Lords Sitting of 8 July 1971

Preamble
The House met at three of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Lichfield.

RUSSIAN NUCLEAR MISSILES: SUGGESTED TALKS
LORD KENNET: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they now know whether they intend that the reduction of the intermediate-range nuclear missiles now deployed in the western part of the Soviet Union, which are capable of reaching this country but not the United States, should ever be discussed with the Soviet Union; and if so, in what forum.]
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE, FOREIGN COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN): My Lords, I am not at present in a position to add to what I told the noble Lord in answer to this Question on this matter on June 22.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, is it not almost unique that a country which faces a concrete prospect of being threatened by the existence of certain categories of arms and has none appropriate to counter them should have no intention whatever of discussing the difficulties of those concerned?
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, I did not intend to imply that these matters would not be discussed in future. In fact, I think that on the last occasion I pointed out that the Government had by no means discarded the possibility of doing so. That, of course, is the answer that I gave to the noble Lord last time and which I repeat to-day. I am sure that the House and the noble Lord realise that this Question really applies to a far wider field than these particular weapons,
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but I think that I can assure him and the House that these matters are very much in the mind of Her Majesty's Government at the present time.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, would it not be possible to communicate both with the Government of the United States of America and with the Government of the Soviet Union, indicating that we are very much implicated in this problem and asking that in their considerations, in which we wish them well, this matter should be discussed with us before the discussions conclude?
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, I think there is no doubt whatsoever that the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union are very well aware of the interests of Her Majesty's Government in this matter.
LORD SHINWELL: My Lords, if Her Majesty's Government are reluctant to make representations and take part in the SALT talks, would it not be desirable that NATO, which is primarily concerned, and the whole of Europe should make suggestions both to the United States and the U.S.S.R. that they should be involved in the discussions?
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, I imagine that the noble Lord knows that the SALT talks are bilateral, between the Americans and the Russians. That being the case, other countries are not directly concerned in these talks. At the same time, I am quite certain that both the American and the Russian Governments are well aware of the position of other members of the NATO alliance.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, are there not discussions going on in NATO with regard to a détente for the mutual reduction of armaments? Is it possible to have those discussions without also bearing in mind these major weapons?
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, it is certainly the case that there are discussions going on in NATO regarding the question of the reduction of armaments and ancilliary matters. I do not think that I can comment on the last part of the noble Lord's remarks, but I will certainly bear in mind what he has said.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, is it not the case that in the SALT talks the Russians and the Americans are talking about

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weapons with which they can annihilate each other, but nobody anywhere is talking about the weapons which can annihilate only us?
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, this of course is something of which I am quite certain that the House, and indeed the country and many other countries in Europe, are well aware. I quite understand the point of the noble Lord's supplementary question, but I think I must refer him to my original Answer.

MUSEUMS AND GALLERIES: ENTRY PRIVILEGES
3.8 p.m.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the first Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will grant entry privileges, where appropriate, to members of societies such as the National Art Collections Fund, the Friends of the Tate Gallery and the British Museum Society, when entrance charges are levied at national museums and galleries.]
THE PAYMASTER GENERAL (VISCOUNT ECCLES): My Lords, I have told the National Art Collections Fund and the Contemporary Arts Society that, provided their minimum subscription is £3 a year, their members will be admitted free to all the national museums on production of a signed and recognisable membership card. Where there is a bona fide society of friends of a national museum and the minimum subscription is £2 a year, the members will be admitted free to the museum or gallery in question on production of a signed and recognisable membership ticket.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Viscount the Paymaster General for that reply, which I am sure will give great satisfaction to all those who care about these things.
BARONESS LEE OF ASHERIDGE: My Lords, may I ask the noble Viscount,
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since he has indicated that it is possible to modify the regulations where it is considered that a just case has been made, whether he would do the same sort of thing for crippled, spastic and disabled children and for those in the community who are not able to pay £3 to belong to an extremely valuable arts society?
VISCOUNT ECCLES: My Lords, in reply to the noble Baroness, we have looked at a large number of requests to make special exemptions. It seems that if we are to keep the basic admission at 10p we really cannot go much further in the exemption field.
LORD SEGAL: My Lords, would not the noble Viscount agree that the members of these societies are perhaps the best able to afford the charges for admission?
VISCOUNT ECCLES: My Lords, I hope that the result of this concession will be that the subscriptions to the societies will be very much increased, and therefore will greatly benefit the museums. That is really the purpose of the concession.
LORD REIGATE: My Lords, may I congratulate my noble friend on what he has said to-day, and ask him whether he will now use his best efforts to obtain the same privilege of free entry to those many museums which already charge for entry, including, for example, the Bowes Museum, run by the Socialist Durham County Council?
VISCOUNT ECCLES: My Lords, all museums other than the 18 national museums are either the responsibility of local authorities or of private trusts, and they can make what arrangements they think fit.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the second Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will grant free entry to artists holding the membership card of the International Association of Art, which is under the auspices of UNESCO, when entrance charges are levied at national museums and galleries.]
VISCOUNT ECCLES: My Lords, I am looking into the suggestion made by the noble Lord. When I have received advice on this very complex matter, I

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will write to him. The arrangements under which scholars will be admitted free of charge will include many holders of documents issued under the sponsorship of international bodies.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, I thank the noble Viscount the Paymaster General for that reply. In considering this suggestion, may I ask him whether he was aware that this concession is granted by many museums in other countries which are associated with UNESCO? Will he bear in mind that it might be embarrassing if the United Kingdom were not equally reciprocal; and also that this concession is most important from the membership point of view?
VISCOUNT ECCLES: My Lords, I have looked at the list of museums abroad which grant this concession, and it is only a very partial list. I think I must find out the conditions on which membership can be taken up in this international society.
BARONESS LEE OF ASHERIDGE: My Lords, may I assume that it is the wish of the Paymaster General to ease circumstances for anyone who finds it a real hardship to pay to get into museums and galleries? If so, is he aware that more than 90 per cent. of your Lordships' House is entitled to enter at half price?—and I think we should agree that less than 9 per cent. really have need of this concession. Would the noble Viscount look at the priorities, and if there are to be concessions, try and give them where they are needed?
VISCOUNT ECCLES: My Lords, I will certainly study what the noble Baroness has said.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, is it not time that the noble Viscount considered devoting his great qualities to something more useful than trying to find exemptions to a most undesirable policy?
VISCOUNT ECCLES: My Lords, I have some sympathy with the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition in what I imagine is his view, that I have had to spend a great deal of time on this matter. But I think this is a constructive move and will benefit museums before long.
LORD WYNNE-JONES: My Lords, would the noble Viscount be prepared to extend his activities and make the exemptions still wider?
VISCOUNT ECCLES: My Lords, I have already said that our basic charge of 10p is very low in comparison with museum charges anywhere in Europe, and we wish to stick to it if we can.
LORD WYNNE-JONES: My Lords, does the noble Viscount think it is worth making?
VISCOUNT ECCLES: Yes, my Lords.

" X "-FILM TRAILERS IN CHILDREN'S PROGRAMMES
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they are aware that trailers for "X"-films showing violent and vicious scenes are being shown during programmes specially designed for children, and whether they will take steps to prevent this practice.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE, HOME OFFICE (LORD WINDLESIIAM): My Lords, I understand that in a recent incident a trailer which had been given a "U" certificate provided certain scenes were cut was issued in error without those cuts having been made. The responsibility for preventing oversights of this kind rests with the local licensing authority. I am assured that steps have been taken by the authority concerned to prevent a recurrence.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for that partially helpful reply, may I ask him whether he is aware that the British Board of Film Censors, who are obviously against such a practice, have said, through their Secretary, that they have no power to prevent happenings of this kind and that local authorities are similarly circumstanced? If, for example, the cinema manager, or even the projectionist, decides to put one of these undesirable trailers in, he can do so. That is the kind of thing that has to be stopped.
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, this was a most unfortunate incident. It has

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been thoroughly investigated by the Greater London Council—the licensing authority concerned—and by the British Board of Film Censors. The licensing authorities have powers to control what is shown in cinemas, and of course they take the advice of the Board. I understand that in the light of this incident and others the Secretary of the Board is holding talks with the trade to discuss the whole question of trailers for "X"-films being shown in performances of films which are mainly for children.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, is the noble Lord the Minister aware that so far as big distributors and the British Board of Film Censors, and of course local authorities, are concerned, everyone is anxious to stop this sort of thing happening? But my information is that they have not the power to do so. If I send the noble Lord information which is in my possession, perhaps he will have a look at it to see whether further action can be taken by his Department.
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, yes; I will certainly look at it. My information is that there is probably no lack of powers; the difficulty lies in reaching some understanding between the interested parties as to what is and what is not a reasonable standard.

THE SUMMER RECESS
3.21 p.m.
EARL ST. ALDWYN: My Lords, subject to the progress of business, I hope that the House may rise for the Summer Recess on Thursday, August 5. If progress should be even better than I anticipate, perhaps the House may be able to rise before that date.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, we are grateful to the noble Earl, Lord St. Aldwyn, for making this shocking statement—though it is one at which we are not entirely surprised. We note the delicate bait that if we skimp our work we can get out of school earlier. I do not think I can possibly protest about this announcement, since I know that in the days of the previous Government we kept your Lordships sitting into August, and even later. I suppose the noble Earl is not able to say whether we shall be
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sitting alone, or that another place will be suffering at the same time. I understand that no statement on Business has yet been made in another place. This strengthens the argument, which was repeatedly put forward to us when we were in Government, of the need to have a more rational distribution of Bills between the two Houses, a matter to which I know noble Lords on the Government side of the House have devoted great efforts, though they have not always been all that much more successful than we were. But I hope that the Leader of the House will continue the efforts which I know he is making in this direction.
EARL ST. ALDWYN: My Lords, the last remarks by the noble Lord. Lord Shackleton, will receive careful attention from my noble friend the Leader of the House. As the noble Lord said, my noble friend is giving this matter very careful consideration. The noble Lord further suggested that I was asking the House to skimp our work. I would not ask the House to skimp its work, but I would ask noble Lords not to waste words.
LORD WYNNE-JONES: My Lords, are the Government aware that this is the day before Transfiguration?

LAW REFORM (JURISDICTION IN DELICT) (SCOTLAND) BILL
THE MINISTER OF STATE, SCOTTISH OFFICE (BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE): My Lords, I understand that no Amendments have been set down to this Bill and that no noble Lord has indicated a wish to move a manuscript Amendment in Committee. Unless, therefore, any noble Lord objects, I beg to move that the Order of Commitment be discharged.
Moved, that the Order of Commitment be discharged.—(Baroness Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

CRIMINAL DAMAGE BILL [H.L.]
3.24 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD HAILSHAM OF ST. MARYLEBONE): My Lords, I beg to move that the Commons Amendments to the Criminal Damage

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Bill be now considered. For your Lordships' information, may I say that I intend to move in respect of each, that this House doth agree with the Commons in the Amendment, and we may be able to take Amendments Nos. 1 and 2, together, and Nos. 3 and 4 together.

CRIMINAL DAMAGE BILL [H.L.]

  COMMONS AMENDMENTS
  [References are the first Commons' print—Bill 154]
  [Nos. 1 and 2]
  Clause 1, page 1, line 18, at end insert—
  " (3) An offence committed under this section by destroying or damaging property by fire shall be charged as arson."
  Clause 4, page 2, line 14, leave out from "of" to "shall" in line 16 and insert "arson under section 1 above or of an offence under section 1(2) above (whether arson or not)".
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I beg to move that this House cloth agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 1 and 2. These Amendments restore the separate name of "arson" which we discussed in our House. The Government, in deference to the opinion of the two branches of the legal profession, moved Amendment No. 1 in another place. Although my preference was for the Bill as it was originally drafted, my advice to the House is that these Amendments should be accepted. They will give a great deal of pleasure to the legal profession.
  Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  LORD GARDINER: My Lords, I have read the proceedings before the Standing Committee in another place and, following the words of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, I advise my noble friends to accept this Amendment.
  On Question, Motion agreed to.

  COMMONS AMENDMENTS
  [Nos. 3 and 4]
  In the Schedule, page 8, line 42, column 3, at beginning insert "In section 103A (as inserted by section 23 of the Highways Act 1971), subsection (4)".
  Page 9, line 17, at end insert—

  " 1971 c.

  The Highways Act 1971.

  In section 23(1), sub-section (4) of the section inserted in the Highways Act 1959 as section 103A."

  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 3 and 4. Amendment No. 3 is necessitated by, and consequential upon, the passage of Section 23 of the Highways Act 1971, which has overtaken this measure on its way through Parliament, and Amendment No. 4 covers the same point.
  Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BILL
3.30 p.m.
THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (LORD DRUMALBYN): My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now further considered on Report.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question Motion agreed to.
Clause 56 [General duty of employers to disclose information]:
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79XX:
Page 47, line 17, after (" of ") insert (" all the stages of ").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, we are now dealing with that clause of the Bill under which employers are required to disclose information for the purposes of collective bargaining to employees or their representatives. This is a matter which we dealt with in a certain respect in Committee, and the purpose of this Amendment is to try to meet the point of view which was then expressed by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor and at the same time to go some little way towards meeting the point of view which we expressed from this side of the House.
The question centres on the point of time at which information should be made available. One would think that it was a very simple matter, but of course it is not easy to define exactly where collective bargaining starts and where the sort of conversations leading up to collective bargaining finish. Therefore one wants to have some kind of definition. The definition in the Bill is "for the

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purposes of collective bargaining", and that is well and good, but one knows that one must make sure that in all the stages, the initial stages and the middle stages as well as the final stages, the information required should be made available. Obviously it does not improve industrial relations if information to be relied on is not made available at the time when it should be. The noble Lord who sits on the Woolsack (or judging from the arduous duties he has recently carried out, who sits on the Woolsack when he has an opportunity of doing so) said at column 407 on May 18:
" but I would say to him—"
that is, to me
" that as negotiations proceed, quite clearly more and different information may be desirable at different stages of a negotiation. Probably in the early stages information is forthcoming without much difficulty; as the negotiation becomes closer it may become more difficult to extract the information. But at any stage when the union feels it is required for the purpose of collective bargaining and that the employer is not performing his duty, its remedy is to go to…"
clauses this, that or the other. So the phrase which kept cropping up was "different stages", and this Amendment is put down in the hope that it will clarify the matter and make it clear to both sides that at all stages the information will be made available.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (EARL JELLICOE): My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for the very clear way in which he has put this point. I should like to make it equally clear from the outset that the intention of Clause 56 as it stands at present is that the employer's obligation to disclose information should start at the stage when managements and unions get together to discuss proposals for change in the terms and conditions of employment or in a procedure agreement, but not before. It has always been the Government's intention that the employer's obligation to disclose information existed, to use the words of the Amendment, at all stages of collective bargaining, as we found in the latter part of this Bill. Indeed it is argued that this is the case, and that the Bill as it stands covers this. I am confident—at least my advisers are confident, and I am content to take their advice on points of this kind—that the clause as
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drafted does provide this. Nevertheless I think that this is a matter which should be put beyond the peradventure of doubt. I take the point which the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, was making. I think there is no doubt that it would be wise to be absolutely clear here, and with that in mind I should be very happy to recommend your Lordships to accept this Amendment should the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, wish to put it.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, had that in mind when he moved the Amendment; and I am most grateful to the noble Earl for taking the point so clearly. I think it helps, although one always relies on advice of this kind, if one makes it clear to everybody that that kind of advice should be available to them. I am most grateful.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79FFF:
Page 47, line 21, after (" undertaking ") insert (" or the undertaking of any associated employer ").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, in moving this Amendment I should like to make it quite clear that I do so in the considerable hope that the Government will find it acceptable.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, might I say straight away, in case I am unduly encouraging the noble Lord by accepting his first Amendment, that I do not think he should push his luck too far. We may find as we go along that there may be something else on which I may be able to help.
LORD DIAMOND: I shall enjoy the journey all the more pleasurably because it is into the unknown. My Lords, the Bill as it stands refers to
" such information relating to his undertaking as is in the possession of the employer, or of any associated employer ".
The information which is likely to be in his possession relates to his undertaking, and the information which is likely to be in the possession of any associated employer is surely information about the associated employer's undertaking; and so I think one needs to include that undertaking as well as his own. That is what the Amendment seeks to do. I beg to move.
LORD PARGITER: My Lords, I should like to make one point on this. The occasion could arise where a holding company with a number of subsidiary companies might be able to withhold information, saying that this was not a matter relating only to a subsidiary company and was primarily a matter for the holding company which was engaged in the negotiations. But the information might be absolutely vital for the trade unions to reach a satisfactory agreement. I should like to advance that as a reason why it would be desirable for this to be made perfectly clear.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I must confess that when I first read this Amendment I was attracted by the symmetry of it, that the disclosure should operate as it were, in both spheres. But may I make it clear, since we have not discussed this point previously, that the clause as drafted requires employers to disclose to trade unions information relating to the undertaking which is needed for collective bargaining, whether it is held by the employer himself or in the hands of an associate of his. I think that is the point to which the noble Lord, Lord Pargiter was referring. The effect of the Amendment would be to extend that obligation very materially, so that the employers had to disclose information relating to the undertakings of associated employers.
As I said at the outset, I was initially looking at this without advice and I was attracted by the symmetry of the Amendment. I saw that in logic there was a case for arguing that if a clause bit on one leg, as it were, it should bite on the other. But there are difficulties here, and quite considerable ones. Subsection (6) of Clause 163, as your Lordships know, defines "associated employers". I will not trouble your Lordships by reading the definition, but it is a pretty wide one, and although I readily concede that in some circumstances the affairs of an associated employer's undertaking might be relevant for the purposes of collective bargaining, to widen the obligation of the clause in the way which is sought would, I think, open the door too wide, and might indeed lead to very considerable practical objections.
I do not wish to pitch it too high, but I will expand what I have in mind. In a multi-company set-up, a requirement
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to provide information about the affairs of associated companies could impose a tremendously heavy burden on the employers. For example, in connection with other provisions of the Bill an employer has pointed out that because of the definition given in Clause 163, to which I have referred, over 150 companies in their group could be treated as "associated". This is by no means exceptional. Indeed, although this is quite a large group, there are other groups which are larger—for example, I think that Courtauld's have something like 500 associates—and therefore the implications of accepting the Amendment, in spite of the merits which initially commended themselves to me, could be tremendously heavy on a company of this sort, which might well be asked to provide information about a whole range of "associated employers". I think this really would be overwhelming the machinery of the Bill. For that reason I hope that the noble Lord, having listened to what I have said, will not press this particular Amendment.
I hope I have made clear that I am not in principle opposed to what he has been suggesting, but I think in practice it would place an unduly heavy burden upon the employers concerned. At the same time, in expressing the hope that the noble Lord will not press this Amendment I should like to point out that there is absolutely nothing in the Bill to stop employers from providing this sort of information if in their view it would promote effective collective bargaining. However, my Lords, to impose a statutory requirement of the sort which this Amendment would entail right across the board would in my view be unwise. That is really the advice that I should like to give your Lordships' House on this Amendment.
LORD BERNSTEIN: My Lords, before the noble Earl dismisses this would he consider a re-phrasing? The reason for this Amendment is that people on this side of the House are suspicious of the possibilities. I appreciate the explanation which the noble Earl has offered, but if the words were, "where the information required is relevant to the bargaining entailed", would that not be sufficient to satisfy extraneous inquiries which had no relevance to the bargaining that was going on? I wonder whether the noble Earl would consider words of that kind

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instead of the Amendment as proposed by my noble friend Lord Diamond.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, may I speak again so that the noble Earl can deal with both speeches at the same time? May I follow up the point which my noble friend has just made and say to the noble Earl that this is a matter of practice, not a matter of political theory, and it is therefore not a matter on which I should seek to divide your Lordships' House. I nevertheless press the argument upon the noble Earl, because I think he has misconstrued the situation according to the Bill. I think that the first unaided view he took was, as is often the case, the better one. And may I say why? The whole of this is conditioned by Clause 56(1)(a) which refers to the kind of information that can be asked for; namely, information without which the trade union representatives would be to a material extent impeded in carrying on collective bargaining.
Let us take the case of a company with 500 associated companies. How many of those associated companies are so closely connected with this particular negotiation as to affect the bargaining that is about to take place or that is going on? The likelihood is that of the 500 associated companies only a few, perhaps less than half a dozen, would in the slightest degree be so closely connected that the information referring to them would be information without which these particular negotiations would be to a material extent impeded. Therefore, with respect, I am not at all worried about a company having 500 or 5,000 associated companies. The ones I am worried about are those one or two associated companies whose connection with the company under consideration is material—and the noble Earl said in his first sentence that there would be cases where that information was material.
My Lords, I did not expect the noble Earl to reply that that was the Government's intention. I expected him to say either that it was an oversight and that they were grateful for the drafting correction, or that this was already covered by the Bill. It cannot be the case that the necessary information can be made available if part of it is relevant and it comes from one or two of the 500 associated companies. I certainly agree with the
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noble Earl that one should not bother your Lordships with a detailed definition of an associated company, but it is much more associated than your Lordships would think; it is a very close connection indeed. It would be the case that there would be one or two of such associated companies whose business would be so closely interwoven with the business of the employer under negotiation that really the employer would not be giving the relevant information. Therefore, I say to the noble Earl that this is not a Party point; it is merely a question of interpreting correctly the spirit behind the clause which says that the employer should give the relevant information; that the union must not ask for irrelevant information, and that the employer should be free to run his business under one hat, two hats or 500 hats if he wants to. I have always been very sympathetic with this point of view and I went to enormous lengths when I had responsibility for the Finance Bill to make financial provisions adjustable to the freedom of industry to run its business as it thought fit. I have not the slighest difficulty in saying that I welcome every business which wants to hive off one particular part of its undertaking under one hat another under another hat and to have 500 or more associated companies; but I cannot accept for a moment that it is not the spirit of this clause that relevant information should be made available.
I hope the noble Earl realises that I am not for one second seeking to give a trade union the right to wander all over the place to seek information and give many people a lot of trouble. That would be utterly stupid and counterproductive. But there is a point here, a sensible point, and I should be grateful if the noble Earl would look at it, and look at it favourably.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, this is the first time that we have discussed this particular point. I am very prepared to look at this between now and Third Reading, but I do not wish to get into the position of holding out a whole host of considerations between now and then for purely practical reasons. On the question of relevancy, I think I can help the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, because—and I may not have made this absolutely clear in my opening remarks—I

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think there is nothing between us on this point. The form of words contained in Clause 56(1) does not necessarily preclude a trade union from requesting information which, although it relates to the undertaking in question and is relevant to the bargaining in hand, also relates to an undertaking of an associated employer. That information will of course, to be caught by this, have to meet the standards of paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1), and the Bill operates in this way as already drafted. It is therefore my view that the clause, as drafted, will allow unions access to all relevant information which they require for the purposes of collective bargaining without at the same time imposing a potentially intolerable burden or very heavy burden on employers.
Having said that, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, that this is not a Party point. We are discussing a purely practical point and it is a question of interpretation of the drafting. I shall be glad to look at it again in the light of arguments advanced by him and by the noble Lord, Lord Pargiter, and the noble Lord, Lord Bernstein, but I should like to make clear that I am satisfied that at the present time the Bill gives us both what he and I would like. I am equally satisfied, subject to looking at it again, that to accept the Amendment would be to impose a heavy and rather impractical burden. I should not wish to be dogmatic on an area of quite difficult interpretation, and I hope, given that explanation, the noble Lord will not (and he has suggested that he will not) pursue this matter at this particular stage.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
3.50 p.m.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79GGG:
Page 47, line 21, after (" is ") insert (" available to or ")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, if this Amendment was accepted the clause would read:
"…all such information relating to his undertaking as is available to or in the possession of the employer,…".
The point is a very simple one. At the moment the Bill requires the employer to produce the information which is in
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his possession. I am not a lawyer; I do not know precisely what that means. If it means in his possession in the particular building in which he happens to be conducting the negotiations, that would not take us very far. If it means in his possession at any time, in the sense that it is already made up, that would not take us far enough. A more sensible description would be "available to" as well as being "in the possession of". That is why the words are inserted. I beg to move.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, again while not being dogmatic, I am, I fear, in a resisting mood. I am not speaking as a lawyer, and it is certainly not my understanding that possession would have this rather narrow interpretation which the noble Lord was inclined to put upon it. May I explain the position, as this is also a new point? Under Clause 56 an employer already has a duty in collective bargaining to disclose to trade union representatives appropriate information which he has in his possession. He is obliged, in addition, to obtain any relevant information from associated employers. Consequently, in collective bargaining in relation to a company, trade union representatives have a right under the Bill, to relevant information from such associated employers. I believe that it would be unreasonable to extend the employer's obligation still further, as the noble Lord's Amendment would do. The Amendment could possibly oblige employers to seek from similar but non-associated enterprises information about procedure agreements (and I take procedure agreements as an example) which might be used in discussions in collective bargaining within their own organisations. That would be going beyond what is reasonable. That is certainly my understanding of the phraseology which we should be bringing into the Bill. The Amendment would involve the possibility of endless arguments as to what could, or could not, be made available. I suspect that we might be creating that sort of happy hunting ground for the barrack-room lawyer which certain noble Lords have accused those who sponsored the Bill of already providing.
Our predecessors in office were, I suspect, of a rather similar opinion to that which I have been expressing, since the corresponding provision in their Bill,

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which was Clause 22, was the same as ours. I am not resting my argument on that; their Bill was no more sacrosanct than ours is, but I believe that the point is relevant. I hope I have shown that I am not in spirit far from the noble Lord on this point, but I think there is a practical objection to the Amendment; and, especially in the light of a "goody" about to come, I hope the noble Lord will not press the Amendment.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, six years as a Chief Secretary has taught me to be singularly incorruptible. If your Lordships do not mind, I will therefore concentrate on this Amendment, in the confident hope that the future is replete with "goodies". Nevertheless, one has to do one's duty on this Amendment. I did not find what the noble Earl said completely persuasive. The condition that any information is to be made available is set out in the Bill, and it has to be information without which the trade unions would be to a material extent impeded. The example the noble Earl gave is the kind of information which the union would not ask for because they would get it from their friends in the union, and would have ready access to it. They would not bother the particular employer about comparable arrangements. Unions are good at getting comparable arrangements and all the information on them. We do not disagree about the kind of information that we think the employer ought to give, but my anxiety is that the words are too narrowly drawn to enable the information to be made available. The noble Earl thinks that my Amendment would incorporate words which are too widely drawn. I do not think that either of us should rest our case wholly on the words if we are trying to reach agreement on this matter. I should be content if the noble Earl would say that he would give it further consideration; that is all that is necessary at this point. I do not know whether he would be prepared to say another word about it.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, we are on a comparatively narrow point. First of all, may I come to an important point of principle. I recognise that the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, like Robespierre, is "sea-green incorruptible", in case he was crediting me with any other possible opinion on his possible corruptibility. I
1068
am unwilling to go beyond what I have already said. There is a practical difficulty here. Having dealt with that point of principle out of order, may I have the permission of your Lordships to speak again on this matter? I find it hard to see what information that would be relevant for the purposes of collective bargaining could be obtained from sources other than the employer himself. If the employer has the information, it is in his possession and therefore the information is caught by the provisions of the Bill. If the information is not in the possession of the employer, if it is outside, it is just as likely that the trade unions will have access to it as the employer himself. I believe that to incorporate the notion of availability, which is a fairly wide one, into the Bill would be opening the door to endless barrack-room arguments as to what constitutes availability. The Bill, as drafted, gives those who wish to promote better collective bargaining—and we all do—everything that is really necessary. I will look at what the noble Lord has said, but I do not think I shall be able to meet him on this point.
LORD DIAMOND: May I interrupt the noble Earl?
EARL JELLICOE: Yes, of course.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Earl for permission to interrupt him; but unless I do so I am in a tactical difficulty. May I ask him to look at this point with a view to finding a word which does not mean available from outside sources, but available to the employer from inside sources although not in his possession at the moment? I am thinking of sheets of information rather than of sources of information. If it is in his possession, one does not want an argument on the lines: "Well, I could get the information if necessary". The Bill refers later on to the problems of preparing information, and one does not want an argument on that basis. I am not seeking to press the noble Earl for information from outside sources, meaning outside the undertaking or firm itself.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, it is certainly my understanding that the Bill as drafted would have that implication. It is also my understanding—but I am thinking on my feet and I am not a

