HL Deb 03 August 1971 vol 323 cc1105-44

House again in Committee on Amendment No. 127.

LORD GARDINER

We have had an opportunity during the adjournment of considering both Amendment No. 127, which is ours, and Amendment No. 131 which will be proposed later. I appreciate that the point which we were seeking to make has been sought to be met by the Government. When we come to deal with that in detail there are one or two criticisms I will make. For the time being, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

LORD WINDLESHAM

This Amendment, No. 128, is consequential on Amendment No. 109 on which my noble friend Lord Denham spoke earlier. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 45, line 28, after (" Kingdom ") insert (" or before the directions for his removal have been fulfilled ").—(Lord Windlesham.)

LORD GARDINER

I am sorry, but neither my noble friend Lady White nor I can understand this. I am sure that it is our fault. We understand subsection (4) as it is in the Bill: The captain of a ship or aircraft, if so required by an immigration officer, shall prevent from disembarking in the United Kingdom any person placed on board the ship or aircraft under paragraph 11 or 15 above, and the captain may for that purpose detain him in custody on board the ship or aircraft. If after the word"Kingdom"you insert: or before the directions for his removal have been fulfilled I do not understand where the alternative comes in: …shall prevent from disembarking in the United Kingdom or before the directions for his removal have been fulfilled…". It is probably entirely our fault, but it is not so worded to be clear to us.

LORD WINDLESHAM

The Amendment was debated earlier and it may be for the convenience of the Committee if I repeat the explanation. Amendment 128, in paragraph 17 of Schedule 2, has as its purpose to ensure that where directions are given under paragraphs 8 to 14 of the Schedule after refusal of entry or illegal entry, or under paragraph 1 of Schedule 3, which concerns deportation, for the removal of a person from the United Kingdom, the captain of the ship or aircraft may be required to prevent a person from disembarking until the directions are fulfilled; and the captain has express legal authority to detain him on board until he reaches his destination. I understand that as the Bill stands, unamended, there is the anomaly that although the removal directions will specify a destination and the person concerned has art appeal as to destination under Clause 17 although in some cases exercisable only after removal, the captain of the ship or aircraft to whom the directions are given has no clear authority to enforce them by restraining the person from attempting to disembark at some other destination.

The Amendment is being made, as my noble friend Lord Denham mentioned earlier, at the suggestion of the Chamber of Shipping and B.O.A.C., in order to ensure that a carrying company is not put at risk of legal action being taken against it in this country because it has sought to enforce directions lawfully given to it by the Immigration Service. Noble Lords will appreciate that we cannot give protection against legal proceedings brought overseas. I hope that that explanation is helpful to the Committee.

BARONESS WHITE

I am sorry, but perhaps as we are getting towards the end of the Bill we are becoming peculiarly dense. If the noble Lord would be good enough to read sub-paragraph (4) of paragraph 16 in the Schedule (the noble Lord referred to paragraph 17, but according to us it is paragraph 16) he will appreciate that while from the point of view of drafting it may not be inaccurate, it is surely inelegant. It does not seem to flow at all, with the peculiar alternative suddenly coming in the middle. My noble and learned friend and I do not wish to make heavy weather of the Amendment, but on reading it we both find it extraordinarily difficult to follow.

LORD WINDLESHAM

I will certainly arrange for this to be checked with the draftsmen. If two noble Members of the Benches opposite, after study, have found it difficult to follow, it may be that some small rearrangement of the words would make the matter clearer. If things can be expressed more clearly I am sure that it would be in all our interests.

LORD GARDINER

The word"or"ordinarily postulates an alternative; it appears to be an alternative as to the time when something can be done. It says: or before the directions for his removal have been fulfilled ". But there is no alternative of time. The sub-paragraph simply provides that the captain can prevent from disembarking in the United Kingdom any person placed on board the ship ", and so on. But I think the noble Earl, Lord Balfour, has an explanation.

THE EARL OF BALFOUR

I win sorry to interrupt, but I am wondering whether line 28 should in fact have been line 23. It seems to fit in there very well.

LORD WINDLESHAM

I will take note of that observation as well, and if there is a need for clarification I will come back at Report stage.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

8.10 p.m.

LORD BROCKWAY moved Amendment No. 128D: Page 46, line 7, leave out (" photographing, measuring or otherwise ").

The noble Lord said: This is a new matter. It refers to paragraph 18(2) on page 46, which reads: Where a person is detained under paragraph 16, any immigration officer, constable or prison officer, or any other person authorised by the Secretary of State, may take all such steps as may be reasonably necessary for photographing, measuring or otherwise identifying him. Paragraph 16(1) on the previous page reads: A person who may be required to submit to examination under paragraph 2 above may be detained under the authority of an immigration officer pending his examination and pending a decision to give or refuse him leave to enter. That is to say, he has not been found guilty; he is to submit to examination pending a decision.

My concern here is that it would be undesirable to create a"rogues' gallery ". I recognise that it is not disputed that reasonable steps should be taken to identify persons, but only in the last resort should these means of photographing, et cetera, be applied. There is too much tendency to-day to use photographs to identify suspected persons and I hope that the Minister may be able to give us an assurance that this is not going to become a general practice. I beg to move.

LORD WIN D LESHAM

Paragraph 18(2) of the Schedule to which the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, has drawn our attention provides that where a person is detained pending a decision on his entry, or pending removal from this country, steps may be taken to photograph, measure or otherwise identify him. These steps may be taken by an immigration officer, a police officer, a prison officer or any other person authorised by the Secretary of State.

Here again, corresponding powers are given by the existing law—the Aliens Order 1953, and the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962. I understand that these powers are used, in practice, primarily for providing the passport-issuing authorities of other countries with the information they need to issue a travel document to one of their own nationals who has arrived here without documents and has been refused entry. They can also be used to identify a person for other purposes: for example, in order to determine whether or not he is identical with someone who has a criminal record in this country. In practice, any photographing is normally done by an immigration officer, a police officer or a prison officer; but there have been occasions on which it has been convenient to have it done by others, such as police civilian employees. I can assure the noble Lord that this work does not form part of the duties of any Securicor employees. The words in question,"photographing, measuring or otherwise ", to which the noble Lord has drawn attention, are taken from the existing law and, because of the requirements of the passport-issuing procedure, it is important that the scope of the power under paragraph 18(2) should be not less than that of the existing provisions.

There is no question of a"rogues' gallery"being built up here. Failing the power sought to be deleted by Amendment No. 28D there would inevitably be increased delay, involving longer detention. When a passenger arrives without a passport or travel document—and unfortunately, as the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, knows, there are such cases—if he is refused entry the Amendment would mean that he would be likely to be held in detention longer while arrangements were made for him to return to his own country. Without a power of this sort it is difficult to envisage how the passport-issuing authorities in the countries concerned would be able to issue a passport to one of their nationals who was not in their country but who might be held in detention at London Airport. With that explanation I hope that the noble Lord may be satisfied and feel able to withdraw his Amendment.

LORD DONALDSON OF KINGSBRIDGE

In relation to getting a passport from the original country, of course no-one will have any objection to that; but that should be covered by saying"with the person's consent ". Where it is not with the person's consent my noble friend is worried. I am not absolutely happy to think—I am open to conviction—that somebody who has not been convicted of anything should be photographed or otherwise measured. I am not sure that this is a good thing from the point of view of civil liberties. I do not wish to make a case of it but I would like to hear a little more about what other purposes this might be used for and which a person may not consent to.

LORD WINDLESHAM

The only information I have before me is what I have given. I am informed that the powers are used primarily for providing the passport-issuing authorities of other countries with information. There was a second point I mentioned, that the provision could be used to identify a person for other purposes, for example in order to determine whether he was identical with someone with a criminal record. I think we must take it that the first category would be the largest. I can envisage, as no doubt the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, can, the case of a person who seeks entry to this country without a passport or entry documents. These are persons who for various reasons feel compelled to come and there has to be some way of arranging for them to be documented if they are to return.

LORD DONALDSON OF KINGSBRIDGE

That would be with their consent, would it not?

