CHILDREN AND YOUNG PERSONS BILL

HL Deb 09 July 1969 vol 303 cc1107-77

5.26 p.m.

THE MINISTER OF STATE, HOME OFFICE (LORD STONHAM)

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.

Moved, That the House do again resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

House in Committee accordingly.

[The LORD ROYLE in the Chair.]

Clause 20 [Orders for committal to care of local authorities]:

BARONESS BROOKE OF YSTRADFELLTE moved Amendment No. 28: Page 24, line 33, leave out from ("(a)") to ("attains") in line 36, and insert ("when the person to whom it relates").

The noble Baroness said: Under the present law approved school orders run for three years if the boy is not above the age of 16. If he is above the age of 16 they continue until the age of 19. If under the present law a child is com- mitted under a fit person order to the care of a local authority that order expires when the child reaches the age of 18. The Bill abolishes approved school orders and fit person orders, and the Government have adopted the approved school precedent in fixing the duration of care orders. It would be far more sensible to terminate care orders at 18 with the possibility of extension as provided in Clause 21.

I would remind the Committee that only a few months ago the Government brought forward a Bill to lower the age of majority from 21 to 18 and to allow voting at 18. The case which the Government put forward for this was that to-day everyone is mature at 18. Yet they are now proposing that 18-year-olds should remain under the care of a local authority for an extra year, until they are 19. Quite frankly, it does not make sense to me. I hope that the Government will not quote the Latey Report in support of the strange things they are doing. The Latey Report stated that nothing that they recommended was to be taken as applying to the criminal law. What we are discussing has nothing to do with the criminal law; these are civil proceedings. This Amendment offers the Government a way of getting out of what will otherwise be an absurdity. I beg to move.

LORD STONHAM

There are two favourable features about the Amendment which has just been moved by the noble Baroness. One is that it was moved with her customary brevity and the other that she gave me some engaging and helpful advice—advice which I do not intend to take. But I understand that we are dealing only with Amendment 28 and not with No. 29. Amendment No. 28 would telescope paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (3) of this clause together to read: A care order shall cease to have effect when the person to whom it relates attains the age of eighteen". As the Bill stands, Clause 20 provides that a care order made before the 16th birthday shall expire on the 18th birthday unless previously revoked by the court or extended by the court to the 19th birthday. The care order made after the 16th birthday lasts until the 19th birthday unless previously revoked. Under the Amendment moved by the noble Baroness, a care order will expire on the 18th birthday even if made after the 16th birthday, unless extended under Clause 21(1).

A care order is not a sentence. Its object is care, treatment and control. This fact is basic to all the provisions of the Bill about care orders, including, in particular, Clause 20. Two important consequences flow from this basic fact. The first is that the length of time for which care, treatment or control under a care order is required is bound to vary from one case to another. I hope the noble Baroness will agree that it cannot possibly be foreseen with certainty at the time the order is made. It is essential therefore, in the Government's view, that the law should allow sufficient time for treatment, and sufficient flexibility to vary the actual length of each order according to the circumstances of the individual child. The whole of this Bill is geared to the needs of the individual child.

The agency made responsible for the treatment of the child must be given the necessary powers to carry out that responsibility in accordance with its assessment of the needs of the child. It cannot sensibly be made subject to the dictates of some outside body which has neither the responsibility for the care and control of the child nor the detailed knowledge of the child which is essential to the proper fulfilment of that responsibility. A court is not a treatment agency: its proper function is judicial—that is, to decide whether circumstances justify the making of a care order in the first place, and to decide whether to revoke the order if an application is made by the child, his parents or the local authority.

The short reason why this Amendment is not acceptable is that it is in conflict with this principle. It would make the care order less flexible and less apt for its purpose, and in this way would reduce the power of a local authority to do its job and to fulfil the responsibility placed upon it by the order. The noble Baroness referred to the fact that the age of majority is now 18; that it has been argued previously that everybody is mature at the age of 18—the new age of majority—and the inference from that is that the maximum here should be 18, as she desires in her Amendment, unless extended under Clause 21(1).

I can understand the noble Baroness hoping that the Government will not quote the Latey Committee Report, because that Report, far from supporting the point of view which the noble Baroness has put forward, is really against it. The Committee said: The general capacity of young people to order their own personal affairs should not affect the criminal or penal field since"— and this is the important part of it— it is the irresponsible, the disturbed and the inadequate who become involved in anti-social behaviour and law-breaking regardless of chronological age. The Government agree with this. The age of majority is not really relevant to the issues raised by this Amendment. The reasons why Clause 20 provides for a care order to last until the 19th birthday, if made at the age of 16, are clearly given in paragraph 34 of Children in Trouble. If the Bill did not provide this, a care order made when a young person was nearly 17 would last for only just over a year. I submit to the Committee that in many cases this just would not be long enough for the treatment which the child required. The length of treatment required does not automatically diminish as a young person approaches his or her 17th birthday; and if the aim of the care order is to provide the treatment required, which it is, and if that aim is to be realised, the law should allow at least two years in all cases.

The noble Baroness referred, quite properly, to the possibility of an extension under Clause 21(1). This could be done only in very limited circumstances, that is, the circumstances of a young person's mental condition or behaviour. They are the only circumstances in which Clause 21(1) allows a care order to be extended to the 19th birthday. I think it would be wholly wrong that this power should be widely, and perhaps improperly, used to secure extensions of care orders made after the 16th birthday, as would be the case it this Amendment were accepted. We submit that it is far preferable that the law should allow sufficient time for treatment in the first place.

It should be remembered that under the present law, as the noble Baroness will be well aware, a juvenile court dealing with a 16-year-old has the option of making an approved school order which I lasts up to the 19th birthday. Under the provisions of this Bill that option will disappear. One of the reasons for the very powerful general support which was expressed, in comments not only on the last White Paper and on this Bill, but on the first White Paper, for the idea of abolishing the approved school order, was the rigid time limit attached to approved school orders which have a fixed maximum term and a normal minimum. Provided that there are adequate safeguards—we believe that there are full safeguards—a more flexible care order is much preferable because it allows a longer period of care where necessary and also (and this is important) an earlier return home where justified as compared with the present approved school order.

Under Clause 21 the child, his parent or guardian, or the local authority may apply to the court at any time for the discharge of an order and may repeat the application after three months if it was not successful the first time. This is a safeguard which does not exist in the case of approved school orders. Another safeguard is contained in Clause 25(4) which requires a local authority to review the case of every child in care at intervals of not less than six months, and, if a care order is in force, to consider whether to make an application for the discharge of the order. Yet a further safeguard will be laid down in regulations made under Clause 41. They will require more frequent reviews where children are in secure accommodation and will require the reviews to be conducted by a committee containing at least one independent person.

Care orders under the provisions in the Bill as we have them will be a continuation of a well-established system under which many thousands of children have been dealt with over many years; and it combines the advantages of flexibility with built-in safeguards for the child and parents. I submit to the noble Baroness that this Amendment is not necessary as a safeguard and that, if accepted, it would reduce the flexibility of the care order and cut across the safeguards now in the Bill. In view of this careful explanation which I have given, I hope that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw the Amendment.

BARONESS EMMET OF AMBERLEY

May I ask the noble Lord to clarify a point which he has just made? I think he said that the cases would be reviewed every six months. As he knows, when a child is put on probation the probation case committee reviews the case periodically during the course of the year. Can the noble Lord explain this to me? Will there be two types of reviewing committee? If a child is put on probation, will the probation case committee deal with the child? If the child is put direct under the supervision of the local authority, what reviewing committee will the local authority set up, and how will these two interact and work together?

LORD STONHAM

I was speaking just now of the approved school order and comparing it with the new system. As the noble Baroness rightly said, there will be an automatic review of the case of each child in care every six months and this will be conducted by the local authority.

BARONESS EMMET OF AMBERLEY

Does that mean a special committee of the children's committee, or what sort of committee?

LORD STONHAM

It is a committee set up by the local authority which, as the noble Baroness surmises, will in all probability be a special committee of the children's committee. The exception to this will be when a child is in secure care under arrangements made or approved by the Secretary of State. Then in the case of a review there must be a totally independent person present, so that no child is kept in care of that kind unless the independent person is thoroughly satisfied that it is right.

EARL JELLICOE

I wonder whether I may come back to the point which my noble friend has raised? I think she was referring to the fact that when children are placed under probation orders there is an automatic review, which I think involves the magistrates, but I do not know. I should like to bring to the attention of the noble Lord the procedure which obtains at present in Oxfordshire and which has been brought to my attention. It has, I think, a great deal to commend it. It is a procedure by which the child care officers and members of their staff meet at six-monthly intervals with the magistrates to review all fit person orders and supervision orders within their jurisdiction.

Therefore, every child who has been placed under a supervision order or a fit person order under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court has his or her case subjected to a review which is a really independent review; it is not merely a review within the children's department or some internal review. It is a review by the magistrates and the children's department staff. I understand that this experiment has gone very well, and both sides have found it a very useful expedient. Could not this system be introduced and extended? It seems to me to have a great deal to commend it, and since we have reached this point I wonder whether the noble Lord could let us have his views on it.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, on the question of probation orders, which the noble Baroness introduced for the purpose of comparison (because under the Bill there will be supervision orders), it will be for the court to decide whether or not the probation officer is used as a supervisor.

BARONESS EMMET OF AMBERLEY

My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lord? This is the point that troubles me. Paragraph 12 says that a child may be put under a probation order by the court only with the consent of the local authority—personally I think that that is a pity. but never mind. If that is the case, there will be two sets of review committees: the probation case committee of the probation office and the other. I should have thought that some sort of amalgamation, such as the noble Earl has suggested, is necessary.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, I think the Committee will agree with me that we are not on this point at the moment, but in any case I think the noble Baroness is wrong. The position under the Bill is that a child under 14 will be supervised by a probation officer only if the local authority consents and if that probation officer is dealing with the family now or has been dealing with it in the past. I cannot see how this question of who is supervisor affects the six-monthly review and the body by whom this review is conducted.

The noble Earl cited the Oxfordshire Committee. Certainly the local authority will be responsible for the new body, and I think we can be reasonably confident that it would not be just members of the children's department who would decide these things. I am glad to say that I know something of the quite remarkable work that has been done in Oxfordshire in recent years by the means which the noble Earl has described. He could hardly have raised a more "bull" point for the whole Bill than what has been achieved in Oxfordshire, where, precisely for the reason he stated, there has been a marked and steady drop in approved school orders made by the court and a corresponding marked rise in the work done by the care officers and the local authority. Obviously, this practice in Oxfordshire is excellent and must be studied by other local authorities, which, because of the results, ought to be predisposed towards it. But I have to say that the actual methods followed by individual local authorities are matters for the authorities.

This discussion does not seem to have much direct relevance to the Amendment which the noble Baroness moved. The issue is simply this. We want it to be possible, when a young person is just under 17 and a care order is made, for that order to continue to 19. The noble Baroness wants it to end in all cases at 18, subject only to the possibility of extension under Clause 21(1), which could be only because of the mental health or behaviour of the young person. We do not think that that extension is sufficient.

EARL JELLICOE

My Lords, the noble Lord said that I had made a "bull" point for the Bill, but I am not concerned with making "bull" points. I drew attention to what was being done in Oxfordshire because the noble Lord himself, in answer to my noble friend, raised the question of review machinery and agreed that it was useful. I raised it precisely because the noble Lord referred to all the safeguards and mentioned, in particular, that this six-monthly review procedure has been written into the Bill. What concerns us is whether these safeguards are adequate, because we doubt whether this is so with an entirely internal review of this sort. That is why I mentioned the procedure at Oxfordshire where the review is conducted by the staff concerned and the magistrates, thereby bringing in an outside independent body.

BARONESS BROOKE OF YSTRADFELLTE

My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord for the care with which he has answered my Amendment. It was a probing Amendment. I was anxious to find out what was in the Government's mind about this point. To quote his own words, he gave it most careful consideration. I am most grateful to him, and now beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

5.46 p.m.

EARL JELLICOE moved Amendment No. 29:

Page 24, line 37, at end insert— ("Provided that no order shall remain in force for more than three years, but without prejudice to the power of the court to make a further order.")

The noble Earl said: My Lords, this Amendment is linked with the subject we have just been discussing. The noble Lord, Lord Stonham, congratulated himself and the Government on having been able to bring into the Bill a procedure which had the twin advantages of flexibility and adequate safeguards. I do not dissent from the first point. I think that this is a more flexible machinery, and provided that the safeguards are adequate, I am very much in favour of this. What worries me, and many other people, is whether the safeguards are adequate.

We must remember that as a result of this legislation care orders will be more frequent than in the past, and the range they will cover, and the responsibilities that will be placed on local authorities, will be wider. I am going to tread delicately here, and what I am saying is subject to correction; but my understanding of the position is this. Under the present position, which will obtain until this Bill becomes a Statute a child or young person can be sent to an approved school only if an approved school order had been obtained. In the case of a child or young person in care, if those supervising him find him too unruly, and that some other form of treatment is necessary; and if they come to the conclusion that the best thing is for that child to go to an approved school, there is no question of the child's going to an approved school without a further application to the court.

