HL Deb 13 July 1971 vol 322 cc192-209

3.1 p.m.

THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (LORD DRUMALBYN)

My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now further considered on Report.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

Clause 106 [Complaint to industrial tribunal of unfair industrial practice under s.5 or s.22]:

LORD STOW HILL moved Amendment No. 85A:

Page 81, line 7, after ("be") insert ("reinstated or").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, perhaps I may discuss with this Amendment the next Amendment, No. 85B, which goes with it. The object of this Amendment is to include, among the recommendations that the industrial tribunal can make when it is dealing with a claim for unfair dismissal, reinstatement as an alternative to re-engagement. I feel I should apologise to the House for asking your Lordships to consider again a question which you considered fully in Committee. I do so only because, having carefully read the Report of the speeches and having considered the arguments, I feel that the answer given from the Government Front Bench did not quite deal with the case that was made in support of this Amendment. It was a very courteous and careful answer, but I think it left the case not wholly disposed of.

I do not want to go over again the broad arguments in favour of the proposal. May I summarise them, however, by saying that I think it will be within everybody's experience that, if a man has been dismissed from his employment, it is not necessarily compensating him adequately to re-engage him. A man, or a woman, may work for years and years faithfully serving those who employ him, achieving status, attracting confidence and gaining the esteem of his fellow workers and of his employers. He is then, in the assumed circumstances, unfairly dismissed and the question arises: if he can show that he has been unfairly dismissed, how should he be treated by the tribunal which deals with his case for the purpose of reimbursing him for the loss he has sustained?

The structure of Clause 106 in which I seek to make this change is as follows. It deals with claims under Clauses 5 and 22, and Clause 22 deals with the case in which a dismissed worker brings a complaint before an industrial tribunal, complaining that he has been unfairly dismissed. Subsection (4) of Clause 106 assumes that the complaint has been made out and it then specifies what the tribunal can do. One of the powers which is vested in the tribunal is the following. The tribunal may, if it considers that it would be practicable, and in accordance with equity, for the complainant to be re-engaged by the employer…make a recommendation to that effect, stating the terms on which it considers that it would be reasonable for the complainant to be so re-engaged or engaged. If one looks at Clause 115, one finds that if subsequently it is brought to the notice of the tribunal that the recommendation has for no adequate reason not been complied with by the employer, it can correspondingly increase the compensation which it would otherwise have been disposed to award. In a sense, I suppose the increase is intended as a kind of puni- tive increase upon the basis that the employer has acted wholly unreasonably. I have foreshadowed the case that I seek to put before the House in support of this Amendment and, as I said, it is that the tribunal should be entitled to recommend that the worker should be either re-engaged—and by "re-engaged" I take it is meant taken into employment in some post or other, with the same employer or with a successor of the employer, but not necessarily in the same post from which he was dismissed—or reinstated that is, to be accorded again the full position from which he was dismissed, carrying with it all that he had won over the years by his loyal service in that post.

I do not think that is an argument which gains strongly from repetition or elaboration. It is a simple point; it has absolutely no Party content whatever, and I should have thought that noble Lords on both sides of the House would find that no conceivable element of doctrine could separate them in their approach to a matter of that sort. This Amendment is simply an effort by those who with me propose it, to see that full justice is done to a worker who, in the assumed circumstances, can show not only that he was dismissed but that he was unfairly dismissed. Once he can show that he has been unfairly dismissed and has established that to the satisfaction of the tribunal, surely the tribunal should be given powers completely to reimburse him for the loss not only in terms of finance, but also in terms of status and dignity, which he has undergone as a result of the assumed wrongful act of his employer. My Lords, I beg to move.

LORD PARGITER

My Lords, I have one question which can perhaps he answered at the same time. What will be the position of a person in an occupational pension scheme perhaps run by an insurance company, or alternatively in a non-contributory scheme run by the firm? If a person is dismissed, then presumably he is not entitled to anything if the scheme is a non-contributory one. If it is a contributory one, perhaps run by an insurance company, he may have his contributions returned to him. But it seems to me very doubtful that he will be reinstated in the pension scheme if he is re-engaged. This is a most important point. If a man is reinstated the position is perfectly clear, but if he is re-engaged the position is not so clear. The tribunal may say that a person's pension should be unaffected, but if an insurance company is involved that may not be so easy. A person ought not to be under any penalty, or implied penalty, if he has been wrongfully dismissed. So I hope that the noble Lord will give consideration to that point.

