THE CASE OF P.C. LUCKHURST

HL Deb 11 March 1969 vol 300 cc407-54

6.35 p.m.

LORD WILLIS rose to ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will now reconsider their decision not to appoint an Independent Committee of Inquiry into the case of ex-P.C. Frederick Luckhurst. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name. I should like briefly to remind your Lordships of the background of this rather disturbing and worrying case. I ask your Lordships to cast your minds back to May 7, 1966, when it was reported to Iver police station that a bank overnight bag containing £139 had been lost. The following day, between 9.30 a.m. and 10.30 a.m., a Colonel Matters of Langley, in Buckinghamshire, found a night safe bag containing a sum of money. He promptly reported the matter by telephone to a local police station. A policeman then called at the house, it is said, collected the bag and returned the following evening in plain clothes (that is to say, with a sports jacket over his uniform trousers) to tell the Colonel that the wallet had been handed in and that it contained a sum of £40. We are discussing in this case a bag which was alleged to have been lost—it has never been proved—a bag that was found and was alleged to have contained £40, but was never produced at any moment at all in evidence.

Seven weeks later, Colonel Matters made inquiries about this money and the bag and learned that no bag had been handed in at any station. As a result of his complaint an official investigation was started. P.C. Luckhurst was one of the police officers who was questioned about the incident. He had been on duty at the time. But he denied all knowledge of the matter, and gave a detailed account of his movements. The next thing that happened was that he was required to take part with nine other local officers, all of whom were in uniform, and one of whom was a sergeant wearing stripes, in an identification parade.

Colonel Matters and his wife were asked to attend the parade, to see if they could identify the police officer who was supposed to have called at their house on two occasions, once to collect the wallet, and later to inform them that it had been handed in and that it contained £40. Colonel Matters walked down the line, said he was not sure, and then asked for the caps to be removed. He walked along the line a second time, and still was not sure. A third time, and still he was not certain. Then he stood back and pointed to P.C. Luckhurst. Mrs. Matters, who had the same opportunities of meeting the policemen as her husband, did not identify Luckhurst at the parade. It was only later, in the magistrates' court, that she did so. For that is the next scene in this story.

Immediately after the identification parade, within a few moments, P.C. Luckhurst was taken into the charge room and charged, solely on the basis of this identification, and sent for trial. On September 29, 1966, he was sentenced to prison for this offence. He was 38 years old at the time, with a wife and three children, and he had been a policeman for 10 years. Prior to this he had been a soldier in the Hussars for seven years. Neither as a soldier nor as a policeman had there been any stain whatsoever on his character. Luckhurst was advised that there was no ground for an appeal against conviction. Nevertheless, he filed an appeal and his brother and other relatives and friends provided limited funds. The appeal was rejected, although the Lord Chief Justice in his judgment referred to the "considerable difficulties or improbabilities" that arose in the prosecution's story.

My Lords, that is the background of this case. Simple it seems, perhaps, and straightforward. I do not think so, otherwise I should not be speaking on this matter now. In my view, in the view of the Police Federation, in the view of independent assessors and investigators there were many alarming and serious irregularities during the investigation of this case, and in its presentation at the trial, which seriously prejudiced the position of Luckhurst. Dr. Ronald Sampson, in a lucid summing up of the case, put the matter as follows: It is not necessary in English law for the accused to prove the certainty of his innocence. It is necessary for the prosecution to prove its case beyond ali reasonable doubt. In this case, the accused was denied the benefit of the doubt in instance after instance. In this case, the prosecution was given the benefit of the doubt in instance after instance.

My Lords, let me outline a few relevant facts, all of which were established at one time or another. The crucial features which supply evidence of guilt are as follows: first, that the accused should have access to knowledge which would enable him to commit the crime; secondly, that he should have the opportunity to commit the crime; thirdly, that he should have an adequate motive. Let us take the first point, access to knowledge which would enable the accused to commit the crime. Colonel Matters said he rang Langley police station to report his finding of the wallet. But as a matter of fact, right up until the trial Colonel Matters was quite uncertain as to which police station he had rung, because there were four police stations locally, each one of which he could have telephoned, and he decided that it must have been Langley only just prior to the trial. If he did ring Langley police station at the time he said he did, Luckhurst could not have taken the call reporting that the wallet had been found because he was at home taking his midmorning break. The man on duty who took the call, if such a call was made, was a P.C. Smith. But P.C. Smith has always denied taking such a call, and there is no official record of it at Langley police station.

However, the simple fact that Luckhurst was not there to take the telephone call, if it was made to Langley station, did not deter the prosecution at all. They came up with an explanation—and obviously it could be the only one possible—that P.C. Smith was somehow involved in this case. In fact, at the appeal hearing the Lord Chief Justice said: It was always the prosecution's case that Smith was in it … from the beginning. Yet, my Lords, Smith was never charged. He is still a serving police officer. He was the chief defence witness, who stuck stoutly to his colleague, yet his evidence was attacked by the prosecution, who plainly suggested that he was in collaboration with Luckhurst in this crime. He has, in effect, been accused but never charged, and has never been given an opportunity to clear his name. Why did the prosecution suggest that Smith was involved? Quite simply, the implication was that when Luckhurst returned to the station after his mid-morning break, Smith told him of the telephone call from the Colonel, and the two men then conspired together to steal the wallet.

The next question is this. Given that Luckhurst was told about the wallet by Smith, did he then have the opportunity to call on the Colonel and collect it and steal it? Not according to the investigation that was conducted later by a solicitor for Luckhurst in company with several police officers. The fact is that on that particular morning, when the information was laid by the Colonel that he had found the bag, when Luckhurst returned after his mid-morning break lie was immediately ordered by the sergeant on duty to take a Commer van—one of those large ones with a flashing light on top—and, with P.C. Smith, to drive to a local quarry and dispose of two unclaimed scooters. That conjures up all kinds of visions, which I will not go into at this stage.

However, they did this. The records, the route, everything, was checked by a solicitor with the aid of the police stop-watched and checked by an inspector of police. Those tests showed that the journey took 90 minutes and, therefore, that Luckhurst and Smith could not have deviated from their route, and could not have called on the Colonel and collected this wallet. These tests proved beyond doubt that the times and mileages as entered were correct, and certainly it is quite clear that it would have been impossible to forge the entries over those mileage meters, and so on. One would have thought that the police themselves in an inquiry of this nature would have taken the very simple step of making this test themselves with the Commer van to see whether Luckhurst's story held water, but they did not. It was only later that Luckhurst's solicitor got the collaboration of the police in carrying out these tests prior to the appeal, and that evidence was never allowed to be given at the hearing of the appeal.

My Lords, you might think, on the basis of all this alone, first that Luckhurst had no knowledge of the telephone call unless Smith told him; and, second, that if he did have knowledge in some way he certainly did not have the opportunity to steal the wallet. You might think that the prosecution case had about as much weight as a stick of candyfloss, and about as much significance. But there are many more disturbing facts on which I should like to touch briefly.

First, Colonel Matters was quite firm about the fact that the policeman who called upon him to collect the hag arrived in a car. But it was proved at the time, as I have indicated, that Luckhurst had access only to a Commer van, a large and conspicuous vehicle with a flashing light. Mrs. Matters, the Colonel's wife, in evidence at the trial referred specifically to Luckhurst's hair style. She said she had been almost sure about Luckhurst during the identification parade because he had a receding hair style which she remembered vividly. She was quite firm about this, and she said that Luckhurst was the only officer on the parade who had receding hair. Yet when Chief Inspector Hall, who was in charge of the identification parade, was questioned by the Deputy Chairman at the trial, he stated quite firmly and clearly that while Mrs. Matters was present at the parade the officers were wearing their headgear and did not uncover their heads while she was there. How could she tell that he had a receding hair style? Mr. Luckhurst is in the gallery to-day, and if any of your Lordships have an opportunity to see him you will be quite clear on one point: that if he was wearing a police hat or helmet at the time, as Chief Inspector Hall swore on oath, then Mrs. Matters must have possessed X-ray vision to see that he had receding hair.

Was Luckhurst given the benefit of this very substantial doubt about the accuracy of Mrs. Matters' testimony?—and here you have a clear-cut conflict between the Colonel's wife, on the one hand, and Chief Inspector Hall on the other. Oh no; not at all.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, I think my noble friend said earlier—and I believe correctly—that Mrs. Matters did not identify Mr. Luckhurst at the identification parade. She did not identify him. What he has said since then would appear to conflict with that, as if she had attempted to identify him.

LORD WILLIS

My Lords, I think my noble friend has missed the point. She failed to identify him at the identification parade; then she said in the magistrates' court that she nearly identified him because of his receding hair style, but was not sure. I think that if my noble friend looks it up he will find that is the fact of the case; and it was the receding hair style by which she said she nearly recognised him, plus his high colour, at the identification parade. But they were wearing caps at the identification parade.

Was Luckhurst given the benefit of this very substantial conflict between Chief Inspector Hall and Mrs. Matters on this very important subject? Oh, no. The Deputy Chairman told the jury, when he summed up: You may think the Chief Inspector was faulty in his recollection when he said that she"— that was Mrs. Matters,— only saw a parade … on which the men had their heads covered. In other words, he did not say "The weight of the evidence is equal on both sides, and you must give Luckhurst, the accused, the benefit of the doubt", as is the basic principle. On the contrary, he came down heavily for a point of view expressed by Mrs. Matters, and virtually dismissed Chief Inspector Hall's testimony. He gave the whole weight to Mrs. Matters; he gave the prosecution, and not the accused, the benefit of the doubt.