1069
lawyer—that the phraseology information in possession" would certainly cover the sort of case the noble Lord instanced as an example, but I shall look again at what he has said. It would be a mistake to hold out a promise that I am going to import new phraseology at a later stage, but without any commitment certainly I undertake to examine what lie has said. I think it would be wrong for me to go so far as misleading your Lordships' House and to use the hallowed phrase "consider again".
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I beg your Lordships' leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79HHH:
Page 47, line 39, after (" be ") insert (" or be confirmed ").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I sincerely hope that this and the next Amendment are the "goodies" which the noble Earl had in mind. This Amendment is a very small one but not without interest, and one might almost describe it as slightly erudite. We are concerned with disclosure at this point and with what the word "disclosure" means. The provision in the Bill says that disclosure of the information shall be in writing. I do not know what would happen at a meeting if someone disclosed information verbally to someone else; that is not in writing, but it is a disclosure. If the person—and I understand this is the intention of the Bill—then said, "That was very interesting. Will you write and confirm it to me?" the employer could then say, "I am not required to do that, I have already disclosed it". If one were required to do it, it would have to be confirmed in writing. I think your Lordships see my difficulty. It would be clearer if the expression "or be confirmed" were included so that lines 38 and 39 of the Bill would then read "The disclosure of it shall be or be confirmed in writing". It is either to be in writing in the first place or, if it has been given verbally, it is to be confirmed in writing.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, for a former Chief Secretary, I am surprised
1070
that the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, does not recognise the difference between the plural and the singular. I think I used the word "goody"; he has already doubled it. I hope that by playing down the particular importance of this Amendment, he was not seeking in any way to devalue the nature of the conciliatory attitude which I am about to show towards it. I think it is an Amendment which shows not only the greatest possible erudition but is also one of great practical importance. That is how I certainly regard it. At the same time I must grant that I do not think that there is a great deal between us on a matter of principle on this particular point. I understand there is some doubt as to whether the Industrial Court here involved would construe the present subsection, subsection (3), so as to entitle a trade union to written confirmation of information. I am quite clear, and the Government are quite clear, that this entitlement is desirable on grounds of policy, and I am happy to accept an Amendment which puts the matter beyond any possible doubt.
This right, of course, would extend only to information which an employer is obliged to disclose under Clause 56; it would not cover additional confidential information which an employer may disclose as an earnest of trust and good faith. Upon that understanding, I am very happy to recommend your Lordships to accept this erudite and undoubtedly very important Amendment.
LORD DIAMOND: I find it difficult to summon words to give adequate expression to the gratitude which I feel to the noble Lord. All I can do is to thank him very much indeed.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, Amendment No. 79DDDD flows from the last Amendment and the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, doubtless anticipated it; perhaps it was the second "goody" which he had in mind. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 47, line 43, at end insert (" or confirming ")—(Earl Jellicoe.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
4.7 p.m.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79YY:
Page 48, line 13, at end insert—
(" (6) In this section the term "trade union" is used in the same way as in the code referred to in subsection (2).")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, on this occasion we have moved from erudition to simple logic, which is perhaps the more persuasive. May I describe the argument in a very few, simple steps. The first step is that an employer must disclose information in accordance with good practice, which we find described in subsection (1)(b):
" information which it would be in accordance with good industrial relations practice that the employer should disclose to them for purposes of collective bargaining."
That is the first step.
The second step is that that means having regard to the code of practice, because in subsection (2) one reads:
" In determining…what would be in accordance with good industrial relations practice, regard shall be had to the principles relating to disclosure of information…set out in the code of practice…".
That is very simple and straightforward. Then one has to look at the code to see what that says and all of us know what it says. Broadly, the term "trade unions" in the code is used to describe both registered and unregistered workers' organisations, so that one has these three simple steps which produce the result which this Amendment would make more clear. I have to say "more clear" because there is a little ambivalence in the Government's mind when it comes to thinking about trade unions. But they realise that as soon as one comes to the practice of good industrial relations which the code describes, then one disregards any esoteric distinction between registered or unregistered trade unions and one has regard to good relations between man and man, between the employer and the employee.
For those purposes, therefore, it is right that all employees should receive the information which is needed to enable the bargaining to take place on a proper footing and a fair footing, and indeed the code of practice, issued under the authority of the Government with the blessing of the Secretary of State himself, tells us to do that very thing. So all I had to do, really, was to say, "Well, it
1072
is not for me to put the Government's Bill right. They should have seen to it themselves." But perhaps their logic was just a tiny bit lacking in this respect, and so I have been only too happy to fill the gap and put down the Amendment, which I now beg to move.
LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY: My Lords, so far in the consideration of this Bill my noble friends and I have supported the Government in their stand of giving advantages to registered trade unions and definitely penalising unregistered independent organisations of workers. We see this as one of the major parts of the Bill, something not bad in itself, and certainly any attempt to take this out would be to wreck not only the Bill but also anything which ought to flow from it. Therefore we have been on the Government side on this particular point all through.
However, on this one point we definitely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, because, as he himself has said, this is really not a question of the relationships of the union itself; it is a question of general good industrial practice and general good management practice. It is the entitlement of all workers to get as much information as possible from the employers about what is going on in the firm. Indeed, we think this is one of the most important factors in the whole of industrial relations as opposed to industrial disputes. It is for this reason that we are now supporting the noble Lord, Lord Diamond.
THE EARL OF BALFOUR: My Lords, there are one or two points here which I feel your Lordships should consider. Although the code of industrial practice, on page 19, goes quite extensively into collective bargaining agreements on the general guide to that question, at the same time it states in reference to the term, "trade unions", on page 8:
" For the sake of simplicity the term ' trade unions' is used in this code to describe both registered and unregistered worker's organisations."
What I am worried about here, as I believe very strongly in trade unions, is that this is exactly the kind of set-up one would have in a works where people were not satisfied with their trade union. They would then demand of an employer to give them all the information they want

1073
to start to form themselves into a breakaway union—which I personally should not like to see. This is why I do not like this Amendment. I think it could be quite distinctly against the interests of the unions.
4.16 p.m.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, in moving this Amendment the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, has laid great stress on the fact that in the code of industrial practice, the draft Consultative Document, no distinction is made between trade unions and unregistered organisations. I agree with him and, furthermore, I should like to say that it is entirely right that this Document should draw no such distinction. The code is concerned with principles of general application, and therefore there is no reason or need to distinguish between registered trade unions and unregistered organisations of workers, both of which have the common purpose of promoting their members' interests. As my noble friend Lord Balfour has pointed out—and he was on a very valid point, if I may say so—the term "trade unions" is therefore used throughout the Consultative Document to describe both registered and unregistered organisations.
Although the Bill draws a distinction in this respect, I do not think that this difference in terminology will cause confusion. The asterisked note on page 8 of the code is absolutely clear. The great majority of people who come into contact with the legislation will do so through the code of practice and the guides which will be issued by the department of Employment, and these will make the position absolutely clear. But the effect sought by this Amendment is to require employers to disclose information to organisations of workers which are not registered. I do not wish to make too much of this, but we have made it plain time and time again—we made it plain when we were in Opposition and we do not hide the fact now—that the registration proposals lie at the very heart of our policy on this matter. I know that the Opposition do not like this; they have made it perfectly plain. But, in any event, this matter has been debated, I think I might fairly claim, both in this House and in another place ad nauseam, and I do not intend to expound our philosophy here—it would be
1074
quite wrong on Report stage—in great detail. I would confine myself to saying only that it is a fundamental principle of this Bill that the privileges and rights which it affords should be restricted to those organisations which accept the very reasonable requirements of the registration provisions and the resulting responsibility towards their members.
The Bill therefore gives certain rights to registered bodies but not to those bodies which do not register. The right to relevant information in collective bargaining is, in our view, one of those rights. I should like to underline a further point here. There is nothing in this Bill to prevent an employer from giving information to officials of unregistered organisations of workers if he wants to negotiate with them; but I should like to make it clear that they cannot demand information as a statutory right under the Bill as drafted. I believe this to be right because it is in accord with our fundamental approach to the problem of registration. In Committee we debated (I suspect that it was at a rather early hour) an Amendment which would have had much the same effect as this, and although the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, did not mention this particular point at that stage—
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, there was no code at that point.
EARL JELLICOE: No, my Lords, there was no code, but we debated an Amendment which was very similar to this; it would have had the same effect. What I was going on to point out was that on that occasion both the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, and the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, implied that under the Bill unregistered organisations of workers would lose their existing negotiating rights. I should like to make it plain that if this is what was thought—it is certainly what they said—it is quite wrong. In this Bill we are not seeking to take away existing rights from unregistered organisations in this respect. What we are doing here is to confer new rights and privileges on those who do register, including the right to information in their collective bargaining. It is in our view, therefore, up to each organisation of workers to balance those benefits against the responsibilities implicit in

1075
registration. The principle of according, along with responsibilities, certain privileges to registered organisations is one from which we cannot depart, and therefore I have no hesitation in advising the House to reject this Amendment which the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, has moved in such studiously moderate terms.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I hear and I understand the statement made by the noble Earl that this is a distinction from which he cannot depart. That is a statement but it is not an argument. But it is the only thing he has said that really sustains the weight of his high office and the matter we are discussing. I recognise that he is in great difficulty about it. We discussed this point in Committee and made suggestions from this side broadly along the lines we are now considering. But at that stage there was no code of practice, and to our astonishment the Government said, "Yes, it is right to give information to employees if their union has registered under this Act, but it is not right to give information to employees if their union has registered under a previous Act." That seemed to me to be an absolutely astonishing statement, and I think I said at the time that I found it quite shocking.
Since then we have had the code of practice, which makes the position absolutely clear that as soon as we attempt to put a theory like that into practice we come unstuck. Just imagine any factory with different sections in it and organised by different unions. Union A is registered under the new Act and union B is registered under the old Act; union A goes to the management and says, "For the purposes of our collective bargaining we need some information." The owner says, "Of course, not only am I required to give it to you by law but it is in accordance with the best industrial practice. Here it is." Then union B, which is registered under the old Act but not under the new Act, goes and asks for the same information affecting a similar body of workers employed by the same employer in the same undertaking but carrying out a different task and therefore organised by a different union. They are told by the owner, "Oh no. We are
1076
not required to give the information to you and we are not going to do so. We have given it to your mates but we are not going to give it to you." One can imagine the kind of explosion that would take place in that factory and how long it would be before all the men were out; and one can imagine also that until that information was made available none of the men would be back at work. It is a sure recipe for industrial unrest.
LORD ALPORT: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lord for one moment? He has said that there would be an explosion in that factory should that situation arise. Surely any normal management, and indeed perhaps even the more stupid management, would realise that point and would give the information to both the unions. The only point at issue is the right of the union to have the information if the employer does not want to give it. Surely in those circumstances it would be right to attribute to management normal common sense.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I entirely agree and I am most grateful to the noble Lord. I am only sorry that he has not spoken more often in these debates.
LORD ALPORT: My Lords, perhaps I should say that the time of the House has been so fully occupied by the noble Lord and his colleagues that there has not been very much opportunity for the rest of us to take part in these debates.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I am very sorry indeed to hear that. We must seek, through the usual channels, to create the opportunities so that we may have the benefit of the noble Lord's comment.
LORD CHAMPION: Extend the Report stage for another month.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Alport, made a most valuable contribution. I entirely agree that any sensible management would give the information and would realise that it would be an intolerable position not to give it. The Government also recognise that, because as soon as they began considering practical points as to how industrial relations were to work in practice they produced a code of practice which says, "This is what you shall do". It says that you shall give this information

1077
to all the employees irrespective of whether or not their unions have registered. What I am saying is that it is a ridiculous situation when, as the noble Lord has said, every sensible employer would recognise that it was his duty to give information. The noble Earl now says, "We cannot depart from the policy we have taken on"; and we know what that means. The Bill therefore says something which is not necessarily quite the opposite to the code of practice, but it does not say the same thing. The Bill makes a careful distinction: it says that if you are registered you are entitled to it and if you are not registered you are not entitled to it. As the noble Lord, Lord Alport has said, that is sheer nonsense. It is nonsense for it to be in the code of practice and not to be in the Bill.
LORD ALPORT: My Lords, may I just correct the noble Lord, who is always very fluent in his interpretation of what those who are taking part in the debate have said? I did not say that it was nonsense; what I said was that it is a question of rights, and that the practice that took place would depend upon the circumstances and should be interpreted as such by the management. But the principle laid down by the Government is perfectly applicable and understandable both to trade unions and to management.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I withdraw immediately what I said previously. The noble Lord did not say that it was nonsense; he made the case to show that it was nonsense to do one thing in the code of practice and another thing in the Statute. That seems to me to be as good a definition of a Government proceeding to nonsense as I can think of: to provide in week one a code saying, "You shall give the information to all concerned", and to provide in week two or three a Statute saying, "You shall not give the information to all concerned but only to some of those concerned."
I am grateful for the support the Liberal Party have given to this Amendment, because it means a great deal that they should have departed from their normal attitude to this aspect of the Bill on this one particular point. The Amendment seeks only to breach this principle in respect of this one area of giving information. The code, if the noble Earl
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would like me to read it out, makes clear, not only in the footnote but time and time again throughout the code itself, that it is important for efficiency that employees—employees in the plural and not just certain employees—are kept informed on matters which concern them, and that managements should ensure that every employee is given full information. All these things are repeatedly stated in the code. It is sheer nonsense; or, if it is not nonsense, it is worse—it is a deliberate withdrawal of rights from a certain class of employee. Because the employer who was so inclined would read the Statute and would say, "I am not required to give you the information until you register, and if you do not register you are not entitled to it by law, and that is the end of the matter." It is obvious that we cannot accept the noble Earl's reply, which is merely to stand on his authority. That is not an argument which appeals to us and we must press this Amendment to a Division.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, before the noble Lord does so I wonder whether he would consider this argument. On Tuesday last we were discussing whether or not this Bill conferred new rights on trade unions. This is undoubtedly a place where a new right is conferred on a trade union—and a right which can be asserted through the Industrial Court. If the noble Lord succeeds in this Amendment no doubt he also had it in mind to make it later in Clause 102, which gives the trade union power to assert this right. If noble Lords will look at Clause 102 they will see that if an employer fails to give the information that this clause requires him to give then a complaint can be made to the Industrial Court and the Court can make an order determining rights, an order directing an employer
" to take such action in fulfilment of the duty in question as…it would be within the power of the employer to take and is action which in the circumstances he ought to be required to take."
If information is withheld for bargaining purposes, then under Clause 126 an order can be made authorising presentation of the claim to the Industrial Arbitration Board. And if we look at Clause 126 we see what the Industrial Arbitration Board can do. There a claim can

1079
be made to the Industrial Arbitration Board and
" Any such claim…shall be a claim that, in respect of one or more descriptions of employees specified in the claim, the terms and conditions of employment to be observed by the employer specified in the order should be, or should include, such terms and conditions as are specified in the claim."
In other words, they then take their bargaining claim to the Industrial Arbitration Board, and it will be for the employer to appear before that Board and, if he likes, argue his case there.
These are new and very substantial rights indeed. I do not think the noble Lord is justified in saying that no new right is given here. The clause gives registered trade unions the right to have certain information. There is a very important distinction between rights given by Statute and good practice set out in a code of practice. The code recommends employers to give information; the code does not say, "This is what you shall do"; it says, "This is what you should do". That is the essential distinction.
Good employers, and we hope all employers, will follow the code and give information of this kind. The only distinction is that if an organisation of workers wishes to avail itself of the rights, then it is required to register under the Bill, and registration will carry with it the requirement to comply with certain standards. That is one of the rights that is conferred. The noble Lord is well aware that neither unregistered organisations of workers nor trade unions can assert the provisions of the code in the Industrial Court. It is true that non-compliance with the code may be quoted in any action before the Court or the tribunal, but a right under it cannot be asserted. The right given in this clause is one which can be asserted, and that is why it is confined to registered trade unions.
4.34 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 79YY) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 64.; Not-Contents, 106.

CONTENTS

Addison, V.

Evans of Hungershall, L.

Reay, L.

Airedale, L.

Fiske, L.

Ritchie-Calder, L.

Archibald, L.

Gainsborough, E.

Royle, L.

Ardwick, L.

Gardiner, L.

St. Davids, V.

Balogh, L.

Garnsworthy, L.

Samuel, V.

Beaumont of Whitley, L.

Henderson, L.

Segal, L.

Bernstein, L.

Henley, L.

Shackleton, L.

Beswick, L.

Hilton of Upton, L.

Shinwell, L.

Blyton, L.

Hoy, L.

Silkin, L.

Brockway, L.

Hughes, L.

Slater, L.

Buckinghamshire, E.

Jacques, L.

Sorensen, L.

Burntwood, L.

Janner, L.

Stocks, Bs.

Champion, L.

Leatherland, L.

Stonham, L.

Chorley, L.

Lee of Asheridge, Bs.

Strabolgi, L. [Teller.]

Cooper of Stockton Heath, L.

Lindgren, L.

Summerskill, Bs.

Crook, L.

Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, Bs.

Taylor of Mansfield, L.

Davies of Leek, L.

Lloyd of Hampstead, L.

Wade, L.

Delacourt-Smith, L.

McLeavy, L.

Wells-Pestell, L.

Diamond, L.

Nunburnholme, L.

White, Bs.

Donaldson of Kingsbridge, L.

Pargiter, L.

Wynne-Jones, L.

Douglas of Barloch, L.

Phillips, Bs. [Teller.]

Douglass of Cleveland, L.

Popplewell, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Aberdare, L.

Bledisloe, V.

Daventry, V.

Ailwyn, L.

Brock, L.

De Clifford, L.

Alexander of Tunis, E.

Brooke of Cumnor, L.

Denham, L.

Alport, L.

Brooke of Ystradfellte, Bs.

Derwent, L.

Ashbourne, L.

Burgh, L.

Drumalbyn, L.

Auckland, L.

Caithness, E.

Dundee, E.

Balerno, L.

Camoys, L.

Effingham, E.

Balfour, E.

Carrington, L.

Elliot of Harwood, Bs.

Balfour of Inchrye, L.

Clwyd, L.

Emmet of Amberley, Bs.

Barnby, L.

Coleraine, L.

Erroll of Hale, L.

Belstead, L.

Colgrain, L.

Falkland, V.

Berkeley, Bs.

Conesford, L.

Ferrers, E.

Bessborough, E.

Cork and Orrery, E.

Ferrier, L.

Birdwood, L.

Courtown, E.

Fortescue, E.

Blackford, L.

Craigavon, V.

Goschen, V. [Teller.]

Gray, L.

Loudoun, C.

St. Helens, L.

Gridley, L.

Lucas of Chilworth, L.

St. Oswald, L.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

Mancroft, L.

Savile, L.

Hacking, L.

Margadale, L.

Selkirk, E.

Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Massereene and Ferrard, V.

Sempill, Ly.

Mersey, V.

Shannon, E.

Hankey, L.

Milverton, L.

Skelmersdale, L.

Hanworth, V.

Morrison, L.

Somers, L.

Hatherton, L.

Mottistone, L.

Strang, L.

Hawke, L.

Mowbray and Stourton, L.

Strange of Knokin, Bs.

Hood, V.

Moyne, L.

Strathcarron, L.

Hylton-Foster, Bs.

Northchurch, Bs.

Strathclyde, L.

Ilford, L.

Nugent of Guildford, L.

Swinton, E.

Jellicoe, E. (L. Privy Seal.)

Oakshott, L.

Tenby, V.

Kemsley, V.

O'Neill of the Maine, L.

Tweedsmuir, L.

Kindersley, L.

Ranfurly, E.

Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, Bs.

Kinnoull, E.

Rankeillour, L.

Vivian, L.

Landsdowne, M.

Robbins, L.

Waldegrave, E.

Latymer, L.

Rothermere, V.

Wise, L.

Leicester, E.

Ruthven of Freeland, Ly.

Young, Bs.

Lothian, M.

St. Aldwyn, E. [Teller.]

Resolved in the negative, and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.

Clause 57 [Disclosure of information to employees by major employers]:
4.41 p.m.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79JJJ:
Page 48, line 15, leave out (" 500 ") and insert (" 200 ").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I hope to produce in respect of this Amendment at least three arguments as to why it should be accepted. We now come to the clause which deals with the requirement that a firm should disclose information to its employees regularly, not necessarily in connection with collective bargaining but just as a matter of sensible industrial practice, to keep people informed. Nobody wants that information to be required to be given in the case of every firm; so one eliminates the very small firm. But, equally, one does not want the requirement limited to the overlarge firm, and I think that at the moment we are in danger of doing that. At the moment, by definition, the person required to give this information is the owner of an undertaking which employs "more than 500 persons, other than excepted persons". For these purposes I am going to assume that "excepted persons" are mainly part-time employees; so the clause requires—and I hope that the House will excuse me from using the words "bites on" for one gets a little tired of being "bitten on" from time to time—an employer whose undertaking engages more than 500 persons, apart from part-time workers, to give this information. In these days that is a
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large firm, and can be a very large firm. In the case of a capital intensive employer, 500 employees, quite apart from part-time workers, could provide a turnover of £5 million a year or more. That is the first point.
The second point relates to the part-time employees. Suppose one had a firm of 450 full-time employees and 2,000 part-time employees, making a total of 2,450. That firm would not be required to give this information. A firm which had 501 full-time and no part-lime employees would be required to give it. I do not think that that is a very sensible way of looking at the matter. I make two points at this stage. The first is that we are, in my view, erroneously restricting the requirements to over-large firms; and, secondly, that the definition wrongly excludes part-time employees. As this particular Amendment refers only to the first leg of my argument, it proposes to leave out "500 employees" and to insert "200 employees". If, then, you have a number of part-time employees it is not such a relevant matter.
I know that there is a provision in the Bill, a so-called escalation clause, which provides for adjusting this figure. The noble Earl may tell me that if it does not work out in practice the figure can be adjusted upwards or downwards. That is true; and I hope that the Government will have regard to that and will adjust the figure if necessary. But this clause is bound to set the tone; it is the figure in the clause that would be regarded as the standard for good practice. Irrespective of the variation clause, I think it right that the Statute should provide a figure which sets the tone correctly. I think that 500

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is far too high. For the reasons I have given I hope that the House will regard 200 as more appropriate. There is nothing between us as regards the need to give the information; but this figure is set too high. I hope that the Government will feel that this is another Amendment that they can look kindly upon and perhaps accept. I beg to move.
LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY: My Lords, I shall be very brief. My name is coupled with that of the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, on this Amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Diamond, made a staggering statement. He prefaced his remarks by saying something to the effect that no one wants the obligations of this clause to apply to every firm. I do, so that is a misstatement. I think the obligations here should apply to every firm; that they are the absolute basis of good industrial relationships no matter what size firm is concerned. I see no reason why these obligations should not be statutory and enforceable. For that reason I support the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, in the rather small step he has taken along those lines.
LORD PARGITER: My Lords, may I refer to one point which I think might have been made clearer? The clause refers to "other than excepted persons". I know that the term is defined in a later subsection of the clause; but why not leave these words out of subsection (1) and call the employees simply "whole-time employees"? That would be simple; everybody would understand it and there would then be no need to refer to a later subsection. Otherwise, I would support the figure of 200. I might even support the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, in making it smaller. I appreciate that a line must be drawn somewhere. The figure of 200 appears to be reasonable.
LORD SLATER: My Lords, I thought that my noble friend was a little modest in his requirements. When I was in the other place, I remember a chemical company who were proposing, at a cost of something like £3½ million, to move into my constituency. They asked about labour relations and how they worked in that area, and I advised them. I asked what this move would cost and they told me that the cost would be anything up to £3½ million. I thought that an investment of that nature would involve bringing in
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200, 300 or 400 people. I was told, to my amazement, that there would be 36 people employed; and that backs up the argument advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley. Such firms are not given the same accommodation as other people because they do not reach the figure of 500 which is in the Bill, and I think that my noble friend Lord Diamond is being conciliatory with his figure of 200.
In all development areas there are factories on industrial estates where the figure would not reach even 200, but they are not to be taken into consideration or given the accommodation which they should receive because that figure is below the one in the Bill. I hope that the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, may be able to help us. An employee in a particular type of industry wishes to know why the firm for which he is working cannot have the same facilities as are afforded for people in other factories where the number of employees may be greater. I am looking at this matter, and the comments which have been made, from that point of view.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: My Lords, I should like to support the Amendment, and I agree with what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Slater. Today, with automatic machinery a firm may employ 25 people and yet have the most enormous turnover. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley; I do not see why this should not apply to all employers, even those employing half a dozen people. I cannot see any objection to that. A bona fide employer should have no objection to his employees knowing everything about his business. I hope that my noble friend may be able to give a favourable response to the arguments advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Diamond.
LORD BERNSTEIN: My Lords, I urge the noble Earl to accept this Amendment. I speak from practical experience, having been involved with a plant which cost over £2 million and employed fewer than 100 people. As has been mentioned, all kinds of work which used to be performed manually has been taken over by automation and by computers. The numbers of workers in efficient companies are being reduced,

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and I think it essential that the minimum figure should be 200.
THE EARL OF BALFOUR: My Lords, may I mention that by subsection (7) the Secretary of State is allowed to vary the number? I support the proposal to have a figure of 500. In many cases, particularly on industrial estates, there are firms which are starting up perhaps in a highly technical field—say electronics. They may be operating on borrowed money, or they may be a subsidiary of another company which has supplied money to start the new enterprise in the hope that it may be successful. Very often such firms operate on a shoestring in their early stages and might not wish to disclose too much information about themselves. Usually in small firms there is a very friendly feeling between management and workers, but I think that if the number is reduced to something like 200 the requirement should not apply to firms of less than five years standing. This would give such firms a chance to get started. As the Secretary of State has the power to vary the figure I feel that we should not press this matter too hard.
4.55 p.m.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I should like to say straight away that I am far from unsympathetic towards the arguments advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, and other noble Lords. I think it is reasonable that employees, many of whom may have spent the whole of their working lives in a particular firm, should be entitled to have information about the firm they work for. The clause springs from a conviction, which I think we all hold, that in the conditions of modern industry employees can easily lose touch with the activities of the firm for which they work.
It is not for me to lecture noble Lords on the problems of modern industry, but I believe that a loss of personal identification with the job is one of our great problems to-day. I am not certain that we have the right answer to it, or that the answer may be found in a modern industrialised society. It is perhaps rather ironical that in the harsher conditions of an earlier age there was often more involvement in the job, and more pride in the work, because, I suppose, people were able to feel they were identified with
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it. I do not know: perhaps it was because the concern was a family concern, and work was then organised in smaller units. I have found that the element of depersonalisation in industrial relations is likely to occur as soon as concerns get above a certain size. That size is about the number that someone can know. I am not basing my argument for accepting the figure of 500 on this, but I think the right figure is that of the number of people with which one person can cope—about the size of a battalion, that sort of thing. That has been my impression from such first-hand knowledge of industry as I possess.
In drafting the provisions of this clause our thinking was influenced in two ways, which was rather schizophrenic, as they pulled in two directions. We wanted to ensure that an individual should receive at least a minimum amount of information about the organisation which employed him. On the other hand, we wished to avoid placing unduly onerous burdens on employers. It is difficult to generalise, but I believe that it is in respect of the larger enterprises that there is a need to do everything one can to counteract the problem caused by depersonalisation and lack of involvement. That is where the greatest need lies for doing something to stimulate better communications by the sort of regular statements which are provided for in the Bill. That is one reason why we have put in a figure of 500. In our view, it is the larger organisations where this is most needed at the present time. In addition, in fixing the initial limit at 500 we had in mind that to oblige small employers to issue such a statement might involve them in a great deal of cost and considerable work. For those two reasons, we believe that, at least initially, the statutory obligation should be limited to fairly big employers of labour.
There are only three things that I should like to add before I say where I stand on this. In the first place, I would point out that there is nothing in the provision to preclude employers of fewer than 500 workers from issuing such statements. Many already do, and many no doubt will continue to do so; and so far as I am concerned, the more the merrier. I hope that this Bill and its general direction will encourage thorn in

