Lords Sitting of 14 July 1971

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Chancellor

READING"POP"FESTIVAL AND DRUG SEARCHES BY POLICE
BARONES WOOTTON OF ABINGER: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether it is a fact (as broadcast by the British Broadcasting Corporation) that the police have been making random searches for drugs of persons arriving by car or by rail at the recent"pop "-music festival at Reading; and, if so, how is this consistent with the statutory requirement that searches can only be made where a police officer has reasonable grounds to suspect illegal possession of drugs.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE, HOME OFFICE (LORD WINDLESHAM): My Lords, the Chief Constable of the Thames Valley Police has said that he has no information to substantiate the allegation that random searches were made. He is satisfied from his own inquiries that police officers had reasonable grounds for suspecting offences under the Dangerous Drugs Act or Drugs (Prevention of Misuse) Act before any action was taken.
BARONES WOOTTON OF ABINGER: My Lords, while thanking the Minister for his Answer, may I ask him one or two supplementaries? First of all, is he aware that searches at Reading included local residents, whether or not they were going to the"pop"festival, and that these searches involved feeling inside women's brassieres and asking them to let down their trousers, if they were wearing these? Secondly, can he explain the difference between searching for drugs every passenger on a coach arriving at a particular destination, as I
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understand happened at Reading, or a proportion of passengers coming off a train, and spot checks for excess alcohol on motorists driving on a particular road? Or are we to conclude that spot checks which were emphatically rejected by Parliament in connection with the Road Safety Act are to be legal in connection with the Dangerous Drugs Act?
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, I am not familiar with the nature of the searches carried out by the Thames Valley Police. All I can say is that the Chief Constable has assured us, having made inquiries, that there were reasonable grounds for suspecting offences under the drugs legislation. Nobody knows better than the noble Baroness does the very great difficulty of defining what is meant by"reasonable grounds"in this connection. The previous Government set up an inquiry, of which the noble Baroness was a member, on this exact point of powers of arrest and search in relation to drug offences, and concluded that reasonable grounds have never been defined and that it was not possible to give a definition.
BARONES WOOTTON OF ABINGER: On that last point, my Lords, may I ask the Minister whether the Government have or have not accepted the unanimous recommendation of the Deedes Committee, to which he has referred, that dress and hair style should not, by themselves or together, be reasonable grounds for search for drugs, and that the police should be asked to accept this principle? Might I also ask the Minister whether he would look further into this matter, because I have a very large volume of disturbing correspondence about the searches that took place?
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, we accept what the noble Baroness has said about dress and hair style, and my right honourable friend has circularised police forces to this effect. Dress and hair style are not factors which, on their own, should be regarded as constituting"reasonable grounds ". As she will know, however, they are included in the list of 11 criteria which, taken together, are regarded as constituting grounds of a kind which the courts would regard as reasonable. I should certainly like to hear from the noble Baroness. As I say, the Chief Constable has made inquiries,

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but if the noble Baroness has any information which is not known to us I will certainly arrange for it to be investigated.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: My Lords, will the Minister look into the matter further to find out how, when passengers are getting off a train, it is possible to discriminate between those who are reasonably to be suspected of illegal possession of drugs and those who are not, unless it is by their appearance?
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, the police are concerned with all the circumstances of the particular occasion. The fact that a"pop"festival was taking place at Reading was a circumstance which the Chief Constable took into account. Had the passengers been getting off a train at Windsor, presumably they would not have been stopped.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, in view of the rather disturbing information my noble friend has put by way of questions this afternoon, may I hope that the noble Lord will make inquiries into this incident? One always has to bear in mind the relationship of the police with the general community. In the light of what was said on the B.B.C. and what the noble Lord has said, that there were not spot checks, it would be for the good of the police that this were made clear. And I think this can arise only as a consequence of an inquiry by the noble Lord.
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, I hope that I have made myself abundantly clear. We have made inquiries. There were between 30,000 and 50,000 people present at this festival. What I have said is that if the noble Baroness has any information which is new to us, we will certainly investigate it.
VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS: My Lords, I wonder whether the noble Lord will help me. It is quite obvious that it is very difficult—in fact, quite impossible—to produce a general definition of what are reasonable grounds. But is it not possible to tell us what were considered by the police to be reasonable grounds in these cases? Can the House be informed of this in some manner?
LORD WINDLESHAM: Yes, my Lords. I would refer the noble Viscount
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to paragraph 123 of the Report of the Advisory Committee on Drug Dependence on Powers of Arrest and Search in Relation to Drug Offences. Some criteria are set out there.
LORD LEATHERLAND: My Lords, does the noble Lord think that in this case we are getting dangerously near to the theory of guilt by association, and does he think that even the stimulus to police recruiting that this incident might give is likely to be outweighed by the former theory?
LORD WINDLESHAM: No, my Lords; I do not think that. This is a controversial matter on which opinions differ. We discussed the question of police powers of arrest and search at considerable length during the passage of the Misuse of Drugs Bill. The noble Baroness, Lady Wootton of Abinger, was among those in this House, and was a member of the minority on the Advisory Committee, who argued strongly against these powers. But this House, by an overwhelming majority, came to the conclusion that the powers should be retained in the new legislation.
VISCOUNT MONCKTON OF BRENCHLEY: My Lords, will my noble friend agree that the number of convictions after this event lead to the supposition that there were reasonable grounds for searching somebody?
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: My Lords, arising out of that, can the Minister say how many searches and how many convictions there were; what drugs were found, and in what quantities?
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, I cannot tell the noble Baroness what drugs were found and in what quantities. I can tell her that 1,811 people were stopped and searched on the grounds that they were suspected of being in illegal possesion of drugs. Subsequently, 119 were charged and convicted.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, may I ask how many police dressed up as"hippies"were searched? The noble Lord need not answer that.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: My Lords, cannot the Minister discourage—
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: No!
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: May I ask one more question, my Lords? Cannot the Minister discourage the very disagreeable practice of disguising police officers in the style of dress which they regard as that of"hippies ", in order to get the confidence of people similarly dressed?
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, perhaps we ought to try to make this question the last on this exchange. The noble Lord, Lord Fraser of Lonsdale, has a further question to-day on the same festival. This is a difficult matter. Clearly, the police officers attending festivals of this sort must do so in plain clothes. If they went in uniform it would be totally impossible for them to enforce the law. The style of plain clothes that is adopted must be left to the police.
VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS: One last question, my Lords—
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: No!
VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS: The noble Lord, Lord Windlesham said that a certain number had been searched and convicted. Is he aware that the proportion of those convicted works out at about one in twelve? Does he consider that it was right to search 12 people, of whom eleven were found to be innocent, in order to convict one? Is that a right proportion?
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, these statistics can be read in different ways, but for a festival of this sort the proportion is not unusual.

POSTAL RATE FOR CHRISTMAS CARDS
2.46 p.m.
LORD FRASER OF LONSDALE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the first Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they have now given further consideration to a special postal rate for Christmas cards.]
LORD DENHAM: My Lords, it is for the Post Office to consider this matter
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and I understand that it is doing so in consultation with the Post Office Users' National Council.
LORD FRASER OF LONSDALE: My Lords, will my noble friend tell the Minister concerned, and ask him to tell the Post Office, that this would be a very good way whereby the Post Office could give a little Christmas present to its many customers?
LORD DENHAM: My Lords, I do not think that for me to tell my right honourable friend and for my right honourable friend to tell the Post Office would be a proper means of communicating the noble Lord's wishes on this subject. But I have no doubt that the Post Office will get to know of the noble Lord's point.
LORD INGLEWOOD: My Lords, before my noble friend offers any advice of that sort to the Post Office, will he urge them, first, to ensure that letters bearing the normal 3p stamp reach their destination in this country the next day, which we were led to believe by noble Lords opposite when they were in power would in fact happen, but which very frequently does not?
LORD DENHAM: My Lords, that, also, is a matter for the Post Office and, I might say, a rather different matter from the Question on the Order Paper.
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, does the Minister recall that in February, 1969, this House was informed at Question Time that the increase in the charge for Christmas cards from the old 3d. rate to the old 4d. rate had led to a reduction of 18 per cent. in the number of Christmas cards posted? If we are now to have a further 50 per cent. increase, from last year's old 4d. rate to this year's new 2½p rate, this will surely have a profound effect upon the number of Christmas cards posted and there will be a very considerable reduction.
LORD DENHAM: My Lords, these statistics are really a matter for the Post Office.
LORD SLATER: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that in 1969 postcards were sent in an open envelope, whereas they are now sent in a sealed envelope and are treated as first-class mail?
LORD DENHAM: My Lords. I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Slater. One further point which I would make to the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, is that at the beginning of 1969 such matters were the responsibility of the then Minister, whereas under the Post Office Act they are now matters for the day-to-day running of the Post Office.
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, since we have a Minister for Posts and Telecommunications, may we have some sort of guidance as to what are, and what are not, proper questions regarding the Post Office to be directed to Her Majesty's Government?
LORD DENHAM: My Lords, if the noble Lord would like to put down a Question, perhaps for Written Answer, I will certainly try to give him such a list.
LORD SEGAL: My Lords, can the noble Lord give the House an assurance that if a special postal rate is introduced for Christmas cards it will be in a downward and not in an upward direction?
LORD DENHAM: No, my Lords, I cannot give any assurance on this matter at all.

READING"POP"FESTIVAL: COST OF POLICE DUTY
LORD FRASER OF LONSDALE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the second Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government how many policemen were on duty, and for how long, at the recent Reading"pop"festival, including the number required for extra traffic control; and who paid the cost.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE, HOME OFFICE LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, 557 police officers were on duty at this festival, about 400 of whom were deployed from outside the Reading area. Forty-eight of these officers were engaged on traffic control duties, 25 of whom would not normally have been on duty in Reading. Every officer worked a 12-hour shift for each of the three days.
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The cost was borne by the Thames Valley Police Authority.
LORD FRASER OF LONSDALE: My Lords, seeing that a"pop"festival is put on to please the"pop"fans or to make money for the suppliers of food and drink and music, is there any particular reason why, following the admirable practice in Britain of trying to get people to pay for what they have, the"pop"fans and the profit-making suppliers should not pay 5 or 10 old shillings, or whatever these new pence are, on top of their ticket for this service? Why should we, the taxpayers and the ratepayers, pay for their pleasure and profit?
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, the Government are keeping close watch over these festivals to see whether general legislation is needed. The imposition of a requirement on festival organisers to pay for the police presence inside and outside festival sites would be a new departure that would call for careful consideration.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord what the general practice is with regard, for instance, to Ascot, Henley or Wimbledon? Is he able to tell us how many policemen are on traffic duty, and elsewhere, on such occasions, and who pays for them?
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, that goes a little wider than the Question on the Order Paper.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Oh!
LORD WINDLESHAM: Perhaps I may be allowed to comment. The practice at football grounds is that, very often by agreement, the club makes a payment to the police authority for those police officers who are on duty inside the ground. This does not apply to police on duty outside the ground who are engaged on traffic control and duties of that sort. Nor, I understand, does it apply to extra police who may be brought in on a particular occasion, such as when it is thought there may be a demonstration of some sort. If the chief constable decides he must bring in extra police, their cost is not met by the club. This is information that I think may be of interest to the House, but I cannot give information on race meetings and other sporting events, without notice.

CITIZENS ADVICE BUREAUX
2.54 p.m.
LORD WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether, having regard to the grant from public funds made to the National Council of Social Service towards the cost of the Citizens Advice Bureaux service, they are aware of the dispute between those two bodies which could have a damaging effect on the value of the service to the community of the Citizens Advice Bureaux.]
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY or STATE, DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT LORD SANDFORD: My Lords, before answering this Question perhaps I should tell your Lordships that before joining the Government I was a member of the Executive of the National Council of Social Service and chairman of one of its associated groups. Her Majesty's Government are aware that there have been some differences between the National Council of Social Service and the Council of the Citizens Advice Bureaux, but have taken the view that the way in which the National Council of Social Service and the Citizens Advice Bureaux Council arrange their internal affairs is a matter entirely for them. I cannot say whether the dispute will have any damaging effect on the value of the Citizens Advice Bureaux. It would certainly be wrong to assume that it will.
LORD WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, while thanking the Minister for his reply, may I ask him whether he really feels that, when a voluntary organisation is receiving something like £200,000 per annum by way of Exchequer grants, how that money is spent is not a matter for the Government to interest themselves in, to see that that money is spent in the best possible way? Does he not feel that if there is internal friction which might affect one of their most valuable services to the community it should be the Government's concern?
LORD SANDFORD: My Lords, the noble Lord is quite right. The service provided by the Citizens Advice Bureaux is,
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of course, of very great and direct concern when it comes to allocating grant, but it is not the service which is at stake at the moment. There have been some changes in personality and disagreements about structure.
LORD WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord the Minister whether he is not aware that the value of the contribution of the citizens advice service to this country, which is well-known, could easily be threatened because within the Citizens Advice Bureaux at the present moment there is a good deal of unhappiness at the arbitrary way in which the National Council of Social Service has sacked the Secretary, and that could well affect the service?
LORD SANDFORD: My Lords, it is just possible that the service might be affected, but organisations surmount these difficulties and there is no reason at the moment to suppose that this difficulty will not be overcome.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: My Lords, in view of the Minister's experience and the work that he himself has done in this field, as some of us know, will he do his utmost to see that in these organisations, if possible, differences of personality are eradicated? Many of us are grateful for the work of the Citizens Advice Bureaux and the National Council of Social Service. It has given comfort, succour and help in moments of need to hundreds of thousands of people in this country. It is essential that we eradicate differences, and I hope the Minister will try to help.
LORD SANDFORD: My Lords, I am glad to receive from the noble Lord his tribute to the work and the service to the community rendered by the Citizens Advice Bureaux. I remain confident that these difficulties are being overcome.

GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS
VISCOUNT GOSCHEN: My Lords, with the leave of the House my noble friend Lord Lothian will be making a Statement on the Common Market at a convenient moment after half-past three. This will be followed by a Statement on housing finance in Scotland by my noble friend Lady Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, and then one by my noble friend Lord Sandford on infrastructure works.
HUMBER BRIDGE BILL
Read 2a, and committed to the Committee on Unopposed Bills.
KESTEVEN COUNTY COUNCIL BILL
Read 3a, with the Amendments, and passed, and returned to the Commons.
HOUSING BILL
Brought from the Commons; read 1a, and to be printed.

POOL COMPETITIONS BILL
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, I understand that no Amendments have been set down to this Bill and that no noble Lord has indicated a wish to move a manuscript Amendment or to speak in Committee. Unless, therefore, any noble Lord objects, I beg to move, pursuant to Standing Order No. 43(2), that the Order of Commitment be discharged.
Moved, That the Order of Commitment be discharged.—(Lord Windleshani.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BILL
2.59 p.m.
THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now further considered on Report.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
Clause 138 [Application to Industrial Court with a view to discontinuing or deferring industrial action]:
LORD CHAMPION LORD CHAMPION moved Amendment No. 92A:
Page 99, line 37, after (" may ") insert (" in pursuance of a resolution of each House of Parliament ").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, at the commencement of our proceedings in Committee on the emergency procedures of the Bill, I said that I agreed that it is desirable as far as possible to prevent any sort of industrial action that, in the words of Clause 138, is likely,
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" (a) to be gravely injurious to the national economy, to imperil national security or to create a serious risk of public disorder, or
(b) to endanger the lives of a substantial number of persons, or to expose a substantial number of persons to serious risk of disease or personal injury."
That being the area of agreement, the question arises as to whether these clauses will achieve that purpose and whether in their operation they will be fair to the worker involved in the industrial action contemplated or actually begun. We are of the opinion that this and subsequent clauses in this Part of the Bill will not achieve these purposes; and we have voted against the clause in Committee.
Our objection to this clause is not mainly that we have doubts about its practicability. We object strongly to so much power being put into the hands of the Secretary of State and then into the hands of the Industrial Court. This power is of the sort that, under the Emergency Powers Acts 1920 and 1964, resides in the Sovereign and is controlled by Parliament. The operative words of the Act of 1920, as slightly amended by the Act of 1964, are:
" If at any time it appears to His Majesty there have occurred, or are about to occur, events of such a nature as to be calculated, by interfering with the supply and distribution of food, water, fuel, or light, or with the means of locomotion, to deprive the community, or any substantial portion of the community, of the essentials of life, His Majesty may, by proclamation,…declare that a state of emergency exists.
No such proclamation shall be in force for more than one month, without prejudice to the issue of another proclamation at or before the end of that period."
The Act of 1920 and that of 1964, also make provision for the fact of such a proclamation being forthwith communicated to Parliament, and if Parliament is not sitting to recall it within five days. There is throughout the principal Act a proper and very meticulous regard for Parliamentary control. For example, in addition to providing for Parliament's recall where necessary, any regulations made by the Government had to be laid before Parliament as soon as may be and could not remain in force after the expiration of seven days unless a Resolution was passed by both Houses of Parliament. Incidentally, a proviso said that there could not be made under the

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Act any regulations making it an offence for any persons to take part in a strike or peacefully to persuade any other person to take part in a strike.
Contrast those powers, my Lords, which have been very rarely used, with those in the Bill. Under this Bill the Secretary of State may, without reference to anyone else or even having to communicate the fact to Parliament, apply to the Industrial Court for an order. The Industrial Court, a free and independent Court, not answerable to anyone, and certainly not to Parliament, may issue an order prohibiting a person or persons from"calling, organising, procuring or financing"a strike or threatening to do so or from organising, procuring or financing"any irregular industrial action short of a strike"or from threatening to do so. Those are pretty considerable powers for a court to exercise, and althought it does not seem certain that the order may prohibit a person taking part in a strike, it will prohibit a person peacefully persuading another to take part in a strike.
This is well beyond the powers in the Emergency Powers Acts in relation to that part of it. The period of the order may be up to 60 days and the provisions of subsection (6), together with those of subsection (4), seem to me to amount to a prohibition to strike; for if one cannot be"called, organised, procured or financed ", it is absolutely tantamount to a prohibition—not upon the individual as a striker but upon any body of workers doing so in an organised fashion. All this—and it is an important"all this "—without the court being in any way answerable to Parliament, and also without the Secretary of State being answerable to Parliament excepting in so far as every Minister is answerable to Parliament through the ordinary procedures and processes of Parliamentary Question and Parliamentary debate. In the event of his making an application to the Court for an order at the beginning of the Long Recess, it may be that some 80 days will have passed before Parliament has the opportunity to express its opinion in any way. That is 20 days longer than the Court is empowered to permit its order to run. We say that this is just not good enough; that it is by-passing Parliament in a wholly unjustifiable manner in a matter which, according to the Bill, is
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one which might imperil national security or create a risk of public disorder.
The sense of the Amendment is clear. The Secretary of State should be empowered to act under this clause only if he has obtained the assent of Parliament. I make no pretence that the Amendment is word perfect. Nor does it make provision for the recall of Parliament as, clearly on a consequential Amendment, it ought to do. But it seeks to give to Parliament its rightful place in a matter adjudged to be vital to the life of the nation. If the situation is as grave as the Secretary of State will have to represent it to be when applying to the Court for an order, the fact ought to be hammered home by a decision of Parliament and by its recall if it happens to be in Recess at the time.
I must say that I was shocked when I heard the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, say in Committee:
" On the point of responsibility to Parliament, the Secretary of State is always responsible to Parliament for his conduct of industrial relations. In the normal way he does not have to go to Parliament to be authorised to take the steps that he takes in the course of industrial relations. He reports what he is doing; he does not need any kind of formal authorisation. It is only in regard to the Emergency Powers Act that confirmation is required. So that in this case he will be in exactly the same position as in any other case in relation to the conduct of industrial relations."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 9/7/71; col. 219.]
That may be so, so far as the normal duties of the Secretary of State in relation to industrial disputes are concerned; but the procedure under these emergency clauses is not a case of the sort of thing that the Secretary of State is normally expected to do when dealing with industrial disputes. In the normal way, in the case of a serious industrial dispute, if his conciliation fails he sets up a court of inquiry and appeals to the unions involved to call off the strike pending the report of the court of inquiry. This has happened in many cases recently. We know what happens. He then reports that fact to Parliament.
Under these clauses the Secretary of State is embarking upon a procedure which may well result in a formal order by a body answerable to no one, involving what is virtually a prohibition of a strike for 60 days, an order which will place

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a large number of citizens at risk of considerable penalties if they step slightly out of line, which might well involve a trade union or organisation of workers in considerable financial penalties for contempt of court if mandatory restraint orders are disobeyed.
One of the leading lights of the Conservative Party has said of the Conservative Party approach to change that they admit that the times involve us in one radical change after another, but they consider it proved by experience that such change can be safely effected only within the framework of a constitution sanctified by traditional authority and institutions. That must be the effect in a manner conformable to proper methods of procedure, and it can best be effected by a group of men known to be devoted to the traditions of their country in an atmosphere where people are confident of the ability of the constitutional procedure to achieve reform and the willingness of all classes to accept it when fairly enacted.
I can imagine that most noble Lords opposite would completely accept that as a statement by someone whom I regard as an authority on the Conservative approach to change. I myself accept that as a precept for change in a society that accepts the rules and restraints of parliamentary democracy. What I would say of the proposals in this clause and some of the subsequent clauses is that they do not conform to traditional methods of procedure. A traditional and accepted procedure in an emergency situation is that parliamentary control, as in the case of the Emergency Powers Act 1920, is exercised by Parliament. Neither are these proposals such that all classes will accept them as fairly enacted, for most classes, or certain parts of classes, in this country object strongly to this Bill and would not regard these proposals as being fairly enacted by Parliament at this time under Conservative control.
The danger here is that the law will be brought into contempt by orders of the court being understandably disobeyed in the sort of circumstances in which Parliament is by-passed by the Secretary of State and by the Court. The law is brought into contempt, as it was in the case of the Kent miners during the war years, when it is flagrantly disobeyed and the outcome is a matter for laughter
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rather than anything else. That is the last thing I wish to see. I do not like to see the law flagrantly disobeyed. If the law is disobeyed, sanctions ought to ensure that those who disobey it are punished; but we have seen so many cases recently when the law has been flagrantly disobeyed and nothing has happened, nothing has flowed from it. We saw it certainly in the case of the Kent miners, which brought about a situation which was laughable rather than anything else. That is not a good thing for this country; it is not a good thing for the law of a democratic society.
I would strongly advise the Government to accept my Amendment and to continue to deal with anything approaching emergencies in the way which is now traditional and generally accepted and within the province of close parliamentary control. What my Amendment does is clear. It would permit the Secretary of State to make his application to the Industrial Court, but only if he had obviously by resolution obtained the consent of both Houses of Parliament. Surely this is the sort of thing that ought to be done in the sort of emergency situation postulated in these clauses, and certainly in this clause which this Amendment is designed to change. I beg to move.
3.17 p.m.
LORD BERNSTEIN: My Lords, I support the Amendment put forward so clearly by my noble friend Lord Champion. I think the implications of this clause are very important and raise issues which affect Parliament. When Clause 134 (now Clause 138) was discussed in Committee, apart from the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, no voices were raised in support of or against it from the Government Benches. This surprised me very much because many noble Lords opposite have had great experience in another place, which I have not, and their opinions would have been valued on this very important issue; but not a voice was raised.
There are three major points in the clause we are discussing. My noble friend Lord Champion, and noble Lords who spoke against this clause in Committee all agree that part of subsection (2)(a), which covers a strike, which would imperil the national security and could be a matter for emergency measures. It is

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also agreed that there must be a limit to the exercise of the freedom to strike when this involves human lives and human health, which also is covered in subsection (2)(b). I am concerned about the total implications of this clause. Any strike, except the most trifling, could be considered"gravely injurious to the national economy"for it could have some effect on imports and exports, to raise one and lower the other. A railway strike could cause public disorder somewhere. A strike of sewerage men could certainly cause public disorder.
Is it not for Parliament, the elected Legislature, to decide whether a strike is causing or could cause grave injury to the national economy or is creating public disorder, and whether the importance of one or both becomes a matter for emergency measures? My noble friend Lord Champion has quoted what the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn said on June 9. He said:
" the Secretary of State is always responsible to Parliament for his conduct of industrial relations."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 9/6/71, col. 219.]
I agree with that in general, but while the matter is being considered by the Industrial Court presided over by a judge, the Secretary of State will be able to avoid answering questions in another place. It seems evident that it would not be proper for Parliament to criticise the Court during those considerations or even after the judgment has been offered. The clause, it seems to me, enables the Secretary of State to free himself of immediate responsibility to Parliament by referring the matter to the Industrial Court.
Although the Industrial Court, according to the Bill, will generally comprise what are called"other members ", the President, an appointed judge, will eventually be responsible for advising on the legal aspects in each case which comes before them. What follows, I suggest, will be a legal definition of the words in the Bill. The clause gives the Court the right to make orders enforceable through"penalties of contempt of Court ", which could finally lead to imprisonment. Its decisions could not be debated in Parliament. My noble friend Lord Champion pointed out that the Government already have powers under the
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Emergency Powers Act 1964, and that those powers could be used.
On June 9, as reported at column 219 of Hansard, the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, said:
" The emergency Powers Act 1920 does not give power to order people to go back to work."
That, I understood, was one of his reasons or excuses for the present emergency clause that we are discussing; but this clause does not give the power to order people to go back to work. If that was the reason for using the Emergency Powers Act, because it does not order people to go back to work, why this provision? Given the enormous scope of the emergency provisions, it becomes all the more important that this Government, or any other Government—because the present Government will not always be in power—should be immediately answerable to Parliament for the measures they propose to take, or have taken. Do the Government really need this clause to deal with the emergency they speak of? I do not think so, and I am supported by the Donovan Commission who said in their Report that they did not think that the Government's present powers needed to be increased.
My noble friend Lord Champion said that this clause takes the immediate decision out of the control of Parliament and puts it in the control of the courts. The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, said he thought the public had more respect—I am not sure about the word"respect "—had more faith, and would more readily accept a decision of the courts than of a Minister. If that is true, there is something wrong with our legislation and a Bill should be passed to make Ministers more responsible than judges for dealing with industrial and human relations matters.
I agree that the Secretary of State is accountable to Parliament, but although Secretaries of State may have wisdom they are short of time. The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, also said that the Secretary of State has to ask himself two questions. How cosy for him! Not only does he ask the questions, but he has the preconceived answers. Questions cannot be asked of him in Parliament because under this clause a decision made by the Industrial Court cannot be debated in Parliament.