My Lords, I turn to two other very serious aspects of the case, both of which prejudiced or hurt Luckhurst. Both deal with the handling of the investigation by senior officers of police. It is specifically laid down in the Police Act of 1964 that if a complaint is made against the police which might disclose a possible criminal offence—and they are the important words—the matter must be referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions. A Chief Officer is bound, unless he is satisfied that no criminal offence has been committed, to send a report of the investigation to the Director. It is for the Director, and not for the Chief Constable, to decide whether criminal proceedings shall be brought. This clearly defined procedure was ignored by the Chief Officer—at that moment the acting Chief Constable of the Buckinghamshire police. Luckhurst was arrested and charged without any reference to the Director of Public Prosecutions.

I find this extraordinary. The Home Office has drawn the attention of Chief Constables throughout the country to this important part of the Police Act. But it has not done Luckhurst very much good. He was denied the safeguard provided by an Act of Parliament, and now we are rather locking the stable door after the horse has bolted. The Chief Officers of the Buckinghamshire Police were clearly wrong in this matter, for whatever reason, and yet Luckhurst, who was the one to suffer because his superiors neglected to carry out their duty, is denied any redress.

The second aspect, which also concerns police procedure, arises out of the identity parade which was held. An identification parade is never really a successful way of establishing positive evidence at the best of times—it is often just perhaps the clincher. But this particular parade was conducted with such irregularity that it amounted to a travesty of justice. Specific rules are laid down for the guidance of the police, and they have recently been reinforced by a new instruction from the Home Office. One rule is that where there are two suspects there should either be two separate identity parades, or one identity parade consisting of twelve people at least, if not fourteen, and that they should be roughly of similar appearance, age and height in the parade. Since all the men who were involved in this particular parade were local section men, all of whom might have been under suspicion at some time or another and to some extent or another, it is clearly rather ridiculous to confront a colonel, who must have seen all these officers around at one point or another, with a parade of his local section men. But in the Luckhurst case the line-up consisted of nine men only, one of whom was a sergeant wearing stripes, which effectively eliminates him and reduces the number to eight. Two men were direct suspects, Luckhurst and Smith, so that reduces the effective number in the line-up to six—half of the requirement.

Even with this handful, Colonel Matters found it difficult to make a positive identification. What is even more disturbing is that Chief Superintendent Strong of the Buckinghamshire police made a statement to the effect that he paraded the men solely to establish whether or not a member of that section was involved. In other words, this was a clear admission that this was not a formal identification parade at all in the legal sense. And no amount of argument can change that, because that is what he did. Afterwards it became a formal and official identification parade. A parade may not be held in order to establish one thing and then be altered round to meet the convenience of the investigating officers when it suits them. Yet it was this tragi-comedy of an identification parade which was the main reason for the arrest and trial of Luckhurst. I think there is sufficient there to indicate that I was right when I said at the beginning that this is a strange and disturbing case.

May I briefly emphasise the major points once more. First, Luckhurst was denied the protection afforded by the Police Act of 1964 when his superiors failed in their clear duty to report their investigation to the Director of Public Prosecutions and await his instructions. The Director might have decided that there was a case for trial, but it is my view—and it is the view of many eminent people who have studied the case—that on the evidence available it is obvious that he might equally have decided that Luckhurst had no case to answer. Secondly, there was the irregular and almost non-existent identification parade which again prejudiced Luckhurst. Thirdly, there were the contradictions in the evidence against him, particularly in relationship to the Colonel's statement that the police officer who called on him came by car, whereas Luckhurst only had a big Commer van. Finally, there is the mysterious question of Mrs. Matter's evidence about recognising Luckhurst by his receding hairline at the parade, when there is equally strong, if not stronger, testimony that she could not possibly have seen Luckhurst's hair during the parade, and did not in fact pick him out at the time.

There was then the clear and, so far as I can see, undisputed evidence that Luckhurst was not on duty at the time the Colonel telephoned and consequently, if he did steal this bag, it must have been in collusion with somebody else and that other person has never been charged and brought to trial. At the time he was supposed to have called on the Colonel to steal the wallet, he was miles away on other police duty, as has been sworn in an affidavit. Finally, there is the amazing situation with regard to P.C. Smith. On three or four occasions the prosecution alleged or implied that he was involved in the crime with Luckhurst—yet he has never been charged and has never been given an opportunity to clear his name of these damaging allegations.

Your Lordships may well be thinking: if Luckhurst did not commit this crime, who did? The answer to that I do not know, and it is no part of my purpose here to-day to indulge in guesswork. But unseemly and panic haste to accuse someone, and to accuse Luckhurst in particular, seems to have been the answer of the police to this question. What I am concerned with to-day is that a man was arrested, charged and imprisoned, his career ruined, on the basis of evidence which is flimsy, circumstantial, contradictory, biased, and often downright false. I am concerned that a British citizen has been denied that full measure of justice which is his by law and right.

The Home Office have said that they cannot re-open the case because there is no new evidence to support such action. Who needs fresh evidence when the old evidence in favour of Luckhurst is so strong, and when the old evidence against him is so full of holes? This trial is over two years old now; it is cold, and it is impossible to get anything new. I take my stand on this question on the old evidence. In any case, one cannot be altogether sure that new evidence would bring about a change in attitude. We had only last week the example of the man who had been wrongly committed to Rampton Mental Hospital nearly four years ago. Last June the Home Office were given some vital new evidence in this case, and dismissed it. It was only after a further inquiry, which was largely engineered by the Member of Parliament who had fought the case, that the Home Office were forced to admit that the man was innocent. I mention this not to kick the Home Office, but merely to indicate that they are not infallible, that they can make mistakes, that it does not behove them to adopt an attitude of rigidity towards these questions of justice and liberty, and that in matters where the guilt or innocence of a human being is at stake nobody, least of all a Government Department, can afford to adopt an inflexible attitude.

What have the Home Office got to lose by an independent inquiry? If it confirms the findings of the court, then they are vindicated. If it does not and Luckhurst is found to be innocent, then they have served the cause of justice and earned all our thanks. There was an official police inquiry, the report of which has never been published. Luckhurst has never seen it; his counsel has never seen it, and we do not know what is in it; and we shall not be allowed to know, for these reports are private and privileged. Therefore, I want to see an open, independent inquiry, made up of people who have no connection with the police and who can assess the evidence objectively. Without it the doubt must linger on—and not only a doubt, a suspicion also, a suspicion which may or may not be well-founded, but which I have often heard expressed in relation to this case.

It is the inevitable suspicion that there is more behind this case than meets the eye; that Luckhurst has been made the scapegoat for other people's incompetence, or worse; that to reopen the matter might cause acute embarrassment to some people; that there is some sort of cover-up going on; that the crust of the Establishment has closed over this case and hardened like concrete. It may be shocking to hold or to voice such a suspicion, but we all know that this sort of thing has happened before and will probably happen again, human nature being what it is. Human beings can do strange things when they are forced into a corner. The Home Office can clear away any such thoughts, doubts or suspicions by agreeing to the appointment of an independent inquiry.

I have not touched on the question of motive and, in conclusion, I should like to do so briefly now. No motive was ever established against Luckhurst. He was not in any debt, his character and integrity was unquestioned, and he liked his job. There was absolutely no reason why he should jeopardise all this by stealing the wallet. There was no evidence that he had been spending extra money and none of the money was found on him or in his house—according to the evidence I have studied—while no trace of the bag was ever found. Moreover, he is not a stupid man. If he was the officer who called on Colonel Matters and collected the wallet and if he did decide to steal it, why on earth should he call back the following evening and give the Colonel one more look at him? He must have known that Colonel Matters would follow the matter up later. Why, therefore, would he expose himself to identification in this way? Why commit larceny so clumsily?

It would be easy, perhaps, for Mr. Luckhurst to try to put all this behind him, to move from the area, to make a new life, forgetting the past and its injustices. But he has not taken the easy way, because he is one of those strange, curious and stubborn men who sometimes spring up in this country, who happens to think that his good name and his reputation are important. From the first moment he was accused until the present day he has not ceased to proclaim his innocence. He has had the backing of all kinds of organisations, including 11 police constables in Slough who signed a statement professing his innocence, which was never admitted in court: an independent investigator, Chief Superintendent Brennan, has sifted through the evidence and come up with largely the same points as I have indicated to-day; and eminent lawyers have expressed their concern about the case.

Luckhurst has put himself into debt, pawned his future prospects, in order to fight his case and to establish his innocence. Guilty men do not do that; they take their punishment and creep away, secretly accepting the verdict of society. He has refused to take the easy way. He maintains, with extraordinary optimism, in view of his circumstances, an abiding faith in British justice, and is convinced that even if it takes twenty years it will eventually clear his name.

Shakespeare, as always, had the words for it, words for this sort of situation, when he said: Who steals my purse, steals trash; 'tis something, nothing; 'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands; But he that filches from me my good name Robs me of that which not enriches him And makes me poor indeed. This may appear to be a very small issue in comparison with great world issues like Vietnam, Nigeria and the balance of payments. But it is not. It is something that strikes at the roots of the British tradition of law and justice. I beg the Home Office, I beg the Government, to end this attitude of inflexibility, to give this man at least the chance of clearing his name before an independent commission of inquiry.

7.4 p.m.

THE EARL OF CORK AND ORRERY

My Lords, we have good reason to be grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Willis, for putting down this Question, for by doing so he performs a public service. I say that because this case is concerned not solely with the fate of one man but with the administration of justice which, to be justice of truth, must be seen to be such. This case is so full of doubts that I think it is impossible for any impartial observer to be convinced that justice was done, and I say that without taking any stand on any belief in the guilt or otherwise of the man concerned. This is simply a question of how the matter was handled. The noble Lord confined his speech almost entirely to facts. All I can do, without being a nuisance to your Lordships, is to underline a few of the facts, and perhaps elaborate them slightly.