In future, of course—and I am not quarrelling with this—there will be no approved schools as such: they will be absorbed into the community school complex. But in practice, of course, they, or something like them, will for quite a long time still exist under another name, although not de jure or by name. Under the Bill as it stands, a local authority with a child in care would not need to obtain an approved school order, or to go back to the court, if it decided that a child entrusted to it needed more secure, more formal supervision. This is clearly implied in Clause 24(2), under which the local authority will not only have the power of a parent or guardian but will be able also to restrict the liberty of the child or young person concerned "to such extent as the authority considers appropriate". That is fairly wide phraseology. The local authority will be in a position to exercise these very wide powers for anything up to eight years. That is not a short period in a young person's life. What worries me is that it will rest largely with the local authority itself, within a department of the local authority, perhaps with one person, whether that child remains in care for the whole of that long period.

It is true, as the noble Lord has pointed out, that under Clause 25(4) provision is made for six-monthly reviews of the case to be made to see whether a particular care order should be discharged. But I wonder whether this is really a sufficient safeguard. Most children's departments are extremely conscientious, as I know, speaking from personal experience, and so are almost all children's officers. But everybody in this world is fallible, and some people are less conscientious than others. Mistakes can be made—and we have all seen the Hammersmith case which was reported in the Press yesterday. There could be cases—I would not wish to put it higher than that—with this purely internal review procedure, in which the procedure for review could be operated in a purely mechanical and perfunctory way. Again, the children's officer concerned may well have an idée fixe about the children. It is not only children who get an idée fixe; adults do, too. They might judge that it was in the child's best interest to remain in care, when quite conceivably some other person, equally qualified, or perhaps more qualified, might take another view.

There is, indeed, another side of the coin. In certain cases a child may be remaining in care against the strong wishes of the child, and it might help the local authority to have the reinforcement of a further order. I know that an application to the court for the review of a court order can be made under subsection (2) of Clause 21 by the child, his parent or guardian. It was argued in another place—and the noble Lord has reverted to the argument—that this constitutes an additional safeguard. I recognise that it is some safeguard, but I wonder whether it is really a sufficient safeguard. Take the case of a child making an application. We all know that many children have a keen sense of justice—some of them, in fact, are embryonic barrack-room lawyers. Do we really expect every person affected in this way, placed under a care order, to carry the precise wording of subsection (2) of Clause 21 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 in his head? One only has to ask the question to see the absurdity of it. Most of us in this House—and we have been looking at this Bill now for some time—have a great deal of difficulty in understanding all the provisions, and it is surely asking a lot of a child to carry them in his head.

Take an application by the parent or guardian. The noble Lord has argued that this again is an additional safeguard. I admit that it is. But is it a sufficient safeguard? The parent or guardian may have moved from the area, and may have forgotten all about the child. Indeed, even by definition, the parent or guardian concerned is likely to be an unsatisfactory parent or guardian; they may not care about the child, and even if it was in the child's best interests for that parent or guardian to make an application to the court for a review of the care order, there is absolutely no guarantee that it will be done. I doubt, therefore, whether that particular safeguard is entirely adequate. Indeed, even with well-intentioned parents, they may not know their full rights here; they may not have it brought to their attention either by the child care officers concerned or by the magistrates (this does happen) that they have this right of application.

In these circumstances, given the number of child care orders which are likely to be enforced; given the range of treatment which they are likely to cover; given the fact that I cannot feel any certainty that the internal safeguard, she internal review procedure, is a sufficient one—and likewise I, at least, can feel no certainty that the safeguard of applications triggered off by the local authority, the child, his parent or guardian can, in all the circumstances, be a sufficient safeguard—is there not a case for an independent review at three-yearly intervals by an independent body? This would mean that the particular child concerned could not remain in care for more than three years without the local authority having to go back to make an application to the court. That is the purpose of the Amendment. I beg to mow.

BARONESS EMMET OF AMBERLEY

I should like to support the noble Earl in what he has said. Three years is a long time in a child's life. Cases occurred not so long ago of foster children who had been neglected. We know that the children's department is already overworked. Those of us who have had to deal with children know that the department will have to be reinforced strongly, and possibly with a rather different type of person from those they have at the moment. Until this is sorted out and one feels confident that the children's department is fully and properly staffed to carry out these duties, I should like to support the Amendment which the noble Earl has moved.

LORD STONHAM

May I first deal with one or two things which the noble Baroness has said. Surely she is aware that the relevant parts of this Bill will not be implemented until there is sufficient staff. We have given that assurance often enough. If the noble Baroness will study Clause 32 she will be fully aware of the answer to this point. I would deprecate what the noble Baroness said about additional staff, and perhaps not properly qualified staff.

BARONESS EMMET OF AMBERLEY

I did not mean not properly qualified. I think everybody will agree that at the moment the children's department is largely staffed by women officers We shall have a great many naughty boys, and I should like to see a far greater number of men and married people recruited into the service.

LORD STONHAM

This sounds like a reflection on women officers, who are in the main dedicated people who do wonderful work; and it is against the trend. The noble Baroness mentioned naughty boys. We have a lot of naughty boys in detention centres—at the moment about 2,000 of them doing three months or six months. All the social workers in detention centres are women. We have some even naughtier boys up to the age of 21 in Borstal—nearly 6,000 of them—and, as the noble Baroness may be aware, we have recently decided not only to have women matrons and other women workers, whom we have always had in borstals, but also to have women governors of borstals.

BARONESS EMMET OF AMBERLEY

My Lords, I am all for a mixed service, and in a service where there have been only men to import women is a very good idea. If there were only women, I should like to see more men employed—a mixed service. I make no reflection upon the present children's care officers, but I think they are going to have a very big, new and heavy responsibility put upon them. I want to be quite certain that the staff is adequate to the new responsibilities.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, yes, they certainly will have a very big and heavy responsibility put on them. The total trained staffs of the social services, which are being increased at a more rapid rate than ever before—the number of children's officers has been doubled in the past five years, an incredible increase, and the rate will increase relatively faster—will ensure that there will be the people to deal with the situation.

May I come back to the noble Earl's Amendment, and deal exclusively with that and with what he said about it, and with its effects. It may help if I read what the noble Earl wants to do. He wants to say: … in any other case, when that person attains the age of eighteen the order shall cease to have effect Provided that no order shall remain in force for more than three years, but without prejudice to the power of the court to make a further order. The noble Earl made a very persuasive speech. He agreed that this Bill provided a more flexible machinery, but he said that what worried him was whether the safeguards were adequate. That worries a lot of people, and it is quite right that it should worry them and that it should be raised in this way. He said that under the existing system you could send a child to an approved school only with an approved school order. That is quite right.

What safeguards have we then? As the noble Earl is aware, the order can last up to the age of 19—I repeat, the age of 19—and there is only one appeal. The safeguards we have now are, first of all; appeals repeatedly and at any time. How much more valuable a safeguard there is in that! I wonder why noble Lords have not been worried about this matter which has been going on over all these years, of only one appeal against an approved school order. Now—and I should have thought this would have been welcome—we are bringing in a system whereby if a child is in a community home, of whatever kind, there is a review every six months, and an appeal virtually as often as you like, without limit. So far as the frequency of reviews is concerned, in the most important cases, although there will not be many of them, for children in secure care there is a review every three months, and an independent person—and it might be the noble Baroness, Lady Emmet of Amberley—will have to be present to decide those cases. I do not want to name the kind of case, but it is in the minds of all of us here.

The other safeguard is the openness of care. Throughout the community care system there is a great openness—in approved schols, in all but a very few places. I am most concerned about this subject and about the kind of newspaper comment that I saw after our last discussion. I do not have the cutting in front of me, but I was particularly disturbed to see an editorial in the Daily Telegraph, which is a very great newspaper and has always very balanced and informed comment. At the end of the editorial it said something like: Under these new arrangements, once the local authorities get them, they just bung them anywhere. I am not quoting the Daily Telegraph; that is a paraphrase of what was said. It is both misleading and hurtful.

What happens? Take the Bill. A child is brought before the court and is thought to be in need of care. He can be brought before the court for one of five reasons. If the court decides to make an order, it has these alternatives: the order can ask the parent or guardian to enter into recognisances to take proper care of him—that means sending him home. It can make a supervision order. It can make a hospital order within the meaning of Part V of the Mental Health Act. It can make a guardianship order. All those four can be considered before the court makes a care order. I think it right to say that a court will only make a care order, which in normal circumstances would mean the child would be kept in a community home of one kind or another, if it thought it was necessary. That is not "bunging a child anywhere".

Then we come to the kind of community home. When I hear some of the discussions and read some of the comments I would almost imagine that the members of local authorities, the elected members, were some sort of ogres; that they did not care for the children in their care; that the local authority officials were looking for customers and that they could not possibly bear to part with one. In fact, all those that they can part with, in the sense that they can be released because they have improved, are successes. I do not deny that there is sometimes a misjudgment, but, please, just because we have a Bill in front of us which envisages changes, do not let us talk as if this great system, which has been built up over the years and is constantly being improved, was not somethings of which every one of us ought to be proud.

I would ask the noble Earl to consider this point first of all: the effect of his Amendment would be to parade all children in care, which means from the age of nought to 18, infants in arms, every three years before the courts. Does any of us want that? Does the noble Earl want it? Do you want to create this anxiety among the great majority of children and parents, 20,000 and more of them? We have 20,000 children in care now. Do we want to do all this just to catch one or two cases where a local court might take a different view from the local authority? Assuming they were likely to take a different view from that of the local authority, would they not he likely to do so if the parent, or the child, or the guardian appealed? They can appeal as often as they like—that is what the safeguard is for.

This Amendment would make a radical change in a system which has been operating very successfully for the past 36 years. A care order under tie Bill corresponds to a fit person order under existing law. There are well over 20,000 children in care under fit person orders, including a substantial number of offenders. Many are children with difficult behavioural problems, and a larger number are committed to care for their own care and protection. There is nothing in the experience of the past 36 years to justify restricting fit person orders to three years at a time.

This Amendment, if it were accepted, would limit all care orders in this way from the age of nought, and I cannot possibly see that this can be justified. If for one moment we thought it was necessary, of course we could have it; but this operates against all experience. Care orders under the Bill will be a continuation of this well-established system under which many thousands of children have been dealt with over many years. The care order combine, the advantages of flexibility with these built-in safeguards for children and parents which I detailed and which are far greater, far more effective, than any safeguards we have now.

I submit to the noble Earl that what is provided in the Bill is a very great improvement on the position we hove at present. The child who goes in future, as approved schools are being abolished, to what he calls the equivalent of an approved school, will, through its parents or guardian, have far greater safeguards against the danger he feared than have children who now go to approved schools So far as these children being "bunged" anywhere (as the newspaper said) is concerned, this is a reflection on everybody concerned. It is a reflection on the courts, which will first of all decide on the kind of order to make; and it is a reflection on the devoted people, voluntary and professional, who will have to make these decisions and decide where, and under what treatment, it is in the best interests of the child that he should be placed. I hope that when he considers what I have said the noble Earl will feel able not to proceed with this Amendment.

6.12 p.m.

EARL JELLICOE

Although I have listened very carefully to the noble Lord's explanation, I cannot say that I am at all happy about the matter. Quite frankly, it seemed to me that a large part of what he was saying was addressed to an editorial in the Daily Telegraph rather than to a speech made by myself. The question of the contrast between the present position as affecting approved school orders and the position envisaged under this Bill was at the heart of a great deal of this discussion, I think. I would merely point out that of course a child can remain in care, as the noble Lord himself said, not for the eight years I have mentioned but for 18 years. An approved school order runs for only three.

The noble Lord then referred to the possible gravity of the consequences which lie behind all this. The noble Lord argued that my fears here were incorrect. I do not think they are, because what worries me is that, because of the flexibility which is being introduced (and I should not quarrel with that if the safeguards were there) the courts may well make a care order on a child envisaging some very mild form of treatment, certainly not envisaging the approved school type of treatment, and then for some reason or other—it may not be the child's fault; it may be due to the circumstances; he may not get on with a particular person who is supervising him—there may be an act of rebellion or something of that kind, and the local authority may decide that some far more strict form of supervision is required. In that event, unless the safeguards operate, the whole matter lies within the orbit of the local authority.

The situation then turns on whether the safeguards are adequate. Quite frankly, the noble Lord has not answered my fears here—that is to say, whether the necessary procedure operating the safeguards would be triggered either by the six-monthly review procedure or by the child itself, by the parent or by the guardians, let alone by the local authority, which was very much involved. For these reasons I confess that I am still profoundly unhappy about this particular issue.

One thing, however, inclines me not at the moment to press this Amendment. That is what the noble Lord has said about the fact that under the Amendment some 20,000 children would automatically, every three years, have their cases reviewed before the courts. That is something which I personally should not wish. What I should like to ask the noble Lord is this. Would he not at least consider introducing the additional safeguard which we are keen to have placed in the Bill, for children over a certain age? If that could be conceded, I personally, and I believe many of my noble friends, would be a great deal happier. I very much hope that the noble Lord will be able to say that between now and the Report stage he will consider some such additional safeguard.

LORD STONHAM

I feel strongly that this is not an issue on which the Committee should divide. I believe that we all want the same thing. I have tried to explain as well as I can how much better the Bill safeguards children than does the present position. As the noble Earl will appreciate, the difficulty of acceding to his suggestion lies in the Amendment which the noble Baroness moved a little earlier, by which in certain circumstances children had to be kept until they are 19—is something I have said not understood?

EARL JELLICOE

No; I was asking my noble friend why that was an added difficulty.

LORD STONHAM

Because the noble Earl suggested we might consider bringing in his suggestion at a certain age. Quite obviously, if we are in difficulty already when a child is made the subject of a care order just before it is 17, then we are in difficulty in bringing in what the noble Earl suggests at a certain age. I mention this now only as my first reaction to what he said. But certainly between now and Report stage I will look at what the noble Earl has said and let him know whether it is possible—and I can make no commitment about this—to meet him. If not, of course he will then be perfectly free to raise the matter again at a later stage of the Bill.

