INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BILL

HL Deb 01 July 1971 vol 321 cc454-571

3.34 p.m.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I beg to move that the Bill be now further considered on Report.

Moved, That the Bill be further considered on Report.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

Clause 8 [Appropriate contributions to trade union in lieu of membership]:

LORD GRAY moved Amendment No. 15D: Page 7, line 37, leave out from (" but ") to (" becomes ") in line 38 and insert (" subsequently ").

The noble Lord said: My Lords. I beg to move Amendment No. 15D, which has been framed to meet a point which I raised during our Committee stage, when the clause now before the House appeared in the guise of Clause 7, a point which my noble friend Lord Windlesham, on behalf of the Government, undertook to discuss with me. I am grateful to him, to the Government and to the official draftsmen for their help in meeting the point with this Amendment, which is designed to close a gap in subsection (5) of Clause 8. Clause 8 deals with appropriate contributions in lieu of trade union membership. As your Lordships will see or will recall, subsection (5) prescribes the periods which shall elapse before contributions under an agreement are first payable. It divides persons affected into two categories. The first covers those workers affected on the date when an agreement comes into force, and the second, as the Bill now stands, covers any persons who are subsequently engaged by an employer and who thereupon become subject to an existing agreement.

As the Bill is drafted, it does not specifically provide for any person who becomes subject to an existing agreement by virtue of any other process—for instance, as a result of a transfer within one employer's employ from a job not covered by the agreement to one that is, or perhaps from an initial period of full-time training or a period of retraining to a job that is covered by an agreement. The Amendment, by deleting reference to engagement in subsection (5), would extend the subsection to cover such persons and require them, along with newly engaged workers, to pay contributions from a date one month after commencing the relevant employment. I hope that this arrangement and the Amendment will commend themselves to your Lordships.

LORD WINDLESHAM

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Gray, has shown once more that Members of your Lordships' House have been able to pick up a number of useful points in the long discussions on this Bill. The noble Earl, Lord Dudley, similarly drew our attention at an earlier stage to a point which, on investigation, turned out to be well justified. As the noble Lord said, he was kind enough to raise this with us, and the Government draftsmen have been able to assist him in drafting this Amendment. We believe that the Bill will be clearer and strengthened, if your Lordships are willing to make this change. Therefore, I suggest that the Amendment be accepted.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH moved Amendment No. 15E: Leave out Clause 8.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, earlier in the proceedings on the Report stage, my noble friend Lord Diamond made the point that at this stage in the Bill we have tabled a number of Amendments which represent further modifications to the Bill and which, though they would not produce an ideal situation, would at any rate improve the Bill in some respects, or perhaps ameliorate some of its provisions. In addition to Amendments of this type we have thought it proper to put down some which address themselves to important conceptions of principles in the Bill, even though they may have had a measure of discussion on earlier stages. We have done so partly because discussions on this Bill, particularly in another place, have not always been as full and occupied as much time as was perhaps necessary, and partly because there are a number of points which were discussed in Committee stage in your Lordships' House to which it might be proper to return in order to see whether the Government have had, to any degree, further thoughts in the interim upon points raised or developed in discussion.

Particularly is it appropriate, in our view, to return to some of these early clauses, in the way in which the present Amendment does, because we now have what we did not have at the time of the Committee proceedings on these clauses—that is, the code of practice, or at any rate a consultative draft of the code of practice, before us. It is important on a number of the issues which the Bill raises to have an opportunity to consider how the principles embodied in the Bill relate in detail to some of the provisions of the code of practice. So although it may not be necessary, in the light of the way in which our discussions proceeded, to move all the Amendments of this type which appear on the Marshalled List on the clauses immediately before us, there are a number of points which we believe require examination in this way.

Clause 8 addresses itself to the introduction of a rather novel concept; that is, the concept that individuals should in certain circumstances pay contributions to trade unions, although not members of them: that they should pay a kind of agency fee, which would not, as I understand it, entitle them to any rights whatsoever in the trade union itself, but would represent merely a transfer of money from the individual to the trade union without conferring any rights to participate in the trade union's work, any entitlement to be covered by the personal services which the trade union gives, or any liability in any sense to be bound by the decisions of the trade union.

I should like to look at this new concept against the background of the code of practice which your Lordships discussed two or three days ago. One thing that the code of practice does is to address itself at a number of points to the question of consultation. Although when speaking on the code of practice I said that in many respects the code appeared to me to write down the role of the unions, it cannot be gainsaid that in the foreword the Secretary of State has committed himself strongly to the view that industrial relations depend, among other things, upon strong, representative trade unions; and there are references to consultation in the code of practice which, in my view, can hardly be meaningful unless there is an extension of trade union organisation and effectiveness. That is not by any means inconsistent with the criticism that I made of the code, that in my view it falls seriously short of a number of the steps that are necessary to carry that programme forward and to assist positively the growth of trade unions. So we have this contradiction, as I see it, in the code of practice, and this seems to me to be reinforced when one looks at the code of practice in relation to the completely novel principle of the agency fee which is being introduced into our industrial relations legislation by this clause.

I think it will not be denied that, save in a limited number of cases where there has been a particular dedication to consultation on the part of management, to have effective consultative machinery for which the code calls in a number of sections, it is necessary to have effectively operating trade unions. I think, therefore, that we are entitled to ask ourselves once again: is this a clause which introduces a concept which is going to tell in the direction of stronger trade unions? I am bound to say that I cannot see that it will. If the Government subscribe as a general proposition to the foreword, the declaration of principle about stronger trade unions which has been expressed on a number of occasions, it is hard to reconcile that declared objective of strengthening trade unions with the concept of introducing a situation in which individuals in a particular field of employment have the facility, at will, of making a financial contribution to a trade union, but not being a member of it.

Trade unions do not depend upon money alone, although money is always helpful. As I understand it, any money which comes to trade unions under this provision will be money which they will be completely free to use in any way that they wish. If I have understood some of the earlier discussions, the money that comes to trade unions under this clause will not be subject to some of the restrictions which are imposed upon money which comes to trade unions by way of members' normal contributions. Some trade unions may indeed put this money into a special fund to finance a campaign for the repeal of this Bill; I do not know, but that is a possibility. Certainly they will be free to use this money, and from one point of view this may be welcome to some trade unions. But I am certain that there is little demand in the trade union movement, if indeed any demand at all, for this kind of arrangement to be made, especially when, as the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, said in our discussions earlier on Report stage, the agency shop and the agency fee is seen as something which should be introduced in substitution for a situation in which there is universal trade union membership. Trade unions, if they are to be strong, need not only money, but need even more the participation and loyalty of those for whom they claim to speak. There cannot be any doubt that a trade union operating in a situation of 100 per cent. trade union membership will be stronger than one which is operating in a situation such as that envisaged in this clause, with the payment of an agency fee under which it will be quite open to an individual, for whatever reason he may choose, to withdraw from a trade union or to abstain from joining a trade union provided that he makes this contribution.

I am bound to feel that in some cases this will have the effect of encouraging individuals who disagree with a particular decision which has been reached through the proper process of discussion and decision in their trade union, to withdraw from the union rather than, as constantly happens in the trade union movement with individuals who disagree with a particular decision which has been reached after discussion and the proper decision-making process, to go on arguing and to secure a change in the decision, again through the proper processes of discussion and decision-making. I am bound to say that this arrangement of enabling somebody to pay a contribution without being a member is likely to encourage some, at any rate, to take that course. This cannot be a course which strengthens the trade union movement. If in fact this arrangement is in a particular workplace and is followed by some marked percentage of the workers concerned, inevitably the position of the trade union in negotiations with the employer will be weakened, for the employer will be able to say: "You have people in the workplace who have not contributed to this decision which you are putting to me; they have not assented to it; they are not parties to it; they feel no obligation to observe it if I reach agreement with you. Therefore, as an employer I am less likely to attach weight to the representations which are made to me".

It would be useful if the Government spokesman could say whether there are any countries outside the United States of America where arrangements of this kind prevail and whether it can be said that to introduce an agency fee arrangement would, in the real and most important sense, as distinct from the financial sense, strengthen the trade union movement rather than weaken it. I cannot see that this clause and this concept are consistent with the Government's often reiterated objective of producing a stronger trade union movement. I beg to move.

3.52 p.m.

LORD SHINWELL

My Lords, during the Committee stage we discussed this clause in considerable detail, and considered all the minutiae; but scant consideration was directed to the principle embodied in the clause, which is a subject to which my noble friend Lord Delacourt-Smith has referred. I believe that of all the stupid clauses in this Bill this is the worst and the most unnecessary. What it proposes is that if a worker in a particular factory, or in fact anywhere in industry, decides that he does not wish to become a member of a trade union he is expected to pay a contribution of some kind. One of the reasons that prevents men deciding to join trade unions is the matter of conscience. A great deal was said about conscience during the Committee stage debates. I am bound to say that if a man has a conscience which inhibits him from becoming a member of a trade union there would be ample elasticity there to prevent his making a contribution. That is my first point.

Therefore let us exclude "conscience" in this context. A conscience is a conscience, and it can only be directed in one fashion; namely, to say, "I do not like becoming a trade union member and I certainly shall not contribute to the union's funds or even to a charity decided upon either by the trade union or by some authority." If we exclude conscience, what remains? A worker may say, "I have not cot a conscience. I dislike the idea of being a trade unionist." All right, then: why should he be called upon to pay a contribution? The Government have stated—and this I want to emphasise and re-emphasise in case the matter does not receive the consideration it deserves—over and over again that their purpose is to strengthen the trade union movement. This clause will do nothing of the sort.

Let us consider this proposal in another context. We have workmen's clubs and also clubs of a somewhat higher standard—I will not suggest an intellectually higher standard—such as the Carlton Club or the various university or Services clubs. Generally speaking, a man who is associated with a university or one of the Services may decide that he does not want to be a member of the club though he is traditionally expected to become one. He says that he does not want to join and so he is made to give a contribution to the funds. How absurd and nonsensical that is! If time permitted, I could find a great many more adjectives to describe the absurdity of this proposal, but I do not wish to detain your Lordships unduly. Therefore, I suggest that the clause should be excluded. It is not going to help trade unionism or the Government, and it is not going to promote healthier relations between employers and workpeople. In those circumstances it would be wise for the Government to expunge it from the record. If not, what are we left with?—a situation which will cause more trouble on the shop floor as to whether a man should or should not pay: and of course he may refuse to pay. All sorts of gimmickries may emerge, and we shall have far worse industrial relations under this situation than apparently we have had in the past or are supposed to have in the present, when there is so much talk of industrial turbulence.

I do not think it is necessary to argue this matter at great length. The objections are so obvious on the grounds of conscience (which has nothing to do with the subject), or on any other grounds, and I suggest that if the Government are not prepared to give way then the very least that my noble friends on the Front Bench can do is to guide us into the Lobby against the Government.

VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, when introducing the Amendment, made great play on the word "loyalty". He said that a union must have great loyalty from its members, and of course he is right. But if you do not have this clause you will have many people who have to join various unions because otherwise they could not work in the factory and would lose their jobs. Therefore you will have a lot of "Trojan horses", and there will be many members in a union who did not want to join it and who do not like it. Under this clause, however, you have the best of both worlds: first, you have the men who would only be a nuisance in the union because they might be undermining it, but they have to pay their contributions although they are not under its discipline. That is an enviable position. Think of all the clubs in England who would love to have subscriptions from people who do not have to be members! I think this is a most generous clause and that the noble Lord's objection to it is rather suspect. I sincerely hope that my noble friends will resist this Amendment.

BARONESS GAITSKELL

My Lords, I should like to get things straight. Workers pay a contribution to a union for services rendered. They do not pay for nothing, and in this country I believe they do not pay quite enough. Now the Government say that they need not join and yet they must pay. This seems to me so extraordinarily illogical, unless it is a roundabout way of making the workers so disgusted with the idea that they must pay for trade unions that they do not belong to that they will decide to join a trade union. If the worker finds that he has to pay in any case, perhaps he will in the end join; but the clause is so illogical that it seems to me that the Government should accept our Amendment.

LORD POPPLEWELL

My Lords, this clause appears to fall into line with the Government's attitude, the paternalistic approach outlined in the code of practice. The trade unions want none of this paternalism. They do not seek to compel a man to make contributions if he is not going to be loyal to the movement to which he is contributing. It is totally illogical that a man should contribute to something that he does not believe in. The trade unions do not want that. The trade unions would stand firm and go all out for a closed shop, and would make all those who contribute to the unions part of that approach. In this clause the Government seem to be seeking a way, when the trade unions ask for closed shops and suchlike, by which they can reply, "Where is the need?" People make these contributions at certain periods of time and it might be three months, or six months, or 12 months before the money is handed over to the unions.

By the next clause workers are asked to contribute the same amount towards a completely different set-up. This seems to me begging the question. It would appear that the Government desire these clauses in order to withstand an argument from the trade union movement that all employees should be members of a trade union. So there may be two lines of approach—first, that the contributions ultimately should go to the trade unions; then, by the operation of the next clause, to make charitable contributions. In this day and age that is nonsense. Surely the correct approach is that the Government should be more forthright and, in acocrdance with the foreword by the Secretary of State to the code of practice, should take a firm stand and say to employees who are joining, "Your job is to get into the union and make it a closed shop". This is welcomed when it is in operation. The effect of the closed shop can be more greatly felt in increased productivity and in the consultations that take place between both sides who know their own strength. But this is a weakening link and it does not merit continuation in the Bill.

4.4 p.m.

EARL FERRERS

My Lords, I think that the noble Baroness and all the noble Lords who have spoken, other than my noble friend behind me, have taken the opportunity to say that they do not like the provisions of the agency shop. This we on this side of the House know, and I think that it is one of the fundamental differences between us. The noble Lord, Lord Popplewell, said that the trade unions want closed shops; but as he knows only too well, the Government's view is that closed shops on the whole are not desirable, though they recognise the advantages which in some cases can be obtained. They recognise also the responsibilities which members working in a place have towards their trade union.

We have had the opportunity of discussing this matter fairly fully both on Second Reading and on the Committee stag^ and on the Report stage the noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, has put down the Amendment to leave out Clause 8, which I take it is a reflection on the way in which we might improve the Bill after the Committee stage. I am bound to point out that of course the Government cannot accept this Amendment because it would make nonsense of the Bill to leave in all the other provisions relating to the agency shop but to delete this clause. All the noble Lords who have spoken have given their views on the agency shop. I will reply as briefly as I can to try to allay noble Lords' fears, but I recognise that there is this division of view and I doubt whether I shall be able to influence your Lordships' minds.

The agency shop provisions are a genuine attempt on the part of the Government to try to reconcile, on the one hand, the responsibilities which a person has to the people who negotiate for him—a responsibility which he has to the other people in his factory, his social responsibility to the people he works with and also the right and the duty to pay for services which he receives from a body which he may not wish to be a member of. On the other hand, there is the genuine view held, which the Government must also recognise, that there may be some people who do not wish to belong to a trade union. Therefore, the right to belong or not to belong is one of the main things in this Bill. All we have tried to do by the agency shop is to reconcile these two apparently conflicting demands: to say that if a person does not wish to join a trade union he is under no obligation to do so, but that nevertheless he is under an obligation to pay some form of fee (for want of a better word) to those who negotiate for him. There are those, whom noble Lords opposite know only too well, described as "free riders", who do not want to join a trade union, nor to pay any contribution, yet get the benefits of others who do. The agency shop provisions are designed to meet just those very objections.

The noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, asked, "Will this tell in the direction of stronger trade unions?" That is a very pertinent point. I think, from what the noble Lord said, that it was his view that it would not tell in the direction of stronger trade unions. It is our view that it will. Unless a person has very strong objections to joining a trade union, to having to pay the same sum of money as he would by being a member of a trade union, and yet have none of the advantages of the trade union, no right to attend meetings, no right to influence the union, he will, in the large majority of cases, come round to the view that, "In that case, if my contribution is to be the same I might as well join the trade union ".

LORD SHINWELL

My Lords, may I ask the noble Earl one question? Do the Government believe in taxation without representation?

EARL FERRERS

My Lords, as the noble Lord knows only too well, this is not taxation; it is the paying of a similar fee as is paid by trade union members, for the benefits which a non-member may have by virtue of the fact that others negotiate on his behalf.

My Lords, I do not wish to labour this point any more because we shall never see eye to eye over it. The noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, asked whether these contributions could be used for Party or political ends. I would refer the noble Lord to the speech which my noble friend Lord Windlesham made at column 678 of the Report of the Committee stage on May 10, because he went into this point in some considerable detail. It would not be appropriate for me to repeat that here other than to say—and I repeat his words: It may be seen, therefore, that the non-members' contribution could not be added to a union's political funds or expended on 'Party' political objects. We believe that the agency shop will be a method of strengthening these unions. We do not believe it will have the bad effect which noble Lords opposite have suggested. I hope, therefore, that this clause will remain part of the Bill.

4.12 p.m.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for his reply. I do not think his assertion—and it was not much more than an assertion—that it is the belief of the Government that this provision for an agency fee is consistent with the declared desire to strengthen the trade union movement will convince my noble friends. I was interested in the reply which he gave to my noble friend Lord Shinwell who asked whether this was not taxation without representation. I dare say the point has crossed the mind of my noble friend, as it has crossed mine, that if a Government drawn from this side of the House had produced a Bill containing a provision which required people who were not members of trade unions to pay contributions to those trade unions some of the noble Lords opposite who are supporting this proposition would have been extremely indignant, and would have said that it was placing a most monstrous imposition upon those individuals.

The argument that this will not strengthen the trade union movement still stands. I am almost disposed to ask the noble Earl whether he can give us an assurance, on behalf of the Government, that we shall not find when the code of practice finally comes before your Lordships' House as a formal draft that the foreword has been modified to bring it into line with the code of practice in the Bill, rather than the code of practice and the Bill being modified as we should like to bring them both into line with the Secretary of State's foreword. I hope we shall not find that the foreword deteriorates as a result of the praise which we have ventured to give to it on this side of the House. It is a pity that we have not had more contributions from the Government Back Benches in the long stages of this discussion. There have been one or two noble Lords on the Back Benches who have contributed valuable speeches from their experience on the employing side of industry. There are many noble Lords of great experience on the employing side of industry whose views we should have very much liked to hear, both upon this question and upon some other questions raised by the Bill.

We have had a contribution from the noble Viscount, Lord Massereene and Ferrard. He advanced the argument—which was rather a strange one—that if the trade unions knew their business they would be very grateful for these proposals. He said that if individuals go unwillingly into trade unions they will be Trojan horses who will do far more harm and be far more of a liability than an asset. There are hundreds of thousands of people who have joined the trade union movement either because they entered an occupation where there was a closed shop, or because they found it was the normal thing to do and, although they were not very keen, they felt that they would like to be like everybody else. Having entered the trade union, having had the experience of receiving the journals of the union, of attending branch meetings, and of finding that people in the trade union movement were interested in what they thought about the problems of the industry (and often it was a novel experience for them to find that somebody was interested in their opinions), having entered with little enthusiasm, and sometimes even a measure of hostility, as a result of experience they have become extremely keen and active trade union members. I was not a keen member—and there are many people active in the trade union movement who will say this—when I came in, but experience of the work of the union made me active and enthusiastic about it. This provision to enable people to pay a fee will, to some extent, enable people to remain outside.

The rather ingenious argument of the noble Earl who replied for the Government was that probably not many people would remain outside anyway, and it would not be very effective. Let us hope that this is indeed the case. It is still not a very good justification for a measure of this kind to say, "It will probably not be used very much ". That is the hope of the noble Lord and it may be of all of us. But while the provision exists, there is always the possibility that it will be used, and in so far as it is used it will weaken and not strengthen the trade union movement. Nobody that I have seen or heard in industry has come along and said, "This is a wonderful, new idea. This is a wonderful solution to an industrial relations problem". It is not a solution to an industrial relations problem, it is a solution to a political problem which the Government have created for themselves. It is a solution to the problem of reconciling the unconstructive criticism of trade unions to which the Government have lent encouragement over many years with the hard facts of industrial life, which lead to recognition of the fact that if industrial relations are to be improved in this country the trade unions must be

strengthened and not weakened. It is that schizophrenia, that attempt to hold two contrary opinions, which runs right through the Government's industrial relations pronouncements and the industrial relations activities of the Government, and through the Bill and the code of practice. The unhappy thing is that this splendid declaration, the foreword, is on the right side. When one comes down to the reality, and to what is proposed, one finds that that falls very far below the Government's declared intention of strengthening the trade union movement and improving industrial relations in that way.

I think the noble Earl went a long way to admit that this is not a solution to an industrial relations problem but a solution to a political problem of trying to reconcile two contrasting ideas which have to try to co-exist in the minds of the Government. Whatever the explanation may be, it remains in our view an undesirable innovation in this Bill; measure which, in so far as it has effect, will have the effect of weakening somewhat the trade union movement. On those grounds I think we must, as my noble friend suggested, divide the House on this Amendment.

4.20 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 15E) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 49; Not-Contents, 102.

