Lords Sitting of 26 February 1970

Preamble
The House met at three of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Manchester.

ROYAL ASSENT
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD GARDINER): My Lords, I have to notify the House, in accordance with the Royal Assent Act 1967, that the Queen has signified Her Royal Assent to the following Acts:

Valuation for Rating (Scotland) Act,

Housing (Amendment) (Scotland) Act,

Rural Water Supplies and Sewerage (Scotland) Act,

Local Employment Act,

Insolvency Services (Accounting and Investment) Act,

Glasgow Corporation Order Confirmation Act.

GOVERNMENT UNDATED STOCKS: HOLDERS' LOSSES
VISCOUNT ADDISON: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government, in view of the widely recognised hardship suffered by the holders of undated Government stocks who have seen their capital drastically reduced, and in view of the failure of successive Governments so far to find means of alleviating their hardship, whether they will consider allowing losses in these stocks prior to April, 1965, to rank against profits made on other realised stocks and shares.]
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, this Government, like its predecessors, has looked very carefully into the position of long-term holders of undated
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securities and examined a number of possible solutions, but has concluded that there is nothing which can be done in the way of altering the terms on which these securities are held which would not create more problems than it solved. The Government could not adopt the proposal made by the noble Lord because we could not allow relief on losses without making gains on the same securities chargeable to capital gains tax. This would reverse the decision taken in the 1969 Budget to take gilt-edged securities out of the field of capital gains tax, exempting gains and disallowing losses alike.
VISCOUNT ADDISON: My Lords, I thank my noble friend very much for his reply. May I put this supplementary question to him?—though I appreciate that I may not receive a reply to-day. Would Her Majesty's Government consider any other means by which this hard-ship might be relieved, such as the establishment of a sinking fund to purchase the stocks in the market at present prices?
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, as I am sure my noble friend would agree, one way of helping the gilt-edged holders is to maintain the balance-of-payments strength and the competitiveness of the export industries. The indirect benefit to the gilt-edged market has been considerable. As I indicated at the beginning of my answer the Government sympathise with the difficulties of the long-term holders of these stocks. If my noble friend puts forward proposals which do not have disadvantages, I will undertake to see that they are considered.
LORD RATHCAVAN: My Lords, would not the noble Lord agree that the exemption from capital gains tax of the price appreciation of Government stock, which I suggested in a Question in your Lordships' House more than a year ago and which was not then very well received, has done more than anything else to improve the status of the gilt-edged market which is now in a better state than it has been for many years?
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, I am sorry if the noble Lord feels that he has been deprived of any feeling of satisfaction to which he is entitled as a result of the adoption of his proposal. But I agree with what he said about the result of the action taken.

GENEVA PROTOCOL AND CS GAS
3.10 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will reconsider the decision to regard CS and other such gases as outside the scope of the Geneva Protocol.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (LORD CHALFONT): NO, my Lords. The Government gave long and detailed consideration to this matter and believe that their decision is the right one.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I thank my noble friend for his Answer. May I ask him some supplementary questions, in view of the grave concern in this matter? First, have not the British Government, whether Labour, National or Conservative, for 40 years stood for the inclusion of these gases within the terms of the Geneva Protocol? Did we not in 1931 secure general agreement at Geneva that lachrymatory gases should be included? What is the reason for this change of attitude?
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, it is true that in 1930 the Government made a certain interpretation of the Geneva Protocol. This interpretation in general terms has now been reiterated. The Government had to give close consideration to what was in the minds of the drafters of the Protocol and what developments had taken place since. One of the developments that has taken place since is that the agent known as CS has been developed. Her Majesty's Government decided that this agent was not significantly harmful, except in exceptional circumstances; and it was to exclude significantly harmful agents that the Geneva Protocol was formulated. We therefore believed that we were right in saying that, although we stood by our interpretation of 1930, this agent should be excluded. It is not, in fact, as my noble friend has suggested, entirely true that we achieved general agreement at Geneva in the 'thirties. We suggested that tear gases should be excluded by
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the Geneva Convention, and the reaction to this was not, as my noble friend has suggested, unanimous.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, was not the only qualification by the United States of America, which had declined to sign the Protocol Agreement? Arising from the noble Lord's reply, may I ask him this question? When he says that this gas is not lethal, is there not abundant evidence in Vietnam where, contained in dugouts, it has caused the death of women and children, and driven the men out of those dugouts to be shot down as soon as they got outside?
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, so far as the first part of my noble friend's supplementary question is concerned, the answer is still, "No". This was not a unanimous reaction; and it is not true that it was only the United States that was not prepared to go along with us. We put the point to the other Powers in Geneva. Some replied agreeing with us; some did not reply at all, and it was the United States that made the reservation. So far as the second part of the supplementary question is concerned, in fact I did not use the word "lethal", I went further than that and said that the gas is not even significantly harmful. So far as the use of this weapon in Vietnam is concerned, that, of course, is entirely a matter for the United States Government. So far as the British Government are concerned, I can say that, if it were ever necessary for British troops to use this substance, it would be used to save lives and to take prisoners.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I am sorry to press this matter, but it is very grave. May I ask my noble friend this question? While we take unilateral action in interpreting this Agreement, is it not the case that if this unilateral precedent is followed it may affect the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and even our own Government's proposal for the Convention on biological weapons? Would the Government be prepared at least to submit to the Geneva Disarmament Conference an interpretation of what this Protocol covers?
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, the reason we are taking what my noble friend has called unilateral action in this case is because, as he will be aware, in any international instrument of this kind

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it is up to the individual signatories to interpret the Treaty they have signed. We are interpreting it in this way, and this is fully consistent with normal international practice. So far as my noble friend's point about the Non-Proliferation Treaty is concerned, I think that this is entirely another question. Nothing we have said about the Geneva Protocol need in any way affect the adhesion of this country or of any other country to a Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.
So far as the Biological Weapons Convention is concerned I am convinced that here, too, there is no real connection. Her Majesty's Government have made clear their view that chemical weapons and biological weapons are entirely different in kind. We shall continue to pursue vigorously in Geneva our attempts to secure a convention on the abolition of the use of biological weapons. I see no reason why our interpretation of the Geneva Protocol on chemical weapons should have any effect on this at all. So far as the last part of my noble friend's supplementary question is concerned, I do not believe that anything is to be gained by using up the time of the Geneva Conference in seeking to banish the use of a non-lethal agent which is not even significantly harmful, when we have things like germ weapons and nuclear weapons to deal with.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, is it entirely wise for Her Majesty's Government to base their decisions on what Her Majesty's Government themselves would do, or what would be done by the British in any particular circumstance? While accepting entirely that the British would not use these gases except in the circumstances that the noble Lord suggests, is it not a fact that the lachrymatory gases can be used to conceal the presence of other more harmful weapons?
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, I was not suggesting for one moment that we had based our decision on the tactical use of these weapons: quite the reverse is the case. We based it on a close examination of the properties of this particular agent. I was merely pointing out to my noble friend, in answer to his comment about the way these gases are used by other armies, how we ourselves regard their use. I can only say that, except
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in very exceptional circumstances, this particular agent is not significantly harmful and we would not use it in a way that would make it so.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: My Lords, while my noble friend says that this gas is neither lethal nor even, in the ordinary case, dangerous, will he confirm that it is is not dangerous or lethal to the very young or the old, or to persons in indifferent health; and would he assert that these lives are not worth preserving?
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, so far as our present investigations are concerned, we have made a careful study of all available evidence. At this moment there is a study going on into the long-term effects of the use of this gas in ordinary circumstances. We shall, of course, take full account of the report when it becomes available. So far, there is no evidence that the use of this gas in war—and I emphasise "in war", because I think it is not fully appreciated that the Geneva Protocol deals with war and not with riot control or internal security—except in exceptional circumstances, is significantly harmful.
LORD RITCHIE-CALDER: My Lords, can my noble friend tell me what one can do, as one heavily involved in international relations, to explain this unilateral action (I follow my noble friend Lord Brockway) in terms of the credibility of British intentions in relation to the Disarmament Conference?
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, I fail to see why this should have any effect on the view that people have of the intentions of the British Government on disarmament in general. What we have done is to examine the Protocol that was signed in 1925, and interpreted in 1930, and we have come to the conclusion that there have been developments since then which would lead us to review that interpretation. If this is taken, as it should be taken, in its context, I entirely fail to see how anyone could regard this as having any effect on our good will in the field of nuclear weapons, in the field of biological weapons and in the field of disarmament and arms control generally. Perhaps I may reassure my noble friend if I say that I was recently in Geneva, since this decision was taken and

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announced, and I saw no evidence among my colleagues there from the inter-national community that our credibility is in any way damaged.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: My Lords, am I correct in saying that we used this gas in Northern Ireland and subsequently sent scientists over there to examine the effect on those people who were subjected to it? And am I right in saying that those scientists were not unanimous in their view on whether that gas was harmless?
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, I think that I can only stick to the formula I have already used. These are words chosen with great care. My noble friend is quits correct in saying that this gas was used in Northern Ireland. Scientists did go there, and they have made a careful study of its effects. We have studied these reports with very great care, and our conclusion from all the evidence is that, except in exceptional circumstances, the substance is not significantly harmful.
LORD RITCHIE-CALDER: My Lords, would my noble friend at least arrange that the evidence on which this conclusion is based is put before people who are extremely doubtful about the facts?
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, the evidence of most of the scientists who have examined this matter is already public; and there is a great deal of public literature on it which everyone can examine. I have examined it myself and I say (I am sorry to return to a well-tried formula, but I know that noble Lords will understand this) that, except in exceptional circumstances, this substance is not significantly harmful to man.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: My Lords, would the noble Lord explain what, in this context, is meant by "exceptional circumstances"?
LORD CHALFONT: Yes, my Lords. I can explain what is meant by some exceptional circumstances—clearly, I cannot be exhaustive about this. If, for example, this substance were used in very high concentrations in enclosed spaces over long periods, this would be an exceptional circumstance.

GLASGOW POLICE MURDER AND FIREARMS CONTROL
3.22 p.m.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what information has been obtained as to how Howard Charles Wilson, recently sentenced to life imprisonment, came into possession of the firearm with which he murdered two policemen in Glasgow.]
THE LORD ADVOCATE (LORD WILSON OP LANGSIDE): My Lords, the three men concerned in the bank robberies which preceded the murders joined the Bearsden Rifle Club a short time before the robbery at the Linwood Bank. One of them purchased a target pistol from an official of the club on the understanding that it was to be used in the club premises only. All three men used the pistol in the club. One of them must have taken it out for unlawful use in the course of the Linwood bank robbery, and later the pistol was deposited at the house in Allison Street, Glasgow, where it was used by Wilson to shoot the police officers.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: My Lords, I am much obliged to my noble friend for his Answer. Does it not suggest that some strengthening is required of the regulations controlling the possession and use of firearms? Also, may I ask my noble friend whether he is aware of reports that in a previous shooting case in the same area the murder weapon had been stolen from an un-attended motor car, and will he consider imposing stringent regulations upon the safe keeping of firearms?
LORD WILSON OF LANGSIDE: My Lords, with regard to the second part of the noble Baroness's question, the rifle to which he referred, which was used in the shooting incident in Glasgow, was indeed stolen from a car, which had been left in a car park at an hotel in the North of England. With regard to the first part of her question, the subject of firearms has recently been a matter of legislation. But I, along with my right honourable

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friend, the Secretary of State for Scotland, will certainly consider further the desirability of additional security measures.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: My Lords, is not the fact that this recent legislation has been followed by these incidents evidence that the recent legislation is not sufficiently stringent?
LORD WILSON OF LANGSIDE: My Lords, I do not think that that is a correct statement of the position.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I wonder whether my noble friend would say whether it is the case that the regulations applying to clubs under the Fire-arms Act apply in England and Wales, but not to the same degree in Scotland? Is that not the difficulty which has to be corrected?
LORD WILSON OF LANGSIDE: My Lords, I am unable to say whether the position in Scotland is exactly as it is in England. I am able to say that the rifle club from which this weapon was stolen was one which was approved by my right honourable friend under the Firearms Act 1968. I will certainly consider, with my right honourable friend, the point which my noble friend has made.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: My Lords, we understand that Her Majesty's Government are considering strengthening the regulations about the security of dangerous drugs. Would it not be reasonable to take similar steps in relation to firearms?

