HL Deb 18 March 1969 vol 300 cc691-714

2.50 p.m.

LORD SHACKLETON rose to move, That this House takes note of the White Paper, In Place of Strife (Cmnd. 3888). The noble Lord said: My Lords, in moving this Motion I am profoundly aware both of the importance and of the difficulty of the subject we are to discuss. The question is one of which we are all too conscious. This is a subject on which men of good will can disagree, and disagree profoundly. Principle, judgment and the law of practical politics are all mixed up. Our discussion takes place against a long background of history in which prejudice and politics have been involved.

When we survey the history of industrial relations in this country we can look back with shame at the intolerance of the past and also with admiration at the farsightedness and devotion of many people in a more difficult period of our history. Above all, we can admire the loyalty of these many people to the cause of trade unionism and unity with their fellow workers. I am well aware that taking part in this debate are a number of noble Lords on this side of the House who have lived and fought for, and indeed have given a life-time of service to, their fellow workers. Those of us who have not had that experience need to feel a little humble; and in putting forward the Government's proposals, I shall certainly not seek to preach to them, any more than to those on the other side of the House—and we know that there are some on the employers' side who have taken the lead in striving for good industrial relations. There are noble Lords throughout the House who have had long experience of industry, but none with experience quite as long as that of the noble Marquess, Lord Aberdeen, who was apprenticed, I believe, some seventy years ago in the Leith shipyard.

I would ask all noble Lords to recognise that it is the firm belief of the Government that, despite the difficulties of the problems in front of us, we really believe that the proposals we are putting forward are in the best interests both of the workers and of the country as a whole. One thing on which I think we are all now agreed is that this is an area where it is high time that the Government should fairly face the issues, and that it is right that a Labour Government should undertake this task. Indeed, when we took office we decided that our system of industrial relations needed a very thorough re-examination, thorough enough to challenge the conventional wisdom; and to this end the Government appointed a Royal Commission under Lord Donovan. I would take this opportunity of expressing the appreciation of the Government, and indeed of the House, to the noble Lord, Lord Donovan, for his labours. I hope that many noble Lords will remain to the end of the debate. My noble friend Lord Beswick has done his best to tempt noble Lords to do so. May I add the further temptation that the noble Lord, Lord Donovan, as well as other very distinguished and experienced noble Lords will be speaking towards the end of the debate? We are very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Donovan.

My Lords, the White Paper provided an independent analysis and prescription, a consultant's report, which was invaluable to all of us. Indeed, I think it is possible that the Conservative document, Fair Deal, on this subject might have been very different if it had been written after they had had the benefit of the Donovan Report. But it is on the Government alone that there rests the responsibility of deciding what action they need to take in the field of industrial relations in the light of the Government's view of the country's economic and social needs, the Government's other policies and, indeed, our vision of the future. The White Paper we are debating to-day, which marks the second stage in the process of reexamination and reform, sets out the Government's proposals for action and legislation.

Let me deal first of all with the Government's major objective in the field of industrial relations. It is to see that people employed in industry have confidence in themselves in face of their employers and can truly take part as of right and in a responsible fashion in the important decisions which affect their working lives; and it is to see that British industry is as efficient as possible. Joint decision-taking and industrial efficiency are not incompatible objectives; they are complementary. This is the view which informs the White Paper. The Government accept the Donovan Report view that: Properly conducted, collective bargaining is the most effective means of giving workers the right to representation in decisions affecting their working lives, a right which is or should be the prerogative of every worker in a democratic society. Accordingly, the main objective of the White Paper is to reform and strengthen Britain's system of collective bargaining, using as a guide the Donovan Report's valuable critique of the present state of collective bargaining in British industry.

My Lords, we must all accept the fact that conflict is unavoidable in industry. There are real differences of interest, not just misunderstandings and failures by the employees to see what is best for them. The first need for managements is to recognise this—and many of the most progressive do so—and to accept that they are not just dealing with subordinates. Negotiating procedures and disputes procedures are needed as a way of working through this conflict. So too, if things cannot be settled promptly in other ways, is the freedom to strike. Managements have a responsibility for seeing that there are quick and fair ways of settling disputes. Nothing that I say in this context in any way derogates from the responsibilities of management in this matter. They should not just see those procedures as something to be gone through if they have made changes unilaterally and the union has objected. The good procedure is a way of reaching agreement, not a court of appeal.

The Government's analysis of the problems of industrial relations has had to go beyond what is in the Donovan Report in two directions. First, the Royal Commission did not seek to advance any general view of what should be the role of Government in industrial relations. It left this to be deduced from its proposals for action. No one suggests to-day, except rhetorically, that the Government should stay out altogether. Without Government intervention, there would be no legal protection for trade unions; no wages councils; inadequate conciliation and arbitration facilities; no industrial training boards; no redundancy payments scheme. Some people say they want the Government to stay out, but I think they really mean that they want the Government to stay out except when it suits them. But most of us, I think, recognise that there are areas where the Government not only can but must seek to play a constructive role. I acknowledge, as do the Government—I hope we all do—that there are delicate issues of freedom in the matters we are discussing. The Donovan Report implicitly accepted the fact that the Government should play a constructive rôle and the Government have explicitly adopted this.

