INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BILL

HL Deb 08 July 1971 vol 321 cc1138-203

8.0 p.m.

Report stage resumed.

Clause 65 [Guiding principles for organisations of workers]:

LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79LLL. Page 54, line 6, at end insert (" ; and every such organisation shall be free to frame rules to meet its own circumstances provided that no rule so framed conflicts with any such principle ").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, we are now at that stage of the Bill which deals, if I recollect correctly, with the guiding principles for organisations of workers. We discussed the various aspects of this during Committee stage. One thing which emerged was the departure in the Bill from the proposals which were included in the Donovan Commission's Report with regard to the freedom of the union to frame the rules to meet its own circumstances. I should like to refer to what was covered in the discussion in Committee. As reported at col. 596 for May 20, my noble friend Lord Delacourt-Smith first quoted from the Donovan Commission Report. Then, having referred to an "important qualification", as my noble friend called it, he quoted the words: without impairing the freedom which trade unions ought to enjoy to frame rules to meet their own circumstances."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 20/5/71; Vol. 319, col. 596]

We are here dealing with a rather difficult conflict. It is obviously right that there should exist the freedom of association which we all recognise—and if necessary I could read a very telling quotation from a speech made by the noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack supporting the idea of freedom of association, to which we are all married—and, within that concept, I am quite sure is the freedom of those who are associated together to decide the basis upon which they are so associated; namely, to frame rules to meet their own circumstances.

This was a concept which the Donovan Commission examined and they came out clearly in favour of it. There is the conflict, I repeat, between that concept and an excess of that freedom which would mean transgressing principles, which, so far as they are approved, affect the conduct of organisations of workers. So it seemed to me, my Lords, while not wholly satisfactory, but again as a possible half-way house, necessary to enshrine the words of the Donovan Commission in this area of the Bill, so as to make it clear that although one was not directly opposing any of the principles which, by the time we have got to the end of this clause, we shall have approved, nevertheless we were making it absolutely clear that the essential freedom to frame rules "to meet its own circumstances" was necessary for an organisation to be viable and free. I hope, therefore, that these words will commend themselves to the Government. I beg to move.

8.5 p.m.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, says that he has enshrined words from the Donovan Commission in this Amendment. I think that so far as those words are declaratory they are unexceptionable. The trouble is that when one sets out to make a declaratory statement of this kind one has to be very careful that one does not get side effects which are neither intended nor wanted. In so far as they are declaratory, one has to consider whether the declaration is in the right place. After all, the rights of individuals as individuals may include the right to associate, but they are certainly not limited to the right to associate. We are here dealing with the guiding principles for the protection of individuals in their membership of organisations.

My Lords, there is nothing in this clause which requires an organisation to frame its rules in accordance with the principles. The requirement in relation to the principles appears in Clause 75(1) which says that if the rules are in conflict with the principles set out in Clause 65, or if they fail to meet the requirements of Schedule 4: the registrar shall serve notice on the organisation indicating what alterations are needed…". That requirement relates, of course, only to registered organisations; but this requirement applies to all organisations, whether they are registered or not. If, for the sake of argument, one were to accept that there were some shred of doubt in this matter, that could not possibly arise under Clause 65, and the insertion of the provision in this clause would only raise doubts about the approval of rules under Clause 75.

That is not the only nor the main difficulty. This Amendment reads, every such organisation "— whether registered or unregistered— shall be free to frame rules "— where they are not in conflict with those principles in Clause 65. That implies surely that the organisation is not free to frame rules which are in conflict with the principles, and one has to ask what the status of such rules would be. I am advised that they would be made void by the provision.

The validity of rules on any of the matters referred to in the clause would be constantly open to doubt. That is something which the Bill itself carefully avoids. Although there is common ground between ourselves and noble Lords opposite that the trade unions are, and will remain, free under the Bill to frame their own rules within the requirements of the law, there is no common ground on the need for a declaratory statement in the Bill. With or without a statement, that is the effect and they will be free to frame their own rules within the requirements of the law. We do no accept that there is any doubt about that at all. It is simply not worth the risk of making a statement which would have the undesirable side effects to which I have referred. So, while agreeing with the principle, we think that these words are misplaced and that they could have unwanted side effects.

LORD DIAMOND

My Lords, I listened carefully to what the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, said. I recognise, of course, that he is sustained by considerable advice as to the effect of any particular Amendment. When one frames one's own Amendments and puts them down one is not quite sure what the ultimate effect will be. However, I think that what he said encourages me to press this Amendment, because what he said was, "You will be in difficulty if this declaratory statement is included at this point, because these principles will need to be tested the whole time against the overall statement." That is exactly what one wants. The principles are principles which the Government see as the appropriate ones; and they may be so. But there is an overriding principle. It has been examined and reported on by the Royal Commission and, as I said before, it stems from a fundamental freedom that we all wish to encourage: the principle

that people who associate together have the right to frame their own rules to meet their own circumstances, subject only to those rules not conflicting with any broad issue of public policy.

Now public policy is involved in the guiding principles, so I think that the noble Lord has confirmed my belief that to the extent that this Amendment would cause questioning and some doubt in the construction and interpretation by those who have that responsibility, then it is a good thing. I would therefore press the Government further to agree that this statement is a statement which the noble Lord says that he accepts—indeed, I would quote from the OFFICIAL REPORT, column 604, when he referred to this matter in Committee—should be embodied, or, if you like, enshrined in the Bill. The noble Lord said on that occasion: But, talking of rules, the short answer is that the unions frame their rules, except in so far as they are defective in the sense that there is no rule corresponding to the requirement of Schedule 4…. I cannot see anything incongruous about this at all. He went on: The unions have responsibility for framing their own rules. Nobody writes their rules for them. They merely have to comply with the law regarding the rules and have the rules specified in the Schedule."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 20/5/71; col. 604.] I think it is wholesome, healthy and democratic that this principle should be before everybody's mind, and I hope therefore that the noble Lord will include it in the clause. If not, we shall seek, by whatever methods are open to us, so to include it.

8.14 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 79.LLL) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 24; Not-Contents, 61.

CONTENTS
Beswick, L.	Jacques, L.	Shackleton, L.
Blyton, L.	Lindgren, L.	Shepherd, L.
Buckinghamshire, E.	Longford, E.	Slater, L.
Champion, L.	Milner of Leeds, L. [Teller.]	Stonham, L.
Diamond, L.	Nunburnholme, L.	Stow Hill, L.
Gaitskell, Bs.	Phillips, Bs.	Stragolgi, L. [Teller.]
Hall, V.	Platt, L.	Taylor of Mansfield, L.
Henderson, L.	Popplewell, L.	White, Bs.
NOT-CONTENTS
Aberdare, L.	Ferrers, E.	Napier and Ettrick, L.
Ailwyn, L.	Ferrier, L.	Oakshott, L.
Auckland, L.	Fortescue, E.	Rankeillour, L.
Balfour, E.	Goschen, V. [Teller.]	St. Aldwyn, E.
Balfour of Inchrye, L.	Gowrie, E. [Teller.]	St. Helens, L.
Barnby, L.	Gray, L.	Sandford, L.
Beaumont of Whitley, L.	Gridley, L.	Savile, L.
Belstead, L.	Grimston of Westbury, L.	Selkirk, E.
Berkeley, Bs.	Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)	Sempill, Ly.
Brabazon of Tara, L.		Skelmersdale, L.
Brecon, L.	Hanworth, V.	Somers, L.
Brougham and Vaux, L.	Hatherton, L.	Stamp, L.
Burnham, L.	Hawke, L.	Strathclyde, L.
Conesford, L.	Henley, L.	Teviot, L.
Cork and Orrery, E.	Jellicoe, E. (L. Privy Seal.)	Thomas, L.
Craigavon, V.	Kemsley, V.	Thorneycroft, L.
Craigmyle, L.	Killearn, L.	Tweedsmuir, L.
Denham, L.	Kinloss, Ly.	Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, Bs.
Drumalbyn, L.	Massereene and Ferrard, V.	Wade, L.
Dundee, E.	Mountevans, L.	Windlesham, L.
Elliot of Harwood, Bs.	Mowbray and Stourton, L.

Resolved in the negative, and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.

8.22 p.m.

LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79L: Page 54, ine 15, after (" is ") insert (" recognised by the Union as ").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, in moving this Amendment I would first refresh your Lordships' memory as to the conclusions of the Royal Commission (which are stated in paragraph 650) with regard to admission. Referring to the rules of admission the Commission's Report states: They should be framed in such a way as to avoid discriminating arbitrarily against any type of applicant,"— that is common ground— but unions must be allowed to retain discretion in deciding whom they should admit. I think that is a short and fair and accurate presentation of the principle involved. There must at the end of the day be discretion exercised by the union and therefore this Amendment is framed to provide for that.

If I may say further why I think that is necessary. I think the shortest way is to remind your Lordships of what my noble friend Lord Delacourt-Smith said when we were discussing a similar point at the Committee stage. He said: Unless there is some regulation and some discretion vested in trade unions as to whom they shall admit and whom they shall reject, we shall have endless friction, endless difficulties, endless disputes, a weakening of the trade union movement and a great complication of industrial relations with no benefit whatsoever."—[OFFICIAL REPORT. 20/5/71: col. 612] I think that is a fair and concise statement of the position. That is how we see it, and therefore we think it is necessary to have an Amendment of this kind to make our point of view clear. If the Amendment were accepted, subsection (2) would read— Any person who applies for membership and who is recognised by the union as appropriately qualified instead of the present wording, which is simply: is appropriately qualified ". That is to say, if the Amendment were accepted the discretion as to what "appropriate" means would be in the hands of the union, whereas without that Amendment it would not. And I repeat that it should be in their hands. That is the effect of the Amendment.

There is the further point that anxiety has been expressed to me by those who are concerned with these matters as to what the Government's attitude is with regard to semi-skilled workers, dilutees, and so on, who without the Amendment, might be regarded as appropriately qualified for employment, thereby disgracing those who had qualified by apprenticeship to do a skilled job, or whatever it might be, and this final decision we think is sensibly left in the hands of the union at the end of the day. It is for these reasons that I hope the Government will look kindly on this Amendment.

THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE (LORD BELSTEAD)

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, in moving this Amendment, quoted from the Royal Commission Report and gave your Lordships the reference for the quotation, which was, of course, absolutely accurate. But, as I heard the noble Lord, he did not follow the quotation through and examine any of the matters which might result from that quotation; and I think it is fair to say that it is because the Government have apprehensions as to what the result or results of the quotation from the Donovan Report might be that we wish to resist this Amendment.

We are well aware that the phrase "appropriately qualified" has caused the Opposition a good deal of concern, and I think it is worth reminding ourselves why that is there. Subsection (2) gives a right of redress against the refusal of admission on grounds which amount to arbitrary or unreasonable discrimination against the individual person concerned. My Lords, paragraph (a) leaves the organisation entirely free to determine for itself the class of worker which the organisation seeks to recruit. If a person seeking admission clearly has no legitimate claim to be a worker of that description the organisation has every right to reject him; and it is only fair to say that in both Houses of Parliament many Members have made the point how important it is from the point of view of standards of safety. But on what grounds is the claim to be tested?

Paragraph (b) states that the worker concerned must be appropriately qualified to perform the work. This Amendment would give the organisation complete discretion to decide what are "appropriate qualifications". Moreover, the Amendment would leave the organisation free to exercise that discretion in different ways in different cases. It could say that one person was appropriately qualified and that another was not, without having to prove to anyone whether it was applying the same criteria in both cases. I am sure that was not the noble Lord's intention, nor would it be the intention of the vast majority of trade unions. But Clause 65 deals with the laying down of principles, and even if the Amendment is merely intended to give workers' organisations the right to lay down their own uniform qualifications—and this was the tenor of Lord Diamond's remarks—it would still be unacceptable to us. The effect would be to give organisations a completely free hand to make any conditions they chose, however doubtful the connection with the worker's actual ability to perform work of a type which the organisation sets out to organise.