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Considering the relationship between the Industrial Court and Parliament the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, referred to the Taft-Hartley legislation on which this clause is modelled. But the clause goes much further than the American legislation; though that may not matter, because I think we should forget what is being done in America. The process of law is different in respect of a Presidential Decree and our Parliamentary system, and they are not capable of comparison. I think that we should also forget the Bill another Government proposed in another place. Under other clauses it is provided that the Secretary of State must consult or he said he would consult other persons and bodies before taking action. Nowhere in this clause does it say anything about consulting the T.U.C. or the C.B.I. In answering a point which I raised during the Committee stage, the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, said that the emergency procedure was included because there was little time for consultation. I still think that the T.U.C. and the C.B.I., with the help of the Minister's conciliation officers, could do more to speed up negotiations than could be achieved by calling into action the emergency powers under this clause and leaving the matter to the Industrial Court to settle. I think that this clause is wrong for the country and is wrong for our Parliamentary procedure. It ignores the judgment of the Donovan Commission on this method of dealing with disputes, as the Commission came out against the ideas embodied in this clause. For all these reasons I support the Amendment.
LORD POPPLEWELL: I wish to support what has been said by my noble friends, Lord Champion and Lord Bernstein. In my opinion this is a very important Amendment. If it is not carried one can visualise that it will be difficult for any undertaking connected with the public services or the economy of the country to declare a strike at all. We have often been told that this Bill when it becomes law will not prevent certain strikes from taking place. If we look at subsection (2)(b) it will be apparent that wide scope is given to the Industrial Court. Surely it is understandable that Parliament should be able to debate
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anything which takes place in the country and which is likely to interfere with our economy or the public services. The Amendment would empower and compel the Secretary of State to come to Parliament so that the matter could be discussed before he gave consent to any recommendation of the Industrial Court. There are two ways in which this might take place: by Affirmative or by Negative Resolution. It is not possible to move Amendments to regulations; they have to be taken as a whole. There may be official strikes and the Secretary of State would be able to prevent an industrial dispute from taking place. Surely that cuts across the terms of the Bill, which is designed to promote good industrial relations. It means that any strike which takes place within the terms of this Clause will be unofficial. It is far too important a matter for the Secretary of State or any member of the Government to be able to authorise regulations and to have the last word. Parliament is supposed to be the overriding authority, and I do not think it is asking too much, if we believe in the need for free trade unions, to require that any regulation should first be debated in Parliament.
3.25 p.m.
LORD STOW HILL: My Lords, may I at this stage put a question to the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, which I am sure he will be able to answer, in view of his long and distinguished career as a Member of the other place. We are discussing how far the control of Parliament is removed from the activities of the Secretary of State under this clause; whether it is too far removed, and whether the clause as at present conceived is generally in the public interest. Ordinarily, if a Secretary of State, or any other Minister, takes a step to which Parliament strongly objects, a Question can be put down to him. He may be questioned about it at Question Time in the other place. If his answers are unsatisfactory, a Censure Motion may be put down on him, or on the Government as a whole. In accordance with the procedure in the other place, a Censure Motion on the Government is always allowed precedence over almost any other business. So ordinarily the Secretary of State is very much under the control

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of Parliament. That is part of our constitutional practice and it is a principle of the utmost importance.
Should I be right in thinking that the effect of the arrangements as set out in these clauses is this? The Secretary of State, let it be supposed, decides to make an application. He forms the view that the conditions specified in Clause 138(2)(a) or (b) are satisfied; for example, that strike action is bound to take place and that it would be gravely injurious to the national economy. Let it be assumed that Parliament as a whole thinks that is an utterly unreasonable view, a most mischievous view, which will conduce to great damage to the public interest. Under the Standing Orders in the other House would not the position be—this is the question I wish to ask—that once he makes his application to the Court, Parliament cannot raise the matter, because Mr. Speaker would be bound to Rule out of order any question or any answer, or other Motion, on the ground that the matter was sub judice? Is that not right? As soon as he approaches the Court, the whole issue is utterly and completely removed from the jurisdiction of Parliament and cannot be considered in any way so long as it is before the Court. The Court has power to prolong the order up to 60 days, so I suppose any debate could not take place for a considerable period of time, if the way in which I understand Mr. Speaker would be obliged to apply the Standing Orders of another place is correct.
At the outset of the debate, we should know exactly where we stand. Not only that, but the Secretary of State is given power in Schedule 3 (page 111) to apply to the Court to make interim orders, so long as he gives notice and satisfies the conditions in the terms of these clauses. That order can be prolonged for 60 days and the whole proceedings from beginning to end cannot form the subject of any question, any discussion or any reference in another place or, I suppose, in this House. I am more familiar with the Standing Orders of another place than with those of your Lordships' House, though I am trying to make myself as familiar with them as possible. This is a question which the noble Lord, partly from his own experience, which is extensive, and partly from the advice which he may receive, will be able to answer.
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It is a matter of considerable weight in making up our minds in this matter. I should be grateful if he would answer that question.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, perhaps it might be convenient if the House were now to allow my noble friend the Marquess of Lothian to make his Statement.

E.E.C. NEGOTIATIONS: BRUSSELS MEETING
3.32 p.m.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN): My Lords, I should like to repeat a Statement that is being made by my right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster in another place. This is the Statement:
" With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I should like to make a Statement about the meeting with the European Community which I attended in Brussels on the 12th of July.
" We discussed three issues: harmonisation of capital movements, transitional arrangements in the field of the Common Commercial Policy, and fisheries.
" Our object in negotiation on capital movements was to secure the agreement of the Community to an adequate transitional period which would allow us to make the necessary adjustments to our present exchange control restrictions progressively and in reasonably even stages.
" Our proposals were briefly outlined in paragraph 130 of the recent White Paper.
" I am glad to be able now to report that the Community have accepted our proposals in relation to capital movements in full.
" The main transactions affected, and the stages of the proposed changes, are as follows:
" First, from the date of our accession, restrictions on financial transactions necessary to facilitate the free movement of labour will be removed,

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and there will also be a substantial relaxation in the rules affecting financing of direct investment, both ways.
" Secondly, remaining restrictions on the financing of direct investment will be removed not later than the end of the second year.
" Thirdly, restrictions on movements of personal capital, among which the most important are those affecting emigrants and those affecting house purchase, will be removed by the middle of the transitional period. The main impact of this change is likely to be a once-for-all cost to our reserves probably spread over about two years.
" Finally, arrangements will be made to cover dealings in quoted foreign currency securities by the end of the transitional period. If circumstances permit, any of these timings may be accelerated at Her Majesty's Government's discretion.
" The negotiation itself has of course been concerned only with this question of transition. Her Majesty's Government have throughout accepted the obligation ultimately as a Member State to conform with the Community's rules regarding capital movements. At the same time, it is worth recalling that the Treaty of Rome itself provides for all Member States important safeguards, particularly Articles 109 and 70(2).
" The directives explicitly leave members free to verify by appropriate exchange control measures the nature and reality of transactions or transfers, for example to ensure that a direct investment in the Community is in truth what it purports to be. This gives protection against the exploitation of freedom within the Community as a channel for movement of funds outside it.
" There is provision also for special action by Member States to take protective measures in the face of any actual or prospective damaging balance of payments situation.
" Her Majesty's Government are satisfied that the phased transition which has been negotiated will spread the unavoidable impact on our reserves as evenly as possible and over a period which will delay the
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main burden until it is likely to be increasingly offset by income return, and an expected growth of inward investment.
" We also reached agreement on a number of transitional measures in the field of the Common Commercial Policy, in particular in relation to anti-dumping and the gradual phasing out of certain import restrictions against state trading countries.
" Finally, fisheries. As I reported to the House on the 24th of June, we have explained fully to the Six the great difficulties that would arise for the United Kingdom, as indeed they would for the other applicants, from the extreme nature of access provisions of the Common Fisheries Policy and the need to modify them to take proper account of the circumstances of an enlarged Community.
" In an attempt to find a permanent solution which would be fair and reasonable for everyone, we proposed that waters within a six-mile limit, measured from the usual base lines, should be reserved for vessels genuinely belonging to the ports from which such waters are now being fished.
" We still consider that our proposal is in all the circumstances a reasonable basis for a common settlement that would be sensible and equitable for all the parties concerned.
" The House will recall that at the Ministerial meeting at Luxembourg between the 21st and the 23rd of June, it was not possible to reach a substantive solution to the problem. But there was an important advance in that the Community put formally on record its recognition that the access provisions of the Common Fisheries Policy would need reconsideration in the different circumstances of the enlarged Community. It was agreed that the matter should be taken up at the Ministerial meeting which has just taken place. Recognising that this is a matter of great political, social and economic concern to all the applicants and that a satisfactory settlement could be therefore worked out only on a multilateral basis, we proposed that the other applicant countries should also be invited to join in these discussions.

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" In the event it did not prove possible to arrange this. In those circumstances we could not hope to find an effective and equitable way of reconciling the interests of all four applicant countries and the existing Community at the meeting on Monday.
" Against this background and given that there must be agreement regarding the Common Fisheries Policy in the Treaty or Treaties of Accession, I proposed to the Community that we should seek to reach an interim agreement. This would mean that if the negotiating conference was unable in the time available to reach a final agreement satisfactory to all, everyone's legitimate interests would be protected until we had done so.
" Under such an agreement the applicant countries would maintain the status quo pending further reconsideration of the regulations and the achievement of a detailed and definitive agreement after enlargement of the Community. None of the applicant countries would be called upon to give up anything at this stage nor be put at any disadvantage in discussing more permanent arrangements. In particular it would avoid the unacceptable situation in which any of the applicants would be expected to agree unconditionally to a permanent solution for themselves without knowing what the final outcome of the Common Fisheries Policy would involve for the enlarged Community as a whole.
" The Six have taken note of this proposal and have indicated that they now feel the need to study the matter in greater depth.
" We shall take up the question again after the Summer Recess. I am convinced that together we shall be able to find a way through this complex problem to a satisfactory solution.
" This is a matter in which it is more important to get the right answer than the quick one. In the meantime our interests are fully safeguarded."
3.40 p.m.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Marquess for repeating this Statement. I think most of us would agree that to deal with an important subject like this by question and answer on the contents of a Statement
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is very difficult, and particularly this afternoon, when we have two other Statements and a good deal of other business, it is not easy or perhaps right for us to pursue too much in depth the Statement before us. In the past when we have had Statements we could always rely upon having a White Paper at the end which would enable us to consider and review the situation clearly and calmly. Therefore I would ask the noble Marquess whether he would consider on behalf of the Government issuing, not necessarily in White Paper form, some form of Government document setting out the background and the conclusions reached, in order that it may be in the hands of noble Lords before we have our debate in about ten days' time. I hope the noble Marquess will meet us on this matter because it is a very important Statement.
I think it must be a matter of regret that a solution was not found for this vital subject of fisheries. It may be better that we should get a right answer in preference to a quick one, but I hope the noble Marquess will be aware of the deep anxieties within the fishing industry and within the community generally. Therefore one should seek to get a settlement as quickly as possible. I hope the noble Marquess will give the House an assurance that in the mind of Her Majesty's Government the settlement must be on the basis of parity between all the countries involved, and that the suggestions that have already been made by Her Majesty's Government about the six-mile limit will be the minimum acceptable to Her Majesty's Government.
The important subject of the Commercial Policy and anti-dumping, I should have thought, was worthy of more than just some six lines in the Statement. I wonder whether the noble Marquess can say whether the existing regulations will continue during the transitional period and, if not, what protection there will be in the event of any dumping by other E.E.C. countries into our markets. As to the transfer of capital, this, clearly, is a most important subject and one that we shall need further time to consider, particularly having in mind the economic situation at present in this country and that, if there is too big a relaxation of the movement of capital, our regional areas might well suffer, especially as we

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all know that no regional development policy has as yet been agreed upon by the E.E.C. The Statement refers to removing the restrictions on personal capital and suggests that the main impact will fall on our reserves over two years. Can the noble Lord give us any assessment of what effect this particular provision would have on our reserves? My Lords, I will leave my comments on the Statement to be developed more fully when we have our debate.
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, we on these Benches likewise very much appreciate and are grateful for the Statement read out by the noble Marquess, which is keeping us posted on the latest phase of the negotiations. It is obvious, we think, that if we do join the European Economic Community we shall have to agree to some measures for harmonising capital movements and that this may naturally place some strain on our balance of payments, at any rate during an initial period. That being so, it seems to us, on a first hearing, that the Government have got the Six to agree to what, on the face of it, appear to be reasonable terms, though we shall naturally, in common with the Labour Opposition, like to have further time to study them before concluding that they are entirely satisfactory.
My Lords, I would just say a word on fisheries. It is not surprising that further time is necessary before we can negotiate a satisfactory settlement. In the meantime, however, could the noble Marquess perhaps answer two questions, one of which I think has been more or less formulated already by the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd? In the first place, are we to assume that a settlement satisfactory to us must be reached before we sign the Treaty of Rome, or may we take it that it will be possible to sign the Treaty first and then to negotiate a settlement within the Community, with the aid, naturally, of the Brussels Commission? The second question is, can the noble Marquess say whether the Government believe that we ought not, in any case, to be placed in a less favourable position than Norway, or at any rate in no less favourable position as regards the Shetlands than Norway, always assuming, of course, that Norway becomes a member eventually of the European Economic Community.
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, may I answer the two noble Lords who have spoken. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, for his welcome to the Statement and I will certainly undertake to consider his suggestion that some Government documents of some sort might be issued, although he will realise that I cannot promise that to him to-day. I also entirely agree with him that on the whole we have got to the stage now when these matters are probably best left until our debate in ten days' time. I would assure him that so far as the fisheries question is concerned it is hoped that this matter will be dealt with at the next ministerial meeting, which is towards the end of September—I think on September 21—and certainly it is our aim that parity should be the guiding principle in any agreement that comes out of it. I hope that that to some extent answers the noble Lords.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, the noble Lord used the word"aim "; that may be"intention ". What I ask the noble Marquess is, will this be the standing point of Her Majesty's Government?
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, I think I can say that it will be. What I cannot tell the noble Lord at the moment is what the reaction of the Six to our proposal is going to be. So far as capital movements are concerned, I am afraid I cannot to-day give him any estimate of the figures for the first two years. All I can say is that it is firmly our conviction that any losses in this period, and indeed over the following few years, will be more than offset by the economic advantages, as the Statement I think has made clear. The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, raised a question about dumping. I would assure him, on the anti-dumping point that was raised, that it was agreed that during the transitional period we should be able to take anti-dumping action against third countries, under our own anti-dumping legislation. I think that I have answered Lord Gladwyn's question about fisheries. We very much hope that we shall get a settlement before we come to the signing of the Treaty. That is the firm purpose of Her Majesty's Government.
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, the noble Marquess has not really answered my question. Supposing that we cannot

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get agreement, is it conceivable that we could then negotiate within the Community?
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: Yes, my Lords; it is conceivable. But we hope to get agreement.
LORD SHINWELL: My Lords, is it not obvious that the euphoria which followed the return of the Chancellor of the Duchy recently and the decision taken by Her Majesty's Government was hardly justified in view of what the noble Marquess has said this afternoon? Therefore I venture to ask three questions. First, having noted that the noble Marquess stated in connection with the balance of payments, et cetera that there would be"a once-for-all cost to the reserves ", may I ask whether he can kindly state what is the estimated cost to our reserves? Or do Her Majesty's Government regard that as a matter of minor importance? Secondly, the noble Marquess spoke about the pending commercial agreements—because apparently there is nothing definitive about the commercial agreements—being offset by increased incomes. Would he be good enough to give us an estimate of the increased incomes? Or is this merely a vague, nebulous statement without any justification? Finally, is it not obvious by now that this fishing impasse is almost insoluble? Would it not be proper, in the circumstances, before any measures are taken, to consult with the countries concerned, and in particular with Norway, who for centuries has been an ally and friend of this country?
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, I entirely agree with the noble Lord's third point, on the need to keep in step with Norway on these matters, and naturally we are consulting them fully about this. Regarding his first two questions, I do not feel that I can this afternoon answer questions which are really in the province of my right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer. But I have no doubt that the noble Lord will return to this matter during the debate, and I am sure he will not receive the satisfaction that he would like, because I sometimes have the feeling that the noble Lord will not be satisfied on any matter.
LORD SHINWELL: My Lords, I must protest, and I think I am justified in protesting. My opinions are my own, just as those of the noble Marquess are his own. And I am justified in holding opinions, unless somebody in your Lordships' House wants to prevent me from holding opinions—and they had better not try! I want to ask the noble Marquess: is it fair to your Lordships' House that a Statement should be made of the kind that the noble Marquess has made this afternoon, and, when he is asked questions, he passes the buck to the Chancellor of the Exchequer? Does it not mean that the noble Marquess does not understand the position at all?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, before the noble Marquess replies, I hope he will accept that in this House Ministers speak on behalf of Her Majesty's Government. I know it is a difficult task, but that is the situation. I asked the noble Marquess a specific question. I can understand the difficulty of the noble Marquess on the wide range of questions put by my noble friend Lord Shinwell; but here in the Statement we have a special reference to one item against the balance of payments, and a clear statement that the full effect of this will be felt during the first two years. If that is in the Statement, there must be some figures available. If the noble Marquess has not got them, let him be honest and say so, but not, frankly, to dodge the issue.
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, the last thing I want to do is to dodge the issue, or to question the sincerity of the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, on these matters. I realise that he feels strongly and genuinely about them, as indeed do a great many other noble Lords. Regarding the point put by the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, I have not got the information with me this afternoon, but I will undertake to procure it. I feel certain that these and a great many other matters will be developed during the course of the debate.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, in the light of that reply, surely it is clear that we should have a full document available to Members of your Lordships' House in order that we can consider it before we have our debate?
LORD ROBBINS: My Lords, is the noble Marquess aware that any attempt at precision in regard to the matter under discussion would be received with complete incredulity by many of us who realise that precision in these matters is absolutely out of the question?
THE EARL OF LAUDERDALE: My Lords, would the noble Marquess come back to the question of fisheries? He used the word"hope"when he said that we hope to get an agreement before signing the Treaty of Rome. Are we to understand from that that a situation might arise in which the Government would invite Parliament to support the signature to the Treaty of Rome in advance of a fisheries agreement?
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, I do not think I can give the noble Earl a categorical answer to that question. My right honourable friend is striving very hard to get a fisheries agreement, he hopes at the next ministerial meeting. I cannot tell at this stage whether he will be successful or not. Therefore I think the second part of the noble Earl's question must await the result of this next meeting.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: My Lords, the House is grateful to the noble Marquess for the Statement, but is he aware that we are not asking for precision, nor are we asking for nebulous statements which no human being can understand in a brief Statement like this one. This House is not even in a position to ask constructive questions about this nebulous Statement. Consequently, will the noble Marquess please see, as my noble friend on the Front Bench requested, that a statement is in the hands of all noble Lords at least 12 hours before the debate? Why all the secrecy about a decision which is the most important in a thousand years of British history? This is a foolish way to discuss such a vital matter.
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, I would accept the last part of the noble Lord's remarks. I think that we have reached the stage now where we must discuss this question in the debate in 10 days' time.
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, would not the noble Marquess agree that, if it
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is a question of harmonising capital movement, this may result not only in an outflow of capital, but also in an inflow of capital? It is impossible to say how much; but surely that is possible?
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, that is true, certainly.
LORD PARGITER: My Lords, can the noble Marquess say whether or not the agreement on the movement of capital will in any way affect our movement of capital within the Commonwealth?
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, I do not think so. I cannot give a categorical answer to that question, because the negotiations on Monday were, and the Statement is, entirely concerned with capital movements within the Community.
LORD LEATHERLAND: My Lords, can the noble Marquess clear up one small point about which I am in some doubt; namely, does this relaxation of capital movement mean that if a British millionaire wants to go and live in France or Italy he can take all his capital with him?
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, that is what it will ultimately mean; and it will also ultimately mean that if a French millionaire wants to come and live here, he will be able to bring all his francs with him.

SCOTTISH HOUSING FINANCE
4.0 p.m.
THE MINISTER OF STATE, SCOTTISH OFFICE (BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE): My Lords, I should like with the permission of the House, to repeat a Statement that is being made by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Scotland in another place on the reform of housing in Scotland. The Statement is as follows:
" Since our plans were outlined in the House on November 3, I have been discussing them in detail with the Scottish local authority associations. The White Paper which I am to-day presenting to the House sets out the Government's proposals, framed in the light of these discussions. Copies of the

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White Paper are available in the Vote Office from 4 p.m. "—
and in the Printed Paper Office of your Lordships' House.
" We intend to introduce a national scheme providing rent rebates for all tenants of unfurnished houses who need help to pay a reasonable rent, whether their landlords are public authorities or private individuals. Under this scheme, for example, a married man with three children earning £20 a week who pays a rent of £1·42 a week, which is the average council house rent in Scotland, will have it reduced to 75p a week.
Most of the cost of these rebates will be met by the Government. In addition, we are proposing to replace the existing subsidies for house building by three new subsidies, designed to give special help to those authorities which still need to build substantial numbers of houses and to those which still have slums to clear. The new slum clearance subsidy will meet 75 per cent. of the cost of slum clearance operations, and it will be payable on expenditure incurred in the present financial year.
" We intend to introduce a more rational and uniform system for fixing rents in the public sector. The White Paper proposes that each local authority should be required to increase rents until its income from them, taken together with the new subsidies, meets its total housing expenditure. These rent increases, however, will be limited to an average of 50p a week for any one year, and no individual tenant will have his rent increased for any year by more than 75p a week.
" In the private sector we propose to speed up the conversion of the remaining controlled tenancies to rent regulation. Here again rent rebates will prevent hardship, and the fair rent will be reached by three equal annual increases.
" The changes we now propose will redirect Government help to the tenants and to the areas which most need it, and they will ease the heavy burden of housing expenditure which Scottish ratepayers now bear. They will provide
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the right framework in which to pursue successfully the policies needed to meet the housing problems of Scotland, now and in the future.
" We intend to introduce a Bill early in the next Session to give effect to the proposals in the White Paper."
My Lords, that is the end of the Statement.
LORD HUGHES: My Lords, may I start by thanking the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, for repeating this Statement. In the absence of the White Paper, I have difficulty in commenting on it in detail and the noble Baroness will not expect that, because my remarks to-day are few, they will necessarily continue to be that way once I have seen the White Paper. But I should like to comment on some of the points in the Statement as they arose.
The noble Baroness referred to the man with an income of £20 a week presently paying a rent of £1·42, which is the average in Scotland, and said that this would be reduced to 75p. This, of course, assumes that the man at present is not in receipt of a rent rebate. The noble Baroness will be aware that there will be many people in Scotland at that income level who may well he paying a rent of less than 75p per week because of the existence of the local authority's rebate system, and she will doubtless be aware of the fact that the last Government laid considerable stress on the value of introducing rebate schemes in Scotland to accompany rent increases.
In relation to the fifth paragraph of the Statement, where it says:
" We intend to introduce a more rational and uniform system for fixing rents in the public sector "
may I ask if this is to be by the same method as was referred to in the English Statement yesterday, of importing the fair rents structure? As the Statement goes on, it would seem not to be that, because it seems to indicate that rents are to rise in Scotland until there is no deficit on the housing account. May I therefore ask the noble Baroness to what figure the £1·42 present average will rise when a situation has been reached in which there is no deficit on the housing revenue account after taking into consideration the subsidies? May I also ask

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the noble Baroness who will undertake the work of rent allowances in the private sector in Scotland? Finally, how many additional employees, either at Government or at local authority level, is it expected that this scheme will require?
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his contribution. I think the first part was a comment, but I should like specifically to reply to his questions. He is, of course, quite right in saying that in Scotland, in the local authority sector, we are basing these rent rebates on the historic pooled costs, and it is not equivalent to the fair rent system in England. In the private sector we are seeking to introduce into regulated tenancies the remaining controlled tenancies in Scotland, which amount altogether to between 100,000 and 150,000. On the question of who will fix the rent in the private sector, it will be done either by agreement or by the rent officer; and in the public sector it will be fixed, as it is now, by the local authority. Wirth regard to the last question, I cannot at the moment say how many additional staff will be required.
LORD HUGHES: My Lords, may I take the noble Baroness back to the first question? Can she tell me what the average rent is expected to be when the housing account is put in balance?
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I am sorry: I did note it but I could not read my own writing. At present, the average standard rent is £1·42, as I have said. It is very difficult to say exactly what it will be in the future because circumstances differ so much from authority to authority. But, to give an example, if local authorities had balanced their accounts in 1969/1970 the average standard rent would have been about £3·10 a week.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, it would be a mistake to pursue this discussion any further until we have the White Paper, but I should like to congratulate the Government on the principles on which it is based. May I ask one question? Will these new financial
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arrangements apply equally to those houses which have already been built and to future houses which are going to be built, having regard, of course, to any real differences in value in the same way?
LORD HUGHES: My Lords, before the noble Baroness answers, may I say that it is the tradition that the Liberal Benches get a chance to come in before anyone else?
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I am sorry, but I felt that I was not in a position to control the proceedings. No doubt that will be noted. I thank my noble friend for his contribution, and would say that the new arrangements will apply both to existing houses and to new houses.
LORD TANLAW: My Lords, I had hoped for a moment that the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, was going to make a liberal speech for me on this occasion. Our reactions to the noble Baroness's Statement can only be first reactions, and from these Benches they are naturally governed by the unemployment and low-wage situation existing in Scotland at this time. In view of this we shall have to look very carefully at the rent increases as well as the rent rebates outlined by the noble Baroness before we can ask our questions. But the Liberal Party objects as a matter of principle to any additional national means test which this Statement implies may have to come about. We believe that there must be a fairer and more effective method of housing assistance to be considered first.
On housing matters, we like to make a distinction between the house and the household. I mean by that that subsidies given by past Governments for bricks and mortar have not been satisfactory, and in one sense we are not sorry to see them go because they are inefficient. In so far as the household is concerned, in our opinion it would be fairer and more efficient to subsidise by means of fiscal assistance without a means test. The most obvious method would he by tax rebates, using the income tax machinery which is already in existence; and in cases where families pay no income tax—which regrettably

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is not an uncommon fact in Scotland—we should like the noble Baroness to perhaps consider housing grants. This method has the advantage of tailoring the housing assistance available to the needs of the individual families. We have no further questions until there has been a chance to look at the Statement more fully.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I quite appreciate that it is difficult for any noble Lord to comment on a White Paper which we have tried to make brief, but which will need considerable study. But I would say to the noble Lord that of course we have felt that it is very important to try to redirect subsidies, first of all to the areas where there is greatest need and, secondly, in rent allowances or rent rebates to the people who are in the greatest need. It is these two principles which lie behind the White Paper.
LORD LEATHERLAND: My Lords, this is a very complicated Statement. May I ask the noble Baroness to clarify one or two points for me? First, will the landlord get more rent from the tenants in the private sector? Secondly, will the tenants in many cases pay part of this amount? Thirdly, will the taxpayer also pay part? Fourthly, does this not amount to a Government subsidy to private landlords?
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, in reply to the noble Lord's first question, the landlord will of course receive more rent but some of these rents—I understand the noble Lord is referring only to the private sector—are very low indeed, the tenancies being controlled. In fact the average is 30p per week, I believe, and landlords have not been able to make the repairs that they would like to make. So in that way this will help them. The second question was as to whether the tenant would pay part. The tenant will pay the rent unless his income is such that he is eligible for a rent rebate. To the third question, as to whether the taxpayer will pay part, the answer is: yes, my
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Lords, because in these subsidies the Government are paying, for example, 90 per cent. in the first year, 85 per cent. in the second year, 80 per cent. in the third year and thereafter 75 per cent. I think that answers the last question, because the Government are collecting the money on behalf of the taxpayer.
LORD LEATHERLAND: My Lords, can the noble Baroness answer with more precision? I hesitate to use that word after the last exchange, but my fourth question was, does this not represent a Government subsidy to private landlords?
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I am sorry: the noble Lord asked four questions and I had a little difficulty in following one. It is a subsidy primarily to the tenants because the result of this will be that if the landlord receives a higher rent, fixed by the rent officer, he will be able to carry out repairs and improve these houses on behalf of the tenant.
LORD HOY: My Lords, may I ask the noble Baroness one question, to avoid any misunderstanding? During the course of her Statement she intimated that the Bill will be introduced early next Session. Are we to understand that this will be a purely Scottish Bill and not joint legislation covering the whole country?
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: Yes, my Lords; I can give that assurance. It will be a Scottish Bill.
LORD COOPER OF STOCKTON HEATH: My Lords, we were discussing the emergency legislation and the provision for the Secretary of State, if need be, to seek an order through the Industrial Court—
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (EARL JELLICOE): My Lords, I must apologise but I think the position is that clearance had not been received for the third Statement when the noble Lord began to speak. It has now been received, and if it is agreeable to the noble Lord my noble friend Lord Sandford would like to repeat it.

