HL Deb 23 February 1971 vol 315 cc928-56

2.50 p.m.

Debate resumed on the Motion moved yesterday by Lord Molson, That this House do take note of the Report of the Commission on the Third London Airport.

THE EARL OF KINNOULL

My Lords, it is both a privilege and, I feel, a certain responsibility to be asked to resume the second day of this historic debate and to try to continue the really high standard set by other speakers yesterday. If one were asked why one wanted to take part in a debate with over fifty other speakers when so much must be repetitious, the answer that I would give would be the same. I believe, as every other speaker would give: it is because one cars about the issue; it is because one cares about one's heritage; it is because, I firmly believe, we are trustees of our heritage to those who follow us, our children and our grandchildren; and it is because, I believe, that this issue is the most important planning decision facing any Government in this century. Although I care as passionately as others for the protection of our environment, I also care that any decisions should be in the best interests of the progress of the civil air transport industry in this country, and I believe that both these interests can be met.

I should like at the outset, as other speakers did yesterday, to pay my short tribute to the Roskill Commission and to all those involved with the Commission's long and arduous work over the last two and a half years. The immense value of this Report must be that it focuses, with great clarity, all the problems, emotional and economic, technical and non-technical, that face the decision of such a major investment. It is indeed a remarkably constructive Report, even if, as in my case, one disagrees with its conclusions. I should also like to pay a tribute to all the voluntary bodies who have striven so hard, at great financial cost, to present their cases to the Commission in the most constructive and favourable light. If one were to single out but one of these, it would be for me the Wing Airport Resistance Association. I am told that it started with seven members; its membership to-day is over 60,000, and it has raised something in the region of £55,000 for its fighting fund: and even to-day I heard on the wireless that its influence is present in the form of some fresh pancakes.

The debate yesterday followed a pattern which I believe will be followed to-day and in another place when their opportunity occurs. It was that no single speaker spoke out in support of Roskill's first choice—Cublington. The argument against Cublington on evironmental grounds appears so strong, with the powerful support of Professor Buchanan in his minority recommendations, with the eloquent words of my noble friend Lord Molson and other noble Lords yesterday, and with the signatures of no fewer than 220 Members of Parliament in the form of a Motion, that I feel it is unnecessary to try to add anything besides stating my total support for the anti-Cublington view.

If Parliament is to have its influence, as my noble friend the Leader of the House stated yesterday that the Government intend it to have, I believe a decision to reject wholly the Cublington site can be in little doubt. The influence of Parliament, and indeed this House, was seen clearly three years ago over the issue of Stansted: and I should like to pay tribute to my noble and learned friend Lord Dilhorne, who played a particularly prominent part on that occasion. I have confidence that the Government will again give similar weight to any influence Parliament may give over Cublington.

If one is correct in assuming that Cublington, by popular consent, is totally unacceptable, it is, I believe, vitally important in the interests and the future of the civil air transport industry in this country, which one must recall plays such a prominent part in our foreign earnings, not to allow a rebound effect to pressure a decision on Roskill's second choice—Foulness. Although it must be very tempting to solve the problem of the Third London Airport by deciding on Foulness because local authorities in the area would actually welcome it, it would, I believe, be wholly Wrong not to pay particular attention to the cautionary words in the Report: The Third London Airport must be able to succeed as an airport. The viability of Foulness is a matter, I believe, of grave doubt. I feel that the Commission amply show this in their Report. We know that the airlines do not want it; we know that it would be very expensive to develop; and there is evidence which raises some concern on its safety factor caused by migrating birds. I personally accept the Commission's strong caveat on Foulness. It would, in my view, prove a monumental white elephant, a national investment blunder of very damaging consequences, and most of all a serious disaster for the future of civil air transport.

Having said that, I would add that in my view neither of the other two short-listed inland sites mentioned by the Commission is satisfactory. I say this because I do not consider that any inland site can harmonise in any area to acceptable standards of environment for those who live in that area. If one were asked: but if one rejects all four short-listed sites of the Roskill Report, and if one accepts that there will be a need in the next 10 to 15 years for a third London Airport, albeit a two runway airport initially, how does one overcome the serious problem both of planning blight on the existing proposed sites, and of the intolerable build-up of noise level around Heathrow and Gatwick?—my answer would be as follows. In the first case, that of blight, which is a matter that I come across quite frequently in my professional life, I accept, in the interests of all those affected, that the Government must make an early decision on whether to choose or not to choose, to go ahead or not to go ahead on one of the Roskill four sites. If they choose not to go ahead on any of these sites, as I hope they will, it must be their duty to lift the blight from the three inland sites by a firm assurance that these sites have been finally rejected.

Turning to the second question, the intolerable build-up of noise level around Heathrow and Gatwick, it is, I believe, a sad myth to think that any immediate relief can be given—indeed for the next ten years—by any decision of any Government to build a third London airport. But there are, in my view, certain positive steps that could be taken to alleviate the position. The first would be to arrange, by international agreement, a strict noise certification scheme to be introduced by, say, 1980. After that date those aircraft operating above certain noise levels would be banned from British airports. In the meantime, it would, I believe, be possible to introduce more generous compensation schemes, either to soundproof houses or even assist people to move from areas worst affected. The problem of noise is under constant study by the Government, but it is, I believe, interesting to note that, out of all noise complaints made to the British Airports Authority over the past few years, 85 per cent. of them arise from either the Boeing 707 or the DC 8.