May I go into more detail and show your Lordships how we feel that subsection (2) is going to work? Suppose that union X decides to recruit only skilled fitters and that only skilled fitters need bother to apply. But it may be that a union will only recognise a particular method of training. If that is so, and if the union can establish before a tribunal that this is reasonable, it may prove its case for rejecting other applicants. What we believe to be equitable is that a union should be under an obligation, if so called upon, to justify its decision before an independent party—in other words, an industrial tribunal. Subsection 2(b) gives an applicant the right to show before a tribunal that he is qualified to be employed on jobs which are organised by the organisation that he wishes to join.

The noble Lord, Lord Diamond, asked the direct question: what do the Government think about semi-skilled workers, dilutees and other such workers of similar categories? Our reply is simple: the Government do not have a view on this point. In line with so many other parts of the Bill, we say that the right course is that the view should be that of an impartial tribunal. This Amendment would take away that right, and it is for that reason that I hope the House will reject the Amendment, if it is pressed.

8.32 p.m.

BARONESS GAITSKELL

My Lords, the Government continually state that their wish is to strengthen the unions, yet it seems to me that throughout our debates we have come across many instances where the Government either ignore the unions, treat them like recalcitrant children, or are completely paternalistic. Here is a chance where they can strengthen the unions, yet they are ignoring them. Who better to judge the qualifications for a worker than the trade union to which the worker belongs? They would not wish to have a worker who was not qualified. Why should they? It would not be in their interests. It seems to me that the Government are unreasonable in not accepting this extremely reasonable Amendment.

THE EARL OF BALFOUR

My Lords, there is one point that I should like to raise. It can happen that there is a redundancy in one particular field. Very often little effort is made by unions, who may be somewhat associated, to stretch their own conditions to allow good union members to join. For example, it may be that there are members of the mining industry who have become redundant, and they have difficulty in getting into another union and other employment. That is one of the reasons why this Amendment should not be accepted. Unions should be encouraged to try to help people who may not be totally skilled or may not have fully served their time in, for argument's sake, the electrical workers' union; they might have been in the mines all their lives. If we can help them to get jobs in possibly different fields from their own industry it is something worth while trying to push.

LORD SLATER

My Lords, it was not my intention to make a contribution, but may I ask whether I understood the noble Earl aright when he said that a miner, through redundancy, is absorbed in another type of industry and wants to join that particular trade union and come away from the miners, but cannot do so? For the information of your Lordships' House, may I say that if anyone leaves the mining industry he is immediately given a clearance card. That means that he is no longer a member of the National Union of Mineworkers because he is not working in or about the mine. He has changed his form of employment, and the clearance card enables him to make his application to the appropriate trade union, without any form of entrance fee, catering for the class of employment he requires. My noble friend Lord Taylor of Mansfield knows as well as I do that inside the miners' union we have what we call "federation" in and about the mines. One particular section caters for the mechanics, another for the men working at the coal face. Others cater for the deputy class, others the officials and so on.

They join this type of federation but they are units, an integral part of their own particular organisation, the mechanics' union or the officials union, and so on. If anyone working within the industry left his job as a face worker to be a deputy he would have to be given his clearance card to go into the appropriate section of the union. I would say to the noble Lord. Lord Drumalbyn, that the Government have made a mistake right from the start. They should have endeavoured to have more consultation with the Trades Union Congress and the people who know the workings of the trade unions. We are not going to be mealy-mouthed about this. There are unions in this country who give accommodation for people who ought to be members of a particular union, and do not have the opportunity of being a member of one, two or three unions: for example, the General and Municipal Workers Union, NALGO, the National Union of Public Employees, the Transport and General Workers' Union and so on. The medical officers of health can also become members of either one or two unions. This does not make sense.

A person should be a member of the appropriate trade union catering for the person's particular kind of work. The suggestions made by my noble friend in regard to this Amendment are something to which I hope the Government will give further consideration and every possible support.

LORD STOW HILL

My Lords, may I intervene shortly on this matter? The noble Lord, Lord Belstead, has not quite accurately diagnosed the effect of subsection (2) of this clause. What are the steps which have to be taken by an applicant? First, he has to show that he is a worker of the description for which the union caters, or one of the descriptions for which the union caters. Secondly, if he wishes to complain that his application for membership has been refused, he has to show that there has been discrimination against him; in other words, by an arbitrary or unreasonable answer to his claim for membership.

The noble Lord based his answer to the Amendment upon this view. He said that the Government do not take a view, for example, about dilutees, and so on; they wish the industrial tribunal in a given case to pronounce upon that type of matter. The noble Lord says that they are averse to putting it within the power and discretion of the trade union to specify what are the qualifications which they think are necessary, who should have the power to say what type of persons they will regard as qualified within one of the descriptions for which they cater? To put the matter upon the industrial tribunal is to ask them to decide something for which they are not qualified. How are they to know what is a wise standard of skill to exact? The people who know that are the members of the union themselves, the responsible executives of the unions. They should be the people called upon to lay down standards of skill, reliability, training, membership or whatever it may be. The noble Lord is quite wrong in saying that that should not be the task of the union, for it obviously should. They are the one set of people which is qualified to prescribe standards. The last people qualified to prescribe standards are those on the tribunal. They have not the material on which to judge.

I venture to intervene as I am concerned, perhaps because of my previous experience of the position of courts. I am most anxious that this legislation should not impose upon them a task which is almost impossible or extremely difficult in the nature of things for them to undertake. It may be said that they will have evidence before them, but the evidence that they should have before them and upon which they should be called upon to adjudicate is surely this: they should have before them the structure of the union and the sort of people for whom the union caters. They should know from the description of members for whom the union provides; they should then be able to say whether the applicant comes within that description. They do not know what is prescribed as prudent for the members' safety so far as standards of skill are concerned. The union knows that. What they are able to say, if the union has prescribed a general standard of training, an apprenticeship of skill in a particular and perhaps dangerous activity—and this is precisely what they can be called upon to decide—is whether, in the individual case, for some reason which cannot be explained except upon the basis of some personal prejudice, or something of the sort, they have excluded an applicant who comes within the description and who is able to show that he possesses the necessary standard of skill which the union has laid down as a qualification.

I hope that the Government will look at this matter again. I submit that this is another case where they are putting the courts in a difficult and artificial position. If the courts have to pronounce on cases of that sort which it is difficult for them to assess, confidence in them will gradually become undermined. That really would be a major catastrophe. I respectfully submit to the noble Lords on the Front Bench that this Amendment does not vest unreasonable power in the union. It says that the standards should be laid down and applied to everybody who is an applicant to become a member of a union. If those standards are not fairly applied, then prejudice and discrimination is shown against a particular applicant and the tribunal will interfere to protect that applicant. But I respectfully ask the Government to take the view that the Amendment places the responsibility of prescribing standards where it ought to he; that is, squarely upon the union itself. I hope that the Government Front Bench will give further thought to this subject and indicate that they would like to go into it rather more deeply.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I wonder whether we are not becoming wholly unrealistic in the consideration of this Amendment. Let us consider what are the true facts here. A person will be engaged for a job. Obviously, he will have to be qualified for that job if he is going to be engaged for it. There are three cases: there is the ordinary case where there is neither an agency nor a closed shop. In that case a man applies for membership of the union; he has been taken on to do a job; he is within a certain description of worker; he will normally be considered as qualified for that job and there will be no diffiulty whatsoever about his being accepted by the union. If it is an agency shop, once again he will be accepted into employment and if he wishes to he will apply for membership of the union or he will apply not to be a member of the union, as the case may be. Here again he is already qualified, for if the union says that he is not qualified presumably he could still not be a member of the union. But why should he not be a member if he is taken on to do a particular job and the mangement are satisfied that he is capable of doing that job? In such circumstances that is a matter for agreement between management and the union.

LORD DIAMOND

I should like the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, to repeat what he said. Did he say that this is a matter for agreement between the management and the union?

LORD DRUMALBYN

I think that is so. The employer has taken on somebody to do a specific job. It is an agency shop situation; under the Bill, that person is going to be encouraged to join the union. What happens if the union says that it is not going to have this man? Obviously, the management and the union will have to get together. That is common sense. I am merely speaking about the common sense of the situation.

Thirdly, there is a closed shop situation, and obviously this is the most difficult aspect. There is no pre-entry closed shop left under the Bill. There is no question whatsoever of a union refusing to take somebody in and therefore preventing his being engaged to be employed under the Bill; but in the closed shop situation he has to become a member of the union. Is it right that the union should say that it is a closed shop and they do not regard him as qualified; therefore he cannot carry on his job when he has quite satisfactory, recognised qualifications? Again, that is something which should be agreed between the management and the union. One has to realise that these are possible situations, and clearly, in almost every case, there will be no difficulty whatsoever. Two things are laid down here: the organisation is free to say who is a worker of the description for which it caters, and, secondly, if a person is appropriately qualified for an employment, any person who applies and is appropriately qualified should be accepted, we all agree, into the union and not rejected by any arbitrary or unreasonable discrimination.

In summary, all I am saying is that there is just an outside chance every now and again that a union might refuse to take somebody on the grounds that he was not appropriately qualified for employment work of that description. But the question of who is appropriately qualified for employment as a worker in a particular factory depends very largely on the management and whom they engage as being appropriately qualified, or on the training that he has received and so on. It is to cover the very rare case where there may be some disagreement about this, where it is not desirable to leave the sole decision as to who is appropriately qualified, as opposed to the general description for which they are catering, to the union alone. In practical terms we are on a very small point here, but we regard this Amendment as unnecessary. It is entirely unnecessary to put in these words and in the very small proportion of cases it might be undesirable. When there is any doubt about putting words in a Bill of this kind it is better to leave them out, we think that they ought not to be in.

LORD DIAMOND

I am much encouraged by the speeches which have been made by my noble friends, each one of which seemed to me to add considerably to the case I was putting forward for the Government's consideration. I am sorry to say that I have not heard a single argument which dispels the point of view put forward by my noble friends. I raised this Amendment in the first place partly to probe the Government's mind with regard to dilutees, and so on, and partly to make clear that we were dealing with a matter connected with a fundamental principle, a right of association and the rights of those who associate to determine who is going to be in the association, which tends to be forgotten. The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, said that there will be only a few cases in dispute. That is right; we are talking only about a few cases, so the world will not fall down if the freedoms which I have suggested it is necessary to exercise are exercised. The noble Lord's first argument is that in the case of a dispute between the worker and the union as to whether the member is appropriately qualified, the fact that the management has engaged him is sufficient evidence that he is qualified to do the job. The only answer I can give to that, one which occurred to me immediately, is—and I shall have to over-simplify it to make it as obvious as I can—to refer to the arguments which the noble Lord as employer, and I as the maintainer of standards, have had.

I refer to the time when the noble Lord was a member of a Government in another place and I was a member of the General Nursing Council. Government policy was to get more and more nurses because nurses were greatly needed. How do you get more nurses? Obviously by reducing standards. And what was the function of the General Nursing Council? To maintain standards. And there was a classical argument between the employer, the Government—the noble Lord sitting opposite—wanting to serve his purposes and, in order to serve them, being prepared to have a gentle regard, a non-critical regard, for the qualification of the person who was putting himself or herself forward, and the organisation representing standards and trying to maintain those standards. It is the usual argument of the short-term view versus the long-term view. I am glad to say that, so long as I was privileged to be a member of the General Nursing Council, we maintained our standards. That may be right or it may be wrong.

I am only saying that of course it is natural that there should be a conflict between the employer, who tends to accept lower standards because they are all that is available, and the union, which tends to support higher standards because of the apprenticeship, and so on, that has been gone through in order to achieve membership. In these circumstances, why does the noble Lord say it is right that the employers' view should prevail? At a moment of incautious speech—which we all experience—he said that the union and the employer should get together and agree. This clause does not say that they should agree. The union has no right in this clause except to go and represent its view to an outside body. So I am bound to say there is nothing here in the clause either to remind us of the fundamental right of the union or to protect skills and qualifications of which the union is naturally the appropriate guardian.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, will the noble Lord forgive me for intervening? There is always a tendency to look narrowly at a particular provision in a Bill. I have said time and time again in our consideration of this Bill that there is nothing whatever in the Bill to prevent the unions and the employers from agreeing on standards of entry, experience, qualifications and all the rest of it; and this is what will happen. What the noble Lord's Amendment would do would be to limit the matter to the unions alone.