INFRASTRUCTURE WORKS IN DEVELOPMENT AREAS
4.16 p.m.
LORD SANDFORD: My Lords, I must apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Cooper of Stockton Heath, but I think it would be more convenient, as I now have got clearance, if, with the permission of the House, I were now to repeat a Statement which is being made in another place by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for the Environment on infrastructure works. The Statement is as follows:
" The Government have decided to authorise increased capital expenditure on infrastructure works in the development and intermediate areas. This will give still further practical support for the improvement of the economic and social infrastructure of these areas and will help to alleviate unemployment, particularly in the construction industry.
" The winter works programmes of the previous Administration did not give local authorities and others involved the time and the scope needed to plan and execute works of lasting benefit. The work under these programmes had to be completed in the winter months—in the least favourable weather conditions for the construction industry as a whole.
" The provision we are making now will, therefore, allow the inclusion of more substantial schemes than was possible in the winter works programmes. The infrastructure works now to be undertaken will be those which can be substantially completed during this and the next financial year—that is, by the end of March, 1973.
" The Departments concerned will now discuss the implementation of the increase in expenditure with the local authorities and others concerned as a matter of urgency.
" We estimate that in England, Scotland and Wales the spending authorities should be able to incur total extra expenditure of about £100 million over 1971–72 and 1972–73. My right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Scotland announced yesterday the main arrangement for Scotland and
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my right honourable and learned friend the Secretary of State for Wales is making a similar announcement.
" This £100 million will cover a wide range of projects such as trunk and principal roads, improvement and extention of educational buildings, minor capital works for hospitals and other health and personal social services. There will be provision also for infrastructure works selected by the local authorities within the field of locally determined capital expenditure. It certainly should be possible for a good deal of work to be done during the remainder of this financial year, with larger amounts to follow in 1972–73.
" This expenditure is wholly additional to the estimated £46 million that will be incurred over the next two years under the measures already announced for higher grants for the improvement of older houses in development and intermediate areas.
" These additional sums, totalling an estimated £146 million, should be seen within the framework of the Government's determination to help in bringing about a large improvement of the economic and social infrastructure of the development and intermediate areas. But they will also make their contribution to employment in these areas in the period immediately ahead ".
My Lords, that is the end of the Statement.
LORD GREENWOOD OF ROSSENDALE: My Lords, as always we are grateful to the noble Lord for repeating that Statement to us. While welcoming any help at all for the development and intermediate areas, may I ask the noble Lord whether he is aware that what I regard as a rather timid hotchpotch of panic measures is no substitute for businesslike management of the economy? It will give little comfort to people who are adversely affected by the Government's economic policy, and it will not reassure those of us who apprehend that unemployment may well top the million mark before many months have passed.
Does the noble Lord therefore appreciate that in our view much more radical steps are needed? On the details that the noble Lord has announced, can he tell

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your Lordships how much of this expenditure is really additional and not just brought forward in a way which will mean that subsequent allocations will be depleted? Can he tell us what proportion of this sum of money will actually be met by the local authorities and not by Her Majesty's Government? Can he further tell us what consultation his Department has had with the local authority associations? Or is this another case where there has been lack of consultation? Finally, having said that, may I express the hope that this, nevertheless, has been a triumph of the moderates in the Government over the doctrinaire"hard-liners ".
LORD BYERS: My Lords, the House will naturally welcome at this time any measure of reflation which the Government can bring forward, but is this the sum total of the measures which are going to be taken? If so, it is totally inadequate. In the hope that it is not the sum total, may I ask what other measures are being studied now, and when the Government will be in a position to make a statement on them?
LORD SANDFORD: My Lords, I am interested that the noble Lord, Lord Greenwood of Rossendale, should describe as a"timid hotch potch"and noble Lord, Lord Byers, as"totally inadequate"a programme which is three times larger than the three programmes of the previous Administration put together, covers a greater geographical area, and is more comprehensive in range and longer in duration. Having dealt with that main point, I confirm that these programmes are additional and not transfers. It is not possible to be precise about the proportion of the expenditure that will he borne by the local authorities, because, as the noble Lord knows, expenditure on trunk roads, for instance, is borne entirely by central Government, but for principal roads 75 per cent. of the cost is met by central Government and 25 per cent. by local authorities. The same applies across the board in varying degrees. It is not possible to be precise because we are now, following this Statement to Parliament, embarking on detailed discussions with the local authorities as to the particular form in which this additional authorisation of expenditure should be taken up.
LORD BYERS: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether he has not misunderstood
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the criticisms which have been made from these Benches? The comparison is not how many times greater this expenditure is on winter works programmes, but whether this is the main measure of reflation of the economy. If it is, then it is totally inadequate. If it is merely a winter works programme, it is better than we have had in the past.
LORD GREENWOOD OF ROSSENDALE: My Lords, further to the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Byers, when the Minister talks about expenditure being so many times higher, will he remember that unemployment is up by a quarter of a million since the last Government went out of office?
THE EARL OF LAUDERDALE: My Lords, would my noble friend say whether we are right in understanding that these public works, irrespective of the benefit resulting from them, are to be located only in development areas, or growth areas; and, secondly, whether, as they must be completed within a year, this excludes the possibility of estuarial land reclamation in areas such as the Tees, Severn-Side and South Wales, where it may help the unemployment situation as well as providing useful infrastructure for the future.
LORD BERNSTEIN: My Lords, the noble Earl raised the point of where this money is to be spent, and how it is to be spent. Perhaps it is not a hotch-potch, although I think the noble Lord, Lord Greenwood of Rossendale, is right—it is certainly a panic measure. We know that newspaper stories have been coming out for the past four weeks on this proposal; the Economist had an article about a month ago criticising the Government's proposals. It cannot be businesslike to have a sudden decision of this kind.
The noble Lord, Lord Greenwood, also asked whether local authorities had been consulted. The answer was rather vague. Have the contractors, whose equipment will be required, been consulted? Can we know how much money is to be spent from September this year to March of next year? Can we have any idea of how many of the unemployed will be employed on these operations? It seems to me that unless we get that information it is a very unbusinesslike project, and I wonder whether this is the result of the famous"Think Tank "

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which we hear is operating in the back rooms of No. 10 Downing Street.
LORD SANDFORD: My Lords, I am answering questions on infrastructure works in the development and intermediate areas. Although I am speaking for the Government as a whole, I am not answering on matters of financial policy, or economics, covering the entire country. I do not think I can add anything more to the Statement in the way of precision, because, as I explained, consultations will now be started with the individual local authorities as to which particular parts of the work are to be undertaken, and until those consultations have proceeded much further, it is not possible to be more precise.
THE EARL OF LAUDERDALE: My Lords, is estuarial land reclamation excluded or included?
LORD SANDFORD: My Lords, it is certainly not excluded. But I think the kind of work that my noble friend has in mind is too large in scale, and requires too much preliminary planning, to be embraced to any large extent within this programme.
LORD GREENWOOD OF ROSSENDALE: My Lords, further to the noble Earl's previous question, will the Government consider extending the boundaries of some of the intermediate areas to include places like Newton Abbot, which I understand is outside the intermediate area but which, nevertheless, has a very high level of unemployment at the present time?
LORD SANDFORD: My Lords, I am glad to take note of that point.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: I should be a curmudgeon not to thank the noble Lord for his Statement. Nevertheless, in future may I ask the noble Lord not to grasp any figure that comes into his head, or is stuck on his paper by a"Think Tank "? He said that the expenditure is three times greater. Only the other day I drew a chart of a part of our expenditure in some of the areas which reached £1,016 million. Three times more than what? Winter help? We had no need of winter help because we had full em-employment.
LORD HANKEY: My Lords, would it be in order to press the Government to incorporate in these measures arrangements to include the infrastructure of approach roads to our ports with a view to decreasing the congestion which is now a great embarrassment to our exporters?
LORD SANDFORD: My Lords, that is certainly the kind of scheme that can be considered.
LORD FERRIER: My Lords, in the light of the Minister's indication in a recent Statement of the importance of by-passing centres of population and historic towns, in his discussions with local authorities will he bear in mind that this is a very important and an accepted matter in the whole pattern of our road system for the future?
LORD SANDFORD: Yes, certainly, my Lords. But we must try to distinguish between this Statement, which is concerned with certain relatively minor works to be put in hand and accelerated in the development and intermediate areas within the next eighteen months, and the announcement relating to the next phase of the trunk road programme which was concerned with the whole country and spread over ten years.
LORD POPPLEWELL: My Lords, where local authorities are being asked to undertake this additional public work, would the noble Lord say whether the cost involved will be borne by the local ratepayers, or whether there will be an additional sum granted from the central Government to the local authorities in order to meet the cost involved?
LORD SANDFORD: The additional cost, in terms of loan charges, will be taken into account at the next biennial review of the rate support grant. There will be loan charges which have to be faced and taken into consideration. As the noble Lord will appreciate, the scheme runs to March, 1973, and the full cost of the capital programme does not have to be met until then; and so he will see that this burden is not all that large, although I agree with the noble Lord that it has to be reckoned with.
LORD BERNSTEIN: My Lords, I dislike pressing the noble Earl but he has not answered the questions of my noble friend Lord Greenwood of Rossendale,

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or even the questions I put to him. If his decision is not to answer to-day but to write his reply, I will accept that. Otherwise, I hope there will be an answer at some time to the questions which have been put to him, which no doubt he will be able to read to-morrow in Hansard.
LORD SANDFORD: My Lords, could the noble Lord say which part of his question I have not answered, and I would be happy to try to do so?
LORD BERNSTEIN: My Lords, I will see whether I can read my own writing. One of the questions put was: What would be the expenditure from September until March? What effect will the expenditure have on the unemployment figures? What consultations have there been with the firms who will carry out the work? What consultation has taken place with local authorities? What additional expenditure would there be this winter over that of last winter? I think that those were the questions put co the noble Lord.
LORD SANDFORD: My Lords, I am neither a prophet nor an Earl—only a Baron—and with limited powers of clairvoyance. I think I answered the question by explaining that, because we are only just embarking on consultations about the detailed form these programmes will take, it is not possible to answer that kind of question at this stage.
LORD PARGITER: My Lords, would not the noble Lord agree that it would have been better to have had some consultation with the local authority associations before this Statement, instead of going into consultation afterwards with a preconceived programme? The local authority associations might have brought forward much better ideas for spending this money than are put forward now.
LORD SANDFORD: My Lords, the details of the programme are not preconceived. We are embarking on consultation with local authorities with an open mind about which items should go to make up the programme.
LORD LEATHERLAND: My Lords, the noble Lord knows that I always like to be helpful. Does he not think it would be a good idea to bring forward the date for starting the construction of the Foulness
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airport? Because that would give an enormous amount of employment to the very large number of people who are out of work in that area.
LORD SANDFORD: My Lords, that may be, but I think the date to bring forward now is that for reconsideration of the Industrial Relations Bill.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BILL
4.33 p.m.
Report stage resumed.
LORD COOPER OF STOCKTON HEATH: My Lords, after all this time, all I wanted to put was a fairly simple question. My noble friend Lord Stow Hill spoke about the emergency situation, and deplored the authority in the Bill for the Secretary of State to seek an order from the Industrial Court. The questions that were put related to whether, in the event of the Court's giving an order, it would be ultra vires for either House of Parliament to discuss the merit of the situation.
There is another side of this issue which worries me, and about which I should like to put a question, which is this. If an order is given against a trade union to desist from strike action, on the ground of emergency or the question of good health, and the union quite properly feels that the order is unreasonable and disobeys it, as I understand it the only court which could adjudicate on that question, if sanctions were applied against the union, would be the Industrial Court. The point I am raising is the unfairness of the Industrial Court in first of all making a decision and subsequently sitting in judgment against a union which disregards that decision.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: My Lords, if the noble Lord is not going to answer that little point directly, I am now going to have mercy on the House, because of the long Statements we have had, and cut my speech down to about a quarter of what it otherwise would have been. I consider this Part of the Bill, with its eight vital clauses which we shall be dealing with, to represent the hinge of British democracy. Here the democratic rights of unions are being tampered with—and I say this quietly, understandingly,

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and without emotion. I beg noble Lords opposite to study this clause carefully before they push it through, and to consider the situation which would result from its implementation. Having listened to my noble friend Lord Stow Hill, who spoke so eloquently, quietly, constructively and cogently, I consider he put forward an unanswerable argument why my noble friend's Amendment should be accepted. We are putting too much power into the hands of individuals.
What have we done in this Bill? What are we doing in Part 8? First, we are putting crippling restrictions on official strikes. Secondly, we are effectively prohibiting sympathetic strikes, and the Minister can invoke Clause 138 without appealing to Parliament if he wishes to take action. Thirdly, we have an effective prohibition on unofficial strikes. Fourthly, we can make illegal all strikes in nationalised industries because we can say that the services concerned are absolutely vital to the safety and security of the nation. Fifthly, we can make illegal all unofficial strikes by action taken under Part 8 and this clause. We can clip the power of shop stewards; we have done it already, and we have clipped the power of local union officials. This is after the whole system has been worked out over a century of trial and error in a particularly British manner.
When I hear noble Lords citing examples from the United States of America it upsets me, because I have been in America when bitter strikes have taken place in Detroit and elsewhere. To ape the industrial systems of the United States of America is a retrogressive step for a nation which gave birth to the British trade union movement. I remember making a speech on Second Reading urging this House not to be panicked into action which it might be sorry about years later. There may be another Government of a different political persuasion. There may be a Government which is more abrasive than the present Government—though that would be difficult—and if it were to make use of these powers I think of the chaos which could he created. I recall what I saw in South Wales in the 1921 strikes and the 1926 strikes when, despite the bitterness, hunger and misery, there were a sense of humour and a sense of understanding
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between the police and the strikers. We are going to lose all that by trying to put on paper things which can never be satisfactorily put on paper or in a Bill. We are setting up a system of society controlled by civil servants and trade union ballots. Nobody can contradict that statement because that is the general effect of this Bill.
My eighth point is that we are interfering with rules which the unions have built up to discipline people. Civil servants, lawyers, doctors, the B.M.A., have their own internal"club"rules. Why should not the trade union movement have its own internal"club"rules? It has not been venomous, and it has not been built up for victimisation. Again, we are interfering, or trying to interfere, with the closed shop union, and God knows what we have now invented—it is a maverick system of trade unionism—to try to get an answer to the closed shop question. My tenth point is that lawyers, not unions, are now to be called in to control so-called restrictive practices and to solve demarcation problems. The situation will be a bonanza for young lawyers who have just qualified. They will not have a clue what they are talking about as regards industry—I have met them. Later on they may come to this House as noble Lords and as judges; but Heaven forbid that at the beginning of their careers these young men looking for briefs should step in to the virile, bristling, industrial entity that we call the trade union movement in times of strike or in times of differences.
I ask the Minister to listen carefully to the two cogent speeches which have been made by my noble friend on the Front Bench and by my noble friend Lord Stow Hill, who put forward his point unemotionally and appealingly. My eleventh point is this—and I have reduced my speech to four minutes. Under this Bill, employers can invent splinter and company unions. Spencerism par excellence can now come into the British system of trade unionism, and those of us who lived through Spencerism and know what it meant, know what a tragedy it was and how it upset industry and the management side. Practical assistance from employers is to be fostered at the expense of democratic unions, and noble Lords on both sides of this House, and

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directors and others outside are not asking for this venomous, this Draconic legislation—the noble Lord opposite is correcting me—that is being put forward. The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, stands there like Horatius on the bridge. He is working very hard, and sometimes, being Etruscan, I can hardly fail to cheer him. Sometimes he needs a few more colleagues to protect the bridge because he has been alone, and I do not want him to throw himself with his armour into the River Tiber. But I am asking him, before he turns us down, to take back this Amendment and think about it, because this matter is the hinge of the democratic movement of the trade unions.
LORD SHINWELL: My Lords, after the succession of eloquent perorations to which we have listened I venture to put a simple point, because there is no need to go round and round the mulberry bush on this issue. What is it about? The question is whether the Secretary of State, who is mentioned in this clause, apprehending an industrial dispute of a substantial character calculated to disturb the life of the nation, should seek one of two alternatives. The first is to consult his Cabinet colleagues as to whether the Government should ask the consent of Her Majesty to declare a State of Emergency. The second is to consult Parliament if he merely apprehends an industrial dispute of what might be regarded as a normal character—one concerning a particular industry or a sector of industry—before he approaches the Industrial Court with an order to proceed as directed in the clause. That is the issue.
But the further question is: what should be the method of consultation? Should he go to Parliament with an Order in Council which calls for an Affirmative Resolution which obviously cannot be amended? There could be a Motion by the Opposition, or by those who were opposed to the submission made by the Secretary of State, calling for the rejection of the Order, but no amendment could he moved. That is one method that he might employ. The other method is what might be described as of a traditional character; namely, apprehending a dispute, he would go to the other place—and then the matter would come to your Lordships' House, if necessary—to report and indicate that, in his judgment, the matter should go to arbitration or that some other method of
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conciliation should be adopted, subjecting himself to questions in the other place and having a decision reached by the Government. We have had experience of that, and the experience which I have in mind should be retailed to your Lordships' House.
Not very long ago there was a seamen's dispute which lasted over a period of seven weeks. It disrupted industry to a substantial degree and affected the economy of the country and, indeed, the policy of the Labour Government. The Minister of Labour at the time—I need not mention the name—declined to intervene. The dispute dragged on. Those of us who were concerned because it was a seamen's dispute consulted the Seamen's Union and the employers, the Shipping Federation, with a view to conciliation. We also sought to prevail upon the Minister of Labour at the time that he should intervene, but, over and over again—and this is a point of substance—he declined to intervene, because he said that it was not the business of the Minister of Labour to intervene unless he was asked, and the dispute dragged on with consequences that are familiar to every Member of your Lordships' House.
All we are entitled to ask for is this. If the Secretary of State, in his judgment, considers that a dispute is likely to occur which would disrupt the economy of the country, he should exercise that judgment by asking the Cabinet to use the emergency powers. But he has the alternative of going to the other place, making a submission, subjecting himself to questions, collecting the voices on both sides in the other place, and then taking what action is appropriate. If the noble Lord could answer the questions which have been put by my noble friends with a great wealth of detail and argument, and tell us what is in his mind and what he would expect the Secretary of State to do in the circumstances that we envisage, it would help us to come to a decision.
4.49 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, we have had a dicussion which has been somewhat interrupted, but which, nevertheless, has been of considerable importance. Reference has been made to the Emergency Powers Acts, and I think the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, treated them

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as an alternative to the present procedures. The noble Lord, Lord Champion, suggested that by these proposals in the Bill we are doing something which is quite different from the Emergency Powers Acts. The first point I should like to make is that the circumstances are certainly not the same. Secondly, we were talking just now about Parliament passing a Bill conferring certain powers on the Secretary of State, and it is perhaps interesting to look back at the powers that were conferred by the original Emergency Powers Act, under which Her Majesty declares that an emergency exists. The original Act conferred on the Government powers to make regulations which would be laid before Parliament. They would not continue in force for more than seven days unless a Resolution of both Houses was made, but they would, of course, come into force at once.
The Proclamation of Emergency itself had to be laid before Parliament, and the Act provided—and the noble Lord agreed that perhaps his Amendment was somewhat defective in this respect—for the summoning of Parliament within five days if it was not in session at the time. I think it is important to recognise the enormous powers that were conferred in that way, because regulations made under the Act could confer or impose on the Secretary of State or other Government Department
" such powers and duties as Her Majesty may deem necessary for the preservation of the peace, for securing and regulating the supply and distribution of food, water, fuel, light, and other necessities, for maintaining the means of transit or locomotion, and for any other purposes essential to the public safety and the life of the community, and may make such provisions incidental to the powers aforesaid as may appear to Her Majesty to be required for making the exercise of those powers effective."
Then it went on, as the noble Lord quoted:
" Provided also that no such regulation shall make it an offence for any person or persons to take part in a strike, or peacefully to persuade any other person or persons to take part in a strike."
It is important to recognise what the powers under the emergency procedures of the present Bill are. In the first place, the Secretary of State is to apply to the Industrial Court. He is to make an
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application to the Industrial Court where it appears to him that there is or is likely to be in the near future,
" an industrial dispute, industrial action, consisting of a strike, any irregular industrial action short of a strike ",
and that that strike, if it came about, would be likely
" to be gravely injurious to the national economy, to imperil national security or to create a serious risk of public disorder, or… to endanger the lives of a substantial number of persons, or expose a substantial number of persons to serious risk of disease or personal injury."
Nobody could say that that was not an emergency. The essence of dealing with an emergency, surely, must be speed. The noble Lord asks that this should be done only with a Resolution of Parliament. My Lords, it might be necessary to bring Parliament together again—this is not provided for—but an emergency of this sort of character could only deepen this delay, so that is a very good reason in itself for conferring powers of this character on the Secretary of State and ensuring that they are processed as quickly as possible. But I think I should point out to noble Lords something which has not yet been mentioned, and that is that the Secretary of State is to make this application only if it appears to him
" that, having regard to all the circumstances of the industrial dispute, it would be conducive to a settlement of it by negotiation, conciliation or arbitration if the industrial action were discontinued or deferred."
It is for that purpose, with the settlement of a strike in mind, that he has to make his application.
The first point, therefore, is that an emergency situation may be one that is not covered by the Emergency Powers Act because there is no power in that Act to prevent anyone from persuading any person or persons to take part in a strike. So there is a gap there; and this is one way in which the gap could be filled in an emergency situation. In making an application the Secretary of State has to specify the persons
" appearing to the Secretary of State to be responsible for calling, organising, procuring or financing the strike ",
and it is those persons alone that any order can bind. To answer the question which the noble Lord, Lord Cooper, put to me, there is no question here of sitting in judgment on the trade unions.

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The order is made on specified persons; and, of course, it is only if they disregard that order that, as always happens when a court order is disregarded, they will come before the court.
My Lords, the second point that I should come to, I think, is this. There is a curious constitutional position which could arise if a Resolution of Parliament were required. Suppose that a Resolution is passed by Parliament authorising the Secretary of State to apply to the Court. There could be an appeal from the Court to the Court of Appeal, and thence to the House of Lords; and if the appeal were against a decision to grant a restraint order, your Lordships here would be in the position, in effect, of adjudicating on a Resolution which your Lordships had made earlier. So this would go full circle.
LORD SHINWELL: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lord? Is he trying to make a distinction between a Resolution presented to the other place, either by the Government themselves or by the Opposition, and an Order in Council, which is submitted by the Government and, maybe, calls for an Affirmative Resolution without possibility of amendment?
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I am not making any distinction at all. I am talking about what happens if, under this Amendment, a Resolution of both Houses were required before an application could be made to the Court: because this is what the Amendment is about. I am simply saying that if that happened the Secretary of State would be authorised to make the application, the Court would decide on that application, there could he an appeal and the thing might come round full circle again to the House of Lords. This may not be a point of very great importance, but it shows the kind of difficulty, the kind of crossing of the wires, that this suggestion would bring about.
The noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, asked me about my experience in Parliament, and I would say this to him. My recollection throughout of the treatment by Parliament of industrial disputes is that it is one of the greatest restraint. If Resolutions of this character were brought forward to the House, what would be the result? I am quite certain that, at a stage like this and under
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a procedure like this, they would not be appropriate. I believe that it is much more likely that in an emergency there would be pressure from both Houses of Parliament to make use of this procedure, rather than to stop it. This is a matter in which the Secretary of State has responsibility, and the Government have a responsibility, for ensuring the health and the safety of the population and the health of the national economy; and they are answerable for their actions to Parliament.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: My Lords—
LORD DRUMALBYN: Will the noble Lord allow me to continue? The noble Lord asked: while the application is before the Court, will it be possible to debate this in Parliament? The issue of whether there is an emergency in this sense and whether the application for an order should be granted could not, I imagine, be debated in Parliament. He asked my personal opinion, and that is it.
But, of course, those are not the only issues. The Secretary of State will also be responsible for deciding whether, having regard to all the circumstances of the industrial dispute, it will be conducive to a settlement of it by negotiation, conciliation or arbitration if the industrial action were discontinued or deferred. This is not a justiciable issue. This is a matter on which I am sure it will be right for the Secretary of State to be questioned in Parliament. But can anyone imagine that an application will be made without the Secretary of State coming to Parliament?
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Yes.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I have vivid recollections on many occasions of the Secretary of State, as Lord Shinwell was saying, gradually being pressured all the time to take some further action. This is what happens. It is quite the reverse of what noble Lords are suggesting in this Amendment. When there is an emergency brewing, Parliament will be aware of it, the Secretary of State will be making statements to Parliament in the ordinary way. Then he will make up his mind to make an application and I have no doubt that he will carry the whole of Parliament with him.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: My Lords, I do not want to be testy and irrascible, but this is the nub of the problem. Parliament will give way; but they will have been presented with a fait accompli. The Minister will have already made his decision and told the Estates-General or the Reichstag, whichever then exists,"I have made the decision." There will be no possibility of changing that decision. Am I right in this? I stand to be corrected.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, there is no possiblity of changing the decision to make an application to the Court; but it will then be for the Court to look at the circumstances and to give a decision. May I say also that when an Order in Council is made for proclaiming an emergency, again the Government announce this to Parliament and lay it before Parliament. It does not need a Resolution that they should do so. The regulations have to be presented and will lapse unless they are passed within seven days. But that is another matter; that is the counterpart of the matter going before the Court.
My Lords, this is a very reasonable method of proceeding. When there is an emergency the Government are entitled to the support of Parliament to deal with that emergency. In my experience, when crises of this sort arise Governments do get the support of Parliament. It would merely give rise to delay and to some confusion if this Amendment were accepted.
LORD PARGITER: My Lords, the assumption behind what the noble Lord has said is that the Industrial Court will be the"Yes-man"for the Secretary of State. Let us assume that the Industrial Court is not the"Yes-man "; let us assume that the Court says,"No, this is not a national emergency." Therefore they will throw it out. Is that decision final? Or will the Secretary of State then go to the Cabinet and say,"I must have emergency powers and get an Emergency Powers resolution because the Industrial Court will not do what I want." If the Industrial Court says,"No! We are not prepared to give an order ", is that the end of the matter?
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I was trying to explain that the Emergency
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Powers Act does not cover the whole of the field. There is a gap here. But if the Industrial Court would not make an order, that is certainly the end of that particular case; an order would not be made against the person specified in the application.
LORD CHAMPION: My Lords, the noble Lord has admitted that these clauses deal with an emergency situation. I say, and I think that those on this side will say, that in any emergency situation Parliament should be consulted straight away; that any matter of this sort should be brought before Parliament without a moment's delay and Parliament should be expected to adjudicate to some extent upon it and make a decision. This would be done under my Amendment but not under the procedure in the Bill. We may have a situation in which the Secretary of State will take his decision to go to the Court on, say, August 7, when Parliament is not sitting. Parliament then will not be sitting to consider the matter until some 80 or 90 days have passed. That is not consulting Parliament. That is not making sure that Parliament is being informed even of what is taking place. I am positive that this is quite the wrong way of setting about this job.
My noble friends asked questions that were not answered. Lord Cooper asked a simple question: if an order were given against a union and the union breached the order, will not the same court impose the sanction? It seems to me that he was entitled to an answer. I am sure the noble Lord will agree that the answer is, that it will be the same court operating in both cases.
LORD DRUMALBYN: Yes, my Lords. I said so.
LORD CHAMPION: My Lords, I am sorry I did not hear the answer. The other point, which I think deserves some special attention, was, how much of the procedure becomes sub judice and therefore prevents question and answer and decisions in Parliament. For how long would this last? That was the question put; and I am not sure that it was answered clearly.
I am sure that we shall never get together on this. The only thing that we

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can do is to register our protest against the clause itself and, in particular, against this ignoring of Parliament by the Party opposite in relation to something which, as the noble Lord has admitted, is an emergency situation.
5.8 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 92A) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 62; Not-Contents, 114.

CONTENTS

Addison, V.

Evans of Hungershall, L.

Popplewell, L.

Airedale, L.

Gaitskell, Bs.

Raglan, L.

Archibald, L.

Gardiner, L.

Ritchie-Calder, L.

Ardwick, L.

Garnsworthy, L. [Teller.]

Royle, L.

Beaumont of Whitley, L.

Greenwood of Rossendale, L.

Rusholme, L.

Bernstein, L.

Henderson, L.

Sainsbury, L.

Beswick, L.

Henley, L.

Segal, L.

Birk, Bs.

Hilton of Upton, L. [Teller.]

Shackleton, L.

Blyton, L.

Hoy, L.

Shinwell, L.

Brockway, L.

Hughes, L.

Silkin, L.

Brown, L.

Tanner, L.

Slater, L.

Buckinghamshire, E.

Kennet, L.

Sorensen, L.

Burntwood, L.

Kilbracken, L.

Stow Hill, L.

Carnock, L.

Leatherland, L.

Summerskill, Bs.

Champion, L.

Lindgren, L.

Tanlaw, L.

Cooper of Stockton Heath, L.

McLeavy, L.

Taylor of Mansfield, L.

Crook, L.

