HL Deb 18 February 1971 vol 315 cc751-68

5.27 p.m.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I beg to move that this Report be now received.

Moved, That the Report be now received.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

Clause 2 [Exception from liability under Section 1]:

LORD KENNET moved Amendment No. 1: Page 2, line 26, at end insert ("or").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I will, with permission, speak to Amendments Nos. 1 and 2 together. These are similar to the two Amendments which I moved on Committee stage. They differ from the former Amendments in that insurrection does not come in this time. The Bill lays a liability on tanker owners to pay for the pollution which may be caused by accident or wreck. It provides for certain exemptions from that liability; and on the last occasion I moved an Amendment to limit the exemptions, or, in other words, to extend the liability. I proposed that insurrection and what we may briefly call "an act of God" should be excluded from the exemptions; in other words, the tanker owner should be liable in those events. This time I am being merciful in my proposals, and allowing insurrection to remain an exemption from liability.

These two Amendments, then, would say that the shipowner is liable not only in ordinary circumstances but also if there is an exceptional, inevitable and irresistable natural phenomenon … I take it that this is international language for an act of God. What it means is a violent storm. It is my contention that the owners of mammoth tankers should not be exempt from liability when they ruin our coastline simply because there has been an exceptional storm. I contend that in that event they should be liable, as they are in other events. I do not believe that the insurance markets of the world, especially the London insurance market, would be incapable of covering them for that. I believe that if the owners were so liable—that is, liable for accidents even in heavy weather around the coast of Britain—the increased premium brought about thereby would be very small indeed and would make precious little difference. They ought to cover themselves for that, and ought to be liable.

At the Committee stage I asked the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, if he could let us know at a later stage what was the situation in other Convention countries, and I mentioned specifically the United States and Canada. I appreciate that my Amendment goes beyond the Convention. The Convention liability is limited in the way that it appears in the Bill. I think that it should be unlimited in this country, because we are a country which imports a lot of oil and we have a crowded coastline. I should like to ask the noble Lord whether he can now tell us anything about the situation in other Convention countries, especially America and Canada. If he is unable to tell us that they have no intention of dispensing with the act of God intention there, then I think that would be a pretty strong reason for Parliament in this country to go ahead and make shipowners liable, even though it goes beyond the Convention. I beg to move.

LORD HAWKE

My Lords, we, as inhabitants of this Island with its long shoreline, have a strong interest in seeing that damage for oil pollution is recoverable wherever possible. This clause gives a series of exemptions. I think it would be quite unreasonable to expect to recover damages where the matter was uncoverable by insurance. The Bill makes great play of insurance further on. I hope that my noble friend can satisfy me either that the insurance market is incapable of covering or is unwilling to cover any of these particular risks (I do not confine myself to (a), but think that (b) and (c) in some respects should be covered), or alternatively that he is pre-prepared to examine it with the insurance interests before the next stage of the Bill.

We are all in this together, and it is only a question of practicability. If we can get any of these things insured against at a premium that is not utterly unreasonable, it is obviously greatly to the advantage of all the inhabitants of this country to do so. The net result would be that they might have to pay a tiny fraction more for their oil, but in the event of one of these disasters ocurring the places affected would be able to recover damages.

5.33 p.m.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, in moving this Amendment, the noble Lord has dealt with two Amendments: first of all, the extent to which this particular exception is justifiable on its own merits; and secondly, what happens in other countries. I will try to deal as best as I can with those two points. I really cannot say much more than I said before, but I hope that I may be able to say it a little more persuasively this time so as to carry the noble Lord with me.

As the noble Lord said, the words, "exceptional, inevitable and irresistible natural phenomenom" as a reason for the shipowner escaping from the liabilities in Clause 1 are similar to the defence known as "act of God" in English Law. But, as I said on the last occasion, the meaning of "act of God" has never been clearly established, and it is difficult to translate into other languages and systems of law. The exception is intended to be both clearer and rather more limited: for example, it could hardly apply to a storm of a force normally found in this country, although technically it might be an act of God. I should not have thought that a violent storm and a storm of exceptional violence are necessarily equivalent to an exceptional phenomenon. It seems to me unlikely that, in the case of a storm in the climate of Western Europe, this particular defence will ever be available. It is always, to some extent, true that any exception to strict liability will import some degree of uncertainty in determining whether individual cases come within its scope. But I do not think the exception in this case is unreasonable. What is much more important, I think, is that the conference decided that both the substance and the wording were right and proper in the circumstances.