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what I think in principle is a highly desirable practice. Secondly, there is subsection (7), to which the noble Lord drew my attention and anticipated what I might say on it. It is an escalator. In this case, I think that it is far more likely to go down than up. I cannot see it going up; I can readily see it going down. I would assure your Lordships that it is my right honourable friend's intention to keep this matter under review and, he will if necessary adjust the figure. I think your Lordships may take it that such adjustment would be downwards. I say that with some considerable assurance.
I see nothing sacred about the figure 500. I gave from my personal experience a rationalisation for a figure of about that size. My own feeling is that the dangers which we are seeking to avoid here, and the problems we are seeking to mitigate, seem to be most prevalent and pressing in the undertakings of 500-plus rather than in the concerns of 500-minus. That is where a conscious effort is most needed to improve communications, though they are needed in the smaller firms, too. I do not wish to dogmatise. There is nothing between us in principle. In my view, 500 is not unreasonable. I do not wish to argue that 200 is necessarily totally wrong and, by the same token that 600 is necessarily totally wrong. In view of what I have said, and above all the clear indication that my right honourable friend will keep this under close review and will have no compunction whatsoever in operating the escalator clause, should this seem desirable and practicable, I hope that the noble Lord will not press this Amendment. I believe that this is not an unreasonable figure at which to start. We may well move downwards over the course of years. My own instinct tells me that we probably shall. But I think that we should give the Bill a trial period and see how we get on; and then, if need be, my right honourable friend will operate the de-escalator.
5.4 p.m.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, we are grateful for the conciliatory reply which the noble Earl has given but I do not feel that he has paid sufficient attention to either the weight or the spread of the
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argument. First of all, may I deal with the point which the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, made. I am sorry that I used the phrase I did, but I did not have to-day's Marshalled List before me and did not have the pleasure of seeing that the noble Lord had attached his name to my Amendment, at which I am delighted. The Liberals take the view that this information should be made available in all circumstances. I share that view, but I am in this practical difficulty: that I do not think this is the kind of statutory provision we can make, because Statutes have to be carried out and, if necessary, policed. That is my practical difficulty; but I certainly share the view that information should be made available much more regularly.
To whom do we intend this clause shall apply? Not to the large firm, which already gives information, and I should be astonished if there were a large proportion of firms with over 500 employees who did not give information already: it is standard good practice. So I think we ought to direct our attention not to firms who already carry out this practice but to those who should be carrying it out. I should like to see a much smaller figure than 200, but we are on Report stage and I have to try to assess which Amendments are so moderate, over-moderate and reasonable that the Government might be willing to accept. That is why I pitched on the figure of 200. From the first-hand information we have been given to-day about the size of firms, I think that 200 is very relevant. It is not our fault that the Government pitched on this definition of number of employees. If they had tried to define it by annual turnover, that might have come out with a different result. I think it is right to base it on employees, because we are concerned about giving information to employees and we arrived naturally at that method of definition. When I said that a firm of 200 could produce a turnover of £5 million, I was being moderate, but I took this from my general experience. I know that as more and more capital-intensive firms come along, and as investment grows, as we hope it will continue to do at a much greater pace, investment per man will grow enormously. If we compare the American figures with our own we see how slight our own is. The number of employees

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in relation to turnover will grow progressively smaller.
The noble Earl was right when he said that this figure would have to be brought down. But we have to pitch it somewhere. Our figure of 200 is not so small as I expect the variation clause will lead to; I expect it will get down to about 100 over the next five years. I feel that I must press the noble Earl a little further to give this Amendment more favourable consideration. Of course nobody is going to say that it is a practical issue, but it must be made clear that we should encourage the smaller firm to do as the bigger firm is doing, and supply this information. At the moment the clause speaks only of the firms who no doubt already do it. In that respect it is not a practical clause, and I am bound to ask the noble Lord whether he is prepared either to accept this Amendment now or at least say he will consider this sympathetically—and I do mean sympathetically. Then there will be no need for us to press this matter further to-day.
LORD KINDERSLEY: My Lords, may I add a word? I have had a little experience, mostly in big industry, but also some in small industry. I cannot help feeling that we have probably to add a great number of part-time employees to the figure of 200, which is 200 fully employed people; so that in fact the final figure will be greater than 200. In my opinion it would be wrong for a firm of that size not to give the information about which we are speaking. I should find it difficult to vote in any other way than in favour of the Amendment, because I think this is fundamentally wrong.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords. I am grateful to noble Lords for the moderation with which they have pressed this Amendment. I should like to mention one point which I imagine is known to your Lordships. Many of the actual units which will be covered by the 500 clause will be under the 500 level. The clause applies, of course, to firms with over 500 employees; but as a result of subsection (1) companies whose individual establishments employ less than 500 will be covered. So there will be quite a few establishments of less than
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500 which will be covered by this Amendment.
Committee stages and Report stages in your Lordships' House are not just charades. I believe that the value of this House is that we can exercise independent judgment, and listen to the weight of argument, without undue attention to Party considerations. I think that a considerable weight of argument has been deployed in favour of this Amendment. I have listened carefully to what has been said from all quarters of your Lordships' House, and I think it would be wrong for me, speaking both as Leader of the House and also from this Bench, if I were not to say that I will pay close attention to what has been said on a part of the Bill to which I personally attach considerable importance. I would say straight away that between now and the next stage of the Bill I should like to give this Amendment sympathetic consideration. It would be a mistake for me to commit my right honourable friend, and indeed myself, as it were, thinking aloud, but I will bear in mind what has been said by a number of noble Lords representing a number of parties.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kindersley, who joined in our debate. Speaking, if I may, for all those who have participated in the debate, I am sure that we want to acknowledge the important gesture that has just been made by the noble Earl the Leader of the House, who holds such a high Cabinet rank, too. When he says that he is going to give the matter sympathetic consideration (which he did say, and for which I asked), I can only say that I am grateful, and I seek the leave of your Lordships to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
5.12 p.m.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79ZZ:
Page 49, line 25, leave out paragraph (a).
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment is raised now, in view of what the noble Earl has said, as a matter for discussion, and I hope he will listen to it from that point of view. In subsection (9) it says:
"…for the purposes of this section "—

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the section on the disclosure of information that we are now considering—
" a person is an excepted person…if…

(a) he is employed under a contract…for less than twenty-one hours…"

and there are two other exceptions which I do not think I need bother your Lordships with. This is the normal definition—and therefore I accept it immediately as a definition—of a part-time employee.
The question before us is: should a part-time employee be denied the information which a full-time employee gets? I do not think he should. If you are in a situation where the employer employs a largish number of part-time employees (even if it is 200 it is a largish number in a largish firm; and as the noble Lord, Lord Kindersley, has made absolutely clear he would automatically be employing some, and possibly quite a large number, if you think of stores and businesses of that kind), I cannot myself see the argument for denying to those part-time employees the right to receive the same information, especially as for the purposes which we are considering. I do not think "part-time employees" is a good description. I think the description is misleading, because very often although it is a part-time engagement, it may be a person's sole occupation, and therefore his livelihood depends on that occupation. That being the case, that person is surely as much interested as a person who works longer hours and receives more remuneration. Indeed, the person could be at a low level of income, having great difficulty in making ends meet, and really be more interested in the odd 5p than the person who works the full hours and receives a larger amount of remuneration. On that score, I should have thought it was reasonable to ask that part-time employees, as defined here, should be given exactly the same information as full-time employees, and for exactly the same reasons, that their livelihood depends on it.
If that were all that the Amendment does I should seek to press it upon your Lordships. But unfortunately the Amendment refers to another aspect of this, too: it refers to the definition of the size of the firm. The noble Earl was good enough to say on the earlier Amendment that he would consider the question of the size of the firm. The size of the firm is defined in terms of full-time employees;
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it excludes part-time employees. If he is going to stick to a definition of that kind, of full-time employees only, then I think we should want to press this Amendment, which would then have the effect of meeting to a point our earlier argument, and also meeting completely the main argument; namely, that the whole livelihood of a part-time employee may depend on the information which is obtained for the purpose of collective bargaining for that employee's standard of living and wages.
I hope that the noble Earl will realise that this is quite an important Amendment. There are two aspects to it, but the more important one is treating the part-time employee as a person whose sole occupation this is. In those circumstances, it is difficult to see why that person should not receive the same information as his or her neighbour, who is also engaged in his or her sole occupation, although it happens to be one of longer hours. I beg to move.
5.20 p.m.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: My Lords, without unduly delaying the House again, I should like to draw attention to an aspect of this matter which may be relevant. One must not forget that there are still parts of Britain where strange conditions of work exist. Even in these progressive days there is in textile towns a great deal of work done at home. In the silk industry and some other textile industries, and in glove making, it is an understood thing that quite a number of people, through generations of families, are linked with part-time work at home.
I possess an old document referring to the 1906 London Exhibition on sweated home-work. Conditions are not like that to-day, but in London in those days people were making tassels for coffins for about 3d. a gross. In the silk and scarf-making industries quite a lot of women do this kind of work at home. I hope that some consideration will be given to this. A firm in some industries could be employing fewer than 200 full-time workers and have quite a lot of home-work done. Without delving into this matter too deeply, the question arises whether those part-time workers should be entitled to know what is going on in the firm for which they are working. I hope that some sympathetic and understanding attention will be given to this matter.
LORD DONOVAN: My Lords, as the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, has undertaken to look at this clause again, may I raise a point which I think is more of technical drafting than anything? We are all assuming that the employees about whom we are speaking are employees of the owner of the undertaking. If one reads the first three lines of Clause 57 one finds that they are wide enough to cover the employees of an independent contractor who may be on the premises for a long time or for a short time. It may be the intention—I do not think it is, but it may be—to include those employees in this obligation. They are not taken out by the last three lines of Clause 57(1) because the employer who is the owner of the undertaking may be a quite different person from the employer of the employees employed by the independent contractor. I hope I have made that clear. It is a purely technical point which may be worth looking at.
5.24 p.m.
LORD SLATER: My Lords, it was interesting to listen to the clarification given by the noble Lord, Lord Kindersley, of the technical matter which arises under this clause. I was also interested in the observations made by my noble friend, Lord Davies of Leek. May I say to the noble Earl the Leader of the House that much part-time working to-day takes place in telecommunications, just as much as in the silk industry. For a very long time trade unions, by means of negotiation, have been fighting for a shorter working week. As a result, in telecommunications the greater part of the personnel employed is female labour. They are prepared to work an eight-hour shift but they do not want overtime work. Yet the cycle of operations has to go on to keep up with export markets and so on.
I have visited some of these factories and I know what happens in my area. Many ladies, when their children have come home from school and the husband has returned from work, work four hours a night for five days a week in this way. They are therefore employed part-time and the employer may employ 600 or 700 on a part-time basis. We have this massive operation going on throughout the country. I will not particularise and give the names of big companies in telecommunications, for that would not be right in view of the knowledge I have
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of what is happening. Having listened to what was said by the noble Earl the Leader of the House in reply to my noble friend Lord Diamond, I hope that the Leader of the House will agree with the case that we are seeking to make.
LORD BERNSTEIN: My Lords, there is a practical side to this matter. You have heard arguments about part-time workers. Every major company employs part-time workers to-day. If there are a number of people working in the same plant, and information is given to some but not to others there will be a leak and someone will disclose that information. Why not give the information to all those employees at the beginning and thus save embarrassment? The difference does not make sense to me.
LORD SOMERS: My Lords, speaking as one who is a part-time employee I sincerely hope that the Leader of the House will give sympathetic thought to this Amendment. I should hate to feel that I was deprived of the knowledge that the very few whole-time employees in my profession are able to get.
THE EARL OF BALFOUR: My Lords, in this connection a development is starting in contract cleaning. The people engaged in this work are almost invariably not employed for more than about 21 hours a week. There are also the big organisations which deal with the school meals service and with school cleaners. That is a very wide industry employing much female labour. I think that such people should be considered if the Government are prepared to look at this clause again.
LORD GRAY: My Lords, I wonder if there might be a question of what is an undertaking. Noble Lords have been speaking about part-time employees, and the definition of an undertaking in the Bill suggests that part-time employees should be taken into account in arriving at a decision about the size of an undertaking. Thus it might be that the proportion of part-time employees who are not to receive information might be so great that those in full time employment received no information.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I wonder whether I could first make one thing

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very plain to your Lordships' House? I do not wish there to be any misunderstanding. I believe the noble Lord, Lord Donovan, started the habit of saying that I was going to have a look at the whole of this clause, and that habit has been creeping in. I should like to make perfectly clear that what I said was that I would give sympathetic consideration to a particular and specific Amendment moved to this clause. That was the extent of my undertaking. I do not wish in any way to detract from the undertaking, but I also do not wish to add to it save by my own volition.
In view of the fact that the debate has gone rather wider than a Report stage debate sometimes goes I should summarise the general position. First, we are anxious to do what we can to promote better communications in industry. This is what this part of the Bill is after. Here we are all agreed. Secondly, we felt it right to limit for practical reasons the employers' obligations in a number of ways. Perhaps I should summarise what we felt to be reasonable and sensible limitations. First, as we discussed on the last Amendment, an employer will not be required to issue statements at all if he employs fewer than 500 people. That I have said I should like to look at.
Then there are three categories of employees who are excluded from the statutory right to receive a statement. They are, first, employees who work for less than 21 hours a week; secondly, those who have been in employment for less than 13 weeks, and, thirdly, those who normally work outside this country. It is the first of those excluded categories of part-time workers, if one is allowed to use this shorthand phraseology, to which the Amendment relates. Its effect would be twofold. First, it would entitle such workers to receive an annual statement, and, secondly, it would mean that such employees would be counted in determining an employer's liability to issue statements. Certainly the effect of accepting the Amendment, given the way the Bill is drawn, would be that all employees would be entitled to a statement, irrespective of the number of hours worked.
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What would be the practical effect? It would mean that the statutory obligation would extend not only to part-time employees employed for four or five days or nights a week regularly, systematically, over a longish period of time (say in a bar or a public house or in a restaurant), but also to a much more casual type of part-time employee. It would apply, for example—and I am using this in no pejorative sense—to an older schoolgirl who works an hour or two on a Saturday morning in a department store or supermarket—one of the "Marks and Sparks" or Tescos of this world. I personally believe that it would be a mistake, and I hope that noble Lords will agree with me, to make this a statutory obligation on employers to impart the information called for in the Bill to such employees.
LORD HUGHES: My Lords, if I may intervene before the noble Earl leaves this point, it seems to me that he is misinterpreting the effect of the clause. It seems to me that the part-time employee is not excluded from getting information, but is excluded from being counted as one of the number of employees making up the 500 beyond which it is obligatory to give the information. The paragraph says that the information will be given to persons employed in the undertaking. Now the definition of "employee" in the definition clause is a person who works under a contract of employment, not a person who works for more than 21 hours, and it is only for the purpose of ascertaining numbers that the 21 hours is effective. Therefore if the noble Earl were right you would have a ridiculous situation in a company which employed 501 full-time employees and 500 part-time employees, which is by no means an unusual thing—indeed it is very common, as my noble friend Lord Slater has said, in the electronics industry, in the textiles industry and as a matter of fact in any industry where the operation is such that it requires women to do delicate work because their hands are more suitable for it than those of men. In many industries nowadays you cannot get women to do such work on a part-time basis, except by allowing them to work for four hours or so a day, sometimes in the morning, sometimes in the afternoon or sometimes in the evening. Once

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this information is to be made available, it must be given to everyone who is employed in the undertaking, whether he is working 40 hours a week or four hours a week.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, with all due respect, I do not think I am misinterpreting the noble Lord. If the noble Lord will look carefully at Clause 57(1), it reads:
" In the case of any undertaking in which on any date within a financial year of the undertaking more than 500 persons, other than excepted persons…"
Then there is the definition of "excepted persons", which catches the part-time employees of whom we have been speaking. I think that is the position: in fact, I am certain it is.
LORD ROBBINS: My Lords, what puzzles me is to understand the nature of the burden which it is apparently assumed is imposed on the employer in providing information for part-time employees equally with full-time employees. I think that if I were now an employer I should want all my part-time employees to have the information, and I cannot see the objection to providing it.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I do not think there necessarily is an objection. What I was seeking to develop was the argument that here it would be a mistake to have a statutory requirement. There is nothing in the Bill to prevent an employer issuing statements to his part-time employees if he wishes to do so; indeed, for many employers it may be more convenient to do so rather than distinguish between one type of employee and another. Here it seems to me that what the noble Lord, Lord Bernstein, was saying was perfectly reasonable. All I would say is that he seemed to be assuming that the employer would be debarred in some way from issuing some statements if this was a sensible thing to do. There is absolutely nothing in the Bill as drafted to prevent this, and in the case that he instanced I think that indeed it would be the sensible thing to do. I also hope that what I have said answers the question—whether satisfactorily or not I do not know—put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Robbins.
Again, I should like to point out that there are two quite firm precedents here
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for adhering to the Bill as drafted; namely, in the Contracts of Employment Act 1963, and the Redundancy Payments Act 1965. I should like to draw your Lordships' attention to the fact that—it is something we touched on a couple of days ago—Section 4 of the Contracts of Employment Act requires employers to issue to their employees within 13 weeks of starting work a written statement of the main terms and conditions of employment; but this does not include employees who normally are employed for less than 21 hours a week. I think it would be anomalous to give part-time employees rights under this clause of this Bill while excluding them, as they are excluded at the present time, from receiving written statements of the terms of their employment which are likely to be of even greater interest. Again, a similar distinction, rightly or wrongly, is drawn in the Redundancy Payments Act 1965.
LORD ROBBINS: My Lords, may I ask whether it would be entirely unreasonable to regard the provisions of the earlier legislation as being imperfect in this respect?
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I do not think it would necessarily be entirely unreasonable; but if one is going to move in one area it would probably be reasonable to move in all three areas and not have a lopsided arrangement. I am certainly quite unable to accept the Amendment as it stands at present because I should be very unhappy at placing a statutory obligation on employers to issue statements of the kind required to the part-time employee of the type which I instanced. I think that to make that a statutory obligation would really be going far too far, but this would be the effect of the Amendment which the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, has moved. I personally believe that the Bill, as drafted, is sensible, and that these exceptions are reasonable. I feel that the Amendment as it stands is defective or goes far too far; but even if it did not go so far I personally believe that the Bill goes just about the right distance in this particular area, bearing in mind that there is nothing in the Bill or elsewhere to prevent employers from issuing these statements to part-time employees if this is the sensible thing to do.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: My Lords, if I may take the time of the House—
EARL JELLICOE: I think the noble Lord has already spoken.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: My Lords, I understood that, and I was introducing it by, "if I may by leave of the House", but I will not now impose on the leave of the House.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I will do my best to interpret what was in the mind of my noble friend Lord Davies of Leek by the look in his eye and hope that what I am about to say will find sympathy in his breast. There is no meeting of minds, I regret to say, on this particular Amendment, and I am sorry that is so because I want to treat it as moderately as I can, and I have been much impressed once more by the generally sympathetic way in which this Amendment has been received and discussed in all parts of the House. I was particularly touched by the gentle and subtle comments of the noble Lord, Lord Robbins, who seemed to me to be saying in very simple terms that not only do two wrongs not make a right but three wrongs in this case do not make a right. Two bad precedents are quoted, and what he might have gone on to say is that these are really different Bills with different obligations involved, and I do not think they are close precedents or similar analogies. So I hope we can have regard to this one Amendment alone.
The noble Earl says that he does not like the idea of placing a statutory responsibility on people in a certain respect, but it is this Bill which places a statutory responsibility. I am glad that it does. It is a wholesome clause and a clause for which we are grateful in all parts of the House. All we have to decide is not the question whether a statutory responsibility should be placed, but on whom it should be placed. At the moment, the noble Earl seems to think that we should include part-time employees, or at all events very small part-time employees. I think we shall be getting into hopelessly unnecessary detail if we say to employers, "You shall give it to all people employed full-time, to all people employed 21 hours a week, but not to people who are employed for 10 hours a week or whose employment of
1100
10 hours a week is spread over fewer than three days." There are so many variations and as has been made clear, the administrative argument is in favour of covering them all, not of putting upon the employer the responsibility of saying, "How many hours did this man or woman work in this week? Does he qualify or does he not qualify?"
I am sure there is no important argument in saying that we should redefine the question of 21 hours. Being compelled by Statute once a year—that is all it is; it is in respect of a financial year—to give these statements to part-time employees as well as full-time employees is something which I should have thought the House will wish to press on to the noble Earl.
My Lords, may I deal with the other part of it, the part affecting the definition of the size of the firm. In spite of what my noble friend said, I certainly took it that subsection (3), which says—
" such information…shall be issued to every person who,…, is employed…and who is not…an accepted person."
meant that this clause refers both to the hours worked and to the definition of numbers. So, having dealt with the hours worked, may I come back to the definition of hours?
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, that is my interpretation of the Bill.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I am glad we are on common ground there, and I hope that what I am going to say will satisfy the noble Earl that there is no reason why we should not press the Amendment. Having dealt with the part-time aspect of it, I come back to the definition of numbers, and the noble Earl has said that he will look at that. I hope he will look at it in terms of saying that every firm with 200 or more employees, be they full-time or part-time, will have the obligation of issuing the statement, and that therefore it is right to remove this exception completely. He will have to make up his mind about that and we hope he will say that. It is conceivable that he will come back and say, "No, I am going to exclude part-time workers in defining the term". But he said he would look at this matter sympathetically, so something is going to be decided: thought is going to be given and a decision of some kind or another is to be made. It

1101
is within his freedom of action to take into account the fact that subsection (9)(a) is, I hope, going to be removed. Therefore there is no technical difficulty why we should not press it. The arguments are in favour of pressing it. Speeches in support of it have come from all parts of the House and I should be failing in my duty if I did not press the Amendment to a Division.
LORD TEVIOT: My Lords, may I ask for one point of clarification? When the noble Lord refers to part-time workers, is he including casual workers and seasonal workers whose employment may fluctuate from time to time? This would make the situation different. Is he referring to regular part-time workers who go on from year to year?
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, the only part of the definition of the exception with which we are necessarily concerned at the moment is part-time workers, in respect of their right to receive this information. Therefore I would say to the noble Lord that if this information is issued on a day when there are half-a-dozen casual workers who will not be there next week, does it matter if they get the information as well or should we put on the employer the responsibility of saying, "I must go carefully through the wages sheet of my 500 employees and extract those who are casual workers and will not be here next week?"
So far as casual workers are concerned there are two points which I should like to put to the noble Lord. First of all, in many cases a casual or a seasonal worker comes back season after season—for example, the hop pickers—and there is quite a relationship between the employer and the seasonal employee. Secondly, I am not suggesting to your Lordships that subsection (9)(b) should be removed, and that subsection defines one of the excepted classes as a person who has been employed in the undertaking in question for less than thirteen weeks. If your casual worker has beer employed for only
twelve weeks then the noble Lord need have no anxiety. I hope the noble Lord shares my view that we do not want to get too complicated on this, and I hope he will support us in the Lobby.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I should like to say one or two things. First, here, as elsewhere, it is not easy to draw the line, but it does not seem unreasonable to say that the line concerning the statutory obligation to furnish this information should be drawn at the 21-hour week; that is, employees working for less than, say, half the normal working week. That seems to us to be a perfectly reasonable watershed. Secondly, I would make clear again that here we are talking about a statutory obligation. There is nothing in existing practice or in the Bill when it becomes law which prevents an employer, when it is sensible so to do, from furnishing this information. There are times when it might be administratively convenient and sensible—the type of instance which the noble Lord, Lord Bernstein, gave. There may be times when it would be inconvenient and not sensible. I do not wish to argue that. This does not affect the fact that part-time employees, however casually employed, for however short a time, can receive a statement if the employer so desires it. The only difficulty between us is whether this should be a statutory obligation.
I believe the effect of this Amendment would bite on the most casual type of employment, somebody being employed for a couple of hours a week. It is quite absurd to place what could be quite an onerous obligation on employers to furnish this information. I do not believe that the Bill as drawn is in this respect unreasonable. This Amendment goes far too wide, and I must advise your Lordships to resist it if the noble Lord presses it to a Division.
5.52 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 79ZZ) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 66; Not-Contents, 89.

CONTENTS

Amulree, L.

Bernstein, L.

Buckinghamshire, E.

Archibald, L.

Beswick, L.

Byers, L.

Ardwick, L.

Birk, Bs.

Champion, L.

Balogh, L.

Blyton, L.

Collison, L.

Beaumont of Whitley, L.

Brockway, L.

Cooper of Stockton Heath, L.

Crook, L.

Hoy, L.

Reay, L.

Davies of Leek, L.

Hughes, L.

Ritchie-Calder, L.

Delacourt-Smith, L.

Ilford, L.

Robbins, L.

Diamond, L.

Jacques, L.

Shackleton, L.

Donaldson of Kingsbridge, L.

Janner, L.

Shinwell, L.

Douglass of Cleveland, L.

Kennet, L.

Slater, L.

Foot, L.

Leatherland, L.

Sorensen, L.

Gaitskell, Bs.

Lindgren, L.

Stocks, Bs.

Gardiner, L.

Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, Bs.

Stonham, L.

Garner, L.

Lloyd of Hampstead, L.

Strabolgi, L. [Teller.]

Garnsworthy, L. [Teller.]

McLeavy, L.

Strang, L.

Gladwyn, L.

Morrison, L.

Summerskill, Bs.

Hanworth, V.

Norwich, V.

Taylor of Mansfield, L.

Henderson, L.

Nunburnholme, L.

Wade, L.

Henley, L.

Pargiter, L.

Wells-Pestell, L.

Hilton of Upton, L.

Phillips, Bs.

White, Bs.

Hood, V.

Popplewell, L.

Wynne-Jones, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Aberdare, L.

Drumalbyn, L.

Loudoun, C.

Abinger, L.

Dudley, E.

Margadale, L.

Alport, L.

Dundee, E.

Mersey, V.

Ashbourne, L.

Ebbisham, L.

Milverton, L.

Auckland, L.

Effingham, E.

Monckton of Brenchley, V.

Balfour, E.

Elliot of Harwood, Bs.

Mowbray and Stourton, L.

Balfour of Inchrye, L.

Emmet of Amberley, Bs.

Nairne, Bs.

Barnby, L.

Falkland, V.

Northchurch, Bs.

Belstead, L.

Ferrers, E. [Teller.]

Oakshott, L.

Berkeley, Bs.

Ferrier, L.

Ranfurly, E.

Bessborough, E.

Fortescue, E.

Rankeillour, L.

Birdwood, L.

Geddes, L.

Rathcavan, L.

Bledisloe, V.

Goschen, V. [Teller.]

Rothermere, V.

Boyd of Merton, V.

Gray, L.

Rothes, E.

Brecon, L.

Gridley, L.

St. Aldwyn, E.

Brooke of Cumnor, L.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

St. Helens, L.

Brooke of Ystradfellte, Bs.

Hacking, L.

St. Oswald, L.

Brougham and Vaux, L.

Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Savile, L.

Caithness, E.

Selkirk, E.

Coleraine, L.

Harcourt, V.

Skelmersdale, L.

Colville of Culross, V.

Hatherton, L.

Strange, L.

Conesford, L.

Hawke, L.

Strathclyde, L.

Cork and Orrery, E.

Hylton-Foster, Bs.

Swansea, L.

Courtown, E.

Jellicoe. E. (L. Privy Seal.)

Swinton, E.

Craigavon, V.

Kemsley, V.

Tenby, V.

Crathorne, L.

Killearn, L.

Tweedsmuir, L.

Daventry, V.

Kindersley, L.

Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, Bs.

De Clifford, L.

Lansdowne, M.

Vivian, L.

De L'Isle, V.

Latymer, L.

Waldegrave, E.

Denham, L.

Lauderdale, E.