Maelor, L.

Walston, L.

Davies of Leek, L.

Mais, L.

Wells-Pestell, L.

Diamond, L.

Moyle, L.

White, Bs.

Douglas of Barloch, L.

Pargiter, L.

Wootton of Abinger, Bs.

Douglass of Cleveland, L.

Platt, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Ailwyn, L.

Dundee, E.

McFadzean, L.

Albemarle, E.

Dunleath, L.

Macleod of Borve, Bs.

Amory, V.

Ebbisham, L.

Mancroft, L.

Atholl, D.

Eccles, V.

Margadale, L.

Balerno, L.

Elliot of Harwood, Bs.

Masscreene and Ferrard, V.

Barnby, L.

Emmet of Amberley, Bs.

Milverton, L.

Belhaven and Stenton, L.

Essex, E.

Molson, L.

Belstead, L.

Falkland, V.

Monck, V.

Berkeley, Bs.

Ferrers, E.

Monckton of Brenchley, V.

Bessborough, E.

Ferrier, L.

Morrison, L.

Bledisloe, V.

Fortcscue, E.

Mowbray and Stourton, L. [Teller.]

Boothby, L.

Fraser of Lonsdale, L.

Boston, L.

Gage, V.

Northchurch, Bs.

Bourne, L.

Garner, L.

Nugent of Guildford, L.

Brentford, V.

Goschen, V. [Teller.]

Oakshott, L.

Brooke of Cumnor, L.

Greenway, L.

Rankeillour, L.

Brooke of Ystradfellte, Bs.

Grenfell, L.

Robbins, L.

Burton, L.

Gridley, L.

Roberthall, L.

Camoys, L.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

Rochdale, V.

Cawley, L.

Hailes, L.

Rothermere, V.

Clifford of Chudleigh, L.

Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Rothes, E.

Clwyd, L.

St. Aldwyn, E.

Coleraine, L.

Hankey, L.

St. Just, L.

Coleridge, L.

Hatherton, L.

Salisbury, M.

Colgrain, L.

Hives, L.

Sandford, L.

Colville of Culross, V.

Hood, V.

Selkirk, E.

Cornwallis, L.

Hurcomb, L.

Sherfield, L.

Courtown, E.

Hylton-Foster, Bs.

Somers, L.

Craigavon, V.

Ilford, L.

Strang, L.

Cranbrook, E.

Jellicoe, E. (L. Privy Seal.)

Strange, L.

Crathorne, L.

Kemsley, V.

Strange of Knokin, Bs.

Cromartie, E.

Killearn, L.

Strathclyde, L.

Davcntry, V.

Kilmany, L.

Tweedsmuir, L.

Davidson, V.

Kilmarnock, L.

Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, Bs.

de Clifford, L.

Latymer, L.

Vivian, L.

Dcnham, L.

Lauderdale, E.

Ward of Witley, V.

Derwent, L.

Long, V.

Windlesham, L.

Digby, L.

Lothian, M.

Wolverton, L.

Drumalbyn, L.

MacAndrew, L.

Resolved in the negative, and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.

5.16 p.m.
LORD STOW HILL LORD STOW HILL moved Amendment No. 92F:
Page 100, line 9, at end insert—
(" ( ) For the purposes of this section, an interruption in the supply of goods or in the provision of services shall not be deemed to be likely to be gravely injurious to the national economy by reason only of the fact that it will cause or is likely to cause substantial loss to or interruption in the activities of any one or more public or private undertakings.")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment proceeds upon the footing that it is the Court, and not Parliament, which is called upon to take a critical decision in a situation of this kind. Previously I have ventured to stress what I think is agreed upon on both sides of the House—the importance of not putting a court of law, in particular one over which a High Court Judge presides, in a situation in which it is called upon to undertake functions hardly appropriate for a judicial body. If a judge is asked to decide what comes broadly within the description of matters of public policy, obviously his decision may provoke strong disagreement, and there is always the risk that over a period of time judicial decisions may become misunderstood and, if the worst eventuate, even suspect. That might happen although judges do, as they always do, their uttermost to discharge their judicial duty with complete and absolute impartiality.
The submission I make to the House, which is one I have previously made, is that it is the duty of the Legislature to try to avoid in its legislation any situation which might put the judges in a position of that sort. That consideration, I submit, arises in this particular case, because if one looks at Clauses 138 and 139, what do we find they provide? The Secretary of State is in the first place empowered to decide to make an application to the Industrial Court. The conditions in which he may make that application are set out in subsection (2) of Clause 138—of course also in the preceding subsection, but the critical conditions are those in subsection (2). He must be of the opinion that the situation may be productive of consequences—I summarise—
" gravely injurious to the national economy ", likely
" to imperil national security or to create a serious risk of public disorder ",
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to quote the condition specified in the former of the two paragraphs of subsection (2).
My Lords, when we were discussing the last Amendment we argued whether that type of decision is one which should ultimately rest with Parliament or whether it should be taken away from Parliament and be transferred to the courts. If it rests with Parliament, the two sides of each House are there to express strong views and to embark on highly controversial ground, and so long as the principles of reasonable discussion and the order of the House are complied with, fullest and most vigorous debate can be centred upon the decision. The Minister can be roundly taken to task and the public can be fully satisfied that there has been a robust and vigorous statement of the position from all points of view. The difficulty in transferring that sort of decision to the courts is obvious. The conditions in which the discussion takes place are wholly different, and the result might be, unhappily, the sort of result I have been trying to describe.
My Lords, in order to try to improve the situation (upon the assumption that your Lordships' House has finally decided that it is to be the Court and not Parliament which is to be entrusted with the making of this decision) we are endeavouring by the drafting which appears in this Amendment to achieve some slightly greater precision as to the conditions which the Court must find present before it can make an order. The Secretary of State makes his application to the Court and under Clause 139 the Court makes an order:
"…subject to its being satisfied on the evidence that there are sufficient grounds for believing that the condition specified in subsection (2) "
of the preceding section
" are fulfilled."
If one looks back at those conditions, or at any rate at the one with which we are immediately concerned, I submit that they are far too vague. They impose a very difficult and invidious task on the judge to whom the application is made and the appointed members of the Court.
I focus simply on the first one:
" To be gravely injurious to the national economy."

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That is a phrase so wide in its import that in the very nature of things it would be very difficult to give a confident answer,"Yes"or,"No"about whether the consequences of industrial action are likely, in that sense, to be gravely injurious to the national economy. What is the standard that one is to apply? What are the questions which the Secretary of State has to ask the Court, and then the Court must ask itself if he makes an application? In a sense, industrial action does harm even if it is on a very small scale; but it may be counter-productive of very great good if it produces a more equitable situation between management and the workers. Work may progress better and a feeling of injustice may be eliminated. But to what stage has one to go before one can predicate that a given situation brought about by industrial action has become gravely injurious to the national economy?
I do not claim great merit, or indeed any merit, for the drafting of the Amendment. It is designed to suggest to the Government a possible method which—if they think it worth further examination—they might like to consider with their expert advisers. The drafting is designed to say that if all you can say about a situation in which industrial action is taking place, or about to take place, is that its consequence is, or is likely to be, a substantial loss to one or a number of public or private undertakings, and you cannot predicate anything more sinister, of itself that would not be enough to enable either the Secretary of State, in making up his mind, or the Court, when it hears the application, to come to the conclusion that the situation may be productive of consequences gravely injurious to the national economy. I am sure that there are a number of defects in that drafting. As I say, it is designed only to embody a suggestion which I hope the Government may think worthy of further exploration.
I feel confident that all Ministers and your Lordships' House as a whole may agree with me in the objective; that it is extremely important to try to be as precise as one can in the formulation of the criteria which must be observed before the Secretary of State moves and the Court has to form a decision. So
402
I can summarise the argument by saying that my objective is to try to get some clearer idea of the sort of situation which the Secretary of State, and thereafter the Court, must have in mind before a conclusion is reached that the expression,"gravely injurious to the national economy"is brought into operation. The approach is to say that if you look at a given situation and all you can predicate with that situation is that the industrial action will, or may, produce substantial loss to a number of undertakings whether private or public, and you cannot say something more, that is not enough. If you look at that situation—I give an example—against a background of a likely strain on the balance of payments, or some situation of that sort, then you have something additional to the fact that loss is, or may be, occasioned to a number of undertakings. You may then well conclude that the situation is one which is likely to be gravely injurious to the national economy. But you must be able, so the Amendment would provide, to say that that situation is something more than merely that loss is going to be occasioned. There must be some background, some other consequence, which may be brought about and to which you can point which affects the national interest. That is the object of the proposal. It would be presumptuous to think that I have the drafting right. I limit my endeavour to what I hope is an acceptable purpose; namely, to make a suggestion which the Government may think worthy of further consideration.
LORD ROBBINS: My Lords, would it be in order if at this juncture I asked the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, whether he can furnish an elucidation of the significance that he attaches to the words"or more"in this Amendment? To me,"one or more"means one to infinity. If it means that, it might be a blocking restriction on the procedure of the Court. If it means a few, I can see the point that he is trying to make.
LORD STOW HILL: My Lords, I am grateful for that question and I will try to answer it. If you take the words"one or more"literally, they might mean any number, a very large number. I am not suggesting that the Amendment is perfect, but even if you have, 10 or 20 important undertakings which will suffer

403
substantial loss, that, of itself, will not justify you in saying that the words"gravely injurious"are fulfilled. But suppose you had 20 undertakings that were occasioned loss, it is then very likely—this is substantially behind the drafting—that there would be some further consequence to which you could point. Suppose there is that sort of situation; suppose that there is a run on the pound or a strain on our balance of payments; if you had industrial action which occasioned substantial loss to 20, 30 or 40 big undertakings in the country then you could say,"This is imposing a serious burden, and now we are in a position to say that a situation has arisen which is gravely injurious "—and so on.
The critical words in the drafting are:"by reason only of the fact ". If all you can show is a loss, that is not enough. The loss very often produces some ulterior consequence, and if you can point to that, it may well be that the words are satisfied. My Lords, I emphasise that I am not claiming that this is a perfect draft. It is simply thinking. I hope it may suggest a way to something more precise than this indefinite"gravely injurious to the national economy ".
5.30 p.m.
LORD SLATER: My Lords, when listening to my noble friend moving this Amendment, I gathered that he was seeking to remove the responsibility for decision away from this particular Court. One can visualise that the First Secretary within a particular Government Department, who is responsible to his Minister, may have been reading the Press reports regarding certain undertakings operating within the country where there is every possibility of something going amiss, and a likelihood of a stoppage of labour, or a strike, or something of that description. Immediately that occurs, what happens, as many people who have held responsibility within Government know, is that a conference is held with Ministers, and with some of their background people from executive positions. Their advice is sought, and the Minister begins to probe them with questions and to seek answers.
I take it that what he would then seek to do, after he has examined the situation would be to come to certain conclusions. One of those conclusions, probably,
404
would be that he would seek to have an interview with the Prime Minister—not so much with the Cabinet, but with the Prime Minister, as the principal Minister of the Government—to whom he would pass on the information that he had had this inquiry—because the Prime Minister would no doubt be kept informed by his own Department as to the reports that had appeared in the Press to which I have referred. Naturally, with the national Press as it is, circulated throughout the country, there could be types of disturbance originating from those reports. Therefore the Minister has to find some form of solution to try to offset types of criticism which might be ventilated and which could be most damaging to the situation that had been talked so much about within the columns of the national Press. He therefore has this interview with the Prime Minister. He airs his views, and eventually the Prime Minister may say to him:"Well, what do you intend to do? Do you think that this is a case which ought to be referred to the Industrial Court? Ought the Court to take the decision? ". The attitude of the Minister may be that that responsibility ought to be passed on to that Court.
My noble friend, if I understood him aright, said that the Court if forced into the position whereby it must arrive at a decision, would be as impartial as it was possible to be in seeking to arrive at a right and proper decision. But, my Lords, would it be right, in the circumstances, and under this Amendment that has been proposed by my noble and learned friend for such a case to be passed on to that Court? After all, you can pick up newspapers, you can have your journalists, and even they can be well outside the pale when they predict what will happen but never does happen: the situation never comes to the type of fruition they believed it would come to in the circumstances.
5.34 p.m.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE (LORD BELSTEAD): My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, in moving this Amendment submitted that the Court will be in a difficult position because their decision will be based on subsection (2)(a) and (b) of this clause.

405
But I felt that the noble Lord was rather easily disregarding two factors. The first is the factor which your Lordships have just debated on the last Amendment, that is the Government's stand that speed is vitally necessary in these matters. The Government are submitting (and have secured the agreement of your Lordships on the last Amendment) that that is not a matter for Parliament but a matter which should go directly to the Court.
The second point which I felt that perhaps the noble Lord was to some extent disregarding was the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, at the Committee stage of the Bill, that certain stages would have been passed through. I agree with Lord Slater, but I reached a different conclusion; that is, that stages will very likely have been passed through in a matter of this sort; that undoubtedly the matter will have been in the Press, unless it has come out of a clear blue sky; that undoubtedly there will have been, let us trust, negotiations; let us believe that there will have been attempts at conciliation by the officers of the Department; and that indeed a good deal will already have been known about the situation before in fact it goes to the Court. I concede at once to the noble Lord that"gravely injurious to the national economy"is a wide phrase, but I am suggesting to the noble Lord that it will be a situation where undoubtedly certain matters will have been clarified by the time the matter reaches the N.I.R.C.
My Lords, if I may now come specifically to the noble Lord's Amendment, the criteria in Clause 138(2), against which the effects of industrial action are assumed, are stringent, and I admit to your Lordships that they are intended to be stringent. Your Lordships will no doubt have noticed that in fact these criteria make no mention of a substantial loss (which I take from the Amendment to be a financial loss) to any individual undertaking. Once again, it is not the intention of the Bill that the reference should be limited in this way. Whether at some point in time the loss to an individual undertaking may be considered to be gravely injurious to the national economy or would satisfy any of the other criteria, would be a matter for the Industrial Court. That is as may be, but at any rate I submit that one thing is clear; that is, that the emergency criteria could not be involved unless
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that loss was likely to have one of the effects set out in subsection (2) of Clause 138. Therefore, with respect to the noble Lord, I feel that the use of the words in this Amendment to some extent confuses the intentions of the clause as printed in the Bill. Although I shared the uncertainty of the noble Lord, Lord Robbins, I did not feel that the explanation which the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, gave—which of course was perfectly accurate, as it always is from the noble Lord—none the less took our discussion a great deal further forward.
My Lords, the same argument applies to the reference in the Amendment to interruption of the activities of an undertaking, but quite apart from difficulties of interpretation of the Amendment, there are stronger objections to the inclusion of this proposal. Your Lordships will be aware of a number of undertakings, particularly in the public sector, where interruption of activities on any substantial scale may lead immediately to an emergency situation as we are trying to define in this clause. One can think immediately of all the public undertakings and the various health services, to mention just a few. The noble Lord has referred to the inadequate drafting of the Bill—
LORD STOW HILL: With respect I referred to my own inadequate drafting; not that of the Bill.
LORD BELSTEAD: My Lords, I am sorry. The noble Lord referred to the difficulty of interpreting the drafting of the Bill which his Amendment seeks to improve, but I do not see how the House, looking at the Amendment, can possibly distinguish, in many of these services to which I have just referred, between the effect on the community and the effect on the undertaking when its activities are interrupted. Anyone who has read the opening paragraphs of Mr. Andrew Shonfield's Note of Reservation—I am not talking of his conclusions at all, but his opening paragraphs—would agree that the effects of sudden strike action on services to an increasingly urban population really can be very grave indeed. It is this criterion as it is developed in subsection (2)(a) and (b) which should form the basis of a decision of the Industrial Court, for may I remind your Lordships that the question of whether an emergency situation exists is solely for

407
the discretion of the Industrial Court, and it is for the Court alone to decide whether or not the criteria in subsection (2) of this clause are satisfied. For those reasons, which I hope may have persuaded the noble Lord, I must ask your Lordships if you will to resist this Amendment.
LORD STOW HILL: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for his reply. May I say first in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Slater, that my object was not to withdraw the matter from the Court but to try to formulate with some more precision the question which the Court would have to answer. That was my objective.
In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, if I were a learned judge (which I am not) and were called upon to answer the questions about which he would have to be satisfied from the evidence under Clause 139, I should not find myself so worried when asked, Yea or Nay, whether the interruption was"likely to expose a substantial number of persons to serious risk of disease or personal injury ", or if asked whether the interruption would really"endanger the lives of a substantial number of persons ", or"was likely to imperil national security ", or"likely to create a serious risk of public disorder ". On all these questions I would have before me evidence to which I could address myself. But I should be very worried if called upon to answer the question, whether the interruption would be"gravely injurious to the national economy ". I find it difficult to know what evidence I should need to have to answer that general and vague question.
The apprehension which I had in moving this Amendment is that it is most undesirable that judges should be called upon to give answers to a general and highly controversial question of that sort—answers which will be dissected and criticised throughout the country and which, over a period of time, may possibly have the result of undermining confidence in the judges. One of the critically important things in the maintenance of our democracy is that everybody should have the utmost confidence in our Judicial Bench. Therefore, speaking from the Opposition Benches, I felt it
408
my duty to call attention to what I think is a risk, and to suggest to the Government a possible way of making any question submitted to the Court more susceptible to a judicial decision. The noble Lord, Lord Belstead, does not commend the Amendment to your Lordships and I do not think I can carry the matter further. Having put my case, I would respectfully ask permission of the House to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, we had a very late start and I do not propose to move Amendment No. 92G and the following five Amendments.
Clause 141 [A pplication to Industrial Court for order for ballot relating to industrial action]:
5.45 p.m.
LORD STOW HILL LORD STOW HILL moved Amendment No. 92N:
Page 103, line 23, leave out (" either or ").
The noble Lord said: I am sorry that I am calling upon the House again so quickly to listen to my argument: that was because there was a sudden cessation of activity since the last Amendment. The objective in this Amendment is similar to that in the last Amendment, although there are some differences. If it were for the convenience of the House, I would acquaint your Lordships that this Amendment goes closely with Amendments Nos. 92Q, R, S, T and U. In Clause 141 the Secretary of State is empowered to approach the Industrial Court for an order, if there are reasons for doubting whether the workers taking part or expected to take part in a strike, were taking part in it in accordance with their wishes and whether they had had an adequate opportunity of indicating their wishes. If one or other of the conditions specified in subsection (1)(a) and (b) of the clause are satisfied, we are thrown back on the conditions we have just been discussing on Clause 138(1)(a).
When we discussed the previous version of this clause on Committee stage, the point was made that it is for the Secretary of State to make a decision whether there are reasons for doubting that the strikers are in favour or not, and if he makes the decision he can approach the Industrial Court. The Court is not asked to confirm or reverse his decision.

409
Its opinion is not relevant on the question whether there is doubt or not. All the Industrial Court is called upon to decide is whether the conditions, or one of them, set out in Clause 138 is present or not.
Noble Lords on this side pointed out that in a situation in which industrial action has started or is about to start, and there is strong feeling on the part of workers in an undertaking that they are not receiving fair treatment in conditions of remuneration—there may have been negotiations going on for a considerable period of time, perhaps in the view of the workers' negotiators protracted unnecessarily and tempers are running high—the Secretary of State is called upon to make a difficult and crucial decision. That being the situation, he may come down and in effect get from the Court, because he thinks there is doubt as to the attitude of the strikers, a decision that there must be a ballot. The ballot has got to take place, and the clauses later on provide that while the ballot is taking place the strike has got to stop. That is not quite accurate: the clauses provide that those who are organising the strike have got to cease organising it and take steps to try to bring it to an end while the ballot is being taken.
The group of clauses is designed to deal with emergency situations in general. I would have submitted to the House that if, with the best will in the world, a Secretary of State takes it upon himself upon his own judgment to say,"I doubt whether the workers really are with this strike or not"and to initiate the action which may result in an order that the organisers of the strike have to stop, not only stop organising it, but have to go out of their way to withdraw instructions to try to bring the strike to an end, instead of that being likely to produce a harmonious conclusion to the trouble it is almost certainly in most cases that one can envisage likely to conduce to precisely the opposite result. It will exacerbate feeling. Those who start out feeling very intensely that they are victims of an injustice, that they have not been fairly met by management, are not going to be mollified by that outside intervention from the Secretary of State. On the contrary, they are going to be infuriated by it.
Then one has all the difficulties that one envisages in this kind of context. Are they going to obey an order of the Court? Well, my Lords, I know that the order does not affect the strikers themselves. It affects those who organise the strike, the officials of the union and so on. But are they then going to be made parties; is the law going to be brought into disrepute; is it going to be resented? That is the last thing that we want to bring about in our country, and I should have thought that that is the sort of consequence which might result if the arrangements are left as they are at present formulated in Clause 141.
In those circumstances, the approach which I would suggest by the drafting which I ventured to put on the Order Paper would have the following result. To begin with, it would mean that the Court would have itself to pronounce upon the question whether the strikers really were with the strike or not—and the wording there is reformulated from the wording in the clause. The clause talks about doubt. There is greater precision in my submission, as to the exact question which, if these Amendments are accepted, the courts would have to pronounce upon by the words which I hope I may read out without taking your Lordships' time unnecessarily. The Amendment 92T substitutes for the words in the clause the following words:
(c) the majority of the workers who are taking part or are expected to take part in the strike or other industrial action are or would be taking part in it against their wishes and have not had an adequate opportunity of indicating their wishes in this respect.")
That would be the matter on which the Court would have to pronounce on some evidence. It would not be left simply to the unchecked judgment of the Secretary of State. That is the first change I seek to introduce.
The other change which I seek to introduce is to paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of Clause 141. Paragraph (b) in its present form provides that it is enough if either of the conditions which are specified in Clause 138 are satisfied. I do not want to go back to them, as that would be taking unnecessary time, but the second change would be that both the conditions must be present. The Court would have to be satisfied that both conditions are present and, furthermore, that

411
the condition as to majority view of workers was also satisfied. All those three requisites would have to be satisfied by evidence before the Court made an order. It is again in an attempt to suggest to the Government a possible change that might obviate the tense situations which I have tried to describe and which would produce a greater likelihood of some harmonious end to a difficult situation, that I have ventured to put down Amendments Nos. 92N, 92Q, 92R, 92S, and 92T. I beg to move.
5.56 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for having explained this series of Amendments so clearly. I have no disagreement with him on what these Amendments mean, but the fact remains that they would completely change the character of the ballot order provision as envisaged in the Bill. The Secretary of State would then be able to apply for a ballot order only if one or other of the two emergency criteria governing a restraint order set out in Clause 138 was satisfied, in addition to the conditions that the effects of industrial action on a particular industry are or are likely to be seriously injurious to the livelihood of a substantial number of workers employed in that industry, and that the majority of those taking part or likely to take part in the individual action would be doing so against their wishes without having had an adequate opportunity to indicate their wishes. In fact, I do not think the noble Lord said one or other. I think he said that all three conditions would have to be satisfied.
We think that this is far too restrictive and we think it is unfair to workers in an industry whose livelihood is likely to be affected by, for example, a serious strike. We believe that occasions may arise when it would be entirely appropriate for the Secretary of State to be able to apply for a ballot order when by itself the effect of a particular course of industrial action gives grounds for believing that the livelihood of a substantial number of workers in that industry may be seriously affected. We also believe that this effect should not by itself be a necessary criterion for a strike ballot application. There may well be situations, particularly in some public services, where industrial action, while not necessarily
412
injurious to the livelihood of workers in a particular industry, is likely to cause grave damage to the interests of the community at large.
I would suggest to your Lordships that it would be absurd to debar the Secretary of State from making his application if he considered that a strike ballot was the necessary course on the grounds that, while the effect of the industrial action might be to cause a national emergency, it could not be shown at the time of the application that the effects of the industrial action were also likely to injure seriously the livelihood of workers in an industry. Yet this would be the effect of the first of the noble Lord's Amendments, as I understand it. So it would restrict the possible uses of the ballot order provisions to an extent that we do not think would accord with requirements.
These Amendments certainly place even more stringent conditions on the powers of the Secretary of State than that. I do not see how the Secretary of State could be called upon to substantiate an application before the Industrial Court at one and the same time that one of the conditions demands positive grounds for believing that the majority of workers taking part, or likely to take part, in the industrial action would be doing so against their wishes, and also that he would have to show that they had not had adequate opportunity to indicate those wishes. Let me put it in this way. If they have had an adequate opportunity to express their wishes, then the Secretary of State will know what those wishes are; if they have not, he cannot possibly know for certain what their wishes are. Hence the words in the Bill,"there are reasons for doubting whether ". That is the very object of those words. But these are the words that the noble Lord's fourth Amendment would leave out. They seem to be extremely important.
Amendment No. 92P proposes that this conundrum should not be just for the Secretary of State. The Industrial Court would be required to reach a decision on it, on evidence submitted by the Secretary of State, before the Court could make a ballot order. I do not see how the Court could reach a decision on these conditions. Then, in addition, Amendment

413
No. 92P, coupled with No. 92T, requires the restrictive conditions about the evidence of the emergency situation to be put before the Court. I have just indicated the objections to that. Taken together, therefore, these Amendments would impose conditions which are incapable of being satisfied, and would I believe, undermine the purpose of the ballot order provisions in situations of emergency. I hope that I have made the point clear to the noble Lord. It is extremely difficult to place an obligation on the Secretary of State to satisfy the conditions which the noble Lord would make and which, instead of being alternative, would all need to be fulfilled. I do not think this would be right; it would not meet the situation: and I do not think the Secretary of State could fulfil the obligation in those circumstances.
LORD STOW HILL: My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Lord. There is one small observation that I should like to make. The noble Lord said he did not know how the Court could decide about the attitude of the workers under Clause 192. That is not quite what the Court has to do. It has to be satisfied on the evidence that there are sufficient grounds for believing; that is to say, it is not a complete conviction, but something more than a prima facie case. However, I will not take up time on that. The noble Lord said that the purpose of my Amendment was to make the situation, to use his term, much more restrictive. Frankly, that was exactly the purpose of the Amendment. It was designed in terms to make the options open to the Secretary of State far narrower. The noble Lord thinks that it is too restrictive. That is a matter of judgment between us, and I do not think it would serve any useful purpose to continue with the discussion. That being so. I ask leave to withdraw Amendment No. 92, and shall not move the other related Amendments.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
6.3 p.m.
LORD STOW HILL LORD STOW HILL moved Amendment No. 92U:
Page 103, line 41, at end insert—
(" ( ) For the purposes of this section the effects of such industrial action shall not he deemed to be such as to be likely to be seriously injurious to the livelihood of a substantial number of workers employed in that
414
industry by reason only of the fact that it will or is likely to result in a substantial loss of remuneration to them in that industry over a prolonged period of time.")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment is on a different point. It is closely analogous to the last Amendment I moved to Clause 138. It is designed to try to introduce some more precision into the expression,
" such as to be seriously injurious to the livelihood of a substantial number of workers employed in the industry ".
That finds its place in paragraph (b) of subsection (2) of Clause 191. Again I can use almost exactly the same arguments, although I am anxious not to repeat myself. What are the criteria that anybody has to employ in answering the question whether the effect of industrial action is likely to be seriously injurious to the livelihood of a substantial number of workers employed in that industry? Is it enough to point to the fact that they will not be receiving their normal remuneration during the period of the strike? Is it enough to say that that period will extend probably for five weeks, six weeks or even more? I submit that the phrase is so indeterminate in scope that it is putting a difficult task upon the Court, under Clause 192, to require the Court to make a decision upon it. That engages precisely the same arguments as I addressed to the House when I moved my Amendment on Clause 138.
I suspected that my Amendment to Clause 138 was defective. My suspicions are still more acute that my drafting of this Amendment, No. 92U, is defective. In particular, I thoroughly dislike the phrase,"over a long period of time ", but it is difficult to find another phrase. What I mean is that if all you can say is that the workers who are engaged are not going to receive their remuneration over a period of time—the remuneration that they would otherwise have received—and consequently, to that extent, will be impoverished, that is not enough to enable either the Secretary of State or the Industrial Court to reach a conclusion that the effect of the industrial action is such as to be seriously injurious to the livelihood of the workers. That is the point.
I frankly concede that I do not like the drafting, which I hope I may say perfectly freely as being the author of