At the Court of Appeal, the Lord Chief Justice said that there were, considerable improbabilities in regard to this case if it were to be established that Mr. Luckhurst was guilty of the offence charged. But having said that, he then said (I am quoting from the New Law Journal of February 22, 1968) that the converse view, that Mr. Luckhurst was innocent led to equal if not greater improbabilities. In effect, therefore, Mr. Luckhurst's conviction appears to have been upheld or a balance of improbabilities, and the balancing factor was undoubtedly the incompatibility of his innocence and his identification by Colonel Matters at the Langley police station parade. What in fact was the evidence which convicted Mr. Luckhurst? It was the identification at that parade. The noble Lord, Lord Willis, has drawn attention to numerous irregularities in the way in which that parade was carried out. Those are technical matters with which I shall not concern myself. But I invite your Lordships' attention to the rest of Colonel Matters's evidence which brought Mr. Luckhurst to the point of trial. Colonel Matters was the man who found the bag. A bag had been lost, and we know that because somebody—an unidentified person—reported it as having been lost. It has never been seen and, so far as I know—although I may be wrong—the evidence that it was lost has not been corroborated.

I think it was the next day that Colonel Matters reported to a police station that he had found it, though I do not know that his finding it was ever corroborated either. He then handed it over in the evening of the same day to a policeman. The fact that he handed it over has been corroborated by nobody, certainly not by the police. The bag was never received at any police station. Colonel Matters said that he telephoned the police station in the morning between 10.15 and 10.45. But in the words of the Deputy Chairman of Quarter Sessions what he actually said was that he thought it was between 10.15 and 10.45. He was not certain. Later in the day he said that Police Constable Luckhurst came to his house in a car—

LORD KILBRACKEN

My Lords, he did not say that it was Police Constable Luckhurst who came. He said that a police constable came.

THE EARL OF CORK AND ORRERY

My Lords, I accept the correction of the noble Lord: it was only later that Police Constable Luckhurst was identified. A policeman came to his house in a car. But it was established that when Police Constable Luckhurst became involved he was driving a large Commer van, with a blue light on top. As the noble Lord, Lord Willis, has pointed out, Colonel Matters was uncertain which police station he had rung up. He was not uncertain only when first asked: he was uncertain throughout the committal proceedings in the magistrates' court. It was only between that appearance and the trial itself at Quarter Sessions, that he became convinced that the police station concerned had been Langley.

That sums up the evidence on which Luckhurst was brought to trial, and I think I am not stretching the matter too far when I say that I have seldom met a collection of evidence more widely open to doubt. There is not one single item that is corroborated, and there is much in it of which Colonel Matters himself was unsure. Yet on the strength of that evidence Police Constable Luckhurst was brought into an identification parade, and was picked out only with the greatest difficulty by Colonel Matters. On the strength of that identification, he was convicted. There may have been some slight corroboration (I will come to that in a moment), but basically that is all that convicted him—that identification, carried out with great difficulty and uncertainty, as described by the noble Lord, Lord Willis, three months (I think the noble Lord said seven weeks, but I believe that in fact it was as much as twelve weeks) after he had seen a policeman, once in the morning and once in the evening—and, incidentally, once in plain clothes. Three months later he was able to go to an identity parade and pick out a man in uniform and say, "That was the man". My Lords, is it possible to do that? Would any of your Lordships undertake to say, "That was the man"? I know very well that I would not.

On the question of whether there was any corroboration, we come to the question of Mrs. Matters and this highly doubtful matter of Luckhurst's receding hair style, as she described it. That has been disposed of by the noble Lord, Lord Willis, and it was disposed of by the Court of Appeal, where the Lord Chief Justice said that Mrs. Matters's evidence was to be ignored—and surely very properly. That is all very well; but was it ignored at the trial? This was part of the evidence on which Luckhurst was convicted; and, as the noble Lord has pointed out, the Deputy Chairman in charge of the trial was at no pains to make a balance in favour of the chief inspector, who said that Luckhurst had had his cap on, and against Mrs. Matters's evidence. So I think it is fairly certain that Mrs. Matters's evidence told against Luckhurst.

Now we come to the position of Police Constable Owen Smith, who, to the best of my knowledge and belief, is still a serving policeman. As has been made perfectly clear by the noble Lord, Lord Willis, this was the officer who was concerned with Luckhurst throughout the material time on the day concerned. His was the evidence that supported Luckhurst. It was absolutely cast-iron evidence and it was accepted as such by the Deputy Chairman at the Quarter Sessions, who said it was perfectly clear beyond doubt that Smith had been with Luckhurst throughout the material time. Was Luckhurst guilty, or was he not guilty? If he was guilty, then surely so was Smith. But Smith has never been brought to trial, so presumably Smith is not guilty. Then why was Luckhurst convicted? My Lords, you cannot have it both ways: you cannot convict Luckhurst and allow his "accomplice" (I use this word in inverted commas) to go free and to continue in service—

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, I must interrupt the noble Earl at this point. I hope we shall not start talking about accomplices. We are privileged here, my Lords, and, whatever the facts of this case, we should not use our position to cast aspersions on other people who cannot possibly defend themselves here.

THE EARL OF CORK AND ORRERY

My Lords, I think the noble Lord has done me an injustice. I made a point of saying that I put that word in inverted commas. Perhaps I may have the noble Lord's ear. I said on purpose, having used that word, that I put it in inverted commas. I did not mean the word to be used in its ordinarily accepted sense, and that is what I intended by that. I shall explain why I did it in a moment. The last thing I wish to do is anything which would justify the very proper strictures which the noble Lord has aimed at me—and I hope he will accept that from me.

Police Constable Smith was with Police Constable Luckhurst. He was alleged, therefore—I must be very careful; he was suspected, according to the prosecution, of having had some hand in this crime. The prosecution always took the view that you could not rule Smith out of it and this view of theirs was repeated. They were stated to have held this view by the Court of Appeal. Very well; but these two men have been separated, and I think this fact alone is enough to establish the fact that there must have been a miscarriage of justice. It may have been a miscarriage of justice against Luckhurst. It may, and I think it a [most certainly was, a miscarriage of justice against Smith, because Smith most certainly has been accused, by implication, if no more, of being involved in a crime, and has never been given the chance to defend himself in open court. That, surely, of itself is grounds for an inquiry into the whole case.

The noble Lord, Lord Willis, asks: If Luckhurst did not commit the crime, who did? The noble Lord does not answer that question. Who can answer it? Who wishes to answer it? I certainly do not. But, my Lords, what was the crime? What evidence has been produced that there ever was a crime in the first place? I began by running over, I hope reasonably accurately, the evidence which was produced, showing that a bag had been lost, that a bag had been found and that a bag had been handed to a policeman. But where was this bag? We do not know. There are all sorts of possibilities, none of which I propose to adumbrate in any way at all. I have nothing to add but to say that I have come to the same conclusion as that which the noble Lord, Lord Willis, came to and which is represented by his Question. That is, that there is so much doubt, so much uncertainty and, I believe, my Lords, so much unease in the public mind that I think a public inquiry should be held.

7.17 p.m.

VISCOUNT ADDISON

My Lords, there are nine speakers on this Unstarred Question, and I therefore propose to confine my remarks to one or two aspects only. I am quite confident that all relevant aspects will be fully touched upon by the time we have reached the end of the list of speakers. When this matter went to the Court of Appeal, as has already been mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Willis, and the noble Earl, Lord Cork and Orrery, the Lord Chief Justice made reference to "considerable difficulties and improbabilities". My Lords, there is nothing to find fault with in those comments when you have read some of the details of this astonishing case. I repeat what the noble Earl, Lord Cork and Orrery, said, that we are all most grateful to my noble friend Lord Willis, because without his Unstarred Question the case might just have gone by the board and might perhaps have been forgotten as a small matter to be shrugged off. Speaking for myself, I must admit that but for this Question I would never have known anything about it, and I imagine that a good many of your Lordships are in the same position.

My Lords, this bag was a night safe bag. It would have been locked when found by Colonel Matters. It was alleged to have contained £139. Colonel Matters, of course, would not know this, because he did not have the key, and could not have looked inside. We have Colonel Matters's word for it (and there is no reason to doubt his word) that he reported the find by telephone to the police—that is, a bag with unspecified contents. Yet there is no record of any such telephone call being received at any of the police stations in the vicinity. However, Colonel Matters again says that the bag was collected the same day by a policeman in a car, and that the next day the policeman came back again to tell Colonel Matters that there was £40 in the bag.

My Lords, it seems to me that there are two points here. First of all, why did the policeman not sign for the bag when he collected it from Colonel Matters in the first place? Secondly, if he did not offer to sign for it, why did not Colonel Matters, who, as an experienced soldier, would know perfectly well that you never hand over anything without getting a proper discharge for it, ask for a signature, from which the policeman would have been identified? P.C. Luckhurst did not go out in the car that day. He was out in a large van accompanied by another officer, P.C. Smith; but the record of the journey and the speedometer reading of this van, which performed the duty for which it was ordered out, indicated that it could not have gone near Colonel Matters's house. Why, I wonder, was it necessary for the policeman, if he were guilty—and I think this point was made by the noble Lord opposite—to make a second call on the next day to tell Colonel Matters the contents of the bag? Why could he not have made a telephone call, which is cheaper, quicker and more appropriate? And, of course, if the receipt had been obtained in the first place even that would have been obviated. The upshot of all these points is that P.C. Luckhurst was put in the position of performing the impossible task of proving himself innocent—which is contrary to the established principles of British justice.

My Lords, I hope and trust that my noble friend Lord Stonham—and he is my noble friend; I have every confidence in his sympathy and kindness and toleration and he knows that I have such confidence—will give the answers to a few more questions when he comes to reply. First, why was not the case referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions before P.C. Luckhurst was charged; and what action has been taken in respect of the individual who failed in his duty so to refer the case? Second, was the case of P.C. Smith ever referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions; and if so, with what result? My Lords, I ask my noble friend these two questions specifically and I expect to receive an answer to both.

