HL Deb 11 November 1970 vol 312 cc744-55

3.20 p.m.

THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN

My Lords, I beg to move that the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 (Continuation) Order 1970, a draft of which was laid before the House on October 27, be approved. While I am sure noble Lords will not wish me to rehearse the events of the past, it is perhaps appropriate for me to explain briefly the position at the present time.

Your Lordships will have heard that Her Majesty's Government's Permanent Representative at the Security Council yesterday vetoed an Afro-Asian draft resolution on Rhodesia. Explaining his vote, he said: In so far as this new resolution repeats previous obligations it is unnecessary: in so far as it imposes fresh obligations, it is unacceptable. … The fresh attempt in operative paragraph 1 to bind the United Kingdom' not to grant independence to Southern Rhodesia without the fulfilment of majority rule' …impinges on matters which are within the sovereignty of the British Parliament.… We are not prepared to enter into negotiations with our negotiating position dictated to us publicly from outside My Lords, it was for this reason that Her Majesty's Government's representative had no alternative but to use the veto in the Security Council last night. I would remind the House that when a similar attempt was made in 1966 to bind Her Majesty's Government in this sense, the Security Council rejected the proposal.

The effect of the Motion now before your Lordships' House will be to continue in force Section 2 of the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965, which gives Her Majesty in Council power to take any action that may be necessary concerning events in Southern Rhodesia. In introducing this Order on November 9 in another place, my right honourable friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the Government intend to carry out their Election commitment to ascertain whether or not a realistic basis for a negotiation in accordance with the Five Principles can be found; and that to this end a preliminary message has recently been sent to Mr. Smith through our Ambassador and Mr. Smith's representative in Pretoria. It has been made clear that this has been done without prejudice to the present constitutional position. Your Lordships will not expect me to disclose the substance of this message, but I can state the purpose quite simply. It is to start the process of establishing whether a negotiation on the above basis will be possible or not.

I cannot pretend that the outlook is particularly hopeful, for circumstances have changed since a similar Motion was debated in your Lordships' House last year. During the last twelve months the Rhodesian régime have taken steps purporting formally to repudiate the Queen's sovereignty by introducing a Republican Constitution. There will, I feel sure, be no Members of the House who do not regret that this should have happened. We on this side of the House have always supported the aim of trying to reach a settlement, under agreed principles, and to restore legality in Southern Rhodesia. But we were not always in agreement with all the methods the last Administration chose to try to achieve these objectives. I know that there are Members of your Lordships' House who sincerely believe that Britain no longer has any power to influence the course of events in Rhodesia and that sanctions should therefore be abandoned.

It cannot be denied that sanctions have failed so far to bring about the political change which was their objective. Nevertheless, they do exert pressure on the Rhodesian economy and restrict the rate of development; and it must surely be right that until we know the result of our attempt to find out whether a negotiation is possible and, if it is, the outcome of any such negotiation, any change in our attitude on sanctions must be ruled out.

So, in inviting your Lordships to approve the Motion, we are asking for your support in our attempt to see whether an acceptable way can be found finally to solve the tragic problem of Rhodesia under the principles which are fair to all races and creeds in Rhodesia and to which both sides of this House have subscribed, and in accordance with the commitments we have made before and since coming into office.

Moved, That the Draft Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 (Continuation) Order 1970, laid before the House on October 27, be approved.—(The Marquess of Lothian.)

3.25 p.m.

LORD REAY

My Lords, this Order must be one of the least satisfactory Orders which annually come before Parliament. No Party likes it. The Rhodesia Act 1965, as the noble Marquess made clear, was designed to achieve a political solution; but each year has brought us, even those of us who support the policy of sanctions, closer to the point of absolute despair about the ability of sanctions to effect a political outcome. This year some of us feel we have reached that point. The Order was introduced when this country, under the last Government, after having been trapped in a problem that was a legacy from her past, anxious to show that she, too, shared the principles of a certain international moral consensus, went to the United Nations in order to lead the United Nations in the direction they would have gone without us.

This action was designed to reinforce the assurance, which was also given, that Britain was capable and willing to solve this problem on her own to the satisfaction of the rest of Africa. This was unfortunately never true. Britain never wished to exert her strength against Rhodesia. This country under the last Government—and there are plenty of us in all Parties who gave at least some measure of support to the Government—simply accepted the blackmail (and one must call it that) that this is what she ought to wish to do, and attempted to achieve by diplomacy a passable imitation of something which could only have been achieved by force. This is a situation from which we have not progressed at all.