I do not know whether I made it quite clear in Committee, but before the defence can operate the natural phenomenon in question must satisfy all the criteria mentioned, whether or not one regards one as more important than another. It must be exceptional. We have plenty of storms around our shores, but we do not have tornadoes; and a tornado might be exceptional if it happened here. On the other hand, other parts of the world do have tornadoes, and there they are not exceptional. But this would be a matter for the individual courts to decide, according to the various circumstances, and it would not affect our shores.

Then, it must be inevitable (which my dictionary says means "unavoidable") and it must be irresistible. The effect of being inevitable and irresistible is that it must be such that normal precautions could not have coped with it. The inclusion of this exception, I think I should explain, was part of a compromise agreed at the l3russels Conference in 1969 between those who, like the United Kingdom, preferred liability on the basis of fault and those who favoured strict liability. The form of liability is a central feature of the Convention, and must emphasise that, according to my advice, it would not be possible for the United Kingdom to ratify the Convention if this Amendment were agreed to.

Apart from this consideration, the purpose of the Convention is to unify law internationally in this field. If each country enacted just so much of the Convention as they felt suited them, this purpose would be completely frustrated. I think I should add to that an illustration of the practical difficulties which would arise if the Convention were ratified by various countries with reservations: for example, if we ratified with the reservation of the exclusion of this particular paragraph, even if such a course were possible in international law, which in this particular case I should doubt, because, as I said before, this is a matter so central to the Convention and to the legislation.

The Convention provides for the mutual enforcement by judges of oil pollution damage covered by it—and When I say "mutual enforcement", I mean enforcement in another country for judgment in this country. If a claimant in the United Kingdom obtained a judgment for damages in a case coming within one of the exceptions of the Convention to which we had not given effect, and then tried to enforce that judgment in a Convention country which had given full effect to the Convention, the courts of that country would be faced with the alternatives of enforcing a judgment for a claim which would not be recognised in that country, or of deciding the issue whether or not the case came within the exception, and consequently whether the judgment should be enforced. The latter would obviously be highly inconvenient.

In the same way, other countries might make reservations from the Convention with which we did not agree, and our courts might be faced with a similar difficulty. If there were a multitude of different reservations the whole point of the Convention as an instrument for the unification of the law on this subject would be gone. That is a strong case for sticking to the Convention unless there are the strongest reasons for departing from it. In that case we should either have to make a reservation, or should not be able to ratify the Convention. The main purpose of this legislation is to enable us to ratify the Convention as soon as possible.

I do not want to detain the House too long, but as the noble Lord has asked me about the legislation in the United States and Canada, perhaps he would like me to make some observations on it. It was last year that the Water Quality Improvement Act—a Federal Statute—was passed into law in the United States of America. This is on similar lines, but does not follow precisely the Convention. It provides for strict liability on the owner or operator of any ship—not merely a tanker. The liability is for Federal Government expenditure on clean-up of oil, but not for other claims. It contains exemptions from strict liability which are rather wider than those in the Convention; in particular, any act or omission of a third party is a defence. Provision is made for limitation of liability: the figure per ton, 100 dollars, is lower than that in the Convention, but the overall limit is about the same. Proof of financial responsibility for this liability is required of any ship in United States waters.

In addition to the Federal legislation, there are several States which, under their own legislation go beyond the Convention in the sense that they are stricter. Several of the provisions of the Federal Act are also quite incompatible with the Convention, and all those inconsistencies would have to be eliminated before the United States could ratify the Convention. Federal legislation enabling the United States to ratify the Convention would override the State's legislation where they were in conflict.