EARL JELLICOE

I am grateful to the noble Lord for that hedged-about offer. I realised that he was not in a position to say anything more at this stage. Certainly I am not anxious unnecessarily to press any matter to a Division, especially on a Bill of this nature. But I must again tell the noble Lord very frankly that I personally—and I suspect many of my noble friends feel the same—am not at all happy about this position; we are not at all certain that the safeguards are adequate.

It is true that radical changes are being made; and I am not necessarily objecting to that. But when we make radical changes we must be very certain of the effects of those changes. I am not myself by any means convinced that the effects of this particular change, with the added flexibility, have been sufficiently carefully thought through. It is certainly my present intention, if the noble Lord is not able to meet me between now and Report stage, perhaps with an Amendment of his own, to come back to this matter at Report stage with an Amendment which will be specifically directed at the upper age bracket. But, that said, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 20 agreed to.

Clause 21 agreed to.

Clause 22 [Special provisions relating to interim orders]:

6.20 p.m.

BARONESS BROOKE OF YSTRADFELLTE moved Amendment No. 29A: Page 26, line 8, at end insert ("or (c) the court or justice has dispensed with the attendance of that person.")

The noble Baroness said: It is clearly necessary that where a care order, other than an interim order, is made the boy or girl should be before the court. However, in the case of interim orders attendance is not invariably necessary, because the court can reach a decision on information provided by the local authority, the police or any other authorised person. The provision in this clause merely reflects the existing law (which is Section 23 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1963), but surely there is no reason why these provisions should not be made more flexible; because to sensitive children attendances before justices can be extremely unsettling. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, is himself particularly sensitive to the effect upon children of certain proceedings, and I would ask him to give the most earnest attention to this Amendment.

Since it will be open to the courts to make interim orders in a wide variety of situations it should also be open to the courts to dispense with the attendance of children where circumstances make this desirable—for example, where routine inquiries as to the home background, the adequacy of the parents, and perhaps the medical history, are proceeding. Surely these are occasions when it may net be necessary to have a juvenile present at the court, and I hope that the Government will consider this possibility for the sake of the children themselves. I beg to move.

LORD STONHAM

As the noble Baroness rightly said, I am very sensitive to the effect when any child is taken to court, and particularly if it is taken unnecessarily; and this is especially true in the case of a baby, which is virtually what this amounts to. But I would ask the noble Baroness to consider the position as we see it, and the effect of her Amendment. Subsection (1) of Clause 22, with which we are now dealing, requires a child or young person to be before the court which makes an interim order (we are talking only about maximum 28-day orders) unless the child is under live or cannot be present by reason of illness or accident. The Amendment moved by the noble Baroness would enable the court or the justice to dispense with the attendance of the child or young person in other circumstances, not specified, which seemed right to the court or to the justices.

There is nothing to prevent a court from making an indefinite number of successive orders, in the same way as, in criminal proceedings, the court can make an indefinite number of remands. There are two safeguards against the abuse of this power. One is the right of a person in custody to apply to a High Court Judge for release. So far as interim orders are concerned, this right is contained in subsection (4) of the clause. The second safeguard is that the person is present before the court. He (or his parents) can say to the court, "Is it not time that you came to a decision on this case?".

Under the Amendment the court could make an interim order for twenty-eight days and dispense with the attendance of a child or young person at the end of that time—this is the danger—when it could make a further interim order. The child or young person would have no opportunity to represent to the court that he should be released if the court was not then in a position to proceed with the case. This is the danger of the Amendment—a danger which I am quite sure has not occurred to the noble Baroness; otherwise it is not the kind of proposal that she would make. The child's only alternative would be to apply to a Judge of the High Court, which is a cumbersome and difficult procedure and ought to be used only when an application to the juvenile court has been refused.

Of course I agree that appearance in court is distressing and unsettling to most children—to all children, probably—and that is why the main object of the Bill, which I have stated many times, is to keep children out of court unless a court appearance is necessary. But surely everyone agrees that liberty should not be infringed without a court order, which is what the Amendment would allow. Liberty can be infringed without a court order: under the Amendment the court can merely renew an interim order without having the presence of the person concerned. We feel very strongly that interim orders should not last indefinitely, and that is why the Bill, like the existing law, provides for a limit of twenty-eight days. If this period of twenty-eight days can be extended from time to time without the child's appearing before the court then, in effect, the interim order becomes indefinite and the child or young person (or his parents) have no remedy except to apply to a High Court Judge. We do not think that this should be the law, and I am quite sure the noble Baroness does not think so, either. We consider that the existing exceptions, relating to children under five and children and young people who cannot be present by reason of illness or accident, go as far as is right. I hope that, with that explanation, the noble Baroness will feel that the Bill is right and that her Amendment is not only unnecessary but undesirable.

BARONESS BROOKE OF YSTRADFELLTE

I am once again most grate- ful to the noble Lord for having taken considerable trouble to make something clear to a non-lawyer, to a mother of children who might find one of those children being brought up before the court (though I think they have reached an age now when they are beyond that stage) for having made crystal clear the implications of this Amendment. My sole anxiety in moving this Amendment was to try to make it possible, as I said, for some of the more sensitive children to be excused from an appearance in court. However, I am quite content to accept the explanation which the noble Lord has given. I think I know him well enough to know that had there been any way of avoiding this situation he would have made it possible. While thanking the noble Lord, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

LORD STONHAM

Amendment No. 29B is consequential on an earlier Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 26, line 36, leave out ("young person") and insert ("person who has attained the age of fourteen").—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 22, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 23 [Remand to care of local authorities etc.]:

LORD STONHAM

Clause 23 deals with the remand of young persons in criminal proceedings. Since children under 14 may be prosecuted for homicide it is necessary to provide for their remand and committal for trial. This Amendment No. 30, does this. The effect is that a child charged with homicide who is not released on bail will be committed to the care of the local authority. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 27, line 16, after ("court") insert ("—

1. (a) remands or commits for trial a child charged with homicide or remands a child convicted of homicide; or
2. (b)").—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 23, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 24 [Powers and duties of local authorities etc. with respect to persons committed to their care]:

6.30 p.m.

EARL JELLICOE moved Amendment No. 31A:

Page 28, line 21, at end insert— ("Provided in the case of a care order that no person's liberty shall be restricted under this subsection for a continuous period of more than seven days without the express permission of a juvenile court.")

The noble Earl said: The point to which this Amendment is addressed is fairly close to the one we discussed at some length just now. As I said then, under Clause 24(2) a local authority not only has the same authority over a child or young person under its care or control as the parent or guardian of the child, but also the power to restrict his or her liberty to such extent as the authority consider appropriate. Again we wish to strengthen the safeguards available for those persons who are subject to care orders. I should like to make it clear that I am not pro-court or pro-magistrates or pro or anti local authority in this matter in any way; I think I have already made clear my admiration for the work which the local authorities do in this area. Yet, as we all know, mistakes in human society do occur, and here we are dealing with a very delicate field of restriction of liberty. Parenthetically, I should be grateful if the noble Lord, when he replies, would tell us rather more about what is involved here: the type of case involved and the type of restriction of liberty to which this clause is addressed.

In dealing with this general point—although not with this precise Amendment—at the Committee stage in another place, the Under-Secretary who was in charge of the Bill said that the decision to move the person in care to secure accommodation would not necessarily or even usually involve keeping him there for more than a few days or even hours, and it was only a question of dealing with a sudden outburst. That I accept. I believe that emergency powers of this sort are necessary. Anyone who has been at all acquainted with these matters knows how a child can become suddenly very severely disturbed, and unless action is taken can do dam- age to himself or herself and can throw out of gear the whole operation of the community or home in which he or she may be. I quite understand the question of emergency action covering a few days or even hours, to quote the Under-Secretary's words.

But then he went on to say the t in a few cases the local authority may consider it necessary to keep the person in secure accommodation for a longer period, without specifying what that longer period might be; and it is that which concerns us. It is very close to the point we were discussing on Amendment No. 29. We feel that in such cases there should be a chance of an independent review, and this Amendment is designed to see that such a person could not be kept in secure accommodation and have his or her liberty restricted for more than seven days without a juvenile court specifically sanctioning it.

I know of the rights of appeal which exist, but I feel that they are not watertight, and I have yet to be convinced on that point. But I do not wish to dwell on this argument again. I am also aware of the safeguards which exist in Clause 41(2)(c), under which regulations will be introduced requiring the approval of the Secretary of State for the arrangements for secure accommodation. But those regulations, I should judge—I speak subject to correction from the noble Lord—will be really concerned with the conduct of the community homes or the secure parts of them; they will be concerned with their internal administration, and not with the safeguards involved. It is in order to reinforce the safeguards, which in this area we consider still to be too flimsy and inadequate, that we feel some such proviso as is proposed in this Amendment should be introduced into the new machinery. I beg to move.

LORD STONHAM

As the noble Earl said, this Amendment is a further expression of the anxieties which have been expressed in our previous discussions about the safeguarding of the liberty of the subject and the feeling which at least some noble Lords have that the powers which the Bill gives the local authorities are excessive where they enable an authority to restrict liberty in the course of providing necessary treatment for a child who, by order of the court, has been committed to their care.

The effect of the Amendment would be to make it impossible for a local authority to accommodate a care order child or young person in secure accommodation for longer than seven days without applying for and obtaining the permission of the juvenile court. The Bill as it stands makes the use of secure accommodation a matter for the local authority by giving them, under subsection (2) of this clause, express powers to restrict liberty without relying on the powers which it also gives to them to exercise the rights of the parent. The local authority are vested by subsection (2) with the same powers and duties with respect to the person who is in care under a care order as his parent or guardian would have but for the existence of that order, and the local authority may, even if a parent would have no such power, restrict the person's liberty to the extent which they consider appropriate, but subject to the regulations which will be made under Clause 41(2)(c) and (e) governing the use of the accommodation in community homes approved for this purpose. I appreciate that when we are talking of a clause which gives regulation-making powers it is not possible for us to have fully informed discussion without seeing the regulations, but I assure the noble Earl that it is my right honourable friend's intention to see that there are full safeguards in the matter.

But the chief issue in this Amendment is that it would destroy the main principle of the Bill, which is that a local authority should be fully responsible for the welfare and control of a child or young persons committed to their care. The children or young persons committed in this way will, of course, include some persistent absconders or some with such aggressive habits that the authority, unless they are free to place the child in secure accommodation, either cannot care for him at all, in the case of the absconders, or cannot protect others from injury, in the case of the aggressive ones. It is perfectly proper for a court to relieve the authority of responsibility by discharging the order.

I know the noble Earl said we have already been told about that safeguard; but it is there. It would be quite unreasonable and unworkable to give the authority responsibility by maintaining the order in force and at the same time to deny them the power to discharge it by overriding their judgment as to the measures called for in a particular case. The noble Earl is well aware from his own Ministerial experience of the crises, the difficulties, that occur, not only in the care of adults who are in custodial care but also with children in care, and this duty which he would place on local authorities, that they can deal with a child for only seven days without getting another order of the court, is going to raise acute difficulties. I submit that it is certainly not necessary, and certainly is wholly wrong, for the court itself to give a local authority this responsibility and this duty and then to override it in this way within seven days.

It is not as if there were no safeguards against the ill-judged or negligent use of powers by a local authority. The additional safeguard was added on the Report stage in another place, as the noble Earl is aware, at the behest of the Opposition, who expressed themselves well satisfied that this addition had been made. They particularly welcomed this in another place.

I would say to the noble Earl that the power that he now wishes to give the court is a power such as no court now possesses. I know that he will say that that is no reason why we should not start now. But if you are going to create a complete precedent in this kind of way there has to be convincing evidence that it is necessary. Care orders in future will apply to children and young persons who, under the present law, may be the subject of approved school orders, and eventually those under 17 who may be sent to borstal. Some approved schools and some borstals provide secure accommodation. When that accommodation is to be used in a particular case, or for a particular time, is not decided by the court. It is not decided by the court now. It is quite properly decided by the authorities responsible under the court order for the welfare and control of the child who is the subject of the order.

As I said in a previous discussion, the subject of a care order under this Bill will have more rights than the subject of an approved school or borstal order; namely, the right to apply to the court for the discharge of the order. I regret that once more I cannot accede to the noble Earl's argument, but I feel that there is good reason for not doing so.

VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS

Can my noble friend tell me, in all the years that local authorities have been looking after children in their care, whether there ever have been any difficulties arising from lack of an arrangement such as this?

LORD STONHAM

In answer to my noble friend, I may say that during my own years as a Minister I have come across cases of children in approved schools who I think have been there far longer than they need have been, and they have then been released. But I must remind my noble friend that as of now there is only one appeal for release from an approved school. When this Bill becomes law, there will be not only the six months' review, but appeals without limit, which of course is the safeguard.

6.45 p.m.

EARL JELLICOE

I seem to be having a bad day with the noble Lord to-day because he keeps expressing the hope that I will he satisfied with his explanation, but—this sounds awfully churlish—once again I am forced to say that I am not satisfied with the explanation. I was anxious to learn what was really involved here. This I have not yet got at because the Under-Secretary in another place said that the type of restriction of liberty concerned would not necessarily or even usually involve keeping the person concerned restricted for more than a few days, or even a few hours. I was wondering what form of restriction was involved, in what type of community home; how often there would be cases in which there would be a longer period envisaged, and in what type of accommodation that would be. It is most important for us to know what we are talking about. If we are talking about locking up a young person for two or three years, and that power is being vested subject to the safeguards—which I think are too flimsy—in a local authority without any reference back to a court, then I am seriously disturbed, and I remain seriously disturbed. And the noble Lord, in failing to respond to my invitation to let us know more about what was really involved in practice, has not alleviated my disquiet.