And this brings me to the second point on which the Government's analysis goes beyond that of the Royal Commission. The Donovan Report gives us what I am convinced are the only satisfactory long-term answers to our basic problems of industrial relations; but it offers no immediate relief to the symptoms of these problems, however serious. The Government for their part, cannot avoid facing up to the fact that some strikes cause harm to numerous other people—often other trade unionists and their families—and to the economy and therefore the prosperity of this country. While they recognise that strikes are unavoidable in an industrial relations system designed to express and resolve conflict, and see the right to strike as an essential safeguard for employees, the Government have sometimes to say, both to employer and employees, that wider considerations must come before their wish to fight things out on the spot. I believe that many of my trade union colleagues on the Benches behind me will agree, because it has been my experience when I have discussed the problem of strikes with responsible trade union leaders that there was not one who did not prefer to find a settlement rather than go for a strike. This is not a new opportunity for interference which the Government are happily seizing; it is a duty which has become unavoidable if grave harm is to be avoided.

The Government's strategy is to reform collective bargaining. We have to advance towards that goal mainly by bringing home to managements their responsibility for initiating change and by strengthening the trade unions. The Government's proposals for legislation are only one of a number of instruments, and our proposals for taking new discretionary powers in certain strikes are best seen as a tactical measure to protect the main advance. The immediate responsibility for reforming collective bargaining rests mainly with the parties concerned, and the Government have welcomed and endorsed the encouragement which the T.U.C. and the C.B.I. gave in their joint statement for reviews of industrial relations at the levels of the industry and the undertaking.

For the Government's part, the Department of Employment and Productivity will be embarking on a continuous review of firms' industrial relations procedures as part of the work of its Manpower and Productivity Service. For this purpose it is setting up a register of agreements. It is inviting large undertakings, employing over 5,000 people, to register their procedure agreements. Later, the Government propose to put the register on a statutory basis. Besides helping the Department's advisory work, registration will emphasise to employers their responsibility for the procedures regulating industrial relations within the undertaking. The Government have also set up, under Royal Warrant for the present, the Commission on Industrial Relations to assist in the improvement and extension of negotiating procedures and collective bargaining. This was one of the major recommendations of the Donovan Commission and one which I am sure we all agree was a most constructive proposal. The Commission will be an independent body which will examine problems and cases referred to it by the Secretary of State. The White Paper says: The Government expects that the work of the C.I.R. will help to bring about a general move towards the reform and re-structuring of collective bargaining arrangements, not least because it will be able to suggest to the parties mutually beneficial improvements from practices which have been tried and found to work in other industries and undertakings. My Lords, I am sure we all wish the C.I.R. good fortune, and I should like to pay a personal tribute to a man for whom for many years, twenty-five years or more, I have had a great admiration: that is Mr. George Woodcock. I think it a most onerous responsibility that he has taken on after his years of responsibility in the T.U.C.

In practical terms, effective collective bargaining is impossible without strong trade unionism. The White Paper therefor proposes measures which will strengthen trade unionism in a number of ways. First, there should be legislation laying down the principle that no employer may prevent or obstruct an employee from belonging to a trade union. Secondly, on the advice of the C.I.R., the Government will be enabled to resolve cases where an employer unreasonably refuses to recognise a union. Where the C.I.R. has considered such a case and recommends recognition but the employer refuses to comply, the Secretary of State will be given power to order the employer to do so; and if a further refusal is met the union concerned will be allowed itself to take the employer to arbitration before the Industrial Court.

Where there is a dispute between two or more unions over recognition, the Government will look primarily to the T.U.C. to seek a solution. Only if it is unable to find one will the matter be referred to the C.I.R. The Commission will be able to recommend that one union should be recognised and another excluded from recognition; and in this case the proposed powers would be to make an order requiring everyone concerned to observe the C.I.R.'s recommendations, subject to penalties if they do not.

The third measure proposed by the Government in order to enable unions to become stronger is the Trade Union Development Scheme. I should like to say a few words on this aspect of the proposals which has not attracted as much attention as it might and therefore has been somewhat misunderstood. This scheme, financed from Government funds but administered by a Committee of the independent and trade union members of the C.I.R., would be available towards the special financial needs of trade unions arising out of, say, an amalgamation, or the development of new research activities, or an expansion of training for shop stewards, or the employment of consultants to examine some aspect of the union's activities. There will have to be suitable accounting arrangements for grants or loans under the scheme, but apart from this it would be run so as to make it absolutely clear that there was no element of Government control over unions. Hence the role of the independent C.I.R. in administering the scheme. There should therefore never be any question of beneficiary unions feeling morally in the Government's debt, for the scheme is designed as a positive recognition of the value of well-organised and well-serviced trade unions to the country, and not as any sort of charity for indigent trade unions.

