Lords Sitting of 15 December 1969

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR On the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Southwark.

WHITEHALL DEVELOPMENT PLANS
2.35 p.m.
LORD ILFORD: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what is the present position with regard to Whitehall: a Plan for the National and Government Centre"; what, if any, decisions have been taken with regard to this plan and the various proposals which it contains; and whether this House will be given an opportunity to debate this plan before final decisions are reached.]
BARONESS LLEWELYN-DAVIES OF HASTOE: My Lords, in view of the importance of the Whitehall site, not only to the United Kingdom but to the Commonwealth, my right honourable friend the Minister of Public Building and Works has arranged for new plans and models to be made available to Parliament and to the public, so that reactions to the proposal will be known before further steps are taken. A new Parliamentary building is proposed to the North of Bridge Street, with an entrance below the road from New Palace Yard. A Commonwealth competition will be launched early next year to select the architect. A new Government Office building, together with other facilities, is proposed on the remainder of the site between Bridge Street and Richmond Terrace. Proposals for a North South riverside tunnel and a one-way system round the Broad Sanctuary site are also displayed for comment.
Mr. Denys Lasdun has been commissioned to carry out a feasibility study for comprehensive development of the Broad
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Sanctuary site. Redevelopment of the Foreign Office site will be considered at a later stage. Noble Lords will, I am sure, have views on all these proposals and may well wish to debate them at a suitable time after the public exhibition.
LORD ILFORD: My Lords, is the noble Baroness able to say what final decision has been taken on the plan, and whether any final decision has been taken?
BARONESS LLEWELYN-DAVIES OF HASTOE: No, my Lords. These plans are there for your Lordships' and the public's inspection and we shall react to them and to whatever criticisms and encouragements may come.
LORD ILFORD: My Lords, has any final decision been taken with regard to Richmond Terrace?
BARONESS LLEWELYN-DAVIES OF HASTOE: My Lords, it has always been envisaged that Richmond Terrace would be demolished. It is an attractive facade, but the accommodation is very sub-standard. Both the noble Lord, Lord Holford, and Sir Leslie Martin, and the two public authorities concerned, as well as the Royal Fine Art Commission, have agreed to the demolition.
LORD ILFORD: My Lords, is it not the case that buildings are always described as "sub-standard" when people want to destroy them?
VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS: My Lords, will my noble friend recognise my peculiar interest in the buildings in Richmond Terrace, in that I was born in No.3? And will she, in these circumstances, let my noble relative, Lady Strange, and myself, and any other noble Lords who are interested, take a look at this building before it is demolished?
BARONESS LLEWELYN-DAVIES OF HASTOE: Yes, indeed, my Lords; I should be very glad to lead them on a conducted tour.
LORD LEATHERLAND: My Lords, I wonder whether my noble friend could arrange for the facade to be preserved when any new building is carried out there, in the same way as a very distinguished architect suggested should be done for the Tate Gallery.
BARONESS LLEWELYN-DAVIES OF HASTOE: My Lords, that suggestion will of course be borne in mind. But I should be deceiving the House if I did not say that it would be an extremely expensive operation.
LORD INGLEWOOD: My Lords, the noble Baroness, in her reply, mentioned the new Parliamentary building. I wonder whether she could say what facilities for Members of your Lordships' House are going to be included in the new Parliamentary building, because some people might consider some of the facilities in this building sub-standard.
BARONESS LLEWELYN-DAVIES or HASTOE: My Lords, while I agree with the last part of the noble Lord's question, I would point out that the Fourth Report of the Select Committee, 1967–68, laid down in some considerable detail what kind of accommodation should be available in the new Parliamentary building.

GOLD PRICES AND LIQUID RESERVES
LORD BOOTHBY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether it is the policy of the Treasury to allow the price of gold to fall below the level of 35 dollars an ounce, and thus to reduce the value of the liquid reserves of the Free World.]
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, within the international monetary system gold is, and will continue to be, bought at 35 dollars per fine ounce, and there is no question of a reduction in the value of reserves held in gold.
LORD BOOTHBY: My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for his encouraging Answer, may I ask him two supplementary questions? First, in view of the fact that as a measuring rod the value of gold is superior to that of any currency, including the dollar, and also that well over half the monetary reserves of the world are held in the form of gold, would not a fall in the free price below 35 dollars be highly undesirable? Secondly, will Her Majesty's Government use their influence to help to bring about an agreement, which now seems to be possible,
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between the United States, the International Monetary Fund and the South African Government for the purchase by central banks of monetary gold in order to avoid an illiquidity which might be disastrous for world production and trade?
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, the noble Lord has couched two questions in a somewhat provocative form. Had they been less provocative I could have given him a more friendly answer.
LORD BOOTHBY: Give me a friendly answer.
LORD BESWICK: In the first place, I would not accept that gold is superior to other forms of currency. Experience is showing that gold is inferior to the S.D.R.'s now being introduced into the monetary system. The fact is that the two-tier system has worked very well since March, 1968, and I cannot myself see that confidence in it can be reduced. As to the second question which the noble Lord asked, it is well known that discussions are taking place between the United States and the South African authorities. It is also known that in October, 1968, a proposal was put to the South Africans who then turned it down, no doubt because they then shared the noble Lord's misplaced optimism about the importance of gold. But there have been these discussions; Her Majesty's Government have exchanged opinions with the United States authorities, and we hope that some agreement may be reached.
LORD BYERS: My Lords, may we take it that the Bank of England would not be prepared to buy gold if it fell below 35 dollars?
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, the noble Lord is absolutely right For the Bank of England to buy gold under 35 dollars would, in our view, be contrary to the Washington Agreement.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, what is "illiquidity"? Is it what used to be called "solidity"?
LORD BOOTHBY: My Lords, I cannot answer the noble Lord—I should have liked to do so. May I ask the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, whether it is not a fact that every country in the world, without exception, prefers gold

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as a final medium of reserve to any other commodity, including S.D.R.s?
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, on the question of illiquidity, whatever is the precise definition, it is not nearly so great a menace as the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, is trying to make out. In fact, we are getting along very nicely in international trade. As to the further supplementary the noble Lord put to me, the truth is that the free market price of gold has not borne out the glowing praise which the noble Lord gave when we had our interesting discussion a few months ago.
LORD HAWKE: My Lords, will Her Majesty's Government bear in mind that any fall below 35 dollars an ounce would be absolutely disastrous to the peasantry of the East. who for many years have stored up their savings in gold as security?
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, I think the fact of the matter is that a good deal of the "old black magic" surrounding gold has gone. I hope it has gone for good.

SPRINGBOKS' TOUR: SALE OF TICKETS
2.43 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether the Ministry of Defence offices of the Navy, Army and Air Force in London are being used for the sale of tickets for the Rugby match against the all-white South African team at Aldershot on December 16th.]
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE, R.A.F. (LORD WINTERBOTTOM): My Lords, it is customary for tickets for matches between Combined Services Rugby teams and touring teams to be sold by the Sports Boards of the three Services at the Ministry of Defence in London. The arrangements for the match to-morrow are no exception to this.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend this question? In
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view of the opinion expressed by the Prime Minister and the Minister for Sport in this matter, and the withdrawal of the Service grounds when the match against Oxford University was cancelled. is it right that accommodation, and civil servants, at the Headquarters of the Royal Navy, the Army and the Royal Air Force should be used for the purpose of supporting apartheid in sport?
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, the individuals can wear two hats. They can he civil servants; they can also be Rugby enthusiasts. The fixture in question was arranged two years ago and is to take place on a Service ground. It is the Government's policy to leave to individual clubs whether or not they should play a touring team; and in this the Combined Services Association are not considered to be any different, or in any different position, from any other club. In consequence, the Government accept that the facilities which are traditionally provided should be available for this match.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend this further question? Is he aware, first, that I am a Rugby enthusiast?
A NOBLE LORD: Scrum-half, I should think.
LORD BROCKWAY: Secondly, is it a fact that in Government Departments accommodation and the use of civil servants is now being provided for this introduction of politics into sport by the method of apartheid?
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, I do not think that Her Majesty's Government are introducing politics into sport. I think it is the noble Lord who is doing that.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, will my noble friend answer the question that I put? Is accommodation at the Defence Headquarters now being used for this purpose, and are civil servants being employed for this purpose.
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, in the course of their normal procedure tickets are being sold by the Sports Boards—I stress, the Sports Boards—with individuals acting in their private capacity within the three Services at the Ministry of Defence in London.
LORD HANKEY: My Lords, is the Minister aware that the vast majority of our countrymen are absolutely fed up with irrevelant political issues being used to spoil sporting fixtures?
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Hear, hear!

ROAD ACCIDENTS IN FOG
THE MARQUESS OF ABERDEEN AND TEMAIR: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government (a) whether the very large and serious road accidents which recently took place in fog conditions would have been avoided if drivers had taken care to follow the advice and instructions in the Highway Code, particularly those on pages 8 and 27; and (b) whether it was not their intention to prepare a further booklet which would be an improvement on the present one.]
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, although full reports on the recent regrettable accidents are not yet available, it seems clear that they resulted from drivers travelling too fast in fog and that they would probably have been avoided if the advice in the Highway Code had been followed. In due course, it is the intention of my right honourable friend the Minister of Transport to publish a revised version of the Highway Code which will embody any necessary improvements. But it is doubtful whether there is much room for improvement to the basic advice on driving behaviour to which the Question refers. Sound advice about driving in fog is given in the Driving Manual which was recently published by the Ministry.
THE MARQUESS OF ABERDEEN AND TEMAIR: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for the explanation he has given. May I ask a supplementary question? Is it not the case that when the Highway Code was being discussed, under his chairmanship, he said, if I remember aright, that it was the intention to carry on and issue a further Code, but with greater preparation beforehand? And was that not supported by many of those who took part in the discussion?
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, I indicated that the Highway Code was being amplified, but, because of the public concern in this matter, which I think is entirely justified, additional advice about driving in fog was published in November. I think the noble Marquess will agree that it is very difficult to cure human folly. What is perhaps more important is that the Ministry of Transport is extending the system of specialised signs, more sophisticated signs, to replace the amber flashing lights on motorways, for which the first contracts have been placed, and which are similar to those on the M.4 on the way to London Airport.
THE MARQUESS OF ABERDEEN AND TEMAIR: My Lords, may I end by asking a further question? Will these signs be in such a form that the ordinary person can understand them if he does not happen to ride often on a motorway but rather in his own area where he lives?
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, I should have thought that that was a most valuable point. When these new forms of fog warning are introduced, they should be publicised through all normal media so that the public understand what the signs mean.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend whether any of the people guilty of this folly were women?
LORD LEATHERLAND: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend whether it would not be even more useful to ask the Ministry of Technology to get in touch with the motor car industry to ascertain whether some electronic device can be perfected, especially having regard to the admirable burglar alarm devices which are now available and, of course, the ASDIC in the Navy?
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, that is precisely what is happening. The Road Research Laboratory and the Ministry of Transport are working on these devices.

PENSIONERS AND UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, at a convenient moment after half-past three my noble friend Lady Phillips will be making a statement on unemployment benefits for occupational pensioners.

JUDICIAL STANDING ORDERS
2.52 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD GARDINER): My Lords, I beg to move the first Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper. Perhaps your Lordships will allow me to speak to the second Motion as well, since they both deal with the same matter. In the Administration of Justice Act last Session, your Lordships may remember that provision was made in rare and selected cases for appeals direct from the High Court to your Lordships' House particularly where, for example, it was a revenue case and both the taxpayer and the Inland Revenue were determined from the start to obtain a decision from your Lordships' House, whereas they must now have, first, a hearing before the Commissioners; secondly, an appeal to a Judge of the High Court, and thirdly, an appeal to the Court of Appeal before, fourthly, they can get to your Lordships' House.
The new Standing Order directs that the application to bring an appeal from the High Court must be lodged within one month of the certificate granted by the trial judge, certifying that the matter of the appeal comes within the conditions laid down in the Act for those cases where an appeal is proper to be brought direct to this House. The new Standing Order further directs that the application shall be referred to an Appeal Committee for their consideration and report. The Act also allows the House to extend the time in which an application must be made, and the Standing Order directs that the Appeal Committee shall consider such application for extension of time.
The proposed Amendments to the Standing Orders are necessary for two reasons. The first Amendment makes clear that Standing Order No. II is concerned only with petitions for leave to appeal from the Appellate Courts of England, Scotland and Northern Ireland, and so distinguishes it from the new Standing Order which I am asking the House to make. The last two Amendments fill a loophole which has been found in relation to certain petitions for leave to appeal from the Court of Session in Scotland. Until recently statutory
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leave to appeal to this House was required only in relation to appeals from the Court of Appeal in England and the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland. It is now clear that some Acts of Parliament make it necessary to have leave to appeal from certain decisions of the Court of Session. The amendments to Standing Orders II and III mean that in these cases petitions for leave to appeal will be governed in the same way as those from the English and Northern Irish courts. I beg to move.
Moved, That, in the Standing Orders regulating Judicial Business, the following new Standing Order be inserted after Standing Order II: —
("That in all cases where application is made for leave for an appeal to be brought direct to the House from the High Court of Justice in England and Wales or from the High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland—

(a) a petition for such leave, together with the certificate granted by the High Court under section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1969, be lodged in the Parliament Office within one month from the date of the grant of such certificate or within such extended time as in any particular case the House may allow;

(b) any such petition, and any application for extension of time or other incidental matter, be referred to an Appeal Committee for their consideration and report.").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

JUDICIAL STANDING ORDERS
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I beg to move the second Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.
Moved, That the following Amendments be made to the Standing Orders regulating Judicial Business:—
Standing Order II—
line 1, after ("Appeals") insert ("from the Court of Appeal, the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland or the Court of Session in Scotland")
line 2, leave out ("Administration of Justice (Appeals) Act 1934 or the Northern Ireland Act 1962") and insert ("provisions of any Act of Parliament")
Standing Order III—
line 2, leave out ("Administration of Justice (Appeals) Act 1934 or the Northern Ireland Act 1962") and insert ("provisions of any Act of Parliament").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

ULSTER DEFENCE REGIMENT BILL
2.55 p.m.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (LORD SHACKLETON): My Lords, I beg to move that this Report be now received.
Moved, That the Report be received.—(Lord Shackleton.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
Clause 1 [Establishment and status of Ulster Defence Regiment]:
LORD BOOTHBY LORD BOOTHBY moved Amendment No. 1:
Page 1, line 6, leave out ("Ulster Defence Regiment") and insert ("Northern Ireland Defence Regiment")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, in moving this Amendment I am aware that the ground has already been well traversed in debate both in this House and in another place. Therefore I propose, simply and briefly, to summarise the arguments in favour of it. Before doing so, however, I should like to make it clear that I strongly support this Bill. I was deeply impressed by the Hunt Report which gave rise to it. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, that the principle underlying the Report, that a military solution has to be found, is absolutely right and I am glad that such a solution has been found.
To summarise the objections, let me take the first objection—the fact that the title is a false one. The Province of Ulster contains three predominantly Catholic counties which are part of the Republic of Eire. From these three counties no recruits will be allowed: they are forbidden. I must quote once again from the speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, on Second Reading:
"Ulster, as we know, is a fact, a historic fact, but a fact which has strong Party political and partisan connotations, whereas Northern Ireland is simply a geographical fact of life. I am sorry that that name has not been attached to the force."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 8/12/69, col. 332.]
The second objection is that there are no precedents for this. This is the first time the word "Ulster" has been used in an Act of Parliament. In Northern Ireland, as the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, has pointed out, the word "Ulster" has for long been associated with Orange
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organisations which have no statutory authority and from which Catholics are excluded. Nor can the name of regiments be called in support of this title. The Royal Ulster Rifles, in which the noble Earl, Lord Cork and Orrery served, never confined its recruiting to the Six Counties of Northern Ireland. It recruited, as he himself told us, from far outside the Six Counties, and even from outside Ulster itself.
The third objection is that the use of the word "Ulster" is evocative of a past which, as I have already twice said to your Lordships, is really best forgotten. In this country it is forgotten. I remember it, because Lord Carson lived in the village of Rottingdean where I was at a private school before the First World War. Our headmaster, who was an Ulsterman, made us line up with Union Jacks to cheer Lord Carson as he drove down the street, and I remember very vividly, as a Liberal—which I was in those days—I was ten years old—the inflamatory passions that were aroused by the slogan, "Ulster will fight; and Ulster will be right". But, my Lords, none of this is forgotten in Ireland to-day.
I come now to the question of a "deal". On the Committee stage of this Bill the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, suggested that the title of the Bill was the result of a deal between Her Majesty's Government and the Stormont Government. This provoked the Leader of the House, the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, to say that it was showing signs of "paranoic suspicion" to believe that there was some kind of mysterious deal. With all respect to the noble Lord—and I have a profound respect for him—I think this was going a bit too far. Of course there was a deal, and there was no mystery about it, and nothing wrong about it. As the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, went on to say:
"I should like to make it very clear that the British Government discuss the problems of Northern Ireland with the Government in Stormont. Obviously there are consultations on the name of the force and other points which relate to it."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 11/12/69, col. 750.]
Obviously there were discussions in this case. I can understand, and even sympathise with, the desire of the Home Secretary not to go back on any part of an agreement which may have been reached with the Stormont Government. But there

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is an overriding consideration. If possible, this Bill must be made to work. I want to see it work. I do not share the views of the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, that it is an unnecessary Bill. I think it is an admirable Bill, based on a very sound principle, but I submit that if the word "Ulster" is retained in the title there is a real danger that the Bill will not work: that the Catholics simply will not join the new Regiment and that it will become nothing more than a recreation of the old B Specials—which are also best forgotten; and in that case, as the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has pointed out to your Lordships, the new Defence Regiment will be nothing more than a farce.
In conclusion, my Lords, I would just say this. Much has been made of the fact that the title of this Bill is unimportant and that it should not be made a contentious issue. The noble Lord, Lord Byers, after a very brief visit to Ireland came back and told us that that was more or less his view. I am afraid I cannot accept it, from my knowledge of feeling in Ulster at the present time, and I do not think that that can be accurately gauged in the course of a visit of two or three days. My reply to the contention that the title in the Bill is unimportant is that by use of the provocative word "Ulster" you are raising it to the level of a contentious issue, and therefore to one of great importance.
What is wrong with "Northern Ireland"? It is a good name, an honourable name, and we hope that in the future it will be a happy name; and it has the overwhelming merit in this connection of being true. The noble Lord, Lord Rathcavan, in a most impressive speech, said that if the title was a stumbling block to Catholics he himself would have no objection to its being changed. It is only because I want the Bill to work, I want it to succeed and to bring peace to this distracted part of the United Kingdom, that I beg to move this Amendment.
LORD HAWKE: My Lords, I am a Protestant; there are various doctrines and habits of Roman Catholicism with which I disagree strongly; and I sympathise wilh the Protestants of Ulster in their fear of possible Roman Catholic domination. But one must live and let live, and if one is going to try to placate
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the strong Roman Catholic minority, I feel that one must go the whole hog and not spoil the ship for a ha'porth of tar. If this title is a stumbling block, I feel we ought to alter the title and do the thing properly.
LORD AMPTHILL: My Lords, I must first of all apologise to the House in that I was not able to be in my place for the Second Reading and the Committee stage of this Bill; I was under doctor's orders and still am to a certain extent. But my conscience compelled me to come here to-day and speak on this Amendment, because I agree very strongly with the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, and the noble Lord, Lord Hawke, and I do not think that this title, the "Ulster Deierice Regiment", will be very helpful. Some of your Lordships may know that I lived and worked in Northern Ireland for a number of years. For over thirty years I was connected with Northern Ireland, mainly concerned with factories. In all my business dealings there I never used the word "Ulster"; we always referred to the "Northern Ireland factories", the "Northern Ireland Government", the "Northern Ireland people" and so on. I think I was long enough in Northern Ireland to get to know the Northern Ireland people, to appreciate partly how their minds work, and partly to understand their fears and the things that move them. In view of that knowledge, I felt it was my duty to come here to-day and support the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, and my noble friend, Lord Hawke, in this Amendment to omit "Ulster" from the title of the regiment.
3.4 p.m.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, one of the impressive aspects of our discussions on this subject has been the broad spectrum of support in the House for the proposal that the name "Ulster" should be dropped and "Northern Ireland" or something similar substituted for it. Because the discussion ranged so widely on the last occasion and there was such a measure of support, I thought it right to discuss the matter fully with my right honourable friends so that what was said in this House should be taken fully into consideration. At the same time, I was unable—and it would have been wrong for me to mislead the House into thinking that there was a great likelihood that I should be able—to

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make a concession; and, therefore, my noble friend, Lord Brockway, took the matter to a Division and his Amendment was defeated by a very narrow margin indeed. I make no complaint that the noble Lord and the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, have brought the same issue before the House at a more convenient time of day, so that your Lordships may once again pass judgment on the matter.
Not only have my right honourable friends considered the matter, but I have also myself, in the light of the views expressed, considered it very carefully in terms of what would seem to be the best for Northern Ireland. I am well aware that the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, as he says, supports the Bill but none the less considers that the Amendment would improve the usefulness and the prospects of the new Defence Regiment and would contribute to peace in Northern Ireland. We are all agreed that that is the object. I am bound to say, however, that some of those who have spoken against the Amendment also know Northern Ireland rather well, and I am to that extent reinforced in my own conclusion which, for reasons which I will attempt to give, is that we ought to stick to the name "Ulster". This is not in any way to underrate the arguments, particularly of the noble Lord, Lord Ampthill, who certainly knows Northern Ireland, or Ulster as you may wish, better than I do.
The question before us is the name to be given to a military regiment. From the military point of view—and I stress that we are talking from the military point of view—certainly within the context of the delicate issues of Northern Ireland, "Ulster" is a much better term than "Northern Ireland", and there are several reasons why this is so. "Ulster" figures in the titles of a number of existing units, some of which have been formed quite recently. "Northern Ireland" figures in none. I will not, however, make too much of the argument as to whether the title should be Northern Ireland, as opposed to the other names proposed, because I know noble Lords had alternative suggestions. But it is worth reminding the House, since some noble Lords may not have heard the argument, that there are currently three
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major T. & A.V.R. units with "Ulster" in their titles, all of which were formed in 1967: they are the 102nd (Ulster and Scottish) Light Air Defence Regiment; the 40th (Ulster) Signals Regiment; the 152nd (Ulster) Regiment, Royal Corps of Transport. And, of course, in the Regular Army there was until recently, as the noble Earl, Lord Cork and Orrery, knows (I think he was called the Earl of Cork and Oratory), the Royal Ulster Rifles, which has now been integrated into the Royal Irish Rangers—a fairly historic name. One could go back further in time and give other instances, but I take the point that we are looking at the situation as it prevails to-day, and I have given enough examples to support my point.
There are admittedly many differences of nature and origin between these historic military units and the new Regiment, but that does not affect the essential point—and I am on the military point now—which is that "Ulster" is a term of military usage which is well known, well accepted, and recently applied, whereas "Northern Ireland" is not. These Ulster regiments, my Lords, are proud of their titles and they reflect their distinguished history and traditions: and I am sure no noble Lord would suggest that there is any element in those traditions and titles which is not a matter for pride.
The new Regiment—and this is the important part of the proposition—will be an integral part of the Army; its uniform. its organisation, its discipline, its administration, its training, its emoluments—all will be on Army lines. This is a fundamental matter. It is necessary to nourish and foster morale. esprit de corps and professionalism; and the military associations of the term "Ulster" will reflect and strengthen these links with the Army. It would be a pity if extraneous influences were to set this particular Regiment apart from Army tradition in the matter of its title.
I could also argue—and this is also important from a military point of view—that "Ulster" is a more colourful as well as a more historic term. These are unimportant considerations, I would agree, where a constitutional document is concerned, but they are very important indeed for the name of a Regiment. And,

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in this context it was the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, who, on the last occasion said,
"This is the first occasion in all history that the term 'Ulster' has been used in a constitutional instrument …".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 11/12/69, col. 732.]
First of all, however, I would hesitate to say that this is a constitutional instrument. To the best of my knowledge, although "Ulster" has not been used in main legislation, it has on occasion been used in subordinate legislation. I do not think this is an important point. For important military reasons, however, as it seems to us, "Ulster" is preferable to "Northern Ireland". I want to emphasise that it is extremely important that if noble Lords want to change the Ulster Special Constabulary into a Regiment, it is desirable it should have a name of a particularly appropriate regimental kind. I have talked about the title of the Regiment. 1 hope I have made clear that it will in fact be very different from the old B Specials. The whole object of the exercise is to produce something of a very different nature.
May we now turn to the use of the world "Ulster" by the people of Northern Ireland? I cannot accept that the term "Ulster" is not in general use in relation to Northern Ireland, and I would maintain that a generality of the people there do think of themselves as living in Ulster. There are very many organisations which use the word "Ulster" in their names. I have consulted the Ulster telephone book and I find that there are no fewer than six pages of names of organisations containing the word "Ulster". There have been important uses of the word "Ulster" in Northern Ireland Acts of Parliament, and I give these examples because they are very germane to my argument. The Finance Act, 1948, established the Ulster Land Fund; the Government Loans Act 1957 made provision for the issue of Ulster Loan Stock; the Ulster Folk Museum Act 1958 set up the Ulster Folk Museum (I would not make too much of that, because it may also refer to the three counties that are outside Northern Ireland); the Amenity Lands Act 1965 set up the Ulster Countryside Committee; the Transport Act 1948 actually changed the title of the Northern Ireland Transport Board to Ulster Transport Authority.
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All those changes were made without any particular objection being raised to the title. There are other examples. There is, for instance, a student body at Queens University, Belfast, called the New Ireland Society, in which I am told a large number of Roman Catholics take part, which has in fact a Committee which is called the Ulster Award Committee and which deals specifically with the encouragement and development of amenities for the people of, and visitors to, Northern Ireland.
I hope, therefore, that I have shown that "Ulster" is a term in general use. In the light of these factors, I cannot accept Lord Kilbracken's assertion—and I hope he will forgive me if I am misrepresenting him—that the term "Ulster" has become "a kind of password, a secret sign". I think some noble Lords have gone in this respect beyond the bounds of fact. I would not dispute that the word "Ulster" has latterly become objectionable to some because it is used in the name of certain extremist organisations. However, it is in the nature of extremist organisations to adopt names which will lend respectability to them. We all know that the Fascists in this country called themselves the "British Union of Fascists", but none of us suggested that the word "British" had suffered as a result.
My Lords, I believe that it is wrong to stigmatise a name which is commonly used by the people of Northern Ireland and that to do so is to build up barriers which we should be making every effort to break down. I fully acknowledge that there are two opinions on this matter. So far as I know—one has not taken a poll—a majority in Northern Ireland would prefer the term "Ulster" in the title of this Regiment. The question to which we must address ourselves is which of these two alternatives will, as of this time, be more in the interests of the people of Northern Ireland as a whole. It is necessary to consider this matter in a wide perspective. With the establishment of this Regiment the responsibility for certain military tasks will pass from the Government in Stormont to the Government in London. This will not be a merely nominal change; it will be a real change. I hope your Lordships are aware of the fundamental significance of the change. This was very much emphasised in another place.