CONTENTS
Addison, V.	Gardiner, L.	Royle, L.
Archibald, L.	Garnsworthy, L. [Teller.]	Sainsbury, L.
Beswick, L.	Jacques, L.	St. Davids, V.
Birk, Bs.	Janner, L.	Serota, Bs.
Blyton, L.	Leatherland, L.	Shackleton, L.
Brockway, L.	Lindgren, L.	Shepherd, L.
Buckinghamshire, E.	Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, Bs.	Shinwell, L.
Burton of Coventry, Bs.	McLeavy, L.	Slater, L.
Champion, L.	Macleod of Fuinary, L.	Stow Hill, L.
Chorley, L.	Maelor, L.	Summerskill, Bs.
Davies of Leek, L.	Mais, L.	Taylor of Mansfield, L.
Delacourt-Smith, L.	Moyle, L.	Wells-Pestell, L.
Diamond, L.	Pargiter, L.	White, Bs.
Douglas of Barloch, L.	Phillips, Bs. [Teller.]	Williamson, L.
Douglass of Cleveland, L.	Plummer, Bs.	Wootton of Abinger, Bs.
Evans of Hungershall, L.	Popplewell, L.	Wynne-Jones, L.
Gaitskell, Bs.
NOT-CONTENTS
Aberdare, L.	Balfour, E.	Belhaven and Stenton, L.
Ailwyn, L.	Barnby, L.	Belstead, L.
Alexander of Tunis, E.	Beauchamp, E.	Berkeley, Bs.
Alport, L.	Beaumont of Whitley, L.	Bessborough, E.
Blackburn, L. Bp.	Fortescue, E.	Meston, L.
Blackford, L.	Gage, V.	Milverton, L.
Boston, L.	Gladwyn, L.	Morrison, L.
Boyd of Merton, V.	Gray, L.	Mowbray and Stourton, L. [Teller]
Brooke of Cumnor, L.	Greenway, L.
Brooke of Ystradfellte, Bs.	Grenfell, L.	Nugent of Guildford, L.
Burgh, L.	Gridley, L.	Oakshott, L.
Camoys, L.	Grimston of Westbury, L.	Rankeillour, L.
Cawley, L.	Hacking, L.	Robertson of Oakridge, L.
Clwyd, L.	Hailes, L.	St. Helens, L.
Colgrain, L.	Hailsham of St. Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor)	St. Just, L.
Conesford, L.		St. Oswald, L.
Cork and Orrery, E.	Hankey, L.	Sandford, L.
Courtown, E.	Hatherton, L.	Savile, L.
Craigavon, V.	Henley, L.	Selkirk, E.
Crathorne, L.	Hood, V.	Sempill, Ly.
Crawshaw, L.	Hurcomb, L.	Somers, L.
Cromartie, E.	Hylton-Foster, Bs.	Stamp, L.
Daventry, V.	Ilford, L.	Stradbroke, E.
De Clifford, L.	Ironside, L.	Strang, L.
Denham, L. [Teller.]	Jellicoe, E. (L. Privy Seal.)	Strathclyde, L.
Derwent, L.	Kemsley, V.	Swinton, E.
Drumalbyn, L.	Kilmarnock, L.	Tanlaw, L.
Dudley, E.	Kindersley, L.	Thomas, L.
Dundonald, E.	Kinloss, Ly.	Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, Bs.
Ebbisham, L.	Loudoun, Ly.	Wakefield of Kendal, L.
Eccles, V.	Mac Andrew, L.	Ward of Witley, V.
Emmet of Amberley, Bs.	Malmesbury, E.	Windlesham, L.
Falkland, V.	Mancroft, L.	Wrottesley, L.
Ferrers, E.	Massereene and Ferrard, V.	Yarborough, E.
Ferrier, L.	Merrivale, L.

Resolved in the negative, and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.

Clause 9 [Contributions to charity instead of contributions to trade union]:

4.28 p.m.

LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY moved Amendment No. 16: Page 8, line 14, leave out from (" by ") to end of line.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I hope noble Lords will allow me to preface my proposal of this Amendment by an apology to your Lordships. When Amendment No. 12 was moved on Tuesday night, owing to an error of communications about which Amendments were to be taken before the supper break, I was not in my place. The Amendment was a Government concession to a Liberal Amendment which had been put down at the Committee stage. I welcome it, and should have liked to express our thanks to the Government; and I apologise to your Lordships, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, to whom I have written.

Amendment No. 16, with which I hope it may be convenient for your Lordships to discuss Amendments Nos. 17, 18, 20, 36, 37 and 38, is an Amendment which, like all the others I have named, deals with one fairly simple point. On Committee stage I and my noble friends argued very strongly that the provision which stated that the choice of charity, to which payments were to be made in the case of conscientious objection, should be the choice both of the trade union and of the individual worker was unduly complicated and might easily lead to friction. We put down an Amendment to make it the choice of the worker only, because we thought that that was marginally the better of the two possible solutions, one of which was to give the choice to the worker only while the second was to give the choice to the trade union alone. This was rejected by your Lordships' Committee.

The noble Lord, Lord Conesford (who I am sorry is not here), said he agreed that the position should be made simpler and he supported us. The Labour Party on the whole said that they also thought the position should be made simpler, but that the right should be given to the trade union alone. I must say that I was personally convinced by their argument, particularly the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell. He said that my Amendment took the biscuit, and, although he is not here, I hope he will accept the fact that I am now giving it hack again—I do not know what sort of biscuit. That does not necessarily mean that the rest of my noble colleagues are convinced that, of the two possible simpler solutions, the better one is to give the choice to the trade union. But we are still firmly of the opinion that a simpler way of dealing with this matter is necessary. We firmly think that it should be for one person only to decide to what charity the contribution should go. Therefore we have put down these Amendments which would have the effect of allowing the trade union to decide which charity should be chosen.

A point was raised in the debate about the nature and definition of a charity, and the suggestion was made that if there were not agreement the range of charities which could be denoted to would be too wide. We have therefore put down Amendment No. 18, which seeks to limit the number of charities which can be chosen. In spite of the immense learning I had about the whole subject of charities yesterday, I am quite prepared to admit that this may be ill-provided. If so, we have time to put it right on Third Reading, but I hope that this proposal will meet with the support of a considerable number of Members of your Lordships' House. As I said, I think the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, definitely supported us in Committee and the Labour Party on the whole supported us. I hope that the Government will accept this Amendment as a means of making the Bill simpler in this respect. I beg to move.

LORD BROWN

My Lords, I rise to add my argument on the Amendments before us. This Bill undoubtedly—although I am not now arguing whether it is right or wrong—will create a great deal of legal work, paper work, hearings and the rest. As it stands in regard to payments to a charity it will create more such work. There is a later subsection and later clauses which envisage disputes about which charitable organisations should have contributions made to them. This is taking the matter too far.

I suggest that in respect of this business of payments to charities the Government are leaning over backwards and going much too far. They are saying that the decision about charitable payments shall be made jointly by the trade union and the individual. The individual should not have the right to argue with the trade union when he is getting services from the trade union for the sum which he will pay to the charity. Why should he have this sort of halo as a giver to charity, when in point of fact is is paying for something which he will receive but avoiding what to him is a moral issue, paying to a body to which he objects? If we leave this matter between the union and the individual to decide I think there is a great danger that a large number of people, being fond of this or that charity, will come to the conclusion that it would be a rather good thing to join this category who say that they object to unions, so that instead of the money going to the unions it will go to their pet charity. There is a danger of this happening.

The reply may be that it will not happen because the union will argue about the money going to a pet charity, but I cannot see the unions arguing in one case after another and taking these things to tribunals. That would be too much of a burden, and in effect I think the individual would get away with it. The more the individual got away with it the more would others be encouraged to join such individuals. Then we should have a situation in which many people would be incited not to pay union dues, not because they had moral objections to unions but because they felt it would be rather nice, instead of paying money to a union, to pay it to their pet charity.

There we have the nub of the matter. These Amendments would simply leave the question to the union. The union could not have the money itself, but it would be giving service to the individual; it would be winning wage increases and many other things for him. Surely the union should have the right to decide to which charity the money should go. In the name of common sense, I appeal to the Government not to leave this rather puny matter in a state which I think will give rise to a great deal of petty disagreement and eventually legal work, documentation and the absorption of some of the time of industrial tribunals. The whole thing is a nonsense. I thought after the last debate that the Government were intending to do something about it. I am shocked that common sense has not prevailed, but I hope that it will now prevail on the basis of the Amendments before us.

LORD PARGITER

My Lords, there is a point which perhaps will appeal to the Government. If there are a dozen men in a shop who want to take advantage of this proposal, and so many deductions are to be made from the pay-roll, and the dozen men want something to go to a dozen different charities, the employer will be faced with the fiddling job of making small sums payable to those dozen different charities. In the interest of good management and efficiency that hardly seems desirable. If the matter were left to the trade union, probably the union would nominate one charity and that would be the end of the story. The man would be told that his money was going to a particular charity and that would be the end of the road. That seems to be a simple way of getting over the problem. While the Government have leaned over backwards to preserve the right of the individual, this seems to be stretching the matter a little far. I suggest that the Amendment should be accepted.

BARONESS WHITE

My Lords, I hope very much that this is an Amendment which the Government will feel disposed to accept. The arguments for it have been put with great clarity by noble Lords who have spoken. I should have thought that the Government themselves, on reflection, would doubt the wisdom of creating a situation of potential conflict over a matter which is a very small one in the totality of the subject we are discussing, and giving it to the industrial tribunal to deal with. Surely the industrial tribunal will have far more important things to do than that.

Then there are other arguments which have been put forward by noble Lords who have spoken. They are of a practical nature, as my noble friend Lord Pargiter pointed out. There is also a matter of principle. What is this contribution? It is not a contribution to charity simpliciter: it is a contribution to charity in lieu of a contribution to a union. It is not just a matter of a person's private benevolence. As the noble Lord, Lord Brown, said, if a person wants to give to charity he should do that out of his other disposable income as a genuine act of benevolence on his part, and not as something which is related to the situation where he prefers, for conscientious reasons, not to belong to the particular union in his place of employment. I cannot really see what serious ground there can be for not accepting this Amendment, but I can see arguments of good sense, and to some degree also of principle, for accepting it.

The only thing which worries me a little about the third of the Amendments which the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, intends to move (all the others, of course, are consequential Amendments) is that concerning the registration on the Central Register of the Charity Commissioners for England and Wales, because as his researches for yesterday's debate no doubt revealed to him there are charities which are not registered but which nevertheless are perfectly proper charities. Some of these could and should be registered if those in charge of them troubled so to do.

The term used in the Bill as it now stands is any institution or other organisation established for charitable purposes". I think that some of these would not be eligible to be registered, and therefore I personally would ask the noble Lord to consider withdrawing this particular Amendment. I am sure his intentions are admirable. One can quite understand why he may have put the Amendment down, but I think it may narrow the possibilities too much. I cannot pretend that I did quite so much research for yesterday's debate as no doubt the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, did; but I did sufficient to make me doubtful about the wisdom of Amendment No. 18. Therefore, I would beg him to reconsider it or, if the Government do not propose to accept it, that he will not contest it.

Turning to the other Amendments, which provide that in all these circumstances it is reasonable and proper to allow the union to decide to which charity these in lieu contributions should go, I hope that the Government will accept this principle. Such a course would make life so much simpler for everybody, and for so many practical reasons which we do not really need to waste time going into because I think they are plain for every sensible person to see. I do not think there would be a breach of any principle. If the Government want to argue for any individual principle, then I think we should argue forcefully that this is not a matter of private benevolence and therefore should not be judged on those grounds. This is not a normal charitable payment; it is an abnormal charitable payment. Therefore, in the circumstances, I do not think the Government have any ground of principle, and all the arguments of common sense go the other way.

4.42 p.m.

LORD WINDLESHAM

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, reminded us when he moved this Amendment, in the course of the Committee stage he and his colleagues tabled a group of Amendments very similar to these, except that they would have left the choice of charity to which the conscientious objector pays his contribution entirely to the worker. Now, for the reasons he has explained, he is trying it the other way round. Under this group of Amendments the worker would have no voice in the matter at all, nor would he have any right of appeal: the matter would be left entirely at the discretion of the union. Noble Lords and the noble Baroness opposite say they consider that that course should be accepted, for the reason that they believe—wrongly, as I think I shall be able to point out—that it would be a simpler system.

We have looked at this point again since the Committee stage, but our position remains as it was then. We cannot agree that one party or the other, whether the worker or the union, should have an exclusive right to make a decision. We think that the best interests of industrial relations will be served by reaching agreement. It is likely that there will be only a small number of cases in which there will be any dispute about the charity to which the contribution should be paid. The noble Lord, Lord Pargiter, mentioned the possibility of a work force where a small number of people—perhaps a dozen or so—would be covered by this provision and might all wish to nominate their own charity, which would cause additional administrative work for the employer, and so on. The noble Lord suggested that it would be simpler all round to have one charity to which they should all pay their donations. I think that is an extremely sensible suggestion, and it is exactly the sort of thing one would hope for; and one would hope that the people concerned would be able to reach agreement on it.

As the clause now stands, there is a provision for voluntary agreement and we believe that the cases will be far fewer under the Bill as it is drafted than as proposed in the Amendments. The noble Lord who moved the Amendment said that he would like a system that is simpler. Therefore what we all want to see is the smallest number of cases in which the parties have not been able to reach agreement. We want them to reach agreement, do we not? We want there to be agreement in the maximum number of cases. If, in the end, both parties know that an independent arbitrator can decide, they will be more reasonable and therefore perhaps more determined in their attempts to reach agreement, because they know that if they cannot reach agreement the industrial tribunal—an independent group of people—will be able to decide the matter.

LORD BROWN

My Lords, I hope that I am in order in speaking. May I ask whether the Government have considered the possibility of a deliberate disagreement in order to load up the tribunal with cases?

LORD WINDLESHAM

My Lords, I really do not think that that is likely. I think that those who are determined to obstruct the Bill will be able to find cleverer ways than that to do it. Their intention in any event, as the noble Lord knows, is to boycott the industrial tribunals altogether. Therefore his question postulates that the T.U.C. will have stepped a little back from the position they have taken, and therefore there will be a tribunal to go to.

I was saying that if only one party decided, the other party would be faced with a "take it or leave it" situation. There are only comparatively few of these cases. Cases of conscientious objection are not particularly numerous but, as the noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, knows in his capacity as a trade union leader, the one-in-a-million case can be very difficult. Rightly or wrongly, people have very strong opinions, and if it is said that they have no choice at all in the matter, and that they are faced with a "take it or leave it" situation that is likely to breed resentment and will leave a sense of grievance behind it.

LORD SLATER

My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord to explain to the House why, because a man has conscientious objections to being a member of a trade union, that trade union should be called upon to sit in judgment as to what that individual ought to do in regard to the contribution that would be equivalent to his trade union contribution? Why should they have to sit in judgment and say that it ought to go to a particular charity? After all, he does not want to be a member and he is looked upon as a non-trade unionist, so why bring him in to justify this position?

LORD WINDLESHAM

My Lords, I do not know how the noble Lord squares that argument with the Amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, which would give the right entirely to the trade union to decide to which charity the contribution should go. Where there is disagreement, the tribunal will act as a kind of honest broker to try to achieve a solution acceptable to both parties; and to do this it will probably base itself on the objections that either party has raised and the force which the tribunal sees in these objections. The noble Baroness, Lady White, spoke about some reservations she had on Amendment No. 18. I understand that the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, would like to debate Amendment No. 18 at the same time as No. 16. The Amendment would have the effect of limiting contributions to charity in lieu of union subscription to charitable bodies registered with the Charity Commissioners in England and Wales.

All three of us who have taken part in this exchange participated in yesterday's debate, and we learned a good deal about the law concerning charities in the process. This would be, as the noble Baroness sensed from her own researches, unduly restrictive; it would exclude, first of all, all educational charities on the register maintained by the Department of Education and Science, and these include not only the educational institutions, but also, for example, a very large number of village halls. It would also leave out three categories of charity which under the Charities Act 1960 are not required to register. The main categories are the "exempt charities" under Schedule 2, which include various friendly societies and provident societies; secondly, charities which are excepted by orders made under Clause 4, many of them in practice religious trusts, places of worship and church property; and, thirdly, the very small charities which do not have a permanent endowment or an income from property over a certain figure, or do not use or occupy land; these are exempted from the obligation to register.

My own feeling is that it is the last type of charity, the very small local charities, which it would be particularly unfortunate to exclude from this part of the Bill: the Friends of the local hospital, the group of people who get together to take children in a children's home to the seaside. This type of activity is I think probably the sort of thing that the representative of the union in the area might well feel the appropriate cause to which the payment should be made. That deals with a rather more specialised point on Amendment 18. But on the main purpose of this group of Amendments, although I do not think there is a great deal between us, we feel that the proposals as they are in the Bill are likely to be fairer and more likely to result in agreement than those the noble Lord has put before the House, and on those grounds I would ask the House to reject the Amendment.

THE LORD BISHOP OF BLACKBURN

I am not quite sure whether I am in order to make one comment. I am sorry that the noble Lord is not able to accept this Amendment which seems to me perfectly reasonable. I am also interested that a number of noble Lords have mentioned "paternalism" as being a charge which is to be levied against the Government on the code of conduct. I should have thought that the Government might very well accuse of paternalism those who are proposing this Amendment, because here we are being very paternal in the trade unions and saying what the charity should be. If we talk about paternalism, I think noble Lords may have to agree that it might be a good thing. I hope the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, might consider not pressing Amendment No. 18. I think there is a great deal of point in what has been said about the register.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

My Lords, since the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, made reference to me, I should like to say a word in reply to him urging him to think again to see whether he cannot accept this Amendment. We discussed at some length at an earlier stage the group of people with whom this provision is primarily concerned, or for whom it was primarily intended: those who have certain religious beliefs which lead them to the view that in their industrial and social life they should not get into organisations in which they will be unequally yoked with unbelievers. I think I said on the earlier occasion—and certainly this is borne out by the Donovan Report's comments on this—that generally speaking these cases are resolved in an atmosphere of mutual respect, the respect of the trade union for the convictions of the individual, which his workmates know is of a piece with the whole conduct of his life, and respect on the part of the individual for the trade union, for the trade unionists and for the work which the union does.

I should not have thought that it was necessary to provide for this. As I was proposing to argue on a later Amendment, it is surely not necessary to provide the elaborate machinery of going to an industrial tribunal about the subject. I should have thought that in general, indeed universally, this would be likely to be settled with very little difficulty. I should not have thought that any trade union, certainly not any trade union where the matter was brought to any kind of responsible level, would wish to make difficulties over the position of these individuals, and I should have thought it reasonable to leave the last word with the union in the belief that in fact no great difficulties are going to arise, and in so far as these arrangements are enforced or apply on a scale sufficient to necessitate any systematic enforcement, provided the trade union had the last word they would be able to resolve the matter in a reasonable way and normally by agreement. I should have thought that it was consistent with the scale of this problem and the atmosphere in which these cases normally are handled to deal with the matter in the way the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, has suggested.

LORD WINDLESHAM

My Lords, may I put this point to the noble Lord? What would he do to meet this situation where agreement could not be reached?

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

My Lords, under the Amendment which is proposed by the noble Lord on the Liberal Benches, in those circumstances the trade union would have the last word.

LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY

My Lords, I would make two quick points. I do not honestly follow the logic of the only serious argument the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, has put forward, that my Amendment would produce a more complicated situation. I do not entirely follow his logic, because it seemed to stem from a false presumption, which is that we want the maximum number of agreements in these cases, whereas the whole purpose of the Amendment is that the question of agreement should not come into it at all.

LORD WINDLESHAM

My Lords, is the noble Lord dissenting from the noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith? Lord Delacourt-Smith said that there should be the maximum amount of agreement and only in the last resort where agreement could not be reached should the union have the final say.

LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY

My Lords, in principle I am agreeing with the noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith; there will be agreement, but on a non-legal non-statutory level. When the law starts operating there will not be agreement. The noble Lord, Lord Gray, has indicated to me that there is the point that some conscientious objectors hold very singular views. Might they not hold singular views on different charities? One of the points of Amendment No. 18 is that it rules out a number of the more contentious kinds of charities, and in this particular matter I am relying on the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, not to give way to my Motion yesterday in extending the definition of charities. I think we have had part of the argument; I think we must let your Lordships decide. If your Lordships decide in favour of this Amendment I will withdraw Amendment No. 18 and consider what alternative should be put down on Third Reading.

5 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 16) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 57; Not-Contents, 86.

CONTENTS
Addison, V.	Gaitskell, Bs.	Sainsbury, L.
Amulree, L.	Gardiner, L.	St. Davids, V.
Archibald, L.	Garnsworthy, L.	Segal, L.
Ardwick, L.	Gladwyn, L.	Serota, Bs.
Beaumont of Whitley, L. [Teller.]	Henley, L. [Teller.]	Shackleton, L.
	Hoy, L.	Shepherd, L.
Beswick, L.	Jacques, L.	Shinwell, L.
Birk, Bs.	Janner, L.	Silkin, L.
Blackburn, L.Bp.	Leatherland, L.	Slater, L.
Blyton, L.	Lindgren, L.	Stamp, L.
Brockway, L.	Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, Bs.	Stow Hill, L.
Brown, L.	McLeavy, L.	Summerskill, Bs.
Buckinghamshire, E.	Maelor, L.	Tanlaw, L.
Byers, L.	Mais, L.	Taylor of Mansfield, L.
Champion, L.	Meston, L.	Teviot, L.
Chorley, L.	Moyle, L.	Wells-Pestell, L.
Delacourt-Smith, L.	Pargiter, L.	White, Bs.
Diamond, L.	Phillips, Bs.	Williamson, L.
Douglass of Cleveland, L.	Popplewell, L.	Wootton of Abinger, Bs.
Foot, L.

NOT-CONTENTS
Aberdare, L.	Drumalbyn, L.	Malmesbury, E.
Abinger, L.	Dudley, E.	Massereene and Ferrard, V.
Ailwyn, L.	Ebbisham, L.	Merrivale, L.
Balerno, L.	Emmet of Amberley, Bs.	Milverton, L.
Balfour, E.	Ferrers, E.	Morrison, L.
Barnby, L.	Ferrier, L.	Mowbray and Stourton, L. [Teller.]
Beauchamp, E.	Fortescue, E.
Belhaven and Stenton, L.	Gage, V.	Nugent of Guildford, L.
Belstead, L.	Gray, L.	Oakshott, L.
Berkeley, Bs.	Greenway, L.	Rankeillour, L.
Bessborough, E.	Grenfell, L.	Robertson of Oakridge, L.
Blackford, L.	Gridley, L.	St. Aldwyn, E.
Boston, L.	Grimston of Westbury, L.	St. Helens, L.
Brooke of Cumnor, L.	Hacking, L.	St. Just, L.
Brooke of Ystradfellte, Bs.	Hailes, L.	Sandford, L.
Burgh, L.	Hailsham of Saint Marylebone L. (L. Chancellor.)	Savile, L.
Camoys, L.		Shannon, E.
Carrington, L.	Hankey, L.	Skelmersdale, L.
Cawley, L.	Hatherton, L.	Somers, L.
Colgrain, L.	Hood, V.	Strang, L.
Conesford, L.	Hurcomb, L.	Strathclyde, L.
Cork and Orrery, E.	Hylton-Foster, B.	Swansea, L.
Courtown, E.	Ilford, L.	Swinton, E.
Craigavon, V.	Jellicoe, E. (L. Privy Seal.)	Thomas, L.
Crathorne, L.	Kemsley, V.	Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, Bs.
Cromartie, E.	Kilmarnock, L.	Wakefield of Kendal, L.
De Clifford, L.	Windlesham, L.	Ward of Witley, V.
Denham, L. [Teller.]	Kinloss, Ly.	Windlesham, L.
Derwent, L.	Loudoun, C.	Wrottesley, L.

Resolved in the negative, and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.

5.8 p.m.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Amendment No. 18A, the Lord Delacourt-Smith.