Windlesham, L.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 58 [Notification of procedure agreements]:
6.0 p.m.
LORD CHAMPION LORD CHAMPION moved Amendment No. 79K:
Page 49, line 32, after (" State ") insert (" after consultation with the Trades Union Congress and the Confederation of British Industries ").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is an Amendment which we discussed at considerable length in Committee. It is reported in two columns of Hansard. It is not my intention to rehearse the
1104
argument that we covered at that time. What I am doing is giving the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, a chance to make a statement, because he was kind enough to say on May 18 (col. 440):
" I am prepared, if this will help, to have another look at it, without commitment, to see whether it might in fact be desirable. I do not think it is necessary, but I have an open mind on this."
My Lords, upon his saying that, I was reported as having said:
" That undertaking to look at it beats me completely."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 18/5/71; col. 440.]
Although this took place at an early hour in the morning, I cannot imagine for one moment that I said that what the noble

1105
Earl said beats me at all. What I said was that he
" meets me completely ".
Certainly that was the purport of my remarks because I liked what he said; namely, that he would have a look at it.
I am now asking the noble Earl to tell us what was the outcome of his further consideration: whether he can meet us without beating us, and whether he can tell us that he is now prepared, after having considered the matter further, to accept the Amendment which, after all, is a reasonable one and is one that he could very well accept without upsetting the principles that he has enunciated from time to time in connection with this Bill. I beg to move.
6.2 p.m.
EARL JELLICOE: I should perhaps explain the Amendment to some noble Lords who may not have been here when we discussed it earlier. This Amendment would oblige the Secretary of State to consult with the T.U.C. and the C.B.I. for the making of any regulations requiring employers to notify their procedure agreements and arrangements.
As the noble Lord, Lord Champion, said, we debated this matter at the Committee stage and I said I would consider it. I did so in studiously neutral terms which, with his usual fairness, the noble Lord has repeated. I have reconsidered this matter, and I say once again—echoing what the noble Lord, Lord Champion, said—that in principle there is little or nothing between us. Yet having reconsidered it—and this was not a pro forma reconsideration, but a real one—I must still advise your Lordships against this Amendment.
When I say that there is little between us, I know that in practice it is highly unlikely that the views of the T.U.C. and the C.B.I. would not be fully taken into account before regulations under this clause were made. I say that because I know that the voluntary exercise which has been going on now for some time, the notification of procedure agreements, has been working really very well indeed. It has been working with the full consultation and co-operation of both the T.U.C. and the C.B.I. I am confident that the consultation and co-operation in this respect will continue when this Bill becomes law and when this particular
1106
part of it "bites", to use a phrase which the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, now wishes to avoid.
The other course would be to lay a statutory obligation here for such consultation, which I do not think would be really justified. In my view the need to lay upon Government a statutory obligation to consult is justified only where the circumstances really demand it. I should like to instance a case where I think a statutory obligation is justified; that is, that before the Secretary of State makes an application relating to procedure agreements to the Industrial Court, Clause 37(3) would require him to consult the parties concerned; namely, the employer and the appropriate trade union. In that case I do not think the special consideration does apply.
However, I should like to refer again to two points, one of which I have already made. First, the views of the T.U.C. and the C.B.I. will almost certainly have been taken into account before these regulations are made. I should like to emphasise that. Secondly, I should like to draw attention to the fact that there is the not unimportant safeguard that regulations made under this clause would be subject to the Negative Resolution procedure in both Houses of Parliament. There would thus be opportunity for specific approaches by or on behalf of those concerned at that stage. In any event, the regulations will only be used in those very isolated cases where it is considered really necessary and important that the information should be obtained.
I should like to assure your Lordships and make clear to the noble Lord, Lord Champion, that I have reconsidered the desirability of incorporating the statutory requirement to consult, but for the reasons I have given I feel that it would be unnecessary to do so. Also, I believe that it is not a good thing in principle to load a Bill with statutory requirements to consult here, there and everywhere, except where it is absolutely necessary.
In the light of what I have said, I hope that the noble Lord will feel that it is not necessary here and that he will not feel it necessary to press his Amendment.
LORD CHAMPION: My Lords, it is quite obvious that the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, as promised, has very carefully

1107
considered this matter between the Committee stage and to-day. I agree with him that the voluntary arrangement is working very well and I have some doubts myself about putting anything into legislation which is unnecessary in the circumstances. For that reason, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
6.9 p.m.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79KKK.
Page 51, line 39, after (" an ") insert (" independent ").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I shall move the Amendment quite shortly in the hope that it is not necessary to press the argument at any length. We are now starting on the clause which refers to the registration of trade unions and other organisations. We are dealing now with an introductory clause which states that an "'organisation of workers' means an organisation" which and then proceeds to a description. The point I am making is a very simple one. The first condition of such an organisation is that it should be an independent organisation. We had a similar Amendment on Committee stage but that Amendment dealt with freedom from domination or control by an employer.
Since then I have looked at the definitions more closely and I find that the word "independent" is there defined in relation to a trade union or other organisation as meaning "not under the domination or control of an employer or group of employers". Therefore it seems to me that one word will serve the purpose of several words, and I hope that is a thought which all of us share. I apprehend I may be told that it is not necessary, that independence is already secured. It is partly because of that possibility that I do not wish to detain your Lordships any longer. I beg to move.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I have looked carefully at this Amendment, and when I first saw it I felt that perhaps there was something to it, because of course we have exactly the same object in view. But, as I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, will realise, the point which we both wish
1108
to pursue is covered under Clause 67, which particularly names an independent organisation of workers as an organisation eligible for registration as a trade union. Furthermore, as the noble Lord himself said quite clearly in his opening remarks, the clause that we are now discussing, Clause 61, is of a declaratory nature. Therefore, if we were to include "independent" in this particular place we should be favouring those unions which are employer-dominated. As neither of us wishes that to happen, I suggest that the noble Lord withdraws the Amendment.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Baroness, who has cleared up the anxieties which were the main reason for my putting down the Amendment, and I seek leave to withdraw it.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, it may be for the convenience of the House if we could consider this particular Amendment, No. 79A with No. 79B. They are drafting Amendments only. I beg to move No. 79A.
Amendment moved—
Page 52, line 19, after (" and ") insert (" which ").—(Baroness Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie.)
6.12 p.m.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79BBBB:
Page 52, line 25, after (" which ") insert (" has power, without the concurrence of any person who is not a member of the organisation, to alter its own rules and to control the application of its own property and funds and which, if it was formed on or before the 30th June 1971, is for the time being registered as a trade union under the Trade Union Act 1871, or if it was formed after that date ").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is an Amendment which I fear we cannot dispose of quite as quickly as the last one. This Amendment, which I now beg to move, refers to the definition of a trade union. The subsection says:
" In this Act ' trade union ' means an organisation of workers which is for the time being registered as a trade union under this Act."
The Amendment seeks to make it say that it is an organisation of workers which is

1109
independent in the words described and which
" is for the time being registered as a trade union under "
one of two Acts. The Acts are the Trade Union Act 1871, under which most trade unions are at present registered, and "this Act"—which of course means the Bill under consideration. However anxious I am to speed your Lordships' business, I am bound to spend some time on what is a most important Amendment at a most important time politically.
First, may I repeat what I have said before: that we are not in dispute with the Government on the principle of registration. Indeed, it is very irritating when noble Lords rise and make speeches as if that was what divided us. What divides us is not the principle of registration; it is the compulsion to register in a particular way as defined under this Bill. Over 80 per cent.—I think, over 85 per cent.—of trade unionists are at present in unions which are registered. So it cannot be said that the trade union movement objects to registration. What it objects to, and objects to bitterly, is the registration that is proposed under this Bill, and all that goes with it. In practice the Government have now seen and demonstrated to us that the distinction which is arrived at by saying, "Only organisations of workers which are registered under this Bill shall be treated as trade unions" is a distinction which cannot stand. Since we last discussed that point the code of practice has been published—the code of practice upon which we all place great hopes; and I certainly very much hope and believe that that code, by itself, unemcumbered with the difficulties associated with this Bill, could lead to considerable progress in improving relations between the Government and the trade union movement and improving industrial relations as between employer and employee. That code of practice makes it perfectly clear: "For the practice of good industrial relations, would you please disregard the distinction between registered and not registered unions".
Secondly, since we discussed this principle in Committee the Government have made a statement with regard to the House of Commons' fair wages resolution, which states that every contractor
1110
with the Government must give the right of joining a union to every one of its employees. That resolution was passed in the late 1940s—1947 or 1948 or at about that time—and has subsisted ever since then, and has been accepted and reconfirmed by every Government since then. The Government have made it perfectly clear that in interpreting what that resolution means one must have regard to all unions, whether they are registered under this Bill or not. So I am saying that in practice this distinction is seen to be irrelevant.
In theory, I now go on to say, the proposed denial of rights to employees who do not belong to a union which registers under this Bill, but belong only to a union which has registered under the previous Act, is, in my view, if not a breach, a near-breach of our international obligations which we have taken on under the International Labour Organisation, and is certainly an infringement of the fundamental liberties which we regard ourselves as entitled to enjoy in this country—in particular, the freedom of association. It also means a withdrawal of statutory rights which have been secured for over a century. That is the theory of the matter.
So the first three points I want to make to your Lordships are these. We are in dispute not about the principle of registration but merely about registration under this Bill. In practice, registration under this Bill will be disregarded in the practice of good industrial relations, because the code invites us to disregard it. And, in theory, it is not only an infringement of our fundamental liberties but is very nearly, if not absolutely, a breach of our international obligations. It is for all these reasons that the Labour Government proposed, both in their document In Place of Strife, and in the Bill which they introduced but which went only as far as a First Reading, that there should be registration under the 1871 Act. That is of course what the Amendment proposes. The Amendment proposes that where old trade unions are registered under the old Act, that is fine: let them continue. Where there is a new trade union created that may be a consideration that it should be required to register under a new provision, but it is a normal method of dealing with changes in the law that one provides that those

1111
organisations which are already well established should continue on their existing procedures and compels only new organisations to take on new liabilities and new responsibilities and new burdens.
I want now to turn to the practical politics of what we are talking about, and I address myself with great seriousness to the Government. At the moment, we are in a situation where 8 million trade unionists belong to unions which have decided not to register under this Bill when it becomes an Act. I believe that today, in fact, instructions are going out from the T.U.C. advising these various unions as to how they can achieve their purposes in this new situation. These trade unions have decided not to register in accordance with a democratically convened conference and democratically arrived at decisions—the Croydon Conference—and the hostility which this Bill has engendered in the trade union movement is undoubtedly hardening; and, if I may say so, the arguments which the Government use to attempt to justify registration only add insult to injury. It shows that the Government are totally incapable of understanding why it is that all these organisations are wholly opposed to this Bill and to the registration provisions of it. As my noble friend Lady Gaitskell said, do the Government really think that all the unions are mad; that they have decided that it is not in their interests to register under this Bill?
I am seeking, as I have sought in every single Amendment that I have put before your Lordships on the Report stage, not to find a method of achieving what I think is right but to find a method of achieving a compromise which may seem right to the Government as well as to us, which may offer a way forward, so far as the unions are concerned, and which may offer an opportunity of avoiding the disasters that will clearly face us if the Government insist not only on carrying this Bill through but on implementing it. The proposal which I offer is that the registration should be either the existing registration or the new registration—the existing registration for existing unions, the new registration for new unions. That is a very moderate proposal. It would provide the Government with the opportunity which they
1112
may need for administrative purposes of having records of unions.
It may be in the public interest that the Government should have records of the unions. The Government would know of their rules, because that is provided for under the original registration provisions. There would immediately be a lessening of tension and a possibility of moving forward. At the moment I am proposing that provision only so far as this clause is concerned. There may be a whole host of consequential Amendments to be made if the Government want to go a long way with us; they may, of course, want to go only a little way. We could provide Amendments for later stages of the Bill which would meet this situation. Certainly what we have to provide straight away is that the 1871 Act should continue to exist, and accordingly an Amendment has been tabled to that effect, because the Government have proposed to remove it from the Statute Book.
I hope I have made clear why I am returning to this important issue and why I regard it as a public duty to advise the Government once more of the difficult situation for which they seem to be heading, and why I feel it right that they should think again in a very serious situation, and why I regard it as elementary justice that trade unions, which for a century have been able to register under the 1871 Act should continue to be entitled to register under that Act. This would be a simple way of achieving it. I beg to move.
6.25 p.m.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I accept the spirit in which the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, has moved this Amendment. He said that in his opinion it was of great importance and he wished to make clear—and I think it is good to have it on the Record in this House—that he and his colleagues are not in dispute on the principle of registration. To instance that, he pointed out that about 87 per cent. of trade union members now are registered under the 1871 Act. He said that new factors had emerged since this matter was last debated at considerable length on the Committee stage, and he instanced in particular the code of practice. He said that the distinction now

1113
cannot stand between the original Act, which is embraced in this Amendment, and the registration provisions under this Bill because, he said, the code of practice makes clear that one should in fact disregard registration.
I hope, and believe, that the purpose behind the code of practice is to make clear the guidelines to the kind of best methods which would be carried out by those who work and those who manage in this country, whether they register or whether they do not. I have the code of practice here, and it does not make any distinction between organisations, because—and this is the important point—the duties of all are the same under the code. The Bill distinguishes between those only because certain privileges are given only to registered unions—for instance, the freedom to introduce a breach of contract of employment. The noble Lord, Lord Diamond, said that from the point of view of practical politics, as he called it, he understood that about 8 million trade unionists now belonging to unions had decided not to register under this Bill, and that a T.U.C. instruction was going out to try to help them in not registering. If the object of the Amendment is to avoid the difficulty that might arise if a large number of trade unionists refused to register, I would suggest that the difficulty would really be for the unions, because they would not have the privileges which undoubtedly exist under this Bill—shall we say the advantages of the Bill?
I read again with very great interest the debate which took place on May 20, and I think that my noble friend Lord Windlesham, who at that time was replying for the Government, made the case for registration—which is voluntary registration—under this Bill very clear. What are the advantages of the Bill? All it does is to lay down that the advantages should be restricted to those organisations whose rules meet minimum standards; and surely all the best organisations—trade unions—in this country would have these kinds of rules, and those who have not got them surely would wish them to reach the minimum standards.
I quite understand that noble Lords opposite have not at any time said that they agree with these particular advantages that registration under this Bill
1114
provides; they have mantained that all along. And throughout the debates we have maintained that it is right to have a minimum standard of rules as laid down in this Bill. I do not think that either of us will convince the other at so late a stage in the Bill, but to turn to the particular Amendment I would only say that, quite apart from the fact that it goes against the main thinking behind this Bill from the practical point of view—and the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, referred to what he called the "practical politics"—I think it would be difficult to have, on the one hand, the Register of Friendly Societies for 1871 unions and, on the other hand, the new register for new unions. To have these two together would really make life very difficult, and it would, to give one example, duplicate the administrative requirements of Clauses 87 to 91.
But it is not merely on the administrative difficulties I base this case. I take the case as put down by the noble Lord. The code of practice lays down the minimum requirements of behaviour of those who work and those who manage. Registration is voluntary; it gives certain legal protection to those who register. I suggest there will be many up and down the country who will think carefully about their position, both individually and within their union, and I hope at the end of the day many of them will think that to register will be the best action they can take.
BARONESS GAITSKELL: My Lords, may I support my noble friend Lord Diamond in his most reasonable plea for the Government to reconsider this. Not only do I wish to ask the Government once again—I have forgotten the words I used before—do they really think that nearly 9 million trade unionists in this country are mad when they say they do not wish to register if this Bill goes through, and are quite ready to give up their privileges? After all, they are not mad; they do not wish to give up privileges for nothing. I really would plead with the Government to look at this sympathetically and see what they can do. and consider my noble friend Lord Diamond's suggestion about allowing the trade unions which have registered up to now under the 1871 Act to go on, and simply let the new unions who wish to

1115
register now register according to this Bill when it becomes law.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: My Lords, the noble Baroness surely realises that if this Amendment were accepted you might as well scrap the whole Bill. The noble Baroness says 9 million trade unionists would refuse to register. I have heard some exaggerations in this House, but never one as bad as that. I know quite a few trade unionists who will be only too pleased to register under this Bill.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, the noble Lord may have his friends among trade unionists, and it may be they are of a mind to register. I would not dispute that for a moment. I beg his pardon, the noble Viscount. I gather he has many titles, both English and Irish, and it would delay your Lordships unduly if I referred to all of them. But what the noble Viscount must not do is to say that my noble friend Lady Gaitskell is exaggerating when she is repeating the figure, nearly 9 million, which is given on the Trades Union Congress's own authority and is the best figure that exists. I hope that the noble Viscount will take that into account. He may know half-a-dozen trade unionists sympathetic to this Bill, but the facts are—and I hope the noble Baroness, Lady Tweedsmuir, and the Government will take this on board, too—that there has been continuous and careful thought and consideration given to this question of registration by all the unions, by all the officials and by all the members of the T.U.C. They have had a full and public conference about it. They have given thought to it subsequently. They know the difficulties that are involved in not registering, and they have all decided that it is clearly against their interests to register and that they are not proposing to do so. They have all made that decision, over 8 million of them, nearly 9 million—I daresay that by the time it comes to the end of the day 9 million will be more likely the figure.
The Government are really being blind, absolutely purblind, if they continue to refuse to recognise what is happening, and it is no use the noble Lady saying that she feels sure that in due course many will be carefully thinking this
1116
matter over and will register. They have thought it over, because they know better what is in their own interests, with great respect than the noble Lord. They have given this matter more thought than the whole of the Government have done. They are capable of thinking about it. They are able people; they are experienced people; they have enormous responsibility. And I daresay there are more votes behind them in their trade unions than there are behind the Government to-day in their political stance, which is also of some interest.
It is no use the noble Lord saying to me "why not?" I had hoped that the commonsense of this would appeal to noble Lords, the realisation that if, after all that consideration, the unions do take the view, which I think is as plain as a pikestaff they should take, that it is wholly against their interests to register, that view would have registered with the noble Lord and the Government. It clearly has not registered with the noble Baroness. It is no use our exchanging arguments; she merely refers to the one side of the question; she can go on doing that till the cows come home. She may say I only refer to the other one. There are two sides. The balance in my view is overwhelmingly against registration—overwhelmingly. The Government are acting in the most unjust and unwise manner. I have no authority on behalf of the trade unions to put forward this proposal, none whatsoever. I was merely hoping the Government might be prepared to see that here was a way in which you could hold the position, give people a chance to talk to one another, get round a table and thus arrive at a modus operandi satisfactory all round. I am not going to try to persuade the Government if they do not want it. It is not something I want, it is not something the unions want, it is a possible compromise. If the noble Baroness does not want it, we will leave it, but we are bound to divide the House
6.38 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, before the noble Lord does that, I wonder if I can say this. We have had very long debates on these matters. The noble Lord says the trade unionists are very able people, and so, if I may say so, is the noble Lord, and yet he is still talking

1117
in quite the wrong terms. He must know, I think, by now that there is no question of registration. As soon as the Bill is passed all those bodies will go on to the provisional register. If any body wants to deregister it is free to do so, but there is no question of registration. Those who are on the 1871 register will automatically go on to the provisional register. This is not a question of semantics, because this is already a compromise which was reached in another place, believe it or not, a compromise solution that was put up. They go on to the provisional register. If at that time a particular union meets the requirements in Clause 67—and they are very simple requirements indeed, that they are an independent organisation of workers, and they have powers without the concurrence of any parent organisation to alter their own rules and administer their own property and so on—it is transferred to the register, it is on the register.
And then at that point the Registrar will do what everybody agrees should be done, which the Donovan Report recommended should be done, that the rules of the trade unions should be brought up to date; this will then be done. And it will be done simply by the Registrar giving notice if the rules are defective in any of the ways we shall be coming to a few clauses later. If they are not defective they will continue like that in the register—quite unchanged. If they are defective, then surely the rules ought to be changed, and the opportunity is then given to change them. If the union does not change them, if it does not bring them up to the standards in the Bill, which are the right standards and are generally recognised as being the right standards, then the registration may be cancelled. Apart from that, the unions are free to withdraw their registration. If they withdraw their registration they are free later, if they choose, to apply for re-registration. There is no question of registration by the unions. It will be a voluntary act on the part of the trade union if they de-register. This is the essential thing. I do not think that noble Lords have yet understood it; and I am absolutely certain that 99 out of a 100 trade unionists, the Congress, the 8
1118
million of whom the noble Lord spoke, have not understood it either.
LORD BERNSTEIN: My Lords, is it not surprising, after all the time we have spent on this Bill, that the noble Lord should publicly admit that the trade unions of this country do not understand it? There must be something wrong somewhere—and, if I may say so, on the Government side.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I have not personally had the opportunity of explaining the Bill to the trade unions; I have tried only to explain it to your Lordships.
LORD SLATER: My Lords, if trade unions are automatically registered, then if they de-register, if they withdraw themselves from that register, does one not take it from the noble Lord's observations that they will be no longer recognised as a trade union by the Government?
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, this is a difficulty of definitions. We are talking about the definition of an organisation of workers. Then we come on to the definition of a trade union. A trade union is an organisation of workers which is for the time being registered as a trade union under the Act. They will be included in the provisional register.
LORD SLATER: My Lords, this is something the Government cannot escape from. If a trade union as it is now—for example the N.U.R.—decided that it is going to de-register, to withdraw itself from the register upon which (purely because of the introduction of this Bill) it has been placed, it would cease to be recognised by the law of the land as a trade union.
LORD DRUMALBYN: Perhaps, my Lords, I may treat this as an intervention. The answer is simply that they then become an organisation of workers, as is provided for in this clause. "Organisation of workers" is an omnibus phrase. It includes trade unions, staff associations, non-independent organisations of workers and the rest. They then become an organisation of workers—entirely at their own choice.
LORD HUGHES: My Lords, does that mean that we are going to be treated

1119
to the wonderful spectacle of a "National Workers' Organisation of Miners", a "National Workers' Organisation of Railwaymen", and an "Amalgamated Workers' Organisation of Engineers and Foundry Workers"? Are they not to be allowed even to call themselves a union?
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, within the terms of Order it is a little difficult for me to go on speaking. We are coming to the question of names later. There is an Amendment down in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, and I shall be able to deal with that point then.
LORD TAYLOR OF MANSFIELD: My Lords, what is the Report stage for but to elicit information? This is the first time I have risen from these Benches during this Report stage. Do I understand the noble Lord to say that existing unions who do not decide to de-register will be put on the provisional register; that they will be approached as to the
compilation of their rules—and this is the point that I want to elicit—and that if those rules are found to be "defective" (that was the word the noble Lord used) the person who so decides is the Registrar? In the event that the union is notified to that effect but take no steps to remedy the defects, would they then be automatically de-registered from the provisional list?
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, the noble Lord puts this question to me, so perhaps I may speak again with the leave of the House. We shall be coming to clauses which deal with this. The noble Lord will then see that the word "automatically" is not appropriate. They cannot be de-registered without an application of the Industrial Court.
6.47 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 79BBBB) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 40; Not-Contents, 88.

CONTENTS

Archibald, L.

Gardiner, L.

Ritchie-Calder, L.

Ardwick, L.

Garnsworthy, L. [Teller.]

Shackleton, L.

Bernstein, L.

Henderson, L.

Shinwell, L.

Beswick, L.

Hilton of Upton, L.

Slater, L.

Birk, Bs.

Hoy, L. [Teller.]

Stocks, Bs.

Blyton, L.

Hughes, L.

Stonham, L.

Brockway, L.

Jacques, L.

Stow Hill, L.

Buckinghamshire, E.

Kennet, L.

Strabolgi, L.

Champion, L.

Leatherland, L.

Summerskill, Bs.

Collison, L.

Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, Bs.

Taylor of Mansfield, L.

Cooper of Stockton Heath, L.

Nunburnholme, L.

White, Bs.

Crook, L.

Peddie, L.

Wynne-Jones, L.

Diamond, L.

Phillips, Bs.

Gaitskell, Bs.

Popplewell, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Aberdare, L.

Courtown, E.

Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Abinger, L.

Craigavon, V.

Ashbourne, L.

Crathorne, L.

Hanworth, V.

Auckland, L.

Daventry, V.

Harcourt, V.

Balfour, E.

De Clifford, L.

Hatherton, L.

Balfour of Inchrye, L.

De L'Isle, V.

Hawke, L.

Barnby, L.

Denham, L.

Henley, L.

Belstead, L.

Drumalbyn, L.

Hood, V.

Berkeley, Bs.

Dudley, E.

Hylton-Foster, Bs.

Bessborough, E.

Dundee, E.

Jellicoe, E. (L. Privy Seal.)

Brecon, L.

Elliot of Harwood, Bs.

Kemsley, V.

Brooke of Cumnor, L.

Falkland, V.

Killearn, L.

Brooke of Yystradfellte, Bs.

Ferrers, E. [Teller.]

Lansdowne, M.

Brougham and Vaux, L.

Ferrier, L.

Latymer, L.

Byers, L.

Fortescue, E.

Lauderdale, E.

Caccia, L.

Geddes, L.

Lindsey and Abingdon, E.

Caithness, E.

Goschen. V. [Teller.]

Loudoun, C.

Clifford of Chudleigh, L.

Gowrie, E.

Massereene and Ferrard, V.

Coleraine, L.

Gray, L.

Merrivale, L.

Conesford, L.

Gridley, L.

Milverton, L.

Cork and Orrery, E.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

Monckton of Brenchley, V.

Mountevans, L.

Rothermere, V.

Shannon, E.

Mowbray and Stourton, L.

Rothes, E.

Skelmersdale, L.

Napier and Ettrick, L.

Ruthven of Freeland, Ly.

Somers, L.

Northchurch, Bs.

St. Aldwyn, E.

Strange, L.

Norwich, V.

St. Helens, L.

Swansea, L.

Oakshott, L.

St. Oswald, L.

Teviot, L.

O'Neill of the Maine, L.

Sandford, L.

Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, Bs.

Rankeillour, L.

Savile, L.

Windlesham, L.

Rathcavan, L.

Sempill, Ly.

On Question, Motion agreed to.

6.54 p.m.
Clause 62 [Employers' associations and other organisations of employers]:
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 79B. We have referred to this Amendment before; it is a drafting Amendment.
Amendment moved—
Page 53, line 4, after (" and ") insert (" which ").—(Baroness Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie.)
LORD HUGHES LORD HUGHES moved Amendment No. 79YYY:
After Clause 62 insert the following new clause:
Definitions of "combined organisation of workers and employers" and "joint industry board".
(" .—(1) In this Act (subject to section 86) "combined organisation of workers and employers" means an organisation (whether permanent or temporary) which—

(a) consists of an organisation or organisations of workers to which section 61 applies and an organisation or organisations of employers to which section 62 applies;

(b) is an independent organisation consisting wholly or mainly of workers and employers or individual proprietors of one or more descriptions;

(c) has as its principal objects the regulation of relations between workers and employers or individual proprietors of that description or those descriptions or organisations or organisation of workers and organisation or organisations of employers; and

(d) has power, without the concurrence of any parent organisation, to alter its own rules and to control the application of its own property and funds and those of its branches and sections (if any).

(2) In this Act subject to sections 67, 68, 71 and 72 "joint industry board" means a combined organisation of workers and employers which is for the time being registered as a joint industry board under this Act.")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I think that this Amendment, particularly
1122
because of the way in which the noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack enunciated it, is appropriately lettered. It is almost totally different from any other Amendment which we have moved at any stage on this section of the Bill. As was emphasised by my noble friend Lord Diamond, the attitude of the trade union movement generally is to object, not to registration, but to registration under this Bill, because of the conditions attaching to it. This Amendment, which differs to a certain extent from the one moved at the last stage to which the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, promised to give consideration, concerns a joint industrial board which wishes to register under the Bill and which the Government are not encouraging in that course of action.
When I said that the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, had promised to consider the matter the noble Baroness, Lady Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, looked somewhat startled. Well, my Lords, he did; and he has done so very well, because he wrote me a very long letter, extending to three foolscap pages, giving the reasons why the Government were still of the opinion that the Amendment should not be accepted. I will refer briefly to points in that letter because I have learned through these rather unusual channels that the Government are still not going to change their mind, and so I am not going to waste your Lordships' time by speaking at great length.
As the Bill stands, it may not prevent organisations like a joint industrial board from being registered, because, technically, it could be argued that they satisfy the definition of an organisation of workers since a substantial majority of the members are clearly workers, even though both trade union and also employers' organisations are acting in this type of association. In his letter the noble Lord went on to say that the reasons why the organisation wanted to be registered did not impress the Government; it was all a matter of probability and possibility. At

1123
no stage in the letter did the noble Lord inform me that it is not essential for this body to register to protect their interests. The phrases used are, "It seems improbable"; "It rests on the possibility"; "There does not seem to be any real danger". The reason why I have given the noble Lord this further opportunity is that in the letter he said there were technical difficulties in the way.
I appreciate that one of the technical difficulties is that an organisation consisting of employees' and employers' associations was seeking under the previous Amendment to come under Clause 61 which dealt with trade unions, and Clause 62 which dealt with employers' organisations; and it could be argued that an organisation which represented both could not therefore properly be regarded as coming under one or the other. It seemed to me, therefore, that the correct method was to bring in a new clause defining a joint organisation.
It may be that the noble Lord is right when he says that the organisation is worrying unduly. My point is that out of all the people in the country affected by the Bill, this one type of organisation which wants to go on the register is performing the task which is the Title of the Bill—industrial relations. Its whole object is to improve industrial relations. They draw my attention to the fact that during the time of their existence, the number of days lost in the industry has fallen from 28,000 to 9,000 last year and to as low as 5,000 the previous year. They accept what the Government want in this Bill. And as a reward for all this, they are told that they are not to have the benefit of registration.
I do not know what the noble Baroness will say in furtherance of this matter. If I am right in assuming that she is not going to accept this new clause, I do not intend to press it. What I shall do is to draw the attention of the organisation concerned to the fact that the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, has expressed the view that, notwithstanding his belief that the Bill is not intended to cover organisations of this kind, they may still try to register as a trade union, because they are a body consisting mainly of workers. I beg to move.
7.1 p.m.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, the noble Lord is quite right in saying that this Amendment is well prefaced by "YYY". It is the only Amendment we have had throughout the Bill which seeks to encourage registration under the Bill. What it seeks to do is to ensure that joint employer and worker organisations should come within the scope of the Bill and be eligible for registration under it. When I appeared surprised at the noble Lord saying that my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn had undertaken to consider this, I thought he said that consideration was going to be given to the whole question of registration and did not realise it was only this particular point on joint boards.
I also am fortunate in having a copy of my noble friend's letter in front of me. I assume that this Amendment is put down in order to place firmly on the Record whether it is necessary for joint boards to have some special provision under the Bill or whether they can register as joint boards. They cannot register as joint boards. Each constituent part, whether it is the employers' or the workers' side, can register under the Bill. The real argument behind my noble friend's letter was that it was not necessary for them to register, because one can hardly imagine a situation where one side would encourage a strike while the other was encouraging a lock-out. I think that would hardly be a problem we would have to face.
Naturally we wish to convince the joint boards that their position is secure. They are concerned whether they could have protection under Clause 96, which protects a registered body as to inducing a breach of contract. If I may read the relevant part of the letter to which the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, referred, it says:
" It seems improbable that the joint boards would ever be directly involved in actions involving inducement of breach of contract of employment."
I am sure that that is true. I would point out that a great deal of consideration was given to this matter in consultation with the joint boards, before we came to the Committee stage and none of those mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, on Committee stage have been able to

1125
produce an example of where they would be in danger under the Bill. That being so, I hope that the noble Lord will feel that the Amendment is unnecessary and will see fit to withdraw it.
LORD HUGHES: My Lords, I indicated that if the answer was as I expected it was going to be, I would not press this Amendment. In spite of all the meetings that have taken place—and the Joint Industry Board have made it perfectly clear to me that they have received very full consideration in meetings with the Law Officers of another place and in the correspondence that has taken place, they remain firmly convinced that they will be under disadvantages if they are not allowed to continue to register. I gather that they are registered as a trade union at the present time. If the point which the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, emphasised just before we divided, that they may find themselves placed on the provisional register, is correct and if they are registered as a trade union now, they will go on the provisional register and then it is for them to see whether their rules conform to what is necessary to allow them to transfer to the register proper. I suppose that what will take place now is that bodies like this will examine carefully what has been said in this further discussion of their position and will consider what is the best course of action for them to follow. I do not think that I can further their interests any more by seeking to press this Amendment and I beg leave to withdraw it.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, it may be for the convenience of your Lordships if the House were now to form itself into a Committee on the National Insurance Bill and thereafter adjourn during pleasure, so that we can have an hour's respite. I beg to move that further proceedings on Report be adjourned to enable the House to resolve itself into Committee on the National Insurance Bill.
Moved, That further proceedings on Report be adjourned to enable the House to resolve itself into Committee on the National Insurance Bill.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

FINANCE BILL
Brought from the Commons, endorsed with the Certificate from the Speaker that the Bill is a Money Bill within the meaning of the Parliament Act, 1911; read 1a, and to be printed.
EDINBURGH CORPORATION ORDER CONFIRMATION (No. 2) BILL
Brought from the Commons; read 1a, and (pursuant to the Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act 1936) deemed to have been read 2a and reported from the Committee.