LORD WINDLESHAM

Some people have arrived in desperate conditions; they have sometimes travelled halfway across the world to try to gain entry into this country. They may have defaced or destroyed their passport in the process. If they have gone to those lengths they might easily feel they were not willing to consent to any measure which might lead to their being returned to their own country. I am afraid that in some cases it would be without the consent of the individual.

LORD BROCKWAY

Paragraph 16 concerns people who have not been found guilty. They are only under examination. Of course I accept the Minister's statement, and I would like to believe that the primary purpose is to supply passport photographs. If that is so, the phrase"with consent"would meet that situation. But one is concerned that people who have not yet been found guilty should have to pass through this identification procedure which, to put it mildly, must be humiliating to them. However, in view of the fact that the Minister says that the majority are desired for passport photographs, and hoping that he may consider the proposal to adopt the words"with their consent ", I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

LORD DENHAM moved Amendment No. 129:

Page 47, line 4, at end insert— (".—(1) Subject to the provisions of this paragraph, in either of the following cases, that is to say,

  1. (a) where directions are given in respect of an illegal entrant under paragraph 9 or 10 above; and
  2. (b) where a person has lawfully entered the United Kingdom without leave by virtue of section 8(1) of this Act, but directions are given in respect of him under paragraph 13(2)(a) above or, in a case within paragraph 13(2)(a), under paragraph 14;
the owners or agents of the ship or aircraft in which he arrived in the United Kingdom shall be liable to pay the Secretary of State on demand any expenses incurred by the latter in respect of the custody, accommodation or maintenance of that person at any time after his arrival while he was detained or liable to be detained under paragraph 16 above. (2) If, before the directions for a person's removal from the United Kingdom have been carried out, he is given leave to remain in the United Kingdom, no sum shall be demanded under sub-paragraph (1) above for expenses incurred in respect of that person and any sum already demanded and paid shall be refunded. (3) Sub-paragraph (1) above shall not have effect in relation to directions which, in consequence of an appeal under this Act, are for the time being of no effect; and the expenses to which that sub-paragraph applies include expenses in conveying the person in question to and from the place where he is detained or accommodated unless the journey is made for the purpose of attending an appeal by him under this Act.").

The noble Lord said: On behalf of my noble friend, I beg to move Amendment No. 129. This Amendment inserts in Schedule 2 an additional paragraph relating to the liability of carrying companies for detention costs. Paragraph 19 of the Schedule already provides, with certain exceptions, that where leave to enter has been refused, the cost of detaining a passenger pending removal is to be borne by the carrying company which brought him here. The corresponding provisions of the existing law—that is, the Immigration Appeals Act 1969, Section 21(1), and the Aliens Order 1969, Article 2, subsection (1)—apply not only where entry has been refused but also where directions are given for the removal of an illegal entrant or crew member without an express refusal.

These cases were overlooked when paragraph 19 of the Bill was being prepared. It is the Government's intention that the scope of the carrier's liability for detention costs should be no less and no greater than under the present law. The purpose of this Amendment is to give effect to this intention by making provision, parallel to that made by paragraph 19 for ordinary passengers, for detention costs in respect of illegal entrants and crew members overstaying shore leave. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD DENHAM

Amendment No. 130 is consequential on Amendment No. 103, which has already been accepted by your Lordships. I say that with slight trepidation. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 47, line 13, after (" police ") insert (" or an immigration officer ").—(Lord Denham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

8.22 p.m.

LORD WINDLESHAM moved Amendment No. 131:

Page 47, line 14, at end insert— (" 20A.—(1) A person detained under paragraph 16(1) above pending examination may, if seven days have elapsed since the date of his arrival in the United Kingdom, be released on bail by an adjudicator on his entering into a recognizance or, in Scotland, bail bond conditioned for his appearance before an immigration officer at a time and place named in the recognizance or bail bond or at such other time or place as may in the meantime be notified to him in writing by an immigration officer. (2) The conditions of a recognizance or bail bond taken under this paragraph may include conditions appearing to the adjudicator to be likely to result in the appearance of the person bailed at the required time and place; and any recognizance shall be with or without sureties as the adjudicator may determine. (3) In any case in which an adjudicator has power under this paragraph to release a person on bail, the adjudicator may, instead of taking the bail, fix the amount and conditions of the hail (including the amount in which any sureties are to be bound) with a view to its being taken subsequently by any such person as may be specified by the adjudicator; and on the recognizance or bail bond being so taken the person to be bailed shall be released. 20B.—(1) Where a recognizance entered into under paragraph 20A above appears to an adjudicator to be forfeited, the adjudicator may by order declare it to be forfeited and adjudge the persons bound thereby, whether as principal or sureties, or any of them, to pay the sum in which they are respectively bound or such part of it, if any, as the adjudicator thinks fit; and an order under this sub-paragraph shall specify a magistrates' court or, in Northern Ireland, court of summary jurisdiction, and—

  1. (a) the recognizance shall be treated for the purposes of collection, enforcement and remission of the sum forfeited as having been forfeited by the court so specified; and
  2. (b) the adjudicator shall, as soon as practicable, give particulars of the recognizance to the clerk of that court.
(2) Where a person released on bail under paragraph 20A above as it applies in Scotland fails to comply with the terms of his bail bond, an adjudicator may declare the bail to be forfeited, and any bail so forfeited shall be transmitted by the adjudicator to the sheriff court having jurisdiction in the area where the proceedings took place, and shall be treated as having been forfeited by that court. (3) Any sum the payment of which is enforceable by a magistrates' court in England or Wales by virtue of this paragraph shall be treated for the purposes of the Justices of the Peace Act 1949 and, in particular, section 27 thereof as being due under a recognizance forfeited by such a court and as being Exchequer moneys. (4) Any sum the payment of which is enforceable by virtue of this paragraph by a court of summary jurisdiction in Northern Ireland shall, for the purposes of section 20(5) of the Administration of Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 1954, be treated as a forfeited recognizance. 20C.—(1) An immigration officer or constable may arrest without warrant a person who has been released by virtue of paragraph 20A above—
  1. (a) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that that person is likely to break the condition of his recognizance or bail bond that he will appear at the time and place required or to break any other condition of it, or has reasonable ground to suspect that that person is breaking or has broken any such other condition; or
  2. (b) if, a recognizance with sureties having been taken, he is notified in writing by any surety of the surety's belief that that person is likely to break the first-mentioned condition, and of the surety's wish for that reason to be relieved of his obligations as a surety;
and paragraph 17(2) above shall apply for the arrest of a person under this paragraph as it applies for the arrest of a person under paragraph 17.
(2) A person arrested under this paragraph—
  1. (a) if not required by a condition on which he was released to appear before an immigration officer within twenty-four hours after the time of his arrest, shall as soon as practicable be brought before an adjudicator or, if that is not practicable within those twenty-four hours, before a justice of the peace acting for the petty sessions area in which he is arrested or, in Scotland, the sheriff; and
  2. (b) if required by such a condition to appear within those twenty-four hours before an immigration officer, shall be brought before that officer.
(3) An adjudicator, justice of the peace or sheriff before whom a person is brought by virtue of sub-paragraph (2)(a) above—
  1. (a) if of the opinion that that person has broken or is likely to break any condition on which he was released, may either—
    1. (i) direct that he be detained under the authority of the person by whom he was arrested; or
    2. (ii) release him, on his original recognizance or on a new recognizance, with or without sureties, or, in Scotland, on his original bail or on new bail; and
  2. (b) if not of that opinion, shall release him on his original recognizance or bail.
20D. The power to make rules of procedure conferred by section 22 of this Act shall include power to make rules with respect to applications to an adjudicator under paragraphs 20A to 20C above and matters arising out of such applications.")

The noble Lord said: This is the Government Amendment to which I referred when the noble Baroness, Lady White, moved Amendment No. 127. I explained that in the course of proceedings in—

BARONESS WHITE

My noble and learned friend moved that Amendment, not I.