CHANNEL TUNNEL PROJECT
LORD MERRIVALE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government, in view of Monsieur Maurice Schumann's statement in London on January 22 last that the French Government see in the Channel Tunnel, beyond its technical and economic aspects, the means as well as the symbol of a decisive rapprochement between our two nations:
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(a) whether they agree with this appreciation of the value of the Channel Tunnel; and

(b) what is the present position regarding this joint project.]

THE MINISTER OF STATE, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (LORD SHEPHERD): My Lords, the British and French Governments are in entire agreement that the Channel Tunnel project offers the prospect of a link between the two countries which would have both physical and symbolic value. They are seeking an acceptable arrangement for its provision on the basis that the Tunnel should be financed and built in the private sector, but operated by an Anglo-French public operating authority.
The present position is that the two Governments hope that acceptable financing proposals will soon be formally submitted to them by the international private groups which are interested in financing the project and managing its construction. This would clear the way for the final economic, financial, engineering and traffic studies which, together with legislation on the British side and an Anglo-French treaty, must precede construction. Some two years' further work must therefore be expected before a decision is taken whether the Tunnel should be built.
LORD MERRIVALE: My Lords, I should like to thank the Minister for his lengthy and constructive Answer. I wonder whether he would say whether, in effect, a financing group has now been selected or whether discussions are taking place with the various interested parties.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, no decision has been taken as to which group would be asked to finance and manage the construction. Informal discussions are going on between the two Governments and the interested organisations, but I hope that it may be possible for a Statement to be made in the not too distant future.
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, if there is any serious doubt about the profitability of the Tunnel, and, consequently, any possibility that serious difficulty might arise about securing the necessary finance, would the Government be prepared to examine the alternative scheme of a bridge/tunnel/bridge?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I think that that is very hypothetical. Certainly Her Majesty's Government believe that this Tunnel is still a financial proposition, but naturally we shall need to look into some of the other aspects, particularly the engineering factors.
THE MARQUESS OF HERTFORD: My Lords, may I ask whether the Government are aware of an increasing anxiety that the Channel Tunnel will not eventually be profitable and may require large subsidies?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I know that there are many worries and concerns, but the two Governments have agreed on a joint policy: they are pursuing it with vigour, and we have joint machinery for discussion and progress.
LORD NUGENT OF GU1LDFORD: My Lords, are there any comparative costs of freight and passenger transport across the Channel, whether by Tunnel, by ordinary conventional ship or by hovercraft? If there are, I wonder whether the noble Lord would give them to us if I put down a Question.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, if the noble Lord puts down a Question I will try and answer him.
LORD POPPLEWELL: My Lords, would my noble friend be more specific as to when he expects a report so far as the costing is concerned? This is a matter which has been going on for a considerable period of time. Approval in principle by both Governments was accepted a considerable time ago. What has been done, and how much longer does my noble friend expect it to be before he makes a real decision as to whether or not to go ahead?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, the problem at the moment is that there are three groups considering the financing and construction of this Tunnel. We must depend upon their submitting their own details and facts for us to study. At the moment the matter is with the three groups, and until we have their information and suggestions we cannot do much about it.

ISRAEL: AIR TRANSPORT OF CARGO AND MAIL
3.28 p.m.
LORD BYERS: My Lords, I beg leave to ask a Question, of which I have given Private Notice; namely:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will state the latest developments concerning the transport of cargo and mail by air from the United Kingdom to Israel.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, I am informed that, following consultation with their staff, from to-morrow B.E.A. will accept at Heathrow cargo and letter mail destined for Tel Aviv under strict security arrangements which have been explained to the staff. At Rome and Athens, which are intermediate points of call on certain of B.E.A.'s services, the acceptance of cargo will be resumed as soon as B.E.A. management is satisfied about security controls.
In the case of B.O.A.C., discussions with their staff on improved security measures are continuing, and the renewed acceptance of cargo awaits the outcome of these discussions.
LORD BYERS: My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for answering that Question. I am sure the House will appreciate the speedy decision which has been taken by the management and staff of B.E.A. in a very difficult case. May I ask the Minister, on the wider context, whether any date has yet been fixed by ICAO for convening this international conference? It could, I believe, have a very important effect if convened early enough.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, as I indicated yesterday—I speak off the cuff—I think it is March 3 when the European members of ICAO will be meeting and dealing with the problem which mostly concerns us. The other date has not yet been fixed.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: My Lords, can the noble Lord confirm that maximum security steps are now actually in force at Heathrow?
LORD BESWICK: Yes, my Lords; I am glad to confirm that that is the case.
May I lake the opportunity of clarifying an answer which I gave to my noble

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friend Lord Wells-Pestell yesterday, when he asked me a simple question about discrimination against Israeli mail? I endeavoured to give a simple answer in what is a very complicated situation. The actual position is that B.O.A.C. have never refused letter mail to Israel, and B.E.A. will, as from to-morrow, be accepting letter mail, but not letter postal packets.

ADDRESS BY FEDERAL GERMAN CHANCELLOR
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, as the House will know, the Chancellor of the Federal German Republic, Herr Brandt, will be addressing Members of both Houses of Parliament on Tuesday next, March 3. It is anticipated that your Lordships' House will be asked to adjourn during pleasure to hear Herr Brandt between 3.30 and 4.30 p.m.
I would also take the opportunity of informing your Lordships that on Wednesday of next week, March 4, dinner will be available between 7 and 8.30 p.m.
EARL ST. ALDWYN: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving this information, but in view of the number of speakers on Tuesday, and the adjournment, would it not be possible to have dinner on Tuesday as well?
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, I am sure that it would be possible, but the consideration we gave to the situation suggested that it was not necessary. The number of speakers at the moment does not suggest that we shall be sitting particularly late. We have been going rather well with the Wednesday experiment, and I thought it would be better for the House if we built up a custom for Wednesday, and then extended it for Tuesday. But if the noble Earl has evidence that we shall need dinner on Tuesday I am prepared to consider it with him.
LORD SALTER: My Lords, may we be assured that there will be enough space for Peers who wish to attend?
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, I am assuming that the noble Lord is now referring to the meeting with Herr Brandt, and not to dinner. In any event, the answer is "Yes" to both questions.
LORD WOLVERTON: My Lords, there will be quite a number of speakers on Tuesday and we shall have to adjourn an important debate. I think we ought to have dinner on that very important night when we shall be dealing with reform of local government.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, I make these decisions after consulting with as many people as are available for discussion. As I am now informed by my noble friend behind me, as well as noble Lords in front of me, that dinner is required on Tuesday, I will ensure that dinner is available.

TEESSIDE CORPORATION (GENERAL POWERS) BILL [H.L.]
Read 2a, and committed to a Select Committee.
TEESSIDE CORPORATION (No. 2) BILL [H.L.]
Read 2a, and committed to a Select Committee.
SOUTHEND-ON-SEA CORPORATION BILL [H.L.]
Read 2a, and committed to the Committee on Unopposed Bills.

FIREWORKS SAFETY BILL [H.L.]
VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS: My Lords, I beg leave to introduce a Bill to regulate the sale and the safe discharge of fire-works. I beg to move that this Bill be now read a first time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a. —(Viscount St. Davids.)
On Question, Bill read 1a, and to be printed.

RIDING ESTABLISHMENTS BILL [H.L.]
3.34 p.m.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a third time. I need not make a speech on Third Reading because the Bill has been

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through all its stages in this House and we have had a good deal of discussion on it. Before I sit down, however, I should like to thank those noble Lords who have taken part, because they have helped to a great extent in the creation of the Bill as it is now amended. Particularly should I like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, for the kind way in which he has treated me during the passage of the Bill, and also for the very co-operative attitude of the Home Office. I wish to express that appreciation.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 3a. —(Viscount Massereene and Ferrard.)
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, may I say what a pleasure it was to me to treat the noble Viscount kindlily. If, as I expect, the Bill will now go from this House, I wish it well in the other place.
On Question, Bill read 3a, and passed, and sent to the Commons.

SUGAR BEET (RESEARCH AND EDUCATION) (INCREASE OF CONTRIBUTIONS) ORDER 1970
3.36 p.m.
LORD HILTON OF UPTON: My Lords, I beg to move, That the Draft Sugar Beet (Research and Education) (Increase of Contributions) Order 1970, a copy of which was laid before the House on January 20, be approved. This is a straightforward provision. The effect of the Order is to maintain at ins present level the maximum contribution which growers of beet and the British Sugar Corporation may be required by Order to pay to finance the programme of research and education which the industry wants to see carried out. The actual rate of contribution is determined annually and is subject to an Order separate from the one under discussion. Section 18(1) of the Sugar Act 1956 provides for an Order to be made each year by the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and the Secretary of State for Scotland setting out a programme of expenditure on research and education for home-grown sugar beet. The Ministers are required by the Act to consult the industry and it has long been the practice to do this through the Sugar Beet (Research and Education) Committee, which comprises representatives of
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the National Farmers' Unions of England and Wales and Scotland, the British Sugar Corporation and agricultural scientists. The income is raised by Orders made under Section 18(3) of the Act and the contributions from growers and the Corporation are paid into the Sugar Beet (Research and Education) Fund which is under the control of the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food.
The 1956 Act specified that the maximum rate of contribution should be 3d. per ton each from the growers and the Corporation for each ton of homegrown sugar beet sold for delivery to the Corporation in that year. Under Section 18(4) of the Act the maximum rate can be increased by Order. The maximum rate was raised to 4d. per ton in 1967 and this gave rather wider scope to Ministers to meet the rising costs of the programmes by increased contributions. The present maximum contribution Order expires on March 31 and without another Order the maximum rate would automatically revert to the 3d. per ton specified in the Act. The actual rate of contribution is currently 3½d. per ton. The income from this rate of contribution in the present financial year ending March 31, 1970, is likely to be of the order of £177,000 and the estimated expenditure on the current programme is £229,000. This means that we are cutting into the reserves of the fund to pay for this year's research. Costs, the major portion of which is attributable to the salaries of the scientists and others carrying out the programme, are continuing to rise, and if the present level of research is to be maintained—and that is what the industry desires—the total expenditure must go up.
The proposal embodied in the Order now before your Lordships is that the present rate of 4d. per ton from the grower and 4d. from the Corporation should be maintained for a further period of two years. The Sugar Beet (Research and Education) Committee do not contemplate any major expansion of the programme over these two years and have looked closely at current expenditure to see that this is fully justified. Ministers are satisfied that the maintenance of the current rate for the period proposed will meet present needs. The position will of course need to be reviewed towards the end of the two years for which the