The second positive step which I believe could alleviate the problem of noise would be to apply a very stringent policy to planning around airports. I have two recent examples of planning which show, I believe, a degree of irresponsibility by planners to both people's environment and indeed to the airport use. The first is a case at Hounslow, when consent was given for some 200 houses to be built, in an area where already the noise level is 55 N.N.I. The second is at Gatwick, where again consent has been given for houses which would, if a second runway is built, come within a noise level of 65 N.N.I. I believe that both these cases show at best a serious lack of grasp by planners, or worse, an attempt to frustrate the growth of these airports. I hope that the Government may perhaps take note of these two cases and consider whether any future steps can be taken to avoid any damaging repetition. If I may turn briefly to Gatwick, it would, I believe, be of interest to know the views of the Government on a second runway. Is it a fact that a second runway will be required before a third London airport could be operating and, if so, how soon will the runway be necessary?

My Lords, my purpose in taking part to-day was not only for the protection of Cublington but also in the long-term interests of the civil air transport industry in this country. Although the Roskill Commission Report is immensely valuable, I do not believe it has thrown up the right answers—I do not believe its terms of reference were wide enough—and I believe a national airports policy is fundamental to the problem. There is still time, in my view, to reconsider this issue before the need of the airport overtakes us, and to allow technology in the form of STOL, VTOL, QTOL, and tracked hovercraft to see if their influence may play a part.

My Lords, it must be better, in the interests of our environment, of our national resources and of our civil air transport industry, not to be bulldozed into a decision from a narrow choice of four alternative sites, all of which, I consider, for one reason or another, are unacceptable.

3.4 p.m.

LORD BESWICK

My Lords, I am glad that the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, reintroduced the subject of civil air transport, for I am certain that this problem is one of the air transport system as a whole, and not simply of a third London airport. The last time that I spoke on the third London airport it was to put the then Government's case for Stansted. Some opposing Peers were kind enough to say that I put the case very well, but certainly—and I see the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, in his place—there was powerful opposition. I mean no disrespect to my opponents of that day when I say that their opposition, in my view, was largely negative. With one or two exceptions, notably my noble friend Lord Leatherland and the noble Earl, Lord Lauderdale, it was much the same yesterday in the arguments against the recommendations of the Roskill Commission. I heard almost all the speeches; only in the speech of my noble friend Lord Greenwood, a speech which the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, rightly described as "civilised", was there a genuine effort to weigh the evidence that had been presented to the Roskill Commission.

I have previously paid my tribute to the quite superb way in which the Roskill Commission went about their task. No one who reads the Report without preconceived prejudices could possibly criticise the integrity of their approach, and yet organisations of one kind or another—including, as my noble friend Lord Greenwood said, something over 200 Members of Parliament in another place, contested in quite vociferous terms the Roskill recommendation before even the full Report had been published. That alone leads me to doubt the objective validity of some of the aniti-Cublington, pro-Foulness spokesmen.

When the last Administration agreed to review the Stansted proposal I was myself predisposed to opt for Foulness. The idea of adding to the effective area of our Islands was greatly attractive. However, the Report, and the controversy it has stimulated, has proven conclusively to my satisfaction that it would be a grave mistake to put such an enormous amount of our national resources into the construction of a major airport in this isolated area at the end of the Estuary. Of course environmental conditions must be considered, but surely other factors must also be taken into account. The economics of the project must be considered. The purpose of the airport cannot be ignored. I can well see that a society may decide to place the beauty and quiet of the countryside above all else; but that is not an argument for wasting hundreds of millions of pounds in an enterprise whose purpose in bound to be frustrated if the potential users reject it. No air transport operator has indicated that they want to, or willingly will use Foulness. The Commission themselves conclude, after giving maximum weight to the factors leading to other conclusions, that there would be between 11 and 12 million passenger journeys fewer in the one year of 1991 if Foulness is chosen instead of any of the other inland sites.

As they say in Chapter 10, paragraph 32, these calculations are consistent with common sense. Simply to state that a businessman will be ready to drive out to Foulness from Central London in order to go to Paris or Brussels is to expose the absurdity of the proposition. The Commission are delightfully restrained in their description of Foulness as a site. They say in Chapter 10, paragraph 10: Foulness is not well placed in relation to main centre; of population and access to it is constrained by the sea and by the Thames Estuary. G. K. Chesterton would have made much more fun out of this. That night we went to Birmingham by way of Beachy Head would be quite a sober journey compared with the day we went to Paris by way of Maplin Sands.

I sense that some people are so aware of the environmental advantage of having nothing but sea to the one side of the proposed airport that they do not face up to the severe economic disadvantage that this factor poses. Only my noble friend Lord Greenwood mentioned the fact that the sea sets certain safety problems. It will be necessary to have additional fire and rescue equipment waterborne, not an impossible requirement but still a factor to be taken into account. It is interesting, too, to see the way in which different parties in this matter treated the safety factor set by the sea birds. Those who would have the responsibility for operating there, notably B.E.A., and some foreign airlines, call attention to the danger from bird strikes at Foulness; but the three county council groups confidently dismissed any increase in the danger factor from this source. I admired the light touch with which the Commission commented that the efforts of witnesses called by the three county council groups to persuade us that this risk (i.e., of bird strikes) could be entirely eliminated by means of an extraordinary battery of bird scaring weapons were not successful. I should myself have thought that noise factors were quite serious enough without adding to them a battery of bird-scaring weapons.

It is illuminating, too, to consider how the importance of agricultural lard has figured in the competing arguments. Apparently both the National Farmers' Union and the Country Landowners' Association urged the importance of this factor when they put the case for a coastal site. They suggested, as I reminded my noble friend Lord Leatherland yesterday, that Professor Wibberley should be invited to give evidence on this point. He was appointed as a consultant, and after careful study expressed the view that Cublington would cause the least loss to agriculture of the four sites in terms of present and future production. As the Commission drily commented: His conclusions may not have been those which the National Farmers' Union or the Country Landowners' Association expected. Nor, they might have added, those of my noble friend Lord Leatherland.

