Lords Sitting of 8 December 1969

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the Clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR On the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Manchester.

NIGERIA: PROPOSED MEDIATION BY SWISS GOVERNMENT
LORD SORENSEN: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they have been approached by the Swiss Government in regard to the reported request to that Government to mediate on the present protracted hostilities in Nigeria.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (LORD SHEPHERD): No, my Lords.
LORD SORENSEN: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend whether there has been any kind of contact with the Swiss Government regarding mediation, and if this is at all related to the report that Emperor Haile Selassie is engaged in yet another attempt in this direction?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, we have, of course, close relations with Switzerland, and naturally exchange views. The Swiss Government have themselves said that if they were to mediate it must be on the basis that both sides would welcome it. So far as the Emperor of Ethiopia is concerned, I have seen the reports in the Press but would not wish to make any further comment.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, in view of my noble friend's reference to the initiative of Emperor Haile Selassie, may I ask whether our Minister in Lagos, during his visit there, has been encouraging this hopeful step towards peace?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, the views of the Federal Government are well known: that they are willing and anxious
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to talk with Biafran authorities if there is any meaningful chance of bringing about a peaceful settlement. Therefore there is no reason for us to press the Federal authorities. I think this is now a matter which we should leave with the Emperor of Ethiopia.
LORD SORENSEN: My Lords, if I may follow with a further supplementary question, may I ask my noble friend whether, according to his information, the attempted mediation by the Swiss Government has now lapsed?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, so far as I understand it, mediation was considered by the Swiss authorities, but I have no information whether it went any further.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: My Lords, following the answer which my noble friend gave before the last supplementary question, may I further ask him: how can we except the Biafran authorities to mediate or discuss matters with us at all while we continue to provide their enemy with arms?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I think the noble Baroness will see that I was answering a rather different question. It was in regard to mediation by the Emperor of Ethiopia.

MARINE SEARCH AND RESCUE
2.38 p.m.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether the Committee set up to inquire into the Marine Search and Rescue Organisation in the United Kingdom has yet reported, and whether the Report will be published.]
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, the Committee has not yet reported, but is expected to do so by the end of this year, or soon after. When my right honourable friend the President of the Board of Trade receives the Report he will consider whether or not it is desirable to publish it.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for that reply, may I ask him whether he cannot go further at this stage in view of the widespread interest in this matter, particularly in summer time, and give an assurance that the Report will be published?
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, I cannot give a categorical assurance that it will be published, but I can see the merit of publication and I will certainly see that the noble Earl's view is taken into account.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: My Lords, could the noble Lord advise us whether the Committee's terms of reference included the question of the reimbursement of the Royal Air Force by the Home Office for the costs involved in civilian rescue?
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, the terms of reference were quite broad. They were to look into the marine search and rescue organisation, and to make recommendations. There is nothing within those terms which precludes the Committee from making a recommendation in the sense referred to by the noble Earl.

URANIUM ENRICHMENT SCHEME
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what progress has been made in the formation of the two companies which will operate the proposed tripartite uranium enrichment scheme for the United Kingdom, West Germany and The Netherlands.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE, MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY (LORD DELACOURT-SMITH): My Lords, the tripartite Prime Contractor and Enrichment Company could not be formed while certain negotiating issues remained unresolved. I do not wish to anticipate the Statement which my right honourable friend expects to make
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shortly about the collaboration, but I can say that the way will soon be clear to set them up.
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for answering that Question, may I ask him whether he could not now tell us the names of the firms involved in each country? I understand from The Times Business News that in Germany and the Netherlands the companies have been named. They were named some time ago, and their percentage participation agreed. Am I not right in thinking that Britain is delaying the scheme largely because our own Fuel Corporation has not yet been formed? Would not the noble Lord agree that the House should be fully informed, in view of the detailed and, I might say, semi-official statements which have been made both in Bonn and Amsterdam? Moreover, in view of American progress in their own uranium enrichment scheme, does the noble Lord not agree that we in Europe should proceed with all speed in this matter?
LORD DELACOURT-SMITH: My Lords, the noble Earl has asked a number of questions. I can certainly agree with him that it is desirable to proceed with all possible speed; but there are a number of matters which have had to be settled, and there are still some points which remain to be resolved. The position is that the British shareholder in both companies will be the Atomic Energy Authority, which, provided that Parliament approves the necessary legislation, will be succeeded in due course by the proposed Nuclear Fuel Company. The Dutch Government and several Dutch companies have formed a group which will hold the Dutch shares; and German industrial groups have similarly formed two groups, one to hold shares in each of the tripartite companies.
So far as a further statement is concerned, as I have said, my right honourable friend hopes to make a statement soon upon this matter; and it will of course be appropriate for the statements to be co-ordinated in the three countries concerned. But I would draw attention to the fact that before they can sign the agreement our Dutch and German partners must, under the Euratom

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Treaty, communicate the terms of it to the European Commission.
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: My Lords, I am sorry to press the noble Lord, but is he satisfied that we are proceeding with sufficient despatch in this matter? I should like to ask him this additional question: can he confirm that the capital expenditure will be of the order of some £625 million, but that the annual saving as a result of our not having to buy this enriched fuel from the United States may be as high as £162 million?
LORD DELACOURT-SMITH: My Lords, I can confirm that all outstanding issues have now been settled. We hope soon to make, in co-ordination with our partners, a comprehensive statement, which will, I hope, cover, among others, the points which the noble Earl raised about capital cost.
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: My Lords, would not the noble Lord agree that the other two countries concerned are ready and that it is Britain that is delaying the scheme?
LORD DELACOURT-SMITH: My Lords, I could not accept that.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, could my noble friend give confirmation of the statement that the uranium will be used only for peaceful purposes and not for nuclear weapons?
LORD DELACOURT-SMITH: My Lords, I hope that my noble friend will be prepared to await the fuller statement which, as I have said, my right honourable friend will be making soon.

GOODS VEHICLES AND ROAD SAFETY
LORD MOYLE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what they propose to do to restrict the alarming increase in the number of both large and heavy vehicles on our major and minor roads which is becoming a serious danger to other road users.]
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, in order to make the movement of goods in the heavier and larger vehicles as safe as possible to other road users. Her Majesty's Government have recently taken a series of measures; namely, the introduction of an annual test of commercial vehicles, the reintroduction of heavy goods vehicle driving licences and the forthcoming institution of operators' licensing. The first of these is directed to the improvement of the maintenance of the vehicle fleet, and the other two measures will further increase road safety by excluding operators and drivers who do not reach the required standards. We should give these measures a chance to work before calling for further restrictions.
LORD MOYLE: My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for that reply, may I ask him whether there is any truth in the report that the Government are contemplating permitting a further increase in the weight, size and length of heavy vehicles, not merely on the motorways and trunk roads but even on the secondary roads?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, proposals by the industry for increasing the gross weight of goods vehicles are now under consideration by Her Majesty's Government. I cannot give any indication of when a decision will he arrived at.
LORD MOYLE: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether he will press the Government to give serious consideration to the growing unrest among road users other than heavy vehicle drivers?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I am wed aware of the unrest among motorists. On the other hand, I am certain that my noble friend will agree that we are now in the latter part of the 20th century, that we need to earn our living, and that the movement of goods is an important factor in our ability to do so.
LORD MOYLE: And so, my Lords, is human life.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, is the Minister aware that it is not only other road users who are endangered but the fabric of our ancient towns and villages? Is it really a sign of being

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alive to the requirements of the 20th century to destroy such places as York?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, the noble Lord is quite correct; all these factors have to be taken into account. But the local authorities have power even to-day to restrict the movements of vehicles if they are causing harm.
LORD POPPLEWELL: My Lords, would my noble friend do everything possible to promote the view that these heavy loads that are cluttering up our highways should be encouraged back to different methods of transport—to rail or to waterway? There is an overwhelming need for this. For many years the general idea has been to get traffic on the roads. Will my noble friend discuss with his right honourable friend the possibility of reversing that trend and getting back to alternative means of transport?
LORD SHEPHERD: I agree with my noble friend that we should see that goods are moved by rail as much as possible.
BARONESS EMMET OF AMBERLEY: My Lords, could the Minister tell me whether the question of the protection of the wheels of heavy vehicles with proper flaps during wet weather is being considered? I asked a question about this some time ago and I was told that inquiries were being made. I should like to know whether any conclusions have been reached.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, that is clearly in the realm of safety. I will certainly see that that point is considered by the appropriate committee.