In Canada there is a Bill before Parliament which has had its Second Reading and is currently being considered by the Commons Committee on Environmental Pollution. The provisions of this Bill, as at present drafted, include virtually absolute liability on the shipowner, either on his own or jointly with the cargo owner. This is absolute liability for damages and clean-up costs resulting from the discharge of any polluting substance. The only exclusion is contributory negligence on the part of the claimant. In the absence of fault or negligence on the part of the person liable, the same limits of liability are to apply as in the Convention. Provision is also made for evidence of financial responsibility and for an additional claims fund financed by levy on imports. It follows that in some respects—particularly in not permitting the exclusions contemplated by the Convention—the Bill is incompatible with it.

The noble Lord particularly asked in Committee whether anything in American or Canadian legislation might be held to affect the levels of liability later on, and I think he included this matter in the point he made this time. As I have mentioned, the limits of liability are the same in both countries, or slightly lower than those in the Convention, and so could not be taken as a precedent for an increase in shipowners' liability in the future. This is relevant to the clause we are coming to discuss.

Your Lordships will appreciate from the differences appearing in the legislation of these countries that obtaining uniformity in this field is far from easy. Our policy is to proceed by multilateral agreement whenever and wherever possible, and strict adherence to the principles in the Convention is of importance if any degree of uniformity is to be obtained. Furthermore, it would be quite impossible for each State to pass legislation giving effect to its individual ideas on the form that legislation in this field should take and then to ratify, or purport to ratify, the Convention.

My Lords, whether or not the particular wording here, and the particular exception, commends itself to the House, I feel that we are in this difficulty: that if we want to ratify the Convention we would have to accept this wording. I consider that this exception is quite reasonable in the circumstances.

5.45 p.m.

LORD KENNET

My Lords, there is one point in what the noble Lord said which is of so much greater importance than ail the others that I should like to press him for a moment upon it, because if the House were to feel that this point overrode everything else and was sufficient, it would be a waste of time to go into any of the other points. It was that his advice had been—and I assume this is advice from the Foreign Office lawyers—that it would not be possible for this country to ratify the Convention if my Amendment were agreed to. That is a very clear statement. It is that no country which wishes to ratify and belong to this Convention may in any smallest respect impose more extensive liabilities than any other country on owners of tankers which have polluted its shores.

I should like the noble Lord to tell us precisely why it is impossible to ratify, and yet to make owners of tankers which pollute the shores of Britain liable, even if there has been an exceptional storm, while taking up no position as to their liability in that eventuality when they pollute the shores of other countries.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I must confess that I do not quite understand the last sentence of the noble Lord. The whole point of the legislation is to ensure that the shores of all Convention countries will be protected under this legislation, if they all pass similar legislation. It applies only to Convention countries; it does not apply to all countries. So far as those signing the Convention are concerned, if they accept the Convention as a whole, then the liability will be placed on the shipowner, with recourse to the insurers, up to the limits in question, and it will be possible for anyone who suffers damage as a result—whether in this country or in another country, or both, if the same occurrence harms both—to recover under the Bill and under their own legislation damages up to the limits specified in the Bill. I hope that is clear—it is rather an involved sentence.

LORD KENNET

I think the noble Lord has made it clear. I do not regard that—I am an amateur; I speak in all humility—and I do not think the House should regard that as a sufficient reason for accepting that this country cannot ratify the Convention if this Amendment is agreed to. I may be sticking my neck out; I may be being foolish, but I simply do not follow this. Let us see what would happen if we pass this Amendment. There is, let us say, a tanker wreck in mid-Channel. Britain and France are both Convention countries, and are both polluted—I give a hypothetical example. A suit is brought in both British and French courts. We have the Amendment, and on the day of the wreck there happened to be exceptionally rough weather. The tanker owner says, in both British and French courts, that conditions were very rough; it was exceptional, inevitable, irresistible, and all the rest of it.