LORD WINDLESHAM

I beg your Lordships' pardon—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner. I explained the concern that had been expressed in another place, and that where somebody had been held for over seven days while inquiries were still being made or pending his removal, the Government accepted in principle the arguments that there should be some arrangements on these lines; that there should be a form of appeal. The noble Lord, Lord Janner, spoke on the matter earlier. Members of another place felt that the appeal might be to the magistrates' court. As I explained before the supper recess, the Secretary of State feels that on balance the immigration appeal authorities are those who have special experience in this field. They are an independent body of people who have the confidence of immigrants and others using the appellate procedure, and we feel that it is more appropriate that the appeal should lie to the adjudicator than to the magistrates' courts. I beg to move.

LORD GARDINER

I must confess that where the physical freedom of the individual is concerned I have a preference for ordinary courts rather than for administrative machinery of this kind. On the other hand, I quite understand that it is possible to take the view that an adjudicator is an experienced kind of judge in this particular field. But I shall be grateful if the Government will reconsider the wording of some of this provision, because there is no doubt that once you embark on the field of our present immigration law you are providing a much lower standard of justice. It is provided here that the adjudicator can release on bail, on a man's entering into a recognizance in addition to his appearing before an immigration officer. Then it provides: Where a recognizance entered into under paragraph 20A above appears to an adjudicator to be forfeited…". The Committee have already seen many examples of the standards which are required before either an adjudicator or an immigration officer can act. He very rarely has to decide that something has happened; it depends upon what appears to him. This is the ordinary immigration formula. It does not depend on whether the recognizance is forfeited or not, but whether it appears to the adjudicator to be forfeited.

Then there is a pretence—well, I say pretence—in that he has to"specify a magistrates' court"and then one has to deem the order to have been made in that magistrates' court, although of course he has never been anywhere near the magistrates' court. Then he can declare the bail to be forfeited. Then it is provided that any sum the payment of which is enforceable is to be treated for the purposes of the Justices of the Peace Act 1949 as being clue under a recognizance forfeited by such a court. Then we get the usual provision again in paragraph 20C: An immigration officer or constable may arrest without warrant "— there is this passion for civil servants to have powers of arresting people without warrant— a person who has been released "— that is, on bail— (a) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that that person is likely to break the condition of his recognizance or bail bond that he will appear at the time and place required or to break any other condition of it, or has reasonable ground to suspect… et cetera.

The Committee has seen this afternoon that there is another refrain that runs through our immigration law. I know they are foreigners—we would not stand for it for ourselves. A police constable may in some circumstances arrest without warrant if he has reasonable cause to believe that a crime has been committed, but the standard of our immigration law is reasonable suspicion that somebody who has done nothing wrong at all is going to do something wrong in the future. It is because of the repetititon in this new Amendment of what is such a familiar and objectionable feature of our immigration law as a whole that I venture to hope that the Government—and particularly, if I may say so, the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, whom I know to be as devoted to civil liberties as I am and to have entertained in the past the same sort of view about our immigration law as I have entertained myself—will reconsider whether these extreme powers of arresting without warrant, on a mere suspicion that somebody who has done nothing wrong may be going to do something wrong, are justified, in which event I shall be grateful.

LORD WINDLESHAM

I must take up the noble and learned Lord on this point. He has made the allegation several times that the immigration laws are illiberal and intolerant and that Governments which come forward with proposals of this kind are insensitive to the rights of the individual. He diverged temporarily from that line of criticism earlier in the evening to pay tribute to one of his former colleagues in introducing the immigration appeals system during the previous Administration. The Immigration Appeals Act 1969, unlike the aliens legislation and some parts of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, which were based on it, is fresh. It contains a bail provision for the cases of appellants whose appeal is pending, and the criteria, as set out in Schedule 3 to the Immigration Appeals Act, were placed before Parliament and approved when the noble and learned Lord opposite was himself the Lord Chancellor.

I did not have warning of this and therefore I have been unable to make extensive researches, but as the noble and learned Lord was giving examples I checked through the 1969 Act and found that most of the points he raised are in it. Forfeiture of recognisances, for example, we find in Schedule 3, paragraph 8(1) of the 1969 Act, which says: Where a recognisance entered into under this Schedule conditioned for the appearance of an appellant before an adjudicator or the Tribunal appears to the adjudicator or the Tribunal, as the case may be, to be forfeited,…". This is the same provision. Then we find in paragraph 9(1): An immigration officer or constable may arrest without warrant a person who has been released by virtue of this Schedule ". I daresay the other points raised by the noble and learned Lord are either contained verbatim in his own Act or are closely modelled on it.

Of course we are all concerned to see that proper expression is given in Acts of Parliament to the rights of individuals, but at the same time we have to ensure that the immigration service, the police, the immigration appeal authorities, all have sufficient latitude to carry out the tasks which have been placed upon them by Parliament. The way in which people carry out their duties is sometimes more important than what is contained in the Statute, and we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, and others with considerable first hand experience. They have all gone out of their way to pay tribute to the considerate and courteous way in which the Immigration Service have carried out the duties placed upon them. I do not think it would be right for anyone to challenge the noble and learned Lord on what he is saying, because that is exactly what Members of Parliament and particularly members of the Opposition should always say, but at the same time there is another side to this matter.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

8.34 p.m.

LORD BROCKWAY moved Amendment No. 131A: Page 49, line 6, leave out (" not ").

The noble Lord said: This Amendment refers to paragraph 23(5) which appears in the Bill at page 49 and reads: …where an appeal to an adjudicator is dismissed, an appeal shall not be regarded as pending unless forthwith after the dismissal—

  1. (a) the appellant duly gives notice of appeal against the determination of the adjudicator; "
I hope I may be allowed at the same time to speak to Amendment No. 131B, because No. 131A does not make sense unless it is read in conjunction with 131B. If these two Amendments are taken together the new wording would read: …where an appeal to an adjudicator is dismissed, an appeal shall be regarded as pending unless forthwith the appellant duly gives notice that he does not wish to appeal against the determination of the adjudicator.

My main purpose in moving this Amendment is to be quite sure that no person shall be removed from this country without being informed of his right to appeal, and that therefore it should be assumed that he does appeal unless he actually indicates, in the words of this Amendment, that he does not wish to do so. If this change were made there would be no doubt that all the persons concerned would be well aware of their right to appeal. I beg to move.

LORD WINDLESHAM

The effect of paragraph 23(5) of Schedule 2 is that, when an adjudicator dismisses an appeal against refusal of leave to enter or against removal directions, the appellant may be removed unless he gives immediate notice of appeal to the Tribunal against the adjudicator's decision or, if leave to appeal is required, he obtains leave from the adjudicator.

As the noble Lord has explained, the Amendments would convert this into a provision that the appellant may not be removed unless he gives notice that he does not wish to appeal against the adjudicator's decision. If, as I think is the case from what the noble Lord has said, his purpose is to ensure that no person is removed from this country without being informed of his rights of appeal, his mind can be put at rest. In practice when an adjudicator dismisses an appeal he always informs the appellant, either, as the case may be, that he is entitled to appeal to the Tribunal or that he may ask for leave to appeal to the Tribunal. If this is what is causing the noble Lord concern I think he can rest assured that this is a statement of the actual practice of the adjudicators.

LORD BROCKWAY

My only concern is that there are difficulties of language and of circumstances, and sometimes I think the individual, even though he is informed in that way, may not be quite clear about the consequences thereof. But in view of what the Minister has said, I ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

8.39 p.m.

LORD BROCKWAY moved Amendment No. 131D: Page 50, line 6, leave out (" may include ") and insert (" shall be ").

The noble Lord said: This Amendment refers to line 6 on page 50, and proposes that the words"may include"be left out and that the words"shall be"be inserted. This issue has been much discussed; namely the conditions under which bail is given. The present wording says that bail"may"include the purpose of the attendance at the relevant Tribunal. As amended the paragraph would read"shall include ", and it should be related only to this factor—that bail should be decided on no other issue than that of ability to attend the Tribunal. I beg to move.

LORD WINDLESHAM

Paragraph 24(5) of the Schedule dealing with the grant of bail pending an appeal to the immigration appeal authorities, provides that the conditions of a recognisance"may include"conditions appearing to the person fixing the bail to be likely to result in the appearance of the appellant at the time and place named. This Amendment seeks to insert the words"shall be"for the words"may include ", for the reasons the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, has expounded.