415
it. I merely put it forward as a suggestion, which again I hope the Government may think it worth while pursuing, in order to make the Court's task and also the Secretary of State's task rather easier, to formulate with some greater precision the question on this aspect of the case to which the judges of the Industrial Court would have to address themselves. With that object in view, I beg to move.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, the noble Lord has been good enough not to go over the arguments that he put on the Committee stage, and I propose to follow his example: we have both had an opportunity of re-reading them. The problem here, as I see it, is: does the Amendment do anything to clarify this position? The noble Lord seems to think that it does. We have great difficulty in seeing that it does, and I shall try to persuade him to our point of view.
LORD STOW HILL: My Lords, I did not say that I thought it did. I said that I hoped it did, which is a very different thing.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I stand corrected. What the noble Lord is attempting to do is to make a distinction between serious injury to a man's livelihood, on the one hand, and, on the other, substantial loss of remuneration over a prolonged period of time, a distinction which in certain circumstances, at any rate, I should have thought it would be quite impossible to sustain. If substantial numbers of people lose their jobs as a result of industrial action, everyone hopes that they will secure other employment, preferably in the occupations for which they are trained, but in the process many of them may suffer a severe loss of earnings which could seriously affect their livelihood. I do not like to give concrete instances, but I indicated the sort of thing that could happen if there were, for example, a stoppage in a particular company of the motor industry, where a prolonged stoppage might mean a severe and permanent loss of business and a cutting down of staff, possibly at another level of employment, because, as we all know, a small body of men can hold up an industry of
416
this kind and affect the earnings of a great many.
As I understand the Amendment, the Court would be debarred from considering this possibility when deciding whether there was a case for a strike ballot order, on the grounds that the only certain and immediate result of the industrial action for the workers was substantial and prolonged loss of remuneration. I do not pretend that the circumstances to which this subsection will apply will always be easy for the Court to determine. It simply will have to decide on the evidence submitted to it by the Secretary of State and the other parties. But this Amendment seems likely to make the task of the Court even more difficult than it is now. I feel certain that it is better to leave the clause as it is, and I hope that the noble Lord will be good enough to withdraw his Amendment.
LORD STOW HILL: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord but, if I may say so, the Amendment is not quite as bad as he thinks and I should like to point out why. What the clause would provide is that the mere fact that the workers lose remuneration shall not by itself enable the conclusion to be drawn that the effects of the industrial action are likely to be seriously injurious to their livelihood. In this draft the critical words are"by reason only of the fact "; in other words, those who seek to establish that the industrial action is likely to be seriously injurious must go on and show something in addition to the fact that the workers will suffer substantial loss of remuneration. For example, they might show that the action went so far as to imperil the future of the undertaking in which they were engaged. That would be quite a different thing and I dare say it would well come within the scope of the phrase"seriously injurious ". In defence of my drafting, may I emphasise that the mere loss of remuneration by itself is not enough. But my endeavour obviously does not commend itself to the noble Lord any more than my last endeavour. It is a matter of judgment, and in these circumstances I do not think it would be a useful exercise to prolong the argument. I should be grateful if the House would give me leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
6.12 p.m.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 92B:
Page 104, line 8, after (" union ") insert (" organisation of workers ").
The noble Lord said: May I, on behalf of my noble friends, move this Amendment and seek your Lordships' lenience if I deal with the matter very shortly, since our debating time has been so curtailed, even though for good reasons. We are dealing here with a clause which describes the circumstances under which the Secretary of State can apply for a compulsory ballot. Subsection (4) says that before he applies he shall, so far as appears practicable, consult every employer, trade union or employers' association appearing to him to be a party to the dispute. I imagine the reason for that consultation would be a last-minute attempt to avoid the difficult step of seeking a compulsory ballot. When it gets to the hearing of the application for a compulsory ballot, all parties must be heard, but when it comes to consultation, as I have read out, your Lordships will have noted that trade unions only are to be consulted, not"trade unions and unregistered organisations ". It seems to me that where you are seeking by consultation to avoid difficulties you should consult everyone concerned. The employer has to be consulted, irrespective of whether he is a big or a little employer, registered or unregistered, or whatever he may be; and I should have thought, therefore, that it would have been sensible for all employees' associations to be consulted. In fact I am much encouraged to believe that the Amendment, which seeks to put this right by ensuring that everybody will be consulted, will find favour with the Government, because when this matter was discussed on Committee the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, said that he was not certain why"trade union"was put in, and that the Government were prepared to look at it again. I trust that now he has done so he will be prepared to view this Amendment favourably. I beg to move.
LORD BELSTEAD: My Lords, my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn has looked at the wording very carefully, but I regret to say not very favourably. The Secretary of State, we entirely agree, is clearly under an obligation to consult; and whilst this obligation is qualified by
418
the phrase"so far as appears to him to be practical in the circumstances ", we do not feel that this phrase would in general nullify the mandatory effect of the clause unless it was physically impossible for the Secretary of State to contact the trade union or employers' association in the time available. I put that point because I know it was of interest at a previous stage, although it was not one made by the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, in his opening speech.
We are now dealing with a situation where industrial action is causing or likely to cause an industrial emergency, and any action which the Secretary of State is empowered to take to try to avert the situation clearly must be taken immediately. We feel that the Secretary of State would obviously be placed in an invidious position in these circumstances if he were given no discretion on consultation. I submit to the House that this discretion should not extend to consultation with unregistered unions. When this point was raised at the Committee stage, as Lord Diamond has said, my noble friend suggested as a first reaction that one of the difficulties about unregistered organisations of workers is that they may be merely temporary and it might be difficult to identify and consult with them. I do not think that the qualifying phrase"so far as appears to him to be practicable"entirely removes this difficulty. Not only may there be physical or administrative difficulties about consulting an unregistered union, but there may also be difficulties of policy.
As I have indicated, the term"organisation of workers"has been defined in the Bill as meaning any organisation whose objects include the regulation of relations between workers and employers, and they can range from very large organisations who for their own reasons simply do not wish to be registered, to very small, temporary organisations formed for a particular purpose, including possibly organisations which have broken away from a main body. In the situation of a serious industrial dispute there may be exceptional circumstances where it would be wrong for the Secretary of State to be required mandatorily to consult temporary organisations about a strike ballot proposal, although technically it would be possible for him to do

419
so. Indeed, I would put it to your Lordships that other parties to the dispute, both employer and trade union, might have the greatest objection to such consultation taking place; and here I bear in mind advisedly a grave national dispute—this is what we are talking about—where a registered trade union might have the gravest reservations about the Secretary of State having to consult mandatorily with a break-away splinter union: this could be the gravest disservice to the registered organisation which properly represented the workers concerned.
Perhaps it may be of some reply to the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, if I finish by saying that we must remember that the purpose of requiring the Secretary of State to consult with the parties before applying for a strike ballot order is not only to seek their views about the proposal; it is also about the terms of any application to be made by the Secretary of State with a view to assisting the Court in deciding whether and in what terms the order ought to be made. The consultations are also a necessary preliminary to the effective conduct of a strike ballot. In this context there is nothing to prevent the Secretary of State from consulting quite voluntarily any organisation which seems to be party to the dispute—and the Secretary of State will have every incentive to do this voluntarily—to ensure that the ballot is held with the minimum of delay.
I come back to the original point, which is a familiar one. We have on this Amendment the reservations of policy which I have submitted to your Lordships. We also have the reservations of speed. We feel that in a national emergency situation speed is going to be of the essence, and a real difficulty will be placed on the Secretary of State if mandatorily he has, by the Bill, to consult with organisations which we entirely accept the Secretary of State may well consult with voluntarily in a situation of this kind.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I find that a totally unsatisfactory reply, both in logic and in terms of policy. It does not help for barrow loads of dust to be thrown into our eyes in an attempt to put us off the logic of the case. It is as
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simple as can be. What we are concerned with is consulting everybody. The noble Lord has said that there is too much of a responsibility, and delays will be caused, but the clause says that every employer has to be consulted. Why does not the noble Lord bring an Amendment forward saying"Consult most employers "? That would save time. But the clause says,
" consult every employer, trade union or employers' association ".
If the noble Lord says that the difficulty is finding time to do all this why does not he alter his own clause? If he is in difficulty about the practicability of doing so and says that the words do not protect the Secretary of State, with which I totally disagree, the words which are already here which say
" so far as appears to him to be practicable in the circumstances, "
give complete discretion in saying what is practicable. If the noble Lord says to me that that does not cover the Secretary of State sufficiently so far as practicability is concerned, why does he not bring an Amendment forward strengthening the words in whatever way he wants? Why bring all these totally irrelevant arguments forward when what we are considering is not whether it is every person but whether a particular category is to be withdrawn from consultation. It will not be a splinter union, it will be the majority, and the biggest unions. If the noble Lord says that the Secretary of State will have difficulty, for example, in finding out how to contact the Transport and General Workers' Union we will tell him what the address is, and where it is to be found. We will do everything that we can to assist.
It is sheer nonsense to say that his argument is based on the kind of statements that he has made to us. What he is doing is refusing to allow consultation to a particular category of trade unions. We are going to have two classes of citizens and two classes of trade unions: the trade union which is registered shall be consulted, and the one which is not registered, irrespective of however big it is, irrespective of the fact that it may be the only trade union involved, is not going to be consulted. If the noble Lord has nothing better to say than that we will divide the House.
6.25 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 92B) shall be agreed to?

CONTENTS

Addison, V.

George-Brown, L.

Peddie, L.

Archibald, L.

Greenwood of Rossendale, L.

Popplcwell, L.

Ardwick, L.

Hall, V.

Raglan, L.

Bernstein, L.

Henderson, L.

Ritchie-Calder, L.

Beswick, L.

Hilton of Upton, L. [Teller.]

Segal, L.

Brockway, L.

Hoy, L.

Shackleton, L.

Buckinghamshire, E.

Hughes, L.

Shinwell, L.

Champion, L.

Janner, L.

Slater, L.

Chorley, L.

Kilbracken, L.

Sorensen, L.

Davies of Leek, L.

Leatherland, L.

Stonham, L.

Diamond, L.

Lindgren, L.

Stow Hill, L.

Evans of Hungershall, L.

Lloyd of Hampstead, L.

Taylor of Mansfield, L.

Gaitskell, Bs.

Maelor, L.

Walston, L.

Gardiner, L.

Norwich, V.

Wells-Pestell, L.

Garnsworthy, L.

Pargiter, L.

Wheatley, L. [Teller.]

NOT-CONTENTS

Ailwyn, L.

Derwent, L.

Margadale, L.

Albemarle, E.

Digby, L.

Massereene and Ferrard, V.

Alport, L.

Drumalbyn, L.

Milverton, L.

Amory, V.

Dundee, E.

Molson, L.

Balerno, L.

Ebbisham, L.

Monck, V.

Barnby, L.

Elliot of Harwood, Bs.

Monckton of Brenchley, V

Belhaven and Stenton, L.

Essex, E.

Mountevans, L.

Belstead, L.

Falkland, V.

Mowbray and Stourton, L.

Berkeley, Bs.

Ferrers, E.

Napier and Ettrick, L.

Bessborough, E.

Ferrier, L.

Netherthorpe, L.

Bledisloe, V.

Fortescue, E.

Northchurch, Bs.

Boston, L.

Fraser of Lonsdale, L.

Nugent of Guildford, L.

Braye, L.

Gage, V.

Oakshott, L.

Bridgeman, V.

Goschen. V. [Teller.]

O'Neill of the Maine, L.

Brooke of Cumnor, L.

Gowrie, E. [Teller.]

Ranfurly, E.

Brooke of Ystradfellte, Bs.

Gridley, L.

Rankeillour, L.

Brougham and Vaux, L.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

Redcliffe-Maud, L.

Burton, L.

Hailes, L.

Rochdale, V.

Byers, L.

Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Rothermere, V.

Carnock, L.

Rothes, E.

Chesham, L.

Hastings, L.

Ruthven of Freeland, Ly.

Clifford of Chudleigh, L.

Hatherton, L.

St. Aldwyn, E.

Clwyd, L.

Henley, L.

St. Just, L.

Coleraine, L.

Hives, L.

Sandford, L.

Coleridge, L.

Hood, V.

Selkirk, E.

Colgrain, L.

Howe, E.

Somers, L.

Colville of Culross, V.

Hylton-Foster, Bs.

Strang, L.

Courtown, E.

Jellicoe, E. (L. Privy Seal.)

Strange, L.

Craigavon, V.

Kemsley, V.

Strathclyde, L.

Cranbrook, E.

Killearn, L.

Teviot, L.

Crathorne, L.

Kilmany, L.

Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, Bs.

Croft, L.

Lauderdale, E.

Vivian, L.

Cromartie, E.

Long, V.

Wakefield of Kendal, L.

Daventry, V.

MacAndrew, L.

Ward of Witley, V.

de Clifford, L.

Macleod of Borve, Bs.

Windlesham, L.

Denham, L.

Macpherson of Drumochter, L.

Wise, L.

Clause 142 [Order of Industrial Court on application under s. 14]:
6.32 p.m.
LORD HUGHES LORD HUGHES moved Amendment No. 92C:
Page 104, line 13, after (" sufficient ") insert (" reasons for doubting whether the workers
Their Lordships divided: 45; Not-Contents, 107.
involved would have had an adequate opportunity of indicating their wishes in respect of the industrial dispute and that there are sufficient ").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, before the Secretary of State can make an application to the Court under the terms of Clause 141 for an order for a ballot and a standstill he has to be satisfied that a strike or industrial action short of a

423
strike is taking place or is contemplated; that such action would constitute an emergency or would be seriously injurious to a substantial number of workers employed in the industry, or that both of those conditions exist, and that there are reasons for doubting whether the workers involved have had an adequate opportunity of indicating their wishes in connection with the actual or proposed industrial action. On receipt of an application, the Court has to satisfy itself that the first two of those sets of conditions exist. But this independent body, the Court, is not to inquire into the third; namely, whether there are reasons for doubting whether the workers involved have had an adequate opportunity of indicating their wishes in the matter.
If I understand the purpose of the Court in this, as in so many other instances in which the courts of the land have a function, it is to provide a possible check on the Executive. But in this procedure the Secretary of State may act as he pleases and the Court has no say. As I understand Clause 141, even though it is certain that conditions 1 and 2 exist, the Secretary of State could still not apply to the Court for an order leading to a ballot and a standstill unless he felt that there were reasons for doubting whether the workers concerned have had an opportunity of indicating their wishes in the matter. It seems to me that this indicates that the key to the whole operation is the doubt about the wishes of the workers, and yet the Court, which must take a decision, is not to be able to inquire into whether there are valid reasons for that doubt. The Court will therefore be expected to make an order for a ballot to clear up a doubt the existence of which they must take for granted.
When this matter was discussed on"clause stand part," in the Committee stage, the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, said, at column 317 of the OFFICIAL REPORT, on June 9:
" The trouble about asking the Court to decide whether the Secretary of State is right to have doubts or not is that it is very difficult to prove a matter of this kind in a Court."
I do not think that that is the case at all. We are not asking that what is in the mind of the Secretary of State should be proved. What the Court has a right to look at is whether or not there is doubt
424
about whether the workers' wishes have been ascertained.
One of the parties appearing before the Court will undoubtedly be those representing the workers—the trade union or organisation of workers, or the officials of such an organisation named in the application. Is it seriously contended that the Court, after having heard the Secretary of State express his reason for this doubt, could not by questioning the other party establish whether there exists a valid reason for the doubts of the Secretary of State? I am bound to say that it seems to us on this side of your Lordships' House to be quite unreasonable to accept that what the Court must take is the say-so of the Minister. It is a doctrine which we find completely objectionable. I do not think I need to make a long speech to make it clear that we think that the Government, in the Bill as it stands, are depriving the Court of the opportunity of looking at all three sets of factors, when the key one is this question of doubt. My Lords, I beg to move.
6.37 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, as Clause 142 is now drafted its purpose is to require the Court to satisfy itself that the Secretary of State has good grounds for believing that an emergency situation in fact exists or is likely to occur as the result of the industrial action. This is a justiciable issue. What we cannot accept is that in an emergency situation the question whether the workers involved have had an adequate opportunity to express their views should be justiciable by the Court. It is well to record—I believe I said this on the Committee stage—that one must bear in mind, as my noble friend Lord Belstead has said, that in a situation such as this the Secretary of State's conciliation officers will have been in very close touch, but essentially this must be a question of"feel"more than anything else.
In our view, the judgment on this point is something for which the Secretary of State must take full responsibility, just as he must take full responsibility for deciding in an application for a restraint order under Clause 138, whether deferment of industrial action would be conducive to the settlement of industrial dispute by further negotiation. This is the kind of question he must decide; it is the

425
same kind of issue. Decisions as to whether or not the Government should intervene in a major industrial dispute have to be taken constantly by the Secretary of State, and the extent of support for a particular course of industrial action is one of the questions he has to take into account when reaching his decision.
In our view, it is right that the Secretary of State should have to answer for his judgment if he forms the view that workers do not support a strike and have had inadequate opportunity to express their opinions. He is not at all likely to apply for a strike ballot order in circumstances where there is a strong possibility that a strike will be fully supported by the workers, for the very good reason that he would look silly. The result of the ballot would merely indicate the extent of his misjudgment. If this Amendment were accepted, the Secretary of State would be able to transfer to the Court the responsibility for deciding whether workers had had an adequate opportunity to express their opinions about a strike in which they were involved. This would be a most difficult task for the Court, particularly as the Secretary of State would still retain responsibility for deciding the extent of support for the industrial action—because there are the two limbs here, although the noble Lord has referred to only one in this Amendment—and we doubt whether, in reality, the two decisions can be separated in this way.
What I am saying is that, given the pressure of an emergency situation, particularly the time factor, we think that the transfer of this responsibility may put the Court in an impossible situation. Views as to the adequacy, or otherwise, of the steps taken to consult the workers concerned about whether or not they wish to take industrial action are bound to be highly controversial; much more so, I suggest, than may often be the case about the extent of an emergency situation. They are speculative, if you like; it is a question of"feel ". The Court would have to deal with much detailed evidence from the two parties concerned—and this is the sort of matter which would involve a great deal of evidence—and could hardly be expected to give the speedy decision which the emergency requires and which is essential to the operation of these emergency procedures
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as a whole. So I hope that the noble Lord will not proceed with this Amendment.
LORD HUGHES: My Lords, in the course of his remarks, the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, said that in certain circumstances the Minister would look silly. That is the part of his remarks with which I find myself in agreement. The one point about which I am quite certain is that on many occasions, as a result of this Bill, the Minister is undoubtedly not only going to look silly, but in fact is going to be silly—at least, in his course of action. I do not want to divide on this Amendment, but this is another of those matters on which we very strongly hold a different view from that expressed by noble Lords on the other side. Having listened to what the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, has said and to what the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, said on the previous Amendment, all I would say is that I wish those who wrote the lines, the playwrights, were as good as those who deliver them. The delivery is far in excess of the quality of the material.
On Question, Amendment negatived.
Clause 143 [Provisions pending result of ballot ordered under s. 142]:
LORD STOW HILL LORD STOW HILL moved Amendment No. 92X:
Page 105, line 2, leave out (" shall ") and insert (" may ")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, if the Court decides to make an order, Clause 143, as at present worded, makes it obligatory for the Court to give a direction as part of its order that from the date of the order the strike is to stop. This Amendment would substitute a discretion for the obligatory quality of Clause 143. In other words, if the Court makes an order it will have a discretionary power to say that the strike is to stop as from the date when the order is made, but it is not bound to do so. The argument is that there is really no reason why a ballot could not perfectly well take place, even although a strike is still in progress. It would be less provocative if the Court did not make an order that while a ballot was taking place the strike was to stop. That is the case for the Amendment. My Lords, I beg to move.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, this is a point which we discussed during the

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Committee stage. The view that I expressed at that time, and which I still hold, is that it is essential that in circumstances of this kind the strike action should come to an end or be deferred, as the case may be, because it is of the essence of this kind of emergency procedure that the status quo ante should be restored. For one thing we believe that the ballot would be very much facilitated if it could be taken when everyone was back at work, or before they had gone on strike. If a strike was allowed to continue in progress, the likelihood is that embitterment would increase, and we think that the right course is to bring people back in order that the ballot could be held. Side by side with that, conciliation could go on all the time, and one would hope that, as a combined result, one would achieve a good outcome. But we do not think this should be optional and we see no point in substituting"may"for"shall"here.
LORD STOW HILL: My Lords, this is a matter of judgment on which I am afraid we shall have to continue to disagree. But I do not think it would serve any purpose to prolong the argument, so I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
6.48 p.m.
LORD STOW HILL LORD STOW HILL moved Amendment No. 92Y:
Page 105, line 3, after (" that ") insert (" if the result of the ballot indicates that the majority of the workers who are taking part or are expected to take part in the strike or other industrial action are or would be taking part in it against their wishes, for a period not exceeding sixty days beginning with the date on which the result of the ballot is reported to the Court.")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is an Amendment of rather more substance, but I will move it as shortly as I can. As I said on the last Amendment, Clause 143, as at present worded, requires the Court, if it makes an order, to direct that a strike is to stop while a ballot is being held. One does not know how long it will take to hold the ballot. In a given situation, it might take quite a period of time. So that what the Court is really required to do, if it decides to make an order, is to direct that for an indeterminate time the workers are not to continue the strike. I am
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conscious that the order is not made against those who participate in the strike; it is made against those who, as officials, organise it. It would be a grievous sin if I repeated what the House has heard from me ad nauseam about embittered feelings and tempers running high, and I hope that that is the one sin of which I may ultimately be found to be innocent. But I submit that it would be a more practical arrangement if the change embodied in the Amendment were made. Instead of the Court's having, as at present, to order that during the period beginning with the date on which the order takes effect the strike is to stop, a changed arrangement is introduced by the Amendment as follows.
If the result of the ballot indicates that the majority of the workers are against continuing the strike, then, as from the date the result of the ballot is reported to the Court, the strike has to stop for a period not exceeding 60 days. That period of 60 days is a counterpart to the 60 days provided for in Clauses 138 onwards; and it is submitted that it is a perfectly workable arrangement that the strike can go on while the ballot is being taken, but that if the ballot result, when reported, indicates that the majority of the strikers are not in sympathy with the industrial action in question, then as from the date that the result of the ballot is reported the strike must stop for a period not exceeding 60 days. It is of course to be hoped that if the result of the ballot shows that the majority of the strikers are not in sympathy with it, then in any event it will come to an end; but if there is still some dissidence among the strikers at any rate the 60-day period—or, rather, the period not exceeding 60 days—will give ample time for accommodation to be reached between the dissident elements and for the strike to be brought to an end in that way. If I may summarise, instead of the strike having to stop while the ballot is being taken, it will have to stop for a period not exceeding 60 days as from the date when the result of the ballot is reported if the majority is shown to be out of sympathy with the strike. My Lords, I beg to move.
LORD BELSTEAD: My Lords, the effect of this Amendment has been

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explained to us in full by the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, and I am bound to say, without wishing to be discourteous, that it is something which we feel cuts across the fundamentals, almost, of this clause, and of the conception of this Part of the Bill. As I understood the noble Lord, the effect of the Amendment is that there would be no restraint placed on the organisers of industrial action until the ballot had been completed. Therefore, a ballot could be held while a strike which was giving rise to a national emergency was in progress, and it is this which we on this side of the House feel vitiates the whole purpose of having the strike ballot procedure at all. I felt that I ought to make this clear at the outset. By the time the ballot was completed, there might be no prospect at all of averting the most desperate situation; and if the ballot was a major one (and this has been the subject of discussion in your Lordships' House before) it might take a few weeks to hold the ballot.
There is a further point which I think is a worry here. The effect of this Amendment would also be that the result of the ballot would be the only factor providing grounds for a restraint order, if I have understood the noble Lord correctly. That restraint, up to the 60 days as set out in the Amendment, would be purely restrictive, if I may put it that way, and would not be, as under the proposals of the Bill, if one takes this part of the Bill in the round, applied for some express purpose, either for further negotiations or for the holding of a strike ballot. I really do not know, on looking at the Amendment, on what grounds the Court could decide what the period of the restraint should be under these proposals. Since the result of a ballot must show that a majority of the workers involved in the dispute, and not just those voting, must be opposed to industrial action before the organisers can be restrained by the Court, the ballot takes on an entirely different character and significance compared to the ballot proposed in the Bill as it is framed at the moment. It is because the purpose of the strike ballot provisions in this Part of the Bill are simply to ensure that where industrial action is likely to have serious consequences for the community, organisation of that action should be restrained—it is for that simple reason—and because the noble Lord's Amendment
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would mean turning this principle entirely on its head and making the restraint the subject of the ballot, that I must ask your Lordships to resist the Amendment.
LORD STOW HILL: My Lords, I do not quite agree with what the noble Lord says. After all, the main purpose of these two clauses is to try to find out in a rather critical situation whether or not the strikers wish to strike. I have submitted previously that if, suddenly, you order—I do not say the strikers to go back, but the organisers of the strike to stop, you are engaging upon provocative action which may result in challenge to the order of the Court and in the strike leaders becoming martyrs, heroes and all the rest of it. And that may conduce to an opposite result to bringing an immediate cessation to the industrial action. That is the point I made. It may be right or it may be wrong, but I submit that it is not obviously wrong by a long way. Again, I feel tempted to commit the sin to which I referred. But if one envisages a situation of that sort, for the Court to order the strike to stop would, I should have thought, be asking the Court to do something which would be construed as provocative to those engaged.
This Amendment suggests a rather different situation. The ballot is ordered, and it takes place. In any event, one does not know how long it is going to take, so the observations of the noble Lord about the indeterminate nature of the lack of restraint apply whatever arrangement is embodied in the clause: that is common ground to both. But what the change would bring about is to say that if the ballot achieves its purpose and shows that the majority are against the strike, then it must stop, and in those circumstances it would not be provocative to order the organisers to stop it. That would be acceptable. The noble Lord said he did not quite know how long, within the outside period of 60 days, a Court was likely to order the organiser to stop organising a strike. If I were a judge and I found there was a large majority against the strike, I should say the full 60 days, in the confident expectation that in that period the dispute would reach an accommodation and one would hear no more about it. If the majority was only very slight, what I might well do if I were a judge would

431
be to choose a much lesser period in the hope that during that lesser period the parties might get together and reach terms. That, I should have thought, would be the situation which would emerge. But I have put the point; my proposal does not commend itself to the Government, and I do not think there is any great point in pressing it. Therefore, having put the point and the arguments and counter-arguments having been heard, I ask the permission of the House to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

ROYAL ASSENT
6.59 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I have to notify the House, in accordance with the Royal Assent Act 1967, that Her Majesty the Queen has signified Her Royal Assent to the following Acts:

Criminal Damage Act,

Rural Water Supplies and Sewerage Act,

National Insurance Act,

Torbay Corporation Act,

Mersey Docks and Harbour Board (Ore Berth) Act,

Luton Corporation Act,

Surrey County Council Act.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BILL
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I beg to move that further consideration of the Industrial Relations Bill on Report be adjourned for one hour in order to enable the Licensing (Abolition of State Management) Bill to be further considered in Committee.

LICENSING (ABOLITION OF STATE MANAGEMENT) BILL
7.0 p.m.
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, That the House do again resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Windlesham.)
House in Committee accordingly.
[The LORD DERWENT in the Chair.]
Clause 2 [Disposal of property in England held by Secretary of State for purposes of State management]:
THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES: Amendment No. 3 to Clause 2 has already been moved, but the debate on the Amendment was not finished and will now continue.
The Amendment was as follows:
Page 2, line 1, leave out (" The Secretary of State ") and insert (" There shall be constituted a body to be called the State Liquor Trade Management Agency (hereinafter referred to as the Management Agency) which ").
LORD WINDLESHAM: As noble Lords who were present on Monday will recall, the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, had moved Amendment No. 3 and had spoken at the same time to Amendments Nos. 4 to 16. What I propose to do now is to reply to the principle behind all these Amendments, which is that a State Liquor Trade Management Agency should be set up. Amendments Nos. 4 to 16 concern Clause 2(1). All the remaining Amendments (Nos. 17 to 30) concern Clause 3(1); and they make a similar proposal as regards the assets in Scotland.
The noble Lord, Lord Stonham, in moving the Amendments explained that their effect would be to constitute a new body described as the State Liquor Trade Management Agency with a discretionary power to dispose of the Carlisle State Management assets on such terms as appear to the Secretary of State to be expedient in the public interest. The Management Agency would consist of three persons, appointed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, qualified and experienced in land and property valuation and with no financial interest in the liquor industry. Similar Amendments to these were tabled and discussed in Committee in another place and the Opposition at that time argued strongly in favour of an independent agency to handle the valuation and disposal of the State Management assets.