He again referred to the fact that at the present time the authorities in approved schools or in borstals have the power to confine those in their charge in specially secure accommodation. Of course, both he and I know that that is the case. But this does not really meet the point which worries us at the present time, because to me it seems possible that a court may make a care order on a young person or a child appearing before it, thinking it may have been marginal whether a care order would be appropriate in the circumstances, or whether it should be a recognisance under subsection (3)(a) of Clause 1 or a supervision order. These things can often be marginal—thinking that some quite mild care regime is all that is required, and not envisaging for a moment that the result could be that the child or young person concerned could have his or her liberty restricted for a period of years.

It turns of course on whether the safeguards are adequate. Here, at the risk of wearying the noble Lord, I must say that I have yet to he convinced that these safeguards are adequate. I only hope that when he reads the inadequate remarks which I must have made in that respect in addressing myself to the previous Amendment, Amendment No. 29—I know how thorough he is in following up these matters—some slight shade of doubt may cross his mind as to the amount of adequacy there is in these safeguards. I ask the noble Lord to do that. But because this Amendment is linked with Amendment No. 29, and in the light of the highly qualified assurance which I received from the noble Lord on that Amendment that he would half consider it between now and the Report stage, I shall once again give him the benefit of the doubt and not press this Amendment to a Division.

LORD STONHAM

Before the noble Earl sits down, may I remind him that I did mention the regulations to be made under Clause 41. Under the regulations proposed to be made for secure accommodation, short-term locking up will be limited to seven days; but for longer periods express permission in writing will have to be obtained. As the noble Earl is aware, this long-term custodial care (I will call it that for the moment) would have to be reviewed every three months, with independent participation. May I just add this? Of course the noble Earl is absolutely right that, with the great majority of children in respect of whom a care order is made, there will be no question of what the world would understand as "locking up". A great many children will be with foster parents; some will be in special boarding schools; others will be in the wide variety of community homes that we already have—though they do not call them "community homes"; cottage homes under a house mother, and so on.

I would also remind the noble Earl, since he is quite rightly thinking of the more serious cases—the minority: the more difficult cases—of a discussion in a debate we had some 18 months ago about approved schools. That was, of course, long before this Bill was introduced. In that debate I outlined our thinking on approved schools, and pointed to the fact that at present in quite a number of approved schools—perhaps most—we have a minority of exceptionally difficult children, disturbed children, who of course have a bad effect on the remainder, and that it was rather hoped that we could have a few special schools with special treatment for children of that kind. We shall hope to achieve that objective through the regional committees.

Much accommodation, of course. will be supplied by local authorities in their own areas and in their own right, but in the more rare types of accommodation it will be for these regional committees to consider what is to be provided. When we talk of secure conditions I am not thinking only of, perhaps, the one or two notable homicides; I am thinking also of the rather larger, but still relatively very small, number of seriously disturbed children for whom special arrangements will have to be made. This is the kind of thing we have in mind, and it will be for the regional committees to get together with their local authority constituents, make their plans, and submit them to the Home Secretary for approval. This is the kind of set-up that we envisage.

EARL JELLICOE

I am most grateful to the noble Lord for that further information which, after some gentle teasing, we have elicited from him. I should like to ask him one question on what he has said about the range of people in secure accommodation which is envisaged. Does he envisage that children or young persons who require restrictions on their liberty (and I am now talking about the really disturbed young people who need special treatment) would be able, under this particular clause of the Bill, to be transferred to the special psychiatric units to which we referred at Second Reading?

I am very grateful to the noble Lord for giving us the further information about the sort of regulations which the Secretary of State proposes to make under Clause 41(2)(c), but I am afraid I did not fully catch the import of what he said. I think he said that for short-term confinements, as it were, nobody could have his or her liberty restricted for more than seven days without some express permission.

LORD STONHAM

Without written authority.

EARL JELLICOE

Without written authority, and that for a longer period there would have to be some review with independent participation. Could the noble Lord let me know who would give that permission when it is a question of the short-term restriction, and what form of independent participation is envisaged?

LORD STONHAM

The local authority would have to give written permission for longer than seven days. As regards the independent participation in a review, this is written into the Bill and it is a three-months interval. There is no dubiety about that at all; this is in relation to secure conditions.

I confirm what the noble Earl said about admission to special establishments, but that admission is only with the agreement of the Secretary of State, so there is that very implicit control. So far as the extreme cases are concerned, we are dealing with very small numbers. I can think of only two girls, two children, in such accommodation at the moment. There are rather more boys, but we are, as I say, talking in terms of just a handful of children. The fact that there are only a handful is no reason why they should not have complete safeguards. But the noble Earl will agree that if psychiatrists and everybody else feel that these children should be in secure accommodation (this does not mean unpleasant accommodation, or anything like that) they should not be free to walk out at any time, though even in that accommodation they do go outside.

In fact, the very case I am thinking about—a recent case—concerns a boy who had improved, and of whom everybody had high hopes. He had not left the place, but he was on an outing, and he just "pushed off". This is the kind of thing that happens. If I have given the idea of something like a grim fortress from which there was no egress, I must make it plain that this just is not the case. The treatment is always the same; it is all given in the hope that the children can be released as stable and useful members of society.

EARL JELLICOE

I am grateful to the noble Lord for the further explanations he has given, and in view of them and in view of what I have previously said, but reserving my right if I am not satisfied on reading our discussion, to come back to this on the Report stage, I beg leave to withdraw this Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 24 agreed to.

Clause 25 agreed to.

6.58 p.m.

Clause 26 [Detention of child or young person in place of safely]:

LORD STONHAM moved Amendment No. 32: Page 30, line 32, after ("warrant") insert ("otherwise than for homicide").

The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 32. With this Amendment I would ask your Lordships to consider Amendments Nos. 33, 34, 35 and 36. All these Amendments deal with children charged with homicide. A child under fourteen arrested for an offence is dealt with in Clause 26(4). If he is not released the police are required to arrange for his detention in a place of safety. Except in a case of homicide, any proceedings brought will be care proceedings, and when the child appears before a court, if the court does not release him, the court will make an interim order. Clause 27 deals with the arrest of young persons for an offence. Since proceedings will normally be criminal proceedings, the clause provides that if they are not released they are to be brought before a court, with a view to remand. The object of the Amendments is to exclude children under 14 arrested for homicide from Clause 26 (which is appropriate to care proceedings) and include them in Clause 27 (which is appropriate to criminal proceedings). This is a consequence of retaining the prosecution of children under 14 for homicide. As regards the places in which children can be detained, as opposed to the circumstances justifying and the authority for detention, there is no significant difference between the two clauses.

The first Amendment, No. 32, excludes children arrested for homicide from Clause 26(4). The second Amendment removes the reference to a belief that a child has committed homicide from the grounds on which the police may authorise detention in a place of safety in Clause 26(4)(b). The opportunity has also been taken to remove the reference to "a grave crime" and substitute a reference to the nature of the alleged offence. The third Amendment excludes a child arrested for homicide from Clause 26(5), which deals with the period of detention in a place of safety. The fourth and fifth Amendments apply Clause 27 to children arrested for homicide. I beg to move Amendment No. 32.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

This seems to be a fairly clear straightening-up and transposition of these provisions from one clause to another, and there are only two points which I should like to make. The reference to "another grave crime" must, I think, be, among other things, a reference to the crimes for which long periods of detention can be imposed upon children under the 1933 Act. I think the noble Lord suggested on Monday that it was only homicide that was left in this category, but he is not right. Wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm still comes into this category, and this is a matter to which I think we shall have to revert at the Report stage. I am sure the noble Lord did not intend to do it purposely, but he suggested that it was only in cases of homicide that there were special powers to deal with children, and I do not believe that that is an altogether accurate description of the situation. So I should like to come back to that at another time.

My other point is simply one of drafting. If your Lordships will look at Clause 27(1), you will see that the Amendment will insert another paragraph (a) and paragraph (b), so that we shall have two sets of paragraphs (a) and (b). I do not think that is altogether felicitous. It is going to make references rather difficult, and it may be that this confusion can be dispensed with by some other method of drafting, or by changing the lettering in the Bill. I wonder whether the noble Lord would look at this point, because it seems to be slightly less evident than is usual in cases of this sort.

LORD STONHAM

I was thinking only this afternoon that it might save a lot of time if the noble Viscount could have a talk with the draftsmen before I table Amendments. This is in relation to a matter which he raised the other night, on which I quite agree with him. But on the first of his points, I do not think the position is quite as he stated it. In fact, my noble friend Lord St. Davids raised a similar point, about which I am writing to him, and I do not think the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, is quite correct. But as these legal points are rather difficult, I would rather not be committed now and would ask him to let me look at this.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD STONHAM

I beg to move Amendment No. 33.

Amendment moved— Page 30, line 37, leave out from ("officer") to ("make") in line 40 and insert ("considers that he ought to be further detained in his own interests or, in the case of an arrested child, because of the nature of the alleged offence,").—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD STONHAM

I beg to move Amendment No. 34.

Amendment moved— Page 31, line 2, after ("warrant") insert ("otherwise than for homicide").—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 26, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 27 [Release or further detention of arrested young person]:

LORD STONHAM

I beg to move Amendment No. 35.

Amendment moved— Page 31, line 18, leave out ("appearing to be a young person").—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD STONHAM

I beg to move Amendment No. 36.

Amendment moved— Page 31, line 20, after ("court") insert ("then if either—

1. (a) he appears to be a child and his arrest is for homicide; or
2. (b) he appears to be a young person and his arrest is for any offence,").—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

On Question. Whether Clause 27, as amended, shall be agreed to?

LORD STONHAM

Such is the speed and efficiency of the Department which I have the honour to represent that I can tell the noble Viscount now that the present paragraphs (a) and (b) in Clause 27(1) will become sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii), and that this can be done as a matter of reprinting. Another victory!

Clause 27, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 28 to 31 agreed to.

Clause 32 [Transitional modifications of Part 1 for persons of specified ages]:

LORD STONHAM

I beg to move Amendment No. 36A, which is consequential.

Amendment moved Page 36. line 4, leave out ("22(5) or")—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD STONHAM

I beg to move Amendment No. 36B.

Amendment moved— Page 36, line 8, after ("that") insert ("section 22(5) of this Act shall have effect as if for the reference to the age of fourteen. or")—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 32, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 33 and 34 agreed to.

Clause 35 [Approval and variation of regional plans]:

BARONESS BROOKE OF YSTRADFELLTE moved Amendment No. 36C.

Page 40, line 35. at end insert— ("( ) Before agreeing to any modification pursuant to subsection (1) of this section to the effect that a community home should be provided by any of the relevant authorities or that a voluntary home provided by a voluntary organisation should be designated as a controlled or assisted community home, the committee shall obtain the consent of the authority or voluntary organisation by which the home is or is to be provided and, in the case of a home which is to he designated as a controlled or assisted community home, the consent of the local authority which it is proposed should be specified in the instrument of management for the home.")

The noble Baroness said: Un till now, the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, has been playing the part of the lady in the famous duet, who constantly replied, "Oh, no John, no John", and I am hoping that the moment is coming when, perhaps, we are going to get an affirmative rather than a "No", because this Amendment is really a machinery Amendment.

LORD STONHAM

I have said "Perhaps" once or twice.

BARONESS BROOKE OF YSTRADFELLTE

In respect of the community home system, it is the intention of the Government that no local authority or voluntary body will be required under a regional plan to undertake an obligation to provide a home unless that authority or voluntary body has previously agreed to accept the obligation. Clear provision is made in subsection (5) of Clause 34 that before any obligation is inserted in an original plan the authority concerned shall have agreed to accept the obligation.

Clause 35(1), as drafted at present, does not seem to make it clear that a regional committee, after submitting a plan, must again obtain the consent of authorities or voluntary bodies before agreeing with the Secretary of State upon a revised scheme which alters obligations. If he proposes any modifications which place a new positive obligation on individual authorities, it is essential that a regional planning committee should not agree until the local authority or voluntary body concerned has agreed. This Amendment is designed simply to ensure that regional planning committees obtain the consent of authorities and voluntary bodies to any modification which imposes obligations, in the same way as subsection (5) of Clause 34 places a duty on the regional planning committees to obtain the consent of authorities and voluntary bodies before submitting their original development plan. I beg to move.

LORD STONHAM

As the noble Baroness made clear, this Amendment concerns the effect of modifications to the plan made by the Secretary of State with the agreement of the planning committee, as envisaged in subsection (1) of Clause 35. I know that the Amendment has powerful backing, because it is desired by the Association of Municipal Corporations. But, despite that, I have to say that it is superfluous, because it is clear from the provisions of subsection (5) of Clause 34—the clause which we have just agreed to—that the duty of the committee to obtain the necessary consents from individual local authorities and voluntary organisations relates to any original plan. Consents in relation to further regional plans are governed by Clause 35(5)(c).

There could be no question of the Home Secretary making a modification to a plan which materially altered the liability of an individual local authority or voluntary organisation to provide or manage a home, without the committee having obtained their consent to this variation in their liability. But I can give your Lordships an assurance that, in view of the doubts expressed and in view of what the noble Baroness has said, my right honourable friend the Home Secretary will advise the committees on this point in a special circular. So I feel that, in any case, the point of the noble Baroness is fully met and that the Bill is adequate.