GIBRALTAR
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: My Lords, I beg leave to ask a Question of which I have given Private Notice; namely,
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will make a Statement about the discussions with the Chief Minister of Gibraltar.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, with permission I will answer that Question at about 3.30 this afternoon.

RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION BILL [H.L.]
2.48 p.m.
Report of Amendments received.
Then, Standing Order No. 41 having been suspended (pursuant to Resolution of December 4):
THE MINISTER OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY (BARONESS SEROTA: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a third time. During the Committee stage of the Bill the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, asked what proportions of financial support will be given to the Board from the Health Ministers, the Atomic Energy Authority and the Medical Research Council. I have since given him this information but he has suggested that I should give it to the whole House at this stage of the Bill. With permission, I shall do so briefly.
The estimated current gross revenue expenditure for the financial year 1969/ 70 will be divided as follows. For the Radiological Protection Service, the Secretary of State for Social Services will contribute £365,000, amounting to 45 per cent. of the total. The Secretary of State for Scotland, will contribute £46,000, some 5 per cent. of the total; and the Medical Research Council, £161,000, 20 per cent. of the total. For the relevant parts of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority Health and Safety branch, the Atomic Energy Authority will contribute £250,000, some 30 per cent. of the total. That makes a total budget of £822,000. For the first few years the contributions from these four sources to the new Board will be worked out on proportions calculated approximately on the basis of current expenditure. Afterwards the proportions will be reviewed, and revised, if necessary, in the light of the situation at the time. I hope that that information is satisfactory to the noble Earl and to the House.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 3a.—(Baroness Serota.)
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Baroness for that additional information about the proportion of financial support

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to be given to the new Board not only by the Health Minister but also by the Ministry of Technology for the Atomic Energy Authority, the Department of Education and Science and the Medical Research Council. These figures give a much clearer picture of the scope of the work. As I see it, we shall this year be spending on these services, something of the order of £822,000, of which about half will come from the Votes of the Secretary of State for Social Security and the Secretary of State for Scotland, and the remainder from the M.R.C. and the A.E.A. I understand that for the first few years the contribution from these four sources will be worked out in similar proportions, but that they will be reviewed from time to time and, if necessary, revised.
The Bill certainly seems designed—and I think this is most important—to promote the efficient use of the radiological protection staff by concentrating them under one Board. However, in the case of the Atomic Energy Authority only a small theoretical section appears to be involved. It would appear that the practical sections doing research, that is to say, the health, physics and medical division at Harwell, will continue—I hope I have this right—to parallel similar work by the Board. I do not know whether the noble Baroness can say whether I am right on this point. I should have thought that here was an opportunity substantially to reduce the A.E.A's. work on radiological protection.
There is one further point on which I am still not quite clear. As I understand it, there are in existence a number of hospital-based film monitoring services on which no information is given concerning their future. I think that the largest is the Liverpool Radium Institute. It seems to me that advantages should accrue if their work were transferred to the new Board and displaced staff were employed on essential medical work. If the noble Baroness does not feel in a position to comment on these points this afternoon, I have no doubt that they will be raised by my honourable friends when the Bill is considered in another place. Apart from these points, and certain considerations which I raised on Second Reading and the Committee stage and which I do not propose to recapitu-
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late now, I agree that this is a useful Bill which should be given a Third Reading.
BARONESS SEROTA: My Lords, I think I can reassure the noble Earl on the two points he has raised. It is not intended that the creation of the new Board should have any immediate effect on the activities, including research activities, which are now being undertaken by the component parts of the new organisation. It will of course be for the Board itself to assess the work it has in hand and to bring about a co-ordination of the various research activities being undertaken at present. It is not possible to predict at this stage whether any saving of the staff engaged in research would be possible, or in fact effected, by such a process, but I have noted the point the noble Earl has made and I am sure that it will be borne in mind.
With regard to his question relating to the future of the film badge monitoring services, it is true that these are at present undertaken by the radiological protection service, and the Atomic Energy Authority provides its own film monitoring service. I think, my Lords, that it would be reasonable for the new Board to provide a national service, probably on an automated basis in due course. I have no doubt that were this to be the case the Board would discuss with other organisations, such as those mentioned by the noble Earl, the extent to which the Board itself should provide a service for the particular organisations involved in this need. I hope that with these two assurances the House will agree to give the Bill a Third Reading.
On Question, Bill read 3a: an Amendment (privilege) made; Bill passed, and sent to the Commons.

CUSTOMS (IMPORT DEPOSITS) BILL
2.56 p.m.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, the purpose of this Bill is to give effect to the Government's decision, announced in this House on October 21, to seek power to extend the operation of the import deposits scheme for a further period of twelve months from December 5, 1969. The powers proposed are precisely those given under the 1968 Act except that

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the rate of deposit is reduced from 50 per cent. to 40 per cent. The power to collect the deposit under the 1968 Act expired at midnight on December 4, 1969. It may be of interest to say that by that time about £1,120 million had been collected and £580 million repaid. But for the necessary Ways and Means Resolution, which covered the situation that exists until the passing of this Act, £540 million would have been repaid over the next 180 days, at the rate of £90 to £100 million a month, without any offsetting new deposits. The financial effect of this Bill will be to reduce the rate of repayment from the £90 to £100 million a month to a net rate averaging some £20 million a month between December, 1969, and May, 1970.
Since the 1968 Act went on to the Statute Book there has been a very marked improvement in the financial position of our country. This is confirmed by the figures published to-day for the balance of payments surplus for the third quarter of the year. But even with this improvement, which has set in during 1969, it would be exposing the convalescent patient to an unnecessarily cold wind if he was exposed to this sharp blast of repayments at the rate of £90 to £100 million a month. This, then, is one justification of the renewal of the import deposits scheme, that it avoids any abrupt impact on our reserve position.
Equally, if not more important, the continued requirement of a 40 per cent. deposit means that the control of credit expansion is assisted and not frustrated. Sometimes in the course of economic policies, extending back beyond the lifetime of the present Administration, we have had a situation in which fiscal measures have run counter to monetary policy. Here we have a proposal which ensures that they run in harmony.
There is another good, complementary, reason for the Bill: it directly discourages certain imports. By the nature of things it is not possible to quantify this discouraging effect but available evidence suggests that the previous rate of increase of imports has been markedly slowed down by this deposits scheme. In any case, where an importer decides that, despite the deposit, he must buy foreign goods, there is a consequential monetary advantage to the economy.
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I believe the case is made for the extension of the deposits scheme, at this reduced rate and for a limited period. But, of course, there are arguments against the proposal, and maybe I could help the noble Lord, Lord Erroll of Hale, and save the time of the House if I dealt with some of them in advance. First, there is the argument that undertakings were given when the scheme was first put before the House for approval in 1968 that it would be temporary. That is true. It was intended to be temporary and it is intended to be temporary. I know of no dictionary which defines "temporary" as one year and "permanent" as two years. I agree that the original intention was to limit the scheme to twelve months, but the effort to shift resources into the export market has been harder than was originally estimated and results have been slower in making an impact on the balance of payments figures. I put it to noble Lords opposite (and I see before me now the hardest-headed and clearest-minded members of the Opposition) that it would be just plain silly to deny ourselves this further use of the deposits scheme until our recovery was more firmly established.
I might add that our friends abroad recognise that this is so and recognise it more clearly than do some compatriots at home. Other countries, fellow members of EFTA and the I.M.F., accept the fact that we are applying this scheme because, and only because, of the balance of payments position, and that it is in their interests and in the interests of international trade generally, as well as in Britain's interests, that we get that position right beyond doubt—and beyond the doubt of the currency speculator. Given that, I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Erroll of Hale, will not play politics in this House and talk about broken international commitments.
There is another argument, more fairly put, and which has to be met; namely, that lack of liquid resources, and credit restriction generally, will result in complete company failures in some cases and inadequate capital development elsewhere. This argument has to be taken very seriously. But it is a matter of judgment, and in a wider context than this one measure. In the New Year there will be additional strains. I know, arising

