N.A.T.O., FRANCE AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

HL Deb 04 March 1969 vol 300 cc100-40

7.45 p.m.

LORD GLADWYN rose to ask Her Majesty's Government, whether in the light of recent Anglo-French exchanges and the apparent desire of the French Government to liquidate NATO and to replace the E.E.C. by an association of entirely independent States, they will now promote the gradual establishment within the Atlantic Alliance of more forward-looking and democratic European Institutions.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I put down this Question in order, if possible, to permit a short debate on the situation arising in Europe as a result of what is known, I think rather unfairly, as the "Soames affair". In spite of the lateness of the hour, I persist in asking it because I believe that the inflexibility of our arrangements is such that it is impossible to get any discussion of this, after all, important matter in your Lordships' House at a reasonable hour—that is to say, before 7 or 8 o'clock in the evening —for about another month.

I do not want to go into the details of this remarkable incident, except to say that in my view—though, frankly, I do not know whether I speak for my colleagues—the Government were right to communicate to our Allies the gist of what President de Gaulle said to the Ambassador. Criticism of how and why they did this may or may not be justified, but the decision which produced the explosion in the Elysée and, consequently, the new situation, was the decision to pass the information on. I seek to explain, as I see it, why the Government were right to risk such an explosion. I am sure that they did it with their eyes open.

Why did it create a new situation? It was not because there was anything very new in what the General actually said. As I describe in my forthcoming book on this subject—

LORD ST. OSWALD

Price? Publisher?

LORD GLADWYN

May I ask your Lordships to read it? We have known for many years, both from his public and private utterances, that the General thinks there should preferably be what he calls a European "Confederation"; that is to say, a simple association of entirely sovereign States, totally independent of America, from the territory of which Confederation the Americans would be requested to remove their armed forces.

If all this were accomplished, it would naturally involve a general repudiation of the Treaties of Rome and the break-up of the European Economic Community, in its existing form at any rate, and the liquidation of NATO, without which the North Atlantic Alliance would be an empty shell, since the Treaty itself contains nothing which obliges any member to go to war in support of any other nation. We also knew that the General had scant regard for smaller countries, and, therefore, it was not at all out of character that he should propose what I think is no longer referred to as a "Directorate", but probably as an "Inner Council" of the four larger Powers, which, so we must understand, would take the place of the Western European Union, even if the obligations of the Germans under this organisation were somehow maintained. No doubt the Western European Assembly, to which we know the General has a certain aversion, would also disappear.

Finally, the idea that the European Economic Community should be converted into what he calls a free trade area is something which, again for years and years, we have heard the General say was "inevitable" if Britain and the other applicants were admitted. Now he suggests—and here, my Lords, is the new situation—that it might even be a good thing if it were so converted now or soon. Owing to his persistent and partly successful efforts over the last ten years to emasculate the existing Community, this, we may think, is not altogether surprising. But at this point we should perhaps consider certain possibilities before, with shouts of joy, we join the British Gaullists in applauding, irrespective of all the other stumbling blocks, this one suggestion for positive negotiations with the Government of France.

In the first place, it is most unlikely that if we ever had such negotiations and got down to hard bargaining the General would he able to arrange for the European Economic Community to negotiate with the European Free Trade Area and thus, as it were, commit a sort of elegant hara-kiri, after which something like the present European Free Trade Association would spread over most of Western Europe. It is much more likely that, having got preliminary agreement that no duties or restrictions should be imposed on imports into the United Kingdom of French and indeed other Europear agricultural products, he would suggest, as he suggests now, in defiance of GATT (the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) some abatement of Community duties on certain British industrial exports, with the resultant agreement constituting—I am sure that this is what he is really aiming at—a sort of British association with the Common Market which had by that time been reduced to a kind of embryonic Customs Union.

Thus we should, as I see it, be in the position of having to cut down our food imports from New Zealand and Australia, and possibly also from Canada, with certainly no net advantage to our industrial exports; while the political advantage would be infinitely less than it would be if we actually joined the European Economic Community, since membership of the famous Four-Power Inner Council or Directorate (or whatever it is called), in which the veto, I need hardly say, would apply, would not result, economically weakened as we should be, in our having any particular influence on the course of events. These events would be, I am afraid, much more likely to be determined by an effective French leadership, largely exercised through some enduring Anglo-French-German alliance. L' A iifgeterre, I can assure your Lordships, would he a very poor relation indeed.

Some noble Lords may not agree, but I myself do not see, therefore, how any British Government, of whatever complexion, could for a moment contemplate accepting any one of the conditions proposed by de Gaulle as the basis for some new deal Europe. Quite apart from the catastrophic effect on our most sure and trusted European allies if we even listened to such suggestions, it must he obvious that acceptance of them would cut us off from America, liquidate what remains of the Commonwealth and reduce us to a state of penury and impotence, and we might even in the long run risk becoming, along with other European States, a kind of satellite of the Soviet Union.

But before considering what we might do next and what our general European policy should now be, let us just for a moment discern a little ray of hope that might even brighten up the whole landscape in the not too far distant future. Why indeed did the General feel impelled—because, in spite of the apparent approach of the Ambassador to the Elysée there is little doubt that he did feel impelled—to try to come to some kind of arrangement with the British? No one, no one on the Continent at any rate, doubts that this was chiefly because the "events", as they are called, of last May and their monetary sequel last September, together with the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the Russians in August, have made it impossible to pursue his previous, dreadful, policy of gradually achieving a European construction without us and thus, presumably, under French leadership, the object of which was to produce, as we all know, a détente based essentially on Franco-Soviet co-operation.

But if this concept—and an illusory one in any case, as we may think —has vanished, then all Frenchmen must scent danger. If they are really left alone with Germany, how are they to continue to be the tail which up till now has wagged this large and rather formidable dog? Nobody blames the Germans for becoming strong economically. They certainly deserve their success. Nobody thinks that the Bonn Government is anything but profoundly democratic. But, however innocent their intentions, it seems likely that in relation to France the Western Germans will get stronger and stronger.

Incidentally—or, rather, more than incidentally, because it is an important point—the date for the re-negotiation of the agricultural arrangements among the Six approaches. Thus, it will probably become clear that the Germans are simply not prepared to go on producing the really colossal sums which they now have to pay into the agricultural fund for the principal benefit of France. More and more they are thus likely to dominate the present European Econo mic Community, always supposing that it continues to exist, and it would of course require a great effort to disentangle it. So in their bones a great many French are coining round to think that, paradoxically perhaps, Europe would be a much less chilly place with L'Angléterre. Even if they realise that, given their Chief's attitude, there is no chance, at the moment, of resuming negotiations for Britain's entry into the Community, they might be prepared to put pressure on the General to consider some rather more acceptable approach to political unity. If the French Government"— said Mr. Stewart on February 24 in another place— were proposing some very considerable changes in the whole nature of the European Communities, whatever one might think about them they were clearly ideas which should be discussed by all those who were concerned."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, C. 1094.] Well said! We might indeed have one day what has been called a new Messina conference, perhaps with French participation.

Therefore, if this first feeler is rejected, as it had to be for the reasons I have given, it is by no means the end of the affair. Efforts to till the breach between our two countries must and will continue, but it must be made quite clear that this breach can be filled only in the context of a greater whole. How can this best be done? As I see it, by concentrating on projects which may not for the moment be acceptable to the General, but which more and more would seem good and reasonable to the other countries concerned, including our own—I am thinking of this country as a whole—and indeed to wide sections of opinion in France itself.

In other words, it is we, after ten years, who now, if we care to use it, have the power of initiative. The Parisian newspaper L'Express came out recently with the headline, "L'Angleterre dit, 'Non' á de Gaulle". The effect, indeed, on the other side of the Channel, where I was at the time—I do not myself of course think that the analogy is correct; I am speaking only of the effect produced on the French mind—was almost as if a rabbit had bitten a stoat! Even the ordinary Frenchman can now perceive that something has changed and that his President can no longer simply order people about. This new assessment of L'Angleterre will probably have very considerable repercussions.