NATIONAL INSURANCE BILL
7.9 p.m.
THE MINISTER OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY (LORD ABERDARE): My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Aberdare.)
House in Committee accordingly.
[The LORD ST. HELENS in the Chair.]
Clause 1 agreed to.
Clause 2 [Revision of benefits under Insurance Act]:
On Question, Whether Clause 2 shall stand part of the Bill?
BARONESS PHILLIPS: I beg to move that we leave out Clause 2, although I should like to first of all assure the Minister that I do not intend to press this to a Division, particularly as I am sure that he will notice, as I have, that there is some faulty drafting in this Amendment. The principle embodied in the Amendment is the same as that of the second Amendment following Clause 4, so I propose to make the point, and probably then to move the second one formally.
This brings forward a very important point of principle; namely, the operation of the earnings rule, which covers

1127
the first five years after retirement for both men and women. The last figures that I saw suggested that, out of the 8 million pensioners there were 1¼ million in this age group, and only about 16,000 of these at any one time would have their pensions reduced because of earnings. This seems to me, therefore, a reason why the Government might have a change of heart on this, because it is not going at any stage to cover a very large group in the community. I am fascinated to know how the demographers (I believe that is the term we use to describe them) arrive at the figure, as I see that the saving is put at £10 million. This seems to me to suggest that there must be a very large number of people involved in this. Perhaps the Minister will be able to let us know something of the size of the problem.
On Second Reading we discussed the point that the pension is completely extinguished when an individual earns a certain amount, which is specified here, and which has been upgraded; and this we appreciate. This represents—and I repeat this—a unique situation in State legislation. Nobody, no worker, actually pays back all his salary in tax. There are occasions when you think you do, but in actual fact I believe that even the highest paid collect something like 6d. in the pound. I think the classic case of the kind of situation that I am concerned about involves a man I know of 66 who, having retired from his own work, went to do voluntary work in a hospital and was persuaded to take a course of training in order to be a hospital orderly—a job, I hasten to say, that nobody wants: London hospitals have great difficulty in getting orderlies. The man does not seem at all elderly for 66—and indeed there is no reason why he should. He has taken on this job, and is carrying it out with great energy and enthusiasm and thoroughly enjoying it, but it means that he has lost his very meagre pension.
Surely if a man has put in 40 years of working life and paid insurance throughout the whole of that time, it is not unreasonable that he should collect a small State pension? There is no danger that anyone will get too much out of the State. The tax system acts as a regulator, so that he will never really benefit from the whole of his retirement pension, even if
1128
he is earning a salary. It seems to me that this rule acts as a definite disincentive, and especially in the area of occupations where we find difficulty in getting employees: the catering trades, the hospitals and the school cleaners, who are the people we find in this particular group. Her Majesty's Government have said on various occasions that they believe in self-help, and this is, after all, a very splendid philosophy. This is why I feel that, in this day and age, we have come to the point of time where the earnings rule should be abolished. I beg to move.
7.15 p.m.
BARONESS WHITE: I should like to support my noble friend Lady Phillips on this. As your Lordships will know, we had a discussion on this point of the earnings rule on the Second Reading of this Bill. I think many of us have been moving for some years to the position where we feel that the earnings rule should be entirely done away with. I hope, when he comes to reply, that the Minister will be able to give us some of the calculations on which the Government are now working. How much would it cost, so far as one can calculate? I recognise there is an element of hypothesis, but I think we should know whether he supports the figures put forward by my noble friend Lady Phillips, or whether the Government are working towards any other calculations.
I think we all feel that it is not merely a disincentive, as my noble friend said, but that this kind of provision is one which makes it far more difficult for the individual to regulate the transition from full-time work to complete retirement. As we said on the earlier occasion, individuals vary enormously in their physical and mental capacity, which may have relatively little relationship to their age, and we feel that there should be the greatest possible freedom for the individual to work out the pattern of his or her life as best he or she may.
I do not know whether the Minister has had any opportunity of considering further the particularly interesting suggestion that was made by the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, on the last occasion, which involved retaining the earnings rule but allowing an average of earnings over a year instead of taking each week

1129
separately. As she pointed out, if people were doing occasional work—which is often very suitable for somebody who is in semi-retirement—it is made peculiarly difficult for them to do so if each week is taken as a separate unit, and the earnings of that particular week are taken on their own without any relationship to the earnings over the entire year.
Of course this would assume that some type of earnings rule was in operation. As the noble Baroness, Lady Seear pointed out with great force and clarity, it could be very much more advantageous, even if the earnings rule was in operation, if there were some arrangement of this sort. I recognise that there would obviously be administrative difficulty, and that it would mean that the person concerned would presumably have to collect retrospectively any money that might be due for the period during which he or she had earned, but I do not think it is an insuperable difficulty.
Nevertheless, welcome as a change of that kind would be, I think it would be better still if we could all now recognise that this particular provision arose in a different era, and that we should now move forward with our greater knowledge of geriatric problems. I would hope particularly that our trade union friends would appreciate that the conditions which led them in the early stages of national insurance to insist on this provision are no longer so relevant, and that most of their own members would probably be benefited rather than disadvantaged by the change which we are asking.
I should like to turn to the similar Amendment which I understood my noble friend was going to discuss (though in fact she did not refer to it) on Clause 4. Here one has a peculiarly difficult situation, if I have understood this correctly, in which the earnings rule is applied to the wife of someone who is receiving invalidity pension. His invalidity allowances, if I am following this correctly, would he reduced if she were earning more than the £9·50, or the tapering allowance up to £11·50 which is provided for. Surely this is against public policy, because the wife of a man who is incapable to the degree which would be required for him to receive an invalidity pension would, I should have thought, if
1130
she was able to arrange her affairs in such a way that she could be free to work, naturally wish to do so—all the more because she might not know how long her husband might live, and she might have to keep herself in the labour market with a view to her own future.
From the nature of things, if her husband was not earning he would not be able to make any very generous provision for his potential widow. I think it needs very little imagination to put oneself in the position of such a woman, and to realise that she might well feel that it was very unfair, if she was trying to make an effort, that the husband's allowance would be reduced if she were in a position to earn more than the permitted amounts, which, although they are greater than they have been, are still not very high by to-day's standards of earnings. So I hope that this can be looked at, even if the Government are not able at this stage to do away with the earnings rule altogether.
After all, when Miss Margaret Herbison was Minister of National Insurance, she secured the abolition of the earnings rule where widows were concerned. That had been a bone of contention for many years. I remember taking part in a number of deputations with Members of all Parties in another place, and discussing this with various Ministers. We were then particularly concerned with the case of the widowed mother. But Miss Herbison was so well versed in the real problems which face a woman in that situation that she was able to secure her colleague's consent to the complete abolition of the earnings rule for widows. Therefore, it seems to me that if the Government cannot take a big step at the present time, they could surely take a step under Clause 4 and modify the present arrangements so that the earnings rule does not apply in the case of the working wife of an invalid husband. This cannot affect a very large category of persons and would not cost a very great deal. I do not know whether the Minister has made any calculations of the number of people covered by Clause 4, but if he has I am sure we shall be very much interested to hear them. I really plead with the Minister to look at this matter again, even if he feels that he cannot take a major step, because here is a category of persons for

1131
whom we should have particular sympathy.
On the main point, I must say that in discussions with various groups I have found that more and more people are resenting the earnings rule, because they think that they have contributed throughout their working lives to what they believe should be regarded as a retirement pension, in the same sense as endowment insurance. If you pay premiums for a private endowment insurance to mature at a certain age, you draw the money which is due to you regardless of whether or not you are earning, and a very great many people are now coming round to the view that that attitude should be taken in regard to National Insurance. I hope very much that the Government will consider this.
7.24 p.m.
LORD ABERDARE: I was very glad to hear from the noble Baroness, Lady Phillips, that she is not going to press this Amendment. As she recognises, it would be a fairly disastrous Amendment to carry, because it would delete the whole of Clause 2 and none of the proposed uprating of National Insurance benefits which we propose under the Bill could take effect. I am sure that that would not be her intention. She concentrated on the earnings rule, as did the noble Baroness, Lady White. I should like to make it clear, at the start, that the earnings rule is an essential prop of the retirement condition for eligibility for retirement pensions. During the first five years after pensionable age, pension is conditional upon retirement from regular employment. It is therefore necessary to have some criterion of what is, or is not, regular employment in order to determine whether or not a person can be regarded as having retired from regular employment, and it is the initial level of the earnings rule which performs this function. Without the rule, the retirement pension would simply be an old age pension payable unconditionally at the age of 65 or 60, which I gather is what both noble Baronesses were asking for.
As regards some of the figures, the noble Baroness, Lady Phillips, was quite correct in saying that about 1¼ million out of the 7½ million retirement pensioners
1132
are in the age bands subject to the earnings rule, and that only about 16,000 at any one time have their pensions reduced on account of earnings. But without the earnings rule to enforce the retirement condition—in other words, if we were to make it an old age pension which was payable as of right at those ages—some 250,000 people over pensionable age and still in regular employment, and 100,000 dependent wives, would all qualify for these pensions and it would cost, roughly speaking, £110 million a year at the new September rates. So we are talking in very high figures, and these could only be met by higher contributions or lower benefits elsewhere.
BARONESS PHILLIPS: I think we must take account of the fact that some would come back in tax. Also, I wonder whether the Minister can explain where the £10 million comes from. That puzzles me.
LORD ABERDARE: That has to do with the next Amendment which the noble Baroness wanted me to take at the same time. I shall come back to that, if I may. What we are doing is easing the rule very substantially under this Bill. The amount of earnings free of adjustment of pension is being raised from £7·50 to £9·50, and for higher earnings the present tapering arrangements remain. So that the point at which the single pension of £6 will be extinguished will be reached on net earnings of £16·50, instead of £13·50 at the present moment, and for a married couple both earning the limit will be £30·70. The point which the noble Baroness did not mention is that, although we encourage people to go on working for these extra five years, and hope that they will, they are at the same time able to earn increments to their pensions and in subsection (3) of Clause 2, which she is also trying to delete, we are raising the increments that they can earn to their pension. It is for those reasons that we consider it is right to retain the earnings rule, although we have made substantial improvements to it.
The noble Baroness, Lady White, mentioned the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, I have looked into it and I have written to the noble Baroness, Lady Seear. I have also sent copies to both noble Baronesses opposite, but they have probably not yet arrived

1133
as they went only yesterday. Her proposal has been examined twice by the National Insurance Advisory Committee, in 1956 and in 1967, when the Committee were looking at the question of earnings limits. In the letter I have sent extracts from those Reports, which show that the Committee went into the matter very thoroughly, and that, whereas a rule averaging earnings might be a benefit to some, there are others to whom it would be disadvantageous. There would be very real difficulties in operating it, and on both occasions the National Insurance Advisory Committee advised against it. But when the noble Baroness receives the letter, I hope she will see the reasons in greater detail.
If I may turn to Amendment No. 2, paragraph (b) of subsection (1) has nothing to do with the earnings rule and I do not think she means to leave it out. This has to do with an invalidity or retirement pensioner who can draw a dependency increase for a separated wife. But she obviously is concerned, as was the noble Baroness, Lady White, about the earnings rule in this case. In the same way as the retirement condition is supported by the retirement pension earnings rule, so the earnings rule for wives ensures that there is a degree of dependency before the husband qualifies for dependency increase. This is the case for the normal retirement pensioner and his wife. What we have done is to extend the retirement pension rule to the wives of invalidity and retirement pensioners; and we have also extended the same earnings rule, which will act as a safeguard: there will be a degree of dependency before the husband qualifies for dependency increase. Hitherto, all wives have been subject to the "all or nothing" earnings rule, whereby dependency increase was completely extinguished if earnings exceeded the amount of the increase. The extension of the retirement pension rule to the wives of invalidity and retirement pensioners living with their husbands is a very considerable easement. The tapered earnings rule will allow these wives to earn up to £9.50 per week without the dependency allowance being affected at all, and to earn up to £14.20 before it is completely extinguished. This compares with the present rule, which would extinguish benefit at earnings of £3.10; so we have made a very big advance
1134
there in the rules. Of course, the man's personal invalidity benefit is not affected in any way by his wife's earnings. The other point which the noble Baroness asked me about was as to its cost. The relaxation which we have made to bring in the wives of retirement and invalidity pensioners will cost £10 million. If we were to do away with the earnings rule, it would cost a further £15 million on top of the £10 million. So, in spite of the eloquence of the two noble Baronesses, I cannot recommend the Committee to accept these Amendments.
BARONESS PHILLIPS: I should like to thank the Minister for his explanation. On a small point, may I ask him whether he said "30" or "13" for the joint income?
LORD ABERDARE: If both were earning, it would be £30.
BARONESS PHILLIPS: That puzzles me a little as it is £9.50 each. However, I will not pursue that now. I appreciate that the Minister has taken the trouble to look into this matter, bearing in mind that both my Amendments were drafted wrongly. I can only plead that, hitherto, my Amendments have always been drafted by somebody else as I was on the other side of the House and not on this, and I am in that sense very much an amateur. The Amendments were put down to get the principle discussed, to which we will return on another occasion. But I should like to thank the Minister for his detailed explanation; and I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Clause 2 agreed to.
7.34 p.m.
BARONESS PHILLIPS BARONESS PHILLIPS moved Amendment No. 1:
After Clause 2, insert the following new clause.
Review of benefits
(" .There shall be an annual review of the benefits provided for in heads 10, 11 and 12 of Part I, and heads 6 and 7 of Part II, of Schedule 2 to this Act.")
The noble Baroness said: This Amendment deals with a different point. Indeed, the facts in its favour are so obvious that they hardly need restating. We are asking here that there should be an

1135
annual review of the benefits provided, and particularly in relation to the retirement pensioner. This does not mean to suggest that we are net concerned about the others, but we feel that at any rate it might be one move towards what we could expect—an annual review of all schemes of benefit. We are dealing here with people of the higher age level, and any assistance that is given to them should not be deferred too long. The old saying in charity is, "To give quickly is to give twice", and it is certainly true that if somebody is in this age band and has to wait two years for a review of his pension, he may well not live to collect the extra money.
The second point, which will be quite obvious to your Lordships, is that we are in a period of rapidly rising prices. I believe they are rising now at an annual rate of 14 per cent.; and a recent index of the movement of prices which I studied showed that the heaviest increase was in food and fares. These will obviously be the two items which affect particularly those in the fixed income group of the retirement pensioners. Furthermore, yesterday we heard the historic announcement of the possibility of our entry into the European Economic Community. This made it clear that, whatever benefits we gain, temporarily at any rate all shoppers must expect a rise in food prices; and even a very superficial study will show that this must be the case. Now I know that when we discuss the E.E.C. we are going to be told that there is long-term advantage. That may well be the fact; but the old lady living in Dorset, who has to pay the same price as a managing director of an international firm who lives in Mayfair, will be the one who feels most sharply any swift rise in prices. No particular reason has ever been advanced, so far as I can discover, why it has to be a biennial review, except, I gather, that Ministers are always told, "It would cause far too much work to the Department if you were to have an annual review." We have an annual review of prices in relation to farming, and we have quite a number of annual reviews. If having an annual review will necessitate a simpler method of paying out benefits, then this seems to me all to the good. I appeal to Her Majesty's Government to accept this very simple
1136
but needed Amendment to the Bill. I beg to move.
LORD ABERDARE: This Amendment, which has a certain attraction about it, is the same as one which was moved in another place on this Bill, and I am afraid I have much the same answer to give the noble Baroness as was given on that occasion. It represents a fundamental departure from previous practice. There have never been regular fixed intervals between reviews, although over the last ten years it has become a pattern for there to be up-ratings approximately every two years. Of course, reviews have never been limited to retirement pensions, and in practice it is unlikely that changes in retirement pension would be made without corresponding changes in at least the other long-term benefits. Both the Opposition and ourselves have now committed ourselves to biennial reviews: the Opposition did so in the Bill that fell at the Election and we did so in our Election manifesto. But, again, we are not rigidly bound to this precise period. Indeed, this year's uprating has, at great effort, been brought forward by six weeks. We are confident that the new pensions, when they are introduced in September, will have a greater real value than the present rate had when it was introduced in November, 1969. The cost of living, as measured by the Retail Prices Index, was going up at an annual rate of 9·8 per cent. in May, 1971, which is the last date for which figures are available. I think it is not quite as high a rate as the noble Baroness suggested.
BARONESS PHILLIPS: I selected food prices.
LORD ABERDARE: The noble Baroness says that she selected food prices. We are confident that, with common sense and restraint on the wages front, price increases can be brought down to a reasonable level, and if this process should happen to take longer than we all hope, there is, of course, the protection of the supplementary benefits scheme, which can be reviewed annually, as it has been in recent years, and which is expressly designed to protect the living standards of the most vulnerable sections of the population.
The noble Baroness mentioned the massive operation involved in upgrading.

1137
It is true that it is a massive operation, and it places a great strain on the administrative resources of the Department, even with the use of the latest computers and other mechanical devices. But I should not like it to be thought that this is the only argument on which we rest our case. We think on policy grounds that the present two-yearly review is right, and beyond that we should continue to keep a close watch on price rises and the value of pensions. We are, as your Lordships are aware, currently working on plans for reconstructing the National Insurance Scheme, and among the questions that we are studying is that of reviews.
The noble Baroness mentioned the White Paper on entry into the Common Market. Of course the figures are there given of the effect on the cost of living, which will be about one-half per cent. each year; that is, taking an increase of about 2½ per cent. each year in retail prices: and as food accounts for about a quarter of the total of consumer expenditure, the effect on the cost of living will be about one-half per cent. per year. We have undertaken, as all Governments have and should, to keep the scale of pensions and other benefits under continuous review. That, I should think, is the best safeguard against any unforeseen difficulty. We have used the flexibility that this provides, as I have said, to bring forward the date of the present upgrading from November, when it was due at the end of two years, to September; and the fact that it has been customary for some years to review supplementary benefits annually is, I suggest, a further safeguard. I am sorry, but I cannot accept this Amendment.
BARONESS PHILLIPS: Again I should like to thank the Minister for his explanation. Being a woman, I am a little sceptical about the figure of one-half per cent., or whatever it is, by which the figure is going to increase. I will wait and see about that. I think one has always to separate the things on which a pensioner spends the major part of his or her income, and I know from shopping that food prices are continuing to rise. Meat is getting so expensive that it will soon be something that you give to somebody for Christmas—two or three chops as a special present instead of a ring. From what the Minister
1138
has said, there is no law that cannot be changed in relation to this annual review. It is on this that I rest my case, and I hope that we can return to it.
On the question of the massive operation of changing the payment of benefits, one always wonders, as a layman, why it is so simple for the Railways Board when they increase their fares merely to stamp over the ticket that you buy, but that when it is a pension that you are going to receive, the whole thing has to be re-drawn and re-typed. Perhaps that is an area that we might study.
In other words, the operation seems much easier if you are getting money out of people than if you are going to pay money to people. I am grateful to the Minister, and I shall of course return to this question. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 3 agreed to.
Remaining clauses and Schedules agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported without amendment; Report received.
[The Sitting was suspended at 7.47 p.m. and resumed at 8 p.m.]

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BILL
8.0 p.m.
Report stage resumed.
Clause 65 [Guiding principles for organisations of workers]:
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79LLL.
Page 54, line 6, at end insert (" ; and every such organisation shall be free to frame rules to meet its own circumstances provided that no rule so framed conflicts with any such principle ").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, we are now at that stage of the Bill which deals, if I recollect correctly, with the
" guiding principles for organisations of workers."
We discussed the various aspects of this during Committee stage. One thing which emerged was the departure in the Bill

1139
from the proposals which were included in the Donovan Commission's Report with regard to the freedom of the union
" to frame the rules to meet its own circumstances."
I should like to refer to what was covered in the discussion in Committee. As reported at col. 596 for May 20, my noble friend Lord Delacourt-Smith first quoted from the Donovan Commission Report. Then, having referred to an "important qualification", as my noble friend called it, he quoted the words:
"without impairing the freedom which trade unions ought to enjoy to frame rules to meet their own circumstances."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 20/5/71; Vol. 319, col. 596]
We are here dealing with a rather difficult conflict. It is obviously right that there should exist the freedom of association which we all recognise—and if necessary I could read a very telling quotation from a speech made by the noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack supporting the idea of freedom of association, to which we are all married—and, within that concept, I am quite sure is the freedom of those who are associated together to decide the basis upon which they are so associated; namely, to frame rules to meet their own circumstances.
This was a concept which the Donovan Commission examined and they came out clearly in favour of it. There is the conflict, I repeat, between that concept and an excess of that freedom which would mean transgressing principles, which, so far as they are approved, affect the conduct of organisations of workers. So it seemed to me, my Lords, while not wholly satisfactory, but again as a possible half-way house, necessary to enshrine the words of the Donovan Commission in this area of the Bill, so as to make it clear that although one was not directly opposing any of the principles which, by the time we have got to the end of this clause, we shall have approved, nevertheless we were making it absolutely clear that the essential freedom to frame rules "to meet its own circumstances" was necessary for an organisation to be viable and free. I hope, therefore, that these words will commend themselves to the Government. I beg to move.
8.5 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, says that he has enshrined words from the Donovan Commission in this Amendment. I think that so far as those words are declaratory they are unexceptionable. The trouble is that when one sets out to make a declaratory statement of this kind one has to be very careful that one does not get side effects which are neither intended nor wanted. In so far as they are declaratory, one has to consider whether the declaration is in the right place. After all, the rights of individuals as individuals may include the right to associate, but they are certainly not limited to the right to associate. We are here dealing with the guiding principles for the protection of individuals in their membership of organisations.
My Lords, there is nothing in this clause which requires an organisation to frame its rules in accordance with the principles. The requirement in relation to the principles appears in Clause 75(1) which says that if the rules are in conflict with the principles set out in Clause 65, or if they fail to meet the requirements of Schedule 4:
" the registrar shall serve notice on the organisation indicating what alterations are needed…".
That requirement relates, of course, only to registered organisations; but this requirement applies to all organisations, whether they are registered or not. If, for the sake of argument, one were to accept that there were some shred of doubt in this matter, that could not possibly arise under Clause 65, and the insertion of the provision in this clause would only raise doubts about the approval of rules under Clause 75.
That is not the only nor the main difficulty. This Amendment reads,
" every such organisation "—
whether registered or unregistered—
" shall be free to frame rules "—
where they are not in conflict with those principles in Clause 65. That implies surely that the organisation is not free to frame rules which are in conflict with the principles, and one has to ask what the status of such rules would be. I am advised that they would be made void by the provision.

1141
The validity of rules on any of the matters referred to in the clause would be constantly open to doubt. That is something which the Bill itself carefully avoids. Although there is common ground between ourselves and noble Lords opposite that the trade unions are, and will remain, free under the Bill to frame their own rules within the requirements of the law, there is no common ground on the need for a declaratory statement in the Bill. With or without a statement, that is the effect and they will be free to frame their own rules within the requirements of the law. We do no accept that there is any doubt about that at all. It is simply not worth the risk of making a statement which would have the undesirable side effects to which I have referred. So, while agreeing with the principle, we think that these words are misplaced and that they could have unwanted side effects.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I listened carefully to what the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, said. I recognise, of course, that he is sustained by considerable advice as to the effect of any particular Amendment. When one frames one's own Amendments and puts them down one is not quite sure what the ultimate effect will be. However, I think that what he said encourages me to press this Amendment, because what he said was, "You will be in difficulty if this declaratory statement is included at this point, because these principles will need to be tested the whole time against the overall statement." That is exactly what one wants. The principles are principles which the Government see as the appropriate ones; and they may be so. But there is an overriding principle. It has been examined and reported on by the Royal Commission and, as I said before, it stems from a fundamental freedom that we all wish to encourage: the principle
that people who associate together have the right to frame their own rules to meet their own circumstances, subject only to those rules not conflicting with any broad issue of public policy.
Now public policy is involved in the guiding principles, so I think that the noble Lord has confirmed my belief that to the extent that this Amendment would cause questioning and some doubt in the construction and interpretation by those who have that responsibility, then it is a good thing. I would therefore press the Government further to agree that this statement is a statement which the noble Lord says that he accepts—indeed, I would quote from the OFFICIAL REPORT, column 604, when he referred to this matter in Committee—should be embodied, or, if you like, enshrined in the Bill. The noble Lord said on that occasion:
" But, talking of rules, the short answer is that the unions frame their rules, except in so far as they are defective in the sense that there is no rule corresponding to the requirement of Schedule 4…. I cannot see anything incongruous about this at all."
He went on:
" The unions have responsibility for framing their own rules. Nobody writes their rules for them. They merely have to comply with the law regarding the rules and have the rules specified in the Schedule."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 20/5/71; col. 604.]
I think it is wholesome, healthy and democratic that this principle should be before everybody's mind, and I hope therefore that the noble Lord will include it in the clause. If not, we shall seek, by whatever methods are open to us, so to include it.
8.14 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 79.LLL) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 24; Not-Contents, 61.

CONTENTS

Beswick, L.

Jacques, L.

Shackleton, L.

Blyton, L.

Lindgren, L.

Shepherd, L.

Buckinghamshire, E.

Longford, E.

Slater, L.

Champion, L.

Milner of Leeds, L. [Teller.]

Stonham, L.

Diamond, L.

Nunburnholme, L.

Stow Hill, L.

Gaitskell, Bs.

Phillips, Bs.

Stragolgi, L. [Teller.]

Hall, V.

Platt, L.

Taylor of Mansfield, L.

Henderson, L.

Popplewell, L.

White, Bs.

NOT-CONTENTS

Aberdare, L.

Ferrers, E.

Napier and Ettrick, L.

Ailwyn, L.

Ferrier, L.

Oakshott, L.

Auckland, L.

Fortescue, E.

Rankeillour, L.

Balfour, E.

Goschen, V. [Teller.]

St. Aldwyn, E.

Balfour of Inchrye, L.

Gowrie, E. [Teller.]

St. Helens, L.

Barnby, L.

Gray, L.

Sandford, L.

Beaumont of Whitley, L.

Gridley, L.

Savile, L.

Belstead, L.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

Selkirk, E.

Berkeley, Bs.

Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Sempill, Ly.

Brabazon of Tara, L.

Skelmersdale, L.

Brecon, L.

Hanworth, V.

Somers, L.

Brougham and Vaux, L.

Hatherton, L.

Stamp, L.

Burnham, L.

Hawke, L.

Strathclyde, L.

Conesford, L.

Henley, L.

Teviot, L.

Cork and Orrery, E.

Jellicoe, E. (L. Privy Seal.)

Thomas, L.

Craigavon, V.

Kemsley, V.

Thorneycroft, L.

Craigmyle, L.

Killearn, L.

Tweedsmuir, L.

Denham, L.

Kinloss, Ly.

Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, Bs.

Drumalbyn, L.

Massereene and Ferrard, V.

Wade, L.

Dundee, E.

Mountevans, L.

Windlesham, L.

Elliot of Harwood, Bs.

Mowbray and Stourton, L.

Resolved in the negative, and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.