433
The argument seemed to rest on the proposition that the Government could not be trusted to handle these matters themselves without risk of accusations of impropriety being made. This argument overlooks the ordinary arrangements for Exchequer financial control which would effectively safeguard the public interest. The Exchequer and Audit Department can, and no doubt will, report to Parliament on the transaction and bring any criticisms to Parliament's attention. No Government could possibly act improperly in this matter; and in the debate on Second Reading the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, from the Opposition Front Bench, utterly rejected any suggestion that they would. The proposed arrangements therefore seem not only unnecessary but also cumbrous and disproportionate to the value of the assets concerned. Nor does it seem to us that any comparison can usefully be made with the scale of operation involved in the denationalisation of the steel industry. The cost of setting up a special agency of this sort would be out of all proportion to the assets involved. There is no doubt at all in our minds that far and away the best, the most effective and the least cumbersome way of handling this particular exercise is to leave the responsibility for determining how the assets should be disposed of in the hands of the Secretaries of State, subject to the normal methods of Government financial control.
The Government's proposals to dispose of the assets involve making use of the independent valuation service which exists within the Government machine; namely, the Valuation Office of the Inland Revenue. The valuations received from the outside agencies will be checked against those of the staff of the Valuation Office—the District Valuer and, in the case of the licensed properties, the Regional Licensed Property Valuer. We believe that this is a more effective safeguard than the proposal in the Amendments to appoint a Management Agency consisting of three people experienced in the valuation of land and property; these people would be in no position to check the independent valuations obtained unless they went out to inspect each of the premises. In any case, mere experience of property valuation is not enough. The valuation of licensed property is a specialist job which relatively few agencies
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in this country are equipped to perform. The joint agents appointed by the Government, on the recommendation of the President of the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, to dispose of the licensed property in Carlisle are a well-known Northern firm with specialised experience and a London firm which is one of the foremost in the country in this specialised field.
Another feature of these Amendments is that the proposed State Management Agency would be given no power to run the business while the properties were being disposed of; so presumably the Secretaries of State would have to continue trading. Thus responsibility would be shared in an uneasy partnership: the Secretary of State trying to run the business, in the realisation that the Agency was trying to dispose of the properties at the same time. Moreover, since the Agency would not be required to sell, the Amendments merely giving it power to do so, the Secretary of State would have no control over the pace at which the sale proceeded, although he would remain responsible to Parliament for the operation of a gradually declining business.
The noble Lord, Lord Stonham, in moving these Amendments on Monday went further and implied that the Agency might decide not to dispose of the assets of the scheme after all. This means that Amendment No. 4, which provides that the Agency shall"have power to"dispose of the properties rather than, as in the Bill, imposing an absolute requirement, could be interpreted as being designed to enable the Agency to preserve the State management assets intact, if it thought it right to do so. This is clearly open to strong objection as a matter of principle. The Government have made clear their view that this is an inappropriate activity for the public sector, and have presented this Bill to Parliament on that assumption. It would not be realistic to set up an Agency which might then decide to implement the policy in a way different from that intended by the Government and different from that intended by Parliament in approving this Bill. These are the reasons of principle why these sets of Amendments are not acceptable to the Government and why I must ask the Committee to reject them.
LORD HUGHES: In recounting what took place on Monday the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, pointed out that Amendments Nos. 3 to 16 are more or less duplicated in Clause 3 by Amendments Nos. 17 to 30, applying more or less the same set of amending conditions to the Scottish clause. I do not intend to move any of these Amendments when we come to them, because all the arguments which have been put forward so ably on Monday by my noble friend Lord Stonham could not possibly be bettered by anything I say over again in relation to Clause 3. I am therefore personally happy to accept that what he said on Monday, in speaking to Amendments Nos. 3 to 16, should be taken as applying equally to Amendments Nos. 17 to 30.
I am reinforced in that decision after having listened to the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, though he put forward what seemed to him to be perfectly valid reasons, from the point of view of the Government, objecting to certain of the Amendments; and when he stated what was possible if those Amendments were put forward he was, of course, reiterating things with which we are in complete agreement. We agree that those could be the consequences of some of these Amendments, but, unlike the Government, we consider them to be desirable consequences. So he will not be surprised if I find my noble friend's statement on Monday much more acceptable than his reply to-day.
7.10 p.m.
LORD STONHAM: I am extremely disappointed, but not wholly surprised, at the nature of the noble Lord's reply. It seemed to me that the only objection he put forward to our proposal for the setting up of a State agency was that it was far too cumbersome. He thought that the appointment of these three people (one of whom, I imagine, would have had knowledge of property licences)—these three wise men—would be far too cumbersome. I do not see that it is so very different from the Government's proposal. They will be appointing estate agents who, it is true will draw a commission on all the work they do, but when these estate agents have come to a provisional decision and have seen prospective buyers they will then have to submit the proposal to the
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Home Office. How cumbersome is that, and how expert are the gentlemen who at the Home Office will make the decision either to accept a bid or to reject it? They are estimable and experienced gentlemen in many fields but they have no expertise in this one. Therefore I should think that not only is the management agency not cumbersome; it is no more cumbersome than the actual machinery that the Government propose to set up, and the decisions would be more reliable. As for its being such a large organisation to set up, out of all proportion to the total value of the assets, I flatly disagree. I believe the values are much greater than the noble Lord thinks or the Bill suggests. In any case, this is public money. These are assets we have had for a very long time. They should not be given away or sold on inadequate advice.
The noble Lord referred to the fact that under my Amendment the Secretary of State still has to trade. That is only in theory, because the proposal is that this management agency should manage and should relieve the Secretary of State of day-to-day problems. But in Clause 5 of the Bill it is provided that the Secretary of State must remain in the business until all the properties are sold. Of course that means that he is eventually responsible for trading, but there is no objection at all to that. As my noble friend Lord Hughes said when the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, objected to our Amendment No. 4—" shall have power to dispose of property "—there is nothing wrong with that. I find it difficult to understand why the Government feel that in a trade of this kind, something they are giving up because it is not appropriate for a Government to deal in pubs and the sale of beer, they nevertheless feel it is appropriate for the Minister to deal with it instead of having a small expert organisation to value the properties and to negotiate their sale. I think it is quite right that such a body should have power to do so.
This may be the last opportunity to speak on this Bill. All our Amendments were designed to be helpful. The Government have rejected them. They do not want more time, which they could so usefully use; they do not want any organisation, however small—and three experts

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does not constitute a big organisation—to settle this business. I think they are wrong. The noble Lord reminded your Lordships that I said on Second Reading that I utterly rejected suggestions which have been made that the Home Secretary has not got clean hands in this matter. Of course I do, and I stick to that; but in the very nature of things it must be better that this is not done by a Minister of the Crown. It is far below his work, and I can only regret that the Government are forcing this Bill through without accepting these Amendments.
On Question, Amendment negatived.
Clause 2 agreed to.
Remaining clauses agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported without amendment.
[The Sitting was suspended at 7.19 p.m. and resumed at 8 p.m.]

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BILL
8.0 p.m.
Consideration on Report resumed.
Clause 144 [Conduct of Ballot]:
LORD HOY LORD HOY moved Amendment No. 92E:
Page 107, line 11, at end insert (" or for any subsequent ballot arising out of the order of the Industrial Court under section 142 of this Act in consequence of a doubt as to the wishes of the workers in respect of any settlement arrived at on their behalf.")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I hesitate to bring this great progress to an end but, having made my contribution, I should like on behalf of my noble friends to move Amendment No. 92E. Clause 144 sets out the procedure to be followed where the Court has ordered that a ballot be taken and the Commission makes the arrangements. In certain conditions the Commission may request a trade union which is a party to the dispute to conduct a ballot of its members itself. If the Commission so decides and the union does make itself responsible for conducting a ballot and carries it out, the Bill says, in subsection (5), that the Commission
" shall pay to a trade union the amount of any expenses reasonably incurred "
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in so acting. This is as it should be. But a point arises in connection with a second ballot conducted by the union arising out of the result of the first ballot. The point is, ought not the Commission to be empowered in such circumstances to pay the expenses reasonably incurred by the union in conducting a second ballot?
The attention of your Lordships' House was drawn to this matter by my noble friend Lord Collison, who did it so admirably that I do not think I can put it more succinctly and better than by simply repeating his words. The noble Lord was a member of the Donovan Commission, and, as your Lordships know, he is an ex-general secretary of a very important union in this country, so his words and opinions do carry some weight. On June 9 my noble friend said:
" If the Secretary of State is in doubt and requires a ballot, and a ballot is decided upon by the Industrial Court, it could well happen that the majority of workpeople concerned would vote for the strike. The strike would then continue, and the union would negotiate with the employer with a view to reaching a settlement…which they would want to recommend to their people."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 9/7/71, col. 330.]
A little later my noble friend said (col. 334):
" If a ballot is demanded by what the trade union people will see as State intervention. I think they will equally well demand, and with justification, that, before they accept their union's decision as to the acceptance of a settlement which some of them may not like, there should be a further ballot…. Obviously, the question as to who pays for the ballot comes into this."
The question, then, is who pays for the second ballot, and it is because that question ought to be answered that this Amendment has been put down. I think it ought to be clearly stated that the Commission should be empowered to pay for the second ballot, and I hope that this will be the view of the Government. I beg to move.
LORD BELSTEAD: My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Hoy, has told the House, my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn undertook, at the time the noble Lord, Lord Collison, made his speech at the previous stage of the Bill, to give this matter further consideration. As my noble friend mentioned during an earlier discussion on this clause, and subsection (7) of Clause 143, it is in fact technically

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impossible to have a second ballot to determine support for continued industrial action. The situation is that the Court is not able to entertain any application for a second ballot because of Clause 143(7), and this Amendment would, therefore, be incompatible with the previous clause. So that the noble Lords should not feel that I am simply shielding myself behind a technicality in this matter, perhaps I should be a little stronger in my remarks and emphasise that the whole purpose of the strike ballot order is to give the workers involved an opportunity to express their views about support for an industrial action likely to cause an emergency situation. It is for this reason that, as the Bill is drawn at the moment, the order does not, and cannot, place any requirement upon the parties once the result of the ballot is known. If the union wishes to hold its own ballot on a return to work (which was the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Collison) it is at perfect liberty, of course, to do so; but in those circumstances the cost of such a ballot ought, we feel, to be met by the union itself, since there is nothing in the strike ballot provisions imposing any obligation in this respect, and any pressure by elements in the union for such a ballot would be a matter for the union to deal with in accordance with its own policy and rules.
May I say, in conclusion, in case my remarks sound unduly uncompromising, that we are dealing here with a situation in which there will have been a vote to do something which the members apparently wish to do: that is to return to work. Therefore I do not know that there is as much between the two sides of the House on this point as may appear from the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hoy, and the speech I have made from this side. I feel that where people have taken a vote on the line of action they wish to take, to place on the Court a mandatory duty to pay for a further ballot, presumably to carry the line of action the workers are already wishing to take to its logical conclusion—namely, to return to work—is asking a bit much;
and for that reason we must resist this Amendment.
LORD HOY: My Lords, I must say that the reply is exceedingly disappointing. The noble Lord has not made out a case at all, and has so far misinterpreted the case I made. What I was saying was that it was likely that the Commission would say to the trade union,"All your members have to be consulted, and as a consequence we place upon you the responsibility of holding a ballot ". The noble Lord agrees with that. The workers then decide to strike, so that the strike is quite legal and valid; it is done by ballot. After the strike has started, the trade union and the employers then enter into negotiations on terms. It may well be that the trade union will then want to recommend those terms to its members. Some members may object and may say,"If you are in fact recommending this as a result of your first ballot which put us on strike, we are going to challenge this decision made by you, the union leader ". As a consequence of that, a ballot might be necessary. This ballot arises as a result of the first decision, and so we are saying—and I thought it was quite a modest request to make—that if the second ballot is a consequence of the first ballot, at least the union ought not to be asked to bear the expense of it. The union has done its part in this job. It has got what it regards as a reasonable settlement, and it wants its action to be homologated, and it can be done by ballot.
I should have thought that under these circumstances (and if this Bill is supposed to promote good industrial relations at all) this is a sample of those good industrial relations. All I can say is that if the Government have no more to say on it than that, then I dread to think what is going to happen in the working of this particular Bill.
8.12 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment (92E) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 31; Not-Contents, 78.

Greenwood of Rossendale, L.

Milner of Leeds, L. [Teller.]

Shackleton, L.

Henderson, L.

Platt, L.

Slater, L.

Henley, L.

Popplewell, L.

Stow Hill, L.

Hoy, L.

Raglan, L.

Taylor of Mansfield, L.

Janner, L.

Ritchie-Calder, L.

Wells-Pestell, L.

Lindgren, L.

Segal, L.

White, Bs.

Lloyd of Hampstead, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Aberdare, L.

Ebbisham, L.

Mountevans, L.

Ailwyn, L.

Essex, E.

Mowbray and Stourton, L.

Albemarle, E.

Falkland, V.

Napier and Eftrick, L.

Balerno, L.

Ferrers, E.

Northchurch, Bs.

Belhaven and Stenton, L.

Fortescue, E.

Nugent of Guildford, L.

Belstead, L.

Geddes, L.

O'Neill of the Maine, L.

Berkeley, Bs.

Goschen, V. [Teller.]

Orr-Ewing, L.

Boston, L.

Gowrie, E.

Rankeillour, L.

Braye, L.

Gray, L.

Rochdale, V.

Brecon, L.

Gridley, L.

Ruthven of Freeland, Ly.

Brentford, V.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

St. Aldwyn, E.

Bridgeman, V.

Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)

St. Just, L.

Brooke of Cumnor, L.

Sinclair of Cleeve, L.

Brooke of Ystradfellte, Bs.

Hanworth, V.

Somers, L.

Burnham, L.

Harcourt, V.

Strange, L.

Burton, L.

Hastings, L.

Strange of Knokin, Bs.

Colville of Culross, V.

Hatherton, L.

Strathclyde, L.

Courtown, E.

Hives, L.

Suffield, L.

Craigavon, V.

Hylton-Foster, Bs.

Teviot, L.

Cranbrook, E.

Inglewood, L.

Teynham, L.

Cromartie, E.

Kemsley, V.

Tweedsmuir, L.

Daventry, V.

Killearn, L.

Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, Bs.

de Clifford, L.

Latymer, L.

Vivian, L.

De L'Isle, V.

Long, V.

Wakefield of Kendal, L.

Denham, L. [Teller.]

Milverton, L.

Ward of Whitby, V.

Digby, L.

Monck, V.

Windlesham, L.

Drumalbyn, L.

Resolved in the negative, and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.
Clause 147 [Effect of strike notice]:
8.19 p.m.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 93K:
Page 109, line 32, leave out subsection (4).
The noble Lord said: My Lords, subsection (4) is that part of the clause dealing with the effect of a strike notice. The clause starts off by saying—and it is a very important statement—that a strike notice shall not be construed as a notice to terminate the contract of employment, or as a repudiation of that contract. I should probably be right in saying that this is the first time that the task of defining a strike has been attempted. It is a very important statement indeed. One wants it to be clear and not to be confused by any subsequent unclear statement in the same clause. Unfortunately I think subsection (4), which the Amendment seeks to remove, is such an unclear and confusing statement. It says:
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" Nothing in subsection (2) of this section shall be taken to exclude or restrict any right which an employer would have apart from that subsection to dismiss…an employee who takes part in a strike."
My Lords, I recognise that there are two different actions. One is the giving of a notice to strike by the employee, and the other, which is in subsection (4), is the giving by an employer of a dismissal notice to the employee. The reason I am raising this point is because this subsection is almost an invitation to an employer to take the view that it would be right for him to dismiss an employee who has given a strike notice. Why do I say that? Because there is no other purpose in putting the subsection there. I am reinforced in making that statement by the discussion we had in Committee when, on June 9, as reported at column 359, the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, who was replying to an Amendment which I had moved on this issue, said:
" …as a corollary to the right of the employee to say he refuses to work, we have the right of the employer to terminate his employment. This is the present situation. It is not affected by the Bill."
As I understand that statement and the rest of what the noble Lord said, this subsection (4) has no effect; it may be declaratory but it has no effect. If I am right, and I think I am, in saying that it has no effect, I mean that it has no legal effect, but it has an emotional effect. It is a highly provocative subsection. The right to strike and to avoid a repudiation of a contract of employment by giving appropriate notice to strike is a very important right and one does not want it confused in any way or any part of it to be withdrawn. I therefore think it would be far safer, and certainly far less provocative, and, if I understand it aright, would not affect the legal provisions of the rest of the clause, if subsection (4) were removed, as the Amendment seeks to do. I therefore beg to move the Amendment.
8.26 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, this Amendment, or its equivalent, was thoroughly discussed in Commitee. This Bill makes a number of changes in the law, but two changes it does not make. The first is that it does not make a strike illegal and the second is that it does not alter the employer's right to terminate a contract of employment during or after a strike, provided it is not discriminatory within the meaning of the clause we have been discussing. Subsection (4), which is alleged to be discriminatory, only preserves the status quo. Clause 147, of which it is part, makes clear a branch of the law which has always been open to contest and has been, I think, argued about by many erudite legal authorities, but subsection (2) of Clause 147 makes it clear that where an employee takes part in a strike after due notice has been given, his action is not to be regarded as a breach of a contract of employment, either for the purposes of any proceedings in contract brought against the employer or in respect of any proceedings in tort, whether brought against the employee or any other person, or for the purposes of Section 5 of the Contracts of Employment Act 1963, which we discussed in Committee, or Section 96 of the Act, which is the section dealing with inducement to break a contract of employment. So, whether or not that was the law before—and that might be the subject of argument—the employee is protected, and
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for certain purposes third parties are protected, in respect of the classes of case which are set out in subsection (2) of Clause 147.
The effect of enacting subsection (2) would of course inevitably raise the issue one way or the other whether that enactment abridged the right of the employer to dismiss. The general policy of the Bill is that, subject to the provisions of the Bill, the right to strike remains and, subject to the provisions of the Bill, the right of an employer to dismiss remains. That is safeguarded by subsection (4). I do not myself see what is provocative about that, because it only pretends to maintain an existing state of affairs and there is in fact no limitation either on the employee to strike under subsection (2) or on the employer to dismiss under subsection (4). If it were true, as the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, says, that subsection (4) constituted an invitation to the employer to dismiss, it would equally be true—although of course it is not—that under subsection (2) there was an invitation to the employee to strike. The truth is that neither is the case.
The purpose of the subsection sought to be left out is simply to maintain the status quo and to dispose of many of the legal doubts between the two parties to a dispute. Of course it is true that in 99 cases out of 100 questions of so-called victimisation on either side and actions by the employee and by the employer are settled as part of the settlement, and it is proper that it should be so. If they are settled as part of the settlement, as part of a no victimisation clause, the Bill has nothing to say to an agreement of that kind: and I have nothing to say, except that if they want to settle a dispute it is a very wise course for both parties to take to say that there should be no more dispute about it. If in the rare minority of cases it is not settled, then the right of the employee to strike is preserved and the right of the employer to dismiss is preserved, subject to the other provisions in the Act. For these reasons, I see no reason to diverge from the opinion expressed by one of my noble friends—I am not sure who it was; I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham—who dealt with the matter on Committee. I see no reason to alter the opinion of the Government in any way, and for this reason the Amendment should be resisted.
LORD SLATER: My Lords, may I ask the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor a question?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Of Course.
LORD SLATER: The noble and learned Lord referred to the status quo and he repeated that two or three times. We have knowledge of that term and we know that where we have had strikes—as the noble and learned Lord will be aware—we have had victimisation. People have been victimised because of their action in striking and they have not been able to find employment, either with the original company or with any other company which may have been an associate or subsidiary of the parent company.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I am not absolutely sure what is the question which I am supposed to answer, but the answer to it, if I can divine what was in the noble Lord's mind, is that after the end of a strike it is wise to include a no victimisation clause: wise from the point of view of both parties. This situation arises only if such a clause is not included; and all it says is that this Bill is not to alter the existing law except to the extent that it is altered in favour of the workman by subsection (2).
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor for what he has said; but, with the greatest respect, I must say that he has confirmed my anxiety. It is not an enormous anxiety but it is an anxiety. May I indulge the noble and learned Lord's usual patience to explain it? The noble and learned Lord based his case on the fact that the corollary to the re-statement of the law in subsection (2) was the re-statement of the law in subsection (4). He did not say that this altered the law. On the contrary, he said that it re-stated the law and he confirmed what was said by his noble friend Lord Windlesham. The noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, said:
"…we have the right of the employer to terminate his employment. This is the present situation. It is not affected by the Bill "—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 9/6/71; col. 359.]
My Lords, there is not a clear balance, as the noble and learned Lord indicated. Because subsection (2) either alters the
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law or makes clear what the noble and learned Lord said had on many occasions been in doubt; that is to say, some people must have thought that the law said a particular thing which subsection (2) now says that it does not mean. So subsection (2) is altering the law, at least in the view of some people.
There is, however, no parallel with subsection (4). In short, you have a reason for stating subsection (2); you have no reason for stating subsection (4), except the one that the noble and learned Lord adduced; namely, to give some balance and make clear that it is right to say this about the employee and it is right to say something else about the employer. It is because the noble and learned Lord has confirmed that subsection (4) does not alter the law that I find it difficult to see why it is necessary to put in a declaratory phrase repeating what is the law. If there is no reason for it in law, you are bound to look at the phrase and say,"Why is it put in? ". If it is put in a clause which is in other respects an acceptable clause—and the noble and learned Lord is right in saying that it is a clause which gives protection to the employee, the striker, on giving due notice—one is bound to construe it as an indication that Parliament thought that at the same time that it was giving something to the employee it was saying to the employer,"But don't you worry; if you want to strike back, you jolly well do so." I am not saying that is what the subsection means. I am saying it is tantamount to an invitation, and therefore, in my view, it is still a provocative statement.
The noble and learned Lord is not prepared to accept the Amendment to delete subsection (4). I am sorry about that. I think it will be of some help that what the noble and learned Lord said, with his great authority, will be on record for all to see; namely, that it does not alter the law; that it is not intended to be provocative; that it is not intended to be an invitation to the employer to do anything that he would not otherwise have thought of doing. All I can do, therefore, is rely on the record of what was said by the noble and learned Lord, and to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
8.37 p.m.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 93L:
Page 109, line 36, leave out (" an ") and insert (" a single ").
The noble Lord said: I suggest that with this Amendment your Lordships consider Amendment No. 93M, as the two tie up together. This is an attempt, probably a very amateur one, to meet a real difficulty. This is a suggested Amendment at line 36 to subsection (5), which says:
"…' due notice ', in relation to an employee, means notice of a duration not less than that which…he would be required to give to terminate his contract of employment."
That is a very common-sense concept, and my recollection is that it arises out of a rather famous law case which so decided. But a strike is essentially the withdrawal of labour by a group of people at one and the same time.
For practical purposes, the strikers are not those who happen all to be engaged on the same period of notice, but all who happen to be engaged in a particular workshop, or at a particular task, or in a particular factory—some geographical or occupational category, not a category defined by a period of notice to be found in their contract of employment. Therefore, this difficulty arises: that for workers to withdraw their labour effectively as strikers, they must all come out together. For workers to avoid the harm that comes through not giving due notice, they must give varying periods of notice if their contracts of employment are for varying periods of notice. Of course, one week's notice would be the average case; some would have a period of notice of less than one week and some more than one week. I suggest that one has to meet this difficulty if one is going to give any value to the relief which giving due notice provides without at the same time making nonsense of the right to strike.
Therefore the suggestion in these two Amendments is that, instead of the clause reading, as it does at the moment,
"…' due notice ', in relation to an employee, means notice…not less than that which…he would be required to give to terminate his contract of employment ",
it should read:"' due notice ' in relation to a single employee"means what I
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have already read out, but the subsection would continue:
" but where a strike notice has been given by or on behalf of a number of employees, then ' due notice ' means one week's notice."
One week's notice is, it seems to me, a fair average period. It will not necessarily be the exact notice period in all relevant contracts of employment, but it will be in most cases. In some cases, it will be a little longer than is necessary; in others, a little shorter than is necessary. But the essential point is that I cannot see any value in the"due notice"relief unless that notice is of such a kind that it can be properly given by every member of the group. No group, no strike. I therefore beg to move this Amendment.
8.42 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, we had a discussion about this point while we were arguing the matter in Committee, and the noble Lord put forward his case then in a little more detail. He said, and said truly, that in a factory there might be employees affected by a dispute, some of whom were on an hourly basis or a daily basis, some of whom were on a weekly basis and some of whom were on a fortnightly basis; and he said this would cause the organisers of the strike to have heart failure because they would not know which employees belonged to which category, and to give a series of different notices of varying length of time would cause a Government Department and a computer a long period of agony. My Lords, I replied and—I still believe that the reply had certain validity—that if they all gave a fortnight's notice they would be in order under the terms of this Bill, because under subsection (5), which this Amendment seeks to modify, the term is not that they must give the exact notice provided for in the individual contracts of employment but that the notice should not be less. All, therefore, that the organisers of the strike have to do in the given set of circumstances is to give the largest period of notice in respect of all the employees. I cannot myself see what difficulty, practically, that presents. It would certainly involve no use of any computer, only a little common sense.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble and learned

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Lord the Lord Chancellor. This is the argument he used on the last occasion, and I would therefore seek to show him that there is a very real practical difficulty, of such practicality that it virtually destroys the strike. I ask the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor to envisage the case of a typical shop or factory where there are 100 workers on one week's notice going on strike, and there is one person employed in a clerical capacity, in the storeroom or something, in the same factory, and he is on two weeks' notice. What the noble and learned Lord is saying is:"There is no difficulty; let there be a fortnight's notice on behalf of 101 persons, in circumstances where they have decided to go on strike, and it is to be hoped that somebody can hold them for one week while one week's notice is expiring." But, my Lords, to hope that it would be possible to hold them for a fortnight when 100 people are on one week's notice and one person only is on two weeks' notice is, to my mind, to hope for the impossible. I would ask the noble and learned Lord to explain how one gets out of that practical difficulty.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, the noble Lord's ingenuity is so enormous that I should have thought it was unnecessary to ask the question. He can do it in one of two ways, but the simplest way would be to let the one man clerical worker go on working for an extra week; and I cannot see why that unduly interferes with the objects of the strike or causes even the stupidest shop steward a moment's anxiety. If, however, he wanted to be super-careful he would try to persuade them all to last out for two weeks. But neither course, I should have thought, presents insuperable difficulty. The first assumes that the workers are so enthusiastic for the strike that they cannot last out for two weeks, and the other one assumes that they have a little common sense. But both of them, I think, present no difficulties at all to an ingenious shop steward, still less to the noble Lord whose ingenuity has impressed the House increasingly as time has gone on. But the fact that I am put such a difficult conundrum on the Report stage of an important Bill only leads me to marvel at the purely imaginary difficulties which the noble
450
Lord has been able to conjure up out of the vast recesses of his imagination.
My Lords, the other thing that needs to be said is that the employees have made a contract. Some people think contracts are only scraps of paper, or even scraps of air. I do not, curiously enough, take that line at all. I think that when an employer makes a contract with his workmen it ought to be kept because it is a promise, I think that when an employee makes a contract with his employer it ought to be kept because it is a promise. I just do not laugh off the theory with which the noble Lord does not seem to have really made intellectual contact, that people ought to keep their contracts, if the contract is that in one case they should keep a week's notice and in another case they should keep a fortnight's notice, my simple-minded doctrine—perhaps naïve, perhaps starry-eyed, perhaps unduly idealistic—is, none the less, that they should do what they have promised to do; and the noble Lord has never really explained why he wants them to do something else and something less than they have promised to do.
But the noble Lord really must catch on with the white heat of the technological revolution, if I may coin a phrase borrowed for the purpose from the Leader of his Party. Strikes are not confined to weekly wage-earners; they are not confined to monthly wage earners. I do not know what the average length of notice required in an airline pilot's contract is—I have not inquired. But I do know one thing: that they are paid approximately the same as the Lord Chancellor or a High Court Judge. No doubt they perform greater services: I am prepared to accept that. The Lord Chancellor is on a minute's notice, but I rather suspect that this would be considered by an airline pilot too short a period. I fancy that a week would be considered too short by an airline pilot, or by his employer, but under the noble Lord's Amendment the whole of an airline could be brought out on a week's notice. Of course this is absolute rubbish; let us face it.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, when the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said,"This is absolute rubbish; let us face it ", I could not have

451
been in greater agreement. I am assuming, of course, that the"rubbish"he refers to is what he himself has just said. I assume that because nobody was talking about the airline pilots. I was talking about the law and the desire to adhere to the law; and about the difficulty that this clause poses—because this clause is about a strike and a strike notice, and for the first time is trying to set down what a strike is. We all know that the first element of a strike is that a group of people have to go out at the same time, otherwise it is not a strike. That is the problem we are facing.
I assumed, erroneously it seems, that the Government, who had been thinking like this in the interests of good industrial relations, were seeking to further good industrial relations. It has been made perfectly clear by the noble and learned Lord that nothing could be further from his mind, at all events, whether it is farther from the Government's mind or

CONTENTS

Ardwick, L.