The purpose of the provision that the conditions of the recognisance may include conditions appearing to the adjudicator or Tribunal to be likely to result in the appearance of the appellant when required is to ensure that in a case in which there might otherwise be difficulty in granting bail this may be overcome by the adjudicator applying some such conditions as that the person shall live at a particular address or report at stated intervals to the police or the Immigration Service. It is not clear to us what the effect of the Amendment would be, but it would not appear, at first sight, to result in decisions by the adjudicator to grant bail in a greater proportion of cases than if the Bill were left unamended. There is no question of bail being used for any improper purpose, and indeed it is difficult to see how it could be.

LORD BROCKWAY

I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

LORD BROCKWAY

The only point here is that surely a man could be released from his obligations at his own request if he feels unable to continue them and to fulfil them. Why should he be asked to provide a reason for doing this? Is it not enough for him to say he is unable to do it? I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 51, line 45, leave out from beginning to (" or ") in line 47.—(Lord Brockway.)

LORD WINDLESHAM

Perhaps this is a good opportunity to say a word or two about the subject of bail in the immigration law. It is a matter that has been discussed in a number of recent Amendments, and it may be helpful if I give a brief explanation.

Paragraph 28(1) makes provision for arrest of appellants who have been released on bail. It provides that an immigration officer or a constable may arrest without warrant a person who has been released on bail if he has reasonable grounds for believing that that person is likely to break the condition of his recognisance that he will appear at the time and place required, or to break any other condition of it, or has reasonable ground to suspect that that person is breaking or has broken any other condition; or, if, a recognisance with sureties having been taken, he is notified in writing by any surety of the surety's belief that the person on bail is likely to break the condition requiring his appearance and of the surety's wish for that reason to be relieved of his obligations.

The provision for the grant of bail in certain immigration appeal cases was introduced under the Immigration Appeals Act 1969, to which I referred in an earlier reply to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner; but at present it applies only to deportation cases. The provisions in the Bill follow closely those in the Act of 1969, which have been re-enacted largely in their existing form, there having been little experience on which any Amendment might be based. I understand that the provisions in the Act of 1969 were themselves based on the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 relating to bail in ordinary criminal proceedings. In the circumstances, the Government do not at present see grounds for amending the procedure which commended itself to Parliament in 1969. The occasions on which the immigration officer would wish to arrest a person believed to be likely to break a condition of his recognisance would no doubt be very rare, but they cannot be ruled out altogether. In such a case a constable might not be available. For the constable himself not to have power to arrest without warrant would mean that in practice no effective steps could be taken when the constable first had reasonable grounds for believing that the person was likely to abscond. It would be wrong to allow a surety to renounce his obligations, thus putting the person on bail in danger of immediate arrest, on any ground except that the belief was that the person did not intend to surrender to his bail.

Therefore, in brief, these provisions in this part of the Bill, and those which have been inserted also by the Government Amendment No. 131, which are largely similar, are based on the Act of 1969, but are an extension. I think this should be welcome to noble Lords in this Committee. The Act at the moment applies only to deportation cases. This Bill applies to cases where somebody is held pending inquiries or is being detained for some other purpose of the immigration control not connected with deportation.

LORD GARDINER

The noble Lord is, of course, quite right in saying that the 1968 Act, and indeed the 1969 Act, contain a good deal of the old immigration jargon of which I have been for so long ashamed; that is quite right. The 1969 Act was a breakthrough, because at least for the first time it provided a right of appeal. This was absolutely basic to all subsequent reforms. In the ordinary course, if a person skips his bail, there is no difficulty in the police getting a warrant and going to arrest him. I am not quite clear why in the case of immigration these arrests have to take place without warrant. This occurs all the way through; I am not sure that there is any place where the arrest is with warrant. It is always the immigration officer or a constable; it is always without warrant. It is always not something you do, but something he thinks you are going to do or that maybe he reasonably suspects you are going to do. In relation to the question of registration with the police, as I understood it, one of the arguments for registration with the police was that if the person disappears it is the policeman who will have to find him and arrest him.

I cannot make out why in a case like this the immigration officer has to arrest anybody at all. There are grave civil liberties objections to anybody except the police arresting people. The first of all civil liberties is that of physical freedom as against detention. I do not know why one always has to have an immigration officer as well as a constable and arrest always has to be without warrant. If I may say so respectfully, this is not at all a Party political point; most of the division on this Bill has not been on Party lines, but between those who believe rather more in civil liberties and those who feel less concerned about that matter. It would be of great help if the Government would go through the Bill, particularly Schedule 2, which I think has always been the worst part, to see whether this old immigration lore, such as the immigration officer always being treated as a policeman and having powers of arrest without warrant and arresting the person because if he does not the person might do something, could not really be overhauled.

LORD WINDLESHAM

The noble Lord asked why an immigration officer should have powers of arrest. Just consider a case at an airport, where in the course of examining a passenger it is decided that he is not entitled to enter the United Kingdom. He is held for further inquiries; the case has to be referred to a chief immigration officer; the man absconds. If the immigration officer had no power to apprehend him, he would have to call in a police officer. If the police officer could not stop the man without a warrant, the police officer would then have to apply to a magistrate for a warrant. In the meantime the passenger would presumably be able to go on his way unhindered. The immigration officer would have said,"I do not think you are entitled under the current laws of Great Britain to enter the United Kingdom ", but he would say,"You try to stop me!". He would he through the airport, in a taxi and have disappeared before any of this process had been set under way. The policeman would still be looking up the address of the nearest magistrates' court to try to get a warrant. Therefore, some powers are needed.

As the noble and learned Lord will know, the Criminal Justice Act 1967 contains in Section 23 and following sections provisions about bail in criminal proceedings, which correspond very closely to those in the Bill about bail in this proceeding. These include provision for arrest without warrant by a police officer on reasonable suspicion of breach of recognisance, or reasonable cause to believe that future breach is likely. I do not think that this is a question of one law for foreigners and another for ourselves. The system is really very close in both cases.

LORD BROCKWAY

After the days the Minister has had on this Bill, I hope he will have a period when he will be able to forget it. Following that, I hope that he will give his mind—because I know how conscientiously he approaches these things—to the whole question of these doubtful restrictions in Schedule 2. They really cause disquiet in those of us who believe in civil liberties. In the hope that he may be able to do that, I will withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Schedule 2, as amended, agreed to.

Schedule 3 [Supplementary provisions as to deportation]:

8.52 p.m.

LORD BROCKWAY moved Amendment No. 131K: Page 52, line 37, leave out (" either ").

The noble Lord said: I am moving this Amendment with some hope that the Minister may be able to accept it. This paragraph in the Schedule gives the Secretary of State power to direct that anyone who is deported shall be sent to a particular country. It gives two alternatives: either, (a) a country of which he is a national or citizen; or (b) a country or territory to which there is reason to believe that he will be admitted. The purpose of this Amendment and the next one is to delete the words"either"and"or ", and not make these alternatives but to make the country of which he is a national also a country where there is reason to believe that he will be admitted, and that the latter condition should apply to the country of which he is a national.

The reasoning behind the Amendment stems from the recent terrible experience of British Asians who have just been shuttled backwards and forwards; leaving Uganda and Kenya and trying to come into this country illegally, being refused entry, and being sent back to Uganda and Kenya; being again refused admission there, and again sent back here—countinuous journeys to and fro. No Member of this House wants that kind of system to continue. The purpose of this Amendment is to ensure not only that the country to which the deported person goes is that of which he is a national citizen, but that the Secretary of State shall come to the conclusion that it is also a country to which he will be admitted. I beg to move.

LORD WINDLESHAM

Paragraph 1(1) of Schedule 3 dealing with the removal of persons liable to deportation, provides that the Secretary of State may give directions for the removal of a person, against whom a deportation order is in force, to a country or territory specified in the directions, being either a country of which he is a national or citizen or a country or territory to which there is reason to believe that he will be admitted. This Amendment seeks to provide that the removal directions must be given for removal to a country of which the person is a national or citizen being a country to which there is reason to believe that he will be admitted.