LORD DE CLIFFORD

My Lords, before the noble Lord rises on this matter, may I ask whether we are really in order in discussing it? It is whether Clause 9, as amended, shall stand part, and in the Committee stage on May 10 your Lordships voted on this very matter by 125 to 42. The clause is exactly the same. Are we right in being asked to decide this matter again?

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, I do not know to whom that question was addressed. It clearly is not open to me, from the Woolsack, to express an opinion. I have the same right to express an opinion as any other Member of your Lordships' House, but it would normally be a question for the Leader of the House to reply to. I do not think that at this stage I have very strong opinions about it, and I think I had better suppress any I have for the moment.

LORD BYERS

My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, whether he has any advice to tender to the House on this matter?

LORD WINDLESHAM

My Lords, I have just had some quick consultation with my neighbours on the Front Bench who have a good deal more experience than I have, and I am afraid I have not got a considered opinion to put before the House. The noble Lord opposite, Lord Delacourt-Smith, has down a number of these Amendments to leave out clauses, and perhaps the best thing I can suggest to the House is that, through the usual channels, we take some advice in the course of the next half hour or so, and that we continue our proceedings until then, bearing in mind, as I am sure the noble Lord will, that some Members of the House feel that we are going over old ground. I think it is for him to decide whether he wants to move this Amendment and the others. If it is possible to give any advice to noble Lords, either I, or my noble friend the Leader of the House, will do so.

LORD BYERS

My Lords, in the event of our getting that advice within the next half-an-hour and that advice suggesting that this Amendment is out of order, can we then close the debate on it?

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE (LORD CARRINGTON)

My Lords, by some extraordinary coincidence, since being asked by my noble friend a moment ago and saying that I had no advice, I now have some advice about whether or not it is right. I think the answer is that it is strictly within the rules of order to do this, but it is very unusual. Generally speaking, it is not considered to be appropriate and is not usually resorted to, because the time for deciding is usually the Committee stage. I should have thought that perhaps there were exceptions which might make it necessary to do so, but that in the general run of events it is rather unusual to do it.

5.11 p.m.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH moved Amendment No. 18A: Leave out Clause 9.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, when I moved an earlier Amendment I ventured to make a reference to the position, and, among other points, I referred to the fact that we now have the code of practice before us, of which we did not have the advantage at the time when we were considering these clauses during the Committee stage. I further indicated that it would most likely be the case that there would be a number of Amendments of this character which, in the event, it would not be necessary to move. This Amendment raises a very important question: the concept of conscientious objection to trade union membership. We discussed this matter at the Committee stage, and the view was expressed from these Benches that we attached great importance to the protection of conscience in all proper cases. We ventured to make the suggestion that this problem, in its industrial setting, might be dealt with more satisfactorily in some non-statutory fashion, perhaps by some kind of declaration to which the trade union movement might subscribe. In view of the fact that no Government Amendment has appeared to this clause, or to any of the clauses which deal with conscientious objection. I take it that the Government think it is necessary to deal with this matter in a statutory, as opposed to a non-statutory, fashion. I should be grateful if the noble Lord could make any observation and give any reasons which have determined the Government to leave the provisions in this Bill in a statutory form. My Lords, I beg to move.

THE EARL OF DUDLEY

My Lords, if this unusual procedure of moving that clauses do not stand part of the Bill is to be adopted, may we have advice as to how its unusualness compares with the unusual course adopted in Committee by the noble Earl, Lord Halsbury, in which he was unsuccessful?

LORD WINDLESHAM

My Lords, must have regard to what my noble friend the Secretary of State for Defence, as a former Leader of the House and as a former Leader of the Opposition, has advised your Lordships; that this practice is very unusual indeed. It would be discourteous of me to refuse to rise to my feet at all in reply to the noble Lord, but I must be very brief. The code of practice does not refer to the clause in front of us, so I do not think one can really say that the publication of the draft code of practice alters the situation to any great extent since our debate in Committee. I can confirm in reply that we very thoroughly discussed in Committee these clauses concerning conscience, and the Government's reasoning was set out. We have not had any reason to think, between that stage and now, that these clauses are not the correct approach.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

My Lords, this is not an Amendment which I should wish to press to a Division, because to do so might give rise to misunderstanding. I think it is very clear from the speeches that were made from this side of the House that it would not be our desire in any way to cast doubt upon the appearance of this provision in the Bill, if the Government insist that statutory means are the right way to deal with the matter. With regard to the speech which the noble Lord has just made, I did not argue that the appearance of the code of practice made any difference to this clause. I referred to the code of practice merely because the general issue had been raised, and it occurred to me that perhaps there were some noble Lords who had not been present at the time when I made the point. But I did not suggest at any stage that that was the reason why all these Amendments have appeared in this form in the Marshalled List.

Since discussion is to take place through the usual channels, I should not wish to make any comment beyond saying that I do not see a substantial difference between moving, as the Government have done in an earlier Amendment, to delete a subsection, and moving to delete a whole clause. I regret the fact that the noble Lord has not explained why the Government have decided to reject an idea which was raised during the Committee stage and to which they did not make an answer; that is, whether it is essential and, indeed, desirable, for reasons which were given, to deal with this problem by provisions in the Statute rather than in another fashion. But, not withstanding that fact, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 10 [Agency shop agreement]:

5.18 p.m.

EARL FERRERS moved Amendment No. 19: Page 8, line 30, Dave out from (" Act ") to end of line 34.

The noble Earl said: My Lords, during the Committee stage the noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, moved an Amendment on very similar lines to this Amendment, as your Lordships will doubtless remember. He explained that he was a little puzzled how it could be possible for a situation to arise under subsection (1)(c) which did not arise under subsection (1)(a) or subsection (1)(b). I told him on that occasion that we could not accept his Amendment, not because we did not agree with it but because the drafting was wrong. We therefore put forward this Amendment which I trust will have the fulsome approbation of the noble Lord. My Lords, I beg to move.

BARONESS WHITE

My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend, I express gratitude to the noble Earl because, as he rightly says, we discussed this matter on Committee stage and inadvertently the Amendment put down at that stage took in a little more than was required for the purposes concerned. I am glad that the Government have been good enough to put this in order, because I think there was no difference whatever of substance between us that subsection (1)(c) was unnecessary and tautologous. We are delighted that the Government have been good enough to put this matter right, and I thank the noble Earl very much.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 11 [Agency shop agreement]:

5.21 p.m.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH moved Amendment No. 20B: Page 9, line 32 leave out (" or the employer ")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment deals with the situation in which a trade union or a group of trade unions desire to enter into an agency shop agreement with an employer and the employer is unwilling to accede to the suggestion that there should be such an agreement. The matter can then be proceeded with only if an application is made to the Industrial Court. In these circumstances, where the trade unions are anxious to make an agency shop agreement one can of course quite easily imagine how, in default of agreement, in default of the employer being willing, they will wish to proceed with the steps specified in the Bill, to make an application to the Industrial Court. But the Bill also provides that the employer may make an application to the Industrial Court. It is, on the face of it, very puzzling that somebody who does not wish an agency shop agreement to be made, and who is indeed resisting an application from the trade union or trade unions for such an agreement, should have the facility to set matters on foot for such an investigation.

If the trade unions are not willing to submit their proposal to the Industrial Court or to make an application, then of course there will be no further action unless, under this provision, the employer makes such an application. It is really difficult to see why the employer should have this entitlement unless it is for some obstructive purpose; unless it is to enable him to set on foot an application at a point in time or in circumstances in which he believes that that application will fail. This seems to us to be a strange provision to insert into the Statute, and we should be very grateful if the Government would explain why they think that such a provision is necessary. I beg to move.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I shall try to accede to the noble Lord's request to explain. When a trade union is pressing an employer to enter into an agency shop agreement and the employer is unwilling to concede an agreement, the Bill permits either party to make an application to the Industrial Court for a ballot. This is an important provision. The union can achieve its object if the ballot favours an agreement, and in the same way the employer can be confirmed in his opposition if the ballot shows that his workers do not favour an agency shop. It is not only a question of investigation, as the noble Lord indicated; it is a question of determining what are the wishes of the workers.

The Bill also provides that it will be an unfair industrial practice for either party to take industrial action to induce the other to refrain from making such an application. Moreover, if the result of a ballot shows that the required majority is not in favour of an agency shop, the Industrial Court will make an order directing that no agreement shall be made within a period of two years and any agreement purporting to be made shall be void. In short, the effect of these various provisions is that an employer who does not believe that a union's claim for an agency shop is widely supported by the employees can defend himself from industrial action designed to induce him to enter into an agency shop agreement if he is permitted to make an application to the Court for a ballot.

It is not difficult to conceive of circumstances in which this could arise. For example, a trade union might apply for an agency shop agreement, as the noble Lord said, in respect of more than one group of workers, and it may be that at the same time there is another group of workers which also might think it right to make an application of this sort, or which might, on the contrary, be against such an application. A number of circumstances arise here. The Bill envisages that an agency shop application cannot be proceeded with unless the Industrial Court is satisfied that the trade union in question is recognised as having negotiating rights; this is one of the things that will have to be considered. If it is recognised so far as negotiating rights are concerned, it may still be the case that the employer does not think that it would be right to take away what is undoubtedly the right of an individual to belong or not to belong in circumstances of this kind; and he may in particular, as I have said, believe that this proposal to take away such a right is not supported by a majority of the workers. Surely, in that case, the right thing is to have a vote about it, to put it to the vote, to have a ballot—and this is what the Bill provides for. If the union is not prepared to put it to the vote, then why should not the employer secure that the question is put to the vote? That is the only way in which the wishes of the workers can be determined.

I do not see the noble Lord's difficulty in this at all. This provision to permit an employer to make an application to the Court is important in three ways. First of all, it enables an employer to protect himself from unjustified pressure by a union; secondly, it ensures that the workers, as individuals, are given the opportunity to express their opinion on the establishment of an agency shop in cases where the employer and the union differ as to whether the union's proposals command their support; thirdly, and not least important, it enables these questions to be determined without industrial strife. For all these reasons, I hope that your Lordships will not accept this Amendment.

LORD BERNSTEIN

My Lords, I can understand the Government's desire, as written in the Bill, to give employees the opportunity to have an agency shop, but I still do not understand why an employer has the right to apply for an agency shop. If the workers want an agency shop there are all the means in the world for applying for one. I am not satisfied with the noble Lord's explanation at all. I cannot see why the employer has to apply for an agency shop if his workers themselves have not taken the trouble to do so. In the discussions on Committee stage it was suggested that it was to protect the employer who wished to have an agency shop that the workers are given the right to decide by ballot; but if they do not want to do it, why should the employer make the application?

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, may I intervene?—because the noble Lord is talking about the workers having the right to make this application. It is not the workers who have this right, but the trade unions, and it is purely to find out what are the wishes of the workers in the matter that the application is to be made.

LORD PARGITER

My Lords, I should like to be clear about this. It seems to me that the only way an employer is likely to use this is in order to stall for two years. I am sorry: I beg my noble friend's pardon.

LORD BERNSTEIN

My Lords, I am not questioning the right of the employees but whether the word "employer" should be included. What I am trying to find out is why we are giving to employers rights which were not in the original idea of an agency agreement.

LORD PARGITER

My Lords, I am sorry if I interrupted. If a trade union thinks there ought to be an agency shop and the workers do not agree, then the trade union has to make an application and a ballot has to take place. Why is there any need for any further provision than just that? Why put in an additional provision? I think frankly it is done with an ulterior motive. I repeat that the motive is that an employer, who appreciates that an application is imminent and may think that the balance might be in his favour against an agency shop among his workers at a certain point of time, and that time is rapidly diminishing and the position might alter quickly in the near future—perhaps due to an active trade union organising the workers—might make an application, get a decision, and then is in the clear for two years. It may be a clever policy, and there may be some employers who would do that, but such an employer is going to have two years of industrial strife, whether he likes it or not. That will be the net effect. It would be better to leave it for the workers to decide by their ballot whether or not they want an agency shop. I should have thought it perfectly simple to leave it at that, rather than create suspicion that there is an ulterior motive in permitting the employer to make an application.

LORD HANKEY

My Lords, I wonder whether we are being sufficiently subtle about this. What the subsection says is that an application to the court must specify:

1. " (a) the description or descriptions of workers in question, and
2. (b) the employer and the trade union or trade unions who (if the agreement were made as desired) would be the parties to the agreement."

It seems to me that there may easily be a difference of view among the workers and between the workers and employer as to what section of the works should be turned into an agency shop, and therefore that it would be legitimate that the employer should have a view about this. It may not be desirable for one particular section to be channelled off as an agency shop. I should think that the inclusion of "the employer" is desirable, to leave it open for different opinions to be expressed to the industrial court and perhaps for the matter to be referred to the C.I.R. I just wonder if we are being sufficiently subtle in our present approach.

5.43 p.m.

EARL JELLICOE

My Lords, I wonder whether, with your Lordships' permission, I might say a few words before we turn to the next Amendment. I understand that a problem arose when

5.35 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 20B) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 46; Not-Contents, 91.

CONTENTS
Addison, V.	Gaitskell, Bs.	Sainsbury, L.
Archibald, L.	Gardiner, L.	St. Davids, V.
Ardwick, L.	Hoy, L.	Segal, L.
Bernstein, L.	Jacques, L.	Serota, Bs.
Beswick, L.	Janner, L.	Shackleton, L.
Birk, Bs.	Leatherland, L.	Shinwell, L.
Blyton, L.	Lindgren, L.	Slater, L.
Brockway, L.	Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, Bs. [Teller.]	Stonham, L.
Brown, L.		Stow Hill, L.
Buckinghamshire, E.	McLeavy, L.	Summerskill, Bs.
Champion, L.	Maelor, L.	Taylor of Mansfield, L.
Crook, L.	Mais, L.	Wells-Pestell, L.
Davies of Leek, L.	Moyle, L.	White, Bs.
Delacourt-Smith, L.	Pargiter, L.	Williamson, L.
Diamond, L.	Peddie, L.	Wootton of Abinger, Bs.
Douglass of Cleveland, L.	Phillips, Bs. [Teller.]

NOT-CONTENTS
Aberdare, L.	Dudley, E.	MacAndrew, L.
Abinger, L.	Ebbisham, L.	Massereene and Ferrard, V.
Ailwyn, L.	Eccles, V.	Merrivale, L.
Airedale, L.	Emmet of Amberley, Bs.	Milverton, L.
Balerno, L.	Falkland, V.	Monk Bretton, L.
Balfour, E.	Ferrers, E.	Mowbray and Stourton, L.
Barnby, L.	Ferrier, L.	Nugent of Guildford, L.
Beauchamp, E.	Fortescue, E.	Oakshott, L.
Beaumont of Whitley, L.	Gage, V.	Rankeillour, L.
Belhaven and Stenton, L.	Gladwyn, L.	Reay, L.
Belstead, L.	Gray, L.	St. Aldwyn, E. [Teller.]
Berkeley, Bs.	Greenway, L.	St. Helens, L.
Bessborough, E.	Grenfell, L.	St. Just, L.
Birdwood, L.	Gridley, L.	Sandford, L.
Boston, L.	Grimston of Westbury, L.	Savile, L.
Boyd of Merton, V.	Hacking, L.	Selkirk, E.
Brooke of Cumnor, L.	Hailes, L.	Sempill, Ly.
Brooke of Ystradfellte, Bs.	Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)	Skelmersdale, L.
Burgh, L.		Somers, L.
Byers, L.	Hankey, L.	Stamp, L.
Carrington, L.	Hatherton, L.	Strang, L.
Colgrain, L.	Henley, L.	Swinton, E.
Conesford, L.	Hood, V.	Tanlaw, L.
Cork and Orrery, E.	Hylton-Foster, Bs.	Teviot, L.
Courtown, E.	Ilford, L.	Thomas, L.
Craigavon, V.	Jellicoe, E. (L. Privy Seal.)	Thorneycroft, L.
Crathorne, L.	Kemsley, V.	Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, Bs.
De Clifford, L.	Kilmarnock, L.	Ward of Witley, V.
Denham, L. [Teller.]	Kindersley, L.	Windlesham, L.
Derwent, L.	Kinloss, Ly.	Wrottesley, L.
Drumalbyn, L.	Loudoun, C.

Resolved in the negative, and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.

I was not in the House about the question of procedure on Amendments to leave out clauses of which we have a slight rash on the Marshalled List and I think there was a suggestion that I might be able to give some guidance to your Lordships on this matter. I am not certain how much I can add to what has already been said, but I have looked into the position and my understanding of it is this. There are certain precedents for having Amendments to leave out clauses at the Report stage, and I should not wish in any way to suggest that this is not so. However, there are not a great many, and I think this has only rarely been used as a procedural device in the past. There may be cases of an exceptional nature when a Member of your Lordships' House wishes to leave out a clause, and this would be in order. But, having said that, I should not wish to recommend this procedure as one of normal application in your Lordships' House, and I think it is to be particularly deprecated when there has been a full discussion in the Committee stage on the clause and the clause has been accepted by your Lordships.

That is my understanding of the position. I do not wish to make a great meal of this matter at this stage, but anything that the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition may be able to say, if he can float his ark out above the flood, I shall be glad to hear. Perhaps he can indicate whether in general he agrees with the comments that I have made above the noise of falling water.

LORD SHACKLETON

My Lords. I am wondering whether we ought not to adjourn. Before I make any comment on the remarks of the noble Earl the Leader of the House, could he, or the Government Chief Whip, tell the House what is happening?

EARL JELLICOE

My Lords, I am afraid that I am just as much at sea as the noble Lord on this.

LORD SHACKLETON

My Lords, the noble Earl has of course been pouring oil on troubled waters. It is always a crisis like this which brings out the best in your Lordships. I am wondering whether on this important point we should go on. I do not know whether noble Lords can hear.

SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS

Yes.

LORD SHACKLETON

Then, my Lords, I should like to say, first of all, to the noble Earl that I am grateful to him for his presentation of this matter. I want to put on record one thing. I entirely agree that the procedure of putting down on Report stage Amendments, as they technically are, to leave out clauses, in the way that it is done in Committee, is undesirable as a general practice. To noble Lords who have expressed concern, I should like to say that we have already taken action. Noble Lords who have raised this may not have heard my noble friend Lord Delacourt-Smith say, I think at the beginning, that he was not proposing to move all his Amendments of this nature.

The reasons for this are these. First of all, a number of Government Amendments have gone down very late indeed—although I make no complaint about that. The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, has done his best, but it makes it difficult for the Opposition to put down their Amendments. There was a case yesterday, for instance, when a Government starred Amendment went down on the day that it was due to be debated, and it made a nonsense of a number of Opposition Amendments which ought to have been Amendments to it. It is obvious that we ought to have had, as I know the Government wanted, three weeks between Committee and Report stages. The period we had was not long enough. My noble friends were in difficulty about putting down their Amendments, knowing that some Government Amendments were going down. Secondly, us my noble friend pointed out, we had an important debate on the code of practice. Again, this did not really provide time to think out suitable Amendments for discussion.

I would agree with the noble Earl that it is perfectly in order to put down such an Amendment, but it is something that ought to be done sparingly and basically with the intention of deleting the clause, rather than mounting a general debate. My noble friends have particular points they want to raise. I would therefore ask the House to show its usual tolerance in this matter. We have been in difficulty. I am not blaming the Government, and I do not think my noble friends should be blamed in this matter. I think it will satisfy the House if we have it firmly on record—and I entirely agree with what the noble Earl said about this—that it is something that one ought not to do too often. For instance, there was the Theft Bill, which was a relatively short Bill, but it kept the lawyers pretty busy thinking out Amendments; so if they could not think out Amendments the noble Earl will understand the difficulties that we have in thinking out Amendments to some of the clauses in this Bill, when neither we nor the Government understand them. Therefore I hope the noble Earl will accept this view. We had discussions through our usual channels and took steps to reduce the number of these Amendments. On the other hand, there are some very important points to make, and I think it would be right if we continue as we have done to-day and do not cut them all out. I think the noble Lords who raised the point were fully entitled to do so.

LORD BYERS

My Lords, the House will be grateful for that explanation of the position. Many of us were worried in case this should become a common practice in your Lordships' House. It would not be a precedent we should wish to initiate. I am glad that the Leader of the official Opposition has said that this is a device which should be used sparingly. There will be occasions when we may have to use it, but if we use it too often it will lose its power.

LORD SHINWELL

My Lords, during the Committee stage it frequently happens that the Government, in rejecting a proposed Amendment, agree to look into the matter and to give further consideration to a point. If, when it comes to the Report stage, it transpires that a particular clause is in no way amended, surely it is appropriate to ask why the Government have not given the matter consideration in accordance with the agreement that was reached earlier.

EARL JELLICOE

My Lords, I do not wish to detain your Lordships, but first may I make an announcement. I understand the cause of our present inundation is a burst water tank. It would rather appear from the quantity of water we have heard tumbling down, which in fact is rather more piano now, that the water tank is now almost empty.

I should like to associate myself with the noble Lord, Lord Byers, in expressing gratitude to the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, for his general assurance. I entirely endorse his view that this is a procedural device—and I am sure this is the general feeling of your Lordships— to which we should resort only very sparingly. I also recognise that there are special circumstances. There was one Government Amendment which did go down particularly late: I think there was only one. We have endeavoured, within the bounds of possibility—there has been a heavy strain on Departments and officials concerned—to get as many Amendments as possible down as early as possible. That is certainly our desire. We may not be able to get them down as early as we should like on all occasions, and if that happens I must apologise in advance. However, it is our intention.

The point put by the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, is a simple one. If there is a particular clause which Government spokesmen have said they would be prepared to look at again—and certain assurances of that nature were given at the Committee stage—and then noble Lords opposite find there is no Government Amendment down for that point, there is a simple answer. If noble Lords wish to revert to that point they may put down an Amendment covering it. I am sure that that is the device to use, rather than to leave out the clause. But I hope noble Lords will not resort to it too generously, because I can assure the House than when we have said we will look at these things we in fact do so, and we have done that a great deal between the Committee and the Report stages. That said, I am grateful to the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition for what he has said. I fully accept the general explanation of the position which he has given, and in the light of what he said, whilst asking noble Lords opposite to use this device in the circumstances of to-day as sparingly as possible, I hope that my noble friends will show more than their usual tolerance to-day.

