one for the other then I can see that that is a possible argument. Whether one agrees or not does not arise immediately, but I can see that it is a possible argument. But any arrangement under which a worker could suffer by these regulations is something which we should probably not agree to, and for which we should certainly want to know the full justification. So although the noble Baroness has explained what is in the Government's mind, I am not happy that the wording of subsection (2) gives effect to it. Therefore, I shall be grateful if the noble Baroness will say that she will consider further whether any variation in the wording is necessary to give effect to the Government's intention.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: I do not want to detain the Committee by constantly speaking, but on the other hand I wish to try to allay the anxieties of the noble Lord, Lord Diamond. He realises that redundancy and unfair dismissal are mutually exclusive. Under Clause 22, for instance, redundancy is a justified reason for dismissal, subject to some qualifications, and we have just accepted on this clause an Amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, that these regulations should be subject to the Affirmative Resolution of the House. Naturally I cannot give the exact and precise details of these regulations now, but they will be debatable and they will be subject to Affirmative Resolution because we have accepted that Amendment. I hope that that will allay the anxieties of the noble Lord.
LORD DIAMOND: Regrettably, notwithstanding the lateness of the hour, the noble Lord's anxieties are not allayed, because, as I. understand the position, if a person is dismissed the remedy which he cannot seek is reinstatement. He may get reinstatement, but he cannot require reinstatement. He can require damages if he is unfairly dismissed, but
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not reinstatement. If I am right about that, it is not the case that these are alternatives, in the sense that, the man having been dismissed and it is found that he is unfairly dismissed, he is therefore reinstated and is entitled to redundancy; his rights are restored in full. That is not the case. If he is dismissed and not reinstated, he may get a sum of money which is much less than he would otherwise have had if it had been dealt with as a simple redundancy. Therefore I think I am not unfair, while having regard to the lateness of the hour, in asking the noble Baroness to consider further whether the words in the clause are such as to permit the Government to carry out their intentions. I recognise that the regulations will be put before the House, but regulations are under the powers of the Bill, or of the Act as it will then be, and I want the way in which a Minister of the present Government or of any future Government acting under this Act should conduct himself with regard to regulations to be made clear, if possible, in the Act. Therefore I want to deal with the matter at source. The noble Baroness is in charge of it, and she is one of the most reasonable Ministers to whom anybody could possibly address an argument. I have addressed my argument to her, and I shall be grateful if she will say that she will be good enough to consider whether the words of subsection (2) are sufficient to give effect to the Government's intention.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: I think that the words are quite sufficient, but I will certainly write to the noble Lord to confirm this. Perhaps—if I could finally allay his anxiety so that he does not have a sleepless night—I should say that the provisions in this particular clause are almost exactly similar to those which were in the previous Government's Bill.
LORD DIAMOND: I shall now have a nightmare.
Clause 145, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 146 [Period of continuous employment]:
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: I beg to move Amendment No. 284C.
Moved—
Page 107, line 35, leave out (" of unfair") and insert ("relating to").—(Baroness Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
On Question, Whether Clause 146, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?
1.5 a.m.
LORD STOW HILL: I do not want to take up the time of the Committee at this late hour, but this clause is important from one point of view. The Committee has previously debated Clause 26 which is the clause which provides that before anybody can bring a claim under Clause 20 in respect of an alleged unfair dismissal lie must be able to show that he has been in employment continuously for 104 weeks. Amendments were put down to try to deal with the situation in which there might have been some sort of interruption—perhaps because of illness; or there might have been various reasons which would prevent an employee who had been in employment for a considerable time saying that it had been continuous for 104 weeks. When the Committee debated that matter, it was the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, who pointed out that it would be difficult in practice to abbreviate that period, at the moment at any rate, because it was anticipated that there might be a consider— able number of claims and the industrial tribunals might find themselves rather overloaded unless a fairly long qualifying period was prescribed.
I have studied Clause 146 in order to ascertain whether any relief for an applicant for compensation under Clause 20 is contained in its terms. It seems to me that there is not. If I am mistaken perhaps the noble Baroness will correct me. If one looks at the successive subsections one finds that subsection (1) seems not to remedy the position. It relates to the total length of employment. Subsections (3) and (4) clearly do not do so on their terms. Subsection (2), when one considers its real effect, does not, I think, modify the position. It provides that the presumption that employment has been continuous is to apply for the purposes of the Bill. I do not think that that can have any practical effect. A worker who makes a claim under Clause 20 either is or is not in a position to assert that he has been in continuous employment for
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104 weeks. I do not find it easy to envisage in practice any cases where the presumption could have any effect. One might have a case. theoretically, in which a worker suffered from an attack of amnesia as to a fortnight during the two years he was working for a particular employer; but in the nature of things that is most unlikely.
I do not want to prolong the discussion; I would simply put this question to the noble Baroness. Can she point to any provision in Clause 146 which makes it possible for the courts to hold in favour of a workman who applies under Clause 20 in respect of an alleged unfair dismissal but who for some reason cannot quite bring himself up to the required margin of 104 weeks?—a worker who, for example, must concede that at some time during that two years there was a break, a break which is insignificant but which would, as the Bill is at present drawn, disentitle him. I am sure the Government do not want him to be disentitled, and I should be grateful if the noble Baroness would point out to me that in some way this clause would assist; or alternatively, that she would give consideration to it in the hope that it may be changed into a form which would give assistance in this sort of case.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: If the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, will look at subsection (1) of Clause 146 he will see that it refers to Schedule 1 of the Contracts of Employment Act. If he looks at subsection (5) of that Act he will discover that all the matters troubling him are covered under this particular provision. Also. he will know from experience that there is considerable case law on this matter. The noble Lord read out various subsections to Clause 146 but one he did not refer to, and which is a very important one, is subsection (2). This provides that the presumption is that the employment is continuous. If that is read together with Schedule I of the Contracts of Employment Act, I think the noble Lord will find that these matters are covered.