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But if it is true that the title does have significance as a matter of substance, I think we must face the full consequences. There are two communities in Northern Ireland, and the Protestants have their susceptibilities about the title as well, however much noble Lords with Northern Ireland connections and with liberal views may take a generous approach. If the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, is right in his estimate of the effect of his Amendment upon Roman Catholics, I must point out to him and to those who think with him that there is a good chance that the Protestants will consider that the United Kingdom Parliament is determined to ignore their point of view and that Protestants will not join the new Regiment. And heaven forbid (and this is as far as I can safely go) that they should look for their protection to unofficial agencies because the official forces of defence are seriously undermanned!
My Lords, I do not believe that the question of the title is a matter of substance, but I think that to change it would be a matter of substance; and therefore I hope that those of your Lordships who think this change should be made will consider very carefully what I have said before the matter comes to a Division, if it does. As I pointed out, the situation in Northern Ireland is inflammable. The title was not chosen without a good deal of thought. In the long term, it is essential that the issue of religion should not enter into the argument where decisions in Great Britain have to be made, and are made, without reference to religion. A man's religion should, in general, have no effect upon his suitability for a particular job —we are all agreed on that, and that is how we understand it in the United Kingdom. Similarly titles of regiments should be decided, in my view, in accordance with normal Army principles.
My Lords, a great deal has been said on this subject: I will not say more, but I do think there is a danger of too much being made of this issue. For all these reasons I hope that your Lordships will not support this Amendment.
LORD KILBRACKEN: My Lords, I had not intended to intervene this afternoon but I feel that I must in view of what my noble Leader has just said and in view of his brief reference to me. He
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has spoken about the implications of the word "Ulster". I want to say, first, that what makes it the more objectionable to us is not merely the word "Ulster" but the conjunction of the two words, "Ulster Defence". This does not occur in the name of any other regiment, and it is this which makes it particularly objectionable. My noble Leader has sought to give the impression that the word "Ulster" is generally used in Northern Ireland, and he was able to say that there were six pages in the telephone directory listing the names of organisations in which that name was used. I suggest that he may well find that in a great many of those organisations the membership is in fact predominantly Protestant.
The word "Ulster" may be used, I admit, carelessly or designedly by some Catholics in the Six Counties; but it is not used by any nationalists and it is certainly not used in the Republic of Ireland, though that may be considered irrelevant. In inter-provincial football matches—and I mean here Gaelic foot-ball—there is an Ulster team, and this team, of course, is as likely to contain members from Cavan, Monaghan and Donegal as it is members from the other Six Counties. My noble Leader has said—and I am sure he is right—that the majority of the people in the Six Counties would prefer the word "Ulster" in the title; but surely the whole point is that we are not here concerned with what the majority want. The majority—the Protestant, Unionist majority—will come forward in strength to join this Regiment. What we want to consider are the wishes on this matter of the minority and whether, by changing the title along the lines suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, we are going to attract more men from that minority to join The Force.
My Lords, that is all I have to say except that I feel I must voice a protest at the fact that this business has been brought forward this afternoon without any notice being given to Members of your Lordships' House. I myself was expecting a Division, if there is going to be a Division—and I hope that there will be—round about half-past four or five o'clock, and it was only by chance that I made a telephone call a couple of hours ago and found out that it had been advanced to practically immediately after

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Question Time. I notice, my Lords—I do not know whether it is by accident or whether they will be turning up later—that neither my noble friend Lord Longford nor the noble Earl, Lord Cork and Orrery, are here. I know that my noble friend Lord Brockway is here already, and that others are present in the House at this moment. I feel that if the Government find it necessary to bring forward the time of important business on which a Division is to be expected, they should not do so unless those actively interested in the Bill have been given notice in advance.
LORD BYERS: My Lords, I had not intended to speak this afternoon, but the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, referred to me and quite rightly said that one cannot come to certain very important conclusions after a two-day or three-day visit to Northern Ireland. I accept that. But what I said in my Second Reading speech was that I hoped we were not going to do what in fact we have done, and that is to erect this question into a big political issue. This is where the danger lies. I think the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, is right when he says that it may not have mattered in the first place; but if we are now going to change the title and make a big political issue out of it we are going to make far more of it than we should have done. I do not believe that this issue will affect the building up of what I want to see—a properly balanced force in the Defence Regiment. What will affect that is the attitude of the leaders of the Catholic movement; the way in which the vetting procedure is shown to be working justly, so that Catholics know they have as good a chance as anybody else of getting promotion; and the whole structure of the officer system in this force. These are going to be the factors which will affect it.
I want to add only this. I should like to see this force get a good, fresh start. I do not want to see it as the B Specials in disguise. I should perhaps tell your Lordships' House—perhaps this is typically Irish—that I was warned before I paid my visit there always to refer to "Northern Ireland"; but I pointed out that the Liberal Party in Northern Ireland consists of Catholics, Protestants and others, and it is called the "Ulster Liberal Party".
LORD LEATHERLAND: My Lords, I came here this afternoon with my mind made up to vote along with the noble Lord, Lord Boothby. I felt that "Northern Ireland" was a more appropriate term for us to use than the word "Ulster". My mind went back to 1914 and 1915, when I was a soldier and had close relationships at one stage with a Yeomanry Regiment known as the North Irish Horse. Then I had contact later on with the South Irish Horse, and I found that those two Regiments got on fairly well with each other; and both were a credit to the British Army. But later on in that war I found that the name "Ulster" also appeared very prominently in Army records. I found that there was a Division—I think it was the 36th; I am not quite sure—which was known as the Ulster Division, and which had the sign on its shoulder of a red hand, and we were always talking about the red hand of Ulster.
There is, therefore, perhaps, when we come to matters of nomenclature, some case for both sides, and before I changed my mind this afternoon I had paid attention to the Judicial Standing Orders which the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack introduced, and he referred to "Northern Ireland Judiciary". But there is one factor which has convinced me that "Ulster" is the right term. If we use the term "Northern Ireland Regiment", we seem to indicate to the broad public outside that this Regiment is an instrument of the Northern Ireland Government. It is not: it is an instrument of the Westminster Government. It will be answerable to the Army, which this House controls; and it will not take its orders at all from the Northern Ireland Government. Therefore I feel it would be doing a disservice to the Regiment and describing the Regiment wrongly if we named it the "Northern Ireland Regiment" and gave people to understand that it took its orders from the Legislature at Stormont.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I wonder whether I may intervene very briefly, above all to regret the fact, and to express my apologies for it, that I was absent from the discussion on this Bill in Committee. I had intended to be here, but the business ran on late and I had an unavoidable engagement which I just could not break. As I see it, a great

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variety of stances have been taken up in our discussion on this matter. There are those who wish to change the name and yet wholeheartedly support the concept of this new force. The noble Lord, Lord Boothby, is one of them; so is the noble Lord, Lord Wigg; and so is my noble friend Lord Cork and Orrery, and, I hazard, my noble friends Lord Ampthill and Lord Hawke. And not least amongst that number there is the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, himself. But there are also those who dislike both the name and the whole concept of the force. It is fair to include the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, and also the noble Lord, Lord Kilbracken, among that number. Finally, there are those who dislike the name but whose views on the force itself I am not quite certain about: for example, the noble Earl, Lord Longford.
I should like to make my position on this absolutely plain. I support wholeheartedly, along with the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, and others, the concept of this new force, and on the whole I favour the retention of the present name. I said at our Second Reading debate that personally I had no very strong feelings either way on the question of name, and 1 still have not. But I concede that there are arguments both ways, though I feel that the arguments in favour. the semantic, and the fact that this is in general usage, military and regimental, have been willingly and fairly put by the Leader of the House this afternoon. If I have a personal bias it is not uninfluenced by a personal experience. The only occasion on which I was captured in the war happened to be when I was serving alongside the Royal Ulster Rifles—though that was no fault of the Royal Ulster Rifles.
There is another consideration which weighs with me and with my vote on this matter if, as I hope it will not, this matter is taken to a vote at Report stage, and that is this. The Government have rightly or wrongly insisted on the retention of this title through a long debate in the Committee stage in another place, and through quite a long debate at our own Committee stage and now at Report stage, and the matter has been escalated into something of some importance, more important than I believe it intrinsically
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to be. The Government, in insisting on this, have insisted on retaining the title not only against those who wish to change the name but also against those who are against the whole concept of this force. It may be clear to us, or at least most of us in your Lordships' House when we vote on this matter and if we favour the Amendment, that we are voting against the name and not against the concept. But I am not sure that it will be as clear outside the House, in Stormont, or indeed in Northern Ireland. I believe that an affirmative vote in that sense would be liable to great misinterpretation outside your Lordships' House. Therefore on the whole I should like to suggest to my noble friends, knowing that I will not carry all of them with me, as the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, suggested at Committee stage, that should this matter be pressed to a Division they should vote in favour of the retention of the present name.
LORD BOOTHBY: My Lords, if I may ask leave to withdraw the Amendment, I should like to say, in the light of the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, that I do not think any useful purpose would be served by a Division in this House. It is clear that the Government are adamant on this matter; and although I cannot altogether share their views, and still feel a sense of considerable foreboding and misgiving, and some heart-burnings, I would in all the circumstances beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
3.35 p.m.
LORD WINTERBOTTOM LORD WINTERBOTTOM moved Amendment No. 2:
Page 2, line 7, at end insert ("but save as aforesaid references in that Act to the regular forces shall not include references to the force").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, your Lordships will recall that during the Committee stage on the Bill last Thursday I undertook to consider further the reference in Clause 2, subsection (1), to officers of the regular forces. This was in connection with the Amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Kilbracken, the effect of which was to ensure that only officers of the Regular Army could be authorised to call out members of the Ulster Defence Regiment for emergency

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service under subsection (2) of Clause 2. We have given very clear assurances, both in your Lordships' House and in another place, that the power to call out the force on emergency service is to be confined to officers of the Regular Army, and it was with that object in mind that subsection (1) of Clause 2 was drafted. But when we came to examine it in the light of my noble friend's Amendment, we agreed that the point needed more accurate definition.
Clause 2(1) says that authority to call out the force on emergency service may be granted to officers of
"the regular forces within the meaning of the Army Act 1955".
The expression "regular forces" is defined in Section 225(1) of that Act as meaning any of Her Majesty's military forces other than the Army Reserve, the Territorial Army (now the T. & A.V.R.) and the Home Guard, et cetera: it does not (without this Amendment) exclude in terms the Ulster Defence Regiment. The Regiment will, of course, be part of Her Majesty's military forces: indeed, Clause 1(2) of the Bill underlines this by declaring that members of the Regiment shall be members of the Armed Forces of the Crown. It could, therefore, be said that the reference to officers of the Regular forces in Clause 2(1) includes (or more precisely, does not exclude) officers of the Ulster Defence Regiment. Even so, of course, my right honourable friend the Secretary of State would not be compelled to grant authority to call out the Regiment to any officer other than one of the Regular Army; nevertheless, it is in our view, as it is in my noble friend's view, most desirable that there should be no doubt about the effect of this provision.
The Amendment which I now propose achieves this by adding the words printed on the Order Paper to the end of subsection (3) of Clause 1. The subsection, as thus amended, will provide that, except as regards references to the Regular forces in certain provisions of Parts II to V of the Army Act 1955 (where it is appropriate that members of the Regiment should be on the same footing as members of the Regular Army), the references to the Regular forces in that Act do not include the Ulster Defence Regiment. The words to be added will accordingly ensure that the reference to "officers of
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the regular forces" in Clause 2 subsection (1) means only officers of the Regular Army.
LORD KILBRACKEN: My Lords I am most grateful to my noble friend for moving this Amendment. My intention at the Committee stage had been to ensure that no officer would be entitled to call out the force, or have the authority delegated to him to call out the force, who is a Regular officer merely by virtue of his being a member of the force. This was an undertaking given in another place but which seems to be not in the Bill. I understand from my noble friend that, as a result of this Amendment, the wish behind my Amendment will be effected. I am grateful for the Amendment and feel some gratification in having been responsible, I think I may claim, for the only Amendment to be accepted on this Bill in either House by Her Majesty's Government.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 2 [Liabilities for service and training]:
3.38 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY LORD BROCKWAY moved Amendment No. 3:
Page 3, line 13, at end insert—
( ) The Secretary of State shall, on the relevant date for the purposes of this subsection. report to Parliament the occasion of any calling out of the force or any part of it in exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (2) of this section.
( ) The relevant date for the purposes of the foregoing subsection is the first day of March, June, September or December immediately following the exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (2) of this section, or, if Parliament is not then sitting, the first sitting day thereafter.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I have been asked by the noble Lord Lord Wigg to move this Amendment on his behalf. He has indicated that he expresses great regret that he cannot be present. He has other duties, as the noble Lords are aware. I do not know whether I should be in order in apologising to the House for the fact that I was not here when an earlier Amendment was considered. Something must be wrong with the loudspeaker arrangements in the House because I was near at hand and I did not know that we had reached

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this stage. I have also been asked by my noble friend Lord Longford to apologise for his absence. Unfortunately he has been struck down by the prevalent epidemic of influenza.
At the earlier stages of this Bill the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, raised the issue which is reflected in this Amendment. As noble Lords will know, he is a great authority on defence matters. He has an enthusiasm for the Armed Forces which I do not always share, but he is very insistent that Parliament should have authority in defence matters and that there should be supremacy by both Houses over the military. In his earlier speeches he recalled that under the Reserve Acts when the forces were called out Parliament should be informed and, if it was not in Session, should be recalled for this purpose. The noble Lord placed emphasis on the fact that it was not until the start of the cold war, when it was feared that it might be undesirable to provide information to a potential enemy, that there was a limitation on this right of Parliament. I do not think it will be suggested that events which have occurred, or are likely to occur, in Northern Ireland would be useful to any potential enemy if the cold war became extended. I want to plead very strongly that Parliament should have authority over the Armed Forces in this and similar matters.
When this point was raised earlier we had assurances from both the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, and the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, that the matter would be looked at again. They indicated that on the Report stage they might be able to make some statement indicating a response to the Amendment which the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, moved. I very much hope that such an assurance may be given by the Minister when he replies. I want only to add this comment. The noble Lord, Lord Wigg, pressed very strongly indeed that there should be a statutory declaration in this matter, and that it would be unsatisfactory to have only Parliamentary assurance; because that would be going back upon the Parliamentary control over the Armed Forces which was the precedent and which was followed until the time of the start of the cold war—with which Northern Ireland has little relevance. Therefore,
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on Lord Wigg's behalf, as well as on behalf of many of us, I would strongly press the Government to accept some statutory obligation in this matter. I will hear what the Front Bench have to say in response to their promise to look at the matter again, and I will reserve any decision as to whether this Amendment should be pressed further. I beg to move.

PENSIONERS AND UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT
3.45 p.m.
BARONESS PHILLIPS: My Lords, with the leave of the House I should like to repeat a Statement on occupational pensions now being made by my right honourable friend the Minister of State for the Department of Health and Social Security. The Statement is as follows:
"The House will remember that increasing public concern about people with substantial occupational pensions who claim unemployment benefit although they may have left the active employment field led my right honourable friend, the then Minister of Pensions and National Insurance, to refer this question to the National Insurance Advisory Committee. The Committee concluded that there was a serious misuse of the National Insurance scheme and made recommendations to deal with it. Preliminary draft regulations broadly along the lines they recommended were accordingly referred to them last year and we have been considering their full and careful report, for which we are much indebted.
"With one Member dissenting, the Committee supported the preliminary draft regulations but recommended substantial easements to take account of the many representations they received. We intend to carry the easements a good deal further in order to give more help to those who have to retire early or have smaller pensions. We propose not to apply the new restrictions to occupational pensioners who are under 60; to apply the condition of further work only where the occupational pension amounts to £25 or more a week; and to taper the payment of unemployment benefit only where the pension amounts to more

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than £15 a week. The condition of further work is, broadly speaking, that the occupational pensioner shall have had 26 weeks employment, after he left his pensioned job, during the 12 months before his claim to benefit.
"The Government's modifications to the original draft regulations should ensure that the regulations will not bear unreasonably on younger occupational pensioners and those with smaller pensions. A married man whose pension amounts to £15 a week will still be eligible for full benefit, giving him up to about £30 a week for six months, and £23 a week for a further six months if he remains unemployed. Adoption of age 60 will give an additional 'breathing space' to those who are made redundant before age 60 or who, like policemen and members of the armed forces, normally retire below that age; it will also effectively remove women from the scope of the proposals. Thus the majority of those who retire on occupational pensions before the State retirement age will not be affected by the limitations which the Government are proposing.
"The draft regulations, accompanied by the Committee's report, will be laid before Parliament for their approval shortly after the Christmas adjournment."
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, may I thank the noble Baroness for having repeated that Statement to the House. All who have been involved in this problem will know of its difficulties. This is perhaps illustrated by the fact that the matter was referred to the National Insurance Advisory Committee as long ago as February, 1966 (I think I am right in saying), and the Committee actually reported in February, 1968. I understand that these draft regulations are to be laid before Parliament so that we shall have an opportunity then to debate them; but may I now ask one or two questions?
First, is the noble Baroness aware that there will be general satisfaction that the Government have very considerably eased the incidence of these regulations as compared with the recommendations of the Advisory Committee—for example, by raising the maximum amount which the
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occupational pensioner will be allowed to retain without abatement to £15, instead of £5 as suggested by the Committee, and by putting the threshold age at 60 as against 55 as advised by the Committee? I would also ask whether the noble Baroness is in a position to give us any idea of the number of pensioners who will be affected. The Report says that on July 25, 1966, there were 24,000 occupational pensioners potentially affected, of whom 16,000 were drawing pensions at the time. What proportion of these does she estimate will be affected by this Order?
Secondly, may I ask whether any difference will be made between those who have been compulsorily retired and those who retire entirely of their own free will? Thirdly, will the definition of "occupational pension" include, as was recommended by the Advisory Committee, the notional value of lump sums paid on retirement as well as the actual annual or monthly payments? I wonder whether the noble Baroness could answer those questions, since it would enable us to examine the Order more carefully when it comes along.
LORD WADE: My Lords, I should like to join in thanking the noble Baroness for repeating this Statement. We shall of course have to study the draft regulations. I agree that sympathetic consideration ought to be given to those who are made redundant before reaching the age of 60, and in the Statement there is, rightly, a reference to policemen and members of the Armed Forces. May I ask a question about those who attain the age of 60 (I do not seek a lengthy explanation), as the position is not quite clear to me? If someone has reached age 60 and is compelled by the terms of his employment to retire, but wishes to go on working for, say, another five years; if he is genuinely anxious to find other employment but is unable to do so, what exactly are the circumstances that will apply in such a case?
BARONESS PHILLIPS: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Lords for their questions. If I may, I will reply first to the noble Lord, Lord Wade. As is apparent from the contents of the Statement, I cannot give a specific reply, because although the age may be 60, the effect of the proposals must depend

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on the amount of the occupational pension. Regarding those who are compulsorily retired, as compared with those who retire voluntarily, I speak subject to correction but I do not think that they are to be treated differently. It is held that an occupational pension is really a continuation of a payment made by the employer; in a sense it is a continuation of a form of earnings, if one cares to put it that way. It is also considered that whether one is compulsorily retired or not, one would have to recognise that this was going to happen.
The question of the lump sum payments is somewhat complicated and will be included in the regulations. I am not in a position to give the noble Lord the exact outline of how this will operate, though I could possibly let him have some information before the actual regulations are laid. As regards figures, as the noble Lord says, in 1966 there were 24,000 occupational pensioners, of whom 37 per cent. had pensions of between £10 and £20 a week, and 16 per cent. of £20 and over. It is not possible to say how many had pensions of £25 a week and over.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, am I right in thinking that the Government have abandoned the possibility of defining more carefully those over the age of 60 who are genuinely in the employment field, and have been forced to adopt this rather indiscriminate form of distinction between those who retire at 60 and those who retire at 65? May I put one other question to the noble Baroness? When the Order comes to be drafted will she see that it incorporates some machinery that will enable this threshold figure of £15 to be altered automatically in line with the cost of living.
BARONESS PHILLIPS: My Lords, I take the second point made by the noble Lord. I shall certainly have discussions on this matter with my right honourable friend. The question of availability, as I am sure the noble Lord will appreciate, in view of his own distinguished career, is not easy to determine. Anybody applying for benefit would, naturally, state that he was available. The regulations will apply as laid down and will relate to anybody coming within the qualifying period of time and the sums of money involved.

ULSTER DEFENCE REGIMENT BILL
3.55 p.m.
Report stage resumed.
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, when the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, put forward a similar Amendment during the Committee stage I undertook to see how far we could go to meet the substance of his proposal, short of a statutory commitment. The noble Lord said then that he would not be satisfied with anything else. I respect the force of his views, which I conveyed to my right honourable friend, but for the reasons which I gave during the Committee stage we do not think that a statutory duty to report to Parliament, even at stated intervals, is appropriate to the employment of the force on emergency service. I said at the time that we hoped that the emergency would not be prolonged into the indefinite future. But if it will help the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, my right honourable friend the Secretary of State is prepared to make figures available quarterly to both Houses giving details of the employment of the force on the lines the noble Lord suggested. I hope that this undertaking, which I make on behalf of my right honourable friend, will satisfy the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, and my noble friend Lord Brockway.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I cannot speak for the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, in this matter; but he asked in his Amendment for periodical reports. not on a particular emergency. and so far as I am concerned I would therefore withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 6 [Short title and commencement]:
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, before moving Amendment No. 4 I should like to raise a point of order. I do not quite know how to raise it. Amendment No. 4 was consequential to Amendment No. 1. I was associated with Amendment No. 1 and ready to participate in the debate upon it. I was in the Guest Room and I heard the loudspeaker announce that we were discussing the Judicial Standing Orders. After that, apparently, the loudspeaker arrangement did not operate, and therefore I came into

837
the Chamber too late to speak to Amendment No. 1. The point of order I wish to raise is this: shall I be in order in moving Amendment No. 4 with a view, if necessary, to putting forward an Amendment in writing on Third Reading which would revert to the proposal in Amendment No. 1?
THE MINISTER OF STATE, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (LORD SHEPHERD): My Lords, I would, if I may, seek to deal with the point of order which the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, has raised. First, I understand that it is contrary to the Rules of the House to move manuscript Amendments on Third Reading. On behalf of the House as a whole I apologise that our lines of communication were not working and that therefore the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, was unable to participate in the discussion on Amendment No. 1 to which he had his name. There was a full debate, and at the end the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, withdrew the Amendment.
Technically, it would be perfectly in order for the noble Lord, Lord Brockway. to move and to speak to Amendment No. 4 since it is in his name, and it is the custom of this House to call all Amendments on the Order Paper. I speak subject to correction, but it seems to me that there would be little point in the noble Lord so doing, other than to be able to make his views clear to the House, and that I think he has done on a previous occasion. Amendment No. 4, I understand, would be consequential to Amendment No. 1 which has been withdrawn. I fear that it is quite contrary to the Rules of the House to move manuscript Amendments at Third Reading.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that statement. I can assure him that I am not concerned just to state my own views to the House. He will remember that during the Committee stage this Amendment was defeated by only one vote, and that thirteen of those who voted against the Amendment—
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, perhaps I ought to bring the House into order. I thought that the noble Lord. Lord Brockway, was still dealing with the point of order that he raised. If he wishes to speak in substance, I think that
838
he should keep within the Rules of the House by moving Amendment No. 4. briefly, and then perhaps withdrawing it.
LORD BROCKWAY: Which I shall be doing, my Lords. Surely I was in order in commenting on what my noble friend the Deputy Leader of the House had said in explaining why I should proceed, despite the ruling he had given. I was not seeking to do more than that. I will proceed to move the Amendment which is in my name. I appreciate the liberty given me on this occasion and the tolerance of the whole House.
First, I want to repeat, in case there is any misunderstanding, my great appreciation of what the Home Secretary has achieved in the extraordinarily difficult circumstances in Northern Ireland. I know that he has not only immensely lessened the intensification but he is still dedicated to that purpose. In a letter which I have received from him to-day, he indicates that that is the case. He says:
"You will know that the Hunt Report considered that some regulations made under the Special Powers Act might not be necessary but could be covered by ordinary legislation, and I shall discuss the whole question with the Northern Ireland Minister of Affairs with a view to embodying in permanent legislation those elements of the Special Powers Act which need to he dealt with in that way."
And he adds:
"The Northern Ireland Government themselves have said on more than one occasion that the provisions of the Special Powers Act should be made permanent or removed."
Therefore, in pressing this Amendment, I have no criticism to make at all of the actions of the Home Secretary in this very delicate matter. As I indicated in my previous speech, I think that the Report shows great appreciation of what the Army did in Northern Ireland in this crisis.
My Lords, I do not think that I have ever felt the tragedy of what has happened in Northern Ireland, more than I did yesterday evening when I listened to "Songs of Praise" on B.B.C. 1. Girls' choirs from Northern Ireland were singing Christmas carols. I am not sure whether they were Protestant choirs or Catholic choirs, but it did not matter. They were children of Northern Ireland. They were singing not hackneyed carols, but carols from all over the world, both Protestant and Catholic. It seems to me that as

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we approach this issue what should be in our minds more than anything else is a realisation of the need that the children of Northern Ireland and the younger generation shall be liberated from the antagonisms and the conflicts of the past fifty years. It is entirely in that spirit that I am moving this Amendment.
I acknowledge that the proposed title, "Northern Ireland Defence Regiment", is something of a compromise; but we want to compromise. We want to find a basis on which those of different views may find some solution to this problem. This proposal of the title of, "Northern Ireland Defence Regiment" was made by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, Chairman of the Commission that made the recommendations which the Government have accepted and to which the proposal for an Ulster Defence Regiment is an appendix. Some of us did not like the title because of the use of the word "Defence". The great issue here is whether the term "Ulster" shall be used in the title.
I should not have thought that there was any doubt at all that the use of the term "Ulster" will make it less likely that members of the minority Catholic community in Northern Ireland will join this force. To them, "Ulster" has disagreeable connotations. It has been associated with the Orange Order and the subsidiary institutions associated with that Order, and the very use of that title is going to make it less likely that they will join the Force. I was interested to read (and I hope that my noble friends on the Front Bench may note this point) that in another place Mr. Hattersley, speaking for the Ministry of Defence, said that if it should be a choice between a large regiment and a regiment of imbalance, Her Majesty's Government would decide in favour of a small regiment, if balance could be secured. My fear is that if this choice of title is retained, and if the regiment is to be balanced, it will have to be a very small force indeed.
There is no one in this House who really believes that the inclusion in this title of the term "Ulster" will not have a dissuading effect upon the Catholic minority. I developed this point in some detail in my speech during Committee stage, I am not going to flatter
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myself that noble Lords have read that speech, and I do not want to take advantage of the House to repeat what I said in detail. But I will make three more points briefly. The first is that this is the first occasion on which the Government of this country have used the term "Ulster" in an Act of Parliament. This is the first occasion on which it has ever been used in a constitutional Instrument.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I think that this is unsatisfactory. My noble friend was not here at the time, but we did deal with this point. I dealt with it especially. I must say that my noble friend is creating great embarrassment to the House. I have great sympathy with him in not knowing that this matter was on, but we have disposed of this question and I must say that I find this situation quite unprecedented.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, quite honestly I want to meet the wishes of the House. I intended to be here in time for the discussion on the first Amendment. It was not my fault that I was not here.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, if I may say so, it was not the fault of the House that the noble Lord was not in his place. It is always an obligation on a noble Lord—whether or not the mechanical arrangements break down—that he should be here. Good notice was given on Friday; a Notice went out, and we have debated this point. The House has disposed of it. I beg noble Lords not to reopen questions which were fully discussed earlier this afternoon on an identical Amendment. If we do this we shall run into very serious difficulties. I am sorry about this, but the noble Lord will of course have an opportunity to make a speech on Third Reading.
We have already covered this point very fully. There was quite a lengthy debate; a number of noble Lords were here and have now left the House under the impression that the matter has been disposed of. I think the noble Lord will lose sympathy if he pursues this Amendment very much further, particularly on the points which have been debated.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I wonder whether I might support what