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proposed Order will be in force. The price of sugar is unaffected by these proposals.
I should like to say something about the research which is supported by these contributions. It is not easy to measure the effects of research on production, but sugar beet has shown an impressive increase in yield per acre from about 9 tons 25 years ago to about 15 tons in recent years. There has been a comparable increase in sugar yield. The whole of the increase cannot be attributed to the research effort alone, since much of it must be due to the general improvement in husbandry standards. Nevetheless, research and experiment have provided greater knowledge of the requirements for seed beds, plant spacing, weed and disease control, and so on. The plant breeders have made earlier sowing possible and have largely overcome the problem of bolting. Monogerm seed is now a reality, and a multigerm variety tolerant to virus yellows is now available. Harvesting operations are now largely mechanised and the primary need is to cut some of the handwork out of the preparation and cultural operations during the growing season. These examples of the success of the research and education programmes bear testimony to the shrewd use of resources and to the work of the industry and the scientists who are helping to increase productivity in this way.
I must also pay tribute to the work of the Sugar Beet (Research and Education) Committee in its sensible and practical advice on the research programmes. This is perhaps a fitting opportunity to thank publicly the chairman, Sir Peter Greenwell, who is retiring after 13 years of untiring service to the Committee. I commend the draft Order to your Lord-ships. It is a measure which will enable further progress to be made in increasing the productivity of this important industry. In conclusion, may I stress again that a separate Order will be made shortly, specifying the actual rate of contributions for 1970–71. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Draft Sugar Beet (Research and Education) (Increase of Contributions) Order 1970, laid before the House on January 20, be approved. —(Lord Hilton of Upton.)
3.45 p.m.
LORD BELSTEAD: My Lords, the House will be grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hilton of Upton, for explaining this Order and for the tributes which he has paid on behalf of the Government, not only to those engaged in research and education but also to those actually in the industry on account of good husbandry. I particularly thank the noble Lord because the retiring chairman of the Committee, Sir Peter Greenwell, lives within a few miles of my home.
As the noble Lord has explained to us, this Order seeks to maintain the contributions from growers and from the Corporation to research and education at a maximum of 4d. per ton for the next two years. The noble Lord, Lord Hilton, has explained that the 1969–70 income from contributions is estimated to be £177,000, which I believe will result in an estimated loss of about £52,000. I wonder whether I may ask the noble Lord why there is to be a drop in the statutory contributions? As I understand it, the 1968–69 accounts for the fund show that a total of £204,344 was received from growers and the Corporation. I was not aware that the national acreage or the national tonnage had been reduced in this way. It is clear that the costs of the research and education programme are, like everything else these days, mounting. Can the noble Lord say whether a rise in contributions is envisaged after April, 1972? I know that that is some time ahead. Alternatively, is it possible that now some cut-back can be made in the programme, for great strides have been made as a result of sugar beet research, which as the noble Lord, Lord Hilton, so accurately said, the industry wants to see carried out.
The noble Lord mentioned monogerm seed, which must have saved growers thousands of pounds in cost; and for any who have attempted the back-breaking job of singling, monogerm seed has come as an undisguised blessing. Apparently there is also now a virus yellows resistant seed. This is also welcome news, for a field which has turned, as they say in East Anglia, "as gold as a guinea", has long been feared after a spell of "muggy" weather. I was not aware that this seed was available commercially, and perhaps the noble Lord could advise us on this.

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There is one area of research to which the noble Lord, Lord Hilton, referred and which still seems to be highly experimental. I refer to pre-emergent sprays for weed control. Of course growers are thankful that these sprays exist, and they realise that conditions have to be reasonable for effective results, but these sugar beet pre-emergent sprays seem to operate on a far more critical factor. For instance, a still morning may be chosen for drilling and band spraying; the morning turns into a beautiful hot day and then sometimes the sun destroys the effect of the spray. Could the noble Lord tell us where in the Schedule to the 1969 Order research into sprays fits, as I feel that this is an area of research which to some extent is as yet unfulfilled. My Lords, with those few questions, I hope that the House will wish to support this Order.
3.48 p.m.
LORD HILTON OF UPTON: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, for the way in which he has supported this Order, and I should like to congratulate him on his knowledge of this subject. If the noble Lord, Lord Nugent of Guildford, had been here I would probably have indulged in a little leg pulling. With the noble Lord's knowledge of the sugar beet industry, having a farm quite near one of the beet sugar factories in East Anglia, he will have to look to his laurels or in the future he will find himself second spokesman on agriculture for the Opposition.
While welcoming this Order, the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, asked me a few questions which he was kind enough to give me in writing before I presented this Order, and which has made it some-what easier for me to give him the answers for which he has asked. In a way I think I partly covered some of the noble Lord's questions in my previous remarks. He referred to the figures that I mentioned earlier on, the estimated income of £177,000, which is now up to something of the order of £204,000. The answer is this. The estimate referred to in my opening speech was in respect of the current year, which does not end until March 31, 1970. The accounts to which the noble Lord referred are those for the year ended March 31, 1969. Although the rate of contribution may be the same,
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since it is levied on each ton of beet sold to the British Sugar Corporation the income must vary according to the size of the crop in each year. For the purpose of estimating the rate of contribution from year to year we have to assume average yields. Actual yields may be above or below that figure, and this has to be taken into account in the calculations.
The second question the noble Lord asked was whether the Government envisage an increase in the rate of contribution after this Order expires. I think I made it clear in my opening remarks that we shall be reviewing the position before the two-year life of this Order expires in 1972. I cannot anticipate the outcome of that review of course, but the trend of costs is upward, and it may well be that the industry will have to decide between a rate of contribution which would meet the rising cost of the present level of research and a reduction in the scope of the programme. However, the cost of the programme to the industry represents a very small proportion of the total value of sugar beet, and the Sugar Beet (Research and Education) Committee which advises Ministers on the programme is well equipped to ensure that costs are kept to the minimum.
The noble Lord also asked whether virus yellow resistant seed is available commercially. The answer is that the multigerm variety, Maris Vanguard, is tolerant to virus yellows and work is going on at the Plant Breeding Institute at Cambridge to develop monogerm variety which is as tolerant as Maris Vanguard and with improved sugar content.
The noble Lord then asked where in the 1969 Order Schedule does research on pre-emergent sprays fit in. The answer is that the main work on pre-emergent sprays is carried out at the Norfolk Agricultural Station which is No. 4 in the Schedule to the 1969 Order, and this is carried out in association with Broom's Barn Experimental Station (No. 3) and the British Sugar Corporation (No. 9). Those are the answers to the questions which the noble Lord put to me, and I hope that your Lordships will now give this Order your blessing.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

THE MIDDLE EAST
3.55 p.m.
LORD NAPIER AND ETTRICK LORD NAPIER AND ETTRICK rose to ask Her Majesty's Government whether, in view of the deteriorating situation between the belligerents in the Middle East, they will explore the possibility of taking some action additional to that inaugurated by the four Great Powers, either by way of a guarantee of a frontier or demilitarised zone to be given by this country and some other European Power or Powers, or by some other course of action. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper; and I may say that in doing so I shall be as brief as possible.
I need not impress upon your Lord-ships the gravity of the situation which faces us to-day in the Middle East, although I cannot help wondering how aware public opinion is of its potential dangers. Also, as 1 am sure we all realise, in spite of the undoubted importance of such factors as refugees, Jerusalem, arms sales, and the recent escalation in the fighting, the key to solving this problem must lie in that central part of the Security Council resolution which insists upon Israeli withdrawal in exchange for Arab promises of peace. And as Mr. George Brown said earlier this week— and here I agree with him—time is fast running out.
I fully realise that there is an inherent incompatibility gap in this exchange of a withdrawal for a peace promise unless there is trust between the contestants of some reliable external guarantee. For it is nothing short of a strategic fact that, unless one of these two elements can be provided, Israel, understandably, will not —indeed cannot—indicate her willingness to withdraw sufficiently either to comply with the principles of the resolution or to make it possible for King Hussein or President Nasser to start talks. And since there obviously cannot be trust for some time after a settlement has been achieved, only some prospect of reliable external guarantees can make it possible to break the present deadlock and enable talks to start with any hope of success.
To date, the external guarantees envisaged seem to be United Nations forces in demilitarised zones, backed by the Security Council two-Power or four-
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Power guarantees. Clearly, in the light of the Veto in the Security Council, Israel's past experience and her distrust of Russian intentions, she will not be satisfied with these alone. Instead, she will continue to insist on relying upon unilateral defence, which of course means retaining territory incompatible with the resolution. At the same time, Her Majesty's Government desire to make the maximum use of the United Nations. The only possible solution, surely, is to add some external guarantee which can be relied upon to operate in time should those United Nations and Great Power arrangements fail. Articles 51 and 52 of the United Nations Charter allow for just this; that is to say, the rights of collective and regional defence until the Security Council can act, which rights, those Articles specifically say:
"Nothing in this Charter shall impair or preclude ".
My Lords, it seems to me that only Europe, including the United Kingdom, has the power and the geographical position to provide the backbone of such an additional external guarantee, ready to act in time, between the levels of the super-Powers and the United Nations forces in demilitarised zones. Britain and Europe, moreover, bear the heaviest responsibility historically for the situation as it is to-day, and have much to gain from its solution now.
Exactly how this should be done requires detailed investigation, but one method suggested has been for Britain and Europe, with any other acceptable unaligned countries, to provide existing fighter-bombers ready, at whatever notice is appropriate, to operate from airfields in Cyprus, Turkey, and indeed from aircraft carriers. And this contribution would be the effective but strictly limited one of guaranteeing to both sides, Israel and the Arabs, that if either of them were to initiate a major air. land or sea attack upon the other they would lose the air superiority which is so vital for victory in the open deserts and seas of the Middle East. Obviously, many problems have to be studied before such a guarantee will be acceptable to all concerned. But many of us believe, I hope not unfairly, that Her Majesty's Government should now take a bold initiative in this matter. So far, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has shown little enthusiasm for doing anything other than

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working through the Four-Power talks and Dr. Jarring, which, so far as I can see, has achieved very little. For it is only when this quite fundamental incompatibility gap in the resolution begins to be closed that there will be any hope of starting talks likely to lead to the peace and stability of the Middle East which is so vital for Britain and Europe.
Therefore, my Lords, I ask that a detailed investigation of an additional "stand-by" guarantee, underwriting any already given by the United Nations or super-Powers, should be initiated forth-with by Her Majesty's Government with her European Allies. There seems initially much to be gained and nothing to be lost by at least trying this, without commitment. Even the start of this investigation might begin to arrest the present steadily increasing gains of "hawks" over "doves" on both sides. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, when he comes to reply, will have something encouraging to tell the House. But I would respectfully suggest to him, as Minister responsible for disarmament, that this suggestion should have his unqualified support.
4.2 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Napier and Ettrick, for raising this Question to-day, and to say that I hope to follow him, not in an inquest or denunciation of one side or the other, but by trying to make proposals which I hope will be constructive for the ending of this tragic situation. May I at the outset say a few words with reference to the appalling aeroplane outrages which are now occurring? One of the frightening things of life to-day is that a few individuals, with cheap and almost untraceable bombs, can endanger the lives of so many people. One hopes that the proposals which are being made at Heathrow by B.O.A.C. and B.E.A. and in international discussions may lead to security measures which will stop these appalling outrages.
To-day there is one hope. Yesterday the Arab Governments and Al Fatah, the leading guerrilla organisation, took steps to urge that all guerrilla groups should restrict their operations to the immediate area of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Egypt yesterday called the Arab Airlines
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Federation to meet at Beirut, with a view to taking necessary measures. One hopes that these activities on both sides may restrict these appalling disasters.
One of the difficulties of this situation is that anyone who knows Israel and the Arab countries must be torn in two directions. One has sympathies for both sides. I have been to Israel on a number of occasions, and have enjoyed the friendship of Mrs. Meier, the Prime Minister. I have led an All-Party Parliamentary delegation to Jordan. One cannot help but be deeply moved, not only by the creative devotion of the people of Israel to the State, but by the seemingly amazing miracle of the way that they have converted deserts into towns and farmlands. As a democratic Socialist, I returned home feeling that Israel had advanced more towards democratic socialism than any country I know, particularly by reason of the constructive work done by her trade union organisation, Histradurth. Therefore, no one can begin to approach this problem without having every sympathy with Israel.
On the other hand, I do not think that anyone can doubt that the Arab revolution represents historical progress. It is not merely a demand for the national independence of their countries. The deeper revolution is one which seeks to use its natural resources, and particularly its oil, to lift the whole standard of life of its people, and to end the amazing gulf between the great riches of the few (probably the most incredibly rich persons on the whole of the earth) and the wretched misery of most of the population. All of us who want to see that situation changed in the Middle East must sympathise with those in the Arab countries who are endeavouring to bring it about.
As the noble Lord, Lord Napier and Ettrick, said, Great Britain has a deep responsibility for what is happening in the Middle East. During the First World War, when we desired the support of the Arab peoples against the Ottoman Empire, and when we desired the support of the Jewish people throughout the world. we made contradictory promises. We promised Palestine as a national home for the Jews, and we promised the Arabs that when the Ottoman Empire was over-thrown they would possess those territories.