Gaitskell, Bs.

Raglan, L.

Bernstein, L.

Gardiner, L.

Ritchie-Calder, L.

Blyton, L.

Garnsworthy, L. [Teller.]

Segal, L.

Brockway, L.

George-Brown, L.

Slater, L.

Buckinghamshire, E.

Greenwood of Rossendale, L.

Stonham, L.

Carnock, L.

Henderson, L.

Stow Hill, L.

Champion, L.

Hoy, L.

Tanlaw, L.

Cooper of Stockton Heath, L.

Janner, L.

Taylor of Mansfield, L.

Davies of Leek, L.

Lindgren, L.

Walston, L.

Delacourt-Smith, L.

Longford, E.

Wells-Pestell, L.

Diamond, L.

Milner of Leeds, L. [Teller.]

White, Bs.

Foot, L.

Popplewell, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Aberdare, L.

Colville of Culross, V.

Gray, L.

Ailwyn, L.

Courtown, E.

Gridley, L.

Albemarle, E.

Craigavon, V.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

Amory, V.

Cranbrook, E.

Hacking, L.

Auckland, L.

Crathorne, L.

Hailes, L.

Balerno, L.

Cromartie, E.

Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Balfour, E.

Cullen of Ashbourne, L.

Balfour of Inchrye, L.

Daventry, V.

Hanworth, V.

Belhaven and Stenton, L.

de Clifford, L.

Harcourt, V.

Belstead, L.

De L'Isle, V.

Hastings, L.

Berkeley, Bs.

Denham, L.

Hatherton, L.

Bledisloe, V.

Digby, L.

Hives, L.

Boston, L.

Drumalbyn, L.

Hood, V.

Brabazon of Tara, L.

Ebbisham, L.

Hylton-Foster, Bs.

Braye, L.

Emmet of Amberley, Bs.

Inglewood, L.

Brecon, L.

Essex, E.

Kemsley, V.

Brentford, V.

Falkland, V.

Killearn, L.

Bridgeman, V.

Ferrers, E.

Kilmany, L.

Brooke of Cumnor, L.

Fortescue, E.

Lansdowne, M.

Brooke of Ystradfellte, Bs.

Geddes, L.

Latymer, L.

Burnham, L.

Goschen, V. [Teller.]

Long, V.

Burton, L.

Gowrie. E. [Teller.]

Macleod of Borve, Bs.

not. The reason why I suggest one week is because, according to the best of my recollection, when we last discussed this matter the noble and learned Lord himself said that in nearly every case the period of notice was one week. Therefore, I thought that the period of one week would fall on sympathetic ears. But it is perfectly obvious that far from it falling on sympathetic ears the noble and learned Lord sought to make a case for his self-entertainment. The noble and learned Lord has a difficult task to perform and he is entitled to entertainment of every kind he can possibly summon. What he is not entitled to do is to exacerbate industrial relations, and to have no intention of improving them; and because the noble and learned Lord has made that perfectly clear. I have no alternative but to divide the House.
8.52 p.m.
On Question. Whether the said Amendment (No. 93L) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 35; Not-Contents, 91.

Macpherson of Drumochter, L.

Rochdale, V.

Teviot, L.

Milverton, L.

Ruthven of Freeland, Ly.

Teynham, L.

Mowbray and Stourton, L.

St. Aldwyn, E.

Tweedsmuir, L.

Napier and Ettrick, L.

St. Just, L.

Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, Bs.

Northchurch, Bs.

Sempill, Ly.

Vivian, L.

Nugent of Guildford, L.

Sinclair of Cleve, L.

Wakefield of Kendal, L.

Oakshott, L.

Strange, L.

Ward of Witley, V.

O'Neill of the Maine, L.

Strathclyde, L.

Windlesham, L.

Rankeillour, L.

Suffield, L.

Resolved in the negative, and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.
8.59 p.m.
LORD BELSTEAD LORD BELSTEAD moved Amendment No. 93P:
Insert the following new clause:
Teacher in aided school dismissed on requirement of local education authority
".—(1) Where a teacher in an aided school is dismissed by the governors or managers of the school in pursuance of a requirement of the local education authority under paragraph (a) of the proviso to section 24(2) of the Education Act 1944, sections 22 and 24 and subsections (1) to (3) and subsection (5) of section 106 of this Act shall have effect in relation to the dismissal as if—

(a) the local education authority had at all material times been the teacher's employer, and

(b) the local education authority had dismissed him, and the reason or principal reason for which they did so had been the reason or principal reason for which they required his dismissal.

(2) For the purposes of a complaint under section 106 of this Act as applied by the preceding subsection, section 115 of this Act shall have effect as if—

(a) in subsection (4)(b), for the words the employer in question refused or failed to make such an offer, and the tribunal or Court considers that he acted unreasonably in doing so' there were substituted the words ' the local education authority refused or failed to permit the aggrieved party to be re-engaged, and the tribunal or Court considers that they acted unreasonably in doing so ', and

(b) in subsection (5), any reference to the employer were a reference to the local education authority."

The noble Lord said: My Lords, the purpose of this new clause is to safeguard the right of appeal against the unfair dismissal of teachers in voluntary aided schools who are dismissed on the request of the local education authority under proviso (a) of Section 24(2) of the Education Act 1944. That Act empowers a local education authority to require the managers or governors of an aided school to dismiss a teacher without giving any reason. The managers or governors and not the local education authority are in fact the employers of the teachers. The
454
unfair dismissal provisions of the Bill provide only for a complaint of unfair treatment against the employer who carried out the dismissal, lf, therefore, such a dismissed teacher made a complaint of unfair dismissal against his employer under these provisions, the employer would have a complete defence under Section 24(1)(d) of this Act, which provides that a fair reason for dismissal is that the continued employment of the employee in the position he held would contravene a duty or restriction imposed by statute. And I am advised that the complaint in this case would almost certainly be dismissed.
My Lords, we consider that this does not give the teachers concerned—that is to say, those in aided schools—fair and just treatment. We think that in these cases the local education authority should be treated as the employer, and that the dismissed employee's appeal should lie against the authority and not against the employer who merely acted on the statutory requirement under Section 24 of the 1944 Act, and that where the tribunal determined that the dismissal was unfair the local education authority should be expressly liable for compensation. I will go into more detail if any noble Lord wishes, but this in fact is what the new clause does. My Lords, I beg to move.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, I wonder whether he would be good enough to say whether the usual consultation took place with the relevant representatives before this clause was finally worked out.
LORD BELSTEAD: My Lords, discussions have gone on with the Church of England and the Roman Catholic school authorities. The Department of Education and Science has been in touch with, but has not discussed with, the teachers' unions and the education authorities this proposal, and there has been no reaction from those two bodies.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 149 [Redundancy payments]:
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE moved Amendment No. 935:
Page111, line 22, after (" Act ") insert (" or a sum payable under section 41(2) of that Act ").
The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 935, and if it is convenient to your Lordships perhaps we can also discuss Amendments Nos. 93U and 93V. These are technical Amendments and they are designed to adjust the clause in order to ensure that the regulation-making powers that it provides in relation to overlapping claims for redundancy payments under the Redundancy Payments Act and complaints of unfair dismissal under the Bill cover payments made to Crown employees, because these are regarded under Section 41 of the Redundancy Payments Act as similar to redundancy payments and in respect of which rebates may be paid out of the redundancy fund. Crown employees are within the scope of the"unfair dismissal"provisions of the Bill, but Clause 149 as it stands at present does not cover the payments to Crown employees which, under Section 41(2) and (3) of the Redundancy Payments Act, are regarded as similar to redundancy payments and attract rebates from the redundancy fund. The Amendments therefore make the necessary adjustments to the clause to ensure that its provisions apply to payments to Crown employees as they do to redundancy payments under the Act. I beg to move.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, unless any of your Lordships wish to participate further in the debate on this, all I need do is to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, for explaining the matter completely to our satisfaction.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
9.6 p.m.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 93N:
Page 111, line 25, at end insert—
(" Provided that no such regulation shall prevent the payment to the complainant of a sum equivalent to the said redundancy payment wherever a lesser sum is awarded by way of compensation under subsection (5) of the said section 106.").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 93N. I am delighted to see the noble Baroness here, because I think we were privileged to have her attendance when the matter was discussed on a previous occasion, and my recollection (though I have not had time to check on this) is that she was good enough to say that she would consider the matter and see whether the proposal which I then made might prove to be acceptable.
The situation, if I may remind your Lordships, that the Amendment seeks to achieve is that, assuming an employee has been unfairly dismissed and is not reinstated afterwards, then he has lost his job, and lost his job in circumstances in which, if he had not been unfairly dismissed, but had simply been dismissed, he would have been entitled to redundancy payment of a given figure. It is conceivable that that redundancy payment, assuming the employee was an employee of long standing and earning substantial wages, might have been a substantial sum. But the Bill provides that where there is unfair dismissal an employee is entitled to compensation, and regulations are to be introduced to provide that he can set one against the other, so that he does not get both the compensation and redundancy. So far, I should have thought that all reasonable people agree.
But what I am instancing to your Lordships is the possibility of a person receiving by way of compensation a small sum, because he is able to get another job quickly. The compensation is based on the likely period that the ex-employee will be out of work, and therefore the amount of compensation awarded on a damages basis is fairly small; whereas if he had received redundancy payment the sum would have been large, because of course redundancy payment has nothing whatever to do with the prospect of future unemployment, but is concerned only with the achievement of past employment. These are two totally different concepts, and the basis on which each amount is calculated is a different one. In the case of redundancy, you take note of the wages that the man has earned and the period that he has been employed. In the case of damages or compensation, you take note of the likelihood of the period for which the man

457
is likely to be unemployed before he gets another job.
To make the position clear, whether your Lordships think it right or not, the present law, as I understand it, is that a man can be given a proper dismissal on Friday, get £500, or whatever sum it may be, in redundancy pay properly under the law, and start his next job at the same or at a higher wage on Monday. That is what the law provides. But, in those circumstances, it is conceivable that the compensation payable, if this were subsequently established as being an unfair dismissal, would be quite small. All I am saying in the Amendment, which seems to me to be worth more than sympathetic consideration, is:
" Provided that no such regulation "—
these are the regulations which this Bill empowers the Secretary of State to bring in—
" shall prevent the payment to the complainant "—
that is, the employee unfairly dismissed—
" of a sum equivalent to the said redundancy payment wherever a lesser sum is awarded by way of compensation under "
the relevant section of the Bill. So, in short, where compensation in the case I have instanced would be quite small, and the redundancy payment quite big, it would be unfair to deny the redundant employee his redundancy pay merely because it has turned out to be an unfair dismissal for which a different kind of compensation, calculated on a different basis, has been awarded. I beg to move.
LORD SLATER: My Lords, I hope that the noble Baroness will accept this Amendment. My noble friend in moving the Amendment talked about unfair dismissal. This often happens where you get four or five people engaged in a form of employment, and because some slight error has occurred in the operations in this small establishment a particular man receives, as it were, a minute's notice, but when the matter is gone into later it is found that he ought never to have been dismissed because he was not responsible for what happened. The man ought still to be in employment, but things did not work out that way. Naturally, because of his qualifications and ability he is quite easily able to find
458
employment further down the street, or within the village or district.
I think my noble friend has been quite fair in putting down this Amendment, and what he has said in regard to redundancy payments is correct. Some men are fortunate enough to be able to take up fresh employment the following Monday or the following week. My noble friend's Amendment provides that a man will be able to get by way of redundancy payment the sum to which he made reference, but it shall not outweigh itself against the compensation due to the man because of wrongful dismissal or something for which he was not responsible. I sincerely hope that the noble Baroness will give us some form of accommodation in this respect.
9.14 p.m.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I have considerable sympathy with the views expressed both by the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, and the noble Lord, Lord Slater, and naturally, being an Aberdonian, I would always prefer to see that whether you were unfairly dismissed or subject to a redundancy payment you always got the best of the bargain. I see the point of this Amendment, but I thought that the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, said in his opening remarks that he had accepted that the provisions concerning unfair dismissal and those concerning redundancy were exclusive of each other. He must have received a great number of letters during the course of this Bill, but I wrote to the noble Lord on June 23 and sought to confirm to him that I felt that the intentions of the Government were correctly laid down in this clause. What they amount to is that if you have a protection which is afforded by the Redundancy Payments Act 1965, or one which can qualify under the unfair dismissal provisions, they are exclusive. You really must choose between them.
In the debate during the Committee Stage I used the phrase—I was looking it up the other day—that"you cannot have it both ways: it must be one or the other ". This is really what this clause is about. You have either been unfairly dismissed or you are entitled to redundancy payment. I quite understand the feeling because I remember that the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, instanced a

459
man aged, I think, 61 who had served very ably for some time and would have been able to qualify for redundancy payments but who was in fact unfairly dismissed. I quite see that. On the other hand you must have one or the other but not both, much as I would like that, as an Aberdonian. That being so, I fear I cannot recommend to the House that they should accept this Amendment.
LORD BERNSTEIN: My Lords, might I ask the noble Baroness this: could not an employee be unfairly dismissed and have his case tried and still be entitled to redundancy payment?
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, an employee can, for example, be dismissed, and he may seek at the time to put it the other way round to the noble Lord—that he was redundant, but he wishes to put forward a claim that he was unfairly dismissed. The Bill provides that he can put forward this claim on either set of circumstances, but he cannot have the award on both at the same time; nor can he choose between them. If the tribunal has decided that he has been unfairly dismissed he takes compensation; if the tribunal decides that he is redundant then he takes a redundancy award.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, surely the redundancy payment will always be the one that is made, because when employees become redundant the employer notifies the Department of Employment some weeks before and is required to work out the redundancy payment, which has to be agreed by the Department before the employee leaves. It seems to me that in these circumstances, unless there is something in the actual dismissal or some attempt on the part of the employer to prevent the employee receiving the redundancy payment, it is unlikely that there will be a claim for unfair dismissal, or at least that it could be considered before the employee has left and has taken his redundancy payment. This is my understanding of the situation and my own experience; and I should be grateful if the noble Baroness would explain to me how there could be this conflict and how a claim for wrongful dismissal could arise.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, if I might put it in the way that I would understand it: at the time, if a man is not redundant—whatever the reason for his dismissal, whether it is fair or unfair—he does not receive a redundancy payment. The noble Lord opposite is asking for the position to be changed, so that the man who is not redundant should nevertheless receive a redundancy payment. I can see the reason. This is not really the object behind the Redundancy Payments Act, and it was not the intention of the Labour Government when they introduced it. The proposed Amendment is not fair to other employees who have not qualified for redundancy payments. We have to bear this in mind. Therefore I suggest that the noble Lord is trying to get the best of both worlds, and I hope that he will realise that one cannot have them both, one must choose.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I am very satisfied that you cannot have it both ways, which is what the Government are trying to do, as I shall seek to demonstrate. I shall write to the Prime Minister to-night recommending the noble Baroness for the job of Chief Secretary, because an Aberdonian is only a beginner at the task of saving the Treasury money.
May I explain why I say that it is not right for the Government to have it both ways to the extent of creating a clear injustice. The noble Baroness did not explain, and perhaps I could explain, the background of the whole of Clause 149. It is the Government taking power by regulations to claw back money paid, to have it both ways. That is to say, where an employee has received redundancy payment, and then gets compensation, the regulations provide that you set one against the other. In short, you deduct the redundancy payment from the compensation so that the employee does not get more than the compensation. You are envisaging circumstances in which you do not know at the start of the situation where you are. As my noble friend Lord Stonham said, in the normal circumstances the first thing that happens is that the redundancy payment is made, then the argument takes place about unfair dismissal. I want to make it clear it is the Government who are introducing regulation-making powers in this clause in order that the employee shall

461
not have it both ways. In the normal circumstances that is not complained about.
What is complained about is that that should apply to the following circumstances: namely, where an employee is dismissed (let us have a neutral word at the moment) and says,"You should not have dismissed me; I was doing my job well and I want it back again ". If he gets his job back there is no question of an employer paying redundancy, or an employee being entitled to redundancy payment. Until you know therefore whether the employee has to be reinstated, nobody knows what the outcome of the situation is going to be. This is the answer to my noble friend Lord Stonham. The man seeks to be reinstated, the court has power to say,"You have been unfairly dismissed ", but it has no power to say,"You will be reinstated ". It only has power to say"We recommend reinstatement ". If reinstatement does not take place then the compensation may be increased.
At the end of the day, and this may be at the end of several days, weeks, or months, for the first time the man who has sought to retain his job, to be reinstated and to continue as a good workman for the same employer, finds that not only has he lost his job, but that because he has lost his job unfairly he is going to be worse off than if his employer had come along and said,"I am sorry, Bill, I don't think we can keep you any longer "—for whatever the reason may be."You have been a jolly good worker for all these years. Here is your notice. Here is your week's pay and here is your redundancy payment amounting to x hundred pounds." That is what he would be entitled to if he knew at the start that he was not going to get his job back, which he does not know until weeks or months have expired.
I submit to your Lordships that it would be a gross injustice if one were set against the other. The noble Lord is shaking his head in a negative fashion. I hope he will be good enough (because I always pay great attention to what he says) to explain to me why it is that that a workman should be much worse off, maybe several hundred pounds worse off, because an employer has treated him unfairly as against an employer who has
462
treated him fairly and given him fair notice.
I hope that the noble Baroness will reconsider what I have said. The noble Baroness rather thought I was not paying sufficient attention to her letter. I can assure her that I read her letters word for word, day after day. The noble Baroness's letter finished, I think I am right in saying (I have it in front of me):
" We think that subsection (2) is sufficient to achieve what we intend. We are considering however whether it is necessary to amend the Bill to provide, etc."
I did not quite know what the"etc." meant; and I did not quite know whether the decision was to amend the Bill. So I thought that, before referring to the letter, I would give the noble Baroness an opportunity of saying what the further consideration by the Government had resulted in and precisely what it meant.
My Lords, I am not satisfied with the present situation. It cannot be right that this injustice should occur. The Government are perfectly entitled to say that in the normal case one should be set off against the other. We have no objection to that. We fully understand that regulation-making powers are necessary to achieve that. We are not objecting to the substance of the clause. We are objecting merely to this one case of a man's seeking re-employment, not knowing where he stands until the end of the day, and then finding himself, because he sought re-employment, much worse off because the employer has dismissed him unfairly than he would have been if the employer had dismissed him fairly. That is a simple statement of the case. I hope that it appeals to all your Lordships' sense of justice.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, as this is Report stage may I ask the leave of the House briefly to reply to the noble Lord? I would say, as there are no objections, in reply to his query about the last paragraph of the letter which I wrote to him, which I am delighted to see he has beside him, that I understand that an Amendment was accepted (No. 90H) to page 162, Schedule 6, and that that covered this particular point. It does not, of course, cover what we are discussing at the moment. The noble Lord said that he accepted—and he has been consistent

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about this; he accepted it right from the beginning in the Committee stage—that one could not have it both ways.
Perhaps the only thing I can do is briefly to state the problem as we see it and what this Amendment seeks to do. Surely we are agreed—certainly I thought we were agreed—that the protections afforded to employees under the Redundancy Payments Act and the unfair dismissal provisions are mutually exclusive. In other words, an employee who is entitled to one remedy cannot also have the other. On the other hand, we must make provision to allow for the hearing of claims of unfair dismissal. A man may have been dismissed as redundant and perhaps he himself is not sure whether he ought to make a claim for unfair dismissal. We must make provision and give time for him to do so. If he does make a claim, the tribunal has to decide whether he was redundant

CONTENTS

Ardwick, L.

George-Brown, L.

Ritchie-Calder, L.

Bernstein, L.

Greenwood of Rossendale, L.

Segal, L.

Blyton, L.

Henderson, L.

Slater, L.

Champion, L.

Hoy, L.

Stonham, L.

Cooper of Stockton Heath, L.

Janner, L.

Stow Hill, L.

Davies of Leek, L.

Longford, E.

Taylor of Mansfield, L.

Delacourt-Smith, L.

Milner of Leeds, L. [Teller.]

Walston, L.

Diamond, L.

Popplewell, L.

Wells-Pestell, L.

Gardiner, L.

Raglan, L.

White, Bs.

Garnsworthy, L. [Teller.]

NOT-CONTENTS

Aberdare, L.

Cranbrook, E.

Hanworth, V.

Ailwyn, L.

Crathorne, L.

Harcourt, V.

Albemarle, E.

Cromartie, E.

Harvey of Tasburgh, L.

Amory, V.

Cullen of Ashbourne, L.

Hastings, L.

Auckland, L.

Daventry, V.

Hatherton, L.

Balerno, L.

de Clifford, L.

Hives, L.

Balfour, E.

De L'Isle, V.

Hood, V.

Balfour of Inchrye, L.

Denham, L.

Hylton-Foster, Bs.

Barnby, L.

Derwent, L.

Ilford, L.

Belhaven and Stenton, L.

Digby, L.

Inglewood, L.

Belstead, L.

Drumalbyn, L.

Kemsley, V.

Berkeley, Bs.

Ebbisham, L.

Killearn, L.

Bessborough, E.

Elliot of Harwood, Bs.

Kilmany, L.

Bledisloe, V.

Emmet of Amberley, Bs.

Lansdowne, M.

Boston, L.

Essex, E.

Latymer, L.

Brabazon of Tara, L.

Falkland, V.

Lauderdale, E.

Brecon, L.

Ferrers, E.

Long, V.

Brentford, V.

Fortescue, E.

Macleod of Borve, Bs.

Bridgeman, V.

Gage, V.

Macpherson of Drumochter, L.

Brooke of Cumnor, L.

Geddes, L.

Milverton, L.

Brooke of Ystradfellte, Bs.

Goschen, V. [Teller.]

Mowbray and Stourton, L.

Burnham, L.

Gowrie, E.

Napier and Ettrick, L. [Teller.]

Burton, L.

Gray, L.

Northchurch, Bs.

Carnock, L.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

Nugent of Guildford, L.

Colville of Culross, V.

Hacking, L.

Oakshott, L.

Courtown, E.

Hailes, L.

O'Neill of the Maine, L.

Craigavon, V.

Hailsham of Saint Marylebone L. (L. Chancellor.)

Rankeillour, L.

Craigmyle, L.

Reay, L.

or whether he was unfairly dismissed, and it will award accordingly. We allow in the Bill for the time factor, when people are not quite sure whether they should make a claim, why they have been dismissed and what their position is. But at the end of the day they can receive an award only under one set of provisions or the other. I agree with the noble Lord that in certain circumstances there would be a larger award if a person was declared redundant, but if the tribunal decided that he was not redundant but had been unfairly dismissed, then the award must be on that count. It must be on one or the other. Therefore, I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw the Amendment.
9.36 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 93N) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 28; Not-Contents, 106.

Rochdale, V.

Strange, L.

Tweedsmuir, L.

Rothermere, V.

Strathclyde, L.

Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, Bs.

Ruthven of Freeland, Ly.

Sudeley, L.

Vivian, L.

St. Aldwyn, E.

Suffield, L.

Wakefield of Kendal, L.

St. Just, L.

Tanlaw, L.

Ward of Witley, V.

Sandford, L.

Terrington, L.

Windlesham, L.

Sempill, Ly.

Teviot, L.

Wolverton, L.

Sinclaire of Cleve, L.

Teynharn, L.

Resolved in the negative, and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.
9.38 p.m.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE moved Amendment No. 93T:
Page 111, line 25, at end insert—
(" ( ) In section 21 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1965 (claims for redundancy payments), at the end of paragraph (c) there shall be added the words"or
(d) a complaint relating to his dismissal has been presented by the employee under section 106 of the Industrial Relations Act 1971 ".")
The noble Baroness said: My Lords, the purpose of this Amendment is to ensure that an employee who has made a complaint of unfair dismissal under Clause 106 will not be barred by the time factor from making a claim under the Redundancy Payments Act for a redundancy payment if the tribunal finds that his dismissal was not unfair. In a complaint of unfair dismissal under Clause 106 a tribunal may find that the employee was not unfairly dismissed but that the reason for dismissal was redundancy. Such an employee, I would suggest to the House, should not be debarred from making a claim for a redundancy payment by reason of the six months' time limit in the Redundancy Payments Act. Therefore, the Amendment adjusts the time limit provisions in Section 21 of the Act. I beg to move.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, this Amendment has been discussed. I beg to move it formally.
Amendment moved—
Page 111, line 28, after (" payment ") insert (" which is either—
(a) a payment ").—Baroness Tweedsmuir of Bellielvie.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, Amendment No. 93V is also consequential. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 111 line 30 at end insert (" or
(b) a payment in respect of the termination of a person's employment, made in accordance with any provision of the Superannuation Act 1965 or in accordance with any such arrangements as are mentioned in section 41(3) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1965 ")—(Baroness Tweedsmuir of Bellielvie.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 150 [Period of continuous employment]:
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE moved Amendment No. 93R:
Page 112, line 1, leave out subsections (3) and (4) and insert—
(" ( ) Regulations made by the Secretary of State may make provision—

(a) for preserving the continuity of a person's period of employment for the purposes of Schedule 1 to the Contracts of Employment Act 1963, or for the purposes of that Schedule as applied by or under any other enactment specified in the regulations, or

(b) for modifying or excluding the operation of section 24 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1965 (which requires the continuity of the period of employment to be treated as broken for the purposes of that Act where a redundancy payment is paid to an employee and he is subsequently re-engaged), subject to the recovery of any sum which, in accordance with subsection (3) of that section, is treated as payment of a redundancy payment,

in cases where, in consequence of action to which the next following subsection applies, a dismissed employee is re-engaged by his employer or is engaged by a successor of that employer or by an associated employer.
( ) This subsection applies to any action taken in relation to the dismissal of an employee which consists—

(a) of the presentation by him of a complaint under section 106 of this Act, or

467

(b) of his making a claim in accordance with the procedure provided for by a procedure agreement designated by an order under section 31 of this Act, or

(c) of any action taken by a conciliation officer under section 146(4) of this Act.".)

