Lords Sitting of 12 July 1971

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Chichester.

THE POLICE FEDERATION
LORD O'HAGAN: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they propose to disband the Police Federation.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE, HOME OFFICE (LORD WINDLESHAM): No, my Lords.
LORD O'HAGAN: My Lords, may I take it from that Answer that Her Majesty's Government are reasonably satisfied with the way the Police Federation is carrying out its statutory duties?
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, the Police Federation is consulted regularly and frequently by my right honourable friend when matters which affect its members' interests are being considered. These consultations can take the form either of informal meetings or of formal consultations in the Police Council, the Police
2
Advisory Board or the numerous committees and working parties set up under these two consultative bodies.
LORD O'HAGAN: My Lords, I beg noble Lord aware that the position from his side of the desk looks a little different? Can he give an undertaking that his certainty that this consultation is done fully is shared by the Police Federation? Or is it an indication of the view of Her Majesty's Government on consultation with the Police that the Police Advisory Committee has not met since last October?
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, the Police Advisory Board, to which I think the noble Lord is referring, has in recent years met about once a year; it is next due to meet on July 19. But there are a number of standing committees, working parties and ad hoc working groups on which the Federation is represented that are in session between formal meetings of the full Board.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, if the noble Lord had given a different answer to the Question, have the Government any power at all to abolish this excellent and highly responsible body which represents all ranks of the police?
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, I agree with the tenor of what the noble Lord has said. Parliamentary approval would be needed; it would be necessary to repeal Section 44 of the Police Act 1964, and my right honourable friend has no intention of doing that.
LORD O'HAGAN: My Lords, may I ask one more supplementary question?

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Can the noble Lord explain to me, in my innocence, why the view from his position is so different from that expressed by the Police Federation? Is there some breakdown in communications here?
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, I am not aware of the feeling of discontent to which the noble Lord refers. My right honourable friend saw the Federation himself—not through the Police Advisory Board or the Police Council—on July 1. The purpose of this meeting with representatives of the Federation was to dicuss police boundaries in the context of local government reform. There is close and continuing consultation.

SUPPLIES TO PAKISTAN
2.39 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what supplies, economic and military, to Pakistan have been banned, how far this applies to existing and future contracts, and what are the amounts involved.]
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE (LORD CARRINGTON): None, my Lords.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for that reply. May I ask the Minister whether he is aware that many of us regard what has happened in East Bengal as the worst outrage against democracy since the time of Hitler? In view of the report of the World Bank, published to-day, which denounces what happened as West Pakistan's guilt, administrative incompetence and militant brutality, may I ask whether Her Majesty's Government will join with the aid consortium in continuing to withhold all aid until West Pakistan comes to a just political solution?
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, I am aware of the noble Lord's opinion. I think it has been announced that we will do what the other countries who took part in the meeting of the consortium on aid agreed to do.
LORD SHINWELL: My Lords, do I understood from the noble Lord, Lord
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Carrington, that if military supplies are not banned that therefore military supplies are continuing? Do I understand that to be the implication? if they are being supplied—I may be open to correction on this; because I do not know all the facts and probably the noble Lord does—are they being supplied to both sides in this conflict?
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, as my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary said in another place, no new contracts for arms supplies to Pakistan have been signed since 1967, with the exception of a refitting of a naval vessel and some radar equipment. There is none in prospect and therefore the question of a ban does not arise.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, it would appear that, with my usual generosity, I have misunderstood the reply of the noble Lord. Did I understand him to say that there is no ban on supplies? If so, is that not extraordinary in view of the repudiation of democracy by West Pakistan?
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, I think my Answer was quite clear; it said,"None." Since there are no contracts for arms between this country and Pakistan there does not seem much point in banning them.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, what about Pakistan as a member of CENTO? Does the Minister really mean that there have been no supplies through CENTO to West Pakistan?
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, I do not think that the noble Lord has read his own Question. The Question asks whether Her Majesty's Government are going to ban economic and military supplies to Pakistan. There are no military supplies being sent to Pakistan.

GREATER LONDON COUNCIL (MONEY) BILL
Read 2a, and committed to the Committee on Unopposed Bills.
D. & J. FOWLER LIMITED AND ASSOCIATED COMPANY BILL
Read 2a, and committed to the Committee on Unopposed Bills.

CIVIL AVIATION BILL
EARL ST. ALDWYN: My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend the Leader of the House I beg to move the Motion standing in his name on the Order Paper.
Moved, That a Select Committee of 14 Lords with the Chairman of Committees be appointed to consider the Bill, and that the Bill be committed to such Committee;
That the procedure of the Committee shall be, so far as possible, that of a Committee of the Whole House;
That the Committee shall first meet at 3 o'clock on Monday the 19th of July, and thereafter have power to adjourn from time to time;
That the Reports of the Committee's debates and the Minutes of the Committee's proceedings be published from day to day as appendices to Hansard and the Minutes of Proceedings respectively; and
That the Lords following, with the Chairman of Committees, be named of the Committee:—

V. Bledisloe,

L. Beaumont of Whitley,

L. Beswick,

L. Burntwood, L. Carrington,

L. Granville of Eye,

L. Gridley,

L. Harvey of Prestbury,

L. Kings Norton,

L. Lindgren.

L. O'Neill of the Maine,

L. Sandford,

L. Trefgarne,

L. Wynne-Jones.—(Earl St. Aldwyn.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BILL
2.43 p.m.
THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (LORD DRUMALBYN): My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now further considered on Report.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
Schedule 4 [Requirements as to rules of trade unions and employers' associations]:
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79X:
Page 150, line 11, leave out (" must ") and insert (" should so far as is practicable ").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move this Amendment. I need to speak only shortly on it as this point was discussed on Committee. The essential purpose of the Amendment is to remove some of the excessive detail in Schedule 4 and to turn it broadly into the nearest we can to a check list. The idea of a check list was mooted and found considerable favour. The Government promised to give the matter further consideration. This Amendment tries to achieve that. I beg to move.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I do not think that we can agree to this Amendment. As the noble Lord knows, it is linked with the Bill itself. The Schedule sets out the rules which a trade union has to comply with under Clause 75, to which the House has already agreed, if it wishes to remain a trade union. It lays down what must be in the rules of the trade union. It leaves the trade unions free to draw up their own rules in any way they please so long as those rules cover the matters contained in the rules in this Schedule. The Schedule is obviously in clear contrast with the code of practice. The code lays down what management and the unions should do: the Schedule lays down what employers' associations and trade unions must provide for in their rules if they are to remain registered. The Bill makes provisions for exemptions in paragraph 24, on page 152. If any of the provisions in Schedule 4 is not appropriate to the circumstances of the particular union, the organisation will show why it is not practicable and paragraph 24

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will give the Registrar the necessary authority to waive it. It is sensible to add a waiver to an exceptional case. It is not sensible to put the waiver in the forefront so that everyone may feel that he is an exception and does not have to comply with the rules. I hope that with that explanation the noble Lord will agree that this Schedule of rules is in keeping with the Bill.
LORD SHINWELL: My Lords—
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I did not know whether my noble friend Lord Shinwell wanted to make an extended point on this Amendment. I was hoping we could come to an early conclusion.
LORD SHINWELL: My Lords, it appears to me that this proposition is extremely relevant to the following Amendments if we can discuss the following Amendments in the terms of what is practicable—because that is what we are dealing with now on this Amendment—then I do not propose to say anything further. Although it appears to be innocuous there is not very much in it—when it comes to amending rules (and there are propositions in the Schedule to which later Amendments will refer), if there are to be vast changes in the rules of employers' associations and trade unions then the question arises whether some of them are practicable. Obviously if they are impracticable there is no point in embodying them in the Bill. That is all I want to say at the moment; no doubt we can discuss the matter later.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I am most grateful to my noble friend for his comments. He is absolutely right, both in the substance of his comment and in the procedural point he makes, that there are a number of subsequent Amendments which will deal with these issues. We are far from satisfied with Lord Drumalbyn's answer. He has made no progress whatever on his thinking at the Committee stage. His answer takes no account of the recommendation of the Donovan Report which recommends that unions should have the right to draw up rules to suit their own circumstances. Unions know best what their own circumstances are. Of course there have to be rules, but they need not be laid down in this detail. May I remind the noble Lord of what my noble and learned friend Lord Gardiner said when we were discussing this matter on Committee:
" If there is anything that will wreck this Bill it will be Schedule 4. I thought the Government wanted the trade unions to register. The effect of these rules is to make it virtually impossible for any union to register."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 24/5/71, col. 864.]
I agree with my noble and learned friend and invite my colleagues and friends and those who share our views to divide the House accordingly.
2.50 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 79X) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 47; Not-Contents, 62.

CONTENTS

Airedale, L.

Hirschfield, L.

St. Davids, V.

Archibald, L.

Hoy, L.

Samuel, V.

Bernstein, L.

Jacques, L.

Shackleton, L.

Beswick, L.

Kennet, L.

Shepherd, L.

Birk, Bs.

Kilbracken, L.

Shinwell, L.

Brockway, L.

Leatherland, L.

Slater, L.

Buckinghamshire, E.

Lee of Asheridge, Bs.

Sorensen, L.

Burntwood, L.

Lindgren, L.

Stocks, Bs.

Champion, L.

McLeavy, L.

Stonham, L.

Cooper of Stockton Heath, L.

Moyle, L.

Stow Hill, L.

Delacourt-Smith, L.

Pargiter, L.

Strabolgi, L. [Teller.]

Diamond, L.

Peddie, L.

Summerskill, Bs.

Gardiner, L.

Platt, L.

Taylor of Mansfield, L.

Henderson, L.

Popplewell, L.

Wells-Pestell, L.

Henley, L.

Reay, L.

Wootton of Abinger, Bs.

Hilton of Upton, L. [Teller.]

Sainsbury, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Alexander of Tunis, E.

Goschen, V. [Teller.]

Oakshott, L.

Allerton, L.

Grantchester, L.

Penrhyn, L.

Balfour, E.

Gray, L.

Rankeillour, L.

Brooke of Cumnor, L.

Greenway, L.

Roberthall, L.

Burton, L.

Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)

St. Aldwyn. E. [Teller.]

Caithness, E.

St. Helens, L.

Carrington, L.

Hood, V.

St. Just, L.

Clwyd, L.

Hurcomb, L.

Skelmersdale, L.

Coleraine, L,

Hylton-Foster, Bs.

Somers, L.

Conesford, L.

Jellicoe, E. (L. Privy Seal.)

Stonehaven, V.

Courtown, E.

Kemsley, V.

Strang, L.

Craigavon, V.

Kinnoull, E.

Strange of Knokin, Bs.

Daventry, V.

Latymer, L.

Swaythling, L.

Denham, L.

Long, V.

Teviot, L.

Drumalbyn, L.

Loudoun, C.

Thomas, L.

Dudley, E.

MacAndrew, L.

Vivian, L.

Dundee, E.

Macpherson of Drumochter, L.

Wakefield of Kendal, L.

Ebbisham, L.

Milverton, L.

Willingdon, M.

Eccles, V.

Monck, V.

Windlesham, L.

Effingham, E.

Mountevans, L.

Wrottesley, L.

Ferrers, E.

Mowbray and Stourton, L.

Young, Bs.

Resolved in the negative, and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.

2.58 p.m.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79Y:
Page 150, line 28, leave out paragraph 6.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I shall obviously have to spend a little more time in explaining this Amendment. I am greatly encouraged as to the reasonableness of your Lordships' House in voting in almost equal numbers on the last Amendment. If I may, I will discuss this Amendment with the following Amendment, No9Z.
These are both attempts to eliminate paragraphs which are of excessive detail, at least—there could be many more—and which contain other stupidities as well. Both these paragraphs set out in quite excessive detail what the rule should provide. Your Lordships will have Schedule 4 before you and you will not wish me to read out the paragraphs in full. In particular, paragraph 7 has the additional foolishness of saying that the rules should
" specify the powers and duties of the governing body of the organisation, of each of its officers and of officials who are not officers of the organisation."
I invite your Lordships to think of any organisation in which any one of you is involved, and of the situation which would arise if the rules of the organisation—not the day-to-day arrangements, not what may be decided on from time to time, but the rules themselves had to specify (" specify"must surely mean to
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set out in complete detail) the duties of the governing body of the organisation, of each of its officers and of officials who are not officers. I suppose one official would be the petty cashier, or the office boy, or what have you. I repeat, I invite your Lordships to think of any organisation with which you are, or have been, closely connected and try to imagine the sort of chaos that would result, the inflexibility and the impossibility of organising and administering that organisation, if it contained within its rules the detailed, specified duties of every member of the governing body, of every one of its officers and of every one of its officials. It just does not bear consideration. For those reasons, I move the first Amendment and I hope that both will be acceptable to the Government.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I am not quite clear whether the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, intended that these two Amendments should be discussed at the same time.
LORD DIAMOND: Yes.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I am much obliged to the noble Lord. When the noble Lord was speaking to a similar Amendment in Committee, he cited not only paragraphs 6 and 7 but also paragraphs 5 and 10 of this Schedule as all exemplifying what he alleged was unnecessary detail in the Schedule. He did not appear to oppose the idea of rule books dealing with these matters, but he just did not want the Schedule to say that they must."Leave it to the unions ",

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were his words. But what is so wrong about saying that the rules of legislative organisations should say how officials are to be placed in and removed from office?
If the noble Lord will look at the Donovan Report, in paragraphs 654 and 698 he will find that it is quite plain that the authors thought these words appropriate matters for rule books to cover. This is what the Schedule says should be done. These are matters which are to be covered by the rules. As I have said before, and said often, it is open to the unions to draft their rules according to their own circumstances provided that they cover these points. Paragraph 6 leaves the organisation free to determine whether election, appointment, or other selection system shall apply to any given post, and to determine methods of seeking and selecting incumbents for those posts. Its practical effect is to ensure that the method of filling any particular post is published to the membership in the rules and thereby known to the members affected; is binding on the organisation's executive and is capable of being altered by constitutional means if the membership so desire.
This provision helps members to ensure that they exert democratic control over their organisation, but deliberately it does not require that all posts should be filled by election, which would seriously hinder organisations in filling posts for which special experience or personal qualities are required. The deletion of paragraph 6 from the Schedule would only serve to weaken the function of registration as a guarantee that an organisation is administered on a just, fair and democractic basis.
If I may turn for a moment to paragraph 7, I should point out that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, said that a trade union would be obliged to specify in its rules the detailed duties—I think the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, echoed this fact this afternoon—of all its employees and that it would be unable—this is what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, said—to change or rearrange these duties as between one employee and another save by a formal change or rule. This obviously is not so. The requirement as drafted applies not to employees but to"officers"and"officials ". An"officer"of a trade
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union is one who holds an office in the union for which provision is made in its rules."official ", for the purposes of this Bill, is defined in Clause 163. It includes both"officers"and such other persons as may be elected or appointed under the rules to be representatives of members. Officers"and"officials"alike may be employees of their union, but the majority are not. Union employees with no responsibility for representing members are not"officials "; they are therefore outwith the scope of this requirement.
The requirement is to specify the duties of those officials as well as their powers. This does not mean that every last detail of internal activity or function of a particular union officer or official must be set out, or that no activities may be undertaken other than those specified in the rules. What is required for any post is that those duties and responsibilities should be specified which, in the view of the union, comprise the essential nature of the office or post, distinguishing it from posts elsewhere in the union, or at higher or lower levels, and which establish the limits of the authority of the official to act on behalf of the union.
Most certainly it is for the union to determine these matters for itself. If, for example, a union decides that a particular official is to be responsible for communicating, union policy to the members, it may wish to say so in general terms and that would satisfy the Registrar. If the union wants to go into more detail, that is its own affair. The Registrar will not prevent it from doing so. I think there may be a genuine misunderstanding here. The term"duties ", I think it would be generally agreed, obviously means what someone is required to do. If one is asked what are the duties of a particular office, one can describe those duties either in broad terms within which specific instructions might be given, or provide a detailed list. Which way one decides to do this may depend to some extent on the nature of the office. In most cases I should think the first course is preferable, but unions can decide this for themselves.
My Lords, if noble Lords opposite will look, as I dare say some constantly do, at the rules at least of one union, they will find the duties specified in the minutest detail. Take, for example, the

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rule book of the A.E.U. That rule book is a comprehensive, detailed document. About five pages are devoted to the office of General Secretary and another three to the duties of divisional and national organisers. Over six pages are devoted to the duties of and obligations upon the branch secretary. It also prescribes the duties of such officers of check-book keeper, doorkeeper, minute secretary, money steward and sick steward and so on.
The duties are specified precisely and with a degree of detail far beyond anything required by the provisions of this Bill. For example, in relation to the post of doorkeeper they specify:
" a non-free member as hereinafter defined shall be eligible for election as Doorkeeper. He shall attend all meetings and assist the other officers in any business of the branch. The Doorkeeper shall at all meetings keep the door closed when any member is speaking. He shall not admit any member who is not known to him unless such member produces his contribution card or obtains some other member to answer for his membership, nor shall he admit any member in a state of intoxication, and on no account shall he take money from a member outside the branch room."
I do not criticise these rules. It is for a union to determine the way in which matters such as these shall be dealt with in its rules, but when a major union freely chooses to have requirements of this detail in its rules, it is absurd to claim that the logical and necessary requirements in the Bill relating to the powers and duties of officials are in any way burdensome or oppressive. The paragraph does not require the duties to be set out in minute detail. My Lords, I hope that the House will reject these Amendments.
3.9 p.m.
LORD SHINWELL: Occasionally, my Lords, I have found the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, convincing when he is occupied in meeting arguments from this side of your Lordships' House; but on this occasion, although I listened most carefully, I found him most unconvincing. To support his contention he has just mentioned that the A.E.U. has five pages of rules defining and specifying the powers and duties of its officials. I should have thought that if a major union of the character mentioned has found it necessary to occupy five pages of rules specifying the duties and powers of officers, it is quite unnecessary to embody
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something even stronger in the Schedule. That is my first point.
May I indulge in a personal note? In all my Parliamentary life, going a long way back, never once have I ventured to criticise a civil servant or any of the backroom boys who are unable to speak for themselves. But when I look at paragraph 7 of the Schedule—perhaps noble Lords would do me the honour of reading it—I am bound to say that the draftsman who compiled that language ought to be subjected to immediate dismissal. It is the most cockeyed contradictory, confusing paragraph I have ever read. The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, has done his best to convince your Lordships' House that an officer's duties should be specified. Who are the officers? Probably the noble Lord and other noble Lords are unaware. But, for example, in the miners' union a banner-bearer who on the infrequent occasions of demonstrations—sometimes only once annually—is appointed to occupy that position of high distinction (and it is regarded as such) is an officer. I understand from the Schedule that this banner-bearer, engaged in this infrequent but quite honourable occupation, must have his duties and his powers specified in the rules that are submitted to the Registrar. Was there ever anything so ridiculous?
The same applies to doorkeepers. I can recall my association with trade unions many long years ago when it was necessary to appoint as an officer a doorkeeper, so as to prevent any undesirable person entering—presumably somebody, who had not paid the whole of his dues, or perhaps somebody (it did occur occasionally; it probably does not occur now because trade unionists are much better behaved) claiming to be a member, who had imbibed too frequently and unwisely and sought to enter and had to be ejected. The doorkeeper is an officer, and I understand that this officer must have his duties and powers specified. How absurd! I am bound to say generally about this Schedule—I speak earnestly on this matter; I am not trying merely to make debating points; one is quite capable of that, but I am not seeking to make debating points—that apart from one item which I shall mention in a moment it is the most repugnant thing in the whole Bill. Nothing but a Govern! meat of nosey-parkers—I hope they will

15
not find the expression too offensive—would have ventured to probe and search and intervene in matters not the concern of a Government at all and of no relevance to the promotion of good and wholesome industrial relations. The only exception is this. I offer no opposition, take no exception at all, to that part of the Schedule which provides that officers must—I use the term contained in the Schedule—have their duties and powers specified in relation to the possibility of industrial disputes. That I accept. That is indeed the purpose of the Government: to try to prevent industrial disputes. But as for the rest, it is quite unnecessary, and why the Government have sought to introduce all these items I am unable to say.
I should like to say a word about the employers' associations. I cannot imagine members of the C.B.I. accepting this. So far as I know, they have no branches; there is only one organisation, the C.B.I., which is fully and wholly centralised. The duties and powers of the officers of the C.B.I. are well known. What is the purpose of introducing the reference to employers' associations? I will tell noble Lords why: because there is an element of pretence about it. If the trade unions are to be probed and ordered about and instructed and investigated—they shall do this and must do that—obviously it is as a sop to the trade unions that the employers' associations, who will not be affected in the least are brought in also. I am bound to say that if ever a Division was necessary during the course of our debates, it is on this item. It is only one of the paragraphs. All the paragraphs, I repeat, with the exception of the paragraph that is relevant to the possibility and even the probability of industrial disputes, should be rejected, and I hope that the Government, on consideration, will realise that this is going too far.
I venture a few final words on this subject. Here we have the A.E.U., and presumably the Transport Workers, the Blast Furnacemen and the very fine organisation presided over by my noble friend Lord Cooper of Stockton Heath, an old-time organisation which at one time was a number of organisations which have now been concentrated into one. These organisations have rules. They
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know their powers and duties. What is the purpose of the Government? I understand the Government are anxious, and so is every Member on this side of the House, to prevent industrial disputes which are regarded as unofficial, so-called wildcat"disputes. Sometimes they come about for no apparent reason. The purpose of your Lordships' House is to try to prevent disputes and to promote good industrial relations. Is this the way to go about it? I think not, and I hope that on reconsideration the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, will see that there is some point in the arguments I have ventured to put before your Lordships.
LORD COOPER OF STOCKTON HEATH: My Lords, may I support the comments of my noble friend Lord Shin-well and express a word of apprehension about how these requirements can be carried out in practice? Paragraph 5 of Schedule 4, for instance, makes provision
" for the election or appointment of officers and for the manner in which officers can be removed from office ".
That I can understand, and that can be operated. But we are dealing with paragraph 6 at the moment. This says:
" If the organisation has officials who are not officers…"
This is immediately going into a very difficult field. If one speaks about officials who are not officers, I myself am not clear who is meant, although they are specified in this way:
" shop stewards, workplace representatives or other officials ".
The impracticability of this provision, I think, relates to the extent to which you want to go. Because of the modernisation of trade union method and practice and administration, we are getting an interesting development. On the one hand, we are getting the people who serve in trade unions who are either popularly elected or appointed through the instruments of government of trade unions; on the other hand, there is emerging—and this is an interesting feature of the last decade, I would say—the employment of professional people, such as university graduates, in research departments who support the people who are popularly appointed or elected.
If we have to set out in the rules the conditions under which a person such as

17
a research officer, who under this wide umbrella might well be described as"an official ", has to be appointed, this is going a long way. I do not see the purpose of it at all, and I do not know where it will finish. There are professional people on the accounting side, looking after the finances. Again, one might call them officers. I do. My finance man is my finance officer. Must we define in the rules how a finance officer is appointed? This provision is going a long, long way. It mystifies me and I say, as a gentle criticism, that I do not know how it can operate.
3.22 p.m.
LORD PARGITER: My Lords, I was rather interested that the noble Lord was quoting from the A.E.U. rules—the A.E.W. rules, as they are now. Some of those rules are very old. The rules of the old A.F.C. go back into the last century and they provided for a specific purpose. They provide for a specific purpose even now. The noble Lord made great play of the fact that the functions of the branch secretary occupied six pages of the rule book. All right. What are the duties of the branch secretary? They are not only that he should act as a branch secretary. He is not only concerned with industrial disputes—in fact he is concerned very little with industrial disputes—but there are certain precise rules which he must obey with regard to entering the contributions of members. The cheque book keeper also has rules with regard to keeping a proper check on the procedure. Most meticulous records are kept in matters of this sort. He has certain specific duties regarding the payment of benefits, to ensure that members are entitled to receive benefit, and so forth, so that instructions may be given to the branch treasurer. The noble Lord might have gone further and referred to the rules of the branch treasurer as well, while he was at it. These matters are all very necessary. The noble Lord was quoting in the context of industrial disputes, but many of these matters have nothing whatever to do with the industrial activities of the union so far as branch officers are concerned; these rules are to a large extent concerned with the friendly benefit side of the union.
The noble Lord referred to the doorkeeper. The doorkeeper performs a very
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important function. The noble Lord is concerned about ballots and their being properly conducted. It is the duty of the doorkeeper to ensure that nobody receives a ballot paper and votes unless he is entitled to. That is the position with regard to the doorkeeper, and surely it is not wrong to specify a matter of that sort which the union deals with within its own rules and for its own purposes—not for purposes connected with industrial disputes or matters of that kind.
Let us go a little further down the scale and see what happens to a shop steward. A shop steward's duties are multifarious, and from my experience and knowledge of shop stewards I believe it would be difficult to try to define those duties and put them in a schedule of rules. If that is done, only two things can happen. The shop steward would probably say that within the powers and duties which are specified he deals with A, B, C and D, but he does not deal with E, because it is not specified; and E may be a cause of a good deal of trouble in a particular factory or on a particular shop floor. These things just happen, and they cannot really he defined. One cannot define in a changing world, a world which is almost changing from day to day so far as shop floor practices are concerned, precisely what are the duties of a shop steward. If it is desired to put in a blanket provision, that is all right. It may be said,"A shop steward's duties are generally to look after the interests of the members." If you think that is worth putting in, then put it in in that particular form. But I cannot see the Registrar going much beyond that and I cannot see exactly how he would be able to, because in different unions and in different industries different rules will apply with regard to the functions of a particular official, who for this purpose we will call a shop steward. To understand the multifarious duties that shop stewards are called on to perform and to say that these must be set out in the rules is not practical.
Perhaps the noble Lord will go a little further and tell us what happens to a shop steward who does not obey the rules. There they are set out, but a shop steward says,"To hell with that! There is something here that needs to be dealt with and I will deal with it." Possibly the employer would say,"You cannot do that because it is not in accordance with

19
the rules of your union which have been issued regarding the duties of a shop steward." Well, that situation will not get us very far in industrial relations. It seems to me that this provision is going beyond any reasonable stage. It puts into the Schedule a requirement for the trade union to do something which the average trade union, I would say, would not treat with great seriousness. If such a provision is not treated with seriousness, it will be bringing the law into contempt. If unions try to operate what is laid down it will bring the law into contempt; and if they do not operate it the law will be brought into contempt. When Parliament makes laws which are brought into contempt because they are inoperable, I can only say such laws ought not to be made. That is a general opinion with regard to not only this Bill but many Bills. I suggest that the noble Lord should look at this question carefully before he puts something into a Schedule of this kind which sounds simple but which in practice is almost completely inoperable. I am not saying that every part of it is inoperable but it is very largely inoperable. And if it is inoperable it will necessarily bring the law into contempt.
LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY: My Lords, I support the Government on the inclusion of this paragraph, but I have not much to say about that because the Government can look after themselves. But to hear a Socialist ex-Minister of considerable distinction call a Conservative Government"a Government of nosey-parkers"is something I shall treasure for a very long time. It is a real"high gamey"piece of Parliamentary life. What I think is a serious point which has been raised is the question of definition. Perhaps the Minister will forgive me if I have missed something. It is not the question of the definition of officials, who are defined, more or less, on page 123, but I refer to the definition of officers. The definition of officials throws us back on the definition of officers, which does not exist, so far as I can see. The whole of this Schedule contains what the officers should or should not do, but again, so far as I can see, without any definition of who or what are the officers. That would apparently leave the question under this
20
Schedule for the trade unions themselves to decide what the officers were to do in response to this particular paragraph. That might be exactly what the Opposition want, but I cannot believe it is what the Government want.
3.30 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, may I speak again with the permission of the House, because I have been asked one or two questions? The question which the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, has put is a very relevant one. The short answer is that officers of a union are those whom the union says are officers. It is for the union to decide who are officers—whether a banner-bearer is to be an officer or not. If people are designated as officers their duties will be prescribed and laid down in the rules in accordance with the Schedule. The second point I should like to refer to is the question of research officers. This point was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Cooper of Stockton Heath, who, if I may say so, spoke with his usual moderation. Research officers are not in fact covered by the definition, under which a person has to be elected or appointed in accordance with the rules of the organisation to be representative of his members or some of them. So that research officers are not, so to speak, executive officers.
LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY: My Lords, the definition says that an official is an officer or a person"elected or appointed…to be a representative of its members ". Surely it does not exclude a research officer if he is an officer or someone who is elected to represent the members.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I think the noble Lord is right in his reading of that definition, but the intention is that there should be a clear distinction between executive officers who are in contact with members in the normal course of their business and other kinds of officers who are not. In any case, as I have said, it will be for the unions to decide who are officers and who are not, but I suggest that a research officer would not be the kind of person who would be designated as an officer for the purposes of this Schedule.

21
My Lords, I do not know that there are any other questions that I have been asked. I would only say to the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, that since the Donovan Commission made it quite clear that in their view it is very desirable that trade union rule books should be clear and unambiguous but they generally fall far short of a satisfactory standard in these respects, it is generally agreed that there should be rules and that there should be some means of seeing that they come up to the highest standards.
The noble Lord, Lord Diamond, proposed a different way of doing this, but obviously it would be much more objectionable from the point of view of trade unions if we were simply to say in rough terms to the Registrar that the rules must be of the highest standard and leave him to decide what are rules of the highest standards and what rules should be included in the rule book. Given this kind of system—registration with the Registrar; the requirement that he shall bring to the attention of a union any instance where the rules are defective, in the sense that a rule covering certain points is not included in the rule book and, if the trade union objects, may challenge the registration in the Industrial Court—one must plainly set out what points must he covered in the rules. That is absolutely unavoidable. It is equally certain, given that, that again one must lay down in some form what the rules must specify—the powers and duties of the governing body of the organisation. It will be for them to say who are the officers. The Registrar will obviously deal with this matter in the manner that I have suggested. Those who are non-executive officers will be disregarded from this point of view; it is the officers whose duties affect the working of the union in its representative capacity who will have to be specified in the rules.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, the noble Lord has certainly been most obliging in the number of varying definitions and explanations he has given of these two clauses. Certainly unions now will be in the happy position that if they do not know what the clauses mean—and nobody now does know what these paragraphs mean—they can read Lord Drumalbyn's speech and extract whichever meaning they like from it. He has served an excellent purpose in liberating
22
unions very considerably indeed in regard to their rule-forming. First, I want to continue the noble Lord's excellent quotation from the Donovan Commission's Report. He quoted from paragraph 648. The Report goes straight on to say in paragraph 649:
" We think that the requirements can and should be revised with a view to ensuring better safeguards for individual members, but without impairing the freedom which trade unions ought to enjoy to frame rules to meet their own circumstances."
That was the conclusion which was drawn after taking into account the comment to which the noble Lord referred.
So, my Lords, I think that what the noble Lord has done is to attempt to answer the Amendment by using essentially two arguments. The first is that the provision is totally unnecessary. That is what we set out to demonstrate. He demonstrated that it is totally unnecessary by producing a rule book of a union and reading out the rules which are set out in such detail that nobody could find complaint or want them to be in any more detail. That was a typical example and so far as that particular example is concerned there is no need for Parliament to bother its head about unions making their own rules. They are quite capable of doing it and the example he gave showed how well they do it. The other argument was,"Please do not bother about these two clauses. The words do not mean what they say: ' Specify ' does not mean ' specify ', it means refer to in a general way ' or ' cover '. The detailed powers and duties do not mean detailed powers and duties; you either refer to them or do not refer to them as you prefer."
What the purpose is of putting in the paragraphs in those circumstances I do not know. I think that what the noble Lord has really done, if he will forgive my saying so, is to demonstrate our case to the hilt: that if you attempt this exercise of setting out in detail what the rules should provide in terms of the duties, responsibilities and authority of all these individuals you inevitably go into too much detail for some purposes and too little detail for other purposes. There is in fact no purpose, no need for these paragraphs; it is intervention, it is nosey-parkeriness of the highest degree.
I am grateful to the Liberal Party, too, for the way in which their arguments

23
supported this case. It is not for me to say how the Liberal Party should vote—that would be an invasion into their freedom of decision which I would not attempt—but I am certainly most grateful for the argument and the way in which the noble Lord demonstrated with regard to this one particular word and one particular case that the Government were talking nonsense again—namely, with regard to the research officer. A research officer means to the Liberal Party, and indeed to the Labour Party, a research officer. To the Government it means a person who is not a research officer. Those who have to read the Bill and decide what their duties are will no doubt write a letter to the General Secretary of the T.U.C. saying,"We cannot understand this. What does it mean? "
And the General Secretary will pass it on to whom?—to the research officer. And the research officer will say,"I do not know what it means. The best thing would be to turn up what the noble Lord, the Government spokesman, said it meant." He will read the differing, opposing meanings which the Government spokesman said it meant and then everybody will be perfectly happy. Everybody there may be perfectly happy, but we think this is a ridiculous way of trying to legislate, and we propose to vote against it.
3.40 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 79Y) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 48; Not-Contents, 85.

CONTENTS

Archibald, L.

Hilton of Upton, L. [Teller.]

Sainsbury, L.

Balogh, L.

Hoy, L.

St. Davids, V.

Bernstein, L.

Jacques, L.

Samuel, V.

Birk, Bs.

Janner, L.

Shackleton, L.

Brown, L.

Kennet, L.

Shepherd, L.

Buckinghamshire, E.

Kilbracken, L.

Shinwell, L.

Burntwood, L.

Leatherland, L.

Silkin, L.

Burton of Coventry, Bs.

Lee of Asheridge, Bs.

Slater, L.

Champion, L.

Lindgren, L.

Sorensen, L.

Chorley, L.

McLeavy, L.

Stocks, Bs.

Cooper of Stockton Heath, L.

Moyle, L.

Stonham, L.

Delacourt-Smith, L.

Pargiter, L.

Stow Hill, L.

Diamond, L.

Peddie, L.

Summerskill, Bs.

Gaitskell, Bs.