The British court says that that does not matter a bit and that the owner is liable for the damage he did to Britain, because he had no exemption for acts of God. The French court says that they should go into the question of whether or not this storm was truly irresistible, inevitable, et cetera. Let us say that the French court decides that it was. The tanker owner is, therefore, liable for the pollution he caused to the coast of Britain, but not liable for the pollution he caused to the coast of France. My question to the noble Lord in that case is: supposing that is the result in the English and French courts, what infraction of the terms of the Convention, if any, has been committed by Great Britain?

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, the position, as I understand it, is this. If the shores of the two countries were both affected, then the owner, in order to limit his liability, would deposit his surety, or whatever it was, or pay the money into court, up to the extent of his liability under the Bill. He would choose, I suppose—I do not know—in which of the two countries he would make that deposit. In that country, and in that country only, the proceedings would take place. Arrangements are made between the two courts to see that anybody who makes a claim in this country would have his claim included with the claims made in France, so that it would be the particular case that would be judged as to whether or not the inclusion applied, and it would be judged only once.

It is just possible—let us face it—that a case which was settled in one way in France might have been settled in another way in this country. But it is equally possible that a case settled by one judge in this country might have been settled differently by another judge in this country. I am afraid that that is all part of the law.

LORD HAWKE

My Lords, could the noble Lord explain whether it is in the Bill, or is it part of the Convention, that the courts of the two countries agree to follow one another?

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I did not say that the two countries agree to follow one another. What I am saying is that the distribution among the claimants is decided in one court. It is for the court in the country in which the money is deposited to decide whether, in the circumstances, there is a liability under Clause 1, and whether the owner is entitled to limit his liability because, chiefly, there was no fault or privity on his part.

LORD HAWKE

My Lords, am I to understand, then, that there is a difference in the treatment; if in one country the owner can escape liability under this clause and in the other he cannot, so that he will naturally deposit his money in the country where he can escape liability he will thus escape liability in the other as well? If that is the case, I quite see the force of the noble Lord's argument that it is much better to take the line of the Convention and not try to go beyond it in any way.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I am sorry that I am finding difficulty in making this point clear to your Lordships. It is simply this. If the two countries that we are talking about have ratified the Convention the law will be exactly the same. The French wording and the English wording are both authentic, and they seem to me to match

very closely in this particular case. It is just the fact that on the particular facts of the case there might be a different judgment as to whether or not, in the particular case, the exclusion applied. But this would be decided only once, and it would be decided in the court of the country where the owner had decided to lodge his security.

LORD HAWKE

Yes, my Lords. But suppose the clause of the noble Lord, Lord Kennet—

VISCOUNT GOSCHEN

My Lords, I must remind the House that this is a Report stage and noble Lords are entitled to speak only once.

LORD HAWKE

My Lords, I think I am entitled to ask the Minister to explain a point in his own speech; that is perfectly understandable.

VISCOUNT GOSCHEN

My Lords, the noble Lord has already made two speeches on this Amendment, and I must ask him to abide by the normal customs of the House.

LORD KENNET

My Lords, with the leave of the House, may I say that the noble Lord has convinced me that if the scenario I have described were to take place it would indeed be a complicated matter legally, and I think the shipowner concerned would certainly elect to have the matter tried in a French court. That would probably not affect the issue that he was still liable under British law. What the noble Lord has not convinced me of is that the adoption of this Amendment would make it impossible for us to ratify the Treaty. He has adduced no arguments to show that, by going a little further in British law than the Convention says everyone shall go, we debar ourselves from adhering to the Convention. That being so, I think it would be of advantage to test the opinion of the House on this matter.

5.55 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 1) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 34; Not-Contents, 62.

