RHODESIA (Hansard, 21 May 1969)

§ THE MINISTER OF STATE, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (LORD CHALFONT)
My Lords, with leave I should like now to answer the Private Notice Question of the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, on Rhodesia, by 352 repeating a Statement which my right honourable friend, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, is now making in another place. The Statement is as follows:
"Mr. Smith announced at a political meeting in Rhodesia on the 7th May that the Constitutional proposals which he advocated would sound the death knell of majority rule. Last night's broadcast has not therefore surprised us, though it provided saddening confirmation of the regime's attitude. I have not yet seen the official text of the Constitutional proposals which Mr. Smith was publishing in Salisbury this morning. But it seems clear that they are broadly in line with those which my right honourable friend the Prime Minister described on the 18th February as 'a complete and flat denial of at least five of the Six Principles'.
"If the door is now being slammed it is not by us, but by the régime. We have made repeated efforts to reach an honourable settlement. Mr. Smith said last night a number of things with which I could not agree; but there is one point he made which I accept and which is central to our inability to reach agreement. Mr. Smith said—and I quote: 'Throughout the entire series of discussions the British have been obsessed with the question of majority rule'. I accept that. It is the first of the Principles which we inherited from our predecessors and it is basic to our dispute with the illegal régime.
"I think it was generally recognised, both in the country and in this House, that in the 'Fearless' proposals we made a very fair offer. Some people thought it went too far. My right honourable friend the Prime Minister resisted pressure at the Commonwealth Conference to withdraw these proposals; but Mr. Smith and his colleagues have turned them down.
"We now await the results of the referendum of the minority electorate, which has been arranged for the 20th June. Let us hope that those who are able to vote on that day will choose a wiser course for the whole future of their country than the disastrous counsel urged on them by Mr. Smith."

EARL JELLICOE
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, for repeating this Statement made by his right honourable friend in another place. It is indeed a very serious Statement. It looks to me, I fear, as if we are now very near the end of a particularly sad and sterile road in our relations with Rhodesia. At this stage I wish to ask the noble Lord only one question. In his broadcast last night Mr. Ian Smith referred to the proposals which he submitted to Her Majesty's Government some little time ago; and there was a reference in the Statement by the noble Lord's right honourable friend in another place to "the constitutional proposals". I am not clear to which proposals he was referring, nor whether we in this House have seen the full text of them. Could the noble Lord assure us in any event, so that we can form our own judgment on these matters, that the full text of any proposals which have not yet been published in this country will be made available to Parliament, together with any correspondence to which they may have given rise? And can he also assure us that we shall see that correspondence before the Whitsun Recess?

§ LORD WADE
My Lords, I should like to join in thanking the noble Lord for repeating this depressing but not altogether unexpected Statement. It may be necessary to wait until June 30, when the vote of this minority electorate takes place, before a pronouncement is made. But in view of the fact that for a long lime now we have been getting the worst of both worlds—the failure of the talks, on the one hand, and a growing distrust on the part of Rhodesian Africans, on the other—does it not seem that we have reached the stage when the British Government should state clearly and firmly that no further useful purpose can be served in talks with the Smith régime?

§ LORD CHALFONT
My Lords, in answer to the question of the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, I referred to some constitutional proposals which Mr. Smith was publishing in Salisbury this morning, and I said—as is indeed the fact—that we have not yet seen the official text of these proposals. So far as the rest of our exchanges with the régime are concerned, they have all taken place under an agreement with the régime that, subject to notice from either side, they would 354 remain confidential. But in the light of Mr. Smith's broadcast we now propose to give notice to the régime and to arrange as soon as possible thereafter for the publication of a White Paper which will give the text of our exchanges with the régime since the Salisbury talks last November.
So far as the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Wade, is concerned, I cannot undertake on behalf of Her Majesty's Government to slam any doors at all. We have stood on a principle: the principle of unimpeded progress towards majority rule in Rhodesia. If the door is to be slammed, it is to be slammed by the régime and not by Her Majesty's Government.

§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY
My Lords, I am sure that there cannot be any of us, in whatever part of the House we sit, who will have heard without a sense of deep personal sadness the Statement that has just been made by the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont. I do not want to-day to say anything that is in the least provocative, but I hope that I shall be forgiven if I remind your Lordships that there are some of us who have during the last few years warned the House consistently, in season and out of season, as to the inevitable results of the policy that the Government have persisted in following against a small country which is based on our own traditions and which has come to our aid more than once when we ourselves have been in desperate straits. In spite of what is sometimes said, I do not believe that the Rhodesian Government or the Rhodesian people have ever been disloyal to the Crown. Their dispute throughout has been entirely with the Government—or, it may be said, with Governments—here in London.
I realise that this is not the moment to develop such arguments at length. I would, however, ask the Government to give time for a debate as soon as possible after Whitsun, so that we may examine whether there may be something that can still be saved from this tragic wreck. I say "as soon as possible", in the hope that perhaps this may be done before the end of June, when other events are apparently forecast in Rhodesia.