8.22 p.m.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79L:
Page 54, ine 15, after (" is ") insert (" recognised by the Union as ").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, in moving this Amendment I would first refresh your Lordships' memory as to the conclusions of the Royal Commission (which are stated in paragraph 650) with regard to admission. Referring to the rules of admission the Commission's Report states:
" They should be framed in such a way as to avoid discriminating arbitrarily against any type of applicant,"—
that is common ground—
" but unions must be allowed to retain discretion in deciding whom they should admit."
I think that is a short and fair and accurate presentation of the principle involved. There must at the end of the day be discretion exercised by the union and therefore this Amendment is framed to provide for that.
If I may say further why I think that is necessary. I think the shortest way is to remind your Lordships of what my noble friend Lord Delacourt-Smith said when we were discussing a similar point at the Committee stage. He said:
" Unless there is some regulation and some discretion vested in trade unions as to whom they shall admit and whom they shall reject, we shall have endless friction, endless difficulties, endless disputes, a weakening of the trade
1144
union movement and a great complication of industrial relations with no benefit whatsoever."—[OFFICIAL REPORT. 20/5/71: col. 612]
I think that is a fair and concise statement of the position. That is how we see it, and therefore we think it is necessary to have an Amendment of this kind to make our point of view clear. If the Amendment were accepted, subsection (2) would read—
" Any person who applies for membership and who is recognised by the union as appropriately qualified "
instead of the present wording, which is simply:
" is appropriately qualified ".
That is to say, if the Amendment were accepted the discretion as to what "appropriate" means would be in the hands of the union, whereas without that Amendment it would not. And I repeat that it should be in their hands. That is the effect of the Amendment.
There is the further point that anxiety has been expressed to me by those who are concerned with these matters as to what the Government's attitude is with regard to semi-skilled workers, dilutees, and so on, who without the Amendment, might be regarded as appropriately qualified for employment, thereby disgracing those who had qualified by apprenticeship to do a skilled job, or whatever it might be, and this final decision we think is sensibly left in the hands of the union at the end of the day. It is for these reasons that I hope the Government will look kindly on this Amendment.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE (LORD BELSTEAD): My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, in moving this Amendment, quoted from the Royal Commission Report and gave your Lordships the reference for the quotation, which was, of course, absolutely accurate. But, as I heard the noble Lord, he did not follow the quotation through and examine any of the matters which might result from that quotation; and I think it is fair to say that it is because the Government have apprehensions as to what the result or results of the quotation from the Donovan Report might be that we wish to resist this Amendment.
We are well aware that the phrase "appropriately qualified" has caused the Opposition a good deal of concern, and I think it is worth reminding ourselves why that is there. Subsection (2) gives a right of redress against the refusal of admission on grounds which amount to arbitrary or unreasonable discrimination against the individual person concerned. My Lords, paragraph (a) leaves the organisation entirely free to determine for itself the class of worker which the organisation seeks to recruit. If a person seeking admission clearly has no legitimate claim to be a worker of that description the organisation has every right to reject him; and it is only fair to say that in both Houses of Parliament many Members have made the point how important it is from the point of view of standards of safety. But on what grounds is the claim to be tested?
Paragraph (b) states that the worker concerned must be appropriately qualified to perform the work. This Amendment would give the organisation complete discretion to decide what are "appropriate qualifications". Moreover, the Amendment would leave the organisation free to exercise that discretion in different ways in different cases. It could say that one person was appropriately qualified and that another was not, without having to prove to anyone whether it was applying the same criteria in both cases. I am sure that was not the noble Lord's intention, nor would it be the intention of the vast majority of trade unions. But Clause 65 deals with the laying down of principles, and even if the Amendment is merely intended to
1146
give workers' organisations the right to lay down their own uniform qualifications—and this was the tenor of Lord Diamond's remarks—it would still be unacceptable to us. The effect would be to give organisations a completely free hand to make any conditions they chose, however doubtful the connection with the worker's actual ability to perform work of a type which the organisation sets out to organise.
May I go into more detail and show your Lordships how we feel that subsection (2) is going to work? Suppose that union X decides to recruit only skilled fitters and that only skilled fitters need bother to apply. But it may be that a union will only recognise a particular method of training. If that is so, and if the union can establish before a tribunal that this is reasonable, it may prove its case for rejecting other applicants. What we believe to be equitable is that a union should be under an obligation, if so called upon, to justify its decision before an independent party—in other words, an industrial tribunal. Subsection 2(b) gives an applicant the right to show before a tribunal that he is qualified to be employed on jobs which are organised by the organisation that he wishes to join.
The noble Lord, Lord Diamond, asked the direct question: what do the Government think about semi-skilled workers, dilutees and other such workers of similar categories? Our reply is simple: the Government do not have a view on this point. In line with so many other parts of the Bill, we say that the right course is that the view should be that of an impartial tribunal. This Amendment would take away that right, and it is for that reason that I hope the House will reject the Amendment, if it is pressed.
8.32 p.m.
BARONESS GAITSKELL: My Lords, the Government continually state that their wish is to strengthen the unions, yet it seems to me that throughout our debates we have come across many instances where the Government either ignore the unions, treat them like recalcitrant children, or are completely paternalistic. Here is a chance where they can strengthen the unions, yet they are ignoring them. Who better to judge

1147
the qualifications for a worker than the trade union to which the worker belongs? They would not wish to have a worker who was not qualified. Why should they? It would not be in their interests. It seems to me that the Government are unreasonable in not accepting this extremely reasonable Amendment.
THE EARL OF BALFOUR: My Lords, there is one point that I should like to raise. It can happen that there is a redundancy in one particular field. Very often little effort is made by unions, who may be somewhat associated, to stretch their own conditions to allow good union members to join. For example, it may be that there are members of the mining industry who have become redundant, and they have difficulty in getting into another union and other employment. That is one of the reasons why this Amendment should not be accepted. Unions should be encouraged to try to help people who may not be totally skilled or may not have fully served their time in, for argument's sake, the electrical workers' union; they might have been in the mines all their lives. If we can help them to get jobs in possibly different fields from their own industry it is something worth while trying to push.
LORD SLATER: My Lords, it was not my intention to make a contribution, but may I ask whether I understood the noble Earl aright when he said that a miner, through redundancy, is absorbed in another type of industry and wants to join that particular trade union and come away from the miners, but cannot do so? For the information of your Lordships' House, may I say that if anyone leaves the mining industry he is immediately given a clearance card. That means that he is no longer a member of the National Union of Mineworkers because he is not working in or about the mine. He has changed his form of employment, and the clearance card enables him to make his application to the appropriate trade union, without any form of entrance fee, catering for the class of employment he requires. My noble friend Lord Taylor of Mansfield knows as well as I do that inside the miners' union we have what we call "federation" in and about the mines. One particular section caters for the
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mechanics, another for the men working at the coal face. Others cater for the deputy class, others the officials and so on.
They join this type of federation but they are units, an integral part of their own particular organisation, the mechanics' union or the officials union, and so on. If anyone working within the industry left his job as a face worker to be a deputy he would have to be given his clearance card to go into the appropriate section of the union. I would say to the noble Lord. Lord Drumalbyn, that the Government have made a mistake right from the start. They should have endeavoured to have more consultation with the Trades Union Congress and the people who know the workings of the trade unions. We are not going to be mealy-mouthed about this. There are unions in this country who give accommodation for people who ought to be members of a particular union, and do not have the opportunity of being a member of one, two or three unions: for example, the General and Municipal Workers Union, NALGO, the National Union of Public Employees, the Transport and General Workers' Union and so on. The medical officers of health can also become members of either one or two unions. This does not make sense.
A person should be a member of the appropriate trade union catering for the person's particular kind of work. The suggestions made by my noble friend in regard to this Amendment are something to which I hope the Government will give further consideration and every possible support.
LORD STOW HILL: My Lords, may I intervene shortly on this matter? The noble Lord, Lord Belstead, has not quite accurately diagnosed the effect of subsection (2) of this clause. What are the steps which have to be taken by an applicant? First, he has to show that he is a worker of the description for which the union caters, or one of the descriptions for which the union caters. Secondly, if he wishes to complain that his application for membership has been refused, he has to show that there has been discrimination against him; in other words, by an arbitrary or unreasonable answer to his claim for membership.

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The noble Lord based his answer to the Amendment upon this view. He said that the Government do not take a view, for example, about dilutees, and so on; they wish the industrial tribunal in a given case to pronounce upon that type of matter. The noble Lord says that they are averse to putting it within the power and discretion of the trade union to specify what are the qualifications which they think are necessary, who should have the power to say what type of persons they will regard as qualified within one of the descriptions for which they cater? To put the matter upon the industrial tribunal is to ask them to decide something for which they are not qualified. How are they to know what is a wise standard of skill to exact? The people who know that are the members of the union themselves, the responsible executives of the unions. They should be the people called upon to lay down standards of skill, reliability, training, membership or whatever it may be. The noble Lord is quite wrong in saying that that should not be the task of the union, for it obviously should. They are the one set of people which is qualified to prescribe standards. The last people qualified to prescribe standards are those on the tribunal. They have not the material on which to judge.
I venture to intervene as I am concerned, perhaps because of my previous experience of the position of courts. I am most anxious that this legislation should not impose upon them a task which is almost impossible or extremely difficult in the nature of things for them to undertake. It may be said that they will have evidence before them, but the evidence that they should have before them and upon which they should be called upon to adjudicate is surely this: they should have before them the structure of the union and the sort of people for whom the union caters. They should know from the description of members for whom the union provides; they should then be able to say whether the applicant comes within that description. They do not know what is prescribed as prudent for the members' safety so far as standards of skill are concerned. The union knows that. What they are able to say, if the union has prescribed a general standard of training, an apprenticeship of skill in a particular and perhaps
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dangerous activity—and this is precisely what they can be called upon to decide—is whether, in the individual case, for some reason which cannot be explained except upon the basis of some personal prejudice, or something of the sort, they have excluded an applicant who comes within the description and who is able to show that he possesses the necessary standard of skill which the union has laid down as a qualification.
I hope that the Government will look at this matter again. I submit that this is another case where they are putting the courts in a difficult and artificial position. If the courts have to pronounce on cases of that sort which it is difficult for them to assess, confidence in them will gradually become undermined. That really would be a major catastrophe. I respectfully submit to the noble Lords on the Front Bench that this Amendment does not vest unreasonable power in the union. It says that the standards should be laid down and applied to everybody who is an applicant to become a member of a union. If those standards are not fairly applied, then prejudice and discrimination is shown against a particular applicant and the tribunal will interfere to protect that applicant. But I respectfully ask the Government to take the view that the Amendment places the responsibility of prescribing standards where it ought to he; that is, squarely upon the union itself. I hope that the Government Front Bench will give further thought to this subject and indicate that they would like to go into it rather more deeply.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I wonder whether we are not becoming wholly unrealistic in the consideration of this Amendment. Let us consider what are the true facts here. A person will be engaged for a job. Obviously, he will have to be qualified for that job if he is going to be engaged for it. There are three cases: there is the ordinary case where there is neither an agency nor a closed shop. In that case a man applies for membership of the union; he has been taken on to do a job; he is within a certain description of worker; he will normally be considered as qualified for that job and there will be no diffiulty whatsoever about his being accepted by the union. If it is an agency shop, once again he will be accepted into employment and if he wishes to he will apply

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for membership of the union or he will apply not to be a member of the union, as the case may be. Here again he is already qualified, for if the union says that he is not qualified presumably he could still not be a member of the union. But why should he not be a member if he is taken on to do a particular job and the mangement are satisfied that he is capable of doing that job? In such circumstances that is a matter for agreement between management and the union.
LORD DIAMOND: I should like the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, to repeat what he said. Did he say that this is a matter for agreement between the management and the union?
LORD DRUMALBYN: I think that is so. The employer has taken on somebody to do a specific job. It is an agency shop situation; under the Bill, that person is going to be encouraged to join the union. What happens if the union says that it is not going to have this man? Obviously, the management and the union will have to get together. That is common sense. I am merely speaking about the common sense of the situation.
Thirdly, there is a closed shop situation, and obviously this is the most difficult aspect. There is no pre-entry closed shop left under the Bill. There is no question whatsoever of a union refusing to take somebody in and therefore preventing his being engaged to be employed under the Bill; but in the closed shop situation he has to become a member of the union. Is it right that the union should say that it is a closed shop and they do not regard him as qualified; therefore he cannot carry on his job when he has quite satisfactory, recognised qualifications? Again, that is something which should be agreed between the management and the union. One has to realise that these are possible situations, and clearly, in almost every case, there will be no difficulty whatsoever. Two things are laid down here: the organisation is free to say who is a worker of the description for which it caters, and, secondly, if a person is appropriately qualified for an employment, any person who applies and is appropriately qualified should be accepted, we all agree, into the union and not rejected by any arbitrary or unreasonable discrimination.
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In summary, all I am saying is that there is just an outside chance every now and again that a union might refuse to take somebody on the grounds that he was not appropriately qualified for employment work of that description. But the question of who is appropriately qualified for employment as a worker in a particular factory depends very largely on the management and whom they engage as being appropriately qualified, or on the training that he has received and so on. It is to cover the very rare case where there may be some disagreement about this, where it is not desirable to leave the sole decision as to who is appropriately qualified, as opposed to the general description for which they are catering, to the union alone. In practical terms we are on a very small point here, but we regard this Amendment as unnecessary. It is entirely unnecessary to put in these words and in the very small proportion of cases it might be undesirable. When there is any doubt about putting words in a Bill of this kind it is better to leave them out, we think that they ought not to be in.
LORD DIAMOND: I am much encouraged by the speeches which have been made by my noble friends, each one of which seemed to me to add considerably to the case I was putting forward for the Government's consideration. I am sorry to say that I have not heard a single argument which dispels the point of view put forward by my noble friends. I raised this Amendment in the first place partly to probe the Government's mind with regard to dilutees, and so on, and partly to make clear that we were dealing with a matter connected with a fundamental principle, a right of association and the rights of those who associate to determine who is going to be in the association, which tends to be forgotten. The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, said that there will be only a few cases in dispute. That is right; we are talking only about a few cases, so the world will not fall down if the freedoms which I have suggested it is necessary to exercise are exercised. The noble Lord's first argument is that in the case of a dispute between the worker and the union as to whether the member is appropriately qualified, the fact that the management has engaged him is sufficient evidence that he is qualified to do the job. The only

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answer I can give to that, one which occurred to me immediately, is—and I shall have to over-simplify it to make it as obvious as I can—to refer to the arguments which the noble Lord as employer, and I as the maintainer of standards, have had.
I refer to the time when the noble Lord was a member of a Government in another place and I was a member of the General Nursing Council. Government policy was to get more and more nurses because nurses were greatly needed. How do you get more nurses? Obviously by reducing standards. And what was the function of the General Nursing Council? To maintain standards. And there was a classical argument between the employer, the Government—the noble Lord sitting opposite—wanting to serve his purposes and, in order to serve them, being prepared to have a gentle regard, a non-critical regard, for the qualification of the person who was putting himself or herself forward, and the organisation representing standards and trying to maintain those standards. It is the usual argument of the short-term view versus the long-term view. I am glad to say that, so long as I was privileged to be a member of the General Nursing Council, we maintained our standards. That may be right or it may be wrong.
I am only saying that of course it is natural that there should be a conflict between the employer, who tends to accept lower standards because they are all that is available, and the union, which tends to support higher standards because of the apprenticeship, and so on, that has been gone through in order to achieve membership. In these circumstances, why does the noble Lord say it is right that the employers' view should prevail? At a moment of incautious speech—which we all experience—he said that the union and the employer should get together and agree. This clause does not say that they should agree. The union has no right in this clause except to go and represent its view to an outside body. So I am bound to say there is nothing here in the clause either to remind us of the fundamental right of the union or to protect skills and qualifications of which the union is naturally the appropriate guardian.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, will the noble Lord forgive me for intervening?
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There is always a tendency to look narrowly at a particular provision in a Bill. I have said time and time again in our consideration of this Bill that there is nothing whatever in the Bill to prevent the unions and the employers from agreeing on standards of entry, experience, qualifications and all the rest of it; and this is what will happen. What the noble Lord's Amendment would do would be to limit the matter to the unions alone.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, this is not right. I am giving the unions the minimum discretion to which they are entitled. I base my case first of all on the three years' study of the Royal Commission, which says they should have this discretion. One cannot just brush that away. I am on solid ground, not my own individual, subjective view, but the view of the Royal Commission which I have quoted, and will quote again with pleasure. The noble Lord, Lord Belstead, said that I had not followed through the quotation. I have looked through the paragraph and I cannot see anything more in it which detracts one iota from the part I quoted; namely, that unions must be allowed to retain discretion. The paragraph says:
" Notwithstanding the other circumstances and arguments therefor, unions must be allowed to retain discretion in deciding whom they should admit ".
That is the first principle and I am on solid ground in saying that. Then I go on to say this—and this is why I am so grateful to my noble friend Lord Stow Hill: because as the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, was speaking I was wondering which clause he had in mind. As I read the Bill, there was the reference to "arbitrary or unreasonable discrimination" and there is nothing in this Amendment which would remove that. So the situation is still, as we would want it to be, that no union can refuse membership in an arbitrary or unreasonable way.
So then I come to the third question that I was concerned with and to the reason I raised it in a probing manner. What is the Government's atttiude with regard to dilutees, and so on? Here I received a frightening reply. I received the reply that the Government were going to run away from their responsibilities and were going to leave the matter in the hands of some outside body. That reply will strike fear into the hearts of those

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who asked me to raise this issue as one of the reasons for this Amendment. The Government must not do that. The Government have the responsibility of setting the pattern with regard to labour employment and labour standards, and merely to put the responsibility on to a body which, as my noble friend Lord Stow Hill has said, is by nature incapable of reaching an informed conclusion on an issue such as this, whereas the union is the appropriate body to do so, will not help the situation at all. It will mean merely that the Minister, who otherwise would have to answer in Parliament for decisions on general policy with regard to dilution of labour and so on, some
9.5 p.m.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79AAA:
Page 54, line 21, after (" notice ") insert (" paying any sums due to the organisation ").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, it would be highly improper for me to say that the answer to "AAA" is "for horses, horses, horses", so I will not do
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thing of most fundamental importance, will avoid that issue.
So, my Lords, I am bound to say that this Amendment, which started off in its usual moderate way, is now seen to be a very necessary Amendment. I am bound to say that absolutely. It is solidly based on the Donovan Commission's Report; it is solidly based in law; it is solidly based in experience. If the Government are not prepared to move in this matter, then we must divide the House on it.
8.57 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 79L) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 23; Not-Contents, 63.

CONTENTS

Beswick, L.

Janner, L.

Shepherd, L.

Blyton, L.

Lindgren, L.

Slater, L.

Buckinghamshire, E.

Longford, E.

Stonham, L.

Champion, L.

Milner of Leeds, L.

Stow Hill, L.

Diamond, L.

Phillips, Bs. [Teller.]

Strabolgi, L. [Teller.]

Gaitskell, Bs.

Platt, L.

Taylor of Mansfield, L

Henderson, L.

Popplewell, L.

White, Bs.

Hoy, L.

Shackleton, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Aberdare, L.

Ferrers, E. [Teller.]

Napier and Ettrick, L.

Ailwyn, L.

Ferrier, L.

Oakshott, L.

Auckland, L.

Fortescue, E.

Rankeillour, L.

Balfour, E.

Fraser of Lonsdale, L.

St. Aldwyn, E.

Balfour of Inchrye, L.

Goschen, V. [Teller.]

St. Helens, L.

Barnby, L.

Gowrie, E.

Sandford, L.

Beaumont of Whitley, L.

Gray, L.

Savile, L.

Belstead, L.

Gridley, L.

Selkirk, E.

Berkeley, Bs.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

Sempill, Ly.

Brabazon of Tara, L.

Hailsham of St. Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Skelmersdale, L.

Brecon, L.

Strathclyde, L.

Burnham, L.

Hanworth, V.

Templemore, L.

Conesford, L.

Harvey of Tasburgh, L.

Terrington, L.

Cork and Orrery, E.

Hatherton, L.

Teviot, L.

Craigavon, V.

Hawke, L.

Thomas, L.

Craigmyle, L.

Henley, L.

Thorneycroft, L.

Crathorne, L.

Jellicoe, E. (L. Privy Seal.)

Tweedsmuir, L.

Denham, L.

Kemsley, V.

Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, Bs.

Drumalbyn, L.

Killearn, L.

Vivian, L.

Dundee, E.

Massereene and Ferrard, V.

Windlesham, L.

Elliot of Harwood, Bs.

Mountevans, L.

Emmet of Amberley, Bs.

Mowbray and Stourton, L.

Resolved in the negative, and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.

so! This is a short point which refers to subsection (3), under which:
" Every member of the organisation shall have the right, on giving reasonable notice and complying, with any reasonable conditions, to terminate his membership…"
The Amendment seeks to add the words,
"paying any sums due to the organisation"
after the word "notice" in line 21. This seems to be a reasonable thing to require a member to do before leaving

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the organisation. Particularly is this so because one might otherwise find that there are individuals who seek to get the benefits of trade union membership and when it comes to their arrears being so great that action is about to be taken they retire, change their jobs and join some other union with their arrears still outstanding. It is improper that this should take place, and therefore I hope that the Government will either say that this is already covered under the words, "complying with any reasonable conditions", or else will agree to the Amendment. I beg to move.
LORD BELSTEAD: My Lords, I really think there is very little between us on the point which the noble Lord. Lord Diamond, has moved in this Amendment. Subsection (3) of the clause already slates that the right to resign is subject to the member "complying with any reasonable conditions", and I think I can almost meet the noble Lord (without however, accepting his Amendment, which I must say we do not want to do) by saying that we would agree with him that in principle there is nothing unreasonable about an organisation wanting to recover money lawfully due to it. If, then, a trade union were to make it a condition of acceptance of resignation that contributions up to the date of resignation shall have been paid, I cannot see, although it does not lie within the mouths of Ministers to lay down the law, that anyone would regard this as unreasonable. It would be pointless to list all the conditions which might be regarded as reasonable. It is, after all, for each organisation to determine for itself what detailed conditions and rules it wants to lay down, and then for the Registrar to determine what is reasonable.
Where we are not seeing quite eye to eye on the Amendment is that we can see no special reason for singling out a requirement to pay sums due to the organisation in specific terms when we are considering a clause dealing with broad principles. The noble Lord referred, perfectly reasonably, to some of the very practical difficulties which unions may find if people leave unions with their dues unpaid. The noble Lord referred to their going off and perhaps joining another union. I imagine that the majority of cases of people leaving a
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trade union will be when there are changes, from a closed shop to an agency shop, for example (but we think there will be very few people who leave on that account) and when a member simply wishes to change to membership of another trade union; presumably then the Bridlington Rules continue to operate. If, however, as the noble Lord suggested, a member is being disciplined and leaves the trade union before action is taken against him, it could well be reasonable for the member to have to remain in that union until the case had been heard; and in any event, after a member leaves (although I know that this probably is not so acceptable to any of your Lordships) nevertheless it will be open to the organisation to recover contributions, arrears or fines through the courts. This does seem to be a special case, and mainly for that reason we would rather not put it in the Bill in the terms of the Amendment. But I hope I have said enough to show the noble Lord hat very little divides the two sides on this matter.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord. He is quite right; very little divides us. He has based his case mainly on the principle which I wholly endorse; namely, that you do not single out special cases when you are dealing with generalities. And he said that his view as a Minister is—and no doubt he is advised about this—that the condition I am suggesting would be regarded as reasonable. Therefore, the purpose of moving the Amendment is achieved, demonstrating that in all probability it would be so regarded if put to the test. In those circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw this Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79MMM.
Page 54, line 34, at end insert—
(" ( ) (i) Every organisation shall have the right, on giving reasonable notice and complying with any reasonable conditions, to terminate a person's membership of the organisation at any time.
(ii) For the purpose of this subsection reasonable notice means notice which takes account of all relevant circumstances including the future livelihood of that person.")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is an Amendment under which it will be specifically and categorically stated that every organisation shall have the right,

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on giving reasonable notice and on complying with reasonable conditions, to terminate a person's membership. And then it goes on to define—I will come to this a little later—in a particular way one of the elements in reasonable notice. The subsection we have just been discussing says that every member shall have the right, on giving reasonable notice, to resign. The corollary is that every organisation shall have the right, on giving reasonable notice, to terminate membership.
There are the two aspects, the reverse and the obverse, of association. It is a very obvious thing to say, but it is not sufficiently clearly stated in the clause. Subsection (9) of the clause says:
" A person's membership…shall not be terminated unless reasonable notice…"
I am grateful that my noble friend Lord Stow Hill is here. I take the view that that is not a sufficiently positive way of saying it, and that it ought to be said positively and said immediately after, or as soon as possible after, the statement that every member of the organisation shall have the right to resign. That is the reason why that part of the Amendment is introduced.
But the Amendment goes further. Not merely concentrating on reasonable notice and compliance with reasonable conditions, it goes on to read:
" For the purpose of this subsection reasonable notice means notice which takes account of all relevant circumstances "—
it could not be broader than that—
" including the future livelihood of that person ".
One knows that when the question of termination of membership of a trade unionist is considered, it may have an effect on that person's livelihood or that person's job at that particular place of work. It is right that it should be taken into account. In case it was the view that that is not taken into account in deciding what is "reasonable notice" and "reasonable conditions", the Amendment specifically states that it should be taken into account. So you may have a situation where in the generality of cases reasonable notice would be a period of x days or weeks. You could have a situation where the skill involved was so special and the
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circumstances of the job so peculiar that it was not likely that the worker would be able to find a similar livelihood elsewhere in as short a period as that of x weeks and he should be given 2x weeks or 1½x weeks. Therefore, I hope that the Government will feel it right that when we are stating the guiding principles we should state not only that a member of an organisation has a reasonable right to resign but that the organisation, in having, in turn, a reasonable right to terminate his membership, should be especially careful if his livelihood is concerned. For those reasons I beg to move.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, the noble Lord has sought to devise a kind of balancing system here. I do not complain of that in the slightest except from the point of view of the drafting of the Bill as a whole; because in Clause 65 we are manifestly dealing with the conditions of organisations of workers in relation to their members. We are not really concerned with the rights of the organisations but with the rights of the members. This clause seeks to protect the rights of the members. It is not intended in the Bill in any way to deprive an organisation of workers of the right to terminate the membership of persons where it has good cause to do so. In fact such provision is made in Schedule 4, which deals with the rules of trade unions. In paragraph 17, reference is made to expulsion and to other disciplinary measures. There is no question of the right to terminate membership being called in question. I suppose that non-payment of contributions is likely to be the most common reason. Other reasons may include transfer of membership to another union under the terms of a Bridlington-type agreement or a member ceasing to satisfy the eligibility conditions of membership.
Termination for disciplinary reasons is in a category of its own which is covered by subsection (8) of the clause: but the same principles apply. Whatever the termination reason, the member should be informed of it in sufficient time to give him an opportunity to take any action he considers necessary to get the decision reconsidered. We feel that in the structure of the Bill and in the context of the clause it would be better

1161
to leave the drafting as it is. Subsections (8) and (9) together give an individual member the right to take the action he thinks necessary. This is what this clause is all about. There is no question of throwing any doubt on the rights of trade unions to terminate membership. But this is more a matter for the rules under Schedule 4 than for this clause.
9.20 p.m.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, before the noble Lord leaves that point would he be kind enough to direct his mind to the heading of the clause, and to the rubric:
" Guiding principles for organisations of workers."
The heading is:
" Principles as to conduct of organisations of workers, other than federations of workers' organisations."
So "federations" are excluded; what is included, and what is focused on, is "organisations of workers". I do not follow the noble Lord when he says that this is not the appropriate clause to deal with matters affecting organisations of workers.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, we are dealing with organisations of workers here; I did not say that we were not. The noble Lord is an old enough Parliamentarian to know that the rubric and title do not affect the text. The text shows clearly that what we are dealing with in this clause is the conduct of organisations of workers towards their members. It is the rights of the members that ought to be protected. Here again I do not think that there is any matter of substance between us. I do not see anything in the noble Lord's Amendment which needs to be stated. I think it much better to leave the drafting as it is. It is designed as a whole for the purpose of protecting the rights of members vis-à-vis the organisations of workers.
LORD STOW HILL: My Lords, I am sorry to intervene again in a terrain with which I am not completely familiar, but I do so as the result of a number of conversations I have had with my noble friends who really are experienced in this field of trade unionism. Your Lordships will remember that when we were discussing the matter and this clause on Committee, we discussed an Amendment
1162
which would have enabled unions to refuse membership to persons who had consistently shown themselves hostile to the purposes of organisations of unions. That Amendment was put down, after considerable thought, to deal with a situation which apparently arises not infrequently.
If you want to organise your union properly and you want disciplinary procedures to work; if you want it to be an efficient instrument for maintaining standards and conducting collective negotiations, it is difficult to achieve that objective if you have as members people who will not co-operate. Everyone is entitled to express an opinion; no one would seek to stifle a hostile expression of views about how a union is managed. No unionist who has spoken to me ever asked for that. But they gave a number of examples, which I will not quote, of cases where an individual just simply could not fit in with the scheme. Sometimes he was over-critical; sometimes he was a "barrack room lawyer type"; sometimes a person, to use a phrase which we have used previously in these debates, who was ideologically motivated in a sense that militated against the objectives of the union.
If you want to organise a union and see that its branches function, that the authority of shop stewards is maintained, and that there is a response among the members to the leadership of the union, it is difficult to do when you have a number of persons of that sort among the membership. When we discussed the Amendment in Committee the Government Front Bench did not feel able to accept it. They felt that it was again a case in which greater protection was necessary for the individual member, the person who was rejected. They felt that if something of that sort were included in what was then Clause 61, now the present Clause 65, his position would not be safeguarded and there might be victimisation. As I understand it, this Amendment is an effort, by a different route, to achieve something on the same lines.
As the Bill stands, the union can terminate membership upon reasonable notice. We are talking not of a person who has rendered himself liable to disciplinary procedure under paragraph 17 of Schedule 4, who cannot be got rid of for any specific conduct of his, but a