LORD SHACKLETON

My Lords, I am grateful. I do not want to prolong this discussion. We sometimes get into these difficulties and we live in hopes that Government assurances may lead to results. I know that noble Lords opposite sometimes try, and I wish they attained more success. But it is difficult, because we on this side are living in hopes and looking at the List every day, hoping to see the Amendment, but never comes. Then, in desperation, we put down a Motion to leave out the clause, as a last hope that there will be signs of action on the part of the Government. Of course these Amendments would never be chosen in the Commons, but we think on the whole we manage our procedures rather well and we somehow find ways of talking—sometimes too much—about the things we want to talk about. I am grateful that the noble Earl thinks we should proceed. We shall move some of these Amendments to-day, at any rate, and we note the issues for the future.

5.55 p.m.

THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE (LORD BELSTEAD) moved Amendment No. 21: Page 11, line 12, leave out from (" secret ") to end of line 14.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment seeks now to delete the Amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Thorneycroft, at Committee stage. An Amendment has been tabled to Schedule 3, which appears on the Marshalled List as Amendment No. 90. The specific Amendments which are not now necessary are Amendments to Clauses 15(1), 49(4), 52(4) and Schedule 1, paragraph 12. I hope that with that brief explanation your Lordships will agree to this Amendment. I beg to move.

BARONESS WHITE

My Lords, we realise that this was a paving Amendment to Amendment No. 90. I am not quite clear whether it is in order to discuss Amendment No. 90 at this point. Perhaps we might have guidance on that.

LORD BELSTEAD

My Lords, with the permission of the House, Amendment No. 90 has been put down by the noble Lord, Lord Thorneycroft, together with my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn. Lord Thorneycroft is not in the Chamber now and though I referred to Amendment No. 90 I did not speak to it. Therefore, I feel we should wait until it is reached.

BARONESS WHITE

My Lords, I am entirely agreeable to that, but this Amendment is pointless unless we are allowed to discuss it with Amendment No. 90.

LORD BELSTEAD

But necessary.

BARONESS WHITE

My Lords, it is necessary as a paving Amendment. I understand that we can have a discussion on the point of substance when we reach Amendment No. 90, and I therefore raise no objection to it.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

5.59 p.m.

LORD DRUMALBYN moved Amendment No. 22: Page 11, line 23, leave out from (" that ") to (" have ") in line 24 and insert (" either a majority of the workers eligible to vote in the ballot or not less than two-thirds of those who voted in it ').

The noble Lord said: My Lords, if it is agreeable to the House I would suggest that we take together with this Amendment, Amendments Nos. 24, 25, 26, 33, 34 and 35. During the Committee stage I gave an undertaking to the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, who had moved an Amendment standing in the names of his noble friends and himself, and also in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, which would have enabled an agency shop to be established when a simple majority of the voters had signified their approval in a ballot. I undertook that if the noble Lord withdrew his Amendment the Government would have a further look at these provisions. I suggested that it might be possible to work out a compromise between the view of the noble Lords opposite, reflected in their Amendment, and the views of the Government, which is that in these two particular cases when the ballot concerns an agency shop or an approved closed shop something more stringent than a simple majority is essential.

As a result of this reconsideration, the Government are prepared to modify the requirements of these provisions to the extent of permitting the establishment or continuation of an agency shop or approved closed shop where either a majority of those eligible to vote or not less than two-thirds of those actually voting have voted in favour. We believe that this modification will meet the objections which were made to the original requirement that, in effect, a worker who failed to vote in the ballot was thereby registering a vote against the establishment of an agency shop or approved closed shop as the case may be. At the same time, it is in accord with the Government's contention that something more than a simple majority is required in a ballot which is to decide such an important question as to whether an agency shop or an approved closed shop should or should not be established.

The Government are also concerned to ensure that the purposes of the agency shop and approved closed shop provisions are not frustrated in a situation where a ballot reveals that an overwhelming majority of those actually voting is in favour of establishing an agency shop or approved closed shop but where this majority does not constitute a majority of those eligible to vote. A further ballot might well have a similar result, and the establishment of the agency shop could thus be held up indefinitely although it might be reasonably clear that the proposal enjoyed the support of a majority of those concerned. The Government consider that a favourable vote of not less than two-thirds of those actually voting could be regarded as indicative of a majority support in these circumstances.

I would only add that if my recollection is right this is not wholly unprecedented. I think I am right in saying—it only occurred to me quite recently and I have not had time to check it—that there is a procedure in Scotland under a temperance Act where a vote can be taken and in order for those who do not want to have public houses in an area to impose their will on those who do want to have them a two-thirds majority is required.

LORD DIAMOND

My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord, as he is so well informed on these matters and I am not, whether he can tell us either from his recollection or from ascertaining the facts what the situation was with regard to the voting in England in relation to deciding between those who wanted Sunday cinema opening to take place and those who did not want Sunday cinema opening to take place? These are interesting parallels. Was that a case of a simple majority?

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I had to deal with these things when I was at the Scottish Office; I have not had to deal with similar matters in England. I was merely pointing out that there are precedents of this kind, precedents where it is a question of taking away rights that are enjoyed by some against their will. Quite aside from the precedents, I think this is a sensible compromise that is being suggested between the conflicting points of view, and I hope that noble Lords will accept it in that spirit.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords. I have to announce that if Amendment No. 22 is agreed to I shall not be able to call Amendments Nos. 22B and 22A. I have received a Manuscript Amendment to Amendment No. 22 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, and the noble Lord, Lord Blyton.

LORD BLYTON moved, as an Amendment to Amendment No. 22 Amendment No. 22C: Line 3, leave out (" two-thirds ") and insert (" fifty-five per cent. ").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I rise to move the Manuscript Amendment standing in my name. As we have said many times, this Bill places many restrictions upon the trade union movement. Although, as noble Lords know, we do not like the Bill, we are now trying to reduce the harshness of its application. This Amendment is one such measure. The Government Amendment is that there must be a two-thirds vote for an agency shop to be established. How can the trade unions get an agency shop under this Amendment? There will be part-time workers voting, and generally they are not in the unions. By law they can say that they are not going to join a union; but they would be entitled to vote on this issue and they most certainly would automatically vote against an agency shop.

Why there should be a two-thirds majority I cannot understand. I remember Winston Churchill saying in the other place on one occasion that a majority of one is a majority; yet to get an agency shop here we have to get two-thirds of the votes cast. I know that I may be told that the miners have a two-thirds rule. That is true. But that is operative only in regard to strikes, and nothing else. This system will be changed next week at the miners' conference, to 55 per cent. of the vote being cast in favour of a strike before a strike can take place.

All we are asking noble Lords to do is to give a chance to the unions to get an agency shop. Under the Government's Amendment if 60 per cent. of the vote is for an agency shop we shall have lost; we have to get 66⅔ per cent. of the vote being cast. If the voting is 65 per cent. we are out. You can expect any amount of trouble if you get into a position like this. The trade unions will find ways to combat a situation of this character, and this will not do industrial relations any good. The Government have always claimed that they want good relations. I do not accept that this Bill will bring them about. The Government are not here because they got a two-thirds majority of the votes cast in the last Election; in fact they are here on a minority vote. However, they are prepared to hamper and place burdens on the unions to establish what, in many instances, they already have in industry. They are taking away the rights that we have had for years and conferring on us so-called privileges hedged around with all the legal sanctions that they can think of, and this Government Amendment of 66⅔ per cent. of the vote is another one. I believe that 55 per cent. of those voting in favour of an agency shop is a sufficient indication to any employer that a majority wants this. To require the two-thirds of those voting is surely designed to make agency shops impossible. It is for these reasons that I beg to move the Manuscript Amendment.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, as an Amendment to Amendment No. 22 it is proposed: in line 3, leave out (" two-thirds ") and insert (" fifty-five per cent. ").

LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY

My Lords, I am grateful to the Government for having looked at this matter again, and for the fairly substantial concession that they have given in Amendment No. 22. In this series of Amendments, including No. 22, I do not think they go far enough in two respects: first of all, because they still have this unusual, extraordinary—if not iniquitous—situation. Your Lordships will forgive me if I am not quite as coherent as I might be in explaining this provision because it is so complex and odd, and so unusual, that it is almost impossible to frame English to describe what they have suggested. The nearest that I have is: whereas you must have a majority of the workers eligible to vote, all two-thirds of those voting, in order to change the state of affairs one way, to start a closed shop; all you have to do to change things the other way, to abandon a closed shop, is to have over one-third of those voting for you, or make sure a majority of those eligible to vote do not vote against you. This is extraordinary, and I bet there was nothing like that in the Temperance Acts of Scotland.

The second point is that I still think that you have to have a very strong case indeed for changing the normal rule in English public affairs about having a simple majority. I accept that there may have been a precedent in Scotland over the Temperance Acts. I am far from convinced that that goes far enough to govern us there. Nevertheless, the fact that this second point is a departure from the 50 per cent. principle, the principle that a majority is a majority of one, as the noble Lord, Lord Blyton, rightly said, puts me and my noble friends in some difficulty when dealing with the Manuscript Amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blyton, and the noble Lord, Lord Diamond. We should have been much happier if the Manuscript Amendment that they put down had been along the lines of Amendment No. 22A, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, and the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, rather than the 55 per cent. which, in its turn, departs from the basic rule of the majority, more than 50 per cent.

My noble friends and I will listen with great interest to any more arguments which may develop in the course of debate, but I am inclined to say that I advise my noble friends not to support the Manuscript Amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blyton; to accept with gratitude, the Amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn; to oppose the contrary reference, when we get to it, about leaving a closed shop, and to hope that the Opposition might find some way of reverting to the original intention in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, and the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, so that we may still consider the possibility of going back to a simple majority. I am sorry if this sounds extremely complex, but it has started off as an extremely complex matter and has now been made a super-complex matter. I hope that we may find some way of resolving it rather more simply than at the moment seems likely.

LORD DAVIES OF LEEK

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley. I should like to say how very cogently, succinctly and logically he has made his case, and I was going to try and say something like that, and I do not think I could do it so well. We seem to have Occam's razor, Morton's fork and all the lot together. Consequently, I should like to know how we can go on. I should like to look at this Manuscript Amendment, but I am also very interested in the Amendment that has been referred to, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, and my noble friend Lord Delacourt-Smith. The House should listen with care to what the noble Lord, Lord Blyton, said—a man of experience in the trade union movement. If we have this hedging of our bets and this kind of formula in factories where there are part-time workers, it is not going to lead to good industrial relations. Whatever our differences, all of us, in all parts of the House want good industrial relations; that is the ultimate purpose of this Bill. We are grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, who has worked so hard, and all the noble Lords opposite who have kept their promise in looking at these matters, but I beg of them to consider whether they are sure this is an improvement in the direction which we want for good industrial relations. At this juncture, without boring the House (for most that could be said has been said), I will leave it at that.

LORD SOMERS

My Lords, one point occurs to me that I should like to put to my noble friend. I am not questioning his Amendment because I am not knowledgeable about it at all. Would it be possible for the plain majority of those eligible to come to one result, but for the two-thirds of those who have voted to come to the opposite result? And if that happened, which would one choose?

THE EARL OF BALFOUR

My Lords, so far as I can see in reading the Government Amendment, one could have a position like this. Take a simple case, where there are 100 people in a factory. If they all vote, and if 51 of the 100 people vote for an agency shop, you have an agency shop; you have the majority. But supposing that only 30 out of the 100 voted, and that 20 of that 30 (or perhaps it should be 22 out of the 30) voted for an agency shop, that would still make a majority of those who voted. Then the union could have their agency shop agreement. I feel that this is still a very small proportion, and I should not like to make this figure of 55 per cent. any smaller.

LORD BERNSTEIN

My Lords, is the noble Earl suggesting that voting should be compulsory? In another part of the Bill, a legal part, people would probably go to prison if they did not vote.

6.20 p.m.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

My Lords, as your Lordships will be aware, my noble friend Lord Stow Hill and I have an Amendment on the Marshalled List which, as the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, says, conforms to the views which he and his colleagues expressed at an earlier stage, and certainly represents the situation which we should wish to see put into effect. I am bound to say, however, that I have the feeling that, at any rate on this clause, those Amendments will not be before your Lordships. We are in the situation in which, while we accept that the Amendment moved by my noble friends Lord Blyton and Lord Diamond represents a departure from the broad traditional situation which we should like to see, it is a compromise; it is some move towards the position of the Government, which in all the circumstances we on these Benches would wish to support.

Of course, we have made it clear that we have no great enthusiasm for the agency shop. We do not think it is as desirable as the closed shop arrangement which, as has been explained by noble Lords on the Government Benches, it is really intended to replace. We do not think that, compared with the arrangements which exist in many industries at the moment, the agency shop represents a step forward. But it is clear that within the framework of ideas, within the framework of arrangements which the Government are seeking to create—within the context of this Bill, that is—the agency shop will in certain circumstances represent an advance on what would otherwise be in existence under the arrangements envisaged in this Bill. It is extremely disturbing, therefore, that one seems to see at so many stages obstacles—and they will certainly appear to the workers themselves to be obstacles—to the agency shop's being brought into being.

There can be no doubt that such a material departure from the broad traditional acceptance of a decision by a majority of those who feel sufficiently involved and inclined to vote is undesirable, and the greater the departure the more undesirable it is. Wherever a situation arises in which one departs from that principle—save in some very exceptional circumstances, such as that to which the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, referred in respect of Scottish temperance arrangements—departs from the broad rule of a simple majority of those who feel sufficiently involved to cast their votes, one gets a sense of frustration, a sense that justice is not being done, and that a rather special obstacle is being erected. While I recognise that what the Government are now proposing represents some movement in the right direction, what they proposed originally and what they are proposing now still leaves a situation in which it appears to be being made as difficult as possible for the agency shop to be brought to an end.

If, indeed, these arrangements in this Bill are ever going to secure a minimum degree of good will and acceptance on the part of the broad mass of trade unionists, there will have to be removed from them provisions which seem to be inserted to make it particularly difficult for the majority of those who happen to be sufficiently interested to cast their votes on an issue like this to have their will prevail. I would urge the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, to consider this point, and to do so from the viewpoint of the desirability of removing the appearance of making things more difficult than they need be, of making the objective desired by the majority of those workers who feel sufficiently involved to cast a vote more difficult to achieve than it need be. I hope he will respond to the plea of my noble friends Lord Blyton and Lord Diamond.

LORD SHINWELL

My Lords, may I in a word or two support all that my noble friend Lord Delacourt-Smith has said. Why should we depart from a principle which has been invariably adopted in connection with a General Election? In a General Election those eligible to vote, though they may not all vote, decide by a majority to select one candidate as against another. That is accepted by the constituency concerned, accepted by the electors, and generally accepted by the Government. There may be some difficulty about which Government it is, but that is quite irrelevant to the issue. Why complicate this business. If the Government want an agency shop, then they ought to provide the easiest possible facilities for obtaining it. The best way to do it is by means of a simple majority. I do not think it is necessary to make it 55 per cent.; it could be 51 per cent. A simple majority would suffice. After all is said and done, it is not so much the actual numerical aspect that matters; it is the temperate mood of the people on the shop floor. That is what we have to consider. Obviously, if there is a mood in a temperate direction of having an agency, then clearly a majority vote would suffice. I cannot understand why we should suggest all these complications when the matter appears to be so simple of solution.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I think I am entitled to speak as an Amendment to my Amendment has been moved. May I start from the point of view from which the Government begin in this matter. That is that the Bill in Clause 5 gives the right to belong, or not to belong, to a trade union. The Government take the view that that right is not lightly to be taken away; that minorities have their rights; and that it is only where a very substantial majority, or an overall majority, of those eligible to vote are in favour of an agency shop—which involves of course a person's having to belong to the union, or, if he does not choose to belong, to contribute to the funds of the union—that the agency shop should be imposed.

The noble Lord, Lord Bernstein, said that it would be making voting compulsory if we really insisted on the test of a majority of those eligible to vote. That really is not so, and in any case there are countries in which voting at elections is compulsory, and countries in the Free World. I do not think that that is a very substantial argument. On the other hand, my noble friend Lord Balfour seemed to be questioning, not without reason, whether it was right to go so far as we have done because, as he said, it might be that only 30 per cent. would vote, or even less, and yet the rights of the 100 per cent. would be reduced if 20 per cent. out of the 30 per cent. who were in favour of their reduction had their way. This would he the result of the two-thirds majority. If I understood him correctly, the noble Earl questioned whether this was not going too far.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

My Lords, is not the implication of the noble Lord's argument that those who do not vote at all are opposed?

LORD DRUMALBYN

No, the implication is simply that in those circumstances we do not know what those who do not vote want. That was why we felt that it should be a majority of those eligible to vote—this was our original thinking—and only such a majority should be able to impose its will on the shop as a whole. We have reduced this by saying two-thirds of those voting. All I was saying was that in doing so it may be that we have gone a little too far, but we have tried to meet the wishes of the Opposition in this regard and to frame a sensible compromise. The noble Lord, Lord Somers, asked which of the two would prevail. This is a straight alternative: either the majority of those eligible to vote or two-thirds of those voting. If 51 per cent. of those eligible to vote are in favour of the agency shop then an agency shop can be introduced, even if 90 per cent. have voted. The noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith felt that there should be just a simple majority of voters. I have explained the reasons why we do not think that this should be so in this case.

The noble Lord, Lord Blyton, if I understood him correctly, said that there was a precedent in the coal mines for a two-thirds majority in favour of a strike. I know that there are other circumstances in which a bare majority will suffice for a strike, but the mere fact that the miners are likely to decide, as I understood the noble Lord to say, that a 55 per cent. majority would do is merely just an instance of what different people consider to be necessary in different circumstances. But our view, as I have said, is strongly in favour of having a substantial majority of those actually voting in a case where the Bill itself guarantees, in Clause 5, the right to belong or not to belong to a trade union.

LORD DAVIES OF LEEK

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, for giving way. I am speaking off the cuff, but what troubles me a little is that we have a position under this Bill in which if trade unions are not satisfied, if the shop is not satisfied, with a vote, another vote can later he taken. That is correct, is it not? Another effort can be made if the first is lost on a majority. What concerns me is that unless we make a good beginning we can have this question coming up in perpetuity.

LORD DRUMALBYN

No; once the matter has been settled a two-year interval elapses, and if a substantial number—20 per cent.—are not in favour of the continuance of the agency shop they can ask for a ballot to take place after the two-year period; otherwise it will continue in force. I think these are sensible arrangements. We have genuinely tried to meet the wishes of the noble Lords half way, and I hope that our proposal will be accepted in that spirit.

BARONESS WHITE

Before the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, sits down, may I ask him to say a word about the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley? We are taking a large number of Amendments together and I think they all deal with the same point of principle in different parts of the Bill. We are not considering only a vote about establishing an agency shop but also about the continuance of the agency shop. The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, was that one-third plus one could disrupt an agency shop which had already been established. That might be of some comfort to the noble Earl, Lord Balfour, who is no longer in his place. He was worried about the possibility of a relatively small number of people being able to establish an agency shop, but the converse is also the case. A very small number could stop its continuance. I think we should have some comments on this point from the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn.

LORD DRUMALBYN

Quite clearly, in the case of a vote on continuance there would have to be 20 per cent. who thought the agency shop ought not to be continued. In those circumstances and only 30 per cent. voting, or something like that, would seem very scant; but once there are 20 per cent. of people who feel there is a doubt whether the agency shop should be continued, then the test of whether the trade union in question commands the support and confidence of the workers is a serious matter. Unless it commands the support of the workers, surely it is not right that the individual rights of the workers should be reduced.

6.35 p.m.

LORD DIAMOND

My Lords, I must pursue this matter a good deal further. As the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, said, it is a very serious matter indeed. Whether I was right not to object when it was suggested that all these Amendments should be taken together, without notice, I do not know. I shall have to consider that point when we come to the other Amendments and see whether comments ought not to be made on them, because they refer to different circumstances although they apply the same arithmetical procedure. On this point I want to engage the attention of your Lordships' House, and particularly of the Government, and seek their assistance. First, may I explain what seems to be, but only superficially, a slight lack of liaison between the Opposition Front Bench and the Back-Benches when we have Amendments appearing of a different kind. My noble friend, Lord Blyton, very wisely put down an Amendment the effect of which would be that a 55 per cent. majority would suffice.

That Amendment has enormous advantages, the greatest one being that if the Government have reasons which I do not understand—but who am I to attempt to understand the Government's mind?—but which the Government understand and feel deeply about, and think that a plain majority is inappropriate in this case and that we must move to a figure in excess of a plain majority, here we have an excellent example of something in excess of a plain majority and which applies in the world of trade unionists and workers. That is why it seemed to my noble friend, Lord Blyton, right to put down this Amendment.

Thereupon the Government put down an Amendment, and if nothing further had happened free speech would have been denied; and that is the last thing which your Lordships would desire. So, since this was drawn to my attention about mid-day, I thought it right to put down a variation of that Amendment in manuscript form and attach it to the Amendment moved by the Government, as this would be the only way of securing discussion. I am sure that I do not have to apologise for that or to establish my argument that this was a sensible way of proceeding so that we could discuss the matter. As I had taken the liberty of doing so, I naturally thought that my noble friend would not object if I added my name, and therefore put it in on my authority and my noble friend's implied authority. That is how the Amendment has appeared.

I want to deal with the reply by the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn—we are still on the Manuscript Amendment. The noble Lord's first point was his most important point. It entertained me immensely, because it was that if one is having rights taken away—here is a Government Minister saying this—then one must establish one's rights to do that by a substantial majority and one much greater than a simple majority. Who is proposing that to us? The noble Lord who sits there, by what authority? He does not even claim to sit there by a majority. Not even a year ago could he claim that he sat there by a majority. But he sits there, very properly, and continues to sit there, very properly, as representing the majority of those who voted although it was a minority of the population on a minority vote. He sits there, and, with his colleagues, proposes that a number of most important rights should be taken away from a number of workers; and he who does that then tries to say to us that the proper approach to this is to have a substantial majority. He omitted one little thing. He and all his colleagues should first have resigned and submitted themselves for re-election—and I do not even go into the point of what that minority would be to-day, according to the best of our information.

So the first thing I say is that it was amusing that the noble Lord should have chosen that argument, in his position, with his Government, when, as we know, he sits there as a member of a minority Government. So do most Governments, and always we accept that a simple majority of those voting is sufficient to enable a Government to take away rights galore from millions of members of the community.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, will the noble Lord allow me to interrupt him? If I may say so, he is making a rather rhetorical point, because what we are here talking about is a right which will be conferred by Parliament, and the way in which I hat right can be modified or reduced by somebody other than Parliament. It is a subsidiary right and is quite a different matter. If Parliament confers rights, one has to look very carefully at the way in which anybody can take away those rights subsequently. What we are trying to do is to make that distinction very clearly.