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from tax demands, but the total evidence available does not suggest, in the considered judgment of the Chancellor and his advisers, that now is the time to revise policy on credit restraints.
There is one further point that I should like to make before inviting your Lordships to give this Bill a Second Reading. There is probably room for more than one opinion upon the merits of this import deposits scheme but I hope the noble Lord opposite will be able to join with me in paying a tribute to the Customs and Excise Department who have had the responsibility of administering it. The procedures adopted were simple and they have been successful. East desposit is repaid separately from a Customs office at Southend-on-Sea. Some 25,000 orders are sent out each week, and from the beginning of the scheme to the beginning of this month 650,000 have been sent out. About 350 early repayments in respect of goods which are exported are despatched each week, and usually within one week of notification that the goods have in fact been exported.
It is not often that the victims of imposts find it possible to pay tribute to the officers responsible, but individual firms, the C.B.I. and other trade organisations have been complimentary. The British Chemical and Dyestuff Traders Association, for example, said:
"I need hardly tell you what the views of this Association are about the scheme in general … but everyone has been very impressed with the prompt and efficient way in which repayments have been made …".
In view of the Christmas spirit, I hope that, on that charitable note, your Lordships will agree to give this Bill a Second Reading.
Moved, That the Bill now read 2a—(Lord Beswick.)
3.5 p.m.
LORD ERROLL OF HALE: My Lords, in rising to take part in the debate on the Second Reading of this Bill, I should begin by declaring a personal interest, as I did during the Second Reading of the Bill a year ago. I am chairman of a company which imports a great deal of Swedish engineering products and we are considerably affected by the present Bill, as we were by the last. However, I should hasten to add that anything I say
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this afternoon has nothing to do with this private interest, although perhaps I speak with rather greater knowledge of the subject than might otherwise be the case. In regard to my own company, we had made proper arrangements to deal with the import deposit financial problems. We have imported more than ever in the last twelve months and our Swedish principals have bought far more from Britain than they have ever done in the past. So, from the point of view of my personal interest, I assure your Lordships that I have no axe to grind at this Box this afternoon.
The noble Lord, Lord Beswick, in an admirably brief speech, sought to answer my arguments before he had heard them—quite a legitimate tactic when you have very little to say in support of your case, but it would have been more appropriate if he had waited until he had heard my speech and then answered the points when he came to wind up. However, I do not wish to spoil his fun. He will find that there are a number of points which he did not succeed in anticipating and to which I hope to receive full and adequate answers before your Lordships grant a Second Reading to this Bill.
First of all, the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, referred to the temporary nature of the scheme and said that "temporary" did not necessarily mean one year, nor did "permanent" mean two years. But the noble Lord might refresh his memory with what he said on the occasion of the Second Reading of the previous Bill, on December 5, 1968. In opening the debate then and giving details of the Bill, he said:
"It fulfils the outline"—
given—
"the 50 per cent. rate of deposit, which may be reduced but not increased by Treasury Order; the repayment period of 180 days; and the twelve months maximum life of the Scheme, which may be reduced, but not increased …".—[0FFICAL REPORT, 5/12/68; col. 309.]
Not the Bill, but the scheme. The scheme was to have a twelve months' maximum life. There was no question of the word "temporary". So much for what the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, said in your Lordships' House.
On Committee stage in another place, on December 3, 1968, the Financial Secretary, referring to the subsection dealing

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with the period of the Bill, said that the Act
"shall cease to be in force at the expiration of a period of one year beginning with the date on which this Act is passed, or at such earlier time as the Treasury may by order …"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, 3/12/68; col. 1484.]
decide. It is clear from what the Ministers in both Houses said at the time that it was their intention that this scheme should last for a maximum period of one year. That was why it was called a temporary import deposits scheme, and industrialists and traders in this country thought that it would last for the maximum period of one year. But we are now to have a second year, and doubtless we shall be told that it may not last the whole of the second year, only to Lind at the end of that year that we get the Mark III Bill.
That may not matter very much in this country. The noble Lord said that no firms are likely to go bankrupt or be unable to pay up on due dates. It is not that which really concerns me; it is the effect abroad. The noble Lord made some reference to the understanding co-operation of our partners in Europe, but I can assure him that the continuation of this twelve-months measure has caused a considerable degree of disillusionment abroad. At the time of the introduction of the scheme, a number of my friends in Europe, not only in Sweden but also in France, Germany and Switzerland, and some who came to see us in England at the London Chamber of Commerce, asked about this import deposits scheme, and we were all able to say—and I make this point strongly because I did so a great deal myself—that this was a scheme which was going to last for a maximum period of one year; that the British Government themselves had said so.
I think noble Lords know me well enough to know that I always defend the British Government abroad, and whenever I can at home, in front of foreigners. I felt completely confident that the maximum life of the scheme was twelve months. So it was difficult when I saw visitors here from Europe, or when I saw them in their own countries, who said: "Oh, your Government will think up another scheme as soon as this one has run out." I said: "No; I do not think so; not this time. I have listened
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to Ministers, and I have heard their assurances. This time I am sure that the scheme is only going to last for a maximum period of twelve months." They said: "Freddie"—those who knew me well enough—"you will believe anything that your Government tell you. There will be something else in its place." I said, "No; I am quite sure this time that they mean what they say."
So the noble Lord has, in fact, let me down personally by his bland assumption that "temporary" does not mean twelve months but can mean any period that you like. It does not matter that I feel that I have been let down in my defence of the British Government abroad; that is of little concern. What really matters is that the British Government, for continuing this scheme without any previous warning or notice, are slightly more in disrepute than they were before, in view of the categorical assurances that were given at the time of its introduction, two examples of which I have already quoted to your Lordships. That does a lot of harm. It induces scepticism about the intentions of the Government.
A week or two ago we were discussing the effect of the £50 travel allowance. I do not intend to refer to that to-day, except to say that it produces a bad effect abroad. it does not make much difference to the balance of payments; and I do not think that this scheme makes much difference to the balance of payments. It is the fact that Her Majesty's Government changed their minds. Having given what everybody understood to be categorical assurances, they blandly throw them overboard and put forward arguments about keeping international money speculators at bay, strengthening the pound et cetera. I regard it as a very unfortunate affair that Her Majesty's Government should have taken this step at the present time, when there was, in my opinion, no need to renew the scheme at all.
Indeed, the difficulty is to find out whether the scheme has been of value or not. It has certainly been an inconvenience to many people in this country. It has probably caused difficulties to some small importers. But the Government themselves are not sure. They say that while it is impossible to quantify—and I accept that it is—they seek authority on the basis of the fact that imports did