BARONESS BROOKE OF YSTRADFELLTE

I am most grateful for that assurance from the noble Lord. I am still hoping that the moment is going to come when I shall hear "Yes", rather than a suggestion that all is well, without being quite so firm as an affirmative. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 35 agreed to.

Clause 36 [Provision of community homes by local authorities]:

7.10 p.m.

BARONESS BROOKE OF YSTRADFELLTE moved Amendment No. 36D. Page 40, line 39, leave out from ("to") to end of line and insert ("take all reasonable steps to provide that home and to manage, equip and maintain it.")

The noble Baroness said: This Amendment, again, is a piece of machinery. As the clause is drafted at the moment, the duty of a local authority to provide a community home once a regional plan is in operation is an absolute one. Authorities are not likely to try to evade an obligation which they have freely undertaken, but an obligation expressed in absolute terms may raise legal conflicts. For example, an authority may agree with a regional committee to provide a home of a certain size in a certain place and then, through no fault of its own, may fail to acquire the land or fail to obtain consent to borrow the money. The application might have been accepted originally on the assumption that the necessary land could be acquired by agreement. If that assumption turns out to be false, the authority should not, because of what is said in Clause 36, be obliged to make a compulsory purchase order.

There is the added difficulty that where an authority is obliged to make a compulsory purchase order with the object of discharging the duties set out in Clause 36 the Home Secretary, as confirming authority for the compulsory purchase order, may be in a difficult position because he will be aware that the duty to provide is an absolute one, unless, of course, the original plan is amended. Clearly, original plans can always be amended, and no doubt will be whenever obligations cannot be carried out. But obligations which may depend for their success on being able to acquire land or raise money should not, I submit, be expressed in absolute terms in an Act of Parliament. I beg to move.

LORD STONHAM

I, too, wish I could have the pleasure of accepting an Amendment moved by the noble Baroness, but the time is not yet. The only thing I can suggest is that we might get together and draft one between us. That might stand a better chance—but I am afraid I cannot accept this one. I know that the Association of Municipal Corporations think that this clause is drawn too tightly because it imposes an absolute duty on a local authority to provide and manage a community home—and I would ask the noble Baroness to mark this—which it has previously consented to provide and manage under subsection (5) of Clause 34, and which has been included in an approved regional plan. We are talking about something that the local authority has already approved; and it is already in an approved regional plan. In a sense it is their home, although it does not perhaps yet exist.

I think that perhaps the anxiety which has been expressed so clearly by the noble Baroness is based on a misunderstanding as to the intended form and content of regional plans. Discussions have not started yet, but discussions will be held on this subject with the local authority associations, including of course the Association of Municipal Corporations, a little later this year. We do not expect any conflict to arise between the regional plan and the local authority's duty to provide a new home because of, for example, a failure to obtain planning permission or to obtain a compulsory purchase order or to obtain loan sanction—all of which, as the noble Baroness is aware, may be beyond the local authority's control. If they cannot get these things and they cannot provide the home—very well; they cannot provide it.

As regards the provision of new homes and facilities, the plan is expected to deal with the following matters: the nature and purpose of the new home: its probable location if no site is available, and its actual location if a site with planning permission has already been acquired; and the target dates for its construction and bringing into use. There is of course an inevitable time lapse, often of several years, between the time of deciding to provide additional facilities and the time when the facilities actually come into use. It could not be argued that a local authority was in breach of a statutory duty simply because something they had agreed to do was not provided immediately—or, it may be, cannot be provided at all—for reasons beyond the local authority's control.

Clause 36 is merely the local authority equivalent of Clauses 37 to 40 in their application to voluntary homes. In both cases it may turn out that something frustrates the execution of some provision in the original plan, and to this extent the plan may eventually have to be altered. Nevertheless, there are no grounds for qualifying the duty of local authorities to provide, manage, equip and maintain their own homes—because, after all, it is their own homes that they are worried about. But I think that if any anxieties linger, even after what I have said, they will most certainly be resolved as soon as we have our discussions with the local authority associations.

BARONESS BROOKE OF YSTRADFELLTE

I am very grateful to the noble Lord, and in view of his assurance that authorities will be expected to do only those things which are within their own control, I am content. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 36 agreed to.

Clauses 37 to 44 agreed to.

Clause 45 [Discontinuance by voluntary organisation of controlled or assisted community home]:

LORD STONHAM moved Amendment No. 37:

Page 49, line 10, leave out paragraph (b) and insert— ("(b) the Secretary of State may by order direct that for the purposes of any provision specified in the direction and made by or under any enactment relating to community homes (other than this section) the home shall, until the date or earlier date specified as mentioned in subsection (4)(b) of this section, he treated as an assisted community home or as a controlled community home. but except in so far as the Secretary of State so directs, the home shall until that date be treated for the purposes of any such enactment as a community home provided by the local authority;")

The noble Lord said: This new, alternative paragraph is a minor Amendment to the provisions which apply when a voluntary organisation whose premises are being used as a community home, controlled or assisted, give notice to withdraw the premises from the community home system and the managers declare that they wish no part in the management of the home during the period of notice. In this situation, subsection (4) enables the Secretary of State to require the local authority to manage the home during the period of two years' notice, or a shorter period if that would be appropriate, as a local authority home.

The Amendment inserts a new paragraph (b) in place of the present one. The effect is to make clear that a voluntary community home which is being temporarily managed as a local authority home (the voluntary organisation having given notice that it is quitting the com- munity home system) may continue to be treated as an assisted or controlled home in such respects as the Secretary of State may direct. This provision might be used, for example, to enable building work, which the voluntary organisation had undertaken under promise of a grant under Clause 62(1), to be completed. If the home were treated in all respects as a local authority home, a grant under that clause could not be made, so they would lose money. I beg to move.

EARL JELLICOE

I am grateful to the noble Lord for his explanation. I found the clause rather difficult to follow and I certainly found the Amendment rather difficult to follow, but in this case I have not found the noble Lord at all difficult to follow. I find his explanation entirely satisfactory.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 45, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 46 agreed to.

Clause 47 [Provision of accommodation and maintenance for children in care]:

LORD STONHAM

I beg to move Amendment No. 38, to leave out "60 of this" and insert "61 of that". I could not resist reading that out. I immediately thought that this amounts to "six of one and half-a-dozen of the other." And that is precisely correct. This is a drafting Amendment. The reference should be to Clause 61 and not 60 of the Bill, and since Clause 47 contains a new Section 13 of the Children Act 1948 a reference therein to a provision in the Bill cannot be a reference to "this Act". I am only sorry that the noble Viscount did not see it first. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 52, line 10, leave out ("60 of this") and insert ("61 of that")—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 47, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 48 [Accommodation of persons over school age in convenient community home]:

On Question, Whether Clause 48 shall stand part of the Bill?

EARL JELLICOE

I am not quite certain of the effect of the new clause. There are a couple of points on it that I should like to ask the noble Lord about. He will recollect that we discussed the question of hostel accommodation for young people at Second Reading and the noble Baroness, Lady Scrota, replied to that point. I believe that this is a serious lack in some places; but I know there is a difference of opinion as to precisely how serious that lack is—although I am glad to say that the provision of hostel accommodation for young people by local authorities is increasing. I should like to ask the noble Lord whether this sort of hostel accommodation will be available to young persons who are not in care as well as to those who are in care, and whether provision for hostel accommodation—and I assume that this will be the case—will be included in the planning of the children's regional planning bodies.

LORD STONHAM

I am grateful to the noble Earl for raising this point. I will tell him at once that Clause 48 in this Bill replaces the present Section 19 of the Act of 1948 which is the section which empowers local authorities to provide hostels for certain purposes.

We require a clause of this kind because it is a principle of the Bill that a single statutory class of residential establishment community homes should supersede the various classes of establishment which at present have separate statutory existence. It is the case that under Section 1 of the 1963 Act persons not in care may use Section 48 accommodation (as it will be now) as well as people in care. I did not complete writing the noble Lord's last question when he sat down.

EARL JELLICOE

I understand that the children's regional planning committees will have a whole range of accommodation under the Bill——

LORD STONHAM

I remember the question. The existing Section 19 of the 1948 Act requires the Home Secretary's approval to the provision of hostels under that section and the new Section 19 does not have any analogous requirement since the relevant regional plan will have specified the nature and purpose of each community home and the proposals contained in the plan will have the approval of the Secretary of State. So these hostels for young people up to the age of 21, whether or not they have been in care, will be included in these plans. I think that will he extremely satisfactory for all of us.

Clause 48 agreed to.

Clauses 49 to 53 agreed to.

Clause 54 [Extension of disqualification for keeping foster children]:

7.26 p.m.

LORD STONHAM

This is a minor Amendment to rectify an omission. It prohibits a person who has been refused registration of any premises under Section 1(3) of the Nurseries and Child Minders Regulation Act 1948 from maintaining foster children unless he has disclosed this fact to the local authority and obtained their consent.

Section 6(e) of the Children Act 1958 already requires the disclosure of the cancellation of the registration of any premises under Section 1(4) of the Nurseries and Child Minders Regulation Act 1948 and it is desirable that the local authority should also know whether registration was refused in the first place. Such a refusal is not a complete bar to the keeping of foster children but necessitates the local authority's consent to the keeping of foster children. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 58, line 5, after ("offence";") insert— ("( ) in paragraph (e), after the word "subsection" there shall be inserted the words "(3) or") and for the words from "refusing" onwards there shall be substituted the words "refusing, or an order under section five of that Act cancelling, the registration of any premises occupied by him or his registration";").—(Lord Stonham.)

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

This is just a drafting Amendment, as I appreciate. I think that Amendments Nos. 49 and 50 are consequential upon it in the Keeling Schedule. Is that not so? I wondered whether anybody had complimented the noble Lord on the Keeling Schedule. If not, I should like to do so now, as it happens to be a thing upon which I am particularly keen. I think that these Keeling Schedules, nuisance though they may be with consequential Amendments, are of great value. The Keeling Schedule is cross-referenced as being applied by Section 68(4). The reference now should be 69(4). There is a small mistake in the Bill.

LORD STONHAM

I am grateful. In view of what the noble Viscount has said, I wonder whether I can include Amendments Nos. 49 and 50 in this discussion so that when we come to them there will be no further discussion. This reinforces what I said earlier, that the noble Viscount must really come at an earlier stage of these proceedings so that we can get these things right.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 54, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 55 to 57 agreed to.

LORD STONHAM

This new clause is designed to apply the Extradition Act 1870 and the Fugitive Offenders Act 1967 to certain offences concerning children. I have a speech to make here which is some seven pages long. Unless the Committee want me to do so, I do not propose to make it at all; but merely to beg to move Amendment No. 39A.

Amendment moved— After Clause 57, insert the following new clause:

Extradition offences

".—(1) There shall be included—

(a) in the list of extradition crimes contained in Schedule 1 to the Extradition Act 1870; and	1870 c. 52.
(b) among the descriptions of offences set out in Schedule 1 to the Fugitive Offenders Act 1967,	1967 c. 68.
any offence of the kind described in section 1 of the Act of 1933 (which relates to cruelty to persons under sixteen) and any offence of the kind described in section 1 of the Indecency with Children Act 1960.	1960 c. 33.
(2) Nothing in this Act shall be construed as derogating from the provisions of section 17 of the said Act of 1870 or section 16(2) or 17 of the said Act of 1967 in their application to any provisions of those Acts respectively as amended by the preceding subsection."
—(Lord Stonham.)

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

The last thing I want to do is to hold up the Committee stage. But may I ask the noble Lord to read the conclusions on the last page or something like that? It is a somewhat unusual thing, I believe, although it does happen from time to time, to introduce new offences into the Fugitive Offenders and Extradition Acts.

I know it occurs from time to time, but I think it perhaps requires the briefest possible explanation.

7.30 p.m.

LORD STONHAM

I cannot read the last page because it says, "For use if raised". But this is a splendid Amendment and I would have explained it at greater length but for the last minute note from the Box to the effect that "Only the first paragraph matters—do not read the whole speech". I had decided before that that it was an excellent Amendment which we should both have enjoyed.

The first subsection of the new clause refers to offences relating to children and young persons. The first is an offence of the kind described in Section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 and it applies to: any person who has attained the age of sixteen years and has the custody, charge, or care of any child or young person under that age, wilfully assaults, ill-treats, neglects, abandons, or exposes him, or causes or procures him to be assaulted, ill-treated, neglected, abandoned, or exposed, in a manner likely to cause him unnecessary suffering or injury to health". It then goes into detail and provides:

1. "(a) on conviction on indictment, to a fine not exceeding one hundred pounds, or alternatively or in addition thereto, to imprisonment for any term not exceeding two years;
2. (b) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding one hundred pounds or alternatively or in addition thereto, to imprisonment for any term not exceeding six months;

(2) For the purposes of this section— (a) a parent or other person legally liable to maintain a child or young person shall be deemed to have neglected him in a manner likely to cause injury to his health if he has failed to provide adequate food, clothing, medical aid or lodging for him, or if, having been unable otherwise to provide such food, clothing, medical aid or lodging, he has failed to take steps to procure it to be provided under the Acts relating to the relief of the poor; It is of course a very old Act. It continues: (b) where it is proved that the death of an infant under three years of age was caused by suffocation (not being suffocation caused by disease or the presence of arty foreign body in the throat or air passages of the infant) while the infant was in bed with some other person who has attained the age of sixteen years, that other person shall, if he was, when he went to bed, under the influence of drink, be deemed to have neglected the infant in a manner likely to cause injury to its health. (3) A person may be convicted of an offence under this section—

1. (a) notwithstanding that actual suffering or injury to health, or the likelihood of actual suffering or injury to health, was obviated by the action of another person;
2. (b) notwithstanding the death of the child or young person in question."