Phillips, Bs. [Teller.]

Taylor of Mansfield, L.

Gardiner, L.

Platt, L.

Wells-Pestell, L.

Henderson, L.

Popplewell, L.

Wootton of Abinger, Bs.

NOT-CONTENTS

Aberdare, L.

Daventry, V.

Loudoun, C.

Ailwyn, L.

Denham, L.

Lucas of Chilworth, L.

Airedale, L.

Drumalbyn, L.

MacAndrew, L.

Albemarle, E.

Dudley, E.

Macpherson of Drumochter, L.

Allerton, L.

Dundee, E.

Merrivale, L.

Alport, L.

Ebbisham, L.

Milverton, L.

Balfour, E.

Eccles, V.

Monck, V.

Balfour of Inchrye, L.

Effingham, E.

Northchurch, Bs.

Beaumont of Whitley, L.

Ferrers, E. [Teller.]

Oakshott, L.

Berkeley, Bs.

Fortescue, E.

Penrhyn, L.

Blackford, L.

Goschen, V. [Teller.]

Rankeillour, L.

Bolton, L.

Grantchester, L.

Reay, L.

Boston, L.

Gray, L.

Redcliffe-Maud, L.

Brock, L.

Greenway, L.

Roberthall, L.

Brooke of Cumnor, L.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

Robertson of Oakridge, L.

Brooke of Ystradfellte, Bs.

Hailes, L.

Ruthven of Freeland, Ly.

Burton, L.

Hailsham of St. Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor)

St. Aldwyn, E.

Caithness, E.

St. Helens, L.

Camoys, L.

Henley, L.

St. Just, L.

Carrington, L.

Hood, V.

St. Oswald, L.

Clwyd, L.

Hurcomb, L.

Skelmersdale, L.

Coleraine, L.

Hylton-Foster, Bs.

Somers, L.

Conesford, L.

Jellicoe, E. (L. Privy Seal.)

Stonehaven, V.

Courtown, E.

Kemsley, V.

Strang, L.

Craigavon, V.

Latymer, L.

Strange of Knokin, Bs.

Crathorne, L.

Long, V.

Swaythling, L.

Thomas, L.

Wakefield of Kendal, L.

Wrottesley, L.

Vivian, L.

Willingdon, M.

Young, Bs.

Wade, L.

Windlesham, L.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

3.47 p.m.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79AA:
Page 151, line 3, leave out from (" action ") to end of line 4.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 79AA. This amendment, if made, would affect paragraph 10 which reads,
" The rules must specifiy any body by which, and any official by whom, instructions may be given to members of the organisation…"
and then come the words which the Amendment seeks to remove,
" and the circumstances in which any such instructions may be so given."
The reason why we put forward this Amendment is because we think it is just impossible for that to happen: for anybody in framing the rules to be able to envisage all the circumstances in which any such instructions may be so given. The paragraph says,
" instructions may be given to members of the organisation "—
by any body and any official—
" for any kind of industrial action ".
That is just envisaging every possible detailed circumstance affecting the whole life of a trade union, and I repeat that we just do not think it is capable of being achieved. If the noble Lord is going to reply,"Well, the words don't mean what they say ", as he broadly replied on the last occasion, that is of some help, but I would hope he would find it possible to accept the Amendment and remove these words. I beg to move.
LORD BROWN: My Lords, I rise to support this Amendment. I have made the comment on a number of questions, both on Committee and at Report stage of the Bill, about the necessity for clarity for organisations as a prelude to industrial peace. If you were to take many of the sub-paragraphs of Schedule 4 and roughly translate them into requirements to be put upon industrial organisations, in a close-linked company any industrial manager would discard them immediately. They are not viable requirements to put on an employment hierarchy, with its
26
close-knit working of managers and others. To try to apply these extremely searching rules to a more widespread body such as a trade union is a bit of organisational nonsense of the worst and most confusing kind. I beg the Government to have a look at all this. They are making an idiot of this Bill by going into all this detail. I wholeheartedly support the Amendment.
BARONESS GAITSKELL: My Lords, I, too, support this Amendment. But I should like to ask the Government what would have happened in the case of the Post Office strike, when I think workers in New York and in Belgium supported the strikers. Would the Government have brought an action against those people, and would the strikers here have been actionable? What is proposed is so utterly ridiculous that I heartily support this Amendment.
LORD SHINWELL: My Lords, earlier on I ventured to say that, when I took exception to items in the Schedule, I took no exception to paragraph 10. Nevertheless, I support the Amendment. I said earlier that I could understand that, within the purpose of the Government and within the principles embodied in the code of practice and in the Bill itself, it is essential, if there is an industrial dispute or if one is likely to happen, that the body responsible should be specified. That is a point to which it is very difficult to take exception. But I cannot understand what is meant by the reference to the circumstances. What does that mean? Does it mean that a dispute may occur after arbitration has been rejected, or after an arbitration award has been submitted? Why were those words added? Subject to any satisfactory explanation by the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, I think we are bound to ask that they should be expunged.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, noble Lords opposite sometimes surprise me. If they read a provision in a Bill and it seems to them to make nonsense, then it is probably desirable that they should think how and in what way it might make sense, for the very good reason that these provisions are not put

27
into a Bill without considerable thought. Noble Lords might credit those who draft the Bills with some concept of practicality, especially as the Bills have also been subject to Ministerial examination. Noble Lords have given a meaning of the phrase
" and the circumstances in which any such instructions may be so given."
Quite obviously, they have given it a meaning that it was not intended to have. Of course it would be quite impossible to foresee all the detailed circumstances which might arise, so obviously that cannot be the meaning of the words. These words are simply intended to ensure that the rules of a registered organisation make clear not only who is to give the instructions, but in what circumstances those who give the instructions within an organisation are to act.
Let me give your Lordships an example. It would be quite acceptable if the rules made clear that local officials were authorised to take any action they considered necessary when an employer breached an existing agreement with the union but that they must refer other matters to a higher authority. Or, again, the rules might say that a district official had power to call a strike whenever the district committee decided that strike action was justified. I think those two hypothetical examples suffice to show that paragraph 10 of Schedule 4 will leave unions with the fullest discretion to decide to what extent they wish to circumscribe the authority to call a strike. The words in question are necessary because without them a union could satisfy paragraph 10 simply by listing the types of official authorised to pass on instructions. That would not be enough. If a shop steward, for example, can call members out on strike only with the approval of the district committee, the rules should make that clear. If the district committee is to have final authority to call a strike on a localised dispute about some subject but must get the approval of the national executive before calling for action in other circumstances, then again the rules should make that clear.
LORD SHINWELL: My Lords, is the noble Lord suggesting that the Registrar would permit a rule to be embodied
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in the rules of any trade union which provided that a shop steward should be permitted to call a strike? Surely he would reject that out of hand. He would not allow such a rule—
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Order!
LORD SHINWELL: My Lords, I am merely asking a question. The Registrar would not allow that to be embodied in the rules. Surely the person who is responsible for calling a strike should be the principal officer of the union or the executive of the union.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I accept that the noble Lord was asking a question. Here again the noble Lord is confusing the content of a rule with the fact that there should be a rule about something. He said that the Registrar would refuse to accept a rule of that kind. I do not see any reason why he should not accept it. If a union specified any body—and I think it is a body that is mentioned in the Bill—and there was a committee of shop stewards, or something of that kind, which was authorised to declare a strike, then in that hypothetical case I do not see why the Registrar should turn that down.
The paragraph states:
" The rules must specify any body by which, and any official by whom "—
so that it could be a shop steward, or committee of shop stewards—
" instructions may be given to members of the organisation."
What noble Lords still cannot understand is that we are talking only about what must be in the rules; not about the content of those rules. Subject to the guiding principles, the content of the rules is for the unions themselves to decide. We are not concerned with that. We are simply concerned that the members of the unions and others should know who is in a position to give instructions, and the circumstances in which the people are in a position to give them. I made clear the sort of circumstances that we have in mind. If the district committee is to have final authority to call a strike on a localised dispute about some subject, but must get the approval of the national executive before calling for action in other circumstances, the rules should make those circumstances clear.

29
These are all matters which the union will decide for itself, and obviously it will frame its rules to meet its own circumstances in a manner which gives its officials the flexibility needed to cope with the unexpected.
4.0 p.m.
LORD BROWN: My Lords, am I to understand that in the terms of the word circumstances"in this subsection the noble Lord. Lord Drumalbyn, is not referring to the conditions surrounding the decision to strike, the behaviour of managers or the particular type of subject over which they are claiming, but merely to the process by which it is decided who should call the strike? If he is doing that, I do not understand how he can possibly interpret the word"circumstances"in that way. That is the pith of the Amendment; the circumstances relate to the ambient circumstances around the decision, not to the process of making a decision.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, obviously it would be possible to interpret the word"circumstances"in general in the sense that the noble Lord, Lord Brown, has interpreted it, but for the fact that if that were so this would make no sense at all. Therefore, the circumstances about which clearly we are talking here are those in which such instructions may be given. The instructions may be given to members, but the circumstances are laid down quite clearly as to who is competent to call a strike and that sort of thing at any particular level.
Paragraph 10, as I have said, leaves the power to decide policy and the delegation of authority clearly in union hands. It merely stipulates that the union decisions on these matters should be clearly set out in the rule book for all members to see. Paragraph 10 would be totally ineffective as a means of ensuring that if these words were deleted. It would make it not at all clear in what circumstances instructions could be given to members of an organisation by any particular body or any official. Clearly, that is why we need the term"circumstances ".
LORD ROBBINS: My Lords, is the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, convinced that these are the only words by which his intentions—with which I should have thought there is 100 per cent. agreement—could be conveyed? It seems to me,
30
listening from the Cross Benches, that this is really a misunderstanding about wording between people of equal good will. What I understood the noble Lord, Lord Brown, and his noble friend to be objecting to was that detailed circumstances had to be enumerated, which certainly would be an absurdity. What I understood the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, to be saying was that he wished to ensure that the broad conditions governing actions of a certain sort had to be observed. Is it not possible to find some form of words to meet both points of view?
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, so long as I have convinced the House that some provision of this kind is necessary, I am perfectly prepared to have the words re-examined. But I think it would be better at the moment to leave the words in than to take them out altogether, because then the paragraph in our view would be defective.
LORD GARDINER: My Lords, it is a new principle of construction to me that one does not construe words in their ordinary sense because if one were to do so they would prove to be unworkable. I should have thought that a good deal of that applies to Schedule 4.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I think I would agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, if he were to add the words"if they could be construed in any other way ".
LORD GARDINER: My Lords, neither here, nor, I should have thought, in the preceding Amendment, is it possible to construe it in any other way when there are rules which are going to be much more difficult to alter now with the registrar's functions than they were before this Bill was in existence, although trade union rules are always difficult to alter. We are told in Clause 75(4):
"…the registrar shall not approve the rules of an organisation under this Act unless—
(a) he is satisfied that these are not defective as mentioned in subsection (1) of this section…"
and subsection (1)(c) says that they are defective if
" they do not comply with the requirements set out in Schedule 4 to this Act ".
So they have to comply with those requirements. In those circumstances,

31
how is the noble Lord able to say the words which read:
" The rules must specify the powers and duties of…its officers and of officials who are not officers of the organisation "
mean anything except what they say? It does not say that one must give a general idea what these bodies are to do; it says that one must specify their duties. As I ventured to say at the Committee stage of the Bill, no limited company or Government Department could possibly work if they could not change from day to day the duties of various employees without having to go through the paraphernalia of the registration with the registrar or amending the Memorandum of Articles of Association. So I should have thought that it was quite impossible for anyone to specify in their rules the circumstances in which somebody might call for industrial action because they must obviously vary in a way which cannot quite be specified.
LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, has undertaken to look at this wording. I think it brings comfort to such of us—as, I suspect, my noble friend and myself—who support what the Government are trying to do here, but I think this Schedule is extremely badly and loosely drafted. The points which have been made from the Labour and Liberal Benches on this matter are not just debating points. If Amendment No. 79Z had been moved it would have been my intention to ask whether the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, would undertake to look again at the definition of"officers ", and to point out that if all that he wanted to say was that the trade unionists should define their officers that could well be said in the Schedule. Again, in this matter there is quite genuine doubt as to what the Schedule means. I am a supporter of the noble Lord in his intentions on this matter, but I hope that the whole Schedule—certainly the early parts of it—will be thoroughly examined before Third Reading because I do not think that it is good enough as it stands.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, may I take those words,"we do not think it is good enough as it stands ". I am sorry if in not formally moving they removal of paragraph 7 I have denied
32
further opportunity to the Liberal spokesman to criticise the wording of this provision. Certainly so far as the words under discussion are concerned in paragraph 10 we are in the difficulty that we are advised in a contrary direction to that which the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, wishes to advise us. The noble Lord must not assume that I speak on these Amendments out of my own deep—indeed, I challenge any noble Lord to have a deeper—ignorance of the law than I possess myself, because we are often helped considerably. In this particular case, I am relying on the advice of a professor of law who has given enormous thought and care to this Bill and I am greatly reinforced by the view of my noble and learned friend who speaks, as does anyone who has held his high office, with great authority on this matter.
The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, says that there is a simple way out of this. If a normal interpretation—that is to say, reading the words in ordinary English to mean what one would think they should mean—produces nonsense, then one must know that that could not be the case because no Conservative Government—and this is the first rule of existence—could ever commit a nonsense. The noble Lord would have to sit on that Bench for a very long time before he could persuade me of that. Of course, he knows and I know that this is a matter of Ministers, and Ministers alone. Either a Minister has given instructions and those who advise him have done their best to interpret them, or else some adviser has put forward an idea and the Minister has accepted it. He may have accepted it with a very quick look or with a very long and slow look, but he has accepted it. There is only one person responsible and that is the Minister. So let us be quite clear about that; clear also that I cannot accept the proposition that no Conservative Minister is capable of putting a foolishness before your Lordships' House. This is one such; and were it not for the fact that the noble Lord has said that he will look at it again we would, of course, be compelled, having regard to the views expressed in many parts of your Lordships' House, to take it to a Division again. But the noble Lord has said that he will look at it.

33
At this stage, may I make a general point about looking at things? We assume that the noble Lord speaks with full authority when he says that he will look at these matters again. We naturally accept that completely and without hesitation. But we are at Report stage, and the next stage is Third Reading; we have a great deal of work to do to get through on the Report stage, which is a very long stage. It is a Herculean task, because the more you do the more there is left to do. It is a sort of monster: the more pages you cut off at the beginning, the more pages there are added at the end. Your Lordships will have noticed that though we have gone a long way through the Report stage the Marshalled List is much longer than it was when we started. So the longer we go on the longer the list grows, and it is going to be a difficult task to get through it.
There are many other things to deal with which the Government may be kind enough to say they will look at again before Third Reading. So I am making a point which I am sure the Government are taking: that we take these offers very seriously indeed, and there must be opportunity to demonstrate that the matter has been considered and a conclusion reached when we come to Third Reading. However, the noble Lord has been good enough to say that he will give the wording further consideration, and I hope that in that consideration he will have regard to what the noble Lord, Lord Robbins, said. We are all saying the same thing, as far as I can see: that the words in their natural sense do not mean what we want. Therefore in the hope that ultimately the words will mean what we all want, I seek your Lordships' permission to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
4.13 p.m.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79BB:
Page 151, line 19, leave out paragraph 14.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move this Amendment with a little less hesitation than some others. Paragraph 14 was a case in which the Opposition thought that, as the rule provided in the Schedule made nonsense, we ought to draw it to the Government's attention; and that we ought not to have regard to the fact that every rule the
34
Government propose must be full of good sense and empty of nonsense. We did, in our vain way, put this forward and it appears that we were not wholly mistaken because the Government have put down an Amendment to the clause which, in effect, achieves what this Amendment proposed at Committee stage. So I hope the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, will not take it amiss if I say that the Opposition still regard it as their duty to examine Bills and not to assume that something which appears on the face of it to be nonsensical could not be nonsensical because it was the Conservative Party which put it forward. We are grateful to the noble Lord for having put forward an Amendment as a result of what we asked for, and for having put forward an Amendment to the clause itself. If the noble Lord tells us that when that Amendment comes forward he will move it then there is no need to spend any more time on this Amendment. I beg to move.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, the noble Lord is quite right. He will have spotted Amendment No. 79DDD to Clause 88(6), and that will make the matter quite clear. With respect, I do not think this was nonsense as it stood, but it was read by some to mean that it was not possible to give away the rule book free. That was not the intention, and it would probably be better expressed in the clause itself. So I would invite your Lordships to agree with the noble Lord in his Amendment.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, is that the way the Government want it? Yes: this paragraph will have to come out if the Amendment to the clause is made. I am grateful to the noble Lord, and I take it he is going to move his Amendment when he gets there.
4.18 p.m.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79CC:
Page 151, line 23, leave out paragraph 15 and insert—
(" 15. The rules must cover the questions of eligibility for and admission to the organisation.")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, paragraph 15 sets out in detail the requirements relating to members of the organisation. It says:
" The rules must specify the descriptions of persons who are eligible for membership of the

35
organisation, and the procedure for dealing with applications for membership, including provision for appeals against decisions of the committee or other body responsible for determining such applications ".
We are trying to put forward something which will act as a check-list to remind those who are drawing rules that a rule must cover this sort of question, the question of eligibility for membership of the organisation and admission to it. We do not think it is necessary to do more than this. This is not a matter of supreme importance: it is really just another example of how the rules could be turned from a over-detailed list of regulations, which in practice I am sure will be ignored because there is too much detail for anybody to take note of, into something sensible which could be a help to new unions who are preparing their rule books. I beg to move.
LORD SHINWELL: My Lords, before the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, replies, I wonder whether he would be kind enough to define what is meant by"descriptions of persons ". Does this relate to craft or skill, or to a particular occupation or vocation, or does it relate to behaviour or anything of that sort? What is meant by"descriptions of persons "? It does not relate, I suppose, to their height or their weight or their girth or anything of that sort, does it? What is it intended to mean?
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, if I may reply first to the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, the words"descriptions of persons"are of course used throughout the Bill in trying to define a specified group. He will find those words constantly used, obviously referring to the kind of group of people suited to be represented by a single trade union.
My Lords, I think that the difficulty with the noble Lord's Amendment is that he is really seeking to replace a fairly precise definition of what is required with a more than usually vague description. To say simply that"The rules must cover the questions of eligibility"without in any way relating to the sort of questions that arise is, I think, a bit dangerous. We attach importance here, particularly to the provision for appeals against decisions of the committee or other body responsible for determining such applications. Indeed, I think it right also to
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provide in the rules a procedure for dealing with applications; at what level admission is to take place, whether they need to be agreed at a higher level, and so forth. I should have thought that to be a reasonable provision, and I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw the Amendment.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I am not going to waste time on this Amendment. It is merely an example of the way we think that the rules could be helpful to organisations; namely, by reminding them of the things which they ought to bear in mind, such as a check list, as opposed to the Government's method of specifying details at this unnecessary length. We cannot do more than put forward our views. The Government are not willing to change the rules and I do not wish to waste your Lordships' time, so I seek permission to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
4.22 p.m.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79DD:
Page 151, line 34, leave out (" procedure and penalties ") and insert (" penalties, if any,").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, line 34 comes within Rule 16 which says:
" The rules must specify…the contributions payable in respect of membership of the organisation…"
A little later it says:
"…and the amount of any such contributions or the basis on which that amount is to be assessed…"
and finally:
"…the procedure and penalties in case of default in payment of contributions."
Why do we need a procedure"in case of default in payment of contributions "? I should have thought it was perfectly simple; in fact, it could be automatic. If you do not pay, you cease to be a member. Why should we have all this procedure laid down so that the Registrar could not admit a union to be a registered union unless it set out in its rules a procedure for dealing with default in payment of contributions? Presumably, the procedure is directed to the accountant who looks up the book, sees that the man has not paid, and puts a line through his membership card (or something like that) after a number of weeks,

37
or whatever the time may be. I do not think it is a necessary detail and I hope the Government will agree that on this occasion also the word"procedure"could be omitted.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I think this is a case in which I hope to be able to convince the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, that there is value in retaining the word"procedure"as well as the word"penalties ". When a member has fallen into arrears, or appears to have done so, it is important that there should be some proper procedure for warning him of that fact, and indicating the consequences to which his default exposes him. Its importance was brought out by the case Edwards v. SOGAT concerning a member's wrongful dismissal from his union for alleged non-payment of dues. That case prompted the T.U.C. to issue recommendations on the matter to affiliated unions. A reference in the rules to penalties is not enough to provide the member with an opportunity to pay his arrears. He must also know, particularly in these days when more and more contributions are being paid by check-off, what steps the union will take before terminating his membership. Clause 65(9) requires that at least he should get a notification of the proposal to terminate membership. One would expect to see some reference to this in the rules. For that reason I hope the noble Lord will agree that a procedure is necessary.
LORD DIAMOND: May I ask the noble Lord why it is necessary to specify the procedure in these rules if all that is really necessary is already contained in the Bill? If your Lordships will consider the similar provision with regard to the Companies Act, it will be apparent that we do not have to specify everything in the rules of the company, in its articles of association, which are covered by company law. You cannot breach company law whatever your articles may say; you have to comply with company law. Surely, when this Bill becomes an Act, the unions will have to comply with it? It is set out in the Bill that there has to be a notification. In any event, everyone would act in that way out of common sense alone. Why therefore do you have in addition to provide for a procedure under these rules?
LORD DRUMALBYN: I should have thought the answer was quite simply in order that members may know, by reading their rules, what is the procedure to be followed in order to fulfil the guiding principle in Clause 65.
LORD BLYTON: My Lords, is the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, aware that during all my life in trade unions it has been the case that on the back of a man's trade union card, and especially in the case of miners' it stated that if you were six weeks in arrears you were not in financial benefit. If at the end of ten weeks you still had not paid, you were struck off the books, and you became a non-member. This practice has been going on for years in all trade unions. Every union has a"non-financial"clause for a member, and also one which excludes a man from membership after a period of time if he has defaulted in the payment of his contributions. I see no reason why this should be embodied in the rules.
LORD SHINWELL: My Lords, do I understand the sense of what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, to be that what is meant here is notification that a member is in default because he has not paid arrears, or something of the sort, and his membership is likely to be terminated? If that is all that is meant, my noble friend Lord Blyton has dealt with the point. As I understand it—no doubt the noble Lord, Lord Cooper of Stockton Heath, would support this contention—almost all union rulebooks contain an item to the effect that if a member is in default, his membership may be terminated if the branch or the executive so decide. That was the position when I was associated with the trade union movement. There was also a notification that it was up to the member to see that his contributions were paid. If that is all that the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, means, I understand it. But is anything else meant by"procedure ", apart from notification?
LORD BERNSTEIN: My Lords, if the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, is trying, out of the goodness of his heart, or if the Government are trying, to help trade unionists, why do not they listen to what trade unionists have to say about this Amendment? They say that the words

39
are not necessary, and surely they should know whether the words are necessary—unless the Government think that they are not capable of breaking the unions according to the Bill, and that it is necessary to put in these words. Otherwise, I fail to see the reason for them.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, if I may with the leave of the House, I will reply to the questions. I am a little mystified at the logic of what we are here being asked to do, or not to do. After all, it is not an answer to the suggestion that something should be put in the rules to say that it is being done already. We are here trying to make certain that the best practice is followed. Noble Lords have said that in some unions the best practice is being followed. I doubt whether it may necessarily be concluded that the best practice is followed in all unions. The noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, asked whether this just means notice. It is not for me to say whether it just means notice. A particular union might want to have a more elaborate procedure. It might give notice and allow for an opportunity for a member to make representations and so on. I would think that"procedure"is the right word to use in these circumstances and that it might be left to the unions to say what the procedure should be in any particular case, so long as there is a procedure. As the noble Lord says, it might amount merely to notification; it might go further and amount to an opportunity to make representations.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I do not think that we need to press this Amendment any further. From the experience of my noble friends who have spoken it is clear that there is no difficulty about this in the present situation. Indeed, the normal situation, as I should envisage, is that every trade unionist has his card and looks at it and knows whether it is up to date. It is as simple as that. If it is not up to date he knows that he will cease to be a member. That is automatic, and unless"procedure"means an automatic procedure, then that would be a perfectly satisfactory explanation of the word. If it could be automatic that would be perfectly satisfactory. This is merely another example of how going into this
40
kind of detail does not help the unions at all and the whole of this Schedule, for practical purposes, will be ignored. In those circumstances, I will not waste your Lordships' time any further and ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 78 [Entry of organisations in provisional register]:
4.31 p.m.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79TTT:
Page 62, line 13, at end insert—
(" (4) The registrar shall send to the Commissioners of Inland Revenue a copy of such particulars entered in the provisional register as the Commissioners may from time to time require.")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move a most important Amendment on which I seek to engage the close attention of your Lordships' House. First of all let me say what the short purpose of this Amendment is. It is to enable the Government to carry out the Secretary of State's undertaking to provide a special register so that non-registering trade unions can get the benefit of tax relief on their provident funds. That relief they get at present; they will not get it in the future if the Bill goes through unamended.
Let me read out what the undertaking was. It was given on March 23, and appears in column 335 of the OFFICIAL REPORT of the other place. The Secretary of State, Mr. Carr, said:
" I assure the House "—
he did not say"I think ", but,
" I assure the House that if it were necessary to set up a special register for trade unions which wished not to register in the industrial relations sense, so that they could continue the other half of their activities, their provident fund activities, I would propose a special register."
That is very clear. He went on to say some further words to which I shall refer shortly. Your Lordships will appreciate that this was an assurance given in the House and it related to unions which wished not to register in the industrial relations sense, that is to say, under this Bill, and it dealt with their activities which are known as their provident fund activities.
It is difficult to know why the Government have not so far implemented this

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undertaking. It is difficult because it is necessary, but it is not so difficult to understand the point of view of the Secretary of State, because he went on to say:
"…it is not necessary. I have gone into this most carefully. I am told that there is no technical advice that the Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1965 or the Friendly Societies Act 1896 is available for registering for the provident funds of unions which do not wish to register under the Bill in the industrial relations sense. Therefore there is a special register in existence."
I think there must be a misprint there, for there is no special register in existence. The Secretary of State took the view that as there was an Industrial and Provident Societies Act, under which non-registering trade unions could carry on their provident fund activities or, alternatively, a Friendly Societies Act, under which they could do the same, there was no need to set up the special register. I therefore have the duty of explaining to your Lordships—because the Secretary of State has not, apparently, given these matters anything like adequate consideration—why the advice tendered was wrong; why it is not possible for unions, which do not register, to carry on their provident fund activities under the Provident Societies Act or the Friendly Societies Act, and why I am calling upon the Government, and the Secretary of State, to honour his undertaking.
There are serious difficulties. The Secretary of State said:
" I am told that there is no technical, constitutional or legal difficulty…".
My Lords, in fact there are serious difficulties, both technical and legal, which I shall explain to your Lordships. They are so serious as to make it impossible for the purpose to be achieved. Again may I say to your Lordships that what I am saying is not based exclusively on my own view of the matter, but derives also from the joint opinion of two eminent counsel whom the Trades Union Congress consulted so as to be quite sure that the advice given to their members was accurate.
First, may I deal with the Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1965? What is almost certainly the case is that the objects of Section 1 of that Act prevent registration by a trade union for these purposes. What is quite certain is that it is inappropriate to attempt to register
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under that Act because there is no general tax exemption for industrial provident societies. It is as simple as that, and I hope it is quite clear that when the Secretary of State referred to the Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1965 he was wrong, and the reason I labour this point is in order to make it clear that if he was so clearly and absolutely mistaken on that matter, he might equally well have been mistaken on the next matters to which I am about to refer.
Having disposed of the Industrial and Provident Societies Act, let us look at the Friendly Societies Act, which is a much more appropriate Act for this function. I will now detail the serious technical and legal difficulties, of which the Secretary of State said there were none but which make it impossible for a trade union to function in the way in which the Secretary of State suggested it could with regard to its provident activities. I am glad to say that on this point the Government have already gone a long way towards recognising these difficulties, the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, was good enough to write to me arising out of the question that I raised on this matter at an earlier stage. He does not take the view that there are no technical, constitutional or legal difficulties. I will read what he says, but I am always anxious not to read out too small a part of a letter, lest I should be charged with being selective. It is a three-page letter so your Lord-ships will not wish to be bothered with the whole of it.
In his letter the noble Lord says:
" I would not, of course, wish to imply that it would be a simple matter for a trade union to take this step."—
This is the step of transferring funds to friendly societies in order to continue to get the tax benefit—
" It might face problems depending on the provisions in its constitution "—
this is what the Secretary of State had in mind, no doubt, when he talked about no constitutional difficulty—
" and rules relating to the powers of its trustees, the nature of the provident benefit to be provided to members and the methods by which they are to be financed. At the very least it seems probable that the consent of members to major changes in union rules would be needed. In come cases it seems quite possible that complex financial and actuarial questions might arise over the division of union funds and assets

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between those to be used for general purposes and those to be allocated to the friendly society taking over responsibility for provident benefits."
All that is quite correct. There would be immense difficulties of the kind outlined by the noble Lord, and I will now, if I may, demonstrate to him why those difficulties are not only immense but insuperable.
There are three major difficulties. There are many more, but three major ones, which is two more than is sufficient for the purposes of this argument. First, there is the rule under Clause 154 of this Bill that no organisation of workers can register under the Friendly Societies Act. The organisation cannot register. But, according to the Friendly Societies Act, the benefit paid to individuals must be provided,
" by voluntary subscription of the members thereof ".
The subscription has to come from the members; the subscription has to be voluntary. The members of the friendly society therefore could not be tied up with the members of the union. There is no way in which one could ensure that these two memberships would precisely coincide. And of course they would increasingly diverge. Even if they started off by being the same membership, there would be the circumstance, first, that trade union members would cease to subscribe to the friendly society, and therefore there would be members of the union who would not be members of the friendly society. Secondly, there would be the circumstance that members of the friendly society would cease to be members of the union but would continue to subscribe to the friendly society. So in these two respects there would be increasing divergence between the members of the friendly society and the membership of the union. There is no method by which the two can be tied and kept together. In fact, by virtue of the statutory provision it is impossible to have a friendly society on any basis other than that the subscriptions are voluntary. So it is perfectly clear in the first place that it would be impossible to achieve what is being achieved at the moment; namely, a union providing provident benefits for its members or their dependants. That is the first point.
There is of course the further difficulty (this is still within this major difficulty which I am speaking about) that members not willing to join the friendly society would need to have their existing rights assured. One cannot assume that it would be possible even to start with the two memberships coinciding. There might be a considerable membership of the union which would refuse to join a new friendly society; and they would say,"We have subscribed to this union provident fund, or to the union funds part of which are used for provident purposes, and will require our rights to be assessed and valued and set on one side." So the continuing funds of the union would, in effect, under the present proposals, be reduced because of the tax provisions. That is the first insuperable difficulty.
The second is that this same condition which I have read out means that a friendly society set up for the purpose could not rely simply on the existing funds in the trade union. The condition, may I remind your Lordships, is"voluntary subscription of the members thereof ". So there is a union with its own provident funds; members have been subscribing for years and years, and there are a number of annuitants and beneficiaries who are drawing benefits. The annuitants, the aged, the sick, the widows, the children who are dependent—all these are drawing benefits out of the union provident funds or the general funds which are also used for provident purposes. Those funds could not be transferred to a new friendly society because the friendly society has to be provided by funds by way of voluntary subscription from the members themselves. The most that could be done is that from time to time the union could give a donation to the friendly society. But it could not provide the funds. So there are two reasons, insuperable reasons, why the union and the friendly society could not be identical bodies and why the funds could not be used.
There is a third reason. It is not quite so crucial, but it can be very important for various unions. It is that the range of benefits which, on the one hand, are provided by trade union provident funds and, on the other hand, are allowed as proper for tax purposes when paid out by a friendly society, differ. To a great extent they overlap; they coincide. To

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a large extent they differ. Not only do they differ, but in many important respects the friendly society range of permissible benefits is narrower than the trade union range of permissible benefits. When I say"permissible ", I mean, so far as a trade union is concerned,"permissible for tax purposes ", and so far as a friendly society is concerned"permissible for friendly society purposes ". So there will be cases where one or more kind of benefit cannot be continued if a trade union attempts to hive-off its provident activities to a friendly society.
So, my Lords, I am saying (I am sorry to have troubled your Lordships in some detail about this matter, but it is an issue of fundamental importance) that there are these three insuperable reasons, two of which are major and one is minor, in addition to many other reasons, why it simply is not possible for registration under the Friendly Societies Act to provide existing tax relief for the membership of the union in respect of their existing funds for their existing providential purposes. It is necessary therefore to set up a special register. I have demonstrated, first, that the reference to the industrial and provident society was merely a careless one; secondly, that the reference to the Friendly Societies Act has not been sufficiently thought out because it is incapable of achieving the purpose. Furthermore, I remind your Lordships of the undertaking, which I will now read once more.
" I assure the House "—
it was said—
" that if it were necessary to set up a special register for trade unions which wished not to register in the industrial relations sense "—
that is exactly our position—
" so that they could continue the other half of their activities, their provident fund activities "—
that is exactly what we are considering—
" I would propose a special register."
I am saying there should be a special register proposed, and proposed fairly quickly, if the Government and the Secretary of State are to honour his assurance given in another place.
I come now to the precise wording of the Amendment. Why do I propose that:
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" The registrar shall send to the Commissioners of Inland Revenue a copy of such particulars entered in the provisional register as the Commissioners may from time to time require "?
Your Lordships are well aware of the procedure, which is that every registered union (which at the moment means a union registered under the 1871 and subsequent Acts) is entitled to this tax benefit in relation to its provident activities. So, incidentally, is every other body which carries out this kind of activity. For at least 50 years it has been a matter of national policy, carried out by every Government during that period, to encourage by tax relief every individual who saves in this way for these purposes. It is obvious common sense and good national policy, and it is always done. The unions are not being favoured in this way; they are being treated exactly as every other body which carries out similar purposes.
Your Lordships are aware, first, that every trade union which is so registered at present gets relief on its provident fund activities; secondly, that under this Bill every such union will be transferred automatically to the special register; thirdly, that the people who will need to know about it are the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, because they have to deal with the tax side. Therefore, all that is necessary to provide a special register, in accordance with the undertaking given by the Secretary of State, is for the Registrar, who has the details of all those who are on the special register, to notify the Commissioners of Inland Revenue. They then set up their special register by administrative means. It is as simple as that. My Lords, I have explained the matter fully; I hope that the Government are persuaded. I beg to move.
4.52 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, the noble Lord has argued that the assurance which my right honourable friend gave in another place cannot be fulfilled and therefore a special register should be set up. That is the burden of what he has said. It was never said that there would be no change, and I do not think it was ever suggested that it would necessarily be easy for the trade unions who do not register (that is non-registered organisations) to hive-off their funds so as to register under the Friendly Societies