All these measures, then, are designed to strengthen and reform collective bargaining, and particularly to support the right of trade unions to take their proper place in a system of industrial relations which will serve the country's social and economic needs as a whole. But along with these rights there are of course responsibilities—the responsibilities of trade unions to their members, and to society, and of managements to their employees. The rights of the individual are certainly not less important than those of the organisations which represent or employ him. The White Paper proposes that an employee should have a right of appeal against unfair dismissal—a man's employment should be, and will be, recognised as something of the greatest value and importance to him, something not to be treated lightly by his employer.

This brings us again to the all-important question of procedure. The intention is that the procedures including appeal procedures will be introduced generally. But where firms have proper procedures, which are satisfactory, there is provision in the White Paper for these to be operated voluntarily. It is also proposed that any individual who has a complaint against a union should, if he has pursued this complaint unsuccessfully through the union's own appeals machinery, be able to raise it with a new Registrar of Trade Unions and before the Industrial Board. In this connection the Government believe it is right that unions should be required to have satisfactory rules on certain subjects as a safeguard for their members. For this purpose unions will be required to register their rules with the Registrar of Trade Unions as a check on the adequacy of these rules, although of course they will be free within broad limits to frame their rules to fit their particular needs and objectives.

This brings me to the thorny issue of legal sanctions, on which I know some of my noble friends and other noble Lords have considerable anxiety, both as to the equity and the workability of the White Paper proposals, particularly those for pre-strike ballots and the conciliation pause. It is essential to put discussion of these measures in the right perspective. The powers envisaged are for use in exceptional situations, and where there is danger of serious and widespread damage to the economy. First, there is the power to order a ballot before an official strike. Before the Secretary of State exercises this power, she will of course have reason to believe that the majority of trade union members concerned do not want a strike; and the only purpose of the ballot would be to give members a chance to have their say. The power would be used only after consultations with the union; and at the end of the day the union could, if it wished, go ahead and call a strike, however the vote went. It is therefore not in any sense to be seen as a measure against strikes.

Secondly, there is the conciliation pause. I am very conscious, in arguing this, as in arguing the other controversial issues, that we could discuss them at great length, but I can deal with them only briefly. The conciliation pause is intended more directly as a safeguard for the community. Two criteria will have to be met before it can be used: first, that the strike was unconstitutional; that is, in breach of the procedures agreed by the employer or his association and the union; or—if there was no agreed procedure or for other reasons—adequate joint discussions had not taken place; and secondly, that if the strike or lock-out continued, the effects would be likely to have serious consequences for the economy. This means, for a start, that there would virtually never be any question of applying the conciliation pause in an official strike. Such strikes normally follow the exhaustion of agreed procedure. They have thus been through negotiations, and there really is not much to be gained—though we can argue this—by insisting on another four weeks of negotiations. Indeed a union which strikes in these circumstances is exercising a perfectly legitimate freedom. It may cause inconvenience to the rest of us, but none the less we recognise that it is essential to preserve this freedom. On the whole, this country has a good record in the matter of official strikes.

One objective of the proposal for a conciliation pause is to see that the most serious unofficial strikes, most of which at present are unconstitutional—that is, proper procedures have not been followed—are conducted in the way that unions normally accept as essential in official strikes: that is, that there are full negotiations following an agreed procedure, and that the Department of Employment has an opportunity to conciliate and if necessary to hold or arrange an inquiry. The other objective of the conciliation pause—and I would emphasise that this is no more than a pause: it does not rule out strike action—is to provide an acceptable alternative to this sort of sudden strike as a sanction against unreasonable action by management. When garbled reports of the proposal first appeared in the Press, some trade unionists reacted by saying, "It's not us you ought to get at; it's the boss who provokes the strike". The Government entirely agree that thoughtless and ill-considered actions inevitably follow this sort of reaction. If the employer is at fault, if he has made unilateral changes when he should have been prepared to discuss matters, or if he has paid no attention to a reasonable complaint, then he must be made to return to the status quo. Even if there is some right and some wrong on both sides, the status quo is normally a fairer basis to apply while negotiation and conciliation are tried. But the "quid pro status quo" (I hope the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, will not mind my using this phrase), is that there should be a return to work. We must remember that the proposed powers are intended to safeguard the community. When they were used to stop an employer who took provocative action, the community would not be safeguarded unless there was also a return to work.

We do not suggest that this is the answer to the problem of strikes. It is a necessary safeguard; no more and no less. I do not think that there is any easy answer. Few noble Lords will think that. As the White Paper makes clear, the Government believe that the fundamental solution lies in the restructuring of our present system of collective bargaining when it is disordered and defective"; and that can be achieved only by the full implementation of the Government's major policies for the reform of collective bargaining and the strengthening of trade unions.