That is what I might call the 1933 Act part of it. The second offence is of the kind described in Section 1 of the Indecency with Children Act 1960. That provides that: any person who commits an act of gross indecency with or towards a child under the age of fourteen, or who incites a child under that age to such an act with him or another, shall be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a terra not exceeding two years, or on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, to a fine not exceeding one hundred pounds, or to both". This offence is analogous to the offence of indecent assault which is already an offence under the Extradition Acts and the Fugitive Offenders Act 1967. Subsection (1) of this new clause refers to offences of the kind described in the relevant enactment and I think that the noble Viscount will be very interested in this particular point, as I was myself. The reason for using these words is that the offences need to be identifiable not only for the purposes of our law but for the purposes of other laws as well.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

That is the point.

LORD STONHAM

Both for the purposes of the Fugitive Offenders Act 1967 and the Extradition Acts it is necessary that the offences should be applicable to the laws of British Dependencies. Accordingly it would not be possible to refer in the Bill to the offences created by the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 and the Indecency with Children Act 1960, because British Dependencies will have similar, but not the same, legislation. The wording of the new clause overcomes this difficulty by referring in a generalised way to these offences.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

Perhaps I may cut the noble Lord a little short here. I am entirely following him, and indeed on subsection (2) of the new clause I am perfectly content. I understand it very well. What I am interested in was the first offence under the 1933 Act and I want to know whether there are, as it were, reciprocal offences in a large number of other countries which cover the same sort of ground. I should have thought that here we had a rather particularised offence and I wondered whether there were parallel offences in the various other countries with which we have extradition treaties.

LORD STONHAM

Most certainly there are. They would not be in the same language—they are not in the same Acts of Parliament. The language is rather archaic in our 1933 Act. Obviously it stems from earlier Acts. But certainly there are comparable offences in other countries and I am sure that the noble Viscount will remember our discussions about the Fugitive Offenders Act which were led, for the Opposition, by the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Cumnor. What it really means is that if people abuse, neglect or hurt children, or commit acts of indecency with them in the manner described, and then they go abroad, if we find them, wherever they are, we can "yank" them back and punish them accordingly.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 58 agreed to.

Clause 59 [Contributions in respect of children and young persons in care]:

EARL JELLICOE moved Amendment No. 39B: Page 61, line 40, leave out from second ("amount") to end of line 2 on page 62 and insert ("which will represent the average weekly cost to the local authority of maintaining all children and young persons who are in the care of that authority provided that the maximum contribution shall not exceed the actual cost of maintaining the particular child or young person if in respect of that child or young person the actual cost is less than the average cost.")

The noble Earl said: I must detain your Lordships for a minute or two on this Amendment, which the noble Lord may recognise as being of particular interest to the Association of Municipal Corporations. It refers to what parents should be asked to contribute, or should be expected to contribute, when a child is in care of a local authority. As I understand the present position, there is no maximum contribution laid down, although in practice the contribution orders are usually for pretty small amounts because most of the parents of children in care are people without very large means. The cost of keeping a child in residential care may be very high—it can be anything ranging from £10 to £20 a week—and the Bill would, as I read it, lay down that the parent would be expected to contribute only the same amount as if the child were boarded out. What foster-parents receive is a pretty small sum—for historical and understandable reasons which go back to the fears of society about baby farming. As a result, I think the average boarding out payment is in the range of £3 10s. 0d. to £5 a week. This would be the yardstick written into the Bill, and that is what worries some people including the Association.

When this matter was discussed in another place the Under-Secretary in charge of the Bill resisted an Amendment similar to this. The basis of his argument was that, because a parent of a child in care had no control over the decisions of the local authority, or of the expenditure incurred on behalf of his child, it would be quite wrong for him to be charged with the cost of treatment which he had no part in choosing. I would straightaway grant that there is some force in that argument. But I should like to point out that the Amendment does not suggest that parents should be charged unlimited sums, but only that they should be charged a maximum based on the average cost of children in care of a local authority; and with the proviso that, where that average cost is not exceeded in a particular case, the smaller sum should be paid.

It is possible that there are already children in care, and children who will be coming into care, from richer homes, with parents who could well afford to pay a great deal more than the standard which is in force. If that is the case, it seems wrong that wealthy or comparatively wealthy, parents should not be asked to make a contribution which has some real relation to the expenses incurred. That is the purpose of the Amendment. It would give the courts rather more discretion to have regard to the means of parents than the present wording of the Bill provides; but, as I have explained, the parent would never be asked to pay more than the average cost of maintaining a child and would be ordered to do this only when it was clear to the court that his or her means would justify going above the boarding-out expenditure. In the event of the actual cost being les; than the average, then the actual cost would be payable and not the average. This seems to me to be an eminently reasonable Amendment; and because the noble Lord is an eminently reasonable man I am sure that it will strike him as eminently reasonable. I beg to move.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, as the noble Earl has said, this is a very reasonable proposition, but whether its reasonableness is based on its merits or on the noble Lord's persuasive powers, I am not sure. But I should like to explain the Government's position. The average amount received in respect of each child in care, including children in respect of whom no contribution is paid at all, is less than 10s. a week. This is because in the great majority of cases the parents' means are such that the contribution order is for a very small sum, or no contribution is asked for at all. Clause 59 provides that the maximum amount of a parental contribution which may be ordered in respect of a child or young person in care should be a weekly amount which the authority normally pay to foster parents in respect of a child or young person of the game age. The noble Earl's Amendment would substitute the average cost of maintaining a child in care, or the actual cost of maintaining that particular child, whichever is the less.

The existing law fixes no maximum. The practice of local authorities varies. Some do not attempt to recover more than the cost of maintaining the child, so that the parent may be asked for a greater contribution if a child is in a children's home than if he is boarded out with foster parents. Other authorities take the view that this is inequitable, because the parent has no control over the decision where the child in care should live. Some have maximum charges for all children, whether boarded out or in children's homes. These maxima vary from about £3 10s. to £5 a week. In the case of children committed to approved schools, where the only responsibility of the local authority is a financial one, the maximum charges are often higher. Examination of the contribution orders made by all courts in two months in 1966 showed that the great majority of contribution orders of more than £5 for a single child were made in respect of children in approved schools.

The object of the clause is to secure greater uniformity of practice and equity of treatment, on the basis that the parent should be required, if his means permit, to pay for the child's board and lodging, so that he is no better off as a result of the child being in care—and that seems to me fair enough—but should not be required to pay for any additional treatment which his child requires, since he has no control over the local authority's decisions about the treatment of his child, and extra payments for special treatment would produce a thoroughly inequitable situation.

It may be argued that if the parent can afford it he should be asked to pay for expensive treatment, because that is what a good parent who could afford it would do. This assumes that the good parent would make private arrangements of his own accord for the child to be accommodated in some kind of establishment analogous to a community home. I do not think that this argument is realistic.

The Explanatory and Financial Memorandum states on page (ix) that the effect of Clause 58 may be to reduce the total recovered by way of contributions by about £50,000 a year. The total amount at present recovered, even though it is an average of less than 10s. per child, is some £11 million a year. The noble Earl's Amendment might reduce this reduction by about £20,000 a year. I think that the noble Earl will accept that while this amount is not to be sneezed at, it is minimal compared with the total amount paid in contributions; and in the Government's view we should not be justified in departing from what we regard as the right principle on which this matter should be decided: that the parent shall be liable for a board-and-lodging charge, so that he is no better off as a result of the child being in care, but shall not be liable for the additional cost of any particular form of treatment.

It may be argued that it is undesirable that foster parents should make profits out of maintaining children and that the amounts paid to them are therefore on the low side. It could be argued from that and I think the noble Earl did argue, that the amount normally paid to foster parents is not the right amount to fix. Our reply to this is that the amount a local authority pays to foster parents must surely be enough to cover the cost of maintaining the child and that it would be wrong for an authority to ask parents to pay, as a board-and-lodging charge, an amount greater than it pays to its own foster parents. There are some foster parents who, because they like children and because they can afford it, take in children at less than the ordinary fee. The Bill covers this by providing that the weekly amount shall be that which the authority would "normally" be prepared to pay, thus disregarding cases where foster parents are prepared to accept a smaller sum and also cases where a special supplement is payable in relation to a particular child.

I would sum up by saying that I thought the noble Earl's argument was reasonable, but, in view of the figures I have quoted, I do not think it is sufficiently reasonable or would be of sufficient advantage to justify altering the principle that we have so far found to be acceptable to the local authorities.

EARL JELLICOE

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for his reply but I am a little puzzled, because he said that the principle was acceptable to the local authorities. It is in fact the Association of Municipal Corporations, who perhaps represent the strongest body of local authorities in the country, who are concerned about this matter. Perhaps I might ask the noble Lord a question. He quoted figures which I find rather surprising: that the total recovered by way of contributions will be reduced by about £50,000 a year by the application of Clause 59 as it stands. I was wondering whether the noble Lord has the figure for what the board and lodging averages out at. It is my understanding that the average contribution which foster parents receive at the present time is in the range of £3 10s. 0d. to £5; and if the figure on which this estimate has been based is in that range it would seem to me that a wealthy parent, who spends a great deal more than £3 10s. 0d. to £5 on his son and daughter for board and lodging if she or he is not in care, would be receiving a subsidy, as it were, for having his child in care. It would be helpful if the noble Lord could let me know what the figure is on which this is based.

LORD STONHAM

I am sorry that did not give the noble Earl the figure when I first spoke. I have it here, but I did not want to go on for too long. The average cost of maintaining a child in care is £7 2s. 6d. a week. This will increase when children in approved schools are included among those in care. I did say to the noble Earl that the cost of keeping children in approved schools was higher. The noble Earl said that the cost was anything from £10 to £20 a week. I cannot confirm that. The average cost of maintaining a child in care is £7 6s. 2d. a week and, apart from any other factors, it will go up when approved schools are included.

EARL JELLICOE

Is the figure the noble Lord has given the actual global cost, and not just the cost relating to board and lodging? I assume that it includes treatment—if that is the right word to use.

LORD STONHAM

I understand that this is the total cost. I was giving it to the noble Earl as the total average cost of maintaining children in care. I think what the noble Earl may have in mind is that the higher cost includes not only schools, but other special forms of care. I am giving the average figure.

The noble Earl, quite rightly, referred to the powerful advocacy and importance of the Association of Municipal Corporations in this matter. However, I would point out the not less important fact that the County Councils Association are fully with the Government here, and therefore we have some might, as well as right, on our side.

EARL JELLICOE

I do not wish to get involved with the noble Lord in a town and country argument. I propose to withdraw my Amendment, but I must confess that I am net entirely happy about this matter. It seems to me that the rich parent may be getting away with a payment which it would be wrong for him to get away with. I reserve the right to come back to this point at Report stage.

LORD STONHAM

I will look at it again, too.

EARL JELLICOE

I thank the noble Lord.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

7.54 p.m.

BARONESS BROOKE OF YSTRADFELLTE moved Amendment No. 39c: Page 62, line 3 after ("shall") insert ("normally").

The noble Baroness said: It may be convenient to discuss this Amendment and Amendment No. 39D together. As a fairly practical person, I much enjoy trying to provide the noble Lord with the nuts and bolts to try to make the machinery work. So far he has resisted all my efforts to help, but I will make one last attempt. It is sound practice to attempt to reach a voluntary arrangement with the families as to the amount of a contribution order. But there are situations when it is quite clear, at the outset that the parents will not contribute to the upkeep of their child as, for instance, when a child has been wilfully neglected or when the child appears to have been rejected.

In such cases it would save much time and effort if local authorities were given a discretion to apply for an immediate contribution order without having to attempt to give notice to the contributors and then wait a month. Local authorities have this discretion at the present time, and I believe that many authorities use it, particularly in the large towns, where there are many families moving in and out who are known to have no intention to meet their responsibilities. These two Amendments would render the procedure easier, and I cannot see how they would do any harm to anyone. I beg to move.

LORD STONHAM

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for suggesting that she might take these two Amendments together, as they are on the same point. As the noble Baroness said, they will enable the court to make a contribution order at the same hearing as the court makes a care order. There are two main difficulties about this. The first is that the local authority would have no opportunity of proposing an amount to the contributor, and the court would have no information about the parents' means and liabilities on which it could base a decision as to the appropriate amount for any order, or whether indeed to make an order at all.

The second difficulty is that the court, having disposed of the case and made a care order, is not likely to want to start to inquire, on what must be adequate information at this first hearing, into the proper amount of the contribution. If the parent contested the matter at the time when the care order was made—as many would be likely to do—the court would have to adjourn. If the parent was not objecting to the making of a contribution, then it is probable that the court would not need to make a money order at all, because the parent would agree without any pressure. The normal course at the present time is for the local authority to ask the parent for a contribution, after getting from him a statement of his means, and, if the contribution is not forthcoming, to make application to the court. And, as the noble Baroness is no doubt aware, the court to which the application is made with regard to the order need not be a juvenile court. This, in our view, is a better system than for a very busy juvenile court to try to settle this money question in the middle of a list of cases.