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Acts. I agree with the noble Lord that it would be inappropriate to register under the Industrial and Provident Societies Act; but, of course, it is recognised that there are differences between the Friendly Societies Acts and the present provisions. It is true, as the noble Lord says, that the range of benefits provided by trade union provident funds, and those allowed as proper for tax purposes, differ; that, although they overlap, they are not identical. I think those are roughly the words that he used. It is recognised that there will be some differences, but the basic principle of the Bill here is that those who do not register under the Bill when it becomes an Act will not be trade unions within the meaning of the Bill, and therefore they will not have the facilities open to them as trade unions.
In effect, this means that those who do not register will have problems, because they will be giving up the right to use their provident funds for any purpose they may think fit. Therefore, in order to get over that they will have to register under the Friendly Societies Act.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, who are"they "?
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I am speaking now of the unregistered organisations, those that do not register under the Bill. This is part of the essence of the Bill, and I do not think it would be possible for us to make any concession in this matter. The choice will be entirely open to the organisations themselves. If they choose to register, then they will be covered under Section 338 of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act; if they do not, then they will have to hive-off their funds and register under the Friendly Societies Act.
The statement made by my right honourable friend was quoted correctly by the noble Lord, and I think it is right to say that we still stand by that. There are no technical, constitutional or legal difficulties involved. I take note of the point made by the noble Lord, that it would not be possible to have existing funds transferred to a new friendly society because the funds have not been subscribed to voluntarily. All I can say is that this is not in accordance with the advice we have received. In the ordinary way there is no compulsion to be
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a member of a trade union, and thus there is no compulsion to subscribe to what is covered by the rules of the trade union. In many cases it is a fact that the subscription of anyone who is a member of a union also goes to cover provident funds, and therefore the argument must be that these are voluntary subscriptions. This is a matter of legal advice. The noble Lord said that he had received contrary advice, but all I can say is that the advice we have received was reflected in what my right honourable friend has said, and there is nothing to prevent organisations of workers hiving-off their funds in order to set up provident funds for the range of benefits that friendly societies can cover.
My Lords, I think perhaps I should go further than this. It is the case that the Bill leaves in doubt the question whether organisations entered on the provisional register will be able to benefit from this facility. Obviously, one of the points the noble Lord must have had in mind was what was going to happen in the intervening period. Perhaps the noble Lord will not wish me to pursue this at the present time because he has a later Amendment—
LORD DIAMOND: Please do.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, if the noble Lord wishes me to, I will certainly do so. This is obviously unsatisfactory because many of the organisations which go on to the register will be enjoying the appropriate benefits at the time of tax relief under Section 338. Of course this will apply to all the unions which are transferred automatically on to the provisional register, whether or not they decide to remain on it, for so long as they remain on the register. If they were to lose this benefit during the period when their eligibility for registration as a trade union was being considered, then the provisional register would have failed in its purpose of providing continuity for existing trade unions.
The proposed Amendment to Clause 78, together with the proposed new clause to follow Clause 80, would certainly provide one way by which the tax positions of organisations on the provisional register might be safeguarded, but obviously the noble Lord's intentions go

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very much further than that. The proposed new clause would clearly give a very definite meaning to the term"registered trade union ". The noble Lord will not be surprised to hear that both Amendments are totally unacceptable to the Government. The new clause, in particular, is nothing less than a new variant on the old Opposition theme that organisations should not have to be registered under the Bill to qualify for tax relief. Not only would this clause allow organisations on the provisional register to qualify for Section 338 relief whilst on that register—an objective which we support—but it would allow them to go on getting that relief even if they asked to be taken off the provisional register or if they failed to qualify for registration as trade unions under the Bill, or if, having been thus registered, they asked to be deregistered. Nor is that all—
LORD DIAMOND: May I interrupt?
LORD DRUMALBYN: May I first finish this point? If any organisation had at any time in the past hundred years been on the old register, no matter for how brief a period, it would under the Amendment qualify for Section 338 relief.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, is speaking to an Amendment which has not even been moved. He asked me whether I should like him to deal with the position of the provisional register, not with an Amendment that has not been moved. I said that I should be grateful if he did so, although in fact the Bill makes that position absolutely clear. If the noble Lord wishes to deal further with the provisional register on this Amendment, to assist us on this Amendment, I shall be grateful. The time to deal with the next Amendment is when I put it forward.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I was trying to meet the noble Lord's wishes. He will appreciate that to some extent his proposals cover transfer to the provisional register as well, because what he is suggesting is that a special register should be opened right away. What we are suggesting here is that there should be a transfer to the provisional register with the continuation of the existing benefits so long as anyone remains on
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the provisional register. I was only saying that to that extent the proposals coincide, and I was going on to indicate what our proposals are. I fully agree with the noble Lord that what I was going to say would come more appropriately on discussion of his later Amendment.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, may I ask for clarification of what the noble Lord has just said? He has just said that the trade union should, while on the provisional register, be treated in the same way as it is treated at the moment on the 1871 register. May I ask him to go on to say whether that is the case, irrespective of what the union then does; that is to say, whether it then gets transferred to the permanent register or then gives notice to deregister?
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, as the noble Lord has indicated that he would rather deal with this matter later, I would rather cover that point at a later time.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: My Lords, may I ask a question which I think is relevant? I am rather concerned about this provisional register. Suppose that in this age of automation, new machinery and the discovery of new tools, new skills are required with new types of industry and jobs; and suppose that I want to form a new group of trade unionists who have never been formed into a union and who have, say, in the field of bio-chemistry or electro-medicine new skills. Will this provisional register be kept open for me to enter a brand new Tory union in the brand new Tory world created by noble Lords opposite and their colleagues in another place?
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, the noble Lord's question goes far wider than the Amendment we are discussing, but it is open to anyone to apply to be a registered trade union at any time.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK:"At any time ". I thank the noble Lord.
LORD DIAMOND: The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, has given a most unsatisfactory and unconsidered reply to a most important question dealing with a matter of honour. I am going to make a suggestion to the noble Lord after I have gone through his speech. The noble Lord has made it perfectly clear that he

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was not expecting me to bring up the arguments I have brought up. That is perfectly understandable, and he has repeated advice which has been given to him previously, except to the extent that that advice was shown to be wrong. The first thing the noble Lord was good enough to do was to agree with me that the Secretary of State was wrong, just simply wrong, when he referred in his assurance to the House to one way out of the difficulty being via the Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1965. I emphasise that once more. I am grateful for the agreement of the noble Lord because it shows that this advice was hasty. No one blames a Minister for accepting advice on a highly technical matter, but sometimes the advice is hasty. What I say to the noble Lord is that I hope on reconsideration he will say to me that in view of the arguments which I put forward—many of which he has not dealt with and most of which are quite new—and in view of the fact that the honour of a Secretary of State is at stake, he will be good enough to consider what will be on the Record to-morrow—the arguments I have put forward—and good enough, if he is not clear about them, to invite me and my legal advisers to meet the Secretary of State and his legal advisers to demonstrate that the Secretary of State has been ill-advised.
The noble Lord did not attempt to deal with two of my three major arguments. He dealt with the third one which I specifically called a minor one, but the two major ones, which are insuperable, he did not attempt to deal with. Of course they are new points, but they are very carefully considered points. I have given reasons for them and I can gladly supply the joint opinion of the two eminent counsel who took this view. This is not a view concocted by the Opposition in order to make a debate at this stage; it is a considered view of the law. I am most certainly not responsible for the Friendly Societies Act 1896, but that Act has certain provisions. If the Government want those provisions altered they must bring forward a Bill to alter them, or say that they will, as they can, deal with the matter in the next Finance Bill or how they choose. What they cannot say is that the law makes it possible for a
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trade union to register in the way in which the noble Lord said that it could. The noble Lord said that they can register, they can invest their funds, under the Friendly Societies Act. I asked the noble Lord who"they"were and he said that they were unregistered organisations. They would have to register under the Friendly Societies Act.
LORD DRUMALBYN: May I interrupt?
LORD DIAMOND: I will give way in a moment. May I refer the noble Lord to his own Bill? If he will be good enough to look at his own Bill he will see that in Clause 154—
LORD DRUMALBYN: While the noble Lord is looking it up—
LORD DIAMOND: I will read this and then I will gladly give way. Clause 154 clearly says:
" No organisation of workers shall after the commencement of this Act, and no employers' association shall after being registered as an employers' association under this Act become registered—

(a)…

(b) under the Friendly Societies Act, 1896."

It is the Bill which makes it statutorily impossible for a union or an unregistered organisation to register under this Act.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, the noble Lord is quite right. I rather misunderstood his question, because I thought he was discriminating between registered trade unions and unregistered organisations of workers. It was made quite plain at the Committee stage that they would, of course, have to set up trustees; they could not register themselves. I took it for granted that the noble Lord realised that this was common ground here. All I was trying to say was that it was open to them to make the arrangements. Obviously it would have to be through trustees.
LORD DIAMOND: No, my Lords, it is not possible for unions to register. Now we are agreed about that, and agreed that the noble Lord did not follow my argument, as he said; I am also suggesting, in as kindly a way as I can, that the noble Lord did not follow the rest of my argument. We are not dealing merely with a matter of argument between two Members of your Lordships' House, but

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with a most serious argument affecting 8 million people, producing something of the order of £6 million a year, and having direct eleemosynary relevance only, to people who are annuitants, or in need, sick, widows, mourners, injured, children. What we are discussing is: will the £6 million or so continue to be made available to them, or will it be withdrawn from them? That is what we are considering. What I am saying is that I have made the case and shown that in one respect we are agreed, that the Secretary of State was ill-advised—hastily advised, let us put it—when he made that statement and gave that undertaking. As to the rest of it, I hope that I can satisfy the noble Lord, and the Government and their legal advisers, that what we are saying is right. The noble Lord has said,"It is true we never undertook that it was easy ". But the Secretary of State did not say that it was difficult. He said:
" I am told there is no technical, constitutional or legal difficulty ".
I do not know what other kinds of difficulty exist. I think I am right in saying that what the Secretary of State was saying was,"I am told there is no difficulty ". I do not think it is open to the noble Lord to say, in face of that,"Nobody says it is easy ". It is the kind of playing at the borderline that one does not want to do to a statement made by an honourable Secretary of State.
I hope the noble Lord will be good enough to consider that here is a very serious matter, here is a question of admitted partial ill-advice. Nobody could know the whole story unless he had considered it as carefully as the two eminent counsel and the T.U.C. have considered it, because of its effect on all their members. I hope the noble Lord will accede to the request I am making. I do not want to push the Amendment to a Division. I do not want to be in the position of charging a Secretary of State with acting in a dishonourable way. I am asking the noble Lord, quite firmly, to be good enough to say that he will consider everything I have said on what is one of the most important issues raised by this Bill, and that he will deal with it again at Third Reading—no promise or undertaking, beyond an undertaking to consider the careful arguments put forward.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, the noble Lord has obviously made a very reasonable suggestion, and it would be ridiculous of me if I were not to accede to his suggestion that we should look at this very carefully indeed. Indeed, if he chooses to come and talk to us about it, we shall be very willing to see him and discuss it in depth—I think that is the phrase. It is our own view that, while a trade union cannot register itself under the Friendly Societies Act, it could quite easily set up a separate friendly society and that this is a solution which would be legally possible. Like all these things, it may be complicated, and therefore not easy. Before we start bandying accusations across the Floor of the House, I think it would be better if we do as I have said; that is, look at this point again very closely and discuss the matter with the noble Lord.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD HAILSHAM OF ST. MARYLEBONE): My Lords, may I appeal to the noble Lord, if he is going to let us have a copy of his legal opinion, to be good enough to send a copy to me. I can assure him it will be treated with all confidence.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I am very grateful that the noble Lord has acceded to my request. I am sure it is right and sensible on such an important matter that both sides should undertake the fullest possible examination of the law and listen to advice about it. I am grateful for what he has said. I shall be very ready to attend any kind of conference which the noble Lord suggests, and discuss the matter after getting instructions—which I am sure I shall get, because nobody wishes these matters to be kept secret. Indeed, the T.U.C. has made it clear in a circular letter to its 8 million associated members that this opinion has been obtained and that it is on the basis of this opinion that it is saying the things it is saying, which are broadly, perhaps in less detail, what I have said. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor for saying he will be willing to consider the written opinion; and after getting confirmation I shall, of course, consider it a privilege to send it to him. In those circumstances, and expressing my gratitude for the patience your Lordships have shown in listening

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to a long debate, albeit about an important matter, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 79 [Transfer from provisional register and cancellation of entries]:
5.18 p.m.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79UUU.
Page 62, line 19, leave out (' six months ") and insert ( three years ")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is an Amendment which I am sure refers to the Industrial Relations Bill, and it seeks to leave out"six months"and insert"three years ". This is a clause which deals with the period within which, unless there are exceptional circumstances, a union which is put on the provisional register either moves on to the main register or has its provisional registration cancelled. I recognise that these matters should be dealt with as quickly as is sensible and expedient, and that there are provisions in the same clause later on under which, if six months is not enough, the period can in suitable circumstances be extended. I feel that six months sets the target, and I think it is an impossibly short target.
There are a vast number of unions, all with their rules. They have all got to be examined by the Registrar. One wants to see careful examination, one wants co-operation if possible, or consultation and discussion with the interested parties. Everybody knows how quickly six months go by in attempting to deal with huge problems of this kind. I do not know what the staffing arrangements are to be, but one does not want to see the Registrar overwhelmed at the start of his function; he would need an enormous new staff to cope with it. I should have thought it in everybody's interest to provide a reasonable period. I am sure that six months is not a reasonable period; three years would be. If the noble Lord thinks another period would be adequate, I will listen to what he says. But at the moment, I think three years is a reasonable period during which one can envisage most of these matters being cleared up. I beg to move.
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for explaining
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the purpose of his Amendment. As he said, the object of the provisional registration is to provide a transitional period during which the registrar can verify that an organisation satisfies the conditions of eligibility for registration. We have set the period of six months which we believe to be right. Of course, in many cases he will not need as long as six months to carry out this task and he will be able to transfer many applicants to the permanent register without any delay. But, my Lords, we have put the figure of six months for two reasons: first, the registrar will have a considerable number of organisations to deal with, certainly at the outset, and in a small number of cases he may require to make some inquiries to satisfy himself whether the organisations are eligible before reaching his decision.
However, I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, is slightly in error over one thing; that is, when he said he thought that full examination of the rules of an organisation is involved to see whether they satisfy the requirements of Schedule 4 and Clauses 65 and 69. That is not so at this stage. That examination comes later after the certificate of registration has been issued. At this stage, eligibility alone is examined; that is, the question of whether the organisation is an organisation of workers or of employers and whether, if it is an organisation of workers, it is under employer domination or control, and whether in either case it is an autonomous body.
A large number of existing unions will clearly meet these conditions without any difficulty at all, and where an organisation which genuinely wishes to seek and to secure registration is unable to satisfy these conditions there is the provision in subsection (3) of this clause for extending this period of consideration further. I would reiterate that at this stage all that the registrar has to do is to satisfy himself that the applicants concerned are eligible for registration; it is only after the certificate of registration has been issued that complete and full consideration is given in detail.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: My Lords, the Bill itself provides that:
" Where the registrar refrains from cancelling the entry…such further period as he may

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consider appropriate for enabling it to make the requisite alteration in its rules ".
In view of that, why cannot my noble friend's Amendment be accepted, because in that case the transition period would be a reasonable one in view of the great changes that are taking place. That will need a great deal of consideration by the administrative staff of the entire trade union movement. Further down in subsection (3) there is a hint that a longer period might not be accepted. Why cannot the noble Lord on the Government Front Bench accept this, what I consider to be a constructive Amendment, moved by my noble friend?
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, if I may have leave to speak again, I would reassure the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Leek, that we do not consider that this is not a constructive Amendment; we realise that it is moved in a constructive manner. All we are saying is that we believe it to be unnecessary because at this stage the registrar merely concerns himself with the provisions of Clauses 67 and 71 which, as I pointed out, are merely to satisfy himself that it is not under the domination of an employer and other such things which are relatively simple to ascertain. Only if the registrar finds that more detail is required and that a period of six months is not sufficient will he permit the union to have its period of provisional registration increased. But we believe that six months is an adequate period for this procedure. It is after the certificate of registration has been issued that Clauses 65 and 69, which contain the detailed considerations, will then be applied.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I would not press the Government unduly on this matter. After all, this is mainly an administrative matter and the Government are better administrators than I am and know more about their own business than I do. I had thought that six months was too short even from their point of view, and my noble friend Lord Davies of Leek has made it clear that he thinks as I do that it is too short for many of the trade unions also. The noble Lord, in dealing with the position of the Government, did not deal with the position of the unions. Some of them may find it too short. However, we have made our point.
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I am sure that the noble Lord realises that it is not a Party issue or a controversial issue. It is merely a question of which is the most sensible way of making a provision at the start; namely, the target date one should fix. I think the provision for extension is a discretionary one on the part of the registrar. It is not a discretionary one on the part of a busy general secretary of a trade union who has been away ill for three months with a further month's convalescence and then finds himself faced with a huge amount of work to be done in less than eight weeks. There is no discretion on the registrar there. We have made our point, and I hope that the noble Lord will give it consideration. I do not wish to press it any further and I seek your Lordships' permission to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
5.28 p.m.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendmeent No. 79VVV:
After Clause 80 insert the following new new clause:
Definition of registered trade union for tax purposes
". For the purposes of section 338 of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970, registered trade union includes an organisation which was, on the 30th June 1971, or had been at any time prior thereto, registered as a trade union under the Trade Union Acts 1871 to 1964."
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment provides very shortly that for the purposes of the relevant income tax section a registered trade union shall include not only unions registered under this Bill but unions which have been registered broadly as at to-day under any of the normal methods of registration; that is, the Trade Union Acts 1871 to 1964.
We are again on this issue of tax treatment but this is a very narrow point. The application of this Amendment is quite narrow. It refers not to the general proposition of registration at all, on which there is a great deal at issue between the two sides, but to the question of registration for the purposes only of the Income Tax and Corporation Taxes Act 1970. That Act governs these matters,"and section 338"refers to a registered trade union. I have already explained and

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therefore I need not repeat it, that the policy of providing tax encouragement to provident saving is a policy which, broadly, has been carried out by every Government over the whole of this country. Therefore, what we are concerned with is whether that policy should be continued or whether certain persons should be singled out for exclusion from that general treatment.
The Amendment I have put forward is not one to provide all unions at all future times with this continuity of treatment; it is only to provide for those unions which register under the new Act, as it will be, or those unions which have registered in the past. My noble friend Lord Davies of Leek sensibly referred to the probability of new unions having to be formed in order to organise those working with new skills. They might need an umbrella and, very properly, might form a new union. Such a union might not wish to register under the Act; such a union would not have been registered under the 1871 Act; and such a union would, therefore, know when it was starting its life that that was the state of the law. That is one thing. That is quite a different thing from a union which has, over the whole of its existence, benefited with regard to its provident funds from the tax treatment which is available to all who carry out similar activities. Quite a different issue arises there.
The attitude of the Government has really been made clear by the Secretary of State in the statement I referred to on an earlier Amendment. The Secretary of State's attitude is not a consideration of whether certain individuals should or should not any longer get a certain tax benefit. That is not his attitude. His attitude is,"You can get this benefit, if not under this Bill, in another way." He does not say,"You shall not get this benefit "; he rests his case on the fact that you can get this benefit in another way, and therefore why should it be made available in this particular way. We had a discussion on the last Amendment as to whether it can be made available in another way, and I do not want to go over that ground again. I only want to make it clear that that has been the attitude of the Government, as voiced by the authoritative person of the Secretary of State himself.
I also want to make clear—although it has been referred to before—whom we are talking about. We are talking about the recipients of provident benefits. The recipients are the annuitants, those who are old. I was much saddened—and the noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack will also be much saddened if he is not aware of this—to find that, for the purpose of, I think, the Friendly Societies Act,"old"starts at 55, when I, at the age of 64, thought I was merely approaching middle age. At all events, the old are those who benefit; the ill are those who benefit; the widows are those who benefit; the mourners—the mourners in a Jewish ceremony of mourning the dead—are those who benefit; and the children of ex-union members who need provision are also those who benefit. These are the people we are talking about. The question is whether their benefits should continue in their present amount or whether, by the withdrawal of tax relief, they should be reduced, in round figures, by something approaching a half. That is the issue that is involved.
I have sought not to reopen the general question of registration, because that is a different political issue on which we are totally opposed to one another. I have sought merely to narrow the issue down to the question of the treatment for tax purposes, and the definition for those purposes. I am therefore suggesting this Amendment as being a simple method of dealing with the matter, and regarding the registration test as it is defined in this Amendment. I should remind your Lordships that registration is indeed necessary, as the noble Lord has said, but it is purely necessary as an administrative matter. The Inland Revenue must be able to keep their tabs on those who are the applicants; those unions which seek these benefits for their provident funds. This has nothing to do with funds which are used for strikes, for industrial action, or anything of that kind at all; it is purely that these provident funds have attracted a certain kind of treatment ever since they were registered in 1871—or, at all events, I think since the 1922 Act, which gave the benefit to these particuar organisations and relied on registration under the Act of 1871, and we are merely asking that this treatment should be continued. I beg to move.
5.36 p.m.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: My Lords, I hope sincerely that some attention in depth will be given to this question, because there are other aspects to the Amendment that my noble friend is moving. I may not be right—that I will acknowledge; but I will put the matter hypothetically. If, as the position now stands, trade union funds are liable to be reduced because some are not exempted from taxation, a whole string of people could be affected, and not only regarding death allowances but in other respects.
I shall not detain the House more than two minutes, but let me give an example of which I have knowledge. For many years, together with six or seven other people, I was on the Miners Welfare Selection Board, selecting students from all over Britain, sons and daughters of men and women who worked in and about the mines. We included an academic group of people from various universities, and we selected the children of miners from secondary schools, grammar schools, and even private schools all over the British Isles. The miners of Great Britain had collected and put aside a fund for scholarships for these people. Once we were delighted that we made a couple of orthopædic surgeons out of miners' sons. What would happen if there were no protection afforded to scholastic funds like that, which had been collected, for instance, by the miners? Some noble Lords will have had experience of the old Miners Welfare Act, by means of which swimming pools, sports fields, and other things were established throughout Britain.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord a question, for clarification? Is he talking about separate funds that were set up as charities, or is he talking about funds that form part of the general funds of the union?
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: My Lords, they are funds which have been subscribed by the men. I cannot define them accurately in the legal way. All I can say is that these funds have, for instance, been collected for generations at the pithead on pay days. At one time 1d. or
½d. on every ton of coal collected was paid (as my noble friend Lord Cooper will know), for these welfare funds. There
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was also a fund for pneumoconiosis, which is an industrial disease. A miners' welfare fund was set up to pay a pound extra for pneumoconiosis and lung diseases for miners working on hard coal or at hard coal faces.
I have made my point, and I should be labouring it if I attempted to extend it. I should like the noble Lord to take into account that there is a kind of penumbra to this Amendment which my noble friend has moved, which affects other things besides mere funds for death and injury.
5.40 p.m.
LORD COOPER OF STOCKTON HEATH: My Lords, I hope that consideration will be given to this Amendment. As the last speaker said, this is an extremely complicated situation. So far as I know, the direct funds are not taxed and the problem arises on investment income. Of course we should not be taxed. We are very much like co-operatives. The contributions of working men have already been taxed and ought not to be liable to taxation again. But, for good reasons, we accumulate large reserves—and the way things are going we shall have to accumulate more—in order to make ourselves capable of functioning. Those reserves, properly invested, yield considerable sums of money; the sum involved if this tax privilege is lost to us will be about £6 million, I sign document after document, and when I sign a document reclaiming about £100,000 of tax I sometimes feel that we are in a very privileged position. So long as we spend on certain friendly benefits amounts that exceed the tax, then we can reclaim it.
I think it is worth explaining the way in which we spend money which we reclaim. First of all, we have an accident benefit. It is a very small payment but it helps to bridge the gap, because very often when a man is injured his firm does not pay anything like his normal income. So we have this little benefit which helps to bring the amount nearer to his normal earnings. I think we spend about £900,000 a year on that. We also have a fatality benefit. In the old days when a man was killed, a cap used to go round for the widow. We have tried to formalise that and we pay £500 in a fatal case. We pay if a man is killed on the way to work.

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Another benefit of which we are very proud is for the sons and daughters of any man in our organisation, which is essentially a labourers' and semi-skilled organisation; if they qualify for university they receive from us a bursary of £50 a year for two years. Those are very generous, necessary and important benefits and I shall be surprised if it is the intention to interfere with them.
This brings me to the question of registration. We have heard this afternoon that the choice between registering or not has not been left to the unions. As a protest against the Bill, I think the T.U.C. tried to encourage every union to indicate that it would not register, and in a very clever way the Government then said,"All right. You are all provisionally registered, anyhow ", and that goes on for six months. I have been surprised to hear this afternoon that, without any of the basic tests in this Bill so long as you are a proper organisation you will be registered after six months. So the question of a choice for the trade union between registering or not hardly arises until six months after the Bill has been passed. Therefore, I hope that the taxation position will be made perfectly clear. If the Government are going to register us provisionally or after six months, then they should make it quite clear where we stand in regard to taxation.
LORD SHINWELL: My Lords, I gather from the part of the debate that I have heard that the Government are satisfied that the provident funds of the trade unions will be protected but that there are certain elements of finance associated with some trade unions which do not come within the category of provident funds. My noble friend, Lord Davies of Leek, referred to the miners' welfare fund. That was started many years ago—as far back as 1924, when I was Parliamentary Secretary to the Department of Mines—and followed the initiative taken by the late Lloyd George, who was interested in miners' welfare. The miners' welfare fund is not part of the provident funds of the miners' union; it is a separate fund. There must be assurances by the Government that that fund will be protected because, as my noble friend indicated, it provides swimming pools and a variety of other amenities which the
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miners have enjoyed for some years and hope to continue to enjoy.
But there is another matter which I think is much more important. The miners have a special pension fund which, again, does not come within the category of the ordinary provident fund. The provident fund provides death benefit or sick benefit and, in the case of some unions, unemployment benefit. But I am talking now about a special fund from which miners receive an addition of, I think, £1 a week to their State pension after a period of service in the mines. I think we are entitled to some assurance that these funds will be protected. Some years ago the seafarers had an education fund. That was provided by the seamen themselves and, to some extent, contributed to by the more enlightened and benevolent shipowners who were anxious to assist in the education of seamen and provide them with amenities. I imagine that that fund, also, is not within the category of a provident fund. So we ought to have assurances that these funds, which are associated with some form of provident benefits but are not an integral part of them, will be protected by Government legislation.
LORD BERNSTEIN: My Lords, can the Government take a more benevolent look at this clause? It seems to me that the position of the employers will be prejudiced, and I shall not have any of the benefits which usually come from industrial peace if the Government persist in keeping the Bill in its present form.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, if I may deal with the various funds, I am clearly not in a position to speak about the position of any particular one. That must depend upon whether it is a charity or a discretionary fund within a provident fund. There are all sorts of considerations and I could not give an answer off the cuff. All I can say is that, so long as a union is registered under the Bill, it will continue without change in so far as Section 338 of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970 is concerned. Surely the point is that at the present time registered unions have this concession. Under the provisions of the Bill, registered unions will have that concession. As the noble Lord, Lord Cooper of Stockton Heath, indicated, the first

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stage will be that those unions that are registered at present will be transferred to the provisional register and within six months—not more—if they satisfy the two tests, they will be transferred to the permanent register and will be incorporated. They will then continue to enjoy, as long as they choose, the remission under Section 338 of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act.
At an earlier stage we were considering what would happen so far as unregistered organisations of workers were concerned or any trade union which ceased to be a trade union registered under the Act. There is this slightly difficult transitional matter of unions on the provisional register. I must deal with this at the present time to clarify the situation. It gives rise to a slight difficulty, and we have carefully considered with Treasury Ministers how best to meet the difficulty at this stage of the Bill's progress through Parliament. We have reached the conclusion that the most practicable solution would be to include a suitable Amendment in the next Finance Bill. I am therefore able to inform the House that this legislation will be included in the Finance Bill to secure that a trade union on the provisional register under the Industrial Relations Bill will be a registered trade union for the purposes of Section 338 of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970 and that the relief will have any necessary retrospective effect irrespective of what decision may be made ultimately so far as they continue on the provisional register, and thereafter until they cease to be registered; once again, when they are registered, they come back under Section 338 again. That provision will ensure that organisations at present benefiting from the provisions of Section 338 by reason of their registration under the Trade Union Acts, 1871 to 1964, will continue to do so while eligibility for registration as a trade union under this Bill is being considered.
On the broader question of making tax relief available to organisations which choose not to be registered under this Bill, I can only re-emphasise the Government's view that that would be totally unacceptable. This point was debated at length in another place and I should be taking up valuable time if I were to do more than briefly remind the House of the
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Government's key points on this issue, without prejudice to what I said to the noble Lord. It is a normal feature of this legislation that tax relief should be conditional upon the recipient organisation conforming to specified registration requirements relating to the character of the organisation and of its activities. There is no justification for making an exception to this rule simply because some organisations object to the idea of being registered under this Bill. It will be open to organisations of workers which choose to withdraw their registrations as trade unions to set up separate registered friendly societies to run their activities and thereby obtain similar, though not identical, tax relief—I emphasise once again to the noble Lord that we have always said,"similar, but not identical tax relief—although at the cost of giving up control over their provident funds and access to them. This Amendment seeks to overturn that principle and I can only invite the House to reject the Amendment.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: May I ask the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, a question before he sits down? I may be completely wrong, but I should hate to see the draconic effect upon a student, for example, taking medicine in his fifth year, in receipt of some welfare scholarship from a trade union, when suddenly his grant is cut off. May we have some assurance from the noble Lord opposite that whatever happens an effort will be made to see that students, either about to take a course or in the middle of a course, if receiving grants from trade unions, will not suffer as a result of Government legislation? Will they try to find some formula to give that guarantee?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, listened carefully to the noble Lord's first intervention, and now to this. I do not think that he was being sufficiently precise to formulate a question which was capable of answer. But, as I understand the matter, on the assumption that a fund is a charitable fund—and I remind him from recent debates, if he does not otherwise know, that education is one of the main objects recognised by the law as charitable—in that sense there is no change in its status proposed by the law. Obviously, as my noble friend said, until one has seen the status of a particular fund it is impossible to give an assurance

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carte blanche. But the objects of charity are the relief of poverty, the treatment of and assistance to the sick and the education of both young and old. All the things which he has said indicate to me that he is talking about a charitable fund. Obviously, I cannot give a legal opinion on that basis, but that is what he has conveyed to my mind. If it is a charitable fund, it remains a charitable fund.
LORD DOUGLASS OF CLEVELAND: May I ask a further question on that point? In my own union, we run the administration for friendly society benefits under a completely different name from that which does the negotiating, although the money is given by the administrative side which collects the money. The British Iron and Steel Trades Confederation is responsible for collecting all the money from members and handing over a certain amount to the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation, which is responsible for negotiating. This was conceived as a method of merging, not for any other purpose at all. It worked very well some 30 to 40 years ago. But it does leave us in a very interesting position now because all our funds that are for friendly society benefits are governed by one section of the union under a completely different name from that part of the union which negotiates. Here I suggest that we should be free from any penalties of non-registration, whatever the union decided to do. Is that the case?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I am reluctant to give instant law, because instant law is almost always bad law. But I listened as carefully as I could both to my noble friend and to the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, in a previous debate. My impression was that the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, was not correct in saying that there were insurmountable difficulties. One of the very reasons I thought he was not correct, probably wrongly—because he is going to show me he has got another opinion if he receives clearance to do so—was precisely that it was within my general knowledge that friendly societies often do exist side by side with negotiating bodies as separate entities in law. I do not believe, therefore, that it was correct to say that the difficulties of creating such friendly societies were insurmountable. I did not interpose because I was afraid of speaking as the
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noble Lord, Lord Diamond, put it, ill-advisedly; but my guess is that the noble Lord is incorrect in what he says. If he would like to communicate with me, or with my noble friend the precise situation in which those two particular entities exist, one could go into the point in depth. But all that is dealt with in this Bill, as I understand it, and under this Amendment, is the particular immunity which trade unions have hitherto been able to acquire for their invested funds under Section 338, as it now is; and that was tied to registration under the old Act.
What is covered by both the existing Amendment and the substantive clauses to which it applies is precisely that immunity, and only that immunity. What is provided by the Bill, as I understand it, is that registration under the Bill is substituted, in effect, as a condition of acquiring the immunity prospectively for registration under 1871 legislation, but that Treasury Ministers have agreed to insert into the next Finance Bill a provision retrospective to the extent necessary to cover the provisional register which is being created to deal with the transition period. But as I understand it, nothing is affected either by the substantive clauses in the Bill or by the Amendment which is proposed, which is not directly related to and comprised within the existing immunity under Section 338. In other words, if, by reason of some arrangements which are now in existence, the noble Lord's organisation has acquired an immunity which is not that of Section 338, so as far as I know that will continue. But if he would like to communicate with me further, or after what I have said rather"off-the-cuff"has been checked by my advisers—in either of those two events—I should like to write to the noble Lord, but I think that what he has said is quite right.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, if I may continue on the same topic for a moment, with great audacity, in order to assist my noble friend, as I understand the position it is not all that difficult. You either have a charity set up as a charity which is not affected by this clause or what we are considering at all, or you have the same kind of treatment that is given to a charity for the same kind of reasons in respect of its provident funds as is given to a registered trade union. The way my noble friend was