LORD STOW HILL: I really mean to keep my promise not to prolong this debate, but I did study Clause 1. I looked up the 1963 Act and it did not seem to me to produce the result I had hoped for. I referred specifically to subsection (2) and

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I gave reasons, which obviously carried no conviction, for the view which I expressed, that it would have no useful application whatsoever. But if the noble Baroness will kindly say that she will give further thought to it, I shall be content.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: I am always willing to give further thought but not necessarily to amend.
On Question, Clause 146, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 147 [Claims under Terms and Conditions of Employment Act 1959, s.8]:
On Question, Whether Clause 147 shall stand part of the Bill?
1.13 a.m.
LORD CHAMPION: Clause 147 amends Section 8 of the Terms and Conditions of Employment Act 1959 in such a way as to preclude the reporting of a claim under that section to the Secretary of State by anyone other than a trade union or an employers' association as defined in the Bill. That seems to be perfectly clear. But when I turn to Part II of Schedule 7 setting out the Amendments in heavy type, 1 read in subsection (2):
" For the purposes of this section a claim, to be duly reported, must be reported to the Secretary of State in writing by an organisation or association which is registered as a trade union or an employers' association under the industrial Relations Act 1971, and is, or is represented by, one of the parties mentioned in paragraph (b)…"
When I turn to paragraph (b) of subsection (8)(1) I read:
" that the parties to the agreement, or to the proceedings in which the award was made, are or represent organisations of employers and organisations of workers or associations of such organizations…"
If I read that correctly in conjunction with subsection (2), it means that not only registered trade unions or employers' associations under the Bill but also one of the parties to the existing agreement may make a claim intending to change that agreement. If I am right about that, it does not seem to me that the Schedule carries out the intention of Clause 147. If I am wrong, it appears to me to create a serious situation in
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which the parties to the original agreement might, if they are not registered under this Bill, be precluded from pursuing a claim under a wages council created by Act of Parliament in 1959.
I think that this is a matter on which we ought to spend some little time, even at this late hour, because it refers to a body of employees who have to be protected by wages councils. I am hoping that the reply I shall get will indicate that people who are really parties to the original agreement will be able to submit a claim to the Secretary of State, even if they do not happen to be registered under this Bill.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: The noble Lord, Lord Champion, was quite correct in the way in which he interpreted this clause and the part of the Schedule to which he referred, because subsections (3) and (4) of the clause authorise the consequential amendments to the 1959 Act, and he read out to us the parts in heavy type. The position is that subsection (1) provides that no action shall be taken on a claim under Section 8 of the Terms and Conditions of Employment Act 1959 unless it has been reported by a registered trade union or employers' association. On the other hand, subsection (2)—the noble Lord was concerned about wages councils—removes what is now an embargo on claims concerning workers who are covered by wages councils. The 1959 Act at the present time excludes workers in wages council industries from the claims procedure. Subsection (2) removes this exclusion and restores the position to that which existed before 1959 under the old industrial disputes order. It requires employers to observe voluntarily recognised agreements and to widen the scope of voluntary collective bargaining arrangements so far as wages council industries are concerned.
LORD CHAMPION: I do not think I have made myself perfectly clear. When I was talking about subsection (2), I was not thinking about the Schedule to which this clause refers. I read out the words of the subsection and the words which particularly struck me as being extraordinary, having regard to subsection (1) of the clause, were the words:
" or is registered by one of the parties mentioned in paragraph (b)."

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I went back to paragraph (b) and found that in the Schedule it relates to those organisations or persons who were parties to the original agreement. It seemed to me that the Schedule does not give effect to Clause 147. But if it does and if the intention is to cut out those words, which are still there according to the amended Schedule which we have before us, the position will be that the parties mentioned in paragraph (b), the parties to the original settlement, will be completely cut out unless they are registered organisations. That is my point. I was not so anxious about Clause 147 as about its application to the Schedule.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: The noble Lord, Lord Champion, is correct once again. I thought I had said that he was, and I thought I had made it clear that Section 8(2) of the Terms and Conditions of Employment Act 1959, as at present worded, enables organisations of employers and workers to report claims to the Secretary of State in certain circumstances.
LORD CHAMPION: Yes.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: What he wanted to know was whether it referred to registered trade unions or not. It does refer to registered trade unions and to registered employers' associations, and this clause is referred to in the Schedule as read out. For the moment I thought that he also referred to wages councils. It is a slightly different matter, referred to in subsection (2) of Clause 147. Here we are restoring the right which existed before 1959 and which, for some extraordinary reason, was removed in the 1959 Act.
LORD CHAMPION: The fault must be entirely mine, but I am not absolutely clear. I will study very carefully what the noble Baroness has said and perhaps return to it later on Report.
Clause 147 agreed to.
Schedule 7 agreed to.
House resumed.