There is one other controversial matter to which I will refer briefly. Here, again, I know that there are strong feelings. This is the proposal that in cases such as a refusal to return to work during a conciliation pause, there should be an attachment of earnings. A number of people who are otherwise well disposed towards the White Paper have taken some exception to the proposal that attachment of wages should be available as a method of enforcing payment of a fine imposed on an unconstitutional striker by the Industrial Board. There seem to be two main grounds for concern: first, that the proposal strikes a blow at the integrity of the wage packet; and, secondly, that the procedure is ineffective, particularly if unsupported by the threat of imprisonment. I will not discuss the desirability of the threat of imprisonment because the Government have firmly ruled this out and I think that most noble Lords will agree.

So far as the first objection is concerned, it is fair to note that no less a body than the T.U.C., in their evidence to the Payne Committee, were strongly of the view that attachment of earnings was the most suitable and least objectionable method of enforcing the payment of judgment debts. I do not suggest, and nobody suggests, that any one method is infallible. We shall certainly listen with the deepest attention to what noble Lords have to say, and I am sure my noble friend Lord Hughes will, if necessary, deal with this subject more fully at the end.

Let me now briefly deal with the only other set of proposals which is, in a sense, in front of us. These are the Conservative proposals, as set out in a pamphlet, Fair Deal on Work. I acknowledge, as I have said already, that the Conservative Research Department and those who produced this pamphlet did not have the benefit of the Donovan Report to guide them in their proposals. The key difference between the Government's White Paper and the official Conservative view concerns the legal status of collective agreements. There are other aspects in the proposals, on some of which we should be agreed, and one or two which we find more objectionable, but the main proposal is on the emphasis of the legal status of collective agreements. The Tory Party attach great importance to this as the key to improving industrial relations, while we, for our part, do not think it matters very much compared with a lot of other things. I am trying to put this point quite fairly. The Government's view is very easily stated. We see no reason at all why art employer or an employers' association should not seek to make with a trade union a collective agreement which is directly legally enforceable. A quirk of the law at present prevents this where employers' associations are concerned, and the Government propose that this particular bar in relation to employers' associations counting as trade unions for the purpose of the Act in question will be removed.

The Opposition seem somehow to have spread what I can only call a mistaken impression, that their whole detailed scheme for the legal enforcement of collective agreements would grind into operation if only Section 4(4) of the Trade Unions Act 1871 were repealed. They think, like the Government but unlike the C.B.I., that a collective agreement is only an agreement if all aspects of it, including its legal status, are freely agreed; and they say that collective agreements ought to be legally binding unless the parties decide otherwise. But they do not face up squarely to the fact that on many occasions the unions do not want legally binding agreements; that employers show little interest in them, and, in particular, that employers are most reluctant to start legal proceedings against employees or trade unions. I wonder how many noble Lords who are employers have ever brought an action against an employee who has walked out in breach of an agreement. I should be very surprised if there are many in your Lordships' House. This is one example where it is open to employers to take action; but they do not.

As the Donovan Report has clearly shown—and I press this on noble Lords—clearly there are enormous difficulties in having legally binding agreements. I would say that the Opposition (I shall be interested to hear what the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, says on this) are taking a far too simple view on what is a very complex problem. If anyone doubts this they have only to read (and I commend this to your Lordships) what Mr. Justice Geoffrey Lane has said in relation to the Ford agreement—an agreement which could have been made legally enforceable had the parties to it wished and to which, in any case, the 1871 Act has no application. This is a most illuminating explanation of the nature of such agreements. I very much hope that noble Lords who support this view will again study what the Donovan Report had to say on the subject of collective agreements.

There is a disposition in some quarters to look for quick and relatively painless remedies for our industrial relations problems—for short cuts, as it were, to industrial peace. Lord Donovan's Report has shown clearly how misconceived, unworkable or inadequate are most of the remedies and short cuts that one hears people in the street and others putting forward. The reform of procedures or institutions, changes in long established attitudes, and the development of greater skills in handling industrial negotiations take time and patience and a large amount of goodwill. I believe that in many parts of industry that good will is strongly manifest on both sides. We are now set on the path towards these changes, and the Government intend to do all they can to encourage them through the C.I.R., the Trade Union Development Fund and their own Manpower and Productivity Service. We are confident that improvements are best achieved, and conflicts of interest best settled, through the strengthening of what has come to be called the "voluntary system". I ask your Lordships to consider the Government's proposals as a whole, and I am sure your Lordships will judge them fairly. I beg to move.

Moved, That this House takes note of the White Paper, In Place of Strife (Cmnd. 3888).—(Lord Shackleton.)