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not grow as much as they have done in previous years. But then imports are unlikely to have grown in the last 16 months because of the Government's credit squeeze and restraint on the money supply. That in itself was sufficient to damp down the demand for imports, and even for domestically produced goods. At the outset of the scheme the Chancellor of the Exchequer on November 22, 1968, in the other place, said:
"The scheme is not one which can or should be kept in being for more than a limited period, but it will have a powerful effect over the next few months…"
But his own Financial Secretary, Mr. Lever, reported in Hansard six days later, said:
"The whole point of the scheme is that it is to have a marginal effect."
So Ministers were not clear about it at the time. As the months passed, it was interesting to see again this curious dichotomy of view. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, at a meeting with insurance officials in May, 1969, reported in the Financial Times, said:
"The Imports Deposit Scheme without producing dramatic results has by no means been without its effect"—
a rather elegant form of double negative, of which he, as a great literary expert, will appreciate the full value.
So, as the months went by, it was interesting to see that it was not clear whether the scheme was having much of an effect or not. If it was not having much of an effect, then there was no point in continuing it; but if it does have an effect, then that ought to have been brought out. British Industry Week, as opinion was crystallising last summer, said on May 30, that:
"As far as can be determined the effects of the scheme have been minimal. A wide cross-section of industry quizzed only last week could find no evidence of imports being curbed since the scheme's introduction. It has certainly caused difficulties, but no more than that."
Then, as one goes on through the year, one finds that the Board of Trade Journal—surely a publication which the Government accept as authoritative—say on August 6, 1969, that the scheme
"may have affected the level of certain imports among industrial materials. There is no clear evidence of any marked effect, however, since imports of semi-manufactures, which were largely subject to the scheme,
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increased a little by volume between the second half of 1968 and the first half of this year."
Perhaps I may be allowed to quote from the London Chamber of Commerce—and here I must declare an interest as one of its Vice-Presidents. In its News Letter of October 24 of this year it said:
"The scheme has, however, involved importers in special and expensive financial arrangements which in some cases will have been passed on to the consumer in the form of increased prices. But the evidence we have been able to obtain from a broad cross-section of importers is that the scheme, while it has had some initial success in checking imports, has not over the period of its operation resulted in a material reduction in the volume of goods chargeable to the import deposit."
So it is very doubtful whether the scheme has been worth all the pain and effort that has gone into its conception.
While I should be the last to say anything against the Board of Customs and Excise, for whose body of officials I have a great admiration, nevertheless, I do not think they need have unctuous praise, because they are merely doing what they ought to be doing. Indeed, they should repay these monies properly: and I wonder whether they would have been so prompt if it had not been for the great outcry at the time that they would not be prompt. Grave fears were expressed by commerce and industry that there would be substantial delays in repaying these import deposits by the time the repayment became due, because so many people have had experience of customs and excise delays in repaying deposits of customs duty in the normal course of business. So if we are to thank them for doing what they ought to do, we should also remember that they probably did it because they knew that there would be a very proper public outcry if they hung on to the money a day longer than they should have done.
We turn next to some of the temporary effects which have been so unsatisfactory. One of those has been the way in which interest has been denied to those who have had to make the deposits. I submit to Ministers that it is a very bad precedent for the Government to establish; namely, the compulsory collection of deposits without the payment of any interest. Noble Lords may remember that

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with post-war credits there was for a long time an outcry because no interest was payable on those that were not repaid. That was put right in the Budget of 1959. since when the deferment of payment of post-war credits has been acceptable. The Government pay interest on money held by the Board of Trade in connection with the insolvency of companies; the Government pay interest on tax reserve certificates. It is a well accepted and proper principle that when the Government hold monies owned by the individual the Government pay a rate of interest. I am not suggesting that it should necessarily be the going rate of interest, but it does acknowledge the principle that interest should be paid.
It is a particularly bad feature of this scheme that these monies should be held without payment of interest. It is particularly exacerbating for those firms concerned when interest rates are so high. I am not making that as a principal point; I just think that it is a bad principle that the Government should take money from people and not be prepared to pay interest. It means that people, recognising how manifestly unfair it is, may be tempted to take it out of the Government in other directions; they may be tempted into delaying paying company taxation by a little longer than they would otherwise do. They say: "You take our money away and will not pay us interest, so we will hold on to what is due to you for as long as we can before you take us to court."
This is where the scheme is so bad. It is destroying what remains of mutual confidence between individuals and Government departments. I have seen it stated in a Sunday newspaper that the best way of living to-day, if you are a company, is to find a means of tax dispute of a sufficiently big sum of money and to take it to court. So long as the matter is before the courts no money is payable and no interest is payable. In fact, if the sum of money involved is large enough, it costs less to bring the case up to your noble Lordships' House for a final decision, pay the legal fees and have use of the money, than to surrender the money earlier to the Inland Revenue, thus losing the interest on it. This is the state of affairs which is induced by the unfairness of Her
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Majesty's Government in refusing to pay interest.
If that were not bad enough, where the Government has been so petty in this matter (it is perhaps a rather technical point, and I hope I am not taking up too much of Your Lordships' time) is that they said at the inception of the scheme that if foreign exporters to Britain provided the money to the British importer, while it did not take money out of the British economy, it would help the British balance of payments in the short run. That is an ingenious argument, and I thought so at the time. A number of foreign firms have done this and provided the money, and thus helped the British balance of payments. The mean part of the Government's action was that it would not allow the British importer to pay interest across the exchanges, at his own expense, to service the loan from the foreign exporter to this country. That is quite indefensible and leads only to a degree of bitterness out of all proportion to the small amount of interest so saved.
When funds from abroad are deposited in Britain in almost any other context, interest at the going rate is permitted. In this one case, where the transfer of funds can be identified as a loan to meet an import deposit, interest across the exchanges is denied to the lender, and the borrower is not allowed to transmit it. Of course, what happens, inevitably, is that ways and means are found of getting round this ban because it is so unfair. If only Her Majesty's Government could realise that when they do these things which are so manifestly unfair they build up far more than any small saving to the balance of payments could possibly justify! For these and many other reasons I deplore the continuation of this legislation, albeit at a slightly reduced rate. I appreciate, too, that the rate can go down from 40 to 30 per cent.: it can be reduced. But it has not been reduced in the past twelve months, and I would ask: is there much likelihood that it will be reduced in the coming twelve months? I think the likelihood is very small indeed.
There are arguments which can be used for exempting different classes of products. I would not wish to waste your Lordships' time on devising refinements to the scheme, which I personally believe

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should be abolished. There are some very strange anomalies in it. For instance, certain steel products are now allowed into this country, temporarily, duty-free because domestic industry cannot provide them; but import deposit still has to be paid. The Government help the user, on the one hand, but handicap him, on the other hand, by still insisting on the payment of import deposits. Plywood is urgently required for packing cases, and the like, for export goods, yet that also is subject to the import deposit scheme. I merely mention some of these anomalies and stupidities of temporary legislation, and say that if this had shown any signs of becoming permanent legislation we should want to see written into the Bill means for dealing with anomalies and absurdities of that sort.
Reading behind the Bill, the real question in my mind is, what is Her Majesty's Government's attitude towards imports. A noble colleague of mine on this Front Bench said to me a few minutes ago: "Nobody is speaking about imports to-day because 'imports' is a dirty word." But why should it be a dirty word? After all, our exports are another country's imports. We live by trade in both directions. I should hope that Her Majesty's Government, in the last few months of their lives, would spend a little time in rationalising their ideas on imports and on trade.
I should like to take your Lordships back to a very important policy speech made by the then Leader of Her Majesty's Opposition, now the Prime Minister. I refer to the famous Swansea speech of January 25, 1964. He spoke very clearly then, and said:
"Import-saving industries needed to be developed, and this should be tackled with at least the same urgency as the exports drive."
He said that he was appalled at the big increase in machinery and semi-finished manufactures that came into Britain in the past few years. Then he went on:
"If I were President of the Board of Trade"—
and he had been, so he should know—
"I should sit down and work out in detail from the trade returns all those imports which rise sharply—Then each would be examined to see whether we could, economically and competitively, find means of producing them in our own factories.
"The next job would be to discuss with industry … the prospect of developing home
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produced substitutes. This would be one of the priority tasks of our new economic planning machinery."
That was said on January 25, 1964, in Swansea. There have been many changes since then. While, on the one hand, we are told about the evils of importing, there seems to be another mood growing up, particularly in the Government's economic Ministries, and among leaders of key sections of British industry.
The Financial Times reports on the meetings of the National Economic Development Council. Perhaps I might mention to your Lordships that reports of these meetings are not exactly inspired leaks, but no official communiqué is issued: a spokesman gives the gist of what was discussed. That is intended to be an authoritative but informal summary of the discussion that took place. So I think it right that I should quote one report, which appeared in the Financial Times, because at this meeting of the National Economic Development Council it was revealed that Government economic Ministries are cutting down sharply on the attention directed to import substitution and the "Buy British" approach. The report continues:
"At an all-day meeting of the National Economic Development Council and heads of seven Economic Development Committees in London yesterday it was agreed that in important sectors, such as engineering, electronics, chemicals and machine tools, the emphasis should be on equipping industry with the best products from whatever source …"—
that is to say, from abroad as well as domestic.
"The interesting point about the views expressed yesterday on imports substitution"—
the point made so eloquently by the then Leader of the Opposition in his Swansea speech—
"is that for many years the desire for import substitution as an aid to the balance of payments has often outweighed the more economic considerations of international competitiveness. Indeed, examination of areas where import substitution might provide savings has taken up a significant proportion of certain Economic Development Committees' time. While these considerations are hardly going to disappear from official policy, it is clear that the United Kingdom's post-devaluation situation has reduced the pressures on this front."
So it seems clear that at least inside Whitehall, if not overtly, there is a change of mood on import substitution and policy. If the report that appears