69
describing it, it will be one or the other, but it sounded as if it was a union. However, there is a close affinity between the two, and I am grateful to those who have brought up the question of charity because, as the noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack has made clear, charitable purposes comprise educational or, broadly, eleemosynary purposes, and it is the eleemosynary powers which are involved in provident funds that we are discussing now. So if it seems to your Lordships' common sense that it is right that funds which are acquired by a union for these charitable purposes should get the same tax treatment as funds which are acquired by a charity for these charitable purposes, then, with respect, I would say to your Lordships that your common sense is well founded. Of course that is the case, and of course it happens, and of course it has been the policy of every Government for at least half a century—every Government: Liberal, Conservative and Labour.
Now, my Lords, what we are considering is whether that treatment be withdrawn from a particular category of persons in order to exert improper pressure on somebody else—what I ventured to call blackmail, what Mr. Victor Feather ventured to call blackmail, what I have carefully looked up in every dictionary I can lay hands on and, I repeat, I regard as blackmail. The question is: is it right for a Government to exercise what has been called in some quarters duress, what has been called in other quarters objectionable treatment, what has been called in other quarters blackmail and what has been called intimidation? The question is whether these are fair appellations; and the Government are getting themselves into a bit of difficulty when a number of noble Lords find themselves compelled to use language of this kind and when a person of the responsibility of the General Secretary of the Trades Union Congress finds himself compelled to use language of this kind. The question is whether these descriptions are accurate, or whether the Government propose to do something different.
The noble Lord did not deal with the arguments; he said that they had been dealt with before. Let me explain to your Lordships, therefore, what is pro- 70
posed in the continuance of the provisions of the present Bill. I recognise that the noble Lord has moved some way in the interim period as to the provisional register. He has altered the provisions in the Bill itself so far as concerns the provisional register, because the provisions made it clear that while you were on the provisional register you did not get tax relief because you were not a registered union. The Government have realised the nonsense of that and have moved at all events to cover the position of the provisional register. But I am on the much more serious issue of the permanent situation. Who are the Government picking on, and why? The Government are picking on a particular category of beneficiaries from eleemosynary charitable subscriptions. Who are they? They are not members of unions. They are not even members of particular unions, because—it the noble and learned Lord seeks to intervene, I will gladly give way. Let me demonstrate why they are not members of particular unions. It is because, as my noble friends, or many of them, have made clear, it is the older unions who have these provident funds, and the newer, white-collared unions do not, or many of them do not. It is the older unions, formed in the tradition of the period when these provident funds were an essential part of trade unionism, who provided these funds for their members in their difficulties.
So what the Government are proposing, if they continue with this undesirable, objectionable, punitive attitude is that certain beneficiaries of certain unions should cease to get this benefit; that is to say, their relief should be reduced by about a half—not their tax relief, but that their relief in poverty should be reduced by about a half. Why? The Government have nothing against these particular individuals. It is because the Government are seeking to pressurise other bodies: not these individuals, but other bodies. The Government are seeking to pressurise certain trade unions, their officers and their committees who take the decision not to register for reasons which have been made very clear. The Government are seeking to pressurise them by saying,"If you continue with this attitude we will see to it that certain beneficiaries no longer get half their benefits ". If that is not blackmail, I do

71
not know what blackmail is. It is exerting improper pressure on a body of persons or a person unconnected with the argument itself.
Now it is fortunate that the trade union movement knows how to deal with blackmail, as we all do. There is only one way to deal with blackmail and that is to ignore it. The trade union movement has democratically decided, and has made public its decision, that notwithstanding that it runs the risk of getting its tax benefits for its poor, its old and its sick extinguished, it is not proposing to be bullied and blackmailed by this Government into making the unions register. They are different bodies of persons: one is the union, and the other the beneficiaries. They are not the same, and they are not the same for all unions. They have decided to ignore the blackmail. So the Government should realise that this attempt to pressurise them has failed. It is no use the Government's saying,"We believe that once this Bill is law it will be all right." It will not be all right, and the Government will be saddled with this act of vindictiveness—which is greater than any that any other Government have ever perpetrated—in respect of a matter over which I am ashamed to think that noble Lords opposite should support the Government. I hope that they will not; I hope that we shall remove this blot on the Gov-
ernments honour and this provision from the Bill.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, the noble Lord will not expect me to leave the matter where it is—
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, may I intervene because it is a matter of procedure? There is a procedure in your Lordships' House that whoever moves a Motion or an Amendment has a right of reply. This has been virtually denied to me throughout the Report stage of this Bill, because every time I have said something, using my right of reply, the reply has been turned into a non-reply by someone opposite getting up and making yet a further speech.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I certainly will not insist if I do not have the leave of the House—
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, has the Minister any further information to give? I would never attempt to deny to a Minister the right to give further information. But if he wants to continue the debate, he must realise that he is denying the Opposition the right of reply, which is part of your Lordships' procedure.
6.12 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 79VVV) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 50; Not-Contents, 91.

CONTENTS

Archibald, L.

Evans of Hungershall, L.

Peddie, L.

Ardwick, L.

Fiske, L.

Popplewell, L.

Balogh, L.

Fletcher, L.

Royle, L.

Bernstein, L.

Gaitskell, Bs.

Rusholme, L.

Birk, Bs.

Gardiner, L.

St. Davids, V.

Blyton, L.

Garnsworthy, L. [Teller.]

Shackleton, L.

Buckinghamshire, E.

Greenwood of Rossendale, L.

Shepherd, L.

Champion, L.

Hall, V.

Shinwell, L.

Chorley, L.

Henderson, L.

Slater, L.

Collison, L.

Hilton of Upton, L. [Teller.]

Sorensen, L.

Cooper of Stockton Heath, L.

Hoy, L.

Stocks, Bs.

Crook, L.

Jacques, L.

Stonham, L.

Davies of Leek, L.

Janner, L.

Stow Hill, L.

Delacourt-Smith, L.

Leatherland, L.

Summerskill, Bs.

Diamond, L.

Lindgren, L.

Taylor of Mansfield, L.

Donaldson of Kingsbridge, L.

Longford, E.

Wells-Pestell, L.

Douglass of Cleveland, L.

Maelor, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Aberdare, L.

Auckland, L.

Bessborough, E.

Ailwyn, L.

Balfour, E.

Birdwood, L.

Albemarle, E.

Balfour of Inchrye, L.

Bledisloe, V.

Allerton, L.

Beaumont of Whitley, L.

Bolton, L.

Arran, E.

Berkeley, Bs.

Boston, L.

Brentford, V.

Greenway, L.

O'Neill of the Maine, L.

Brooke of Cumnor, L.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

Penrhyn, L.

Brooke of Ystradfellte, Bs.

Hacking, L.

Rankeillour, L.

Brougham and Vaux, L.

Hailes, L.

Redesdale, L.

Burton, L.

Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Rothermere, V.

Carrington, L.

Ruthven of Freeland, Lv.

Clwyd, L.

Hanworth, V.

St. Aldwyn, E. [Teller.]

Colville of Culross, V.

Hatherton, L.

St. Helens, L.

Conesford, L.

Henley, L.

St. Just, L.

Courtown, E.

Hood, V.

St. Oswald, L.

Craigavon, V.

Hylton-Foster, Bs.

Selsdon, L.

Crathorne, L.

Jellicoe, E. (L. Privy Seal.)

Sherfield, L.

Daventry, V.

Kemsley, V.

Skelmersdale, L.

de Clifford, L.

Killearn, L.

Somers, L.

Denham, L.

Latymer, L.

Stamp, L.

Drumalbyn, L.

Loudoun, C.

Stonehaven, V.

Dundee, E.

MacAndrew, L.

Strang, L.

Eccles, V.

Mancroft, L.

Strange of Knokin, Bs.

Effingham, E.

Merrivale, L.

Strathclyde, L.

Emmet of Amberley, Bs.

Milverton, L.

Strathcona and Mount Royal, L.

Exeter, M.

Monck, V.

Falkland, V.

Monsell, V.

Tweedsmuir, L.

Ferrers, E.

Napier and Ettrick, L.

Vivian, L.

Fortescue, E.

Northchurch, Bs.

Wakefield of Kendal, L.

Goschen, V. [Teller.]

Nugent of Guildford, L.

Windlesham, L.

Gray, L.

Oakshott, L.

Wrottesley, L.

On Question, Motion agreed to.

Clause 81 [Application to registrar to investigate]:
6.20 p.m.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79WWW:
Page 63, line 32, at beginning insert (" Subject to the provisions of the following section ")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is, as the words indicate, a paving Amendment to a proposal, which appears as Amendment No. 79BBB, arising out of a discussion we had during the Committee stage when the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, was good enough to undertake to look at the matter again because he had inadvertently given the case away by his own argument. We do not want to make much of that; we recognise that his argument was a telling one (in fact it was the one we were using) and he has been good enough to look into the matter and, I believe, subject to what he advises, provides exactly the same point, only much more neatly, as we would expect from his expert draftsmen. I refer to Amendment No. 79ZZZ. I am moving this Amendment merely to provide an opportunity for confirmation of that fact, and then I shall be glad to withdraw my Amendment in order to give way to his much more neatly worded Amendment.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, the noble Lord is perfectly right. Amendment No. 79ZZZ will bring the Bill into
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line with what I thought it meant, and what he wanted it to mean; so I think we will be happy on both sides of the House.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord. I ask your Lordships' agreement to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79FF:
Page 63, line 35, at end insert (" for non-payment of any contribution which under the rules of the organisation he is required to pay, or ")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 79FF. The clause at the moment reads:
" Any person who—

(a) is a member of an organisation to which this section applies, or

(b) was a member of such an organisation and has ceased to be a member of it otherwise than by voluntary resignation,…

shall be eligible to make an application…"
We think that those persons are properly described as being eligible to make an application, and that one of the persons who is not so eligible, as provided by the Bill, is a person who has ceased to be a member by voluntary resignation. We think there should be a further exclusion; that is to say, a person who has ceased to be a member for nonpayment of any contribution under the rules. In short, if the member resigns he

75
cannot complain. If he does not pay his dues he cannot complain. If he pays his dues and continues to be a member, and satisfies the other conditions, he can complain. We think that that is a sensible way of organising matters, and I therefore beg to move the Amendment.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, we are really almost back on to a point that we have already discussed this evening. I agree that it is undesirable to give a perpetual right of complaint to former members who have let their membership lapse because they have failed to pay, or deliberately withheld, contributions. The difficulty with this Amendment—as with the previous one—is that it would exclude not only those people, but also those whose membership lapsed through no fault of their own. I quoted before the case of Edwards v. SOGAT. If I may remind your Lordships of the circumstances there, Mr. Edwards was deprived of membership because, unknown to himself, he had fallen into arrears following the failure of his branch secretary to forward to the employer a form authorising the deduction of union subscriptions from his wages. Fortunately such cases rarely occur, but it would be unsatisfactory if another Mr. Edwards was prevented from complaining to the Registrar and had instead to seek redress in the courts. It is for this reason alone that I cannot recommend your Lordships to accept the Amendment.
If, however, the noble Lord looks at the next two Amendments in my name, to this clause and to Clause 82, he will find that these go a long way towards meeting his criticism of the defect of this subsection. Their combined effect, if accepted, will be to restrict the right of complaint to an action taken against the complainant, whereas at present any person eligible under subsection (1) of Clause 81 can complain against any breach of rules or guiding principles. Taken together, with the four-week time limit imposed by subsection (2) of Clause 82, these will restrict severely, but appropriately, the right of complaint of ex-members. I hope that the noble Lord will agree not to press this Amendment.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, there is not a tremendous issue between us, and I agree with what the noble Lord
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has said about the other aspect, that the member should be an interested member before he starts complaining. But I am in a little difficulty because I did not think that the case of Edwards v. SOGAT presented a problem any longer. Although I cannot refer to the part at the present moment, I thought there was a provision in the Bill already which made it clear that when a member has paid by deduction, even if the intermediate party who was responsible for passing the payment on had failed to do so, or there had been a delay in the post, or something like that, the payment still counted as having been paid. I thought that was already provided for. If that is the case, then there is no application of Edwards v. SOGAT to my Amendment, because my Amendment deals with a person who has not paid, not with a person who has been erroneously thought not to have paid because there was a slip between the payment and the receipt by the secretary or accountant of the union.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether he thinks it matters very much if a man is thrown out of a union in a case like this if the cause is alleged non-payment, although he has really paid? Does he think it matters very much what he is thrown out for? He ought in either case to have the right to come back if there is justification.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, the noble Lord has made two speeches: the first confused me; the second added to the confusion. Let me start all over again. This Amendment refers to a member who has not paid, not to a member who was alleged not to have paid. If he is erroneously alleged not to have paid through some slip-up in the post, or by an official, or by the cashier of the company which deducts the payment, then it does not count. I am dealing only with a man who has not paid and who knows he has not paid, and about whom there is no dispute as to the facts that he has not paid. All I am saying is that a person who has paid should have the right to complain. A person who is a member should have the right to complain, subject to these other provisions. But a person who is not a member—the Government say—who resigned voluntarily, should not have the right to complain. Absolutely right. I am also

77
saying that a person who carried out the act which is the normal method of resigning voluntarily—namely, not paying the subscription—also ought not to complain. If he wants to complain he should have paid. If he has paid up, well and good; if he has not paid up, then that is the normal method of resigning voluntarily and he should not be one of the complainants. I hope, therefore, if I have now made the position clear, that the Government will depart from their previous view, which was clearly based on a misapprehension of what the Amendment intended, and will either accept the Amendment or say that they can accept it in some more polished wording.
LORD SHINWELL: My Lords, I do not wish to complicate the matter any further, because there is already a good deal of confusion about it, but the Amendment provides for non-payment of any contribution, not necessarily the ordinary, normal trade union contribution within the normal rules of the union, whichever union it may be. But from time to time unions require—the executives decide and it is accepted generally by the members in general—to have a levy in addition to the ordinary trade union contribution. A member may resign voluntarily because he objects to paying this levy, or he may refuse to pay the levy yet still claim to be a member. Surely in that situation—if he has not acted in accordance with the rules of the union—he has no right to complain. The union rules may provide, without specifying any particular sum by way of levy, that a levy can be imposed. What would be the situation in such a case? Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, could explain what would be the situation if a man refused to pay an additional contribution, apart from the normal contribution, by way of a levy not specifically provided for in the rules although the rules provide that the executive may decide to impose a levy at some time or other.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, misunderstood what was said by my noble friend, as I understood him. The case my noble friend quoted would result in the member's not having paid; that would be the result of the non-forwarding of the document instructing that
78
the deduction should be made. In the case cited it would result in non-payment within the meaning of this clause.
LORD DIAMOND: But of course, my Lords; I am not disputing that for one moment. The noble Lord is right, as he always is. All I am saying is that I thought there was a provision in the Bill which specifically said, in effect, that, notwithstanding Edwards v. SOGAT, or whatever the case is called, anybody who has paid, even if the payment has not reached the union, shall be regarded as having paid.
LORD CONESFORD: But he would not have paid, my Lords; that is the point.
On Question, Amendment negatived.
6.34 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN LORD DRUMALBYN moved Amendment No. 97ZZZ:
Page 64, line 11, after (" taken ") insert (" against him ").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is the Amendment to which I have already referred and which meets the point of the last Amendment but one. It adds a condition to the grounds for complaint which must be satisfied; that the action complained of, being a breach of the rules or guiding principles, has been taken against the complainant. The new emphasis is that the complainant must be the injured party. It might be convenient for your Lordships if we considered at the same time the Amendment to Clause 82, page 64, line 32, at end to insert:
" and that the application is made on grounds falling within subsection (3) of that section ".
This is tied up with the same matter. On this Amendment during the Committee debate, noble Lords opposite pointed out that, as drafted, the provisions gave very wide access indeed to the complaints procedure. Ex-members of a trade union would retain a perpetual right of complaint to the Registrar against any breach of rules or guiding principles by the organisation, whether or not they were affected. Clearly this could lead to serious abuse by malcontents and cause great inconvenience for the organisations concerned and for the Registrar. This Amendment will have the effect of excluding extraneous parties. My Lords, I beg to move.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I rise to thank the noble Lord once more for meeting our point of view on this, and for narrowing the grounds for intervention as we suggested on the other Amendment which he discussed at the same time.
Clause 82 [Action by registrar on application under s. 8I]:
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 79AAAA, to which I have just spoken.
Amendment moved—
Page 64, line 32, at end insert (" and that the application is made on grounds falling within subsection (3) of that section ").—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 79GG. Your Lordships are word perfect on every clause in this Bill and will therefore recollect that in these circumstances it is right that the Registrar"should"defer consideration, not that he"might"defer consideration.
Amendment moved—
Page 65, line 12, leave out (" may ") and insert (" shall ").—(Lord Diamond.)
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, because throughout this Bill great emphasis is placed on the settlement of disputes without need to resort to the statutory machinery, we are happy to accept this Amendment.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I am happy to repeat my gratitude on this part of the Bill.
Clause 83 [Investigation initiated by registrar]:
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79HH:
Page 65, line 44, after (" persistent ") insert (" and substantial ").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 79HH. Clause 83 deals with investigations initiated by the Registrar, and provides that where the Registrar
" has reason to suspect that there has been a serious breach, or have been persistent breaches, of its rules ",
80
then he shall investigate the matter. The Amendment relates to the question of persistent breaches of rules, and seeks to add the words"and substantial"so that in order for an investigation to be permitted the breach must be both persistent and substantial. The point is a simple one. One does not want investigations into trivial matters to be triggered off too readily. It can be a minor breach for which it is not worth setting up the whole machinery of investigation. There can be a very minor breach which is persisted in. It still does not matter. The important thing is that it should be a substantial breach as well as a persistent breach. I beg to move.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I am afraid we cannot accept this Amendment, although I do not want to give the impression that there is much difference of principle between ourselves and noble Lords opposite. Noble Lords will remember that we debated this same point during the Committee stage, and my noble friend Lord Belstead undertook that the Government would look at it again. We have done so, and we have concluded that the present drafting of subsection (1) satisfactorily achieves what we intended to achieve.
Noble Lords have argued that in any organisation, however well run, there will inevitably be minor rules which are sometimes disregarded. But where there is a series of these persistent but minor breaches of rules, noble Lords opposite have pointed out that the Registrar will be bound by subsection (1) as it stands, to investigate the matter.
Perhaps I may first explain why we do not expect any difficulties or inconvenience on this score under the clause as it stands. Then I should like to draw your Lordships' attention to certain undesirable consequences of the Amendment. The fear of noble Lords opposite is that a good deal of unnecessary fuss and formality will take place on a matter of no consequence, and that there will be an unnecessary interference with the running of trade unions. But this is unlikely, on three grounds: the first is that the Registrar has to have reason to suspect persistent breaches of rules; in practice, he will rely on correspondence from union members, on his own close knowledge of registered organisations and

81
on a variety of other sources of information. But where the breaches are so minor as not to worry or harm any member they are not likely to come to the Registrar's attention, and the question of investigation will therefore not arise.
Second, the breaches have got to be persistent. This word imports a degree of discretion, since it is left to the Registrar to decide when a breach has been committed often enough to fall into the"persistent"category. Third, let us suppose that the Registrar investigates breaches of a minor nature and of little or no consequence. Even in such a case his investigation need not be an affair of any great formality or weight, or anything even approaching a semi-judicial process. The Registrar will have to satisfy himself that the matter has been cleared up and that the breaches are unlikely to recur; but that can be done quite informally, perhaps by correspondence. Much will depend upon relations between the Registrar and the trade union or the employers' association, but where the matter is of no consequence the investigation may be correspondingly brief. We feel that subsection (1) would not require the full scale or frequent investigation of minor matters which the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, seems to envisage.
I think I should add that even if we wished to amend the clause the present Amendment would not be a satisfactory way of doing so. One reason is the use of the word"substantial ". Although the word has a clear enough meaning to the layman, its previous use in Statutes has given rise to considerable litigation and judicial interpretation. We do not wish to open up the possibility of wrangling of that kind, especially since the similar word"serious"is used in the previous line. But whatever the exact meaning of"substantial ", if the Registrar was in doubt about his power to investigate it would of course be difficult in some cases to determine without investigation whether a breach was substantial or not.
What is perhaps more important, the Amendment would probably be interpreted to mean that each of the persistent breaches must be substantial. The Registrar could therefore not investigate a series of breaches where one of them might be relatively unimportant in isola-
82
tion but where their total effect was substantial. There might, for example, be a series of incidents in which branch officials had independently taken action for which union rules required them to seek approval from a more senior official—for example, in calling an overtime ban. Each incident might be less than substantial in its importance, but if they continued unchecked the Registrar might consider it a symptom of a deeper problem. He would need to investigate in order to establish whether the union was operating in the way its rules intended, or whether some branches were effectively outside the control of the union as a whole. In these circumstances, we do not wish to put in any peril or to hamper the Registrar's power to investigate, and this is a further reason why we cannot accept this Amendment. I hope I have given a fairly full explanation. I thought I ought to do so because we did undertake to investigate the position.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, the noble Lord has clearly given this matter careful thought in accordance with his undertaking, and as he said at the start there is not a great deal of difference between us. My anxiety was the same as his, that these investigations, with a good deal of formality, should not be triggered off too lightly. The noble Lord has said a great deal which may be helpful to those who find themselves faced with what they consider to be an unnecessarily formal approach to a minor matter, and no doubt the Registrar would feel it appropriate to have some regard to the spirit in which the noble Lord has spoken. In those circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (LORD ROYLE): My Lords, I would point out that if the next Amendment, 79JJ is agreed to I cannot call Amendment No. 79KK.
6.49 p.m.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79JJ:
Page 66, line 4, leave out from (" Act ") to end of line 6.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, we are always grateful for the assistance which comes from the Woolsack. I was going to move this Amendment—and

83
indeed I now do so—and I was hoping that it might be convenient for your Lordships to discuss Amendment No. 79KK at the same time. These are, in fact, alternative methods of meeting the same problem that we have already discussed. I move the Amendment because on a previous occasion the Government were good enough to say that they would give it consideration and—one never knows!—they may have given it consideration and may have something helpful and accommodating to say. In those circumstances, I beg to move Amendment 79JJ, and would say to the Government that if they prefer 79KK I will withdraw the first Amendment and move the second.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I do not think I can say much more than I said on Amendment 79HH. The point really seems to be a similar one and I do not think it would be worth developing at any length. I am afraid that we cannot accept this Amendment.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I understand that. I moved the Amendment because, as I said, the noble Lord had promised to give it consideration, it is broadly the same point. But I seek your Lordships' permission to withdraw it.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD DRUMALBYN LORD DRUMALBYN moved Amendment No. 79BBBB:
Page 66, line 23, leave out (" and ").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is a paving Amendment. This and Amendments Nos. 79CCCC and 79DDDD are necessary consequential Amendments following on the acceptance of Amendment No. 79LL in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, to leave out paragraph (b) on page 66, line 24.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I accept this Amendment. When Amendments are accepted your Lordships may think that they are not important, but indeed this one is. This is an acceptance by the Government in a slightly tidier form of the Amendment in my name, Amendment No. 79LL, to leave out paragraph (b)in a most important subsection. We made this point in Committee and I will not repeat it now. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, both for accepting our Amendment and
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for using the good offices of the Government draftsmen to tidy up the wording a little.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 79LL.
Amendment moved—
Page 66, line 24, leave out paragraph (b).—(Lord Diamond.)
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, this Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 66, line 31, leave out (" paragraph (a) of ").—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, this Amendment again is consequential. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 66, line 34, leave out (" paragraph ") and insert (" subsection ").—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79MM.
Page 66, line 34, leave out (" considers ") and insert (" is satisfied that ").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this occurs in subsection (4) of the clause, which provides that where the Registrar gives notice about the investigation we have been discussing but is unable to secure such action or undertaking as is mentioned in the Bill and considers that in default it would be appropriate for him to present a complaint to the Industrial Court, it is open to him to do so. In other words, this is a subsection dealing with the discretion of the Registrar to present a complaint to the Industrial Court. As the Bill is worded, he can present the complaint if he considers that it would be appropriate. We think it is not adequate that the Industrial Court should be invoked merely on his consideration. We should much prefer it to be on his satisfaction. Therefore we propose to strengthen the clause by removing the word"considers"and inserting the words"is satisfied that."
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I do not think that this will have a world-shaking effect, but it may have the effect

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of addressing the Registrar's mind to the question in a more positive manner and for that reason I invite your Lordships to accept the Amendment.
LORD DIAMOND: I think that is a worthwhile effort. I hope that the noble Lord will not think me ungenerous if I say that if it were likely to have a world-shattering effect it would be a bit odd for the Government to accept it.
6.56 p.m.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79NN:
Page 66, line 35, leave out (" it would be an appropriate case ") and insert (" the only way of achieving either or both of the purposes described in the said paragraph (a) is)".
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment deals with the same subsection. At the moment the Bill provides that where the Registrar is satisfied that it would be an appropriate case he presents the case to the Industrial Court. Again to strengthen the clause still further and not to trouble the Industrial Court except in cases of real necessity, the Amendment proposes these words, which would mean that the Registrar would present a complaint to the Industrial Court only if he were satisfied that it was the only way of achieving either or both of the purposes described in paragraph (a). Paragraph (a) deals with securing a remedy to, or mitigating the consequences of, breaches in the rules.
The Government have said time and again that reference to the Industrial Court should be only a long-stop and that first one should negotiate, consult and try to deal with the matter in a civilised way. Only if no progress is made on those lines should the Registrar be armed with these powers. We do not think that this is the way to deal with the matter generally. It should he a long-stop and here is an Amendment to make it a very long stop. I hope this will be acceptable to the Government.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I think that what is immediately apparent is that what Clause 83 provides is in the nature of a reserve power which, almost by definition, will be invoked rarely. I accept that the investigation may, of course, reveal no breaches but where it
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does I expect that the organisation will almost invariably agree to put the matter right. What we are possibly left with is a very small volume of cases in which the organisation refuses to take action or to give an undertaking to remedy a serious or persistent breach of rules or guiding principles.
As the Registrar has no power of enforcement, he must have means of refering such cases to the N.I.R.C. and that is the purpose of subsection (4), together with Clause 104. Once this point has been arrived at, I think that quite a strong argument can be made for requiring all cases to be referred to the Court. However, this will be a very serious step and we think it is in an area in which the Registrar should have some discretion. For example, it may be that the organisation has given an undertaking in terms that, while not completely satisfying the Registrar, are such that he would not feel justified in asking the Court to issue a mandatory order.
What this Amendment seeks to do is to remove that discretion—which to my mind can work only to the advantage of registered organisations—and instead to restrict complaint to those cases which cannot be resolved in any other way. Although the intention of the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, in moving the Amendment is clearly to restrict reference by the Registrar to essential cases, in practice I think that our formula will be to the greater advantage of organisations. The Registrar's investigation may, for example, reveal quite minor breaches of rules but, if the organisation refused to put the matter right and no other remedy were possible, under the terms of the Amendment reference to the Court would be mandatory. As subsection (4) stands, the Registrar would have discretion not to present a complaint.
I think there is not a great deal between us on this point; it is a very narrow one. We are both seeking to avoid unnecessary references to the Court. On balance, I think this is best achieved by giving the Registrar discretion which in these circumstances can operate only to the advantage of organisations rather than by narrowly defining the conditions for reference, which may have the opposite effect to that intended. I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to agree with me and to withdraw his Amendment.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I am grateful for that reply. The noble Lord has obviously given the matter great consideration. Here again, there is not a great deal between us, and I recognise that my Amendment might not give quite as much discretion to the Registrar as the way the Bill is drafted. Therefore, there is a great deal to be said for the noble Lord's point of view. I still think that it is a pity to refer to the Industrial Court unnecessarily but I do not think that it is a matter that I should wish to press. The Government have latterly been quite accommodating in the number of Amendments which have been accepted. Although there is not a great deal between us, I think it would be extremely timely if we were to devote our attention to other matters. In those circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, there appears to be a natural break, and I hope that it will be convenient for the House to postpone consideration of this Report for an hour. I beg to move that the considerations on Report of this Bill be adjourned to enable the consideration of the Licensing (Abolition of State Management) Bill in Committee.

HIJACKING BILL
Brought from the Commons; read la, and to be printed.

LICENSING (ABOLITION OF STATE MANAGEMENT) BILL
7.3 p.m.
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord WindleshamWitllesham.)
House in Committee accordingly.
[THE LORD ROYLE in the Chair.]
Clause 1 [Abolition of restrictions on sale and supply of intoxicating or exciseable liquor in certain districts]:
LORD STONHAM LORD STONHAM moved Amendment No. 1:
Page 1, line 19, leave out (" are hereby ") and insert (" shall be ")
The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 1 standing in the names of my noble friends and myself. I hope it will be convenient to the Committee if with this Amendment I discuss also No. 31. The purpose of the Amendment to line 19 is to give the Government much-needed time in respect of the declaratory part of Clause 1. The words"are hereby repealed"mean that the Secretary of State will relinquish his powers immediately the Bill receives the Royal Assent. This may have most unfortunate consequences. On the other hand, if this Amendment is accepted, the words will be"shall be repealed ", and this will provide an opportunity to put in a date with relation to the timing of the Bill, which we propose to do by means of Amendment No. 31. That provides that the Act shall come into force one year from the date when it is passed.
The Amendment does not mean that the Home Secretary's monopoly cannot be broken; it can be broken by administrative action, if the Home Secretary agrees that licences approved by the justices should be allowed and not vetoed—but that has been possible all the time. But it is expedient to the public interest, if I may coin a phrase, if this matter is to be decently and properly concluded, that the Home Secretary should have discussions with the employees, through their trade unions, and also with the justices and with many other people concerned with, and interested in, the break-up of the State scheme. They have the right to be consulted; and it is necessary. The opportunity for these consultations will vanish if the Bill operates immediately the Royal Assent has been given, because Clause 1 flatly states that the Home Secretary's powers and rights"are hereby repealed"immediately, although, of course, other

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sections of Part V of the Bill must remain to allow the administration to continue, because increasing the grant of licences, which must occur if the Home Secretary's powers are taken away, will reduce the value of the licensed properties in the scheme. That is inevitable. I think that in Scotland, where the scheme is very small, the licensee board has already approved the grant of 19 new licences. It would be no good, unless this Amendment is accepted, for the Secretary of State for Scotland to say that he did not want them to become operative, because his powers to say,"Yea ", or"Nay ", will go. He will not be able to say anything—a nice change.
It may be that the Government will regard our Amendment as insufficient in point of time; they may want longer. I think that this may be so in the public interest, rather than the full year that we propose. I certainly do not mind altering the Amendment' accordingly; but as we have it now it allows a full year and creates a definite date: the chopper will not come down immediately we finish with the Bill. If the Government are adamant over this Amendment, they may find themselves with empty unsold properties on their hands, because no one will be interested in them. The valuation and the negotiations for sale will take time, and the negotiators will do much better business to the public interest if they are not working all the time desperately with this pressure on them. There are 1,500 employees to consider who are working in areas which already have high rates of unemployment, and the unions surely have the right to discuss with the Home Secretary arrangements for the redeployment of their members. This, too, must take time.
For all these reasons I hope the Government will accept that this is a helpful Amendment. As the Bill stands, the monopoly powers under Section 103 of the 1964 Act will cease on the day the Bill receives the Royal Assent, which may be next month. By accepting the Amendment the Government will gain a whole year extra in which to close down the management scheme and sell the assets to private enterprise while they still retain their value. Indeed, the Home Secretary has the duty placed on him by the Bill to conduct the sale in a manner which
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is expedient in the public interest. That interest inevitably demands sufficient time, and this will be afforded by the Amendment which I invite the noble Lord to accept. I beg to move.
LORD WINDLESHAM: The Government have announced their decision to abolish State management of the liquor trade, and we do not think there is any advantage to be gained from continuing the system for any substantial period after the appropriate legislation has been passed. The effect of these two Amendments (Amendment No. 1, as the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, explained, is really a paving Amendment to Amendment No. 31, the Amendment of substance) would be to delay the process of sale by a year. We believe that during such a period it is highly probable that members of the staff would begin to leave and could not be replaced because it would be known that the scheme was coming to an end; that the condition of the properties would deteriorate because it would be difficult to justify spending capital on improvements; and that turnover would diminish. If this were so, the ultimate sale value of the properties would decline as well as the service provided by the State Management districts. This would not be in the interests either of the taxpayer, who will benefit from the sale, or of the local population making use of the public houses and other facilities offered by the scheme.
The noble Lord, Lord Stonham, has argued in the same way as was argued by the Opposition in Committee in another place: that there might be some advantage in delaying the repeal of the Secretary of State's monopoly powers. He claimed that if the immediate repeal of these powers were announced the effect might be to reduce the value of the properties to a buyer. We believe that this argument must not be put too strongly. The danger of a fall in values can be exaggerated. The fact is that at the moment a buyer knows that the monopoly will come to an end: that is the basis of this Bill and it has been stated by Ministers. He is aware of that. If he were bidding for the scheme on the basis that the monopoly was to continue, then that monopoly would be a property right, something of value in its own right. But in the present case he knows that not to be so; the fact that there used