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But I agree with my noble friend that there is little object to-day in holding an inquest on the past. What we now have to do is to consider what can be done to end the present tragedy. I think we must begin with the United Nations resolution. I am proud of the fact that our Government proposed it. Among many others there were three main features: first, the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories; secondly, that the Arab nations should recognise the State of Israel; and thirdly, that the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Akaba should be regarded as international waters for the free use of all.
Not only has there been the United Nations resolution, but there have since been discussions between the Four Powers, disappointingly delayed and apparently still far from reaching agreement. There has been the dedicated service of Dr. Jarring, as the United Nations' negotiator passing from one side to another, but unhappily with little effect. So to-day, despite the increasing danger of this undeclared war—a danger not only to the peoples of the Middle East, but to the peace of the whole world— little progress has apparently been made.
I can understand the opposition which is felt both in Israel and in the Arab countries to a settlement which would be imposed by outside Powers. Quite clearly there cannot be peace and harmony in the Middle East unless both Israel and the Arab nations accept the basis of that settlement, and resentment to anything thrust upon them is inevitable. Nevertheless, I want to urge that what is happening in the Middle East cannot be regarded as only an Israeli-Arab conflict. The Great Powers are involved. They are involved not only in their interests in oil and the opening of the Suez Canal; Russia's concern is because the Middle East is a neighbouring territory and is a gateway to the Far East. The Great Powers are also involved because of the real danger that if this conflict escalates, it may lead to the world war which we all fear. Therefore, I strongly urge that the Great Powers and the United Nations have the right to take some initiative in these matters.
What I suppose we all want in the first place is a cease-fire and negotiations. The difficulty is that the Arab Governments
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refuse either a cease-fire or negotiations while their territory remains occupied, and we seem to be at a deadlock in any advance towards peace. I imagine all of us who are concerned have been giving anxious moments of thought as to what can be done. I want to make four suggestions, three which are immediate, the fourth requiring longer-term preparation.
The first deals with the proposal that has been made for an embargo on arms to both sides. It ought to be a matter of deep concern to all of us that the Israeli-Arab conflict, just as in recent years the Nigeria-Biafra conflict, is being fought with the arms of the industrial West and Soviet Russia, and that out of these tragedies, the loss of thousands of lives, armament firms are getting their orders. The difficulty about an embargo on arms in the Middle East is that there is now an imbalance of arms not only in quantity but in character, and therefore a general embargo would be regarded as unfair to one side or the other. My proposal is that the suggestion should be made to the Security Council of the United Nations that there should be an embargo on arms to all in the Middle East who decline to accept the resolution which the United Nations Security Council itself has adopted. That proposal seems to me to be logical, to have principle behind it, and to be a way not only to bring about an embargo but also to bring about a genuine acceptance of the United Nations resolution.
My second proposal follows what the noble Lord has said regarding the absolute necessity of giving these nations, particularly Israel, a sense of the security of their frontiers. The noble Lord suggested that Europe should give this guarantee. I am not opposed to that—in a sense I think the more guarantees the better—but one must remember that the Powers most deeply involved are the United States of America and Soviet Russia. There have already been guarantees—there is the Tripartite Treaty—but I want to support what the noble Lord has said: that at this moment it is tremendously important that paper guarantees of the past should be made present assertions and that there should be urgent sincerity behind them.
Again I should like to suggest that our Government should raise in the Security

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Council the proposal that a new binding guarantee of frontiers should be given by the Security Council of the United Nations, and should accompany that by the proposal for a United Nations peace-keeping force in neutralised regions on the frontiers to keep the two sides apart. Anyone who has been to Israel can understand the fear of its people about present frontiers. There is the Golan Heights; I have been in a kibbutz just below those Heights where the children have to sleep every night underground for fear of shelling. Is not the alternative a peace-keeping force, to be there on the Golan Heights and separating Israel from the Arab forces?
THE EARL OF ARRAN: My Lords, may I just amplify what the noble Lord is saying? Is it not also a fact that it was possible to lob a hand grenade down from the Golan Heights into the Israeli kibbutz or village? Indeed, that has been going on for twenty years and they have known no safety during that time. Are those not the facts?
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I thank the noble Earl. He has supported what I am urging, because I am aware of that as well. I have been there, and I have seen it. There is a second issue here. One of the great problems is Jerusalem, which the Israelis have occupied and which they show every sign of continuing to occupy. Old Jerusalem is the spiritual capital of three historic religions. Strangely, they are all inheritors of the common father, Abraham. It might be possible to find a solution if a United Nations presence were to stay in the Old Jerusalem City in order to maintain its catholic—I use the term in its broad sense—character.
My third proposal—and I will be brief about it—concerns the terrible problem of the refugees. One has been in those refugee camps. To think that they have been there—is it for 18 or 20 years?— with the United Nations pouring out its funds for their maintenance! It is utterly and absolutely useless. I suggest that in this situation there should be a United Nations plan for the settlement of the refugees. Many of them are in the territories occupied by Israel, and if the withdrawal of the Israeli forces were carried out their re-settlement would be comparatively easy. Others date much further back. My own experience is that the
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younger refugees are increasingly leaving those camps and going to work in Kuwait and Iraq; that largely it is the older people who remain. But if you asked the older people whether they would prefer compensation and ending their lives in the more congenial atmosphere of Arab countries, I believe that the majority of them would today accept. I am urging that there should be a United Nations plan for this.
Lastly, my Lords—and this is the bigger, longer-term and rather more fundamental proposal which I want to make —I suggest that the United Nations should summon a Geneva Conference, similar to the Geneva Conference which was held in 1954 on Indo-China. Those of us who are a little older can remember that Geneva Conference and the hope for peace it created. I think one can say today that if America at that Conference had accepted its agreements, as it does now, the Vietnam war need never have occurred. I should like to see the United Nations calling to Geneva representatives of all the Governments—and there are many—who are involved, all the Powers. It might be under the joint chairmanship—and this would be a wonderful gesture—of America and the Soviet Union, just as the 1954 Conference was under the joint chairmanship of a British representative and a Russian representative. The Israeli and Arab Governments should be invited. Perhaps they would begin by refusing to meet; if so, we might adopt the Rhodes method— the method which is so familiar in trade union and employer discussions—where they would meet separately at first in two rooms, with negotiators taking messages from one to another, and perhaps finally being prepared to meet together to reach a solution of their problems.
I have tried to speak in a positive and constructive way. I believe that great initiatives are required if this undeclared war is not to escalate into a disaster, not merely to the Middle East but to the peace of the whole world. I hope the suggestions that I have made with that constructive purpose may be seriously considered by Her Majesty's Government.
4.23 p.m.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, my noble friend Lord Napier and Ettrick is younger than most of us, and I think his mind is not affected, as the minds of

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some older people are, by the sub-conscious assumption that Britain is somehow or other responsible for the behaviour or misbehaviour of the peoples of Africa and Asia and the Middle East. British Imperialism, which is now a rather nasty term of abuse, has given to many of these peoples half a century or more of peace and progress and education in the arts of civilised government, which some of them have already forgotten. But they are now their own masters.
Fifty years ago the League of Nations entrusted Britain with the task of governing Palestine and making a home there for the Jews. About fifteen years later, Malcolm Macdonald, who was then Colonial Secretary and who still continues to give devoted service to the peoples of our former Colonies, took the very courageous step of substantially increasing the annual quota of Jews who were admitted to Palestine, because of the cruel persecution which had been begun in Germany by Hitler. This greatly annoyed the Arabs, who then started their first campaign of violence and murder inside, but not outside, Palestine, and a strong British force had to be sent there for two or three years to keep order.
But our policy always was to admit as many Jews as could be absorbed by the economic capacity of the country, and this policy was successful, because by their hard work and their skill the Jews tremendously increased the productive capacity of Palestine. It was a wonderful sight to fly over Palestine, as I did in 1943, and to look down from a height of 20,000 feet at all those Jewish settlements looking like green islands of fertility in a brown sea of barren desert.
By the end of the war I think we had settled something less than half a million Jews in this very small country. But then, alas it was the turn of the Jews to begin a campaign of violence and murder. The crimes of the Stern gang were just as hideously atrocious as the crimes of the Arab terrorists which have horrified us so much during the last week. The brutal murder of the late Lord Moyne in Cairo—a man who had never been anti-Jewish in any way— simply because he happened to be the British Resident Minister there; the
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sending through the British Post Office of small parcels which exploded and killed their recipients when they were opened; and the continual kidnapping and cruel murder of British soldiers in Palestine were all perpetrated because we were trying to be fair both to the Jewish immigrants and to the indigenous Arab natives of Palestine. In return we got nothing but abuse from every side, including the United Nations and the United States.
Some of your Lordships may remember the exasperated, almost despairing, cry of Ernest Bevin, who said that he could not solve the Palestine problem if the Americans insisted on making it a political issue in what he called their local elections. The Labour Government, with the acquiescence of the Opposition, decided that we just could not go on having our soldiers murdered in the performance of an international duty in which nobody would support us and everybody condemned us. Mr. Gromyko, who was at that time the Russian representative at the United Nations in New York, was one of the strongest advocates on behalf of his Government of admitting a much greater number of Jews and establishing the State of Israel. I hope that is a point which the Foreign Office will always remember, because it is useful now to remind the Russians of it on every suitable occasion.
So we then surrendered our Mandate to the United Nations—and, my God, what a mess they made of it! Within a few months or weeks half a million Arabs voluntarily quitted the country. They were not forced refugees: they were voluntary emigrants who sat on the frontier confidently expecting that when the Jews were extinguished they would then all be able to go back and possess themselves of the Jewish property. At the same time, Israel was invaded by vastly superior numbers of Arabs, who were, however, severely "clobbered" by the tiny Jewish armed forces, except in Jordan, where the Arab Legion, which had been trained originally by British officers, successfully occupied half the City of Jerusalem and the whole of the Province which is now called the West Bank. These things the United Nations could do nothing, or did nothing, to prevent; and when they sent a fine Swedish public servant, Count Bernadotte,