United Kingdom passport holders were in the mind of the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, as he spoke. They are not, in fact, deported at all from this country. I know it may seem a somewhat fine distinction to him, but I do not think that these Amendments would have any impact on the people he is trying to help, because they are not deported under the equivalent provisions of the present law. What happens is that they are removed under provisions which are the equivalent of paragraph 8 of Schedule 2. They are never admitted to the country at all. They are not admitted here and then deported again; they are not admitted at all.

The only consolation I can offer to the noble Lord and I think he will probably know this from his own resources—is that since my right honourable friend's decision to double the quota of special vouchers, and to provide a once-and-for all allocation for the most extreme cases, the numbers of those seeking to enter without proper entry documents, and who therefore are sent back, have been very greatly reduced. This is an indication, at any rate, that the rate at which people are leaving East Africa is now getting closer to the rate at which they, are properly admitted to this country with vouchers for work and settlement.

Another point is that people are not deported to a particular country. They are deported from the United Kingdom and removed to a country, normally being the country of which they are a national. But in some circumstances removal to some other country may be more appropriate—for example, a person may have lived for years outside his own country and may have facilities to re-enter the country of his last residence. In those circumstances, and certainly where the person concerned wishes to return to his country of last residence, return will be arranged to that country. But the effect of the Amendment would appear to be that return would have to be to the country of nationality. This would not be in the interests of those for whom the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, is concerned.

He can be assured that the Home Office is not concerned to remove people being deported to any particular country, and that such people are always given the opportunity to state the country of their choice; and if they are admissible to that country the Home Office will raise no difficulty about their going to it, provided that no extra charge on public funds is involved. It is further relevant that a person being deported has a right of appeal as to the country of destination, a right of appeal that is continued under Clause 17(1) of the Bill.

LORD DONALDSON OF KINGSBRIDGE

I do not think there is any real difference between the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, and my noble friend. But it seemed to me that what my noble friend was trying to effect in his Amendment was that somebody should not be deported to a country which would not admit him. This is a situation which could arise and which the Bill ought to meet, but I do not think either paragraph 1 or the Amendment meets it. I do not know whether the noble Lord agrees with me that that is probably the intention of the paragraph, but I do not think it is what comes out.

LORD WINDLESHAM

We are in deep territory here, and I should not want to be specific without checking further. But I am assured that the Amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, will not do what he wants. I say that for two reasons. First of all, it would not affect United Kingdom passport holders at all, because they are not deported anyway; and, secondly, it would narrow the range of destinations to which a man could go, because he would have to fulfil both paragraphs (a) and (b). Therefore, if he was not a national or a citizen of the country to which he wished to go and which was willing to receive him, he still could not go to it. At the moment, that option is open to him and it seems better to preserve that flexibility.

LORD BROCKWAY

It seems to me that under the original terms of the Bill the choice of going to a country which will admit him is also excluded. I listened with very great care to the Minister and I supported what he said in his concluding remarks, that a person could go to the country of his choice if it was willing to admit him. I have had many cases where I have succeeded in getting that right. But that does not even seem to be in the terms of the Bill itself, so will the Minister look at this point again before the Report stage?

LORD WINDLESHAM

I shall certainly look at it to see whether I have misled the Committee in any way, but I do not think I have. It would fall within paragraph 1(1)(b) of Schedule 3, would it not, if the person said that he wanted to go to a particular country or territory which was willing to admit him? He could be deported to that territory under paragraph 1(1)(b).

LORD BROCKWAY

I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Schedule 3 agreed to.

Schedule 4 [Integration with United Kingdom law of immigration law of Islands]:

LORD BROCKWAY moved Amendment No. 131M: Page 54, line 42, leave out paragraph 2.

The noble Lord said: I am moving this Amendment largely in order to get some clarification. The first part of paragraph 2 suggests that a person who has decided to go abroad—perhaps on holiday or on business—does not automatically have the right to return, and that the process of obtaining Leave to enter this country will have to be repeated. That is rather qualified by the last three lines of the paragraph and I shall be glad to hear from the Minister exactly what they mean. I beg to move.

LORD DENHAM

This Amendment applies to a man who, on leaving the United Kingdom, as is visualised under Clause 3(4) which we have already discussed, is able to re-enter without seeking new leave—in other words, he can go off to Paris for the weekend because he is one of the exceptions under Clause 8. Under paragraph 2 of this Schedule, if instead of coming straight back to the United Kingdom he goes to one of the Islands where he needs permission, his previous permission to come back to the United Kingdom is cancelled. The reason for this is that if he needs to get leave under paragraph 1 to go to the Islands and gets it, that leave will extend to the United Kingdom. He will not need his former leave and it will be cancelled so as to make matters easier and avoid confusion. If, on the other hand, an Island refused him leave to enter, then it is thought by Her Majesty's Government that there would probably be good reason when he came back to the United Kingdom to see whether his leave should be granted again here. I hope that that has explained the position to the noble Lord.

LORD BROCKWAY

Yes, I think so. Will the noble Lord tell me whether a refusal to go to the Island is a refusal by the Island, or a refusal by us to allow him to go there?

LORD DENHAM

The Island will be refusing him leave to enter, although he already has leave to enter the United Kingdom. We have no jurisdiction over whether or not the Island accepts him, but if the Island accepts him then his leave to the Island will extend to the United Kingdom.

LORD BROCKWAY

I am not quite satisfied, but I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Schedule 4 agreed to.

Schedule 5 agreed to.

Schedule 6 [Repeals]:

9.6 p.m.

LORD GARDINER moved Amendment No. 132: Page 58, column 3, leave out lines 6 to 9 and insert (" The whole Act ").

The noble and learned Lord said: In moving this Amendment may I also speak to Amendment No. 133? I am sorry to have to take up time at this hour of the night with what are probing Amendments. May I assure the Government that I do not expect any answer at all to-night. I said a word about this matter on Second Reading, which I think was misunderstood. There are two different questions here. There is the question whether, in a particular field of law, the whole of that law needs an overhaul in the sense of substantial alteration; and there is the question whether, in a particular field of law, the law is all right but is all over the place and needs consolidating and putting together in one place. In relation to our law of citizenship and our law of immigration, which are quite different, there is a division of opinion between the Government and the Opposition. As the Committee knows, our view is that an Immigration Bill is quite unnecessary. The numbers are down and there is now no problem there at all; race relations are never better and we do not need an overhaul of our immigration law. But what we do need—and we said in our Election programme that we were going to prepare this—is a new citizenship law, because I imagine that we must be the only country which has no clear statement as to who our own citizens are. In recent years both America and Canada have overhauled their citizenship law. But this is a difference of opinion between the Parties, and I am not going to say any more about it.

On the other point, which is quite a different one, as to whether we ought not, in either or both of these two fields, to put all our law together in one place, I am not in the least surprised, of course, that the Government have left our various British Nationality Acts exactly as they are, because they say, quite rightly,"This is not a citizenship Bill at all; this is an Immigration Bill ", and I accept that that is so. But, being an Immigration Bill, I am a little puzzled at the statutory course which they have taken. They have repealed the whole of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968, and that is quite right because here is an entirely new immigration code. They have repealed the whole of the Immigration Appeals Act 1969, and that is also quite right because it is in here. But when it comes to the 1962 Act, they have repealed the whole of it except for two subsections of two sections. One of them is Section 20(1) and (3), and so I looked to see what those subsections did in the 1962 Act. What they did was to omit two words with regard to deportation from Section 18(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1950. That rather puzzled me, because the Matrimonial Causes Act 1950 was repealed by the Matrimonial Causes Act 1965. I am not quite sure where we are getting to.

The position with the old Aliens Restriction Acts is even more curious, because they have repealed altogether the Aliens Restriction Act 1914 but have left three or four little bits of the amending Act, which was the Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act 1919. They have left bits which puzzle me very much. I am not clear, therefore, why, in the field of immigration as such, all these provisions have not been repealed and put into this new code. As I have said, I am not expecting any answer to-night. These two Amendments are intended to be probing Amendments, and if necessary we can proceed with them when we come to the Report stage of the Bill. I beg to move.