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to come from the National Economic Development Council is true, I welcome this change. The best way of helping British industry to become more efficient in terms of world competitiveness is for its products to be bought on merit, and not for patriotism or on patriotic grounds. The best way for British firms to become efficient is for the products of other countries to be equally available in this market, as they are in other markets of the world where British firms have to compete. The best way for British firms to re-equip themselves with the most modern capital equipment is to buy British or foreign, depending upon which is the more suitable for their purpose, regardless of what flag may be attached to the packing case delivered to the works. That is why I deplore the continuation of this measure. I think it is inappropriate to our time when, I hope and believe, economic recovery is on the way. I think this measure is one which the Government should have abandoned when the Act came to an end three or four days ago. If it continues, it will be one part of the clutter which at present surrounds Whitehall and slows down the work of industry in the country. I would urge the Government to clean up something of this clutter, and make a start by scrapping this measure within the next few months.
3.30 p.m.
LORD MOYNE: My Lords, if I may speak, although I have not put my name down, I should like to begin by saying that I think I have no interest to declare because, although my firm manufactures in Ireland and imports to England, the Irish Government, I believe, makes up the interest on the sums borrowed to pay the deposits. So I think I have no interest to declare. But, if I have, I declare it. I will speak very briefly, just to ask a question of the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, because I think we are behaving meanly and against our treaty obligations. When we imposed these deposits, in plain breach, as I see it, of our special treaty obligations to the Republic of Ireland, it was argued, with some cogency, that the deposits, which weighed very heavily on the economy of that small country, would be less harmful than quotas, for which at the time we should have been entitled, undoubtedly, to apply to the inter-
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national authority. Does the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, now say that, in spite of the improvement in our balance-of-payments position, we would still be entitled to apply for the more drastic method of quotas?

GIBRALTAR: DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME
3.31 p.m.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, with the permission of the House, I would now reply to the Private Notice Question asked earlier by the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough.
I am glad to say that we were able to reach full agreement on a Three-Year Development Programme designed to strengthen the Gibraltar economy, which in terms of British aid amounts to about £4 million. An agreed communiqué was issued at 3.30 p.m. to coincide with the return of the Chief Minister to Gibraltar this afternoon. I am arranging for a copy of the communiqué to be circulated in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
Following is the text of the communiqué referred to:

GIBRALTAR TALKS: (DECEMBER 2-8)
Joint Communiqué Issued at Conclusion of Consultations
A series of talks under the chairmanship of Lord Shepherd, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, have taken place during the past week with representatives of the Government of Gibraltar, comprising the Governor (Admiral of the Fleet Sir Varyl Begg), the Chief Minister (Major R. J. Peliza), the Gibraltar Ministers for Labour and Social Security (Mr. M. Xiberras) and for Information, Port, Trade and Industries (Major A. J. Gache) and the Financial and Development Secretary (Mr. E.H. Davis). The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Minister of Overseas Development also had talks with the delegation, and during their visit the Governor and Chief Minister, accompanied by Lord Shepherd, were received by the Prime Minister.
In the course of these talks Gibraltar Ministers put before British Ministers Gibraltar's development proposals for the next three years, and repeated and made clear their views on a variety of other subjects, which included Gibraltar's relations with Britain, citizenship, Anglo-Spanish relations.
The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary took note of the views expressed by Gibraltar Ministers and re-affirmed Her Majesty's Government's assurances to the people of

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Gibraltar in the preamble to the Order-in-Council embodying the 1969 Gibraltar Constitution. He undertook to consider the resolution on citizenship recently adopted by the Gibraltar House of Assembly, while holding out no prospect at this time that amendments to United Kingdom legislation concerned would be possible. The Gibraltar Ministers accepted that, in accordance with previous assurances by Her Majesty's Government there are in practice no obstacles in the way of Gibraltarians who wish to do so coming to the United Kingdom under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act.
The Gibraltar representatives tabled a comprehensive Development Programme for the three years 1970 to 1973 drawn up with the object of counteracting the economic difficulties resulting from the Spanish restrictions and in the light of the recent report of the Manpower Mission (Lords Beeching and DelacourtSmith). After full discussion it was agreed that Her Majesty's Government would assist the Gibraltar Government to carry out their Development Programme in the following ways.
The British Government will support Gibraltar's proposals for about a further 750 housing units in addition to the current housing programme. The Gibraltar Government have expressed particular satisfaction that the British Defence Secretary is making available for this purpose, without charge to Gibraltar, the greater part of Viaduct Reclamation site which is the property of his Ministry.
The British Government will finance the immediate construction of a hostel for temporary immigrant labour which is vital to Gibraltar at this time.
Discussions took place on the Gibraltar Government's proposals to turn to a system of comprehensive secondary education, and the British Government will support this, subject to further details becoming available.
Money will be provided for a Schools Sports Centre, for additional medical facilities and for port development. The British Government will also assist appropriate schemes for tourist development. These will include a number of amenities which will be available for the people of Gibraltar as well.
To achieve this development programme the Government of Gibraltar have asked for expert advice in a number of fields and the British Government will make this available under Technical Assistance arrangements.
The cost of British support for this programme in the next three years is expected to be about £4 million exclusive of Technical Assistance.
The Gibraltar Ministers indicated that owing to Gibraltar's present difficulties a deficit on the ordinary budget was forecast for 1970 and that they had in mind to introduce into the House of Assembly measures to increase revenue from local sources in order to help bridge this gap. In these circumstances Her Majesty's Government are willing to assist Gibraltar to meet special expenditure attributable to the consequences of Spanish restrictions by making available a further sum of £100,000
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in addition to the £100,000 previously provided to the same end.
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord for having repeated that Statement, which I warmly welcome. I wonder whether the noble Lord could, none the less, give us a little more of the detail of this Three-Year Development Programme on which we are going to spend some £4 million. For example, can he say how many houses are to be built and where the land is coming from on which to build them? Can he also say something about Gibraltar's probable deficit on her ordinary Budget in 1970 and how the gap is to be bridged? Further, may I be assured that in these recent talks the question of sovereignty was not discussed, and that there is no question of our yielding to pressure in this matter, when the people of Gibraltar have made it abundantly clear that they wish to remain British?
I wonder whether the noble Lord can also tell me if Gibraltarians really want the system of comprehensive secondary education, which I think is included in this package deal? Will it be "comprehensive" in the same sense as we use the term here?
LORD BYERS: My Lords, I, too, should like to welcome this Statement and to thank the Government for the efforts which they have made on behalf of Gibraltar. May I nevertheless ask them whether the Gibraltar delegation who were over here were fairly satisfied with the results of their talks? Does this £4 million represent something like the assistance they were hoping to get?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, perhaps I may reply first to the noble Lord, Lord Byers, who asked whether the Gibraltar Ministers were fairly satisfied. All I can say is that the delegation left me this morning with smiles on their faces, and I think that is an indication that they were satisfied. It was not a question or problem of money; it was a question of how much could be spent by Gibraltar in terms of the Three-Year Programme. It may be a fact—I hope it is—that Gibraltar can proceed faster on her development programme than we foresee at the present time. In terms of sovereignty, we reaffirmed, as we always do when we see Gibraltar Ministers, the position of