LORD DIAMOND

My Lords, this is not right. I am giving the unions the minimum discretion to which they are entitled. I base my case first of all on the three years' study of the Royal Commission, which says they should have this discretion. One cannot just brush that away. I am on solid ground, not my own individual, subjective view, but the view of the Royal Commission which I have quoted, and will quote again with pleasure. The noble Lord, Lord Belstead, said that I had not followed through the quotation. I have looked through the paragraph and I cannot see anything more in it which detracts one iota from the part I quoted; namely, that unions must be allowed to retain discretion. The paragraph says: Notwithstanding the other circumstances and arguments therefor, unions must be allowed to retain discretion in deciding whom they should admit ". That is the first principle and I am on solid ground in saying that. Then I go on to say this—and this is why I am so grateful to my noble friend Lord Stow Hill: because as the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, was speaking I was wondering which clause he had in mind. As I read the Bill, there was the reference to "arbitrary or unreasonable discrimination" and there is nothing in this Amendment which would remove that. So the situation is still, as we would want it to be, that no union can refuse membership in an arbitrary or unreasonable way.

So then I come to the third question that I was concerned with and to the reason I raised it in a probing manner. What is the Government's atttiude with regard to dilutees, and so on? Here I received a frightening reply. I received the reply that the Government were going to run away from their responsibilities and were going to leave the matter in the hands of some outside body. That reply will strike fear into the hearts of those who asked me to raise this issue as one of the reasons for this Amendment. The Government must not do that. The Government have the responsibility of setting the pattern with regard to labour employment and labour standards, and merely to put the responsibility on to a body which, as my noble friend Lord Stow Hill has said, is by nature incapable of reaching an informed conclusion on an issue such as this, whereas the union is the appropriate body to do so, will not help the situation at all. It will mean merely that the Minister, who otherwise would have to answer in Parliament for decisions on general policy with regard to dilution of labour and so on, some

9.5 p.m.

LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79AAA: Page 54, line 21, after (" notice ") insert (" paying any sums due to the organisation ").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, it would be highly improper for me to say that the answer to "AAA" is "for horses, horses, horses", so I will not do thing of most fundamental importance, will avoid that issue.

So, my Lords, I am bound to say that this Amendment, which started off in its usual moderate way, is now seen to be a very necessary Amendment. I am bound to say that absolutely. It is solidly based on the Donovan Commission's Report; it is solidly based in law; it is solidly based in experience. If the Government are not prepared to move in this matter, then we must divide the House on it.

8.57 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 79L) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 23; Not-Contents, 63.

CONTENTS
Beswick, L.	Janner, L.	Shepherd, L.
Blyton, L.	Lindgren, L.	Slater, L.
Buckinghamshire, E.	Longford, E.	Stonham, L.
Champion, L.	Milner of Leeds, L.	Stow Hill, L.
Diamond, L.	Phillips, Bs. [Teller.]	Strabolgi, L. [Teller.]
Gaitskell, Bs.	Platt, L.	Taylor of Mansfield, L
Henderson, L.	Popplewell, L.	White, Bs.
Hoy, L.	Shackleton, L.

NOT-CONTENTS
Aberdare, L.	Ferrers, E. [Teller.]	Napier and Ettrick, L.
Ailwyn, L.	Ferrier, L.	Oakshott, L.
Auckland, L.	Fortescue, E.	Rankeillour, L.
Balfour, E.	Fraser of Lonsdale, L.	St. Aldwyn, E.
Balfour of Inchrye, L.	Goschen, V. [Teller.]	St. Helens, L.
Barnby, L.	Gowrie, E.	Sandford, L.
Beaumont of Whitley, L.	Gray, L.	Savile, L.
Belstead, L.	Gridley, L.	Selkirk, E.
Berkeley, Bs.	Grimston of Westbury, L.	Sempill, Ly.
Brabazon of Tara, L.	Hailsham of St. Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)	Skelmersdale, L.
Brecon, L.		Strathclyde, L.
Burnham, L.	Hanworth, V.	Templemore, L.
Conesford, L.	Harvey of Tasburgh, L.	Terrington, L.
Cork and Orrery, E.	Hatherton, L.	Teviot, L.
Craigavon, V.	Hawke, L.	Thomas, L.
Craigmyle, L.	Henley, L.	Thorneycroft, L.
Crathorne, L.	Jellicoe, E. (L. Privy Seal.)	Tweedsmuir, L.
Denham, L.	Kemsley, V.	Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, Bs.
Drumalbyn, L.	Killearn, L.	Vivian, L.
Dundee, E.	Massereene and Ferrard, V.	Windlesham, L.
Elliot of Harwood, Bs.	Mountevans, L.
Emmet of Amberley, Bs.	Mowbray and Stourton, L.

Resolved in the negative, and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.

so! This is a short point which refers to subsection (3), under which: Every member of the organisation shall have the right, on giving reasonable notice and complying, with any reasonable conditions, to terminate his membership… The Amendment seeks to add the words, paying any sums due to the organisation after the word "notice" in line 21. This seems to be a reasonable thing to require a member to do before leaving the organisation. Particularly is this so because one might otherwise find that there are individuals who seek to get the benefits of trade union membership and when it comes to their arrears being so great that action is about to be taken they retire, change their jobs and join some other union with their arrears still outstanding. It is improper that this should take place, and therefore I hope that the Government will either say that this is already covered under the words, "complying with any reasonable conditions", or else will agree to the Amendment. I beg to move.

LORD BELSTEAD

My Lords, I really think there is very little between us on the point which the noble Lord. Lord Diamond, has moved in this Amendment. Subsection (3) of the clause already slates that the right to resign is subject to the member "complying with any reasonable conditions", and I think I can almost meet the noble Lord (without however, accepting his Amendment, which I must say we do not want to do) by saying that we would agree with him that in principle there is nothing unreasonable about an organisation wanting to recover money lawfully due to it. If, then, a trade union were to make it a condition of acceptance of resignation that contributions up to the date of resignation shall have been paid, I cannot see, although it does not lie within the mouths of Ministers to lay down the law, that anyone would regard this as unreasonable. It would be pointless to list all the conditions which might be regarded as reasonable. It is, after all, for each organisation to determine for itself what detailed conditions and rules it wants to lay down, and then for the Registrar to determine what is reasonable.

Where we are not seeing quite eye to eye on the Amendment is that we can see no special reason for singling out a requirement to pay sums due to the organisation in specific terms when we are considering a clause dealing with broad principles. The noble Lord referred, perfectly reasonably, to some of the very practical difficulties which unions may find if people leave unions with their dues unpaid. The noble Lord referred to their going off and perhaps joining another union. I imagine that the majority of cases of people leaving a trade union will be when there are changes, from a closed shop to an agency shop, for example (but we think there will be very few people who leave on that account) and when a member simply wishes to change to membership of another trade union; presumably then the Bridlington Rules continue to operate. If, however, as the noble Lord suggested, a member is being disciplined and leaves the trade union before action is taken against him, it could well be reasonable for the member to have to remain in that union until the case had been heard; and in any event, after a member leaves (although I know that this probably is not so acceptable to any of your Lordships) nevertheless it will be open to the organisation to recover contributions, arrears or fines through the courts. This does seem to be a special case, and mainly for that reason we would rather not put it in the Bill in the terms of the Amendment. But I hope I have said enough to show the noble Lord hat very little divides the two sides on this matter.

LORD DIAMOND

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord. He is quite right; very little divides us. He has based his case mainly on the principle which I wholly endorse; namely, that you do not single out special cases when you are dealing with generalities. And he said that his view as a Minister is—and no doubt he is advised about this—that the condition I am suggesting would be regarded as reasonable. Therefore, the purpose of moving the Amendment is achieved, demonstrating that in all probability it would be so regarded if put to the test. In those circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw this Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79MMM.

Page 54, line 34, at end insert— (" ( ) (i) Every organisation shall have the right, on giving reasonable notice and complying with any reasonable conditions, to terminate a person's membership of the organisation at any time. (ii) For the purpose of this subsection reasonable notice means notice which takes account of all relevant circumstances including the future livelihood of that person.")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is an Amendment under which it will be specifically and categorically stated that every organisation shall have the right, on giving reasonable notice and on complying with reasonable conditions, to terminate a person's membership. And then it goes on to define—I will come to this a little later—in a particular way one of the elements in reasonable notice. The subsection we have just been discussing says that every member shall have the right, on giving reasonable notice, to resign. The corollary is that every organisation shall have the right, on giving reasonable notice, to terminate membership.

There are the two aspects, the reverse and the obverse, of association. It is a very obvious thing to say, but it is not sufficiently clearly stated in the clause. Subsection (9) of the clause says: A person's membership…shall not be terminated unless reasonable notice… I am grateful that my noble friend Lord Stow Hill is here. I take the view that that is not a sufficiently positive way of saying it, and that it ought to be said positively and said immediately after, or as soon as possible after, the statement that every member of the organisation shall have the right to resign. That is the reason why that part of the Amendment is introduced.

But the Amendment goes further. Not merely concentrating on reasonable notice and compliance with reasonable conditions, it goes on to read: For the purpose of this subsection reasonable notice means notice which takes account of all relevant circumstances "— it could not be broader than that— including the future livelihood of that person ". One knows that when the question of termination of membership of a trade unionist is considered, it may have an effect on that person's livelihood or that person's job at that particular place of work. It is right that it should be taken into account. In case it was the view that that is not taken into account in deciding what is "reasonable notice" and "reasonable conditions", the Amendment specifically states that it should be taken into account. So you may have a situation where in the generality of cases reasonable notice would be a period of x days or weeks. You could have a situation where the skill involved was so special and the circumstances of the job so peculiar that it was not likely that the worker would be able to find a similar livelihood elsewhere in as short a period as that of x weeks and he should be given 2x weeks or 1½x weeks. Therefore, I hope that the Government will feel it right that when we are stating the guiding principles we should state not only that a member of an organisation has a reasonable right to resign but that the organisation, in having, in turn, a reasonable right to terminate his membership, should be especially careful if his livelihood is concerned. For those reasons I beg to move.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, the noble Lord has sought to devise a kind of balancing system here. I do not complain of that in the slightest except from the point of view of the drafting of the Bill as a whole; because in Clause 65 we are manifestly dealing with the conditions of organisations of workers in relation to their members. We are not really concerned with the rights of the organisations but with the rights of the members. This clause seeks to protect the rights of the members. It is not intended in the Bill in any way to deprive an organisation of workers of the right to terminate the membership of persons where it has good cause to do so. In fact such provision is made in Schedule 4, which deals with the rules of trade unions. In paragraph 17, reference is made to expulsion and to other disciplinary measures. There is no question of the right to terminate membership being called in question. I suppose that non-payment of contributions is likely to be the most common reason. Other reasons may include transfer of membership to another union under the terms of a Bridlington-type agreement or a member ceasing to satisfy the eligibility conditions of membership.

Termination for disciplinary reasons is in a category of its own which is covered by subsection (8) of the clause: but the same principles apply. Whatever the termination reason, the member should be informed of it in sufficient time to give him an opportunity to take any action he considers necessary to get the decision reconsidered. We feel that in the structure of the Bill and in the context of the clause it would be better to leave the drafting as it is. Subsections (8) and (9) together give an individual member the right to take the action he thinks necessary. This is what this clause is all about. There is no question of throwing any doubt on the rights of trade unions to terminate membership. But this is more a matter for the rules under Schedule 4 than for this clause.

9.20 p.m.