9.10 p.m.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

As I have been awaiting this, my great moment, for some hours, I shall not take advantage of the generous leave which the noble and learned Lord has given me not to reply to his interesting comments. I shall not reply to the Second Reading points at any length. I should dearly have liked to have a citizenship law, but for reasons I explained in a lecture to the Race Relations Institute some little time ago I think it is not a feasible proposition, since we made the cardinal error of not having one in 1948 when it was still, I think, a relatively easy thing to unravel the knots which we had begun to tie. But our idealism about the Commonwealth then, although it was genuine at the time, is quite different from what our idealism about the Commonwealth is now, or what the facts have turned out to be, and I very much question whether we can unravel the knots at the present time. I do not want to go into the details, because they are highly technical, but I should dearly have liked to achieve that result, if not in this Bill at least in another one.

In the meantime, I think the noble and learned Lord was a little less than generous in not acknowledging that it really is intolerable that the whole of the control into this country of the entry of aliens should depend upon the old Defence of the Realm Act 1914. That was passed in a single night when we were expecting a war with Germany which took place but which has now finished for the greater part of a human lifetime. That Act has never been repealed but, with small amendments, has remained in the Expiring Laws (Continuance) Schedule enacted by Parliament year by year. Whatever the merits or demerits of the Bill, the noble and learned Lord really ought to recognise that that position is at least theoretically intolerable even if in practice it leads to rather less injustice than you would expect.

To revert now to the noble and learned Lord's particular points, the Bill as it stands repeals the provisions of the 1919 Act which were concerned with immigration control. That is because it is an Immigration Bill. The sections concerned are Section 1. Section 2(1), Section 13(3) and Section 14(1). Sections 2(2), 7, 14(2), 15 and 16(2) are being repealed in this Session's Statute Law (Repeals) Bill (Part V of the Schedule). That leaves me with Sections 9 to 12 and certain others to which I will come. Sections 9 to 12 related only to former enemy aliens and these were repealed between the Wars. The remaining sections containing substantive provisions deal with the following matters—I have taken these matters from the side notes. Section 3 deals with incitement to sedition; Section 4 with pilotage certificates; Section 5 with employment of aliens in ships of the mercantile marine; Section 6 with the appointment of aliens to the Civil Service; Section 7 with restriction of change of name by aliens; Section 8 with provisions as to aliens on juries. Of these Section 5 is repealed by tile Merchant Shipping Act 1970 although it has not yet been brought into force. Section 7 is being repealed in this Session's Statute Law (Repeals) Bill. The other restrictions on aliens contained in Sections 3 to 8 are not part of the law of immigration control and I am advised that provisions for repealing or amending any of these would be outside the proper scope of an Immigration Bill. The need for continuance of these restrictions has been re-examined and will continue to be re-examined from time to time as the appropriate field of law comes under review; an example being jury service, to which Section 8 of the Act of 1919 refers.

Under E.E.C. regulations, the phrase"our own nationals"may be favoured so far as public employment is concerned (that is to say, employment in the Civil Service), in that the free movement of labour provisions do not apply to posts in the public service. But in introducing this Bill it was no part of the Government's intention to make any change in the relative position of British subjects and aliens under the general law of this country, and it was not therefore appropriate to carry out a general review of the position of aliens in fields of law, other than immigration control, before the Bill was introduced.

As the noble and learned Lord pointed out, the Bill as it stands repeals the whole of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962, to which I now come, except for a few provisions which amend other legislation that is not affected by the Bill. Section 12(2) of the Act of 1962 is repealed only in part; in so far as this provision deals with the qualifying period for naturalisation of British protected persons it is not superseded or otherwise affected by anything in the Bill, and so it would not have been appropriate to repeal it and re-enact it in this Bill. Section 12(4), I gather, is still needed as an ancillary provision to Section 12(2). The noble and learned Lord referred to Section 20(1). This amends the Matrimonial Causes Act 1950 and the Matrimonial Causes Act (Northern Ireland) 1939. These enactments, I am advised, are still in force for certain purposes and consequently any provision amending them has to be preserved. Section 20(3) is still needed as an ancillary provision to Section 20(1). It is thought, therefore, that it is not possible—or, if it is possible, not desirable—to sweep away the whole of the 1962 Act. But, as I have said in earlier portions of this fascinating discourse, the relative portions of the Act will be re-examined from time to time when we examine the field of law to which they apply. In the meantime this is an Immigration Bill.

LORD O'HAGAN

As the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor is in a forthcoming mood, may I ask whether he can help me on a question of citizenship? I am sure that he will tell me if I have it wrong. Shall we not have to evolve a de facto citizenship law when we come into the Common Market, defining those who are and those who are not our nationals for the European Economic Community? As I understand it, we shall have to tell them which of these various types of British citizen we say do belong and which do not. They may say to us,"You cannot have all these patrials. There are far too many of them to come into Europe. We must keep them out. And we do not like the idea of these Kenya Asians ". Whatever happens we shall have to produce something that satisfies them, and it must not be a makeshift form of citizenship law.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I do not really know the phrase "de facto" law; I know only the type of law we call de jute law. It is true that we already have a jungle of regulations which people might mistake for a citizenship law if they did not think deeply enough about it. This was what my lecture to the Race Relations Institute was about, up to a point. We never have had citizenship as a legal concept in this country. It started with the idea of mediaeval allegiance and this is the basis on which the whole thing is founded, in rather a complicated kind of way. The matter first came to a head at the Union of the Crowns between England and Scotland. The question then arose as to the status of Scotsmen in England. An interesting case was heard in the Court of King's Bench in 1607, about a class of people called post-nati, a case which goes through about 50 pages of Coke's Reports, in which all the arguments are set out at length, beginning at the Book of Genesis. It was eventually decided that Scotsmen were not aliens even if they were post-nati. Of course, this might have been very beneficial, but from the point of view of the clarity of our jurisprudence it might not have been quite so good as it sounds. Your Lordships will remember that the King at that time was a Scotsman.

I have always thought that the moment at which we went wrong in modern times was in 1948, when we enfranchised India and Pakistan. I think that we should have said, rather crudely and logically, that however many benefits we conferred on the citizens of countries which were enfrancised, we should start with the proposition, which I have always been brought up to believe but which was not universally approved, that the human race could be divided into two classes—British subjects and aliens. Instead of that, we said that persons in Schedule 1 of the 1948 Act should be citizens of the Commonwealth, thereby for the first time introducing the concept of citizenship, and in order to make things abundantly clear we said in the same section of the Act that, being citizens of the Commonwealth, they should have the same rights as British subjects, which did not, I think, clarify the issue at all.

Then we had the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962. Under this Act, as subsequently interpreted by the courts, the human race was divided into several categories. There were the aliens, assuming they were not sub-divided into friendly and enemy aliens. There were the Commonwealth citizens and the United Kingdom and Colonies citizens. Unfortunately, again no opportunity was taken to clarify the legal issue, and all the United Kingdom and Commonwealth citizens are again sub-divided. I am speaking of the situation before 1968, when the right of entry was unrestricted. Anyone from Gibraltar, which was still a Colony, became subject to immigrant control as a Commonwealth immigrant. This means that there was a further subdivision of the human race. It become even more complicated with the legal decisions. Suppose one started in Gibraltar and went to the Seychelles Islands (I hope I am getting this right), if you got your passport from the United Kingdom High Commissioner you were all right and could come in; but if you got it from the Governor of Gibraltar without going to the Seychelles Islands you could not.

BARONESS WHITE

With respect to the noble and learned Lord, the Seychelles are still a Colony. There is no High Commissioner there.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I may be wrong. I think Mauritius is what I have been thinking of. I am grateful to the noble Baroness. If you got it through a Governor it did not work; but if you got it from a High Commissioner, it did, even though you came from a colony. This led to intense confusion about the 1968 Act, which was passed in an emergency without clarifying the law. When we have gone into the Common Market, of course, there will be a further sub-division of humanity, because the aliens will begin to proliferate; hitherto it has only been British subjects who have proliferated. If the noble and learned Lord can really suggest that you can simplify that at all easily, I think he is making a mistake. I do not think our entry into the Common Market will do more than add another sub-division to the human race.