LORD SLATER

My Lords, I was interested in the case that my noble friend Lord Stow Hill put forward when moving this Amendment. He suggested that the Court should make reasonable recommendations and that those recommendations should be accepted. My reason for supporting this Amendment is that I happened to occupy a position in which I had to give every consideration to recommendations placed on my desk for dismissal of workers. This was when I was at the Post Office as a junior Minister. The recommendations used to come up through the machinery to my desk and they were not always recommendations of dismissal for something that had happened in the work of the Post Office but for something which had happened outside that employment. I remember a particular case which came before me and which went before a sheriff court in Scotland. Two individuals had committed some offence outside Post Office work for which the sheriff imposed his judgment, but he added a rider to the effect that he sincerely hoped that the Post Office would not seek to dismiss those men from its service.

The recommendation for dismissal came to me because the Department said, "We cannot have these people in the service, because they will be engaged in an office of trust." In the capacity I held at that time I came to the conclusion that the sheriff had had some specific reason for making his recommendation or he would not have made it. Therefore I could not in any circumstances accept the recommendation coming from my advisers that the men should be dismissed, and I did not dismiss them. They were kept in the service. In all probability, if I had accepted the recommendation by the Department, as has been suggested by my noble friend Lord Pargiter, those men would have gone on to the open market to seek further employment, but the Post Office could not have given them a reference, even if they were able to find other employment, because they had been dismissed from the service. Not only that, but, as my noble friend said, they would also have lost an amount of money which would have come to them if they had not suffered this form of dismissal affecting pension and gratuity rights. Therefore I sincerely hope that on this Amendment, proposed by my noble friend Lord Stow Hill, and supported by Lord Pargiter, the Minister will see that its acceptance could avoid a great deal of difficulty which could be caused if a man was dismissed in this way and lost his employment and then society had to keep him by means of social security benefits.

3.13 p.m.

LORD BROWN

My Lords, I am sorry to take up further time of the House, but there are many angles from which this Amendment can be supported and I see no harm in adding to the arguments in favour of what I regard as an important Amendment. One of the things I have objected to strongly about the law is that if a person is convicted of a crime and then found to be innocent of it he is pardoned, but if one has a commercial contract and breaches it, then goes to the courts which decide that it has been breached, one is not invited to write a new contract with the other party but is able to get back inside the terms of the original contract. Admittedly this Bill refers to "unfair dismissal", which involves the idea that the person has been already dismissed, but the Bill and the code of industrial relations are full of references to the contract of employment. If a man is held subsequently to have been unfairly dismissed, then the original contract stands and the word "reinstate" seems to be the appropriate word to use in those circumstances. This is a legal argument and no doubt I may be shot down by some of my noble and learned friends and I may be at risk in treading on legal issues, but I believe that there may be a point here.

While I am on my feet, may I yet again draw attention to the fact—this is not quite relevant to the Amendment—that in dealing with the question of dismissal I do not think a sufficient amount of objective thought has been brought to play on the whole issue. I believe we still stand in a situation in which there is no discrimination in the Bill between dismissal from a company, the total employment organisation, and dismissal from a role within the organisation, with the possibility of being transferred to another role. If the courts are not guided on this question before the cases begin to arrive, they will be in great difficulty. It is one thing to be dismissed from a company and quite another thing to be dismissed from a role and offered some other role within the company which one may or may not take. I am sorry to drag this matter in, but it has a bearing on the question of reinstatement. I hope that the Minister will consider these two Amendments on the basis of the four different sorts of argument which have been put forward in support of them.

3.16 p.m.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, the noble Lords who have spoken have all done so very persuasively and I should start by saying that we have great sympathy with what they have said. We have looked again at the subsection, but we are still, I am bound to tell noble Lords, of the view that no change is necessary. Our intention here was to provide for both reinstatement and reemployment of the employee, provided that an adequate alternative to his old job were available. We think that within the term "re-engagement" is included "reinstatement". Under the subsection, as the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, has said, the tribunal will be able to recommend full reinstatement where it considers the remedy both practicable and equitable. The reason for this is that under subsection (4)(b) the tribunal is required to make a recommendation and to state the terms on which it considers it would be reasonable for the employee to be re-engaged. That means, quite simply, that the tribunal is given very wide discretion between what some noble Lords think altogether full reinstatement, which probably is different from reinstatement, and the minimum of re-engagement. So it will be appropriate, in any case where a tribunal thinks it to be so, to recommend that an employee be given his old job back on such terms as if the dismissal had never taken place.