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on a mission of peace to Palestine, he was assassinated by the Stern Gang, who openly exulted in their deed.
In a few years it became evident to everybody, I think, except possibly the United Nations Secretariat, that Russia, in spite of her former advocacy of the State of Israel, was now determined to establish her own domination of the Middle East by supplying the militant Arab nationalists with enough powerful modem military equipment to exterminate this little Jewish community, which they could not do without Russian help. When Nasser seized the Canal in 1956 he did not do it for any economic reason; he did it as a preliminary to his invasion of Palestine. But he had timed that invasion to take place at the beginning of 1957, and the Jews anticipated him by two or three months.
I happened at that moment to be on a two-months speaking tour in Canada and the United States, and as soon as the fighting began they did not want to hear any other subject except that, and I suppose that I made 40 or 50 speeches and broadcasts on the Suez crisis while it was going on. It was a revelation to find that no one of the ordinary public in Canada or in the United States had the faintest idea about the massive Russian military help which had been supplied, and which had indeed made possible this attempt by Egypt to destroy Israel. They knew nothing about it at all. My own view, which was not of very great importance, was that Britain and France were right in taking the course they did, if only they had finished it. I think that if they had had the guts to carry on American public opinion, which always admires success, would have come round; and we should then, I think, have been in a position to do what my noble friend Lord Napier has just suggested that we should do: give an effective guarantee of future peace by European Powers.
But, my Lords, we decided to yield to American pressure; and the Israelis were persuaded to withdraw by the promise—which of course was broken— that their ships would be allowed to use the Canal, and that a United Nations force would be stationed with the purpose of preventing an act of aggression from either side. This force, my Lords, sat at ease for nearly ten years, while Arab nationalism grew in intensity, while the
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moderate régime of Iraq was overthrown and while Russia patiently and methodically rebuilt the armed strength of Egypt and Syria with even more modern, more powerful and more sophisticated weapons than had been supplied before. Then, in 1967, when Egypt and Syria mobilised their forces and advanced towards the frontiers of Israel, this United Nations force vanished into thin air and has never been heard of since.
My Lords, I agree with my noble friend and with the noble Lord opposite —we all agree—that this armed confrontation is a very grave danger to the peace of the world. I wish it would come to an end. But it is very difficult when your wishes are in conflict with your intelligence. I am bound to say, if one is to be frank, that I do not believe this dangerous confrontation will end quickly or soon. I think it may last a long time, because I cannot see the necessary conditions for its ending being fulfilled. So far as I can see, there is no sign that Russia has changed her former policy (it is rather an "old hat" policy now; it has been going at least since 1953) of trying to gain control over the Middle East by whipping up Arab nationalists and getting their enthusiastic support and admiration because the Russians have helped them to get rid of the Jews, whom the Arabs hate. That is still, to all appearances, Russian policy.
As for the Americans, I think that the United States would be willing to compromise on almost anything except the existence of Israel, which I think the United States must try to protect; and since the destruction of Israel, the removal of Israel, is still the cardinal aim, I am afraid, of Russian policy and of the Arab nationalists, it is very difficult to see how a compromise can be arrived at.
As for the Israelis, my Lords, whether we sympathise with them or whether we do not, whether we like them or whether we do not, let us try to put ourselves in their place and imagine what is bound to happen. They are not fighting for some economic gain or some territorial gain: they are fighting simply for their lives. It is a matter of life or death; and when a community is threatened with death it is bound to fight, because if it does fight it has nothing more to lose than if it does not. From the point of view of the Israelis, what does it matter

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to them whether they are destroyed by the Russians or by the Arabs? They have got to fight, anyhow: they have got to defy both if they are going to live.
It is not at all difficult to see that if Israel can be defended with the military frontiers of Suez and the River Jordan the cost is far less, the effort is far less and the chances of success are far greater than if Israel had to defend the indefensible frontiers of the present State of Israel. Whatever we should like to happen, it is not realistic to expect that Israel will agree to withdraw unless she can be given guarantees which are really reliable, and of a totally different character from those which she has ever had before. To ask Israel to withdraw without giving such guarantees, however much good will you have and however much good will they have, is just not realistic. It is like expecting to be given ice-cream in hell. It is just "not on".
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I hope the noble Earl will forgive my interrupting at this stage. Does he really think that the kind of speech he is delivering is making a contribution towards peace in the Middle East? Both the noble Lord who asked the Question and myself refrained from merely supporting one side or the other because we are concerned about peace. What contribution has the noble Earl to make towards peace?
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, I am not supporting one side or the other. I was just as antagonistic towards the Jews at the time of the assassinations which they committed as I am now antagonistic towards the Arab terrorists. I am trying to be realistic and to see how we can really get peace instead of just indulging in wishful thinking which is not based on the facts of the situation. Since the noble Lord has interrupted me, if I may respectfully say so, although I am very fond of the noble Lord, this fault, wishful thinking, is one to which he is specially prone.
My noble friend Lord Napier and Ettrick suggested a guarantee which he felt to be more reliable than those which Israel has previously enjoyed, a guarantee by the European Powers under Section 52 of the United Nations Charter. I think that this is an idea which must be considered favourably and followed up; but I am sure that my noble friend is
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not really expecting the noble Lord who is to reply for the Government to say now that he will do what he was asked to do and will take an active initiative in trying to do this—because this is a very hot subject and one in which the Foreign Office is probably very much afraid of burning its fingers. It would not help the situation if the noble Lord who is to reply for the Government were to say that he would like to do a whole lot of things which might be totally unacceptable not only to Nasser and to Mrs. Meier, but also perhaps to President Nixon and to Mr. Kosygin—and also to M. Pompidou. It would not really produce any fruitful results. All that I would expect the noble Lord to say in reply to this Question—and I may of course be wrong—is that the Government are going to pursue Four-Power talks under the November resolution of the United Nations. I would not expect him to go any further than that.
As for the question of whether this is done by separate powers under Section 52 or not, I have said, I think rightly, that up till now the United Nations has not been very successful in this matter. In fact, it may be argued that it has been worse than useless; because the United Nations is meant to be effectual in keeping peace but if it has not the ability to do so then, when it tries and fails, it disappoints and disillusions people. But the United Nations is what the sum total of its members is, and it does not follow that because the United Nations has not yet had the power to succed in this kind of problem that it will never have the power to do so in the future.
The position at the United Nations is that you have one great free Power which is stronger than all the other free Powers put together and one great Communist Power. If you ever had not only one free Power, the United States, but also a great Western European group of Powers economically united, whose economic power was equal to or even greater than that of the United States, then the character of the United Nations in my belief would be completely altered. It might be able to do all kinds of things which it has not the power to do now. The realisation of this European community—and I am not going to talk about it now, for it is not the right occasion—we hope has not been destroyed by

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General de Gaulle; but it has certainly been delayed by his not altogether un-successful effort to turn the Community into a kind of inward-looking, exclusive, highly protectionist, rich man's club. That is the kind of institution which is of no value whatsoever to the peace of the world.
I shall be corrected if I am wrong, but I think that I am right in saying that France has never paid any subscription to UNRWA. The only subscribers are the United States who pay a lot and ourselves who pay less. But if the European Economic Community could become something different, something which we all want it to be, it would then be possible not only to give stronger guarantees of peace in the sense of promises to resist aggression (which is the negative side of it) but also to give economic help on a much vaster scale, which in my submission is a very much more effective way of keeping peace. The prospect of fruitful economic co-operation is often much more effective from the point of view of peace than the mere negative threat of counter-military action.
It has I think been established that it is economically possible to irrigate great areas of the desert in the Sinai and in other parts of the Middle East which would provide homes and wealth not only for the few hundred thousand Arab refugees but for vast numbers of new entrants as well. This is a project which would have to be undertaken through the International Bank. The huge capital would have to be raised through the International Bank and through the United Nations. America could not afford to do it all herself. It could be economically possible if it were financed through the International Bank both by the United States and by an economically powerful Western European Community.
My Lords, the right reverend Prelate who is about to follow me will remember that Esau and Jacob were for a long time bitter enemies—and with very good reason, because Jacob had taken from Esau, by methods not altogether creditable, a number of things which Esau valued. He had to flee for more than twenty years to the country where he married, and when he came back he was in great terror that Esau who was advancing with a force of 400 armed
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men was going to destroy him and his followers. But when Esau saw his brother he alighted and ran to embrace his brother, and kissed him, and gave back the large gifts of livestock which Jacob had presented to him in order to appease him, and the two brothers went home and lived in peace and friendship together. I am sure that we all hope that one day the descendants of both Jacob and Esau will follow the example of their progenitors.
4.50 p.m.
THE LORD BISHOP OF CHICHESTER: My Lords, we are treading on well-worn ground in our debate this afternoon and from these Benches I wish only briefly, before the Minister replies, to underline two or three of the points which have been raised or touched upon. Of course I wish to support the noble Lord, Lord Napier and Ettrick, in his Question; I am very glad that he raised it. With him and others present, I share the sense at times almost of despair at seeing the contestants forced by their own actions into more and more impossible positions, with the nations outside standing by helpless to intervene or, when they do intervene, only aggravating the situation.
The noble Lord, Lord Brockway, has said that there are particular concerns beyond the political and the diplomatic issues that are raised and which., speaking for the Churches, I must express. As he has reminded us, Jerusalem is the centre of three great religions stemming in part from the same source. It is the meeting point of at least three cultures, too; and the working out of some co-existence between them to-day, whether religiously or socially, is a long-term process in which many people must take part. The Anglican Archbishop in Jerusalem is in the almost unique position of having a free entry into almost all the countries of the Middle East and therefore has many opportunities to speak with the leading people of those countries. When he was in this country recently he gave an address in Westminster Abbey during which he picked on certain aspects of hope in the situation. He referred to indications that thoughtful and prominent people in Israel and in the Arab countries were asking themselves seriously the question of how ultimately they would come to live together; how they would relate