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, the present subsection (3) of this clause enables the Secretary of State to make regulations to provide for an employee's continuity of employment to be preserved for the purposes of Schedule 1 to the Contracts of Employment Act and the legislation to which that Schedule applies. This is in cases where employees are re-engaged after making a complaint of unfair dismissal under Clause 106. We have given further consideration to this provision, and we think that it ought to be widened in order to allow the Secretary of State to make similar regulations to preserve an employee's continuity of employment in two other sets of circumstances. They are: first, after re-engagement, following his making, a claim of unfair dismissal under a voluntary procedure which is exempted from the unfair dismissals provision of the Bill under Clause 31; and, secondly, after re-engagement following action by the conciliation officer under Clause 146(4). I am sure your Lordships will agree that it is just that the Secretary of State should be able to make provisions for continuity of employment in all three sets of circumstances in which an employee might be re-engaged after making a complaint of unfair dismissal. This is what the Amendment seek to do.
My Lords, the second part of the Amendment refers to Section 24 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1965. This provides that where a redundancy payment has been paid to an employee and he is then re-engaged by the employer, his continuity of employment is broken for the purpose of the Act. The Government feel that where an employee refunds a redundancy payment in circumstances where he is re-engaged by a former employer as a result of making a complaint of unfair dismissal under Clause 106, or through an exempted voluntary procedure, or as the result of action by a conciliation officer, his continuity of employment should be preserved for the purposes of the Redundancy Payments Act. Therefore the Amendment enables the Secretary of
468
State to make regulations to this end. I hope that your Lordships will agree that this improves the Bill. I beg to move.
LORD STOW HILL: My Lords, I should like to put one question to the noble Baroness who has moved the Amendment. She will recollect that she very kindly answered on behalf of the Government when I raised certain difficulties about Clause 28, and also Clause 150, which she is now proposing to amend. She may also recollect that I was concerned about the requirement in Clause 28 for 104 weeks' continuous employment in order to found a claim for unfair dismissal. In the course of our earlier debates she pointed out that under Clause 150 the provisions of Schedule 1 to the Contracts of Employment Act 1963 were made applicable for the purpose of determining in any given case whether employment was continuous or not.
I submitted, in reply to her, that the then provisions of Schedule 1 to the 1963 Act were not altogether satisfactory as they did not in terms provide for continuity, despite certain short breaks—for example, breaks occasioned by friction or something of the sort, or possibly even brief strike action—and I submitted that the Court should be given a discretion to treat employment as being continuous for 104 weeks even though there had been some short interruptions.
This Amendment enables the Secretary of State to make regulations for preserving the continuity of a person's period of employment for the purpose of Schedule 1 to the 1963 Act. As I read it, that seems to be subject to no qualifications art all. As I listened to the noble Baroness when she introduced this Amendment she did not have in mind the particular breaks to which I referred when I was questioning the Government previously as to the effect of the Schedule, but it seems to me that the regulations which the Amendment empowers the Secretary of State to make could cover the sort of situation which I was describing. I see nothing in the Amendment to prevent their covering that. I have no doubt that the noble Baroness is not yet in a position to say what the intention is with regard to the regulations. I am concerned as to two

469
things—and I hope that I may have her confirmation. The first is that the regulations could be made to cover the situation that I was describing, and the second is to ask whether she is in a position to give any information as to the Government's intention. I should be grateful if she could inform the House that it is in fact the Government's intention to make provision by regulation for the sort of case I had instanced. I shall quite understand if she cannot at this stage answer the second question—it is perhaps too early; but I shall be grateful if she can answer the first.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I understand the particular point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill. I wrote a letter to him also, and I hope that he has it beside him, in the same way as his noble friend Lord Diamond had my previous letter.
LORD STOW HILL: My Lords, if I had received a letter from the noble Baroness that would be an incident which I most certainly should not forget.
LORD GREENWOOD OF ROSSENDALE: My Lords, the noble Lord would have slept with it under his pillow.
LORD STOW HILL: My Lords, I have not received it. It may have been lost in the post, or it may not yet have reached me; but I should have been most interested to see such a letter. Unless I am grievously mistaken I have not received a letter from the noble Baroness, but I am grateful to her for having written to me.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, that was just an interruption and perhaps, with the leave of the House, I may say to the noble Lord that I am deeply grieved that he has not had my letter, because I wrote to him on June 23, which is quite a long time ago.
LORD GEORGE-BROWN: My Lords, the postal services under this Government are not doing very well, are they?
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I wrote to the noble Lord on the particular point raised by him, regarding the provisions of
470
Schedule 1. I will of course send him another copy, because I have it here.
LORD GEORGE-BROWN: Hand it to him!
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, in order not to delay the House I will answer the two brief questions which were put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill. In the first place, the regulations can cover the situation he had in mind. Secondly, the purpose of my letter was to explain that, having given further consideration to this clause, which at that time was Clause 146, and is now Clause 150, we felt that the provisions of Schedule 1 to the Contracts of Employment Act, together with the Bill, completely cover the intermittent breaks in employment which were concerning him, and that they would therefore provide for a continuous period of employment.
LORD STOW HILL: My Lords, may I have the leave of the House to thank the noble Baroness and to assure her that I will at once make a most intensive search of my correspondence. But I did not say I had not received her letter without careful consideration as to whether I had.
VISCOUNT DAVENTRY: My Lords, may I ask whether the noble Baroness put a 2½p or 3p stamp on it?
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 152 [Recovery of sums awarded in proceedings involving trade union or employers' association]:
LORD STOW HILL LORD STOW HILL had given notice of his intention to move Amendment No. 93F:
Page 113, line 9, leave out from beginning to (" comprised ") in line 18.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, Amendment No. 93F relates to a very technical point that I took up on this clause and on which the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor answered on behalf of the Government. He very kindly said he would consider the question that I raised, and he has since considered it and written to me upon it. I certainly have his letter and I have it by me. I am very sorry indeed to say that it did not convince me. But this is a highly technical point, and I

471
do not think it would serve any useful purpose to pursue it. I simply wish to thank the noble and learned Lord, and, with the leave of the House, I will not move this Amendment.
Clause 153 [Proceedings against unregistered organisations]:
LORD STOW HILL: My Lords, I beg to move the next Amendment in my name, which again, I am afraid, is rather a technical one. Clause 153 deals with proceedings against unregistered organisations of workers.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend the number of the Amendment to which he is speaking?
THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (VISCOUNT HOOD): My Lords, I called Amendment No. 93Q.
LORD STOW HILL: My Lords, I am extremely sorry. I was speaking to Amendment No. 93G. I apologise to the House.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, we all recognise the difficulty of all these letters, and I am sure my noble friend does not need to apologise to anybody. I beg to move Amendment No. 93Q:
Page 114, line 14, at end insert (" or has not been so used.")
Clause 153 deals with proceedings against unregistered organisations, as my noble friend has just said, and subsection (4) deals with
" Recovery of any sum which in any such proceedings is awarded as compensation or damages ",
and it says that it
" shall not be enforceable against any property comprised in a fund belonging to…the organisation, if under the rules of the organisation property which is…comprised in that fund is precluded from being used for financing strikes…".
So we are dealing with the protection of that property, and we are dealing with it because it is entitled to that protection if the rules say that it should be precluded from being used for financing strikes.
The Amendment seeks to add"or has not been so used." In short, there should be two tests: one whether the rules say that it is precluded from being used, the
472
other the fact that it has not been so used. The reason why I suggest that additional test is that until this Bill is published unions will not know necessarily that in order to obtain that protection they should have rules which say that this property is precluded from being used. They may be under the impression that if you simply do not use the property in that way that is adequate for protection—and indeed it probably is until this Bill becomes law. When the Bill becomes law those unions which want to continue the protection would have to alter their rules, and that would take time. Therefore, it is right that the additional test which I am proposing should be adopted, and that is why I beg leave to move the Amendment.
9.56 p.m.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, the effect of this Amendment would be to extend the protection against liability for awards of compensation and damages that is afforded to unregistered organisations of workers and employers by this clause to cover not only those funds which, under the rules of the organisation, are not available for financing industrial action, but also any funds which have not yet been so used, in the words of the Amendment, or not used for that purpose.
Noble Lords will recall that this Amendment is similar to one which was withdrawn at an earlier stage, in Committee, and I fear that we cannot accept it for two reasons. First, the Bill is intended to offer protection only to provident funds, and then only if the organisation is prepared to forfeit any right to call on them for other purposes by putting them under independent control. Secondly, because the Amendment would, in contrast, provide immunity for the general funds of an organisation which had not before used them for what, I suppose, would be called"militant"purposes. For these reasons, we do not feel that we can accept the Amendment.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I would not propose to seek to divide the House on it, but I am unhappy about the answer. As the noble Baroness said, the purpose of the Bill is to protect provident funds. But provident funds can be of two kinds.

473
They can either be funds which are earmarked and set aside, or they can be those funds which are part of the regular funds, the normal funds, of a union, and that part which is used for provident purposes. This presents no problem for tax purposes, because the tax definition is merely a question of fact: what had the funds been used on, and if they had been used for provident purposes then the tax benefits are paid, or repaid, as the case may be. Therefore, it is right that where you have unions, or unregistered organisations, which do not separate their funds in this way, the test should be a factual test; and if in fact the funds are not used for strike purposes, and have never been used for strike purposes but only for provident purposes, even if they are not set aside it is reasonable that they should be protected in this way.
If the noble Baroness is not prepared to change her mind about this, all one can do is to take note of the view of the Government, and organisations of this kind will have to take the appropriate steps to protect their funds by earmarking them, setting them on one side, or doing whatever is necessary, which I want to point out to the noble Baroness means a new course of conduct for them. For years and years and years they have been able to treat one fund as serving a variety of purposes, but this course will no longer be available to them. The noble Baroness has made clear that the Government are not prepared to look kindly on these organisations in this respect, and I have no alternative but to seek your Lordships' permission to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
10 p.m.
LORD STOW HILL LORD STOW HILL moved Amendment No. 93G:
Page 114, line 14, at end insert—
(" (5) For the purposes of this section property belonging to the organisation shall not include property belonging to any member of the organisation otherwise than jointly or in common with the other members of the organisation.")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is the Amendment which I mistakenly began to move before the last Amendment was discussed. I put it forward merely as a suggestion for consideration, and I do
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not pretend for a moment that any great question of principle is involved here. It arises in the following way. Clause 153 specifies the property which can be taken in execution of a judgment against an unregistered organisation of workers. In Committee I called attention to the fact that the Donovan Commission Report pointed out that there was considerable doubt as to what constituted property of an unregistered organisation of workers. Under the Trade Union Act, 1871, the property of a trade union was vested in trustees, but it was doubtful at all times what constituted the property of an organisation not registered under the 1871 Act. Now the 1871 Act is being repealed by this Bill, and in those circumstances doubt exists as to what one means by the expression,"property belonging to an unregistered organisation of workers."
In Committee I suggested that perhaps it would be useful to take the opportunity of resolving that doubt by incorporating some definition which indicated precisely what was meant by"property belonging to a union ". The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor replied on behalf of the Government, and pointed out that it would not be practicable to incorporate any such definition because there was a wide range of doubt, which applied not only to the property of an unregistered organisation of workers but also to a number of other bodies, clubs and so on, and that therefore it would not be feasible to amend subsection (3) of the clause by putting into it any such definition. That I entirely accept and understand, and I do not ask the Government to do so. It would need some other measure of a more comprehensive character to resolve that doubt.
The suggestion, however, which I seek to make in the Amendment is not to go anything like so far as producing a definition, but simply to say what is not included in the property of an unregistered organisation, whatever that property is. What I seek by the new subsection is to exclude from such property the property of any member of the organisation which he does not own jointly or in common with other members in it, in other words his own property. I would not for a moment suggest that that is something which I should press on the Government, but I put it forward as a suggestion which I think might be an

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improvement if the Government think it is rightly framed. It would, I imagine, bring some sense of comfort and security to members of unregistered organisations if they were told explicitly in the terms of the Bill that their own personal property was in all circumstances completely immune. That is the purpose of the Amendment which I beg to move.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, this Amendment makes no difference to the existing effect of the Bill. It makes clear that which I thought was already clear, that the private property of members of an unregistered organisation
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of workers or employers is not available to meet an award of damages, compensation or whatever it may be, arising from civil proceedings against the organisation. My Lords, that is the position of the clause as it stands; that is the effect of the Amendment and, faced with that position, I am happy to accept the Amendment.
LORD STOW HILL: My Lords, may I thank the noble and learned Lord for accepting the Amendment? I do not maintain that it is a world-shaking Amendment, but it effects a slight improvement, and I am grateful to him.
On Question. Amendment agreed to.
10.6 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved Amendment No. 93A:
After Clause 153 insert the following new clause:
Nominations by members of trade unions
.—(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision—

(a) for enabling members of trade unions who are not under sixteen years of age to nominate a person or persons to become entitled, at the death of the member making the nomination, to the whole or part of any moneys payable on his death out of any funds of the trade union of which he is a member; and

(b) for enabling any moneys payable out of the funds of a trade union on the death of a member of the trade union, to an amount not exceeding £500, to be paid or distributed on his death (whether in accordance with such a nominaton or otherwise) without letters of administration, probate of any will or confirmation.

(2) Any regulations made in accordance with subsection (1)(a) of this section—

(a) may include provision as to the manner in which nominations may be made and as to the manner in which nominations may be varied or revoked, and

(b) may provided that, subject to such exceptions as may be prescribed, no nomination made by a member of a trade union shall be valid if at the date of the nomination the person nominated is an officer or employee of the trade union or is otherwise connected with the trade union in such manner as may be prescribed.

(3) Any regulations under this section may include such incidental, transitional or supplementary provisions as the Secretary of State may consider appropriate, and, in particular, any such regulations made in accordance with subsection (1)(a) of this section may include provision for securing, to such extent and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed,—

(a) that nominations made under the enactments repealed by this Act shall have effect as if they had been made under the regulations (and, in the case of any such nominations made by members of organisations which are not for the time being registered as trade unions under this Act, shall so have effect as if the organisations were so registered) and may be varied or revoked accordingly, and

(b) that any nomination made under the regulations by a member of an organisation which, at the time of the nomination, is registered as a trade union under this Act shall continue to have effect notwithstanding that the organisation ceases to be so registered, and may be varied or revoked accordingly.

(4) The Secretary of State may by order mad by statutory instrument direct that, in relation to deaths occurring after the end of
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the period of one month beginning with the date on which the order comes into force, subsection (1) (b) of this section shall have effect as if, for the reference to £500, there were substituted a reference to such higher amount as may be specified in the order.
(5) No order shall be made under subsection (4) of this section unless a draft of the order has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.
(6) In this section any reference to a trade union shall be construed as including a reference to an organisation of workers which is for the time being entered in the provisional register."
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, it falls to me to propose what looks at first sight to be a rather involved Amendment, which achieves really a very modest result. The repeal of the Trade Union Act Amendment Act 1876, which is effected by Schedule 9, will involve the repeal of an existing facility. The existing facilities allow members of a registered trade union to nominate persons to receive sums from union funds in the event of a member's death, and money can be distributed in other circumstances where there is no will. This is a useful facility which ought to be saved. It would have been possible—perhaps in some ways it would have been more attractive—simply to save the provisions of the 1876 Act. But that Act operates according to an outdated code, and there are other and more modern codes operating elsewhere. The result is that it has been thought advantageous to substitute a new code on lines similar to those found in other and more recent Acts. This is what the new Clause attempts to do.
The new provisions preserve the essential features of the old procedure. They protect the position of existing nominees, but they commit the details of procedure to regulations. These regulations are to be made by the Secretary of State, and this, it is thought, will give greater flexibility and adaptability to the new code. There are two consequential Amendments to Schedule 9—and those of your Lordships who are interested in details will find them in Amendments Nos. 99 and 100—repealing the Provident Nominations and Small Intestacies Act 1883, and parts of the Administration Estates (Small Payments) Act 1965. In due course I, or another noble Lord who is a member of the Administration shall propose these Amendments.
The new clause ensures that the regulations will maintain the existing features of the present procedure. An important function of the clause is to protect the rights of existing nominees. A nomination made by any organisation registered under the existing Trade Union Act will remain valid, irrespective of whether that organisation can and does subsequently register as a trade union under this Bill. Similarly, a nomination made by a member of an organisation registered as a trade union under the Bill will remain valid, even if the organisation subsequently cancels or loses its registration. I have received and it will be my duty to call it, if I can find it in the mass of paper with which I am surrounded, a manuscript Amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Diamond. In the meantime, I beg to move the new clause.
My Lords, it is now my duty to call a manuscript Amendment, supplementary to the present Marshalled List as an Amendment to Amendment No. 93, as follows,"in subsection (6), to leave out line 3."
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved, as an Amendment to the Amendment:
" In subsection (6), leave out line 3."
The noble Lord said: The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has been good enough to explain the purpose of the new clause. It will enable a member of a trade union under 16 years of age to nominate a person to become entitled at his death to the whole or part of any monies payable at death out of funds of the trade union of which he is a member. Subject to what the noble and learned Lord has just said, we find it unacceptable to distinguish, for the purpose of a young man disposing of his monies without the use of a will, between a young man who is a member of a union whose committee had decided to register and of a young man who belongs to a body which had not decided to register as a trade union. This is a circumstance we treat with seriousness and solemnity. We do not like to make this artificial distinction. It seems to me a pity that this much-needed new clause, which provides the continuation of this facility, should have this blemish.
Subsection (6) says:
" In this section any reference to a trade union shall be construed as including a reference to an organisation of workers which is for the time being entered in the provisional register."
The words"trade union"mean a registered trade union. Though subsection (1) shows some evidence of progress in the Government's thinking, it does not go so far as to remove entirely a distinction which I think it is only proper we should remove. It seemed to me, on considering this matter (and one gets to these matters very late, because things have been moving very fast and the Marshalled List has been growing every day until to-day), that one way of dealing with it was to remove this last line, which is what my manuscript Amendment seeks to do. The subsection would then read:
" In this section any reference to a trade union shall be construed as including a reference to an organisation of workers."
I think the effect of that would be (though I am an amateur in this) to remove the distinction, which I think we should remove when considering these solemn matters. For that reason, I beg to move my manuscript Amendment.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The original Amendment was No. 93A, after Clause 153 to insert a new clause on the Marshalled List, since when a manuscript Amendment has been proposed to the Amendment No. 93A in the following terms: that is to say,"In subsection (6), leave out line 3." That is the Amendment which the House should now discuss.
My Lords, I have had this manuscript Amendment only since I occupied the Woolsack this afternoon. It follows, therefore, that what I say now is not irrevocable, and I am sure noble Lords will accept that. It is possible that there may be less technical objection to this manuscript Amendment than I now seek to set forth, and I should not like the noble Lord to think that, without adequate consideration off the Woolsack, I would reject it finally or out of hand. Our present thought is that the Amendment to the Amendment is not acceptable, but for the reason I have given, I do not suggest that this decision is irrevocable.
The manuscript Amendment would have the effect of making the new procedure for nominations, and the distribution of money where there is no will, available

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to members of any organisation of workers, whether registered as a trade union or not. There has been throughout this Bill a controversy between the two sides of the House as to the virtues of registration under the Bill and the vices of non-registration under the Bill. I do not want to embark upon this contentious subject from a contentious point of view, but obviously one of the advantages of registration under the Bill, and indeed of registration under the existing set of laws, is that one can be, up to a point, satisfied that an organisation which is registered is reputable, and that one has some control in the end of whether it is administered properly. If an organisation is unregistered, as many organisations and trade unions are up to this moment (they do not have to register), then there is no control over it at all. The procedure which we sought to save was limited to registered trade unions; that is to say, trade unions registered under the existing law.
There is no question of progress in this matter, as the noble Lord said. As soon as this particular trouble was drawn to my attention—and I am bound to say that, for instance, at the stage of Second Reading I was quite unaware of it, although perhaps I ought to have known of it because it was vaguely in the number of things I did know—I said that of course this must be saved; and it has been saved by the Amendment which I have proposed. What the noble Lord now proposes is that the procedure, instead of being saved, should be extended to unregistered organisations. I do not want to help unregistered organisations, because our policy is to encourage organisations to register. But nor do I want to penalise people who happen to be members of an unregistered organisation as such, because they happen to be members of an organisation which has taken a foolish decision. What I am concerned with, as Lord Chancellor, is the proper administration of the law, and at the moment the manuscript Amendment is not acceptable. But I had it in my hands only after 2.30 this afternoon and therefore I do not want to give the noble Lord an unqualified,"No ". Perhaps he will be good enough to withdraw it and in the meantime I will consider the matter. However, I must tell him that it is not acceptable to the Government.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I wonder whether I might make two prefatory comments before coming to the substance of my remarks. First, I should like to say that I well understand that the noble and learned Lord and his advisers have had totally inadequate time to consider this Amendment. In an ideal world one would have had more assistance and more time oneself and would have got to this a little earlier and so have put it forward to the Government a little earlier; but in an ideal world industrial relations would be such that there would he no need for a Bill of this kind at all. So this is just unfortunate. Secondly, may I say that when I referred to progress I was not for one moment suggesting that when the matter was put to the noble and learned Lord it would not receive his sympathy—that is to say, the whole matter of Amendment 93A and not my Amendment to it? I was referring to the fact that whereas up to now in the Bill a union on the provisional register is not a trade union, we are now in this clause getting that treatment as a trade union that we have had in another case during the provisional period. That is the only element of progress, and again that is something which should not be raised in a contentious way.
As to the substance of what the noble and learned Lord was good enough to say, I quite appreciate that the way he put it, with respect, would be entirely the proper way having regard to his important duties. I quite accept that although this is a facility which one would not wish to deny to a young man because of some incidents outside his control, nevertheless in the proper administration of the law it is essential that there should be proper and responsible administration. I quite understand that there would have to be sufficient evidence of that kind of approach in order to extend this facility to those who are members of an organisation of workers, as opposed to being members of a trade union.
I would only say this to the noble and learned Lord: that he should bear in mind during his consideration that if the registration had been of precisely the same kind as under the 1871 Act, then it would be reasonable to assume that the same proportion—something like 85 per cent.—of union members would be

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in registered unions. It is because the new registration proposals have turned the majority of unions from members of registered unions to members of non-registered unions that we are all finding ourselves in this difficulty. The noble and learned Lord has been good enough to say that he will consider the matter. He has said it in a most acceptable context. I am grateful for his undertaking to consider it, and seek permission to withdraw my manuscript Amendment.
Amendment to Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
10.25 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR rose to move Amendment No. 93W:
After Clause 153, insert the following new clause
Winding up of trade unions, employers' associations and certain other organisations
".—(1) For the purposes of the application of Part IX of the Companies Act 1948 to—

(a) an organisation in respect of which the Chief Registrar has presented a petition under section 90(4) of this Act, or

(b) an organisation whose registration under this Act as a trade union or as an employers' association has been cancelled,

the organisation shall he regarded as an unregistered company within the meaning of Part IX of that Act, whether apart from this section it would be so regarded or not.
(2) Section 399 of that Act (winding-up of unregistered companies) shall have effect in relation to any such organisation as is mentioned in paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of the preceding subsection as if—

(a) in subsection (3), for the words"place of business ", wherever they occur, there were substituted the word"office ";

(b) subsection (5)(a), the words"or has ceased to carry on business, or is carrying on business only for the purpose of winding up its affairs"were omitted; and

(c) in subsection (6), in paragraphs (a) and (b), for the words"at its principal place of business, or by delivering to the secretary or some director, manager or principal officer"there were substituted the words"at its principal office, or by delivering to the secretary or any other officer ".

(3) Except as provided by subsection (1) of this section, Part IX of the Companies Act 1948 shall not have effect in relation to any trade union or employers' association.
(4) An organisation which has been incorporated by virtue of section 74 of this Act shall not be dissolved, except by an order of
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the court under the Companies Act 1948, until there has been lodged with the registrar a certificate signed by the secretary, or by some other officer of the organisation approved for the purpose by the registrar, that all property vested in the organisation has been duly conveyed or transferred by the organisation to the persons entitled to it."
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, I must now propose this Amendment in a slightly amended form from that in which it appears on the Marshalled List. As it appears on the List it reads:
" After Clause 153, insert the following new clause—".
The Amendment is the same, but it must be proposed in the form:
" After the new clause last inserted, to insert the following new clause ".
This is a rather formidable-looking Amendment to effect a relatively modest purpose. It establishes that a trade union or employers' association has to be wound up under Part IX of the Companies Act; that is to say, in the same way as an unregistered company. But it also provides that Part IX is applicable only to a winding up which takes place on the initiative of the Registrar. This really arises out of a number of criticisms which were put forward on May 24 at the Committee stage by the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill. In particular, Clause 90, as it now is, was alleged to leave it in doubt whether or not the subject of winding up was adequately dealt with; and in particular whether it was clear which part of the Companies Act would apply to the winding up of a registered organisation, and how and in what circumstances the relevant provisions would be applied. The purpose of the new clause is to meet these criticisms.
For the purposes of Clause 90, trade unions and employers' associations are to be dealt with under Part IX of the Companies Act 1948, so in effect they will be dealt with in the same way as unregistered companies are dealt with. Part IX will also apply to the organisations which have had their registration under the Bill cancelled. The reason for this is that such organisations do not cease to be bodies corporate and it is therefore necessary to provide for the manner in which they are to be wound up. There is another important function to the new clause: it is to make clear that, even though a trade union or employers'

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association is to be treated as an unregistered company, it will not be open to the creditors to seek the winding up; only the Registrar will have that right. That is provided for in Clause 90.
The new clause also makes provision for the proper dissolution of a registered organisation in other circumstances, as when the members themselves decide on dissolution in accordance with the rules. I hope and believe that the new clause fully covers all the technical provisions needed to support Clause 90, and I hope that it will meet with universal approval.
LORD STOW HILL: My Lords, I rise to express sincere indebtedness to the noble and learned Lord for the steps that he has taken to meet difficulties which I felt on Clause 90. He wrote me very fully upon the matter, and he has now put down and introduced this new clause. So far as I am concerned, it seems to meet completely the difficulties that I raised and, as I have already said, I am most indebted to the noble and learned Lord.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 154 [Restrictions on registration under other Acts]:
10.30 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved Amendment No. 93X:
Page 114, line 32, at end insert (" unless the decision of the registrar on the application is reversed on or in consequence of an appeal to the Industrial Court ").
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, the effect of this Amendment is as follows. It provides that the registration of an organisation of workers as a
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company under the Companies Acts shall not be void if the Registrar's refusal to enter the organisation upon the special register is reversed as the result of the organisation's appealing to the Industrial Court against his decision. It follows, I think, that this is a consequential Amendment rendered necessary by the addition in Committee to what is now Clause 114 of a right of appeal against the Registrar's decision not to admit an organisation to the special register.
Organisations of workers are prevented by Clause 154 from retaining their registration as companies unless they are admitted to the special register. If the organisation of workers registered as a company is refused admission to this register, it will be able to make use of the new appeal facility to challenge the Registrar's decision before the Industrial Court. In this situation it is necessary to ensure that the organisation has the right to retain its registration as a company pending the result of the appeal. The Amendment will have this effect. It will defer the application of subsection (2)(b) of the clause until the organisation's position is made clear either as a result of the appeal or as a result of the Registrar's reviewing and withdrawing his objections to entry upon the special register before the appeal reaches the Industrial Court. My Lords, I beg to move.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, all I think it needs for us to do is to thank the noble and learned Lord for having explained the purpose of this Amendment, which undoubtedly is an appropriate one and improves the Bill. We are grateful.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.

OXFORDSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL (No. 2) BILL
The CHAIRMAN of COMMITTEES The CHAIRMAN of COMMITTEES informed the House that the opposition to the Bill was withdrawn: the Order made on July 1 last discharged, and Bill committed to the Committee on Unopposed Bills.
HARINGEY CORPORATION BILL
Reported from the Select Committee, with Amendments.
SURREY COUNTY COUNCIL BILL
Returned from the Commons agreed to, with Amendments: the said Amendments considered and agreed to.

TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING BILL [H.L.]
Reported from the Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills, with Amendments, and recommitted to a Committee of the Whole House.

1967

1968

1969

1970

Rugby Football

1

4

1

Not available

Boxing

0

1

1

Not available

Accidental drowning during recreational activities

Not available

135

169

144

Bathing accidents other than drowning

1

3

4

Not available

Road accidents at week-ends

Not available

1,814

1,977

1,763

Information regarding motor car racing, motor cycle racing, National Hunt racing, balloon flights and parachuting is being prepared and I will write to the noble Lord when it is available. The form in which accident records are held makes it impracticable to extract information on