The difficulty about the word "reinstatement" is simply this: that it has not any clear sense. "Re-engagement" has, but "reinstatement" has no clear sense. There are several meanings that can be applied to it. It can mean re-engagement with retrospective effect to the date of dismissal; it can mean re-engagement in the position which the employee had at the date of dismissal but without retrospective effect; it can mean re-engagement in the position which the employee held at the date of dismissal, or re-engagement in that position without retrospective effect and also it can mean that if in the meantime he would have been promoted to a higher position, re-engagement at that higher position. It has all these various meanings; and the word, I am informed, is not a word that is used at the present time in legislation except in the Title of legislation or in the rubric. It does not appear, I am told, in the text of legislation at the present time. So it has no clear meaning. But what I would assure noble Lords is that what I have said is the intention, and we believe that this will be the effect. It will be within the competence of the tribunal to recommend re-engagement, using its discretion in the light of the conduct of the parties, and in the light of the practicalities of the situation to recommend all of these things: reinstatement in the very fullest possible sense of the term, or simply re-engagement in another job, which is obviously not reinstatement. So the word "re-engagement" covers reemployment in a different job all the way up to full reinstatement, and for those reasons we are entirely at one with the noble Lord in his intentions. We think they are achieved, and therefore we do not think that this word should be added. I would only add that, if it were, it would cause a good deal of redrafting difficulties right throughout the Bill. Does the noble Lord want to ask a question?

LORD SHINWELL

My Lords, I will not trouble to make a speech. Would the noble Lord agree that if he were to add a proviso to the term "re-engagement" on the lines of what he himself has said in the course of his speech—namely, that it might not mean the same job, and that kind of thing, but it would not in any way adversely affect his pension and other rights—it would make all the difference? He might consider that.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I made a gesture as if I was going to sit down, I admit, but I then remembered I had not dealt with this particular point. At the Committee stage noble Lords expressed their concern that there should be full reinstatement. As I have already said, it is our advice that subsection (4) is sufficiently widely drafted in lines 10 to 13 to enable the tribunals to make recommendations on these matters. But I ought at the same time to make it clear to your Lordships that questions relating to the preservation of pension rights are in rather a different category. They will depend to a considerable extent upon the rules of a particular pension scheme, and will largely be out of the orbit of the tribunal recommendations. I would myself imagine that if, in a particular case, the tribunal desired to make the fullest reinstatement and it were possible under the pension scheme, then it might include that in the terms, but I am afraid I could not say more than that on that point.

My Lords, perhaps I should just refer, in closing, to what the noble Lord, Lord Slater, said and what the noble Lord, Lord Brown, said. The noble Lord, Lord Slater, was very interested indeed about a particular case which came to him when he was Assistant Postmaster General. But, really, it is difficult to bring what he was talking about there into line with what we are talking about here, because the essence of the case that he was talking about is that the men were in fact not dismissed. He asked, therefore, rather hypothetical questions about a different case, and I do not think I could answer those. I hope I have dealt with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pargiter.

LORD PARGITER

At an appropriate time, I should like to ask a question.

LORD DRUMALBYN

Then I will come back to that. So far as the noble Lord, Lord Brown, is concerned, he said—and this was really his main point—that "reinstatement" is the appropriate word to use. I hope that I have demonstrated to him that this is just not so. If it were, we would certainly have used it. Does the noble Lord, Lord Pargiter, want to come back?

LORD PARGITER

I am grateful to the noble Lord. As I appreciate, there are circumstances in regard to pension schemes which would make for difficulties, but the point I had in mind was that reinstatement would imply so far as the employer was concerned all the legal responsibilities of replacing a man and restoring the status quo. I appreciate that it might not be possible to do that with an insurance company. In fact, if the tribunal made an order which affected an insurance company there might be difficulties; but that would not absolve the employer from making the equivalent reinstatement of the man so far as his pension rights were concerned. That is why I am very much concerned about it.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I can understand the noble Lord's concern, but I am afraid it is not a matter I can go into detail about here, because even although the word "reinstatement" was put in here it would not alter the situation.

