§ 3.44 p.m.
§ THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN)My Lords, with the leave of the House perhaps I may now answer the Private Notice Question which has been put down by the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd; namely, Whether, in view of the now confirmed reports of extensive fighting in Laos, consequent upon the operation made by the Army of South Vietnam, the Government will make a Statement on the action taken by Her Majesty's Government as Co-Chairman of the 1961 Geneva Agreement on Laos.
As my right honourable friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said in another place on February 3, he was willing at any time to join with the Co-Chairman to reconvene the Geneva Conference in order to try to deal with this matter. He repeated this to the Soviet Ambassador on the following day. The action which has now been taken by South Vietnamese forces in Laos is a direct consequence of the flagrant violation of Laotian neutrality by North Vietnamese troops which has been going on for years. When those troops proceed to kill South Vietnamese, the reaction of that country is fully understandable.
§ LORD SHEPHERDMy Lords, I am most grateful for the reply which the noble Marquess has given me to my Private Notice Question. He will be aware of the very deep concern in this House, and in Parliament as a whole, at any extension of the fighting in South-East Asia. We recognise the difficulties of Her Majesty's Government, as Co-Chairman of the Conference, in dealing with the situation, but the recent developments in Laos must give us particular concern.
May I ask the noble Marquess three questions? First, has there been an 28 official approach to Her Majesty's Government by the Government of Laos? Secondly, do the Government think that there is reason for a special initiative by the Co-Chairmen in this matter; and, if they do not feel that a special initiative is warranted, perhaps the noble Marquess will tell us why not. Thirdly, in view of the importance of our own relations in South-East Asia, and in view of what is, we understand, the new relationship between the Prime Minister and President Nixon, may I ask the noble Marquess whether there has been consultation between the Prime Minister and President Nixon on this matter?
§ LORD GLADWYNMy Lords, while appreciating what was said in the Answer which the noble Marquess has just given, may I inquire, on behalf of my colleagues on these Benches, whether the Government feel that this operation by the South Vietnamese Army is likely to assist the process of withdrawal of the United States forces from South Vietnam? And would they not perhaps agree that when this withdrawal has been completed the future of South Vietnam will have to be decided by free elections in accordance with the decision of the Geneva Conference of 1954?
§ THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIANMy Lords, I should like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, for his comments, and I will attempt to answer the three questions which he put to me. So far as my information goes, there has been no official approach from the Laotian Government to Her Majesty's Government on this point. I think we all recognise the seriousness of the situation, and I do not want for one minute to underestimate that. That is why my right honourable friend said that he is still hoping that it will be possible to reconvene the Conference. I think that we shall have to watch the situation very closely, and I will certainly undertake to pass on to him what the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, has said regarding perhaps taking a special initiative in this matter. On the noble Lord's third point, we were not consulted specifically by the American Government about this matter, although of course we are, as the noble Lord will appreciate, in consultation with them on a number of matters related to South-East Asia.
29 The noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, asked whether this matter would help the eventual American withdrawal from South Vietnam. I think that this is a very difficult question to answer offhand. The point of the present operation, so far as the South Vietnamese are concerned—and, indeed, with what support they have had from the American Army—is of course to bring the war to an end at the soonest possible time and to hasten the process of what they call the "Vietnamisation" of the war. The noble Lord also asked me a question as to what might happen after the war regarding free elections. I think that perhaps this is something that will have to wait a little longer, my Lords.
§ LORD SHEPHERDMy Lords, I appreciate the difficulty of noble Lords who sit on the Front Bench opposite. Often they have to speak for Departments in which they are not directly concerned. The noble Marquess is a Minister in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and, if I may say so, I think it very unsatisfactory for him to come here and say that he does not quite know whether there has been an approach by the Government of Laos. It must be the case either that there has been an approach or that there has not been an approach. I should have thought that the noble Marquess could give us a consistent answer to that question. I should also have thought that he could give a reason why Her Majesty's Government have thought it improper or inopportune to take a special initiative as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference in the light of the very dangerous, and developingly dangerous, situation in South-East Asia. Can the noble Marquess give any further assurances in this matter?
§ THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIANYes, my Lords. I can. As I thought I said in my original Answer, we are watching this situation very carefully. My right honourable friend, as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference, is, I know, only too anxious to do what he can to bring the situation under control. I am sorry that the noble Lord perhaps somewhat misinterpreted what I said previously. There has been no approach from the Laotian Government. I can give that assurance.
§ LORD SHEPHERDMy Lords, the noble Marquess still has not given us a 30 reason why a special initiative has not been taken.
§ THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIANMy Lords, I think that the first thing to do in this matter is to try to re-convene the Conference. This is what the Geneva Conference is about: it is to try to settle the problem in Laos. I think that at this stage it is up to the Soviet authorities to come forward and agree to talk about the matter.