LORD DIAMOND

My Lords, the noble Lord is making the matter much too complicated. We are dealing with a very simple issue: is the method by which the community decides that somebody or other should take away their rights a simple majority or a majority of two-thirds? The answer is that it is a simple majority of those voting. I am grateful to the noble Lord for saying that he thought I was making a rhetorical point, because that gives me an opportunity of assuring him, and your Lordships, that I am doing nothing of the sort. So far as I am aware, I am making the first point; namely, that in all our everyday goings-on we accept as a fundamental principle the right of a majority to elect a Government which can then take away the rights of others. That is the first point.

As to the noble Lord's interesting reference to Scottish pubs, I think perhaps a more relevant reference would be to English cinemas, where a simple majority prevails. But that is not the important issue; nor, if I may say so, were the figures raised by the noble Earl, Lord Balfour, when he said, "Let us assume a factory of 100 workers; let us assume that only 30 per cent. vote, in which case the Amendment which the Government propose would mean that 20 people voting would secure an agency shop. We assume that 70 did not vote because they were not in fact concerned. Is anybody seriously going to suggest that those 70 have been justly dealt with because 20 people decided, but have been unjustly dealt with because 17 people decided—because on the present proposed Manuscript Amendment all that would be necessary on the figures given by the noble Earl, would be, "for 20, read 17". I am glad that it will be possible for my remarks to be conveyed to the noble Earl. Can anybody really say that 70 people have been well treated by the votes of 20 but that they have been grossly ill-treated by the votes of 17? Of course not.

That brings me to the main point. Wherever we have an attempt to enable human beings to satisfy themselves that justice is being done—and that is what we are really talking about—we adopt a procedure of appealing to them to make up their own minds and say what they want; and in all these spheres we take a simple majority, because that gives people a sense that justice has been done. I will agree immediately, having explained why the 55 per cent. came about, that as soon as you get a figure other than a simple majority you are then getting into a situation where people will say, "Well, if 55, why not 56 or 54? Why not any old figure?" But if you have a simple majority that must be something which appeals to the sense of justice deep in every one of us.

I will now turn to the procedural point of how we can achieve this—I thought I heard somebody saying that somebody was not being very helpful, and I naturally take that to be a reference to the Government. We have before us a Manuscript Amendment suggesting, instead of "two-thirds", "55 per cent.". If the Government want to give a plain, simple majority they can easily do it. That is the only point I want to make at this moment. There is nothing to prevent the noble Lord from getting up and saying, "We withdraw our Manuscript Amendment proposing 55 if he will substitute 50 by way of a Manuscript Amendment". There is no procedural difficulty before your Lordships' House which would prevent that from being done. I repeat that, in my view, a simple majority is fundamental justice. But if the Government, for some curious quirk in their own approach, take the view that you must have something more than 50 as a token, well then there is 55 per cent.—and there is good precedent for it. Therefore, if the Government are not going to meet us any further than that, I think the Manuscript Amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Blyton, ought to be supported.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, Amendment No. 22 having been

Resolved in the negative, and Amendment to Amendment disagreed to accordingly.

6.57 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 22) shall be agreed to?

6.48 p.m.

On Question, Whether the Manuscript Amendment (No. 22C) to the Amendment (No. 22) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 38; Not-Contents, 80.

CONTENTS
Archibald, L.	Delacourt-Smith, L.	Popplewell, L.
Bernstein, L.	Diamond, L.	St. Davids, V.
Beswick, L.	Gardiner, L.	Shackleton, L.
Birk, Bs.	Hoy, L.	Shepherd, L.
Blackburn, L.Bp.	Jacques, L.	Shinwell, L.
Blyton, L.	Janner, L.	Slater, L.
Brockway, L.	Lee of Asheridge, Bs.	Stonham, L.
Brown, L.	Lindgren, L.	Stow Hill, L.
Buckinghamshire, E.	Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, Bs. [Teller.]	Strabolgi, L.
Champion, L.		Taylor of Mansfield, L.
Chorley, L.	Longford, E.	White, Bs.
Crook, L.	Maelor, L.	Williamson, L.
Davies of Leek, L.	Phillips, Bs. [Teller.]	Wynne-Jones, L.

NOT-CONTENTS
Aberdare, L.	Derwent, L.	Latymer, L.
Ailwyn, L.	Drumalbyn, L.	Lindsey and Abingdon, E.
Balfour, E.	Dudley, E.	Loudoun, C.
Barnby, L.	Emmet of Amberley, Bs.	MacAndrew, L.
Beauchamp, E.	Falkland, V.	Macleod of Borve, Bs.
Beaumont of Whitley, L.	Ferrers, E.	Milverton, L.
Belhaven and Stenton, L.	Ferrier, L.	Monk Bretton, L.
Belstead, L.	Fortescue, E.	Mowbray and Stourton, L.
Berkeley, Bs.	Geddes, L.	Nugent of Guildford, L.
Bessborough, E.	Goschen, V. [Teller.]	Oakshott, L.
Birdwood, L.	Gray, L.	Platt, L.
Boston, L.	Grenfell, L.	Reay, L.
Brecon, L.	Gridley, L.	Rhyl, L.
Brooke of Cumnor, L.	Grimston of Westbury, L.	St. Aldwyn, E.
Brooke of Ystradfellte, Bs.	Hacking, L.	St. Helens, L.
Brougham and Vaux, L.	Hailes, L.	St. Just, L.
Byers, L.	Hailsham of St. Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)	Sandford, L.
Carrington, L.		Savile, L.
Coleraine, L.	Hatherton, L.	Selkirk, E.
Cork and Orrery, E.	Henley, L.	Skelmersdale, L.
Courtown, E.	Hood, V.	Somers, L.
Craigavon, V.	Hylton-Foster, Bs.	Strang, L.
Cranbrook, E.	Inglewood, L.	Tanlaw, L.
Crathorne, L.	Jellicoe, E. (L. Privy Seal.)	Teviot, L.
Crawshaw, L.	Kemsley, V.	Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, Bs.
De Clifford, L.	Kilmarnock, L.	Ward of Witley, V.
Denham, L. [Teller.]	Kindersley, L.	Windlesham, L.

moved, an Amendment to Amendment No. 22, line 3, was proposed in manuscript by the noble Lord, Lord Blyton, to leave out from line 3 the words "two-thirds" and insert the words "55 per cent.". The Question which I have to put is that the Manuscript Amendment be agreed to.

LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY

My Lords, I hope it is in order for me to speak to this Amendment: I will do so very briefly. It is merely to make the position of my noble friends and myself clear. We voted, rather reluctantly, against the Manuscript Amendment. If the Opposition Front Bench should decide that they wish to go through the Lobbies against the Government on Amendment No. 22, and if they should defeat the Government on this, we should, of course, then be able to vote in favour of Amendment No. 22A, which would then have to be called; and we would willingly do so. I am not suggesting to the Opposition Front Bench that they should do this; in view of the size of the last vote it would seem a slight waste of your Lordships' time. But I just wanted to explain that they would have a little more support on that issue than on the last.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

My Lords, my noble friends and I have listened to the very persuasive speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, and we have, I think, left no doubt that our preference is quite clearly for the simple majority. However, this matter has been tested, in a form not precisely that which we would have liked, on the Amendment, and having regard to all the circumstances I do not think my noble friends and I would wish to press the original Amendment to a division.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD GARDINER moved Amendment No. 23: Page 11, line 41, at beginning insert (" knowingly ")

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, on the Committee stage of the Bill, when we were discussing the question of inducing a breach of contract, I pointed out that it was, a tort well known to the law, subject to any special defence there might he, knowingly to induce a breach of contract. But the word "induce" stood alone in the Bill, and it did not include the word "knowingly". The Government's answer was that to induce necessarily imported knowledge and therefore it was not necessary to put in the word "knowingly". I respectfully dissented from that view, having been myself in a case, Deakin v. Thomson (originally Thomson v. Deakin), in which there was a breach of contract which was said to have been induced by Mr. Deakin, of the Transport and General Workers' Union; but in fact he had not known of the existence of the contract. I therefore continued to suggest that if, after all, it was the Government's case that "induce" meant "knowingly induce", there could be no real objection to inserting the word, and a possible gain, at least in clarity. The Government have now had an opportunity, I am sure, to give further thought to that, and it is for that reason that I ventured to put down this Amendment again. I beg to move.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, I still think the insertion is unnecessary, and I still think there is some danger in it. But as the noble and learned Lord evidently attaches importance to it, and as I think the danger is relatively small, and as it will give a certain amount of reassurance to persons who may otherwise have been alarmed by the terms of the Bill as it stands, my intention is to accept this Amendment, and I would so advise the House.

LORD GARDINER

My Lords I am very much obliged to the Government for their consideration of the matter.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, it may be for the convenience of your Lordships if we have a short interval at this stage, and I would suggest we resume in half-an-hour, which is at 7.31 p.m.

[The Sitting was suspended at one minute past seven o'clock and resumed at twenty-nine minutes before eight o'clock.]

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (LORD HENLEY)

My Lords, before I call Amendment No. 24 I have to advise your Lordships that if it is agreed to I cannot call Amendment No. 24A.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 24.

Amendment moved— Page 11, line 44, leave out from (" that ") to (" voted ") in line 1 on page 12 and insert (" neither a majority of the workers eligible to vote in the ballot nor two-thirds of those who voted in it have ").—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH moved Amendment No. 24B: Page 12, line 6, leave out (" two years ") and insert (" one year ").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, here, again, by this Amendment we do not seek to produce a situation which from our point of view would be an ideal one; we would question the necessity for any period of time in the context of this clause. But we propose that for the period of two years in the Bill there should be substituted a period of one year, because we believe that that would make a significant improvement within the general context of the arrangements about which we have made our general feelings clear. The significance of the two-year period is that it is the time within which, if a ballot is unsuccessful, certain things may not happen. The first thing that may not happen is that an agency shop agreement may not be made between the employer and the trade union for the workers who were concerned in the ballot. Even if the two parties wish to make an agreement, they cannot do so within the two-year period and if they seek to make such an agreement it will be regarded as void. Further, under subsection (4), during that two-year period the Industrial Court may not entertain any application under Clause 11 if, among other things, it relates (wholly or in part) to workers of' any description comprised in the ballot.

This is really a very severe and extensive programme of prohibition for a two-year period. It prevents the parties doing what they may wish to do, and it prevents the Industrial Court even from considering an application which, as I think is clear from subsection (4)(b), might be materially different in terms of the people concerned from the application which was the subject of the unsuccessful ballot. In our discussions on earlier Amendments we have indicated that we think it is unduly difficult to achieve an agency shop, and now we have this further situation that if an application produces a ballot result which is unsatisfactory, by what we regard as rather stringent tests, then this programme of prohibition will take effect for a period of two years.

Two years is a substantial time in the development of an industrial situation, and the whole economic situation and prospects of an industry could undergo a very substantial change. Certainly, the outlook of workers employed in a particular concern could undergo a very substantial change indeed. But despite the possibility of substantial changes within that time, there is this bar to the parties acting voluntarily in any circumstances. They cannot create an agency shop agreement, and there cannot be put before the Industrial Court, or before the Commission on Industrial Relations, any application from the trade union or the employer, or from both acting together, covering not only the workers who were involved in the original application, but also quite a substantial number of other workers who might be caught by the consequences and wording of subsection (4)(b). I put it to your Lordships that the period of two years is an unreasonably long one in these circumstances, and that if there is to be a period at all it should be of not more than one year. My Lords, I beg to move.

LORD POPPLEWELL

My Lords, I sincerely hope that the Government will have another look at this. From an industrial point of view, it is very difficult to understand why an embargo of two years should be insisted upon. One can understand the Government's lines of approach if one looks at this matter politically, but in industry the position very often changes rapidly. Who can tell what circumstances might arise a few months or a few weeks after an application has been made, which will bring about a completely changed atmosphere? The Government's aim is to establish good industrial relations. If that position does come about, as I am certain that it will within a very short period, then it seems ridiculous, when both sides in an undertaking desire to clear the air and to get good bargaining negotiations taking place, to prevent that happening by this two-year period.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, this is not a question of getting good bargaining negotiations going; this is a question of an agency shop. This is quite distinct from recognition procedures, the establishment of collective bargaining, the establishment of procedure agreements and so on.

LORD POPPLEWELL

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, merely indicates how little he understands the Bill and how little he understands its effects, because after the agency shop vote has taken place something may change, and there may be a general desire on both sides to establish an agency shop. If no application can be made within two years, that desire which has developed in the changed circumstances will be prevented from being given effect to by the words of this Bill. That is the position, and that is exactly what will take place. If that happens, bitterness will enter into the negotiations at some stage. These are the facts of life. This is not a theoretical approach; this is what actually happens. The position changes from time to time; and I cannot for the life of me see why there should be this two-year period. Leave both sides to work it out. I think that is a much more common sense, arrangement. However, if the Government would like to impose some ban, let them accept the Amendment suggested and have one year instead of two.

As I indicated at the commencement of this Bill, the code of practice and, particularly, the foreword by the Secretary of State desire to establish this good relationship. Why ever in the world, then, put in an irksome thing like this? It does not achieve any purpose except to produce bitterness; the bitterness reflects itself by word of mouth in negotiations over some difficulty which might have developed, and the whole thing blows up. I sincerely hope that the Government wilt take a more practical look at this and, if they cannot do away with it altogether, will accept the Amendment limiting it to one year.

LORD BELSTEAD

My Lords, we on this side of the House would certainly concede that the period of two years is an arbitrary period. We would also concede that it is not necessarily a perfect period. But in speaking from the Opposition Front Bench, the noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, and also the noble Lord, Lord Popplewell, in supporting, him, have perhaps overlooked one or two points which the Government feel they have had to take into account in arriving at the two year-period and in wishing to resist, as we do, the period of one year. It is true, as the noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, said, that even if the two parties subsequently wish to make an agreement they may not do so for two years, and that during that period the Industrial Court may not entertain an application in this particular constituency. But there is the point, which is a valid one, that after a ballot two years will give the union time in which to find, and ultimately to prove in another ballot, the necessary support for a new application.

I would remind the House that the subject we are discussing now has no effect at all if the original agency shop has been reached voluntarily. But the point which I do not think has been brought out sufficiently by noble Lords opposite, and indeed which has possibly been missed in other discussions this evening, is that the ballot gives those who are voting a full and reasonable chance to assess a situation. Indeed, we have had debates in Committee where it has been suggested that ballots are going to take a very long time, and that it is going to put certain unions in great difficulties. Indeed, the Government have been asked how they are going to arrange the ballots, and whether it is not conceivable that they cannot be arranged at all. We on this side of the House have resisted these suggestions, but certainly one would assume that a ballot will give those who take part in the voting and those who wish to influence those who take part in the voting time enough to look ahead and be able to point to what the future of that particular undertaking may be. When the noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, and the noble Lord, Lord Popplewell, say that so soon afterwards—one year according to the time which the Opposition would wish—there could be such a great change, I think it is being a little hard on the common sense of those who are taking part in the ballot and on the ingenuity of those who undoubtedly will be bringing their influence to bear on people who will be taking part in the voting.

The final point I would put to your Lordships is this. We believe that once a vote has been taken in a ballot of this sort the rights of those concerned are protected. Now it may well be that it is the rights of minorities, but we believe that this is important. My noble friend Lord Drumalbyn expanded on this in Committee and again this afternoon. We hope that we have got the balance right here between the rights of the individual and the effect it will have—and undoubtedly it will have an effect—on the general tenor of an undertaking after a ballot has been taken. For those reasons, I am afraid that we on this side must resist this Amendment.

7.46 p.m.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

My Lords, the noble Lord has replied with great persuasiveness and charm, but I am sorry to say that he has left me completely unconvinced by his arguments, and I am sure he must have left completely unconvinced by his arguments anyone who listened to his speech with an open mind. For what justification can there be for so wide a programme of prohibition for a period of two years? If I may say so, the noble Lord did not deal in any great detail with my point that the parties are prevented from even forming a voluntary agreement. One may take it that, in general, if this situation arises (and he pointed out that it arises in the case where an agency shop has been the subject of an application and has had to be the subject of a ballot) it is by definition, I think I am right in saying, a case where the trade unions have sought an agency shop and the employer has been resisting. Otherwise, there would not be a ballot; otherwise, there would not be the intervention of the Industrial Court. There must have been resistance from the employer for the situation to have arisen at all, for a ballot to have been required and for the ballot to have been unsuccessful. But even if the employer who was opposed to the proposition in the first place changes his mind, changes his judgment, he cannot make an agreement with the trade union within that two-year period. Really! this is an excessive and unreasonable situation.

Nor, if I may say so, did the noble Lord deal with my point about the very wide effect of subsection (4)(b), which carries the effect of the blight of this prohibition widely beyond the original group of workers covered in the ballot. Two years is a long period. It really is surprising that the noble Lord should say that it is difficult to accept that in the period of a year people will have changed their minds. We are not saying that they will necessarily have changed their minds, but we are saying that they may well have changed their minds in a period very much shorter than two years. What an extraordinary situation it would be, my Lords, if we applied this sort of rule to Parliamentary Elections and by-elections; and if we said, "If people have chosen a candidate of one Party, and if that candidate unfortunately dies after they have elected him as their Member of Parliament, they must, until a two-year period has expired, have a candidate of the same Party automatically returned as their Member of Parliament"!

LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY

My Lords, this does happen in some countries, and many people think it a very good idea and that it should happen in this country.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

My Lords, many things happen in many other countries which are different from what we do, but we in this country, with our particular tradition of thinking about political and social matters, and with our particular concepts of democracy, faulty though they may be, nevertheless prefer to keep to the ways with which we are familiar. I am bound to say—and certainly the interruption of the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, does not disturb the fact—that people may change their minds very substantially within a 12-months period. It would be indelicate, almost rude, of me to press that point with all the illustrations that come to mind of noble Lords on both sides of the House—

LORD BELSTEAD

Even within a three-week period.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

My Lords, that is so. But we are talking about decisions people make by a ballot vote, people who as little as 12 months later may say, "What a mistake we made in that ballot! Let us do everything we can to change our minds." In the situation envisaged in Clause 13 they will be unlucky. They will not be able to change their minds; they will be precluded, even if the employer has changed his mind, from doing anything. And that ban will extend—I must press this point—not only to people of the description covered in the original ballot, under subsection (4), but most likely to a substantial group of other people as well. This is a very bad provision and I am deeply disappointed that the Government do not see their way to meet us on this very modest Amendment which is an endeavour to ameliorate it somewhat.

8.0 p.m.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH moved Amendment No. 24E: Leave out Clause 14.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I propose to move this Amendment which is to leave out Clause 14 and I should like your Lordships to consider with it Amendment No. 27A which is to leave out Clause 15. These two clauses describe a situation in which an agency shop may be called into question by a process initiated by the presentation of a "round robin", or an application supported by a percentage of the workers, and as a result of that it becomes the subject of a ballot. I believe it proper to direct attention to this whole set of

7.52 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 24B) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 29; Not-Contents, 67.

CONTENTS
Archibald, L.	Gardiner, L.	Shepherd, L.
Birk, Bs.	Hoy, L.	Slater, L.
Blyton, L.	Jacques, L.	Stonham, L.
Buckinghamshire, E.	Janner, L.	Stow Hill, L.
Champion, L.	Lindgren, L.	Strabolgi, L. [Teller.]
Crook, L.	Maelor, L.	Taylor of Mansfield, L.
Davies of Leek, L.	Phillips, Bs. [Teller.]	White, Bs.
Delacourt-Smith, L.	Platt, L.	Wise, L.
Diamond, L.	Popplewell, L.	Wynne-Jones, L.
Gaitskell, Bs.	Shackleton, L.

NOT-CONTENTS
Aberdare, L.	Ferrers, E. [Teller.]	Nugent of Guildford, L.
Ailwyn, L.	Geddes, L.	Oakshott, L.
Auckland, L.	Goschen, V. [Teller.]	Rankeillour, L.
Balfour, E.	Gray, L.	Reay, L.
Barnby, L.	Grenfell, L.	Ruthven of Freeland, Ly.
Beauchamp, E.	Gridley, L.	St. Aldwyn, E.
Beaumont of Whitley, L.	Grimston of Westbury, L.	St. Helens, L.
Belhaven and Stenton, L.	Hailes, L.	St. Just, L.
Belstead, L.	Hailsham of St. Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)	Savile, L.
Berkeley, Bs.		Sempill, Ly.
Boston, L.	Harcourt, V.	Somers, L.
Boyd of Merton, V.	Hatherton, L.	Strathclyde, L.
Carrington, L.	Henley, L.	Suffield, L.
Coleraine, L.	Inglewood, L.	Tanlaw, L.
Cork and Orrery, E.	Jellicoe, E. (L. Privy Seal.)	Teviot, L.
Courtown, E.	Kemsley, V.	Teynham, L.
Craigavon, V.	Killearn, L.	Thorneycroft, L.
Cranbrook, E.	Latymer, L.	Tweedsmuir, L.
De L'Isle, V.	Macleod of Borve, Bs.	Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, Bs.
Denham, L.	Massereene and Ferrard, V.	Ward of Witley, V.
Drumalbyn, L.	Monk Bretton, L.	Windlesham, L.
Effingham, E.	Mountevans, L.	Wolverton, L.
Falkland, V.	Mowbray and Stourton, L.

Resolved in the negative, and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.

provisions, especially in the context again of the code of practice with its references to the desirability of creating and enhancing the strength of trade unions.

It may have escaped the attention of your Lordships that this permits the whole discussion and decision upon an agency shop to take place with the minimum reference to the trade union responsible in respect of the agency shop in question. This is a quite remarkable procedure, for if your Lordships will examine it, you will see that it is possible for an agitation to be started, and finally for a decision to be reached which nullifies an agency shop agreement without those undertaking the agitation having at any stage to bring the causes of their complaint to the trade union of which they may be members, or at any rate to which they will be contributing money. This is a serious and important point and I believe that the Government should give attention to it.

I am not so optimistic as to believe that the Government will accept this Amendment and the one which we are considering with it. But I put to the Government that it is creating an extraordinary situation when there is written into a statute a process which means that a group of workers may start an operation and carry it through without at any stage being under the necessity—if I understand the procedure right—to bring their grievances, their criticism, into the forum of the trade union which represents them. It is destructive of the concept of trade union democracy and the moral and natural relationship between a trade union and its members.