3.27 p.m.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I am sure that I shall be echoing the feeling of the House as a whole if I start by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, for the extremely reasonable and, indeed, conciliatory way in which he has introduced this debate. This is, as he has said, a subject of great importance and difficulty, and I suppose that we shall find men of good will disagreeing in the course of the debate. I only hope that we shall be able to keep the debate on lines which one would expect from men of good will; and I see no reason why we should not.

We have been asked to "take note" of the Government's White Paper In Place of Strife. The Government wisely have not asked us to approve it in its entirety, so they are not asking us to take it or leave it, but to consider it. That, my Lords, is sensible, for I think we are agreed on the objectives: first, on the need to reduce the causes of strife; secondly, when strife does arise, on the need to contain it so as to cause the least possible damage to the economy and to the lives and interests of those not primarily involved in it; and thirdly, on the need to establish confidence in the means of avoiding disputes and of settling disputes that are not avoided.

The decision of the Government that the time has conic to take action to deal with our creaking and groaning system of industrial relations is much to be welcomed. It did not take the Government very long to come round to our view that a start could not be made on this without first having a Royal Commission. We thought, and we still think, that it would have been wrong to appoint a Royal Commission just before the 1964 General Election. The Prime Minister then thought it wrong to appoint one at all. Inevitably, the Royal Commission needed time to consider so vast and important a subject; and it took three years. Nobody need complain about that: on the contrary, as the noble Lord has said, we owe a big debt of gratitude to the Royal Commission for the care and thought that they gave to their Report.

The Government have not adopted all the recommendations of the Royal Commission; nor, I suppose, would any of your Lordships agree with all of them. But the Commission have drawn public attention to the major defect in our present system of collective bargaining; that is, the weakness at factory level. Procedure rules are often neither adequate nor clear; there is a widespread tendency not to keep them, and there are not enough people, either on the management or on the employee side, with sufficient training and skill in negotiations. We very much welcome the moral and practical encouragement which the Government propose to give to training in industrial relations both on the management and on the employee side and also to strengthen the trade unions, which the White Paper says are undermanned and under-financed. I would just comment that any democratic institution flourishes best on its own sources of support, but at the same time we do not in any way object to Government support for a transitional and interim period in the way that the noble Lord has indicated.

Secondly, the Royal Commission have drawn attention to the pernicious effects of these shortcomings. An annual average of over 2,000 unofficial strikes, some of which are later made official, not only brings the reputation of this country into grave disrepute abroad but saps the vitality of industry and undermines the confidence of management and the sense of common purpose of industry as a whole. These damaging effects on reputation and morale, no less than the more obvious disruption of the economy, particularly losses of export earnings, make it imperative that we should cease to regard industrial relations as a matter for industry alone. We are all involved as a community. The problem is how to protect the right of employees to negotiate freely the terms and conditions on which they give their services and at the same time ensure that the right is exercised in such a way as to benefit, and not harm, the interests of the, community, and not to cause avoidable loss or damage to third parties.

I hope we are all agreed that the foundation of all sound business and professional relationships is the honouring of agreements; that there must be recognised means of altering agreements when circumstances are changed; that some attitudes must be changed, especially the attitude that, "Rules are fine so long as they do not have to be applied; that agreements are splendid so long as they give me what I want without having to concede anything in exchange, and so long as they do not have to be kept; and that penalties are highly desirable so long as they can be enforced against the other chap and not against me".

I heard on the radio this morning that much of to-day's debate would be concerned with financial penalties and the attachment of earnings, where necessary, to meet them. True, in another place the Secretary of State devoted to this aspect a whole column of her speech on the White Paper. For my part, there is only one thing I want to say about it. While it is obviously essential that neither employer nor employee should be able to avoid paying penalties that are properly imposed, it would I think be a pity if they were to be enforced in a manner that did not apply to judgment debts in general. It is therefore highly desirable, in my view, that enforcement of judgment debts should be dealt with in general legislation rather than in an Industrial Relations Act as a special case. But an assurance that they would be so dealt with might well suffice, in view of the overriding need to bring legislation before Parliament very soon.

My Lords the sooner the new legislation is brought before Parliament, the better. It will be more than a pity if it cannot be brought in this Session. We really must urge the Government on this point. It is not as if the promised Industrial Relations Act is going to be the last word on the subject for ever. It will be amended and adjusted and added to as experience in the next few years shows to be necessary. We are likely to have a whole series of Acts of Parliament in the 1970s, just as there were in the 1870s. What is needed now is legislation before the 1970s.

The Economist said on March 8 that if the proposals in the White Paper had already been in effect neither the Ford nor the Vauxhall shut-down would have taken place. The writer of the article said: The Ford strike would have been avoided by the power to order a secret ballot before an official strike. The Vauxhall strike would have been avoided by the power to order unofficial strikers to return to work for a 28-day conciliation pause. While I am not so sure as the Economist of the certainty of these propositions, at least there would have been a far greater chance of avoiding the damage that these stoppages have caused. The article went on to say, however, that the overriding priority must be to deal with strikes now and that it would be quite possible in a quick Bill this Session also to include such fundamental rights as the right to belong to a trade union without victimisation.