LORD DIAMOND

My Lords, before the noble Lord leaves that point would he be kind enough to direct his mind to the heading of the clause, and to the rubric: Guiding principles for organisations of workers. The heading is: Principles as to conduct of organisations of workers, other than federations of workers' organisations. So "federations" are excluded; what is included, and what is focused on, is "organisations of workers". I do not follow the noble Lord when he says that this is not the appropriate clause to deal with matters affecting organisations of workers.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, we are dealing with organisations of workers here; I did not say that we were not. The noble Lord is an old enough Parliamentarian to know that the rubric and title do not affect the text. The text shows clearly that what we are dealing with in this clause is the conduct of organisations of workers towards their members. It is the rights of the members that ought to be protected. Here again I do not think that there is any matter of substance between us. I do not see anything in the noble Lord's Amendment which needs to be stated. I think it much better to leave the drafting as it is. It is designed as a whole for the purpose of protecting the rights of members vis-à-vis the organisations of workers.

LORD STOW HILL

My Lords, I am sorry to intervene again in a terrain with which I am not completely familiar, but I do so as the result of a number of conversations I have had with my noble friends who really are experienced in this field of trade unionism. Your Lordships will remember that when we were discussing the matter and this clause on Committee, we discussed an Amendment which would have enabled unions to refuse membership to persons who had consistently shown themselves hostile to the purposes of organisations of unions. That Amendment was put down, after considerable thought, to deal with a situation which apparently arises not infrequently.

If you want to organise your union properly and you want disciplinary procedures to work; if you want it to be an efficient instrument for maintaining standards and conducting collective negotiations, it is difficult to achieve that objective if you have as members people who will not co-operate. Everyone is entitled to express an opinion; no one would seek to stifle a hostile expression of views about how a union is managed. No unionist who has spoken to me ever asked for that. But they gave a number of examples, which I will not quote, of cases where an individual just simply could not fit in with the scheme. Sometimes he was over-critical; sometimes he was a "barrack room lawyer type"; sometimes a person, to use a phrase which we have used previously in these debates, who was ideologically motivated in a sense that militated against the objectives of the union.

If you want to organise a union and see that its branches function, that the authority of shop stewards is maintained, and that there is a response among the members to the leadership of the union, it is difficult to do when you have a number of persons of that sort among the membership. When we discussed the Amendment in Committee the Government Front Bench did not feel able to accept it. They felt that it was again a case in which greater protection was necessary for the individual member, the person who was rejected. They felt that if something of that sort were included in what was then Clause 61, now the present Clause 65, his position would not be safeguarded and there might be victimisation. As I understand it, this Amendment is an effort, by a different route, to achieve something on the same lines.

As the Bill stands, the union can terminate membership upon reasonable notice. We are talking not of a person who has rendered himself liable to disciplinary procedure under paragraph 17 of Schedule 4, who cannot be got rid of for any specific conduct of his, but a member incapable in a general sense. We are trying to meet the situation by saying to a union that if they cannot get along with a man, if he is a disruptive element and obstructing the proper processes of the union, it may terminate his membership but it must take into account his livelihood, his interests as a wage-earner—the fact that he may not find it easy to obtain other employment. With 800,000 persons unemployed, this position obtains especially at the present time. The union has to give him a reasonable time to get himself other employment.

The great issue which has divided the House, and which has been debated over and over again is the issue of the agency shop and the closed shop. When the Commission have before them a proposal for an agency shop or a closed shop, they would find it much more acceptable if they knew that nobody could be victimised, in the sense that he could not be got rid of and possibly deprived of his livelihood, simply on reasonable notice, not further defined. If they knew that an individual could be removed from the union only if a reasonable opportunity was given to him to find another avenue of employment they would find it more easy to approve the establishment of that agency shop or closed shop. Therefore I submit that this is not a fringe Amendment. It is one which goes close to the basic principles on which this Bill is constructed, and the basic matters of principle which have divided the House upon it.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, looking carefully at this Amendment, the only significant difference I see between it and the Bill is that in the Amendment there is no specific provision for giving the reason for dismissal.

LORD STOW HILL

My Lords, the noble Lord is mistaken. There is a basic, a crucial, difference between the situation as it would be if the Amendment were accepted and the situation as it is with the Bill drawn in its present form. The union will not be able to terminate the membership of one of its members unless it gives reasonable notice, which must mean—and this is the critical difference—it takes account of all relevant circumstances, including the future livelihood of that person. He cannot be got rid of on a week's notice in a period of heavy unemployment, such as the present day. If there is a closed shop, he may have to leave his employment, and the union cannot terminate his membership unless it takes account of that, and gives him notice of such length that he will have a reasonable opportunity to establish himself somewhere else. That is the distinction. It is a basic and critical difference. I submit that it will go a long way towards the building up of more orderly relationships for which the Government are striving under the terms of this Bill. I submit that that is its purpose; that is the basic essential of this Amendment. It is a matter of important principle, and I hope that the noble Lord will listen to it and consider it much more sympathetically than he has up to the present moment.

9.32 p.m.

LORD POPPLEWELL

My Lords, I should have thought that this was a reasonable Amendment for the Government to accept. It is something that would not be used very often, but it is a reserve power that would enable the unions to face up to difficult members—and we do get them occasionally. I remember only one incident in my active trade union career in which a clause of this description would have been extremely helpful and would have prevented much discontent and difficulty that developed in the circumstances. It is the question of a man's future livelihood that has to be taken into consideration, even if a union wanted to apply this particular clause. When you get a member from time to time deliberately violating rules and working against the structure of the organisation of which he is a member, the trade union officers are in extreme difficulty in keeping the peace in that particular area. A clause of this description, purely as a reserve power, would be very helpful and in the interests of all concerned.

LORD DIAMOND

My Lords, I am bound to press the Government a little further on this matter. The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, has not put forward any strong reason why the Amendment should not be accepted. He said, first of all, that this was not the appropriate place, and when I quoted the heading and the rubric he said that that did not decide it, and I quite agree. So I will read the first paragraph: The principles set out in the following provisions of this section shall be guiding principles in the conduct of every organisation of workers,…". That is what the clause is about. If the noble Lord were saying, "We are interested only in defending possible individual union members against organisations, and we are not interested in specifying reasonable conditions for the unions themselves", then I could understand his remarks. That may be his point of view; it is not our point of view. Our point of view is that a clause, to be a fair clause, should state, as it does in subsection (3), that every member has a right to give reasonable notice and retire, and also that every organisation has a right to give reasonable notice and to terminate the membership.

My noble friend Lord Stow Hill has pointed out the effect of this Amendment. It is a very moderate and balanced Amendment and it has acknowledged everything that the union should take into account in deciding whether the membership should be terminated. I dislike intensely putting your Lordships to the bother of trooping through the Lobbies

and taking time, but the noble Lord does not seem able this evening to understand any of our points, or able to meet us at all. If he said that he was prepared to look at this again and see whether there is any other part of the Bill where this could be better incorporated, I should be only too glad to reconsider it for a later stage. At the moment he merely says, "Well, leave the drafting to the draftsmen". I do not know what Parliament is here for it we are to be told, "The draftsmen have served it up and you must eat it".

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, with the leave of the House, I really cannot go further than saying that, as this is a clause which is designed for the protection of the individual member, we shall look at the Amendment to see whether there is any point that is not covered already in the Bill and which should be covered in the Bill. I cannot say more than that. We do not think this is the right place.

9.35 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 79MMM) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 18; Not-Contents, 57.

CONTENTS
Bernstein, L.	Hoy, L.	Shepherd, L.
Blyton, L.	Janner, L.	Stonham, L.
Buckinghamshire, E.	Lindgren, L.	Stow Hill, L.
Champion, L.	Milner of Leeds, L. [Teller.]	Strabolgi, L. [Teller.]
Diamond, L.	Popplewell, L.	Taylor of Mansfield, L.
Gaitskell, Bs.	Shackleton, L.	White, Bs.

NOT-CONTENTS
Aberdare, L.	Emmet of Amberley, Bs.	Lauderdale, E.
Ailwyn, L.	Ferrers, E. [Teller.]	Massereene and Ferrard, V.
Auckland, L.	Ferrier, L.	Mowbray and Stourton, L.
Balfour, E.	Fortescue, E.	Napier and Ettrick, L.
Balfour of Inchrye, L.	Fraser of Lonsdale, L.	Oakshott, L.
Barnby, L.	Goschen, V. [Teller.]	Rankeillour, L.
Beaumont of Whitley, L.	Gowrie, E.	St. Aldwyn, E.
Belstead, L.	Gridley, L.	St. Helens, L.
Berkeley, Bs.	Grimston of Westbury, L.	Savile, L.
Brabazon of Tara, L.	Hailsham of St. Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)	Selkirk, E.
Brecon, L.		Skelmersdale, L.
Burnham, L.	Hanworth, V.	Strathclyde, L.
Conesford, L.	Harvey of Tasburgh, L.	Templemore, L.
Craigavon, V.	Hatherton, L.	Terrington, L.
Craigmyle, L.	Hawke, L.	Thomas, L.
Crathorne, L.	Henley, L.	Tweedsmuir, L.
Denham, L.	Jellicoe, E. (L. Privy Seal.)	Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, Bs.
Drumalbyn, L.	Kemsley, V.	Vivian, L.
Dundee, E.	Killearn, L.	Windlesham, L.
Elliot of Harwood, Bs.

Resolved in the negative, and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.

9.43 p.m.

LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79M: Page 54, line 40, leave out (" casting his vote ") and insert (" voting ").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move this Amendment, which is a very small matter, and I hope that the Government will find it helpful. The clause as it is at present drafted refers in subsection (6) to: In any ballot and on any motion,…every member of the organisation shall have a fair and reasonable opportunity of casting his vote…

I think that you cast your vote "in any ballot", but "on any motion", presumably, you either cast your vote or you simply vote—for example, on a show of hands. All one is trying to do by this Amendment is to make sure that the method of voting is that which the organisation decides, either putting up your hand or casting your vote, or whatever the case may be. I beg to move.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Does the noble Lord move his Amendment.

LORD DIAMOND

Yes, at the beginning and, ex abundanti cautelâ, at the end.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, this is an Amendment which I think is in the right place and very well adapated to its purpose. It makes an improvement, and I am happy to accept it.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

9.45 p.m.

LORD DRUMALBYN moved Amendment No. 79C:

Page 55, line 7, leave out from (" to ") to end of line 10 and insert— (" take part in a strike which the organisation, or any other person, has called, organised, procured or financed otherwise than in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute, or in such circumstances as, in accordance with any provision of this Act, to constitute an unfair industrial practice on the part of the organisation or of that person, or (c) to take part in any irregular industrial action short of a strike which the organisation, or any other person, has organised, procured or financed as mentioned in paragraph (b) of this subsection ")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 79C. The Amendment does two things. First, it makes clear the intention of paragraph (b) of subsection (7); secondly, it extends the scope of the paragraph in an important respect. First of all, if I may deal with the point of clarification, it was intended that subsection (7) should prevent an organisation of workers from disciplining any member who declined to take part in a strike or other form of irregular industrial action where inducing that action in itself constituted an unfair industrial practice. For example, it is an unfair industrial practice to induce a strike over recognition issues while the matter is before the C.I.R., and any union taking such action lays itself open to proceedings before an industrial tribunal or the Industrial Court. It would be illogical if workers who refused to join such a strike could be punished by heir union for not taking part. But, unfortunately, paragraph (b), as it stands, would only protect the worker who refuses to participate in inducing such a strike, since it is the actual inducing, and not the strike itself, which constitutes an unfair industrial practice. Paragraph (b) of this Amendment has the effect of transferring the protection to non-participants in the strike itself, irrespective of whether they decline to participate in its inducement. This was the original intention, and I hope that your Lordships will agree that the Amendment is effective in removing any uncertainty about the meaning of the subsection.

LORD DIAMOND

My Lords, I am sorry, but I must ask the noble Lord a question. This is an important Amendment, and as our speaking rights are strictly and properly limited, I must ask him this. He referred to paragraph (b) of the Amendment. Did he intend to do that? I cannot see a paragraph (b) in the Amendment.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I meant paragraph (b) of the clause.

LORD DIAMOND

Would the noble Lord mind repeating that part?