I do not think it likely that this sort of situation will arise frequently, but we know there may be groups who operate for various reasons of their own; references have been made in our earlier discussions to such groups by some of my noble friends. If a statutory provision is introduced which facilitates a group of workers campaigning without any necessity to use the proper procedures of their own trade union to any degree at all, it seems to me that by making such provision the Government are opening a very dangerous gate. It would be setting a very dangerous pattern, and one which certainly cannot be reconciled by any stretch of imagination with the objective of strengthening the trade union movement. I beg to move.

8.5 p.m.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, does not seem to have made his position in this matter quite clear. The question to be answered is this: ought there to be a way of challenging the position of an agency shop? The method in these two clauses applies to an agency shop agreement whether made voluntarily or by a ballot. The only difference is that if there has been a ballot you have to wait for two years before the challenge is made. I thought I detected in the very moderate speech made by the noble Lord a recognition that there ought to be some way of challenging it. He was saying, if I understood him correctly, that there ought to be written into the Bill some means by which dissidents should first have to bring their cause of disagreement—what I think he called "cause of agitation"—to the trade union. If the code of practice provisions are set up there will, or at any rate there should, be a works council with its consultative committee. Since the code lays down that every plant with a membership of 250 or more should have such a council, I should have thought it inconceivable that a matter of this kind would not have been discussed and fully ventilated in a works council before the "round robin", as the noble Lord called it, was started. I would think it equally unlikely that 20 per cent. could be found to support the applicant unless there was a considerable degree of dissatisfaction in the factory, or in the enterprise, with the arrangements for representation—with the agency shop agreement itself, because that is what we are talking about.

I do not think it can be disputed that there must be some means of challenging the existence of an agency shop. Let us take the case where an agency shop agreement has been made voluntarily. It is possible that the arrangement might have been made between the employer and the trade union without adequate consultation with the members, and it is conceivable that it might not have the full support of the membership? In such a case one would expect that there should be some means of challenging it so that a ballot could be taken. The answer may well be that before the agency shop agreement is entered into on a voluntary basis a ballot will be taken. If that be so, I should imagine that it is unlikely, if a favourable ballot was obtained then, that it would be challenged within a short period of time. I am only saying that there must be a means of challenging a voluntary agreement that is reached, so to speak, behind the backs of the workers, between the trade union and the employer.

We are not dealing with a common case but with the occasional case, where real trouble might well arise. We have already discussed the question of the two years' interval. If there are 20 per cent. prepared to put their names to a demand for a ballot, surely if that agency shop agreement is to continue it ought to be possible to get at least a 40 per cent. vote in favour of continuation, and then there will be the two-thirds as against the 20 per cent. who have to put their names down. If the 20 per cent. and the substantial support over and above the 20 per cent. are more than two-thirds of those voting, or a majority of those entitled to vote, then surely that agreement ought not to continue. This is our position, and I think it is a reasonable way of arranging for the challenge. I do not see the difficulty that the noble Lord envisages.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

My Lords, even if the noble Lord does not see the difficulty I assure him that there is a very real difficulty. It is clear from the provisions, as I read them, that the arrangements are largely automatic. The 20 per cent. application is made, the Industrial Court entertains the application, and the Commission proceeds to organise a ballot. At no stage in this procedure is there any investigation by the Commission or any report on the industrial circumstances surrounding the application.

Trade unions take a good deal of responsibility in the course of discussing industrial relations. It is right and proper that they should. This often leads to situations in which misconceptions and feelings of criticism can arise. These can best be dealt with within the trade union, as the workers concerned realise that the best way to get their criticisms heard and answered is to raise them within the trade union machinery. Either the policy has to be changed, or the workers are convinced that the course that is being followed is the proper one and the one that they ought to support. But this

necessitates that matters are discussed within the trade union itself, through the proper processes of discussion and decision-making.

But these clauses provide in certain circumstances a different way, which enables action to be taken and criticism to be expresed by anybody outside the trade union, and without anybody at any stage raising the necessity for the matter being considered through the trade union machinery. For the purpose of discussion I will not challenge the view of the noble Lord that there must be some method by which an existing agency shop may be called into question, though in other contexts I might wish to discuss that proposition with him, and certainly to refine it. The question I put to him is this. Is it really proper that this matter should be dealt with in a way which places no necessity upon the individuals who are raising the application, and whose action can lead to a ballot, to raise it within their own trade union machinery?

There is not even scope in these arrangements for an investigation by the Commision. Surely the Commission for Industrial Relations ought to play some more real, as distinct from purely formal, part in the proceedings. I do not think that the noble Lord has taken fully the criticisms and the difficulties to which in some cases this clause could give rise.

8.16 p.m.

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 29; Not-Contents, 74.

CONTENTS
Archibald, L.	Gaitskell, Bs.	Shepherd, L.
Bernstein, L.	Gardiner, L.	Slater, L.
Beswick, L.	Hoy, L.	Stonham, L.
Blyton, L.	Jacques, L.	Stow Hill, L.
Buckinghamshire, E.	Janner, L.	Strabolgi, L. [Teller.]
Champion, L.	Lindgren, L.	Taylor of Mansfield, L.
Crook, L.	Maelor, L.	White, Bs.
Davies of Leek, L.	Phillips, Bs. [Teller.]	Wise, L.
Delacourt-Smith, L.	Popplewell, L.	Wynne-Jones, L.
Diamond, L.	Shackleton, L.
NOT-CONTENTS
Aberdare, L.	Beauchamp, E.	Blackburn, L.Bp.
Ailwyn, L.	Beaumont of Whitley, L.	Boston, L.
Auckland, L.	Belhaven and Stenton, L.	Boyd of Merton, V.
Balfour, E.	Belstead, L.	Brecon, L.
Barnby, L.	Berkeley, Bs.	Coleraine, L.
Colville of Culross, V.	Harcourt, V.	St. Helens, L.
Cork and Orrery, E.	Hatherton, L.	St. Just, L.
Craigavon, V.	Henley, L.	Sandford, L.
Cranbrook, E.	Inglewood, L.	Savile, L.
De L'Isle, V.	Jellicoe, E. (L. Privy Seal.)	Seear, Bs.
Denham, L. [Teller.]	Kemsley, V.	Sempill, Ly.
Digby, L.	Killearn, L.	Somers, L.
Drumalbyn, L.	Latymer, L.	Stamp, L.
Effingham, E.	MacLeod of Borve, Bs.	Strathclyde, L.
Falkland, V.	Massereene and Ferrard, V.	Suffield, L.
Ferrers, E.	Monk Bretton, L.	Tanlaw, L.
Goschen, V. [Teller.]	Mountevans, L.	Teviot, L.
Gowrie, E.	Mowbray and Stourton, L.	Teynham, L.
Gray, L.	Nugent of Guildford, L.	Thomas, L.
Grenfell, L.	Oakshott, L.	Thorneycroft, L.
Gridley, L.	Platt, L.	Tweedsmuir, L.
Grimston of Westbury, L.	Rankeillour, L.	Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, Bs.
Hailes, L.	Reay, L.	Ward of Witley, V.
Hailsham of St. Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)	Ruthven of Freeland, Ly.	Windlesham, L.
	St. Aldwyn, E.	Wolverton, L.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 15 [Ballot on application under s. 14]:

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 25.

Amendment moved— Page 13, line 14, leave out from (" that ") to end of line 15 and insert (" neither a majority of the workers eligible to vote in the ballot nor two-thirds of those who voted in it have ").—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

8.24 p.m.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH moved Amendment No. 25C: Page 13, line 21, leave out (" two years ") and insert (" one year ").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I appreciate that this is similar to the Amendment which I moved when we resumed at 7.30, and I should not propose to invite my noble friends to divide the House again on this issue. But I am bound to say that I feel, in the light of the arguments that have been put forward, that the case of the Government for rejecting this Amendment is a lamentably weak one. The considerations are those that I set out at greater length on the similar point in relation to the earlier clause. I would point out again that this provision introduces for a period of two years an elaborate programme of prohibitions. The employer and the trade union are prohibited from reaching agreement, even if they wish to do so; any agreement which they purport to reach is void; and, as is clear, I think, from the latter part of subsection (3), the blight of this prohibition extends well beyond the

workers who are covered by the original ballot. To extend a prohibition so wide, for a period as long as two years, with such substantial changes in industry and its prospects, and which in the viewpoint of workers can take place in a much shorter period, fully justifies our Amendment to reduce the period to one year. I deeply regret that the Government have not felt able to meet us upon this point. I beg to move.

LORD BELSTEAD

My Lords, all I would do is to reiterate the stand which we took on the previous Amendment to which the noble Lord has referred. The general tenor of the noble Lord's arguments on both this Amendment and the previous one does bring up one other point to which I certainly did not refer before. I think it is the belief of the Government that, if noble Lords were successful in Amendments of this sort, they might at the end of the day bitterly regret it. If agency shop agreements are successfully made, and it were possible to follow the line of thought of the Opposition on this and to challenge after one year instead of after two years, this could have in my belief—and I mean this sincerely—a counter-productive effect. As your Lordships know, there are other reasons why we resist these Amendments, and in particular this one. Once again, I must ask your Lordships to reject the Amendment.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

My Lords, I am bound to say that I am no more convinced by the additional argument that the noble Lord has advanced. There is no necessity why one should carry this same one-year rule from the clauses in respect of which I have moved it to the other clauses, which would enable an existing agency shop to be called into question after a shorter period. If it were a choice between having one year throughout, or two years throughout, I would favour one year; but I would certainly prefer to have two years in the case of the continuance of the agency shop; that is lo say, a two-year period before application could be made under Clause 14. But certainly there seems an overwhelming justification for a shorter period than two years in the case of this elaborate prohibition which is covered in the subsection to which the present Amendment refers. Having expressed the views of my noble friends and myself on this point, and in the hope that, even at this late stage, the Government may recognise that there are powerful arguments in support of the two Amendments I have moved, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

LORD DRUMALBYN

May I, with permission, raise a point here? Owing to an unfortunate error in the Marshalled List, Amendment No. 26 was not moved. It did not appear under my name, but it should have done.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Is it the desire of the House that, owing to the printer's error, I should now call Amendment 26?

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 26.

Amendment moved— Page 13, line 35, leave out from (" that ") to (" have ") in line 36 and insert "either the majority of the workers eligible to vote in the ballot or not less than two-thirds of those who voted in it")—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

8.31 p.m.

LORD GARDINER moved Amendment No. 27:

Page 13, line 43, at end insert— (" (5) If it appears to the Industrial Court that there is a bona fide dispute as to whether the report by the Commission on the result of any such ballot is the true result of the ballot, such dispute shall be determined by the Industrial Court.")

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, at the Committee stage of the Bill I pointed out that in all the clauses dealing with the balance there was a provision that if the Commission reported to the Industrial Court, and if the result of the ballot went a certain way, the Industrial Court had no discretion at all but was bound to make an order. I asked the question, "What is to happen if there is a dispute as to whether the Commission's report on the result of the ballot is right?" I pointed out that there are sometimes disputes, of which I have had more than one example in the courts, where it is alleged that a ballot has been "rigged". No provision was made in the Bill for what was to happen in such a case. I was not, of course, suggesting that the Commission would do anything improper; but after it had reported, the evidence might have been forthcoming. I asked: was nobody entitled to say, "This ballot has been rigged"?—as happened in a case when this was done by the Communist members of the union. I suggested a provision so that, if there were a bona fide dispute as to whether the report of the Commission on the report of the ballot was right, the question should be decided by the Industrial Court, which could hear the witnesses and determine the matter.

I therefore drafted and put down, in what I hoped to be English, a simple clause as follows: If it appears to the Industrial Court that there is a bona fide dispute as to whether the report by the Commission on the result of any such ballot is the true result of the ballot, such dispute shall be determined by the Industrial Court. Since putting down that Amendment, I have observed the Government's Amendment No. 94, which is designed in general to meet the same point, except, as they have had the great advantage of Parliamentary draftsmen, that it is in 34 lines instead of four lines. It does not completely satisfy me, apart from the drafting, because I put down subsequent similar Amendments to other clauses dealing with ballots, including an emergency ballot. For some reason which I do not understand, the Government Amendment does not cover emergency ballots but only ballots covered in other parts of the Bill. I should think that probably the most sensible course for me to take, when I have heard what the noble and learned Lord Chancellor has to say, is to ask leave to withdraw this Amendment. Then we shall see when we come to the Government's Amendments whether they require some amendment. I beg to move.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, on Clause 15 I venture to reply to the noble and learned Lord because it was obviously to me that he raised these points. We had hoped to meet his desires, at any rate in everything except the emergency procedures, and I agree with him that it would be appropriate to talk about those when we come to that alternative or to our Amendment No. 156. However, I gather that, despite the greater length of Amendment No. 94, he will be quite satisfied with that, so far as this particular clause is concerned. If so, I hope he will withdraw his Amendment. I do not think I need say more upon it at the present time.

LORD GARDINER

My Lords, I fin not too happy about the drafting of Amendment No. 94, because it appears to depend on rules which are not yet in existence, and I do not know what they will contain. But perhaps, before withdrawing the Amendment, the noble Lord will tell us why Amendment No. 94 does not apply to emergency ballots, where such a provision would have been more than ever necessary.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords. I should be glad to do so, but I should have thought the time for that would be when we got to the appropriate place in the Marshalled List. At the moment, we are considering only the noble and learned Lord's Amendment in relation to this particular clause, and I think it would be out of order if we were now to consider Amendment No. 94 in detail, or, for that matter, his Amendment to the clause on emergency procedures.

LORD GARDINER

My Lords, I think the Government are playing this rather close to their chests, and I should have thought that perhaps it would have saved time, when we got to Amendment No. 94 if we had had some explanation beforehand. But if the noble Lord does not wish to give this now, I will withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 16 [Pressure to anticipate result of ballot]:

LORD GARDINER

My Lords, Amendment No. 27B covers the same point as Amendment No. 23. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 14, line 3, after (" so ") insert (" knowingly ").—(Lord Gardiner.)

LORD GARDINER

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 28.

Amendment moved— Page 14, line 14, after (" Act, ") insert (" knowingly ").—(Lord Gardiner.)

LORD GARDINER

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 29.

Amendment moved— Page 14, line 19, at beginning insert (" knowingly ").—(Lord Gardiner.)

8.38 p.m.

BARONESS WHITE moved Amendment No. 29B:

After Clause 16 insert the following new clause:

Employers' duty to keep list of workers' contributions under s. 8 or 9 of this Act

". Where there is in force an agency shop agreement, any employer or employers' association which is party to such agreement shall institute and maintain up-to-date a list of all workers who in lieu of membership of any trade union which is party to such agreement have agreed to pay appropriate contributions to that trade union in accordance with section 8 of this Act or equivalent contributions to a charity in accordance with section 9 of this Act, and shall free of charge furnish a copy to that trade union upon all reasonable requests made by that trade union for a copy pf such list, and such list shall in the case of each such worker state the amount of the appropriate contributions or as the case may be the equivalent contributions to a charity payable by him."

The noble Baroness said: I beg to move the Amendment standing in the name of my noble friends. We have had some discussion already on this small but important point; namely, that in these provisions for the setting up of agency shops, as we know, there will be some groups of workers who will pay contributions in lieu of membership of a trade union and others who will pay equivalent contributions to a charity. We have already indicated that we think it would be only reasonable in these circumstances for the Bill to make provision for the unions to be supplied with particulars of those workers, by definition not their own members, who are making these payments.

I looked at the code of practice to see whether that would help us at all, but the difficulty is that it is in such general terms that when one seeks to apply it to any particular situation one finds it of only limited value. But there are one or two phrases in it which might help us. In the section dealing with communication and consultation it says: It is important for efficiency and for good industrial relations that employees should feel that:

1. (a) they are kept informed on matters which concern them."

Paragraph 2 goes on: Management is responsible for effective communication and consultation. It should deal with them systematically and not leave them to casual methods. It seems to me that this is one of the types of information which a union would be reasonably right to ask for. It is something which I should have thought a good management would be very willing to do, but, of course we are dealing in this Bill with managements of all kinds and there may well be some who feel, "Why should we bother?"

I am sure the Government will appreciate that not all of this Bill is going to be universally popular. The whole conception of the agency shop is not universally popular, and it seems to me that this would be a small concession to make and something which would be very much appreciated, riot least because I am sure they will also understand that many provisions of this Bill are going to lay very heavy burdens on trade unions and on their organisations. They will, for one thing, with the complexity of this legislation, have to engage lawyers and pay for legal advice to a far greater extent than they do at the moment, and there will be other ways in which the provisions of the Bill, justified as they may appear in the eyes of the Government, will lay very real burdens on organisations which will not find it easy to carry them.

I have some intimate knowledge of trade union organisation, and I know that at shop floor level much of this Bill is going to be very onerous indeed. This is a small provision which would not be unduly burdensome for the employer. Employers will have to keep records in any case, and all we ask is that they supply copies of those records to trade unions on request, so that they will be clear who is paying what to whom and so will be able to keep a proper check on what is going on. I hope that the Government will accede to what I am sure they will realise is a helpful and reasonable Amendment. I beg to move.

LORD BELSTEAD

My Lords, this Amendment to require employers to provide a list of workers who, in lieu of membership to a trade union, are going to pay to a charity, or to the trade union in an agency shop situation is, I know, moved by the noble Baroness in a desire to be helpful, but I cannot accept it, not because there is a difference of opinion but because we believe on this side that there is a difference of opinion about practicality. We cannot see how the employer is going to have the records. The noble Baroness said that management should not leave this to casual methods. I wonder if for a moment I could dilate on this. It is obviously the duty of a trade union to keep lists of its own members, and I cannot see—and I do not expect any well-run trade union can see—how their duty to keep proper records and make provision for ballots, for instance, can be fulfilled if the trade union does not have an up-to-date list of members.

In an agency shop situation those working in an undertaking who are not on the trade union list of members will, as we know, be liable for contributions either to the trade union or else to a charity, but the employer will not be in a position to know exactly who these people are. The trade union will know because it has its own records, and the workers concerned will know, and as a result of Amendment 14 which your Lordships agreed to some time ago, some of the workers will request their employers to check off their equivalent contribution to a trade union or a charity, and to that extent the employer will know about them. But the employer to whom this Amendment applies will be the one party in the matter who will not necessarily know the whole truth, and we believe therefore, without any difference on the matter, that this Amendment is imposing an impossible duty. Could I remind your Lordships that the onus is on the worker, and if he fails to observe this condition of employment he may be dismissed or otherwise penalised by the employer, and the trade union may induce the employer to dismiss—

BARONESS WHITE

My Lords, with respect, the noble Lord was about to say that the worker could be dismissed, but how could the employer dismiss him if he did not know?

LORD BELSTEAD

My Lords, I am not aware that this is relevant. The relevance of what the noble Baroness has said would occur when it is known, and when it is known dismissal can take place. When it is known by the trade union the union may induce the employer to dismiss. In addition to this, there is nothing to prevent voluntary agreements on a matter of this sort, but if it is made statutory we do feel that it may be impossible to effect and would take away from trade unions matters which we feel should properly fall within their area of responsibility.

LORD POPPLEWELL

My Lords, is not the noble Lord begging the question? More and more agreements are being entered into between employee and employer with a view to deducting trade union contributions. This seems to be a developing theme amongst enlightened employers, and if that is so does it not do away with the noble Lord's argument that the employer would not know? He would be the person to whom the names were being given. If a person says, "No, I am not going to join, but I am willing to pay a contribution", if it has been agreed that that contribution shall be deducted from wages, which is a very common practice and a growing one, the employer is the only person who is likely to know. The employer is surely also the one who is going to be responsible for knowing when a person has decided to pay his contributions to a charity.

LORD BELSTEAD

My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord, and if the House would allow me, before the noble Lord develops his argument further, I would mention two points here. In the first place, when the contributions are being paid the employer will not necessarily know which type of contribution is which. Secondly, the noble Lord is referring to the check-off system. It is increasing, and noble Lords with experience of trade union matters—particularly the noble Lord, Lord Popplewell—are saying that this is a good idea, but this is a little different from a statutory obligation being imposed in the Bill. On the one side we are talking about a check-off system which is voluntary and is increasing, but this will be a binding duty. This is where we join issue with the Opposition. There is very little between us, but there is this.

LORD POPPLEWELL

My Lords, I agree that it would be a binding duty. But what could happen? A worker may be suspect as to what attitude he has taken, and he eventually decides. He informs the rest of his workmates that he is making a contribution to a charity. His workmates may suspect that very much indeed, and there may be suspicion that he is not so doing, and one can easily see the difficulty that would arise within the works. It may be that in a close, compact factory records will be kept, and the trade unions will be able to keep their records, but when it comes to industry that is diversified, such as transport and that type of thing, you will find there is great difficulty indeed. Some of these people may be in small, isolated unions away from the area officer, or something of that description, and find that it is impossible to keep a check. I should have thought that through this paternalistic Bill it would not be a hardship to ask the employer to keep a record of those people who are not paying direct to the trade union as trade union members. It would be a means of keeping suspicion out of the area. There will be a suspicion if some people say that their contributions are going in a certain direction and the trade unions have no record of it at all. In the interests of good relations this is not an undue hardship to inflict upon the employer, and I hope that the Government will not be quite so dogmatic in turning down this Amendment. If the wording is not quite suitable, then I do not know how it can be rearranged in the future but I sincerely hope that the Government another look at this matter.

8.52 p.m.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

My Lords, I should like to add my voice to the pleas that have been made by my noble friends Lady White and Lord Popplewell. I was most surprised at the Minister's reply. I had thought, after the exchange we had on a similar topic at the Committee stage, and the degree of sympathy which was then expressed for the point of view that we put forward on this problem, that the noble Lord would give a sympathetic response to this Amendment, even if he felt it necessary to criticise in some minor degree some aspects of the wording. The short debate we have had really casts great doubt on how the Government really imagine this agency shop arrangement is going to work in practice. Under Clause 13, which we have already considered and passed, there is a provision that in certain circumstances, when the agency shop is to be set up: it shall be the duty of the employer to take all such action as is requisite on his part for the purposes—

1. (a) of entering into an agency shop agreement…"

and so on.

We must press the Government to describe to us in more detail how they imagine an agency shop agreement is to be operated, who will record those individuals who elect not to be trade union members but to pay contributions, and how precisely those contributions are to be collected. Is it really seriously believed by noble Lords opposite that they can be collected by the ordinary trade union shop steward, that he can go round and collect the contributions from individuals who have said, "We do not mind paying money, but we do not want to have anything to do with your union"? So it cannot be done by the shop steward, the trade union branch secretary or financial secretary, or whatever the official may be called. It cannot be carried out tinder the trade union's own arrangements. Presumably it must be dealt with by the employer. I had assumed all along (perhaps wrongly) that this was accepted as part of the action requisite on his part for the purposes of entering into an agency shop agreement.