It used to be said that the only way to achieve political unity in Europe was to get economic unity going first. However true this dictum, it has been vitiated, as we all know, by de Gaulle's double veto on our entry into the Community in pursuit of political objectives that have now been shown to be unobtainable. Owing to this delay efforts to join up the Six and the Seven economically will undoubtedly take much longer than we had previously hoped, though I have no doubt, as I say, that once the political climate improves negotiations to that end will be promptly resumed.

How then do we improve the political climate? Here, as it seems to me, is where Her Majesty's Government, if they would, could really make some running. Why should General de Gaulle have a monopoly of great thoughts about the future political organisation of Europe? There is no reason why we should not have great, and perhaps rather more practicable, schemes as well. And, strangely enough, it might well be less difficult to get going on political and defence projects, rather than on economic ones. To borrow the classic phrase of the General, "L'intendance suivra"—the services will come along.

It has been said so often that it can profitably be said again. In all the vast spheres not covered by the Treaty of Rome—that is to say, broadly speaking, foreign policy, defence and technical developments in such matters as space, electronics and so on—rapid progress towards greater unity can be made only if certain simple principles are accepted, and they need not frighten anybody. All you have to do is to get all concerned to agree that, in certain limited and specified spheres to start off with, some Authority shall be established which, in the last resort, and when all established procedures have been utilised, shall take decisions by some form of "weighted" majority voting.

Did not Mr. Stewart himself say, in answer to questions on the "Soames affair" on February 24 in another place, that, none of us can accept a position in which France tries to put a veto on all progress in Europe"?—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, 24/2/69, col. 1089.] If this statement is to be taken at its face value—and we must assume that it must be—then, logically, we can only favour a system in which no State, in the last resort, has a right of veto. Why single out France? And if this is indeed our belief, why not come out with some scheme or schemes embodying, in some of the fields outside the Treaty of Rome, the essential feature of weighted, or "qualified", voting?

Nor should that be all. Detailed plans for the operation of independent political and defence commissions— no doubt with advisory powers only to start with, but with the right to be consulted by Ministers and with the duty of considering all problems from the point of view of the group as a whole—could at least be circulated for discussion with any Governments interested. This is not a starry-eyed proposal, I assure your Lordships. It has already been worked out in considerable detail and is supported not only by the Western European Assembly which comprises hard-headed politicians, and the European movement, but also by a number of French deputies. Even some Gaullists, I think I am right in saying, would see some merit in the idea.

Finally, in any proposals which we might canvass there must be an important role for such a body. Personally, I do not think that Her Majesty's Government, any more than any of the other Governments concerned, would be likely to favour direct elections to such a Parliament. at any rate for a considerable time. But we could certainly indicate how a European Parliament, even if nominated, could exercise real powers of supervision in any new European Community that might now be discussed.

All I am really saying is this. Europe is moving. It is essential for us as a nation to make up our minds in which direction we want her to move. If, consciously or unconsciously, we favour the nationalist or Gaullist line, there is no hope at all for European unity and. as I think, small prospect of improving the political and economic position of these Islands. If, on the other hand, we favour the "no veto" or "Community" approach—no doubt in fields outside the Treaty of Rome, to start off—then we should formulate our ideas and canvass them with all friendly Governments, including—and why not?—the French. Failure to do so will inevitably give rise to the suspicion that what we secretly favour is, after all, some kind of nationalistic solution, and if there were the slightest truth in this—I do not think there is—what are we quarrelling about with the General? His thesis is, after all, quite logical, given his disastrous premise.

So, greatly daring, I suggest that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary should, first of all, clear the main lines of a new and constructive plan with their colleagues, and then invite the excellent French Ambassador to a meal, for the purpose of explaining at length to M. de Courcel the many attractions of the scheme, together with a request for comments. There is no need for any misunderstanding: the essentials of the plan would be handed to the Ambassador in the form of an aide memoire in accordance with normal diplomatic custom; no need to worry about leakages, since a copy would also be sent for comments to all our other allies. Why not? The whole idea would be not to isolate France or to force our way into the Common Market over her dead body, but rather to contemplate new and democratic methods of coming together in fields outside the Treaty of Rome, by methods which would gradually eliminate that veto which Mr. Stewart has so properly condemned.

If it were found that the plan represented a large consensus of opinion—and it would, of course, be some time before this were forthcoming—then a conference to consider the proposals could be held. It need not be summoned by us. Perhaps by agreement, some smaller Power could take this initiative. France would be invited and might well attend, and, if she did not, it would simply be a case of the absent being always in the wrong. If a conference without the French was successful, then a determined effort would be made to sell the resulting scheme to the French, and perhaps a second negotiation might then follow. If all these efforts failed and the French Government had nothing whatever to do with the scheme, it would have to be decided whether to put it into operation without them. This would be a grave decision which would have to be carefully con sidered in the light of all developments, including the highly regrettable possibility of the French withdrawal from the European Economic Community.

Whatever happens, and whether or not progress in this direction is immediately possible, those who had produced and subscribed to the scheme should never falter in their insistence on the no-veto principle. That is the key. If we lose it we are lost. If we hold on to it we shall not for much longer be knocking at Europe's door, because we shall be able to open it. In any case, if we get bored with Europe and try to knock on America's door, we shall certainly be knocking for much longer, if not indefinitely; and where, my Lords, would be the key?

So while congratulating the Government on what they have done so far, I urge them once again to have the courage of what I have gradually come to believe are their sincere convictions, and shortly to come out with some plan—some fundamental thoughts— about how best to organise a really democratic Europe.

8.9 p.m.

EARL, JELLICOE

My Lords, on general grounds I am delighted that the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, persisted with his Unstarred Question this evening. I hope it means that his forthcoming book, which we await with impatience and which we shall all read with pleasure, will go to the "top of the pops" very quickly indeed. But, more seriously, it was clearly desirable that your Lordships should have an opportunity of debating our national stance towards Europe, in the light of the depression which has recently settled over Anglo-French relations. I have said that on general grounds I am glad that the noble Lord persisted with his Unstarred Question. But on personal grounds I must confess that I am a little less glad, because before his Unstarred Question went down on the Order Paper I took on a commitment which I judge to be inescapable. That means that I shall be breaking a rule which I have never before broken in your Lordships' House, and I hope the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, will acquit me of any discourtesy if I am not here to listen to his winding-up speech. It is a commitment I cannot escape. The noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, did not hold an inquest on the immediate past, and in that I am sure that he is right, since the future of Anglo-French relations and the future of Britain's relationship with Europe is far more important than the sorry events of the last few weeks. However, since he has been inclined to condone, unlike his late leader in another place, Mr. Grimond, the Government's handling of this difficult problem, and since I take a very different view from the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, about that aspect of the matter, I feel that I must dwell, if only briefly, on those sorry events. The French have christened this incident "l'affaire Soames" and we seem to be following their example. I believe, with the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, that this is a complete misnomer. It does an injustice to our able, articulate and pretty formidable Ambassador in Paris. More properly it should be called "l'affaire Quai d'Orsay—Foreign Office", and perhaps in the footnotes of history it may eventually go down as "l'affaire Wilson".

I am not one of those who automatically believes that if something goes wrong in our relationships the British Government of the day, of whatever political complexion, is necessarily to blame; and in this case I am more than willing to accept a very substantial part of the Government's account of what transpired. I am sure that the Foreign Office received a faithful account from Mr. Soames of his fateful conversation with the General early in February. I am sure that the Government's cautious reaction to the General's proposition was warranted. I also sympathise with their desire to communicate at least the gist of what the General said to our close partners in Western Europe and indeed the United States of America. Likewise, I do not question their assertion that the version communicated was in fact substantially that received from our Ambassador in Paris.

At that stage I find one aspect of the Government's conduct in this affair hard to understand and indeed impossible to defend. It was quite clear that the French Head of State was talking in confidence to our Ambassador, and that being so I hold that the decision to communicate the gist of these talks to the other five Governments and to the American Government without the French Government being informed beforehand, let alone approving, incomprehensible and indefensible. Despite the Foreign Secretary's determined stonewalling in the other place the other day, I find this hard to understand, because Sir Alec Douglas-Home pointed out in another place last week that we had a perfectly simple alternative open to us; the springs of diplomacy had not run dry. General de Gaulle was, in my view at least, saying something that was not altogether novel; he had made statements of this sort to many people beforehand, and I cannot myself see why days were lost while this was shuffled round the corridors of Whitehall.