I do not propose to refer to the identification parade which has been already adequately dealt with except to say that it seems to have been carried on in an exceedingly unprofessional way, to say the least of it. The accused was identified by one of two people who had an equal chance to know what he looked like—and then only at the third or fourth attempt. I am not sure whether it was at the third or at the fourth attempt. One can assess that as a 50 per cent. success if one Is generous; and that, I think, is the most generous estimate. It simply cannot, in fairness, be free from at least sonic degree of doubt.

My Lords, there is one other question that I should like to put to the noble Lord who will be replying on behalf of the Government. Who advised P.C. Luckhurst that he had no grounds for an appeal, when the whole evidence seems to bristle with doubts, the benefit of which would have been given to him? Did not the Lord Chief Justice in the Court of Appeal expressly refer to "considerable difficulties and improbabilities"? My Lords, improbabilities, yes. It seems to me, judging from what I have read of this case, that it is improbable that P.C. Luckhurst was guilty and it seems certain to me that he was not proved guilty.

7.25 p.m.

LORD FOOT

My Lords, I have been trying to foresee what sort of reply we are going to get from the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, at the end of this short debate. If he is going to refuse to agree to this proposed independent inquiry I imagine that he will rest his case in this way: he will say that where there is a case of a man having been tried according to the ordinary process of law, having been convicted by a jury, appealing against that conviction and having his appeal dismissed by the Court of Criminal Appeal, it is not the business of the Executive to constitute itself as a sort of super Court of Appeal and to interfere with the decision of the Courts. At any rate, that is the general rule and, if I may say so, I accept that entirely as the general rule. Indeed, we should be embarking on a perilous course if we were ever not to accept that that is the general rule and that it is not the business of the Executive, in the ordinary way and in the absence of exceptional circumstances, to interfere in the decisions of the Courts—and especially where the decision of the court has been confirmed by the Court of Appeal.

But, my Lords, I ask myself this question. Are there cases, exceptional cases, where it would be permissible and proper, and, indeed, imperative, that the Executive should look at a case and should, where they are satisfied, interfere with the decision of the Courts? Clearly, there are exceptions. One of them is where new evidence comes to light after the matter has been dealt with in the court of first instance and in the Court of Appeal. That we all know. And if new evidence comes to light which seems to demonstrate that the individual was wrongly convicted, then there are various courses open to the Home Office. One of them is to send back the case to the Court of Appeal and invite them, in the light of the new evidence, to look again. Another course, if they are satisfied that the man was wrongfully convicted, is to grant him the rather anomalous remedy of the free pardon. There are various ways in which the matter can be dealt with. I ask myself this question and I respectfully ask the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, this question: are there other circumstances in which the Executive might be entitled to interfere with the decision of the Court, to this extent: that it should set up an independent inquiry to try to find out the real facts of the case?

Although I listened with every attention to all the criticisms that have been made, and very rightly made, of the way in which the identification parade was held on this occasion, I do not myself think, whatever impropriety occurred, that that, by itself, would be a justification for setting up an independent inquiry. There are two features of this case to which I would draw the attention of the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, and which, I suggest, are so exceptional as to justify interference by the Executive by way of an inquiry. The first is the failure to comply with the requirements of the Police Act 1964. May I remind your Lordships that the Police Act, Section 49, says: Where the chief officer of police … receives a complaint from a member of the public against a member of the police force for that area he shall"— I am leaving out the unimportant words— … record the complaint and cause it to be investigated … It then goes on to describe the way in which he shall arrange for the investigation to take place. Then subsection (3) says: On receiving the report of an investigation under this section the chief officer of police, unless satisfied from the report the no criminal offence has been committed, shall send the report to the Director of Public Prosecutions. Rather curiously, it stops there and does not go on to say, as some Statutes do, that no prosecution shall be instituted without the authority of the Director. That that was the purpose of this section is put beyond any sort of doubt because this matter is dealt with, and the purpose and the meaning of the section is dealt with, in the Home Office Circular No. 21 of 1967 in which it says that where a case arises under Section 49 it is for the Director of Public Prosecutions to determine whether or not criminal proceedings shall be taken.

My Lords, I do not think it is disputed that in this case no such report was sent to the Director. He never had the opportunity of considering the papers. What is the object of requiring the report to be sent to the Director? It can have no other object, I suggest, than to ensure that before any proceedings are instituted against a policeman the matter shall be considered by a wholly independent authority. That can be the only purpose of the section; and it is that defence and protection which was struck out of the hands of Mr. Luckhurst by the failure of the police authority to send the report to the Director. It might well have been that the Director would have decided, looking at the papers and the report, that it would be quite wrong to put a man at risk of prosecution and conviction upon evidence so tenuous and so slender as in this case.

The other feature of this case which I suggest justifies an inquiry is the curious situation of Police Constable Smith. Nothing that I say here is intended to constitute any reflection upon him. Indeed, if one takes the view as I do, and as the noble Lord, Lord Willis, does, that Mr. Luckhurst was wrongly convicted, clearly we share the view that Constable Smith was in no way implicated in this business at all. But it seems to me (I am not going to review the facts of the matter again) to follow quite incontrovertibly that if the verdict of the jury was right and Mr. Luckhurst was guilty of this offence, clearly Constable Smith connived at the offence and was himself guilty of the same criminal offence of converting this bag and this money to his use, either as a principal or as an accessory. I am afraid that that follows most certainly. Anybody who has read the papers must agree that that is the case.

If that is so, and if it follows from the verdict of the jury, if the jury's verdict was right, that Constable Smith has committed a criminal offence, why are no proceedings brought against him? I suggest—I think it is a reasonable assumption—that the reason why no proceedings are brought against him is that if proceedings were brought they would fail, and we should then have the absurd and anomalous situation that two juries had disagreed and come to contrary conclusions on the same evidence: one jury concluding that Mr. Luckhurst was guilty and the other jury concluding that Constable Smith is innocent; coming to opposite conclusions upon the basis of exactly the same evidence.

My Lords, is that what the Home Office is worried about: that they might find that if proceedings were brought here, the proceedings against Smith would almost certainly fail and we should find ourselves in that almost intolerable situation? I can see the difficulty. We should all be in a hopeless position if that should result. Is that not a good argument for trying to resolve this matter by way of an independent investigation? If we are in danger of running into this trouble of having two verdicts which contradict each other, one man having gone to prison—for 12 months, was it not?—and another man acquitted and maintaining his position in society and in the police force; if we are frightened of having that anomalous result, is it not fair and reasonable, and would it not get the Home Office out of a hole, to agree to an independent inquiry and an independent investigation?

If, at the end of this debate, the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, gives us a negative answer, that will not allay all these doubts. It will not be the end of this matter; all this uncertainty will continue. There have, of course, been cases before where the Home Office has turned down an application for an inquiry. We had the dreadful experience of the Evans case. Are we going to make that mistake again? It is not to be believed that if we are turned down to-night it is the end of the matter; that Mr. Luckhurst will go home and we shall hear no more about it. We are going to hear about this until the matter has been cleared up.

7.36 p.m.

LORD FRANCIS-WILLIAMS

My Lords, I have no desire at this stage to go in detail through all the matters which have arisen in this case and which have been so excellently and clearly stated by my noble friend and by other speakers. I simply want to confine myself to making an appeal to the noble Lord, Lord Stonham (for whom everybody in this House has the very highest respect, knowing his long experience and his deep-seated tradition of justice and kindliness) not to answer in the negative. As has been said, my Lords, a negative answer to-night is not going to end this affair. It is one of those cases—and there are many in the history of this country—which will go on and on because public opinion knows in its heart that there is something wrong; because the evidence it is asked to accept simply does not add up; because this charge was based on such a mass of inconsistencies that it just is not viable to ordinary common sense.

My Lords, it is a case which bristles with so many difficulties that one could go on and on reiterating them, and they have been pointed out again and again by every speaker in this debate. Inconsistencies in evidence; the startling fact, as the noble Lord, Lord Foot, has said, that if there had been a case brought against both the police constables you would have been faced with two different verdicts. In fact, my Lords, that is what you are faced with now, because in one instance it was decided to bring a case against Luckhurst; in the other instance, although the evidence involving the other police constable was almost identical, no case was brought. You have two verdicts: one verdict that a man's career shall be ended and, but for his own courage and pertinacity, his life ruined; and another that a man's career in the police shall go on under a suspicion but unaffected. And this inconsistency, I assure the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, and as I am sure that he would agree, is something that British public opinion will find it impossible to swallow. This case will go on as a festering sore unless it is settled, in the only way it can be settled, by an impartial, independent inquiry.

It is particularly essential that where the police are concerned justice shall be done and shall be seen to be done. It is particularly essential that the public shall feel that, if a member of the police force is guilty of a crime, his uniform shall not be allowed to cover up that crime and that he shall be brought to justice. But it is absolutely vital to public confidence that the public shall also be aware that justice is done to the police force itself, and that when a member of that force is suspected of a crime every precaution is taken to ensure that he gets true and proper consideration and adequate justice. Manifestly, there was a failure all along the line in this case.

One other thing is important—enormously important—to the proper conduct of justice and police administration in this country; that is, that members of the police force shall themselves feel that if they fall under the shadow of suspicion they will receive fair treatment and a fair examination of their case. There surely can be nothing more damaging to police morale, which it is so important to sustain, than for the message to go out that a police constable of fine record and of known good character can appear to be "railroaded", as in this case, on the flimsiest and most contrary of evidence. So I appeal to my noble friend to wave away all the temptations of bureaucracy which I have no doubt are assailing him, and have assailed him ever since this case came up, and to stand in your Lordships' House and, with that honesty for which we all honour him, agree that the case for an independent investigation has been made out.

7.44 p.m.