LORD DRUMALBYN

The Amendment includes paragraph (b). I am sorry if I misled the noble Lord. The second object of the Amendment is to extend the scope of the clause to strikes and other industrial actions which are not connected with an industrial dispute—for example, a political strike. The House has already given some thought to this question in Committee when we discussed an Amendment in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Byers, Lord Henley and Lord Beaumont of Whitley. That Amendment was unacceptable for technical reasons, but I think it is fair to say that there was a general feeling revealed in the debate that some protection of this nature was desirable, and even the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, was heard to say: "No one on this side of the Committee supports political strikes."

Noble Lords will be well aware that on a number of occasions in recent months unions have attempted to bring pressure to bear on members who have refused to take part in political strikes. There is some uncertainty about their right to discipline members in this situation under the existing law, and I feel sure that the House will agree that Parliament would be failing in its duty if the Bill failed to remove that uncertainty. I do not think I need go further into the purpose of this Amendment.

LORD DIAMOND

My Lords, I am sorry, but before the noble Lord sits down he must go further into it, because he has not said one word about which part of the Amendment achieves the purpose which he says it achieves. He must spell it out. This is a most important Amendment which affects the liberty of the subject and goes beyond the purpose of the Bill, as I read it. I hope that the noble Lord will explain it to the House because it is very important.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I am sorry, but I should have asked that Amendment No. 79D should be taken together with this Amendment. That Amendment is to Clause 65, on page 55, line 33. That Amendment is linked with the earlier Amendment which refers to disciplinary action—the Amendment I have been talking about—against members of workers' organisations who decline to take part in strikes or other irregular industrial action. The Amendment 79C applies in part to the situation where the action is taken in circumstances unconnected with any industrial dispute, but the definitions of "strike" and "irregular industrial action" which appear in Clauses 163 and 33 respectively are expressly related to the industrial dispute situation and therefore have to be modified for the purpose of this clause. The Amendment leaves the essential nature of the definitions intact while rendering them applicable to the situations with which this clause, as amended, is concerned. My Lords, I hope I have covered the matter—

LORD DIAMOND

Not at all.

LORD DRUMALBYN

Perhaps then I should explain that this Amendment does not prohibit workers' organisations from adopting a disciplinary code. Very many trade unions feel it important that members who break the rules of the union should be liable to a penalty or ultimately to expulsion. They will not be prevented from taking such powers, but they will be subject to constraints in the way that such powers are exercised. If, for example, a trade union has a rule which says that members are to withdraw their labour if instructed to do so by a district committee acting within its powers, that union would in general be able to exercise any disciplinary powers within its rules against a member who refused to strike. Its exercise of those powers in individual cases would, however, be subject to the test that the action it took was reasonable and fair, and within this context it would not be permitted to discipline a member for refusing to take part in a strike which was an unfair industrial practice or which was not connected with an industrial dispute with the employer. My Lords, I hope the noble Lord, Lord Diamond is a little clearer about this Amendment now, but if he is not, I shall just have to try to explain it further.

LORD DIAMOND

My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down—

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

The Question is, That Amendment No. 79C be agreed to.

LORD DIAMOND

My Lords, I did say, "Before the noble Lord sits down".

LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY

My Lords, the noble Lord. Lord Drumalbyn, said in part that this was an Amendment which met the purpose of an Amendment put forward in Committee by my noble friend Lord Byers and myself to which my noble friend spoke. We are grateful to the Government for meeting us on this point. Perhaps it is convenient that I should speak before the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, speaks at the end of this debate, because that may give him an opportunity to get back at Members on the Conservative and the Liberal Benches on this point. I think what is now being done is a very valauble and useful thing. We are not in any way trying to limit the liberty of people to withhold their labour on political matters. The Liberal Party no less than the Labour Party regards it as vital to the liberty of the subject that workers, if they do not like on political and conscientious grounds what their firm is doing should be able to withhold their labour. That is a basic human right, a human right, for instance, which is spelled out in Roman Catholic theology on such matters as contraception and abortion. In the whole of moral theology in the Roman Catholic Church and to some extent in the Anglican Church, this is a human right which must be observed. But to say this is not to say that a union itself should have the power to enforce and particularly to hold over a member strong disciplinary measures if the member does not agree with the union on these matters. Power in these matters should be very definitely confined to industrial disputes, and I think that the Amendment put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, is a useful one. For our part, we should like to welcome it and to thank him for his initiative in putting it forward.

BARONESS GAITSKELL

My Lords, I must apologise to my noble friend Lord Diamond for intervening before he speaks, but I simply wish to say that I once described the Industrial Relations Bill as a legal jigsaw puzzle. Well, having heard these two Amendments together, it not only seems to be a legal jigsaw puzzle but one in which the pieces do not fit, and I do not understand a word of it. I should be very grateful if the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, would clarify it for me, if he can.

LORD DIAMOND

My Lords, I sought to intervene before the noble Lord sat down but that was not apparently thought appropriate or proper, so I am bound to address the House now in this way. I am virtually in the same position as my noble friend Lady Gaitskell. The noble Lord gave us the strongest impression and misled us completely into believing that he had not the foggiest idea of what he was talking about. He really did. He gave us the impression that he was getting into the same muddle as we were—and, my God! that is a muddle. I was hoping that when the noble Lord introduced a totally new provision into the Bill at this late stage, going further (as I read the two Amendments) in the way of restriction of labour than anything so far contained in the Bill, he would have regarded it as his responsibility to explain which words produced which results. But I am afraid he got himself and us into a hopeless muddle, and I find it very difficult to know whether or not the two Amendments taken together mean what the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, thinks they mean—in which case, far from having a go at him, I would be supporting him almost up to the hilt—or whether they mean something different.

I think we have a responsibility for finding out what the words mean. That is my stance at the moment. My noble friend the Leader of the Opposition has made perfectly clear the stance of the Opposition on the general issue of political strikes, where it can be defined in such an obvious and easy way. But, my Lords, we all know that you cannot define it in such an obvious and easy way for statutory purposes. As I understood him what the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, said was that the right to protest against a political action is a fundamental right.

LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY

Yes.

LORD DIAMOND

That is our point of view, too; but of course it is obviously difficult to define a precise stage between exercising a right of protest against something which stems from a political decision which you probably want to protest against, and what is generally called "a political strike". There was an issue—was it not one concerning the Musicians' Union?—where they refused to cooperate on a political issue. I do not know whether football players are organised in a union. I imagine that they are. They may take a certain view about being ordered by their employer to go and play in South Africa, for example.

A NOBLE LORD

Or Russia.

LORD DIAMOND

Or Russia. There was a case where a union refused to load ships which were going to Poland in order to bring an end to the Russian Revolution. There was a case where, as my noble friend has reminded me, trouble arose out of loading ships for Nigeria. I want to know what the Government's proposals are. That is all I am asking at the moment; I am not taking a view until I know what they are.

I could not follow the noble Lord's speech. I tried hard to associate his remarks with the Amendment and I could not, because he was referring to the clause when he said he was referring to the Amendment, and then when I looked at the Amendment he said he was referring to another Amendment. It was difficult to collect one's thoughts and find out what he was talking about, so I hope that all your Lordships will find it necessary for me to do at the moment is merely to question the noble Lord and to say that I would be grateful if he would have another go and tell us what this important clause means. We quite understand that part of it has no new effect, but we are interested in the part which has a new effect. What are the words and what is the effect? We should be grateful for his guidance.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, the noble Lord has asked me to explain this and I shall endeavour to do so. May I just take him through this—that is the only way that one can possibly do it. This clause as it is drafted at the present time says this in subsection (7): No member of the organisation shall he subjected by or on behalf of the organisation to any unfair or unreasonable disciplinary action; and in particular (but without prejudice to the generality of this subsection) no disciplinary action shall be taken against any member of the organisation by reason of his refusing"— and we are talking about disciplinary action taken against a member of the organisation— or failing—

1. (a) to take any action which, in accordance with any provision of this Act, would constitute an unfair industrial practice on his part, or
2. (b) to participate "

and instead of the word "participate" we then have— take part in a strike which the organisation, or any other person, has called, organised, procured or financed otherwise than in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute ". I draw attention to the fact that it is not only if the organisation itself but if "any other person, has called, organised, procured or financed an industrial dispute that (b) applies. Those words are important because it might be possible, for example, for an outside organisation to organise the strike but for the organisation itself perhaps to finance the strike or in other ways to assist it, and then subsequently to discipline the person concerned for not having taken part in the strike, so those words are important. I read again: take part in a strike which the organisation, or any other person, has called, organised, procured or financed otherwise than in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute ". In other words, the disciplining is limited to cases, in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute ". It goes on to prohibit disciplinary action even where there is an industrial dispute: in such circumstances as, in accordance with any provision of this Act, to constitute an unfair industrial practice on the part of the organisation or of that person… Then it says: (c) to take part in any irregular industrial action short of a strike which the organisation, or any other person, has organised, procured or financed as mentioned in paragraph (b) of this subsection. The noble Lord will see the concept of irregular industrial action is added also to the provision. I should have thought all this was self-explanatory—

LORD DIAMOND

There is another Amendment.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, the other Amendment, if the noble Lord would like me to deal with that, too—I thought I had explained it perfectly simply—is: For the purposes of subsection (7) of this section, section 33(4) of this Act, and the definition of "strike" in section 163(1) of this Act, shall apply as if—

1. (a) in section 33(4) the words "in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute", and
2. (b) in the definition of "strike" the words "in contemplation or furtherance of an 1175 industrial dispute, whether they are parties to the dispute or not ",

were omitted. That is purely a drafting Amendment the effect of which is that for the purposes of the bar on disciplinary action against non-participants in certain types of strike, or other irregular industrial action, the definitions of irregular industrial action or strike already in the Bill are to apply outside the context of an industrial dispute by which they are qualified for purposes elsewhere in the Bill. I should have thought that was perfectly clear, and I have already explained it. If the noble Lord has not understood it, then if he will study it on the Record I am sure that he will come to understand it.

LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY

My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, I should like to ask a straightforward question. I hope that I am not trespassing on your Lordships' patience if at the same time I apologise if I was a little abrupt with the noble Baroness, Lady Gaitskell, because I thought that these two Amendments made sense. May I ask the noble Lord this question. Would he agree with what I thought was the result of the Amendment which, if it is true, the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, says he agrees with?

LORD DRUMALBYN

I am sorry, I did not quite hear what the noble Lord said.

LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY

In that case, my Lords, I will leave the matter.

LORD DIAMOND

My Lords, I was going to ask the noble Lord whether he would explain the words "in contemplation or furtherance". Whose contemplation?

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, this is the well established, common form in trade union legislation at the present time. It has always been "in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute".

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

The Question which I have to put is, That the said Amendment be agreed to.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

That, I am afraid, stops the Amendments to Amendment No. 79C, and we now go on to Amendment No. 79QQQ, which is a fresh Amendment, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Diamond.

LORD SHEPHERD

My Lords, would the noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack explain what he meant when he said that he was afraid that this stops the consideration of the Amendments? I was not quite certain what the noble and learned Lord was referring to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, if I am asked to explain. I think I should explain from the Woolsack, because this is my function as Chairman. Amendment No. 79C has now been passed in an unamended form. It follows that no Amendment to Amendment No. 79C can be moved, unless I am wrong, and therefore Amendments Nos. 79NNN and 79PPP fall. I am advised I did not call it, so I shall call it. That means that we must not take the Amendment as passed, because once the Amendment is passed I cannot call the Amendment to it. Nobody moved it; perhaps I should have called it. I shall now call it. The trouble was that the noble Lord, instead of moving his Amendment, asked a question, and in consequence I became confused. I now call Amendment No. 79NNN.

LORD DIAMOND

My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack. From ignorance of the procedure here, but some knowledge elsewhere, I was naturally expecting the Question to be put in the ordinary way, after the Amendment on the main Question had been put; then one would take the further Amendment. I am most grateful to the noble Lord for giving me the opportunity of saying, "Not moved".

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

We seem to have reached the same point by different routes. I shall now, ex abundanti cautelâ, call Amendment No. 79PPP.

LORD DIAMOND

Not moved.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, we have already discussed this Amendment. I beg to move.