CONTENTS
Amherst, E. Beaumont of Whitley, L. Brockway, L.
Arwyn, L. Beswick, L. Brown, L.
Buckinghamshire, E. Geddes of Epsom, L. Plummer, Bs.
Burton of Coventry, Bs. Greenwood of Rossendale, L. St. Davids, V.
Chorley, L. Henley, L. Segal, L.
Collison, L. Kennet, L. Shepherd, L.
Delacourt-Smith, L. Leatherland, L. Wade, L.
Diamond, L. Lindgren, L. Wells-Pestell, L.
Donaldson of Kingsbridge, L. Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, Bs. [Teller.] White, Bs.
Evans of Hungershall, L. Wootton of Abinger, Bs.
Gaitskell, Bs. Mais, L. Wynne-Jones, L.
Garnsworthy, L. [Teller.] Phillips, Bs.
NOT-CONTENTS
Aberdare, L. Drumalbyn, L. Lauderdale, E.
Amherst of Hackney, L. Eccles, V. Lonsdale, E.
Ampthill, L. Emmet of Amberley, Bs. Merrivale, L.
Ashbourne, L. Erroll of Hale, L. Milverton, L.
Auckland, L. Falkland, V. Mowbray and Stourton, L. [Teller.]
Audley, Bs. Ferrers, E.
Belstead, L. Ferrier, L. Nugent of Guildford, L.
Birdwood, L. Glasgow, E. Rankeillour, L.
Bledisloe, V. Goschen, V. [Teller.] Rhyl, L.
Boston, L. Greenway, L. Robbins, L.
Brooke of Cumnor, L. Grenfell, L. St. Aldwyn, E.
Brooke of Ystradfellte, Bs. Grimston of Westbury, L. Sandford, L.
Brougham and Vaux, L. Hacking, L. Somers, L.
Colville of Culross, V. Hanworth, V. Strang, L.
Conesford, L. Hatherton, L. Suffield, L.
Cork and Orrery, E. Hawke, L. Swanborough, Bs.
Cottesloe, L. Hood, V. Tenby, V.
Craigmyle, L. Howard of Glossop, L. Teviot, L.
Daventry, V. Ilford, L. Vivian, L.
Davidson, V. Inchyra, L. Windlesham, L.
Denham, L. Inglewood, L. Wolverton, L.

On Question, Motion agreed to.

Clause 4 [Limitation of liability under Section 1]:

6.0 p.m.

LORD KENNET moved Amendment No. 3: Page 3, line 15, leave out ("2,000 gold francs") and insert ("such amount as may be fixed by the Secretary of State under subsection (1A) below").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, at the Committee stage of the Bill I explained that the purpose of this Amendment was to get rid of the actual sum of the liability, so that it could be varied quickly by the Government by order and thus leave the principle of liability in the Bill. May I say at this point that in the Committee stage Hansard quotes me as saying: The effect is to leave the concept of the limitation of liability out of the Bill as it is drafted".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 9/2/71; col. 38.] This is precisely the wrong way round. What I said was: The effect is to leave the concept of liability in the Bill as it is drafted but to take out the specific level.

After that the noble Lord explained that he did not want to do that, because the Bill laid liability on the shipowners, and that any future Convention taking the liability up to 30 million dollars in accidents in accordance with the CRISTAL fund which is being set up, when there was national legislation to put that Convention into effect the liability would fall on the cargo owner. I take the point and have reflected about this a good deal, but I should like to ask the Government two questions. Are they quite sure that it might not be convenient, when we are legislating to give effect to a future Convention, to leave all the liability on the shipowner up to 30 million dollars and to let the shipowner collect everything over 13 million dollars from the cargo owner under CRISTAL arrangements. I do not know. The Government obviously cannot say at this stage whether or not they would like to do this, but if that did turn out to be a convenient way of doing it then there would be no need for a new Bill at all. All that would need to be done would be to up the 13 million dollars to 30 million dollars, and that could be done by regulation.

Then there is the point that we live in an age where the value of money seems to go down. It is always our purpose to cause it to go down as slowly as possible, but down it keeps going; and for that sole reason we shall want to increase this liability. Might it not be convenient to be able to do so by order, rather than by bringing in a complete new Bill? I put these points to the Government. If they are not sure that these things may not happen there seems to me still to be an argument for taking the precise level which is appropriate for 1971 out of the Bill and putting it in a regulation. That would be the effect of my Amendment. I beg to move.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I am bound to recognise the force of the noble Lord's argument in this case, but once again the trouble is that it is at variance with the Convention. The fact that the amounts are expressed in the Convention in gold francs makes it a little easier, because presumably it would be likely that in the event of devaluation the powers in the Bill to redefine the equivalent of the gold franc could be used. The trouble about this Amendment is that it completely excludes the ceiling on a shipowner's liability in the absence of fault or privity on his part, and doing that would make the ratification of the Convention impossible. It is of course true that there is the prospect of another Convention coming along which, as the noble Lord says, should enable the supplementary payment to be available but there is no certainty about it. The Convention has yet to be agreed.