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to be a monopoly situation will be discounted by the buyer because that situation will not continue. We think therefore that it would be inconsistent for Ministers to have to enforce such a prohibition on private persons trading in the districts in the light of our announced intention of abolishing State Management. If any private person should seek in the meantime to provide new facilities in the area after the monopoly powers have ended we think the licensing justices are the proper people to decide the matter.
The noble Lord said, quite correctly, that there were a number of licences which had been granted but not implemented—that is,"frozen ". Now it is true that after Royal Assent those licences which have been granted, either by the licensing justices or the courts in Scotland, will be unfrozen and it will be possible for the applicants concerned to proceed. There are a number of other applications which have not yet been decided and in these cases the normal practice would be followed. The applicant would go before the licensing justices and make out his case and if the Secretary of State, before the Scheme was wound up, saw reason to object the applicant would have the opportunity to enter an objection in the normal way.
These are the main reasons why, having studied with some care this argument which was put forward in Committee in another place, we do not feel that an Amendment on these lines would be desirable and that is why it is necessary to ask your Lordships to reject it.
LORD HOY: Perhaps I may be permitted to say a few words on the Scottish issue. I do not think that this is a very momentous Bill. Indeed, in Scotland there is great regret that the Government should have introduced this Bill at all, and when it follows a Bill about fee-paying schools we think that the Government are simply tampering with the situation in Scotland and this makes no contribution to our economy. It is true that, as my noble friend said, the Scottish part may be small, but it is extremely important; and we think that the Secretary of State for Scotland has considerable power, residual if you like, by which he never grants licences in these par-
92
ticular areas. If we are going to repeal these provisions immediately on the passing of this Bill, I do not think that the noble Lord could deny that we should be reducing the present value of the licensed premises in these areas. For that reason, we thought that if the taxpayer is to get money out of this it might be a good thing if the power was retained by the Secretary of State until such times as these properties were disposed of. If the Government are determined that they should be disposed of, I think the noble Lord will agree that that is bound to have the effect, whatever else happens, that the present-day value of the properties will decline. But I am extremely sorry to think that, after all the argument in another place, the noble Lord should find it impossible to accept it this very modest Amendment that my noble friend has put down.
LORD STONHAM: I am very disappointed that the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, cannot accept my Amendment, but I am astonished at the arguments he has used for rejecting it. After all, he sees no advantage in delay because the properties themselves will deteriorate and lose some of their value; the staff, knowing what is to happen, will melt away. But this is precisely what will happen in any case. Some of them have already"melted ". This is a straight proposition. The greatest deterioration in value of these licensed properties will occur because more licences are granted. In fact, those which have already been granted in Scotland outnumber those that are in the scheme. The increase in licences must inevitably considerably reduce the value of the existing ones. Nothing will diminish the value of this national asset more than throwing open the whole field immediately the Bill receives the Royal Assent. The noble Lord said that the value of the monopoly was overstated. Is that why successive Governments have clung to it for 55 years?
LORD WINDLESHAM: No; I did not say that it was overstated, and the noble Lord would not want to misrepresent me on this. What I said was that he must not overstate the argument he is seeking to use. The potential buyers know that there will no longer be a monopoly situation. If they buy some of the properties

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they will be in a free market situation, just as they would be if they were in another part of the country.
LORD STONHAM: Yes; and I also know that if the distinguished agents whom the Government have appointed to do this business carry out negotiations for sale they will negotiate on current figures. They will not say,"The monopoly position is going anyway, so we will halve the takings and negotiate on that." Of course they will not. The noble Lord said that the licensing justices are the best people to decide. I agree with him. But it has always been the view of the Home Office—it is not a question of politics—and successive Home Secretaries have always taken the view that if they said Yes, to licences recommended by the licensing justices, the value of the property would be affected; consequently they said, No. Suddenly to jettison this whole argument and say, as soon as we have finished with the Bill and lost monopoly powers, Yes, it is every man for himself ", is nonsense to me. It certainly does not allow the Home Secretary to dispose of the property in a manner which is expedient in the public interest. It is expedient in the public interest to accept this Amendment.
LORD BURTON: Before the noble Lord sits down: he referred to the Scottish part as small. I should have thought that it was pretty extensive. I admit that the noble Lord, Lord Hoy, said it was an important part but I cannot understand why the noble Lord, Lord Stonham is talking about a small part. Secondly, I could not appreciate why he referred to the trade unions. That seems to be a complete red herring. It seems to me that the Opposition are trying to rake up any dispute, because they dislike the immediate denationalisation of this part of the industry.
LORD STRATHCLYDE: May I intervene for a moment to try to dispel an impression which I believe to be entirely wrong'? I know from my own experience that both at Invergordon and at Gretna the people have wanted to get rid of the State interference, this monopoly. I know very well the Invergordon area, with which I was connected so closely during the First World War, and the great munitions factory at Gretna. The reasons for introducing this monopoly
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disappeared many years ago. The people in these areas of Scotland have wanted to get rid of it for years, and to my knowledge it has been held up time and again, not by Scottish Ministers but by the Home Office in England. We should have got rid of it years ago, but for the wish of the Home Office to maintain it, and I am glad that Scotland is now to get what it has longed for for many a long day.
LORD STONHAM: In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Burton, may I say, first, that I appreciate that nothing in Scotland is small. I was referring to the relative sizes and values of the schemes in Scotland and in England. It is the case, unfortunately, that the relative values are very much different. I do not doubt that the hostelries run by the scheme are highly valued in Scotland. With regard to the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, which seemed to me more appropriate to a Second Reading speech, all I say is that I would not enter into any dispute between the Secretary of State for Scotland and the Home Office. Certainly I was not aware of it during the five years I was at the Home Office. Whatever the popularity or otherwise of the scheme in Gretna, successive Secretaries of State, including, the noble Lord himself, have continued the scheme until now.
LORD WINDLESHAM: Before the noble Lord concludes, I should say that there have been discussions with the unions and with the staff associations concerned. I think that we should be clear about this. These discussions are going on now and will continue after the Royal Assent, so it should not be thought as a result of our discussion to-night that there has not been sufficient time for proper consultation. We have taken great care in consultations of this kind. Despite the way in which the noble Lord has argued his case, this Amendment goes a great deal wider than he has suggested. The Amendment would not simply have the effect of preserving the Secretary of State's monopoly power but would provide that the Act shall not come into force for twelve months. In other words, the process of sale could not be begun at all; and the whole purpose of Parliament would be held up for twelve months.
LORD STONHAM: I am very grateful for what the noble Lord has said

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about consultation and the discussions now taking place. There are several unions concerned, and they have acted very responsibly for many years. My only point in this Amendment was to create more time. I believe that it would not alter the effect, because eventually the property is going to be sold, but it would
7.33 p.m.
LORD STONHAM LORD STONHAM moved Amendment No. 2:
Page 1, line 19, at end insert—
(" (2) For the purposes of this Act"intoxicating liquor"means, in the case of beer, that the original gravity of the beer shall not be less than 1038 degrees.")
The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 2. During previous dis-
give more time to do the whole thing decently.
7.26 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 1) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 35; Not-Contents, 77.

CONTENTS

Ardwick, L.

Henderson, L.

Rusholme, L.

Birk, Bs.

Hilton of Upton, L.

St. Davids, V.

Blyton, L.

Hoy, L.

Segal, L.

Buckinghamshire, E.

Jacques, L.

Shackleton, L.

Champion, L.

Janner, L.

Shepherd, L.

Collison, L.

Leatherland, L.

Stocks, Bs.

Davies of Leek, L.

Lindgren, L.

Stonham, L.

Delacourt-Smith, L.

Milner of Leeds, L. [Teller.]

Stow Hill, L.

Diamond, L.

Morris of Kenwood, L.

Taylor of Mansfield, L.

Gardiner, L.

Peddie, L.

Wells-Pestell, L.

Garnsworthy, L. [Teller.]

Popplewell, L.

White, Bs.

Greenwood of Rossendale, L.

Royle, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Aberdare, L.

Emmet of Amberley, Bs.

Nelson of Stafford, L.

Allerton, L.

Falkland, V.

Nugent of Guildford, L.

Auckland, L.

Ferrers, E.

Oakshott, L.

Balerno, L.

Geddes, L.

O'Neill of the Maine, L.

Balfour, E.

Goschen, V. [Teller.]

Penrhyn, L.

Balfour of Inchrye, L.

Gowrie, E.

Rankeillour, L.

Barnby, L.

Gray, L.

Reay, L.

Berkeley, Bs.

Greenway, L.

Redesdale, L.

Boothby, L.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

Ruthven of Freeland, Ly.

Brooke of Cumnor, L.

Hacking, L.

St. Aldwyn, E.

Brooke of Ystradfellte, Bs.

Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)

St. Helens, L.

Brougham and Vaux, L.

St. Just, L.

Burton, L.

Hanworth, V.

Sandford, L.

Caccia, L.

Harvey of Tasburgh, L.

Selkirk, E.

Clwyd, L.

Hatherton, L.

Selsdon, L.

Colyton, L.

Kemsley, V.

Skelmersdale, L.

Conesford, L.

Killearn, L.

Somers, L.

Courtown, E.

Latymer, L.

Stonehaven, V.

Craigavon, V.

McFadzean, L.

Strathclyde, L.

Cullen of Ashbourne, L.

Macleod of Borve, Bs.

Sudeley, L.

Daventry, V.

Milverton, L.

Teynham, L.

de Clifford, L.

Monck, V.

Tweedsmuir, L.

Denham, L.

Monsell, V.

Vivian, L.

Drumalbyn, L.

Mowbray and Stourton, L. [Teller.]

Wakefield of Kendal, L.

Dundee, E.

Windlesham, L.

Eccles, V.

Napier and Ettrick, L.

Wrottesley, L.

Effingham, E.

Resolved in the negative, and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.

cussions on this Bill it has frequently been stated that the Carlisle State Scheme brews the best beer in Britain. This statement has not been challenged, and I assume that it is accepted as a fact. This Amendment is directed, so far as one can do so, to preserving the quality, strength and reputation of the Carlisle beer. Customers know by now that they will have to pay more, but they will not have to pay more for inferior stuff if we can help it. I am not a judge of these matters. So far as I am concerned,
the beer is good if the customers like it. Apparently they like the taste, and that liking has to have a foundation, such as, what is in the beer. The test of strength and quality is the original gravity which this Amendment seeks to establish.
I understand that the original gravity is recognised as the yardstick for determining the quality and strength of different beers. That is the view of the Consumers Association, which published a report on the subject in 1960. The brewers do not accept this view. They said recently that it matters hardly at all when the Britisher comes to choose his pint. He wants the beer he likes and which suits his palate. Having achieved this, he will stick to it through thick and thin—" thick and thin"sounds a little ominous. But we must regard this judgment as partial, especially having regard to the brewers' habit of selling their very thin beer as powerful stuff.
The original gravity is the measure of the ratio of the raw materials to the water that goes into the beer. That ratio determines the body, flavour, condition and the stimulating characteristics of the beer. The original gravity is measured at the work stage of production, that is, the stage of brewing when all the ingredients except the yeast have been added, and before anything has been lost through fermentation. Brewing of course starts with the barley, which is turned into malt. Hot water is then added to the malt, which is thereby turned into mash, and the enzymes in the malt become reactivated by the hot water and release a sweet extract which is filtered out of the beer mash. This is the wort; and the original gravity of the beer is that of the wort before the hops are added.
Your Lordships will appreciate the importance of the original gravity: it depends upon what is put into the beer. And they do the job properly in Carlisle! The specific gravity of water is 1,000 degrees, and the extent by which the gravity of unfermented wort exceeds 1,000 degrees indicates the combined quantity of malt and sugar which has been added. So the gravity of the wort is the original gravity of the beer. For example, if the"o.g."of the wort is stated to be 1,040, it means that 100 gallons of it would weigh 1,040 lb, and
98
the extra 40 lb. would represent the sugar, malt and proteins which have been put into it.
Clearly the"o.g."is an important measure of strength, and it is understandable that it is a measure which determines the excise duty. The duty is now £10·35 per barrel of 36 gallons of beer with an"o.g."of 1,030, and it increases by 8s. per barrel for every single degree above 1,030. The Which? report, published in 1960, gave particulars of draught beers sold in the North. They stated that the"o.g."of Carlisle bitter was then 1,038.2, and that is the reason for the figure"1,038"in the Amendment: it has not been selected haphazardly.
Of course, the average original gravity of other brewers' brews is much lower. One London firm has a widely advertised product the gravity of which is only 1030, only just qualifying as beer at all. In fact, some of the highest priced beers are those with the lowest original gravity. It is a large-scale swindle practised on the British public which certain brewers perform. Some beers, I am astonished to find, are so weak that if they were 1 or 2 per cent. less they could be sold as non-alcoholic, just like Coca Cola. This particularly applies to certain keg beers, which the brewers have the effrontery to advertise as strong or powerful. Your Lordships may have seen an advertisement on television with a charming barmaid being asked to taste a particular keg beer. She sips it and says,"It is too powerful for me ". For obvious reasons it would be unfair to name this particular beer. But your Lordships may have noticed yourselves that it is the weak ones, keg beers or not, which are advertised extensively as powerful. One advertisement I saw coming along to-day was,"Are you man enough to take it?" It should be,"Are you fool enough "-that would be more sensible. Indeed, that particular one is only a trifle over 1,030, and of course the brewer pays on that the minimum excise duty. It is scarcely surprising that The Times on April 26 this year quoted a brewer as saying:"The public will drink what we so-and-so tell them to drink ". Well, perhaps they will, but we ought not to allow them to get away with it. These keg beers are high in price and high in gas and water content. We do not want them

99
foisted on to the people of Carlisle, who are accustomed to a good quality wholesome brew, and we can ensure this by this Amendment, which I invite the Government to accept. I beg to move.
LORD WINDLESHAM: The intention of this Amendment, similar again to one put down in another place, is presumably to provide that any beer sold in the Carlisle district, whether before or after the sale of the scheme, shall be of a stated minimum gravity. There are a number of objections; some of them I will come on to in a moment. Let me start by saying that the Amendment would not be acceptable as a matter of principle. There are no national regulations governing the strength of beer at all. The Licensing Act 1964 itself, taken with the Customs and Excise Act 1952, merely excludes from the definition of intoxicating liquor beer with an original gravity not exceeding 1016 degrees or a strength not exceeding two degrees of proof. The strength of beer is a matter left to the laws of supply and demand, and it would be anomalous to prescribe a minimum strength for a particular geographical area.
Next, the Amendment is irrelevant to the Bill and would not achieve its purpose. It proceeds by way of defining"intoxicating liquor"for the purposes of the Bill, but the noble Lord will find that those words are used only in Clause 1(a) as part of a factual description of the effect of Section 103 of the Act of 1964, and in Clause 2(7) in a way which would make the Amendment of no effect. The Amendment, therefore, would not have the result intended. Nor would it apply to Scotland, because these words are not used in the part of the Bill which applies to Scotland.
There is another point. The noble Lord, Lord Stonham, said that the figure of 1038 had not been selected haphazardly. Maybe not haphazardly, but very carelessly. He did say the figure dated back to 1960, and things have changed since then. If he had consulted the source of information quoted to us with such vitality by the noble Lord, Lord Jacques, the Sunday Mirror report in March of this year—incidentally, this concerned a series of tests carried out by an independent analyst—he would have found that
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the original gravities of the Carlisle beers were all below 1038. If we take the results of that table as being the most favourable to the noble Lord's case, the figures were as follows: bitter 1036·3—below 1038; keg, 1036·6—below 1038; and mild 1033. So all the beers in Carlisle are already under the figure of 1038. This Amendment would not have the effect the noble Lord wishes and for these reasons among others I must ask your Lordships to reject it.
LORD JACQUES: I thought the Minister did not accept the Sunday Mirror report.
LORD WINDLESHAM: I thought I would give the figures quoted in it because they may carry more weight than any assertion from me. But the information I have in front of me is that the average original gravity of beer sold in this country is between 1037 and 1038. That of the present Carlisle beer is less than the minimum of 1038 sought by the Amendment. The report of the Monopolies Commission on Beer contains a table on page 10 giving the national average original gravity over the years, and since March, 1957, this figure has been under 1038 across the whole country.
VISCOUNT STONEHAVEN: The good people of Carlisle surely could put the results in their stomach right by taking a"chaser ", as we do in Scotland.
LORD BALERNO: As a whisky-drinking Scot, I venture with some trepidation to embark on this particular subject. But I should like to point out to the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, that while he was right in saying that the gravity was a quality of the beer, it is only one of the qualities of a beer. Therefore you cannot measure the total quality of a beer by the gravity alone, and many beers of lower gravity are, to the drinker, of high quality. One of the things that astonishes the Scot beer drinker is the liking of the English for what we regard as a rather thin beer, and it always upsets the Scot who emigrates to England. So it is not only the gravity that comes into the question of the quality of the beer.
LORD STONHAM: I am most grateful to the noble Lord. I was aware that original gravity is only one part of the

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total quality of the brew; there are the alcoholic content, and other things. But I felt that original gravity not only was the determining factor of the other things, but technically was quite enough for me to manage without enlarging the field.
The noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, said that there are only two references in the Bill to intoxicating liquor, and he specified particularly subsection (7) of Clause 2, which reads:
" In this section premises ' means premises used for the sale of intoxicating liquor by retail."
If we fixed the original gravity it would mean that those premises would have to sell beer of this quality, otherwise they would not continue to be"premises"within the meaning of this Bill. I am not the least perturbed by the fact that the original gravity of Carlisle beer has been slipping to some extent, to a minor extent—1038·2 to 1036·6. If they had been slipping, they could pull their socks up, and it shows that this would apply not only to Carlisle but to all of them. As to there being no national standard, I am suggesting that we should seize this present opportunity to make a beginning. The noble Lord is perfectly right to enjoy himself as a Scot and to talk about the weak English beer—and indeed it is quite disgraceful. I think it is disgraceful not only to have a weak thin stuff but actually to advertise it in such a way that the fools who drink it take the gas in which has been previously taken off during an earlier process and pumped hack into the beer under the impression that it is strong and powerful and they are"he-men"if they drink it.
LORD BALERNO: Surely a large proportion of the natives like it that way.
LORD STONHAM: That is exactly right; they have been told on television that they have got to like it that way; that they are manly and powerful if they like it that way. It may be absolutely horrible stuff, but this is what the brewers say. It is good beer if the customers like it; all we have got to do is to educate them—or uneducate them, if you like—to swallow the stuff and think it good. I think it is wrong to practise that kind of deception and that it is much better to sell a good honest drink. That is why we have tabled this Amendment. I am
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sorry that the noble Lord does not feel able to accept it.
On Question, Amendment negatived.
Clause 1 agreed to.
Clause 2 [Disposal of property in England held by Secretary of State for purposes of State management]:
LORD STONHAM LORD STONHAM moved Amendment No. 3:
Page 2, line 1, leave out (" The Secretary of State ") and insert (" There shall be constituted a body to be called the State Liquor Trade Management Agency (hereinafter referred to as the Management Agency) which ")
The noble Lord said: I hope that with this Amendment it will be possible for us to discuss the remaining Amendments, Nos. 4 to 16, that I have put down for Clause 2. They are all either consequential or related to this particular Amendment. On Second Reading, considerable concern was expressed that the Bill, as drafted, saddled the Home Secretary with the onerous and unsuitable job of haggling over the sale of properties comprising the State scheme, and the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, by implication, in effect agreed with this because he said that the Government had decided to seek the highest professional advice in the appointment of valuers and estate agents who would conduct the sales on the Home Secretary's behalf. He also told us that it had been decided to sell 40 of the smallest public houses as individual units and to offer them, in the first instance, to the present managers; and in response to a question that I put to him he told us that it might well be done with the remaining public houses.
LORD WINDLESHAM: I have not got Handsard in front of me, but I do not think I quite gave that impression. I said that we should want to hear the recommendations from the agents as regards the other properties.
LORD STONHAM: I said that it might be done with the others, and I think that is implied in the noble Lord's remarks. My Amendments are designed to create the framework to make all this possible. Clause 2(1) gives to the Home Secretary two powers. The first is to,
" dispose of property held by him for the purposes of…the Act ".

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That is the power to dispose. The second power is indicated in the words:
" or shall use such property for other purposes ".
That is the power not to dispose of the properties. In short, under the Bill the Home Secretary does not need to dispose of them and he is not compelled to use them as licensed premises: he can use them for something else.
I am proposing in the Amendments that both these powers should be handed over to a State Liquor Trade Management Agency which would consist of three persons, qualified and experienced in the valuation of land and property, to be appointed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. This impersonal, impartial agency would completely free the Home Secretary of what I regard as the odium of dealing in this matter. It would carry out expertly the transactions referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, and satisfactorily perform the essence of the function of the local trust which was originally imposed by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, but the Home Secretary would remain in the business the whole time until he decided, under Clause 5, to get out of it.
What we are proposing is exactly what the Government want. They decided to abolish State management because they considered it inappropriate for the Home Secretary to be running a brewery and managing pubs. Very well. But it must be equally inappropriate for the Home Secretary to have to haggle about the disposal prices. The management agency would relieve him of all this in a manner satisfactory to the public. This proposal follows the pattern which was followed with iron and steel when there was set up a realisation and disposal agency; it follows the pattern followed in 1963 with transport when a holding company was set up, as we suggest here, with power to dispose of the undertakings. The fact that it did not dispose of them showed that the holding company had a better set of values than the Government had. Of course this might happen again with the Trade Management Agency. That would not matter at all. What does matter is that we should have an expert body which would act objectively and impartially in a manner expedient in the public interest. I am naïve enough to
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believe that everybody wants an impartial public body to do this job. That can be accomplished in the manner in which we have proposed to amend the Bill. I think that is what the Home Secretary wants, and what we want. I commend the Amendment to your Lordships for acceptance. I beg to move.
LORD LEATHERLAND: As it is now 8 o'clock, ought not someone to call,"Time gentlemen, please!"so that the other debate can be continued?
LORD WINDLESHAM: I am in the hands of the Committee. It is 8 o'clock. Some time has been earmarked, through the usual channels, on Wednesday next at 8 o'clock, and since the noble Lord moved his group of Amendments to Clause 2 only, I think we would, in any event, have to carry on with our proceedings to consider the Amendments to Clause 3. Therefore, perhaps I may delay my reply until Wednesday, if that is convenient to members of the Committee, and move that the House do now resume.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
House resumed.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BILL
8.2 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I beg to move that the consideration on Report of the Industrial Relations Bill be now resumed.
Moved, That the consideration on Report of the Industrial Relations Bill be now resumed.—(Lord DrumalbynDruntalbyn.)
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I wonder whether this would be a convenient opportunity to put one request to the Government. We now have a very long Marshalled List, and a number of Amend ments have been put down. I do not want to go into the arguments now, but I should like to make a request to the Government that they should provide us, at some early stage, with a schedule, or with the answer to the question of how many Amendments, all told, the Government have put down at Report stage and, of these, how many were in response to Opposition requests. I think that information would have to be made available sooner or later, and we should be most

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grateful if the Government could see their way to providing it.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, the noble Lord was good enough to give me private notice of that question. The information has already been prepared, but unfortunately I have not got it with me at the moment. However, I shall certainly let him know.
On Question, Motion agreed to.
Clause 84 [Organisations eligible for entry in special register]:
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79PP:
Page 67, line 13, after (" its ") insert (" principal ").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 79PP. The clause in relation to which this Amendment appears deals with a special register and defines the organisations which are eligible for entry in it. Subsection (3) says:
" any organisation shall be eligible for entry in the special register if—…
(b) its activities include the regulation of relations between workers of…those descriptions…"
The Amendment seeks to add the words"principal activities ", so that it would then read,
" any organisation shall be eligible for entry in the special register if—…
(b) its principal activities include the regulation of relations between workers…and employers…"
The purpose of the Amendment, as is plain, is to strengthen the subsection and to make it clear that, in our view, there should go on to the register only those organisations which are (what shall I say?)"professionals"and not"amateurs"in this field of regulating relations between workers and employers. These organisations are, of course, in competition with one another. It is only right that the field of competition should be a fair one, and that those which are on the special register should have, as one of their principal activities, the regulation of labour relations and of negotiation so that they can compete on fair terms with those who are not on the special register. I beg to move.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I am afraid that, so far from strengthening this subsection, the Amendment would
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" bust"it. The trouble is that the purpose of the special register is not to accommodate organisations looking after particular kinds of workers. I am afraid this is an Amendment that I must oppose, and it is important that noble Lords should be clear why, because it strikes at the very heart of the reasons why the special register was added to the Bill. The special register affords a means of making the benefits of registration, together with the associated obligations, available to registered companies and chartered bodies which have some concern with industrial relations matters, but which are not eligible to register as trade unions in the normal way. The reason why they are not able to register as trade unions is precisely that the regulation of relations is not one of their principal objects. If it were a principal object they would have been unable to register as companies by reason of Section 5 of the Trade Union Act 1871, which is reproduced in full by Clause 151.
Similarly, no chartered body could hope to keep its charter if it had developed the regulation of industrial relations in its members' interests as a principal activity. Chartered bodies, as noble Lords will know, are, by definition, those which have several public interests. The Amendment would, therefore, preclude from admission to the special register the very organisations it is designed to accommodate; namely, companies and chartered bodies which are engaged in industrial relations as a subsidiary activity. The creation of a special register is indeed an important concession to these organisations, as my noble friend Lord Windlesham made plain during the debate on this part of the Bill in Committee. If there were no such register, such organisations which wanted to enjoy trade union status would have to give up their existing status, and in some cases might have to dissolve themselves and start all over again. In our view, the concesssion is entirely justified, and it would be wrong to remove it by this Amendment. I must therefore ask noble Lords to reject this Amendment.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation. I see that there are difficulties in having this Amendment here. On the other hand, there are difficulties of the kind which I explained, which were the reason for moving the Amendment. I

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shall simply have to see what other method is open to us to try to achieve fairer competition, which is what we are anxious for. I see that this is not the right place for this Amendment, and I therefore ask your Lordships' leave to withdraw it.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
8.9 p.m.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79QQ:
Page 67, line 16, after (" concurrence ") insert (" of any person who is not a member or ")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment again is in this same clause, and indeed in the same subsection. Subsection (3), as your Lordships are now aware, refers to any organisation being eligible for entry in the special register if its activities include the regulation of relations between workers and employers, and if
"(c) it has power, without the concurrence of any parent organisation, to alter its own rules ".
It is that second provision with which we are now concerned. That is one definition of independence. In order to make this independence even clearer, we seek to add words which would make the subsection read:
"(c) it has power, without the concurrence of any person who is not a member of any parent organisation ".
Independence can be destroyed, either by having a parent organisation upon whom an organisation depends, or by having members who exert a special power—and that is the case in certain house unions. Therefore, we propose the Amendment to ensure and establish the independence of the organisation seeking entry in the special register. My Lords, I beg to move.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I think the noble Lord will probably recall that a similar Amendment to Clause 67, Organisations eligible for registration as trade rations, was rejected as unnecessary; exactly the same considerations apply here. Unless the noble Lord is able to show that there are different considerations, it would save the time of your Lordships if we did not pursue the matter further.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I gather that what the noble Lord is saying
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is that he is satisfied that the Amendment is not necessary, because the independence is assured?
LORD DRUMALBYN: That is right, my Lords.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, that was the purpose of moving the Amendment. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD DRUMALBYN LORD DRUMALBYN moved Amendment No. 79J:
Page 67, line 18, leave out from (" funds ") to end of line 19.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment is identical to earlier Amendments to Clauses 67 and 71 which have already been approved by the House. In moving the Amendment to Clause 67, my noble friend Lord Ferrers, explained that, on reflection, the Government had reached the conclusion that the words proposed for deletion were not an essential prerequisite of registration and might prevent organisations from registering. The same is true with regard to organisations seeking entry on the special register, and it is desirable that the same tests should apply here as apply to registration as a trade union or employers' association. My Lords, I beg to move.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79RR:
Page 67, line 19, at end insert—
(" and
(d) does not receive, directly or indirectly, financial assistance from any employer ").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is an Amendment which is similar, if not identical, to one that we discussed earlier. The purpose of moving it is to obtain—it may sound a little Irish, and I hope I offend nobody—the Minister's assurance that it is not necessary. My Lords, I beg to move.
THE EARL OF BALFOUR: My Lords, if an employer or an organisation is contributing towards a provident fund, through an organisation which is eligible to be entered in the special register, would the acceptance of this Amendment prevent such a contribution?
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, if the Amendment were accepted I do not see how it could possibly prevent what my

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noble friend wants to see continue. The whole purpose of the clause is to allow that to continue. There may be ways in which financial assistance is made available by an employer for good industrial relations, and one would not want some minor case of that sort to interfere in any way with the test of independence. We are still satisfied that the test of independence is sufficient. Therefore, I do not think it is necessary for me to reiterate the reasons why this Amendment is also unacceptable, except to say that it would give rise to precisely the same dangers in the context of organisations seeking entry upon the special register as did the earlier Amendment in relation to the registration of trade unions. It could be an embarrassment to good industrial relations and to organisations, either on the register of trade unions or on the special register.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, in effect, the noble Lord has kindly given me the assurance which I was seeking. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 88 [Annual return, audit, annual report and members' superannuation schemes]:
EARL FERRERS EARL FERRERS moved Amendment No. 79DDD:
Page 70, leave out lines 8 and 9 and insert (" either free of charge or on payment of a reasonable charge ").
The noble Earl said: My Lords, this Amendment is consequential on one which the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, moved earlier and which was accepted by the Government. That change has relieved registered organisations of the obligation to specify in their rules the charge to be made for supplying a rule book to any person. Subsection (6) at present requires that the charge should be specified in the rules, and we propose to remove the words in question and replace them with a provision which allows the organisation either to make no charge at all or to make a reasonable charge. My Lords, I beg to move.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, all I need to do is to thank the noble Earl and the Government for meeting our point of view.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 90 [Power for Chief Registrar to inspect and apply for winding up order]:
8.18 p.m.
LORD STOW HILL LORD STOW HILL moved Amendment No. 79XXX:
Page 71, line 15, leave out (" in accordance with the Companies Act 1948 ").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I move this Amendment formally, and I do so really in order to give myself an opportunity of thanking the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, for writing me an extremely helpful letter on certain points that I had raised on this clause (which in the previous version of the Bill was Clause 88) and on two other clauses which are really allied to it. They are Clause 74 of the present version, which was Clause 72 of the previous version; and Clause 152 of the present version, which was Clause 148 of the previous version. The House may remember that when it last met to consider this Bill, I moved an Amendment to Clause 74 and the noble Baroness, Lady Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, indicated to me that a letter was on the way from the noble and learned Lord which dealt with the points I had sought to raise. At that time I had not received the letter, but I have now received it and am extremely grateful for it.
The Amendment which I move formally—and I shall explain in a moment why I say"formally "—is really to call attention to what seemed to me a defect, in that no indication was given in Clause 90 of the machinery under the Companies Act 1948 that was to be brought into action in the event of the Registrar seeking to wind up a registered trade union or an employers' association. The noble and learned Lord indicated to me in his letter that that matter had been fully taken into account and that it was the view of the Government that the best way to deal with it would he to make Part IX of the Companies Act 1948 applicable and that an Amendment would he put down for that purpose. That Amendment is now down as No. 93W. I have done my best to study both Part IX of the 1948 Act and the various changes introduced into Part IX by Amendment No. 93W. So far as my study goes, it seems that those arrangements would be absolutely satisfactory

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and would provide the necessary machinery to wind up a trade union or employers' association registered under this Bill.
With regard to contributories, about which I expressed some doubt, if I understand the position rightly, I think the situation is adequately safeguarded in that they could not be called upon to contribute in a liquidation except and to the extent that they might be liable to do so under any rules of the organisation which, upon its incorporation under Clause 74, become the rules of the incorporated body. Once again, I should like to thank the Government for having given this such careful thought and for having moved that Amendment. As the noble and learned Lord's letter points out, some other matters which I raised on the other clauses to which I referred are still under consideration. I think I am right in saying that no Amendments have been tabled to those other clauses—no doubt they are still being considered. Perhaps they will make their appearance on the Marshalled List later if the Government, on reflection, think that some change is necessary. Having said that, and expressed my thanks, may I explain what I meant by"formally moving the Amendment"by now saying that, having formally moved it, I ask the leave of the House to withdraw it.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 94 [Relaxation of restrictions on changeschanties in rules]:
LORD DRUMALBYN LORD DRUMALBYN moved Amendment No. 79EEE:
Page 73, line 7, leave out (" (2) ") and insert (" (1) ").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I am sorry that I have to move this Amendment. It arises from a mistake on an earlier Government Amendment considered by your Lordships in Committee as Amendment 263EEEE. Line 7 in subsection (3) refers to the purposes specified in the clause. Those are set out in subsection (1) and not subsection (2). I beg to move.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, we are grateful to the noble Lord. This is obviously an error. The only comment I have to make when I see the multitude of noble Lords who have added their names to the Amendment is to say how
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pleasant it is to think of the number in your Lordships' House who read the Bill with such assiduity as to pick out that:
" One is one and all alone, And ever more shall be so."
I do not know why these things arise in the way they do but in fact I think our Amendment was down first and the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, added his name; the courtesies of the House require that the noble Lord's name should come first, but I am delighted that we are in agreement.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
8.26 p.m.
Clause 96 [Inducement of, or threat to induce, breach of contract]:
LORD GARDINER LORD GARDINER moved Amendment No. 80:
Page 73, line 22, after (" dispute ") insert (" knowingly ").
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 80B:
Page 73, line 23, leave out (" or threaten to induce ").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, in what I am sure is the very temporary absence of my noble friend Lord Archibald, I beg leave to move this Amendment. It relates to the Part of the Bill which deals with unfair industrial practices. This clause sets out to deal with inducements, or threats of inducement, to breach of contract. There was discussion at ane earlier stage, which I recollect not with quite the same complete clarity that I would have wished, on the meaning both of inducement (which the noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack was good enough to explain) and also of threatening to induce. It seemed to us that the inducement itself presented a complex part of the law, but that was much clarified by the discussion which took place. However, the question of threatening to induce seemed to us to produce a situation which was almost incomprehensible.
The noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack explained, so far as I recollect, the various elements that go into the legal definition of an inducement to breach of contract, and when one came to consider those elements it seemed to us that one of them was completely incompatible with a threat of inducement, because inducement had to