LORD BROCKWAY

My Lords, like the other speakers I want to thank my noble friend Lord Willis for raising this matter tonight. In one sense I am sorry that there have been any other speakers than my noble friend himself, as it seemed to me that he made such a strong case that what he said should be much more in the mind of my noble friend the Minister when Ire comes to reply than any of the remarks which other speakers may have made.

I am concerned in this case because Frederick Luckhurst was a police constable at Langley, which was in my constituency. He lived just outside my constituency at Iver, and because I did not want to trespass on the political territory of another Member of another place I did not take up his case publicly. But I did take it up privately, and for this reason. Among the ordinary men and women who live in Langley, among those who come to my political surgery on a Saturday and among the members of the police force in Slough itself, I found an absolute conviction after the sentence was passed that ex-P.C. Luckhurst was not guilty. I think it quite extraordinary, in view of the fact that the Buckinghamshire Police should have brought this prosecution, that eleven colleagues of ex-P.C. Luckhurst in the Slough Police Force should have signed a document stating that in their view he was innocent of the charge which was brought against him.

Because I want to take my own advice and not divide too much what my noble friend Lord Willis said at the beginning from the reply which the Minister will make, I will only say that when I was led to consider this matter, as a result of the extraordinary public feeling in Langley and Slough, there were two questions which were most prominent in my mind and I hope that when he comes to reply the Minister will be able to make a statement on them. I was first influenced by the fact that the Buckinghamshire Police did not refer this complaint to the Director of Public Prosecutions, as required by Section 49(3) of the Police Act 1964, and because they did not do that, ex-P.C. Luckhurst was denied the opportunity of having his case considered by an independent authority before it was brought to court.

The second consideration which was in my mind, and which has been referred to by other speakers, was the unsatisfactory composition of the identification parade. I think it is always doubtful whether evidence by identification parade should be taken as so absolute as it is, and if one looks at the composition of this particular parade, one honestly could not have a feeling that it was any guarantee of the truth of the charge. And if one reads the transcript of the proceedings, one finds that almost the entire case for finding ex-P.C. Luckhurst guilty was identification at this parade.

I want to say just two more things. First—and I do not think that anyone has yet said this—I find it extraordinary that the Police Federation should have asked for a judicial inquiry. It is almost unprecedented on the part of the Police Federation to declare an opinion upon such a matter, because the charge against ex-P.C. Luckhurst was brought by the Buckinghamshire Police. That the Police Federation were so convinced of the justice of having some reconsideration of this case and should have declared themselves in this way, though members of the police force were concerned on both sides, seems to me good evidence of the strength of the case which noble Lords who have spoken tonight have tried to set out.

The last thing I want to say is this. I ask my noble friend the Minister to consider our request for an inquiry, not only for the sake of ex-Police Constable Luckhurst but for the sake of Police Constable Owen Smith. He complained that some- one was doing an injustice. I put it to the Minister that unless there is an inquiry it is the Home Office which will be doing Police Constable Owen Smith an injustice, and for this reason: that Police Constable Owen Smith in the court gave evidence which corroborated in every detail the defence of ex-Police Constable Luckhurst. I do not want to make a charge, because I think ex-Police Constable Luckhurst was innocent. I therefore think that no charge can be made against Police Constable Owen Smith. But I am saying that if ex-Police Constable Luckhurst was guilty, then a very serious charge in the matter of the procedure of evidence in court could be brought against Police Constable Owen Smith.

As I say, it is not only for the sake of ex-Police Constable Luckhurst that I am pleading. Police Constable Owen Smith is under a cloud. He remains in the police force, and has been removed from one division to another. That suspicion must rest on him, and it is for the Home Office, not only for the sake of ex-Police Constable Luckhurst but for the sake also of Police Constable Owen Smith, to ensure that there should at least be the opportunity for both of their names to be vindicated by the kind of inquiry for which we are asking. I join with others in making that appeal to the Minister. Indeed, I would make an appeal even above him to our Home Secretary, who has shown that he has the readiness to look at issues of this kind again and not to be bound by the kind of red-tape procedure which there has often been at the Home Office. I make my appeal both to the heart of the one and to the brain of the other, or the brain of the first and the heart of the other combined, and ask the Minister at least not to close the door this evening but to say that, having heard all that has been said in this House, he will refer it to the Home Secretary and put to him the very strong case which my noble friend Lord Willis made and which has been supported by all the speakers from all sides of the House.

7.53 p.m.

LORD KILBRACKEN

My Lords, when I observed that I was to be the last speaker on the list before the Minister came to reply, and when I saw that the six speakers who preceded me were all such eloquent and eminent noble Lords (in particular, I would mention my noble friend Lord Willis, to whom we are grateful for putting down this Question to-day), I felt rather afraid that by the time it was my turn to stand up I should have had to cross out just about everything that I had intended to say. But having listened with the greatest attention to all the speeches that have been made, I think I still have a number of important and relevant facts to draw to the attention of your Lordships which have not so far been raised.

We have heard a great deal about this highly controversial identification parade that was held at Slough. But one thing which has not been brought out is that this identification parade was regarded in an extremely different way by the police who were conducting it, and by Colonel Matters who was going to try to identify the culprit. So far as Colonel Matters is concerned, it is possible to quote from his cross-examination by defence counsel at quarter sessions. Mr. Laughland said to Colonel Matters: You knew when you went into the identification parade that the parade would contain a man or men who might be thought to have been on duty at Langley police station on the 8th May? Colonel Matters replied: Yes, I suppose so. He was then asked: In other words, you thought it likely that the suspected culprit would be there on parade? And Colonel Matters replied: Yes. The police themselves, however, were regarding it in an extremely and significantly different way, because I have here a report made by Chief Superintendent Strong in a letter to the Police Federation News Letter; and he was the senior officer at Slough Police Station on the day that the parade took place. He was replying to the charge that because there had been two suspects present at that parade there should have been two separate parades. He replied in the following terms: I understand from the Press that a question has been raised in the News Letter that at the time the identification parade was held there were two suspects. At that time there were none within this category. By that he must have meant: "At that time we had no suspects." I repeat: At that time there were none within this category. The officer who conducted the identification parade was in no way connected with the investigation. The precise function was solely that of establishing whether or riot a member of this police force, that is, the Buckinghamshire Police Force, was involved. For this purpose he paraded all the members of the force"— as I shall show in a moment— who had been on duty at Langley and at Iver on the morning of the 8th May, 1966. So far as the police position is concerned, on that day they were not saying, "We think we have got the man who did it here." They were merely parading all those police officers who had been on duty at Langley and at Iver that morning. And, to be quite precise, the identification parade consisted of four police officers from Langley and two from Iver who had been on dory on the morning of May 8; three police officers from Langley and Iver who had not been on duty that day; and one man from Slough making up the number. So that one can come to only one of two conclusions. On the one hand, as was said in this News Letter, there were no suspects present in this parade, in which case one has to ask: what was the point of holding a parade if the person who was supposed to have done it was not necessarily there? But if, on the other hand, anyone who was present at Langley or at Iver Police stations on that particular morning was considered a suspect, then there were six suspects out of ten people present. And whoever Colonel Matters chose, the odds were six to four on, I think, that he would choose someone who could be considered to have taken part in this crime, and then he would have been in exactly the same position as Luckhurst is in to-day, of having been identified by a responsible and respected officer and having to prove that he was not there and to prove an alibi.

The next point to consider is that Colonel Matters, believing that the culprit was definitely there, that the police had decided who they thought had done it and that he simply had to pick him out, proceeded, as he said in cross-examination, by a process of elimination. He did not try to find out, to decide, which man was Luckhurst, but decided to eliminate those who he was sure were not Luckhurst. Then he was again questioned by counsel for the defence and asked about his certainty as to which this man was. He replied: There is always room for doubt in these matters. I wanted to eliminate people who were obviously"— and then he corrected himself— who I had obviously never seen before, and I eventually came down to the one person who I was absolutely certain was the man who visited my house". Defence counsel said: So the process which you adopted was really, to use your own words, a process of elimination". The reply was: To start with, certainly". Then counsel asked: That was the process which you adopted at any rate throughout your three traverses of the line of men, was it not? The reply was: Yes". He was then asked: Putting on one side this one you felt sure you had not seen before". The reply was: Yes". He was then asked: And then finally, at the end, having followed through that process, one was left with the accused; that is right, is it not? The reply was: Yes". When we take into account the way in which the people, the police officers, were chosen who were taking part in this parade, which I have already adumbrated, it seems to me beyond belief that the evidence of Colonel Matters, on which the entire prosecution case virtually depended, should be considered of anything like enough value to justify conviction.

My Lords, I want to consider for a moment the evidence that was given by Colonel Matters. I do not want to cast any aspersions on that gallant officer, a retired officer of the Royal Marines. But there are some very extraordinary inconsistencies in the evidence that he gave at different times. What is noticeable about the differences is that he became progressively more definite about things that helped the prosecution, and he became progressively less definite about things that helped the defence. There are three examples. At committal the gallant Colonel was extremely doubtful whether he had 'phoned Langley. He knew it had been a police station with a Slough telephone number, but there were four police stations with a Slough telephone number, including Slough and Langley. But as the weeks and months went by he somehow or other became progressively more certain that it had been Langley that he had telephoned, and he said that one of the main reasons for deciding that was that it was the nearest police station to him. And it was not the nearest police station to him. The nearest police station to him was at Iver.

Then in a statement which Colonel Matters made to the police in July he definitely informed them that the officer who came in plain clothes to his house on May 9 was wearing a light coloured sports coat. But when he appeared at quarter sessions he had become extremely vague about this sports coat. He was asked: Can you give any description at all of the sports jacket which he was then wearing? Answer: No. Then, Not even whether it was light or dark? Answer: No. He was then asked: Did you at any stage give a description of the jacket to the police when they came? Answer: No. Then, You did not do so? Answer: No. I said a sports jacket; I could not remember the colour or anything about it. And yet senior police officers had taken down his statement and had testified that at the time the statement was made he informed them that this officer came in a light coloured sports coat.

