HL Deb 21 October 1969 vol 304 cc1630-8

3.18 p.m.

LORD SHEPHERD

My Lords, I beg to move that the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 (Continuation) Order 1969, i. draft of which was laid before this House on October 13, be approved.

The effect of this Motion will be to continue in force Section 2 of the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965, which is something that Parliament has done in each subsequent year since the passing of the original Act. Section 2 enables Her Majesty in Council to take any action that may be necessary concerning events in Rhodesia. To fail to keep that Section in force, therefore, would not only be a denial of Her Majesty's sovereignty over Southern Rhodesia, it would also' have the effect of condoning the rebellion and removing the largest barrier before the illegal regime on their disastrous course.

In introducing this Order in another place on October 16 my right honourable friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary spoke of our repeated efforts to secure an honourable settlement with the illegal regime. He said that in his judgment it was important to make clear to everyone in this country and throughout the world, first, that we stood by the Six Principles—five laid down by the previous Conservative Government and one added by the present Government—and, secondly and equally, that provided the Six Principles could be secured, we were ready to be flexible and reasonable on anything consistent with that.

My right honourable friend went on to say that we have been prepared and are still prepared to be flexible on details, on form and even, within reason, on timing. But there is one matter which is not susceptible to compromise. Any settlement, to be acceptable to this Parliament, must be a settlement which would mean unimpeded progress within a reasonable time towards majority rule. But sadly, in the last 12 months, the real nature of Mr. Ian Smith's objectives has been revealed with an appalling clarity. He and his colleagues have promulgated as "ideal" for Rhodesia a Constitution and allied legislation which will maintain white minority rule for ever. By establishing separate white and black constituencies and by abolishing cross voting he has discarded the basis of a multiracial society and started on the road of separate development which leads inevitably to apartheid.

Under this Constitution there will be a bicameral legislature in Salisbury: a Senate, composed of 2? members, of whom 10 will be European, 10 African chiefs paid by the regime, and 3 members appointed without reference to race; and a Lower House, composed of 50 Europeans, 8 chiefs or elders, again in the pay of the règime, and 8, and only 8, directly elected African members.

There are at present about 20 Africans to every European in Rhodesia. Within twenty years there will be about 29 Africans to every European. Yet the Constitution gives the Africans less than 25 per cent. of the new Lower House, and limits their ultimate representation to parity with the Europeans—a parity which, as Ministers in Salisbury have made perfectly plain, will never be reached. It will depend on the Africans paying the same total sum of income tax as paid by the Europeans, who at present pay about 200 times as much as the Africans.

I do not know whether the House has had its attention drawn to a speech made the other day by Mr. Lardner Burke in the Rhodesia Parliament, when, dealing with the principles of the Constitution, which he said would not be affected by the Land Tenure and the Electoral Bills, with all his authority in the regime, he said this: The Government is not talking of parity to-day or next year or in any ascertainable number of years. The Government is dealing with an ultimate which is designed to replace the concept of African majority rule. The purpose of the provisions "— and I ask the House to note this— dealing with Parliament are to ensure that African majority rule as an aim is no longer constitutionally attainable. Those are the words of Mr. Lardner Burke. I do not think anyone who has seen the course of events in recent months would deny that that is their objective. These are not the only features of this Constitution to cut across the Six Principles, five of which were laid down by the Conservative Government and one which this Government has added, to which I believe both sides of the House are committed.

In the June referendum, when the minority electorate was given the opportunity to approve or reject the new Constitution, only about 9, 000 non-Europeans out of a total population of 4, 800, 000 had the vote. Not, however you look at it, a very broad mandate for a Constitution which precludes the achievement of majority rule. Moreover, as I have said, there will in future be two voting rolls, one African, one European. Irrespective of wealth, education or any other qualification, no African will be any longer entitled to vote on the same roll as a European. There will be no more cross voting and the system of franchise will be based on one factor and one factor alone, colour.

Discrimination against the majority is also entrenched in the illegal regime's Land Tenure Bill. Under its provisions slightly more land will be reserved for 230, 000 Europeans than for 4, 800.000 Africans. An obvious result of these provisions is that it will be impossible for most, if not all, African farmers to reach anything like the prosperity and the tax level of the Europeans. That is why these two pieces of legislation have to be seen side by side.

There are three further aspects of the regime's present course which I feel I should mention. These are the status of the new Declaration of Rights, which will be without any form of legal enforcement; statutory powers of detention without trial; and powers with regard to the Press which could enable the regime to control what the newspapers say as effectively as they already control the radio and television.