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Her Majesty's Government over Gibraltar; and this is perhaps best spelt out in the preamble to the present Constitution.
In regard to a probable deficit, I think that this is very much for the Gibraltar Government themselves to announce in Gibraltar, when they announce what steps they themselves are going to take to deal with the deficit. Our contribution was made in the light of the facts and figures they provided to us in confidence.
In terms of comprehensive education, there is a feeling that special need exists in Gibraltar for greater technical education in order to meet the dockyard needs and all the other developments that are needed in Gibraltar. Whether it will be comprehensive education as we know it in this country is for them themselves to decide. As the noble Earl knows, our own form of comprehensive education covers a very wide area.
The principal feature of the development plan is housing. We are undertaking to assist in the building of some 750 units on top of what is already planned. This of course cannot be achieved in the first three years, but this is a commitment to this long-term building project. On the question of land, I am very pleased that the Ministry of Defence have been able to give us one of the (I think the phrase is) "choice pieces" of land in Gibraltar—some reclaimed land by the sea—and it is this new piece of land that has become available to us which makes housing a real starter in Gibraltar. We are also going to help in the field of emergency housing for immigrant workers, and in the field of tourism communications. We shall help, too, with a special feature, which I think is very much needed in Gibraltar. It is that special development projects should be undertaken to increase the opportunity of leisure and recreation for the young people of Gibraltar.
LORD MERRIVALE: My Lords, I should at the outset like to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, on the part he played in reaching agreement with the Ministers of Gibraltar over here. As he knows, I had the pleasure of meeting the three gentlemen last week. Can the noble Lord say whether Her Majesty's Government accept in its entirety the Manpower Mission Report
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—that is, the Beeching/Delacourt-Smith Report—and whether they propose to implement its recommendations which concern Her Majesty's Government: for instance, that work study specialists should be sent to Gibraltar? As the noble Lord said that Her Majesty's Government would be assisting in the supply of better communication facilities, may I ask whether they will give this matter top priority, because I believe there is very great difficulty in travelling to and from Gibraltar either by air or by sea, over the weekends in particular?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, whether Her Majesty's Government accept the Beeching Report in principle is neither here nor there. This is a matter for the Gibraltar authorities. If they were to ask for specialists—as they have done in certain fields—in work study, to which the noble Lord himself referred, we should be only too willing to assist them. In the field of communication, such as air services and the ferry between Tangiers and Gibraltar, this has been a considerable problem both financially and otherwise to the Gibraltar Government; but I think that the assistance we are now giving to Gibraltar should overcome most of the problems.

CUSTOMS (IMPORT DEPOSITS) BILL
3.39 p.m.
Second Reading debate resumed.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, I wonder whether I may first refer to the brief but very relevant contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Moyne. He asked me about the position of the Irish Free Trade Agreement. There is a special case here which I recognise. Certainly Her Majesty's Government wish to do nothing at all which will impair the good relations between this country and Ireland, especially as manifested in the Agreement which we reached with them. But the noble Lord should not talk about bad faith here. The Government of Eire have never charged Her Majesty's Government here with bad faith. They have never said we were acting contrary to the Agreement. Certainly they expressed their disappointment; of course they did. We, too, were disappointed in

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having to do this. But there was no question at all that we were breaking any undertaking. The noble Lord says, quite rightly, that under the Agreement it would have been possible to impose quotas, but I think that, on reflection, he will agree, and most others would agree, that quotas would have been far more mischievous than this import deposits scheme. So I hope that his fears with regard to trade between this country and Ireland—which I hope will expand—are not well founded.
To the noble Lord, Lord Erroll of Hale, I think I owe an apology, and I am always ready to apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Erroll. It seemed that I spoilt his fun a little by anticipating the kind of arguments which he would put up. Apparently I did not foresee two which he has listed, but otherwise it was rather interesting that I had not only got the arguments that he had down in his speech, but I had them in the right order—which I must say was rather lucky. The noble Lord referred to the fact that I had used some words twelve months ago about the scheme being for a maximum period of twelve months. I said then in good faith—and he will recognise this—that Her Majesty's Government had put before Parliament a scheme which had a legal life of twelve months. Parliament agreed that they should have powers to implement the scheme for twelve months. We have found that the economic situation is not so secure now as to justify our withdrawing this scheme, so we have come to Parliament again for a renewal of those powers, although, as an earnest of our good faith, we have suggested that the powers should be given at the reduced rate of 40 per cent. rather than 50 per cent.
The noble Lord also said that I had tried to make some reference to international reactions. I did not try to make any reference; I succeeded. I specifically referred to reactions from overseas, and I said that not in any case had there been any question of any country overseas charging this Government with breaking any international commitment. Why then should the noble Lord, who is every bit as loyal to his Queen and country as I am—and I would never say one word to the contrary—spend his weekend in
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devising a speech attacking this Government for having broken international agreements? It really is not good enough. He speaks about disrepute. The only disrepute really is when people read in the newspaper or in Hansard that across the floor of the House this kind of charge is bandied about. Let us, I suggest to the noble Lord, forget it. It really is not worthy of him.
The noble Lord mentioned the point that I tried to deal with the extent to which imports were frustrated directly by the import deposits scheme. I noticed that some figures were given in the other House, but they proved to be too much for the Opposition there to assimilate, and I did not intend—and I do not now intend—to quote those figures about the way in which the trend went before the scheme and has gone after the scheme. The evidence suggests that the rising tide of imports was halted to some extent, and in so far as the imports have not been frustrated there is this other advantage: that an amount of money—50 per cent. of the proposed imports in value—shall be deposited with the Government. and this of course has a useful effect upon the volume of credit. This, then, is a sort of Morton's Fork—either you catch it on that prong or on the other prong. In either case it is something to the advantage of the economy of this country.
The noble Lord spoke about its being mean not to allow across-the-exchanges interest to be paid on those deposits which were financed by the overseas supplier. Well, the noble Lords says we were mean. Sometimes I believe he really thinks that moneys collected in this way are put directly into the pockets of the individual members of the Government. What we were trying to do was to help the economy of the country—our country—and had overseas suppliers been allowed to finance the deposits at a rate of interest, to that extent the objectives of the scheme would have been frustrated or hindered. We hoped that the scheme would be successful and that it would be possible to end it within the period of twelve months.
If there is any other question which the noble Lord put to me, I have no doubt in good faith, I will certainly write and answer him. But may I end my appeal that this House should give the

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Bill a Second Reading by saying this? I said at the beginning, and I repeat it, despite the noble Lord's rather fractious posture at the Opposition Box, that he is a man of considerable judgment in commercial and financial affairs, and I put it to him that he does not really believe that this is the point of time at which we could end this scheme abruptly. It is much better to phase it out. Possibly in the course of the next twelve months—I do not know—it may be considered wise to reduce the 40 per cent. to a lower percentage. It may be wise and possible to end it completely. But right now, until we are more certain, it would be irresponsible to end this scheme; and I do not believe that in his heart the noble Lord, Lord Erroll, considers that it would be sensible to end it.
The noble Lord ended his speech with quite an eloquent plea about the benefits of international trade. Of course I agree with almost everything he said. We want a situation in the world where we can have the freest possible exchange of trade. That is the situation in which this country does best, and that is what we want. And it is because we believe—I believe, certainly, and I think the noble Lord believes—that the financial situation we had before, with "Stop—Go" policies and difficulties and doubts about the pound sterling, was contrary to the best interests of international trade that it was necessary to take quite ruthless measures to put the situation right. All the evidence goes to show, and the most recent evidence supports it, that our balance-of-payments position is improving, and this scheme has helped to improve it. It would be wrong to end it now. Therefore I hope that your Lordships will agree to give this Bill a Second Reading.
On Question, Bill read 2a: Committee negatived.