Page 55, line 33, at end insert— (" ( ) For the purposes of subsection (7) of this section, section 33(4) of this Act, and the definition of "strike" in section 163(1) of this Act, shall apply as if—

1. (a) in section 33(4) the words "in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute", and
2. (b) in the definition of "strike" the words "in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute, whether they are parties to the dispute or not",

were omitted.")

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

10.14 p.m.

Clause 66 [Unfair Industrial Practices in connection with principles stated in s. 65]:

LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79CCCC:

Page 55, line 38, at end insert— (" Provided that any such action shall not be an unfair industrial practice if and in so far as it does not contravene any provision contained in Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 of the International Labour Organisation or of Article 5 of the European Social Charter.")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, Clause 66 deals with the question of unfair industrial practices in connection with the principles which we have been discussing, not wholly satisfactorily, in the previous clause. I imagine that the Government would say that the last thing they want to do is to introduce a Bill under which there is permitted what is not permitted under international labour organisations to which the Government have subscribed. I am advised either that there is some doubt about this or that some of these principles can constitute a contravention of those conventions. Apparently, the matter is not free from doubt. I have two sources of advice, and that advice has been offered to me. Therefore I thought the simplest way of clarifying the matter was to put in a proviso to make it clear that the Government are not intending what nobody would expect them to intend. I beg to move.

LORD DRUMALBYN

As I understand it, the effect of this Amendment would be to deprive an individual of any right of redress in respect of an action taken against him by an organisation of workers where the action, although in breach of the guiding principles, was not in breach of specified international instruments. The instruments specified are Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 of the International Labour Organisation or Article 5 of the European Social Charter.

I think this Amendment is founded on a misunderstanding. Its apparent object is to ensure that the guiding principles shall not be enforced—I think it is right that this is the noble Lord's intention—in any way which would deprive organisations of workers of the right conferred by these instruments. The inference is that there is, or may be, some inherent conflict between what the guiding principles say that an organisation cannot do and what these instruments say it should be able to do. I must tell the noble Lord that that is simply not true. Clause 65 serves a purpose quite distinct from that of the two I.L.O. Conventions and from Article 5 of the European Social Charter. Clause 65 is essentially concerned with the rights of the individual member in relation to the organisation to which he belongs. The two Conventions and Article 5 are concerned with the rights of organisations in the community—with freedom of association, and the right to organise and bargain collectively.

The noble Lord might like me to give an example to illustrate the difference. Article 2 of I.L.O. Convention 87 on Freedom of Association states this: Workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organisation concerned, to join organisations of their own choosing without previous authorisation ". In other words, no worker should be kept out of a union because his employer or the Government or anyone other than the union says he cannot join. Subsection (2) of Clause 65 is not concerned with the attempts of outsiders to stop people from joining unions; they are dealt with in Clause 5 of the Bill. But it is concerned to prevent a union from being able arbitrarily to reject individual applications for membership without good reason. Convention 87, on the other hand, says nothing but that the rules should say who can join a union; it certainly does not say that unions can have the right to exclude applicants unreasonably or arbitrarily. Clause 65(2) ensures that the rules do not countenance arbitrary and discriminatory treatment of applicants.

I could give the noble Lord other examples, but obviously one cannot go right through the Article in this fashion. But the same pattern would follow. The point is that Clause 65 and the international instruments really have quite different objects; they do not conflict, and this Amendment would achieve nothing except to cause confusion. So I must ask the House to reject it.

LORD DIAMOND

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord. I raised the matter because the view was strongly put to me by a very authoritative source that the objects did conflict. The noble Lord has no doubt taken advice, and no doubt he is not speaking without due consideration by his advisers; and if his advisers are satisfied that there is no conflict, there is no point in having the words there. If there were a conflict the words would be necessary to remove it. In view of what the noble Lord has said, for which I am grateful, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 67 [Organisations eligible for registration as trade unions]:

10.19 p.m.

LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79N: Page 55, line 43, after (" concurrence ") insert (" of any person who is not a member or ").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 79N. In this clause we are discussing the organisations which are eligible for registration as trade unions, and the purpose of this Amendment is to make it clear that, in order to be eligible, an organisation has to have the power to alter its rules in the way described without the concurrence either of a parent organisation or of any person who is not a member of the organisation. This is an attempt to strengthen the independence of the unions and I hope it will find sympathy with the Government. I beg to move.

EARL FERRERS

My Lords, we accept the fact that the noble Lord has said that this Amendment is put down in order to strengthen the wording in regard to the independence of trade unions, but it is already a condition of eligibility for registration that an organisation of workers must be "independent" as stated in subsection (1)(a) of this clause. The word "independent", as the noble Lord knows, is defined in Clause 163 as meaning not under the domination or the control of an employer… No organisation which was unable to alter its rules or to deploy its funds without the permission of an employer or an employers' organisation could be said to be "independent" in this sense. Therefore I suggest that in this respect the Amendment is unnecessary.

It is difficult to think of any other person who might have authority over the rules of an organisation unless that person happens to be a corporate body, for example, a federation of trade unions. I doubt whether this is intended, but I think the effect of this Amendment would be to exclude from registration any trade union which gave up any of its sovereignty to a federation. I am quite certain that this was not what the noble Lord had in mind. We believe that the word "independent" is adequately defined in the Bill, and that this Amendment would not add to it.

LORD DIAMOND

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Earl. I always find it difficult to understand the kind of answer which says, for example, as here, that if the word "independent" is included in Clause 67(1)(a) then in subsection (1)(b) you do not have to put in any of the words which describe that independence. I find it difficult to understand that kind of answer when I look in subsection (1)(b) and I see the words without the concurrence of any parent organisation ", why, for example, does not the independence of any organisation exclude the meddling of any parent organisation, and why, therefore, should be have to put in the words or any parent organisation "? I am merely saying that I do not understand it; I am not saying it is wrong. No doubt the draftsmen have understood it, and if the noble Earl says that the words which I have proposed are unnecessary because that degree of independence is already secured by the words in subsection (1)(a) then I am content to seek your Lordships' permission to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

10.25 p.m.

EARL FERRERS moved Amendment No. 79G: Page 56, line 1, leave out from (" funds ") to end of line 2.

The noble Earl said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 79G which stands in the name of my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn. This Amendment and the corresponding Amendments which have been tabled on Clauses 71 and 84, namely Amendments 79H and 79J, are felt to be necessary because it has become evident that certain features of the tests of eligibility for registration which are set forth in these clauses could present difficulties for some organisations who wish to register. The purpose of subsection (1)(b) of Clause 67 is to ensure that organisations which obtain registration as trade unions under the Bill have the authority to comply with the statutory requirements on registered organisations, which are stated in the Bill. This makes it essential that a trade union should have the authority to make any necessary changes in the rules and to control the application of its property and funds.

There are in existence a number of organisations, both of workers and of employers, which have been created by the amalgamation of existing organisations and where the terms of amalgamation have left the original organisations with a considerable degree of autonomy, although they have now become parts of a large organisation. It is not uncommon in this sort of situation for these so-called "branches" to retain independent control over certain funds, for example funds devoted to provident purposes. In such cases one may find that the parent organisation has no control over certain branch funds, while the branch does not have complete autonomy over its own rules. In this event, Clause 67, as it stands, would prevent both the parent and the constituent organisation from registering as trade unions, and Clauses 71 and 84 would have similar effects.

On reflection the Government do not feel that the unions' control of branch funds is essential for the purposes of subsection (1)(b), and have concluded that the tests of eligibility for registration are therefore unnecessarily rigorous in this respect. It is therefore proposed that the reference to control of branch funds in this clause can be dispensed with and similar Amendments are proposed to the later clauses. I hope this will have the approvel of noble Lords, and I beg to move.

LORD DIAMOND

My Lords, I think I understand what the noble Earl said, although it is not all that easy to follow. I do know that there are certain unions whose branches have autonomy over their own funds. I would ask the noble Earl what happens when the branches are not sufficiently independent to register separately and yet have some independence, some autonomy over their funds? Do I gather that if this Amendment is accepted the branches will now be included with the parent and the whole thing will be registered as one?

EARL FERRERS

My Lords, if the branch is included in the parent organisation and the parent organisation is registered, then the branch will also thereby be registered. Under the Bill as it stands, if a branch had autonomy over the use of its funds it would be excluded from being registered, and so would the parent organisation. Under the Amendment, the parent organisation, including the branch, will now be able to be registered, even though the branch retains the automony over its funds.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79P.

Page 56, line 2, at end insert— (" and (c) does not receive directly or indirectly financial assistance from any employer ").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is again an attempt, as an earlier Amendment was, to reinforce the independence of the union. I think the words are words which appear somewhere else in the Bill; I am not absolutely sure about that. At all events, that is the purpose of the Amendment, and if the noble Lord is going to say that it is not necessary because the word "independent" in Clause 67(1)(a) sufficiently covers it, well and good. But I should have thought there was something to be said for the words. I beg to move.

EARL FERRERS

My Lords, I am afraid that this Amendment is not acceptable to the Government—not for the reason which the noble Lord put forward but because we do not believe it to be necessary. We also feel that it would have a restricting effect. If this Amendment were accepted, no workers' organisation benefiting in any way from financial assistance from employers could register as a trade union. As a means of preventing organisations under employers' domination or control from gaining the status of trade unions, that the Amendment is, I suggest, superfluous because subsection (1)(a) already has that effect.

LORD DIAMOND

My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Earl? If he says that, then I need not trouble him any more.

EARL FERRERS

My Lords, in that case I will not trouble myself or the noble Lord any more; although I am bound to say that the Amendment does have different effects.

LORD DIAMOND

My Lords, in view of what the noble Earl has said, that subsection (1)(a) covers the point, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

10.32 p.m.

LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79Q.

Page 56, line 2, at end insert— (" and (c) is not for the time being registered as a trade union under the Trade Union Act 1871 ").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move this Amendment, but not, at this stage of our debate, with any great hopes. This would have been very relevant if an earlier Amendment had been accepted, permitting registration under the 1871 Act and under this Bill to run side by side. The Government did not see fit to do that and I do not therefore wish to spend a lot of time on this Amendment. If the Government are going to say, "No", they might as well say it quite quickly.

EARL FERRERS

My Lords, No!

On Question, Amendment negatived.

LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79R: Page 56, line 6, leave out (" all ") and insert (" three-quarters of ").

The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 79R. This relates to the problem of registering a federation of workers' organisations—it might be the T.U.C. but not necessarily so—where something less than 100 per cent. of the constituent members are registered. We have discussed this previously, and the Bill provides for all the constituent or affiliated organisations to be registered either on the general register or on the special register. I understand the Government's anxieties, but it is going too far to talk of 100 per cent. I repeat what was said previously: that these organisations are valuable organisations, much needed by Governments, helpful to Governments in all sorts of ways; they produce information and enable the country to be governed and are continually being used. One does not want to come to cross-purposes because a small number of organisations within the federation—small in number, or small in importance or small in membership, whatever the case may be—do not register. I agree that 100 per cent. is a round figure, but it is not a suitable one in terms of practical politics.

I hope the Government will recognise this and make their own Bill more workable by removing the word "all" and substituting for it something representing less. In my Amendment I have suggested "three-quarters With the consent of the House I suggest we now discuss the following Amendment which is purely to suggest an alternative of" 85 per cent."I should have thought" three-quarters" was all right; but if the Government want "85 per cent." then I would withdraw the first suggestion and be happy to accept the second. I do not think this is a Party issue; common sense says it will not be possible to get 100 per cent. The Government will need the cooperation and functions of these federations and therefore less than 100 per cent. should be provided for in the legislation.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, that this is not a political issue; it is a severely practical issue for one or two reasons. The outstanding one is that if you were to try to lay down a certain proportion, whatever it might be, which was not to be registered, that proportion would gain an advantage by a side door so to speak. The second practical point is that it is extremely difficult to specify any effective proportion in a matter of this kind. Were we to talk of a proportion of the membership of a federation in individual terms this might make sense; but you could quite easily have a federation of, say, 20 members and take three-quarters of that, and it would mean that five members need not be registered trade unions. Those five might constitute 95 per cent. of the total membership of the federation in terms of numbers. As a practical issue I do not think that this is possible.