Finally, there is the question of the vehicle, or vehicles, used in the two visits to Colonel Matters on May 8 and May 9. In his original statement to the police he said that the first visit was made in a police car, and the second visit in a dark coloured car. When he appeared at quarter sessions he gave extremely contradictory evidence. First of all in cross-examination he was asked, speaking about the visit on May 8: Do you know whether he came in a vehicle, or on foot? He replied: I am sure he came in a vehicle. He was asked: What makes you sure? He replied: I was conscious of the fact he did come in a vehicle although I never saw that vehicle. Yet when he was being re-examined by his own counsel a few minutes later he said that he was certain it was a car on this occasion. He was asked: How are you certain of that? He replied: Well, through the hedge in front of my house I could see a car which had not been there before. It was there when he came to the front door. On May 9, having said previously that a dark coloured car had brought the police constable to his front door, he was asked: Do you know whether he came in a vehicle on that occasion or not? He replied: I did not see the vehicle but I believe he did; I imagine he did. I do not know what your Lordships will conclude about the imagination of Colonel Matters. Each of these three points is of particular significance because, first, of course if he did not 'phone Langley, if he 'phoned Slough or Iver or the other station or stations which have Slough telephone numbers, then no investigations were made, so far as anyone is aware, of the movements of anyone who might have taken this telephone call, or of colleagues who might have gone and picked up the bag and perhaps made away with it. No inquiries were made there at all. And so far as the sports jacket is concerned, which is a vital piece of evidence, he had first of all been quite certain that a light coloured sports jacket was being worn; and it has been proved on oath that Luckhurst did not possess a light coloured sports jacket.

Similarly, in the matter about the vehicle that was used, if the visit was, as Colonel Matters originally said, in a police car it could not have been Luckhurst, who had access that day to a Mini-van in which they drove to Slough, and then a Commer van in which they went from Slough to dispose of their scooters and a Mini-van that took them back to Langley. As to the dark coloured car, at that time he possessed a car but it happened to be coloured light blue.

We have heard again quite a lot about Mr. Smith, and I was most interested in what the noble Lord, Lord Foot, said upon that matter. The point is not that if Luckhurst was guilty of larceny Smith must also have been guilty of larceny; it is a much simpler matter than that. It is a question of perjury, because we have Smith saying on oath in quarter sessions, categorically and without any doubt, that if the telephone at Langley police station had rung between 8 a.m. and 11 a.m. on that day, May 8, it must have been he who would have answered it. Yet we have it completely accepted by the court that it was by a telephone message to Langley police station by Colonel Matters that the matter came to the attention of the police in Langley. This is absolutely undisputed, for the only way in which Luckhurst could have been involved was if a telephone call had been made to Langley; and Smith states that it must have been he who would have taken it, and he did not take any such call. If he had, he would have recorded it, and he did not record it. Therefore if Luckhurst is guilty there can surely he no doubt that even if Smith was not guilty of larceny he must be guilty of perjury and an action should be brought against him.

Similarly, Smith has said on oath in court that throughout the period from 11 o'clock to 12.45 p.m., when they got back to Langley, he was with—in the company of—Luckhurst. He has said this absolutely, beyond any doubt: "He was by my side the whole time". Perhaps it cannot be proved that he was guilty of larceny because of course he could not be identified. He did not go up to the Colonel's house (if he was there, which I do not believe he was). But if it is accepted that Luckhurst is guilty then Smith cannot have been with him all the time, and it must surely follow that Smith was guilty of perjury.

Two noble Lords have posed the question: if Luckhurst did not do it, who did? Both noble Lords declined to speculate in any way. I should like to go a little further and to say, first, that of course it could have been any off-duty policeman at any of these stations who got to know, somehow or other, that a wallet had been handed in, whether they were notified by someone at Langley or whether Colonel Matters made a mistake and notified somebody else. Or it could have been any officer who was on duty that morning at any police station other than Langley or Iver. However, I feel I must also say this, and I must be careful not to identify anybody. There is a police constable who was an extremely close friend of, I will say, one of the protagonists in this case, and these two had been associated in at least one extremely nefarious practice.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I hesitate to interrupt the noble Lord, but I think he is going rather far in raising this particular matter. I think the case can stand where it is at the moment.

LORD KILBRACKEN

My Lords, I absolutely accept what the noble Lord has said. Indeed, I was in some doubt whether I should be in order in raising the matter. It is something which has appeared in the local Press and therefore is public knowledge; but if it is the feeling of the House that I should not raise it I simply will say nothing about it at all.

I have two small points to make in conclusion, and I apologise for keeping your Lordships so long. The noble Lord, Lord Foot, in particular, raised the question of why the D.P.P. was not informed when a complaint was made by a member of the public. It occurred to me that my noble friend Lord Stonham might reply by saying that no complaint was made. Therefore I should like to read out the question that was put to Detective Chief Inspector Henry Keenan in quarter sessions, when he was asked by counsel for the prosecution Did you say to him"— that is, to Luckhurst— 'A complaint has been made by a Mr. Matters …' and so on. Therefore, when Luckhurst was first questioned the Detective Chief Inspector made a point of saying that the action was as a result of a complaint from a member of the public.

Finally, my Lords, I want to say just this: as so many other noble Lords have said, I very much hope that my noble friend Lord Stonham will find that compassion in his heart that we all know is there and will agree to my noble friend's request. But if, by any chance, he does not do so, let Luckhurst never forget that tonight, in your Lordships' House, seven noble Lords stood up one after the other, and each without exception were for him and believed that a grave injustice had been done, and were prepared to stand up and say so.

8.17 p.m.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, before the noble Lord replies perhaps I may be allowed to say a word or two. I do not envy the noble Lord the task of having to reply to this debate. There are many difficulties in it, but it has shown the great concern that noble Lords feel about this particular case. It is a case which is obviously a peculiar one: it has its irregularities, and there were oddities in it. But there is also the more general concern about identification which is raised—and indeed fomented—by this case. Moreover, the Police Federation has taken it up, and this is something that does not often happen.

I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, will feel grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Willis, for having raised this matter, and I am grateful to him for having sent me the papers. I apologise to him for having missed the beginning of his speech. Obviously—and I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, will say this—we are not here to try the case all over again to-night, but he will have been impressed by the great amount of care that noble Lords have taken to collect the evidence and to bring it forward to-night. The difficulty in a case like this is that, in a way, the least said, the soonest mended. As one noble Lord has said, it would have been much easier if only one speech had been made. But then the Government could have said, "There is no real interest in this matter or pressure behind it; it is only one person batting on his own."

Here we are faced with a man of excellent character, not only in the police force but also in a famous regiment, and who is doing his best not to be robbed of that excellent character. The case has already been brought forward by seven noble Lords, only one of whom is a lawyer, and the noble Lord, Lord Foot, drew attention to the fact that in the normal way the Executive will re-open a case of this character only if fresh evidence is provided. I think the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, will confirm that. If there is one thing that is quite clear in the House I think it is the feeling that there is some evidence missing in this case, and that is why an inquiry is needed. The whole thing does not hang together at all as it stands. There is also the fact that the prosecution was brought without reference to the Director of Public Prosecutions, and this is a matter, on which, as an immigrant from a country where all prosecutions are brought by the Director of Public Prosecutions, or at any rate by the Procurator-Fiscal in Scotland, one feels very strongly. And this is exactly why Section 49(3) is in the Police Act: to bring the situation so far as the police are concerned into line with what is required in a matter of this kind. Perhaps the noble Lord will be able to say something about that.

Then there is this question of the general concern about identification. There is no doubt that there has been a great deal of discussion in the Press about this aspect, and I would ask the noble Lord whether the way in which the Deputy Chairman of Quarter Sessions stated the law is correct. He is said to have said: The evidence"— that is the evidence of identification— …is not evidence which has to be corroborated at all. If you accept that evidence of identification, that is evidence sufficient to support the case for the prosecution. I should like to ask the noble Lord—and this is an important point: was there any corroborative evidence? This is important in the light of the general feeling of disquiet and concern in the country about identifications. And if there was corroborative evidence, what was it?

Because of this general feeling of concern I feel, and I would join with other noble Lords who have spoken tonight in their plea, that there is need for further inquiry, though I fully understand the great difficulty in saying what that further inquiry should be. This is one of the reasons why I hope that even if the noble Lord has been instructed to take a negative attitude on this to-night he will at least leave the matter open so that there will be an effort to see what kind of appropriate inquiry could be made into this case, to winkle out the missing pieces of this story—because there are missing pieces. If this is not done, there will be continuing investiga- tions of a private character. Perhaps we shall have an inquiry on T.V., as has happened on other occasions; and this would be very undesirable. It is unusual for Parliament to ask a Minister to look into a case that has been decided in the courts and has gone to appeal, but I hope that the noble Lord will feel that this is a special case and that he will be able to take special measures to deal with it.

8.25 p.m.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, I am fully in agreement with the noble Lord. Lord Drumalbyn, that I have a difficult task. I am in agreement with him, too, that it is an extremely difficult and very distressing case. And I agree with him in thanking my noble friend Lord Willis for bringing it to our notice again and for his speech, the sincerity and passion of it. I am sure that he will not mind if, later, I am a little critical of some of the things he said. I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken but I must say at once that this debate has been unusual, in my experience unique, in that we have had a retrial. This is something in which I shall not participate. I am not here to say whether Mr. Luckhurst was guilty or not guilty; I am not trying him and I would not presume to do so. But we have had a trial with eight defending counsel, no evidence, no cross-examination, and of course the inevitable verdict. I shall deliver no verdict.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My Lords, I do not think that is fair to any of those who have spoken. So far as I am concerned, I was very careful indeed not to express any opinion whatever.