I cannot myself see why it was not possible for the Foreign Office to have gone straight back to Paris, presumably in a communication from Prime Minister to Prime Minister or Foreign Secretary to Foreign Secretary, making it clear that we had noted with interest the President's statement, but of course, as he would be well aware, there was a considerable gulf between his position and our known position; that we shared his desire to try to find some more common ground as between neighbours, and that we should be delighted to continue the dialogue. At the same time, we could have made it perfectly plain that before embarking on further talks with the French Government we felt that our partners in Europe must be made generally aware of the gist of what had transpired, and before taking the dialogue further we would obviously need to agree with the French Government on ways and means by which those partners could be brought into the discussions, should they prove fruitful, the right moment. I believe that in some such way it could have been made perfectly clear in a perfectly friendly way that these were our prior conditions to the renewal of this particular dialogue.

As I understand it, we feared a leak or a trap. Perhaps, who knows, we were right to do so. But if the wily General was in fact setting a trap for us, the course of action I have suggested would have de-fused its consequences and we should have been entirely in the clear. I still find it very hard to comprehend why the Government did not take some such course of action and I still find their failure to do so, despite the explanations of the Foreign Secretary in another place, quite indefensible. I find it indefensible because not only has the course of action adopted by the Government put a full stop to an Anglo-French dialogue which just conceivably—I would not put it higher—might have been useful; more important, it has weakened the diplomatic credibility of the British Government of the day.

I find this a serious matter and I find the doctrine apparently enunciated by the Government in explanation of their handling of this affair bizarre. I find bizarre the doctrine that the judge of the confidentiality of a diplomatic confidence is the recipient of that confidence. I find that doctrine bizarre in the extreme. But enough of that. I shall read with interest the explanation of the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont. I doubt whether he can persuade me to alter my view of the Government's clumsy handling—I put it no higher—of this particular incident. But even if he cannot persuade me, I of course recognise that this incident, sad and sorry though I hold it to be, is more a symptom, albeit a very tragic one, rather than a root cause of the collapse of confidence between the British and French Governments to-day.

I think it would be idle to suppose that anything very spectacular can be done to lower the temperature of Anglo-French relations at the present time. But what we can do to improve those relations I hope that we will do. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, that this situation has to be looked at in the wider context. But in the narrow context of Anglo-French relations I hope that we shall continue to remind ourselves that both countries have a very great deal at stake over a whole range of joint projects, and I hope that we shall put our hacks behind those projects. Dealing with the biggest of them, the Concorde, I have often been rather dismayed at the readiness of the British Press, and indeed the public, to crab this great project whenever they could. The French take a much more robust attitude to this particular matter, and I have felt at times that the Government's attitude towards it has been a bit ambivalent. I hope that this and other joint projects will receive our full support unless and until both partners are convinced and decide not to proceed with the particular one. I feel that this is something which is incumbent upon us and can help the future of Anglo-French relations over at least some area of the ground.

So much for the narrow question. What of the wider approach to Western Europe? Many of us on this side of the House, myself included, are quite sympathetic to the general approach which the Government have, so far as I can make out, been pursuing for the last year or so. We agree, too, that it is right to keep our application to join the European Economic Community on the table, up to date, and fresh before the European public.

In some respects, of course, I hold that our policy should go further. I personally believe that we should be wise, wherever it is possible and practicable, to adapt our own institutions so as to make eventual membership of the Community easier when the time comes, as I think it will come, for our application to be successful. I am thinking particulary of agricultural and taxation policies. Again, I do not dissent from the view that, if we are temporarily blocked by the French veto from membership of the Community, we should pursue the search for greater European unity in those areas which lie outside the Treaty of Rome; the areas which I think the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, mentioned—defence, technology and, indeed, political consultation.

Here—and this is really of crucial importance, if we are to convince our friends in Europe of our seriousness and stability of purpose—it is really important that we should practise, and be seen to practice, what we are preaching. I am not certain that we always do. I cite only two examples. In the field of defence, the maintenance of the Atlantic Alliance and of NATO must clearly remain the foundations of our policy. Nevertheless, I entirely agree with the Government, that it is right and sensible for the European partners in NATO to take a greater share of the defence burden, and to seek within the Atlantic Alliance some closer identity in defence matters.

But it is rather difficult to convince our partners that we are really serious about these matters when we allow our reserves to be depleted, when we make no provision whatsoever for home defence, and when our armed forces are faced, as they are now, with emaciation through manpower starvation. By the same token, I believe that the Government have been perfectly right to emphasise to our partners in Europe the absolute need for Europe to remain in the van of technological progress.

We shall be debating these matters in eight days' time on a Motion in the name of my noble friend Lord Bessborough. Therefore, I should like to say this evening only that I believe the Government are serious about this question of European co-operation in science and technology, but that sometimes their actions, whether in relation to ELDO or whether in relation to the airbus—and I will not go into more instances—belie their words.

Finally, there is political consultation. I believe—and I think I part company with the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn here —that we need to tread rather warily; perhaps rather more warily than Her Majesty's Government have done of late. As an old W.E.U. boy, a former member of the W.E.U. Assembly, I do not underestimate the importance of that body, and on one condition I am all in favour of its greater use. It is, after all, the only political structure in which we regularly meet, and in which we are able to consult not only the French but also their five partners in the European Economic Community.

However, just because it is of this special significance, I hold it all the more important that we should not place too great a strain on this institution—more strain than it may he capable of bearing. I think that in recent weeks we have gone close to the limits of what is possible. I am restraining myself from saying more, but I really feel we should be cautious here. In the last resort, if we place too great a strain upon this not very powerful structure, we are facing the Germans with an impossible choice; that is, a choice between the British or the French connection. I hope that some way out of the present W.E.U. imbroglio will be found.

I understand that the next Ministerial meeting is to be held at The Hague in May, and it is certainly my understanding that all seven W.E.U. Members agreed at Luxembourg that it was desirable to work out better procedures for consultation. This matter is likely to arise before the May meeting, and I should be very glad if the noble Lord, in his reply, was able to say something about the Government's expectations for that meeting of the Ministerial Council of W.E.U. in May.

In conclusion, I should only like to say this. Although I believe we should tread warily on this question of political consultation, especially in regard to the strain we place upon the W.E.U. structure, I do not think that this absolves us from thinking out our own ideas towards Europe; and in that I am in complete agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn. But although there is no time to go into them this evening, I think I would dissent from some of his particular recipes. While the Government have shown great tactical initiative in the European field, what has rather worried me in recent months is that they have shown rather less initiative in the development of their own thinking towards Europe. We have backed the Harmel Plan and the Nenni Plan, but we have yet to produce a Stewart Plan or a Wilson Plan.

Here I very much go along with what the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, said. I believe that sooner or later—sooner, I hope—we are going to be faced with clear, if difficult, choices in Europe and it behoves us, in this period of attente, to think out our policies through the European thicket. Perhaps it would be wise for us, in certain circumstances, to opt for rather more radical and more daring solutions—and this is a criticism I would make of Governments of both Parties—than we have been prepared to advocate in the past.

8.27 p.m.

BARONESS GAITSKELL

My Lords, I am very glad that the noble Lord. Lord Gladwyn, has both introduced his Unstarred Question and explained it, and for me he has produced some very new and interesting ideas. I speak not as a Common Market crusader, unlike the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, and the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe. But I find myself in greater sympathy with the ideas of the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, than with those of the noble Earl. Many people in this country are interested in a healthy, united Europe, though I have not found that they are frantic about the economic machinery of the E.E.C. It is obvious that Britain, as a great trading country, is interested in a large free trade area and a large market. It is now six years since my husband died, and to-day I cannot help savouring the irony of the growing disillusion among members of the E.E.C. the realisation that the present institutions are not sacroscanct.