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their cultures and religions and ways of life, recognising that this was an essential ingredient in the peace of the Middle East. Some people are thinking about this now amid the clash of arms, but in a sense it is only the clash of arms that we see.
If I may carry the Old Testament story a little further than did the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, Noah in his beleaguered Ark (whoever you prefer Noah to be in this instance) despatched not only the raven—or shall we call it the hawk?— but also the dove into the landscape round about. It may be very difficult for those officially in power to despatch doves rather than ravens or hawks; nevertheless, I hope that the Minister will tell us whether there are any signs from which encouragement can be given to those who are responsible—signs that people are beginning to speak together; or that there are groups that may be stimulated in this far bigger issue of trying to blend different cultures and ways in this one part of Europe. I have no doubt that there are many ways in which he could remind us in the Churches and elsewhere that we should be busy on this matter too.
I would ask whether, when we speak of their coming to terms together in peace, and drawing up a treaty, we are not at the moment almost asking for what is psychologically impossible. It is not only the past history which has been referred to, the dangers under which members of both Arab and Israeli communities have lived and will remember; it is also the more recent history. It is the tragedy of acts of reprisal that although each one is intended to level the score, in fact it inevitably provokes another act. The recurrence and the extension of these can breed nothing but resentment, anger and distrust, and also build up, or conjure up, violent spirits which cannot very easily be controlled.
In this kind of situation are we expecting too much in thinking that the sides can, as it were, confront one another round the peace table, here and now? Are there not prior questions? It may well be, as the noble Earl has reminded us, that one of the things that must be done is to make peace seem desirable by the economic possibilities that might ensue; but it is still more important to
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make peace seem possible. Sometimes we speak as if we take this for granted. I was struck by an address given by the Minister of State, Mr. William Rodgers, last December on the question of the Middle East. He spoke of the three principles on which talks were taking place with the Soviet Union; three principles which will be familiar to us. He enunciated them as, first, that there should be a binding commitment by Israel and the United Arab Republic to peace with one another; secondly, that the detailed provision of peace relating to security et cetera should be worked out between the parties, and thirdly, that in that context there should be a withdrawal of forces.
It is quite true that any terms of peace or security must, in a sense, be worked out and commend themselves to the parties concerned rather than be foisted upon them by well-meaning Governments outside; and yet, my Lords, does that come first? The noble Lord who pro-pounded this Question stressed, as others have done since, this basic thing: that inevitably there will be, not a peace treaty to which all can conform at once, but at the best a long period of growing together, of peaceful co-existence; and the vital thing in this is the element of security. Can we expect them to work out, as Mr. Rodgers indicated, a form of security congenial to themselves?
No doubt as the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, said, and as others have said, security here, or in any part of the world, might be achieved for the time being by the concurrence of the United States and Soviet Russia. They could arrange between them to secure any kind of cessation of hostilities, if they wanted to. But we recognise that in this particular case each of them is in some way too much identified with one side or the other; and equally, perhaps their own relationships with one another are so unstable as not to encourage others to think that they could provide any kind of permanent guarantee by themselves. Surely, my Lords, something is needed in these peace-keeping problems between this kind of guarantee by two major super-Powers and the very doubtful kind of assurance which may be given at present through the United Nations. It must be, not an assurance but a firm and visible guarantee.

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Obviously, my Lords, it is not for me to speak from these Benches of the political or the strategic possibilities of a European guarantee; but some way in which middle Powers can co-operate in peace-keeping seems to be more desirable from here than from anywhere else in the world. If one of our contentions with Europe has been that if we were to go into Europe—to use the common phrase—it would be in the hope that Europe might be encouraged not to look inwardly to itself but outwardly upon the world, here would be a very particular way in which we should have a right to say to our neighbours in Europe, "Here on your doorstep is a responsibility which the nations of Europe must share". And if that guarantee could be shared but by some of the countries in Eastern Europe also, so much the better.
Finally, my Lords, may I endorse what is perhaps taken for granted in this issue? —that is, this question of the refugees that the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, has raised. It is obvious in one way that the problem of the refugees will be solved, if it is solved at all, only after the cessation of hostilities; after some settlement has been made. Indeed, what happens to the refugees would play a part in that settlement. Yet the problem cannot be left on one side until that point, partly, of course, because many of the refugees are not new refugees. There is still the unresolved question of the refugees in the Gaza Strip and in the Jordan Valley, to whom, after two wars, we ought to have given much more thought than we have done. They will be there, whatever happens regarding restoration to those whom the recent fighting has dispossessed. The refugees constitute both a stimulus and a source of recruitment to the guerrillas, and so long as their problem remains untackled in any serious way, then it will remain as an aggravating feature of the present situation and will postpone the possibilities of a settlement. Therefore there is much to be said for an approach to the international community and for getting it to recognise that this is our problem, that we must begin to study it and find some answer to it before a settlement is reached, rather than afterwards. I hope that the Minister can give us some assurance that this is happening.
5.0 p.m.
BARONESS ELLIOT OF HARWOOD: My Lords, I do not intend to speak for more than a few moments but I feel that I must take part in the debate on the Question put down by my noble friend Lord Napier and Ettrick, because within the last month I was in Israel and visited Jerusalem, Haifa and other places. I cannot add much to what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, and by my noble friend Lord Dundee, but I may say that I came back with the very clear impression that everybody in Israel wants peace, and that anything they can do to get peace they would be prepared to do. They abhor these guerrilla war tactics, as we all do.
As my noble friend Lord Dundee has said, simply and straightforwardly, being one small nation surrounded by stronger nations Israel naturally realises that they have to survive by their own strong arm or they will not survive at all. There is no compromise for them. They have to preserve the Slate of Israel or the avowed policy of Nasser and the Arab States to eliminate Israel will take effect. That is the situation in which they find themselves. On the other hand, from the highest in the land, from the Prime Minister downwards, the Israelis have said that they are prepared to talk peace and to negotiate with the Arabs. They have offered to meet the Arabs on any location where the Jordanians, King Hussein or Nasser are prepared to meet them. So far that offer has received only a straight negative: they are not prepared to meet and negotiate. So the Security Council and the Great Powers have been trying to bring about some sort of arrangement by which they could intervene in this dispute, to see whether they could produce a policy which they could persuade both sides to follow. I am afraid that this is a fruitless task. I do not think that Israel, or the Arabs either, will accept negotiations which are being carried on, so to speak, over their heads, in which they themselves are not taking part. If they were to be invited to take part, I am clear that they would be prepared to negotiate frontiers and other things.
I never was very enthusiastic about the famous resolution which the Government supported in the United Nations. I agree that the parts of the resolution which require recognition of Israel as a State

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and the freeing of the Suez Canal are excellent and we would support these, but one can see that withdrawal of Israel from all occupied territories before any negotiations begin is a perfectly impossible proposal. This will not happen. I am speaking only from my impression. There are many parts of the territories now part of Israel on which they are prepared to negotiate. I do not think that they will go back to the exact frontiers which existed before the 1967 war. I think that they were never more than the armistice lines which happen to be there when the fighting stopped and were not negotiated frontiers at all. I think that it would be most unwise to suggest that the 1967 frontiers should again be established, because it would lead to the same impossible situations which existed in many parts between 1948 and 1967, of villages cut in half and so on. Anybody who knows the geography of the area knows how unsatisfactory those frontiers were.
On the other hand, it is perfectly fair to say that the present frontiers are also not satisfactory. They are too large. But I think that it would be possible to negotiate the frontiers in a straight confrontation between Israel and the Arab States, whereas I do not think that Israel will withdraw from them before any negotiations take place. As my noble friend Lord Dundee said, let us be practical in this and not indulge in wishful thinking. If Israel could feel that there was some security for a generous gesture —and after all they are the most generous people in the world—I feel that something might come of this.
It is extraordinary how conditions vary in this small country. I am particularly interested in agriculture and in this field, as the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, has said, there has been a miracle. Less than a month ago I was taken round some of the agricultural settlements, not on the West Bank where I have been many times, but in the North. It is an area entirely inhabited by Arabs and I saw what the Arab fanners were doing in developing this astonishing production of early fruits, strawberries and the like, which has become so popular and so lucrative. I had lunch with two Arab fanners and two Israeli experts from the Ministry of Agriculture on the formers' own verandah on a lovely hot day. They
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could not have been more friendly to-wards everybody. The Arab farmers are making a great deal of money, having learned these high skills which they did not have before. I give this illustration to show that where there are interests in common there can be great friendship.
I saw on the same day, for instance, an Israeli doctor working in an Arab health centre, with nobody but Arab nurses to help him. It was an ordinary health clinic for children, nursing mothers and so on. It was the same type of clinic that we have in any of our towns, and this doctor had been there for eight years. All his patients were Arabs, and the health centre appeared to be working marvellously. Yet it was an Israeli doctor who was the key to that clinic. This introduction of common interests between the Arabs and the Jews brings them together. This is encouraging. If only those common interests could triumph over the political difficulties— but perhaps this is wishful thinking; and I say this although I have said that we must not have wishful thinking—then there is something there which could lead to a more satisfactory state of affairs if the common interests of the people were encouraged whether in industry, agriculture, health and welfare or in anything else. Those are the matters which bring about co-operation between the two races. So I strongly urge Her Majesty's Government to take a realistic view of this situation; to pursue, as I am sure they are prepared to pursue, every possible method of bringing these two very difficult peoples together, and to realise that it is no good calling on the United Nations negotiators unless they are prepared to go direct to the people concerned.
I was interested in what the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, said about the negotiations which might be carried on by the Israelis and the Arabs all in one place, with the Israelis in one part of the building and the Arabs in another. Negotiators would get together, and that would be a beginning. I am sure that negotiations must take place on the ground between the two countries, and not by the super-Powers talking over their heads, because nothing will come of that at all, and it is really just beating the air. Nevertheless, I beg Her Majesty's Government to continue, because the situation is so acute and difficult that

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anything they can do to try to get a détente everybody would support most heartily.
5.12 p.m.
LORD TREVELYAN: My Lords, I should like to add a very few words just on the one aspect of how we progress towards a settlement. I do not propose to enter into a detailed discussion on the constituent parts of a possible settlement, since I do not think we can get very far in your Lordships' House with a debate in this way. It is quite clear that the various proposals which have been made by the noble Lord, Lord Napier, and other noble Lords, will have to be considered in due course by Her Majesty's Government, and the other Governments concerned.
However difficult it may be to reach a settlement, I believe that it is not wholly impossible to reach one within the frame-work of the United Nations resolution of November 22, 1967. Whatever various people may think of that resolution, we shall not get another one, and we had better hang on to it. What we must hope is that it will not be merely a paper resolution, like all the other United Nations resolutions on Palestine. The settlement must clearly be under the auspices of the United Nations, with the support of the Four Powers. It becomes more difficult every day to reach a settlement, and delay clearly increases the dangers of the situation.
The Four-Power discussions appear to the outsider to be making no progress, and it seems that Dr. Jarring has now gone back to Moscow because he has not been able to get in New York a brief on which he thinks he could operate in the Middle East. It is clear that any negotiations that are going to produce any practical result must be with the participation in some way of the parties concerned. I strongly agree with the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, that great initiatives are now necessary, whether in the form that he suggested or in another suitable form. I believe that a settlement is possible because I believe that a settlement is in the real interests of both Arabs and Israelis.
I should therefore like to ask Her Majesty's Government, first, what proposals they have to convert the present Four-Power discussions into real nego-
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tiations with the participation of the parties concerned. Secondly, it is noticeable that plans have been produced by the United States, the Soviet Union and France, but not by Her Majesty's Government. I should like to know whether Her Majesty's Government intend to propose a plan of their own, or whether they see their role as one of conciliation between the other parties.
5.16 p.m.
LORD WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, I am personally very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Napier, for introducing this Question this afternoon, because I feel that in all the matters with which we are concerned, either in your Lordships' House or in the country as a whole, there is nothing at this moment more important than peace in the Middle East. I go all the way with my noble friend Lord Brock-way in what he has said, and also—if I may call her my noble friend—my noble friend Lady Elliot, who I think made a most realistic speech this afternoon. If the noble Baroness will allow me to say so, she has made a very good appraisal of the situation.
I, too, have been in Israel, both before the Six-Day War and after it. I have seen what has actually taken place in that country within a very short time of the end of the Six-Day War. I would say to Her Majesty's Government that we cannot afford to sit on the fence and not put our leg down on one side or the other, because there comes a time when we have to identify ourselves with what we believe to be right. I have had an opportunity of discussing the situation at some length on more than one occasion with a number of Israeli Ministers. I cannot say what they are prepared to do, but I know that the problem is not nearly so difficult as many of us believe. I think the noble Baroness was quite right when she implied, even if she did not say so, that if only the Arabs would have the good sense to sit down with the Israelis they could get virtually all they want. Perhaps I have gone a wee bit too far, for they will not get the Golan Heights. It may well be that there will have to be some arrangement with regard to security in Jordan, and perhaps on the Suez side.
I, too, have been in kibbutzi in Israel. I have been in the kibbutz where, I think one noble Lord said, a grenade could be