1163
member incapable in a general sense. We are trying to meet the situation by saying to a union that if they cannot get along with a man, if he is a disruptive element and obstructing the proper processes of the union, it may terminate his membership but it must take into account his livelihood, his interests as a wage-earner—the fact that he may not find it easy to obtain other employment. With 800,000 persons unemployed, this position obtains especially at the present time. The union has to give him a reasonable time to get himself other employment.
The great issue which has divided the House, and which has been debated over and over again is the issue of the agency shop and the closed shop. When the Commission have before them a proposal for an agency shop or a closed shop, they would find it much more acceptable if they knew that nobody could be victimised, in the sense that he could not be got rid of and possibly deprived of his livelihood, simply on reasonable notice, not further defined. If they knew that an individual could be removed from the union only if a reasonable opportunity was given to him to find another avenue of employment they would find it more easy to approve the establishment of that agency shop or closed shop. Therefore I submit that this is not a fringe Amendment. It is one which goes close to the basic principles on which this Bill is constructed, and the basic matters of principle which have divided the House upon it.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, looking carefully at this Amendment, the only significant difference I see between it and the Bill is that in the Amendment there is no specific provision for giving the reason for dismissal.
LORD STOW HILL: My Lords, the noble Lord is mistaken. There is a basic, a crucial, difference between the situation as it would be if the Amendment were accepted and the situation as it is with the Bill drawn in its present form. The union will not be able to terminate the membership of one of its members unless it gives reasonable notice, which must mean—and this is the critical difference—it takes account of all relevant circumstances, including the future livelihood of
1164
that person. He cannot be got rid of on a week's notice in a period of heavy unemployment, such as the present day. If there is a closed shop, he may have to leave his employment, and the union cannot terminate his membership unless it takes account of that, and gives him notice of such length that he will have a reasonable opportunity to establish himself somewhere else. That is the distinction. It is a basic and critical difference. I submit that it will go a long way towards the building up of more orderly relationships for which the Government are striving under the terms of this Bill. I submit that that is its purpose; that is the basic essential of this Amendment. It is a matter of important principle, and I hope that the noble Lord will listen to it and consider it much more sympathetically than he has up to the present moment.
9.32 p.m.
LORD POPPLEWELL: My Lords, I should have thought that this was a reasonable Amendment for the Government to accept. It is something that would not be used very often, but it is a reserve power that would enable the unions to face up to difficult members—and we do get them occasionally. I remember only one incident in my active trade union career in which a clause of this description would have been extremely helpful and would have prevented much discontent and difficulty that developed in the circumstances. It is the question of a man's future livelihood that has to be taken into consideration, even if a union wanted to apply this particular clause. When you get a member from time to time deliberately violating rules and working against the structure of the organisation of which he is a member, the trade union officers are in extreme difficulty in keeping the peace in that particular area. A clause of this description, purely as a reserve power, would be very helpful and in the interests of all concerned.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I am bound to press the Government a little further on this matter. The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, has not put forward any strong reason why the Amendment should not be accepted. He said, first of all, that this was not the appropriate place, and when I quoted the

1165
heading and the rubric he said that that did not decide it, and I quite agree. So I will read the first paragraph:
" The principles set out in the following provisions of this section shall be guiding principles in the conduct of every organisation of workers,…".
That is what the clause is about. If the noble Lord were saying, "We are interested only in defending possible individual union members against organisations, and we are not interested in specifying reasonable conditions for the unions themselves", then I could understand his remarks. That may be his point of view; it is not our point of view. Our point of view is that a clause, to be a fair clause, should state, as it does in subsection (3), that every member has a right to give reasonable notice and retire, and also that every organisation has a right to give reasonable notice and to terminate the membership.
My noble friend Lord Stow Hill has pointed out the effect of this Amendment. It is a very moderate and balanced Amendment and it has acknowledged everything that the union should take into account in deciding whether the membership should be terminated. I dislike intensely putting your Lordships to the bother of trooping through the Lobbies
and taking time, but the noble Lord does not seem able this evening to understand any of our points, or able to meet us at all. If he said that he was prepared to look at this again and see whether there is any other part of the Bill where this could be better incorporated, I should be only too glad to reconsider it for a later stage. At the moment he merely says, "Well, leave the drafting to the draftsmen". I do not know what Parliament is here for it we are to be told, "The draftsmen have served it up and you must eat it".
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, with the leave of the House, I really cannot go further than saying that, as this is a clause which is designed for the protection of the individual member, we shall look at the Amendment to see whether there is any point that is not covered already in the Bill and which should be covered in the Bill. I cannot say more than that. We do not think this is the right place.
9.35 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 79MMM) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 18; Not-Contents, 57.

CONTENTS

Bernstein, L.

Hoy, L.

Shepherd, L.

Blyton, L.

Janner, L.

Stonham, L.

Buckinghamshire, E.

Lindgren, L.

Stow Hill, L.

Champion, L.

Milner of Leeds, L. [Teller.]

Strabolgi, L. [Teller.]

Diamond, L.

Popplewell, L.

Taylor of Mansfield, L.

Gaitskell, Bs.

Shackleton, L.

White, Bs.

NOT-CONTENTS

Aberdare, L.

Emmet of Amberley, Bs.

Lauderdale, E.

Ailwyn, L.

Ferrers, E. [Teller.]

Massereene and Ferrard, V.

Auckland, L.

Ferrier, L.

Mowbray and Stourton, L.

Balfour, E.

Fortescue, E.

Napier and Ettrick, L.

Balfour of Inchrye, L.

Fraser of Lonsdale, L.

Oakshott, L.

Barnby, L.

Goschen, V. [Teller.]

Rankeillour, L.

Beaumont of Whitley, L.

Gowrie, E.

St. Aldwyn, E.

Belstead, L.

Gridley, L.

St. Helens, L.

Berkeley, Bs.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

Savile, L.

Brabazon of Tara, L.

Hailsham of St. Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Selkirk, E.

Brecon, L.

Skelmersdale, L.

Burnham, L.

Hanworth, V.

Strathclyde, L.

Conesford, L.

Harvey of Tasburgh, L.

Templemore, L.

Craigavon, V.

Hatherton, L.

Terrington, L.

Craigmyle, L.

Hawke, L.

Thomas, L.

Crathorne, L.

Henley, L.

Tweedsmuir, L.

Denham, L.

Jellicoe, E. (L. Privy Seal.)

Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, Bs.

Drumalbyn, L.

Kemsley, V.

Vivian, L.

Dundee, E.

Killearn, L.

Windlesham, L.

Elliot of Harwood, Bs.

Resolved in the negative, and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.

9.43 p.m.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79M:
Page 54, line 40, leave out (" casting his vote ") and insert (" voting ").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move this Amendment, which is a very small matter, and I hope that the Government will find it helpful. The clause as it is at present drafted refers in subsection (6) to:
" In any ballot and on any motion,…every member of the organisation shall have a fair and reasonable opportunity of casting his vote…"
I think that you cast your vote "in any ballot", but "on any motion", presumably, you either cast your vote or you simply vote—for example, on a show of hands. All one is trying to do by this Amendment is to make sure that the method of voting is that which the organisation decides, either putting up your hand or casting your vote, or whatever the case may be. I beg to move.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Does the noble Lord move his Amendment.
LORD DIAMOND: Yes, at the beginning and, ex abundanti cautelâ, at the end.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, this is an Amendment which I think is in the right place and very well adapated to its purpose. It makes an improvement, and I am happy to accept it.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
9.45 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN LORD DRUMALBYN moved Amendment No. 79C:
Page 55, line 7, leave out from (" to ") to end of line 10 and insert—
(" take part in a strike which the organisation, or any other person, has called, organised, procured or financed otherwise than in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute, or in such circumstances as, in accordance with any provision of this Act, to constitute an unfair industrial practice on the part of the organisation or of that person, or
(c) to take part in any irregular industrial action short of a strike which the organisation, or any other person, has organised, procured or financed as mentioned in paragraph (b) of this subsection ")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 79C. The Amendment does two things. First, it makes clear the intention of paragraph
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(b) of subsection (7); secondly, it extends the scope of the paragraph in an important respect. First of all, if I may deal with the point of clarification, it was intended that subsection (7) should prevent an organisation of workers from disciplining any member who declined to take part in a strike or other form of irregular industrial action where inducing that action in itself constituted an unfair industrial practice. For example, it is an unfair industrial practice to induce a strike over recognition issues while the matter is before the C.I.R., and any union taking such action lays itself open to proceedings before an industrial tribunal or the Industrial Court. It would be illogical if workers who refused to join such a strike could be punished by heir union for not taking part. But, unfortunately, paragraph (b), as it stands, would only protect the worker who refuses to participate in inducing such a strike, since it is the actual inducing, and not the strike itself, which constitutes an unfair industrial practice. Paragraph (b) of this Amendment has the effect of transferring the protection to non-participants in the strike itself, irrespective of whether they decline to participate in its inducement. This was the original intention, and I hope that your Lordships will agree that the Amendment is effective in removing any uncertainty about the meaning of the subsection.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I am sorry, but I must ask the noble Lord a question. This is an important Amendment, and as our speaking rights are strictly and properly limited, I must ask him this. He referred to paragraph (b) of the Amendment. Did he intend to do that? I cannot see a paragraph (b) in the Amendment.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I meant paragraph (b) of the clause.
LORD DIAMOND: Would the noble Lord mind repeating that part?
LORD DRUMALBYN: The Amendment includes paragraph (b). I am sorry if I misled the noble Lord. The second object of the Amendment is to extend the scope of the clause to strikes and other industrial actions which are not connected with an industrial dispute—for example, a political strike. The

1169
House has already given some thought to this question in Committee when we discussed an Amendment in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Byers, Lord Henley and Lord Beaumont of Whitley. That Amendment was unacceptable for technical reasons, but I think it is fair to say that there was a general feeling revealed in the debate that some protection of this nature was desirable, and even the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, was heard to say: "No one on this side of the Committee supports political strikes."
Noble Lords will be well aware that on a number of occasions in recent months unions have attempted to bring pressure to bear on members who have refused to take part in political strikes. There is some uncertainty about their right to discipline members in this situation under the existing law, and I feel sure that the House will agree that Parliament would be failing in its duty if the Bill failed to remove that uncertainty. I do not think I need go further into the purpose of this Amendment.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I am sorry, but before the noble Lord sits down he must go further into it, because he has not said one word about which part of the Amendment achieves the purpose which he says it achieves. He must spell it out. This is a most important Amendment which affects the liberty of the subject and goes beyond the purpose of the Bill, as I read it. I hope that the noble Lord will explain it to the House because it is very important.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I am sorry, but I should have asked that Amendment No. 79D should be taken together with this Amendment. That Amendment is to Clause 65, on page 55, line 33. That Amendment is linked with the earlier Amendment which refers to disciplinary action—the Amendment I have been talking about—against members of workers' organisations who decline to take part in strikes or other irregular industrial action. The Amendment 79C applies in part to the situation where the action is taken in circumstances unconnected with any industrial dispute, but the definitions of "strike" and "irregular industrial action" which appear in Clauses 163 and 33 respectively are expressly related to the industrial dispute
1170
situation and therefore have to be modified for the purpose of this clause. The Amendment leaves the essential nature of the definitions intact while rendering them applicable to the situations with which this clause, as amended, is concerned. My Lords, I hope I have covered the matter—
LORD DIAMOND: Not at all.
LORD DRUMALBYN: Perhaps then I should explain that this Amendment does not prohibit workers' organisations from adopting a disciplinary code. Very many trade unions feel it important that members who break the rules of the union should be liable to a penalty or ultimately to expulsion. They will not be prevented from taking such powers, but they will be subject to constraints in the way that such powers are exercised. If, for example, a trade union has a rule which says that members are to withdraw their labour if instructed to do so by a district committee acting within its powers, that union would in general be able to exercise any disciplinary powers within its rules against a member who refused to strike. Its exercise of those powers in individual cases would, however, be subject to the test that the action it took was reasonable and fair, and within this context it would not be permitted to discipline a member for refusing to take part in a strike which was an unfair industrial practice or which was not connected with an industrial dispute with the employer. My Lords, I hope the noble Lord, Lord Diamond is a little clearer about this Amendment now, but if he is not, I shall just have to try to explain it further.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down—
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The Question is, That Amendment No. 79C be agreed to.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I did say, "Before the noble Lord sits down".
LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY: My Lords, the noble Lord. Lord Drumalbyn, said in part that this was an Amendment which met the purpose of an Amendment put forward in Committee by my noble friend Lord Byers and myself to which my noble friend spoke. We

1171
are grateful to the Government for meeting us on this point. Perhaps it is convenient that I should speak before the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, speaks at the end of this debate, because that may give him an opportunity to get back at Members on the Conservative and the Liberal Benches on this point. I think what is now being done is a very valauble and useful thing. We are not in any way trying to limit the liberty of people to withhold their labour on political matters. The Liberal Party no less than the Labour Party regards it as vital to the liberty of the subject that workers, if they do not like on political and conscientious grounds what their firm is doing should be able to withhold their labour. That is a basic human right, a human right, for instance, which is spelled out in Roman Catholic theology on such matters as contraception and abortion. In the whole of moral theology in the Roman Catholic Church and to some extent in the Anglican Church, this is a human right which must be observed. But to say this is not to say that a union itself should have the power to enforce and particularly to hold over a member strong disciplinary measures if the member does not agree with the union on these matters. Power in these matters should be very definitely confined to industrial disputes, and I think that the Amendment put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, is a useful one. For our part, we should like to welcome it and to thank him for his initiative in putting it forward.
BARONESS GAITSKELL: My Lords, I must apologise to my noble friend Lord Diamond for intervening before he speaks, but I simply wish to say that I once described the Industrial Relations Bill as a legal jigsaw puzzle. Well, having heard these two Amendments together, it not only seems to be a legal jigsaw puzzle but one in which the pieces do not fit, and I do not understand a word of it. I should be very grateful if the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, would clarify it for me, if he can.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I sought to intervene before the noble Lord sat down but that was not apparently thought appropriate or proper, so I am bound to address the House now in this way. I am virtually in the same position as my
1172
noble friend Lady Gaitskell. The noble Lord gave us the strongest impression and misled us completely into believing that he had not the foggiest idea of what he was talking about. He really did. He gave us the impression that he was getting into the same muddle as we were—and, my God! that is a muddle. I was hoping that when the noble Lord introduced a totally new provision into the Bill at this late stage, going further (as I read the two Amendments) in the way of restriction of labour than anything so far contained in the Bill, he would have regarded it as his responsibility to explain which words produced which results. But I am afraid he got himself and us into a hopeless muddle, and I find it very difficult to know whether or not the two Amendments taken together mean what the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, thinks they mean—in which case, far from having a go at him, I would be supporting him almost up to the hilt—or whether they mean something different.
I think we have a responsibility for finding out what the words mean. That is my stance at the moment. My noble friend the Leader of the Opposition has made perfectly clear the stance of the Opposition on the general issue of political strikes, where it can be defined in such an obvious and easy way. But, my Lords, we all know that you cannot define it in such an obvious and easy way for statutory purposes. As I understood him what the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, said was that the right to protest against a political action is a fundamental right.
LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY: Yes.
LORD DIAMOND: That is our point of view, too; but of course it is obviously difficult to define a precise stage between exercising a right of protest against something which stems from a political decision which you probably want to protest against, and what is generally called "a political strike". There was an issue—was it not one concerning the Musicians' Union?—where they refused to cooperate on a political issue. I do not know whether football players are organised in a union. I imagine that they are. They may take a certain view about being ordered by their employer to go and play in South Africa, for example.
A NOBLE LORD: Or Russia.
LORD DIAMOND: Or Russia. There was a case where a union refused to load ships which were going to Poland in order to bring an end to the Russian Revolution. There was a case where, as my noble friend has reminded me, trouble arose out of loading ships for Nigeria. I want to know what the Government's proposals are. That is all I am asking at the moment; I am not taking a view until I know what they are.
I could not follow the noble Lord's speech. I tried hard to associate his remarks with the Amendment and I could not, because he was referring to the clause when he said he was referring to the Amendment, and then when I looked at the Amendment he said he was referring to another Amendment. It was difficult to collect one's thoughts and find out what he was talking about, so I hope that all your Lordships will find it necessary for me to do at the moment is merely to question the noble Lord and to say that I would be grateful if he would have another go and tell us what this important clause means. We quite understand that part of it has no new effect, but we are interested in the part which has a new effect. What are the words and what is the effect? We should be grateful for his guidance.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, the noble Lord has asked me to explain this and I shall endeavour to do so. May I just take him through this—that is the only way that one can possibly do it. This clause as it is drafted at the present time says this in subsection (7):
" No member of the organisation shall he subjected by or on behalf of the organisation to any unfair or unreasonable disciplinary action; and in particular (but without prejudice to the generality of this subsection) no disciplinary action shall be taken against any member of the organisation by reason of his refusing"—
and we are talking about disciplinary action taken against a member of the organisation—
" or failing—

(a) to take any action which, in accordance with any provision of this Act, would constitute an unfair industrial practice on his part, or

(b) to participate "

and instead of the word "participate" we then have—
1174
" take part in a strike which the organisation, or any other person, has called, organised, procured or financed otherwise than in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute ".
I draw attention to the fact that it is not only if the organisation itself but if "any other person, has called, organised, procured or financed an industrial dispute that (b) applies. Those words are important because it might be possible, for example, for an outside organisation to organise the strike but for the organisation itself perhaps to finance the strike or in other ways to assist it, and then subsequently to discipline the person concerned for not having taken part in the strike, so those words are important. I read again:
" take part in a strike which the organisation, or any other person, has called, organised, procured or financed otherwise than in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute ".
In other words, the disciplining is limited to cases,
" in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute ".
It goes on to prohibit disciplinary action even where there is an industrial dispute:
" in such circumstances as, in accordance with any provision of this Act, to constitute an unfair industrial practice on the part of the organisation or of that person…"
Then it says:
" (c) to take part in any irregular industrial action short of a strike which the organisation, or any other person, has organised, procured or financed as mentioned in paragraph (b) of this subsection."
The noble Lord will see the concept of irregular industrial action is added also to the provision. I should have thought all this was self-explanatory—
LORD DIAMOND: There is another Amendment.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, the other Amendment, if the noble Lord would like me to deal with that, too—I thought I had explained it perfectly simply—is:
" For the purposes of subsection (7) of this section, section 33(4) of this Act, and the definition of "strike" in section 163(1) of this Act, shall apply as if—

(a) in section 33(4) the words "in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute", and

(b) in the definition of "strike" the words "in contemplation or furtherance of an

1175
industrial dispute, whether they are parties to the dispute or not ",

were omitted."
That is purely a drafting Amendment the effect of which is that for the purposes of the bar on disciplinary action against non-participants in certain types of strike, or other irregular industrial action, the definitions of irregular industrial action or strike already in the Bill are to apply outside the context of an industrial dispute by which they are qualified for purposes elsewhere in the Bill. I should have thought that was perfectly clear, and I have already explained it. If the noble Lord has not understood it, then if he will study it on the Record I am sure that he will come to understand it.
LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, I should like to ask a straightforward question. I hope that I am not trespassing on your Lordships' patience if at the same time I apologise if I was a little abrupt with the noble Baroness, Lady Gaitskell, because I thought that these two Amendments made sense. May I ask the noble Lord this question. Would he agree with what I thought was the result of the Amendment which, if it is true, the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, says he agrees with?
LORD DRUMALBYN: I am sorry, I did not quite hear what the noble Lord said.
LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY: In that case, my Lords, I will leave the matter.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I was going to ask the noble Lord whether he would explain the words "in contemplation or furtherance". Whose contemplation?
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, this is the well established, common form in trade union legislation at the present time. It has always been "in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute".
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The Question which I have to put is, That the said Amendment be agreed to.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: That, I am afraid, stops the Amendments to Amendment No. 79C, and we now go on to Amendment No. 79QQQ, which is a fresh Amendment, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Diamond.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, would the noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack explain what he meant when he said that he was afraid that this stops the consideration of the Amendments? I was not quite certain what the noble and learned Lord was referring to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, if I am asked to explain. I think I should explain from the Woolsack, because this is my function as Chairman. Amendment No. 79C has now been passed in an unamended form. It follows that no Amendment to Amendment No. 79C can be moved, unless I am wrong, and therefore Amendments Nos. 79NNN and 79PPP fall. I am advised I did not call it, so I shall call it. That means that we must not take the Amendment as passed, because once the Amendment is passed I cannot call the Amendment to it. Nobody moved it; perhaps I should have called it. I shall now call it. The trouble was that the noble Lord, instead of moving his Amendment, asked a question, and in consequence I became confused. I now call Amendment No. 79NNN.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack. From ignorance of the procedure here, but some knowledge elsewhere, I was naturally expecting the Question to be put in the ordinary way, after the Amendment on the main Question had been put; then one would take the further Amendment. I am most grateful to the noble Lord for giving me the opportunity of saying, "Not moved".
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: We seem to have reached the same point by different routes. I shall now, ex abundanti cautelâ, call Amendment No. 79PPP.
LORD DIAMOND: Not moved.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, we have already discussed this Amendment. I beg to move.
Page 55, line 33, at end insert—
(" ( ) For the purposes of subsection (7) of this section, section 33(4) of this Act, and the definition of "strike" in section 163(1) of this Act, shall apply as if—
1178

(a) in section 33(4) the words "in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute", and

(b) in the definition of "strike" the words "in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute, whether they are parties to the dispute or not",

were omitted.")
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
10.14 p.m.
Clause 66 [Unfair Industrial Practices in connection with principles stated in s. 65]:
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79CCCC:
Page 55, line 38, at end insert—
(" Provided that any such action shall not be an unfair industrial practice if and in so far as it does not contravene any provision contained in Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 of the International Labour Organisation or of Article 5 of the European Social Charter.")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, Clause 66 deals with the question of unfair industrial practices in connection with the principles which we have been discussing, not wholly satisfactorily, in the previous clause. I imagine that the Government would say that the last thing they want to do is to introduce a Bill under which there is permitted what is not permitted under international labour organisations to which the Government have subscribed. I am advised either that there is some doubt about this or that some of these principles can constitute a contravention of those conventions. Apparently, the matter is not free from doubt. I have two sources of advice, and that advice has been offered to me. Therefore I thought the simplest way of clarifying the matter was to put in a proviso to make it clear that the Government are not intending what nobody would expect them to intend. I beg to move.
LORD DRUMALBYN: As I understand it, the effect of this Amendment would be to deprive an individual of any right of redress in respect of an action taken against him by an organisation of workers where the action, although in breach of the guiding principles, was not in breach of specified international instruments. The instruments specified are Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 of the International Labour Organisation or Article 5 of the European Social Charter.
I think this Amendment is founded on a misunderstanding. Its apparent object is to ensure that the guiding principles shall not be enforced—I think it is right that this is the noble Lord's intention—in any way which would deprive organisations of workers of the right conferred by these instruments. The inference is that there is, or may be, some
1180
inherent conflict between what the guiding principles say that an organisation cannot do and what these instruments say it should be able to do. I must tell the noble Lord that that is simply not true. Clause 65 serves a purpose quite distinct from that of the two I.L.O. Conventions and from Article 5 of the European Social Charter. Clause 65 is essentially concerned with the rights of the individual member in relation to the organisation to which he belongs. The two Conventions and Article 5 are concerned with the rights of organisations in the community—with freedom of association, and the right to organise and bargain collectively.
The noble Lord might like me to give an example to illustrate the difference. Article 2 of I.L.O. Convention 87 on Freedom of Association states this:
" Workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organisation concerned, to join organisations of their own choosing without previous authorisation ".
In other words, no worker should be kept out of a union because his employer or the Government or anyone other than the union says he cannot join. Subsection (2) of Clause 65 is not concerned with the attempts of outsiders to stop people from joining unions; they are dealt with in Clause 5 of the Bill. But it is concerned to prevent a union from being able arbitrarily to reject individual applications for membership without good reason. Convention 87, on the other hand, says nothing but that the rules should say who can join a union; it certainly does not say that unions can have the right to exclude applicants unreasonably or arbitrarily. Clause 65(2) ensures that the rules do not countenance arbitrary and discriminatory treatment of applicants.
I could give the noble Lord other examples, but obviously one cannot go right through the Article in this fashion. But the same pattern would follow. The point is that Clause 65 and the international instruments really have quite different objects; they do not conflict, and this Amendment would achieve nothing except to cause confusion. So I must ask the House to reject it.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord. I raised the matter because the view was strongly put to me by a very authoritative source that the objects did conflict. The noble Lord has no doubt taken advice, and no doubt he is not speaking without due consideration by his advisers; and if his advisers are satisfied that there is no conflict, there is no point in having the words there. If there were a conflict the words would be necessary to remove it. In view of what the noble Lord has said, for which I am grateful, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 67 [Organisations eligible for registration as trade unions]:
10.19 p.m.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79N:
Page 55, line 43, after (" concurrence ") insert (" of any person who is not a member or ").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 79N. In this clause we are discussing the organisations which are eligible for registration as trade unions, and the purpose of this Amendment is to make it clear that, in order to be eligible, an organisation has to have the power to alter its rules in the way described without the concurrence either of a parent organisation or of any person who is not a member of the organisation. This is an attempt to strengthen the independence of the unions and I hope it will find sympathy with the Government. I beg to move.
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, we accept the fact that the noble Lord has said that this Amendment is put down in order to strengthen the wording in regard to the independence of trade unions, but it is already a condition of eligibility for registration that an organisation of workers must be "independent" as stated in subsection (1)(a) of this clause. The word "independent", as the noble Lord knows, is defined in Clause 163 as meaning
" not under the domination or the control of an employer…"
No organisation which was unable to alter its rules or to deploy its funds without
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the permission of an employer or an employers' organisation could be said to be "independent" in this sense. Therefore I suggest that in this respect the Amendment is unnecessary.
It is difficult to think of any other person who might have authority over the rules of an organisation unless that person happens to be a corporate body, for example, a federation of trade unions. I doubt whether this is intended, but I think the effect of this Amendment would be to exclude from registration any trade union which gave up any of its sovereignty to a federation. I am quite certain that this was not what the noble Lord had in mind. We believe that the word "independent" is adequately defined in the Bill, and that this Amendment would not add to it.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Earl. I always find it difficult to understand the kind of answer which says, for example, as here, that if the word "independent" is included in Clause 67(1)(a) then in subsection (1)(b) you do not have to put in any of the words which describe that independence. I find it difficult to understand that kind of answer when I look in subsection (1)(b) and I see the words
" without the concurrence of any parent organisation ",
why, for example, does not the independence of any organisation exclude the meddling of any parent organisation, and why, therefore, should be have to put in the words
" or any parent organisation "?
I am merely saying that I do not understand it; I am not saying it is wrong. No doubt the draftsmen have understood it, and if the noble Earl says that the words which I have proposed are unnecessary because that degree of independence is already secured by the words in subsection (1)(a) then I am content to seek your Lordships' permission to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
10.25 p.m.
EARL FERRERS EARL FERRERS moved Amendment No. 79G:
Page 56, line 1, leave out from (" funds ") to end of line 2.
The noble Earl said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 79G which stands in the name of my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn. This Amendment and the corresponding Amendments which have been tabled on Clauses 71 and 84, namely Amendments 79H and 79J, are felt to be necessary because it has become evident that certain features of the tests of eligibility for registration which are set forth in these clauses could present difficulties for some organisations who wish to register. The purpose of subsection (1)(b) of Clause 67 is to ensure that organisations which obtain registration as trade unions under the Bill have the authority to comply with the statutory requirements on registered organisations, which are stated in the Bill. This makes it essential that a trade union should have the authority to make any necessary changes in the rules and to control the application of its property and funds.
There are in existence a number of organisations, both of workers and of employers, which have been created by the amalgamation of existing organisations and where the terms of amalgamation have left the original organisations with a considerable degree of autonomy, although they have now become parts of a large organisation. It is not uncommon in this sort of situation for these so-called "branches" to retain independent control over certain funds, for example funds devoted to provident purposes. In such cases one may find that the parent organisation has no control over certain branch funds, while the branch does not have complete autonomy over its own rules. In this event, Clause 67, as it stands, would prevent both the parent and the constituent organisation from registering as trade unions, and Clauses 71 and 84 would have similar effects.
On reflection the Government do not feel that the unions' control of branch funds is essential for the purposes of subsection (1)(b), and have concluded that the tests of eligibility for registration are therefore unnecessarily rigorous in this respect. It is therefore proposed that the reference to control of branch funds in this clause can be dispensed with
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and similar Amendments are proposed to the later clauses. I hope this will have the approvel of noble Lords, and I beg to move.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I think I understand what the noble Earl said, although it is not all that easy to follow. I do know that there are certain unions whose branches have autonomy over their own funds. I would ask the noble Earl what happens when the branches are not sufficiently independent to register separately and yet have some independence, some autonomy over their funds? Do I gather that if this Amendment is accepted the branches will now be included with the parent and the whole thing will be registered as one?
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, if the branch is included in the parent organisation and the parent organisation is registered, then the branch will also thereby be registered. Under the Bill as it stands, if a branch had autonomy over the use of its funds it would be excluded from being registered, and so would the parent organisation. Under the Amendment, the parent organisation, including the branch, will now be able to be registered, even though the branch retains the automony over its funds.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79P.
Page 56, line 2, at end insert—
(" and
(c) does not receive directly or indirectly financial assistance from any employer ").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is again an attempt, as an earlier Amendment was, to reinforce the independence of the union. I think the words are words which appear somewhere else in the Bill; I am not absolutely sure about that. At all events, that is the purpose of the Amendment, and if the noble Lord is going to say that it is not necessary because the word "independent" in Clause 67(1)(a) sufficiently covers it, well and good. But I should have thought there was something to be said for the words. I beg to move.
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, I am afraid that this Amendment is not

