§ 2.47 p.m.
LORD ST. OSWALDMy Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
§ [The Question was as follows:
§ To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will make a statement on the findings of the Board of Inquiry into the mid-air collision between a Canberra and a Victor on August 19, 1968.]
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE, R.A.F. (LORD WINTER-BOTTOM)Yes, my Lords. The accident occurred when a Canberra from Royal Air Force, Germany, which had completed a task on Wainfleet range and was climbing in an Easterly direction from the range, collided with a Victor climbing out of Marham in a North-Easterly direction. The Canberra pilot contacted the Eastern Radar Station during his climb out from the range and was instructed by the controller to turn 30 degrees right for identification. There were many thunderstorms in the area and the dense weather returns made identification on the primary radar impossible. The controller therefore had changed to the "secondary radar only" display in order to achieve it. Although 641 this display provides a positive means of identification it cannot be used to maintain radar control because only an aircraft transmitting a radar signal can be seen by the controller. Having achieved identification, the controller advised the pilot to revert to normal navigation. One minute and twenty seconds later the Canberra collided with the Victor in cloud.
The Victor had been using the standard lane for climbing out of Marham, with some small variations to avoid the heaviest weather. The pilot obtained some assistance from the Midland Radar Station in avoiding thunderstorms on the climb, but the controller had great difficulty in identifying the aircraft owing to the abnormally heavy weather returns on primary radar. These weather returns concealed the approaching Canberra from him. Conversely the Eastern radar controller did not see the Victor on the secondary radar. The Board's finding was that the cause of the accident was the abnormal weather conditions coupled with the unsatisfactory performance of the ground radar in these conditions.
We are naturally much concerned to ensure that there will not be another tragic accident of this kind. The odds against such an accident are of course immense; but full assurance will be possible only when the existing radars have been replaced by more modern equipment which will not be seriously affected by thunderstorms. Meanwhile work is in hand on improving the effectiveness of existing radars; mandatory new penetration and departure procedures for aircraft using the ranges on the coast of East Anglia have been introduced, together with certain new restrictions on flying by other military aircraft in the area.
LORD ST. OSWALDMy Lords, in thanking the noble Lord for his detailed reply to my Question, I wonder whether I may ask him for further clarification on one or two points. I am grateful also for the measure of reassurance that he gave on the improbability of a repetition of such an accident. I gathered from his words—I should like him to confirm it—that this could be regarded almost as a freak accident under freak conditions. He said that the controller advised the pilot to revert to normal navigation. Could he say whether the pilot in fact responded to this in the one minute and 642 twenty seconds between that time and the actual moment of collision? The noble Lord also spoke of the unsatisfactory performance of the ground radar in these conditions—and I took him to mean that the unsatisfactory nature was technical rather than human. Can he say how long it will be before the existing radar has been replaced by more modern equipment, proof against thunderstorm conditions?
§ LORD WINTERBOTTOMMy Lords, the first point is that the actual standard procedure for identification is that an aircraft, on request from the controller, makes two turns: it will turn (shall we say?) to the right and then to the left. Because of the very difficult conditions, only one turn was observed, although in point of fact identification was achieved through secondary radar. To turn to the noble Lord's next point, about the nature of the equipment, this equipment is entirely satisfactory for military purposes, but it is not in fact altogether satisfactory for air traffic control purposes, for which it was being used. A feasibility study is being carried out to see whether this can be improved. The last question the noble Lord asked was—
§ LORD WINTERBOTTOMThis, unfortunately, I cannot say, my Lords, because the study is only now going on.
§ LORD OGMOREMy Lords, could the Minister inform the House why the Royal Air Force do not use civil equipment? Surely all the civil airports in this country are not put out of use whenever there is a thunderstorm. Is it not about time that the R.A.F. used some of the civil equipment such as there is at Heathrow?
§ LORD WINTERBOTTOMMy Lords, this is an extraordinarily difficult technical problem. Perhaps when the Linesman Mediator comes into operation this may be somewhat easier. But when there is heavy cloud, heavy thunder, about, all radars are affected and it is necessary to have secondary modifications on them to overcome the problems created by atmospheric conditions.
643 May I make one further point? There is no question of any failure of responsibility on the part of any individual.