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thrown from the Golan Heights into the kibbutz where the occupants, including the children, as a normal part of their existence had to sleep in what we call air raid shelters. I would remind Her Majesty's Government that the State of Israel is the only democratic State that I know of that exists in the Middle East at the present time; the only State that approximates to our way of life; the only State that has the same kind of responsibility for the welfare of people as we pride ourselves on having in this country.
My noble friend Lord Brockway referred to the imbalance of arms, which at the present moment is running very much in favour of the Arabs. We have to face the fact that the military balance in the Middle East is being upset. To what extent we have contributed to that situation I do not know, but I know that French arms sent to Libya are not helping the situation. We have also to face the fact that Libya is becoming rather more active than passive in her support of those who are against Israel. I would say to Her Majesty's Government that we have to think very seriously as to where our friends are to be found; that when it comes to selling Chieftain tanks and aeroplanes we must take into account this balance of power because —I think my noble friend Lord Chalfont will agree—it has been the policy of this Government to preserve the balance of power in the Middle East, which at the present moment is threatened.
It is in pursuance of this policy that this Government some time ago considered the sale of Chieftain tanks to Israel. When it comes to the sale of arms, I would beg the Government to think very carefully in the future where those arms are going and how ultimately they are going to be used. I am the first to recognise that the supply of arms cannot be an alternative to peace. But I would remind your Lordships that the State of Israel is in much the same position to-day as this country was in in 1940. We really cannot blame her for taking the action that she is taking at the present moment. Perhaps there is no need for me to remind your Lordships that it was Cairo that broke the cease-fire.
Of course, anybody who has been to the State of Israel comes away with a
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tremendous admiration for what has been done there. The noble Baroness has seen this more recently than I have—wheat growing out of sand; a society which they have created in about two decades. It is a kind of society of which each one of us would be proud.
We must face the fact—I want to repeat what the noble Baroness has said— that in the last analysis the Israeli Government will not tolerate a peace imposed from outside. They want recognition by the Arabs not only that they have the right to exist but that they have the right to live, and that the State of Israel is in fact in being. Until the Arabs agree to meet the Israelis around the table—and, as the noble Baroness said, the Israeli Ministers are prepared to go anywhere at any time to such a conference—we are living in a fool's paradise if we think that peace can be imposed upon the Israelis by the Four Powers. I do not think they can hope to achieve anything at all. I subscribe to what the noble Lord, Lord Trevelyan, said a moment or two ago. I should like to see the United Nations take this matter out of the hands of the Four Powers, in the sense that it should assume the responsibility of trying to get the Arabs and the Israelis seated together at a table. I am convinced in my own mind, as a result of the conversations I have had, that if this could be done peace would be very easily effected.
5.25 p.m.
LORD HANKEY: My Lords, I apologise for prolonging this debate, but having had some connection with the Middle East I should like to say a few words in support of my noble friend Lord Trevelyan. It is important that something should now be done to try to get a settlement of some kind in this dispute. It is possible to arrange a settlement of a war like this only when neither one side nor the other is on top, because if one side thinks that it is winning it naturally will not make peace. This is the kind of stalemate at present in which I should have thought the wheels of diplomacy might reasonably operate.
One or two considerations have caused me great concern. As I understand it, there is a demand that, before they begin to negotiate, the Jews should evacuate the territories which they have occupied.

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I warmly agree with what has been said in this debate: it is quite absurd to expect the Jews to agree to that, because it is precisely the evacuation of those territories that is one of the prices, and the main price, which they are going to pay to get peace. Therefore to press that demand means that any diplomatic initiatives which are taken in this sense are bound to be futile; they simply cannot succeed.
There is another very good reason why it is not a very sensible thing to do. The subversive forces upon which the Arabs rely for carrying on the war naturally have to be kept at arm's length by the Israelis, and they need a kind of glacis round the inner part of their territory, a kind of outer territory within which they can try to stop these people from getting in and killing their people. It is not very reasonable to ask the Israelis to give up that territory until it is certain that the subversive forces will not continue to cross the territory. Quite frankly, this is not a very easy demand to make, because it is quite clear that the Arab countries do not find it easy to control those forces. And, even if they make peace, those forces may not consider themselves to be bound. So this matter has to be looked at rather carefully.
I believe that the great danger of the present situation is that the Great Powers —or shall I say the very Great Powers? —will sooner or later find themselves obliged to take more and more of a hand. I believe that this is the principal danger. This is a situation which could spark off the world war that we all want to avoid. We cannot any longer continue to let this situation run, in the hope that it can be safely isolated.
One of the matters which give me cause to reflect about this is the continued closure of the Suez Canal. The Canal is really the umbilical cord of Europe. It is our back door. It is a very important line of communication. It may be that oil now comes round the Cape in larger ships than can go through the Canal, but a great deal of other trade needs to come to and fro. This closure is extremely bad for Great Britain, extremely bad for Europe. It is essential that the Canal should be opened, and this means that we do not want the Israelis to be sitting there. On the other hand, that does not mean that
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we must expect them to go right out of these territories before the negotiations start. There was great force in some remarks and hints which the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, made on the subject of that area.
Therefore, my Lords, I should have thought there was a great deal to be said for the course which the noble Lord, Lord Trevelyan, advocated, which is that we should try by any manner of means to get negotiations started; and obviously it has to be under the aegis of the United Nations. If we do not, then we have to look out for further trouble.
Another reason for thinking that the situation may not continue to be as favourable as it is now is that, for reasons of their own and in their own wisdom, the Government have said that they propose in due course to withdraw British forces from the Persian Gulf. This will create a power vacuum East of the area in question, and it is very liable to react on the power structure in this vital area of the world which is of such great importance to the new Europe.
5.29 p.m.
LORD BROCK: My Lords, I do not wish to prolong this debate, but I should like to add another example to those given by the noble Baroness, Lady Elliot of Harwood, of the ways in which these two opponents can be brought together within a common interest. In the Swiss air disaster last Saturday one of the victims was Professor Norvinsky, a very successful and distinguished cardiac surgeon from Dasa Hospital in Jerusalem. The week before he left he came and saw me, and he told me, among other things, of the way in which so many Arabs come over from the East to Jerusalem to avail themselves of those improved techniques of surgery which are not available to them in the Arab countries. He said that those who come for treatment include infiltrators, and they are all kindly treated and receive excellent attention. In addition, he said, they include wealthy patients who are quite able to go to Europe or America but who prefer to avail themselves of the excellent facilities that are available in Jerusalem itself. He mentioned eight separate cases of this sort which he had treated. I am sure that this is another fruitful example of the way in which the two opposing races can be brought

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together in a common utilitarian and humanitarian interest.
5.31 p.m.
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, like other noble Lords I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Napier and Ettrick, for initiating this short but extremely valuable debate. He, like other noble Lords, emphasised the gravity of the situation and the dangers which are inherent in it, and I can only say that Her Majesty's Government are fully alive to those dangers. It is true that this is an area not only in which people are suffering to-day but in which they are likely to suffer more in the future unless we can do something to alleviate their suffering, and it is a situation which, as we have heard, is now bringing suffering to people outside the area.
The short intervention of the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, is perhaps one of the most positive and constructive that I have heard him make in any of his speeches in your Lordships' House. He made a number of points which I think are constructive enough to merit a direct and, I hope, constructive answer from Her Majesty's Government. The noble Lord mentioned first of all the question of arms limitation. That is, of course, an extremely difficult area of negotiations. We in the British Government have repeatedly declared our willingness to work for a general agreement on the limitation of arms supplied to the area, even in advance of a political settlement; and that remains our position. I know of my noble friend's great interest in this problem. It is, as he knows, not an easy problem, but, as I have said, we are willing to work for a general limitation of arms supplies.
In the meantime—and this perhaps refers more to some of the remarks made by my noble friend Lord Wells-Pestell than to those made by the noble Lord, Lord Brockway—reference was made to the supplies that were going to certain countries in the Middle East, and I can only say that it is our policy to judge on its merits any application from any country for military equipment. But there are certain considerations which we always take into account, one of which is, I can assure the noble Lord, the military balance in the Middle East. It is not our intention—it never has been
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and it is not now, I can assure him— to see any country in the Middle East at such a disadvantage that an aggressor might be tempted to act against it.
On the question of Jerusalem, which my noble friend also mentioned, as he is aware, the Security Council resolution of November, 1967, did not in fact mention Jerusalem, but it is generally agreed, both among the four Powers and by the parties to the conflict in the Middle East, that a political settlement would have to establish a permanent regime for Jerusalem. As my noble friend has said, it would have to be a régime that would cater for the rights not only of the two States—in this case Israel and Jordan— but also the three religions of Christianity, Islam and Judaism.
My noble friend referred to the subject of refugees, and so did the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chichester. The United Nations resolution, as they will know, calls for a just settlement of the refugee question, and I do not think anyone would suppose for one moment that there could be a settlement in this area which did not provide for a settlement of this particularly agonising question.
The newest, and perhaps the most interesting, proposal of my noble friend was for a Geneva Conference similar to that called on Indo-China in 1954, to try to deal with this apparently intractable problem. This is an interesting proposal and we shall study it with great care, but I must say that at the moment I can see one possible flaw in it—I stress, "one possible flaw". The noble Lord himself said that it would be necessary for the Israelis and the Arab countries to be present. I am not quite sure whether they would agree to be present, and that might be the major difficulty. It seems to me that to the Israelis, to attend such a conference would imply acquiescence in something that they have always rejected, namely, an imposed solution. Various noble Lords have said to-day that in their view, at any rate, the Israelis will never accept an imposed solution. On the other hand, it seems possible to me that to the Arabs such a conference, if the Israelis were also there, would imply an acceptance of direct negotiations. But this is a terrible problem, and as with all the other constructive suggestions of this sort, we are prepared to look very closely indeed at the useful suggestion which has been made.