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the Leader of the House has just said. If I could help the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, I can tell him—and I am sure I am not alone in this—that I have read and studied with great care what he said last Thursday at the Committee stage.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I think the House knows that I want to act in sympathy with its general desire. I regret the tone in which the Leader of the House has just raised this matter. I do not think he was in the House when I first raised it and when I had a reply from the Deputy Leader on these points. I am speaking now only because I understood that it was in order. But if there is this feeling in the House—and I have a tremendous sense of association with the House in these matters—I am prepared to conclude this speech on the understanding that I shall have an opportunity on the Motion for Third Reading to raise the matter again. I know that it was not the fault of the House; it was the fault of mechanical arrangements. But I do not think it was my fault that I was not here when the debate was called. In all these circumstances, I now withdraw this Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
4.12 p.m.
Then, Standing Order No. 41 having been suspended (pursuant to the Resolution of December 4):
LORD WINTER BOTTOM: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a third time. I think it would be appropriate for me to pay tribute to the spirit of care and concern for the future of Northern Ireland which has informed our debates on this subject. The Government's proposals have found their critics in your Lordships' House, as they have done in another place; and the length of our discussions reflects the force and fervour with which those criticisms have been pressed. But I believe that, with one or two exceptions, noble Lords in all parts of the House accept the need for this force and, in the words of the noble Earl, Lord Cork and Orrery, they wish it well.
It is significant—and I hope that my noble friend Lord Brockway will note this point—that out of 16 hours spent in Committee on this Bill, both in your Lordships' House and in another place,
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more than five hours have been devoted to the title of the force. I make no complaint about that, and I shall relieve your Lordships' apprehensions by saying that I have no intention of re-embarking on that difficult topic. I think that my noble friend the Leader of the House on both occasions when he wound up our discussions made the position of the Government clear, and I believe convinced the majority of noble Lords that the retention of the present title was correct. I would only remark that the depth of conviction that has characterised discussion of that question, the fertility of argument, the pervasiveness of objections and the difficulty of compromise typify both the intractability of these matters and the importance that we all attach to their solution. So it has been with every major point about this force—its recruitment, composition, tasks, training and organisation. On each of these matters the Government have had to make judgments without the support of precedent, with the certainty of convinced criticism, and in the knowledge that the vindication of our judgment is not in our hands. For it is not by this Bill alone, my Lords, that life and meaning will be given to the Ulster Defence Regiment. Parliament may provide the authority, the Government establish the framework; but it is the people of Northern Ireland themselves who must bring this Regiment to life. They alone can make it, as I am confident every one of your Lordships desires, truly part of the British Army: a symbol of resistance to extremism of communal harmony in Northern Ireland, and of the wider unity of the United Kingdom.
My Lords, I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 3a.—(Lord Winterbottom.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, before putting the Question, may I say that in the Report stage I omitted to call Amendment No. 5, because I took it that the noble Lord was not moving it.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I do not propose to accept the invitation to speak at this moment. I want to express my very great fear that this Bill under its present Title will not have the result of bringing harmony between the Protestant majority and the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland.
4.16 p.m.
VISCOUNT BARRINGTON: My Lords, I did not intend to speak on Third Reading. I am no doubt entirely to blame for the fact that I was not here during the Report stage. I, like a number of other noble Lords, did not receive the information. Nobody is to blame for that, but it seems to me none the less disastrous, because there are a number of noble Lords who are not in the House now, of whom I am the least effective speaker, who believe the title to be of vital importance to this Bill. As the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, said, we all agree that what we wish in this House is for the people of Northern Ireland to make a success of this Bill, whatever it is called. They can do that only if it results in a balanced force, and there are those of us who put up arguments—and they seem to me strong ones—that it is making it almost impossible (I do not want to be too pessimistic) to have a balanced force with this title.
The only other comment I should like to make is this. The noble Lord said that the noble Lord, the Leader of the House, convinced a majority of your Lordships at the Committee stage that this title was the right one, but I should like to be allowed to point out that it was a narrow majority—in fact, a majority of one. I do not know if it is indiscreet to say this, but I suggested on the Second Reading of the Bill that there seemed to be a cleavage of opinion between the Front Bench and the Back Bench Peers on this subject. I have not analysed the voting, but I am quite sure that most of the 30 Members who voted against the Amendment were Front Bench Members and were not convinced by any speech made in this House. They knew about the issues, made up their minds, and voted accordingly. It is a little misleading to say that they were convinced by the speech of the noble Lord, the Leader of the House, which, if I may say so, was a most admirable attempt to do the impossible and to suggest that there was some logical reason for retaining the title; which nobody who listened to the debate could possibly suppose. It is therefore tragic that circumstances have prevented other Peers from speaking on this Bill at the Report stage. I apologise, my Lords, for speaking on Third Reading, which
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I have never done before and, I hope, all being well, will never do again.
LORD KILBRACKEN: My Lords, I should just like to say that the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, said quite truly when he spoke that I was opposed in principle to the setting up of this force. Now it it going to be set up, and in a moment this Bill will be passed. Before it is passed I want to say that as the Bill is going to be enacted I wish it well. I hope, with all my heart, it will act in the way that the Government expect of it.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, while I cannot associate myself with everything the noble Lord, Lord Kilbracken, has said, I should very much like to associate myself with his last words. I happen always to have favoured the Bill and the principle behind it. But I think that now we all, whatever our original or our basic standpoint may have been, can echo his sentiment: that we wish the Bill to be enacted without delay and we wish the new Regiment every success. Certainly we on these Benches will do everything we can to help that process.
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, Her Majesty's Government, I am sure, are most grateful to noble Lords for the good wishes sent, at the end of this debate, to the new Regiment which we are setting up.
On Question, Bill read 3a, with the Amendment, and passed, and returned to the Commons.

FOOD AND DRUGS (MILK) BILL
Brought from the Commons; read 1a, and to be printed.

MATRIMONIAL PROCEEDINGS AND PROPERTY BILL [H.L.]
4.21 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a third time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 3a. —(The Lord Chancellor.)
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: My Lords, I want to say a very few words.

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After we have debated this Bill for some months, once more I want to express my profound disappointment that it has failed to do what I believe Members on both sides of this House wished it to do last July when we finished the Divorce Bill. At that time many Members expressed concern about the woman who will be compulsorily divorced despite the fact that she has not committed any matrimonial offence. There was no doubt that the attitude of Members changed when they were assured that a Bill would be introduced, which would go through this House before the end of the year, to afford some protection to this particular woman.
When the Bill now before us was introduced, I sought to move Amendments and failed completely. Now, of course, it has reached its final stage and will go to another place. There are those in this House who may think that my views are not shared by others outside who are in a position to understand the legal implications. I would only say that when I camel into the House just now I found waiting for me a letter from an eminent lawyer, who has spoken to me and to others on this matter before, and it says this:
"Finally to-day the point I want to emphasise is that this new Bill is simply a revised edition of the old Law Commission Working Paper No. 9, which has been going about for a couple of years at least."
I do not want to repeat what I have said before, but I want just to remind the House that in July we believed that a new Bill would be introduced, or at least that the Bill which had been embodied in the Law Commission's Report No. 25 would be amended in such a way that there would be certain provisions which would protect the innocent woman who is to be divorced. But that has not been forthcoming. At this stage I can only say that the Bill we are now dealing with still has to go through another place. I understand that many Members there feel very strongly that it should be amended so that this protection shall be forthcoming. I hope that when this Bill returns here it will have been amended in that way.
LORD CHORLEY: My Lords, I did not take part in the discussions on this Bill during the earlier stages because it seemed to me that it was very appropriate to the objective which the noble and
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learned Lord on the Woolsack had in mind and which he assured us he would see carried through. But I cannot help rising to defend—not that it needs defence—the work of the Law Commission on this matter. To talk about this as a vieux jell which has been floating round for two years is really an insult to the very capable work which has been done by the eminent men at the Law Commission. It seems to me, as a lawyer who has perhaps given as much thought to this matter as has the noble Baroness's correspondent, that this Bill is admirably fitted for the job which the draftsman set out to do and which the noble and learned Lord promised us should be done.
The noble Baroness moved Amendments and has continually argued that a very much wider community of goods should be introduced, for which there is possibly quite a lot to be said. But, with great respect to her, that has nothing to do with the much narrower purpose of this Bill. I had some sympathy with her when the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack was indicating that community of goods as a method of dealing with matrimonial property has a great deal to be said against it. No doubt it has, but his arguments were largely founded upon what has happened in France and Belgium and other countries where this was introduced a long time ago and not kept up to the needs of modern communities. I hope that before too long this matter may be raised as a general subject on a Bill which takes into account what has been done in the Scandinavian countries and in West Germany, where there is a good deal to be learnt as to what is feasible on the other side.
I have spoken to Scandinavian lawyers, and indeed to English lawyers, who have given a great deal of thought to this subject, and, as modified in the Scandinavian countries and in West Germany, I think there is a viable case to be made for what one might call a modern type of community of goods as between men and women in the matrimonial home. I hope that this matter will be looked at as a general problem; and because in relation to this particular matter this provision has not been regarded as providing a reasonable solution—and with that view I entirely agree—I hope that its value will not necessarily be dismissed,

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because there is a great deal to be said for it, and I think a much more careful and fuller study should be given to it in the light of experience in the Scandinavian countries and in West Germany.
4.27 p.m.
LORD LEATHERLAND: My Lords, as this Bill now speeds its way to the Statute Book, there is one matter about which I should like to say two or three words. It is a matter which I raised at an earlier stage of the Bill. It concerns Clause 35. Under Clause 35 Her Majesty's Judges are urged, when making decisions upon matters arising out of the Bill, to have regard to what is said in the Report of the Law Commission. I remember saying at that earlier stage that this was interfering with the freedom of Her Majesty's Judges to apply their own interpretations to the phraseology of the measure. We all know the very important part that interpretation plays in the administration of our laws; and I felt that this was unduly restricting the ability of Her Majesty's Judges to bring to bear their intelligence, their wisdom and their experience. Since I made those remarks—and this is not a case of post hoc ergo propter hoc—I notice that the Bar Council and the Law Society have both expressed exactly the same view. I am wondering whether, in view of this infectious adherence to the principles I adumbrated before, my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor still feels that it is wise to proceed with this particular clause, Clause 35, of the measure.
4.29 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, if I may reply to my noble friend Lord Leatherland first, there is nothing in the clause in question which makes any judge look at anything at all. All it says is that "he may"—there being some doubt at the moment as to whether he may or not. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, told us that of course a judge would in fact look at such a Report, but there is some doubt as to whether he really should. There is nothing at all here to compel any judge to do so; it merely enables him to do so. So far as the views of the Bar Council and the Law Society are concerned, they were particularly expressed on a Report on the Interpretation of Statutes which has been published by the Law Commission.
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This Report favours legislation under which the judges should be able to look at a wide variety of documents, including, for example, White Papers; and for my part I agree that that is a much more doubtful question.
I think this is the third time that my noble friend Lady Summerskill has said that during the proceedings on the Divorce Reform Bill I gave her, or gave the House, some assurance that the Bill now before your Lordships would provide special protection for women who might be divorced under the five-year clause. This statement was, and is, wholly unfounded, and every time she has said this I have pointed out that it is wholly unfounded. Since her views have been given very wide currency, I must again repeat that point. Nobody could have been more at pains to make it absolutely clear that no-one on the Divorce Reform Bill should think that there was anything likely to be contained in this Bill would have that effect. I said so repeatedly. At the earliest stage of the Divorce Reform Bill I took the trouble to get a letter from the Chairman of the Law Commission summarising what would be the contents of this Bill. In order that the letter should be available to every Member I said on the Second Reading that I had already had copies made, and that they were available in my office (and I know that my noble friend Lady Summerskill had her copy) so that every Member could see exactly what this Bill would contain and nobody could think for one moment that there would be anything in this Bill relating to community of property. In fact the letter went out of its way to point out that the Bill would not assist those involved in divorce proceedings under the Divorce Reform Act.
It was during the Committee stage that my noble friend Lady Summerskill started suggesting that somebody had said otherwise. I at once intervened to recall this history to her and to say, perfectly plainly, that it was no good anyone thinking that this Bill would contain any special protection for those whom my noble friend has in mind. I pointed out that that Bill contained Draconian powers—powers such as a judge had never had before—to assist those women and to refuse a decree, in certain cases of hardship, or to say to a man, "You can

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afford to take out a policy to provide for your wife the pension she would have had if she had not been divorced, and if you will not do that I shall not give you a divorce".
I made it crystal clear throughout that this Bill would not contain any provisions in regard to community of property, which is indeed a difficult subject. As this has been raised before, and on the last occasion it was given very wide publicity, particularly by all the women's organisations, I am bound to repeat what I said before; namely, that there is no foundation at all for what my noble friend has said.
BARONESS SUMMER SKILL: My Lords, if I was entirely under the wrong impression, why was it that we agreed in July that this Bill should be implemented on January 1, 1971, the same date as the Divorce Reform Act was to be brought into force?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, it was the House which decided, by an Amendment, that the Divorce Reform Act should be brought into force on January 1, 1971. In this Bill it was thought convenient because, as I explained, the Matrimonial Causes Rules have to be redrawn in the light of the Divorce Reform Act, and have to be redrawn in the light of this Bill; and, instead of having two completely different re-drawings, one after another, it was convenient that they should all be done together. That was the reason I gave.
On Question, Bill read 3a.
Clause 14 [Alteration of agreements by court during lives of parties]:
4.34 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved Amendment No. 1:
Page 14, line 5, leave out from ("circumstances") to ("and") in line 8 and insert ("including, if relevant, the matters mentioned in section 5(3) of this Act").
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment, like most of the other Amendments, is a drafting Amendment which makes it clear that in considering whether to vary a maintenance agreement by inserting (or increasing) provision for a child who is not the child of the paying party, the court is to have regard to the same factors as it would if ordering financial provision in favour of
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such a child. Clause 5(3) requires the court, when deciding whether to order a spouse to make financial provision for a child of the family of whom he is not the parent, to take into account, inter alia: (a) whether, and on what basis, that spouse had assumed responsibility for the child; (b) whether he knew the child was not his own; (c) whether anyone else is liable to maintain the child. These factors are obviously equally relevant when there is a question of inserting in a maintenance agreement financial arrangements for the benefit of a child, and the Amendment accordingly attracts Clause 5(3) to proceedings to vary such an agreement.
The Amendment also simplifies the wording, which reproduces the existing wording of the corresponding provision in the 1965 Act. I beg to move.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 17 [Restrictions on decrees for dissolution, annulment or separation affecting children]:
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved Amendment No. 2:
Page 18, line 26, at end insert ("but, if such an order was made, no person shall be entitled to challenge the validity of the decree on the ground that the conditions prescribed by subsections (1) and (2) above were not fulfilled.")
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, this is a drafting Amendment which makes it clear that a decree nisi made absolute after the court has made an order under Clause 17(1) cannot thereafter be challenged on the ground that the court ought not to have made the order. It is apparent from paragraph 46 of the Law Commission's Report, and from the note on Clause 17 of the Commission's draft Bill, that this is what the Commission intended. The object of requiring an order of the court is twofold. First, it provides for the possibility of an appeal--and the Rules will have to allow an interval after the making of an order before the decree can be made absolute sufficient to allow a party to appeal. Secondly, the making of the order is intended to exclude the possibility of a subsequent challenge to the validity of decree absolute on the grounds that Clause 17 has not been complied with. It is probably implicit in Clause 17(3) as drafted that the existence of an

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order does in fact exclude such a challenge to the validity of the subsequent decree absolute. But this is not said expressly, and it might be possible to raise a contrary argument. The Amendment eliminates any such possibility. I beg to move.
On Question. Amendment agreed to.
Clause 18 [Orders for custody and education of children affected by matrimonial suits]:
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved Amendment No. 3:
Page 19, line 12, leave out ("paragraph (a) above") and insert ("this subsection")
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, if no noble Lord objects I would ask leave to discuss Amendments 3 and 4 together, because they are linked Amendments which enable the Divorce Court to direct that steps be taken to make a child a ward of court wherever it has power to make a custody order. As drafted, Clause 18(1) reproduces the existing law in so far as the Divorce Court's powers to direct wardship proceedings arise only where there is a decree of divorce, et cetera, and not where the petition is dismissed. But its powers to award custody arise in either case, and it is anomalous that there should be a distinction in relation to wardship: either the powers should not exist at all, or they should exist wherever custody can be awarded.
The power to direct wardship proceedings is rarely exercised, possibly because, as the law stands, such proceedings have to be taken before another Division of the High Court—the Chancery Division. But the Administration of Justice Bill now before Parliament will transfer wardship jurisdiction to the Family Division (which will also exercise the High Court's divorce jurisdiction), and the power to direct wardship proceedings may become more valuable. The opportunity is also taken to substitute the more readily understandable expression "making the child a ward of court" for the traditional "placing the child under the protection of the court". There is no difference in meaning between the two expressions. I beg to move.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 4.
Amendment moved—
Page 19, line 15, leave out from ("for") to ("court") and insert ("making the child a ward of").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved Amendments Nos. 5, 6 and 7:
Page 19, line 15, at end insert—
("(1A) Where an order in respect of a child is made under this section, the order shall not affect the rights over or with respect to the child of any person, other than a party to the marriage in question, unless the child is the child of one or both of the parties to that marriage and that person was a party to the proceedings on the application for an order under this section.")
Clause 19, page 20, line 1, after ("18") insert ("(1A) and")
Clause 19, page 20, line 2, leave out ("it applies") and insert ("they apply").
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, if no noble Lord objects, I will move Amendments Nos. 5, 6 and 7 together, as Nos. 6 and 7 (which relate to Clause 19) are consequential on No. 5. Amendment No. 5, to Clause 18, provides expressly for the effect of a custody order made in divorce and other proceedings: (a) if the child is not the child of either spouse, the order does not affect the right of any other person—for example, his parent or guardian—to custody; (b) if the child is the child of either spouse, the order affects the rights of a third person only if that person was a party to the custody proceedings. The effect, under the current law, of a custody order on the rights of third persons is not altogether clear. There is some authority for the proposition that such an order operates only inter partes. This is the case of B. v. Attorney General. In that case, Lord Justice Willmer expressed the view that such an order did not affect the rights of any party not before the court, but this judgment was obiter, since the point did not arise directly and was not in issue before the court.
This comparative absence of authority has not caused any great inconvenience so far, probably because there is at present no situation in which the Divorce Court can award custody of a child who is not the child (whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of at least one of the spouses. The result is that in almost

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every case the person with the greatest natural right to custody is necessarily a party not only to the divorce proceedings but also to the custody proceedings themselves. The Bill, however, makes a change in this position, because a "child of the family" may be a child of neither spouse. It becomes, therefore, necessary to state specifically what is to be the effect of a custody order on persons other than the parties to the marriage which is the subject of the divorce proceedings.
There are two possible approaches. First, the rule could be that any person with a claim to custody must be brought before the court and be bound by the court's order. This approach would have the advantage of reducing the chances of future disputes between, for example, foster parents and natural parents in which attempts might be made, by means of new proceedings, to frustrate the effect of a custody order made on the divorce of the foster parents. The alternative approach, which is adopted by the Amendment, is to write into the Bill the rule that divorce proceedings between foster parents cannot lead to the natural parent's right being overridden.
The reason for preferring the second approach is that otherwise the Bill would be introducing by a side door a change in a fundamental rule of family law, which is that, subject always to the intervention of properly constituted public authorities, a parent is entitled to the custody of his child. One may, for example, get a case where, because his duties require him to spend two years in a remote and unhealthy part of the world, Mr. Smith, a widower, entrusts his children to Mr. and Mrs. Jones, who Treat them as children of their own family. If, while Mr. Smith is still away, the Jones's marriage breaks down, it is only right that, as between Mr. and Mrs. Jones, the court should be able to decide who is to have custody of the Smith children. It is equally right that, on learning of the impending Jones divorce, Mr. Smith should be entitled (as he is) either to take his children away from the Joneses or to intervene in the custody proceedings: he may, for example, wish to make it clear to the court that he is content to leave the children with Mrs. Jones, but that, sooner than let Mr. Jones have them, he would come home and take them away.
What would be unacceptable would be that either Mr. Smith's rights should be overriden without his being a party, or that he should, by intervening, put himself at the risk of having those rights overridden. The Amendment accordingly provides specifically that in such a case Mr. Smith's rights are not prejudiced whether or not he intervenes in the custody proceedings. It provides in terms that a custody order is not to affect the rights to custody of anyone other than the spouses, unless (a) the child is the child of either or both of them, and (b) that other person was a party to the custody proceedings.
There is a further reason for not adopting the alternative approach. The Home Secretary has set up a Committee, announced on July 24, 1969, to
"consider the law, policy and procedure on the adoption of children and what changes are desirable."
This review of adoption law will include the question whether long-term foster parents should be entitled to retain custody of a foster child against the wishes of his natural parents, and one of the obviously relevant factors will be the effect of divorce proceedings between the foster parents. My Lords, I beg to move.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, I would say simply that I hope that noble Lords will accept these Amendments. The noble and learned Lord has set out the two alternatives that could have been adopted, and I entirely agree with the way he has decided to handle it.
On Question, Amendments agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill do now pass.
Moved, That the Bill do now pass.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Bill passed, and sent to the Commons.

POLICE PENSIONS (AMENDMENT) (No. 3) REGULATIONS 1969
4.47 p.m.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, I beg to move that the Police Pensions (Amendment) (No. 3) Regulations 1969, a draft of which was laid before the House on

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November 25, be approved. These draft Regulations amend the Police Pensions Regulations 1966 in one respect only. The 1966 Regulations empower a police authority in certain defined circumstances to grant what is known as an augmented award to the widow of a police officer who loses his life as the result of an injury received in the execution of his duty. This award consists of a pension which, with social security benefits, amounts to not less than one half of the average pensionable pay of the deceased officer, together with a substantial lump sum.
Regulation 2 of the draft Regulations reproduces, in 14(1)(a) and (b), the existing provision in the 1966 Regulations, and then, by paragraph (c), adds a new provision which has the effect of extending the circumstances in which the augmented award be paid. The new circumstances are that the officer was attempting to save, or prevent the loss of, human life and there was a likelihood of his receiving a fatal injury. These circumstances correspond to those which were recently introduced into the Firemen's Pension Scheme to allow the payment of a comparable augmented award to a fireman's widow. The new provision is unlikely to increase the average number of augmented awards which become payable each year by more than one or two.
My Lords, I believe the House will welcome this extension of the circumstances in which the augmented award may be paid, and I should advise your Lordships that the Police Council for Great Britain has been consulted about the amendment and is in agreement that it should be made. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Police Pensions (No. 3) Regulations 1969, laid before the House on November 25 last, be approved.—(Lord Beswick.)
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: My Lords, in the light of the assurance by the noble Lord that the Police Council have agreed to these amending Regulations, I suggest that your Lordships can accept them without hesitation. Personally, I welcome the addition that is being made. I would add that I am sure it is desirable that the pension provisions for policemen's widows and for firemen's
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widows should be kept as closely as possible in parallel.
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, I should like to raise what I fear may be thought to be a somewhat niggling point, but I notice that the second condition is that where the policeman has been attempting to save human life the circumstances have to be such that there was an intrinsic likelihood of his receiving a fatal injury. I cannot think of any instance of the word "intrinsic" here adding anything at all to the word "likelihood", and I feel that it would be a sorry day if some policeman's widow, after he had lost his life trying to save the life of another, lost her augmented award because, although he lost his life in circumstances where there was a likelihood of his receiving fatal injuries, somebody might say there was not an intrinsic likelihood of his receiving a fatal injury. I cannot see that the word "intrinsic" here is useful at all, and I should have thought that if it does not have a certain meaning it is superfluous and would be much better left out, so that in all the circumstances where there was a likelihood at all of the officer receiving fatal injuries, and he did, then his widow would receive her augmented award.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, I remember a number of occasions when I have sternly resisted the temptation to say that the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, raised niggling points, and I resist that temptation again to-day. Actually, the word is necessary. It is intended to be there, and it secures a result which it is intended to secure. May I put it this way? The policy of paragraph 14, sub-paragraph (1)(a), is to cover what may be termed "murderous attacks"; that is to say, attacks which are likely to result in death, irrespective of any special peculiarities of the policeman concerned. As the noble Lord knows, there are three levels at which awards can be made, and this is a special case where, by the nature of the act, there was a special risk. This word "intrinsic" has been in the regulation in sub-paragraph (1)(a)—I think I am right—since 1953, and was intended to ensure that this special risk was recognised by a special award. In subparagraph (1)(c) the word is used because it is used in sub-paragraph (1)(a), and

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it is intended that the two categories of circumstances should be kept in parallel. I think that this is quite right.
I would go along with the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, if there was any evidence before me which suggested that the police authorities, when using their discretion in these matters, had ever used it on the wrong side. They have always used it to make it possible for the widow to receive an award, and I think they will continue to look at these matters generously in that way. But in order to ensure that it is the intrinsic nature of the attack which determines the award, it is suggested that the word should remain in there, and I hope the noble Lord will, on reflection, agree with that.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

WEST RIDING COUNTY COUNCIL (GENERAL POWERS) ACT 1964 (EXTENSION OF OPERATION) ORDER 1969
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF HOUSING AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (LORD KENNET): My Lords, this Order has been to the Special Orders Committee, who report that it is unopposed, it is precedented, raises no great issues of policy and may be properly passed by the House without special attention. I beg to move that the Order be now approved.
Moved, That the West Riding County Council (General Powers) Act 1964 (Extension of Operation) Order 1969, be approved.—(Lord Kennet.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

CUMBERLAND COUNTY COUNCIL ACT 1964 (EXTENSION OF OPERATION) ORDER 1969
LORD KENNET: My Lords, what I said about the last Order applies also to this Order. I beg to move that it be now approved.
Moved, That the Cumberland County Council Act 1964 (Extension of Operation) Order 1969 be approved.—(Lord Kennet.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES (INFORMATION AGREEMENTS) ORDER 1969
4.56 p.m.
THE MINISTER OF STATE, MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY (LORD DELACOURT-SMITH): My Lords, it may be for the convenience of your Lordships if I recall very briefly the background to this Order. The Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1956 was introduced to prevent harmful restrictive trading practices and has, since it became law, had a good deal of influence. But even though this legislation dealt satisfactorily with undesirable forms of restrictive agreements, such as those under which competing firms agreed on prices which they would charge, experience has shown that in some cases such agreements are being replaced by agreements of a new type: that of the price information agreement. Under such agreements companies keep each other informed about charges which they are imposing, or which they propose to impose, and it has been found that these can often have the same practical effect as straightforward price agreements.
Because there was a danger that the whole object of the 1956 Act might thus be circumvented, the Government took additional powers under the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1968 to call up for registration and examination a wide range of agreements of this new kind. The 1968 Act gave power to the Board of Trade—and the power has passed, as noble Lords will know, to the Department of Employment and Productivity—to make orders calling up agreements relating to many different aspects of trading arrangements: prices, terms and conditions of sale, cost, qualities and descriptions of goods produced, persons supplied or acquiring goods, and areas or places in which goods are supplied.
The Order which I am moving is the first Order under this Act, and it has been decided to keep it to a relatively narrow field. It will call up for registration agreements relating to prices and terms and conditions of sale. The Order does not, of course, exhaust the order-making power under the Act, but it is likely to cover those types of information agreements which can be most readily