It is to the credit of the Trades Union Congress and the Confederation of British Industry that as soon as the Royal Commission had reported they set to work together—and I quote: to define the scope of industry-wide agreements on the one hand and factory or company-wide agreements on the other, and the proper relationships between them. Obviously, industry-wide no less than factory agreements will have to be reviewed.

So far as factory agreements are concerned, it seems to me the first questions are these. What are to be the rules of the game? Who are to be the teams? Who is to be the referee? And what is to be the board of appeal? The Government are inviting the 300 largest companies, those with over 5,000 employees, to file with the Department of Employment and Productivity their rules for procedures both for the settlement of grievances and disputes and for the determination of terms and conditions of employment, and also for their arrangements for consultation. Other smaller companies, they say, may also be invited to submit their procedures. All this is to be done voluntarily. Compulsory registration, they say, will apparently follow, the "scope" of it to be decided in consultation with industry in the light of the D.E.P.'s examination of the agreements and what is termed in the White Paper "their experience"—which I take to mean the success they achieve in persuading companies to alter their agreements where the D.E.P. or the Commission for Industrial Relations, on a reference from the D.E.P., think it desirable.

It seems doubtful whether compulsory registration of all such agreements with the D.E.P. would ever be worth while or possibly even practicable. There is, I suppose, some point in registration as a formality, first to ensure that such agreements exist and, second, in case a dispute occurs. There is apparently to be no power to require amendment of agreements. They may be right, since they are freely negotiated or re-negotiated with the advice and help of the C.I.R., as the case may be. But ought not guide-lines to be issued? The noble Lord was good enough to refer to Fair Deal at Work, and that suggested that there should be a code. These guide-lines could be issued whether or not, as is there suggested, the code is attached as an appendix or Schedule to the Industrial Relations Act. Such a code could properly be negotiated between the T.U.C. and the C.B.I. with the aid of the Commission for Industrial Relations or the D.E.P., or both. Indeed, it might be better if a tripartite body examined the procedure agreements to be submitted voluntarily, instead of the D.E.P. alone. I put this point to the Government.

The next question is: who is to negotiate? This raises the problems, first, of the status of shop stewards and their link with unions and local union officials, and, second, of the recognition of trade unions by individual employers. Here we come to the heart of the matter. How is the community to be assured that at factory and company level procedure agreements will be followed both in negotiation of substantive agreements and in dealing with disputes, and that substantive agreements will be honoured? For the interests of the community are here involved as well as those on whose behalf the negotiations are carried out.

The White Paper in paragraph 109 accepts the Royal Commission's recommendation that trade unions"— presumably they mean all trade unions— should register with a Registrar", who will for the time being be the Registrar of Friendly Societies. The Registrar will be empowered to challenge their rules on the ground that they do not adequately cover the subjects specified", which I take to mean the subjects suggested by the Royal Commission, one of which is the appointment and functions of shop stewards. The White Paper does not accept the recommendation that trade unions should have corporate status, on the ground that it would not be appropriate to unions' constitutional structure. I hope that the noble Lord who is going to reply will explain this objection in winding up. The unions are to review their constitutional structure, which I think should be brought into line with the law as amended rather than the other way round. The main point here is that whoever is negotiating on the employees' side at factory or company level should be acting on behalf of the trade unions, whether he is a shop steward or a trade union official. Shop stewards, in other words, should be integrated into the trade union structure, especially where they are to do the negotiation.

Then there is the subject of trade union recognition; that is, employer recognition of a trade union for the purposes of local negotiations. This again divides itself into two problems: first, the willingness of an employer both to recognise and to negotiate with the trade union; and, secondly, the establishment of satisfactory negotiating arrangements where there are two or more trade unions. The unhappy situation in the Steel Corporation is a case in point. The White Paper proposes that the C.I.R. should investigate any case where an employer refuses to recognise or negotiate with the union and should report to the Secretary of State after arranging a ballot, if it thinks it appropriate. The Secretary of State would then have power, if he or she thought fit, to require an employer to recognise the trade union and/or to negotiate with it, as the case might be. If the employer failed to comply, the union could take him to arbitration by the Industrial Court, whose award would be legally binding. I hope I have correctly described the procedure.

In our view, before recognition is accorded in such circumstances it is desirable to hold a ballot. The argument of the White Paper that a union may be able to recruit members only after it has received recognition is surely fallacious. It is not a question of recruitment; it is a question of employees expressing their opinion by vote as to whether or not the union should be recognised. Ina democratic organisation the union will surely be in a far stronger position if its support is based on a majority of the employees' votes than on a Ministerial fiat.

As to the second point, as the White Paper says, questions of conflict between rival unions present greater difficulties. We have at present a devastating example of the difficulties at Ford's, where unofficial strikes against an agreement confirmed by the trade union side were subsequently made official by some of the unions represented in the negotiations, and where the agreement was actually brought into effect on March 1 at the request of the trade union side.