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The noble Earl, Lord Dundee, gave us an interesting historical analysis of the situation in the Middle East. He was somewhat resentful at the suggestion of my noble friend that he had been biased, but I know he will not mind if I suggest that a careful listener might have detected, if not actual bias, shall we say a certain asymmetry of sympathy? But then that is not unique, even in your Lordships' House. Perhaps I may take him more seriously to task on the fact that he was, I think, uncommonly disobliging about the United Nations. This is an attitude which has always seemed to me to be unrewarding, if not positively damaging to the chances of a solution in the Middle East. This problem will not be an easy one to solve, and it seems to me that the four Powers, who are, after all, the four permanent Security Council Powers in the United Nations, and the United Nations itself, might well be the forum in which a solution is found.
Before leaving the intervention of the noble Earl, perhaps I could answer one of the points which he made rather more directly. He suggested and, I think, asked for confirmation, that France had not contributed to UNRWA. It is almost true to say that, but not quite. France is a very small contributor, but perhaps it gives me the opportunity to point out something that is often forgotten, which is that this country is in fact the second largest contributor in the world—second only to the United States of America.
May I deal for a moment with the point on refugees which was put forward by the right reverend Prelate? He asked specifically, although referring to points that had been made by my noble friend Lord Brockway, what we were doing about this problem and whether I could give him an assurance that we were doing anything at all. I am afraid that the satisfaction I shall give him will be limited, but I can say that we are working all the time for a comprehensive political settlement which must, as I indicated earlier, include an effective settlement of the refugee problem, and we are contributing, as I have just said, at a level of nearly £2 million a year, second only to the 20 million dollars per year of the United States of America, to the UNRWA organisation. Our Minister in New York, Lord Caradon, has on several occasions urged the Israelis to
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readmit to the West Bank refugees and others who were displaced by the June war. I can assure the right reverend Prelate that we shall do all we can to solve this problem, but I doubt very much whether its final solution will be found in anything but a comprehensive political settlement.
I was grateful for the vivid personal impressions of the noble Baroness, Lady Elliot of Harwood. I must say that I envy her her days of wine and roses among the agricultural experts: I could only wish that common interests led always to such harmony. The noble Lord, Lord Brock, referred to other instances in which a community of interest can lead to harmony. It often does, but not, unfortunately, always; and, as the noble Baroness rightly pointed out, the realities of life, especially in the Middle East, are not always as we should like them to be.
Before passing on to the substance of the speech of the noble Lord who opened the debate, perhaps I might take up one point made by my noble friend Lord Wells-Pestell, because I think it may be important in looking at future attempts to solve this problem. The suggestion he made was that this problem should be taken out of the hands of the Four Powers and placed in the hands of the United Nations. I want to make the point that the Four-Power talks are in fact taking place within the context of the United Nations: they are taking place in New York, and our representative at those talks is our Minister resident at the United Nations. And, of course, the Four Powers concerned are the four Security Council Powers of the United Nations. So I think the noble Lord can be assured that all our efforts, whether in the Four Power talks or anywhere else, will take full account of this most prestigious and valuable organisation.
Perhaps I may now come to the specific proposals of the noble Lord, Lord Napier and Ettrick. As I have said, I agree entirely with the way in which he has characterised this situation. It has deteriorated, it is deteriorating; and in my view it will continue to deteriorate if present trends go on. This is a prospect which no one can possibly view with any kind of equanimity. The region we are discussing is a region where millions of people are suffering; and it is a region,

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as other noble Lords have pointed out, where the outbreak of another war, a real war, as opposed to the kind of uneasy armed truce going on now, could easily spread; it could easily suck in the Great Powers of the world, and it could easily represent a threat to the peace and security of us all. It is good, therefore, that we should look at any idea that might be put forward that would lead to a solution of this problem.
The noble Lord has asked, in effect, whether we will explore the possibility of taking some action additional to that inaugurated by the Four Powers, either, I think I am right in saying, by way of guarantee or by some other course of action. This question of guarantees is a very complicated one, and in order to give perspective to what I have to say about it I think it would be useful first to say something about the attitudes of the two parties to the conflict as we interpret them, and about the genesis and development of the attempt to bring about an international settlement.
My Lords, I think that the attitudes of the two parties are best reflected in the interpretations which they have placed on the Security Council resolution of 1967, which was sponsored by my noble friend Lord Caradon. My noble friend Lord Brockway has outlined the terms of this resolution, so there is no need for me to go through them again. I would simply say that to the Arabs this resolution is a blueprint for action, but to the Israelis it is an agenda for negotiation. This, I think, sums up the attitudes of the two sides.
These attitudes have not changed during the past two years. The Arabs doubt whether Israel has any intention of withdrawing from the occupied territories, and they suspect that Israel's insistence on the achievement of a settlement through the negotiation of peace treaties is no more than a device to justify continued occupation of these territories. The Israeli view, on the other hand, is that they doubt whether the Arabs want to make peace with Israel and to accept her as a member of the Middle Eastern community of nations. They regard the refusal of the Arabs to engage in negotiation as evidence that the Arabs simply want to recover the occupied territories without being obliged
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to make peace with Israel. Here is a classic case of total breakdown of trust and communication, total deadlock.
The international effort to bring about some kind of break in this deadlock had its origin in the adoption of the Security Council resolution of November, 1967. For 16 months—for almost a year and a half following the adoption of that resolution the United Nations representative, Dr. Jarring (and I was grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, for using the much overworked word "dedicated" in respect of this representative of the Secretary-General: he is indeed a dedicated man) has worked hard to fulfil his mandate. The mandate, in the terms of the resolution, was
"to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned, in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement."
That was what Dr. Jarring was asked to do. By the beginning of 1969 it had become clear that he could not hope to succeed in his task alone; he must have assistance from others. So there was a proposal that the Permanent Representatives in New York of the four Security Council Powers should
"discuss means by which their Governments might contribute to the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East".
This was how the Four-Power talks came about, and this is why we agreed to take part in them.
Those Permanent Representatives first met in early April, 1969. Since then they have had over twenty meetings. They are agreed that the Security Council resolution of 1967 provides the only framework for a settlement, and that the terms of a settlement should be embodied in a package, not dealt with piecemeal; and they agreed that their own task was to provide guidance for Dr. Jarring. I still hope that they will succeed in this aim. I make no predictions, but I certainly do not accept the view of noble Lords, as forcefully expressed in this House this afternoon, that they have no chance of success. There are important differences which remain to be resolved, but at the same time all the four participating Powers—and these include the super-Powers to which much reference has been made today—realise full well how important it is that they should make progress in their task. I would beg noble Lords not to fall into the trap

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of despair simply because the Four Powers are making slow progress in what is one of the most intractable problems of international power with which we have ever been faced.
Having sketched in the background, may I now turn, my Lords, to the actual proposal about guarantees? This is a proposal of quite astonishing complexity. To begin with, I think there has probably been some confusion between the kinds of guarantees that would be necessary. We should probably need to have guarantees of two kinds: first, guarantees which would be intrinsic to the political settlement itself—that is to say, part of it, written into it; and then we should probably need to have the kind of guarantees that I think most noble Lords have been talking about this afternoon—external guarantees. So far as the intrinsic guarantees are concerned—the kind of thing that we shall have to build into a political settlement— they might be of several kinds. You could have the establishment of demilitarised zones, which is provided for, as noble Lords will recollect, in the Security Council resolution itself. You could have the establishment (or, to be more strictly accurate, the re-establishment) as the noble Earl pointed out, of a United Nations peace-keeping force in the region. You could possibly have the establishment of machinery for the resolution of disputes among the parties. There are various ways of building some kind of guarantee into the political settlement.
But external guarantees, too, could be of various kinds. For example, you could have an external guarantee given by the Four Powers, or by the Security Council as a whole, or by a larger number of Members of the United Nations. I think one noble Lord suggested this afternoon that you might have a super-Power guarantee given by the United States and the Soviet Union. An external guarantee could take another form. It could take the form of an undertaking to consult if one of the parties complained of a breach of the settlement. That is a familiar kind of guarantee in international treaties. It could take the form of an undertaking to go even beyond consultation if a breach of the settlement were proved, and to take action in defence of the status quo. This is perfectly legitimate under the terms of the United Nations Charter.
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This, I think, is enough to show that even in trying to analyse what a guarantee is we are faced with a subject of quite remarkable complexity. We have been considering all these possibilities. None of them has escaped our notice. We have also been considering their draw-backs, and indeed their advantages, particularly in the kind of external guarantee to which the noble Lord, Lord Napier and Ettrick, specifically referred. We have been doing this, first of all—and let me make a point here, and not labour it—against the background of our defence policy. I do not think there is any point in people thinking of guarantees which go outside the context of our defence policy, the general principles of which have been set out as recently as this month. But we have also been considering it in the light of what we know about the attitudes of the parties. I have already described these attitudes in general terms.
Given these attitudes, if we can reflect for a moment on the almost total absence of trust that exists between the parties to this dispute, let us look at the kind of questions we have to ask ourselves. Remember that, generally speaking, there are two parties to this dispute. That is a crude over-simplification, but it will do for the purpose of this argument. Would an external guarantee of the kind which the noble Lord has in mind be credible, believable to the two parties concerned? If it is not credible or believable, then it is not acceptable. By that I mean this. Would each side believe that in certain specific circumstances the guarantors would inevitably take action against it? Equally, would each side believe that in certain specific circumstances the guarantors would inevitably take action against the other side? These would have to be the two elements in a credible guarantee; and, as I have said, you have already two sides to the conflict.
There are, in fact, four questions to be answered, and in my view all we can say is that a guarantee of the kind the noble Lord has contemplated would be credible if the answer to all four of those questions was a clear unequivocal, "Yes". All the evidence that is available to us—and I have summed it up in what I have tried to say earlier about the attitudes of the

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parties— is that it would be impossible to answer all those four questions in the affirmative. I can, however, assure the noble Lord that we shall continue to study the merits of an external guarantee of the kind that he has in mind, and I am most grateful to him for putting it forward in his speech to-day.
To help us in this study, which we shall add to the others in which we are engaged, we should welcome any evidence which the noble Lord, or indeed any other noble Lord, may be able to give us about the likely attitudes of the parties to the offer of a guarantee by a group of Powers in Western Europe. I personally am not wedded to the idea of solving these problems through purely European machinery. But if this would be effective, then by all means let us examine it; and if any noble Lord can give us any evidence that either of the sides involved in this conflict would be prepared to look sympathetically at such an idea, it will be extremely useful to us in examining its possible effectiveness. I need hardly say that we ourselves, of course, shall continue to seek evidence of that kind. I do not wish to be dismissive or obscurantist about this in any way, but I must say that the evidence which is now available to us does not give any hope at all, or any indication of any kind, that the answer to the four questions that I posed earlier would be, "Yes".
Finally, may I say that we constantly ask ourselves, as noble Lords have asked me this afternoon, whether we are doing enough to help to bring about a settlement; whether there is any action of any other kind that we might usefully take in addition to action that we are already taking. We shall continue to do this. I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Trevelyan, that we shall not display any want of resource. In his speech, which was, as always, as constructive as it was brief, he said that some kind of initiative was needed. These initiatives are, I think, not always productive. But if one would be productive now, I think that the place where we should take it is in the Four Power talks in New York. This is not to say that it is necessary for us to put forward any proposal of our own. I know that the noble Lord, with his
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background, will recognise at once the difference between action and activity. The one thing that we want to avoid is activity of a kind that would not lead to constructive action.
For the moment, therefore, in spite of the extremely interesting and constructive suggestions that have been put forward in your Lordships' House this afternoon, we believe that we can continue to make our best and most effective contribution towards solving this problem by going on with our participation in the Four Power talks in New York. This we shall do.
LORD WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, before my noble friend sits down will he permit me to ask him a question? I did not want to interrupt him in the course of his reply. I am most grateful to him for reaffirming Her Majesty's Government's policy of preserving a balance of power in the way of arms in the Middle East. But how is this determined? Does it mean that each country is assessed according to what may be considered its needs, so that if there were three or four countries banding together showing aggressive tendencies towards one country, they would have four times the amount of arms that the other country had?
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, I do not think that the noble Lord should assume that the Government are quite so simple as his arithmetic. The point here is that when we are deciding upon applications for arms we take into account a number of factors. The military balance is one; our own interest is another. I think we should not too easily forget those matters. They include also our interest in helping to bring about a settlement in the Middle East. I think I see the drift of my noble friend's question, and I think I know what he is getting at. I can only repeat what I said previously, that it is not our intention to see any country in the Middle East placed at such a disadvantage that some aggressor might be tempted to act against it. I hope that my noble friend will be satisfied with that answer.
LORD WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, I am much obliged.

HUDDERSFIELD CORPORATION BILL [H.L.]
  WARWICKSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL BILL [H.L.]

    DONCASTER CORPORATION BILL [H.L.]
    Reported, with Amendments.
    House adjourned at one minute before six o'clock.