LORD GLADWYN

My Lords, will the noble Baroness not agree that it is not the institutions of the European Economic Community which are to blame, or which are at fault; it is the failure to apply them.

BARONESS GAITSKELL

My Lords, I cannot say that I entirely agree with that, but I am prepared to examine it. I am, of course, appalled by General de Gaulle's cynicism and his proposal actually to jilt the E.E.C. After refusing to admit us into the Common Market for so long, he now comes up with a new and, according to the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, very unsatisfactory set of ideas. Certainly the British Government were absolutely right to say, "No", loud and clear. To those people who kept wringing their hands—and here I include the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe—because for once we had rebuffed the General, I can only say that hitherto every time we turned the other cheek it has resulted in two slaps in the face.

EARL JELLICOE

My Lords, I wonder whether I could just intervene for a moment. I am not necessarily opposed to rebuffing the General. What I am opposed to is a breach of confidence.

BARONESS GAITSKELL

I thank the noble Earl. I might have something to say about it later.

We should not exaggerate this business of bad Anglo-French relations, and I think that the noble Earl has exaggerated them. I do not intend to "chew the cud" of all the diplomatic tittle-tattle that has been churned out in the Press. It is, of course, in our interests that Europe should be stable and healthy. The future of Europe, whether as the E.E.C. or some other association which may be evolved, depends on the economic and social health of all the European countries, especially France, Germany and Britain. There is, of course, some danger that the Big Three will go on playing each other off, one against the other, while their internal situations deteriorate.

I must stress that the fuss about the Franco-British quarrelling and General de Gaulle's posturing hides a certain danger. It is that this distracts attention from France's real economic and social problems. Everything I read and hear about the French situation to-day makes me think that the General is doing very little to strengthen the franc, or towards creating strong, democratic political institutions which will survive his death. Is it really so important to discover which Foreign Minister put his cards on the table and exactly on which day, when it is on the cards that the franc might be devalued at some future date?

General de Gaulle is quite shameless about changing his mind, and this is not always a bad thing to do. I suggest that at this moment the General would do better to try to be loyal to his true allies, even those he so strongly resented during the last World War. France has formidable domestic problems, and we, too, have our problems. The display of bad temper with the British has nothing to do with the realities of power. In fact, the French could take note of the rightness of our policies and what we are trying to do by concentrating on a healthy economy, a strong pound and a strong balance of payments, for these are the pre-conditions for an effective role overseas.

The General's actual proposals are quite frightening, theoretical as they are. We are asked to substitute the Atlantic Alliance—for what? We know that if we forgo the American nuclear umbrella now and put a European deterrent in its place, it would have to include a German nuclear bomb. I doubt if even the Germans are really enthusiastic about such a prospect. Of course one hopes that a Europe divided into East and West blocs will not persist for ever. One hopes that political changes will take place, working towards a real unity among all the European countries. Finally, returning to the recent Anglo-French exchanges, I think that the Government acted with courage and honesty, though in the field of diplomacy these two qualities do not always result in good public relations.

8.34 p.m.

LORD ROBERTSON OF OAKRIDGE

My Lords, I find myself in some difficulty in expressing an opinion on the Question tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, in part because I am not quite so certain what is meant by certain words in the Question. However, I feel an urge to make a few remarks in the light of recent Anglo-French exchanges. If, in other respects, I stray a little beyond the limits set by the noble Lord's Question, I hope that I shall receive the generosity of the House.

L' affaire Soames"—what a strange business it has been! Everyone is now very busy trying to play it down, to sweep it under the carpet, to suggest that it should be forgotten as quickly as possible. That is not surprising, because in my simple mind nobody has come out of this business with very much credit. However, the fact is that it has happened; it will not be forgotten. It will long be remembered as a milestone, if not a millstone, in the course of Anglo-French relations. As for the part played by the various participants in this strange business, there is no need for me to dwell too much on the part played by the General. He, we are told, offered us a great opportunity which we were foolish enough to ignore; we were told this again only yesterday by the French Foreign Minister in the Chamber. It is true that he appeared to offer the possibility of a dialogue between England and France. He went on to give his ideas as to the general lines which that dialogue should take and did so in terms which it will have been quite clear to him would be completely unacceptable to this country.

It is of more importance to examine the part played by our own representatives, by our Ambassador in Paris and our Government here in London. It is an important part of any Ambassador's job to work for the improvement of relations between his country and the country to which he is accredited, and it is clear that Mr. Soames has been doing precisely that. I said a short while ago that nobody comes out of this business with much credit, but the one man who must be excused from any serious criticism is the man who has been quite wrongly attached to this strange affair. He was invited to a private lunch, he went and he listened carefully to what was said to him, He wrote a report on it, and before sending that report to London he sent a copy to the Quai. As to whether or not the report was correct, we are entitled to assume, knowing what we do of the officials of the Quai, that if there had been anything seriously wrong with it they would have been on to our Ambassador within the hour. In fact, they were given eight days, so it is reasonable to assume that that report was generally a correct one.

What of the part played in London by the Secretary of State and the Government? One can well imagine the reaction in the Foreign Office when that telegram arrived from Paris. Anybody who knows the Foreign Office—and we have many distinguished representatives of it among our own numbers—knows that the Foreign Office does not at all like to be surprised by new ideas which it has not been expecting. Moreover, our Foreign Office has been subjected for years to the ruderies which they have had from Paris, and it is natural that they should find this proposal, if that is what it should be called, very objectionable and should treat it with discredit and suspicion. That is very natural. But in diplomatic affairs one must never allow one's feelings to influence one's decisions. One may make one's decisions logically and by the sheer exercise of such brains as one has, but one must not allow the feelings of the heart to enter into the matter at all.

In speaking of the Foreign Service and the Foreign Office, I should like to say that I have the highest respect for our diplomatic service. I do not know what advice they gave their Minister or Mr. Soames. I have an uncomfortable feeling that in this particular case they allowed their feelings to carry them rather too far. As to the part played by the Secretary of State, I read with great interest the account of the debate in another place on Tuesday of last week. I thought that the Secretary of State seemed to be rather too sensitive about some of the remarks that were made. He said that it appeared that honourable Members were desperately looking for something for which they could blame the Government".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, 25/2/69, col. 1339.] In the very unlikely event of the right honourable gentleman reading what I am saying to-night, I hope he will at least not make that accusation in his mind of me, for I am not in the least interested or looking for things for which I can blame the Government, but I in fact think that the handling of this affair has not been very happy. I largely agree with the criticisms made by the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe. There was apparently an opportunity to reopen the dialogue between England and France, and I feel that the opportunity should have been taken in some way. Of course, the proper precautions must be taken, and on no account should we commit ourselves to the sort of proposals of detail which the General was offering us.

Having said that, I should like to end by expressing one or two of my own feelings about the broader question raised by the final words in Lord Gladwyn's Question. He says that our objective in Europe should be the gradual establishment within the Atlantic alliance of more forward-looking and democratic European Institutions. Those are very long words for me, and I do not know that I quite follow what he means by them; but one thing is very clear to me, and I feel no hesitation about saying it. It is that any European institution which is worth anything must include this country, Germany and France—and all without any reservations. Of that I am perfectly certain; and it should surely be the policy of this country to get the co-operation of Germany and of France towards that end. There should not be great difficulty about Germany, because Germany is still largely influenced by the doctrines preached by the late Konrad Adenauer, and, whatever criticisms may be made of Konrad Adenauer, it cannot be said that he was not a good European. If we want that co-operation, however, we must go about it in the right way, and it is no good going on talking about, "If they will not pay more for our troops we will take our troops away", and it is no good lecturing them about up-valuing the mark. That kind of thing will certainly not gain the co-operation of the Germans. We are not the only people who are apt to talk to the Germans as if they were second-class European citizens: I think they have heard something of the same sort from Paris, too.