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have a certain effect and one could not know in advance how a threat could be sure to produce that result. Therefore it seemed to us that threatening to induce was a concept which was very difficult to understand and no doubt would be very difficult for those whose function it would be to interpret, particularly in courts of law. Therefore we put down this Amendment, in the hope that we could receive further clarification and understanding of this matter. When I say"we"put it down, I mean that some of us put it down. It so happens that it was not I who did so, but my noble friend Lord Archibald, who, if he were here, would be able to explain the matter in far greater detail and with much greater authority than I can attempt to do. As I have explained to your Lordships on many occasions, I am no lawyer. I listen to these matters with great interest and am much encouraged and enlightened by what transpires. But in the circumstances Ido not wish to delay your Lordships unduly, especially as we have lost Lord Archibald. I merely move the Amendment, and hope that we shall receive a full explanation from the Government. I beg to move.
LORD STOW HILL: My Lords, shortly to supplement what my noble friend has said, I have re-read the argument, and I think the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor may be able to confirm that my recollection is correct when I say that my noble friend's point was this. The noble and learned Lord had indicated that in the view he held, if one construed the word"induce"it had five separate elements. There was a certain controversy as to whether it was four or five, but in point of fact the noble and learned Lord has on a number of occasions told the House what he regards as the necessary elements in the word"induce ". If I remember correctly, my noble friend Lord Archibald's argument, which was put in the form of a question to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, it was in substance this. If you accept that the word"induce"involves certain things, at least there must be a contract and at least there must be a breaking of it as a result of the inducing. Upon the assumption that those are prerequisites before the word"induce"can be said to be in operation, how does one fit into that
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situation a phrase like"threatening to induce "? In other words, you can utter a threat which may be completely ineffective and go no way towards producing the result that there is an inducing with the components that the noble and learned Lord indicated in his view it contained. I think that was the substance of my noble friend's point. I do not know whether the noble and learned Lord has his argument in front of him, but I thought it might be helpful to the House if I gave at any rate what was my recollection of his argument.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I am still in some doubt as to the purpose of this Amendment. Clause 96, which we are discussing, makes it an unfair industrial practice in certain circumstances for any person, in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute, to induce another person to break a contract to which that other person is a party. The clause says that, as well as to induce, a threat to induce that result is an unfair industrial practice. The noble Lord, Lord Diamond, in the absence of the noble Lord, Lord Archibald, who raised the question rather interrogatively on Committee, moves to omit the words,"or threaten to induce ". But I still do not know why. Therefore, it is rather difficult for me to reply to the Amendment. It seems to me to be every bit as bad to achieve something by threats as to achieve something by action. In a previous, somewhat intemperate speech the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, characterised something as blackmail—a phrase which I had always understood to be against the tradition of this House. But I cannot understand why a threat is not as bad as carrying out the threat if it achieves its results. I defined the word"induce"in accordance with the textbook definition on a number of occasions at the Committee stage; and I have accepted an Amendment by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, in order to remove doubt and allay anxiety, to insert the word"knowingly"before the word"induce"wherever that word appeared in the Bill so that there could be no doubt at all that a person so acting would be acting in knowledge of what he was doing. I am now asked to remove from the sphere of unfair industrial practice a threat to commit the knowing inducement of a breach of contract, and

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nobody can explain to me why. I should advise the House to reject the Amendment.
LORD DELACOURT-SMITH: My Lords I think, with respect, that the noble and learned Lord has himself underlined the difficulties in which some of us find ourselves, for if I understood him aright he based the justification of these words upon the argument that to achieve an object by a threat was as bad as achieving that object by carrying out the actual act which had been threatened. This is the difficulty in which I think some of us find ourselves: that it is an unfair industrial practice to threaten to induce without it being established that the threat itself in fact produces any effect. The noble and learned Lord, if I understood him aright, seemed to make the assumption that the threat referred to in the wording was a successful threat.
On Question, Amendment negatived.
8.36 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved Amendment No. 80A:
Page 73, line 29, leave out (" section ") and insert (" Part of this Act ").
The noble and learned Lord said: I rather suspect that once again I am standing in for my noble friend. I ought to explain that this Amendment is the first of quite a number of Amendments which can really be understood only if they are read together. If I may briefly list them, they are Nos. 80A, 81A, 81B and 81C. The purpose of this Amendment to Clause 96 is to extend the references to trade unions and employers' associations in the new subsection (3) which is contained in Amendment No. 81C, which is to page 74, line 9, so as to include organisations which are on the provisional register. It is a consequential Amendment to the Amendment to subsection (3) of Clause 97.
The Amendment to Clause 97 has three purposes: first, to make it clear that the unfair industrial practice in Clause 97 applies to any person whether or not he was the person who committed the original unfair industrial action which his secondary action is intended to support; second, to make it clear that a trade union is not to be made liable under this clause for giving official sup-
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port to an initial unofficial act—for instance, calling a strike in breach of contract, which is an unfair industrial practice under Clause 96; and, third, to carry out the promise which I made at the Committee stage to omit the horrible words"aid and abet ", which in any event have criminal connotations. This is done by substituting the verb"to further"for the double verb"to aid and abet"in relation to the taking of secondary action.
My Lords, when we discussed Clause 97 in Committee, I pointed out that the Government regarded it as defective in the form in which it has hitherto appeared and that an Amendment would be put down for Report. I also made it clear that when the time came to put down the Amendment which I had promised I would take what advantage I could of the observations made during the debate on the Committee stage. I do not think I need say anything more in criticism of the phrase,"to aid and abet ". Everything that need be said was said on Committee stage and on the whole I agreed with it, if I could find another phrase to do as well which had civil and not criminal implications and which could be described as contemporary English. I think we have succeeded, by the aid of the official draftsmen, by the use of the word"further ".
At the Committee stage we also discussed the position that arises when a trade union makes official industrial action which originally was unofficial. I put forward the view that I did not believe that there was any real danger to a trade union that such action would in itself be considered an unfair industrial practice under the clause. But I explained to the Committee that in another place there had been those who had expressed anxieties on this score and who might still fear that the clause might bear unfavourably upon legitimate union recognition of industrial action. Subsection (3) as amended will, I hope, eradicate any remaining doubt, whether well-founded or ill-founded, about the intention and scope of the clause in this context.
My Lords, the clause as it stands deals with the liability of any person for taking or threatening to take steps specified in subsection (2) for the purpose of aiding

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and abetting another person in doing anything which is an unfair industrial practice by that person under the Bill. As I said in the Committee, we also wish to amend the clause to make clear that it will be an unfair industrial practice for someone to organise industrial action to further an original unfair practice committed by himself as well as one committed by someone else. It would obviously be quite illogical, and at variance with our intention, if the person who committed the original practice were at liberty to seek to further his original action, if that action was an unfair industrial practice, by organising secondary action in support of it; but would be liable under the clause if he supported an unfair industrial practice of the same kind as originated by someone else; or alternatively, that another person would be liable if he supported the original action originated by himself.
The Amendment to Clause 96 is really paving to, or consequential upon—whichever way one looks upon it—the Amendment to Clause 97 which takes account of an objection made by noble Lords during the Committee stage debate and the promises that I have made and that I hope I have now redeemed. Therefore, I beg to move the Amendment No. 80A standing in the name of my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn.
8.45 p.m.
LORD STOW HILL: My Lords, technically we are discussing what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has described as a paving Amendment; and in moving that Amendment he has also explained to the House very clearly the re-cast of Clause 97 which appears in the Amendments in the Marshalled List to which he has referred. I think it would probably be for the convenience of the House if, in answering, or in making such observations as I think may be of use on the paving Amendment, I also make observations in reply to the observations by the noble and learned Lord on the Amendments for which this paves the way. If that is the general wish of the House I will proceed accordingly. The only slight disadvantage about that is that the House will see that there are on the Marshalled List Amendments Nos. 81J and 81K in the name of my noble friend Lord DelacourtSmith. He may wish to move them in
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due course, although I would apprehend that if Amendments 81A and 81B were carried, that would automatically involve the result that his own Amendments could not be moved. Therefore while I am making some observations on the new form Clause 97, the House will perhaps permit me to give a general indication about what, as I see it, would be the effect of the two Amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Delacourt-Smith. If that is a convenient course I propose to follow it, because I think that it will occupy the least amount of time.
We had a very full discussion in Committee on this group of clauses, which, obviously, are central to the Bill. I am sure we are all agreed on that. In the course of them a number of questions were raised, and the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor indicated, as he has reminded us to-day, that he had some doubts about this form of what is now Clause 97; and that he would seek to re-cast it so as to take account of the doubts which he harboured about it. I should like to test his wording to see how far it has gone and what are the changes that are made and then to offer one or two observations on the re-cast clause which I think probably the Government will not be able to accept, because it has been clearly indicated by Ministers that here we are at the parting of the ways. Noble Lords on this side of the House take one view as to what should be the content of this group of clauses; the Government take a different view, and both views are strongly held. Therefore there is limited room for concession on both sides. I believe that both sides of the House would accept that that stage must come in the case of any major difference and here we are right at the very kernel of it.
On that basis may I take the successive Amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, which the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has explained? I am sure that we are all indebted to him for having removed the criminal taint of the words"aid and abet ". He has substituted for them,
" further any action which has been taken, whether by him or by any other person."
The submission that I would make to the House is that the words substituted

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are very much wider in scope than the original words"aid and abet ". Noble Lords will notice that in the two Amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, the effect of the words"aid and abet"in their restricted sense is sought to be reproduced in the wording which he has suggested—namely, take any material action in support of ". The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor may agree or disagree with me, and in any case I am sure that the House would be grateful to hear his view whether I am right in suggesting that the expression,"further any action which had been taken"is much wider in scope.
After all, my Lords, something which one does and which, even in a minimal sense, permits the consequences of an action previously taken by somebody else, or by oneself, could, I should have thought, come within the scope of the words,"further any action which has been taken ". By contrast, I should have thought that one does not aid and abet unless one does something such as is described in the language of my noble friend Lord Delacourt-Smith. You take some material action in support of it. You do something which is identifying you with it. You almost take part in it. That I should have thought, was the normal connotation of aiding and abetting. If I am right in thinking that the words have been expanded in the language that the noble and learned Lord has chosen, personally speaking, I should regret it, and I think that my noble friends would share that regret. These are extremely important clauses, and they put upon unions which are not registered what I hope it is not an exaggeration to describe as the severe disabilities imposed by Clause 96. For this reason we on this side of the House very much regret an extension of the ambit of the words,"aid and abet ".
The second point I should like to put in the form of a question to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor: what is precisely the scope of new subsection (3) which he is proposing to introduce into Clause 97? He has already explained it, but I should like to be certain that I followed his explanation accurately. The exclusion that subsection (3) makes is a very restrictive one. I be-
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lieve that that was the intention of the noble and learned Lord. He indicated that his intention was that where there is unofficial action which is subsequently made official by a registered trade union, the official action thereafter taken shall not itself constitute an unfair industrial practice. The reason for that was that the question had been raised in Committee as to whether official action by a registered trade union, following upon unofficial action, could itself constitute an unfair industrial practice. I have been trying to think of what other circumstances could be brought within the scope of the exclusion, and I have not been able to think of any. There may be others.
If I may, again following the course that I have adopted, refer my comparison to the language in the second Amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Delacourt-Smith, that would be the language which I should prefer and which I imagine my noble friends would prefer. I say that in the knowledge that probably the Government find it unacceptable because it conflicts with a basic view they hold. I hoped that the change in Clause 97 would prevent the consequence which I thought might be possible during the course of the Committee stage, that if a registered union took action to assist a union overseas, that automatically would constitute an unfair industrial practice. Without going into the minutiae of the language, that would be the result of the language chosen by my noble friend Lord Delacourt-Smith. When I put that point, the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said that in his view, there was not much reason for that. He thought that in the whole concept of the Bill, and bearing in mind the general principle of its interpretation, actions described in a Bill, unless by necessary implication it is otherwise indicated, relate to actions which take place within our shores and not overseas. I did not feel wholly convinced by the argument, but I hope that the noble and learned Lord's view on that is right. I am not saying that it is wrong. Any danger would have been removed by Amendment 81K. I feel I am on safe ground in saying that the Amendment of the noble and learned Lord in the new subsection (3) is not designed to achieve that wide exclusion and is carefully framed so as not to go so far as that.

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There is a difference of adoption and approach, and that is where one has to leave it.
Those are my general comments. I should like to add an expression of thanks to the noble and learned Lord for obviously having considered carefully the arguments advanced and the criticism of this group of clauses during the Committee stage, and for producing, as a result of his further cogitation, this new clause which does not contain some of the defects that he felt might be inherent in the old one. I regret that he did not feel able to go further in reducing the rather draconian and adverse consequences to Clauses 96 and 97 as they now will appear in the Bill. Having said that, I would add that I do not feel able to advise the House to oppose the Amendment.
8.56 p.m.
LORD DELACOURT-SMITH: My Lords, there is little which I can or would wish to add to the clear observations of my noble friend. I should like to add my appreciation to his for the steps which have been taken to remove some of the phrasing from this part of the Bill which some of us found objectionable. When one looks at the two clauses which are now under consideration it does not seem that what has been done by the Government has removed the unfairness of Clause 97 as it will stand even when amended. It was to this which my noble friend was referring when he spoke of the difference of approach between the two sides of the House which comes out clearly in the consideration of these clauses. He went on to speak of the poor prospect of the Government being disposed to modify these clauses in a way that would make them a great deal more acceptable to my noble friends.
I can bring this out best by looking at Clause 97 as a whole when the Amendments to which the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack has referred are embodied. The embodiment of these Amendments will not remove the unfairness of Clause 97, which tells so much more heavily against workers and trade unions than against employers and employers' organisations. The two sides in industry have now a much more varied and sophisticated armoury of weapons than at one time they had, when there
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was a strike on the one hand and a lockout on the other. The Government have recognised that on the employees' side, in the case of trade unions, there is a range of actions that can be taken in the course of an industrial dispute which fall short of a strike. The Government have defined these as organising, procuring, or financing any irregular industrial action short of a strike. But so far as the employers are concerned they refer still to the sole weapon of a lock-out. That is the only employers' weapon to which reference is made at any rate in this clause of the Bill.
I should have thought that it was widely recognised that employers now, in the exercise of their industrial authority and their economic power, had similarly a whole range of action open to them short of a lock-out in an industrial dispute which can be used particularly against individuals: restriction of normal promotion expectations, removal from one factory to another location which would be much less convenient to the individual; reallocation to a new job which may be much less favourable and satisfying; limitation or reallocation of overtime, and of course various other kinds of victimisation such as a concerted refusal to employ a particular worker, or one employer in some way or other making a suggestion to another employer that he should either dismiss or refuse to employ a worker whom the first employer has dismissed and perhaps, as he would be able to under this Bill, refused to reinstate despite the decision of a tribunal.
It is interesting that in the Press only this morning there is reference by one sizeable trade union to an anxiety that the employers are compiling black lists of workers who, for one reason or another, are not looked upon favourably. It would surprise me very much if there did not exist in quite a number of places black lists of workers who have committed no offence and who indeed may well have done nothing which would be even an unfair industrial practice under this Bill. I make these observations to draw attention to the fact that, even with the Amendments which are now being proposed, which as we recognise, and as my noble friend has recognised, go at any rate some way to taking account of the views which were exnressed, there still remains a basic inequity, as we see

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it, in the clause which we have particularly under consideration at the moment. I must further emphasise the point which was made by my noble friends, that it appears to us that the expression"to further any action"is a wide term. It would be helpful to know whether the Government are fully satisfied that that term really is the appropriate one in these circumstances.
9.3 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, may I begin by making one general observation'? I must say that one becomes rather saddened by the somewhat grudging attitude of the Opposition when we carry out our undertakings. If I had given no promises and made no concessions on Clause 97 (as it now is) in Committee, and had put down no Amendments at all, as I should not then have been bound to do, but had simply used our majority to succeed in dealing with it, we should have got through this clause without very much discussion. But because I went out of my way to be conciliatory, to make promises and to carry them out, I am greeted with a deluge of rather deprecating remarks. I do not suppose that that will break my bones; I only draw the attention of the House to the fact that in the end, perhaps, Ministers will be found who do weary of well doing; I hope that I shall not.
The first criticism which was made was that I had carried out my undertaking to get rid of the words"aid and abet ", which had at any rate the merit of having behind them a long legal history, by introducing the words in the proposed new subsection,"to further any action ". I am asked to say whether those words are not wider than the words"aid and abet ". I am inhibited from giving an absolute assurance about that because, as I tried to explain on Committee, I have never been able to understand what the word"abet"means. It was precisely because I was unable myself to understand what the word"abet"means that I was eager to get rid of it. All I can say is that we went to the draftsman and said,"Look; can't you translate this into modern English which people will understand?", and he came up with the Amendment which I am now
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proposing. I think it more or less covers"aid and abet "; I cannot think of anything which is different in it, and I am not prepared to say that it is wider.
Nor did the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, say just how far he thought it was wider. He contrasted it unfavourably with the rival Amendment No. 81J—" take any material action in support of ". I should have thought that the draftsman had said"take any material action in support of"rather more elegantly by using the word"further ", and I prefer it. But I cannot honestly say, not knowing what the word"abet"means, which is the wider. It seems to me they are pretty well identical, and I prefer the professional draftsman to the amateur draftsman; and as I was not a professional draftsman I can say that without immodesty.
The next point made was that the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, said he hoped I was right about the non-extraterritorial application of an Act of Parliament. Well, so do I, but I do not think much of that by way of criticism. It was all right to say he hoped I was right when I said, in answer to his question across the Floor in Committee, that this was the answer to his criticism. But if he thinks I am wrong, I should like him to tell my why. He has had a month to think about it since, and one becomes rather tired of people saying a month later, when they have all the resources and expensive legal education and a most notable legal practice and experience behind them,"I wasn't altogether sure whether the Lord Chancellor was right." Cannot he do better than that? If he cannot, I shall assume that I am right because I thought that what I said was pretty elementary law.
The next point was that contrast was drawn between the new subsection, which carried out exactly the terms of my undertaking, and, again, the rival put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, in Amendment No. 81K. The point about No. 81K is that it would defeat altogether the whole purpose of Clause 97. If we adopted Amendment No. 81K, there would not be any purpose in having Clause 97 in at all because, obviously, if the second reaction complained of is itself an unfair industrial practice, there is no need for Clause 97 at all. But those of us who supported

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Clause 97 in the first place did so precisely because we visualised a situation in which an unfair industrial practice was undertaken and then a number of more damaging actions, not in themselves unfair industrial practices, were undertaken in support of it. That is what Clause 97 is about. That is what Amendment No. 81K would take out again. So much for that.
My Lords, I turn now to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, who talked about the underlying unfairness. The argument he presented to the House was that the poor old employer has apparently only one remedy, the lockout; and that the unions, in the white heat of technological revolution, have devised a wider range of weapons (or of clubs in the bag) to bring pressure to bear on the employer. The noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, then suggested a number of nasty things, short of a lockout, that the employers could do to individual workmen whom they did not like: black lists, and all the rest. The trouble about that is that it loses sight of the purpose of the clause. It is one of the many arguments that have been presented from the Opposition Front Benches during the course of these protracted debates in which the wood is completely lost sight of by an ingenious catalogue of trees in a totally different plantation. This clause is about unfair industrial practices; and before you get started on the clause you must assume that something has been done which is an unfair industrial practice. The unfair industrial practice in this case is inducement of breach of contract. If the employer does that, the Clause bites on him. If the trade union does it, the clause bites on them. But in order to get the clause to bite on anybody you must get the original unfair industrial practice started. Once you have done that the clause can bite.
The fact is that this clause is thought necessary in order to prevent a whole sequence of actions starting from an illegal origin, an origin which would be illegal under the Bill if it becomes an Act. The new subsection (3) covers the case—I think unnecessarily for the reasons I gave in Committee. But, for the reason I gave at the outset of these remarks, I wanted to be conciliatory and so I explained that if there was any doubt about this matter we would put it beyond
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the range of doubt by introducing a new subsection. That is what we have done. We did it in order to cover the case which we thought was substantially just and which was presented in Committee—where officials of a union or members of a union take illegal action which would bring them within the range of an unfair industrial practice by virtue of Clause 97. Our action in support of our undertaking is to exclude the liability of the union if all they had done was to render official an action which had previously been unofficial. That was the case presented to us in Committee. That was the case with which we undertook to deal. That is the case with which we have dealt in the third proposed Amendment.
I hope that, without undue cantankerousness, I have replied to the not very generous welcome which has greeted the fulfilment of the undertaking given by me and by my noble friends. I hope that, with these explanations and answers, the House will be prepared to accept the Amendment.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
9.13 p.m.
LORD STOW HILL LORD STOW HILL moved Amendment No. 80E:
Page 73, line 39, at end insert (" other than any part of a collective agreement which is a procedure agreement as defined in subsection (5) of section 162 of this Act.")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, the Amendment which I beg to move is really—I will not say on Report"of a probing nature "—to ask the House to consider whether or not the expression"contract"in subsection (3) of Clause 96 has been drawn too wide. I hope that I do not repeat unnecessarily that Clause 96 is crucial to the whole thinking of the Bill. It is obviously of great importance to trade unions to be as precise as possible in ascertaining the obligations which are put upon the unions and what they have to fear if they intend to embark upon industrial action.
Before the Bill was introduced it was only actionable if you induced a breach of a contract of employment under the 1906 Act. Now, in accordance with the Donovan recommendation, the expression"contract"in subsection (1) has been enlarged so as to include contracts other than contracts of employment. Then one looks to see what contracts are included

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within the scope of Clause 96, and one finds in subsection (3) that, without being I hope, too technical, a collective agreement is not included in a contract the breach of which one must not induce. But then paragraph (b) introduces a qualification of that general exclusion:
" notwithstanding anything in the preceding paragraph, includes so much of any contract of employment as is implied or incorporated in that contract by reference to a collective agreement."
The submission upon which the Amendment is based is that the incorporation into the contract of employment of terms in a collective agreement should not include any terms in a collective agreement which constitute a procedure agreement as defined in subsection (5) of Clause 162. Clause 162 is a new and comprehensive clause which gathers together all the elements which go to define a collective agreement, and subsection (5) of that new clause describes what is meant by"procedure agreement ". Quite clearly, you can by a course of conduct get terms gathered from a collective agreement and made part of a contract of employment.
A collective agreement specifies certain terms and conditions. A worker goes to work upon terms that his contract of employment will be upon the basis of those conditions. They thereby, I should have thought, on ordinary principles of law, become part of his contract of employment; and that indeed is intended by paragraph (b). But I do not find it easy to see how the particular features of a collective agreement which constitute a procedure agreement and which are set out in paragraphs (a) to (g) of subsection (5) of Clause 162 could very well be incorporated into a contract of employment. Therefore the Amendment is really designed to elicit an answer from Ministers as to what types of provisions contained in a procedure agreement they envisage becoming part of a contract of employment. There may be some. I find it not too easy to see that any of those described in paragraphs (a) to (g) of Clause 162(5) could very well be incorporated; but I daresay I am wrong.
My reason for moving this Amendment, as I have said, is that I think it is of such critical importance that one
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should be clear in one's own mind as to what contracts one is referring to in Clause 96. Therefore, I should be most grateful if the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, or whoever is going to reply, would be good enough to give us some examples—there may be many, and I may be asking a question which is easily answered—of a procedure agreement which could become part of a contract of employment. As your Lordships will know very well already, the parties to a collective agreement are not the individual workers but the trade union and the employer. It is for that purpose that this Amendment is put down, and I beg to move.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, Clause 96, as by this time we know, deals with inducing a breach of contract and, with certain exceptions, makes to induce knowingly a breach of contract an unfair industrial practice. Subsection (3) of Clause 96, with which this Amendment is concerned, defines or at any rate gives a line on the meaning of the word"contract ", excluding from the word"contract"in paragraph (a) collective agreements or any part of collective agreements. They are not contracts, the knowing inducement of a breach of which constitutes an unfair industrial practice. But subsection (b) makes it plain that included in the word"contract ", knowingly to induce a breach of which is an unfair industrial practice, is
" so much of any contract of employment as is implied or incorporated in that contract by reference to a collective agreement ".
The noble Lord proposes a new Amendment, which puts an exception to that exception by using the words
" other than any part of a collective agreement which is a procedure agreement as defined in subsection (5) of section 162 of this Act."
The effect of that would be to remove from the scope of the definition of contract for the purpose of Clause 96 any terms of an individual contract of employment which were incorporated by reference to a procedure agreement between an employer and an organisation of workers. Bearing in mind that the terms do not include a collective agreement of any kind or any part of it and, of course, a procedure agreement is a collective agreement, we now look at

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what it includes. The answer is that it includes among other things an individual contract of employment. That is put in because we do not want to create a situation where unofficial strike leaders could induce a number of individual workers to commit breaches of their own contracts of employment, for which the individuals would remain liable, while the instigators of the whole affair could get off scot free because they were not guilty of an unfair industrial practice.
The whole philosophy of the Bill as regards unfair industrial practice is that the instigators are those who primarily must be held responsible, and not the individual. The real criticism of the noble Lord's Amendment is that it reverses the whole philosophy. If I may come back to the question he asked, since he described this as a probing Amendment, I can say that individual contracts of employment which are inside the definition of contract for the purpose of Clause 96 are all made up of terms which are incorporated as a result of collective agreements reached between an employer and a trade union. A substantive example is rates of pay. When a trade union makes a new agreement with an employer, the individual contracts of employment become amended by the new rates of pay and such terms are substantive terms in contracts of employment by reason of those collective agreements. But some are procedural. For example, take agreements which might be negotiated between an employer and a trade union providing that any employee who has a grievance shall, in the first instance, refer the grievance to his immediate supervisor or union representative: this is not altogether unreasonable and it is not at all unusual.
It seems to me—and I believe it will seem to the House—both inconsistent and illogical to suggest, as the Amendment does, that the substantive terms incorporated as a result of collective agreements should be within the scope of the definition of contract while procedure agreements should be excluded. That would largely nullify the effect of procedural terms incorporated in individual contracts, and thereby reduce substantially the range within which an unofficial strike leader who chose to break a contract within the clause, which is a contract right across the field, would become liable for what he did. I am
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bound to say that I think it would have a deplorable effect upon the authority of responsible union officials, since it would make it so much easier for unofficial strike leaders to call strikes without running the risk of proceedings under Clause 96.
I think the Amendment is also illogical, because to my mind it draws a wholly illogical distinction between the substantive clauses in an individual contract of employment, made by reference to negotiation arrived at in collective agreement, and those which are purely procedural. I should have thought that was one-sided and lacking in logical reasons to support it. With that explanation, I hope that the noble Lord will not pursue this Amendment; but if he does, then my advice to the House would be to reject it.
LORD STOW HILL: My Lords, I am grateful for the answer. Of course, on the general merits I am not arguing in a contrary sense from that of the noble and learned Lord. What I was seeking to do was to try to obtain precision; if I may say so respectfully, I do not think the noble and learned Lord quite answered that part of the argument. He did to some extent. He said:"Well, if you look at a collective agreement, that part of it which relates to rates of pay would probably, by implication, become incorporated into the contract of employment." I agree: and so it should. I am perfectly content that the contract of employment we are talking about should be one which, by implication, incorporates that part of the collective agreement which relates to rates of pay. But the point I put to the noble and learned Lord—which I think he only partly answered, perhaps by reference to procedures relating to grievances—was that it seemed to me that, if you look at the content of a procedure agreement, ordinarily that does not become part of the terms of a contract of employment. Take, for example, paragraph (d):
" facilities for officials of trade unions or other organisation of workers; "
That does not become part of the contract of employment of the individual worker, though no doubt it is a useful provision. As I have said, my whole objective in moving this Amendment was to try to get clearly stated in Clause 96 what is the contract, or what are the contracts, that one is talking about when one applies the provisions of Clause 96. I should have thought that by including

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the procedure agreement as part of a collective agreement you are including something which is unlikely to be incorporated in the contract of employment, and therefore you are making for uncertainty; you are moving away from precision and engendering doubt as to what is the scope of Clause 96. That is the point. Obviously it is not worth while pursuing. The House is in possession of the arguments on both sides, and, having said that, I ask your Lordships' leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
9.28 p.m.
LORD GARDINER LORD GARDINER moved Amendment No. 81:
Page 73, line 39, at end insert—
(" (4) Nothing contained in this section shall render it an unfair industrial practice for any person to publish any matter upon an occasion privileged within the meaning of the Defamation Act 1952 as amended by any subsequent Act or to publish, whether orally or in writing his honest opinion on a matter of public interest.")
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, I am not sure that anybody moving a further Amendment to this Bill ought not to begin by expressing an apology. I do not propose to do so in this case, for two reasons. The first is because after 19 days, and having completed more than half of the Report stage, the Government at half-past two this afternoon were still going to move a further 76 Amendments, of which 16 appeared on the Marshalled List for the first time this morning. Secondly, we are not on this clause discussing trade unions or employers' associations. This is the one clause on which we are not; it is the one clause which excludes trade unions and employers' associations, or persons acting for them. Here we are discussing you and me and the whole of the general public. What we are dealing with is freedom of speech; and experience has shown that Parliament has, rightly, always been extremely vigilant in the whole field of freedom of speech.
I start from this point of view. Our law is not as well arranged or as systematically arranged as it should be, although it is improving; but, of course, when a lawyer is asked anything about the law the first thing he has to do is to ascertain what is the category of law in question.
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If the client says"If I do this, shall I be committing a criminal offence?"then the lawyer knows where he is: he is in the field of criminal law. If there is a contract concerned, or a possible breach, then he is in the field of contract and he knows that he is dealing with the law of contract. If it is a question of a tort, the law saying that you must not defame your neighbour or trespass on your neighbour's property, then the lawyer says,"Well, I know the principle of the law of tort, and I know where I am ".
But I think it is essential to realise that in this Bill we have a wholly new thing which no lawyer has ever seen before, which he knows nothing about and which does not fall into any known category. It is a thing called an"unfair industrial practice ". It may concern a contract or a breach of contract, but it is not part of our law of contract. It may result in the man's being sent to prison for not obeying an order. It is not called an injunction but a new thing,"an order in the nature of an injunction ". But it does not create a criminal offence, and it is not part of our criminal law. Knowingly to induce A to break his contract with B, so that B suffers damage, is under our law an actionable tort. This unfair industrial practice is not a tort, and by a later Amendment the Government are making that clear by saying that the Industrial Court shall not be entitled to hear any action of tort. So it is something quite new and something to which none of the existing rules applies.
It was in these circumstances that during the Committee Stage fears were expressed about your right and my right to freedom of speech, and the particular risk which might attach to the Press. There are two things to be said about this. The right to express your honest opinion on a matter of public interest is not, and never has been, a special right of the Press. It is your right, and my right and everybody's right. Of course it applies to the Press, but it applies to everybody else as well. But the statement made by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor last time, to the effect that he did not really think the Press ought to have any special privileges, is certainly not a view that has ever been taken by Parliament.
The foundation of the right of the Press to report proceedings in Parliament, however damaging it may be, however defamatory, or however much it may cause people to break contracts, depends on the Parliamentary Publications Act 1840. The right of the newspapers to publish fair and accurate reports of what goes on in court, no matter what the consequences to third parties may be, depends on the Law of Libel (Amendment) Act 1888, and for the rest, it depends very much on the Defamation Act 1952, which largely codified the law in this field, much of which up to that point had been case law. The Act relates to existing defences of justification and fair comment, but in Section 7, newspapers are given, subject to certain conditions, a qualified privilege, and Parliament thought it right that newspapers should be in that special position. The section says:
" Subject to the provisions of this section, the publication in a newspaper "—
it applies only to newspapers—
" of any such report or other matter as is mentioned in the Schedule to this Act shall be privileged unless the publication is proved to be made with malice."
Part I of the Schedule relates in the main to reporting proceedings of other legislatures and reports of proceedings in courts—international courts and so forth. Part II includes these words—I will not read them all:
" A fair and accurate report of the findings or decision of any of the following associations, or of any committee or governing body thereof, that is to say…
"(b) an association formed in the United Kingdom for the purpose of promoting or safeguarding the interests of any trade, business, industry or profession, or of the persons carrying on or engaged in any trade, business or profession, industry and empowered by its constitution to exercise control over or adjudicate upon matters connected with the trade, business, industry or profession, or the actions or conduct of those persons;"
So, whatever inducement that may cause to other people in defamation—but, of course, not in relation to the hitherto unheard of"unfair industrial practice"the Press—was protected in a publication of that kind.
Then there is this passage:
" A fair and accurate report of the proceedings at any public meeting held in the United
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Kingdom, that is to say, a meeting bona fide and lawfully held for a lawful purpose and for the furtherance or discussion of any matter of public concern, whether admission to the meeting is general or restricted."
Then it goes on to include fair and accurate reporting of the proceedings of local authorities, tribunals and general meetings of companies and so forth. But of course this protects a newspaper only from proceedings in defamation and certainly does not cover what in this Bill is called"an unfair industrial practice."
It was in those circumstances that in Committee my noble friend Lord Stow Hill, put down an Amendment for the protection of the Press. He raised a perfectly simple case, which was of this nature. A local reporter goes along to a factory where a public meeting is being held at the gates and a small number of employees are being addressed by a man who, rightly or wrongly, is saying,"Our working conditions in this factory have become so intolerable that we really have no alternative except to walk out." The journalist reports this and makes a fair and accurate report of the meeting. He says,"I went into the factory myself. I saw that the working conditions were exactly as this man had described them. I sympathised with them, and if I had been one of them I would have come out myself." As nine-tenths of the workers in the factory read that local newspaper, this has the effect of inducing them to come out.
My noble friend Lord Stow Hill, said that he did not think it right that in such a case the journalist should be liable for an unfair industrial practice. The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor in replying did not deal with this example in any way at all. He did not say that any man who reports a speech like that which leads to a strike ought to be penalised in damages, or what is called"compensation ". You cannot bring an action for damages, but you can make a complaint the result of which is that you are awarded compensation. The terminology is entirely new; but it seems to come to the same thing and if the result were a strike tens of thousands of pounds might be involved. The noble and learned Lord did not say,"I think it is right that in those circumstances that man should be ruined for life ". He did not say,"Oh no, such a man would not be liable at all ", nor did he explain why. What he said was that he did not think the Press