I hope that the Affirmative Resolution of your Lordships' House this afternoon will be interpreted in Southern Rhodesia and throughout the world as condemnation of the course on which the Rhodesia Front seems set. It seems hardly necessary to say that a negative vote would be interpreted by the regime in Rhodesia as condonation of policies which are abhorrent to all political Parties in this country and seem to us manifestly to be contrary to the best interests of the population of Rhodesia irrespective of race.

I would urge your Lordships to remember that there is much exaggerated talk about evasions of sanctions. In fact sanctions have seriously diminished the volume of capital investment in Rhodesia and export earnings have shrunk by 40 per cent. since I.D.I. According to the regime's last annual report Rhodesia has a per capita income which is now less than it was four years ago. This downward trend is surely unique in the economies of all the countries of the world, and we are determined to watch carefully for potential breaches of sanctions and to report them to the United Nations Sanctions Supervisory Committee in accordance with the obligation imposed on us under paragraph 21 of Security Council resolution No. 253 of 1968.

I wish to emphasise that sanctions were not implemented in a spirit of vindictiveness. Their objective is to induce a change of heart in Rhodesia so that we may again be able to talk to people who are in a position to discuss a settlement on the basis of the Six Principles laid down by the British Parliament. We stand ready to resume links when that time comes. Meanwhile we are resolute in our determination not to surrender our principles and to pursue our existing policy. I would therefore ask your Lordships' House to give this Order your vote if it becomes necessary, confirming the Government's powers in regard to Rhodesia until there is a return to legality there. I beg to move.

Moved, That the Draft Southern Rhodesia 1965 (Continuation) Order 1969 laid before the House on October 13 be approved.—(Lord Shepherd.)

3.29 p.m.

EARL JELLICOE

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for his clear explanation of this Order. We have debated Rhodesia on many occasions in the last four or five years, and having listened to and indeed spoken in some of those debates, I am left with a number of settled and rather sad impressions. In the first place, I cannot escape the impression that our debates on this question have a certain air of unreality about them, and that is because of the clear divorce in all this between the responsibilities which are undoubtedly still vested in the British Parliament and our actual power to discharge those responsibilities.

My second dominant impression is a sense of deep and continuing regret at the path chosen by Mr. Smith. U.D.I. was a gamble. I believe it was a gamble which there was no need for Mr. Smith to take. It can, of course, be claimed that it was a gamble which in a sense has come off. But if it has come off, Rhodesia and Rhodesians, white and black, have paid and are paying a heavy price for it. Now we have this Constitution. We discussed the proposed Rhodesian Constitution in our debate last June, and if I recall correctly it had no friends in your Lordships' House. I am not surprised that that was the case. Apart from the principle of the thing—and I do not dissent from what the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, said in that respect in his speech—I greatly doubt whether in practice it offers a way forward that has any long run prospect of success. There is little or no light at the end of the constitutional tunnel for the great majority of Rhodesians. I doubt myself whether over the longer run it is possible for a minority of 5 per cent. or so politically to contain the vast majority of their fellow citizens, whether it be in Africa, in Europe, in Asia or anywhere else around this globe.

My other dominant impression is a real doubt whether we were all fated to come to this sorry pass. I do not think we were. I do not, of course, acquit Mr. Smith and his Government from their share of the blame—far from it. Nevertheless, while fully conceding the great complexity of the problem, I cannot acquit our Government from their share of the blame. The real tragedy of the position, as I see it, is that these things need not have happened. There was No inevitability or fatality about them. I know that my belief here is not susceptible of proof, but I am convinced that had a Conservative Government been returned to power in 1964 there would have been no U.D.I. and, in the end, after hard bargaining—doubtless after very hard bargaining indeed—it would have been possible to reach a settlement on terms no less good than those which were on the table during the "Fearless" talks. In these matters so much tarns on timing. The sad, harsh fact of the matter is that at the essential times the essential trust between the major participants was sadly lacking.

I need no reminding that we are not conducting a post-mortem this afternoon. Once again we are being asked to approve this Order, which I think is now a fairly hardy annual. We are asked to deal with the actual present situation, and we have a number of possibilities. We could, of course, vote for the Order. That is what my noble friends and myself in effect did when this matter came before us four years or so ago. We felt we had but little option in that matter at that time, in order then to demonstrate our view that U.D.I. was a mistake and to bring home to the Rhodesians the isolation of their position, in the hope that, realising this, the way would be open for negotiations.

That was our original hope and our original expectation. But both the hope and the expectation have been disappointed. I do not seek now to apportion the blame, but the fact remains that the sanctions which we in effect supported four years ago, however reluctantly, are quite a different matter from the sanctions which are in force now. The screw has been tightened, and whatever the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, may say, the pressure of sanctions has become increasingly vindictive. Apart from this, the nature of the sanctions themselves has been changed in one rather crucial respect. No longer do the ultimate decisions lie within the control of Her Majesty's Government. Now, as a result of the decision of Her Majesty's Government, that control has been dumped in the lap of the United Nations.