As to our attitude towards France, my Lords, it is undoubtedly extremely irritating to be treated by the General as if we were an inferior nation. In the light of history it is extremely irritating, but we should not allow ourselves to be irritated. That is not the way to deal with foreign affairs. In our own difficulties we should not turn to France. We should not seek or expect any help from them. We are not likely to get it, anyway. We should solve our own difficulties, and that is what will make it easier to talk to the General. We all have friends in France. I was over there at the same time as Lord Gladwyn, when news of l' affaire Soames first broke; and I am going there on Thursday. We have many friends over there, all of us, and we rest content that our reputation with the Frenchmen who really mean anything is not going to be shaken by the antics of the General. We can look forward with content to retaining their respect and seeking their co-operation in the effort which we shall certainly make.

8.45 p.m.

LORD ALPORT

My Lords, I fear that I shall be accused of starting on a rather sour note when I remark that there could be no better example of the painful inadequacy of the management of business in your Lordships' House than the circumstances of this debate. Since the debate on the Address, we have had no occasion on which we have had a chance to consider foreign affairs. This is at a time when the relations between this country and France are seriously strained; when there is an ominous crisis in Berlin; when the whole of the Eastern bloc has recently passed through a traumatic experience with the suppression of Dubcek's Czechoslovakia; when there is near war in the Middle East capable of setting alight half a continent; and when there is a new President in the United States, with new policies and new prospects for that super Power and our closest ally.

Yet, my Lords, we with difficulty appear to tear ourselves away from such engaging topics as female prostitution, the provision of contraceptives for dogs, the diseases of salmon, and homosexuality; from an Order Paper which is full of legislation of limited significance; and, after a debate about some alleged irregularity of procedure on the part of an obscure individual on an obscure committee dealing with an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease, to spend a few minutes on foreign affairs. No wonder, my Lords, that Parliament is an object of cynicism and contempt! I am reminded of a passage in one of Disraeli's novels in which he makes one of his characters say: He is a man. He is thinking in real politics; foreign affairs; maintaining our power in Europe". Nowadays your Lordships' House, with all its experience and intellectual ability, is cluttered up with the trivialities of administration and legislation unless some Member like Lord Gladwyn comes to our rescue with a Motion of importance, framed as a Question according to our curious custom, on a subject which should be the concern, and indeed is the concern, of every person who thinks about politics at the present time. It is therefore, my Lords, in no spirit of formality that I offer my thanks to Lord Gladwyn for introducing this debate on this subject at this time.

Let me begin by saying that so far as I personally am concerned I believe that there is every justification for the manner in which His Excellency the British Ambassador in Paris and the British Government handled the initiative which the French President attempted to take to detach Britain from the United States and from its friends in NATO and the W.E.U. It was clearly a clumsy and (if I may repeat the word used by the noble Baroness, Lady Gaitskell) cynical piece of diplomacy—if I may say so, well in character with the practice of the Fifth Republic. As seems to be the invariable rule with General de Gaulle's diplomacy, his initiative in fact produced exactly the opposite effect to that which he intended. For this we may be grateful, since it has helped, perhaps, in some degree, to condition British thinking about the future of Europe to accept some of the basic facts that have emerged as a result of our experience there during the last ten years and more.

These are, in my view, first, that owing to French policy the E.E.C. in its present form is not the institution upon which European unity can be securely based in the future; and, secondly, that unity must be developed through political and not economic co-operation alone. Thirdly, that the basis of that unity to-day should be a solid understanding between Britain and Germany and access between London and Bonn. There has, I submit, never been any reality in the Gaullist idea that the balance of power in Western Europe lay between Germany and France. However large may be France's gold resources or complicated her diplomacy, France to-day is the France of 1872, of 1917, of 1940. She is in the same position as she was on those previous occasions, an unstable element in Western Europe.

The extent of her weaknes3 was brutally illuminated by the collapse of last summer when the existing r6girne was nearly destroyed by a student uprising. The result of that weakness within France to-day is the exaggerated nationalism to which she is prone, a pathological assertiveness of which General de Gaulle is the contemporary expression. European unity cannot be created while a principal element in it—that is, France—is in an aggressively nationalist mood. There is no reason to suppose that if the General disappeared from the political scene to-morrow, Gaullism, or rather the psychology of the defeat of 1940 of which Gaullism is the expression, would disappear from France or that France would suddenly become internationally minded.

The policy of "Waiting for Godot" is just as fruitless for the British as for the French. Even if Mr. Heath became Prime Minister to-morrow, he would not be able to carry Britain into association with the E.E.C. on terms which the French would accept and demand. It may be that Mr. Heath and Mr. Rippon believe that the way to Europe lies through Paris. If they do, they wilt find, I think, that a diminishing number of Conservatives agree with them. Political and economic association linked to the North Atlantic system cannot be based on the existing E.E.C. and secured through a Franco-German alliance. Quite apart from the incompatibility of Gaullism, such a system, if it is to work, must contain its own balance-of-power mechanism. France is too weak to balance Germany. Only Britain in Western Europe is capable of doing that. This is true when for the first time since Germany became a unified country in Europe, the interests of both Britain and Germany are almost identical.

My Lords, it is not a matter of detaching Germany from France; the closer that Germany can keep to France the better. It means that parallel to, but separate from, the E.E.C. we should be seeking to construct in Western Europe a political system based upon close cooperation with Germany in the fields of political institutions, defence and technology, and to create a European attitude to regional problems outside Europe. The attempt to discuss the problems of the Middle East in W.E.U. was, I consider, a step in the right direction.

Our aim should not be to get into the E.E.C. through the back door of Western European Union, but to create with our friends a political association, with or without France, to which the E.E.C. might one day be linked. The key to achieving this, I submit, is an association with Germany. Old fears and hatreds (which I have shared all my life) must not be allowed to stand in the way of such an understanding. I believe that the time during which it will be possible to achieve this is limited. It may be that the emergence of exaggerated nationalism within France will infect Germany, or that Germany in five years' time will be so powerful that a political association with the rest of Europe, and with Great Britain in particular, will cease to have attractions to her public opinion. It may be that a new Government in Bonn after the next elections will be able to act more independently, more confidently, more imaginatively, than the present regime has been able to do.

For our part, I hope that we shall not be tempted simply to pick over the car-case of a dead policy, but to realise that for us the era of the E.E.C. has passed. I hope that whoever is Prime Minister in these next four or five years will lead Britain towards the Europe of the 'seventies, and not back towards the Europe of the 'fifties, the Europe of Adenauer, Schuman and de Gaspari. In the meantime, I hope that the Government will continue to seek a place for Britain in Europe which represents a better vision of the future than simply a stubborn determination to join the present E.E.C. at any cost.

8.57 p.m.

LORD BROCKWAY

My Lords, I should like to repeat what others of your Lordships have said in appreciation of the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, for ini- tiating our debate to-night. I should like also to endorse what the noble Lord, Lord Alport, has said in very severe criticism of the arrangements of this House which require a debate of this importance to take place in answer to a second Unstarred Question at this time of night. I do not think that the noble Lord toe Leader of the House or our Chief Whip and its offices are entirely responsible for this state of affairs. I think it is partly ourselves. We have become accustomed in this House to ending our debates in the fairly early hours of the evening and because of that when we have an important debate of this kind there is a small House. I should like to make, if I may, to the noble Lord the Leader of the House, two suggestions; first, that it should be made clear to the House that our duties are now so wide that Members should expect to remain in this House to debate these matters for longer hours than we have done in the past; and second, that it should be considered whether we ought not to meet on Mondays as well as from Tuesdays to Thursdays.

My Lords, I endorse all that the noble Lord, Lord Alport, has said about the issues which have come before this House in recent weeks. I have great sympathy with the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, be cause in a similar way, through an Unstarred Question, I had to raise in this House the important issue of the war between Nigeria and Biafra. I hope that my words may lead those responsible to make such arrangements in this House as are necessary to its dignity and honour in treating such important issues.