THE EARL OF CORK AND ORRERY

So was I.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, I have listened to every single word of the debate, and virtually every speech was a rehearsal of the evidence. This is impossible to deny.

LORD WILLIS

My Lords, will my noble friend allow me to intervene? How is it possible for anybody to get up in your Lordships' House and make a case for an independent commission of inquiry into this case without drawing attention to what we consider to be defects in the evidence and therefore quoting that evidence? The noble Lord must not ask me to do the impossible.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, I have uttered, I think, three sentences and have had two interruptions. I listened to my noble friend for half an hour or 35 minutes, and I think that it might he even for the benefit of Mr. Luckhurst if I were to be allowed to get on with what I have to say and with my view of the case.

I repeat, again, that I am not in the slightest degree trying or retrying this man, but it is my duty to state the Home Secretary's decision very clearly. And this prompts me at once, despite what my noble friend believes, to say that a great deal of what has been said to-night is irrelevant, for the reason that it was all, or virtually all, considered by the judge and jury, or by the Court of Appeal. My noble friend Lord Francis-Williams said that this man had been "railroaded". I cannot accept that a man who has been tried before a court of law and a jury, and has then gone before the Court of Appeal, which included the Lord Chief Justice, has been "railroaded". The use of such words does not, I think, help.

I know that my noble friend Lord Willis has long felt concern about this case, and I am equally aware that, apart from those noble Lords who have spoken to-night, my noble friend is not alone in feeling concern about it. This is not the first time I have seen these papers and considered them. Indeed, any disputed question which touches a man's honour and affects his whole future demands the deepest and most careful consideration, and especially in a case of a man with such a record in the service as Mr. Luckhurst. I assure my noble friend that I do not think this is a small case and I do not think it is unimportant—by no means. And it has been most carefully and closely considered—as indeed it should have been—by two Home Secretaries: Mr. Roy Jenkins and my right honourable friend the present Home Secretary, who has considered it again in the past few days. I can assure my noble friend Lord Francis-Williams that I am not in this accepting bureaucratic decisions, as he termed them. It was considered again in the light of my noble friend's Question.

I am afraid that I must tell your Lordships that my right honourable friend the Home Secretary does not, on the information so far before him—that is, prior to this debate—consider that any further inquiry would be justified. But my noble friend and all your Lordships will. I hope, accept that this is not a conclusion which the Home Secretary reached lightly or without the fullest consideration. I would also add that this case has never been as fully debated before as it has been tonight. This case, the case for an independent inquiry, has not previously been put before us in the way that it has been put to-night; and the alleged relationship between Mr. Luckhurst and Police Constable Smith has not been put as it has to-night, except in correspondence. These are important matters which I shall most certainly bring to the attention of the Home Secretary.

I will deal first with one point, while I have it in mind, to get it out of the way. It is a point that was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn. He referred to the statement by the Deputy Chairman: that in English law no corroboration is required to support evidence of identification by a single witness. The Criminal Law Revision Committee are at the moment considering the law of evidence, and of course may be expected to express views on this point when they come to report. But, meanwhile, that is the law. Before I explain the reasons for my right honourable friend's conclusion I would, at the risk of some repetition of what has been said, in some cases several times, outline briefly the main facts of the case and the results of the investigation which was made into it. I must also, again at the risk of saying some things with which your Lordships are already familiar, make clear the constitutional position of the Home Secretary—indeed, of any Home Secretary in cases of this kind. I must indicate the framework within which my right honourable friend must work, what he can do and what he cannot do.

First, as to the facts, Mr. Frederick Charles Luckhurst, then a serving member of the Buckinghamshire Constabulary, was at Buckinghamshire Quarter Sessions on September 29, 1966, convicted of stealing a bank wallet and was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment. The bank wallet was lost on the morning of May 6, 1966, at Iver. It was found the same morning by a Lieutenant Colonel Matters, who took it home and telephoned the police. Shortly afterwards, a uniformed police constable called on Colonel Matters and collected the wallet from him. The following day the same police constable called and informed the colonel that the wallet had been returned to the bank. Subsequent inquiries showed that the wallet had not in fact been returned but had been stolen.

At an identification parade comprising police officers at Langley police station Colonel Matters identified Police Constable Luckhurst as the officer who called upon him and took charge of the wallet. Mrs. Matters, who was also present at the parade, did not identify Mr. Luckhurst. That is why I interrupted my noble friend in the course of his speech, because at the committal proceedings Mrs. Matters did identify Mr. Luckhurst in the dock, for what that was worth; and in cross-examination she said: I failed to identify the man on parade because the man who came to our house had a much higher colour, and the man on parade was paler. In cross-examination subsequently at the trial she said that she picked out Mr. Luckhurst because of his hair style, because when she saw the officers she saw them with their caps off. This, as my noble friend Lord Willis, said, is contrary to the Chief Inspector's evidence that the officers did not remove their hats.

I have quoted that only as an example, for the purpose of saying that this and virtually everything else that was said, was before the jury. The noble Lord, Lord Foot, was good enough to say, as I should have expected, that the one thing we, the Executive, cannot do is to interfere with the verdict of a court. There was evidence given that upon the morning in question Mr. Luckhurst was in the Langley-Slough area, having been sent out in a police vehicle with another officer to dispose of some motor scooters. In the view of my Department the essential issue before the jury was whether, during this journey, Mr. Luckhurst could have visited Colonel Matters and collected the wallet. I am not going to comment on that, because every word, every jot and tittle of that evidence, was before the jury or the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal against conviction, but on March 14, 1967, they dismissed the appeal. The Court refused leave to call further evidence, apparently because they were not satisfied that there was a reasonable explanation for the failure to adduce the evidence at the trial. In giving judgment, the Lord Chief Justice commented, as my noble friend has said, that considerable difficulties or improbabilities arose on the prosecution story. But the Lord Chief Justice also said, as I do not recall my noble friend saying, that the converse produced equal if not greater, improbabilities, and he concluded that there was no ground whatever for interfering with the verdict.

Whatever one's impression of the evidence, this is a British court of law and a British appeal court. Like all noble Lords, I have often thought of a case that the evidence was thin, or possibly even, if I had had the misfortune to be on the jury, that a particular man would not have been convicted. I know that this experience comes to all of us. But what the Home Secretary has to do is to accept these matters as decided by the court, and as decided by the Court of Appeal. It was for the Court of Appeal to decide whether to hear fresh evidence on the appeal, and it is not for me to comment on their refusal to admit further evidence or on their decision to dismiss the appeal. The evidence that the Court of Appeal did not consider was among the matters subsequently investigated by Detective Chief Superintendent Brennan at the request of the Home Secretary.

My noble friend Lord Addison asked me two questions which at this stage I think I can deal with. He asked me whether Police Constable Smith's position was referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions, and, if so, with what result. It was not so referred; but it was referred to the county prosecuting solicitor. My noble friend asked who told Mr. Luckhurst that he had no grounds for appeal. I do not know; he was not told by us. Then he asked, possibly by implication: was any action taken with regard to the Acting Chief Constable? Detective Chief Superintendent Brennan thought that the Acting Chief Constable was under no obligation to treat the case as a complaint under Section 49 of the Police Act, and that while it might have been advisable to seek the advice of the Director of Public Prosecutions there were no grounds for suggesting that the prosecution was not properly initiated. This was a point that the noble Lord, Lord Foot, put to me, and perhaps I might add here that these points were considered at the time by the Secretary of State. But he agreed with these conclusions, and on that basis there was no occasion for action against the Acting Chief Constable.

VISCOUNT ADDISON

My Lords, is my noble friend saying that there was no duty upon the authorities to refer the case of Luckhurst to the Director of Public Prosecutions?

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, that is what I am saying. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Foot, read out Section 49 of the Act, and if you read the words between the commas in that section you will note that if the chief officer was satisfied about this, and that the prosecution should be instituted, he was perfectly within his powers.

The noble Lord, Lord Foot, asked me whether Section 49 was complied with, and said that this of course was a question of evidence. The prosecuting solicitor advised that there was sufficient evidence to justify proceedings against Mr. Luckhurst but not against Mr. Smith, and that was the reason for the difference.

LORD FOOT

My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lord in order to ask this question? Is the noble Lord saying that the complaint that was made by Colonel Matters to the police was not a complaint made by a member of the public? Because those are the words used in the Police Act. If it was a complaint made by a member of the public, does not the case then fall exactly within the provisions of Section 49? If it does, then what does the noble Lord say about the circular which I quoted from the Home Office, which says that where a case arises under Section 49 it is for the Director of Public Prosecutions to determine whether or not criminal proceedings should be taken?

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, the point at issue here, and the question put to me and which I have answered, is whether there was an obligation in respect of this case, at that time, on the acting Chief Constable to refer the case to the Director of Public Prosecutions, and I am saying that there was not. The noble Lord has said that this was a complaint by a member of the public as if it was a complaint about the conduct of a police officer. But in fact the complaint was the report of a theft, and the report of a theft in which it was possible that a police officer might be concerned. That was the reason for the identification parade. I agree that it would have been better—certainly in the light of our present knowledge—if the officer taking the decision had in fact referred the case to the Director of Public Prosecutions, and obtained his advice as to whether or not a prosecution should be instituted. I of course cannot comment on what that advice might have been, but I simply say that it would have been better if that had been done.

LORD BYERS

My Lords, is this a matter of preference, may I ask the noble Lord? At the point when it was thought that the police officer was involved, was there not then an obligation to comply with the Act?

LORD STONHAM

No, my Lords; not in relation to this case. This was not just a case of, as it were, a complaint about police conduct; it was a case of an actual theft. It did not alter the fact that if it appeared—and the legal advice was given by the prosecuting solicitor—that the evidence against one individual was sufficient to justify a prosecution, the acting Chief Constable was not obliged to refer that case to the Director of Public Prosecutions. Noble Lords can dissent and shake their heads; I am telling them what I am advised, and this is what actually happened.