§ LORD CHALFONT
My Lords, certainly I, for one, accept the noble Marquess's great distinction in these affairs, 355 and his obvious feeling about this matter excused the somewhat lengthy nature of his question. I should simply like to say that there has been no question of intractability on the part of Her Majesty's Government in this affair. We have gone to great lengths with this régime to reach a settlement. We have been ready to be flexible on all the details, on all the forms, and even on the timing; but it is now evident that what is really standing between us is an acceptance of the principle that really matters. What prevented j a settlement, it now seems all too clear, is Mr. Smith's disagreement with the fundamental principle, on which we cannot compromise: that there must be unimpeded progress towards majority rule in Rhodesia. On the point raised by the noble Marquess, about a debate, perhaps I should be wise to leave that to my noble friend the Leader of the House.

§ LORD SHACKLETON
My Lords, the noble Marquess asked about the possibility of a debate. I am conscious that the noble Marquess has been showing considerable restraint in the matter—and we appreciate this. I would ask him to let me consider this suggestion for a debate a little further. I think it is necessary that we should consult on it with other Members of your Lordships' House; and I must of course consult my friends in the Government. It is quite clear to me that we shall have to have a debate at some stage; and, subject to the considerations I have mentioned, probably the earlier the better. Perhaps he will agree to leave it like that. This is not an attempt to evade an issue but, clearly, delicate issues of timing are also involved.

§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord very much.

§ BARONESS GAITSKELL
My Lords, will not the Minister agree that it would be to the eternal shame of the United Kingdom if they were now to come to terms with Mr. Ian Smith after his recent statement, which shows a complete capitulation to apartheid and is an affront to all Afro-Asian countries—that is, half the world? Will he not also agree that Mr. Ian Smith's blinkered and prejudiced view of race can have only a disastrous and far-reaching effect on future events in Africa?

§ LORD CHALFONT
My Lords, I am in much sympathy with what my noble friend says but, as I have said, I think we must await two things. First of all, we must await the official text of Mr. Smith's constitutional proposals and we must study that before we can take any attitude about this matter. Secondly, we must await the results of the referendum. When those two matters are clear to us, then it will be for Her Majesty's Government to reconsider their position. Bui, certainly at this stage, we are not prepared to be the ones who are slamming the door.

§ LORD GRIMSTON OF WESTBURY
My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that in the course of a television interview yesterday evening the Prime Minister admitted that he had misjudged the situation three-and-a-half years ago, when he thought that the Rhodesian problem would be settled in a matter of weeks rather than months? Bearing that in mind, is it not now possible that the Government are again misjudging the situation in trying to put all the blame for the breakdown and for the unhappy result of what has happened on to Mr. Ian Smith?

§ LORD CHALFONT
My Lords, I cannot accept that anything that the Prime Minister said on television last night supports the thesis now put forward by the noble Lord. What he in fact said was that he had misjudged the situation in believing that Mr. Smith was a man with whom one could come to agreements. I think it is now quite clear from the evidence that the reason for the breakdown and the reason for the intransigence and the intractability lies with Mr. Smith, and certainly not with the Prime Minister.

§ LORD GRIMSTON OF WESTBURY
My Lords, the noble Lord is now treating the matter on an entirely personal basis.

§ LORD SALTER
My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord the Leader of the House whether, in considering what he is going to think about before we meet again, he will ask himself if it is now to our advantage, or to the advantage of anyone in the world, that sanctions should still be continued in present circumstances? I ask that question bearing in mind the fact that the Government 357 declared both Ghana and Nigeria as fit for independent rule but decided that Rhodesia was not; and also bearing in mind the fact that, obviously, from the point of view of the acceptability of the Africans in Ghana and Nigeria and their lot in life, their situation has been worse than the lot in life of the Africans in Southern Rhodesia.

§ LORD SHACKLETON
My Lords, if the noble Lord, Lord Salter, addressed his question—if it can be called that—to me, it merely suggests the wisdom of the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, in asking for a debate; and I should have thought the chance of that was just about "evens" at the moment. But I do not think we can start widening this discussion into a debate about what happened in other African countries. Therefore, unless there are some questions of elucidation, I hope that we may get on with the other debate, although I fear I have a small Statement to make.

§ THE EARL OF SWINTON
My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord this question? I do not in the least want to discuss this subject now, but is it not extremely important that there should be a debate before any decision is taken by the Government as to what their course of action is to be?

§ LORD SHACKLETON
My Lords, I am not quite sure what new decision the Government might take in the meanwhile. I will just say that I have noted what the noble Earl has said. Clearly, we have to consider the situation, and it is obvious that the House will want at some stage to debate it. But in everybody's interest I think we must consider what is the best timing for such a debate, and I hope that noble Lords will leave the matter there.

§ LORD CLIFFORD OF CHUDLEIGH
My Lords, speaking as a person who has recently returned from Rhodesia, may I ask whether the noble Lord is aware that the ordinary people in both countries—and I am talking about the people who vote—are fed up with their politicians for not having reached an agreement? Is the noble Lord further aware—and I was told this by a Rhodesian who was on both "Fearless" and "Tiger"—that the Rhodesians believe that if it had been left to the Prime 358 Minister alone, an agreement would already have been reached, but that each time an agreement was near his entourage pulled him aside?

§ LORD CHALFONT
My Lords, I am not quite sure to whom or to what part of the Rhodesian population the noble Lord is referring. The noble Lord mentioned the voters, but I would point out that there are four million Africans in Rhodesia to whom we also owe consideration, and if we reached any kind of accommodation with the present régime—and I think the noble Lord will agree with this—which compromised the principle of progress towards majority rule, we should be doing the whole of Rhodesia and the whole of its future a disservice.