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used as a substitute for price-fixing agreements. In the light of experience there may, in due course, have to be further orders—for example, relating to information about costs, which can also be a mere substitute in some cases for price fixing. The present Order is, in fact, so framed as not to make registrable the exchange of information between buyers about prices which they have paid or are being called upon to pay. Clearly, such information is much nearer to cost information, and it would have to be considered in the context of any Order relating to costs.
The other major point which I must make is to draw attention to the Schedule to the Order, which sets out the information agreements to be excluded from the general call-up. We have always recognised that even in the class of price information agreements there are certain categories of such agreements which are desirable and beneficial in the national interest, and the objective in drafting the present Order has been so far as possible to exclude beneficial categories of agreement from call-up. I should say that in drafting these exclusions we have benefited a great deal from the extensive consultations we have had with industry, with the Confederation of British Industry and with trade associations during the last few months since the period in February when, as the Act required, we published a notice of the matters which we intended to cover in this first Order. Since then we have studied very carefully the representations received in response to that notice.
I think it would be convenient, my Lords, if I tried to indicate briefly the effect of the more significant exclusions which are contained in the Schedule, although I need hardly say in such a case as this that all I can do is to give a broad summary, and that it is necessary for anyone considering the effect in any particular case to study the Order itself. First of all, the Schedule excludes information agreements relating to exports. Without this exclusion, industry would find itself obliged to deposit with the Department of Employment and Productivity all export information agreements under the special provisions relating to exports in the 1956 Act. Second, we are excluding information agreements which
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are needed in connection with the supply of statistical or other information to Government Departments and other public authorities. I am sure that the reason for this exclusion will be self-evident. We do not want to upset the arrangements for the collection of valuable statistical information or the arrangements for consultation between industry and Government.
The third category of exclusions relates to those cases where the information is already public or is being collected with a view to publication, not for the private purposes of the firms concerned. We consider that in such cases it would not be sensible to require the agreements involved to be registered. The fourth category is that of information agreements which are incidental to types of restrictive agreements which are themselves exempt from registration under the 1956 Act. We must clearly ensure that these do not become subject to registration as a consequence of this Order. Lastly, there are provisions relating to the rather special positions of the Agricultural Marketing Boards and the nationalised gas and electricity industries.
My Lords, the intention is that, subject to the approval of Parliament, the Order should come into operation on February 1, 1970. This date, rather far ahead, has been chosen so that there can be, it is hoped, time between the making of the Order and its coming into operation for industry to become aware of its provisions and to consider its effect upon any agreement which may exist at the moment. When the Order comes into operation, agreements existing at that time will have to be registered with the Office of the Registrar of Restrictive Trading Agreements within three months. The Registrar, when the agreements have been registered, will consider in the case of each agreement whether its provisions are of such significance as to call for investigation by the Restrictive Practices Court. In the event that he does not regard the provisions as significant, he may make representation to the Secretary of State, who may in turn give a direction that the agreement should not be referred to the Restrictive Practices Court. In the event that this does not take place, the agreements will be examined in due course by the court, and

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they are of course deemed to be contrary to the public interest unless the court is satisfied that there is justification for the agreement in terms of the public interest in the circumstances of the particular case under one of the heads set out in the legislation.
My Lords, I have mentioned this procedure to bring out the fact that registration does not of itself mean that agreements are automatically condemned. Indeed, I would expect that any clearly beneficial agreements which happen to remain in the categories being called up will not, in the event, have to be examined by the court. This Order represents a further step in the effort under the restrictive practices legislation to bring to an end types of agreements in industry which are harmful to the public interest because they distort or prevent competition. With the explanation I have given of the contents of the Restrictive Trade Practices (Information Agreements) Order 1969, I invite the House to give approval to the draft Order laid before it. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Draft Restrictive Trade Practices (Information Agreements) Order 1969, laid before the House on 26th November last be approved.—(Lord Delacourt-Smith.)
5.5 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, first of all I should like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Delacourt-Smith, for the very clear way in which he has explained the purposes of this Order to your Lordships. He has made it clear that this is a subject which has been under consideration for some time; and, indeed, I do not think I can do better than quote the report of the Registrar for the period July 1, 1963, to June 30, 1966, when he says:
"It is I think unnecessary further to argue the proposition that registration and examination by the Restrictive Practices Court of information agreements are desirable, since I think it has been accepted by all Parties in Parliament".
That, of course, is so, as was made clear when we had before us the 1968 Act, when my noble friend Lord Jellicoe gave his support particularly to the provisions regarding information agreements. Since then we have had, as the noble Lord said, the Transfer of Functions Order, and now we have this Order; and the noble Lord has explained to your Lordships the reason
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why the Order has been limited to the price at which and the terms and conditions on which goods are supplied—and, perhaps it is right to add, the processes of manufacture which are applied to goods.
My Lords, I gather from what the noble Lord has said that it is still the intention of the Government subsequently to introduce an Order or Orders to cover the other points referred to in Section 5 of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1968, and to which he referred; that it to say, such as
"… quantities or descriptions of goods … costs incurred or to be incurred … processes of manufacture …"
and
"the persons or classes of persons to or for whom goods have been or are to be supplied …"
I would ask the noble Lord to confirm that this is his intention, because if it is I think it would be well that industry should know that now and not think that, simply because the Government have thought fit to introduce this Order of a restricted character (of a modest character; shall I put it in that way?) to start with, it is not their intention subsequently to cover the other subjects.
I think I am right in saying that representations were made to the Board of Trade (as I suppose it was at that time) that the Order should be so restricted, and what I am really asking is whether the Government have accepted those representations in the sense that this Order should be restricted to these particular purposes of price and terms and conditions, or whether the Government have come to the conclusion that the other parts of Section 5 of the 1968 Act do not need to be implemented. Of course, my Lords, it may well be that the reason for proceeding in this way is not to give the Registrar indigestion, so to speak. He will have quite a formidable task, no doubt, after the day appointed for this to come into operation, February, 1, 1970, in coping with the registration within the three months thereafter of all these various information agreements, and I am sure the Government were right to restrict the Order, even if it is only for that reason, to price and terms and conditions.
My Lords, the noble Lord referred to the various degrees of processing that such

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information agreements have to go through, and I should like to ask him how long this process takes. First of all, the Registrar has to consider the agreement, and possibly investigate it. Then, if he so decides, he may either apply to the Secretary of State for a declaration that the effect of the Order on the public interest is insignificant or he may decide to take the case to court. The reason why I think it important to ask this question is (I think I am right in saying) that until a decision has been reached—that is, until either the Secretary of State has said that the effect of the agreement is insignificant or the court has decided it is not unlawful to operate the agreement—people will not know where they are. So the time taken is obviously a matter of considerable importance.
It is perhaps also worth mentioning that, while restrictive trade agreements have only rarely got past the Restrictive Practices Court, there is a fair likelihood that the proportion of information agreements getting through may be greater, because of the addition in Section 10 of the 1968 Act of the new paragraph saying
"restriction does not directly or indirectly restrict or discourage competition to any material degree in any relevant trade or industry and is not likely to do so."
The addition of that to the "gateways" in the 1956 Act may mean that a higher proportion of information agreements may get through than has been the case with restrictive agreements in the past.
There is one aspect of this matter to which I think I ought to refer. Information—intelligence if you like—passes very freely in the market, and in many cases the operation of information agreements is designed simply to ensure that the information which passes is accurate: the agreement has no restrictive intent. The information in some form or another will pass round the market pretty quickly. The reason I say this is that we are dealing here with restrictions that do not give rise to any criminal prosecutions, and the effect of failing to register an agreement is simply, as I understand it, that any person who is adversely affected, or thinks he is adversely affected, by that agreement, if it exists, may apply to the courts and bring a civil action in order to obtain
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damages for such injury as he may have suffered. The danger of actions brought in this way is that in many cases there may be a false inference of the existence of such an agreement where in fact no agreement exists, the information having passed in the normal way—for example. a market leader's price has been followed as soon as it became known in the market.
My Lords, I have every confidence in the judgment and skill and fairness of the Registrar, and there is no doubt that things have worked extremely well so far. Indeed, the confidence of industry has probably been enhanced rather than the reverse through the operation of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act. Nevertheless, there is the danger that, with the calling up of these information agreements, a situation might arise in which pressure built up for investigations to be made by the Registrar, or indeed by the courts on discovery (my noble friend will put me right on this), to the point at which industry began to lose confidence in co-operation. I know that this is the last thing the Government want, always provided of course that the co-operation is in the public interest and not against it. I say this because I think that the working of these information agreements, or of this first instalment, as I think it is, needs to be watched pretty carefully in the first two or three years and I hope that we shall in due course have another report from the Registrar on the working of this particular Order, possibly before the Order is extended. This may be desirable.
I would express the hope—and so far as the Registrar is concerned I think I can express it with confidence—that the Order will be operated in such a way as not to destroy the confidence of industry or their co-operation for all good purposes, but I feel that there is the danger that confidence could be undermined if there were a large number of private civil actions. This is the only danger that I see in this Order. Apart from that, I give it the utmost support.
LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY: My Lords, this is one further step in a process, which has been going on for some time, to restrict restrictive practices themselves. It is something which needs to happen throughout the whole economy,

865
not merely in this particular field, and it is something which I think is happening. There are various areas which need more attention, and I hope to have time to mention one or two of them to your Lordships' House when, later this week, we come to consider prices and incomes. Meantime, I would merely say that we on these Benches warmly welcome this Order as a step forward towards greater competition. As the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, said, there is always a balance to be maintained between competition and co-operation. While I would be the last to say that we should move away from co-operation in most parts of our society to-day, there can be little doubt that we have in the past suffered from too much co-operation between certain sections of the economy, possibly to the detriment of other sections of the economy. I think that we have to continue to fight this and we give this Order a wholehearted welcome.
LORD KIRKWOOD: My Lords, I am entering this discussion without any prepared notes but as one who has been before the Restrictive Practices Court on behalf of an association (I should declare my interest), the National Suphuric Acid Association. We went before the Restrictive Practices Court on two occasions, and in both instances the case against us was withdrawn: it was unfounded. But in the course of this investigation we were involved in legal expenses amounting to nearly a quarter of a million pounds. That cost had to be borne by industry, and I hope that, if there is going to be a further examination of the Restrictive Practices Court and the method by which associations are called before it, prior investigation will be made in such a manner as will not involve the calling of evidence which could not be substantiated in a proper court.
One of the points I was particularly concerned about, apart from the very expensive legal costs, was the involvement of senior executives in the chemical industry with whom I had to go into discussion for a period of nearly twelve months in answering the case which the Registrar had brought against us. I would suggest that the legal costs were infinitesimal compared with the costs that the chemical industry incurred because individuals in the industry had to
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concentrate on a restrictive practice case rather than on their own proper business. May I say that the National Sulphuric Acid Association is an association of those chemical producers in this country who purchase their sulphur in bulk form for the whole of the industry. The Association's object is to keep the price of sulphur on a very stable basis, and the chemical industry in this country is to-day enjoying a sulphur price unequalled in any other part of the world.
5.21 p.m.
LORD DELACOURT-SMITH: My Lords, I am very pleased at the welcome which, in general, this Order has received. As the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, has said, the general approach of the legislation upon which it is based is one which is accepted by all Parties. He asked a number of questions to which I shall try to reply. He asked, in the first place, whether the relatively restricted character of the present Order was to be taken as indicating that the Government had decided not to make other Orders under the 1968 Act embracing other types of information agreements. The position is that no decision has been taken about the introduction of Orders relating either to costs or to any other aspect of information agreements covered in the original Act. But I am sure that the noble Lord will bear in mind that, in the event of the Government deciding to lay further Orders under this Act, there is a procedure (which, as I have said, we have observed in the present case) which requires a substantial period of notification to industry and the opportunity to make representations; and, of course, such representations are very carefully considered. The noble Lord was right in saying that there have been representations on the particular point to which he drew attention. He was also right in saying that a substantial influence in deciding the shape and scope of the present Order was the desire not to face the Registrar of Restrictive Practices with an indigestible task.
The question of the period of time that the process takes is one which is difficult to answer. The extent of investigation required in a particular example depends on the nature of the agreement, on its provisions, on how those provisions operate in practice and on many other factors. On the other hand, it may be

867
possible to refer some agreements to the court with very little delay at all and the cases then do not take any substantial period of time. Therefore, I cannot really give a general answer to that particular question. I can confirm that, as the noble Lord said, until a particular agreement has been before the Restrictive Practices Court and has been declared by that court not to be consonant with public interest, there is nothing illegal about the agreement.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, also joined in the welcome given to the Bill. I took note of the fact that he will be raising at a later stage this week some points which are germane to this afternoon's discussion. As the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood, has indicated, very real problems arise for industry from the operations of this Act. I think that one can only say that while these procedures are time-consuming and may be expensive, nevertheless the general sense of public opinion, and certainly the view of Parliament, has been that this is a very important field of commercial and industrial activity and one that requires provisions of the kind that Parliament has approved.
LORD KIRKWOOD: My Lords, may I interrupt to make the point that it is a very serious matter when the Restrictive Practices Court call in an association twice and on the second occasion withdraw the case when it is halfway through? What I am objecting to is the procedure by which evidence is assembled before an industry is brought before the Restrictive Practices Court. I trust that great care will be taken before anyone is brought to the court once: but that there will be even greater care if they should be brought to the court twice.
LORD DELACOURT-SMITH: My Lords, I think that coincides with the point that I was just going to make and, more particularly, in relation to the concluding point made by the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn. He spoke about the repercussions which could arise in industry from this legislation and this Order and about the necessity for keeping under review the operation of the Act. I think that anybody who has read the Report of the Registrar and of the operations of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act—and
868
the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, quoted from it—will recognise the care which has been taken and the quality of that Report. I am sure that the necessity to keep the operation of the Act and, in the present context, the operation of this Order, under close review, is appreciated by all concerned.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, may I ask one further question relating to interpretation which has caused a certain amount of doubt in the industry? Paragraph 2(b)(i) of the Schedule relating to agreements to which the Order does not apply, says:
"…neither that information nor information based thereon is to be furnished directly or indirectly by that person to any party to the agreement except—
(1) information which does not relate to any party other than the party to whom it is furnished;"
The interpretation of this has given a certain amount of trouble to the industry. I wonder whether the noble Lord could make it clear.
LORD DELACOURT-SMITH: My Lords, I will do my best to assist the noble Lord. Perhaps I can do so by indicating the general purpose of paragraph 2(b) of the Schedule. The prime purpose of this is to allow trade associations to carry on their representational functions, as I am sure the noble Lord will accept. It allows them to collect information from their members, to process it and to make representations of it to Government Departments and other public authorities. There may be a variety of reasons why a particular trade association wants to do this. Obviously, there must be some safeguard to prevent an association, collecting information nominally for some public purpose but, in reality, for circulation of price information among their members.
The exclusion as drafted is designed to prevent a trade association circulating information about particular firms' prices and, as a further safeguard, prevents any information collected for submission to a public authority being circulated unless a Government Department have asked in writing for the information to be provided to it. In a bona fide application I do not anticipate that there should be any difficulty about the Government Department formally indicating that it requires information

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essential to consideration of the application. To come more specifically to the noble Lord's exact point, the intention there is to examine computer accounting systems. Firms send their accounts and the computer bills the customers, informing the firms of the total. The intention here is to ensure that the position is adequately safeguarded. I trust that that explanation will satisfy the noble Lord.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE BILL [H.L.]
5.30 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The LORD STRANG in the Chair.]
Clauses 1 to 3 agreed to.
Clause 4 [Extension of power to dispense with holding of assizes]:
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS moved Amendment No. 1:
Page 4, line 44, at end insert—
(" ( ) for enabling assizes to be held specially at any place for the transaction of such class of business as may be specified;").
The noble Viscount said: It was the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, who raised this point on Second Reading. To be perfectly candid, such is the state of legislation about what are the powers of the court that I have not been able to discover whether or not there is already a power to do what my Amendment proposes. The noble and learned Lord suggested that if assizes are withdrawn from some of the towns, under the provisions in the clause as drafted, there might be occasions when it would still be convenient, because a large number of witnesses would have to come from that locality, or for some other reason, to try a case at one of the towns from which the normal assize had been withdrawn. As
870
I understand it, the Beeching Commission had much the same point of view in mind, and the last thing the Commission wished to have was inflexibility.
Although it may well be that an Order in Council is a clumsy method of achieving this aim. it would seem to me sensible to have a provision whereby occasionally cases could be tried at such towns. It may be that an Order in Council would be a clumsy method, because there would not be time to get such an Order passed after the news had come to the notice of the Lord Chancellor that a case of this sort was pending at, say, Builth Wells, or where-ever it might be. I feel sure that the subject is worthy of further consideration, and I have put down this Amendment to suggest that if there is not a power we should have one; and, if there is already power, to ask the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, what it is. I beg to move.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I would agree that provision ought to be made for an exceptional case where it might be more convenient to take the court to a location where there were a large number of witnesses than not, though I think that if the Beeching proposals are to be implemented and to succeed, it would have to be a very rare case. In fact, the Amendment is unnecessary. To explain why it is unnecessary is a little involved, because there are rather complicated provisions.
Section 70(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 provides that:
"His Majesty may, by commission of assize or any other commission, either general or special, assign to such judges of the High Court or other persons as are named therein, the duty of trying and determining within any place or district specially fitted for that purpose by the commission any causes or matters, or any questions or issues of fact or of law or partly of fact and partly of law in any cause or matter, depending in the High Court, or the exercise of any civil or criminal jurisdiction capable of being exercised by the High Court, and any commission so granted by His Majesty shall have effect as if enacted in this Act."
The power conferred by the above subsection to issue special commissions has rarely been used, and it has only proved necessary to issue about three or four special commissions of assize during the past twenty years or so. The power under

871
Section 70(1) is used in the case of divorce to appoint Special Commissioners to assist the High Court Judges. For this purpose two continuous commissions have been issued one covering London and the other the rest of England and Wales.
The Order in Council referred to in Clause 4 of the Bill is the Assizes Order which is issued from time to time under Section 72 of the Act of 1925. Section 72(1)(b) provides:
"For the appointment of the place or places at which assizes are to be held on any circuit and for directing that assizes or any special commissions shall be held at more than one place in the same county on the same circuit…"
For this purpose "assizes" has the meaning given by Section 13(5) of the Interpretation Act 1889 which provides that:
"The expression 'assizes', as respects England [and] Wales,… shall mean the courts of assize usually held in every year, and shall include the sessions of the Central Criminal Court, but shall not include any court of assize held by virtue of any special commission."
The effect of the above statutory provisions, therefore, is that the Assizes Order issued under Section 72 of the Act of 1925 deals only with the courts of assize usually held in every year and does not touch the power conferred by Section 70(1) to issue special commissions. The noble Viscount may be assured that there is no intention of removing the existing power of issuing special commissions so that a court can sit to hear an occasional case wherever this may be needed. Paragraph 278 of the Royal Commission's Report makes it clear, however, that any visits to special places must be kept to the absolute minimum to avoid disrupting business in the busier centres. Therefore while I fully accept the object which the noble Viscount had in putting down the Amendment, it is in fact unnecessary to make any change in the law for that purpose.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: I am very much obliged to the noble and learned Lord. It may perhaps be a matter on which I can be forgiven for not having discovered the full details myself. I am sure that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, will be equally glad to know that this is something that can be done under
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the existing powers of the law; and one must leave it to the noble and learned Lord—after he has had the consultations with the local authorities that he has promised and withdrawn some of the assizes from towns where they now sit—to see whether he can devise machinery; because I think this will be necessary to try to discover whether there are such cases in those towns or counties in question.
When an assize is going round to each county, as is now the case, it is improbable that a special commission will be needed, because the judge will go there at least twice a year. But if he is not to go at all, I think some means will be required whereby the news can come through that a case is pending involving, for example, calling all the oldest inhabitants of a village as witnesses. It might be difficult to transport them, and they might be unwilling to be transported further away than their own county town. I am sure that the noble and learned Lord will think about the point and devise some method to meet it. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
LORD MORRIS OF BORTH-Y-GEST: May I thank the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor for his explanation which, if I may say so, fully meets the point which I raised.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 4 agreed to.
Clauses 5 and 6 agreed to.
Clause 7 (Courts with power to attach earnings):
5.38 p.m.
LORD DONALDSON OF KINGS-BRIDGE LORD DONALDSON OF KINGS-BRIDGE moved Amendment No. 2:
Page 7, line 18, at end insert—
( ) Within a reasonable time after the passage of this Bill, the Lord Chancellor shall by statutory instrument, which shall be subject to affirmative resolution by both Houses of Parliament—

(a) restrict the power of enforcing judgment debts, in whatever court they arise, to the county court of the locality in which the debtor resides or carries on business

(b) establish within each county court an office, to be called the Enforcement Office, which shall have control of all the Court's enforcement duties and duties in relation to administration orders, and in particular,

873
when an application for enforcement is made, shall—

(i) investigate the debtor's resources and needs

(ii) Consolidate the debtor's judgment debts for the purpose of making any order for attachment of earnings

(iii) apportion among judgment creditors the proceeds of any such orders in accordance with such rules as the Lord Chancellor may lay down.")

The noble Lord said: The object of this Amendment is fairly clear. I want to bring into the Bill some indication of the Government's intention to carry out the major and, in my opinion, the most important part of the Payne Report. In introducing the Bill, my noble and learned friend said that it would plainly be impracticable to give effect to all four of the Payne Committee's recommendations straight away. The Payne Report advocated that the recommendations should be carried out by stages, which is exactly what the Government are proposing to do. I want to make sure of this. I noticed that in his reply to the Second Reading debate my noble and learned friend spoke on the question of the enforcement offices, which is the major point I wish to speak about, and said:
"I should very much like to have enforcement offices, but one has to be practical."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4/12/69, col. 256.]
Speaking again about the necessity for welfare officers, he said:
"It would be nice to have a welfare officer in every court."
That is rather faint praise.
I think it is important to pin this Government and any future Government down to the vital need to start the enforcement offices at an agreed time. My noble and learned friend quoted the Minority Report of two members of the Payne Committee saying that enforcement offices could not be started immediately but he ignored the recommendation in the main body of the Report, where the recommendation is quite clear. Paragraph 35(1) says:
"The enforcement offices could be established in the sense that the enforcement officer could be appointed and he could delegate from the present staff certain officers to carry out enforcement duties."
There are other indications in the paragraph which suggest that the Committee as a whole expected to see something done more immediately. I gave my
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reasons for this in some detail on Second Reading and I do not propose to go through them again. I believe that my noble and learned friend and his colleagues are just as keen as I am to see these enforcement offices set up and to see this Bill transformed from what it is now, simply a change in method of protecting creditors, without any special attention to the social consequences, into a social measure of real importance of which a Labour Government can be proud.
The Amendment itself simply sets out what the Payne Committee thought that the enforcement offices ought to do. I do not propose to go through them, beyond saying that the power of enforcing judgment debts should be restricted to the court where the debtor goes, and the office should not have power to investigate, consolidate and apportion among judgment creditors. The importance of all these things was fully discussed on Second Reading. These are my reasons for wishing to see that the Government's intention to carry out the Payne Report as a whole instead of piecemeal is enshrined in the Bill. I beg to move.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: I should like to support my noble friend's Amendment. It seems to me that the two halves of the Payne Committee's Report are undoubtedly connected. If it is proposed to abolish imprisonment for debt, with only a number of specialised exceptions, it is essential that some improved method of enforcement should be added, otherwise we are going to have the position in which there is really no sanction for non-payment of civil debts. I think we are all of one mind. We want to abolish the sanction of imprisonment. But we shall be leaving a dangerous vacuum unless something on the lines of my noble friend's Amendment is added to the Bill.
LORD LLOYD OF HAMPSTEAD: On the debate on Second Reading, I ventured strongly to urge the Government not to disregard the central and basic recommendation of the Payne Committee—which is the new system of enforcement offices. Therefore I naturally have considerable sympathy for the object of the present Amendment. The scheme of giving merely general statutory powers and leaving the details to be worked out by a rule-making authority

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is familiar enough in many spheres, but I regard it as probably not viable in the present instance. It would give rise to immense difficulties—for instance, in our consideration of the substantive rights involved, such as the right of the individual creditor at the present moment to obtain payment of his debt. With all deference to my noble friend, this is a matter which would require specific statutory provision. However, like my noble friend, I venture to urge the Government to recognise that there is a strong feeling among those closely connected with these problems that the main recommendation of the Payne Report is both sound and viable.
It may well be that the Government do not feel that they have had time enough to work out all the details, but I could have hoped that they would grasp this occasion to give rather more urgent priority than they have so far apparently done to this whole question. I hope that the Government will indicate their intentions more specifically, and, in particular, indicate that they are ready to accept the main recommendations and to give urgent priority to setting up machinery for implementing these proposals as soon as practicable. I should like to see a time scale for this purpose. This is not a controversial or Party matter in any way and therefore could not be affected by any calculation as to an approaching General Election. I think that my noble friend would be willing and, I should say, would be well advised, to withdraw his Amendment, if some assurance of that kind were given.
Lastly, I would emphasise that though the origin of this proposal is an elaborate and highly technical Report, this is not just a lawyers' area of reform; it involves a big social problem, which affects a vast number of people. There is incalculable social benefit in introducing a new enforcement system which will bring relief to the lives of a great many families whose problems at the moment are merely aggravated under the existing procedure, without any real hope of remedy. That is why I express great sympathy for my noble friend's proposed Amendment and my hope, which I have repeated several times, that the Government will give a more specific indication of their intention on this important matter.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: I do not suppose that the noble Lord, Lord Donaldson of Kingsbridge, seriously means that a matter of this complexity should be dealt with by Statutory Instrument. Nevertheless, it is an extremely good way of getting the matter before the Committee, and I am glad that he has done so. If I do not go into the details at great length, it is for two reasons: first, I want to hear what the noble and learned Lord has to say about it, and, secondly, it seemed to me, from reading the Second Reading speeches, that the Government have made a policy decision that at the moment they are not going to have enforcement offices because they cannot staff them and cannot find the money. If that is so, I hope that the situation will change very soon and that we shall be able to have the enforcement offices, which, I agree with other noble Lords, are an integral and fundamental part of everything that Payne recommends. But if we cannot have them in this Bill, then I believe there are a number of things which Payne recommended we should do but for which this Bill provides no machinery at all.
Therefore my approach is rather, not to seek to force the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor to set up the full panel of enforcement offices, but to get a full consideration of the practicalities—about the amendments which Payne recommended on administration orders, about the whole question of priorities, about how we are to deal with multiple debtors when they come in front of different courts and there are different assessment of earnings, and things of that nature; and, above all, to probe at some length as to how the registrars, county courts and magistrates are going to have time to go properly into the details of all the things that are required for the social justice side of this Bill. I do not for the life of me see how they are going to achieve it.
This is in no way meant to be a disparagement of the noble and learned Lord's Amendment, because I should have very much have liked to see that, too. He, and other noble Lords on that side of the House, will seek also to improve the Bill and try to put in it much more of the details and machinery that we should like to see. I know that the noble and learned Lord is as anxious

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to help as anybody to get into the Bill more nuts and bolts which can be screwed up and made into operating machinery within the county court and magistrates' courts system—and, indeed, the High Court system, so far as it comes into it. It is for that reason that I do not enter into this debate in order to press this Amendment, although I shall be very interested indeed in any indications of the timetable that the noble and learned Lord may be able to give and any other assurances that he can give as well.
5.52 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: May I say, first of all, that I welcome any amount of discussion of this Bill. I entirely agree that there is nothing Party political about it in any way. Therefore the more we all put our heads together the better. Nothing is clearer than the fact that there would, as one of the members of the Committee put it, be administrative chaos if we tried to carry out all of these recommendations (I think there are 300 of them altogether) at once.
That is well illustrated by Lord Donaldson's Amendment, because he wants me to provide at once that all debt collecting should go to the county court. I quite agree that that is one of the main objects; but look what would happen if we tried to do this at once. In last year's Bill, it may be remembered, there was a provision channelling many of the small High Court debt cases into the county court. I think that when the Bill reached the other place I had to increase the bottom limit in question.
The reason I had to do that was because if I had taken any more cases from the High Court into the county court all the under-sheriffs would have gone out of business. They must have a certain level of work to be able to carry out the rest. If they had gone out of business there would have been no way of enforcing judgments for possession of land in the High Court, or judgments for possession of goods in the High Court, nor would any juries have been empanelled on assizes—because the under-sheriffs do all that work. Those tasks will have to remain under the under-sheriffs until Beeching gets under way, when other arrangements will be made,
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presumably, for the circuit administrators to see to the calling of the juries. We cannot, I am afraid, afford to dispense with the sheriffs at this point. That only shows how one has to go forward by steps.
The Committee said that there were two things which were urgent and should be given priority. One was the abolition of imprisonment for debt, and the other was the attachment of earnings orders. That is why they have been given precedence. They said certain other things could be done at the same time, but they did not say that they should be done at the same time. One of the things one has to consider is the form which an enforcement office should take.
The Committee say in paragraph 356:
"The first consideration is whether the establishment of a new Enforcement Office will require the creation of a new organisation with new personnel and new accommodation. We do not think this will he necessary or desirable. The functions which the Enforcement Office will be called upon to discharge are to some extent already being performed under existing court machinery so that it will be necessary only to transfer powers and staff to the Enforcement Office. Throughout the country there exist county court offices, many of which arc also district registries of the high court, with staff familiar with the enforcement procedures of both courts.
"In these circumstances we think that the new Enforcement Office should be built on the foundation of the present county court system. The Enforcement Office should make full use of the existing staff and accommodation of the existing county court offices so far as may be necessary for the enforcement of judgment debts. In this way the Enforcement Office will utilise the skills of the existing staff; in particular, the local knowledge and experience of county court bailiffs will be employed."
Then it says that the Enforcement Office in each district office should be presided over by the enforcement officer, and this should be filled by the registrar of the county court. It says:
"It would be undesirable and impracticable to introduce a new officer of equal rank with the county court registrar and fulfilling functions which would run parallel with his. Moreover, difficulties over the control and supervision of the staff, which in many offices would be common to both, would be inescapable."
Then they say that it should not add materially to the work now performed by county court registrars,
"… bearing in mind particularly that they are already in charge of the enforcement processes passing through their registries."