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should be in a different position from the rest of us and any Amendment which dealt simply with the Press would not have his approval. He then proceeded to make a number of objections to the drafting of the clause.
It is in those circumstances that I have ventured to put down this Amendment to provide that:
" Nothing contained in this section shall render it an unfair industrial practice for any person to publish any matter upon an occasion privileged within the meaning of the Defamation Act 1952 as amended by any subsequent Act…".
These, after all, are the occasions on which so far Parliament has thought that, so long as what is said is fair and accurate, there should be a measure of privilege. In order to meet the noble and learned Lord's point that it should not relate solely to the Press, it goes on:
" …or to publish, whether orally or in writing his honest opinion on a matter of public interest."
Later on the Marshalled List, my noble friend, Lord Stow Hill, has down Amendment No. 92. This is again dealing only with the Press, and I can save the time of the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, by telling him that it is exactly the same as my noble friend's Amendment at Committee stage, except that he has carefully taken into account every objection to his draft made by the noble and learned Lord, and removed every one of them; so it is the same as it was except that it has not now got any of the objections with which the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, answered. No doubt it might be convenient to discuss to some extent No. 92 at the same time. I do not know; that is a matter for your Lordships.
But there is here, I think, a real threat, not merely to the freedom of the Press but to the freedom of all of us to say what we think on a matter of public interest. The freedom which hitherto has been given by Parliament to the Press in circumstances in which it is not given to anybody else is not given to the Press for the purposes of the Press. Privilege in defamation is never given for the benefit of the defendant. Privilege is almost always what is called qualified privilege; that is, the right to say what you honestly think, without malice, on a particular kind of occasion. Some-
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times it is absolute privilege, which is a terrible power because absolute privilege means that even if you know that what you are saying is untrue, even if you say it maliciously and even if you damage other people, there can still be no action. We have—I think quite rightly—limited this privilege to two classes of people: Members of your Lordships' House and of the House of Commons for what they say in Parliament; and all those in our Law Courts, whether judges, lawyers or witnesses, for what they say in court. That is not for their benefit, but because we thought that in those two special cases it was so important in the public interest that people should be absolutely free to speak their minds without having to worry whether there could possibly be a libel action.
The qualified privilege which has been given to the Press provided that 'they do not act maliciously is not for their benefit but because it is to the advantage of all of us that we know what is going on. We should get fair and accurate reports of what is being said at public meetings and if there is controversy—even industrial controversy—we should know accurately what is being said on both sides. For that reason I submit that some protection is necessary here both for the Press and for ordinary people who are saying what they honestly think on a matter of public interest. I beg to move.
9.44 p.m.
BARONESS BIRK: My Lords, I should like to support the Amendment which has been so admirably moved by my noble and learned friend, Lord Gardiner. After the debate we had in Committee on the new clause moved by my noble friend, Lord Stow Hill, the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, pointed out that the clause as then proposed really weakened the position of the journalist. Several comments were also made about the privilege of a journalist. As a journalist myself, I would point out that while there is a great deal to be said—and I think it is right in concept—against journalists' having a special privilege, nevertheless they must be more at risk by reason of their profession. The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said at Committee stage that the freedom of the Press to report events is the freedom of the man in the pub to talk about

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them; that it is not different in character and does not depend on a man's acting as a professional journalist. But, of course, the journalist is more at risk, first because it is his work, whether in television, broadcasting or writing; and, secondly, because he hopes, if lie is at all a successful journalist, to reach a rather larger audience than the people scattered about a pub, otherwise he probably would not last very long as a journalist. I have been reading carefully what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said at the Committee stage, and have also discussed once again with the Secretary of the National Union of Journalists the feeling that there is still a risk in the Bill as it stands at the moment.
My noble and learned friend Lord Gardiner explained—and it needs no elaboration from me—the introduction of the unfair industrial practice which brings a new concept and again a new risk to freedom of speech. I think that an improvement has been made in the Bill, and I personally am grateful for the Government's acceptance of the word"knowingly"throughout the Bill before the word"induced ". Nevertheless, doubts still remain. Until the Bill, when it becomes an Act, has been working for some time we shall not know whether the law as it stands in the Bill at the moment can be used against journalists, or indeed, as my noble and learned friend Lord Gardiner says, against any person. We have at the moment a very distinguished ex-Lord Chancellor taking the view that there is a risk; we have the noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack (unless he has had a change of mind) now taking a different view. I do not think it will be possible every time a journalist—in this case an industrial correspondent—is about to write an article to 'phone up the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, to ask,"Do you think I am at risk about this? ". Having read the noble and learned Lord's predecessor's paper on the work of the Lord Chancellor I should have thought he had enough to do without giving advice to journalists.
What I think is also a great source of worry is the effect this can have even though there may not be in fact any practical result. This is the aura of caution that it will spread, and this is
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something on which a great many responsible journalists who are industrial correspondents feel very strongly. The fact that there is this law, if the Bill is left as it is at the moment, in operation will inhibit editors, will encourage them to take a more cautious view, and one could get (which I think would be unfortunate) in the future a situation in this country where it is all right to"have a bash"at the unions or at strikers but quite wrong to criticise employers and to show up any faults which they may have. This would seem to me to be a dangerous development of what we like to feel is our freedom of speech in this country, and I think it is something that needs to be watched and, indeed, needs an Amendment in this Bill.
I personally should be quite prepared to accept either the Amendment moved by my noble and learned friend Lord Gardiner or a later Amendment, No. 92, which, with its alteration, is to be moved by my noble and learned friend Lord Stow Hill. Both deal with the same point but in a different way. The Amendment moved by my noble and learned friend Lord Gardiner is shorter and it also widens the concept because it includes"any person"rather than restricting it to journalists. Whether the last part of it, following the word"Act"in line 4, may be considered by some noble Lords as taking rather too wide a view, I do not know. If so, it may be possible to amend it again by shortening it. My noble friend Lord Stow Hill's Amendment, No. 92, seems to me now to have answered some of the criticisms of the noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack. If I may say so, with great respect, as someone who is semiliterate legally, it seemed to me clear when he moved a similar Amendment at Committee stage that the onus was not put on the defendant, but now (and I think this must be one of the main points of the noble and learned Lord's opposition to the Amendment) this has been spelled out. Whatever is decided, I hope that noble Lords will recognise the anxiety felt about this particular matter. Something should be done in this Bill to allay that anxiety, and whether it is done by way of one Amendment or another, the main thing is that the situation should be clarified and the concern mitigated.
THE EARL OF BALFOUR: My Lords, may I ask a question here? Are not the protections which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, is seeking in his Amendment covered by Clause 132? I thought that in this Clause the words,
" act…in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute…"
gave the Press the protection they need. I do not quite understand this, and it is the reason for my question.
LORD GARDINER: No, my Lords. I think the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor will agree with me that that clause does not afford any cover in respect of freedom of speech.
9.52 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I do not propose to speak at all to Amendment No. 92, which has a number of built-in arguments of its own which are quite peculiar to it, and which we can deal with when we come to it. There is nothing more hopelessly boring than for two lawyers to start contradicting one another in public, nor anything more confusing to either House of Parliament. But some of the things the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, said were so inaccurate and so misleading—and they succeeded in misleading the noble Baroness, Lady Birk—that I must try to get rid of some of them.
In the first place, he said that this was a totally new thing coming on the law. With respect, this is approximately the opposite of the truth. Under the Common Law of England, inducing a breach of contract is a tort; it always has been rather more so than now, but it is a tort at Common Law. Under the Trade Disputes Act 1906. this was restricted by eliminating from the ambit of the tort contracts of employment if the inducement was in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute; but otherwise it was still a tort at Common Law, and it is now. The Government, in the course of this Bill, have decided to remove that tort. That is to say, the Bill does not impose a new liability; it removes an old one: and that (although I think my noble friend Lord Balfour misread the clause) is the purpose of Clause 132. The removal from the field of tort applies not merely to the old limitation, as it was enacted in 1906, to contracts of employ-
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ment. You cannot sue now for inducing a bearch of contract in furtherance of a trade dispute, whether it is a contract of employment or not, if the Bill goes through. That is the old law. It has been known from time immemorial; that is to say, since inducing a breach of contract was recognised as a separate tort. And in its limited form—that is to say, excluding contracts of employment in relation to acts done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute—it remains the law until this Bill becomes law.
What this Bill does is to eliminate that from the field of tort, and to impose a liability of a much more restricted kind under Clause 96. It is limited to actions which are defined and restricted under Clause 96, and it is limited in the further way that when you come before the Industrial Court to complain you are not, as you were previously at law, entitled to your remedy as of right. You are entitled to your remedy only if you can establish to the satisfaction of the Court that it is just and equitable to get it. Thus what we have done is not to impose a new liability, as the noble and learned Lord led the noble Baroness erroneously to suppose, but to take away an old one and substitute a much more restricted one, which results in a discretionary remedy and not an automatic remedy. So let us get that absolutely plain at the beginning.
Secondly, contrary to what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, said, I was at great pains to point out during the Committee stage that, whether or not it be true that journalists are in the law of libel peculiarly vulnerable to actions—which I think is manifestly the case—that is not true in relation to actions for inducing a breach of contract. Although actions for inducing a breach of contract are actions to which journalists and everybody else have been liable, and from the year dot, over the whole field, except the restricted one, since 1906, not one action could I find in which they had been subjected to the law, in contrast to the vast catalogue of actions which appear every year in cases of defamation. I presume that, had I been wrong or insufficient in my researches, one of the noble and learned Lords opposite would have been only too pleased to point out my error. So the evidence is that far from being

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particularly vulnerable to this kind of action, journalists are not more vulnerable than any ordinary human beings. In fact, they are not vulnerable at all.
BARONESS BIRK: My Lords, none of this was done within the context of the Industrial Relations Bill, and the sort of legislation that is now going through. This is a different situation.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, the noble Baroness is wholly misunderstanding the trend of my argument. Journalists have always been vulnerable to far more extensive actions for inducing a breach of contract, most of which we are removing except in this restricted sphere; but the fact is that they have never been sued. Not only is the case that they are particularly vulnerable to actions of this kind not made out at all, but the presumptive case against it is absolutely overwhelming. I am not going to deal any further with the specific position of journalists under this Amendment (although I shall have to refer to them again under Amendment No. 92 when it is moved) because this Amendment is not restricted to journalists. So far as I can make out, it applies by reference—and a more extraordinary proposal for legislation by reference I have seldom seen—the whole of the law of defamation in relation to qualified privilege and fair comment to everybody, whether journalists or not. That is the proposal which is solemnly put before the House. Why it should be thought that the particular defences, the logical criteria, which are available in an action of libel or slander should be particularly relevant to actions under this Bill before the Industrial Court for inducing a breach of contract, I am not able to understand.
The next thing which emerges from this particular Amendment is that, quite contrary to what the noble and learned Lord said in his opening speech, I was at particular pains to attack the underlying philosophy of an Amendment of this kind at its root. Once one has accepted that"inducing"means"knowingly induce "—which it always did, but which in order to avoid the smallest degree of doubt I have willingly had inserted in the Bill so that we now know it beyond peradventure—the whole of this kind of defence becomes superfluous because no fair and
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accurate report of what is said at a public meeting, whether it is by a journalist or a member of the public, is an inducement to breach of contract.
In order to achieve that result, we now know that it has to be done knowingly and with the intention to produce the result. No comment can be either and be a fair expression of opinion on a matter of public interest. If, on the other hand, it is established that what is done is done deliberately to induce a breach of contract, within any meaning for the purposes of defamation so far as it is applicable to this Bill or can be applied to this Bill at all clearly, the defence of fair comment"would disappear in smoke, because if one thing is certain about the defence of fair comment it is that it must be in good faith and without an oblique motive. There the oblique motive would be established by the complainant before the start. The point about this Amendment is that it is both unnecessary and objectionable, and I advise the House to reject it.
10.3 p.m.
LORD STOW HILL: My Lords, I do not wish to prolong the debate, but merely to comment on what has been said. Certainly I did not understand my noble and learned friend—
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I hope the noble Lord will forgive me for a moment. I do not complain in the least, I am only pointing out that what he is about to do—that is to say, after the Government's reply to make another speech—is exactly what was complained of about my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn earlier in the afternoon.
LORD STOW HILL: Certainly I considered I was winding up the debate. That is what I thought I was expected to do, and if the House is prepared to listen I should very much like to address the House.
I did not understand my noble and learned friend to be saying anything other than that there was a new concept—namely, that of an unfair industrial practice—introduced by this Bill. He is not criticising it; he simply says it is a fact. With that new concept introduced a state of some uncertainty exists as to how the position of the journalist is left. I should have thought that that was obviously

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right. In my view, my noble friend Lady Birk put her finger upon a very important point, that we are anxious not to inhibit journalists from freely exercising their profession. It would be a great misfortune if uncertainty spread as to whether a journalist could be at risk if he were somewhat too outspoken and if, as a result, over the years editorial offices started issuing cautions and saying to their staff,"If you wish to bash strikers "—that was the noble Baroness's phrase—" go ahead; you are perfectly safe so long as you have regard to the law of libel. If, on the other hand, you feel in honour bound to support them, if you feel that they have a very strong case indeed and you cannot conscientiously, and having regard to your responsibility, write without expressing a strong opinion that they ought to do what their leaders say and strike, then you are on dangerous ground. Watch your step."
Now the difficulty in this sort of situation is that these results creep in insidiously. They do not creep in in six months; they creep in in a year. What happens is that after some time the matter is perhaps tested in the courts, and it may turn out that a particular journalist, because he has used rather extravagant language in perfectly good faith, and well within the bounds of what we accept as the normal limits of free speech in this country, has gone to the length of saying to them,"I think you ought to strike ". I do not want to go again through the elements of"inducing"and"knowingly inducing ": we have had them over and over again, and it would not assist your Lordships to rehearse them still once more. I have submitted to the House before, and I feel I must submit again, this case. Suppose you have a journalist who honestly thinks that they ought to strike and says so; who says so in editorial comment, who says so in no unmeasured terms and who may be absolutely right in saying so, who may be saying perfectly justly what they ought to do. It may be the case that he is knowingly inducing them to break their contract of employment, and that by so doing he renders himself liable under the Bill to pay what may be to him a perfectly crippling sum by way of compensation. I know that this is a new and discretionary jurisdiction, but the courts must administer it as they find it formu-
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lated in the text of the Bill. That is what my noble and learned friend was saying, I thought so cogently, in moving his Amendment.
I hope that the Government, even at this late stage, will realise that here at least there is a danger; and if there is a danger I would have thought the logical result would be that someone should do something to try to provide a special protection for the journalist. I have had another try, as my noble and learned friend has said, in the Amendment which I have put down, to take account of the criticisms that were made; but whether it will be useful to take up your Lordships' time by moving that Amendment when its turn comes I very much doubt in view of what has been said. However, I do ask your Lordships to give further thought to this attempt by my noble and learned friend to which I have added my name.
I should like to say this to the Government. One criticism which the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor made was that this Amendment went too far, and I think he was referring to the words
"…or to publish, whether orally or in writing his honest opinion on a matter of public interest."
The gravamen of the argument is that we should protect journalists, and, if I may say so with respect, it is a point that the particular words I have just cited give protection to people who cannot claim to be journalists or to be writing as such. I would simply ask the Government to consider between now and Third Reading whether, unless they think that really this risk is wholly elusive, which I do not, they could not accept the Amendment leaving out those last words. In other words, could they not accept that the privilege which is available to a journalist in terms of the 1952 Act should be made expressly available to him so as to protect him from any risk under Clause 96 of the Bill?
I want to say just one other thing. Some years back members of the Bar discovered, much to their dismay, that they might be held liable in negligence for the work that they did as barristers. So far as I know, no action has been brought against barristers for a century; and I would submit that it is not really conclusive at all to say that actions

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have not been brought against journalists. Things were different in the last century. People's ideas were quite different. Legislation dealing with industrial action had not got very far. It did not get to a key point until 1906, when one had the Trade Disputes Act. I would submit that the mere fact that there were no actions in very different circumstances, when thinking and social conditions were utterly different from what they are to-day, is not really a reliable indication that journalists are safe. That is what I should like to say in reply, and I hope the House will take it. I do not know whether my noble and learned friend wishes to add anything. I hope, therefore, that the Government, if they feel they cannot accept the whole Amendment, will accept at any rate that part of it which incorporates the relevant provisions of the 1952 Defamation Act.
10.10 p.m.
LORD GARDINER: My Lords, we shall have an opportunity to consider this matter again when discussing Amendment No. 92. I do not therefore wish to take up further time, but as a matter of courtesy—no: I need not trouble the House; I was going to make a further reply to the noble Earl, Lord Balfour, but I see that he is not in the Chamber.
I am naturally disappointed. My Amendment is not limited to journalists. Perhaps for the Record I should refer to the point made by the noble Earl, Lord Balfour, that we are all protected by Clause 132, and point out that is not so, because that deals with a tort. We all understand the position about torts. That is now removed. That will be further made plain by Amendment 91H, a Government Amendment:
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" The Industrial Court shall not have any jurisdiction except that…expressly conferred on it by or under this Act; and accordingly that Court…shall not entertain any proceedings in tort…"
So we are not dealing with tort at all. We are not dealing with inducing a breach of contract as such; we are not dealing with a breach of contract. We are dealing solely with this new thing, an unfair industrial practice, on which a complaint can be made and on which a court can make, not an injunction, we are told, but an order in the nature of an injunction, and award not damages but compensation.
It is different from the old tort of inducement of breach of contract because there you always had the defence of justification. If in all the circumstances the court thought you were justified in doing what you had done you were not liable. That defence has been taken away in relation to this new unfair industrial practice. My Lords, I am disappointed. It is a matter, I should have thought, of serious consideration whether there should not be occasions on which, not in the interests of an individual but in the public interest, there should be a measure of protection, particularly for people who are doing no more than honestly saying what they think on an important matter of public interest, even though perhaps, because that person is in a particularly influential position, or is writing in a local newspaper with a wide circulation, it has the effect of leading to men saying,"I really cannot put up with these working conditions any longer." Having settled that, my Lords, I beg leave to withdrawn the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 97 [Industrial action in support of unfair industrial practice]:
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, this is one of the sequences that I explained fully and that we discussed fully before. I beg to move Amendment No. 81A.
Amendment moved—
Page 73, line 40, at beginning insert (" Subject to subsection (3) of this section ".)—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, this Amendment is the next in the same series. I beg to move Amendment No. 81B.
Amendment moved—
Page 74, leave out lines I to 3 and insert (" further any action which has been taken, whether by him or by any other person, and which, in accordance with any provision of this Act, constituted an unfair industrial practice ").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment 81D.
Page 74, line 5, leave out (" procuring or financing ") and insert (" or procuring ").
The noble Lord said: This Amendment occurs in the clause dealing with industrial action in support of unfair industrial practice, the first subsection of which states that
" It shall be an unfair industrial practice for any person…to take any of the steps specified in the next following subsection,".
The next following subsection states
" The steps referred to in the preceding subsection are—

(a) calling, organising, procuring or financing a strike."

The Amendment proposes those four steps should be reduced to three; namely, calling, organising or procuring a strike. We are told by the Government—and we accept it—that a mere contribution to a strike does not constitute an unfair industrial practice.
I do not wish to be unfair with the"sub-committee"going on on the Front Bench opposite, but this House is so ill-equipped for that kind of thing. There is over-close proximity, and I do not want to overhear, by mistake, what the
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noble Lord is saying. As I was saying, it has been established that contributing to the funds of a strike is not an unfair industrial practice. But it is an unfair industrial practice for a person to pass the hat round for that purpose. This is carrying the matter too far. It is objectionable that pressure of this kind should be used in order to prevent a strike taking place. One offers no comment on the strike itself; the mere act of passing the hat round is itself an unfair industrial practice and one wants if possible to have that removed. I dwell upon this matter also because each of this series of steps, calling, organising, procuring, financing, constitutes an unfair industrial practice. If this Amendment were accepted one of those would be eliminated. The act of calling would still be an offence of this kind whatever kind it is. Organising would be one; procuring would be one.
It is because of this that I refer to the total number of these new offences created by this Bill. They were first calculated by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Donovan, who said there were at least 179. I have always accepted his calculation. I like to get figures right in anything I say; if my figures are wrong I offer my apologies to the House. The figure is wrong and I offer my apologies to the House. The figure is not 179, it is 218. A list has been prepared and is available for checking by noble Lords opposite. This Bill introduces 218 different steps, each one of which constitutes an unfair industrial practice. It is not for me to say whether or not that is a tort. It is a new offence and that is apparently what the Government mean by their legal framework for industrial relations. There are 218 steps, each one of which constitutes an unfair industrial practice. It is one too many, and therefore I seek to persuade your Lordships to accept this Amendment which would reduce it to 217. I beg to move.
10.20 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I must ask the pardon of the House if on this Amendment I show myself slightly more incoherent than I normally like to be. The reason is that I was given this block of Amendments to deal with but this particular one was marked as having been dealt with under

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Clause 65 and no additional information was vouchsafed to me; and so I have had rather rapidly to procure the former brief which was supplied to my noble friend. I will not go into the, to my mind, absurd enumeration of possible unfair industrial practices in which the noble Lord has just indulged. It is achieved by an extreme form of pedantry which bears no relation to reality. Let me give an example. If a strike is called by a strike leader for one unfair industrial practice—let us say, to compel somebody to join the union to which he does not belong—that is one unfair industrial practice and that set of circumstances will constitute only one, however often it is redefined.
Quite obviously, when one is putting in a Bill the various steps which will constitute the instigation of a strike one will put in"procure ", one will put in"organise ", one will put in—which this Amendment seeks to take out"finance "; but it does not make three different sets of actions in relation to concrete circumstances. Only the most pedantic lawyer, familiar with the oldest and most obsolete forms of enumerating the counts in an indictment, could possibly start seriously to enumerate things in that way. When I gave, in a much earlier state of this Bill—so long ago that I am an older and a wiser man—the figure of 25 as being about right, I gave what was much more like the reality of the case. The difference is based on a difference of enumeration; it is based on the fact that my figure is a realistic one while the other is a fanciful one which could have been invented only by a follower of the Mediaeval School and the counting of angels on the point of an imaginary needle.
It might help if I were to start by explaining the reasons why financing industrial action imposes a liability upon those responsible. Liability for the unfair industrial practices which are enumerated is imposed on those responsible for initiating and furthering industrial action in the circumstances with which the various clauses deal. Instituting, calling, organising or procuring industrial action are various ways of describing the means of getting it under way. On the other hand, financing industrial action once it has
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started is a means of ensuring that, for instance, the strike is effectively maintained and carried on. In practice, of course, some or all of these activities may, as I have already pointed out, be interrelated in point of time, and it is not possible to say whether or not one follows the other. The point is that, although each can be described as a separate activity, they are all directed to the same end: ensuring the effectiveness of the action in question.
Therefore it follows that where the promoter of industrial action is made liable under the Bill for proceedings before the Industrial Court, the person or organisation responsible incurs that liability whether he or it takes one or more of the promotional actions or whether they do so at the same or different periods of time. Thus, for instance, a trade union which supports a strike by paying out strike pay is just as much responsible for the strike as the person who called it or organised it.
Similarly, an employer who gives direct financial help to another employer to enable that other to institute and carry on a lockout is responsible for financing the lockout. At the Committee stage, doubts were expressed about the meaning of finance"in relation to the what are now Clauses 97 and 139. My noble friend undertook at that stage to write to the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, about the points raised. I understand that my noble friend has carried out this undertaking. But from what I have said I hope it will he clear that the interpretation of the word"finance"in the context of these clauses, and in others where the same principle applies, cannot extend to cover anyone who is merely a source of funds or is participating in the supply of funds, whether or not he knows for what purpose they will be used. The person or organisation responsible for financing is the one who makes use of the funds to finance industrial action. He alone will be liable, if such action is liable, to proceedings before the Industrial Court as an unfair industrial practice or in respect of contravention of an emergency restraint order. In his letter to Lord Diamond, my noble friend gave two reasons why the National Insurance Act which was mentioned at the Committee

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stage was not a relevant precedent in respect to the interpretation of"financing ". In the first place, that Act is concerned with assessing the rights of an individual employee to unemployment benefit where there is a strike at his place of work arising from a trade dispute in which he is assumed to have an interest. Secondly, it relates to the involvement of the individual employee in the trade dispute causing the stoppage of work, whereas this Bill is concerned only with those responsible for promoting the industrial action.
In the context of the Government Amendment to Clause 65(7), which I think has been passed, there are additional reasons for resisting the Amendments to delete"finance ". Clause 55(7) as amended will in part prohibit an organisation of workers from disciplining any of its members who refuse or fail to take part in a strike or other irregular industrial action that has been called otherwise than in support of an industrial dispute or the inducement which constituted an unfair industrial practice. The Amendments would have the effect of enabling an organisation to take such disciplinary action against members, provided that it had merely been given financial support for the strike without actually organising or procuring it. For example, a group of its members might unofficially cause a strike for purely political motives for which the organisation gave tacit support by subsequently granting strike pay to the participants. In this situation, the organisation will not be precluded from disciplining members who chose to ignore the strike call, but such an anomalous situation is clearly undesirable since it would encourage unofficial action as a way of getting round the restriction.
I hope your Lordships will therefore agree that there are sound reasons for asserting that those who finance industrial action must bear responsibility for the effects of that action. I have also tried to show that in the context of the relevant clauses, the word"financing"cannot be interpreted to include those who are not themselves responsible for initiating or furthering the action in question. I would ask the House not to accept this Amendment.
10.29 p.m.
LORD DELACOURT-SMITH: My Lords, I do not wish to detain the House for long; but it seems to me that some indication should be given of what seems to me to be the effect of the inclusion of these words in the Bill in the light of the explanation contained in the letter which Lord Drumalbyn so courteously sent to my noble friend (and of which he was good enough to give me a sight) and in view of the explanation of the noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack. If I understand the position aright, we may well have the situation after the passage of the Bill, in which (shall we say for the purposes of the argument?) an unregistered organisation of workers embarks upon a dispute and other groups of workers—in the same trade union, the same organisation or possibly in other organisations or in registered trade unions—arrange collections for the assistance of those who have withdrawn their labour. That would be, as I understand it, an unfair industrial practice. It would be the case even if the collections were organised—as indeed such collections are organised—primarily for the humanitarian purpose of minimising the family suffering to which the strike gives rise. We have been told—and indeed it is not surprising because it was put fairly clearly in the Bill—that those who organise such assistance to fellow workers can themselves be regarded as guilty of unfair industrial action and proceedings can be initiated against them. This seems to be an extraordinary situation to find in a Bill which is supposed to be dealing with the amelioration of industrial relations. I should have thought that such a development, if I have correctly understood it, far from ameliorating industrial relations would do much to embitter them.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I do not wish to detain your Lordships unduly at this hour of the night, but what my noble friend, Lord Delacourt-Smith, has said echoes my own views on the matter. I can only repeat that I think it is objectionable in the extreme to include passing the hat round as"an unfair industrial practice ". It means, as my noble friend has said, that the rest of the argument cannot take place except under duress and hardship of one kind or another.

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I must return for one moment to the 218 steps. From what the noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack has said, there is no doubt that if we remove this further offence by accepting the Amendment then the number of steps would be reduced by one. There would still be all these others. It makes it perfectly clear that we are right in what we say—not pedantic, not counting angels but just counting the steps created by the Government as creating offences. It is too late to pursue the matter unduly and we still have an enormous Marshalled List in front of us, so I shall not seek to take up time by dividing your Lordships' House. We are totally unsatisfied with the position, but all I can do in the circumstances is to seek permission to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved Amendment No. 81C:
Page 74, line 9, at end insert—
(" (3) Any steps taken or threatened to be taken by a trade union or an employers' association for the purpose of furthering any action which—

(a)has been taken by one or more officials or members of the trade union or employers' association; and

(b)constituted an unfair industrial practice by virtue only of section 96 of this Act,

shall not be an unfair industrial practice by virtue of this section.")
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move this Amendment. This is the last of the series which I explained some time ago on Clauses 96 and 97, and is in fact the one I have described which makes it plain that a union which endorses officially an unofficial action does not thereby become liable.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 98 [Industrial action against extraneous parties]:
LORD GARDINER: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 82:
Amendment moved—
Page 74, line 19, after (" is,") insert (" knowingly ").—(Lord Gardiner.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
10.35 p.m.
LORD DELACOURT-SMITH LORD DELACOURT-SMITH moved Amendment No. 82F:
Page 74, line 20 leave out (" or to prevent him from performing it ")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move this Amendment. At an earlier stage we indicated our general views on Clause 98, and a short while ago I referred to what appears to us to be the inequity of this group of clauses and the way in which the balance is tilted in the direction of the employer and against the employee. In those circumstances, and at this stage of the Bill, it can be our main objective only to try to remove from Clause 98 some of those phrases which make it as wide as it is. The purpose of this Amendment, therefore, is to limit somewhat the effect of subsection (I) (b). I think its effect is clear enough from the wording. I beg to move.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, Clause 98 has a different purpose from Clause 96 or Clause 97. Clause 96 attacks inducing a breach of contract, subject to the limitations of that clause; Clause 97 renders unfair actions done in furtherance of actions which are already unfair industrial practices; but Clause 98 renders unfair as an industrial practice any specified steps taken in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute against an extraneous party to the dispute—that is, a person who has no direct interest in the dispute. The conditions for the application of the clause are set out in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c), and this Amendment to line 20 is to omit part of paragraph (b), which says:
" his purpose or principal purpose in taking or threatening to take those steps is to induce that other person to break that contract or to prevent him from performing it;…"
The reason why we have these words in Clause 98 and not in Clause 96 or Clause 132 is explained by the different purpose of Clause 98, which is designed to protect extraneous parties. We think that it should be maintained in the clause, because it provides more protection in respect of inducement of breach of commercial contract in contemplation or in furtherance of an industrial dispute than the law as it now stands. For this reason we cannot accept the Amendment, which would destroy the balance of Clause 98 that we have set out to create.