My Lords, as my noble friend, Lord Chalfont, would expect, I shall to-night be putting forward a different, an independent, view from that of others who have taken part in this debate. But I know him well enough, his breadth of mind, his forward-looking attitude to our problems and his willingness to accept new ideas, to be perfectly sure that he will pay some consideration to the different approaches which I shall express. I want to begin by saying that I have no doubt whatsoever that the Government were absolutely correct in conveying to their allies the substance of what was said in the conversations between General de Gaulle and our Ambassador in Paris. It was our duty to those who were acting with us and who were concerned in those discussions. If Her Majesty's Government had not done so, there would have been the leakages which already had begun, and there would have been a sense among the Government's allies that some conspiracy was being carried on. The total effect on the disruption of the political mind of Europe would have been far deeper than it has been. Nevertheless, my Lords, I would say to Her Majesty's Government that I think the one mistake which they made in that connection was to inform France that they were going to convey to their allies what had happened only simultaneously with the visit of the Prime Minister to Berlin. In my view, they should have given France longer notice of that fact.

When I turn to the issues to be discussed to-night I wish to regret the stern and stiff line that has been taken with General de Gaulle and France in this debate. I do so because I do not believe that Her Majesty's Government are indestructably right and I do not believe that the French Government are indestructably wrong, take the view that the problems of Europe are far more complex than the attitudes of the two sides; and if I were asked to provide evidence of that I would refer to the speeches delivered in this debate, all denouncing France and General de Gaulle.

Note the difference between the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, and the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Alport. Lord Gladwyn laid down a definite pattern and plan for the solution of all these problems as if they were rigid and inflexible. Lord Alport suggested that the solution of the European problem was for Britain to get nearer to Western Germany and Bonn. My Lords, both those proposals should be discussed when we are engaged in the dialogue on the future of Europe. But these problems are so complex, not only between Britain and France; not only between France and Germany; not only between America and the Soviet Union, Italy and Scandinavia—all these problems are such that we should be entering a dialogue about them with open minds as to their ultimate solution, and recognising that each point of view has a contribution to make to the final decision.

My Lords, in one sense the tone of our debate to-night has been obsolete. It has been made obsolete by the visit of President Nixon to Europe. I was depressed when President Nixon was elected to his high post. I did not think that I should have words of praise to say of him. But his inaugural speech as President, a magnificent declaration for peace in the world, and the atmosphere which he has created in Europe by his visits to the different European countries has changed the whole climate and has created an atmosphere in which we can begin to discuss these matters, not by anti-de Gaullism, not by anti-the Bonn Government; not by the self-righteousness Of thinking that British policy is absolutely correct, but in a dialogue of thinking out these problems anew and the best way in which they may be solved.

My Lords, may I take two suggestions which came from General de Gaulle in his recent discussions? In case there is any idea that I am a "fan" of General de Gaulle, let me say at once that had I been a citizen of France I should have voted against him. I am absolutely opposed to his authoritarian attitude in France, and I regret the extension of that authoritarianism to the relations between European nations.

But when one has said that, if we intend to approach these problems in a realistic way, trying to understand the attitudes of others, let us look at two of the actual proposals made by General de Gaulle. The first was that the association of European nations should be on the basis of confederation. I am not going to accept that as a final proposal, but what I do say is that the E.E.C., so far as it has operated, has failed to create in Europe either the institution or the spirit which can realise a European Community. The noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, said that this was not a matter of its principles, but of their application or lack of application. He was right. But if we are to solve political problems between nations we must accept the mental attitudes and psychologies of the peoples who are involved in the solution which we are seeking. Much as I desire the ending of national sovereignties and the beginning of much wider associations, we have to face the fact that the peoples are not emotionally prepared. Look at Europe and ask whether the people of this country and the peoples of France, of West Germany and of Italy, are yet ready to sacrifice their national loyalties and aspirations to become a part of a complete European community? We must recognise that they are not.

This is not only a problem of Europe; it is one of the biggest political problems in the world today: how to associate national aspirations with wider combinations. It is the problem of Nigeria and Biafra, of Quebec and Canada, of Nagaland and India, of Anguilla and St. Kitt's. And this problem is not going to be solved by just laying down a pattern; it has to evolve, and, in the case of Europe, it has to evolve in dialogue between the different European countries.

The other thing I want to say is on the proposal which General de Gaulle has made for the ending of NATO. I would say that the conclusion of the conflict between West and East, between the United States of America and the Soviet Union, is probably the most important issue in the world to-day. We hope that, despite Czechoslovakia and Berlin, a detente is beginning which will enable the antagonism and ferocity which have divided West and East to be reduced. We hope that not merely President Nixon's visit to Europe but his visit to the Soviet Union will contribute towards that goal. I think it very likely indeed that we are moving to a situation where we can take bolder steps to end that division than we have in mind at this moment.

LORD GLADWYN

My Lords, would the noble Lord agree that the dissolution of NATO before we have arrived at anything like a German settlement would be more likely to precipitate a Third World War than anything else?

LORD BROCKWAY

My Lords, I do not accept that; but what I am going on to say will meet the point the noble Lord made. NATO is to be reviewed this year at the end of its 20-year period. The Communist Governments who are in the Warsaw Pact have publicly indicated at two Congresses that they are prepared to end the Warsaw Military Pact and they have suggested that in place of the division of Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact there should be a Euro- pean security pact, which would be an umbrella for all the nations in both West and East. It may be true that if a unilateral decision were reached for the ending of NATO, what the noble Lord has indicated may occur. That is not the proposal I am making.

LORD GLADWYN

No, my Lords; hut it is the proposal that General de Gaulle is making.

LORD BROCKWAY

My Lords, I am quite sure that it would not be the proposal which General de Gaulle would make if there were conversations in a practical way. The noble Lord has the right to disagree, but he also has the right to listen. What I am suggesting to my noble friends is this. General de Gaulle makes the proposal for the ending of NATO and we turn it down rigidly. I am suggesting that the correct response to that proposal should have been to go into dialogue and discussion with him about the problems of Europe and of East and West and to contribute our suggestion, if Her Majesty's Government would accept it, that mutually the NATO and Warsaw Pacts should be ended and that we should have in substitution a European security pact.

I conclude by saying this. The thing with which I was most impressed during the visit of President Nixon to Europe was what the Pope said to him in Rome. I am a humanist; I am not a member of any religious organisation; but I pay my tribute to the Head of the Catholic Church for what he said. These were his words: This is the mission which your great nation, Mr. President, along with other members of the international community, is called upon to fulfil: a mission of peace, a mission of noble-hearted collaboration with all peoples, and particularly with the developing peoples, in mutual esteem, with respect for fundamental freedoms of men and of nations, and in the promotion of genuine human values. All peoples are closely bound together, now more than ever before, in a common destiny, the great world-wide effort to build on solid foundations the earthly city in which each individual lives and works. I believe that if we began to approach the problems of Europe and the problems of the world with those motives and in that kind of spirit we could solve our problems without the conflicts which are now taking place between the nations.

9.16 p.m.

LORD HANKEY

My Lords I should like to support very much what the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, said at the beginning of this debate, and also what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Alport, later on. Personally, I am glad that Her Majesty's Government are maintaining their demand for drawing closer to Europe, and also for entering the Common Market. I have no doubt that this is the best policy for us to pursue, although it is obviously going to be a long haul. I cannot imagine, looking back at the history of the last century and at the steady decline of Europe's influence and potentialities since the war, that we can afford to continue the sort of particularism, if I may use that phrase, of separate, egotistical, nationalist States in Europe, which has led us all into the present morass.

It follows, logically and in plain common sense, that we ought to favour some pulling together, some derogation of sovereignty, some common political and administrative institutions such as those of the Common Market. I cannot agree with the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, that we ought to seek to start a new dialogue which will throw into question what has already been achieved in the Treaty of Rome and in the other collective institutions which have been formed. I believe that to start a new dialogue which throws into doubt what has already been achieved plays into the hands of those who, whether they admit it or not, really want to destroy those institutions. I feel, on the contrary, that while a dialogue may be desirable, it should be based on how existing institutions can be improved and extended. In the world in which we live, and in the light of events in Czechoslovakia, NATO also seems to be absolutely essential for our survival as free nations and as free men.