LORD GARDINER

Returning, if I may, to the mysteries of Schedule 6, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor for all the homework that he has evidently done on this point. The situation under that Schedule is now crystal clear to the whole Committee, and I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Schedule 6 agreed to.

In the Title:

9.27 p.m.

VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS moved Amendment No. 134: Line 3, after (" law ") insert (" to restrict the immigration of coloured persons into the United Kingdom ").

The noble Viscount said: It has long been our custom in Parliament that the Long Title of a Bill should contain the purposes of the Bill. It seems clear to many noble Lords on both sides of the Committee that one of the effects of this Bill is to restrict, or possibly control, the immigration of coloured persons into the United Kingdom. It is for that reason that I am suggesting that these words be added to the Long Title. There appear to be four possible lines of opinion on this. There are those, largely on this side of the Committee, who are opposed to the Bill having this effect. Nevertheless, if the Bill has this effect—and we believe that it does—and also has this intention, we hold that this should be added to the Long Title simply as a matter of common sense.

There is a second possible opinion, mainly held, I believe, on the other side of the Committee, but also by certain noble Lords on these Benches. They believe that the Bill should restrict the immigration of coloured persons into this country. I am not saying that they hold this view for any bad reason; it may be for the honourable reason that they believe that better race relations will result if this is done. If they believe that this is a right thing to do, then they should be happy to say so in tile Long Title of the Bill.

It seems to me, in logic, that there are possibly two other opinions on this. One is that the Bill does not do these things, and is not meant to do them. I suppose that is a point of view that may be held in logic, but I do not think that if any noble Lord gets up and suggests that the Bill does not do these things he will be believed by many people. Most people in this country believe that this is one of the major purposes of the Bill, and indeed it has been extensively canvassed in the country on this basis.

There is also a possible fourth opinion, which I do not think much of myself but which nevertheless may exist; that is, that the Bill does these things but that we should not say so. This slightly takes my breath away, because any attempt to hold that opinion is an attempt to perpetrate just about the worst kept secret in history. I do not believe it is really possible for anyone to hold that the Bill does these things but that we should somehow make a secret of it. Who on earth will not have heard of the purposes of this Bill and who on earth will not believe that this is not one of the purposes of it? For that reason, I believe that this point of view is completely out of court. Now I come to think of it, that is possibly the limit of the possible arguments on this point. I shall be intensely interested to hear what the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, intends to say on this matter. I will say nothing more. I beg to move

LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY

I hope that the noble Viscount and his noble friend will not pursue this line of argument any further. They must know that they have great sympathy from us on these Benches, but I suggest that this particular Amendment, and even this debate, if persisted in, can do nothing but harm. This is a discriminatory law. I think it is a bad law and I dislike it intensely; but one thing that it does not do is to restrict immigration. It has been totally accepted on all sides of the House at every stage that in fact immigration is already restricted without this Bill and this Bill has no significant effect upon it. It is true, as the noble Viscount pointed out, that the Government have got a great deal of kudos from a large number of ill-disposed people who believe that it does exactly that. I do not think that we should reinforce this by changing the Title of the Bill to make them believe it more strongly. To start with, I am not in favour of this Government getting any undeserved kudos from any quarters, no matter how ill-disposed, nor am I in favour of these ill-disposed people thinking that the Government necessarily agree with them and back them up. Therefore although I sympathise intensely with the aim behind the Amendment of the noble Viscount, I sincerely hope that he will not press it any further.

LORD CONESFORD

Arthur James Balfour once described a deplorable scene in the House of Commons which he had witnessed by saying that they had reached the very dregs of debate. He evidently foresaw Lord St. David's speech.

LORD O'HAGAN

I should like to be a little more polite and to associate myself with the words used by the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley. Whatever people outside this Chamber and in another place may think, this Amendment is by implication an attack on the integrity of the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, and his right honourable friend Mr. Maudling. Although I believe this Bill is unnecessary and undesirable and I share many of the apprehensions of the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, and the noble Viscount, Lord St. Davids, I do not think this Amendment would improve things very much.

LORD BROCKWAY

During the Committee stage of the Bill I have tried to be co-operative but I did not want to hide the fact that I regard this as a bad Bill in itself and one which will have a very bad effect on community relations in this country. As I see it, the Amendment which has been moved by the noble Viscount, Lord St. Davids, is a plea for honesty. Ever since we had our first Immigration Bill in 1962 I think we have all been hypocritical in this matter. These Bills have not been introduced to deal with the problem of immigration. Except for two years, in every year since the war more people have left this country than have come in. The problem, therefore, is not one of immigration.

If we are all honest with ourselves we know that this is a problem of colour. Before the Act of 1962 we had the"Keep Britain White"campaign. It was that campaign and the apparent response to it which created the atmosphere in the House of Commons which led to the Act of 1962. The noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, has said that this Bill does not restrict immigration. What it does is to continue the restriction of immigration. The Bill co-ordinates the various immigration Bills which we have had and maintains the restrictions which they have imposed. It does therefore restrict coloured immigration. Take the factor which has been mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, the new division between patrials and non-patrials. Is there anyone in this Committee who believes that that will not work against the non-white populations in our Commonwealth more than against the white populations? One can become a patrial if one's father was born in this country, and can be admitted to this country. How many of the non-white citizens of the Commonwealth are able to take advantage of that clause and come to this country?

The clause in the Bill which outrages me perhaps more than any other is that which provides a condition over labour vouchers by which an immigrant can come for a year and be tied to a particular employer. I have described that as"indentured labour ", and it fulfils all the conditions of indentured labour—

LORD BARNBY

If the noble Lord will give way for a moment, I wonder whether he could give me some help in this matter. Is he speaking to the question of the Title of the Bill, or is he treating us to a general review of the effects of the Bill?

LORD BROCKWAY

I am speaking to the Title of the Bill. If what I have said is true, then the real purpose, among others, of the Bill, the real core of the Bill, is the restriction of the entry of coloured immigrants into this country. If there was not the feeling in the country on that matter which has been whipped up by Mr. Enoch Powell, we should not have had so many clauses in this Bill. I believe that to be honest we should recognise that and say that. Politicians to-day, particularly the young politicians, are suffering because we are not honest and because we hide our intentions. It is because of this that I support the Amendment which has been moved by my noble friend Lord St. Davids.

LORD SHACKLETON

I intervene only because of the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Conesford. It is certainly not the view of my colleagues on the Opposition Front Bench that we should support this Amendment, for the reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley. It would be inappropriate to support the Amendment, although I fully acknowledge the sincerity of my noble friends in this matter. The case against this Bill was fully put by the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, at the moment when he said that we should not support this Amendment.

I must say to the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, for whom I have deep affection and the greatest respect, that if he had continued with his remarks I should have asked for the reading of Standing Order No. 30, which clearly lays down that the type of remark he made about my noble friend Lord St. Davids is not something that your Lordships do. It may be that the noble Lord wishes to withdraw the remark.

LORD CONESFORD

Such is my respect for the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition, and also because I have given further thought to the final sentence of my intervention, that I unhesitatingly withdraw the remark. May I say what I had in mind without detriment to that withdrawal? Of course it was not meant to be—and in so far as it was I withdraw it—a comment on the character of the noble Viscount, Lord St. Davids, with whom I have had, and hope to continue to have, friendly relations. It was a comment that I thought we had reached the very dregs of debate. Having said that, and cordially agreeing with the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition, I beg to withdraw my remarks.

LORD SHACKLETON

I am sure that the Committee appreciate that generous withdrawal. I realised, watching the noble Lord across the Floor of the House, that he was getting somewhat incensed, and at such a moment one occasionally utters words which one might have put in another way. I am sure that my noble friend Lord St. Davids will accept that as a most generous withdrawal.