We heard much yesterday about the charm of Cublington, but only my noble friend Lord Greenwood of Rossendale was prepared to consider the amenities of the Essex coast. Yet to many people the opportunities for physical and spiritual refreshment are much greater between the estuaries of the Essex coast than in the Vale of Aylesbury. The noble Lord, Lord Greenway, spoke movingly about Stewkley Church, but, as the Commission have put it, we cannot be absolutely certain that our descendants would commend our judgment the more for preserving Stewkley Church rather than the Essex coastline and for preventing the extinction of the dark-bellied Brent Goose.

There is just one other factor about which I feel quite strongly. We speak a good deal about the nuisance or hardship caused to people displaced by the airport, or subjected to noise if they remain in the area, but what about the equally cruel hardship caused to those displaced by a roadway, or doomed to live within the noise shadow of a motorway? We have only to think of the terrible human suffering caused to those who were left living alongside the M.4 extension to realise how important this factor is. More people will be affected this way if the necessary access roads are driven out to Foulness.

I have been concerned so far to try to redress the balance between the skilful and highly professional propaganda put out by those primarily concerned to ward off the threat, as they see it, to Cublington. For my part, I agree with the Commission and with the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe: there is no ideal site. I fully understand the natural instinct to fight off a threat to one's home. But if the nation needs a new four-runway airport it would be quite wrong to set aside the recommendation which the Roskill Commission made after such painstaking investigations. Having said that, I have to agree that the Commission were working to a given directive, which, as my right honourable friends who established the Commission have said, has been overtaken by events.

Since that directive there have been two important developments. First, the Commission themselves have shown that the need for the first runway of the new airport will not now arise until 1980, and the need for the third and fourth runways they put at the years 1995 and 2002. Secondly, the techniques and technology of aviation have developed, are developing, and could develop at an increasing pace. Contemporary avionics and computerised air traffic control make possible a better use of air space, and we can now talk much more confidently about the prospect of short take-off aircraft. Also, of quite decisive significance in this context is the near availability of quieter engines. And as I said at the outset, I agree with the noble Earl that we have to consider the aircraft industry and the air transport industry as a whole, I have to declare an interest.

The problem, therefore, has to be considered against the two new factors: first, that we have four or five more years before the first of the new runways will be needed; secondly, that we can have more advanced technology at our disposal if we choose to develop it. Roskill refers, in Chapter 5, to evidence that V/STOL, aircraft could be in service by 1985, though, it is added, less sophisticated aircraft could be available earlier. Since that evidence was given, there has been a good deal of re-thinking of this matter. The date was correct so far as VTOL is concerned, but authoritative thinking now has moved from the consideration of vertical aircraft as the next step to the so-called less sophisticated machines—the short take-off—and this, I am suggesting to your Lordships, makes a very considerable difference in timing.

The choice now, I suggest, is not between one of these four major four-runway airports but between Cublington and, as the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, said QTOL. By QTOL, a term which both he and I took from this week's Flight International, I mean an aeroplane with quieter take-off and landing, due to the fact that it is powered by quieter engines and leaves and returns to earthbound people within a shorter distance. These possibilities, I am convinced, need to be considered as a matter of urgency before we commit something between £500 million and £800 million worth of our national resources to building a new four-runway airport. Roskill himself says that the availability of these new aircraft possibilities would be a matter of money. It will in fact be a matter for the Government to decide how they propose national resources will be allocated.

So far in air transport we have striven to secure economy of time and money by increased aircraft speed and size. In my view, we are now at the point when these objectives must be obtained by quite different techniques. Increased aircraft speed on journeys over 1,000 miles is still the most important way to save journey time. Moreover, a human body ought not to be dehydrated in a pressurised cabin for more than two or three hours at a stretch. But on the shorter journeys of up to 600 or 700 miles time must now be saved by more economic use of both ground and air space. When I speak of journeys of up to 600 or 700 miles, I am speaking of more than half the total number of aircraft movements within the London area. On journeys of this distance we can now save more time by cutting down taxi-ing, eliminating delays on the ground, and enabling the aircraft to get into the air and on to course much more quickly than by any additional increase in aircraft speed. Incidentally, a spokesman of one major American airline asserted a few weeks ago at a BALPA symposium that the cost to his company of non-productive flying was no less than one million dollars a day.

My Lords, this Report before us carefully compares journey times of 10 minutes more or less as between one aircraft site and another, but, as my noble friend Lord Royle said, if a passenger can be saved a quarter of an hour or twenty minutes waiting at the airport, then clearly this in even more important. If we can eliminate some of the miles of taxi-ing to the end of the runway—usually about one and half to two miles—and another four or five miles speeding along the runway and climbing on to course before beginning the real journey to a given destination, then again we have a potential economy in both time and money. If we define "access time" not as the time taken to travel between Central London and the entrance to a given airport but as the time taken from my chair at home to my seat in an aircraft, then immediately we shall seek savings of time in a very different way.

My Lords, you may ask: how practical is all this? Do all these considerations really offer an alternative to turning the bulldozers loose in the Vale of Aylesbury? In my view the answer is Yes. The most authoritative advice I have suggests that between 1978 and 1982 we could have 100-seat aircraft operating economically on routes of up to 600 or so miles, which would need something like 2,000 to 4,000 feet of concrete runway, and which would pollute by noise an area only about one-twentieth of that affected by the quietest projected conventional aircraft. Expressing this in a different way, if we take the 35 N.N.I. contour (which is the threshold of nuisance as defined by the Wilson Committee), then at a QTOL port of the future the affected area would be two to four square miles, as against 195 square miles within the present contour around Heathrow.

I have said that the new aircraft could operate economically. By that I mean that the seat-mile costs would be within 5 to 10 per cent. of that currently achieved. My understanding of the feeling of this House, and of the country generally, is that some penalty for a reduction in the noise nuisance and an improvement in the environment would be not only tolerated but welcomed. This 5 to 10 per cent. penalty is not excessive, and may even be less if lower landing charges are taken fully into account. I make this reference in the context of the Commission's estimate that landing charges will need to be doubled if the cost of a new airport is to be funded within 30 years. There are other advantages. Smaller aircraft would encourage a trend once more to higher frequency of services—again a time-saver for businessmen. Also, improved frequency has advantages in processing passengers.