I wanted to go on to talk about the constitutional position of the Home Secretary, what he can and what he cannot do in a case of this kind where he receives representations on behalf of a convicted person alleging that he was wrongfully convicted. My Lords, I say that it is for the fury to decide, in accordance with the evidence before them, whether or not a charge is proved. They did so decide that it was proved, and we cannot do anything about that however much we might feel that the evidence was flimsy. Noble Lords have asked me all sorts of questions during this debate. Why did not the jury do this? Is it not astonishing they did not do that? But this is not a matter for me, and it is not a matter for the Home Secretary.

LORD BROCKWAY

My Lords, I am very reluctant indeed to interrupt, but is it not the case that a Home Secretary can look at a problem, and if he comes to the view that a wrong decision has been reached on matters which have been brought to his attention, he can refer the case to the judge of the court and get the view of that judge as to whether the matter should be reopened? I can assure my noble friend that I have taken up cases that have been dealt with in that way by the Home Secretary.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, I really am astonished to hear my noble friend say this. I cannot accept it, and if he is not aware of the Home Secretary's constitutional position in this, what his powers are and what they are not, then perhaps he will listen while I tell the House.

The first thing is that if a case is sub judice there is no question of any kind of interference at all, by word or in any other way, until the case is tried and decided. If it goes to appeal, equally no word can be said. A Home Secretary can only take action after the appeal if there is fresh evidence, new evidence. I have not heard what I regard as a shred of new evidence in this debate to-night; nothing that was not available to the first court or to the Court of Appeal. So on those grounds the Home Secretary has no power to move. Of course, if some new evidence came up that was so strong, so convincing that there had been a mistake, that an innocent person had been convicted, the Home Secretary, without bothering about a trial, could ask Her Majesty for a pardon, as the noble Lord said. If the evidence was strong, but not convincing, he could refer it to the Court of Criminal Appeal. That power used to be under Section 19, but under the 1968 Act it is under Section 17. The Home Secretary has no power to order a retrial. He has power under the same Section 17 to refer a case to the Court of Appeal, or back to the Court of Appeal, for determination as if it were an appeal by a convicted person. If, on a reference of that kind, the court found reason to quash the conviction on grounds of fresh evidence, it would have power under Section 7 of the same Act to order a retrial.

These are the facts, and these are the limits of the Home Secretary's powers. Time and time again—not only since I was a Minister but many times before I was a Minister—I used to refer new evidence in cases, or what I thought was new evidence in cases, to the Home Secretary of the day for possible action tinder Section 19, and sometimes it was successful and the cases were so referred. But you trust start with something new. The Home Secretary is not a further Court of Appeal, and it is not for him to re-try a case and to consider whether, had he been the jury or had he been the Court of Appeal, he might have come to a different: decision. My Lords, this must be accepted. I hope the noble Lord, Lord Foot, at least will agree with me that this is a statement of the Home Secretary's position. I am glad to see that he nods his head.

LORD FOOT

My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lord again'? I entirely accept what he has said, except in one particular. Is he saying that there is only one circumstance in which the Home Secretary can intervene in the decision of the courts, and that is where there is new evidence? Is he saying that that is the only circumstance in which the Home Secretary can intervene? If that is the case, upon what does he base that statement? Supposing there has been, as in this case, a departure from the proper procedure of referring the matter to the D.P.P., would that not be a ground on which the Home Secretary might be entitled to intervene?

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, in this case this matter has already been considered by the Home Secretary. It is not regarded as a point which would justify the intervention of the Home Secretary in that way. Of course this is one of the points which have been considered. If fresh evidence is brought to his notice which was not before the court of trial or the Court of Appeal then he considers whether it throws such new light on the case as would justify some special action on his part, and I have given your Lordships what that special action could be.

My noble friend Lord Willis himself asked the question, "What new evidence? Who wants new evidence?" And I have unfortunately to reply to him: the Courts. If we are going to activate these processes, that is the answer. It is not the Home Secretary; it is not myself. It is something new that was not before the courts earlier—and could not have been available at the trial—which can be considered of sufficient importance that it might influence the Court of Appeal to take the actions open to them.

Having regard to the anxiety that has been expressed about this case the Home Secretary thought it right that there should be a full investigation, and at his request the acting Chief Constable of Buckinghamshire arranged for an inquiry to be undertaken by a senior officer from another force. This was a very senior officer, Detective Chief Superintendent Brennan, of the Birmingham City Police. This inquiry was a re-investigation of all the facts of the case and of all the points made by and on behalf of Mr. Luckhurst subsequent to his conviction. All the original witnesses were seen again and all other persons who it appeared might possibly assist with information were also interviewed. Detective Chief Superintendent Brennan furnished a detailed and comprehensive report to which were appended statements by all those whom he had interviewed. After most careful study of these documents my right honourable friend felt that he must conclude that there were no grounds on which he would be justified in recommending any interference with the verdict of the jury. He announced the decision in February of last year in another place.

I discussed this matter with my right honourable friend last week-end and he still felt that he could find no grounds for any different conclusion or for ordering any inquiry in addition to the very full investigation which has already been undertaken. In reaching this conclusion the Home Secretary has taken full account of the point put forward by my noble friend Lord Willis, that Detective Chief Superintendent Brennan's report drew attention to a number of procedural details in regard to the conduct of the identification parade attended by Mr. Luckhurst which could have been dealt with better: and, as my noble friend has also pointed out, the Home Secretary has now issued new advice on the procedure for dealing with identification parades, including specific advice about parades where police officers themselves are involved.

Detective Chief Superintendent Brennan's inquiry was very thorough. It is quite unfair to suggest, as indeed was attributed to my noble friend Lord Brockway in an article in the Guardian, that his inquiry was less than adequate. He had the assistance of a superintendent and of a detective inspector who were specially assigned to assist in the inquiry. Their investigation occupied five weeks, and Chief Superintendent Brennan's report included copies of all the statements, covering some 327 pages. He reinvestigated all the facts of the theft and made full inquiries into all the points raised by or on behalf of Mr. Luckhurst. These included the further evidence which the Court of Appeal declined to admit at the hearing of the appeal, the possibility of the offence having been committed by some other police officer, and the points of police procedure raised by the Police Federation.

In the course of the inquiry Chief Superintendent Brennan saw all the original witnesses, all the officers from all watches on the Langley Sub-Division, all officers on duty in the Slough Division who would have had occasion to use motor vehicles at the relevant time, as well as some other officers from different parts of the county. He also interviewed all persons who it was thought might be able to assist in any way, including Mrs. Luckhurst and the wives of other police officers and representatives of the prosecuting solicitors, the Police Federation Joint Central Committee, and the Buckinghamshire Constabulary Joint Branch Board of the Police Federation. Despite these comprehensive inquiries no significant new evidence was brought to light, and the known facts remain materially the same as they were at the time of the trial.

It is true that Detective Chief Superintendent Brennan criticised some of the procedural details in connection with the parade, but he also concluded that none of these had affected the fairness of the parade. The Home Secretary accepted that conclusion. In my right honourable friend's view it is in no way vitiated by the fact that new advice on identification parade procedure has now been issued. It is one thing to say that something could have been done better; it is another to say that it went so badly as to cause injustice. This, as I say, was not the conclusion reached in the case of Mr. Luckhurst. The jury were aware that Mrs. Matters did not identify him, and they must have weighed this strong point in his favour before reaching their verdict.

Another point which was put forward by my noble friend—and it was also put forward by the Joint Central Committee of the Police Federation—was that when it first came to notice that the wallet which Colonel Matters found had not been returned to the bank the Acting Chief Constable should have treated the matter as a complaint against the police. As I have said, it is true that with the knowledge of all the facts that became available as a result of Detective Chief Superintendent Brennan's investigation it would have been better had the advice of the Director been sought. But this does not mean that the prosecution against Mr. Luckhurst was not properly initiated or that he was not properly convicted. The question of his guilt or innocence was for the jury to decide. Consideration is being given, in the light of discussions which have taken place with the Director of Public Prosecutions, to the general question whether further guidance should be given to chief officers of police on the circumstances in which they should consult the Director in cases where commission of offences by police officers is alleged.

My Lords, if one takes the case from beginning to end, as my noble friend Lord Willis did, and adds up each step and each point which might have been done better and might have had an effect, the inescapable conclusion to which we have come is that, in the circumstances of the case, and failing the production of fresh evidence which was not and could not have been available at the time of the trial, my right honourable friend the Home Secretary cannot move outside the constitutional framework which must guide his actions and cannot therefore prompt action in the courts which might possibly have the effect which the noble Lord desires.

So we come back to the one point which was insistently made and which was in fact the burden of my noble friend's Question: that there should be an independent inquiry. I am bound to say that if there were such an inquiry it could only express an opinion, though I agree that such an opinion might be of very great value. But we are very impressed by the fact that Chief Superintendent Brennan's inquiry was very thorough, and I find it not merely difficult but quite impossible to believe that senior police officers making an inquiry as thoroughly as they did go out other than with the hope, at least, that they can honestly vindicate one of their number through their inquiries. This is the natural thing that one would expect. They certainly do not go out with the idea, as was suggested during the debate, of covering up something. Moreover, the fact that this report was not published is of no significance at all, since these reports are always confidential and are never published. They have to remain confidential.

Although it is difficult to believe that much more can be learned about this case, and although the holding of an independent inquiry is very exceptional, I appreciate the strong views of noble Lords in all parts of the House that this is a very exceptional case. I will certainly bring to the notice of my right honourable friend the Home Secretary the views that have been expressed in this debate, and leave him again to consider the position.

LORD WILLIS

My Lords, before my noble friend sits down, may I ask whether he is aware how grateful I am for that last ray of hope that he has thrown out; and how grateful I am to my noble friends on both sides who have supported me on this important issue?