LORD POPPLEWELL

I think most noble Lords will be very concerned about the reply given by the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, when he states quite frankly that it is the intention of the Government that re-engagement and reinstatement, according to the Government's view, amount to the same thing.

LORD DRUMALBYN

No.

LORD POPPLEWELL

They were the noble Lord's words. He said the intention was to include both.

LORD DRUMALBYN

No, my Lords. I said that re-engagement included reinstatement and re-employment.

LORD POPPLEWELL

This adds to the confusion that is in the Bill. The noble Lord went on to say that there was no objection in principle but it would create a lot of trouble now to amend the Bill to cover these points. Surely this is an admission. If the Government feel, as we are advised, that this is a legitimate Amendment to ensure that the man gets his job back again—and this is very important—and the reason why it is not acceptable is because it is too much trouble to alter the Bill, surely this indicates a weakness which we really ought to put right. It does not matter what we say in this House; it does not matter what is said in the other place with regard to the meaning of any Bill. The ultimate decision is what is actually written down in the Bill when it comes to be operated outside.

Most of us who have had some experience have defended people who have had their services dispensed with. Sometimes we have got them back into their old job and at other times we have not, but have got them back on a lower wage scale or with them losing the benefits, as indicated by my noble friend, Lord Pargiter—pensions and sickness benefit, and other things. If a man is proved innocent of these unjust practices, surely, now that we are passing this Bill, it is our duty to see that he does not suffer any loss at all, but that he goes back to his old job and to the old "perks" that are attached to it. This must be part of the thing that we have to put right. We must ensure that the meaning is there when this Bill becomes an Act.

THE EARL OF BALFOUR

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Popplewell, has just stated, I think this is very important. Although we can get somebody back into his old employment, we cannot necessarily always guarantee getting him back his old job. I think this is where the real importance of this phrase comes in. We can put in legislation that a man must be re-engaged if it is at all possible, but we cannot put in legislation that he must be reinstated. I think, my Lords, that this is really the crux of the whole matter.

3.29 p.m.

LORD BERNSTEIN

My Lords, the noble Earl who has just spoken evidently forgets what this clause is about. It is about a complaint being considered under this clause relating to a dismissal, and the suggestion is that the complaint is well-founded. That is what we are talking about. My noble friend Lord Brown and I do not always agree, but in this case, as two employers, we do agree. The word "reinstatement" may not be used in legislation, but we are talking of a human relations problem. It is certainly used in industry by the companies with which Lord Brown is involved and by the companies in which I am involved. If I may say so, in my company no managing director has the power or desire to dismiss somebody unless he has examined the file and accepted that the reasons for dismissal are overwhelming. The word "reinstatement" means reinstatement to us. The word as used in industry means that a man is entitled to get his job back. Paragraph (4)(b) says: says: considers that it would be practicable Practicable to whom? If somebody else has been given the job in the three months while the complaint has been under discussion of course there are going to be difficulties; but who is responsible for the difficulties, the man or the company? As an employer, I think the Amendment should be accepted. It would be helpful not only to the people who make the complaints but to the people who have to deal with the complaints.

On the question of pensions it is stated in subsection (5), line 20: the tribunal shall make an award of compensation… No doubt the tribunal will take into account the loss which the man must have suffered if he has been dismissed and is not reinstated. That is not the same thing. No compensation will give a man back the opportunity for advancement in the company which has made the mistake. Is this clause to defend the employer about a mistake or to defend and help the man who has been unfairly dismissed?

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, the noble Lord has put a question, and the answer is that the tribunal or the court will do what is just and equitable in the circumstances.

LORD BERNSTEIN

My Lords, it does not say so. It says what would be practicable". I agree that and in accordance with equity follows. But if it is not practicable to the employer what are they going to do? They say you have to dismiss a man. Are they going to get involved in what is practicable with the operational company? The noble Lord, Lord Brown, and others have made a good point, and I think it would be regrettable if this Amendment is not accepted.