Coming to General de Gaulle's propositions of February 4, I still cannot really understand why he wants to disrupt both the Common Market and NATO, and still less, indeed, why he should want us to propose such a thing. I really feel that his motives and methods are extremely suspect. Say we had done what General de Gaulle wanted and entered into secret talks with France about all this, what would have happened? Obviously, there would have been a leak in Paris: there always is—and there was one, anyway. Where should we have been then? We should have been in a pretty kettle of fish, and stinking fish at that. Our NATO Allies would have been horrified; our friends in EFTA and among the Six would have been deeply shocked at us.

Our Ambassador in Paris, who most wisely got the record of his conversation with General de Gaulle approved on February 8, seems to me to have handled this question quite admirably. I entirely agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Oakridge, said in this connection.

But what was our Prime Minister to say to Dr. Kiesinger in Bonn, when he went there on February 10? Mr. 'Wilson was no longer in any doubt as to what had been said to Mr. Soames. He knew the French had a Treaty with Germany, concluded in 1963, about the time when our Common Market negotiations broke down, by which each side promised to act in very close consultation with the other. If General de Gaulle kept his own treaties, then he should have told the Germans what he had said to Mr. Soames. Indeed, he ought to have told the Germans in advance. What would Dr. Kiesinger have thought of Mr. Wilson if he had not been frank and had suppressed all mention of such a vital French initiative on one of the very subjects that were to be under discussion? Would that have led to the establishment of a better Anglo-German understanding, such as we must have if we are one day to enter Europe successfully?

What a shocking pitfall Mr. Wilson and our Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs succeeded in avoiding—a pitfall for themselves and for the United Kingdom; a pitfall for NATO, which is due to be reviewed this year and where a reasonably good common understanding will be very necessary; a pitfall for the Common Market, for EFTA and for all forms of Atlantic and European co-operation. Of course, it could be said, and it has been said in this debate, noticeably by the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, that we ought to have informed the French before we informed the Germans. But I should like to point out that, if we had done that, the French might have objected and then we should have found ourselves in an even worse situation than we are in now. Therefore, I think that on balance the Government acted very wisely in acting as they did.

I prefer to believe that on the whole this was a major gaffe> on the French side, rather than a deliberate trap. But I am bound to say that French diplomacy very seldom drops bricks of such immense magnitude. Do not let us be put off now by a hit of defensive bluster on their side. One day, in my opinion, we shall enter Europe successfully, because in the years we live in nothing else makes political and economic sense. I hope we can meanwhile carry co-operation forward into wider spheres, as suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn.

I have twice said, "enter Europe successfully". By that I mean that we cannot enter Europe safely unless we put our economic house in order, and, in particular, unless we restore a state of law and order in our labour relations. I cannot, to my very deep regret, be here when your Lordships' House discusses this question on March 18, and as it is so germane to our relations with the new Europe I shall now say a word about it, even if for brevity I have to do it rather superficially.

The Government's White Paper, In Place of Strife, is much too weak, but it is in many respects a considerable improvement on the Donovan Report. The Government have kept this question under the carpet for much too long, and are now proposing to do much too little.

NOBLE LORDS: Order, order!

LORD HANKEY

But the vote in another place shows what courage Mrs. Castle must have needed to do what she has done. I earnestly hope that the Government will not be put off by that vote from doing what is plainly necessary. This country cannot afford to go on—

NOBLE LORDS: Order, order!

LORD BESWICK

My Lords, I think the voices that were raised were querying what the noble Lord was saying about a subject which is not really before the House.

LORD HANKEY

My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Gaitskell, has recognised in her speech, we cannot have a valid foreign policy or a valid defence policy, which was referred to by the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, unless our balance of payments and our economic policy are put in order. I urge that this question is germane to what we are discussing.

LORD GLADWYN

My Lords, with all respect to the House, I do not think we can really, on the basis of my Unstarred Question, go into the balance of payments or the social policies of this country.

LORD HANKEY

My Lords, I still wish to repeat that unless we put our economic house in order we cannot expect to have a valid European policy. Therefore I urge that this question is still germane. However, I will cut short my remarks on this subject because clearly it is getting late at night and we want to conclude this debate. If we go down the list of economic Powers in Europe, as will be clear from the latest O.E.C.D. statistics which your Lordships will find in the Printed Paper Office to-night, it is evident that we shall find it hard to enter Europe successfully, and I do not think we can safely enter Europe at all unless we put our affairs in much better order. To conclude my remarks, I earnestly hope that the Government will persist in their application to enter Europe, as well as with their incipient and tentative policy on industrial relations, without which other policies really cannot be successful.

9.26 p.m.

THE MINISTER OF STATE, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (LORD CHALFONT)

My Lords, I, too, am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, for giving us the opportunity to have this brief debate in your Lordships' House about our European policy. I agree that it is a late hour and a "thin" House, but nevertheless I think the debate has been worth while. I listened with some interest to what the noble Lord, Lord Alport, said about the fact that we are having this debate so late at night and in answer to a second Unstarred Question. I cannot go all the way with him in his strictures on the management of affairs here. I recognise his disenchantment and his deep feeling about this, but after all, as he said, foreign affairs are about our influence in the world and I think it should be said that some of the legislation which is necessarily discussed in your Lordships' House is about precisely the sort of influence that we shall wield in the world. Although I agree witth a very great deal of what the noble Lord, Lord Alport said, we must concern ourselves here not only with the questions of the power we wield in the world but with the kind of people we are and the kind of society in which we live.

To return to Lord Gladwyn's Question, I was particularly interested to note the form in which he cast it. It seemed to suggest a concern with what happens in the future rather than with raking over what has happened in the past. This indeed turned out to be the theme of the noble Lord's speech, and although I cannot agree with everything that he has said about the way ahead, I am most grateful to him both for concentrating in his speech on the problems of the future and for his endorsement of the Government's action in our recent controversial dealings with France and our other European partners.

I have been pleased to find that the speeches in your Lordships' House reflect what I have found to be the general consensus among thinking people on this subject; namely, that the action of Her Majesty's Government in consulting our friends in Western European Union about proposals involving their interests and security, was right and proper. The noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Oakridge, said that in diplomacy we should be careful not to pay too much attention to the feelings of the heart, but I know he will agree with me when I say that whatever may be the truth of that, it is essential in diplomacy always to take account of feelings of morality and of principle. Whatever our foreign policy may be and whatever tactics we may have to follow from time to time, there must in any civilised foreign policy be a thread of principle, and I believe we should have been guilty of deviousness, if not something worse, had we done anything else in this affair.

Therefore I propose—and I hope I shall not detain your Lordships too long—to follow the pattern that has been set in this debate. I shall deal briefly with some of the comments that have been made on the Government's part in what has been called, with trivial and pre- dictable irrelevance, "the Soames affair". Here I might take the opportunity to echo the remarks made by my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary in another place. Whatever criticisms may have been levelled at our Ambassador in Paris in certain sections of the foreign Press, I want to make it perfectly clear that Her Majesty's Government are in no way disposed to support those criticisms. The Government are fully satisfied with the way in which Mr. Soarnes handled this matter.

I should like to deal very briefly with the criticisms that were made, particularly by the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe. I am sorry he is not here to hear what I have to say in reply to him, but he explained to me as well as to your Lordships, and I know he has an engagement that I, for one, would not have wanted him to miss. But I must put on record my answers to the criticisms he made. One of the things he said was that it was a bizarre doctrine that the recipient should be the best judge of the confidentiality of any proposition or piece of information. I do not know whether I would entirely disagree with that, but I think what would be bizarre in the extreme would be the doctrine that it was open to any Government to go to another with proposals to talk to them on matters which might gravely affect the welfare of other countries and to bind them in advance not to tell the other countries about it. This would seem to me a very bizarre doctrine indeed.

It has been suggested in this debate and elsewhere that there was nothing new in what the General had to say, and indeed the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, wondered why such old proposals had been shuffled for so long around the corridors of Whitehall. But at the same time it was suggested that it was somehow a breach of confidence to discuss them. These seem to me to be two mutually incompatible propositions. Either these matters were new, in which case it was our duty to talk to our friends and allies about them, or they were not, and I fail to see how one can suggest at one and the same time both that the proposals were not new and that it was a breach of confidence to discuss them.