§ LORD DAVIES OF LEEKMy Lords, is the noble Marquess aware that, what-ever philosophy of politics they may take, most sensible beings in the Western World are now feeling that this war has reached the height of brutality and that it is paying no tribute at all to the so-called free Western civilisation? May I ask whether the noble Marquess has asked his right honourable friend whether or not he has been in touch with the Soviet Union as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conferences of 1961, 1962 and 1954? Is he further aware that Chou En-lai himself said to me in Peking that if we could have left Laos as it was after the great efforts of Sir Anthony Eden (he mentioned him in particular) we should have had that neutrality? As one who has been on the spot, may I say that that neutrality was not broken by the North Vietnamese, as was borne home when the United Nations investigated an alleged invasion? The whole situation has grown to what it now is from a pack of half-truths—and in some cases direct lies.
§ THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIANMy Lords, I can confirm to the noble Lord that my right honourable friend has been in touch with the Soviet Authorities on this point, through their Ambassador in London. On his rather more general points as to the causes of this sad situation, I do not think that he would expect me to comment very much. I think that one must agree that the action taken by the South Vietnamese forces at the moment has been provoked by the fact that the North Vietnamese have been unable to recognise the neutrality of Laos.
§ LORD SHEPHERDMy Lords, I am encouraged by the fact that the noble Marquess has been more forthcoming to my noble friend. Am I to understand now that the Foreign Secretary has 31 been in touch with the Soviet Government since the invasion of Laos by the South Vietnamese forces?
§ THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIANMy Lords, my right honourable friend saw the Ambassador of the Soviet Union on, I think, February 4. At that time we were not quite certain what was happening.
§ LORD BOURNEMy Lords, would the noble Marquess appreciate that in the operations last year, operations which were conducted by the Americans and supported by the Vietnamese, the Communists lost 80 per cent. of their lines of communication, and that what they are trying to do now, and have been trying to do ever since, is to replace the port of Sihanoukville by strengthening up the Ho-Chi-minh trial? Therefore, may I ask what is the difference between this operation, now being undertaken by the South Vietnamese and supported by the Americans, and the same sort of operation that took place last year?
§ THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIANMy Lords, I think that in many way there is little difference: both are preventive actions.
§ LORD BROCKWAYMy Lords, in view of the grave danger that the war in Vietnam may now be extended to Laos and to South-East Asia, may I ask the noble Marquess these questions? First, is it not the case that the Government of Laos, which is sincerely neutralistic, has opposed both the intervention of Communist troops and, now, the troops in Saigon supported by the American Government? Is it not the case that any intervention of foreign troops was prohibited by the agreement of the Geneva Conference, of which we are joint Chairman? And is not the action of Her Majesty's Government in endorsing the Saigon, American-supported, intervention now prejudicing the opportunity of Her Majesty's Government to contribute constructively and usefully to a solution of this problem?
§ THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIANMy Lords, it is true that the Laotian position is one of neutrality; and I do not think that that is disputed. I think it is also true to say that the Laotian Government 32 take the view that their neutrality has been violated for a great many years by the North Vietnamese. We want to do what we can to stop the war. That is why my right honourable friend will carry on with his endeavours to try to get the Conference reconvened. But, as the noble Lord will realise, this is a matter for the Russian Government as well as for ourselves.
§ LORD SHEPHERDMy Lords, may I commiserate with the noble Marquess, for this is a difficult subject? Would he undertake to see his right honourable friend and to ask him whether, in the light of the present circumstances and the very considerable dangers that are inherent in the position, this is not the moment, yet again, to make an approach to them as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference?
§ THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIANMy Lords, I can certainly give that undertaking. I shall convey exactly what the noble Lord has said to my right honourable friend.
§ LORD ALPORTMy Lords, as my noble friend and as Lord Shepherd has said, this is an important matter. It is. I understand, the Answer to a Private Notice Question put down by the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd. So far as I know, it has been our custom for Private Notice Questions normally to be taken after Oral Questions, unless a Statement was to be made in the House of Commons which made it necessary for them to be taken after 3.30 p.m. Your Lordships' House was very full at Question Time; and I am sure that a number of noble Lords would have liked to hear the questions and answers on this particular subject. Would it not be better in the future that where no Statement is made in the House of Commons, a Private Notice Question of this kind should be taken at a definite time, immediately after Oral Questions?
§ THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIANMy Lords, that is a matter for what one would call the usual channels. In this particular instance, a precisely similar Question was tabled this afternoon in the House of Commons for answer at a certain moment after 3.30 p.m. Therefore I think it was felt, with the agreement of noble Lords opposite, that it would be appropriate to take it at that time.