ULSTER DEFENCE REGIMENT BILL
3.49 p.m.
TILE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE, R.A.F. (LORD WINTER-BOTTOM): My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a second time. When the House discussed the Police Bill last week my noble friend the Lord
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Privy Seal and Leader of the House reminded your Lordships of the very full and valuable discussion of the situation in Northern Ireland that took place a few weeks ago in your Lordships', House; and he recalled the circumstances in which both that Bill and the one before us to-day were conceived, following the report of the Advisory Committee chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. It is a measure of the weight which the Government, and I believe the whole country, attach to the Committee's work that not only have the main recommendations of their Report been accepted, both by the United Kingdom Government and by the Government of Northern Ireland, but they have been followed within two months by two Bills to give effect to them.
The Bill which is before your Lordships this afternoon authorises Her Majesty to establish and maintain a part-time military force for service in Northern Ireland. Command of the Armed Forces is the prerogative of the Crown, and thus there are a number of matters with which this Bill does not deal, notably the tasks of the new force, its organisation and the pay and detailed conditions of service of its members. Legislation confines itself broadly to granting authority to the Crown to raise a force, and to establishing its discipline, and prescribing the conditions in which it may be used. Thus the Bill does not give a comprehensive account of the new force, and it was for this reason that my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence presented a White Paper on November 12 which gave a detailed account of his proposals. In the light of that White Paper, I believe that it will be unnecessary for me to detain noble Lords with a general description of the proposed force. Discussion in another place and public comment generally have however concentrated on certain key issues, mainly related to Clauses 1 and 2 of the Bill, and to these issues I should like to draw your Lordships' attention.
Clause 1(1) prescribes the title of the force. It has been suggested, I know, that the word" Ulster" is inappropriate. My Lords, let us be quite clear that there is no deep constitutional significance in this. Of course we all know that Ulster has nine counties and not six. But the new force is to be a part of the Army,

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and Army units have used and continue to use the word "Ulster" in their titles. Many of them have been formed since the partition of Ireland. Among reserve units, there is, for instance, the 40th (Ulster) Signal Regiment, which was formed in 1967. It has been the practice, when forming new units, to incorporate names which have been used before and, in using the word "Ulster" on this occasion, we are simply following this practice.
My Lords, Clause 1(1) of the Bill also provides for the force to have a numerical ceiling; and, as the White Paper explains, this ceiling will be 6,000 officers and men. The Report of the Committee under the chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, did of course suggest a strength of about 4,000, but the Committee did not have the time or the means to go into this in detail. After most careful consideration of this point, we have concluded that a ceiling of 4,000 would be too low. This does not mean that we shall aim at recruiting 6,000 immediately: the figure of 6,000 is a ceiling and not a target. It would however, be very foolish to handicap ourselves with a ceiling which there is a good reason to believe may be too low. Noble Lords will not expect me to go into the details of our calculation of the figure of 6,000. One consideration to which I would refer, however, is that in a part-time force it is impracticable to expect a man to turn out for duty too often. This means that it is essential to have enough manpower.
Having discussed the size of the force, I should now like to say something about its task. As stated in the White Paper, this will be to support the regular forces in Northern Ireland, should circumstances so require, in protecting the border and the State against armed attack and sabotage. It will fulfil its role by undertaking guard duties at key points and installations, by carrying out patrols and by establishing check points and road blocks when required to do so. I must emphasise that it is not the intention to employ the new force on crowd control or riot duties in cities. The need for such a force in Northern Ireland is, regrettably, all too apparent against the backcloth of a history of violence and terrorism. The Hunt Report referred to
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this and to the more recent campaign of terrorism from 1956 to 1962 when several hundred raids were made, including thirty on police stations.
This year there have been a number of attacks on public utility installations in Northern Ireland. Several of these were mentioned recently in another place. I repeat them now to emphasise the need for an effective defence force. There was the attack on March 30 on the electricity sub-station at Castlereagh, when two transformers were damaged by explosion; there were two separate attacks on April 20, when an electricity pylon at Kilmore was severely damaged, and the main supply from the Silent Valley reservoir was broken by explosives which broke two pipes of 30 inches in diameter; then on April 24 a 48-inch water pipe was blown up at Dunadry.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, for the benefit of those who are not so well informed as the noble Lord, would he agree that the attacks between 1956 and 1962 were known to be the work of the I.R.A.? The attacks this year appear to be the work of very different extremists.
LORD WINTER BOTTOM: My Lords, I suppose that General Freeland will be very glad to know exactly who caused these outrages. Nevertheless, from wherever the extremists come, these points have to be defended. That is the object of this Bill.
LORD KILBRACKEN: My Lords, could the noble Lord make clear that they do not come from the Republic of Ireland, that they come from within the Six Counties?
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, no; I cannot make that clear.
To resume what I was saying, quite apart from any cold assessment of the possibility of terrorist attacks, there is, as the Hunt Report pointed out, a very real fear of them, and public anxiety will not be allayed unless precautions are taken, and are seen to be taken. It is the view of Her Majesty's Government and of the Government of Northern Ireland that it is essential that the threat should be met by a properly constituted military force, trained specifically for its task and under military control and discipline. This is not a task for the police, or for a reserve

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police force such as the Ulster Special Constabulary, despite the considerable part that that force has played in helping to deal with past campaigns of terrorism.
The essential characteristic of a military force is its subjection to military law. This distinguishes it from any other body of citizens. For although codes of discipline exist in many walks of life that serve the community—for example, the police, the Civil Service, and the medical profession—the discipline of the Armed Forces is not only more rigorous and more comprehensive than any other, but it alone is enforced by penal sanctions. The extent to which military law should apply to members of a part-time force is thus a question to be considered with care.
LORD WIGG: My Lords, would the noble Lord allow me to intervene? One of the clauses of this Bill puzzles me. Will he be good enough to indicate where in the Bill before the House provision is made for this new force to be made subject to military law? In other words, at what point in the Bill are those who serve in it made amenable to the conditions of the Army Act?
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, may I suggest that this is a very important Committee point; and I propose to say more about it later.
LORD WIGG: My Lords, with respect, this is surely not a Committee point; it is fundamental. If the case for the Government is that the new force is part of the regular forces and subject to military law, then the Army Act 1955, as amended, must apply. There is no provision in the Bill at all for that to happen, and I am completely puzzled by it.
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, my noble friend who is to reply tells me that he will deal with this point. But I think that if the noble Lord studies the Bill a little more carefully he will see that this is not forgotten.
As I was saying, the extent to which military law should apply to members of a part-time force is thus a question to be considered with care. In general, the pattern is that officers are subject to military law at all times, but that other ranks are subject only when called out for service or undergoing training. That is the pattern that was established for-
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merly for the Territorial Army, and now for the Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve; and Clause 1(2) of the Bill applies the same provisions to the Ulster Defence Regiment. I hope that that satisfies the noble Lord to a certain extent.
There is, however, one significant departure from the traditional pattern to which I should call your Lordships' particular attention. Much concern has been expressed about the practice of the Ulster Special Constabulary in keeping arms and ammunition at home. My right honourable friend the Home Secretary, in an apt phrase which has been widely quoted, said that there are too many guns about in Northern Ireland; and the Report of the Committee under the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, criticised the general issue and carrying of firearms by the Royal Ulster Constabulary. It is certainly not the practice for members of our Armed Forces to keep arms and ammunition at home, at any rate in peace time; but my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence recognises that there will be times and places, particularly in remote rural areas of Northern Ireland, where the central storage of arms will be incompatible with operational efficiency if the force is to be capable of quick reaction to a sudden emergency. He intends, however, that the possession of arms at home shall be very closely controlled; and there are two ways in which this will be done.
First, my honourable friend the Minister of Defence for Administration made clear, while the Bill was in Committee in another place, that permission to keep arms at home would be given only by an officer authorised to call the force out for emergency service under Clause 2(2) of the Bill. Second, Clause 1(2)(b)(ii) of the Bill provides that when a member of the force is in possession of military arms and ammunition, he is subject to military law, whether he is on duty or not. This is a most important safeguard, because it means that members of the force in this situation do not merely have a duty to look after such arms (and in this context it has often been said that the Ulster Special Constabulary had a remarkable record in the safe custody of arms; there is no complaint on this score) but are answerable under military law for the use to which