LORD DIAMOND

My Lords, I am sure that the noble Lord will recognise that we are in considerable difficulty about a matter which is of the utmost importance to every employee concerned, and we are very grateful that we are marching in step with the noble Lord in our desire to include reinstatement as an indication to the tribunal of what should be done, in contradiction to what the noble Lord indicated in his short intervention. The difficulty which the noble Lord put to us, and we are bound to take note of it, is that there is a technical drafting difficulty in that the word has never been used before in the text of a Bill. The noble Lord I am sure will forgive me if I point out to him—and I think he will find this correct in reading Hansard—that whenever in his interesting and clear and lucid speech he wanted to make his meaning clear he said "reinstate". I am only making the simple point that in conversation between us we all understand what "reinstatement" means.

The difficulty is that inasmuch as it is a word which is in such current and regular use throughout industry and in ordinary parlance, surely if it is omitted from the Bill it will be open to anybody to say that Parliament did not want us to reinstate, otherwise it would have said so. That is point No. 1. Point No. 2 is, "Why", they would go on to say, "did Parliament use a word like 're-engage', which word could be satisfied without reinstatement?" There is that difficulty. So the difficulty I see is not only that which the noble Lord has put forward but the fact that legislation as at present drafted is a clear indication, for those two reasons, not to reinstate. The noble Lord has used the word "re-engagement" as including the sense of reinstatement. That may be so, but for the two reasons I have given it is open to any tribunal to read this clause as at present drafted as meaning, "Do not reinstate but only re-engage".

I am bound to come to the technical difficulty, although my noble and learned friend Lord Stow Hill will be better equipped to deal with the legal side than I am. The word "reinstate", if it has not been used in the text of a Bill, nevertheless must have a meaning capable of being written down in English, and what it means could be written down in words which have been used in the text of a Bill, so if the noble Lord does not like the word "reinstatement" it can be broken down into what it really means and those words can be put in the Bill. The noble Lord said at one stage that "reinstatement" means "re-engagement in the fullest sense of that term". If that is a draftsman's phrase and is intelligible—it is intelligible to us—then put in the Bill "re-engagement in its fullest sense", or whatever words indicate to a tribunal that it should include in its review the possibility of what every noble Lord in the House would describe as "reinstatement". We must not be put in the ridiculous position that what both sides of the House want is incapable of being achieved and, worse than that, that an indication is being given to the opposite. I do not know how it is going to be drafted, but we cannot leave it in its present form.

LORD SINCLAIR OF CLEEVE

My Lords, may I say that I have great sympathy with the thought that lies behind this Amendment. From my own experience I think it is desirable that what we all recognise and think of as reinstatement should somehow be covered. But I must say that on looking at this clause as drafted it seems that the words immediately following subsection (4)(b): the tribunal shall make a recommendation to that effect, stating the terms on which it considers that it would be reasonable for the complainant to be so re-engaged or engaged give the tribunal full discretion to specify reinstatement or such degree of reinstatement as it thinks appropriate. That seems to me to be common sense.

3.38 p.m.

LORD STOW HILL

My Lords, may I press the noble Lord a little further on this matter and take some of the points he has dealt with? First of all, he feels that there is a difficulty about the word "reinstatement", and if I understood him correctly he was saying that the word "reinstatement" is not used in the text of any other Statute. With great respect to him, it was used, for example, in Clause 37 of the last Government's Bill. The words are: shall make an order for reinstatement". That Bill, I take it, was drafted by the same Parliamentary counsel as drafted the present Bill. If they found no difficulty in putting it in the last Bill I should have thought there could not be any difficulty so formidable as to prevent its being put into this Bill. It seems to me that the Minister might be a little more helpful here. I do not mean to say that he is intending to be unhelpful—that is the last thing I would ever say of the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn. The noble Lord is very responsive to the mood of the House; he has always shown himself to be so. I should have thought that it was quite obvious on this occasion that there is, on both sides of the House, strong sympathy with the general purpose of this Amendment. If that is so, and if the Government, as the noble Lord has said, also sympathise with it and themselves would like to achieve precisely the objective I sought to outline in moving this Amendment, we should make a concerted effort to ensure that that objective is achieved by the language which appears in this Bill.