One possible solution is to adopt the American system of a single designated union for a factory. To start with, a union must prove that it has the support of 30 per cent. of the employees. If the National Labour Relations Board consider that it is suitable, a secret ballot is held, and if a majority of the employees vote in favour it becomes the accredited bargaining unit. Some people in this country are always a little apt to suspect gangsterism in anything American, but the fact that nearly 90 per cent. of those entitled to vote in the ballots during 1967 participated seems at least to indicate a healthy individual interest in trade union affairs. No doubt joint committees could be established as an alternative, voting being presumably weighted in relation to the strength of membership, but the advantage of the American system is that it is clean-cut and would tend to reduce the excessive number of trade unions. Obviously, if it were adopted satisfactory arrangements for the transfer of membership from one union to the other and for re-admission to unions would have to be made.

I come now to unofficial strikes. The White Paper lays stress on the right of the community to require that groups of employees shall not take precipitate action, and on the urgency of ensuring that the processes of conciliation are followed first. This is a matter primarily for the trade unions themselves, but we agree that if they fail to maintain discipline in their own ranks the D.E.P. must step in with its conciliation machinery, whether it is invited to or not. But are the steps proposed inadequate? Where the dispute arises from some action on the part of the management the White Paper says that the Secretary of State will require them to withdraw it so as to preserve the status quo"— I suppose strictly they mean the "status quo ante". This may not always be possible or reasonable, and I think the noble Lord has disposed of this. The White Paper was a little ambiguous in this matter. It made it clear that it will not always necessarily be required.

The White Paper then continues: if a strikes takes place the Secretary of State would be able … to issue an Order requiring those involved to return to work and to desist from industrial action for a period of twenty-eight days", and this would be coupled with a requirement to the employer to maintain the status quo ante.

LORD SHACKLETON

My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lord for a moment? I think he is absolutely right in saying that it is the "status quo ante".

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I am much obliged. If either side failed to comply, the Industrial Board could, at its discretion, impose financial penalties. In a case such as the Girling dispute, where only 27 workers are said to have cost Fords £500,000 a day for four weeks and to have caused the laying off of about 5,000 workers, there would not have been much difficulty in fining the 27. But what about the present Ford dispute? Would the Ministry have had time to intervene before the strike was made official, and would the unofficial strikers have complied with the Minister's order? And what would have happened if they did not? In my view there are strong objections to Ministers being saddled with the odium of a decision in these cases. This could easily turn a strike from being industrial into being political. What reason is there to suppose that the Minister's order is more likely to be respected than the court's? Should not the Secretary of State in his capacity as representative of the public interest apply to an appropriate court for an injunction and let the court fix the penalties for defying the law?

On official strikes, in the same way we think that before official strike action is taken, whether on an industry wide or plant basis, the right course is to refer the dispute to arbitration by an industrial court, and that agreement should so provide. If either of the parties decline to accept the court's award, the Secretary of State should again have power to apply to the court for an injunction to stop the strike or lock-out for a period specified in the court order. Where a strike or lock-out would gravely affect the national interest, in our view the court should be able to grant an injunction for at least 60 days. Here again I quote the American case. In the U.S.A. the court can do so for 80 days on the application of the Attorney-General, and after 60 days, if no settlement has been reached, the Attorney-General must report the employer's latest offer, and a ballot is then held on whether or not to accept it.

Experience is interesting. In the 20 years between 1947 and 1967 this procedure was needed on only 24 occasions and on none was the ballot required. The important thing is the injunction, which gives time for cooling off, for in 17 cases a settlement was reached during the period. In only six of the 24 cases were strikes begun or resumed after the period. The White Paper envisages that the Secretary of State would order a ballot to be conducted by the unions, if they were disinclined to do so themselves and there was, in his opinion, first, a threat to the national interest and, secondly, doubt whether the strike commanded the support of the majority. What would happen if the unions refused is not made clear in the White Paper. There certainly seem to be some weaknesses in the Government's proposals. On inter-union disputes, the procedure proposed by the Government seems about right to me, though again we would prefer that the Minister should apply to the courts for an order, rather than issue it himself.

I began by saying that one of the objects must be to contain the dispute. To me it is incomprehensible that anyone should even contemplate extending the immunities outside the immediate area of the dispute. Yet the White Paper proposes, in paragraph 100, that the legal hazards which it says under the present law face sympathetic strikes and other ways of bringing indirect pressure on the employer should be removed. The White Paper gives as its reason that "Trade Unions have a long tradition" of sympathetic strikes. But, my Lords, since when has the Labour Party become traditionalist? Are we not to try to change attitudes that are harmful to the interest of the community? Are not sympathetic strikes, by definition, in breach of procedure and unconstitutional? Are they not often designed to bring pressure on the community rather than on the employer?