So far as CRISTAL is concerned, this is entirely a voluntary arrangement, and I see the noble Lord's point in saying that it might be better to leave the whole of the liability on the owner, without any exceptions at all, and let him collect from CRISTAL as well as from the Bill itself. But surely whether that is so or not, that would not be a reason for leaving out of the Bill the limit of the owner's legal liability. I am not quite sure of this, but we should certainly have to consider it. I should be quite willing between now and the next stage, or before the Bill goes to another place, for this aspect of it to be considered. We have two things to consider, whether it would be practicable and would work; and, secondly, whether it is in accordance with the Convention.

The fact is that at the moment the work now going on in IMCO is to try to ensure additional compensation in the case of major disaster that goes beyond the limits—the case of the big tankers. It is agreed that the source of this additional compensation will not be the tanker owners but, directly or indirectly, the oil companies. Therefore, one is putting a different liability elsewhere. The maximum figures in the supplementary fund will be considerably higher than those in the Convention, but they will not affect those figures in the Convention, since tanker owners' liability will remain the liability laid down in the Convention. Therefore, it is appropriate to have the figures as in the Convention, with the possibility of adjusting them in terms of sterling as and when necessary.

LORD KENNET

My Lords, with the leave of the House, it is perfectly clear that though the noble Lord understands perfectly well what I am after, whenever he looks down at his brief it is terrible "corny" old departmental stuff. To accuse me of trying to take a liability out of the Bill so that we cannot sign the Convention is absolute nonsense. All I want to do is to put the level of liability in regulations so that British law will say the liability is 2,000 gold francs, and so on; and of course we can ratify the Convention. But I am much heartened by the noble Lord's statement that he will have one more look at it between now and the next stage, or between now and the House of Commons; and, that being so, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 5 [Limitation actions]:

6.13 p.m.

LORD KENNET moved Amendment No. 8: Page 4, line 38, leave out subsection (4).

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is a probing Amendment. At the Committee stage I confessed to the noble Lord that I could not understand subsection (4) of Clause 5, and I put this Amendment down in order to give the noble Lord an opportunity, if he would be so good, to explain to the House what the subsection means. It is a fearfully complicated bit of drafting. I beg to move.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, it is not only a complicated bit of drafting but a complicated matter, and, that being so, perhaps the noble Lord will allow me to refer to my brief, and I hope he will not find it too "corny". Clause 1 of the Bill imposes on the owner of a tanker a new form of strict liability for oil pollution damage. Clause 3 precludes the bringing of proceedings for that type of damage against that owner under any other head, or against his servants or agents. But there may be other persons concerned with the operation or management of the ship who may incur a liability. For instance, the ship may be under charter, and a negligent master who causes an accident may be the charterer's servant and not the owner's. It will follow, therefore, that the owner may be liable under Clause 1 and entitled to limit his liability to the amount specified under Clause 4; and a charterer or some other person may be liable under the ordinary principles of law and be entitled to limit his liability, which is to £28 per ton, under the existing rules in the Merchant Shipping Acts.

In this case, in drafting the Bill, we have tried to follow two principles: first, that the claimant should be free to pursue his claim against whomever he likes and against whomever he can: and, secondly, that the total liability of the ship—if I may use a loose phrase; the liability is on the owner, of course—should not exceed the limitation figures set out in Clause 4. These are expressed to be the limits of liability. To achieve this result, we have provided in Clause 7 that where a limitation fund is established, proceedings against other persons who are entitled to limit their liability in connection with the ship are to be stayed, and claim ants are to look to the owner's limitation fund. The subsection we are now discussing is designed to cover the position where payments are made to claimants for oil pollution before the owner's limitation fund is established, by allowing persons who have made such payments to claim against the fund.