He went on to discuss the question whether we should have asked the French first to consent to discussion of this with our other friends in Western Europe, or that we should at least have told them we were going to do this. As my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary said in another place, it is quite simply the fact that we handled the matter in this way because we do not believe it would have been right to put ourselves in a position where we were apparently asking the French for permission to inform our friends of something they had a perfect right to know. And I noted with interest and approval what the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, had to say about that.

The noble Earl also suggested, I think with a little more vigour than he meant, that these events had in some way put a stop to our talks with the French. This, of course, if it is so, is not the fault of Her Majesty's Government. We are ready at any time to talk to the French Government provided only that they understand exactly where we stand on the essentials of security and European unity. But none of us can accept the position in which France tries to put a veto on all progress in Europe, and none of us certainly can accept that issues of this magnitude which affect the future of our allies can possibly be settled without them.

I come now to a brief reference to the proposals made by the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, in the latter part of his speech. He talked about the possibility of federal types of solution to European political problems. He talked of a European Parliament and weighted and qualified voting. All these are interesting propositions. But I must reiterate that our aim at the moment is full membership of the three European Communities. This remains our aim, and our application to become members remains in.

LORD GLADWYN

Would the noble Lord agree that that is not the only aim of Her Majesty's Government?

LORD CHALFONT

Yes, indeed, I would agree with that. Her Majesty's Government have many other aims, but in so far as the Common Market is concerned—and I will come on in a moment to look more closely at some of his propositions—we have always made it clear that we regard the enlarged Community as the best basis for European integration, going far beyond the economic field. We have always said that the Community is a dynamic thing which has already evolved and which will continue to evolve.

So far as the emergence of Europe as a community is concerned, we believe that Europe can emerge as an entity which can express its own point of view and, as a result, its influence in world affairs, and we have said right from the beginning that we shall play our full part in this process. As a member of the Community, when we become a member, we shall accept whatever responsibilities the Community may decide to assume, and we shall join as eagerly as any other member in creating new opportunities for the expression of European unity. But we cannot—and I agree with all that has been said about this—wait idly by until the French veto is lifted on our attempt to enter the Common Market.

I listened with interest to the proposals of the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn. His schemes were more ambitious, perhaps, than those he has heard put forward by others. However, I do ask him to believe that their implementation would depend for support on Governments on the Continent as well as on Her Majesty's Government. The noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, made a somewhat significant remark when he said, "All you have to do is to get everybody to agree". Yes, indeed.

LORD GLADWYN

My Lords, in the long run, of course. What I said was we might take an initiative—put forward at least some ideas of our own.

LORD CHALFONT

My Lords, I assure the noble Lord that we have ideas of our own. They may not always agree entirely with his ideas, but we have examined this problem, and I agree with him when he says that the objective of all of us is a Europe speaking with a single voice and capable of having a proper influence on world affairs. But, as I say, although I cannot go all the way with the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, in his proposals for a British initiative, I think it might be right to end my remarks this evening by very briefly outlining to your Lordships exactly how the Government believe we should go forward with our European policy. I hope the noble Lord will acquit us of the charge of not having any ideas, although, as I say, he may find they are not entirely the ideas that he himself has put forward.

First, we very much regret the damage that has been done to relations between ourselves and France in this recent episode. However, I think it is right to say that these relations have not been as cordial as they might be, and indeed as they should be, since the French Government applied its veto to our negotiations in November, 1967. It is important to realise that the relations between our two countries are not just a function of the day-to-day tactics of diplomacy and foreign policy; they spring from what is quite clearly a fundamental difference of opinion between ourselves and General de Gaulle about the future prosperity and security of Europe. It is also significant to say that so far as the other members of the Western European Union are concerned—and this also means by definition the other members of the Common Market—they seem to agree with us. So there is, in effect, a fundamental difference between General de Gaulle and the rest of Western Europe about the way we should go forward and the place we should make for ourselves in the world.

The noble Lord, Lord Brockway, hinted at the beginning of his speech that he might say things that a member of the Government would find difficult to accept. Let me say at once that I do not think his views and mine are as far apart as he may have feared. I agree with him entirely that in examining the future of Europe we must absorb, and examine with respect, new ideas. We must not let ourselves become fossilised by obsolete ideas of national sovereignty. I ask him to believe that although Europe is split, as it is at the moment, by ideological, political and economic differences, I share his fervent hope that that split will not last long. I ask him to believe that as long as it lasts we in this country, if we have any intelligent responsibility for the security of our people, must regard the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Western Alliance as the cornerstone of our policy. We must, as the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, has said, seek for a European identity in defence matters and in political matters, but it must be an identity four-square within the Atlantic Alliance.

That is why we rejected what I believe is the Gaullist thesis on the Atlantic Alliance and on NATO. Then we rejected also, but we have a different view of, the future development of the Communities and of the political framework of Europe. I have said that full membership remains our aim. Negotiations are blocked, but we must continue; and I believe that the way to go forward is to make progress towards integration where we can in fields outside the Community Treaties of Rome and Paris.

LORD GLADWYN

My Lords, does the noble Lord think that we can make substantial progress in those directions without the introduction of techniques, such as weighted majority voting?

LORD CHALFONT

Yes, my Lords, I believe that progress can be made, and I believe that it is already being made. It is being made through the steps which we have taken in the Western European Union. It has been achieved first of all through discussion. It first came to a head in the discussion in February of this year on the Harmel proposal, the idea that you should have consultation on political and other matters inside the framework of the W.E.U. As soon as that idea was put forward by the Belgian Foreign Minister and set out later in an Italian paper which covered these proposals, there was unanimous agreement on the need to improve these political consultations. Six delegations at the Luxembourg meeting agreed that before taking decisions on important foreign policy issues, they would undertake an obligation to consult so that they could harmonise their national positions. I believe that this is already a decisive step forward and the noble Lord, Lord Alport, was good enough to recognise it.

The first thing that happened was that we had a meeting of the W.E.U. Council on February 14 to discuss the Middle East in advance of the Four Power consultations. France was invited, and to our regret did not find it possible to attend. There was a useful discussion, and I ask the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, not to close his mind on this matter, for there is progress to be made in this field as well as in the field of techniques and institutions which he mentioned. The Prime Minister's visit to Bonn was another step in the process of consultation. He had a thorough discussion of all the European issues with the Chancellor of the Federal Republic. After the meeting there was a joint declaration which confirmed the identity of views between us and the Federal Republic on European unity. The next steps are as follows—and there are a number of things which can be done and which are being done. There is the meeting of the Action Committee of the noted and distinguished European, Jean Monnet, which is to take place in London in a few clays' time. In April the President of the Italian Republic will pay a State visit to London. We shall continue, and indeed intensify, the consultations inside W.E.U. This will include, as one noble Lord suggested, the meeting of Ministers of the W.E.U. in The Hague in May.

The noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, spoke about putting a strain on the W.E.U. because it is a forum in which we speak to the French and to our other Allies. There can be not the slightest doubt that a Europe without France is as unthinkable as a Europe without Britain. It has been said before, and it will bear saying again, that so long as Britain and France are at odds the future of Europe will always be uncertain. This is a fact that has been proved over and over again in the past and will certainly be proved again in the future. But if anyone believes that the British Government—I think this was hinted at in at least one speech this evening—are trying to isolate France in our attempt to build a united Europe, then they will believe anything. So far, it is the French Government which has always chosen the solitary path. They have chosen it in NATO, they have chosen it in the European Economic Communities, and they have chosen it in the Western European Union. If France is isolated, it is because France has chosen to isolate herself.

I do not believe that these policies are in the interests of France or of Europe. Nor do I believe that they will persist for long. I think I can end in no better way than by assuring your Lordships' House that if at any time any move should come from France that seems to us designed to further the interests, the prosperity and the security of Europe as a whole, we shall be ready to discuss them with France in consultation with our friends and our allies. But we shall not, my Lords, I hope, ever make the fatal error of believing that we can buy worthwhile new friendships by betraying old ones.