I do not wish to go over what we have already said in your Lordships' House about mandatory sanctions. I would only repeat my conviction that psychologically we have here embarked on a mistaken course. The sanctions have served only to drive the white Rhodesians in on themselves, and physically they have proved ineffective. Indeed, they present us with an almost intolerable and, I think, virtually insoluble dilemma. Either we have to persist in a course of action which has proved to be ineffective and is bound to remain ineffective so long as South Africa and Portugal remain outside the net of sanctions, or, alternatively, in order to make these sanctions effective, we have to accept the risk of confrontation with South Africa and Portugal, and that is a road along which the Government have said, quite rightly, that they will not go. I certainly cannot ask my noble friends to vote in support of a policy which, as it has developed—and much of the development has flowed from the actions and decisions of Her Majesty's Government—presents us with such an intolerable dilemma.

The second possibility would be to vote against this Order, and 26 Members of the Conservative Party last week took that course in another place. I respect their sincerity as I would respect the sincerity of any of my noble friends who would be inclined this afternoon to take the same course. I say straight away to my noble friends that here I find the choice to be extremely difficult. A straight vote against this Order, now that the policies which Her Majesty's Government have adopted seem doomed to failure, has all the attraction of simplicity. However, I believe that we on these Benches should be wrong to depart from the attitude which we have hitherto adopted so long as there is a chance, however faint, of some possibility of a settlement with Rhodesia.

It is, of course, possible to maintain that all this is now water over the dam; that the days of negotiation and the possibility of settlement are gone and past for ever. I am not absolutely convinced that this is yet the case. The disadvantages for Rhodesia in the present situation are very real. There is a clear and great gain for Rhodesia in restoring normal relations with the outside world and, as a first step, with the United Kingdom. In any event, we do not yet know what the Rhodesians themselves are going to do. The Constitution Bill has still to pass the Rhodesian Parliament, and, as my right honourable friend Sir Alec Douglas-Home reflected in another place last week, we know that constitutional Bills occasionally slip. We have reason to believe that an election will be held in Rhodesia in the early Spring of 1970, but we learn that there are certain difficulties over the Rhodesian Boundary Commission—it would seem that difficulties about Boundary Commissions are not confined entirely to our shores—and we cannot yet be certain, whatever we think is likely, about the outcome of that election.

In sum, I feel that there is a lot to be said for not making any radical change in our position on this issue, difficult though it is, until we know what is the outcome of those events. There are two main reasons why I believe this to be so. In the first place, I believe that those of my noble friends who might be inclined if there were a vote to vote against this Order, might well feel that their vote was merely a protest against a policy which has clearly failed or would seem to have failed. But we should remember this. That might be the purport behind their vote, but this is not—here I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd—how it would be represented in Rhodesia itself. It should be remembered that in Rhodesia a vote against this Order would almost certainly be interpreted, as my right honourable friend Sir Alec Douglas-Home mentioned last week in another place, as a green light for Mr. Smith to declare his republic and to adopt his Constitution.

Secondly, it must be clear to all of us that the time must be coming—indeed, it may well be overdue—for a review of the success or failure of the whole of our policy towards Rhodesia. But the time is also coming—indeed, it is overdue—for a review by the British electorate of the success or failure of the policies of Her Majesty's Government. If, as I believe will happen, a Conservative Government is returned to power at the next General Election, then I am quite sure that in their review of our policy towards Rhodesia that Government should be as unfettered as possible by prior commitments.

LORD SHEPHERD

My Lords, the noble Earl is making a very interesting statement. Does he think that, if this new Conservative Government came into being, they would turn against the five Principles which they themselves clearly laid down in the previous Parliament?

EARL JELLICOE

My Lords, I really do not know why the noble Lord asked me that question. It was perfectly clear that I was not saying anything of the sort. All I was saying was that there should not be any prior commitments in respect of the sanctions Order which we are now debating, as it would be very unwise for us to take a commitment one way or the other at this juncture of time.

I believe that a vote for or against his Order would significantly reduce the freedom of action of the successor Government of this country, whether it be Conservative or Labour. My conclusion, therefore, and this is the advice which I should like to proffer to my noble friends, is that if there is a vote on this Order—and, on the whole, I hope there will not be one—we should abstain, as we have implicitly done on at least the last two occasions. Abstention is not my favourite recipe, and I proffer that neutral advice rather reluctantly. However, being quite unable to bring myself to vote for this Order, and having a very lively doubt as to how a vote against it would be interpreted, especially abroad and particularly in Rhodesia, abstention is the course which I propose to take if there is a vote, and it is also the course which I hope will commend itself to my noble fiends.