Technically, this Order deals only with Rhodesia, but in practice it deals with our policy towards Southern Africa. It is hardly possible to separate any longer Rhodesia from South Africa. Mr. Smith was asked in public a week ago how long it would be before "one man, one vote" came to Rhodesia. He replied, "I hope never!" Rhodesia's eyes are on South Africa, and her one anxiety is that South Africa should not repudiate her, should not exclude her from her own defensive circle. For South Africa, Rhodesia is a welcome buffer State to be strengthened where possible, diplomatically, militarily and financially. They are only dissimilar in strength. From the point of view of the African countries of the Commonwealth each is identically evil. Accordingly, the consequences of a change in policy on our part towards South Africa would be the same consequences as a change in policy on our part towards Rhodesia; would be the same consequences as a change in our policy towards both countries together.

The authority we follow, the source of the commands that we obey when we adopt policies that we do not wish to adopt in these areas or take actions which are against our interests, is essentially the Commonwealth. No United Nations consensus would so restrict our policy were it not for our attachment to the Commonwealth. It is the break-up of the Commonwealth which has become the standard threat used to limit the freedom of our action.

I should like to ask this question. What is it in the idea of the Commonwealth which can bind us to endure so many painful situations, to listen to so many exhaustive lectures, and take actions which are not in our interests at all? The remarkable thing is that these interests are not sacrificed to any other country's interests; they are not expected to further any other country's economy or even to change the balance of power in South Africa: they are sacrificed to an idea. I believe that the answer lies in a conservative attachment to tradition in this country which wishes to perpetuate the form of the past even when it no longer corresponds to fact. And the support for this attitude comes from what I see as the truly conservative element in all Parties: that element which starts from the premise that the unity of the Commonwealth, because it was the unity of the Empire, is paramount.

To perpetuate a form of the past when it no longer corresponds to fact is by definition hypocritical; and to be hypocritical is to be vulnerable to all the moral blackmail of other countries. There is not one moral argument of the Commonwealth countries—and all their arguments are moral—which we dare defy by an appeal to reality because our position is based not on reality but on pretence. I therefore think that it is the radicals of all Parties—and by "radicals" I mean all those who wish Britain to find her modern place in the world—who must in the end support the break-up of the Commonwealth, or support an action to be taken by Britain which deliberately risks the break-up of the Commonwealth; and then choose instead relationships with individual countries, including of course Commonwealth and developing countries, but choose these relationships in place of one relationship to one single, archaic idea.

It might be constructive to compare our position with our closest Continental neighbour and not least at this moment. Since the news of General de Gaulle's death yesterday afternoon, many noble Lords will have read and heard generous and admiring tributes, in the sentiments of which many noble Lords will, I am sure, have shared. It was largely under de Gaulle's leadership that France emancipated herself from her past, and in particular her colonial past. De Gaulle enormously stimulated that country's nationalism and made her a force with an independent course and an independent will, both in Europe and in the world. What General de Gaulle achieved was a post-colonial national renascence, and it may be worth remarking that for this achievement even those who are not French prefer on the whole to admire him as a patriot rather than to object to him as a nationalist. France also followed behind us in Africa, taking the commercial advantages, where we were forced to become the victims of our own moral pretensions. Where Her Majesty's Government hesitate now in the face of international anger to sell a certain amount of arms to South Africa, that country, France, has long ago completed sales of many times that value.

The point is that France is no longer bound by her past, and, whether noble Lords like the fact or not, there is a connection between the achievement of General de Gaulle and the freedom that that country acquired to behave internationally in a manner in which we have never dared to behave ourselves. There are other countries whose foreign policies are inhibited by their past and in particular by guilt associated with their past; but perhaps none in so comprehensive a way, and to so inflated an extent, as this country.

In the months or even in the years following U.D.I., it may or may not have been reasonable to argue that the United Kingdom should attempt to acquire a control over the destiny of Rhodesia, and to ensure that that country received its independence on the same enlightened principles as we used with our other imperial territories. Most of us on these Benches believe that it was correct to make that attempt. We also considered that if sanctions were being applied—and they were being applied—then at least they should be applied effectively enough to be likely to bring about a political solution within the Five Principles. But every year has increased the distance between the objective and the fact. To-day Rhodesia celebrates—and "celebrates" is, by and large, the right word—the fifth anniversary of her effective independence. To-day, my Lords, as I said earlier, I should have thought hardly anyone could be found who believes that economic sanctions one way or the other will affect the political outcome.