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They say that the staff should be drawn from the staff of the county court in the district:
"Indeed we think that it will be unnecessary to draw any hard and fast line between the duties performed by the staff for the purposes of the high court or county court machinery and the Enforcement Office machinery, and that the same staff could be employed for both."
The Report then says:
The Enforcement Office should be open on the same date and during the same hours as the county court offices …"
If the registrar is in effect the enforcement office, and it is going to be his staff at the same premises, what do you gain by calling all this an enforcement office? If the same staff are to deal with debtors under the same registrar as now, whether you write over them in a particular part of the office, "Enforcement Office" is not very clear. We have gone into this and we calculate so far that we can do this work with the existing staff. They are going to be relieved of nearly 1½ million, or whatever the number is, of judgment summonses, their preparation and everything else. We believe we can do this work now with an additional 10 registrars and 100 staff. That is what we propose to do.
They will have the power of making administration orders, doing the sort of thing that the Committee recommended. The object which my noble friend wishes to achieve by the establishment of enforcement offices will, so far as I can see, be achieved. There is no actual magic in calling them enforcement offices. Every administration order will be under the conduct of an officer of the court. The court will have power, on an application for an attachment of earnings order, to call for a statement by the debtor of his resources and needs, and, if necessary, to order him to attend for them to be investigated. It will be possible to consolidate the debtor's judgment debts, as well as his other liabilities, by making an administration order coupled with an attachment of earnings order; and where an administration order is made payments under it will be apportioned among the creditors pro rata.
That is how I see the system working. The phrase "enforcement office" could cover a number of things. There are a number of dissenting reports or reservations
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which envisage something rather different. So far as the office envisaged by the main body of the Report is concerned, the work could be done by the existing staff, and it would appear to me that whether you call a registrar a registrar or an enforcement officer does not really achieve any useful result. I hope, therefore, with that in mind—particularly in view of the impossibility of doing these matters by a Statutory Instrument—my noble friend will be satisfied and withdraw his Amendment.
LORD DONALDSON OF KINGS-BRIDGE: My noble and learned friend has done scant justice to the intentions of this Amendment, and to the various noble Lords who have supported it. I must say that his reply has been a considerable disappointment to me. In the first place, he spoke as though this Amendment demanded action at once. It states quite clearly "within a reasonable time". It seems to me that within a reasonable time a number of things have to be done if we are not going to be very unhappy about the arrangement. I do not know quite what more I can say. I do not really think the Amendment is viable as it stands, but the arguments that I detected in my noble and learned friend's speech is that the whole thing is perfectly all right as it is and that the enforcement officers and the registrars are the same thing with a different name. Nobody is being asked to do anything about it, and so nothing will be done; and that is exactly what I am afraid of.
I hope that at some stage we can be given some indication that the Government do not regard the change of name of registrar as implying fulfilment of the Payne Report's recommendations. That is not what the Payne Report says at all. The Payne Report says something much more elaborate; it suggests that there will be additional staff, social workers and all sorts of things. It seems to me that we cannot feel very happy if we are not to be given any indication that the Government even agree with this point of view and think it will eventually be done. However, in view of the fact that we have had a discussion—and that is as far as I can go—I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
On Question, Whether Clause 7 shall stand part of the Bill?
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: There is a point that I should like to raise on Clause 7. It is one that I mentioned in my speech on the Second Reading. This Bill, under Clauses 5 and 6, restricts the power to commit debtors to prison, and the whole scheme of course is to replace such committals by attachment of earnings orders, keeping the imprisonment sanction for certain limited categories where the Government feel it necessary. But if one withdraws the sanction of imprisonment for civil debt of the ordinary sort, and replaces it in this way, there is one class of person who will no longer be subject to any sanction; that is, the self-employed. The self-employed, I think I am right in saying, has no earnings as defined in Clause 19(1)(a) and (b). Therefore there are no earnings to which an attachment order can be made. The provisions of Clauses 5 and 6 apply as much to him as to everybody else, but at the moment we are left with no sanctions.
It will no doubt be replied that there are still other methods, such as garnishment; and that there is always the law of distress, to which one can go back, and execution on people's goods. But I believe it is often found, when the bailiffs going to execute judgment on people's goods get inside the house, that all the goods belong to the man's wife, or to his son or daughter, or to some other member of the family. The man has literally only the clothes he stands up in, or the tools of his trade, or whatever it is that the bailiffs are not allowed to execute judgment upon. Therefore the effect of this part of the Bill is to remove all effective sanction on these people. Garnishment proceedings are neither very common nor very useful, because they are very complicated, particularly if they involve bank accounts. This is not a field with which I am very familiar, but their use, I think, when a comparatively small debt is involved, is like taking a sledgehammer to crack a nut.
Nor, of course, are self-employed people all that uncommon. There are the professional classes, who one would hope would not usually run into debt or get into this sort of difficulty; but there is always the one who may. There are all the people who are now self-employed so that their employers do not have to pay S.E.T.—and these are a growing class, not entirely confined to
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the area which I had hitherto understood to be the case. There are also many other people who perhaps come into this category and whom one would not think of straightaway as being professionals—for instance, people who rua one-man businesses or have shops; people who are small traders running the business themselves, as opposed to being the director of a limited company.
What is the Government's answer to this problem? I cannot believe that we should be left without any sanction at all, or only the sanctions which suffer from these disabilities, particularly the one about execution. No word has been said about this aspect. I asked the noble and learned Lord in my Second Reading speech about this, but I fully appreciate that he had a lot to answer and this was not one of the questions to which he replied. I believe that, before we even start to try drafting Amendments to this Bill, the noble and learned Lord ought to tell us what is the attitude of the Government in this particular respect so that we can consider it.
If the explanation is satisfactory, the matter can be left, but if there are improvements which can be relatively easily inserted in the Bill—perhaps improvements suggested by the Payne Committee in some of these regards—then let us have them, because the last thing we want is that this Bill should be incomplete and should leave large holes. We cannot do everything the Payne Committee recommends, but we must tackle the problem overall, at any rate as a starter. This Bill deals with the preliminary and urgent matters, but I am very concerned that there should not be too many gaps round the edge of the net which will allow people to escape. I should like to return to this point at another stage, after I have heard what the noble and learned Lord has to say upon it.
LORD ROYLE: My Lords, I should like to say just a word or two in support of what the noble Viscount has said. This is a matter which causes deep anxiety and, whilst I am one of those people who believe that in no circumstances should people be imprisoned for debt, any of us who has had experience in magistrates' courts of dealing with separation orders knows that although attachment has worked quite well with regard

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to the wage-earner, the problem has always arisen with regard to the professional classes and the self-employed. It has been a tremendous headache for justices ever since maintenance orders in separation proceedings could be attached to wages, and there does not seem to be a solution. I admit at once, having given a great deal of thought to that over very many years, that I have not found the answer. I support the noble Viscount in asking the Government to search for an answer, though I feel, in view of the fact that we are, in effect, abolishing imprisonment for debt, that we should have to search very hard and very long to find an alternative. I frankly admit that I do not know what it is, but I share the noble Viscount's worries about it.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: There is not any answer to this problem. It will be very difficult to deal with the self-employed. The Payne Committee recognised this, and said so. They did not suggest any answer. It will in fact be limited to other forms of execution against goods, and so forth. But, of course, the same difficulty arises now over imprisonment for debt. I know that it is very unusual for a committal order to be made against someone who is self-employed, because one cannot get a committal order unless one can prove what means he has. And that is the difficulty. So perhaps such a person will not be so much better off than he is at present. But otherwise, in the case of a self-employed man, if one cannot attach his earnings because he has not got any earnings (though the definition of "earnings" is fairly wide) there can be only execution against any goods he has or against any source of income which can be attached. If the noble Viscount can think of any way in which we can improve that position I shall be happy to hear it.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, I see no reason at the moment why I should be able to do better than the noble Lord, with his experience in the magistrates' court, or the Payne Committee, or the noble and learned Lord, with his Department to assist him in the research. But this is something which might be further considered—not at this
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stage, plainly; but we have the Christmas Recess ahead and there will be time for a little thought on these subjects, though they may not be the most cheerful and jovial Christmas fare that one can have. One thought that occurs to me is that there are, perhaps, simplified methods of dealing with attachments of bank accounts. It may be that it ought to be considered whether one can go behind a claim that all the goods in the house belong to the wife, or to another member of the family, if the claim is plainly made in bad faith.
I simply throw out those two ideas as being obvious methods whereby the matter could be dealt with rather more simply. In the latter case, often it is obviously a subterfuge to prevent the creditor from getting his money, and subterfuges are not usually looked very kindly upon by the law. It may be that one ought to attack the problem at that end and see whether an Amendment can be devised which would require the man to prove that he had not had possesion of, or had not owned, these goods for some time. It might be possible to do something of the nature of the provision in, for example, the Bill we were just looking at, whereby if a man, in order to avoid a maintenance payment order, gave away all his property within a certain period beforehand, the court could undo what he had done. It seems to me that that is the kind of line that might be pursued. Certainly I take the view that, even if the self-employed and professional people do not go to prison, we ought not to leave this Bill without any sanction against them. I will certainly do my homework on this, if the noble and learned Lord would do a little of his.
Clause 7 agreed to.
Clause 8 [Application for order and conditions of court's power to make it]:
6.12 p.m.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS moved Amendment No. 3:
Page 7, line 46, leave out paragraphs (a) and (b) and insert ("it must appear to the court that the debtor has failed to make one or more payments under an order to secure maintenance payments or, as the case may be, required by the relevant adjudication and that the failure is due to his wilful refusal or culpable neglect.")
The noble Viscount said: This is only a probing Amendment and its purpose is to discover what is the reason for the distinction between subsections 3(a) and 3(b) of Clause 8. In the case of securing maintenance payments, as has always been the case under the 1958 Act, an attachment of earnings order under this Bill can be made only if the debtor has failed to pay one or more of the instalments and the failure is due
"to his wilful refusal or culpable neglect".
That is singled out as being the one occasion when an attachment of earnings order cannot be made straight away under the Bill. It cannot be done when the magistrates or the county court or the High Court first make an Order for maintenance; one cannot, even at the payer's request. on that occasion get the matter dealt with by an attachment of earnings order. It can be done only if he has wilfully refused or culpably nelected to make these payments. That is simply a matter of old law.
The Bill then goes on to say that all the other types of debt which are under the Bill covered by an attachment of earnings order can be dealt with; an order can be made by the court without any such wilful refusal or culpable neglect. I do not understand the principle that underlies this distinction. It may well be that the second answer is right. Payne, I think, suggested that there should be no such criterion and that one should be able to make an attachment of earnings order the moment the debt is proved or the moment it is shown that the man has not paid his taxes, or whatever the circumstances may be. He may not pay his legal aid. All those things are really anti-social. Not paying your taxes may be very pleasant but it is anti-social. Not making payments under your legal aid contribution is very anti-social indeed. Those people will be attached at once, but with maintenance one has to come back again and have further proceedings, and probably very disagreeable proceedings, before it can be done.
The Amendment I have put down is the simple adoption of the 1958 Act criterion for everything. It would, incidentally, have this result. There would probably be fewer attachment of earnings orders; and it might well be that it is not a bad thing. It might be
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that we ought to try this out under wording such as I have suggested, with power, as is often the case, to drop that criterion if it appears to be working well—again, this is just a suggestion—and allow it to be done not only for all the new types of debt that can be dealt with by attachment of earnings orders, but for maintenance as well, to be done in the first place as is now provided under Clause 8(3)(b). I do not know, but I should very much like the noble and learned Lord to justify this curious distinction. I understand its history, but its logic I am not so sure about. I beg to move.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: There has always been a difference between maintenance and affiliation cases and business and other debts; and, as I have always understood it, the reason is that a maintenance order is much more serious because this is an indefinite order which is going on and on. These other debts, after all, are finite debts and usually very much smaller in proportion. It has always been the case, therefore, in maintenance cases, that one has to satisfy a court that it is a case of wilful refusal or culpable neglect. It would not be reasonable that a man's earnings should be attached for an indefinite time to secure maintenance payments where he has fallen into arrear through no fault of his own but through illness or other misfortune. This has never applied to ordinary debts. Even a committal order sending a man to prison can be made if it can be shown that he has had the money to pay and has not paid. There has never been any requirement on the creditor to prove that anything was culpable or wilful.
It would be difficult for an ordinary civil creditor to be able to establish that failure to pay is due to wilful refusal or culpable neglect, and it would be unreasonable to place this burden on him for the extraneous purpose of limiting the number of attachment orders so as to give employers less trouble. There is a clear distinction—there always has been—and it is logical and right; and it is right to follow it now, because if when there was imprisonment for debt one could be sent to prison on mere evidence that one had had the means to pay and not paid, it is difficult to see why the creditor's difficulties should be made greater when it

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comes to an attachment order. I hope, therefore, that when the noble Viscount has had an opportunity of considering that, he will not press the point.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord. To be perfectly honest, I was not as worried about the limitation of the numbers of orders for the benefit of employers as about the underlying philosophy of this matter. I suppose it is right that it is inherent in the first words of Clause 8(3) that the person against whom the maintenance order is made can himself apply to have that order attached to his wages straight away if he wants to; because the wording is that it cannot be made
"on the application of any person other than the debtor"
unless there is wilful neglect. So he can, if he wishes, ask the court to do it straight away. Therefore, we have a certain amount of distinction here, I entirely appreciate. I should like to think about what the noble and learned Lord has said in answer to this Amendment and decide whether or not I want to come back to it. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved Amendments Nos. 4 and 5:
Page 8, line 12, leave out from ("section") to end of line 13 and insert ("64 of the Act of 1952 (distress or committal)");
Page 8, line 19, leave out ("74") and insert ("64").
The noble and learned Lord said: With the leave of the Committee, I beg to move Amendments Nos. 4 and 5 together. These Amendments are linked and drafting Amendments. The words in lines 11 to 13
"for the enforcement of a maintenance order under section 74 of the Act of 1952"
are strictly speaking not accurate. Sums ordered to be paid by a magistrates' court (which include maintenance payments) are enforced under Section 64 of the 1952 Act. Section 74 only modifies the operation of that section in relation to maintenance orders. The correct reference therefore should be to Section 64. The corresponding provision in the 1958 Act (Section 7(b)), which is being repealed, does not refer to a particular section of
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the 1952 Act. It is thought that such a reference is desirable here, in view of the way in which the latter part of this subsection is framed. I beg to move.
On Question, Amendments agreed to.
6.19 p.m.
LORD DONALDSON OF KINGS-BRIDGE LORD DONALDSON OF KINGS-BRIDGE moved Amendment No. 6:
Page 9, line 6, at end insert—
(" ( ) The court shall not make an attachment of earnings order where—

(a) the judgment debt is owed under a contract for the supply or hire of goods or services in the course of business, or under a contract ancillary thereto, and

(b) the debtor at the time the contract was entered into had a judgment debt entered against him on the Register of Judgments kept in the Lord Chancellor's Department, and

(c) the court considers that, taking into account all the circumstances of the debt, including the nature of the goods or services, a prudent and fair-minded person would not have entered into the said contract with the debtor.")

The noble Lord said: Again, this Amendment is obvious in its intention. It is trying to do something which I think everybody agrees is very difficult, and I shall not be surprised if my noble and learned friend says that it will not do. But it is very important in legislation of this kind to look at the matter as a whole. I have not spoken to a single social worker (and I move among them a good deal), who is the person who looks after families who in the end are going to have this sanction applied to them, who has not said, "Well, the first thing to do is to put some onus on the lender". I am not going to stress this point. I expatiated on it at the Second Reading and I think your Lordships can all see what I am trying to do. It is worth noting that this attachment of earnings will bite much more widely than prison ever has done, so it is particularly important that the weak and feckless should be given all the protection the law can give them in order to protect them against borrowing things which they ought never to borrow.
The Amendment is in a mild enough form. It does not attempt to render the debts unenforceable, only to deprive the creditor of the sanction of attachment. My noble and learned friend may well object that the Payne Committee, among other people, thought that this was not possible. I think they said something to

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that effect at paragraph 853. But as the Government have already rejected—or at least omitted—the most vital parts of the Payne Committee's recommendations I do not think they can logically quote the Committee against me in this particular case, which is the only point on which I diverge from them.
The Amendment demands that three conditions be fulfilled before it comes into operation: first, that the judgment debt shall be of the right kind, namely, concerned with contracts for goods or services; secondly, that there shall be already entered against the debtor a judgment debt in the Lord Chancellor's Register of Judgments; and, thirdly, that the count shall take the view that the credit ought never to have been issued. At present, the Register of Judgment Debts includes only county court judgments of £10 or over. The Payne Committee recommend that High Court and magistrates' courts judgments should be added, and my noble and learned friend has already said how difficult that would be. I dare say that it could not be done at once, but probably we should all agree that it is desirable in the end. Payne also recommended that the lower limit should be reduced to £5. Since 25 per cent. of all county court judgment debts are for sums of between £5 and £10 this seems to 132 a very important provision, though one which, like everything else in this whole legislation, will, if properly done, create a lot more work.
On the Second Reading I went into some detail on this point, but really all this Amendment is doing is to strengthen the hand of the judge. Already judgment is often given in derisory terms—perhaps a shilling a month for twenty years, or something of that sort—and I think this Bill should specifically recognise that there is an onus on the creditor, in his desire for business, to behave within certain limits. I do not put this Amendment forward necessarily as being a complete answer, but I feel that this Bill should make some effort to deal with this difficult part of the case as a whole. I beg to move.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: I should like to make a constructive suggestion about this, and I think it is one that may not be altogether outside the bounds of possibility. I do not know about the point raised by the
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noble Lord, Lord Donaldson of Kings-bridge, but so far as I understand the subject of administration orders (which is, I confess, very little) I see in the existing law an opportunity of doing something along the lines requested by the noble Lord.
On pages 206 and 207 of the Report of the Payne Committee, the present law, about the deferment of subsequent creditors when an administration order applies to a debtor, is set out, and it makes it clear that the subsequent creditor who involves the debtor in a debt after the date of the administration order is deferred. Under the administration order, all those people who have already incurred credits with the debtor get their money first, and the subsequent man does not. At paragraph 795, the Payne Committee goes on to consider the question of whether the subsequent creditor who could not possibly have known about the administration order should have a few days' latitude to satisfy the court that he gave credit to the debtor without knowing about it. It says plainly that the latitude allowed should only be for a few days because the order, when made, will be registered in the central register, about which the noble Lord, Lord Donaldson, has spoken.
It seems to me that there are two things involved here. One is involved with people. Some are creditors who induce people to get far more indebted than would be wise. That is a class of creditor who, presumably, if he has made a valid contract in accordance with the hire purchase laws, has to be allowed to have his money at some time, so long as nothing has happened and the matter has never come before the courts, or the debtor has not got himself subject to attachment orders or administration orders, or anything of that type. It is too bad if he goes in for these extravagances which he cannot afford. But once the matter comes to the attention of the court by an application from somebody for an attachment order, or by an application from somebody for an administration order, it seems to me to be right that after that people should be at risk if they give further credit.
As I understand it, the difficulty about administration orders—which would have this effect, if I understand the position—is set out in paragraph 782: that is, that

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the court itself cannot make an administration order of its own motion. I think the creditor can apply for one and the debtor can apply on one, but the court cannot. As I understand what is going to happen, it is this. The vast majority of judgment summonses and the attachment procedures will be dealt with by the local county court. I think the court are to get copies of all the other attachment orders which are made, anyway—and if they are not, I have an Amendment which makes sure that they will—and the registrar of the county court will then know in relation to the debtor what is the state of play.
I would suggest to the Committee that the moment may well come when the registrar will say to the county court judge (or perhaps he can do it himself): "The moment has arrived when we make an administration order against this person"—or in favour of this person, because often it is in the debtor's favour to have one of these orders. The registrar will then say, "As a result we shall be able to administer his property and deal with the creditors in the order of priority, and bring all those who have already involved themselves with this man into the administration order so that they may have their share pari passu. We shall give the rates and taxes to the responsible authorities first, and then deal with all the other orders". Moreover, the noble Lord's point will then be met. Once that order has been made, subsequent creditors will have to be deferred, because that is already law.
I think there is only one Amendment we need, and that is to give the court power, after giving due notice to the creditors and the debtor, to make an administration order of its own motion. If we did that, it would be a comparatively small Amendment, although I think there are other Amendments in regard to administration orders which the Payne Committee suggests and which perhaps could be incorporated in a new clause on this subject. At any rate, we should have gone some way towards meeting the noble Lord's point. That, I think, is at any rate a constructive suggestion, and it is one that I put forward for the consideration of the Committee.
LORD DONALDSON OF KINGS-BRIDGE: Before the noble Viscount
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sits down, I should like to ask whether I misread Clause 8(8). Does this not already give the power to do exactly what the noble Lord has suggested?
VISCOUNT COLVILLE or CULROSS: If it does, that is all the better.
6.30 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I think we are all sympathetic to the objects which my noble friend Lord Donaldson wants to achieve. But I am afraid that there are a number of difficulties. The Payne Committee considered this point, and in paragraph 851 of their Report they said:
"If one starts upon the task of drafting provisions to cover the diverse circumstances in which the deferment of future creditors might be justified one finds two things: (i) that it is extremely difficult to specify the conditions in which it would be proper to impose a deferment, and that the result would in all probability lead to a flood of litigation, and (ii) that in so far as one can isolate a set of circumstances in which the deferment would be justifiable and practicable, one has reached a picture in which an administration order would be the obvious solution and the deferment is then adequately covered by Section 149"—
that is, of the County Courts Act 1959.
The Amendment would prohibit the making of an attachment of earnings order in the circumstances specified. But I should have thought that if it is socially undesirable that a debt contracted in such circumstances should be enforced by the attachment of earnings, it is difficult to see why such a debt should be enforced at all. There seems no good reason for distinguishing between attachment of earnings and other forms of execution when the alleged vice of the transaction lies in the circumstances in which the debt was incurred.
In paragraph (a) of the Amendment reference is made to the judgment debt being "owed under a contract", but technically a judgment debt would be due by reason of the order of the court and not under a contract. The same paragraph refers to "a contract for the supply or hire of goods or services in the course of business." I am not quite clear about the phrase "in the course of business". Paragraph (b) mentions the "Register of Judgments kept in the Lord Chancellor's Department", and this is presumably a reference to the register kept under Section 101 of the County

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Courts Act 1959 in respect of every judgment (other than a judgment in Admiralty proceedings) entered in a county court for £10 and upwards.
The principal difficulty—certainly one of the difficulties—arises over the interpretation and application of paragraph (c), which illustrates the difficulties which the Payne Committee anticipated. To limit the enforcement of contracts by reference to what a prudent and fair-minded person might do would place a very difficult burden on the courts and make it almost impossible for anyone to tell in advance what obligations would be enforced and what would be regarded as unenforceable by attachment of earnings. In a society where trade depends so greatly on the grant of credit this involves a very far-reaching change in the legal approach to contracts. But I think we might all consider this point further. I see very great difficulties in having large numbers of cases in which whether an attachment order can be made or not depends on what a prudent and fair-minded person might have done, and I am afraid that one would probably get very different decisions from different registrars in different courts.
So far as the £5 and £10 is concerned I am afraid that I cannot do now what is suggested. It means substantially more staff, more filing space and so forth. It would mean, I think, about another 180,000 judgments a year; and this clearly would take considerably more staff and filing. But I will certainly bear it in mind. The general experience, I think, of the European countries which have given up imprisonment for debt in favour of attachment of earnings orders is that creditors do exercise more care in the people to whom they give credit. If they always have imprisonment as the "big stick" at the back, that is one thing; but if they have not, I think they may take more care—I should hope so—in not granting to a person such credit as on his income he obviously cannot repay. I am sorry not to be more helpful. This particular Amendment would be very difficult to adopt, but I am certainly ready to think about it again.
Long DONALDSON OF KINGS-BRIDGE: I thank my noble and learned friend. I did not expect to get more
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than this generous offer to think further. I was going to raise a point on the Question, That the Clause stand part, but as the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, has already raised the question of administration orders, I will raise it now. The Payne Committee recommend that the limit of £300 should be raised. I think that it should be removed altogether. I do not know whether my noble and learned friend has any views about that. I think it is desirable that the limit should be raised to some extent.
Secondly, if we take Clause 8(8) in its most obvious sense it is clearly an encouragement to county court judges to use administration orders of their own volition. If they do that, they are going to run into almost the same position—this is what worries me—as the enforcement officer, if he were simply a registrar, with the changed name and nothing else to help him, would run into. For the last three years, administration orders have totalled 1,360 in 1966, 1,874 in 1967 and 1,754 in 1968. Comparing those totals with the possible numbers, the numbers are very small indeed. These orders are not being used, and in my opinion they are not being used because the courts have not the staff to use them properly. So we are really back where we were. Having made that point, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 8, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 9 agreed to.
Clause 10 [Compliance with order by employer]:
6.37 p.m.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS moved Amendment No. 7:
Page 10, line 32, leave out subsection (3).
The noble Viscount said: I must admit that it is peculiarly dense of me not to have seen Clause 8(8), but I am very glad I have had it drawn to my attention and it seems to me of great significance. I apologise for wasting time with a prodigious speech on the subject. Perhaps I could save a little time now if, by leave of the Committee, I dealt with Amendment No. 7 together with my new clause, and also Amendment No. 13, to leave out Part II of Schedule 4. The