A QTOL strip alongside the two runways at Heathrow would enable an aircraft going South to turn round and pass over an airspace now the least used in England; namely that immediately above Heathrow airport. By the time it crossed over the airport at 8,000 feet the noise nuisance would be negligible.

Sceptical individuals among us will ask if it is possible to have all this before we reach the present deadline as laid down by Mr. Justice Roskill's Commission. As I see it, my Lords, the requirement would be for a strip at Heathrow, another strip at Gatwick and a third strip at, possibly, Poplar Docks; and these could be in full operation by the early 1980s. One can also envisage that if the economic planning needs of Essex lead to the kind of seaport which the Essex County Council would be prepared to encourage, then a QTOL strip there might well complement that seaport for specialist air traffic.

But could we have a reasonable margin of capacity? Could we be certain that the new type of aircraft would be ready before we pass saturation point at the present so-called conventional airports? A number of possibilities are open to us which would ensure an adequate margin of capacity. If, for example, the runway at Thurleigh was used for all the training flights now operating from Stansted then, without placing an intolerable burden upon the Stansted area, we could accommodate there a good proportion of the present charter flights. It may be necessary to insist that the orginal plans for a second conventional runway at Gatwick be carried out. It may also be advisable to build a new runway or use another existing runway elsewhere, out of the London area, to accommodate nonscheduled flights. Without the geographical restrictions placed upon the Commission—because we should be planning for the holiday traffic and without the decisive need to be so near to London—an appropriate site, possibly on the South Coast, could be more readily identified.

My Lords, I will now sum up. Foulness, which some see as a solution without tears would, in fact, be a gross misuse of public funds. It would cost more; it would be less accessible; it would not be economically used, and it would not be without important environmental penalties. The new factors which have emerged are the setting back of the airport capacity deadline and the bringing forward of new aircraft developments. If we use the time saved by the one for the exploitation of the other, then QTOL, instead of Cublington, becomes a practical proposition.

This will entail the operational readiness by 1980 of a new era of aircraft. It will also mean the continued refinement of avionics and ground control equipment to ensure precise and safe air control and navigational requirements. It will mean the provision of short strips, 2,000 to 4,000 feet long, at Heathrow, Gatwick and, conceivably, at Poplar Docks. Later I envisage other regions of the United Kingdom being served similarly with air communications which they now lack. To give a built-in margin of capacity, to provide against possible delays in the readiness of the new aircraft, we shall need two new long runways. These could be the second runways at Gatwick, as originally planned, and the utilisation of Thurleigh for training purposes. Also for consideration would be a new airport, away from London, on the South Coast, with no noise nuisance, with a surface journey en route from London to required destinations, which could be used for holiday traffic.

My Lords, the case I have tried to make is not one for procrastination. I do not offer opportunity to avoid important and probably painful decisions. Intense and urgent study will be needed if the new possibilities are to be exploited. But I do say, quite confidently, that the possibilities are practicable if we choose to put in the necessary effort to make them so. I have referred to my interest in one aircraft company but, as I see it, this must mean an effort by an entire industry and, it may well be, on a European scale. Given this approach, and with the necessary early and thorough study, a more hopeful solution can be found than that to which the Roskill Commission were bound to turn. But I emphasise that the study must be both early and thorough.

LORD VIVIAN

My Lords, before the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, sits down (and I apologise to the noble Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, who it to follow), may I intervene and ask one question? Early in his most interesting speech, the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, said—and I do not wish to misquote him in any way—that no air authority had recommended the use of Foulness. May I remind him that the noble Lord, Lord Leatherland, in his interesting speech yesterday, raised the point—and I think the noble Lord, Lord Beswick will agree—that the British Airports Authority and B.E.A. both say that Cublington is the least acceptable site.

LORD BESWICK

My Lords, what both those organisations said was that they would use Cublington if required; they would not use Foulness.

3.30 p.m.

VISCOUNT DILHORNE

My Lords, I am sure that the House has listened with a great deal of interest to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Beswick. I certainly did. I do not think anyone could accuse him of an entirely negative approach. My memories of our debates over Stansted were revived by yesterday's debate, and his speech to-day has revived them more vividly for me; and, as has so often been the case, I have, rather to my surprise, found in his speech more parts that I agreed with than disagreed with. The first part of his speech was, I am afraid, entirely negative: it was just that Foulness would not do. The second part was constructive, and I do not propose to try to comment upon that part because I have not the technical knowledge or expertise which would justify me in doing so. But the conclusion to be drawn, if I understood him correctly, from the second part of his speech was this: do not decide on a four-runway London airport now. I shall come back in due course to both those topics on which the noble Lord addressed the House.

He characterised our opposition to Stansted as a negative opposition. So, my Lords, in one sense, it was. It was saying to the then Government, of which the noble Lord was so distinguished a member, "No; do not go on with Stansted". But it was not entirely negative. It was constructive, because we pressed for the appointment of a Commission, and the Government in their wisdom—and I have always admired them for it—changed their attitude and took that course.

LORD BESWICK

My Lords, I wonder whether the noble and learned Viscount will allow me to emphasise, as no doubt he takes it already, that I did not mean the term "negative" to be offensive; I simply meant that they did not point to another airport.