We on these Benches do not find it unreasonable that Her Majesty's Government should wish to test for themselves, through a contact with the Smith Government, the possibility of a settlement on the basis of the Five Principles. We support Her Majesty's Government in their intention to maintain sanctions over this period. If a last attempt is to be made, it should be made without any change in our demands or in the conditions supporting those demands. But if Her Majesty's Government report next year that there are no prospects of a political settlement with Rhodesia consistent with the Five Principles—and we must all expect that this will happen—then we shall be faced with two alternatives. We shall either have to withdraw sanctions; to start a fresh, more realistic policy; to admit with regret, but not necessarily, I agree, with shame, the failure of a not entirely dishonourable policy that had its origins in an impossible arrangement of pre-war colonialist policy and then to take the risks that must inevitably follow from any assertion of our independence as a nation. Or we must continue along the indefinite road of paying a certain price in trade, because we wish to do what the Commonwealth wishes us to do; and pay a much larger price for other inhibitions that the basis of such a policy imposes on all other aspects of our foreign policy.

Which of these alternatives should be chosen must be a matter that depends on the valuation one puts on the unity of the Commonwealth. Undoubtedly, there are many Members of your Lordships' House, and certainly there are many Members on these Benches, who set passionate store by the unity of the Commonwealth. For reasons which I have partially outlined, I no longer share this view. At this moment I would add only this: that for the Commonwealth to break up would by no means mark the end for us in our possibilities for positive relationships with countries now inside the Commonwealth, or with other developing countries outside it, in which we could continue to discharge, as we discharge now, some of the duties of an ex-colonising power to an ex-colonial territory, of a rich country to a poor country; and to assist such countries, either alone or with international co-operation. My Lords, we on these Benches do not believe that the time has yet come for such a decision; but I hope, and I believe that every other noble Lord in this House will hope, that this is the last time we shall see this Order come before this House.

3.37 p.m.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

My Lords, I should like, first of all, to offer our warmest thanks to the Leader of the House for readjusting to-day's business so as to enable this debate on Rhodesia to take place at a reasonable hour. Yesterday it looked as if we should have to discuss it in the middle of the night, and that, I am sure your Lordships will agree, would have been very wrong. For there are, I suggest, certain new elements in the situation which differentiate to-day's debate from those which we have had in the past and which give it a rather special significance and importance. The first is, of course, the fact that this is the first opportunity that we in this House have had of examining the Rhodesian question since the General Election and the advent of a different Party to office in this country. I hope that noble Lords opposite will not think it offensive of me if I say that some advantage should surely accrue from new eyes being turned on this most intractable problem. It already seems apparent, from what the noble Marquess has told us this afternoon, that there may be substance in that view.

There is, moreover, yet another new element in the situation, which seems to me to make an even more fundamental change in it. It is this: though so many people in this country seem unwilling to face the fact (and this I am afraid I thought was true even of the speech of my noble friend Lord Lothian; and certainly of the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Reay), Rhodesia is no longer what she was; a dependency of the Crown; a member of our family—or whatever you like to call it. Now, so far as we are concerned, Rhodesia is a foreign country, like any other foreign country; a country which sprang originally from the same stem as ourselves, as the United Slates did, but foreign all the same. I hate to say this, my Lords, but it is true. Whether we like it or not—and I personally was very sad at the news—Rhodesia, by her declaration of a Republic, has severed her last links with Britain and is now in exactly the same position as any other foreign country; and any negotiations that take place between us and the Rhodesian Government from now on must, I believe, take place on that basis.

I know that there are people—perhaps there are a number in this House—who even now will argue that they do not accept that assumption. Of course, they can say this if they wish: but it does not alter the hard fact. After all, Great Britain, I believe, continued to quarter the lilies of France on our Royal Standard up to the year 1801; but that did not mean that we had any control over what went on in France or had done so for many centuries, and during that long period France would have greatly resented any interference by us in her internal affairs. And so I believe it is now with Rhodesia.

Many Rhodesians may retain, and I believe do retain, their old affection for Britain and especially for the Monarchy. Yet Rhodesia has made her great decision. She has, by declaring a Republic, cut her last links with us, and she will probably never come back to our fold. I will not follow the noble Lord, Lord Reay, into recalling yet once more to your Lordships the sad story of how all this has come about. We all know it only too well. My purpose to-day is to look into the future and not into the past; and what I have said I merely state as a self-evident fact.

That being so, to go on harping about the Five Principles, as if we were in a position to insist on this or that, is to my mind irrelevant to the position as it exists to-day. It belongs to the past. If, before starting negotiations, we try to make pre-conditions on matters entirely concerned with Rhodesia's internal affairs, her representatives will merely say, "We are now an independent country, and our internal affairs are nothing to do with you", just as the delegates of France or Spain—or, indeed, of Tanzania—would say in similar circumstances. It is essential, I believe, that our Government—and all of us—should recognise this simple fact if we are to get a settlement at all.