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only disadvantage of doing this is that the OFFICIAL REPORT will not print my new clause, which is a great pity because I can never get a copy later when I want it. Perhaps I can move it formally for that purpose.
The problem that I am concerned with here is multiple debtors. As I understand the Payne Committee Report, they were also concerned with them, because they are a very large proportion of the hard core, whether of the wilful or the incapable who get involved in procedure of this sort. To be perfectly honest, I have to approach this, though I shall not necessarily be very popular, not so much from the point of view of the difficulty of the employer who has to deal with Part II of Schedule 4 but of seeing that the system works at all. Despite the fact that administration orders can be made, as I now find out, on the motion of the court, there is still an elaborate procedure in this Bill to deal with cases where they have not been made and where we have more than one attachment of earnings order against the same man. If that is so, then the first thing that happens is that the employer has to deal with them in the order of priority set out in Part II of Schedule 4. I think that is comparatively plain after one reads it several times.
The first thing to do is to discover whether any or all of the attachment of earnings orders are in relation to judgment debts or payments under administration orders. If all of them are, then they are dealt with in order of priority of the dates on which they were made. As I understand it, the employer disregards the second one altogether until he has paid off the former one. But if any attachment of earnings order is for another purpose—and I think these purposes include maintenance orders, orders for payment of costs or orders for payment of fines and the collection of legal aid contributions—then the moment one of those attachment of earnings orders comes in where there is already an ordinary judgment debt being dealt with in this way, the employer has instantly to drop the judgment debt which he has been dealing with so far and give priority to the new order that has come in. If there is then another of the excepted class—say, the man had a fine and a legal aid contribution
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and for some reason it was dealt with by two attachment of earnings orders—the employer has to deal with both of those first, but in the order of their coming in, before he reverts to dealing with the old, long-standing ordinary civil debt that he had been paying.
It is also true—and one does not want to make too much of it because there are defences—that if he gets it wrong, it is a criminal offence. Of course there are defences, and they are fairly generous ones, but a fairly substantial burden is being imposed on the employer, and one which I am not certain he is going to find very easy to comply with because he just is not going to know the distinction between these things unless a copy of the Act is stuck up in every factory or office in the land, or at any rate in the pay office.
There is another very serious matter which I feel will go wrong on these occasions. The whole scheme of the Bill, apart from administration orders, is to let the courts, one after another, if this is what is going to happen, make these attachment of earnings orders against the same man. There is no machinery for providing that they are to know before they make such an order what other courts have done about him beforehand. There are three different sorts of courts here: the High Court, the county court and the magistrates' court, and certainly on the face of the Bill I cannot see anything which requires an interchange of information between them and a consideration of what has been done by another court already before they make any attachment of earnings orders.
The provisions in Clause 14, which is where the court is meant to get the information on which it bases the normal deduction rate and the protected earnings rate, do not include any provisions for the man to tell them about any other attachment of earnings orders. Perhaps he will automatically, but it is not one of the statutory duties, and therefore the courts may make different orders. I can envisage the court dealing with a judgment on behalf of a hire purchase company, which the court thinks ought not to have been enforced in that way, and making a very small normal deduction rate and setting a protected earnings rate fairly high because it considers there is not a great

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deal of merit in the case. Then the same man, because he has already got into financial difficulty, cannot pay some extra bit of income tax—it is not dealt with by P.A.Y.E. On this occasion the magistrates' court—because it can be the magistrates' court and not the county court here—does not necessarily know that the county court has already made an order, and sets a different normal deduction rate and a different protected earnings order—because there is no reason why these things should coincide. That second order is, as I have already explained, enforced first by the employer. Therefore the man's contributions under these orders fluctuate wildly from week to week. At the same time very different considerations are being taken into account in fixing what is the normal deduction rate and what is the protected earnings rate.
That can also apply as between two judgment summons, or two judgment debts. The unmeritorious creditor comes first and gets a small amount paid off week by week. The employer has to pay that order, and he pays it first, because that is what Part II of Schedule 4 says, But then along comes the second, meritorious creditor, who certainly ought to be paid at a much quicker speed and, if necessary, at the expense of some hardship on the debtor's part. But the court cannot do anything about that because the unmeritorious creditor is preferred already.
I am very concerned about the way this scheme is going to work. I should have thought that it ought to be automatic that when there is more than one attachment of earnings order that comes to the notice of any court, there ought to be either an administration order or what, for the purposes of my new clause, I have called the "scheme". I do not mind what it is called. Its object is, I think, perfectly clear. It means that the moment there is more than one order, it is not the employer who has to decide on priorities according to whether or not he understands Schedule 4; it is the court—and that means the court officials, who know perfectly well what are the criteria under which these various orders have been made and who know which one gets the priority. They then consolidate the orders.
The advantage of this is twofold. If, in the case I have already quoted, the prior attachment of earnings order involves a small payment spread over a long period of time, the court can, on consolidation, say, "This is absurd. We have now got a situation where the meritorious creditor has been put off for something like 20 years, and a shilling a week is going to be paid. The situation is such that we now wish to consolidate this order, and we want the employer to dock £3 a week off this man's pay. Then we will distribute it according to what the two courts have said; £2 19s. to the meritorious, and one shilling to the unmeritorious." The same applies when there are priorities for taxes, for legal aid, or whatever else it is.
There is a further advantage in this respect. If there is the power that I have put in subsection 3(b) of my new clause, then when the matter comes before the court the court can think again, not about the protected earnings rate—because I should have thought that that was a minimum below which nobody ought to go—but the normal deduction rate, which is a very different matter. There may have been a small deduction, and the court may think that the man is perfectly capable of bearing a much larger one without any diminution in his family's health or well-being, and one that he can very well afford to pay if he has been so foolish as to get himself into these debts. But apart from an administration order, the court has no such powers at the moment when there are multiple attachment orders against the same man.
The last point which I wish to stress, and I think it is the most important of all, occurs in subsection (1) of my new clause. There really must be an interchange of information between the courts who are empowered to make these orders. The obvious repository of the information is the county court, and the county court in the area where the man lives, because that is where the attachment of earnings orders are ordinarily going to be made. Certainly that court ought to have a copy of every other attachment of earnings order that is made by any other court, and it ought to be done by law. I suspect that there ought to be a requirement on any court, other than the debtor's own county court, to consult

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with that court before it makes an attachment of earnings order, in order to see what the situation is. I do not think that need be made statutorily, because I think the courts would do it anyway. However, I think that the central file—and indeed a file is what the Payne Committee expected to be in existence on any debtor, and I think it would be in existence in the county court registry, whether it is called an enforcement office or not—ought to be kept there, and reference ought to be made to it.
I put forward these suggestions only because I honestly think they are better than the provisions of Clause 10(3) and Part II of Schedule 4 which, at the present moment, simply leave it to the employer to work out this order of priorities according to the type of attachment of earnings order. I genuinely think that this is a job that the court ought to do, and the court will do better and more fairly, and take more of the relevant circumstances into account, than the employer either can or ever will be allowed by law to do, because he has only to fulfil the orders of the court. My scheme allows a "rethink" when you get a multiple debt, and a "rethink" every time a new debt is proved and a new application for an attachment is made, or a new attachment of earnings order is made in some other court. That is the sort of system that ought to exist, and I very much hope that before this Bill finally becomes law we shall be able to do something like it. We should take the duty to deal with priorities off the employer and put it on to people who, I think, are much better suited to do it; namely, the registrar, primarily, of the county court. I beg to move.
LORD DONALDSON OF KINGS-BRIDGE: I should like briefly to support the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross. He has raised a new point, I think, about the series of different levels of deduction, which I am sure my noble and learned friend will study. But otherwise, of course, he is really asking for enforcement offices. Consolidation and priorities are jobs which the Payne Commission certainly thought the enforcement offices would do; and obviously, having asked for them myself, I must get up and say that I entirely agree with him. I also fear that he will run into
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the same difficulties that I ran into, which is that the courts will not have the staff to do it. That is why we feel so sad that there is no future indication of the Government's intentions in this direction. But I have much pleasure in supporting the Amendment.
6.51 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Before replying to the noble Viscount, may I, somewhat irregularly, say, with reference to the observations made by my noble friend Lord Donaldson before he withdrew the last Amendment about the limit on administration orders, that we have had the sense before now to provide for the amount to be varied by Statutory Instrument; and I quite agree that there is a case to be made, which I am considering, for increasing the limit, or possibly even having none. To the noble Viscount I would just say that there cannot actually be an attachment for income tax in a magistrates' court, but only in a county court.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: I am sorry.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Here, the real answer is: Yes, we intend to do all this, and we intend to do it by rules; and it is really better to do it in this way, if possible, because then it is easier to alter.
I spent quite a part of this morning with a large deputation from the C.B.I. considering all this from the employers' point of view. The object which the noble Viscount has in mind can be achieved more simply and satisfactorily under the Bill as it stands. It is intended to invite the Rule Committees to provide that an application to a county court for an attachment of earnings order shall be made to the court for the district in which the debtor resides. If the High Court, or a magistrates' court, makes an attachment order to secure, for example, the payment of maintenance, it will be required to send a copy of the order to that county court; and that, we think, should be done either on the same day or the next day, because usually it will be the local county court or the local magistrates' court.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: What about the High Court?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The High Court, no; but certainly so far as the two local courts are concerned.
Subsection (1) of the proposed new clause is therefore unnecessary because the provision which it seeks to make may be made by rules. Every county court will keep an index of debtors within its district against whom attachment orders have been made. A creditor will be required to search the index before applying to the county court for an attachment order. If he finds that an attachment order has already been made against his debtor to secure the payment of maintenance, it is unlikely that he will think it worth while applying for one in respect of his debt; and, if he does, it is even more unlikely that the court will make one. By virtue of Clause 8(8), however, the court will have power to make, instead, an administration order under Part VII of the County Courts Act. If the court decides to make an administration order, it will no doubt discharge the earlier attachment of earnings order and make a fresh one to secure the payments directed to be made under the administration order. Thus it will be possible to bring all the debtor's liabilities under one order, and the employer will have only one attachment order to comply with.
The advantages of an administration order over the scheme proposed by the noble Viscount are, I suggest, as follows. First, detailed provision for administration orders is already made by the County Courts Act, and the courts are well accustomed to them. Secondly, an administration order covers all the debtor's liabilities and not merely the debts owing to creditors who have applied for attachment of earnings orders. Under the proposed new clause there would have to be a fresh consolidation every time another creditor obtained an attachment of earnings order, and the employer might be faced with a series of different orders and schemes.
Thirdly, under an administration order the creditors rank pari passu. An officer of the court is appointed to have the conduct of the order, and he declares a dividend from time to time. Under the proposed new clause each scheme would apparently provide ad hoc for the priority to be accorded as between the creditors. This would impose a very
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difficult burden on the court, and there might be great divergence in the priorities accorded by different courts. The Payne Committee considered that the individual deferment of creditors by order of the court was impracticable. That appears in paragraph 848. Plainly, as a class, creditors for maintenance should have priority because the money is needed for the support of their clependants, and if it is not provided they may have to fall on National Assistance. Fines and other pecuniary liabilities in criminal proceedings ought also to be satisfied before ordinary civil debts. Part II of Schedule 4 provides for this, and it would clearly be unsatisfactory to replace it by schemes making ad hoc provision for priority.
In the Second Reading debate the noble Viscount expressed concern about the difficulty which employers might have in operating fthe system of priorities in Part H of Schedule 4. There should, however, be no difficulty in practice. An attachment order to secure the payment of an ordinary judgment debt will be clearly distinguishable from an attachment order to secure the payment of maintenance and similar liabilities. The employer will be given clear instructions as to how to comply with any order served on him. As indicated above, it is very unlikely that he will ever be troubled with more than one order in respect of the same debtor.
After discussing this matter with the deputation from the C.B.I. this morning, I think I can say that they left feeling reasonably happy, though I promised to consider whether the shilling was enough (they did not think it was), and whether seven days was long enough. The sort of thing we were discussing was the case where there was a magistrates' order. They would send it both to the employer and to the county court, and it would then take the county court a day or two to act. The C.B.I. representatives expressed the view that seven days might be a little on the short side; but otherwise I think they were reasonably happy.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: Certainly this Amendment was not drafted for the benefit of the C.B.I. It was drafted for the benefit of the doubts that I myself felt on this matter. I can readily see the disadvantages of what I

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call a scheme over the administration order, but the fact still remains that the Bill, if it is left as it is, is going to contain a provision whereby there can be two or more attachment of earnings orders in respect of the same man not consolidated by an administration order. It seems to me likely that, if this is going to be allowed to stay unchanged, one will get a situation in which the unmeritorious, ordinary judgment creditor will get in first. This is one of the things that Payne says: that so often the whole of this process is started by the people who are a bit sharp and who know the form. They know how to get these things in the county court, and they secure precedence. It is not until a little time afterwards that other creditors wake up and find that they have missed the boat because the unmeritorious creditor, if I may so call him, has already got his attachment of earnings order and that has got to be paid out before they get their share.
In these circumstances, I would suggest that it may be worth while amending the Bill to this extent. If there is an entirely different class of attachment of earnings order, such as the noble and learned Lord said in relation to tax or maintenance, or something like that, perhaps that can be given priority and can stay in Part II of the Schedule. But do not let us ever have more than one attachment order in relation to judgments for perfectly ordinary civil debts. If there is more than one order, let us have an automatic administration order, so that the question of priorities can be sorted out by the court and not simply be decided according to the timing of the creditor who happened to get in first. I do not know whether that is a good idea, but it seems to me to solve at least part of the problem. Incidentally—and I do put this incidentally—it is bound to make life easier for the employer because he will never have more than one of each. He may perhaps have more of the priority ones, the maintenance and the taxes, but he will never have more than one ordinary civil debt running at a time.
I think this has been a very valuable discussion—it has certainly cleared my mind a great deal—but I do not think we have quite finished with this subject
904
yet. However, I should like to consider it before the next stage and perhaps return to it then. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw this Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
On Question, Whether Clause 10 shall stand part of the Bill?
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: I do not know that there is any particularly good moment to deal with this last point of general substance that I want to put to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor. Perhaps it would be better done on Clause 14. This is the question of how the court is going to have time to go into the examination of the debtor's means and the proper amount that he ought to be asked to pay under any attachment order or administration order.
As I understand the situation, judgment summonses are at the present time dealt with pretty quickly. I think they go through in some places in one minute or less; and this is quite proper, because they involve no examination of the sort we are talking about, and there is nothing the court need do. But if the figure mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd of Hampstead, of 100,000 attachment orders a year (it is also referred to at the end of the Explanatory Memorandum) is right, there are going to be a substantial number of these matters which come before the courts.
I think the main proposal that the Government have in mind in order to provide the court with the necessary information is the form that is required under Clause 14. That form will have to be considered, together with the type of the debt and the circumstances in which the debt was incurred, and it may be that the court will require more information—and this they can always ask for. There will also be occasions when there are applications to vary attachment of earnings orders and the same process will have to be gone through all again. From the little that I know about attachment orders in magistrates' courts, which almost always relate to maintenance, at any rate in the area I have asked, these matters are gone into thoroughly; and very properly so. The magistrates do seek out the information and make what they think is a fair order in all the circumstances.

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Is the noble and learned Lord satisfied, first of all, that the courts will get the information they require through Clause 14, and the form that the debtor has to fill up, without follow-up from social workers who are not included in this Bill? Secondly, will the registrars have time to give proper consideration to the matters which are so important under this new procedure? We are extending the social service under this Bill. That is part of what Payne said, and the consideration that will be given by the courts amounts to almost the same thing (although perhaps this is an unfortunate analogy) as the consideration that is given in passing sentence on a criminal charge. The courts will have to consider all the circumstances of the family and the debtor himself; how he got into debt, and from my little experience of criminal courts, I know that this takes time. In criminal cases there are probation reports to read; the police officer knows about the man and has made inquiries. Here there is nothing except what the debtor himself says. On the question of the fullness of information, and the time taken by the registrars, I am not happy, and I should be glad if the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor could say something to the Committee at this stage.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: It will of course be necessary that steps should be taken to ascertain fully both the assets and the liabilities of the debtor, as in maintenance cases. But I rely on the fact that this Committee, including a High Court Judge, a county court judge and a registrar, and so on, were right when they said that there should be no difficulty, subject only to numbers and extent, in having the county court staff deal with the matter, because it is something which they are used to doing. It is merely a matter of judging how far the staffs will have to be increased.
Our estimate is that there will need to be 10 additional registrars with, probably, a saving of seven county court judges; additional clerical staff of 90, with a saving, I think, of about 90 county court places. So there is a saving again, and it should be possible to do what the Committee said was to be done. After all, every administration order at the moment which they are now being encouraged to make involves that procedure.
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I believe that in real life the staff are very helpful to debtors, even helping them to fill out forms, and so on; and if that works in relation to orders of that kind, there is no reason why it should not work in the future on a bigger scale.
Clause 10 agreed to.
Clauses 11 to 22 agreed to.
7.6 p.m.
LORD LLOYD OF HAMPSTEAD LORD LLOYD OF HAMPSTEAD moved Amendment No. 9:
After Clause 22 insert the following new clause:
Harassment of debtor
".—(1) If any person does any act calculated to cause harassment to or to interfere with the peace or comfort of any debtor or any member of his household and which is not reasonably necessary for the protection of the interests of the creditor or for the purpose of obtaining payment of the debt by due process of law, he shall be guilty of an offence.
(2) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding one hundred pounds or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to both and, on a second or subsequent conviction, to a fine not exceeding five hundred pounds or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or both.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be taken to prejudice any liability or remedy to which a person guilty of an offence thereunder may be subject in civil proceedings.
(4) Proceedings for an offence under this section may be instituted by any local authority to which section 107 of the Rent Act 1968 applies."
The noble Lord said: The Payne Report discussed in some detail the problem of unreasonable harassment of debtors. It is pointed out that while a creditor is of course entitled to use all lawful and reasonable measures to obtain payment, such as sending reminders or solicitors' letters threatening proceedings and so on, at the present time under the existing law there is a whole repertory of what they describe as reprehensible forms of pressure which are brought to bear on debtors by unscrupulous classes of creditors. The Committee received a good deal of evidence about this which enabled them to identify the nature of the problem, and in the Report they give many examples of the kinds of pressure sometimes employed. These are set out in some detail in page 320 of the Report, and I do not want to take up a lot of

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time at this late hour by repeating them. Suffice to give as examples, apart from the so-called "blue and red frighteners", as they are referred to in the Report, are the cases where neighbours or local shopkeepers are informed about an indebtedness under the guise of seeking information and various kinds of disagreeable intimidation.
The conclusion of the Committee, which I would emphasise is unanimous on this point, is this. They say:
"After all allowances have been made the conclusion is inescapable that some practices are employed with the object of instilling fear and panic in debtors, causing them anguish and driving them to desperation in trying to pay off their debts. Such creditors disdain the law and endeavour to bypass it by using strong-arm tactics or cunning devices. In our view it cannot be tolerated that just claims be pursued by unjust methods. It must not be forgotten the debtor class includes many, who by misfortune or mischance, have drifted into debt and are peculiarly exposed and vulnerable to the methods which we condemn."
There is no doubt that, as in the case of harassment between landlord and tenant—though no doubt some of these improper pressures which arc employed may give rise to some possible kind of liability or responsibility, criminal or civil—in practice unless some new kind of summary offence is created both the courts and the police are powerless to deal with this kind of problem. Accordingly, the Committee recommends the creation of a new offence, the offence of harassment of debtors on lines similar to those introduced with, I think, salutary effect in the sphere of landlord and tenant by the Rent Act 1965. Your Lordships will no doubt recall that that provision in the 1965 Act was introduced as a result of the many disclosures of what was called "Rachmanism", which were discussed in considerable detail in the Milner-Holland Report.
In the debate on the Second Reading, I suggested that this problem, having been identified by the Committee, ought not to be disregarded. My noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor indicated that he had a good deal of sympathy with the point but that difficulties had been felt about definition and enforcement. But he went on to say that if I were to put down an Amendment he would be happy to consider it. Accordingly, I have put down this Amendment and I have followed,
908
broadly speaking, the lines indicated by the Committee in paragraph 1238 of their Report. The Committee were against classifying particular disreputable methods which they found to be used, but they suggested that the methods which should be treated as unlawful could be defined in general terms
"as any harassment of the debtor which is not reasonably necessary for the protection of the interests of the creditor."
They also pointed out that in their considered opinion they did not think that this would cause any difficulty to magistrates who, after all, are able to apply standards of this kind when dealing with other offences of a similar character. After all, the courts have to consider every day in assessing legal responsibility what is reasonable in the circumstances; and there seems no reason at all why they should be unable to administer a law of this kind.
I will say a few words in regard to the actual provisions of my Amendment. So far as subsection (1) of the new clause is concerned, I have here followed the general pattern indicated in the Report, and I have supplemented it with something which has already been found acceptable in Section 30 of the Rent Act 1965; that is to say, the words referring to any act "calculated to interfere with the peace or comfort" of the debtor or any member of his household, a concept, it seems to me, which is doubtless borrowed from our law of nuisance. With regard to subsections (2) and (3) of the new clause, again these follow very closely the pattern of Section 30(3) and (4) of the 1965 Act. With regard to subsection (4) of the new clause, this follows the pattern of Section 108 of the Rent Act 1968 which gives local authorities power to institute proceedings in regard to harassment under the 1965 Act and also sets out the meaning of a "local authority" for this purpose.
I do not claim any special virtue or merit in this particular drafting. I have little doubt that it is capable of improvement, and for my part I should gladly accept any improvements which may be suggested. But I venture to suggest that this is a practical solution to what has been identified as a serious social problem and one that is likely to become a good deal more serious with the abolition of

909
imprisonment for debt, as the Payne Committee themselves point out. Therefore, I would suggest that it is a problem that should be dealt with and which ought not to be disregarded. I beg to move.
LORD DONALDSON op KINGSBRIDGE: I should like briefly to support my noble friend. If further evidence were required—and I do not think it is after the Payne Committee Report could produce plenty from the files of the family service units, from the Consumer Council and, doubtless, from the Citizens' Advice Bureaux. This is something which does happen, and I think it is important that it should be dealt with; for it will tie in very well with the Inertia-selling Bill, which has some provisions tending in this direction, and which Mr. Arthur Davidson is bringing in in another place. If we could get it in here it would give strength to his arm. I warmly support the Amendment.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: As I intimated on Second Reading I approach this matter most sympathetically and I think my noble friend's drafting is a very good effort. If I mention one or two difficulties, it is simply to get them on the Record. The new clause adopts the word "harassment" but does not define it. The words "interfere with the peace or comfort" are borrowed from the Rent Acts and are understandable in the context of a Rent Act tenancy; but it is a little difficult to say what they mean here. So far as "not reasonably necessary" is concerned, what would be reasonable in the case of someone who systematically avoids paying his debts might be unreasonable in another case. Again, that we could consider.
The subsection does not make it an offence for a person to do something which is reasonably necessary for the purpose of obtaining payment of the debt by due process of law. One would have carefully to consider this and particularly so far as the work of the county court bailiffs are concerned. I am told that it would be against current policy to provide for a six months' term of imprisonment as an alternative to a fine. Subsection (4) provides that proceedings under the clause may be instituted by a local authority. There has been no opportunity to consult with the Local Authority Associations, but it is thought that most
910
local authorities would be reluctant to take on this additional responsibility. In any case, that provision would need further consideration, because it suggests that any local authorities may institute proceedings. I make these points only to serve to show that we have gone into the matter and I am not giving it up. The Home Office is interested, the draftsmen are interested. Though some of them say that they cannot make a job of it, I say that we must. I encourage my noble friend to hope for another stage of the Bill when between us we can work out something that will work.
LORD LLOYD OF HAMPSTEAD: I am grateful to my noble and learned friend for his very generous gesture towards my somewhat lame effort to deal with this problem. I appreciate that some of the phrasing is of a general character; but I share the view of the Payne Committee that this is the sort of thing which can be left to the common sense of magistrates, provided they are presented with general, common sense concepts. I should have thought, with great respect, that such ideas as "harassment" and "interference with peace and comfort" are ideas which the courts can deal with without a great deal of difficulty.
I do not attach any special significance to this, but so far as penalty clauses are concerned I thought I was following the precise form of Section 30(3) of the 1965 Act which provides:
"A person guilty of an office under this section shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding one hundred pounds or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to both …"
That is the precise wording of my Amendment. For my own part, I do not pretend to have any special expertise in criminal law or of penalty clauses in penal Statutes.
I do not wish to take up more time of the Committee since my noble and learned friend has made this proposal, which I am very happy to accept, that further consideration should be given to this point. If the drafting skill and experience of his office can either rephrase where necessary or find suitable formulae I should strongly welcome it. Therefore I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
7.20 p.m.
LORD DONALDSON OF KINGS-BRIDGE LORD DONALDSON OF KINGS-BRIDGE moved Amendment No. 10:
After Clause 22 insert the following new clause:
Expenses of whole-time or part-time social workers
". The Lord Chancellor's Department shall authorise every county court to pay the reasonable expenses of any person employed whole-time or part-time to assist the court in the capacity of a social welfare worker."
The noble Lord said: My Amendment is, I think, quite obvious in its intention. We have accepted reluctantly my noble and learned friend's view that it is quite impossible at this stage to implement at all quickly the major recommendation of the Payne Report, which is the establishment of enforcement offices with the assistance of social workers. When one considers that there are 600 county courts, clearly 600 social workers alone would be an enormous affair. However, there would be some mitigation of this omission, it seems to me, if we pursued something which, as my noble and learned friend knows very well, has already begun; namely, the finding of voluntary workers to sit in county courts and to assist families and the registrar, in just the sort of way that the Payne Committee considered that the enforcement officer and his professional would do.
As my noble and learned friend knows, Mr. Vertsheimer, in conjunction with Judge Leon of Brent, has been doing this for some time, and he has a number of colleagues doing the same. All I want is that this work, which I shall be happy to do what I can to assist, should not stop for want of payment of reasonable expenses. I want to be sure that my noble and learned friend has power to pay reasonable expenses to volunteers. We can then perhaps try to develop the thing further. I beg to move.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am afraid that at the moment I have not any money for social workers, though, as my noble friend knows, nobody is a greater admirer of the work they do than I. If, by saying that the Lord Chancellor's Department is to pay somebody something, the House of Lords could give me some money with which to pay them, that would be an admirable
912
arrangement; but I am afraid that we are not recognised by the Treasury. I think that we shall have to see how we go on. The registrar's court officials already give great help to judgment debtors. There are these voluntary social welfare workers attached to some county courts. I am not in the least against having professional social workers and employing them, but I am afraid that at the moment Government funds do not extend to it.
LORD DONALDSON OF KINGS-BRIDGE: I would only say that this is done throughout the Home Office and there is no reason why the Lord Chancellor's Department should not get similar treatment. Volunteers working in the Probation Service get it and I think, with respect, that my noble and learned friend ought to insist on it. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clauses 23 to 27 agreed to.
Clause 28 [Courts to have power in action by mortgagee for possession of dwelling-house to adjourn proceedings, etc.]:
LORD ILFORD LORD ILFORD moved Amendment No. 11:
Page 23, line 10, after ("dwelling-house") insert ("to which the Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions Acts 1920 to 1939 apply")
The noble Lord said: The purpose of this Amendment is to introduce into the Bill a recommendation of the Payne Committee which has not been adopted for reasons which no doubt will be explained to us later. The recommendation deals with mortgages for house purchases. The Payne Committee made a detailed examination of house purchase mortgages and came to the conclusion that there were certain classes of mortgage which presented very undesirable features and were capable of being made very onerous on the mortgagors. Accordingly the Committee recommended that the courts should be given powers, which they do not possess now, to enable them to check abuses of this type. They recommended, first, that the courts should have the general power to adjourn proceedings in which possession of a dwelling house was claimed and no judgment had been given; that the court should have power to stay or suspend