I know it can be and is argued that some local authorities proceed in this way at present. If they do, I am bound to say that we do not regard it as a satisfactory way of proceeding, and from what I have said perhaps the noble Baroness may be inclined to agree. It can also be argued, with some superficial reasoning, that it is useful in the case of families always on the move. But is that really the case? The difficulty is likely to be in getting the money under the order (for example, by attachment of earnings) rather than in the making of the order. If the parent does not reply to the authority's letter within a month, the authority can go to the court. With people who are always on the move, as we well know, the prospect of getting anything out of them is very small, and will not be added to by the fact that a money order can be made at the time when the care order is made.

We have looked at this matter carefully. I am extremely sorry that even at the last throw the noble Baroness has not brought down a coconut, but it is not because I have not looked at her points and tried to be sympathetic with them. I am sure she is aware that sometimes we cannot agree, however much we should like to, and I have tried to give valid reasons for not agreeing every time.

BARONESS BROOKE OF YSTRADFELLTE

I am disappointed that at the last stage the noble Lord is unable to meet me more than half way, but I can see the validity of his argument. At the same time, it always distresses me when people who really ought to be making a contribution manage to get away with it time and time again. I was hoping that this might be a means whereby one could ensure that those who wished to throw up their responsibilities so far as their children were concerned would not be able to do so. As it appears that this is not going to be achieved under my Amendment, I beg leave to withdraw it.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 59 agreed to.

Clause 60 [Returns of information and presentation of reports et cetera to Parliament]:

8.1 p.m.

LORD STONHAM moved Amendment No. 39E.

Page 62, line 44, at end insert— ("( ) The clerk of each juvenile court shall, at such times and in such form as the Secretary of State may direct, transmit to him such particulars as he may require with respect to the proceedings of the court")

The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 39E. This new subsection places on the clerk of a juvenile court a duty to provide the Secretary of State with such particulars of court proceedings as he may require. The purpose is to enable statistics of care proceedings to be compiled and published. At present statistics of care, protection or control proceedings are included, rather incongruously, in the Criminal Statistics. As with criminal proceedings, the information is obtained from returns made by the police. The Adams Committee on Civil Judicial Statistics, which reported in July last year, recommended that the publication of statistics of non-criminal proceedings in magistrates' courts in the Criminal Statistics be discontinued, and that the courts, rather than the police, should be responsible for supplying the information on which the statistics are based.

Clerks of juvenile courts are already required to maintain a separate juvenile court register, and the information which will be required under this subsection will already be in the register. We are in consultation with the Justices' Clerks Society about the best way this information can be provided, whether by a copy of the register or otherwise. This will give us fairly useful information without a great deal of additional labour being placed on anyone, and we shall also have the statistics in and from the right place and compiled by the right people. I beg to move.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

There is only one question I wanted to ask on this Amendment. When proceedings are brought under Clause 12E—that is to say, on the commission of what would normally be an offence if it was not a child—are they going to be split up in accordance with what the offence would have been if it had been an adult, or are we simply to have all cases under Clause 12E lumped together? It would be interesting, and it might be valuable, to know what offences the children and young persons are committing. Under this Bill as it stands they will not necessarily be specified as such. It may be better to classify them according to crimes of violence, or in whatever way the Home Office normally does this. I wonder whether the noble Lord has thought about that.

LORD STONHAM

I am not sure whether I have all the refinements, but certainly these figures will be split up. These figures of children who come before the courts and in respect of care orders will be analysed in a way such as the noble Viscount has suggested. I think he is asking whether they will be split up into A, B, C, D and E, according to the way they are dealt with by the court. The answer to that is "Yes". In addition, we shall continue to get figures of the number of alleged offenders cautioned by the police. They will not come before the court at all. We shall be given particulars as to whether they were dealt with by prosecution, care proceedings, caution, or by reference to the local authority children's department. When this Act begins to operate, or to be operated, we shall begin to have an increasing volume of sophisticated statistics which should tell us a very great deal.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

I do not think the noble Lord has quite got my point. I know it will be A, B, C, D and E: but under E will it be split up into the sort of crime, or what would be a crime if anybody but a child or young person was involved in the incident? One does not want to know just how many offences, or alleged offences, have been committed and have been dealt with, either by caution or by care order or something else. One wants to know what sort of offences would be involved. I do not wish the noble Lord to pursue the matter now, but it is something which I think will be worth thinking about.

LORD STONHAM

I believe the answer to the noble Viscount is "Yes", but I will confirm it to him.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 60, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 61 to 70 agreed to.

Schedule 1 agreed to.

Schedule 2 [Children's Regional Planning Committees]:

EARL JELLICOE moved Amendment No. 41: Page 72, line 32, leave out sub-paragraph (2).

The noble Earl said: This is a very simple Amendment, just to knock out a sub-paragraph of Schedule 2. There may be a simple explanation why it should stay in. At first blush, this particular sub-paragraph of the Schedule appears to be extraordinarily restrictive. All of us would favour co-option of outside members to these important children's regional planning committees. Clearly, those committees are going to have a big job to do and will wish to draw all possible expertise into their planning. In particular, I think the voluntary bodies and volunteers would have an important contribution to make. These committees will be planning the provision of a whole range of accommodation for the children in the regions concerned. I am quite sure that voluntary organisations will have a big part to play here, and therefore there will be many people whom the regional planning committees will wish to co-opt to the committees, and from whose help they will benefit.

My fear is that if we let this subparagraph stand we shall be putting off those people, and not encouraging them to play the part which they are fully able to play in these regional planning committees. They are being treated not as second-class citizens but as 10th-class citizens, because, subject to any direction by the relevant authorities, they will not be able to vote, if the nominated members think they should not vote after they are co-opted; they will not be allowed to speak, and they will not he allowed to attend. I am not quite certain what they will be allowed to do. I do not know what, subject to any directions given by relevant authorities means. I do not see how those words could possibly be more restrictive. All this is only in relation to such matters as specified by the nominated members. I cannot think the nominated members, whoever they may be, would wish to adopt this extraordinarily restrictive attitude towards volunteers and others, and experts, whom they wish to bring into their consultations.

I am prepared to be told that this extraordinarily restrictive procedure is the normal procedure. If I am told that, I shall be open to persuasion, but my belief is that normally in local authorities when people are co-opted to a committee they assume the full responsibilities as a member of that committee. There is no question of their not voting; there is no question of their not speaking; there is no question of their not attending. If you want them, there does not seem to be much point if they are not allowed to attend or to speak or to vote. I hope that I have made the purpose of my Amendment clear. It is exploratory, but if the exploration discloses the position as I think it is, then I think it is rather more than exploratory.

8.11 p.m.

LORD STONHAM

I hope from the noble Earl's concluding words that he is not going to start a revolution at this time of night. I admit that he has put up a remarkable case. The offending words are these: Where any persons are co-opted to serve as members of the committee for a planning area in relation only to such matters as are specified by the nominated members then, subject to any directions given by the relevant authorities, the extent to which those persons shall be entitled to attend, speak and vote at meetings of the committee shall be such as may be determined by the nominated members. I would ask the noble Earl to note particularly the words: subject to any directions given by the relevant authorities". The effect of the noble Earl's Amendment by removing this paragraph from the Schedule would be to remove any specific reference to the power of the nominated members on the planning committee—this concerns a planning committee—to limit the voting. speaking and attending rights of co-opted members who have been co-opted for limited and specific purposes.

The noble Earl asked, not without justification: What are these people going to do? What are they there for at all? Why have them? Of course, we have to have regard to the common sense of the nominated members in making this provision work. Notwithstanding the general power which paragraph 4 gives to ensure that local authority members—not necessarily nominated members—are in the majority at all times, it is considered necessary to give the nominated members a clear power to define the extent to which they require co-opted members to make their contribution. Co-opted members have no statutory responsibility for the consequences or the implementation of the committee's decisions. Everything rests ultimately on the individual local children's authorities in their responsibility for accommodating and treating children in their care and for meeting the cost of facilities for supervision. It seems only right that the provisions of the Schedule should recognise this responsibility, financial and otherwise.

I think the decisive point that I put to the noble Earl is this. If the Amendment were accepted, it would then mean that the planning committee would have to request the relevant authorities at regular intervals to make directions about co-opted members under paragraph 1(1) of the Schedule. It was to avoid this step that paragraph 3(2) gave the power to the nominated members of the committee. I read this paragraph to the noble Earl because it refers to, "such matters as are specified by the nominated members". In other words, it applies only to people co-opted for limited and specific purposes, and does not apply to all co-optees. I do not know whether there was a misapprehension on the noble Earl's part. If that was so, then I can assure him that that is not the case. If he will look carefully at these words he will see that they are: serve as members of the committee … in relation only to such matters as are specified by the nominated members". The provision is very limited. In other words, someone is asked to come on the committee for a specific purpose, or for specific purposes, and really he is there to give advice and help for only those particular purposes. It is only to those people co-opted for a limited purpose that this restriction would apply.

VISCOUNT MONCKTON OF BRENCHLEY

I find it very difficult to avoid the conclusion that this provision is not straightforward nonsense. In view of my work for boys' clubs in Kent and some of the approved schools I suppose I could be co-opted to a committee for a specific subject. But if I went I should want to know that I should be allowed, first, to attend; secondly, to speak, and thirdly, to vote. The only occasion when a provision of this kind would apply would be if I were paid not to do so!

EARL JELLICOE

The noble Lord has helped a little in pointing out the qualification here, but I am still a little puzzled. May I take it that those members of these regional planning committees who are to be co-opted over the whole range of the regional planning activities will have no such restriction placed upon them, save that I think they will be in a minority? May I take it that that is the case?

LORD STONHAM

The co-optees?

EARL JELLICOE

The co-optees.

LORD STONHAM

Yes.

EARL JELLICOE

They will have full powers to attend, speak and vote? There- fore this restriction applies only to those who are co-opted for special and specific and limited purposes. If that is the case, then I should have thought it would be far better if those who were co-opted—I can see the distinction here—for specific, limited purposes had it made absolutely clear that they would have the right to attend, speak and vote at meetings at which those particular subjects were discussed and were, if necessary, to be voted upon. As I read this provision the way it is drafted, this would not be the case, because even within that specific area they may not be able to attend, speak or vote. I may have misinterpreted this, but perhaps the noble Lord will say.

LORD STONHAM

The noble Earl is quite right when he says that those who are full co-optees will be able to attend, speak and vote. But if one is appointed for a limited purpose—if, for example, one is co-opted solely to represent the Boy Scouts—one really cannot expect to decide upon, for instance, local authority expenditure on community homes. You are asked to advise about the Boy Scouts, and you might be asked about some other related youth matters. But these committes are going to decide matters which affect a whole region. There are very important matters of expenditure involved, and we surely just could not have numbers of co-optees who were asked to come on for a limited period given this right.

This limitation very often applies. There are a number of cases where people are nominated to come and help—people come in attendance perhaps to give expert advice. They might be co-opted for a particular subject and they might be co-opted for one or two meetings to settle particular points. But they must be treated differently from the nominated members and the co-optees who are there for other purposes at all times. I will read what the noble Earl has said and consider it again, but I think we have this one right and that it is in accord with normal practice.

EARL JELLICOE

It is very strange practice. I certainly cannot remember any such Schedule, but my memory for Schedules of Bills is not encyclopædic. Nevertheless, I would be much happier, if the noble Lord wishes to insist or this distinction between those co-opted for general matters and those co-opted for specific and more limited matters (and I appreciate that distinction), if it were made clear, which could easily be done by a minor drafting adjustment, that those who were co-opted for a limited range of matters at least had the right to attend, speak and vote on that limited range of matters. The noble Lord has nodded affirmatively, so I take it that he agrees.

LORD STONHAM

I will just nod verbally.

EARL JELLICOE

Having dotted that "i" I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Schedule 2 agreed to.

Schedule 3 agreed to.

Schedule 4 [Transitional provisions and savings]:

8.21 p.m.

LORD STONHAM moved Amendment No. 42: Page 81, line 10, at end insert ("or from being dealt with under any of those Acts.")

The noble Lord said: This is a technical Amendment to make it clear that the prohibition in Clause 4 on proceedings for offences committed by children does not extend to proceedings under the Armed Forces Discipline Acts in respect of acts or omissions which took place overseas. Would the noble Viscount like me to continue?

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

Yes, please.

LORD STONHAM

The position is that certain provisions of the Service discipline codes apply to civilians, including children, who accompany Servicemen on overseas postings. Under these provisions a member of a Serviceman's family can be dealt with by the appropriate British Service authorities. Whether or not this is the most desirable way of dealing with a British child overseas who is in trouble, it may in practice be the only alternative to his being arraigned before a foreign court. It may, in certain circumstances, be much better "to look after our own" and, in these circumstances, the Service authorities' jurisdiction over the children and families of Servicemen overseas is in their own best interests. I hope your Lordships will agree. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD STONHAM

This is a technical Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 81, leave out line 12 and insert ("in respect of a person before the date on which the information was required by virtue of that section to contain a statement of his age.")—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD STONHAM moved Amendment No. 44:

Page 81, line 18, leave out paragraph 5 and insert—

("5.—(1) The coming into force of section 7(1) or of an order under section 32(1)(d) of this Act shall not affect any sentence of borstal training passed before the date when the said section 7(1) or the order came into force or any committal for sentence before that date under section 28(1) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1952; but a sentence of borstal training shall not be passed on any person (including a person to whom such a committal relates) if on the date of the relevant conviction he had not attained the minimum age which is for the time being specified in section 20(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1948.

1952 c. 55.

(2) Nothing in section 7(2) of this Act affects a probation order made before the coming into force of the said section 7(2).")