My Lords, I quite follow the noble Lord's argument that the phrase, "to be re-engaged on such terms as he considers reasonable" would cover all that could be included in the Bill if the word "reinstatement" were put into it. I submit that is not the case, or at least that it is doubtful whether it is the case. If it is doubtful one can remove the doubt by definition sections and other drafting devices which Parliamentary counsel master so completely. I should have thought that reinstatement could have various aspects. In the first place it could have those aspects which I have sought to describe: those which relate to status; those which relate to the position which a person has achieved after many years.

The noble Lord will say that that can be done by prescribing in the recommendation terms which go to putting the worker back in precisely the same situation as he was before. I should have thought that there was some doubt, as a matter of drafting, whether the expression "terms" did extend so far. Generally speaking, I should have thought "terms" related to the remuneration you are to receive and the type of work you are to do, and could not be said to extend to putting you back, in terms of dignity and status, into the position in which you were before. So I should have thought that is open to doubt. Secondly, as the noble Lord said, there was the question of retrospection; and as has been pointed out by many of my noble friends, particularly by the noble Lord, Lord Pargiter, that is of critical importance in this case because of the pension aspect.

I should have thought that if one uses the word "re-engage" in a Statute, you are connoting by the word itself that there is the beginning of a new contract; that you are not seeking to wipe out a break in a contract which has taken place and putting the person back to the position that he would have been in if there had not been that break. You are excluding retrospective operations.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, if that is so, why does the noble Lord think that the Bill uses the words "re-engaged or engaged"?

LORD STOW HILL

My Lords, the expressions "re-engaged" and "engaged" both describe, I should have thought, the creating of a new contract of engagement, a new contract of employment which starts as from the time you are speaking of, and it is the opposite of wiping out a break which had occurred in the past. I should have thought it undoubtedly a question whether the object that the whole House has in view is achieved by this language. With respect to the noble Lord, is not he being perhaps a little less co-operative than he is generally in refusing even to consider that which could have the effect of removing a doubt? Would he not consider, for example, putting something in the definition clause, Clause 163, to say that the expression "re-engagement" shall be deemed to include everything connoted by the word "reinstatement", couched in proper language which Parliamentary counsel could find? Would he consider doing something of that sort? Would he consider incorporating in this clause something which would make perfectly clear that the expression "terms" could extend to putting the position back as it was before?

So far as the pension situation is concerned, will the noble Lord consider putting something in Clause 115 which, as I have said, enables the industrial tribunal to increase the compensation payable if the recommendation is not carried out? Would he not consider putting something in that clause to make clear that the compensation that may be awarded, whether or not the man is re-engaged, shall amply cover any loss that he may sustain as the result of wrongful dismissal owing to a break in the contract of employment, for the purpose of any pension scheme? My Lords, all those things could be done. It would need a certain amount of careful drafting, but it is not beyond the wit of the Parliamentary draftsmen to achieve that purpose or of putting it beyond all doubt if they are instructed to do so. In reply to this debate I would earnestly ask the noble Lord to say that he will take this back. He recognises the justice of the case. He recognises, and indeed in his language it was almost instinct, I though, that doubt must be removed from the language as it is at the moment. I hope he will ask Parliamentary counsel to draft something to remove that doubt in its entirety.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, the noble Lord has asked me some questions, and, with the leave of the House, I will attempt to reply. The noble Lord has rested his case on the fact, as he says, that "reinstatement" has a different meaning from "re-engagement". I said that so far as I knew "reinstatement" was not used in an Act of Parliament. "Oh", he said, "but it was used in a Bill." How was the word "reinstated" defined in that Bill? It was defined as being re-engagement by the same employer

or by a successor or associated employer. If I had any doubt (and I assure noble Lords that I went into it in exactly the same questioning spirit as they have done and probed it) about whether the draftsmen could still be mistaken after all the explanation he has given, I would take this matter back again. But I am quite satisfied, and I give this advice to the House, that the word "re-engagement" covers "reinstatement". Although noble Lords may think they know what "reinstatement" means, as I pointed out it has three clear meanings and it may have several others. Obviously, if we used it at all, it would have to be defined. It is certainly not excluded by the word "re-engagement" as the definition that I have referred to says. Really, my Lords, I would be less than honest with the House if I suggested that I would be able to get any change of opinion if I were to take this matter back. It has been very fully gone into, and I can assure noble Lords that there can be no doubt as to the construction that will be put on it.