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acceptable to the Government—not for the reason which the noble Lord put forward but because we do not believe it to be necessary. We also feel that it would have a restricting effect. If this Amendment were accepted, no workers' organisation benefiting in any way from financial assistance from employers could register as a trade union. As a means of preventing organisations under employers' domination or control from gaining the status of trade unions, that the Amendment is, I suggest, superfluous because subsection (1)(a) already has that effect.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Earl? If he says that, then I need not trouble him any more.
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, in that case I will not trouble myself or the noble Lord any more; although I am bound to say that the Amendment does have different effects.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, in view of what the noble Earl has said, that subsection (1)(a) covers the point, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
10.32 p.m.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79Q.
Page 56, line 2, at end insert—
(" and
(c) is not for the time being registered as a trade union under the Trade Union Act 1871 ").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move this Amendment, but not, at this stage of our debate, with any great hopes. This would have been very relevant if an earlier Amendment had been accepted, permitting registration under the 1871 Act and under this Bill to run side by side. The Government did not see fit to do that and I do not therefore wish to spend a lot of time on this Amendment. If the Government are going to say, "No", they might as well say it quite quickly.
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, No!
On Question, Amendment negatived.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79R:
Page 56, line 6, leave out (" all ") and insert (" three-quarters of ").
The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 79R. This relates to the problem of registering a federation of workers' organisations—it might be the T.U.C. but not necessarily so—where something less than 100 per cent. of the constituent members are registered. We have discussed this previously, and the Bill provides for all the constituent or affiliated organisations to be registered either on the general register or on the special register. I understand the Government's anxieties, but it is going too far to talk of 100 per cent. I repeat what was said previously: that these organisations are valuable organisations, much needed by Governments, helpful to Governments in all sorts of ways; they produce information and enable the country to be governed and are continually being used. One does not want to come to cross-purposes because a small number of organisations within the federation—small in number, or small in importance or small in membership, whatever the case may be—do not register. I agree that 100 per cent. is a round figure, but it is not a suitable one in terms of practical politics.
I hope the Government will recognise this and make their own Bill more workable by removing the word "all" and substituting for it something representing less. In my Amendment I have suggested "three-quarters With the consent of the House I suggest we now discuss the following Amendment which is purely to suggest an alternative of" 85 per cent."I should have thought" three-quarters" was all right; but if the Government want "85 per cent." then I would withdraw the first suggestion and be happy to accept the second. I do not think this is a Party issue; common sense says it will not be possible to get 100 per cent. The Government will need the cooperation and functions of these federations and therefore less than 100 per cent. should be provided for in the legislation.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, that this is not a political issue; it is a severely practical issue for one or two reasons. The outstanding one is that if you were to try to lay down a

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certain proportion, whatever it might be, which was not to be registered, that proportion would gain an advantage by a side door so to speak. The second practical point is that it is extremely difficult to specify any effective proportion in a matter of this kind. Were we to talk of a proportion of the membership of a federation in individual terms this might make sense; but you could quite easily have a federation of, say, 20 members and take three-quarters of that, and it would mean that five members need not be registered trade unions. Those five might constitute 95 per cent. of the total membership of the federation in terms of numbers. As a practical issue I do not think that this is possible.
Naturally one sympathises with a federation where a minority of its constituent members, for son-le reason or other, refuse to become registered. Possibly they may not be eligible for registration. The answer to that is that there is a difficult choice to face: they would have to decide whether to exclude from membership those who were not registered; or for the federation itself to forego the advantages of registration. One has also to bear in mind so far as federations are concerned that, as federations, they do not gain nearly so much in the way of advantages as do individual trade unions. From the point of view of the trade union member it is far more important that the rules of the union should conform with the rules laid down in the Bill than that the rules of the federation should conform, and so on. It is far more important that an individual's trade union should belong than that a federation should belong. But there is this choice. If you cannot get 100 per cent. agreement of the membership it is an insurmountable difficulty, if one accepts, as we feel we must, that the advantages should he enjoyed only by registered trade unions.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, the noble Lord has not answered my point at all. He is so concerned with what he regards as the advantages to trade unions, and what we regard as obligations and burdens on trade unions, that he cannot remove his gaze from that to think objectively about the point I put to him: namely, the need for Governments to have good relations with federations of trade
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unions and federations of employers' associations. This would be impossible if you cannot have registration. Registration should not be made impossible if there is but a small minority of the membership of the federation not registered for one reason or other. I am sure the Government will find this a practical difficulty.
I am not going to press this Amendment to a Division. It is designed to help the Government because this is a problem which the Government will meet. If the Government wanted to overcome it they could do so easily. Where there is a will there is a way, and one could think of all sorts of formulae which could get over it. One which occurs to me is to insert the words, "such smaller number" or "such smaller number as the Secretary of State adopts." We do not have to provide for it in the Bill, but give the power to make regulations and then every case could be looked at separately. This is in the Government's own interest, of having workable relations with important elements in trade and society, which the Government need in order to be effective in Government. But I must leave it to them. I ask your Lordships' permission to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
10.41 p.m.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79RRR:
Page 56, line 15, at end insert—
(" Provided that no rule in the rule book of an organisation of workers or a trade union prior to the passing of this Act shall have effect in so far as it deals with the registration or non-registration of the organisation of workers or trade union.")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, organisations of workers are now faced with the difficulty that in their rule books they find references to registration, which may refer to the Trade Union Act 1871. It was clear to what this referred when the rule was made, but it will no longer be absolutely clear. All the circumstances will have to be taken into account to find out what is meant by "registration". This is clearly related to the problem of the fair wages clause, which I raised in the debate on the code of practice, where there is a reference to trade unions. Under this Bill, a trade union is an organisation which is registered under the Bill. The

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Government recognise that this causes confusion and, as the noble Lord told us, they are arranging for a statement to be made in another place to clarify this. All I am asking is that a statement should be made here clarifying this issue, so that those organisations which have references in the rule books to registration will know that they have a neutral situation; that they are free to do what they want. The alternative is for the union to alter the rules, but that takes time. In some unions the rules can be altered only every three years. I think this Amendment would be a helpful clarification. I beg to move.
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, we recognise the point which the noble Lord has made on his Amendment, but we feel that trade unions should be free to make their own decision about whether or not to register. We believe that they should make their own rules and that it is not right that we should by this Bill alter the rules under which they are abiding at the moment. The unions make their decisions in various ways, according to the provisions of their constitutions and rules. Some may make a decision relating to registration by resolution at annual conference, others by adoption of a new rule. We believe it is right that they should abide by their rules, and that, if they wish to alter them, they should do so in accordance with the way in which they are entitled to alter them. The noble Lord said that at the time the rules about registration were made, what was in mind was registration under the Trade Union Act 1871. That may be the case or it may not: one cannot tell what caused a union to make a particular rule. What does seem to be clear is that if one wants to interpret the intentions of the rule-making authority, it is best to go back to the body and ask them to consider the question again.
As soon as the Registrar informs a trade union that a particular rule may have to be changed—perhaps because it is in conflict with the requirements of the Registrar—the union will have to call its rule-making authority under Clause 94 of this Bill. When the union is considering the rules which the Registrar has told it to reconsider, it is of course entitled to consider at the same time any other rule it may have, including any which may oblige it to become registered.
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We do not believe that there is anything to be detracted from the unions by their becoming registered; we equally believe that it is not right in this Bill so to alter their rules that they will be prevented from becoming registered. If their rules say that unions are to be registered, then the Government feel that it is right for the trade unions themselves to alter their rules in accordance with their own provisions.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Earl, but I do not think he has really taken my point. I am merely trying to say that, as I understand it, it is not possible for anybody to give advice, without considering each case separately and all the circumstances, including the documents, and so on, and what is meant by the words as a result of this Bill. The simplest thing would be for the Government to help all organisations in this way, instead of, as the noble Earl suggested, putting each organisation to the trouble of altering its rules so as to clarify its position. Of course it can do that; but it is much more troublesome. If the noble Earl is not prepared to help them, that is the end of it, and in those circumstances I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 69 [Guiding principles for organisations of employers]:
LORD DRUMALBYN LORD DRUMALBYN moved Amendment No. 79E:
Page 57, line 12, leave out from beginning to (" to ") in line 13 and insert—
(" ( ) No member of the organisation shall he subjected by or on behalf of the organisation to any unfair or unreasonable disciplinary action; and in particular (but without prejudice to the generality of this subsection) no disciplinary action shall be taken against any member of the organisation by reason of his refusing or failing—

(a) to take any action which, in accordance with any provision of this Act, would constitute an unfair industrial practice on his part, or

(b) to institute or participate in a lock-out which the organisation, or any other person, has organised, procured or financed otherwise than in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute, or in such circumstances as, in accordance with any provision of this Act, to constitute an unfair industrial practice on the part of the organisation or of that person.

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( ) The principles set out in subsections (1) and (2) of this section, and those set out in subsections (3) to (6) and subsections (8).")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment corresponds, so far as employers are concerned, to Amendment No. 79C, which dealt with the position of trade unions and organisations of workers. I think it follows exactly the same lines, dealing with lock-outs as the other Amendment did in regard to strikes. I do not think I need to go into it in detail. Its effect is simply to prohibit an organisation of employers from disciplining any member who refuses or fails to commit an unfair industrial practice, or to participate in a lockout instigated or supported by the organisation, where such instigation or support would itself constitute an unfair industrial practice, or where the lock-out itself is not in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute. I beg to move.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether he can explain the necessity for this Amendment? I know that it matches the other Amendment, but unless it is pure window-dressing I cannot see any purpose in it. Can the noble Lord tell us what sort of circumstances he is proposing, at this late stage, to legislate against or for, and whose rights are increased or reduced?
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, it is quite conceivable that an employers' association might indulge in an unfair industrial practice on a recognition issue or something of that kind, and it might wish to discipline one of its members for not adhering to its instructions. It could quite easily happen, though not very often, and it is only fair that this provision should be in the Bill since the same restriction is placed on trade unions.
On Question. Amendment agreed to.
10.51 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 79F, which is consequential.
Amendment moved—
Page 57, line 15, at end insert:
("( ) For the purposes of this section, the definition of "lock-out" in section 163(1) of this Act shall apply as if the words" in contemplation
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or furtherance of an industrial dispute "and the words" whether parties to the dispute or not "were omitted.").—[Lord Drumalbyn.]
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 71 [Organisations eligible for registration as employers' associations]:
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 79H, which is consequential on Amendment No. 79G.
Amendment moved—
Page 57, line 26, leave out from (" funds ") to (" shall ").—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 73 [Provisions as to certificates of registration]:
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79U:
Page 58, line 33, leave out from (" name ") to (" and ") in line 37 and insert (" of any other organisation of workers or of any other organisation of employers ").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, Clause 73 refers to a certificate of registration and the registered name of an organisation when it becomes registered as a trade union. It states in subsection (4):
" The name so specified—

(a) shall not be identical with the name by which another organisation is for the time being registered…in the special register, and

(b) shall not be a name so nearly resembling the name…"

The present rules affecting registration under the 1871 Act are, to my mind, wiser. What those rules state is not merely that you shall not register a union under a name which is the same as another registered organisation, but that you shall not register if the name is the same as another organisation, whether it is registered or not. What we are seeking to do is to avoid confusion, so it seems sensible that the same rules should apply here. The Amendment therefore proposes that if the name is similar to any other organisation of workers or employers, whether or not it is registered, you should not adopt that name.
I can give one example which seems a forceful one. Let us suppose that a large union does not register for five years, and then it decides to register. By

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that time the Registrar has registered another organisation with the identical name, as he will be empowered to do under the Bill as its stands. Then the position will arise that a substantial organisation is prepared to register but is not able to register in its own name, because in the meantime the Registrar has registered another body with the identical name. This could cause not only confusion, but tension and difficulties. The present rule is a sensible one, and what appears in the 1871 Act is a good precedent for the 1971 Act. My Lords, I beg to move.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I am afraid we feel that the Bill as it stands is less confusing than with the Amendment which has been moved by the noble Lord; and perhaps it would be convenient to the House, if it is also convenient to the noble Lord who has moved this Amendment, that we should also discuss the next Amendment, because I think they go together. These particular Amendments would prevent the registration of a trade union or an employers' association under a name which might be confused with that of any other organisation of workers or employers. Why we feel the Bill is best as it stands is because it is in fact modelled on Section 13(3) of the Trade Union Act 1871, which also related only to registered trade unions. I take the point that the noble Lord made, that there might be a union which for about five years decided not to register and then, when it came to do so, found that the Registrar had already granted that name and that he therefore could not give it to this particular organisation; but that would happen in any case. The difficulty about the noble Lord's Amendments is that the Registrar really would have no certain means of knowing the names of the very large number of unregistered workers' and employers' organisations in existence at any one time. Therefore, I should like to suggest to him that the Amendments probably could not be administered as effectively as the provisions in the Bill as it stands. In fact, if I remember rightly, I think I had something to do with moving an Amendment on this question of names on Committee stage. I hope, therefore, that the noble Lord will not alter it, because I rather liked it in the original.
LORD DIAMOND: I find the argument appealing but not wholly persuasive. First of all, the noble Baroness said that this Bill is modelled on the 1871 Act. That may be so. It merely is a case, then, of history repeating itself. In 1871, Parliament thought it knew what was the right thing. No doubt somebody from the Opposition Benches got up and proposed what I am now proposing; the Government thought it was not the right thing and did not listen, as usual, and so it was enacted in that form in 1871. But by the time 1876 arrived—in the course of five short years—it was discovered to be a foolish proposal and there was introduced Trade Union Regulation 2, which apparently is not in the noble Baroness's papers but which I am assured was introduced. Parliament therefore decided to reverse the process out of experience. I am sorry that the noble Baroness has not been adequately briefed, but as she has based her case on a false assumption she will realise why I am not acceding to the logic of her case.
So, in spite of the rebellious remarks from the noble Lord sitting behind the noble Baroness (which noble Lord is showing the results of the last rebellion in which he was engaged, and we hope the results are rapidly improving) I think it would be right to ask the noble Baroness to give further consideration to this question. I think we are on a point which is good in common sense, and, so far as I know, we are on a point which is good in practice and experience. I am told that Regulation 2 of 1876 is the relevant one, so perhaps, in the circumstances, the noble Baroness would be good enough to say that she would like an opportunity to consult her advisers, particularly the one who failed to brief her properly.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, if I may speak again with the leave of the House, the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, asked me whether I would reconsider the matter from a common-sense angle. While it is true that I do not happen to have Regulation 2 of 1876 handy, I will do as the noble Lord suggests and approach the problem in a common-sense way, not by saying that I will reconsider it, but by suggesting to noble

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Lords that now in 1971, when we are considering whether it would be easier to have this applying only to registered organisations or whether it would be easier to have it applying to any organisation of workers, as the noble Lord's Amendment proposes, it would define and narrow the issue and make it easier to clarify if we leave the Bill as it stands. I approach this, as appealed to, in a common-sense way, and I appeal to the House not to accept the noble Lord's Amendment.
On Question, Amendment negatived.
Clause 74 [Incorporation and vesting of property]:
11.2 p.m.
LORD STOW HILL LORD STOW HILL moved Amendment No. 79SSS.
Page 59, line 15, at end insert (" and in so far as applicable the rules of the organisation shall become the rules of the body corporate.")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I hope that I shall not take up much of your Lordships' time in moving this Amendment, because when we discussed these clauses (and I refer to Clauses 74 and 90, which deal with the corporation structure of unions as the result of the grant of a certificate of registration) at the Committee stage on May 18, the Ministers said that they would like to look further at the clauses, which were then, respectively, Clauses 72 and 88. Since the Committee stage, my noble friends and I have received from Ministers a number of letters dealing with the questions that were asked on the Committee stage, and I should like to express my deep indebtedness for those letters, which I have found extremely helpful. From something that the noble Baroness, Lady Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, said, I was not quite sure whether I should have received a letter on this particular point. I have not done so. Therefore, perhaps I should proceed upon the assumption that I should again revert to the point in an Amendment.
The real question raised by Clause 74 is how the conversion of the trade union, an association of individuals, is to operate when the association becomes a body corporate: what is to be the machinery? The process of incorporation by charter of associations of individuals is of course
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well known. I myself have studied many charters for the purpose of incorporation of members of an association. The charter, in my experience, always sets out what is to be the constitution of the new body, and what are to be its rules; or it at least gives a reference to some other document in which the rules are to be contained or, possibly, states how the rules are to be made. One would have thought it would be requisite, in order to complete the process of conversion in this particular case of the aggregate of individuals into that corporation, that something analogous should be provided for in the terms of the Bill we are discussing. I think I am right in saying that no such machinery is provided for. It is for that reason that I have ventured to put down the Amendment to page 59, line 15, to insert the words:
" and in so far as applicable the rules of the organisation shall become the rules of the body corporate."
In this particular context I should have thought that even more essential than it might have been in other contexts. That is because the formulation of the rules and their conforming to some broad standards is made a condition of registration. In other words, the attention of those who drafted the Bill was particularly concentrated upon the scope and nature of the rules of the new corporation. It would therefore seem necessary, in order to apply the process of incorporation, to provide something as to what the rules of the new corporate body were to be. I infer that it is the Government's intention, at any rate, that the existing rules of the trade union, subject to such mutations as are rendered necessary, should become the rules of the corporation itself as from the date of incorporation. If an individual trade unionist wished to know what his rights were against the corporation or against any member of the trade union, he should look at the rules of the trade union as adapted and converted into the rules of the corporation. That is what I would imagine. There may be somewhere in this Bill—though I have not discovered it—or somewhere in some Statute which is automatically applicable, some provision which would have the effect of automatically making the rules of the union the rules of the corporation. If there is such a provision, I should be grateful if the noble Baroness would indicate

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where I can find it. So far, I have not found one, and therefore I think it should be incorporated into the provisions of Clause 74.
My Lords, when we discussed the matter in Committee on May 18, I ventured to put to the Government Front Bench a considerable number of questions. The Minister said that the Government would like to consider them and I expected that, as a result of their further thinking, a number of Amendments might appear on the Marshalled List dealing with some of those points. In fact only one Amendment appears, the next on the Marshalled List, which deals with the topic of the obligations resting upon a trustee for the organisation which are by that Amendment transferred to the corporation. That seems to be a perfectly reasonable and practicable change. I do not know whether I should infer from the fact that there is only that one Amendment that Ministers having considered the matter carefully with their advisers, feel that no further change is necessary. If that is so, I should be grateful if the noble Baroness, when she replies to the debate, would amplify that with the advantage of the Amendment which is before the House and say what further thinking the Government have had on that general topic.
May I remind the noble Baroness and Ministers of a matter which particularly concerned me and which I find not easy to understand? It is in regard to the property of the new corporation which would be amenable for the purpose of satisfying judgments obtained by persons who had claims against the corporation. I refer to what is now Clause 52, and I think I am justified in raising that issue on this Amendment because it arises out of the rules structure of the corporation. In that context, I asked what could be the object of providing that when judgment was given against the corporation, property of the members of the corporation otherwise than that jointly owned or owned in common with other members of the corporation should not be amenable to execution.
The clear implication of that is, I suppose, that property, whether owned jointly or in common with other members of the corporation, should be amenable to execution in satisfaction of a judgment obtained against the corporation. I find
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that very difficult to understand. It seems to me that there can be no possible circumstance in which such property could be rendered amenable to the process of execution. If one is to give full force to the provision in Clause 74 that once the union becomes a body corporate all the property of the union vests in it, and if the property held by the individual members jointly is to vested in the corporation, what is the point of saying or implying that that property is amenable to execution in the hands of the individual members of the union?
Those are the kinds of questions I asked, and I do not want to rehearse them again, because they are fully set out in the speech which I ventured to address to your Lordship's Committee on May 18. But I would remind the noble Baroness of those questions, and I should he most grateful if, in dealing with the Amendment, she would indicate whether she thinks it is desirable, and possibly also expand a little and give some indication as to the thinking of Ministers on the proper answers to those questions. The Ministers did say they would be glad to go into the matter further, and I should be most grateful if she would elaborate her answer—which I think would be just within the rules of relevancy and order. I beg to move.
11.12 p.m.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, we have certainly looked very carefully at the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, but, so far as this particular Amendment is concerned, we do not feel that the provision which he has laid down is necessary. I should like to explain why. As he will recall, the Bill requires, in Clauses 68 and 72, that an organisation which applies for registration must submit a copy of its rules to the Registrar along with the application, and the Registrar will already have access to the rules of organisations that are transferred from the 1871 register to the provisional list. Clause 75 and Schedule 4 further make requirements concerning the rules of organisations which have been registered under the Bill. Therefore it seems clear to us that for an organisation to be incorporated under the Bill it must have rules; and those rules must set out the relations between the members and the organisation. The incorporation of an

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organisation under this clause does not, as I am quite sure the noble and learned Lord knows, create a new entity. It merely changes the status of an existing one; and it therefore follows that the rules of the organisation immediately before its incorporation are still the rules of the organisation after incorporation. The Amendment would not in fact clarify what is already a fact. I suggest that, framed as it is, it would create uncertainty as to which of the organisations registering might be invalidated, because of the phrase "in so far as applicable". That would create uncertainty, and it is for this reason that I hope the House will not accept the Amendment.
The noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, will, I am sure, have received by now the letter which was sent to him by my noble and learned friend who sits on the Woolsack, concerning the rules of limitation of liability and also the winding up: all matters which he incorporated into the particular speech to which he has referred.
LORD STOW HILL: My Lords, if the noble Baroness will forgive me, from something which she said in conversation I had the impression that a letter might be on its way to me. I have not yet received it, but I shall look forward to doing so.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, in that case I feel it would not be incumbent upon me to read out a letter which was sent by my noble and learned friend upon the Woolsack. I think it did cover the other point, and I do not feel that I can quite relevantly refer to Clause 152 here. Therefore, having answered the point on the rules, I hope that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stow Hill, will feel that his Amendment is unnecessary and that he will withdraw it.
LORD STOW HILL: My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Baroness for what she has said. At a quarter past eleven in the evening and in the knowledge that a full and informative letter is on the way, it would be hardly appropriate for me to engage the House upon a minute discussion as to the effect of Bonsor v. The Musicians' Union which we have to some extent dismembered. I
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will not venture to do that. With great respect, I do not feel convinced by the noble Baroness's reasoning with regard to the effect of incorporation, but I do not think it would assist the House if I prolonged the discussion further at this time in the evening. I am most grateful for what the noble Baroness has said which I shall certainly ponder over, and shall greatly look forward to receiving the letter.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, does the noble Lord seek leave to withdraw the Amendment?
LORD STOW HILL: My Lords, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE moved Amendment No. 79CCC:
Page 59, line 15, at end insert (" and any liability or obligation to which any person is for the time being subject in his capacity as a trustee for the organisation shall by virtue of this section be transferred to the organisation.
( ) Nothing in section 12 of the Finance Act 1895 (which requires certain Acts to be stamped as conveyances on sale) shall be taken as applying to this Act.")
The noble Baroness said: My Lords, the object of this Amendment is first of all to provide for the transfer of liabilities from the trustees to the organisation upon the latter's incorporation as a trade union or employers' association and, secondly, to establish that the incorporation of an organisation as a trade union or employers' association shall not attract stamp duty.
Subsection (3) of this clause provides for the vesting of property and funds upon incorporation, and subsection (4) for the continuation of proceedings. The Amendment adds a corresponding provision for the transfer of liabilities from the trustees to a corporate body. The vesting of property and transfer of liabilities together create a liability to the payment of stamp duty upon incorporation under Section 12 of the Finance Act, 1895. We have discovered this, although only at Report stage, and it was not our intention that this should he the effect of registration. Therefore, I hope the House will accept this Amendment. I beg to move.
LORD STOW HILL: My Lords, speaking for myself I would have thought that these were helpful Amendments, particularly the second one relating to stamp duty. The first one I have already referred to. That would seem to me, if I may respectfully say so, to follow from what had previously been enacted in Clause 74, and I hope the House will agree that it has merits.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 75 [Examination and approval of rules by registrar]:
11.19 p.m.
LORD DIAMOND LORD DIAMOND moved Amendment No. 79W:
Page 60, line 15, at end insert—
(" (5) Where a disagreement arises between the Registrar and the organisation as to whether its rules are defective as mentioned in subsection (1) of this section such disagreement shall he referred for settlement to an independent review body consisting of three persons of whom two shall be trade unionists appointed by the Secretary of State after consultation with the Trade Union Congress.")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, the principle of this Amendment is one which we have discussed before and it is merely to incorporate the Donovan recommendation at this point in the Bill. The question of a disagreement about the rules as between the Registrar and the organisation was fully gone into by the Donovan Commission, and they strongly recommended that there should be a body set up which could help in resolving these difficulties and that that body should consist of two trade unionists with a lawyer as chairman. I have, so far as possible, followed the wording of the Commission's Report, and I suggest this would be a helpful proposal to incorporate into the Bill.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, this Amendment gives expression to the point of view which the noble Lord expressed at the Committee stage, and I would readily acknowledge if there were no other machinery available under the Bill, that there would be much to be said for the proposal. The proposal that the Donovan Commission made did not deal only with the question of whether the rules complied with the
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requirements of the law. It listed three other matters as well. These are all dealt with by the Industrial Court or tribunal, as the case may be. It would seem that this would be adding an unnecessary piece of machinery into the machinery that already exists. I daresay the noble Lord did not think it worthwhile following out his proposal. It would seem fairly clear that if such a committee were set up subsections (2) and (3) of the clause would not be needed. This would be final, particularly as he used the words "referred for settlement". If it were settled this matter could hardly arise, except to the extent that if the decision given was against the union the registration would have to be cancelled, and that matter would go to the Industrial Court.
As there is provision for the trade union or employers' association to apply to the Industrial Court, and this is plainly at least an equally impartial court to the machinery the noble Lord suggests, and this machinery is in the Bill, it seems quite unnecessary for this particular purpose to set up this further machinery. I was not absolutely clear from the way the noble Lord explained his Amendment whether this was intended to be a particular tribunal, or an ad hoc tribunal, to be set up locally whenever disagreements of this kind arose. In either case it is unnecessary as the Bill is drafted; it would be simply an additional piece of machinery. I suggest to the noble Lord that it simply is not worth while in the circumstances, and I hope he will withdraw the Amendment.
LORD DIAMOND: My Lords, I will certainly not withdraw the Amendment. This is a very worthwhile proposal, which is fully argued by Donovan. We have argued it on a previous occasion. It is as different as chalk from cheese to the kind of machinery which the noble Lord proposes. I made the argument absolutely clear on the last occasion when we discussed this matter. It is not a proposal for compulsion, but for discussion and settlement short of compulsion. It is not a proposal for court action, but a proposal for friendly advice. In psychological terms it is an extremely wise proposal. I have no intention of withdrawing it, although I know that I should

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be disturbing your Lordships unnecessarily, from an arithmetical point of view, if I pursued the matter in the Division Lobby.
On Question, Amendment negatived.

BRITISH RAILWAYS (No. 2) BILL
The Queen's consent signified, and Bill reported, with Amendments.

ANGLESEY MARINE TERMINAL BILL [H.L.]
The Queen's consent signified, and Bill reported from the Select Committee with Amendments: a Special Report made, and to be printed.
House adjourned at twenty-four minutes past eleven o'clock.