913
any judgment which had been given or order made, and that they should have the general power to postpone the date on which a mortgagor was liable to give up possession.
The Committee intended that these additional powers should be restricted to smaller dwellings, and they chose as a definition dwelling houses with a rateable value bringing them within the Rent Acts. The effect of that recommendation would have been that all the houses with a rateable value above that to which the Rent Acts apply would not have been affected by the recommendations. There was no reason why they should be affected, because one does not encounter the same type of abuse in respect of that class of property. The recommendation also had an important effect for local authorities to whose houses the Rent Acts does not apply. Accordingly, houses of local authorities, both above and below the limits of the Rents Acts, would not have been affected at all.
The recommendation has not been adopted in the Bill. I think it is clear that the Committee intended to recommend that local authority houses should not be subjected to these extended powers. The matter is dealt with in paragraph 1391 of the Committee's Report where it states:
"The Committee does not propose that the discretion to adjourn an application for possession or to stay or suspend execution should be applicable where the mortgagee is a local authority seeking possession of a dwelling-house, since the tenant of such a property does not enjoy the protection of the Rent Acts."
I submit that the Committee intended that these extended powers should not apply in the case of local authority houses. There is no reason why the additional powers which the courts would possess should be extended to cover local authority houses. After all, local authorities are responsible public bodies. They do not act in the way in which mortgagees in this type of mortgage with which the Commission are dealing sometimes act. They act with a sense of responsibility and with a sense of fairness and justice towards their tenants. It is unnecessary to extend these additional powers to that type of house.
It is frequently urged that the local authorities should be given more discretion
914
in matters which fall within their purview and ought not to be interfered with by the central Government; that local authorities ought to be allowed to conduct their functions without interference and undue restriction. The noble Lord, Lord Radcliffe-Maud, is the latest authority to urge that course, and I thought that it was by now pretty generally accepted. Here is an instance where the relations of local authorities with their tenants are going to be subject to powers that are really of no importance to the tenants. We are not dealing with the type of mortgage to which the Commission alluded. I think we should assume that the local authorities will act fairly and reasonably with their tenants.
I hope that the Committee will take that view and will say that, however necessary it may be that these extended powers should be given to the courts to restrict the abuse of the smaller mortgages, they do not in the least apply to local authorities, who should be left free to deal with their tenants in the way they think just and proper. If the local authorities do not behave properly towards their tenants, there are a great many people who arc always ready to tell them about it, and it will not be long before they know. I hope that the Committee will adopt the recommendation of the Payne Committee and put back the situation to what it was when the Payne Committee made their Report. I beg to move.
LORD ROYLE: I have been released from another duty just in time to say a few words in support of the noble Lord, Lord Ilford. When I considered this question, I realised that there are two views on it, but I am a little concerned from the point of view of the local authorities. When it comes to granting new mortgages, a building society has more opportunity of refusing a doubtful application than a local authority has. Many people obviously use local authorities as a long-stop, and because of that it seems to me that local authorities perhaps have a right to a protection which is not granted to other people.
I am thinking in terms of, say, a poulterer at Covent Garden, who cannot possibly live in a house which is many miles from his place of employment and is concerned with finding accommodation which permits him to be at his work

915
at four or five o'clock in the morning. The type of property he may find is an apartment somewhere in the vicinity of his work, and this is the type of property that is invariably thrown back to the local authority, because the building societies do not feel able to grant a mortgage on property of that character. It seems to me that there should be greater protection for the local authority than for other institutions lending for mortgages and I therefore support what the noble Lord, Lord Ilford, has said. It would be ridiculous for me to go into details, in view of the lucid way in which the noble Lord explained what is in his mind, and I hope that my noble and learned friend may consider it in this light.
LORD MILVERTON: There is little that I can add, after listening to the noble Lords who have already spoken, but there are one or two things that I should like to emphasise. I lay no claim to being a lawyer but I have some knowledge of administration, and it is difficult for me to reconcile the reasons—if there are cogent reasons, as I suppose there must be—why the recommendation of the Payne Committee was added to in this Bill. I feel that if it is right to exempt local authorities from the sanctions of the Rent Acts, it is surely right also to exempt them from the jurisdiction of the courts under Clause 28. And from the recommendation in their Report it is obvious that the Payne Committee seemed to think on those lines. It would be a pity if, for the sake of what for want of a better word I would call the legal niceties, local authorities were to be classified with the other authorities who come under this clause. It seems to me possible that that sort of change in their position might be misinterpreted as in some way a distrust of the power which they formerly had.
I suggest that there is here an important point of principle—that is, the substitution of the court's discretion for that of the local authority, without, if I may be allowed to say so, any reason of substance being given and against the view of a Committee under the chairmanship of a learned judge and comprising members of the legal profession. I hope that the noble and learned Lord will be able to give favourable consideration
916
to the Amendment so ably moved by the noble Lord, Lord Ilford.
7.36 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: As the Committee know, I am ordinarily in favour of local authorities, but it seems to the Government that this analogy of the Committee in relation to the Rent Acts was perhaps carried too far. The scheme of the Rent Acts is to extend protection not so much to the dwelling-house as to the tenancy under which it is occupied; and the recommendation made by the Payne Committee must be read as if it referred to houses having a rateable value which would bring them, if let, under the protection of the Rent Acts. As the mortgage protection Acts are not concerned with the relationship of landlord and tenant but with that of mortgagor and mortgagee, there is no relevant connection between them and the proposal in the Bill to protect mortgagors under mortgages which are given by the local authorities to the tenants in certain circumstances.
Under Part I of the Rent Act 1968, there is a number of types of protected tenancy which are not given the protection of the Act and which are completely irrelevant to mortgage cases—for example, furnished houses and agricultural holdings. The exceptions which Part I of the Act and the Royal Commission have in mind is presumably that created by Section 5 of the 1968 Act, which provides that a tenancy shall not be a protected tenancy where the interests of the landlord belongs to a local authority, a New Town commission, a housing corporation or a housing trust which comes within the meaning of the Charities Act 1960. To attempt to apply these provisions to property which is not let is bound to lead to confusion and difficulty. Apart from the legal complications, the argument advanced in favour of the Amendment is that as the local authorities are responsible bodies it is not necessary to make them subject to the sanctions contained in Clause 61. The same perhaps could be said for building societies, which do not relish the application of these provisions to their activities any more than the local authorities do.
Like building societies, local authorities vary a great deal in their standards and

917
outlook, and in rejecting, in paragraph 1386 of their Report, the building societies' claim for exemption, the Payne Committee said:
"…we have to recommend a procedure which will ensure that justice is done in every class of case. We cannot avoid the conclusion that the final decision as to the enforcement of an order made by the court should rest with the court itself."
Consultations with local authority associations undertaken by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government indicate that by no means all local authorities wish to be excluded from the operation of the clause. If, as one would expect, a local authority acts reasonably towards its debtor, and gives him opportunity to pay, it should have no difficulty in convincing the court that there is no scope for any further delay through applying the powers in Clause 28. This, however, is no argument for excluding local authorities entirely, as not all authorities may act in the same way. Local authority tenancies are excluded from the distinction of the Rent Act 1968, because the functions and responsibilities of local authorities in providing and managing rented accommodation are not comparable with those of a private landlord. No similar distinction can be drawn between local authorities as mortgagees and other mortgagees.
As I ventured to say on Second Reading, of course the local authorities, under a duty to provide housing, are not under any duty to provide loans. I should welcome any other views by any other members of the Committee, and I will certainly take into account what has been said. After all, what is one doing here? One is merely ensuring that somebody who is not a tenant but is in the process of buying a house and who owes some money on mortgage, is treated fairly. While most building societies are very reputable and behave perfectly, there are a few, unfortunately, who sometimes do not; and there are some strange local authorities in some places, too. Their conduct varies, and if it is right to protect the mortgagor in relation to the building society, why not in relation to the local authority? I hope, therefore, in considering those matters, the noble Lord will withdraw his Amendment.
LORD ILFORD: In the light of what the noble and learned Lord has said
918
ask leave to withdraw the Amendment. I find it difficult to follow his explanation. What the Payne Committee had to do was to select a certain class, which could be defined, which would be excepted from the extended powers that they recommended should be given to the courts. It does not seem to me that it makes any difference that there may be certain classes of tenants under the Rent Acts who are protected as tenants, and not premises which are protected as premises. However, I am very grateful to the noble Lord for what he has said—not for what he has said about the local authorities, but for what he has said about my Amendment. If I may be of any further assistance by suggesting something to him, I will do my best. I ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
8.44 p.m.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS moved Amendment No. 12:
Page 23, line 11, leave out from ("property") to second ("the") in line 13.
The noble Viscount said: I asked the noble and learned Lord on Second Reading whether he would he so good as to explain why foreclosure had been dealt with in Clause 28 by excluding it, contrary to the recommendations of the Payne Committee, in paragraph 1360. He very courteously said that he would write and explain why he had done so, and indeed he did. I now understand it, but I think it is a matter of importance and ought to go on the record so that everybody can see why it is that the Government have not followed this recommendation in full. I should therefore be very glad if the noble and learned Lord would kindly explain again what he said to me in the letter so that it may appear in the OFFICIAL REPORT for everybody to read. I beg to move.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I will certainly explain it for the record. The powers given by Clause 28 will be exercisable inter alia for
"the purpose of giving the mortgagor an opportunity to pay any sums due under the mortgage…"
This purpose is already achieved under the present procedure relating to foreclosure of mortgages which is designed to give the borrower every opportunity of redeeming the mortgage. When the date

919
fixed for repayment of the loan has passed and the contractual right to redeem has become an equitable right, the mortgagee can bring proceedings requiring that the mortgagor shall either pay or be foreclosed, that is to say, deprived of his right to redeem. If the mortgagor does not pay, an order for foreclosure nisi is made, the effect of which is that the mortgagor will lose his property if he does not pay upon a date, usually some six months later, which is specified in the master's certificate. The judgment orders an account to be taken of what is due to the plaintiff for principal, interest and costs and provides that if this amount is not paid on the appointed date the defendant shall be debarred from all interest in the mortgage property. If the mortgagor fails to pay, an order for foreclosure absolute is made; but even this may be reopened in certain circumstances if such relief appears to be due to the mortgagor in the special circumstances of the case. At best, the whole process cannot take less than eight months and a more common period is about a year.
In paragraph 1360 of their Report, the Payne Committee said:
"Foreclosure, although formerly very rarely used by mortgagees, appears to be reviving and, in our opinion, the restrictions which we are recommending in relation to claims for possession should equally be applied to foreclosure proceedings".
Despite this, it appears that the interests of a mortgagor are adequately protected in a foreclosure action and it would be superfluous to add the further protection which will be afforded by Clause 28. I said in a letter to the noble Viscount, Lord Colville:
"The Court of Chancery has, of course, always done its best to protect the mortgagor's equity of redemption and the foreclosure procedure is designed to give him every opportunity of redeeming the mortgage. If the mortgagor does not pay, the court makes an order for foreclosure nisi under which the mortgagor loses his property unless he pays …",
Then I explained about the six months and what happened after default. I went on:
",…it seems to me that the mortgagor is very adequately protected in so far as proceedings for foreclosure are concerned and that it would be superfluous to extend the protection provided by the Bill in relation to applications for possession to proceedings for foreclosure."
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: I am very much obliged to the noble and learned Lord. I think it is important that that should be explained. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 28 agreed to.
Remaining clauses agreed to.
Schedules 1 to 5 agreed to.
Schedule 6 [Provisions of Maintenance Orders Act 1958 as amended]:
7.50 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved Amendments Nos. 14 to 17:
Page 40, line 12, at end insert—
("or
(c) apply for a determination under section 16 of the Administration, of Justice Act 1969").
Page 40, line 30, after ("determination") insert ("(but subject to subsection (1)(ii) of this section)").
Page 42, line 41, at end insert—
("or
(c) apply for a determination under section 16 of the Administration of Justice Act 1969").
Page 44, line 7, after ("determination") insert ("(but subject to subsection (1)(ii) of this section)").
The noble and learned Lord said: I beg to move Amendments Nos. 14, 15, 16 and 17 together because they are linked Amendments which provide that where an application is made under Clause 16(1) for the court to determine whether particular payments to a debtor are earnings for the purposes of an attachment of earnings order and the clerk of a magistrates' court applies under Clause 16(2)(d), he shall apply only if he is requested to do so in writing by the beneficiary under the related maintenance order and, where he makes such application, the person who requested him to do so shall be liable for any costs arising out of the proceedings relating to the application.
The Amendments on page 40 amend Section 20 of the 1958 Act, which makes special provisions for procedure in magistrates' courts with respect to attachment of earnings orders. The Amendments on pages 42 and 44 amend the Keeling Schedule in which Section 20 of the 1958 Act is set out as amended. Where an attachment of earnings order has been made by a magistrates' court to secure

921
payments under a maintenance order, the beneficiary is to have the assistance of the collecting officer of the court in getting the order effectively enforced. This accords with the principle that in magistrates' courts the clerk to the court can take enforcement proceedings with respect to a maintenance order on behalf of the beneficiary.
Clause 16(2)(d) therefore provides that the clerk who was receiving payments under the related maintenance order for transmission to the beneficiary will be able to make an application for a determination under Clause 16(1). As drafted, however, he would be able to do this of his own motion and would be liable for costs incurred in the proceedings relating to it. This is contrary to the general principle that the clerk acts on behalf of the beneficiary only at his or her request and that the beneficiary is liable for the costs of proceedings taken on his or her behalf. The principle applies to the enforcement of a maintenance order by any means and, in particular, to an application for the making, variation, or discharge of an attachment of earnings order—see Clause 8(1)(c) and Schedule 6, Part 11, paragraph 20(1)(b) and (ii) of the 1958 Act as amended. The proposed Amendments therefore apply it to an application by the clerk for a determination under Clause 16. I beg to move.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: Would I not be right in saying that Amendments Nos. 16 and 17 ought to be printed in black print because they are amendments and would go in the Keeling Schedule dark as being new, as opposed to pale, being old? If that is so, ought we not to have a manuscript Amendment to that effect?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: That may be right. May I see that it is put right?
On Question, Amendments agreed to.
Schedule 6, as amended, agreed to.
Schedule 7 agreed to.
Schedule 8 [Enforcement by Magistrates' Court of Legal Aid Contribution Order]:
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved Amendment No. 18:
Page 45, leave out lines 38 to 41.
The noble and learned Lord said: Paragraph 4 of Schedule 8 is no longer considered to be necessary. The corresponding provision in Section 45 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1952 enables a magistrates' court to make an order with the consent of the defendant without hearing evidence
"where a complaint is for an order for the payment of a sum recoverable summarily as a civil debt, or for the variation of the rate of any periodical payments ordered by a magistrates' court to be paid, or for such other matter as may be prescribed."
If it is found that this power is needed by the magistrates' courts for the enforcement of legal aid contributions in criminal cases, it will be possible to prescribe, by magistrates' courts rules, that the appropriate provisions of Section 45 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1952 should apply to a complaint for the enforcement of a legal aid contribution. Since there is this power to apply Section 45 to legal aid contributions, the paragraph in the Schedule is not needed. I beg to move.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved Amendment No. 19:
Page 46, line 1, leave out ("(except subsection (6))").
The noble and learned Lord said: The purpose of this Amendment is to make it possible, on an application by a person who has defaulted in paying a legal aid contribution ordered by a criminal court for an order by a magistrates' court committing him to prison for nonpayment to be reviewed, for the magistrates' court to, remit the' legal aid contribution in whole or in part. As paragraph 6 of the Schedule is at present worded, the magistrates' court does not have this power to remit on an application by the defaulter for the order of committal to be reviewed. It only has the power to remit under Section 76 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1952 (referred to in paragraph 3 of the Schedule) on the hearing of a complaint for enforcement. Section 18(6) of the Maintenance Orders Act 1958 gives the power to remit on an application by the defaulter for the committal to be reviewed, and although it was at first considered inappropriate to apply that subsection to legal aid contribution orders since it refers expressly to affiliation orders or orders enforceable as affiliation orders, it is now considered that

923
the subsection should be applied to legal aid contribution orders as well, since otherwise there would be no power to remit the whole or part of the contribution except on a complaint for its enforcement.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Schedule 8, as amended, agreed to.
Schedule 9 [Enactments repealed]:
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved Amendment No. 20:
Page 46, line 47, at end insert—

(" 15 & 16 Geo 6. & 1 Eliz. 2. c.55.

The Magistrates' Courts Act 1952.

In section 74(6)(a) the words "Under the Maintenance Orders Act 1958")

The noble and learned Lord said: This drafting Amendment repeals a reference to the Maintenance Orders Act 1958 which is made in Section 74(6)(a) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1952. The subsection (which relates to a magistrates' court's power to commit a maintenance defaulter to prison) provides that it shall exercise this power only if it has considered, among other things, whether as an alternative to imprisonment it would be appropriate to make an attachment of earnings order under the Maintenance Orders Act 1958. The part of the 1958 Act which relates to the making of attachment of earnings orders is being repealed by the Bill. It is therefore necessary to remove the reference to that Act.
As attachment of earnings orders will only be made by virtue of powers given by this Bill and courts are now familiar with the principle of attaching earnings, it is thought to be unnecessary to substitute a reference to the Administration of Justice Act 1969.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: I want to say only two things. First of all, the mind boggles as to how the reference in a 1958 Act could have got into one dated 1952, but I think I can see how it happened. Secondly, the noble and learned Lord has given many explanations in the course of the Committee stage which I believe will be of the greatest assistance in further discussions on this Bill both outside and inside the House, and I should like to thank him very much for this.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: If I may say so, I am very grateful to the noble Viscount and to all those who have been good enough to assist with the Amendments. We have a number of things to think about and to get straight.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Schedule 9, as amended, agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported, with the Amendments.

CABORA BASSA PROJECT AND RHODESIA SANCTIONS
7.59 p.m.
LORD GIFFORD LORD GIFFORD rose to ask Her Majesty's Government: Whether it is their policy to discourage, and if necessary prevent the participation by British companies in the Cabora Bassa project in Mozambique; and whether they will take international initiatives aimed at preventing such participation by companies of other countries. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper. The Question calls attention to a remote corner of Southern Africa, not even a town; it is a steep ravine situated on the River Zambesi, in the province of Tete, in the Portuguese colony or Mozambique. It is a remote place—the next urban centre of any size is Salisbury, in Rhodesia—but it is a place which may have a crucial significance for the future of Southern Africa as a whole. It is called the Quebrabasa Gorge and it is the site of the proposed Cabora Bassa hydro-electric project.
Before referring to the dam itself, I think it is worth recalling a few bald facts about Portugal and Portuguese colonies. For over forty years Portugal has ruled inside European territory undemocratically and dictatorially under the Salazar and now under the Caetano régime. The power of that régime is maintained by an armoury of laws and by secret police which would do the Greek Colonels proud. As well as being a dictatorship in Europe, Portugal is the last surviving old-style colonialist Power. In Africa, it maintains hold on three territories, Angola, Mozambique and Guine-Bissau; in defiance of world opinion; in defiance of the United

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Nations, and in defiance of the principles which we on this side of the House would hold to be fundamental. It has no intention of abandoning that control. If Portuguese rule in Europe is authoritarian, in Africa it is worse. The African population is not only repressed politically but exploited and degraded.
Even by their own standards the Portuguese have failed in Africa. Their boast is that they have come to civilize and assimilate the African. Their record of civilisation has produced an illiteracy rate among Africans of over 95 per cent. So far as assimilation is concerned, I can do no better than quote Ronald Segal, in his book, The Race War:
"…the policy of assimilation clearly suffered from a congenital lassitude; after 400 years of activity, the percentage of Africans in 1950 whose civilisation had been officially acknowledged was 0·74 in Angola, 0·44 in Mozambique, and 0·29 in Portuguese Guinea."
In those territories the possibility of peaceful political change and peaceful advancement to independence has never been present. When popular demonstrations in Northern Mozambique, in the town of Mueda, were held in 1960, over 500 people were killed by Portuguese troops. And so Africans of all three territories have taken up armed struggle for independence. They are waging war on the Portuguese with increasing success. In Mozambique around 60,000 Portuguese troops are trying to contain guerrilla forces of the Mozambique Liberation Front of around 10,000.
The greater part of the two Northern provinces' of Mozambique have been liberated; that is to say, while the Portuguese are holding towns and garrisons and have control of the air, in the countryside the people are under the control of Frelimo, the Mozambique Liberation Front; and there, through schools, health clinics, economic change and, above all, first-class leadership—and I have met many of the leaders—a new Mozambique is slowly being created. Since 1967 a new theatre of operations was opened in Tete Province where Cabora Bassa is situated. I have absolutely no doubt that, although the protest may be slow, as more and more people of Mozambique come to realise that the possibility of fighting for a better future and for their own independence is there for them, the movement will push further
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and further South and obtain its goal. I have no hesitation in saying that I wholeheartedly support that movement.
It is against this background that the Cabora Bassa project must be considered. It is a vast undertaking. It was originally costed at about £103 million and the cost now is thought to be considerably more. The output of hydro-electricity which it will generate is double that of Aswan High Dam. The lake which wilt be formed by the dam will stretch 150 miles back, as far as the Rhodesian frontier. And beyond that, when the dam is built, it will be only part of the development which is projected. I quote from the Standard Bank Review of December, 1968, which says that the dam:
"will be the base from which a massive development of the Tete district is planned, incorporating the settlement of a million immigrants, the planting of extensive lands to crops, the establishment of manufacturing industry and the exploitation of whatever minerals may be extracted economically."
Normally a development of such magnitude could be only beneficial to an underdeveloped region. But when one looks at Portugal's past record and future ambitions in Africa, that project can be seen only as an ambitious attempt to secure, with the assistance of massive foreign investment, what they have failed to secure by force of arms; that is, the perpetual domination of Mozambique. For, of course, the one million immigrants will be Europeans. Compare that to the number of 100,000 Europeans presently the inhabitants of Mozambique. They, and the three white supremacist Governments of Southern Africa, will be the principal beneficiaries of this plan—not the people of Mozambique. The example of South Africa shows us how a large settler population coupled with mass industry can enable a ruling minority to dominate totally the mass of the people.
It is no coincidence that South Africa is deeply involved in the project. Economically the principal partner in the Zamco Corporation, which is to build the dam, is the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa. Politically, it is of course immeasurably to the advantage of South Africa to have a strong buffer State in Mozambique against the independent North, just as it is immeasurably more vulnerable if an independent State were to be established on South Africa's

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frontier. And, militarily, indeed, South African troop detachments have already been observed by Frelimo forces guarding the site of the dam.
For these reasons, my Lords, quite apart from the issue of sanctions, I am totally opposed to the building of this dam. I support Resolution No. 2395 of the General Assembly of the United Nations, passed in 1968, which deplored:
"the activities of the financial interests operating in the territories under Portuguese domination, which obstruct the struggle of the peoples for self-determination, freedom and independence and which strengthen the military efforts of Portugal."
For those reasons alone, I wish financial interests in this country to have no part in such activity.
In addition, of course, the Cabora Bassa project presents a direct challenge to those countries which have subscribed to the imposition of sanctions against Rhodesia. I have mentioned that Salisbury is only 200 miles away. The Rhodesian frontier is 60 miles away. It is quite evident that Rhodesia will benefit substantially from this dam and from this development. It will benefit in three ways. As to the first, I can only quote a booklet which has been produced, and is actually entitled, The Way to Cabora Basso, produced by the National Export Council of Rhodesia. That booklet says:
"With this tremendous market situated so advantageously close to our production centres we would be foolish to let our competitors steal a march on us … Rhodesia is ideally placed as a manufacturing centre to provide all the varied needs of a large community working on the project—from foodstuffs to feed them, through the clothing they will wear and the chairs they will sit upon, up to the vast quantities of cement to be poured into the dam and the timber shuttering to close it."
The value of the trade which it is hoped will accrue in this way to the Rhodesian economy has been estimated, by that same Council—perhaps exaggeratedly—at £125 million over five years.
The second benefit is of course that Rhodesia is an obvious potential customer for the electric power to be generated by the dam. We learn, again from Rhodesian sources, of a likely power shortage by the mid-1970's. And Salisbury Radio broadcast in July, 1968:
"If the Cabora Bassa project is going to be as economical as the Portuguese say it is
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going to be, then it seems likely that it is from this source that Rhodesia will draw her power rather than commit a huge sum in implementing the planned stage two of the Kariba scheme to increase that dam's productivity."
Finally, the scheme will enable Rhodesia to have an immensely valuable outlet to the sea for her trade. From the lake which I mentioned earlier, through a sehies of locks by-passing the dam, down to a new port on the river delta, the Zambesi will be navigable for barges from the Rhodesian frontier to the sea.
There is more evidence which I could quote and which I will make available to my noble friend, but I have no doubt that those who participate in this project will be breaking not only the spirit but also the letter of the United Nations sanctions resolutions. So far as British law is concerned, it is an offence not merely to import goods from and export goods to Rhodesia; it is equally an offence by Section 2 of the Order.
"to do any act calculated to promote the exportation of any goods from Southern Rhodesia"
and, by Section 4, to do any act calculated to promote the supply of any goods to any person if one has reasonable cause to believe that they will be used for the purposes of Rhodesian business. I hope that that is an accurate paraphrase of part of Section 4. My Lords, the Portuguese and the Southern African Governments have already shown that they do not give a fig for the Rhodesian sanctions. They are very happy to promote the exportation of goods from Rhodesia. Therefore it is all the more incumbent upon Governments who care about the United Nations and about sanctions to do what we can to wreck their sanctions-busting operations.
I turn now more specifically to the terms of my Question. My noble friend will be aware that when the Question was put down it had been reported that the G.E.C.—English Electric Group were anxious to tender for a major share in the Zamco consortium. They were reported as wanting to fill the gap left by the Swedish company, A.S.E.A., which itself withdrew because of the risk of breaking sanctions. I would say here that I look forward very much to hearing the noble Lord, Lord Nelson of Stafford, and the noble Lord, Lord Erroll of Hale, who can say much more than I can what G.E.C.—English Electric and A.S.E.A.