VISCOUNT DILHORNE

My Lords, I think it would have been very wrong for us, with the information then available, to reach any conclusion or to point to any other airport. The difference between the Stansted debate and the present debate is surely this. On the earlier occasion we were having to say, "No" to a course that was pretty firmly contemplated—I will not put it higher than that. Now we have to express our opinions on the issue, primarily, whether the new airport should be at Cublington. I say "primarily", for that is not the only issue. But we are not asking the Government to think again. They have rightly said that they will want to hear the views expressed in this House and in another place before reaching a decision. I welcome that statement, and I think it is right. So all we are asking the Government to do is to think hard and think long before reaching a conclusion.

I had hoped when the Roskill Commission were appointed—perhaps it was too much to hope—that their final recommendation would not be very controversial; and I am sorry that it is. I hoped that the result of their labours for two and a half years would be generally acceptable; and no-one could fail to be impressed by the massive investigation they undertook. It was certainly a far more complex matter than I, for one, ever envisaged; and whether or not one agrees with the Commission's conclusion they certainly deserve our thanks for providing us with so much information which should enable us and the Government to reach a right and better informed judgment on the matter than we otherwise would.

The noble Lord, Lord Beswick, referred to criticism of the integrity of the Commission. I myself have not seen and do not recollect any criticisms of the integrity of the Commission. When one has to consider the judgment of some body or court of appeal one may come to the conclusion—and one sometimes has to—that that decision was wrong. But expressing that view involves no criticism of the integrity; and although I am hound to come to some criticisms of the Roskill Commission I should be the last person to want it thought that I was in any sense criticising the integrity of anyone.

The Commission's recommendation of Cublington (and I think that the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, is the first person who has spoken partially in favour of it, by inference, in rejecting Foulness) is certainly not one that should be lightly rejected. It certainly should not be rejected for emotional reasons—and deep emotions are raised here, as they were over Stansted. Nor should it be rejected on account of pressures or demonstrations exercised by one side or the other. I would say that it should be rejected only if, after the exercise of calm and dispassionate judgment, it is clear that on the information now available their conclusion is wrong. They recognised—and I think they were right to do so—and I quote from paragraph 3.6: that if our final recommendation were to command respect and acceptance it had not only to be as right as the best methods could make it but the reasons leading to our judgment had to be as objective and as explicit as we could make them. Only by this approach would there be any hope of persuading informed opinion that our conclusion should be accepted whatever its degree of popularity. That the Commission used the best methods I would certainly not question, but whether the best methods have produced the right result depends on the data to which those methods were applied, and I would think that a cost/benefit analysis fed with the wrong information could go just as wrong as a computer when not given the right material. I have to confess—and it gives me no pleasure to do so—that I am not in the least persuaded by the Report that the majority of the Commission have reached the right conclusion. In fact, study of the Report—and I have studied it as closely as I can in the time I have had available—has satisfied me that their conclusion is wrong: that if there is to be another airport the last place it should be is Cublington; that if it went there it would be a national disaster of the first magnitude. Indeed, reading the Report has led me to doubt whether there is any need for a third London airport or for another four-runway airport of that size at all.

My Lords, I shall not myself be affected if one is built at any one of the four sites in question. I speak for no one, no group or body of persons, and it is only because I felt, exercising the best judgment that I could, that the final decision of the Commission was hopelessly and terribly wrong that I added my name to the list of speakers.

The Commission appear to have thought, and many of those who have spoken in this debate appear to have thought, that the Commission's task was to find a site for a third London Airport; and I stress the word "London". There are many references to that in the Report. The Commission begin Chapter 4 by saying that they had decided to search for sites which might "prove suitable for a four runway third London airport"; and Chapter 5 begins with the words: Our terms of reference require us to investigate the timing of the need for a third London airport with four runways. My Lords, their terms of reference did no such thing; they never mentioned a third London Airport at all.

I know that great care was taken in drafting the terms of reference. The noble Lord, Lord Greenwood of Rossendale, made reference to the part I played. He was in error in one respect; I was not at that time sitting on the Cross-Benches. The omission of mention in the terms of reference to a third London airport was not inadvertent or accidental; of that I am sure. It is odd and unusual for a Report of a Commission or Committee not to state its terms of reference, and this Report does not. May I remind your Lordships of them. They appear in Hansard and were as follows: To inquire into the timing of the need for a four-runway airport to cater for the growth of traffic at existing airports serving the London area…". That is not the same as saying, "a third London airport".

LORD DAVIES OF LEEK

My Lords, for the Record would the noble and learned Viscount mention the date and column?

VISCOUNT DILHORNE

My Lords, the noble Lord will see the date and column in a footnote to the Report of the Roskill Commission; I think it was May 20, 1968. The terms of reference continued: to consider the various alternative sites, and to recommend which site should be selected."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 20/5/68, col. 479.] When those terms of reference were announced to this House, the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, rightly said in answer to a Question that the Commission had no geographical limitations. With those terms of reference, I should have thought that the first thing one had to ascertain would be: where was the anticipated growth of traffic likely to come from. I should have thought that to be the first task. If it was to come mainly from London and the South-East, then there is not much difference in the result; one could then still speak of a site for a third London airport. But if that was not the case, the gloss on the terms of reference assumes some significance. It may well be that the population of London and the South-East is more air-minded at the moment than are the population of the Midlands and the North. But it seems to me not to follow that that pattern will continue. It may well be the case that the potential growth of air traffic in the North and Midlands is far greater than in the South-East and in London. If that be so, then that points not to another London airport, but to increased facilities for flying in the North and the Midlands.

But the Commission thought they had to find a third London airport. If you start with that assumption, you do not consider whether it is right that it should be a London one—that is assumed. But into the balance in deciding which is to be the site for a third London airport they have thrown the convenience of those living in the North, and that is one of their major reasons for choosing Cublington. So far as I can see, no consideration is given to the inconvenience that the people in the North will suffer and their expense in coming to the London area to fly. I fear that the Commission started their investigation on the wrong foot, and I fear that their interpretation of their terms of reference has affected not only their thinking but also their conclusion.