Naturally one sympathises with a federation where a minority of its constituent members, for son-le reason or other, refuse to become registered. Possibly they may not be eligible for registration. The answer to that is that there is a difficult choice to face: they would have to decide whether to exclude from membership those who were not registered; or for the federation itself to forego the advantages of registration. One has also to bear in mind so far as federations are concerned that, as federations, they do not gain nearly so much in the way of advantages as do individual trade unions. From the point of view of the trade union member it is far more important that the rules of the union should conform with the rules laid down in the Bill than that the rules of the federation should conform, and so on. It is far more important that an individual's trade union should belong than that a federation should belong. But there is this choice. If you cannot get 100 per cent. agreement of the membership it is an insurmountable difficulty, if one accepts, as we feel we must, that the advantages should he enjoyed only by registered trade unions.

LORD DIAMOND

My Lords, the noble Lord has not answered my point at all. He is so concerned with what he regards as the advantages to trade unions, and what we regard as obligations and burdens on trade unions, that he cannot remove his gaze from that to think objectively about the point I put to him: namely, the need for Governments to have good relations with federations of trade unions and federations of employers' associations. This would be impossible if you cannot have registration. Registration should not be made impossible if there is but a small minority of the membership of the federation not registered for one reason or other. I am sure the Government will find this a practical difficulty.

I am not going to press this Amendment to a Division. It is designed to help the Government because this is a problem which the Government will meet. If the Government wanted to overcome it they could do so easily. Where there is a will there is a way, and one could think of all sorts of formulae which could get over it. One which occurs to me is to insert the words, "such smaller number" or "such smaller number as the Secretary of State adopts." We do not have to provide for it in the Bill, but give the power to make regulations and then every case could be looked at separately. This is in the Government's own interest, of having workable relations with important elements in trade and society, which the Government need in order to be effective in Government. But I must leave it to them. I ask your Lordships' permission to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

10.41 p.m.

LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79RRR:

Page 56, line 15, at end insert— (" Provided that no rule in the rule book of an organisation of workers or a trade union prior to the passing of this Act shall have effect in so far as it deals with the registration or non-registration of the organisation of workers or trade union.")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, organisations of workers are now faced with the difficulty that in their rule books they find references to registration, which may refer to the Trade Union Act 1871. It was clear to what this referred when the rule was made, but it will no longer be absolutely clear. All the circumstances will have to be taken into account to find out what is meant by "registration". This is clearly related to the problem of the fair wages clause, which I raised in the debate on the code of practice, where there is a reference to trade unions. Under this Bill, a trade union is an organisation which is registered under the Bill. The Government recognise that this causes confusion and, as the noble Lord told us, they are arranging for a statement to be made in another place to clarify this. All I am asking is that a statement should be made here clarifying this issue, so that those organisations which have references in the rule books to registration will know that they have a neutral situation; that they are free to do what they want. The alternative is for the union to alter the rules, but that takes time. In some unions the rules can be altered only every three years. I think this Amendment would be a helpful clarification. I beg to move.

EARL FERRERS

My Lords, we recognise the point which the noble Lord has made on his Amendment, but we feel that trade unions should be free to make their own decision about whether or not to register. We believe that they should make their own rules and that it is not right that we should by this Bill alter the rules under which they are abiding at the moment. The unions make their decisions in various ways, according to the provisions of their constitutions and rules. Some may make a decision relating to registration by resolution at annual conference, others by adoption of a new rule. We believe it is right that they should abide by their rules, and that, if they wish to alter them, they should do so in accordance with the way in which they are entitled to alter them. The noble Lord said that at the time the rules about registration were made, what was in mind was registration under the Trade Union Act 1871. That may be the case or it may not: one cannot tell what caused a union to make a particular rule. What does seem to be clear is that if one wants to interpret the intentions of the rule-making authority, it is best to go back to the body and ask them to consider the question again.

As soon as the Registrar informs a trade union that a particular rule may have to be changed—perhaps because it is in conflict with the requirements of the Registrar—the union will have to call its rule-making authority under Clause 94 of this Bill. When the union is considering the rules which the Registrar has told it to reconsider, it is of course entitled to consider at the same time any other rule it may have, including any which may oblige it to become registered.

We do not believe that there is anything to be detracted from the unions by their becoming registered; we equally believe that it is not right in this Bill so to alter their rules that they will be prevented from becoming registered. If their rules say that unions are to be registered, then the Government feel that it is right for the trade unions themselves to alter their rules in accordance with their own provisions.

LORD DIAMOND

My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Earl, but I do not think he has really taken my point. I am merely trying to say that, as I understand it, it is not possible for anybody to give advice, without considering each case separately and all the circumstances, including the documents, and so on, and what is meant by the words as a result of this Bill. The simplest thing would be for the Government to help all organisations in this way, instead of, as the noble Earl suggested, putting each organisation to the trouble of altering its rules so as to clarify its position. Of course it can do that; but it is much more troublesome. If the noble Earl is not prepared to help them, that is the end of it, and in those circumstances I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 69 [Guiding principles for organisations of employers]:

LORD DRUMALBYN moved Amendment No. 79E:

Page 57, line 12, leave out from beginning to (" to ") in line 13 and insert— (" ( ) No member of the organisation shall he subjected by or on behalf of the organisation to any unfair or unreasonable disciplinary action; and in particular (but without prejudice to the generality of this subsection) no disciplinary action shall be taken against any member of the organisation by reason of his refusing or failing—

1. (a) to take any action which, in accordance with any provision of this Act, would constitute an unfair industrial practice on his part, or
2. (b) to institute or participate in a lock-out which the organisation, or any other person, has organised, procured or financed otherwise than in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute, or in such circumstances as, in accordance with any provision of this Act, to constitute an unfair industrial practice on the part of the organisation or of that person.

( ) The principles set out in subsections (1) and (2) of this section, and those set out in subsections (3) to (6) and subsections (8).")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment corresponds, so far as employers are concerned, to Amendment No. 79C, which dealt with the position of trade unions and organisations of workers. I think it follows exactly the same lines, dealing with lock-outs as the other Amendment did in regard to strikes. I do not think I need to go into it in detail. Its effect is simply to prohibit an organisation of employers from disciplining any member who refuses or fails to commit an unfair industrial practice, or to participate in a lockout instigated or supported by the organisation, where such instigation or support would itself constitute an unfair industrial practice, or where the lock-out itself is not in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute. I beg to move.

LORD DIAMOND

My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether he can explain the necessity for this Amendment? I know that it matches the other Amendment, but unless it is pure window-dressing I cannot see any purpose in it. Can the noble Lord tell us what sort of circumstances he is proposing, at this late stage, to legislate against or for, and whose rights are increased or reduced?

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, it is quite conceivable that an employers' association might indulge in an unfair industrial practice on a recognition issue or something of that kind, and it might wish to discipline one of its members for not adhering to its instructions. It could quite easily happen, though not very often, and it is only fair that this provision should be in the Bill since the same restriction is placed on trade unions.

On Question. Amendment agreed to.

10.51 p.m.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 79F, which is consequential.

Amendment moved—

Page 57, line 15, at end insert: ("( ) For the purposes of this section, the definition of "lock-out" in section 163(1) of this Act shall apply as if the words" in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute "and the words" whether parties to the dispute or not "were omitted.").—[Lord Drumalbyn.]

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 71 [Organisations eligible for registration as employers' associations]:

EARL FERRERS

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 79H, which is consequential on Amendment No. 79G.

Amendment moved— Page 57, line 26, leave out from (" funds ") to (" shall ").—(Earl Ferrers.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 73 [Provisions as to certificates of registration]:

LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79U: Page 58, line 33, leave out from (" name ") to (" and ") in line 37 and insert (" of any other organisation of workers or of any other organisation of employers ").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, Clause 73 refers to a certificate of registration and the registered name of an organisation when it becomes registered as a trade union. It states in subsection (4): The name so specified—

1. (a) shall not be identical with the name by which another organisation is for the time being registered…in the special register, and
2. (b) shall not be a name so nearly resembling the name…"

The present rules affecting registration under the 1871 Act are, to my mind, wiser. What those rules state is not merely that you shall not register a union under a name which is the same as another registered organisation, but that you shall not register if the name is the same as another organisation, whether it is registered or not. What we are seeking to do is to avoid confusion, so it seems sensible that the same rules should apply here. The Amendment therefore proposes that if the name is similar to any other organisation of workers or employers, whether or not it is registered, you should not adopt that name.

I can give one example which seems a forceful one. Let us suppose that a large union does not register for five years, and then it decides to register. By that time the Registrar has registered another organisation with the identical name, as he will be empowered to do under the Bill as its stands. Then the position will arise that a substantial organisation is prepared to register but is not able to register in its own name, because in the meantime the Registrar has registered another body with the identical name. This could cause not only confusion, but tension and difficulties. The present rule is a sensible one, and what appears in the 1871 Act is a good precedent for the 1971 Act. My Lords, I beg to move.

BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE

My Lords, I am afraid we feel that the Bill as it stands is less confusing than with the Amendment which has been moved by the noble Lord; and perhaps it would be convenient to the House, if it is also convenient to the noble Lord who has moved this Amendment, that we should also discuss the next Amendment, because I think they go together. These particular Amendments would prevent the registration of a trade union or an employers' association under a name which might be confused with that of any other organisation of workers or employers. Why we feel the Bill is best as it stands is because it is in fact modelled on Section 13(3) of the Trade Union Act 1871, which also related only to registered trade unions. I take the point that the noble Lord made, that there might be a union which for about five years decided not to register and then, when it came to do so, found that the Registrar had already granted that name and that he therefore could not give it to this particular organisation; but that would happen in any case. The difficulty about the noble Lord's Amendments is that the Registrar really would have no certain means of knowing the names of the very large number of unregistered workers' and employers' organisations in existence at any one time. Therefore, I should like to suggest to him that the Amendments probably could not be administered as effectively as the provisions in the Bill as it stands. In fact, if I remember rightly, I think I had something to do with moving an Amendment on this question of names on Committee stage. I hope, therefore, that the noble Lord will not alter it, because I rather liked it in the original.

LORD DIAMOND

I find the argument appealing but not wholly persuasive. First of all, the noble Baroness said that this Bill is modelled on the 1871 Act. That may be so. It merely is a case, then, of history repeating itself. In 1871, Parliament thought it knew what was the right thing. No doubt somebody from the Opposition Benches got up and proposed what I am now proposing; the Government thought it was not the right thing and did not listen, as usual, and so it was enacted in that form in 1871. But by the time 1876 arrived—in the course of five short years—it was discovered to be a foolish proposal and there was introduced Trade Union Regulation 2, which apparently is not in the noble Baroness's papers but which I am assured was introduced. Parliament therefore decided to reverse the process out of experience. I am sorry that the noble Baroness has not been adequately briefed, but as she has based her case on a false assumption she will realise why I am not acceding to the logic of her case.

So, in spite of the rebellious remarks from the noble Lord sitting behind the noble Baroness (which noble Lord is showing the results of the last rebellion in which he was engaged, and we hope the results are rapidly improving) I think it would be right to ask the noble Baroness to give further consideration to this question. I think we are on a point which is good in common sense, and, so far as I know, we are on a point which is good in practice and experience. I am told that Regulation 2 of 1876 is the relevant one, so perhaps, in the circumstances, the noble Baroness would be good enough to say that she would like an opportunity to consult her advisers, particularly the one who failed to brief her properly.

BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE

My Lords, if I may speak again with the leave of the House, the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, asked me whether I would reconsider the matter from a common-sense angle. While it is true that I do not happen to have Regulation 2 of 1876 handy, I will do as the noble Lord suggests and approach the problem in a common-sense way, not by saying that I will reconsider it, but by suggesting to noble Lords that now in 1971, when we are considering whether it would be easier to have this applying only to registered organisations or whether it would be easier to have it applying to any organisation of workers, as the noble Lord's Amendment proposes, it would define and narrow the issue and make it easier to clarify if we leave the Bill as it stands. I approach this, as appealed to, in a common-sense way, and I appeal to the House not to accept the noble Lord's Amendment.