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have been doing. The noble Lord will know that he was certainly reported as welcoming the opportunity to take part in the consortium. It was also reported that the British Government were encouraging G.E.C.—English Electric to go ahead, and I only say that I hope my noble friend will take this opportunity to make it clear that those reports were not true. Since then, G.E.C.—English Electric have announced that they now have little chance of taking part, and it seems that the supply of electrical equipment will probably be undertaken by their West German rivals, Siemens. I do not know what motivated that change; I believe that political considerations played their part, but we shall look forward to hearing from the noble Lord, Lord Nelson, what was involved.
But, my Lords, even if British interests are not going to be involved directly in this consortium, there is still much that can be done to stop this project from going forward. First, I would ask the Government and my noble friend who will reply to make it quite clear that any British company which participates in this project, whether as a member of the consortium, as a sub-contractor or as a supplier of finance, will do so at their peril. It is possible that G.E.C.—English Electric will still be seeking to play a minor role. It is certainly true that Barclays Bank D.C.O. will intend to help finance the project, and, on that question, if the builders of the dam are—as must be the case in my view—doing an act calculated to promote Rhodesian business, I cannot see how those who assist the building by supplying equipment or funds are any the less culpable.
The second question I would raise with the Government is that this country has been scrupulous in its adherence to the United Nations sanctions resolution, and with that we have influence which we can bring to bear on other Western countries. I do not know whether the topic of Cabora Bassa has been referred to the United Nations Advisory Sanctions Committee, but it certainly should be. The extent to which Rhodesia will benefit, and as the project develops is benefiting, from it should be subjected to the closest possible scrutiny. Outside South Africa the companies which are taking part in the consortium are French
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and West German. West Germany is not a member of the United Nations, but that is no reason why representations cannot be made to the West German Government to observe, as it would do as a member of the United Nations, the sanctions resolution. I am not saying that we should be doing this merely to go moralising about Europe, but if we are losing exports, as we should be, in a just cause we can at least try to stop our rivals from snatching them up.
Finally, it is high time that we took considerably more effective action against the principal beneficiaries of this scheme—the Portuguese Government. We must end the farce by which Rhodesian goods pass freely from Rhodesia through Lourenco Marques. We must expose that other charade whereby arms supplied for NATO purposes for the defence of freedom are used against the people of Africa. We must acknowledge, as the Social Democratic Government of Sweden has done, that the Mozambique liberation front is a movement which deserves our support. These are wider questions than that of Cabora Bassa, but I do not see why Portugal should be allowed to get round, and abet the Rhodesians to get round, the sanctions issue, and we should be acting more effectively to ensure that they no longer do.
At Cabora Bassa one can see how the interests of the three white régimes of Southern Africa are united. They are united against the interests of the mass of the African population and against the forces of African liberation. At Cabora Bassa there will be a confrontation of those forces—an armed confrontation. The Mozambique liberation front is determined to stop that dam from being built. I believe that the three white régimes will be defeated and will fail at Cabora Bassa, just as they will ultimately fail in Southern Africa as a whole. I believe also that in this conflict, which I regret to say will be one of the most explosive conflicts to come in this world, we in this country must make it clear on which side we stand.
8.19 p.m.
LORD ERROLL OF HALE: My Lords, we have just listened to a most interesting speech by the noble Lord, Lord Gifford, who has demonstrated a close study of the subject matter as well

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as informed us with great lucidity. He was obviously concerned that the dam should be of benefit. I should like to remind him that one of the greatest developments in Africa has been the development of hydro-electric power. There has been the Volta River scheme, which was accepted by the noble Lord although instituted by that dictator Kwame Nkrumah. There was the Aswan Dam scheme—it is quite all right if the Russians build something, but not right if the Western Europeans build it. There was the Jinja River Falls scheme, which has been of inestimable benefit to the people of Uganda, including the Indians, who set up many factories only to find that subsequently they were having a very rough time of it. The Kariba Gorge has again provided inestimable benefits in the form of hydro-electric power for all races in Africa. I think it is a great mistake to assume that hydro-electric power benefits only the "white supremacists", as the noble Lord suggested. It does a great deal to benefit the people; the poorer they are, the more the benefit to them.
LORD GIFFORD: My Lords, the noble Lord will remember that I took pains to say that normally one would welcome hydro-electric development in Africa.
LORD ERROLL OF HALE: My Lords, I think the noble Lord should welcome it on this occasion, because the greatest beneficiaries will be the African people in Mozambique. With the outline of development of irrigation and other projects, the people who stand to benefit most in South Africa from cheap electricity are the African population, because they cannot afford expensive electricity but can afford cheap electricity. It would be entirely wrong to suggest that this scheme should not go ahead and give help to those people who would benefit just because there may be some white people involved in it. I would suggest that it is something of a red herring to try to tie the objections to the scheme to the Rhodesian sanctions law. I will come to that later. I remain convinced that this is a highly desirable project, and I think the Frelimos would be cutting off their noses to spite their faces if they took armed
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action against those men prepared to build such a great project and provide the benefit.
The noble Lord was good enough to make reference to my connection with A.S.E.A. I must declare my interest; I am Chairman of A.S.E.A.'s British subsidiary in this country, and they have discussed their possible participation in the project with me from time to time. I do not want to enter into the argument as to why they are no longer part of the Zamco consortium. I would confine myself while wearing my A.S.E.A. hat to giving one or two factual explanations which noble Lords will be glad to have.
First of all, although the scheme is within 100 or 200 miles of Salisbury, there is no question of the scheme as at present designed being able to supply electricity to Rhodesia. Indeed, it would be technologically uneconomic to have a breakpoint halfway down the transmission line. It would cost far more to do that than to run a separate AC line from the station itself. A proportion of the power generated will go to Mozambique and to all those who wish to have electricity. Another important point is that none of the supply to Johannesburg or that part of Southern Africa which will be the southern terminal can go back into Rhodesia from South Africa because there are no Escom connections between Rhodesia and South Africa. The only connection between the two countries is a very small line arranged by the local mining company across the Beit River bridge to provide lighting for the Rhodesian customs post. Apart from that, there is no supply by South Africa to Rhodesia.
Then, on the controversial question of whether one should give help to Rhodesian exports, I think the report the noble Lord read out was very optimistic. I know he was only quoting, but I think that to say that one cannot proceed with a project because the construction workers might buy chairs and tables made in Rhodesia is to stand the whole thing on its head. Certainly the company I have the honour to represent made careful investigations and was completely satisfied that it could avoid any such help to Rhodesian exports.
The noble Lord was good enough to point out that a third competitor is now

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on the scene. There was my own company and the company headed by the noble Lord, Lord Nelson of Stafford, who has managed to stay for the debate despite personal inconvenience. In the last 15 years there have been only ten high-voltage DC schemes, so it is not a very big or frequent market. The effect of all this clamour has been to deprive A.S.E.A. and the noble Lord's company of participation. A third competitor has arrived on the scene, a German firm. We have now three competitors where only two existed before in a field where the opportunities for genuine competition are limited. The arguments have not been satisfactory, nor in this case has the sanctions policy proved in the best interest of Britain or her EFTA partner.
I should like now to discard my A.S.E.A. hat and make a few observations on the situation generally, and I would stress that these are entirely my own observations and not in any way coloured by my association with an important electrical mannifacturing company. The first point to be made is that the United Nations resolutions are interpreted differently by different sovereign countries, and in a matter of large contracts such as this it has led to considerable difficulty. In what I would call a descending order of severity, the most severe is the United States of America which has a very rigorous law operating against enemy countries such as North Vietnam, North Korea, Cuba and China, and to which they have now added Rhodesia; rather than draft a separate law they have tacked Rhodesia on to the schedule, so to speak.
More or less by accident, the most severe country in the operation of sanctions policy is the United States, and I think Canada is very much the same. Next, I believe, comes Sweden, particularly with its latest law, which is one of considerable complexity, and as it has not been before the courts there is a good deal of scope for interpretation. Then comes the United Kingdom, somewhere in the middle, where a lot of things can be done by United Kingdom companies which would not be permitted under Swedish law. Next come France, Italy and Japan; and, although Germany is not a member of the United Nations, I agree with the noble Lord that
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Germany would do well to support the general policy.
Those four, grouped together, are more or less at the bottom of the list in terms of severity. For example, French and Japanese cars are now being manufactured in Rhodesia, actually in factories owned by British companies. So those British companies have the galling sight of seeing their capital investment being used by their competitors to reinforce the competitors' position in a territory which we hope will one day be free of sanctions and to which we may hope to return. This is indeed my main point to the noble Lord. He assumes that sand ions will go on for ever. Let us look ahead to a settlement. Would it not be a tragedy if as a result of what he has said to-night this scheme were to be held up for ten years and, though the sanctions policy were to come to an end, the Rhodesians, in a new mood, were to be unable to participate in the benefits and the Africans in Portuguese East Africa and South Africa were to have a standard of living that much lower than it would otherwise have been?
I therefore suggest to Her Majesty's Government that as the United Nations resolution—I am compressing it a little—was the result of British initiative, Her Majesty's Government have a duty to try to secure uniformity of interpretation. I know it is not easy, but if we are to have a sanctions policy—and I am not debating to-night whether we should or not—I think Her Majesty's Government should take the lead in trying to secure uniformity of interpretation as far as possible.
Secondly, in the case of large projects such as the one we are discussing—it may be a harbour or a railway next time—where the operation is fairly close to Rhodesia, the Government should be prepared to give some sort of ruling in advance, if necessary by an Amending Order, so that British manufacturers may know whether they are in the clear or not. I think that British manufacturers have a fine reputation for following the Government's sanctions policy. The one or two cases that have been before the courts only serve to show how the great majority have faithfully followed the Government's sanctions policy, often at great loss and inconvenience to themselves, while struggling to keep their factories

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full—not an easy matter these days, in face of international competition. I submit that before the House rises to-night we expect from the Minister who is to reply some indication of action and leadership by Her Majesty's Government.
8.29 p.m.
LORD BEAUMONT or WHITLEY: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Gifford, for introducing this subject to-night and putting this Question. As the noble Lord, Lord Erroll, has said, sanctions is not the issue to-night. We on these Benches have often accused Her Majesty's Government of dilatoriness in imposing sanctions on Rhodesia, and we have sometimes thought that their desire to make peace with Rhodesia has led them to imperil the Six Principles. But we accept that it is their desire to impose and enforce sanctions as they stand at the moment.
It is not my intention to follow the noble Lord, Lord Gifford, into the whole question of Portuguese colonial policy, but the fact that I do not do so should not be taken to mean that I do not support almost everything that he said in this matter. But it seems to me that to-night we are asked to discuss what is, in point of fact, a very narrow and a very clear matter. It seems to me that it is indeed very odd that we should have to ask this question at all, since the answer appears to be so clear.
The noble Lord, Lord Gifford, has said what the law is, what Article 2 of the Southern Rhodesia United Nations Sanction Order 1968 says, and I do not propose to repeat that; it appears to be not in the least difficult to interpret. The noble Lord, Lord Gifford, has produced the evidence that participation in the dam will do exactly a number of things which are forbidden by that Order, and I listened with great care to the remarks which the noble Lord, Lord Erroll of Hale, had to make on this matter. It seemed to me, if I may say so with great respect, that this was the least satisfactory part of the noble Lord's contribution to the debate, because it did not seem to me that he had managed to refute the evidence that there is going to be very considerable gain to Rhodesia.
To quote one particular example, this question of there being no supply of
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electricity from South Africa back to Rhodesia rests entirely on the fact that there is none at the moment. Although obviously it is not up to people, in interpreting the law, to consider what other countries and other States may do in particular circumstances, it does appear in the light of present circumstances to be highly likely that when the Rhodesians run short of electricity supply in the mid-1970s they will turn to South Africa, and they will receive substantial help through this dam.
It seems to me, on the evidence that has been presented to us and from what we have managed to find out in other areas, that any British firm helping to build the dam would quite clearly be in breach of the British law on this matter. But if there should be any doubt, it also seems clear to me that the British Government should be seen to be coming down on the side of the enforcement of sanctions. It is our responsibility to the people of Rhodesia, first and foremost, to be the most adamant country in sanction enforcing. If anyone should say, as has been said on other subjects and other matters, that if we do not do it somebody else will, my reply would be that I regard this as an argument that is totally unethical and totally unacceptable.
However, I sympathise very much with the noble Lord, Lord Erroll of Hale, and I would support the plea that he made towards the end of his speech, first of all, that we should make a very strong effort to try to secure uniformity of interpretation of the law—and indeed uniformity of the law in those countries which are enforcing sanctions. And I think that people who are in the position of our industrialists, who are trying to get greater exports for this country, which we all want, would be much helped if that were to happen. Secondly, although I do not know the facts of the case in this particular instance (and I hope the noble Lord who is to reply will touch on this), I think that the request for a ruling in advance on many questions like this is obviously a very reasonable one, and a ruling would be very helpful.
Be that as it may, we cannot afford in any way to drag our feet and we should not in any way be seen to be dragging our feet, on sanctions. Many countries think, rightly or wrongly—I think rightly—that we mishandled the

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whole matter of sanctions. Many countries think, rightly or wrongly—and I think wrongly—that we did it on purpose; that we are more interested in the rich white man's club than in the people of Rhodesia and the concept of justice. I hope that what the Minister says tonight will reassure us all.
8.35 p.m.
LORD NELSON OF STAFFORD: My Lords, in rising to-night to speak to the Question tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Gifford, I must immediately declare my interest—although the noble Lord has already referred to it—as chairman of G.E.C.-English Electric. We have heard with interest the noble Lord's views on the Portuguese methods of Government and colonial policy, but as an industrialist I must point out to your Lordships that it is our job to get business overseas within the laws of this country. That is what we are doing, and that is how we proceed.
In the case of Cabora Bassa, the facts are not entirely correct. I think your Lordships should realise that this large scheme, which is the construction of a dam across the Zambesi to generate a large amount of power, 1,200 megawatts, at an approximate value of £120 million, would bring into the country some £60 or £65 million worth of equipment. The site is 150 miles inside Portuguese East Africa namely, Mozambique, and my company received an inquiry for this project in January, 1966, from an authority formed for the purpose by the Portuguese Government. Therefore, the customer is the Portuguese Government, and, so far as my company is concerned, so far as this country is concerned, we have many satisfactory trading relations with the Portuguese.
My information on the power station is that the financing of the project, which is international financing, is entirely based on a contract to sell the whole of the power to South Africa, with the exception of a very small fraction for local consumption in the area of the dam. This power will be supplied to South Africa over 1,000 miles of transmission line, all of which is on Portuguese East African territory, and fed into the South African system. The South African system is very short of power. The South Africans are not going to use their credit to put up a
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scheme of this magnitude to meet other than their own power needs. I think that is a very sound assurance, if one did not need any more. But on top of that, it is technically not feasible to do it. You cannot transmit this power for 1,000 miles down to South Africa and bring it 1,000 miles back again. Anyone who would do that sort of thing would have to be a lunatic. I think I must make it clear that this is the basis of the contract.
My company tendered as a part of a United Kingdom /Italian consortium, and in presenting our offer we made sure, so far as we were able, that we did not offend any of the Rhodesian sanctions. There was no Rhodesian equipment in it; there was no use of Rhodesian cement, which has been referred to in some places; there was no use of anything coming from Rhodesia. We were in competition with a United States consortium, who presented an offer, and a European consortium in which all the major industrialists in Europe were included, including Germany, Switzerland, France and Sweden. This consortium was later awarded the contract provisionally in July, 1968, and this was confirmed in September, 1969.
At that point the Swedish company—a specialist company engaged, as my noble friend Lord Erroll of Hale has already explained, in long-line high-power transmission lines—withdrew. We were specialists in this type of equipment too, and it was natural, seeking export business, to see whether there was a possibility that we might be invited by the European consortium to supply them with equipment for the line from Portuguese East Africa to South Africa—nothing to do with Rhodesia at all. In the event, in fact, we did not get the inquiry; they did not send us the inquiry, and the problem did not arise. There was nothing political in this; it was highly commercial, and they decided to do it themselves, for the very good reason that my noble friend has mentioned, that they wanted to get into this business. This was a heaven sent opportunity, and they are now in it.
So much for the facts. In conclusion, I should just like to put two points to your Lordships. My company has always obeyed, and always will obey, the laws of this country. In pursuing this valuable export order for a Portuguese customer.

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there is no intention whatsoever to flout the laws of our land. Our intention is solely to obtain, if we can, and within the law, valuable work for our factories which in this field, as your Lordships will know, are particularly underloaded at the present time. It is also to obtain valuable business for export, and thereby to contribute to the balance of payments. Finally—and this is where I find the argument put by the noble Lord rather difficult to understand—in all these schemes we are contributing to the development of the underdeveloped countries. Our objective in world finance, wherever finance comes in, is to raise the standard of living in those countries. One cannot do that without power, and that is what we have in mind.
Finally, may I draw you Lordships' attention to the dangers inherent in debating individual overseas contracts in your Lordships' House or in any other House? It can do great damage to our reputation. Many people overseas do not understand our political system. They read the reports of statements and debates; and it is our constant endeavour to try to put right misunderstandings which arise from matters of this sort. And I would make it quite clear that our competitors do not in any way diminish their efforts in trying to present a misleading position if they can. So it seems to me, at least, that the law must be, and should at all times be, subject to scrutiny and amendment through debate; but, surely, in the meantime, to avoid dangerous misunderstanding it must be left to the custodians of the law to see that the law is properly observed. My Lords, we are an exporting nation and my company is an exporting company. Can we afford to turn down business which, under our laws, is available to us? I agree with my noble friend Lord Erroll that if that is the case, the Government should clarify the law.
8.43 p.m.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, the value of this discussions has been much increased by the contribution of my noble friend Lord Nelson, who has given us the advantage of his wide knowledge and great experience in this matter. I am sure we must be grateful to him for that help. I think this is the most destructive, ill-advised and mischievous
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Question that I have seen on the Order Paper in this House for a long time. I came particularly to hear a proper denunciation of it by my noble friend Lord Erroll. He, speaking with great moderation, gave us the advantage of an effective examination of the angles that were raised by the noble Lord in asking his Question—and none of us will doubt the sincerity of the noble Lord's motives in bringing it up, however misguided we may feel it will be in its result. I was also shocked to hear the support for this Question which we have just heard from Lord Beaumont on the Liberal Benches, because it was of a character which one would not have expected.
I have no interest to declare except that of British industry; and as I see it this is a suggestion that there should be a limitation of the participation by British firms in activities in countries with whose internal policies we may disagree. The House does not need any reminding that the prestige of British engineering is very much benefited by the prosecution of its activities abroad, and a good record of achievements brings in more business. It is to denounce the suggestion that there should be a limitation of British trade that I rise; and I hope that we shall hear from Lord Shepherd, when he replies, a proper upholding of such activities by British industry. He himself, with his long business experience, I am sure must be well impressed by the danger of letting the challenge of this Question go unanswered.
I have never actually been on the site of the darn but I have had many talks over the past several years with Dr. Vaneck, who was the originator of this scheme; I have read a great deal of the literature about it; and I have digested all the benefits that can come to the African population from it—and they, of course, when the scheme comes to fruition, must be the biggest beneficiaries from it. As I think has already been explained, when it is completed this dam will bring the cheapest power, it is alleged, anywhere in the world; and it will be one of the big illustrations of an attempt to develop a settlement by irrigation to the benefit of the Africans in Mozambique. It will benefit the development of industry all over South Africa—and do not let us forget that the South African Republic, with only 6 per

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cent. of the population, consumes more than 50 per cent. of the total electricity on the African Continent.
But that is not the point on which I intend to spend any time. Lord Erroll has already emphasised the danger of this Question. I most emphatically support what he has said. It is because I support the development of this scheme that i deplore any suggestion of further criticism of the South African Government, or of the Portuguese Government, for that matter, particularly in the present atmosphere, which is creating enough dissatisfaction in South Africa with regard to attitudes in Britain. It is for that reason that I hope we shall hear—and, indeed, I look forward to hearing it—from the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, with his great experience of business, a proper encouragement of British industry and a reply to any attack on its participation in any part of the world in anything that may bring trade to this country.
LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down I wonder whether he would answer one question. He said, I think, of the Question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Gifford, that it was destructive, irresponsible and ill-informed. This question was asked, more or less, in the Economist of November 15—a paper which is usually held by most of us to be constructive, responsible and informed. Would the noble Lord apply those adjectives to the Economist?
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, my interest in speaking was merely in defence of British industry and to make a plea that we should not further antagonise South Africa.
8.48 p.m.
LORD BROCK WAY: My Lords, I had not intended to take part in this debate but I am impelled to do so by the speeches which have been delivered. I am a little sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Erroll, has now left his place on the Opposition Front Bench, because I particularly wanted to make a comment upon his speech. We have this dilemma. I recognise at once that these great engineering schemes for the distribution of electrical power can contribute immensely to the economic development of Africa and to the livelihood of its
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peoples. The noble Lord referred particularly to two of these projects: one the Volta project in Ghana and the other the Aswan Dam in the United Arab Republic, the Egyptian side. He also made reference to the dictator Kwame Nkrumah, under whom the Volta project took place. I quarrelled with Kwame Nkrumah when he repressed opposition and imprisoned leaders of other Parties, and, face to face, I expressed my criticism of that.
Nevertheless—and I think that what the noble Lord, Lord Erroll, said would indicate his recognition of this—the Volta project was a tremendous enterprise in Ghana for the economic development and the lifting of the standard of its people. I have been there. I have never in my life seen such a natural dam. It had the great quality of being built already between vast natural rocks with, behind it, that great lake, with enormous fishing possibilities and the extension of its electrical power all over Ghana, the effect of which will be immense. Therefore I accept the view of the noble Lord, Lord Erroll, that these schemes are going to be of enormous importance to the development of Africa and the livelihood of its peoples.
I thought the noble Lord was a little unjust in his reference to the Aswan Dam. If I heard him aright, he suggested that some of us were supporting it because it was Russian-aided. My Lords, I think that one of the great tragic mistakes in all policy in Africa in recent years was the decision of the United States of America to withdraw its contribution to the Aswan Dam scheme, and I regret tremendously the fact that our British Government followed the initiative which the American Government took upon that issue. The consequence has been—and we may not yet be able to judge the effects of this—to drive Egypt into the hands of the Soviet Union, which has stepped in and financed this great project.
The noble Lord, Lord Erroll, is perfectly correct when he says that these dams and the distribution of electrical power are of enormous influence in lifting the standard of life of the African people. Go into the neighbourhood of the Aswan Dam: you will see deserts converted into fertile land; thousands of peasants able to earn a livelihood

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which they could not have before, and the development among them of cooperative systems of society which may be the pattern of Africa in its development in its rural spheres. In all those respects I endorse what the noble Lord has said.
Then we come to this dilemma—and this is the real dilemma before this House to-night. The Volta scheme, in Ghana, was done by the African people for themselves; the Aswan Dam system in the U.A.R. was done by the Egyptian people for themselves. Whatever financial support they got from other countries—from America in the case of the Ghana dam; from the Soviet Union in the case of the Egyptian dam—loans which will be repaid in time, they are projects of the people for the people; for the development of the people and not for exploitation from outside. In the case of this dam in Mozambique, which again is going to have tremendous economic effects, it may lead to the expansion of the livelihood of thousands of people who are there, but it is not being done by the people for the people: it is done by a colonial Power, in the interests of the financiers of that colonial Power, and in the interests of the citizens of that colonial Power.
Has the noble Lord, Lord Erroll, seen the proposals of the Portuguese Government in this respect? They propose to introduce into Mozambique one million Europeans. It is not Africans who, in co-operative peasant communities, are going to benefit from the dam. One million Europeans are to be brought into an African country which is colonially controlled, with the Africans demanding the right to govern themselves. This project is not similar to Volta; this is not similar to the Aswan Dam; it is the exploitation by a colonial Power in the interests of its own financiers and its own one million Europeans, at the expense of the Africans who are living there. This is the real dilemma which faces us in Southern Africa. It faces us in Rhodesia, where a minority of 230,000 Europeans are trained to dominate nearly 5 million Africans; in Angola and Mozambique, under Portuguese control, where the African people are demanding the right to govern themselves; in South-West Africa where the
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United Nations has declared that the mandates should be transferred to the United Nations and away from the apartheid control in South Africa.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, if I may interrupt for a moment, does the noble Lord propose that in South-West Africa there should be any alternative government to the present government, which controls the ports and the rolling stock, and no other form of government is possible?
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, in reply to the noble Lord's interruption to what I have said, I want to be quite honest and answer that question. I think it is somewhat futile for the United Nations to carry these resolutions when it has no power to implement them. I want to see the United Nations given the power to implement its resolutions and to secure that the government of South-West Africa shall be in the interests of the African people, instead of the apartheid system which is dominated by the Republic of South Africa.
I was going to conclude by saying that this is a problem of the whole of Southern Africa; a problem of the Republic of South Africa itself. And if there are to be Volta projects, if there are to be Aswan dams, if there are to be these dams in Mozambique, then they must be for the benefit of the African people who live in those territories. They must not be imposed by colonialist Governments, they must not be applied by British Governments who have contracts for that purpose. They must not deny to the peoples of those territories the right to decide their own destinies, not only politically but economically as well.
9.0 p.m.
LORD SHEPHERD: We have on the Order Paper a rather narrow Question, but the debate has been wide-ranging and I am not quite certain whom I should blame, my noble friends behind me or the noble Lord, Lord Erroll of Hale, who discussed reform—I would not say deliberately, but certainly it does tend to enlarge the area of debate. I think the House will agree that my noble friend Lord Gifford put his point of view in the most cogent and sincere form possible.
My Lords, If I may, I will deal first with Her Majesty's Government attitude

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with regard to self-determination of the people of Mozambique. It is this. While we recognise their right to self-determination, we maintain, as we must maintain, that the question of carrying out the principle of self-determination rests, not in principle but in timing, with the administering Power. I would hope that the Portuguese authorities themselves would take note of world public opinion. We would wish to see the situation there evolve peacefully in the direction of Mozambique becoming independent, with rule by the majority. That is what we ourselves seek in Rhodesia.
The noble Lord, Lord Nelson, said that in business we must operate within the law. I am the first to say that his company have always shown that respect. Our sanctions legislation is directed only against Southern Rhodesia and not against Portugal or any other country. Therefore, it is not Her Majesty's Government's policy to discourage or prevent British companies from engaging in legitimate trade or dealings in Mozambique. There is nothing in our sanctions legislation which makes it an offence to supply goods from this country to Mozambique unless the supplier knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, that they will be supplied or delivered to, or to the order of, a person in Southern Rhodesia or that they will be used for the purpose of any business carried out or operated from Southern Rhodesia. In short, the mere supply of equipment to Mozambique does not fall within the ambit of our sanctions legislation. Similarly, there is nothing in our sanctions legislation which makes it an offence for a British bank, or the South African branch of a British bank, to finance the operation of a South African company constructing a dam and power project in Mozambique.
My Lords, I was asked to what extent this dam would affect the economic future of Rhodesia. As my honourable friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State said in another place on October 20, it is far too early to know how this dam will affect the economy of Rhodesia. So far as I can see, it is very much in line with what the noble Lord, Lord Nelson, himself said: the supply of power to Mozambique, the development of Mozambique and also the supply of power into South Africa. But I think I should make it clear, since I was asked
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about the legal position—clear in terms of sanctions to those British companies who might participate in this dam—that if British firms were to participate either as contractors for the construction of a power station or for the supply of machinery, they could not be held to be responsible for any decision the owners of the power station might take in 1974 or later to supply power to Southern Rhodesia. They would not be accessories to the breach of sanctions by virtue of their participation as constructors or contractors.
However, the location of the dam site is such that Southern Rhodesia might well be the most convenient and competitive source of supply for construction material such as sand, cement, structural steel, reinforcing rods and the like, and for other ancillary services including the supply of foodstuffs for the labour force. Participation by a British company in the construction of the installations at Cabora Bassa (or by a British bank or by the South African branch of a British bank in the financing of such construction) may therefore carry with it a risk of possible involvement in dealings in, or financing of dealings in, goods of Rhodesian origin. Any such company or bank should bear this in mind. They should also bear in mind that the Southern Rhodesian United Nations Sanctions (No. 2) Order prohibited dealings in any goods exported from Southern Rhodesia.
Having said that, everything depends on the nature of the involvement and on the facts of each case. A contravention of our legislation would only arise if there was evidence of the use of Rhodesian goods and the involvement of a British institution in their export from Rhodesia. The noble Lord, Lord Barnby, was, I thought, rather in the position of the pot calling the kettle black when he referred to the speech of my noble friend Lord Gifford as "mischievous". From my own point of view, he has made some of the most mischievous and damaging speeches in this House. But I say to him that the British Government will do all they can to help those companies that act within the law in their export trade.
Perhaps I should give this information so far as the Cabora Bassa business is

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concerned. E.C.G.D. would not cover any of this project unless it had consulted with Government Departments. We gave our support to what is referred to as the Anglo-Italian consortium and we took the view that the support we gave was implicit in the financial terms that were supported by E.C.G.D. I would make clear that giving that support did not in any way imply that British members of the consortium, if successful, would not have been subject to the provisions of our sanctions legislation.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Gifford, asked whether we gave encouragement to G.E.C.-English Electric to take over from the Swedish company. We did not encourage them to seek to fill this gap. We had already drawn the company's attention to the sanctions legislation and pointed out the risks involved by a British firm in participating in any contract for the supply or installation of equipment in Cabora Bassa. The noble Lord, Lord Erroll of Hale, asked whether I could spell out in clear terms the position of British companies in like circumstances. I have sought to set it out in terms of the Sanction Order. If any company wish to go into any of these contracts they will be advised to consult the Board of Trade, and we will give them the best information we can. In the end, it depends entirely upon the particular circumstances of the operation.
As regards the possibility of Her Majesty's Government taking any international initiative aimed at preventing, on
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sanctions grounds, such participation by foreign companies, it is for the United Nations Security Council, acting on the advice of the United Nations Sanctions Supervisory Committee, to determine whether any individual member of the United Nations is in breach of its obligations under the Security Council Resolution No. 253. If we were to receive information that, for instance, Rhodesian minerals had been used, or were likely to be used, by a company participating in this project, we could bring the matter to the attention of the United Nations Sanctions Supervisory Committee; and it would be for that Committee, on which we are represented, to decide what action it should take on our information. Any other United Nations member could take similar action.
My Lords, in this case there is no legal requirement for us to take action against any companies which wish to develop in Mozambique. Whether one should take action or not is a matter of belief. I would only say to my noble friends that if we stopped trading with all the countries in the world with which we disagreed we should be in a very parlous state. We have to make our judgments on the facts, and particularly on what we are being asked to supply and how the article will be used. In general, it is not possible, I think, to lay down a firm rule on this. We would support business to Mozambique but, I would add: if it infringes the Sanctions Regulations, then let those companies beware!
House adjourned at twelve minutes past nine o'clock.