The noble Lord, Lord Greenwood of Rossendale, said that he thought that the terms of reference were too narrow. The noble Lord, Lord Beswick, also said something to that effect. But they admit, I am sure, that they share some responsibility for that; and I may have had some responsibility for that, too. But I do not feel that there is any need for those responsible to don any form of white shirt on account of the terms of reference, for in truth and in fact those terms were pretty wide—in my view, far wider than they have been interpreted by the Commission. It is true that they were not asked to investigate a national airports policy. I think it was thought at that moment that time would not permit of that exercise; now we know that perhaps it would have done.

LORD WYNNE-JONES

My Lords, would the noble and learned Viscount forgive me for one moment? Is it not true that the British Airports Authority at the time were asking effectively for a third London airport because of the growth of traffic at Heathrow and Gatwick?

VISCOUNT DILHORNE

My Lords, that is perfectly true. That is why they wanted Stansted. But they did not go into the question of where the growth in the future was likely to come from. What is also true is that they were saying it had to be done in a far speedier time than the Report of the Commission in fact proved to be the case. What are we told about this traffic—We are told that the greater part of the anticipated traffic is estimated to be for leisure purposes: that in about 25 years' time nearly 60 per cent. of the forecast is expected to be accounted for by British non-business traffic and nearly 15 per cent. by British business traffic—75 per cent. British traffic.

I should have thought that one had only to look at the map published last week in connection with local government to have real doubts about whether the growth of traffic will come mainly from London and the South-East—unless the efforts to stop the drift South are unsuccessful; and perhaps no single thing could accelerate that drift more than another London airport. That map shows metropolitan counties in Yorkshire and Lancashire far exceeding the size of Greater London; and in addition to that, there is the Birmingham area. None of those four sites would be rightly placed for the population of those areas, and if the growth does or may come from there it would be quite wrong to build a third London airport.

I was interested to see that in his brilliantly written Minority Report Professor Buchanan said that he thought that a case could be developed for not putting the so-called London airport in the South-East at all, but for locating it in the central regions. I think that a strong case could be made out for that suggestion; and I think, too, that this debate has already shown that I am not alone in thinking that. That case has not been considered, and I think it certainly should be before any one of those four sites is finally selected, otherwise we may make a very great error.

I have sought to show that the Commission were wrong in believing that they had to find a site for a third London airport. They believed that a third London airport was essential in the national interest. If an airport is essential in the national interest, I am wholly unconvinced that it should be a London airport. Nor am I convinced, particularly after hearing what the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, said, that another airport is necessary at all. As I understand it, air traffic is mainly of two kinds, scheduled and charter flights. It would be of great convenience for those in the North and Midlands who wish to take charter flights, who wish to fly for leisure purposes, to be able to do so without coming to the London area; and I believe that there is a lot of unused capacity at local airports.

There are the facilities. Should they not be used? It would of course mean more noise in those localities; but surely it would be possible to encourage flights from those places to a degree which does not involve such an intolerable amount of noise as you get at Heathrow, and as you are bound to get from a four-runway airport where air traffic is concentrated. I suggest that that is another matter that should be gone into before a final decision is made.

Does time permit of this? After the estimates of time put forward at the time of Stansted, one feels some doubts about the reliability of the present estimates. But even if they are right, surely the delay would be better than coming to the wrong conclusion. If there is to be a third London airport, then in my view the choice lies between Cublington and Foulness, and I want now to address myself to that. For an airport in either place a heavy price has to be paid, and one has to make up one's mind whether that price is worth paying to provide greater facilities for flying, which will be used to the extent of 75 per cent. by the British people, and 60 per cent. for leisure purposes.

It is argued that unless we have another London airport we shall be in danger of losing our position as a great centre of world air transport. Is not this just keeping up with the Joneses with a vengeance? And do we keep up by, at great cost, providing extra facilities mainly for British people—and mainly for their leisure? I must confess that I am rather tired of this sort of argument, which one heard so much when Concorde was being considered.

I fear that in a number of respects the scales have been wrongly weighted in favour of Cublington and against Foulness. I hope I shall not weary the House if I give a few instances leading to that conclusion, instances in which I think the wrong data were used in the cost/benefit analysis and which I think go a long way to invalidate the Commission's conclusions. The Commission say: The noise maps for the four sites show that Foulness is superior to the inland sites from the noise point of view. The affected land at Foulness—that is to say, the land within the 35 N.N.I. contour—would be 98 square miles, which is contrasted with the figure of 342 square miles at Cublington. The area of land affected by noise by Foulness, as has already been said by my noble friend Lord Molson, would be reduced if the runways were moved slightly to the East of where the Commission placed them. Your Lordships can see where that would be in the last map in the Report of the Commission. That small change was rejected by the Commission, I think I am right in saying, on account of the additional passenger user costs involved.

One would have thought that the difference in the area of land affected by noise would have told heavily in favour of Foulness as being the right site, but in the Commission's assessment this noise factor in favour of Foulness is discounted by the assumption that if the airport goes to Foulness the noise at Luton will increase. My Lords, why should that be assumed? I can see no reason for it, and I can see a number of reasons why it should not be allowed to do so, even if there is no third London Airport. In their Table 12.1, the Summary cost/benefit analysis, £11 million has been debited to Foulness for Luton noise costs, and that cancels out the debit to Cublington in respect of noise on site. However, it does not stop there. They have also added to the costs of Foulness £18 million for the extension of Luton, an extension of a municipal airport which, if our planning laws are what they should be, should, I think, never be permitted. In addition, that £18 million is £5 million more than the amount included in the Cublington costs for noise off site.