And yet, my Lords, there is no doubt at all that it would be greatly to our own national interest that a settlement should be reached. There is something which we really must take into account. Indeed, Sir Alec Douglas-Home himself made a great point of our national interest in the speech on the sale of arms to South Africa which he made at the Conservative Conference at Blackpool; and, of course, he was quite right. But what he did not say is that this is equally true of Rhodesia.

Nor is there anything new about an apparent conflict between abstract ideals and national interests. Again and again in our history, a situation has arisen where the Government of the day has been faced with a clash between the strict dictates of a moral conscience and the national interests of our country, and where the national interests have prevailed. I think that the case of the Armenian massacres in the latter part of the last century is a fairly good example of that. And, after all, there is nothing so very immoral about a Government having a proper care of our national interests.

Moreover (and this I think follows from what I have just said), are we so certain that in this particular case the moral basis of our policy is so very solid? Are we so sure, for instance, that majority rule is a moral principle at all? Or is it, as I think I have already said once to your Lordships in this House, just a stage in the evolution of a country from barbarism to a highly civilised state? And are we so confident that in this instance we, who live 5,000 miles away, know better at what pace that evolution can safely take place than those who live on the spot?

My Lords, we have already by our policy driven Rhodesia out of the Commonwealth. Do we really want to perpetuate this wrangle and push her into the arms of South Africa, whose policy, I understand, the Government, and even more the Opposition Parties, dislike? That is something that Opposition speakers in another place the day before yesterday seemed quite unable to appreciate, and yet that is what surely will happen if we go on on our present lines. And what a boon it would be, my Lords, if a settlement could be reached; first to the African—for, as Sir Alec said at Blackpool this year, it is the Africans who suffer most from sanctions; secondly, for the Europeans in Rhodesia, who are at present denied the possibility of developing their country more rapidly, as it should be developed, to the advantage of black and white alike; and, lastly, to ourselves, whose clear interest it is to see that our trade with Rhodesia, which we have lost, should be so far as possible restored to us. Indeed, so far as I can see, the only people who are really at present benefiting from sanctions are those countries who to-day are filching our trade from us, for no very high- minded reasons. I would entreat the Government to abandon the policy of trying to enter into negotiations on the basis of the past. The past is dead. We cannot put the clock back, and to try will lead only to increased hardship for black and white alike.

And now, my Lords, to sum up, we know from what Sir Alec has said to us that the policy of sanctions has failed in its object of beating Rhodesia to her knees. As far back as 1967 (I quote from the Daily Express of October 13 of of that year) he used these words: However much one may have disagreed with them and forecast their failure to achieve a political result, sanctions were at any rate a policy: but now, because sanctions are openly failing, the Government— he was referring, of course, to the late Government— are left with no policy at all. And, my Lords, though he has not used exactly those words in more recent speeches, he has gone so far as to declare at Blackpool, only a few weeks ago—and, he said very much the same thing in another place the day before yesterday: There is nothing more tragic than the rift between Britain and Rhodesia. I am certain that we have to try to mend the breach. But did he add, mentally, "On our own terms"? I hope not. For that would be riding for a fall; and the Government must know it: and, if there is a fall, if negotiations fail, as on the basis of the Five Principles they are in my view bound to fail, we may be committed to a continuation of sanctions, if not for ever, at any rate for a considerable time. Can the Government really be contemplating that possibility?

One thing is certain, my Lords. Our national interests demand a settlement, and to get that must surely be our supreme aim. That being the case, I would make this proposal to the Government and to this House. I am not going to suggest—though I should very much like to see it—that we should now grant de jure recognition of the independence of Rhodesia; for I fully realise that that might be too strong a dose for many people in this country to swallow at one gulp. But there is an alternative which does not raise the same moral issues; and that is de faco recognition. That is merely a recognition of what everybody knows to be the truth, and it would justify taking off sanctions, to the advantage of everybody, black and white, in Rhodesia. That, I would submit with all deference, would be the statesmanlike course to adopt.

My Lords, I must confess that I should dearly have liked to challenge a Division on this Order to continue sanctions. But it is clear that the Government regard themselves as committed to yet one more attempt to get an agreed settlement, and that nothing will budge them from that position: and there is no doubt that if anyone can achieve this particular miracle it is Sir Alec. That being the case, slim though the chances may be, and taking into account the attitude of both the Opposition Parties, any attempt to press this matter to a Division this afternoon would evidently be a very futile exercise. I would, however, most earnestly appeal to my noble friend Lord Lothian, who is, I understand, to reply for the Government, that he will at any rate leave us with some hope that, whatever the result of these projected negotiations, even if they fail, or even if no negotiations take place at all, the Government will not rule out the possibility of according de facto recognition to Rhodesia. For that, my Lords, may well prove to be the only way of bringing this unhappy dispute to an end.