The noble Lord was saying that it is up to the trade union to keep the records of its own members and that they will presumably know who are the non-members. This does not necessarily follow, for trade unions have their own methods of record-keeping and in many industries it may be quite impracticable to keep the records of membership in a form which make them easily available to the shop steward, or other union representatives, at the actual work place. To take one example: supposing we were concerned not with a nice, small, cosy factory but with a situation in which the agency shop agreement operates in respect of building and contracting operations. The whole arrangement of trade union organisation is extremely difficult in the construction industry precisely because people move from site to site. A site will only be open for a few months or, at most, two or three years. As the building operation proceeds, the workers required on that site, as distinct from others run by the same employer, change. First, workers are required to put in the foundations, then to construct the shell of the building. More workers are needed to fit the building out, and so forth. It is a great problem for building employers, especially in the case of large building firms, to keep track of where their workers are at any one time. It is completely impracticable to expect the trade unions in a situation like that to be able to identify precisely, at any given time on any given site, who are their members and who are the people who have chosen not to be members but just contributors.

We must press the Government for some clearer concept of how this is to operate. The obligation must be put on the employer. It is easy, and has been accepted very readily, to write in responsibilities which will bear on the trade union. Some heavy responsibiilties are being imposed on trade union representatives at all levels by this Bill. It is not unreasonable in the case of the agency shop agreement to put an obligation on the employer to see that the bookkeeping is properly carried out. He will carry out this operation, if he has any sense, in sensible co-operation with the trade unions, and the trade unions will co-operate with the employers to see that the records are reasonable and that things run as smoothly as the inherent nonsense of the arrangement renders possible. There must be an obligation on the employer, because otherwise nothing can be done. One cannot put the sole responsibility on 'the trade union; one cannot let the responsibility rest in the air. The only person in this field who can possibly do this job, who has the facilities to do it because he is doing it in his normal work of control and deployment of his labour force, is the employer. It is on him that the responsibility must surely rest.

BARONESS WHITE

My Lords, may I further press the Government on this? My noble friend has spoken with great experience as a general secretary of a trade union. I repeat that I have had some experience, both as a civil servant in the Ministry of Labour (now some years ago), and as a constituency member with for example, a large steelworks, with many thousands of workers, and some 16 different trade unions operating in that particular works. When you have a situation of that sort, with some 13,000 or 14,000 workers, divided between 16 different unions, and you have a small group of workers scattered over a large enterprise, people working on three shifts, and so on, who are difficult to locate, how do you deal with that? You may have some people who want to pay contributions in lieu, others who want to pay to a charity. If you had an industrial union system in this country it might be simpler, but it is not a case of one union having to keep track of these things. Mr. "So-and-So" may not be on one list, and how is the union to know? Mr. "So-and-So" in fact may be on another list. There is no central organisation possible within a normal trade union structure in a large enterprise of this kind, either in one location or, as my noble friends have indicated, in such others as the building and contracting industry where people are moving all over the place. Another example is the transport industry where those concerned are not even at a fixed base for any length of time. Then there are the other industries that we have mentioned, our dear friends the seamen and the actors, who are always moving around and changing jobs.

What is meant in the Bill by the passage to which my noble friend Lord Delacourt-Smith referred, in Clause 13, where it says: … it shall be the duty of the employer to take all such action as is requisite on his part for the purposes of… after such an agreement has been made… carrying out the agreement so long as it remains in force "? Surely this should be one of his obligations. We fail to see how the Government envisage this provision working. If one goes back to Clause 11 which sets out the conditions for agency shop agreement, one sees that it says: terms and conditions of employment shall include a condition that every such worker must either—

1. (a) be or become a member of that trade union or "

pay these appropriate contributions. Is it not in those circumstances the duty of the employer to see that this particular condition is carried out? Is it not really to be part of his side of the agreement? Somebody must do some sort of monitoring on this, and in the kind of conditions we have endeavoured to describe—either industry where there is a very scattered working population, or a very complex industry with a large number of people divided among a large number of unions—you would find yourself in a very difficult position if you expected the unions to do the monitoring or policing work in this connection.

If it is the employer's obligation, as I should certainly suppose it to be, taking Clauses 11 and 13 together, then one would surely expect that the employer would have some sort of records. If he does, then we cannot understand why there should be any objection to his making those records, for this particular purpose, available to the trade unions. There will be cases—where a person pays to a charity, for example—in which it will be difficult to know which union has the obligation to make sure that the charitable contribution is being paid. It surely should not be for a union, which may not be certain even which union he would he in membership of if he were prepared to join a union—which he is not—to know which union's job it is to make sure that he pays to the charity of his choice. Surely it should be the employer's obligation. I do not think we are at all clear about this matter. I do not think my noble friends are clear about this. We hope the Government may be.

LORD BERNSTEIN

My Lords, I have little to add, but there is a practical side to this question. Somebody has to do the book-keeping. Some monies have to be taken every week and registered in some company's or somebody's cashbox. Some day that money has to be paid out. If you do not offer this information to the people who have a right to the information for checking purposes there will be a leak. There are leaks in Washington, in the Pentagon. There will be a leak in every business. The practical course is to ensure that there is good book-keeping and that the information is available to those who want it. Otherwise, it is all just nonsense.

BARONESS SEEAR

My Lords, it seems to me that a logical consequence flows from the introduction of the agency shop with the right not to belong, which is laid down in this Bill. It is this. I realise that noble Lords on the Government side may be unwilling to go to these lengths, but surely the implication is that where there is an agency shop there should also be a check-list system, if it could be implied that where there is an agency shop there is a check-list, all these difficulties would be solved. We know that the agency shop is not popular in many areas. We know that the other evening we passed the clause which says that the closed shop, where it has existed, does not continue as a right. This will be an extremely unpopular decision, causing a great deal of ill-feeling. But I think that the pill would be sugared in some areas at any rate if the check-list system was introduced; and it would certainly deal with the administrative problem which we are now discussing.

9.6 p.m.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I think that the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, has got nearest to the problem of any speaker so far. I have a good deal of sympathy with the proposal here. But the difficulty is, as my noble friend said, a purely practical one. May I direct noble Lords' attention to what is being asked for here. They say they are limiting the list that is to be kept to those workers who, in lieu of membership of any trade union which is party to such agreement, have agreed to pay appropriate contributions to that trade union or equivalent contribution to a charity. What my noble friend has said is that it is not for the employer to know who are members of the trade unions and who are paying contributions in lieu.

If the suggestion of the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, were accepted—that in all agency shop agreements there should be a clause stating that the check-list procedure should be applied—this would solve the problem. But surely is not this the right answer? Why should we make this a compulsory adjunct to the provisions for an agency shop agreement?

LORD BERNSTEIN

My Lords—

LORD DRUMALBYN

The noble Lord must try to understand the points. We are being asked here to cause the employer to do something that he cannot do, for the simple reason that it is not for him to distinguish between those who are members of the trade unions and are within the check-off system and those who are, in lieu of membership of a trade union, making a contribution. He cannot do that. It is for the trade union to tell him if that is so. However, the point is this. There is no obligation on the trade union to do that. We are here going into detail which is quite unnecessary.

The premises on which this Amendment is based are these: first, that the employer has a record of those required to contribute. The second premise is that the employer knows which employees are union members, and the third premise is that the check-off system operates in respect of all employees or all contributing non-members, one or the other or both. No doubt the first premise is valid, that the employer has a record of those required to contribute, because in an agency shop everyone has to contribute something, either to the union as a member, or to the union as a non-member, or to a charity. Unless there is a check-off system, as the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, has correctly appreciated, one cannot operate these distinctions because some employees will be paying contributions direct to the trade union and it is not for the employer to say that they should not do so.

Some of those making contributions in lieu of membership will be paying direct. Some, if they like, can ask for the money to be deducted by the employer and in that case the employer will make the payment. We carried an Amendment to that effect only on Tuesday. So we have an infinity of different circumstances. The noble Lord himself indicated the different circumstances which arise. In the construction industry the circumstances may be quite different from those in other industries, more complex and more difficult. The point is that this is a matter which the union has to settle for itself.

Noble Lords have looked at Clause 11, but the point here is that every worker must either be or become a member or agree to pay appropriate contributions to the trade union or one of the trade unions, not necessarily the trade union to which he belongs. I suppose there may be some procedure for collection or something of that kind. It is surely for the trade union to make arrangements for the way in which money is to be paid and for it to make the arrangement with the employer if it wants the matter dealt with in a certain way. That can be done in the agency shop agreement itself. Because of the infinity of different circumstances which may arise, it would have been wrong, I should have thought, to lay down in the Bill a particular form of words. In any case, I have drawn to the attention of noble Lords the difficulty the employer would have in knowing who are the workers making the payments in lieu of membership as distinct from those in membership, because it is not for him to know that.

I was asked by the noble Lord, Lord Archibald, on Tuesday night, what happens if the employer does not pass on the payments. The answer is quite easy. If necessary they can be recovered as a civil debt. In fact he would either retain them deliberately or by a mistake, by inadvertence. If it were by inadvertence, he would no doubt be converting them to his own use and we would find a stronger word if he were doing it deliberately. There is no essential difficulty about this. It is purely a matter for agreement between the trade union and the employer in these circumstances. It is to the trade union that each person, each employee engaged by the employer, has to go to indicate whether he is to belong to the trade union, whether he is to pay a contribution in lieu or to pay to a charity. It is with the trade union that he has this relationship, not with the employer.

BARONESS GAITSKELL

My Lords, is the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, saying that at no time does the employer know how many of his workers belong to a union; how many do not belong, and how many are paying on grounds of conscience to a charity? Is the noble Lord actually saying that? That is what I understood him to say.

LORD DRUMALBYN

No, my Lords, I did not say that an employer at no time knew. I said that all employers at all times do not know, which is not quite the same thing. There is no reason why they should know it. They do not necessarily know it. In any case, my noble friend was entirely right in saying that this is primarily a matter for the trade union and something which the trade unions themselves in their relations with employers can settle in the ordinary way. Of course the noble Lord, Lord Bernstein, was quite right in saying that the person who has to keep accounts of payments which he has received in lieu of membership and passed them on is the employer. If he does not do so he finds himself in the courts.

LORD BERNSTEIN

My Lords, who would take action against the employer? Would the noble Lord suggest that the trade union should take action against the employer for not giving the money to the charity? Who would take action against the employer? Someone has to have that responsibility. Who is to police the employer?

LORD DRUMALBYN

I should have thought that quite plainly it was the trade union itself in its own interests which would do the policing. It will know how many are paying through the employer and how many are paying to the union direct. It will know how many are to pay contributions in lieu. It must know that.

LORD DIAMOND

My Lords, may I make my "maiden speech" on this Amendment? May I say first to the noble Lord that the answer to his question about where the primary responsibility lies is a very simple one—it lies on the Government, because the Government have introduced a scheme which at the moment is not workable, and the question we have all to address our minds to is how it can be made to work. I am referring to the agency shop agreement.

I venture to express my views about this because during one's professional life one is continually called in to try to make a complicated arrangement like this work; and having been for many years (a long time ago) a financial director of a large civil engineering works, as well as being a practical accountant, one has been brought up to have to face this sort of problem. When the noble Lord says that there are a number of pre-requisities the answer is that in fact there is only one prerequisite; and that is the total number of employees. That is the one prerequisite; that is the starting point, and there is only one source for that information and that is the employer. I am delighted that the noble Lord, who is a professional colleague, is listening with his usual care whenever I address your Lordships' House, and doubtless he will say if I am wrong in any single respect.

The only way to start is through the total list of employees. The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, is saying—and quite rightly—that the employer does not know the whole story. That is right; we give him that straight away. Nor does the trade union know the whole story. That is also right, and he will give that to us straight away. The question is how to make this thing work. Somebody must co-operate with somebody else, and somebody has to have the responsibility of keeping the total record, because otherwise nobody will know and nobody will accept it. It is the Government's scheme. The noble Lord cannot wriggle out of this one. It is not our scheme, it is their scheme and it is no use the Government introducing a scheme if the scheme will not work. It can be seen on the face of it from the start that it will not work. In order to make it work somebody has to keep the totality of the records, and there is only one person who has the one source of information which is the prerequisite of the lot, and that is the employer. Nobody other than the employer on the large building site knows who is employed and by whom. There are vast numbers, and they are changing. Sometimes they are direct employees, sometimes they are employees of sub-contractors and sometimes they are employees of sub-sub-contractors. It is a most complicated thing, and that is only to take one instance.

In a factory of any size, there are many unions and there are many people coming and going. So I say that one starts off with the simple proposition that only one person knows the whole story and that is the employer; that is, he knows the whole story so far as the employees are concerned. To the extent that he does not know the whole story so far as the payment of union dues is concerned, of course the unions will be glad to co-operate and to give the employer what information they have. With that the employer can keep his total record. The suggestion that has been made is that within that concept of the employer knowing the total story and having that obligation, there is one method—an obvious one—of reducing the employer's work enormously. I refer to the suggestion made to us by the noble Baroness, Lady Seear. With that I entirely agree, but, with respect to her, I am sure she will agree that this is within the concept of somebody having responsibility, and that is supposed to be the employer. There is nothing in the Bill which says that the employer has to give the union information as to union dues. There is nothing to that effect under the cock-eyed system that the Government are introducing.

I am saying that if the Government want this system they have the responsibility of thinking out a system that will work. It can work only on the basis of the total number of employees, and the only person who knows that is the employer; to the extent that he needs additional information the union will gladly co-operate in giving it to him. It cannot be the other way round because the union does not start off with knowledge of the total situation. The responsibility must be put on one party or another, otherwise there will be complete chaos and nobody will accept the responsibility. Once you have responsibility it is reasonable that the employer should give the union representative such information as he needs in order to satisfy the provisions of this curious proposal. But it is the Government's proposal. That is the only way of doing it. We must therefore press the Government endlessly to see, if they are going to have this system, that they must put the responsibility upon the employer to collect the information and distribute the information, because there is no other way of making it work.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, perhaps I may ask the noble Lord this. Why is it necessary in an Amendment like this to place the obligation for playing the part which the employer has to play in this in the Bill, and only the obligation of the employer? The noble Lord admitted the trade union would have to play a part as well. Why should it not be both?

LORD DIAMOND

My Lords, the answer to the noble Lord's point is, if he wants to add in that the co-operation of the union is also required, let him add it in. But the union will obviously have to co-operate in its own interest. The union has to have some method of knowing how it is going to collect its contributions, as opposed to its dues, from its newly created non-members, in addition to knowing which of the newly created non-members are not going to pay contributions or dues but are going to pay to a particular charity. I know it sounds ridiculous and laughable in the extreme, but it is an idea introduced by Her Majesty's Government and therefore we have to pay it the respect it is entitled to. That is the reason the responsibility is put upon the employer, because nobody is going to be so stupid as to try to take it on unless they are given the responsibility of doing it. If the arrangement is to work, it must be done in that way. I defy the noble Lord to tell me any other way that it will work. All he has said is, on behalf of the employers, "We are not proposing to put the responsibility on them".

BARONESS WHITE

Even with a checklist.

LORD DIAMOND

Even with a checklist—"and if the union loses out as a result, that is bad luck on them and we do not care; we will not pass too many sleepless nights about that ". I ask the noble Lord which other way is it going to be made to work?

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, if I may say so, before the noble Lord sits down (if that is the correct phrase), the noble Lord has defied me to say which way it is going to work. We are dealing here with agency shop agreements, the vast majority of which will be agreements between the parties reached entirely voluntarily. Is it not an absurd thing in relation to such agreements reached entirely voluntarily to put this kind of provision here? Surely the short answer to the noble Lord is "by agreement".

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

My Lords, if I might, with leave, speak again, this is not a very good answer we are getting from the noble Lord. How many times have the Government said "We cannot leave it to agreement; it must be spelled out in detail; there must be penalties threatened, with recourse to the industrial tribunals or the Industrial Court"? Now when the practical difficulties are really exposed the noble Lord says "It will be reached by agreement". What about those which are not reached by agreement, where there is an agency shop as a result of a ballot in spite of resistance?

EARL JELLICOE

My Lords, I hesitate to intervene, but I did not hear the noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, get the permission of the House.

9.24 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 29B) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 33; Not-Contents, 74.

CONTENTS
Airedale, L.	Diamond, L.	Seear, Bs.
Archibald, L.	Gaitskell, Bs.	Shackleton, L.
Ardwick, L.	Gardiner, L.	Shepherd, L.
Bernstein, L.	Henley, L.	Slater, L.
Beswick, L.	Hoy, L.	Stonham, L.
Blyton, L.	Janner, L.	Stow Hill, L.
Buckinghamshire, E.	Lindgren, L.	Strabolgi, L. [Teller.]
Champion, L.	Maelor, L.	Tanlaw, L.
Crook, L.	Phillips, Bs. [Teller.]	Taylor of Mansfield, L.
Davies of Leek, L.	Popplewell, L.	White, Bs.
Delacourt-Smith, L.	Reay, L.	Wynne-Jones, L.
NOT-CONTENTS
Aberdare, L.	Falkland, V.	Mowbray and Stourton, L.
Abinger, L.	Ferrers, E.	Nugent of Guildford, L.
Ailwyn, L.	Goschen, V. [Teller.]	Oakshott, L.
Auckland, L.	Gowrie, E. [Teller.]	Orr-Ewing, L.
Balfour, E.	Gray, L.	Pender, L.
Barnby, L.	Grenfell, L.	Rankeillour, L.
Beauchamp, E.	Gridley, L.	Ruthven of Freeland, Ly.
Belhaven and Stenton, L.	Grimston of Westbury, L.	St. Aldwyn, E.
Belstead, L.	Hailes, L.	St. Helens, L.
Berkeley, Bs.	Hailsham of St. Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)	St. Just, L.
Boston, L.		Sandford, L.
Boyd of Merton, V.	Harcourt, V.	Savile, L.
Brabazon of Tara, L.	Hatherton, L.	Selkirk, E.
Brecon, L.	Hood, V.	Sempill, Ly.
Coleraine, L.	Inglewood, L.	Skelmersdale, L.
Colville of Culross, V.	Jellicoe, E. (L. Privy Seal.)	Strathclyde, L.
Craigavon, V.	Kemsley, V.	Suffield, L.
Craigmyle, L.	Killearn, L.	Thomas, L.
Cranbrook, E.	Kinnoull, E.	Thorneycroft, L.
Crathorne, L.	Latymer, L.	Tweedsmuir, L.
De L'Isle, V.	Lindsey of Abingdon, E.	Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, Bs.
Denham, L.	MacLeod of Borve, Bs.	Ward of Witley, V.
Digby, L.	Massereene and Ferrard, V.	Windlesham, L.
Drumalbyn, L.	Monk Bretton, L.	Wise, L.
Effingham, E.	Mountevans, L.	Wolverton, L.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 17 [Special provisions for approval of closed shop agreement]:

9.32 p.m.

LORD DRUMALBYN moved Amendment No. 30: Page 14, line 26, leave out (" employers' association ") and insert (" organisation of employers ").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I hope it will be the wish of the House that along with Amendment No. 30 we should take Amendments Nos. 32, 39, 40 and 41 which all deal with the same point. Amendments on very similar lines to the ones that I now wish to move were moved during the Committee stage by the noble Baroness, Lady White, and the noble Lord, Lord Archibald. On that occasion the Government were not able to accept those Amendments, but I undertook that we would look at the matter again very sympathetically. This we have done, and we believe that in the narrow field of approved closed shop agreements we can properly make a concession without undermining the basic philosophy of the Bill on registration.

These Amendments will enable an organisation of employers which is not registered under the Bill to be a party to an approved closed shop agreement. This will overcome the objection which was made by the noble Baroness and the

noble Lord, that the requirement on an employers' organisation to register before it could be a party to an approved closed shop agreement was essentially a handicap for the trade union. We accept that argument and as we want to ensure that the objects of these provisions succeed, I commend these Amendments to the House. My Lords, I beg to move.

BARONESS WHITE

My Lords for once—and it is a very long time since we have been able to say this—we are grateful for what the noble Lord has said. This is a concession for which we asked at an earlier stage because we were very strongly pressed on this, particularly by the trade unions in the entertainment world, and we have no doubt that this change in the description of an employers' organisation will help. Accordingly, we are thankful for small mercies.

LORD STOW HILL

My Lords, may I put one question to the noble Lord who moved the Amendment? While I am also extremely grateful to the Government for having, on reflection, made this concession, would not the logical consequence of it also be to enable unregistered organisations of workers to apply to become parties to approved closed shop agreements? At the moment, Clause 17 enables trade unions only (if one looks at it from the trade union point of view) to make a joint application to become parties to an approved closed shop agreement. The Government have—quite rightly, if I may respectfully say so—amended the expression "employers' association" to include an unregistered organisation of employers. Why should not one equally make a change in the case of trade unions, so as to enable unregistered trade unions to become parties to a joint application?

The noble Lord said that the change in the case of the employers' association would not undermine the thinking upon which the Bill generally is based. Is that consideration not equally applicable in the case of a change which would enable unregistered organisations of workers to become parties to such a joint application? After all, I should have thought, so far as unregistered organisations of workers are concerned, that the basic thinking upon which the Bill proceeds centres around Clauses 96, 97 and 98. Those clauses can stand quite independently of the clauses relating to approved closed shop agreements. So, while I do not wish to look a gift horse in the mouth (if I may use an expression which I hope is not disrespectful to the Government) and while I am most grateful to them for the changes they have felt able to make, I would ask them also to consider whether it would not be fair and logical to make a similar and corresponding change so as to enlarge the application of Clause 17 to unregistered organisations of workers. Why on earth should they not be parties to approved closed shop agreements?

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I do not know whether I ought to describe the noble Lord as "Lord Oliver Twist", but he is obviously asking for quite a bit more. I would certainly hesitate to describe any argument that he put forward as specious, but I think he has got a little near it on this occasion because in Committee we made it very clear how far we expected the trade unions to be in a position to fulfil their obligations towards their members in accordance with guidelines, and so on, before an application from them for an approved closed shop could be entertained. I think that argument was fully understood even though noble Lords did not agree with it. I think the noble Lord fully understands the argument, and I do not think I need develop it.

9.38 p.m.

LORD BELSTEAD moved Amendment No. 31:

Page 15, line 26, at end insert— ( ) Where a worker to whom the agreement applies, and who is specially exempted, has agreed to pay appropriate contributions to a charity, and requests his employer to deduct the contributions from his remuneration and pay them on his behalf, then so long as that request remains in force—

1. (a) he shall not be regarded for the purposes of subsection (5)(a) of this section as having refused to pay the contributions to the charity, and
2. (b) any failure on the part of the employer to comply with the request shall not be regarded as a failure on the part of the worker to pay the contributions."