Surely that is quite illogical and wrong, as illogical as if you were contrasting the size of, say, Edinburgh and Liverpool and you included in the population of Liverpool the population of Manchester and also the cost of housing developments at Manchester. It would be just as illogical if you were seeking to contrast the weight of the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell—I am sorry he is not here—and myself, and you added to the weight of the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, that of the noble Lord, Lord George-Brown, on the ground that if one spoke on the Common Market the other is bound to speak in the opposite sense—and if you threw in, in addition, the cost of a new suit of clothes for the noble Lord, Lord George-Brown. Surely what you have to do is to contrast the noise at Foulness with that caused at Cublington. I think this is one instance of wrong data being included in the cost/benefit analysis.

My noble friend Lord Molson thought that a third London airport was necessary to prevent increased noise at the existing airports. My noble friend Lord Jellicoe asked us to consider what deferment would mean for the sufferers at Heathrow. Surely the existing airports are going to be used to their full capacity, and the Commission were only asked to provide a site for the growth of traffic that was likely to occur in excess of what Heathrow and the other airports could take. Is that not right? For if it is, a third London airport is not a relief for suffering, and deferment does not mean anything for the present sufferers at Heathrow. I think a strong case can be made out for saying that experience at Heathrow has shown that Heathrow is the wrong place for an airport. I was interested to see my noble friend Lord Bledisloe express that view yesterday. I must say that I should regard it as a strong argument for a four-runway airport at Foulness if that were to replace Heathrow; but the proposal is for an airport to take the traffic that cannot be taken at Heathrow and Gatwick.

As has been said already, but I should like to remind the House, the major item of cost that counts against Foulness is the passenger user costs amounting to £207 million to £267 million. I understand that the original calculation was that it would cost something of the order of four shillings—or I suppose I should say 20p per person per trip more to travel to Foulness than to Cublington. If you multiply that by the number of passengers who are expected to travel throughout the years, you get a very high figure indeed. I believe that has been done. I should be interested to know what the total was for each place before one was deducted from the other, but the difference is represented by those figures. I myself do not think that passengers would value their time as the Commission suggests, or that they would object to paying a little more per journey to Foulness. The Commission say that there is a considerable number, especially those living in the North-West of London, for whom the difference in time and money is considerable. So the argument runs that the airport should be at Cublington to save money and time for the people living in the North-West of London, who would be the first people willing to pay more to avoid an airport's being there.

Surely far too much weight has been put on the passenger user costs in the cost/benefit analysis, and far too little to the noise differential between Foulness and Cublington. If you omit the £18 million for the extension of Luton, the passenger user costs and the freight user costs, to which similar observations apply, the actual construction and running costs of Foulness are cheaper than those of Cublington by over £40 million, if the Ministry of Defence are right about Brize Norton, and by something of the order of £15 million to £20 million if they are not.

Here I want to ask a question of Her Majesty's Government in relation to Brize Norton. I think it is an important one and one that can be answered. It is imply this; do the Government accept the Commission's criticisms of the Ministry of Defence's case about Brize Norton, one of our two main air support bases? I have no doubt that millions have been spent on it. Only Foulness involves no redeployment of our fighter bases, and it appears to be the Ministry's view that an airport at Cublington would mean that Brize Norton would have to shut and a new aerodrome be created to take its place on a green field site. If no equally good green field site can be found, then, to quote the language of the Ministry, there would be a— considerable degradation of operational capability. The Commission did not accept that. They firmly believed that Air Support Command is unlikely to move from Brize Norton, and that it is even more unlikely that it would be replaced on a green field site.

Their thinking about this seems to have been much influenced by the fact that at the time of Stansted the Ministry put up a great fight for the artillery range at Shoeburyness and now have abandoned that. I do not myself think it is right on that account to reject the case put forward by the Ministry about Brize Norton, and I should therefore like to know whether the Government accept or reject the Commission's criticisms. If the Ministry's case was not exaggerated, it just does not suffice to add to the costs attributable to Cublington £29 million for the building of a new airport and to disregard, as appears to be the case, the value of the existing airfield which will be useless for its present purpose; and to ignore the loss of operational capacity. If it was not exaggerated, then very great weight should be attached to it, for we should not reduce our defences to provide an airfield for passengers, 60 per cent. of whom will be travelling for pleasure.

There is another matter in the Report which has puzzled me greatly, and that is the Commission's evaluation of the loss of agricultural land. Thirteen square miles will be wanted for the site at Cublington; none for the site at Foulness. Land will also be required at each site for the urban development which always accompanies an airport, and land at Foulness will be wanted only for that. Is it the case that no land has been added to the 13 square miles at Cublington for urban development? I rather think it is. There is a major growth area nearby—Milton Keynes. But Milton Keynes was never intended to be an adjunct to an airport, and if it is to be used as one, does it not mean the abandonment in whole, or in part, of the purpose for which Milton Keynes was designed and intended? If Milton Keynes was already established and occupied, would there not have to be further land development on account of the airport? If there would, I understand that it would be of the order of 65 square miles, making a total land usage at Cublington of some 78 square miles.

Of course if you omit from the evaluation all land usage for urban development at Cublington, the land used at Foulness will exceed that at Cublington. But if you do not omit it, then I understand that the land used at Cublington will exceed that used at Foulness by some 20 square miles. On that basis, surely it could not be said that the land loss at Foulness exceeded in value that at Cublington; that it exceeded the loss from 20 square miles. So the accuracy of the evaluation made by the Commission would seem to depend on whether or not there was an addition for urban development at Cublington; and, if there was not, upon the assumption that Milton Keynes can be taken over for the purposes of the airport. I think that that matter should be looked into again.

The Commission's consultant believed that Cublington would cause least loss to agriculture. The N.F.U., who certainly speak with authority on this subject, took an entirely contrary view. Nevertheless, despite the evidence of the N.F.U., the Commission accepted the views of the consultant and rejected those of the N.F.U. One criticism that I hope can justifiably be made of the Commission is an undue readiness to accept the views of their consultants and experts where there was a conflict of evidence, in preference to the views of other persons who could speak with authority and knowledge.