In fact we now think that this subsection in its present form is too wide in its scope. It enables not only persons concerned in the management or operation of the ship to limit their own liability, but also other persons, such as the owner of another ship which had caused the oil pollution damage by colliding with the tanker from which the oil escaped. It would have been comparatively simple to draft an Amendment to deal with this point but I should like to explain why I have not put one down. The reason is that a further point has been drawn to our attention, namely, that the Bill, and this clause in particular, may not preserve the rights of a tanker owner who has incurred a liability under Clause 1 against a party whose negligence has caused the casualty. This subsection in its present form, if anything, points to the opposite conclusion, and this is not the intention; that is why we are considering the point further. I do not think it would be sensible to put an Amendment before your Lordships until we are reasonably certain that we have something which is right on those points. I would, however, assure your Lordships that we intend to narrow the scope of this subsection, and in those circumstances I would ask the noble Lord not to press his Amendment.

LORD KENNET

My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord for that full explanation. It seems to confirm my suspicion that when one cannot understand something it may be that it is pointing in two directions at once, which it did seem to me to be doing. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 10 [Compulsory insurance against liability for pollution.]

LORD KENNET moved Amendment No. 9: Page 6, line 42, leave out from ("State") to end of line 44.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, the last two Amendments that I have put down, to which I wish to speak together, concern the circumstances in which the Secretary of State may give a certificate saying that he believes the ship in question is covered against the liability imposed by the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, explained last time that he wanted the Government to have a certain amount of flexibility in this respect, and I think I am right in saying that the flexibility of which my Amendment would deprive the Government and which they are anxious to retain is as follows. The Secretary of State wants to be able to give a certificate to a ship registered in a non-Convention country but insured in a country which may or may not be a Convention country but is known to him to have an efficient insurance market. That being so, this seems to me a very proper freedom to wish the Secretary of State to have.

Before asking leave to withdraw this Amendment, however, I should like to ask the noble Lord whether he can give the House an assurance that the Secretary of State will exercise the power to give the certificate and to make regulations which the House is about to afford to him in such a way as always to provide an incentive to countries to sign the Convention and to shipowners to register their ships in Convention countries. What I am asking is: can the noble Lord say that the Government will use this power with great care, and in such a way as to make life awkward for countries that do not adhere to the Convention and for shipowners who register in non-Convention countries; and also to use it as an incentive to bring countries into the Convention and to get ships registered in those countries and not in others. I beg to move.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, the objectives that the noble Lord has mentioned are very desirable objectives, but I should like to consider between now and the next stage (perhaps I might write to him on this) to what extent it would be possible—I am not discussing whether it would be proper, but whether in fact it would be possible—to do this. The main purpose of these arrangements is simply to make sure that the oil tankers carrying substantial amounts of oil that come to or pass our shores are fully covered by insurance; and in order that we may be certain of that we shall insist that when they do come to our shores carrying oil they have certificates indicating that they are fully covered. So far as non-Convention countries are concerned, the question here is to what extent it is possible to ensure that they are properly covered without insisting on their being covered by a certificate from the Secretary of State in this country.

As the clause stands at present, up to this particular subsection, of course there is an obligation on every Convention country to ensure that its ships are covered; and we will of course ensure that all our ships are covered wherever they are in the world. The question is how best to ensure that the ships of non-Convention countries are covered. This will depend on the estimate of the Secretary of State as to how competent the various non-Convention countries in which large tankers are registered are of assessing whether the insurance meets up to the requirements of the Convention. I cannot give a more direct assurance to the noble Lord at the present time than that we will try to steer more and more countries to register, because I am not quite certain how far the certificate arrangements can do that. I should like to look at this point further. But I hope the noble Lord will agree that the arrangements which we are contemplating are the right ones in the circumstances, and that he will wish us well in the difficult task of deciding which countries are capable of doing this job.

LORD KENNET

My Lords, with the leave of the House may I say that I do indeed wish the Government well in this respect. It seems to me that this is a good arrangement for a naughty world, and I hope that it will be used to make the world less naughty. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.