On Question, Amendment negatived.

Clause 74 [Incorporation and vesting of property]:

11.2 p.m.

LORD STOW HILL moved Amendment No. 79SSS. Page 59, line 15, at end insert (" and in so far as applicable the rules of the organisation shall become the rules of the body corporate.")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I hope that I shall not take up much of your Lordships' time in moving this Amendment, because when we discussed these clauses (and I refer to Clauses 74 and 90, which deal with the corporation structure of unions as the result of the grant of a certificate of registration) at the Committee stage on May 18, the Ministers said that they would like to look further at the clauses, which were then, respectively, Clauses 72 and 88. Since the Committee stage, my noble friends and I have received from Ministers a number of letters dealing with the questions that were asked on the Committee stage, and I should like to express my deep indebtedness for those letters, which I have found extremely helpful. From something that the noble Baroness, Lady Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, said, I was not quite sure whether I should have received a letter on this particular point. I have not done so. Therefore, perhaps I should proceed upon the assumption that I should again revert to the point in an Amendment.

The real question raised by Clause 74 is how the conversion of the trade union, an association of individuals, is to operate when the association becomes a body corporate: what is to be the machinery? The process of incorporation by charter of associations of individuals is of course well known. I myself have studied many charters for the purpose of incorporation of members of an association. The charter, in my experience, always sets out what is to be the constitution of the new body, and what are to be its rules; or it at least gives a reference to some other document in which the rules are to be contained or, possibly, states how the rules are to be made. One would have thought it would be requisite, in order to complete the process of conversion in this particular case of the aggregate of individuals into that corporation, that something analogous should be provided for in the terms of the Bill we are discussing. I think I am right in saying that no such machinery is provided for. It is for that reason that I have ventured to put down the Amendment to page 59, line 15, to insert the words: and in so far as applicable the rules of the organisation shall become the rules of the body corporate.

In this particular context I should have thought that even more essential than it might have been in other contexts. That is because the formulation of the rules and their conforming to some broad standards is made a condition of registration. In other words, the attention of those who drafted the Bill was particularly concentrated upon the scope and nature of the rules of the new corporation. It would therefore seem necessary, in order to apply the process of incorporation, to provide something as to what the rules of the new corporate body were to be. I infer that it is the Government's intention, at any rate, that the existing rules of the trade union, subject to such mutations as are rendered necessary, should become the rules of the corporation itself as from the date of incorporation. If an individual trade unionist wished to know what his rights were against the corporation or against any member of the trade union, he should look at the rules of the trade union as adapted and converted into the rules of the corporation. That is what I would imagine. There may be somewhere in this Bill—though I have not discovered it—or somewhere in some Statute which is automatically applicable, some provision which would have the effect of automatically making the rules of the union the rules of the corporation. If there is such a provision, I should be grateful if the noble Baroness would indicate where I can find it. So far, I have not found one, and therefore I think it should be incorporated into the provisions of Clause 74.

My Lords, when we discussed the matter in Committee on May 18, I ventured to put to the Government Front Bench a considerable number of questions. The Minister said that the Government would like to consider them and I expected that, as a result of their further thinking, a number of Amendments might appear on the Marshalled List dealing with some of those points. In fact only one Amendment appears, the next on the Marshalled List, which deals with the topic of the obligations resting upon a trustee for the organisation which are by that Amendment transferred to the corporation. That seems to be a perfectly reasonable and practicable change. I do not know whether I should infer from the fact that there is only that one Amendment that Ministers having considered the matter carefully with their advisers, feel that no further change is necessary. If that is so, I should be grateful if the noble Baroness, when she replies to the debate, would amplify that with the advantage of the Amendment which is before the House and say what further thinking the Government have had on that general topic.

May I remind the noble Baroness and Ministers of a matter which particularly concerned me and which I find not easy to understand? It is in regard to the property of the new corporation which would be amenable for the purpose of satisfying judgments obtained by persons who had claims against the corporation. I refer to what is now Clause 52, and I think I am justified in raising that issue on this Amendment because it arises out of the rules structure of the corporation. In that context, I asked what could be the object of providing that when judgment was given against the corporation, property of the members of the corporation otherwise than that jointly owned or owned in common with other members of the corporation should not be amenable to execution.

The clear implication of that is, I suppose, that property, whether owned jointly or in common with other members of the corporation, should be amenable to execution in satisfaction of a judgment obtained against the corporation. I find that very difficult to understand. It seems to me that there can be no possible circumstance in which such property could be rendered amenable to the process of execution. If one is to give full force to the provision in Clause 74 that once the union becomes a body corporate all the property of the union vests in it, and if the property held by the individual members jointly is to vested in the corporation, what is the point of saying or implying that that property is amenable to execution in the hands of the individual members of the union?

Those are the kinds of questions I asked, and I do not want to rehearse them again, because they are fully set out in the speech which I ventured to address to your Lordship's Committee on May 18. But I would remind the noble Baroness of those questions, and I should he most grateful if, in dealing with the Amendment, she would indicate whether she thinks it is desirable, and possibly also expand a little and give some indication as to the thinking of Ministers on the proper answers to those questions. The Ministers did say they would be glad to go into the matter further, and I should be most grateful if she would elaborate her answer—which I think would be just within the rules of relevancy and order. I beg to move.

11.12 p.m.

BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE

My Lords, we have certainly looked very carefully at the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, but, so far as this particular Amendment is concerned, we do not feel that the provision which he has laid down is necessary. I should like to explain why. As he will recall, the Bill requires, in Clauses 68 and 72, that an organisation which applies for registration must submit a copy of its rules to the Registrar along with the application, and the Registrar will already have access to the rules of organisations that are transferred from the 1871 register to the provisional list. Clause 75 and Schedule 4 further make requirements concerning the rules of organisations which have been registered under the Bill. Therefore it seems clear to us that for an organisation to be incorporated under the Bill it must have rules; and those rules must set out the relations between the members and the organisation. The incorporation of an organisation under this clause does not, as I am quite sure the noble and learned Lord knows, create a new entity. It merely changes the status of an existing one; and it therefore follows that the rules of the organisation immediately before its incorporation are still the rules of the organisation after incorporation. The Amendment would not in fact clarify what is already a fact. I suggest that, framed as it is, it would create uncertainty as to which of the organisations registering might be invalidated, because of the phrase "in so far as applicable". That would create uncertainty, and it is for this reason that I hope the House will not accept the Amendment.

The noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, will, I am sure, have received by now the letter which was sent to him by my noble and learned friend who sits on the Woolsack, concerning the rules of limitation of liability and also the winding up: all matters which he incorporated into the particular speech to which he has referred.

LORD STOW HILL

My Lords, if the noble Baroness will forgive me, from something which she said in conversation I had the impression that a letter might be on its way to me. I have not yet received it, but I shall look forward to doing so.

BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE

My Lords, in that case I feel it would not be incumbent upon me to read out a letter which was sent by my noble and learned friend upon the Woolsack. I think it did cover the other point, and I do not feel that I can quite relevantly refer to Clause 152 here. Therefore, having answered the point on the rules, I hope that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stow Hill, will feel that his Amendment is unnecessary and that he will withdraw it.

LORD STOW HILL

My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Baroness for what she has said. At a quarter past eleven in the evening and in the knowledge that a full and informative letter is on the way, it would be hardly appropriate for me to engage the House upon a minute discussion as to the effect of Bonsor v. The Musicians' Union which we have to some extent dismembered. I will not venture to do that. With great respect, I do not feel convinced by the noble Baroness's reasoning with regard to the effect of incorporation, but I do not think it would assist the House if I prolonged the discussion further at this time in the evening. I am most grateful for what the noble Baroness has said which I shall certainly ponder over, and shall greatly look forward to receiving the letter.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, does the noble Lord seek leave to withdraw the Amendment?

LORD STOW HILL

My Lords, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE moved Amendment No. 79CCC: Page 59, line 15, at end insert (" and any liability or obligation to which any person is for the time being subject in his capacity as a trustee for the organisation shall by virtue of this section be transferred to the organisation. ( ) Nothing in section 12 of the Finance Act 1895 (which requires certain Acts to be stamped as conveyances on sale) shall be taken as applying to this Act.")

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, the object of this Amendment is first of all to provide for the transfer of liabilities from the trustees to the organisation upon the latter's incorporation as a trade union or employers' association and, secondly, to establish that the incorporation of an organisation as a trade union or employers' association shall not attract stamp duty.

Subsection (3) of this clause provides for the vesting of property and funds upon incorporation, and subsection (4) for the continuation of proceedings. The Amendment adds a corresponding provision for the transfer of liabilities from the trustees to a corporate body. The vesting of property and transfer of liabilities together create a liability to the payment of stamp duty upon incorporation under Section 12 of the Finance Act, 1895. We have discovered this, although only at Report stage, and it was not our intention that this should he the effect of registration. Therefore, I hope the House will accept this Amendment. I beg to move.

LORD STOW HILL

My Lords, speaking for myself I would have thought that these were helpful Amendments, particularly the second one relating to stamp duty. The first one I have already referred to. That would seem to me, if I may respectfully say so, to follow from what had previously been enacted in Clause 74, and I hope the House will agree that it has merits.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 75 [Examination and approval of rules by registrar]:

11.19 p.m.

LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79W:

Page 60, line 15, at end insert— (" (5) Where a disagreement arises between the Registrar and the organisation as to whether its rules are defective as mentioned in subsection (1) of this section such disagreement shall he referred for settlement to an independent review body consisting of three persons of whom two shall be trade unionists appointed by the Secretary of State after consultation with the Trade Union Congress.")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, the principle of this Amendment is one which we have discussed before and it is merely to incorporate the Donovan recommendation at this point in the Bill. The question of a disagreement about the rules as between the Registrar and the organisation was fully gone into by the Donovan Commission, and they strongly recommended that there should be a body set up which could help in resolving these difficulties and that that body should consist of two trade unionists with a lawyer as chairman. I have, so far as possible, followed the wording of the Commission's Report, and I suggest this would be a helpful proposal to incorporate into the Bill.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, this Amendment gives expression to the point of view which the noble Lord expressed at the Committee stage, and I would readily acknowledge if there were no other machinery available under the Bill, that there would be much to be said for the proposal. The proposal that the Donovan Commission made did not deal only with the question of whether the rules complied with the requirements of the law. It listed three other matters as well. These are all dealt with by the Industrial Court or tribunal, as the case may be. It would seem that this would be adding an unnecessary piece of machinery into the machinery that already exists. I daresay the noble Lord did not think it worthwhile following out his proposal. It would seem fairly clear that if such a committee were set up subsections (2) and (3) of the clause would not be needed. This would be final, particularly as he used the words "referred for settlement". If it were settled this matter could hardly arise, except to the extent that if the decision given was against the union the registration would have to be cancelled, and that matter would go to the Industrial Court.

As there is provision for the trade union or employers' association to apply to the Industrial Court, and this is plainly at least an equally impartial court to the machinery the noble Lord suggests, and this machinery is in the Bill, it seems quite unnecessary for this particular purpose to set up this further machinery. I was not absolutely clear from the way the noble Lord explained his Amendment whether this was intended to be a particular tribunal, or an ad hoc tribunal, to be set up locally whenever disagreements of this kind arose. In either case it is unnecessary as the Bill is drafted; it would be simply an additional piece of machinery. I suggest to the noble Lord that it simply is not worth while in the circumstances, and I hope he will withdraw the Amendment.

LORD DIAMOND

My Lords, I will certainly not withdraw the Amendment. This is a very worthwhile proposal, which is fully argued by Donovan. We have argued it on a previous occasion. It is as different as chalk from cheese to the kind of machinery which the noble Lord proposes. I made the argument absolutely clear on the last occasion when we discussed this matter. It is not a proposal for compulsion, but for discussion and settlement short of compulsion. It is not a proposal for court action, but a proposal for friendly advice. In psychological terms it is an extremely wise proposal. I have no intention of withdrawing it, although I know that I should be disturbing your Lordships unnecessarily, from an arithmetical point of view, if I pursued the matter in the Division Lobby.

On Question, Amendment negatived.