LORD BESWICK

My Lords, may I interrupt? Will the noble and learned Viscount agree that it was, in fact, the N.F.U. and the Country Landowners' Association who recommended that Professor Wibberley's views should be taken into account?

VISCOUNT DILHORNE

My Lords, I know that the noble Lord and I both recommended, finally, the appointment of this Commission, but we do not necessarily have to accept the Commission's conclusion as right. I should have thought that great weight ought to be attached to the opinion of the N.F.U., particularly when the consultant expressed the view that loss of agricultural land would not be permanent and had to be regarded only as something which would happen for 50 years, because within that time new methods of food production not dependent upon agricultural land would be found; therefore, that point could be ignored.

But whether or not that be right about production in the future, it still means that that land will be lost. That is the question that I was getting at; and I must say that I am not satisfied by the Commission's approach to that question. The Commission thought it was a relatively small factor—"relatively small" were their words. But relative to what? Relative to the addition of a few pence per person per trip, which is built up to £207 million as a maximum and which tips the scales against Foulness? I do not regard the loss of a big area of land from agriculture as something which is a light factor in this balance of assessment. I hope that that will be looked into again, for I do not think the Commission have attached nearly enough importance to it.

What is the position? Foulness is the easiest site for air traffic control. The proximity of Heathrow and Cublington would create difficult problems for air traffic controllers. Fog and snow would be less a problem at Foulness than at any inland site, and Cublington is the worst of the four for fog and snow. The Commission have made all those statements, and yet they have chosen Cublington. Foulness on its own would cause least noise nuisance. It is right on planning grounds. Why then have the majority of the Commission decided on Cublington?

My Lords, I suggest that there are the following four reasons: first, incorrect evaluation of the facts—of that I have already given instances; secondly, too much reliance on their cost/benefit analysis; thirdly, their doubts as to the viability of Foulness to which the noble Lord, Lord Beswick referred; and, fourthly, the fact that they regard its relative inaccessibility as "by far the greatest disadvantage of Foulness". It may be that the Commission attached most importance to those last two reasons, which are to some extent interconnected.

Why did they do that? I do not think anyone can dispute that there is really not much in it, so far as accessibility from London is concerned, between Foulness and Cublington. If the growth of traffic from London and the South-East requires another airport, either of them would do and either of them would be viable. But the Commission's doubts as to the viability of Foulness compared to Cublington, and their observation that the greatest disadvantage of Foulness is its relative inaccessibility, are due to their belief that Cublington would attract more passengers from the North and Midlands than Foulness—and in saying that they may be right.

But neither site is in the right place for the North or the Midlands, and the Commission themselves, as I have sought to show, interpreted their terms of reference as meaning that they had to find a site for a third London Airport; that is to say, one serving London and the South-East. That being so, it seems to me illogical to tip the scales, and to tip them so heavily, against Foulness, not on the ground that it will not do for London and the South-East, but on the ground that more people may be tempted to travel from the North to Cublington than to Foulness.

The noble Lord, Lord Beswick, had doubts as to the viability of Foulness without passengers from the North. I hope that I am not misinterpreting what he said—perhaps I am to this extent—but, at any rate, he thought that operators would not go there.

LORD BESWICK

My Lords, it is not a question of passengers from the North. I do not believe that anyone would willingly drive to Foulness from the North in order to go to Paris.

VISCOUNT DILHORNE

My Lords, I cannot see, bearing in mind that the difference is estimated to be only about 12 minutes extra, why anyone should mind driving to Foulness any more than driving to Cublington or to Heathrow. Personally, of the three, and knowing the Cublington area a little, though having no interest there, I consider that it would not be difficult to drive to Cublington and I do not think it would be difficult to drive to Foulness; and probably, in a short time, both would be easier than driving to Heathrow. But, be that as it may, if these doubts as to the viability of Foulness as a third London Airport, on the basis of a 12-minutes extra road journey or five minutes extra on the train, have any real validity, do they not cast doubt on the need for a London airport to cater for London and the South-East? I should have thought they did. If Foulness would not be viable, does it not follow that such an airport for London and the South-East would not be required? I should have thought that that was the case.

My Lords, may I, in conclusion, say this? The regional planning factors and the value of preserving the countryside have not been reflected in the cost/benefit analysis. The Commission found no practical way of doing so. But they are very real and weighty factors. I propose to say no more about them, because I could not add anything to what has already been so well said, and particularly by Professor Buchanan. I find it hard to understand how anyone who has read his report can think that the nation should pay the price it would have to pay to have an airport at Cublington. For the reasons I have given, I think Cublington should be rejected. If it is, the suffering at Heathrow and Gatwick will not increase in consequence, as I assume it is the policy that those airports will be used to the extent of their present capacity. I myself should like to see Heathrow closed and a fine four-runway airport built at Foulness to take its place. That would relieve the suffering. But that may not be practicable, though the value of Heathrow might go a considerable way to meet the cost of Foulness. But, my Lords, that is not the plan; nor was it a matter for the Commission. I doubt the need for a third London airport at all, but if there must be one then Foulness is, and in my opinion always has been, the obvious place for it.

I hope that after the expression of views in this House the Government will not delay long before they say that Cublington will not do and so relieve the anxiety of many, many people. I should like them to defer a decision as to Foulness until they have gone into the other matters to which I have referred, and into the matters to which Lord Beswick has drawn attention. I should like them to say, "No" in relation to Cublington; to say, "No" in relation to Nuthampstead and Thurleigh; but (though I regard it as unfortunate) to leave Foulness in suspense while these other matters are considered. I hope the Government may think it right to take that course, but I think I should say that, should they decide in favour of Cublington, I feel so strongly that that decision is wrong that I will do all I can to prevent its implementation.