The noble Lord said: My Lords, an Amendment similar to this one was moved as Amendment No. 14 in relation to the situation of an agency shop. This Amendment, which I think is self-explanatory, is in relation to the situation of the approved closed shop. I beg to move.

LORD DELACOURT-SMITH

My Lords, we accepted this, of course, when a similar provision was moved in respect of the agency shop arrangements. In the light of our discussion on the earlier Amendment a few moments ago it seems surprising that such great care has been taken in this particular respect towards those who contribute to charity, while arrangements of a more general kind seem to be as unsatisfactory as we sought to indicate.

BARONESS WHITE

My Lords, we still need a little explanation as to what is going to happen about these contributions. How is anybody going to determine that the employer has paid them to the charity? Who is in a position, as my noble friend Lord Bernstein asked, to take any action? The worker is not to be regarded as being in default if the employer does not take the appropriate action. That is fair enough. But we are not clear how anybody is to know whether the employer has paid out the money. There may be several charities involved. Since an earlier Amendment was not accepted, there may be a multiplicity of charities. Before passing this Amendment we need to have further information as to how the Government propose this will operate. We should like to know in whose hands the remedy lies and who is to obtain the information on which to take any action that may be required.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I should have thought that in a case like this it was the obligation of anybody who kept an account of this sort to account to those who are directly responsible: in the first case the people to whom the employees have to go in order to put themselves in order, either by paying their contribution to the trade union or by paying a contribution in lieu of membership or making a contribution to charity. The man will go to the trade union, and it is absolutely reasonable that the trade union should have an account of the way this is done. We were saying that this is so much an ordinary accounting practice, an ordinary practice of good business, that you really do not need to put it into the Bill as a separate part of the law. I should have thought that the trade union would be absolutely in its rights in asking for an account at any time of any of the money that was being paid in accordance with their contributions without any special provision in law.

LORD BERNSTEIN

My Lords, would the noble Lord consider adding those words to the Bill?

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I have just said that I do not think it is appropriate to add those words to the Bill because it seems to me to be ordinary good business practice.

LORD DIAMOND

My Lords, we are sorry if this intervention in an attempt to set things straightened out causes signs of impatience in various parts of the House but we have to do our duty and pursue this matter. If we have exhausted our rights in the view of the Government Front Bench, I am delighted to see the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, there, brimful of knowledge of how to deal with this. I address my remarks to him immediately. I am following what Lord Drumalbyn said. I am no lawyer. We are entitled to rely on the Government for legal advice and assistance. I do not know whether there is any contractual right or relationship—what the lawyers call privity of contract—as between the union and the employer in relation to individual employees who themselves have instructed the employer to carry out a certain obligation. I do not know on what authority the noble Lord says that a union has a right, without its being statutorily described, to ask the employer for this information. It is certainly the case that without this information, the union cannot function and this scheme cannot operate.

Therefore, I intervene as shortly as possible to ask the noble Lord to say how he is justified in his comment that the union has a right to ask for this information. If he is telling me that there is some common law right and you do not need any mention in the Statute, or if he is telling me that there is some provision in the Statute under the rules, or something else which I have not seen, of course I accept that. But otherwise I should have thought the proposal made, which is perfectly all right so far as it goes, just does not go far enough to enable the Government scheme to work.

LORD BELSTEAD

My Lords, if I may draw this matter to a conclusion, I think the answer to the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, is that the mechanics of the matter is that the trade union and the employee agree on the charity to which the employee who objects on grounds of conscience to paying to a union, shall pay his dues. I have not looked that up but I think that is in the Schedule. Then, under the check-off, the employer is due to pay that money over. This point was quite squarely dealt with earlier on by my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn; but on behalf of my noble friend and myself, as this point has been put at great length by the Opposition, we should like, without any commitment whatsoever, to take one more hard look at it, if noble Lords opposite would agree.

Schedule 1 [Provisions as to certain closed shop agreements]:

9.47 p.m.

LORD STOW HILL moved Amendment No. 31A: Page 128, line 6, leave out (" and ") and insert (" or ").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 31A, and if it meets with the approval of the House, I propose to discuss together with it Amendments Nos. 31B, 32A and 32B. They are all directed precisely to the same objective, and I hope that I may address the House on that assumption. The object of these four Amendments—

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lord to ask whether he would think of discussing Amendment No. 41B too, which deals substantially with the same point?

LORD DIAMOND

My Lords, I object.

LORD STOW HILL

My Lords, I have taken that into account. There are differences with regard to Amendment No. 41B and I think it would be a little inconvenient to discuss that as well. When we come to Amendment No. 41B, if I am called to move it, I will do my best not to repeat anything that I have said on these Amendments but point to the differences in 41B from the present Amendments.

The object of these Amendments is quite simply to change paragraph 1 of the Schedule 1 in such a way as to make it possible either for a trade union unilaterally, or for an employer, or an employers' organisation as it would now be, to make application to the Industrial Court for an approved closed shop. As paragraph 1 is at present worded, such an application could be made only if both the employer and the trade union joined in the application. The rationale of the existing provision that the application must be joint is, I find, not altogether easy to understand. There are in this Bill, besides this procedure, two other analogous procedures, one for an agency shop agreement and one for the designation of a sole bargaining agent. Each of the three procedures have a number of common features. They involve an application to the Industrial Court, the Court submits the matter, if it thinks the application is competent, to the Commission for its advice and report and then, in differing forms, there is provision for the holding of a ballot.

The rationale of the distinction made between the procedure in relation to an approved closed shop, which requires a joint application, and the procedures in relation to the other two, I do not find easy to follow. It is a distinction extraordinarily difficult to justify. When we look at what has to be done, it seems to me that it becomes even more difficult to justify. I will not trouble your Lordships with the other two procedures but would invite your Lordships to consider what has to be done, if an approved closed shop has to be obtained under Schedule 1. The basic provision is contained in paragraph 5, and one cannot get anywhere unless one can persuade the Commission that the four conditions in that paragraph are satisfied. Even then one cannot get the approved closed shop approved if one cannot satisfy the Commission that this objective could not be equally well attained by an agency shop agreement.

If your Lordships will glance at what has to be shown, your Lordships will see that an enormous volume of proof has to be undertaken by an applicant. First of all, the applicant has to say that the agreement is necessary—not desirable, but that it is indispensable. One cannot do without it. Then one has to satisfy the Commission that the agreement is necessary for the purposes

1. "(a) of enabling them to be organised, or to continue to be organised,…
2. (b) of maintaining reasonable terms and conditions of employment and reasonable prospects of continued employment for those workers;
3. (c) of promoting or maintaining stable arrangements for collective bargaining relating to those workers; and
4. (d) of preventing collective agreements relating to those workers, which have been or may thereafter be made by the applicants, from being frustrated."

The Commission have to be convinced about all these requirements and even if convinced on all four the applicant has to go still further and satisfy them that this objective could not be equally well achieved by an agency shop agreement. To set out to demonstrate the presence of all those requirements is a most formidable task.

How you would do it in practice, I do not know. I suppose if one tries to take one's mind to equivalent procedures before a court of law, one would envisage a very long and formidable volume of evidence to establish it. I will not trouble your Lordships by going into this in detail, but if it is really necessary to satisfy the Commission in a real sense that an approved closed shop agreement is necessary for those purposes, it would be a elaborate and complicated procedure. I suppose the joint applicants either will have to go through that proceeding, which might take a long time, or the alternative way in which affairs might turn out might be simply that satisfying the Commission is merely more or less an empty phrase; that the Commission take a rough ad hoc look at the position and form a purely superficial view without going into it. If the latter is to be the result of the scheme embodied in Schedule 1, really it would be better to take out paragraph 5 altogether. If the former is to be the position, and paragraph 5 is to be observed according to its terms, then I should have thought that the burden upon applicants is a very heavy one.

To go back to the point that I am immediately on, why on earth, if a trade union is intrepid enough to be ready to take upon its shoulders that task, should it be denied even the opportunity of so doing? A trade union may feel strongly that it could demonstrate all those requirements; it may feel strongly that it could show that an agency shop agreement would not serve the purpose. If it feels that in the circumstances it has the information and the evidence which it could put before the Commission which would demonstrate that, why in the world should one deprive the trade union going to the Commission and trying to prove all those things?

I find that a question of extreme difficulty to answer. I do not want to use a strong phrase, but I do not think it is an excessive way to put it to say that it is flying in the face of common sense to say to an individual union: "Even though you may be convinced that you can show all those things, we are not going to give you the opportunity to do so, because the employers are not prepared to go along with you." As has been said before in our debates—and I apologise for repeating it—already a large number of workers are covered by the provisions of closed shop agreements which have worked well for years. One would imagine that in most cases employers would be only too glad to co-operate, and only too glad to have closed shop agreements as well, because they have been shown by experience to conduce to orderly negotiation on the terms and conditions of employment. But nobody is perfect. This world is an imperfect world, and I suppose you will constantly get the employer who is awkward and will not co-operate; who wants to make things difficult, or cannot make up his mind. Why should the existence of a closed shop agreement hinge upon that sort of thing in a case where you have a union quite ready to take upon its shoulders the burden of satisfying the Commission as requisite? There is really no risk at all to anybody in giving the trade union that opportunity.

If one looks further on in the Schedule, one finds in paragraph 7 that if the Commission are not prepared to indicate to the Court that, having considered those matters, they are satisfied about them, then that is the end of it and the application can go no further. What risk to anybody is involved in those circumstances by allowing a union to have a try? Assuming that it is successful in showing all those things, surely the public interest and the interests of the workers and employers concerned points to the setting up of closed shop agreements if the union can prove it. If it cannot, then cadit quœstio the matter goes no further and the Court can do no more about it. I would submit that this is really a most important aspect of the Bill and it is most unfortunate if it is going to remain in its present form and thus deprive unions, should they think themselves able to discharge the obligation of proving what is necessary, of the chance of doing so.

An argument, good or bad, becomes worse by repetition, and I will not attempt to make mine worse than it is; but I have ventured to draw attention to this point again because it is so important. It covers millions of workers and is something which I would submit to the House is a most important aspect of the building up of sensible orderly bargaining arrangements, and for no reason that I can discover to limit the possible scope of successful applications in this arbitrary and quite unjustifiable way seems to me to militate very strongly against the public interest. I ventured to raise this matter on Committee when we were debating the Question, That the Schedule be agreed to, and I have now put it down on Report. I hope the House will feel that I have not taken up its time unnecessarily in doing so, but I attach very great importance to this aspect of the Schedule and I hope that the Government will be able to say that they will give further thought to it. I beg to move.

10.2 p.m.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, one of the first answers that I have to give to the noble Lord is this: I think he is starting from a rather different concept of the approved closed shop than we are. I think he would like to sec it very much more widely extended and much more frequently applied than we think is likely to be the case. We believe that the agency shop will meet most cases, and, as he will recall, when the Bill was first introduced in another place it contained no reference to an approved closed shop at all. This was subsequently introduced, and it was introduced with one or two industries particularly in mind. It follows then that we believe that closed shop agreements should be approved only in the most exceptional circumstances, and that those circumstances must include the willing consent of all concerned that the closed shop is in their interest. To some extent I thought the noble Lord answered himself in the points that he put because, if one looks at the criteria, I would have thought that unless both the employer and trade unions were themselves convinced of these four points it would be very unlikely that the application would meet with the approval of the C.I.R.

Taking the points one by one as he mentioned them, they include enabling the workers to be organised, or to continue to be organised, as mentioned in Section 1(1)(c) of this Bill, concerning the Commission, which is the effective body for regulating relations between employers and workers and maintaining reasonable terms and conditions of employment and reasonable prospects of continued employment. That is something I would have thought both the employers and workers would have in mind on this question. The third point is: of promoting or maintaining stable arrangements for collective bargaining relating to those workers; and the fourth: of preventing collective agreements relating to those workers, which have been or may thereafter be made by the applicants, from being frustrated. I would have thought that in the sort of cases we have in mind and the conditions that have to apply in an industry before a closed shop is likely to be approved, one would have to have a strong conviction on the part of both employers and workers that this was the only possible solution for their industry.

My Lords, I should add that one of the main reasons for the requirement for a joint application in the closed shop situation is that there is no ballot required before the closed shop is implemented, so it is highly desirable that there should be agreement on both sides. There is an option for a ballot, but no requirement. The involvement of the employer is in part intended as a means for the protection of employees and of their rights. One might ask why we have not required a ballot. That is because the kind of situation in which we envisage a closed shop agreement being justified is one where the holding of a ballot would be very difficult, very time-consuming and, for that matter, expensive and uncertain in its result. This is due to the nature of the constituency of the ballot, so that in the absence of a requirement for such a ballot the agreement of the parties seems to be very necessary.

I would add that various organisations came forward when the Bill was first published and urged that in their particular sections of industry some form of closed shop was essential for the maintenance of reasonable terms and conditions of employment. One of the points they were most insistent upon was that all the parties concerned with existing agreements in those industries were agreed on the need to continue them. All parties were agreed, both the employers and the trade unions. In those circumstances, it does not seem to be too much to expect that, in the particular situation where an application is made for approval of a closed shop, it should be a precondition that there is agreement between the employer and the trade union.

LORD STOW HILL

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for his courteous answer. All I can say is that I am not convinced by his reasoning. I shall put my reasons very shortly, but I rather despair now of convincing him. May I take first his point about the ballot? One of the main planks in my argument was that the Schedule is hedged about with precautions to prevent anybody from being put at risk of undergoing something which he strongly objected to and which was not in the general interest. I elaborated upon the need to satisfy the Commission and pointed to the fact that unless the Commission were prepared to report that they were satisfied on all those matters, the Court could do no more; the application lapsed. The noble Lord says that no ballot is essential in this case. Every possible role that a ballot could usefully fulfil is present and is provided for in this Schedule. The Schedule provides that if the Commission report in favour, and say they are satisfied that all the criteria are fulfilled—in other words that it is highly desirable that there should be a closed shop—even then if 20 per cent. of the workers ask for a ballot there is a ballot, and if the majority are not in favour of a closed shop there is no closed shop.

There can be no greater safeguards. The safeguards are mountainous. So, my Lords, there really is very little risk if a trade union is given the chance of making a unilateral application. I was rather alarmed, in the answer of the noble Lord, by the statement he made—and I have heard him make it on several occasions—that he thought that ordinarily an agency shop agreement would serve the purpose. It must be discouraging for any person who undertakes to do what paragraph 5(2) requires to be done to put language of that sort in the mouth of an extremely experienced and well-informed Minister. One of the things which has to be done is to satisfy the Commission that an approved closed shop would not equally well serve the purpose. If the noble Lord is right in saying that nearly always it would, there is precious little chance of the conditions being proved which must be proved before the application can go further. If the Minister is right, and if that is the sort of view a Commission would be disposed to form, one might as well cancel the provision for an approved closed shop altogether. Nobody will ever get one. It will not make much difference whether the application is joint or unilateral if the Minister is right.

I have offered opinions to the House as to what the likely result of an agency shop agreement will be, and I do so with great hesitation because I am not greatly experienced in these matters. I would not have ventured those opinions if I had not discussed them with noble friends of mine who have spent their lives in the trade union world. They constantly tell me that the agency shop agreement is the ideal for the discordant personality who avoids being called a "free rider" because he makes the contribution to the union but spends his whole time running down the union leadership and saying, "If you had a person like me as your representative you would do far better than you have done." That is the ideal ground for him. It encourages such people and they will breed if you have too many agency shop agreements. I radically disagree with the view of the Minister: it would be disastrous. There would not be any approved closed shop agreements.

I do not think I can usefully take up your Lordships' time in pressing the Minister. He has rejected the case and I am sorry he has. He has rejected it without the smallest intimation that he will consider it. I shall be best serving the purposes of the House (unless any other noble Lord wishes to participate) if I now ask leave of the House to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 32.

Amendment moved— Page 128, line 7, leave out (" employers' association ") and insert (" organisation of employers ").—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

10.12 p.m.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, we now come to a number of Manuscript Amendments which run numerically: 32C, 32D, 32E, 32F, 32G and 32H in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, and the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill.

LORD STOW HILL moved Manuscript Amendment No. 32C: Page 128, line 38, leave out (" necessary ") and insert (" desirable ").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I speak before your Lordships' House, still in a mood of penitence after the long Manuscript Amendment which I had the audacity to ask your Lordships to look at either yesterday or the day before. I hope that I do not offend in like case in asking your Lordships to consider these Amendments, which are very short. I think the rules of the House require that either I or the noble Lord on the Woolsack should read them out—

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Both.

LORD STOW HILL

—unless the House gives contrary intimation. The Amendments are very simple and I should like to indicate their effect first, and then hope that your Lordships will think it not necessary for them to be read out. What they do is this. They seek to lessen the quantum of proof which, as I reminded the House when we were discussing the last Amendment, is imposed upon applicants by paragraph 5. I reminded the House that paragraph 5 reads at present that it is necessary—and I emphasise the word "necessary"—to satisfy the Commission as to the four requirements set out in heads (a), (b), (c) and (d) at the bottom of page 128. I have read them already; I will not trouble your Lordships by reading them again.

What this group of Manuscript Amendments does is to substitute for the word "necessary" the word "desirable". In other words, the paragraph would read: specified in the draft agreement, that it is desirable for those workers to be comprised in an approved closed shop agreement for the purposes…". Then the Amendments leave out head (a); they leave in heads (b) and (c); they leave out head (d), and leave out subparagraph (2) of the paragraph. In other words, if the Amendments were not made, what would have to be established to the satisfaction of the Commission would be that it was necessary for those workers to be comprised in an approved closed shop, for the purposes of maintaining reasonable terms and conditions of employment and reasonable prospects of continued employment, and of promoting or maintaining stable arrangements for collective bargaining. If the Amendments were made, it would be necessary for applicants to establish no more than what is set out in heads (b) and (c), and to establish them to the point of proof indicated in the word "desirable" instead of "necessary".

I do not think that those differences are purely technical. One construes the words "necessary" and "desirable" in their ordinary English sense. I should have thought that if one asked what is meant by "necessary", you would say that you meant something of a highly compulsory character, something which is indispensable, something which cannot be done without; in other words, it is indispensable to have a closed shop agreement in order to achieve the purposes set out in the sub-paragraphs. The word "desirable" is of much less compulsive quality. It is, in other words, preferable on balance. It is not necessary in the sense that it is indispensable, but preferable on balance that certain things should take place. I submit that this is a substantial change which of itself eases the burden a great deal. Therefore, what an applicant would have to show is that on balance it would be preferable to have a closed shop agreement in order to maintain reasonable terms and conditions of employment and to promote and maintain stable arrangements for collective bargaining. I submit that that is a reasonable burden to impose upon an applicant. That is all he would have to do. He would not have to show that an agency shop agreement would serve the purpose equally well. He would simply have to show those two requirements as being satisfied.

Is there really any reason why he should have to go further than that? Is not that, in the nature of things, applying common sense tests, enough? What reason is there for requiring an applicant to go beyond saying that it is better on balance, if you wish to maintain reasonable terms and conditions and promote stable bargaining arrangements, to have a closed shop agreement in the particular industry or section of industry that you are speaking about? I submit that the argument speaks for itself. Obviously, I would have submitted that that is enough and that to go further and impose a heavier burden is to do what I tried to describe when I was moving the last set of Amendments: really to impose a burden which simply cannot be undertaken in ordinary circumstances by any applicants, joint or single. For those reasons I commend these Amendments to the House and I beg to move the manuscript Amendment No. 32C, Schedule 1, page 128, line 38, to leave out "necessary" and insert "desirable".

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, on this group of Amendments there is not very much that I can add to what was said on the Committee stage. These tests and criteria were very carefully devised and we feel that in this connection "desirable" is a very undesirable word to use. It is a highly subjective word. The tests are objective and impose a duty to consider whether it is necessary for the four purposes concerned for the workers to be comprised in an approved closed shop. I think the noble Lord was quite right in interpreting "necessary" as "indispensable". It means that they really must be if these purposes are to be fulfilled; and that is exactly what we intended it should mean, and not merely as in the subjective tests that he proposes to apply.

I would not recommend my noble friends to agree to the exclusion of the provision that in the circumstances the purposes specified in the preceding heads (that is the four criteria) could not reasonably be expected to be fulfilled by means of an agency shop agreement. For the reasons I have already stated we could not accept that, because we think that where possible an agency shop agreement should be the norm in cases of this sort, and it is only in exceptional cases, where there is no real alternative if these purposes are to be achieved, that the closed shop should be approved. I do not think I need say more than this. We have gone over it before and I think the issues are perfectly clear here. I hope the noble Lord will not mind a short reply, even though I cannot tell him that we have carefully considered these proposals. I cannot tell him that, for the very good reason that he only put them down today. I hope the noble Lord will not pursue this Amendment further.

LORD STOW HILL

My Lords, unless any other noble Lord wishes to speak, I think I should best conduce to the purposes of the House if I asked leave to withdraw this Amendment and intimate that I do not propose to move the subsequent Amendments, 32D, 32E, 32F, 32G and 32H. This, I think, would obviate the necessity of their being read out from the Chair and read out by me in accordance with your Lordships' Standing Orders. In those circumstances I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 32C.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, this Amendment follows the same principles. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 130, line 37, leave out from (" that ") to (" have ") in line 38 and insert (" either a majority of the workers eligible to vote in the ballot or not less than two-thirds of those who voted in it ")—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 34.

Amendment moved— Page 130, line 42, leave out from (" that ") to (" voted ") in line 43 and insert (" neither a majority of the workers eligible to vote in the ballot nor two-thirds of those who voted in it have ")—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 35.

Amendment moved— Page 131,(line 41, leave out from (" that ") to (" voted ") in line 42, and insert (" neither a majority of the workers eligible to vote in the ballot nor two-thirds of those who voted in it have ")—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

10.25 p.m.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 39.

Amendment moved— Page 133, line 13, leave out (" employers' association ") and insert (" organisation of employers ")—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 40.

Amendment moved— Page 133, line 14, leave out (" employers' association ") and insert (" organisation ")—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 41.

Amendment moved— Page 133, line 23, leave out (" employers' association ") and insert (" organisation ")—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

EARL ST. ALDWYN

My Lords, I think perhaps this might be a convenient moment to adjourn the Report stage of this Bill. I therefore beg to move that the House do now adjourn.