3.47 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 85A) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 69; Not-Contents, 102.

CONTENTS
Addison, V. Gardiner, L. Reay, L.
Archibald, L. Garnsworthy, L. [Teller.] Ritchie-Calder, L.
Ardwick, L. Greenwood of Rosendale, L. Royle, L.
Beaumont of Whitley, L. Henderson, L. Rusholme, L.
Bernstein, L. Hilton of Upton, L. Sainsbury, L.
Beswick, L. Hoy, L. St. Davids, V.
Birk, Bs. Hughes, L. Samuel, V.
Blyton, L. Jacques, L. Segal, L.
Boothby, L. Janner, L. Shackleton, L.
Brown, L. Kennet, L. Shepherd, L.
Buckinghamshire, E. Kilbracken, L. Shinwell, L.
Burntwood, L. Leatherland, L. Silkin, L.
Burton of Coventry, Bs. Lee of Asheridge, Bs. Slater, L.
Carnock, L. Lindgren, L. Soper, L.
Champion, L. McLeavy, L. Sorensen, L.
Collison, L. Maelor, L. Stocks, Bs.
Cooper of Stockton Heath, L. Nunburnholme, L. Stonham, L.
Crook, L. Pargiter, L. Stow Hill, L.
Davies of Leek, L. Peddie, L. Summerskill, Bs.
Delacourt-Smith, L. Platt, L. Taylor of Gryfe, L.
Diamond, L. Plummer, Bs. Taylor of Mansfield, L.
Douglass of Cleveland, L. Popplewell, L. Wells-Pestell, L.
Gaitskell, Bs. Raglan, L. White, Bs. [Teller.]
NOT-CONTENTS
Aberdare, L. Allerton, L. Balfour of Inchrye, L.
Aberdeen and Temair, M. Atholl, D. Barnby, L.
Ailwyn, L. Balerno, L. Belhaven and Stenton, L.
Albemarle, E. Balfour, E. Belstead, L.
Berkeley, Bs. Goschen, V. [Teller.] Mowbray and Stourton, L.
Bessborough, E. Greenway, L. Nelson of Stafford, L.
Boston, L. Grenfell, L. Nugent of Guildford, L.
Bridgeman, V. Gridley, L. Oakshott, L.
Brooke of Cumnor, L. Grimston of Westbury, L. O'Neill of the Maine, L.
Brooke of Ystradfellte, Bs. Hacking, L. Rankeillour, L.
Burton, L. Hailes, L. Robbins, L.
Caithness, E. Hailsham of St. Marylebone, Roberthall, L.
Camoys, L. L. (L. Chancellor.) Rochdale, V.
Carrington, L. Hankey, L. Ruthven of Freeland, Ly.
Cawley, L. Hanworth, V. St. Aldwyn, E.
Clwyd, L. Hatherton, L. St. Helens, L.
Colgrain, L. Hives, L. St. Just, L.
Conesford, L. Hood, V. St. Oswald, L.
Cork and Orrery, E. Hylton-Foster, Bs. Sandford, L.
Craigavon, V. Ilford, L. Sempill, Ly.
Cranbrook, E. Jellicoe, E. (L. Privy Seal.) Sinclair of Cleeve, L.
Crathorne, L. Kemsley, V. Stamp, L.
Daventry, V. Kilmany, L. Stonehaven, V.
Denham, L. Latymer, L. Strang, L.
Derwent, L. Lauderdale, E. Strathcarron, L.
Drumalbyn, L. Long, V. Strathclyde, L.
Dundee, E. Loudoun, C. Tenby, V.
Eccles, V. Lucas of Chilworth, L. Teynham, L.
Effingham, E. MacAndrew, L. Vivian, L.
Elliot of Harwood, Bs. Macleod of Borve, Bs. Wakefield of Kendal, L.
Emmet of Amberley, Bs. Mancroft, L. Ward of Witley, V.
Ferrers, E. [Teller.] Milverton, L. Willingdon, M.
Ferrier, L. Monckton of Brenchley, V. Windlesham, L.
Fortescue, E. Morrison, L. Wrottesley, L.
Fraser of Lonsdale, L.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.