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Apart from that, there is a sound reason for making interference in a contract, by preventing its performance, an unfair industrial practice under this clause. There are contracts, many of a long-term nature, whose execution can be stopped completely at a given point in time without, technically, any breach having occurred. However, the loss to the parties to the contract can be just as great as if the contract had actually been breached. Since we have given specific protection to this type of damaging interference in Clause 132 and have not made it an unfair industrial practice under Clause 96, we would indeed be remiss under this clause if, in seeking to protect innocent third parties against industrial action directed against their commercial contracts, we were to exclude a deliberate act of interference which prevented the execution of the contract merely on the ground that no breach had actually resulted from that act. I would therefore ask your Lordships to reject the Amendment.
LORD DELA COURT-SMITH: My Lords, I feel that my noble friends and I cannot withdraw this Amendment, but we do not propose to divide the House upon it. I think it is quite clear from the speech that has been made by the noble and learned Lord that the observations I made earlier upon the general effect and balance of these clauses were quite justified.
On Question, Amendment negatived.
LORD DELACOURT-SMITH LORD DELACOURT-SMITH moved Amendment No. 82H:
Page 74, line 27, leave out from"not"to"taken"in line 28.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 82H. It is consistent with the view which I expressed on the earlier Amendment that we on this side of the House regard the definition of"extraneous party"given in this clause as an excessively wide one. In particular, it is hard to see the justification for the particular phrase which the Amendment seeks to delete from the Bill. In the circumstances in which this paragraph would have application, there would be a dispute between a trade union and an employer. It would be a dispute in which each side would be
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using such resources as were available to it, and in which each side would no doubt be anxious to maximise the support which it could receive from other parties.
Subsection 2(b) deals with the situation of a person who has taken action in material support of a party to the dispute. It does not seem to us to matter whether that action has been taken in contemplation or furtherance of the trade dispute or not. The action, by definition, with which we are concerned is action which is in material support of a party to the dispute. In those circumstances, it would seem to us quite logical and proper to omit these words which the Amendment seeks to delete. The material question before us surely is whether in fact action which is taken by another party does or does not support a party to the dispute. It is not the motives of the individual who takes the action but whether indeed his action does or does not bring support to a party in dispute. For it to be said that for an individual whose action does give such material support to a party, to be an extraneous party merely because he has not taken the action which objectively is a factor in the situation, specifically in contemplation or furtherance of that dispute, is quite illogical and unreasonable and we would ask your Lordships to delete these words. I beg to move.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, this is a new Amendment, being a starred one, and I am a little surprised to see it put down on the Marshalled List. The subsection with which the Amendment deals is subsection (2). Clause 98, as I explained in relation to the last Amendment, renders it an unfair industrial practice to take action of the specified kind against parties who are not parties to the industrial dispute, referred to in the side note as"extraneous parties "—innocent third parties. For the purposes of that subsection a person is regarded as an extraneous party or innocent third party in relation to an industrial dispute if he is not a party to that dispute and he has not taken, in contemplation or furtherance of the dispute, any action in material support of the parties to it.
The noble Lord solemnly proposes to leave out the words"in contemplation or furtherance of that dispute ". The

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effect of that would be that anybody who at any time had given material support to a party who happened to be a party to the dispute would not be regarded as extraneous; and it would involve all those who had commercial contracts, or who perhaps at some time had lent money to a party to the dispute even though they had no bearing on the dispute at all, to be hit out at blindly, and if it were passed the Amendment would be a licence to hit out blindly against absolutely innocent third parties.
Anyone who, by means of a normal commercial contract to supply goods or services, has taken action materially to support the activities of an employer—or, I suppose, a trade unionist—who is a party to an industrial dispute, might be regarded as involving himself, even though the contract has no bearing whatever on the industrial dispute in question. A customer of the party in dispute, who has undertaken to receive goods from that party, might be regarded as being involved in the dispute and so legitimately liable to industrial action, even though the contract has nothing to do with the dispute and he has no interest one way or another. I suppose it could mean that any person who had given financial assistance to a party to a dispute could also be regarded as being involved when, quite obviously, that kind of assistance might have no bearing at all on the dispute in question. That is what the noble Lord has proposed, and I do not advise the House to accept the Amendment.
LORD DELACOURT-SMITH: My Lords, we are of course dealing with situations, as I sought to describe, in which an industrial dispute is taking place. I think it is a travesty of the facts to suggest that in such a situation it is the custom of trade unions to strike out quite wildly and indiscriminately. It has been their custom in certain sets of circumstances, either through their own trade union or, in some cases, through the action of friendly trade unions, to take action against parties other than those who are direct parties to the dispute.
What this Bill seeks to do in this particular section is to circumscribe the freedom of action in such situations as narrowly as possible. I am bound to say that I believe the form of words which we have before us does circumscribe trade
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union activity quite unreasonably in this way, and I would still urge your Lordships to delete the words which are specified in the Amendment. However, again I recognise that this is not a matter on which it is profitable in the light of our time-table to divide the House. Although I do not feel able to withdraw the Amendment, I shall not divide the House upon it.
On Question, Amendment negatived.
10.50 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved Amendment No. 82A:
Page 74, line 31, after (" section ") insert (" as a party to an industrial dispute or ").
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, the purpose of this Amendment is to ensure that an employer who is an associated employer in relation to a party to a dispute, or who is a member of the same organisation of employers, or who contributes to an indemnity fund, shall not for those reasons alone be considered to be either a party to a dispute or to be materially supporting a party to a dispute.
Your Lordships will by now bear in mind that the purpose of Clause 98 is to make unfair the calling of industrial action against someone not in any way involved in the dispute with the purpose of interfering in a commercial contract between him and a party to the dispute. Subsection (2), which we have already discussed in connection with an earlier Amendment, makes it clear that to qualify to be considered as an"extraneous party ", the person concerned must not participate in the dispute either as a party to it or by giving material support to one of the parties in contemplation of it.
During the Committee stage an assurance was given on behalf of the Government that the mere fact of association between two companies does not necessarily mean that each of them must automatically be regarded as participating in a dispute to which the other is a party. Similarly, the mere general contribution to an indemnity fund not related to a specific dispute should not imply interference in a dispute merely on the ground that at some point in time someone who is a party to a dispute can take advantage of the fund.
The three conditions set out in subsection (3) as now drafted do not for that reason alone imply that material support

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is being given to a party to a dispute. It was thought reasonably self-evident, for reasons that I have given, that none of these conditions could raise any presumption that someone was participating in a dispute, as a party to it, unless the facts showed this to be so. For instance, a member of a large employers' association would not be presumed to be a party to a local dispute—perhaps on some matter of internal policy—involving another member in a different part of the country. Or, to take another example, a member of a large conglomerate organisation would not be presumed to be a party to a dispute affecting another member in a different industry, perhaps in another part of the country, when the dispute did not concern his industry or his company.
All that the Amendment does is to make this clear. It sets out that an associated employer, a member of the same employers' organisation, or an employer who makes a contribution to a general indemnity fund, shall not for that reason alone be unable to claim the status of an"extraneous party"to a dispute, that is someone who is not actually involved in the dispute nor is materially supporting one of the parties to it. Obviously, if a person is participating in the dispute in either of these ways subsection (3) will not protect him, and it will be perfectly legitimate for a union (or for that matter anyone else) to organise a strike against him for the purposes set out in subsection (1). I hope that this Amendment clarifies the Bill without really altering its sense, and for that reason I beg to move.
LORD DELACOURT-SMITH: My Lords, as I have explained on earlier Amendments, my noble friends and I regard the terms of this clause, and particularly those of subsections (2) and (3), as too wide. In those circumstances we can hardly welcome any Amendment, however modest, which can have no effect but to widen them still further. In those circumstances I am afraid we cannot on this side give a welcome to this Amendment.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
10.56 p.m.
LORD DELACOURT-SMITH LORD DELACOURT-SMITH moved Amendment No. 82C:
Page 74, line 33, leave out paragraph (a).
The noble Lord said: My Lords, although in the interests of saving the time of your Lordships' House I have abstained from moving a number of Amendments which we had on the Marshalled List bearing upon this clause, I feel that Amendment No. 82C is one upon which I should state the case to your Lordships. If we turn to the definition of associated companies in the definition clause, which has now reached the number of 163, we find that in subsection (6) of that clause on page 125, it says:
" For the purposes of this Act any two employers are to be treated as associated if one is a company of which the other (directly or indirectly) has control, or if both are companies of which a third person (directly or indirectly) has control; and in this Act associated employer' shall be construed accordingly."
We are dealing here with a situation in which an industrial dispute has arisen with an employer who has associations as close as this definition indicates with other companies. It is a most reasonable expectation that with companies so intimately associated assistance of various kinds will be made available in various ways to the employer who is the direct party to the industrial dispute. It may not be easy for any outsider to establish precisely what steps are being taken within this close association of companies to bring assistance to the employer who is directly involved in the dispute; but it would hardly be surprising if trade unions made an assumption, or if trade unions, upon some evidence which appeared to them to be sound, took the view that this close association between the companies concerned was leading to some assistance being given to the employer who was directly involved in the dispute. It appears to us to be almost an academic step to seek to suggest that an associated employer is entitled to be regarded as a person extraneous to the dispute and as not having taken any action in material support of the employer who is party to it. In those circumstances we believe it would be reasonable to omit this paragraph from the subsection. I beg to move.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, we have threshed this out so thoroughly on Committee—and to some extent I did anticipate a little the merits of this proposed Amendment when I was

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proposing my own clarificatory Amendment a few moments ago—that I almost hesitate to say anything by way of amplification; but I must just summarise our reasons against it because it is in fact a complete reversal of the presumption that we are seeking to make in this paragraph (a), the association of employers, for the purposes of this clause. Clause 98 makes unfair industrial actions against parties who are extraneous to the dispute. That, I am afraid, I have said too often, but it is a basic conception in approaching any of the Amendments on this clause. Subsection (1) gives the conditions in which the subsection bites; subsection (2) gives the definition of"extraneous party "; subsection (3) is for the purpose of establishing that three classes of person do not in fact, by reason only of belonging to that class, become parties to the dispute, and the first class is that of an associated employer.
The Amendment seeks to overcome this presumption in relation to the associated employer, and to say that, notwithstanding that the associated employer is working in perhaps quite a different industry, notwithstanding that he is working in quite a different part of the country, he must, by that fact alone, be regarded as a party to any industrial dispute in which that employer became involved even though he had no connection with the dispute in question. That is the proposition to which we are asked to subscribe as"almost academic "—I think those were the noble Lord's words. We regard it as not only not academic but singularly perverse to make that the case, if, as I suppose, this Amendment is to be read with the new subsection (4) which is to be proposed later in amendment 82E—which I think is a legitimate assumption. I have repeatedly made it plain that if an associated employer does take action of the kind specified in subsection (2)(b) of the clause he is not protected by this subsection. On the contrary, he will then be involving himself in the dispute and thereafter any union will be entitled to take action against him of the kind which would otherwise be prohibited. So long as he does not involve himself in the dispute, we regard it as perverse to say that he is to be regarded as being involved, when in fact he is not, by reason solely of the fact that he is an associated employer
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within the meaning of the Bill, and for that reason, which I have explained more than once, I would press the House not to accept this Amendment.
On Question, Amendment negatived.
11.5 p.m.
LORD DELACOURT-SMITH LORD DELACOURT-SMITH moved Amendment No. 82D:
Page 74, line 37, after (" contributed ") insert (" but has ceased to contribute ")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 82D. I hope that this may reasonably be regarded as an Amendment to clarify the present purpose of subsection (3)(c). Subsection (3)(c) states that a person shall not be regarded as having given material support to a party to a dispute merely by reason of the fact that he has contrbuted to a fund which may be available to such a party by way of relief. As at present drafted, the Bill does not say,"is contributing to a fund ", it says"has contributed to a fund ". We are therefore perhaps entitled to assume that this means that this is an act which has taken place and has been completed in the past. But there is, of course, an element of ambiguity here in the phraseology as it stands at present in subsection (3(c). Our Amendment seeks to clarify this by insisting that for a person to have the benefit of the exclusion which (3)(c) confers upon him from being regarded as in any way a party to a dispute, it should be clear that his contribution to the fund in question has ceased and that he is no longer contributing to the fund, that he is not engaged, for example, in some arrangement for periodic payments to the fund. I hope that your Lordships' House will feel able to accept this as a necessary clarification of subsection (3)(c). I beg to move.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I am afraid that again this is not entirely an unploughed field. The seed I am about to scatter upon it has been scattered before, although apparently it has failed to germinate in the minds of the Opposition Front Bench; but I will not weary in well doing. This Amendment raises an issue which we discussed at some length at the Committee stage. For our part, we cannot accept that a person who has contributed in the past to an indemnity fund, which had no bearing upon a current

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dispute at the time when he made the contribution, should create any presumption that the contributor must, by that reason alone, be involved in a dispute to which some other contributor to the same fund is a party; and this must apply, in our belief, whether or not any further general contributions into the fund will be made.
The question of retrospective funding does not affect the merits of the case. I cannot imagine that there could be any need to give specific protection to somebody who at the time of the dispute is not even contributing to the fund which might be used to help an employer who is, or has been, involved. The question arises only in relation to payments which have been made at some time into a fund which was established without reference to a particular dispute, and we think that such contribution ought not, for that reason alone, to involve the contributor in any dispute for which the fund might thereafter be applied. I should have thought that this was fairly plain sailing. After all, the contributor cannot know at the time of the payment how the fund will be applied, or if it is applied at all. Nor can he get his money back if it is used in relation to a particular dispute in which he is not involved, and of which he may easily disapprove. He is in the same position in relation to the dispute as a member of a union who has paid a general contribution to a strike fund.
It is important to make it absolutely plain that the subsection does not protect a person who contributes to a fund raised specifically for the purposes of a particular dispute, and in that situation it will not even be necessary to know that he knows about the purposes of the fund, nor to establish that he is not an extraneous party. It is also important, in my respectful submission to the House, not to be led away entirely by the airy remarks from the Opposition Front Bench, suggesting that people do not hit out blindly in these cases. There are at least two reported cases in the last ten years—Stratford v. Lindley and Torquay Hotels v. Cousins—where the most blind hitting out took place. We are not talking about academic possibilities; we are talking about actualities. The fact that the noble Lord wants to
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omit the protection given to contributors to a general indemnity fund, when the contributors cannot affect the outcome of the particular dispute and have parted with their money before they knew what the dispute was about, indicates that what we are talking about is not an academic possibility but a reality. For the reasons I have given, I fear more than once now, I must ask the House to reject the Amendment.
LORD DELACOURT-SMITH: My Lords, I am afraid that my noble friends and I are hardly likely to find that reply a very convincing one. As the noble and learned Lord has said, this is not the first occasion on which we have traversed this ground and I am sorry that the seed which he has sown so lavishly has on some occasions fallen on such stony ground. I think that this is an unworthy subsection. It clearly opens the way to a group of employers who have a fund for mutual self-defence. It may indeed be a fund deliberately launched in contemplation of a series of disputes with the trade unions, although when the employers launch the fund and make their contributions to it they cannot say precisely which employer will be involved at any time or what the issue of the dispute may be. But this subsection allows the employers who have established such a fund to be regarded, when the dispute actually arises, as parties extraneous to it. I think that is stretching common sense a little far. I think individuals should show that they have ceased to contribute to a fund and are not merely in the process of making their periodical contributions, as they could be if I read this subsection aright. Surely our Amendment, to ensure that they should show that they have ceased to contribute before they can he regarded as extraneous parties, is reasonable, and I am sorry that it does not commend itself to the Government.
On Question, Amendment negatived.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved Amendment No. 82B:
Page 74, line 42, at end insert (" or
(d)supplies goods to, or provides services for, a party to the industrial dispute in pursuance of a contract entered into before the industrial dispute began, or is a party to such a contract under which he is or may be required to supply goods to, or provide services for, a party to the industrial dispute.")
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment seeks to introduce into subsection (3), which we have been discussing, a new paragraph, (d). The intention of the Amendment is to make it plain that a person who has entered into a contract to supply goods or provide services, or who may be required to do so with another person who afterwards becomes a party to a dispute, shall not be regarded for that' reason alone as a party or as giving material support to the party, provided the contract was entered into before the dispute began. There has been continual and considerable discussion about the circumstances in which the actual performance of a commercial contract might be regarded as participation in the dispute. The Amendment seeks to clarify the position while maintaining a fair balance between the right of parties to the dispute involving secondary industrial action. Broadly speaking, its effect is that it will be unfair for a union to organise strike action against a contractor for the purpose of interfering with a contract made by him with the party to the industrial dispute before the dispute began, unless that contractor is involved in the dispute as a party or has been giving material support to the party otherwise than by the existence of the contract. Conversely, it will be legitimate for a union to organise action against a contractor who has entered into a contract with a party to the dispute after the dispute began unless the contractor can show that he is not in any way participating in the dispute.
We think this is a fairer balance as between the various interests than exists at present. There is at present no protection at all under the Act of 1906 against liability in tort for inducing a breach of contract other than a contract of employment, whether or not the action was done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute. There have been a number of cases in recent years involving what might be called secondary activities by unions; there have been a number of injunctions or awards for damages against them. The point is that the answer to the unfair industrial practice in Clause 98, that the person induced to break the commercial contract was giving support to the party to the industrial dispute, would not be available as such to the
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respondents at common law, apart from this section. Therefore, we think it is reasonable to make it clear that the protection should not be available under the clause merely by reason of the fact that a contractor has entered into a contract with a party to the dispute before the dispute began. It will still be open to a union to show that, apart from that fact, he is indeed interfering in the dispute, and for that reason strike action against his contract is legitimate. In these circumstances, I beg to move.
LORD DELACOURT-SMITH: As I have said on earlier Amendments, I am conscious of the hour, and it would not be appropriate for me to speak at any length upon this Amendment. My noble friends and I have addressed ourselves to this question and we have put down a later Amendment, No. 82J, which in our view is a more reasonable way of dealing with this problem. In those circumstances although we cannot accept the terms of the Amendment which the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, has proposed, I am not going to discuss it at length, nor to divide the House upon it.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
11.20 p.m.
LORD STOW HILL LORD STOW HILL moved Amendment No. 82J:
Page 74, line 42, at end insert—
(" (4) A person shall be regarded as having taken action in material support of a party to an industrial dispute if such person enters or has entered into any arrangements with such party for the transfer to such person of the production or supply or any goods or the provision of any services theretofore produced or provided by such party, unless it is shown that such arrangements are or were made, as the case may be, on purely commercial considerations and independently of the existence of such industrial dispute and not with the intention of assisting such party in any way in relation to such industrial dispute.")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg shortly to move this Amendment. It follows a path similar to that followed on the occasion of the last Amendment. It is, again, an attempt to give precision with regard to a person who is not involved in a dispute. It envisages the situation in which strike action has been taken against a particular company and then it is ascertained that another company, a second company, has had transferred to it the production of services or goods theretofore produced by the first

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company. It is of course difficult for the union to ascertain in a situation of that sort whether the transfer of the production of goods or services is undertaken by the second company in order to assist the first company in the conduct of the industrial dispute or whether it has nothing to do with it.
What the Amendment seeks to do is to provide that where that has happened the onus should be upon the companies concerned to show that really that transfer had nothing to do with the industrial dispute, that it was arranged on purely commercial considerations and independently of the dispute, and that it was not undertaken with the intention on the part of the second company to assist the first company in the conduct of the industrial dispute. I submit that that does not conflict with the broad scheme of Clause 98. It simply isolates a case in which it is difficult in given circumstances to draw a conclusion as to whether the second company (in the example I have taken) should be regarded as having nothing to do with the dispute; and to make available, by shifting the onus of proof on to that company, information to show whether the transfer was for the purpose of assisting the company engaged in the dispute or had nothing to do with it. I beg to move.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, this somewhat involved Amendment appears now on the Marshalled List for the first time; but in my submission we have already done what is just in this matter by the existing terms of Clause 98(2), for we have provided there a definition of an"extraneous party"which excludes a party who, in contemplation or furtherance of a dispute, has taken any action in material support of a party to it. It will be, I would have thought, for the Industrial Court before whom a complaint is made to decide whether the party is extraneous in that sense; in other words, to decide on evidence whether he has taken any action in material support of a party to the dispute. The effect of this rather involved subsection (4) which the noble Lord has proposed is to provide a presumption which would take away the discretion of the Court, in circumstances which are really not adequate, to define the meaning of"material support ".
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Whether it is intended or not, the Amendment seems to give a definition of the meaning of"material support"for the purposes of this clause. If it does, and in so far as it does, the definition is quite defective, for it makes no mention of other forms of support which might be given, such as direct financial assistance by various means. For that reason alone I should have thought it was unacceptable. It is no benefit to try to shackle the court which is to decide a question, which is fundamentally a question of fact, by defining the words"material support ", even if it were possible to give an exhaustive definition of those words. Surely the sensible course must be to leave it to the court to decide the question in the circumstances of the case and on the evidence before it.
Secondly, and from our point of view more important, we cannot accept the presumption, whether couched in adequate terms or not, that a person is to be regarded as a party to any dispute, irrespective of the circumstances. We do not think it possible to legislate in those terms. What we have done in subsection (2)—I think it is all that we can do—is to make clear that a person will not be regarded as a participant if he is neither a party to the dispute nor has taken action in support of a party which clearly involves him in a dispute. The effect of the clause as it stands might very well be that which underlines the noble Lord's intention in moving this Amendment, but we think that should be left to the discretion of the court and to a full investigation of the circumstances of the case. For those reasons I do not find it possible to advise the House to accept this Amendment.
LORD BERNSTEIN: My Lords, it is a bit late in the night to enter into a duel with the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, especially as he appears to want to use tractors or ploughs for duelling instead of words or pistols. But he said at the beginning of his remarks,"We think we have done what is just." I always thought that what is just ought to appear to be just. The suggestion of my noble friend Lord Delacourt-Smith makes clear the meaning to people like me who have eventually to pass information to people down the industrial line. I suggest that if the

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Government cannot accept the Amendment which we should like them to accept, at least they should find words which are clearer than those in Amendment No. 82B
LORD STOW HILL: My Lord, I do not think it would assist the House to prolong the discussion. I cannot accept for a moment that this shackles the Court in the least. It simply shifts the onus of proof in a given set of circumstances. The clause has been discussed, we have heard the answer, such as it is, and I ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 101 [Complaint to Industrial Court of unfair industrial practice]:
11.29 p.m.
LORD STOW HILL LORD STOW HILL moved Amendment No. 83A:
Page 76, line 11, at end insert—
(" and
(d) is the person intended by the respondent to be directly affected by such action and has suffered loss as the immediate and proximate result of such action not being loss occasioned in any way indirectly as a consequence thereof.")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I can move this Amendment very shortly indeed. It relates to a point that I raised on Committee as to the words in Clause 101:
" the person against whom the action was taken."
The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor felt that the Amendment that
I then suggested was not satisfactory and he undertook to reconsider the language. Our objective, I think, was exactly the same. Since then he has been so good as to reconsider the language and to write me a letter on it. I tried a"Mark II"Amendment which he dealt with in his letter and this really is a"Mark III"Amendment. I am not quite sure whether the noble and learned Lord has been able to consider this, and I simply put it before him. The characteristic which is introduced is that besides requiring that the complainant shall be the person against whom the action was taken, it requires that he shall be not only intended to be directly affected but also that he shall have suffered loss as the immediate result of the action, and not indirect loss. The merit of the Amendment is that it provides a second safeguard. The general
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objective is a common one of both sides of the House—to avoid, in a given situation, a number of awards, all up to £100,000, being made in proceedings to different people who joined in those proceedings. I simply ask the noble and learned Lord, if he has been able to consider this"Mark III ", to say whether he thinks it is acceptable or not. If he has not yet had an opportunity of considering it—it was put down rather late—perhaps he would be so kind as to say that he will look at it in due course.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, as the noble Lord has said, this Amendment was put down rather late and therefore I am reluctant to exclude altogether the possibility that I might think on it again, as the noble Lord has so plausibly asked me to do. I am anxious to keep any Amendments on Third Reading down to the absolute minimum, and I do not think that at the moment this Amendment is acceptable, for the reason that I am about to indicate. I do not think there is anything in substance or principle between the noble Lord and myself. I said this in Committee, and I still hold the same view after having heard the noble Lord again. What we all want to ensure is that a complaint under Clause 101 can be presented only by the party against whom an unfair industrial practice is directed. As I promised the House in Committee, I have looked again with the draftsmen at the wording of subsection (1)(c) of this clause. I have looked at it very carefully, and having done so I am bound to say that I think the present wording is preferable to that proposed by the noble Lord.
As regards Amendment 83A, in particular, I freely admit that the matter is not altogether easy, but I am not convinced that the Amendment adds to the clarity of the subsection. It still seems to me that the example I quoted in our earlier debate of the railway passengers still has a certain relevance. Moreover, Amendment 83A would, I feel, be rather too narrow, for two reasons. First, I do not think it can be for the complainant to prove what the respondent intended. The respondent may plead that his action was not intended to be directed towards the complainant; and that might well be a reason why the Industrial Court, after hearing both sides, might think it just

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and equitable not to grant any remedy on the complaint, or to grant a declaratory order under Clause 101(3)(a). But it must surely be for the respondent to plead and argue that in answer to the complaint, and not for the complainant to establish the respondent's intentions.
Secondly, the reference to loss in the Amendment might be appropriate if compensation were the only remedy available to the Industrial Court. But that is not so. The remedy can be a declaration; it can be an Order in the nature of an injunction. For instance, where a trade union complains that an employer has broken the terms of a collective agreement, and that this constitutes an unfair industrial practice, if it establishes its case the trade union ought at least to be able to obtain a declaratory order under Clause 101(3)(a), or perhaps, and in suitable circumstances, a mandatory order under Clause 101(3)(c), even though no loss can be proved at the time it pursues the matter in court. My own view and that of my advisers, who include Parliamentary Counsel, on whom on matters of this kind I am bound to rely up to a point, is that in the present form paragraph (c) of subsection (1) achieves what both the noble Lord and I wish to do, and achieves it adequately for the purpose. I have, I think, pointed clearly to a number of problems that could arise from the Amendment suggested, and I would hope that the noble Lord would not pursue this Amendment but would rather seek leave to withdraw it.
LORD STOW HILL: My Lords, I rise for the purpose of thanking the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor. Obviously there are difficulties about it; it is a difficult piece of drafting. I ask the leave of the House to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD STOW HILL LORD STOW HILL moved Amendment No. 84:
Page 76, line 42, at end insert—
(" (5) In any proceedings on a complaint under this section, an official of a trade union shall be deemed to have acted within the scope of his authority if his actions are subsequently ratified by the trade union of which he is an official.")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move this Amendment. Your
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Lordships may remember that when we were discussing what is now Clause 96 an Amendment in almost exactly the same terms was put down to that clause on the Committee stage. The object was to try to protect a trade union official, even though he had acted outside the scope of his authority from his trade union, if his actions were subsequently ratified. On that occasion the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor gave reasons for saying that that could not be accepted. They were not the basic reasons which divide the two sides of the House on the general content of the Bill, and the noble and learned Lord said that in any event the trade union official surely should be able to obtain clear authority.
I do not revert in this Amendment to the same argument because noble Lords will observe that it is put down, not to Clause 96, but to Clause 101. I venture to move an Amendment in the same terms this evening because in my submission when it is put in Clause 101 it has a rather different and, from the point of view of the Government, perhaps a more acceptable result. In Clause 101 one is being told what the Industrial Court can do by way of granting relief in the event of a complaint's being presented to the Industrial Court. If noble Lords will look at subsection (4) they will see that it is there provided that compensation shall not be ordered to be paid by an official of a trade union if it is shown that he was acting within the scope of his authority.
What the Amendment seeks to do is simply to provide this. Supposing in the course of those proceedings the trade union are in effect ready to take the official under their wing and say that they ratify his actions for the purpose of the proceedings, then the trade union official should not be liable to have an award made against him personally; it would go against the union. In my submission, that is a very different context from Clause 96. In Clause 96 one is specifying the action which is to constitute an unfair industrial practice. In Clause 101 one is simply saying what is to happen when a complaint actually comes before the Court. The Amendment would seek to provide that where proceedings are actually taking place before the Industrial Court, if a trade union is prepared to take responsibility

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for what the official of the trade union has done outside the scope of his authority, then the award of compensation should be made against the trade union and not against the official. I beg to move.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, this is another Amendment which was in fact discussed very fully in Committee. Subsection (4) of Clause 101 provides for the limitation of personal liability of a trade union official. In order to secure the protection of subsection (4), it must be shown that he acted within the scope of his authority. But when he gets that protection the Industrial Court cannot make an award against him either for compensation or a mandatory order in the nature of an injunction. The only order that can be made against him is a declaration determining the rights of the parties. That is a very substantial protection. The limitation of the protection is based on the fact that he is a trade union official and by Schedule 4 the rules of the organisation of which he is a member which is a trade union or an employers' association registered under the Act—must satisfy certain requirements which we consider reasonable requirements. There must be set out the powers and duties of officials (paragraph 7) and there must be specified when and by whom industrial action can be recommended (paragraph 10).
The policy underlying all this is threefold. First, we want to protect officials who have acted according to the rules of their union. Secondly, we want to buttress the authority of those rules. Any official will think very carefully before breaking the rules of his union as he knows that there is the possibility of a court order if he breaks them. Correspondingly, unions will wish, I would hope, to consider very carefully the degree of discretion which they allow to their officials, since a union which gives to its shop stewards the authority to call strikes will run a greater risk of liability than a union which limits their authority to do so. Thirdly, the provision constitutes an incentive for officials and unions to ensure that their union is registered and thus to obtain protection for officials in respect of their personal liabilities. It is clear that although the Amendment, to some extent, would not affect the first, it would undermine the second and third
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of the objectives which I have described. It would remove from union officials most of the incentive to act within their authority. They would be far less reluctant to exceed their authority if they knew that subsequent endorsement of their actions would place them in the clear. A shop steward might, for example, easily induce workers to walk out without notice—a"wildcat"strike—if he thought he could thereafter obtain a posteriori ratification by his union. If the union rules said that all officials calls for industrial action must be approved by district officials of the union, the shop steward would run the risk of a court order if the employer complained. But if this Amendment were adopted it would be open to the union to release him a posteriori from the consequences of his action by ratification of his conduct. I think that that must inevitably encourage shop stewards to act similarly in future. For that reason, we cannot accept this Amendment.
I do not think that, with the provision as drafted, officials of unions ought to act timidly or with lack of decision—not, that is, if they are acting within the authority they are given by the rules and not, that is, if the rules are reasonably clear in giving them the authority. They might think from acting irresponsibly they might shrink from breaking the rules. I do not think that one would necessarily regret that. We cannot accept this Amendment. It was debated before. I recognise that the noble Lord has stated his position. I have stated mine.
LORD STOW HILL: My Lords, I am obliged for that full answer. May I in justification of myself say that I think my recollection is right when I say the full debate was on Clause 96? I simply moved it formally on what was the equivalent of Clause 101, which was then Clause 97. That was why I thought it reasonable to take a short time to move it rather more fully this evening. In view of the answer, I ask leave to withdraw the Motion.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
11.46 p.m
LORD GARDINER LORD GARDINER moved Amendment No. 84A:
Page 76, line 42, at end insert—
(" (5) It shall be a defence to any proceedings under this section that the matters complained of took place in circumstances in

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which, had the proceedings been in tort, there would have been available the defence of justification.")
The noble and learned Lord said: I beg to move this Amendment. It is not one on which I intend to take up the time of the House and still less to divide the House, but it is a point on which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Donovan, the noble Lord, Lord Byers, and I have expressed the same views. Under the tort of knowingly inducing a breach of contract, which generally will continue, the onus is entirely on the plaintiff to prove his case. If the plaintiff proves his case the defendant still has a legal right to be absolved if he can satisfy the Court that in all the circumstances what he did was justified. The defence of justification has nearly always been impossible to define because circumstances vary and it must depend entirely on the facts of the case; but if the plaintiff satisfies the Court on it then the Court has no discretion; it is bound to absolve him. Under this new animal of the unfair industrial practice, the onus again is naturally on the plaintiff but the defendant has been deprived of his defence of justification which every other citizen except the trade unionist will have, and he has to rely on the Court not to make an order against him unless they think it fair to do so. The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor expressed the opinion that he thought as a whole he would be just as well off in that way as if he had not been deprived of his defence, but at the conclusion of the debate which we last had on this subject on May 27, col. 1363, the noble and learned Lord said:
" I regard this as a continuing debate. I do not say, ' No, we cannot look at it again ' or ' I am certainly right '…I think this is the best I can do at this stage."
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Donovan, said:
"…there is a lot of difference between being entitled to an acquittal as of right and being entitled to an acquittal at the discretion of the Court and if this defence were expressly provided in the Bill it would save a great deal of anxiety among trade unionists and would prevent a great deal of misrepresentation. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor for making it clear that he has not said the last words upon this subject and that he will consider it again." [col. 1365].
The noble Lord, Lord Byers, said that he would withdraw his Amendment in view of what the noble and learned Lord had said. He continued:
" I take it that he has not closed his mind to looking at this problem again." [col. 1366.]
My Lords, I put down this Amendment so that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, who has now had time to consider the matter further, may tell us of any further views which he has.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Again, my Lords, I do not think this is a case where there is any difference of principle between the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, and myself; that is to say, I think we look to the Bill to achieve the same result. But however often I come back to his defence of justification, the more certain I am that my original approach was right. Nobody knows what the defence of justification is. We all accept that the books say that it is open, but nobody knows what it is. Although it has been mentioned in all the books and from time to time in a number of cases, the whole thing depends upon a single authority, that of Brimelow v. Casson, which we debated at the Committee stage, and which I went into at great length then. Therefore, I shall not trouble the House with it again.
I simply cannot conceive of any set of circumstances in which the defence of justification could be raised even plausibly by a respondent to a complaint under this Bill which would not be rendered unnecessary by conversion of the remedies under the Bill into an equitable remedy rather than a legal remedy, because before a complainant can succeed he must establish that his application for an order is just and equitable. So far from taking away something from the respondent's legal defence, we are erecting a barrier for his defence against a complainant succeeding, which must protect him before he reaches it. So far from being not so well done by under the Bill as he will be if he had this mysterious defence of justification, which no one can define, I am satisfied that he is a great deal better off. Far from being deprived, he is given something.
I do not want to be dogmatic, but however often I approach this problem, this is the result I get. For this reason I think that the Amendment is a misguided

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one. Who am I to attack the Common Law and the common lawyer, having been one of that school all my life'? But there are times when equity has the last word. I am bound to say that I think by making the rule in equity, we have done a far, far better thing than by reintroducing into the law of industrial practice this mysterious Boojum, the defence of justification, in the tort of inducing breach of contract. That Boojum exists in the textbooks, but what it is, where it would be available and who would be able to claim advantage of it, I do not know, and for the purpose of this Bill I would hope that it would softly and silently vanish away in the bright daylight of equity and justice.
LORD GARDINER: My Lords, I have listened carefully to what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has said. I am bound to say that for my part I still agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Donovan. But I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for being good enough to give consideration to the point and I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 102 [Complaint of breach of duty under s. 13(1) or s. 56]:
LORD DRUMALBYN LORD DRUMALBYN moved Amendment No. 84B:
Page 77, line 9, at end insert (" or to confirm any such information in writing when requested by them to do so ").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment simply extends the grounds for complaint to include cases where the employer fails to confirm in writing information which he is required to disclose to a trade union under Clause 56. It is consequentially on the Amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, No. 79HHH. I beg to move.
LORD DELACOURT-SMITH: My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Diamond, may I express his appreciation to the noble Lord for having met this point and introduced this Amendment.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 105 [Special provisions as to certain complaints to Industrial Court]:
LORD DRUMALBYN LORD DRUMALBYN moved Amendment No. 85:
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Page 79, line 36, leave out (" section 55(1)(b) of this Act ") and insert (" paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of section 55 of this Act, or by virtue of that paragraph as modified by any of the provisions of subsections (2), (3A) and (3B) of that section ").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this looks a complicated Amendment but it is simply consequential following on Amendment No. 77 to Clause 55. Your Lordships will recall that Clauses 51 and 55 were amended with the purpose of carrying the concept of"associated employers"right through the recognition procedure. Amendment No. 85 is a consequential Amendment following on those Amendments. It is necessary because the new subsections (3A) and (3B) which have been inserted into Clause 55 have the effect of modifying Clause 55(1)(b) to deal with the case where a recognition order has been made against more than one employer. I beg to move.
LORD DELACOURT-SMITH: My Lords, this is a formidable looking Amendment. We are happy to accept the explanation that the noble Lord has given.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.

FRIENDLY SOCIETIES BILL
Returned from the Commons agreed to, with Amendments: the said Amendments to be printed.
CITY OF LONDON (VARIOUS POWERS) (No. 2) BILL
The CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES informed the House that the opposition to the Bill was withdrawn: the Order made on June 23 last discharged, and Bill committed to the Committee on Unopposed Bills.
ETON RURAL DISTRICT COUNCIL BILL
Reported, with Amendments.

EAST SUSSEX COUNTY COUNCIL (NEWHAVEN BRIDGE) BILL
The Queen's Consent signified, and Bill reported with Amendments.
House adjourned at four minutes before midnight.