The noble Lord said: Paragraph 5 of Schedule 4 is a transitional provision which preserves sentences of borstal training passed, or probation orders made, before the coming into force of Clause 7. It also preserves a committal for sentence under Section 28 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1952, under which a magistrates' court may commit to quarter sessions with a view to a sentence of borstal. This may be interpreted as giving quarter sessions power to pass a sentence of borstal training even although borstal for young persons of that age has been abolished. The amended paragraph 5 makes it clear that, while the committal to quarter sessions is not affected by the coming into force of Clause 7, quarter sessions may not pass a sentence of borstal on a young person who, at the time of the conviction, had not attained the new minimum age for borstal. Quarter sessions will be able to deal with him by making a care order or any of the other orders available in the case of juveniles. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD STONHAM

This is a technical Amendment to paragraph 7 of Schedule 4 which provides for the "conversion" of approved school orders into care orders. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 82, line 14, at end insert— ("( ) A person who is the subject of a care order by virtue of sub-paragraph (2) of this paragraph and who was unlawfully absent on the specified day from an approved school in which he was then required to be shall. until the local authority to whose care he is committed by the order direct otherwise, be deemed for the purposes of section 30 of this Act to be duly required by the authority to live after that day in the premises which on that day constituted the school.")—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Schedule 4, as amended, agreed to.

Schedule 5 [Minor and consequential amendments of enactments]:

LORD STONHAM moved Amendmendment No. 46:

Page 87, line 17. at end insert—

(". In section 43(1) of the said Act of 1948 for the words from "Parts IV and V" onwards there shall be substituted the words "the Children and Young Persons Acts 1933 to 1969, the Adoption Act 1958 and the Adoption Act 1968".")

1958 c. 5 (7 & 8 Eliz. 2. 1968 c. 53.

The noble Lord said: Section 43 of the Children Act 1948 enables the Secretary of State to appoint an Advisory Council on Child Care for the purpose of advising him on matters connected with the discharge of his functions in England and Wales under the 1948 Act and a number of other enactments dealing with children and young persons. The effect of the Amendment is that the purpose of the Advisory Council is to advise the Secretary of State on matters connected with the discharge of his functions under all the enactments dealing with children and young persons and with adoption. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD STONHAM

This Amendment is consequential on the prohibition on prosecutions of children under the age of 14. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 92, line 1, at end insert—

(". In sections 2 and 9 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967, after subsection (3) of each section there shall be inserted the following subsection:—	1967 c. 80
(3A) In the case of a statement which indicates in pursuance of subsection (3)(a) of this section that the person making it has not attained the age of fourteen, subsection (2)(b) of this section shall have effect as if for the words from 'made' onwards there were substituted the words 'understands the importance of telling the truth in it.'")—Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

8.28 p.m.

LORD WILSON OF LANGSIDE moved Amendment No. 47:

Page 92, line 7, leave out paragraph 49 and insert— . After section 44(1) of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968, there shall be inserted the following subsection— (1A) A supervision requirement imposing a condition as to the place where a child is to reside in England or Wales shall be a like authority as in Scotland for the person in charge of the place to restrict the child's liberty to such an extent as that person may consider appropriate having regard to the terms of the supervision requirement".

. In section 97(1) of the said Act of 1968— (1) after the words "that is to to say—" there shall be inserted the words "section 44(1) (except head (b)) and (1A)", (2) after the words "Part V" there shall be inserted the words "section 98(3)".

. In section 98 of the said Act of 1968, after subsection (2) there shall be inserted the following subsection— (3) An order under this section may make such transitional provisions as appear to the Secretary of State to be necessary or expedient in connection with the provisions thereby brought into force, including such adaptations of those provisions or of any provision of this Act then in force as appear to the Secretary of State necessary or expedient for the purposes or in consequence of the operation of any provision of this Act before the coming into force of any other provision of this Act or of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969. . In Schedule 2 to the said Act of 1968, in paragraph 19, after the word "children" there shall be inserted the words ", for the word "offenders" there shall be substituted the word "children", and for the word "offender" in the three places where that word occurs there shall be substituted the word "child"". . In Schedule 7 to the said Act of 1968, in paragraph 1(1)(a), for the words "section 63" there shall be substituted the word "section 62".

. In Schedule 8 to the said Act of 1968, in paragraph 7— (a) for sub-paragraph (1) of that paragraph there shall be substituted the following sub-paragraph—

(1) In section 87, for subsection (1), there shall be substituted the following subsection—

(1) Any person detained in a training school under the the law in force in Northern Ireland may, with the consent of the Secretary of State, be transferred by order of the competent authority in Northern Ireland to such place in Scotland as the Secretary of State may direct for the purposes of under-going residential training, and shall be subject to the provisions of this Act and of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1963 as if the order sending him to the school in Northern Ireland were an order for committal for residential training made under section 58A of this Act made upon the same date, and as if the order were an authority for his detention for a period not exceeding the period for which he might he detained under the training school order made in respect of him.;	1963 c. 39.
(b) in sub-paragraph (2) of that paragraph at the end there shall be inserted the words "; and in section 87(2) and (4) the words "England or", wherever they occur, shall be omitted";
(c) in sub-paragraph (3) of that paragraph the words "to such" shall he omitted;

(d) after sub-paragraph (3) of that paragraph there shall be inserted the following sub-paragraphs— (4) In section 87(5) the words "in relation to England, the Secretary of State, and," shall be omitted. (5) In section 87 subsection (6) shall be omitted. . In Schedule 8 to the said Act of 1968, in paragraph 9(2), for the word "for" there shall be substituted the word "of".

. In Schedule 8 to the said Act of 1968, in paragraph 10, at the end there shall be inserted the following words— after the definition of "Street" there shall be inserted the following definition—

'Training school order' has the same meaning as in the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968'".	1968 c. 49.
. In Schedule 8 to the said Act of 1968, in paragraph 17(1), for the words "in Scotland" there shall be substituted the words ", within the meaning of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968".	1968 c. 49.

. In Schedule 8 to the said Act of 1968, in paragraph 38, for the words "In section 15(4)" there shall be substituted the words— (1) In section 15(3), for the words "the last mentioned order" there shall be substituted the words "or to the care of a local authority by a care order (other than an interim order) in force under the Children and Young Persons Act 1969, the fit person order or care order as the case may be". (2) In subsection (4)". . In Schedule 8 to the said Act of 1968, in sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 51, for the words from "include" where it secondly occurs to the end of the sub-paragraph there shall be substituted the words '"include"'; and paragraph (e) shall be omitted.

. In Schedule 8 to the said Act of 1968, after paragraph 59, there shall be inserted the following paragraph:—

Criminal Justice Act 1961 (c. 39)

59A. In section 32(2), after paragraph (g), there shall be inserted the following paragraph—

(h) section 58A of the Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937.

1937 c. 37.

. In Schedule 8 to the said Act of 1968, for paragraph 74(1), there shall he substituted the following sub-paragraph—

74.—(1) For section 11(1)(a) there shall be substituted the following paragraph—

"(a) during which his or her residence in a residential establishment is required by a supervision requirement made under section 44 of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968, and the child is not absent from the residential establishment under supervision;".	1968 c. 49
in paragraph (b), for the words "the said Act of 1937", there shall be substituted the words "the Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937", after paragraph (b) there shall be inserted the following paragraph—	1937 c. 37
"(bb) during which the child is liable to undergo residential training under committal by virtue of section 58A of the said Act of 1937, and is not released under that section;",
and for paragraph (c) there shall be substituted the following paragraph—
"(c) during which the child is accommodated by virtue of rules made by the Secretary of State under section 45 of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968".".	1968 c. 49.
. In Part I of Schedule 9 to the said Act of 1968, in the entry relating to the Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937, in the third column, after the words "Sections 68 to 86" there shall be inserted the following words—	1937 c. 37.
"In section 87(2) and (4) the words "England or" wherever they occur, in subsection (5) the words "in relation to England, the Secretary of State, and" and subsection (6)."
. In Part I of Schedule 9 to the said Act of 1968, in the entry relating to the Children Act 1958, in the third column, for the words "Section 2(6) and (7)" there shall be substituted the words—	1958 c. 65.
"In section 2, in subsection (4) the words from "or by virtue of" to "of an approved school", and subsections (6) and (7)."
. In Part I of Schedule 9 to the said Act of 1968, in the entry relating to section 15(3) of the Adoption Act 1958, in the third for the words "or the Children' to "1937"" there shall be substituted the following words "fit person by' to 'care of a' and the words 'fit person order or' and 'as the case may be'".	1958 c. 5 (7 & 8 Eliz. 2).

In Part II of Schedule 9 to the said Act 1968, in the entry relating to the Children Act 1958, in the third column, the entry relating to section 17 shall be omitted.	1958 c. 65.
. In Part II of Schedule 9 to the said Act of 1968, in the entry relating to the Family Allowances Act 1965, in the third column, for the words from "11," to "(2)," there shall be substituted the word "11(2)"."	1965 c. 53.

The noble and learned Lord said: This Amendment adds to Schedule 5 a number of paragraphs—I believe 18 in all—making Amendments to the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968. These are either directly consequential on the provisions of the Bill which is before your Lordships or are verbal and minor drafting adjustments designed to clarify the provisions of the 1968 Act.

No significant policy changes a:-e involved if this Amendment is given effect to by your Lordships, and I have assumed (I hope correctly) that your Lordships would not wish me to go through in detail all 18 of the additional paragraphs sought to be added to the Bill. If your Lordships have any questions to raise upon any of them I shall do my best to answer, but as will be appreciated some of them involve less problems of law and interpretation than problems rather of the nature of a kind of drafting jigsaw puzzle. I beg to move.

EARL JELLICOE

There is one point I should like to ask the noble Lord about and it is to be found on page 7 of the Schedule. It is the last paragraph on page 7, and it relates to the transfer of persons detained in training schools under the law in force in Northern Ireland to Scotland. I did not know about this transfer from Northern Ireland to Scotland, and I wonder whether the noble Lord could enlighten us on what it is all about.

LORD WILSON OF LANGSIDE

I shall try to do so. The position, as I understand it, is that paragraph 7 of Schedule 8 of the Act of 1968 made certain changes which were consequential upon the abolition of approved schools in Scotland, which was effected, as your Lordships know, by our 1968 Act. The changes which were made were in Section 87 of the Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937. That dealt with the transfer to Scotland of children in approved schools in England and Wales, and in the equivalent, as I understand it, training schools in Northern Ireland; and the changes proposed in what will become, if your Lordships approve it, paragraph 54 of Schedule 5 are consequential upon the abolition of approved schools in England and Wales.

EARL JELLICOE

I do not wish to pursue this particular matter, but it is one with which I am not familiar. On the face of it, it seems strange that there is this authority to transfer children from Northern Ireland to Scotland. I do not necessarily expect an answer now, but I was wondering whether there are effective safeguards here. It seems quite a drastic step, and I was wondering whether the parents or guardian of the child concerned, or the local authority, or the child itself, has a right of appeal if such a transfer is to be made.

LORD WILSON OF LANGSIDE

Without at all intending to be facetious, I am a little surprised that the noble Earl should see anything strange in the transfer from Northern Ireland to Scotland but not from Scotland to England. There have always been cross-Border provisions governing children on probation or in care as between Scotland and England, and so far as I am aware we have always had them in Scotland so far as Northern Ireland is concerned. But I will look into the matter further, in view of the noble Earl's concern about it.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Schedule 5, as amended, agreed to.

Schedule 6 (Repeals):

LORD STONHAM moved Amendment No. 48:

Page 92, line 14, at end insert—

("1894 c. 60.

The Merchant Shipping Act 1894.

In section 183(3), the proviso.")

The noble Lord said: This is a minor Amendment providing for the repeal of a provision under which the Secretary of State could have received sums deducted from a seaman's wages in respect of parental contributions due to a local authority in whose care the seaman's child was. The repeal confirms the right of the local authority to retain sums of this kind. The provision has been redundant and anomalous since the reorganisation of grants payable to local authorities in 1958. The repeal is a delayed consequence of that reorganisation. I beg to move.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

Surely no Children and Young Persons Bill would he complete if its repeal schedule did not refer to the Merchant Shipping Act 1894.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Schedule 6, as amended, agreed to.

Schedule 7 (Section 1 to 6 and 14 of the Children Act 1958 as amended.)

LORD STONHAM

I beg to move Amendment No. 49.

Amendment moved— Page 104, line 6, after ("subsection") insert ("(3) or")—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD STONHAM moved Amendment No. 50: Page 104, line 8, leave out from ("refusing") to end of line 11 and insert ("or an order under section five of that Act cancelling, the registration of any premises occupied by him or his registration;").

The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 50, and as this is the last Amendment I should like to express my grateful thanks to the noble Earl and his noble friends for their great help and co-operation, which has enabled us to deal with so many Amendments quite satisfactorily and expeditiously. I should like to say a particular word of thanks to the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, not only for the immense care with which he studies these Amendments, which I find very helpful, but also for the fact that on this occasion, although he mentioned that we brought in the Merchant Shipping Act, we did not bring in Henry VIII. I beg to move.

EARL JELLICOE

I should very much like to reciprocate and thank the noble Lord for his courtesy and also to congratulate him on his stamina through this Committee stage. He said that it had been not only speedy but also helpful. I am afraid we have not gained all the points we should like from the noble Lord opposite, but of course we will have a chance of doing that at Report.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Schedule 7, as amended, agreed to.

House resumed: Bill reported with the Amendments.