We believe that the immunities afforded by the Trade Disputes Acts should be confined to disputes between management and employees and should not extend either to strikes which take place outside the area of the original dispute or to inter-union disputes, coercive action to enforce a "closed" or "union" shop, or strikes called to prevent an employer from employing men on work which they are qualified and fit to do. The emphasis alike on observing procedure and limiting the area of disputes must be, in our view, maintained.

There remains the question: to what extent should procedure and substantive agreements be legally binding? Are they to be contracts or just scraps of paper? Of course, agreements which were never intended to be legally binding ought not to be made legally binding. What is needed—and I put forward our view of this—is to give both sides confidence that agreements made will be kept and that both sides will have a remedy if they are not, instead of only one as at present, and that the remedy of strike action—one practical remedy that is. Surely it must be the desire of everyone to see an orderly means of ensuring observance of agreements. I do not think there is a great deal between us on this, as the noble Lord said. The White Paper wants agreements to be legally binding only if they are expressly stated to be so. We think that at the very least certain types of agreements which are made after long and arduous negotiation should be legally binding. We believe that if both sides come to the negotiating table with the intention of making agreements legally binding at least for a specified time, they will treat the actual negotiations with a greater sense of responsibility and will in fact make better and clearer agreements.

In one astonishing sentence the White Paper talks about legally binding agreements which have been imposed upon unions without their consent". How can you have an agreement, legally binding or otherwise, without the consent of the parties? It would be strange if we were asked to accept the argument that Britain is unable to do what so many other developed nations do, that is, to have a system of legally enforceable collective bargains and to make it work. Surely what has been done by statesmen and lawyers between them elsewhere can be done here.

We welcome the establishment of the C.I.R. as what the White Paper calls a disseminator of good practice and a focus for reform by example". They have a most important missionary task in promoting the reform of industrial relations. We think it is a pity that their functions are concentrated upon recognition problems and procedures. Even so, they will have the opportunity to din into management and employees alike that, as the Director General of the C.B.I. has said, working relationships are no longer about rectifying intolerable wrongs—those days are past— they are about the improvement of working effectiveness and the rewards that go with it". We should like to see the creation of a Productivity Board whose function would be, in the words of Fair Deal at Work, to further the objective of a high productivity/high earning economy. We want a really forward-looking approach to industrial relations, not a traditional one.

We should also like to see the Registrar given much greater powers than the White Paper envisages. We think that he should have power to refuse to register trade union rules which include provisions restricting output or efficiency, subject to appeal to the industrial courts, and exclude provision for appeal to an industrial court on disciplinary matters. We think that in every instance industrial courts should be composed of a legally qualified chairman and two members, one from the employers' and one from the trade unions' panels. We think there should be both regional courts and a national appeal court on the lines, say, of the National Insurance structure.

Lastly, and perhaps most important of all, we must never forget that trade unions are not an end in themselves, but primarily a means to promote the wellbeing of the individual. We welcome the proposals in the White Paper to fortify the rights of the individual, particularly against dismissal from his job and against refusal of admission to a union or expulsion from it. We agree that any provision in a contract of employment debarring an individual from joining a trade union should be void, but we are inclined to think equally that any provision compelling him to join one should equally be void. Freedom should not be one-legged.

There is a great deal in the White Paper that we welcome. There are con- spicuous signs of grace in it, such as the flat statement that opposition to the admission of Government or industry trained "dilutees" to skilled jobs is misguided, and the great importance that the Government attach to the review of dilutee agreements. We think it right that both employers' associations and trade unions should be capable of being sued in tort except in the circumstances of a trade dispute. On the other hand, there are strange lapses, such as the idea that the obvious need for trade unions to to be provided with the information they require to negotiate intelligently should be translated into a legal requirement. That would certainly be a fertile and. I think, a futile sources of strife. It is eminently a matter for a code of industrial relations.

I should like to conclude on a personal note, which I am sure many of your Lordships will not agree with. It may be politic at the present to put out a White Paper called In Place of Strife in which it is boldly stated that strikes are inevitable. But in the long term I believe that the day will come when strikes are considered as uncivilised as any other means of taking the law into one's own hands and getting one's way without regard to the effect on innocent third parties. The idea that it is justifiable to strike when all else has failed seems to me self-contradictory. So long as there are courts in the land to settle disputes all else has not failed. Let us make a start at least in that direction. In a civilised country the courts are the place to settle disputes. At least let us take steps to see that the withdrawal of labour in defiance of procedure just at the time when the employer and the public most need it is not only to be outlawed but heavily penalised.

The White Paper shows courage but not enough to satisfy the mood of the nation. There are some steps in the right direction and a few in the wrong direction. At least it is a great deal better than nothing at all, and we urge the Government to bring legislation before Parliament quickly. We shall hope to improve the Bill when it comes before us, and later to improve the Act after the next Election.

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