I do not think I need detain the Committee much longer, and I may save the time of the Committee and of the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, if I speak on behalf of my noble friends in these, the final stages of the Committee stage. Our objection, and the objection of many noble Lords in all quarters of the Committee to this particular Bill, has been made clear. I do not think it is appropriate again to voice this objection in trying to amend the Title of the Bill. The Government know full well that there will be opportunities for amendment when we come back on Report, and we hope that we shall have seen wisdom by then. I urge upon my noble friend who has moved this Amendment, who I know feels deeply on this matter, that the question here is not one of sincerity or honesty, but of the appropriateness of this particular Amendment. Therefore, so far as the official Opposition is concerned, we are not proposing to support the Amendment if my noble friend divides the Committee. In the light of this discussion and of the arguments he has heard, and in the light of what the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, may wish to say, I hope he will decide that he has made his point with sufficient vigour.

9.45 p.m.

LORD WINDLESHAM

This is probably an appropriate time for me to intervene on this last Amendment to a long Committee stage. I do not think a very long speech is called for. I have spoken so often during the six days of Committee that I think noble Lords who have been present know what my views are. The Bill establishes a new single system of control over all immigration from overseas and does so by creating a right of abode. It is a law reform measure; it brings together 50 years' worth of legislation, much of it quickly put on the Statute Book in response to events. All those who have this right of abode are described by the word"patrial"and they will be completely free to come and go and work here as they wish. We might just bear in mind that Clause 2, the patrial clause, is an exempting clause. It is a clause which exempts people from immigration control and does not subject them to it. We have seen as we have gone through the Bill that the visitors, the passengers, the normal tourists, the working holidaymakers, the students—people of this sort—are hardly affected by the Bill.

LORD SHACKLETON

If I may interrupt the noble Lord, I have tried to be as helpful as I can in this matter. I beg him not to make a Third Reading speech on this particular Amendment. I realise that he has had to put up with a lot on this and he will have to put up with quite a lot more. If he is going through the whole of the Bill on an Amendment to the Long Title I think it is likely that some of my noble friends will wish to reply to him.

LORD WINDLESHAM

I regret that intervention. I hope that the noble Lord will not jump the gun on this. He has joined the Committee, if I may say so, at a very late stage. He is quite right to come in and express the views of his Party on the Bill. I was about to make two general observations. He can be sure that I was not going to make wide ranging remarks. I think that noble Lords who have heard the debate will agree that it is a general one. The noble Viscount, Lord St. Davids, intended it to be a general debate—I do not criticise him for that—arid the noble Lord, Lord O'Hagan, had a rather similar Amendment in the Short Title to the Bill which we debated in these rather general terms. We got through it in 10 or 15 minutes and without any heat being generated, and I certainly do not want to do that now.

VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS

The noble Lord referred to me. I intended it to be a very short debate on this particular point. I did not intend it to turn into a Third Reading of the Bill. No doubt we shall have that in due time after many other proceedings during which we hope to further amend the Bill because I hope that this Bill will in fact be considerably further amended. I shall not take this Amendment to a Division to-night, although it would be fascinating to me to see how many noble Lords there were in the House—

LORD WINDLESHAM

I was giving way to the noble Viscount because I thought he wished to interrupt me. I am afraid I must say to the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, that I had not come to the end of my remarks. When I do, I have no doubt that the noble Viscount may wish to say whether or not he wants to divide. That is for him and his own Party. I was addressing myself to the Amendment, admittedly in rather general terms. The wording of the Amendment is to restrict the immigration of coloured persons into the United Kingdom and to insert these words into the Title of the Bill.

I was talking about the nature of Clause 2. The noble Lord, Lord Brockway, devoted most of his remarks to the patrial concept. I do not criticise him for that. I think the concept is the essence of the Bill. Here is, the difference between us, and it is one that we are entitled to debate. However, I am not, as I said at the beginning, going to make a long speech; in fact very much the contrary. I wanted to end on one particular note. I think that noble Lords who have been sitting throughout the Committee stage will share the view that we have in this country done a remarkable job over the last ten years in absorbing so remarkably quickly a large number of immigrants from different cultural and racial backgrounds, with surprisingly little tension. We can continue to do this; we can continue to provide an example of how these problems can be treated in a civilised society. But we cannot take this process of absorption for granted and we must devote our thoughts and actions and priorities in this direction. That is what the Government intend to do.

If the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, will bear with me for two minutes more on this last Amendment, we are at the end of a very long Committee stage and I should like to thank noble Lords who have taken part for their patience and tolerance. Issues of principle are involved. I know how deeply noble Lords opposite feel. We had the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, speaking this evening on the civil liberties aspects of the Schedule—what might appear to be in many ways very detailed points. But underneath them all, as he told us—he has told us forcibly on a number of occasions—there was his concern that officials should not have too much power over people coming into this country who may have difficulties in understanding languages and customs, and that they should have the same rights as other people have.

Our Report stage is not to take place until October. There will therefore be a very much longer interval than would normally be the case, but it gives me an opportunity to study what has been said during the Committee stage. The Government have given a number of assurances, some on major issues of principle, and we will of course want to consider them very carefully indeed. I am sorry if I have gone a little wide on this, but it is the end of our proceedings on this stage and I think it is appropriate to make some general observations of this kind.

9.52 p.m.

BARONESS WHITE

Before my noble friend Lord St. Davids has his say, I should like to reciprocate our thanks to the noble Lord for the careful and courteous way in which he has dealt with Amendments during the Committee stage. But he was making what sounded to me much more like the kind of speech one makes at a much later stage.

LORD WINDLESHAM

We have the Recess.

BARONESS WHITE

We have a Recess; indeed we have. And we hope very much that during the Recess, and refreshed by it, the noble Lord will look very carefully indeed at the many points which have been made, not by any means only from the Opposition Benches. What has been so remarkable in this Committee stage is that there have been expressions of concern and disquiet on certain aspects of this Bill from all quarters of the House. Therefore we are particularly disposed to hope that when we return in October the noble Lord will already have himself placed upon the Order Paper a number of constructive Amendments.

VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS

I am sorry if I started rather too early under the impression that the noble Lord. Lord Windlesham, had sat down, when according to our custom he had not, but I thought it was necessary to put something on the Paper at the end of this Bill to show that a large portion of this Bill has been an effort by the Party opposite to win favour with some most disreputable political—

SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Order!

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

If the noble Lord proceeds, I shall ask that the Standing Order be read.

LORD SHACKLETON

If I may interrupt at this point, may I say that Standing Order No. 30 does not apply. And if the noble Lord cannot control himself it might be a good idea to have it read, because I can see that he is getting very excited.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I am not getting excited at all. If we read it, we can see whether it applies or not. If I may say so to the noble Lord, the Leader of the Opposition, he is getting into the frame of mind in which he is beginning to dictate to people, not only the form of their speeches but the content of their speeches. This is not the first time he has attempted to do it. He has attempted to do it to my noble friend Lord Windlesham, and I am bound to tell him that he is exceeding the power even of the Leader of the House by so doing.

LORD SHACKLETON

I hoped that my interventions earlier were intended to be helpful to the Government. I will not pursue this matter any further. I am only pointing out that the noble and learned Lord has forgotten what Standing Order No. 30 contains. I think probably we had better bring this debate to an end.

VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS

I am sorry if I have aroused too much ire on the part of the noble and learned Lord. I was in fact briefly recapitulating what the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, had said. But since obviously it excites a great deal of heat, and possibly it would be better if we had less heat, while still continuing to say that it is my belief and the belief of many noble Lords that this is one of the purposes of the Bill and therefore it should go into the Title, in order to try to get a slightly better state of affairs in this House I shall at present withdraw this Amendment.

SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: With leave.

VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS

With leave, if I may, so that we may possibly reach a somewhat calmer atmosphere at a later stage.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (LORD ALPORT)

Is it your Lordships' pleasure that this Amendment be withdrawn?

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Object!

BARONESS WHITE

How childish!

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES

The Question is, That this Amendment be agreed to.

On Question, Amendment negatived.

House resumed: Bill reported, with Amendments.