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they put them. In these conditions the irresponsible, negligent or disobedient use of arms, even if it had no serious consequence in itself, would be liable to penalties of imprisonment. By this means we are confident that, so long as it continues to be necessary for some members of the force to keep some arms at home, their number will be severely limited, and their use strictly controlled.
My Lords, one of the principal matters which the Bill determines is the liabilities for service which members of the force undertake. There are three distinct liabilities, set out in subsections (2), (3) and (4) of Clause 2. The last two will be familiar to noble Lords who are conversant with the affairs of the Reserve Forces; they are liabilities for permanent service in circumstances, broadly speaking, of general war, which are shared by all members of the Regular Army Reserve and the Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve, though in the case of the Ulster Defence Regiment the liability is only for service in Northern Ireland. Actual or apprehended attack on the United Kingdom, covered by subsection (3), is generally considered to mean a warlike act by another Power, and is to be distinguished, for example, from raids across the frontier by the I.R.A. Imminent national danger, to which subsection (4) refers, is declared by Order of Her Majesty, and is also considered to apply in the context of general war, though it might conceivably be invoked in circumstances of natural disaster. Neither of these liabilities is specifically directed to the tasks for which this force is designed. It is desirable that they should apply to members of the force, however, because they are nationwide liabilities addressed to circumstances—which we must all hope will not occur—in which all the resources of disciplined manpower will be mobilised. But the special circumstances in which this force is designed to operate are covered by the liability in subsection (2).
There are important implications in the wording of this subsection to which I must direct your Lordships' attention. The first is that the authorised officer (and I should like to discuss the question of authorisation in a minute) may call out the force,
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"if, and for so long as, it appears to that officer to be necessary or expedient."
This gives the authorised officer unhampered discretion in the exercise of his own judgment. We are thinking here not of crises on a national scale, but of local emergencies, involving a few men for a short space of time. Speed of reaction is essential, and to achieve it the process of call-out must be simple and swift. The formula to which the authorised officer must address his mind is,
"the defence of life or property in Northern Ireland against armed attack or sabotage.…"
This is designed to emphasise two complementary aspects of the force's role; it is not intended to be used in crowd control or riot duties, and it is designed to meet what the Hunt Report described as "the threat of armed guerilla-type attacks". The formula is also qualified by the words "whether actual or apprehended". The authorised officer must be free to use initiative. In local, irregular operations of this kind, or sporadic incursions, intelligence is sometimes defective, and sometimes timely action prevents a threat from materialising. The power to call out the force will not be hampered by having to wait until something has actually gone wrong.
Noble Lords may well feel from this brief account that the power to call out the force for emergency service is very wide. It is important that there should be safeguards against the indiscriminate use of such a power. These safeguards are provided in subsection (1) which deals with the authorisation of officers. First, the power to authorise stems from my right honourable friend, so that the use of this power is accountable to him, and through him to Parliament. Second, authority can be given only to officers of the regular forces, who will be fully integrated in the military chain of command. Third, they must not be below the rank of major. Fourth, such authority may be made subject to limitations—we are thinking here of limitations in respect of the units a given officer may call out, or the area his responsibility covers, or the period during which he may exercise his power. In this way we have tried to ensure that the force can be called out in fulfilment of its tasks quickly and effectively but without any sacrifice of constitutional responsibility or military control.

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My Lords, I should now like to say something about enlistment into the Ulster Defence Regiment. As is explained in the White Paper, enlistment will be open to all male citizens of good character of the United Kingdom and Colonies normally resident in Northern Ireland, whatever their denomination or faith. Her Majesty's Government will do their utmost to see that this objective is achieved. Enlistment into the Ulster Defence Regiment will be entirely the responsibility of the Army. Application forms, for which the detailed provision will be made in the Regulations to be laid before the House when the Bill becomes law, will be available from January 1 to all sections of the community. There will be as many distribution points as possible—post offices, public libraries, Army recruiting offices, Regular Army and T. & A.V.R. units, police stations and so on. All completed application forms will be sent direct by the applicants to Headquarters, Northern Ireland. Every application will then be dealt with, in exactly the same way, under the arrangements of the General Officer Comanding, Northern Ireland, and on the lines of the general procedure for enlistment into the Army.
I do not wish to take up the time of the House by going into the detail of the normal Army enlistment procedures; but, since the noble Lord, Lord Byers, drew attention on November 12 to the important question of security vetting, it may be the wish of your Lordships that I should say a further word about this particular matter. Security screening will be an essential and integral part of the enlistment process. The object will be to ensure as far as possible that the applicant for enlistment is of good character, is not himself an extremist or an active supporter of any extreme political or religious group, and is likely to act in the best interests of the people of Northern Ireland as a whole. The suitability of all applicants will be checked against all information available to the General Officer Commanding, Northern Ireland. He will also have the assistance of members of the Army security vetting organisation, who will supplement his own resources and, in particular, will undertake such personal inquiries as may be necessary. The decision on the individual applica-
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tions will be vested solely in the General Officer Commanding, Northern Ireland.
Her Majesty's Government will do all they can to see that the Ulster Defence Regiment is representative of the community of Northern Ireland as a whole. There will, therefore, be no automatic transfer to the Regiment of the present members of the Ulster Special Constabulary. Their applications will be dealt with on their merits and all will be subject to the same degree of scrutiny.
Recruitment publicity will be directed towards all sections of the Northern Ireland community. In addition, in order to make doubly sure that the interests of the minority community are fully protected in this context, General Sir John Anderson, who is the Colonel Commandant designate of the Ulster Defence Regiment, will be taking special steps to make contact with leaders of the minority community with a view to encouraging its members to apply to join the Regiment—and especially ex-Servicemen because they can the more readily become immediately effective. Arrangements will, of course, be made to check the recruitment performance during the period of the build-up.
Her Majesty's Government have decided that there will be advantage in making available to the General Officer Commanding, Northern Ireland, a source of advice on the administration of the Ulster Defence Regiment, especially on recruitment policy. Accordingly, as part of the administrative arrangements for the new force, an Advisory Council will be set up in Northern Ireland with appropriate terms of reference. It is not intended that this should be a very large body. The aim will be to obtain the services of a suitable number of persons of experience and standing who will be representative of all shades of responsible opinion in Northern Ireland.
As I have said, the responsibility for the Ulster Defence Regiment will be vested solely in the General Officer Commanding, Northern Ireland; but his Advisory Council will have an important part to play, for example, in helping him in his recruitment campaign, advising on mothods of improving recruitment in difficult areas or in minority communities, advising on regimental matters, and generally helping to encourage confidence

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in and understanding of the new force among the people of Northern Ireland as a whole. Your Lordships will, I am sure, understand that I am not able this afternoon to say more about the composition of the Advisory Council, but an appropriate announcement will be made as soon as is practicable.
My Lords, the Bill before us to-day is a short and simple measure, drafted on traditional lines, to establish a small, part-time military force. Some may see the force as an unimaginative off-print of the Reserve Army; others may hold that it is only the B Specials in another guise. Opinion on this subject is strong, divisions are deep, and too often fear and prejudice close men's minds to argument. But it is our belief that the Ulster Defence Regiment will convince the people of Northern Ireland that it serves their interests loyally, efficiently and impartially, and represents them all. To do this it need do no more than show, in fact as well as in name, that it is a regiment of the British Army. My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a second time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Winterbottom.)
4.12 p.m.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, we are grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, for the clear way in which he has introduced this Bill to your Lordships this afternoon. It is my intention to be fairly brief, and I should like to say straight away and without equivocation that we on these Benches, who have given our support to the Government's general approach to the razor-edge problems of Northern Ireland, support this specific measure. As I see it, it stems in line direct from the Report of Lord Hunt's Advisory Committee. That Report was endorsed, with a striking degree of unanimity, by your Lordships in the debate in mid-October, and since I did not have the opportunity to participate in that debate I should like now, if I may. to nay my tribute to that Report from the noble Lord and his associates—a striking Report, going very much to the root of the matter which they were asked to look into and produced with striking speed.
On the question of speed, I note that we are, it would seem, being asked to
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take this Bill with a very fair degree of speed, since I believe that the Committee stage, and indeed all the other stages, are down for this coming Thursday. I realise that we should get on with this matter but, given the interest in it which the number of speakers would seem to betoken, I wonder whether we are in fact not taking it a little too swiftly. But we can come to that later.
My Lords, one consequence of Lord Hunt's Report, the Police Bill, received its Second Reading here last week. It was welcomed by my noble friend Lord Derwent. The Bill before us this afternoon is a second consequence, another pendant of the Hunt Report, and it is therefore only logical and also right for me to welcome it. The noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, has explained the reasoning behind this Bill and the creation of the new force, and in essence it seems to me to rest on four linked principles. In the first place, there is the sad fact that, for historical reasons of which we are all aware, the problems of internal peace and of internal security in Northern Ireland are, in the terms of the noble Lord's Report, "peculiarly difficult". We have only to remember the tragic disturbances of the early 'twenties, the I.R.A.'s terrorist attacks in the late 'fifties and the early 'sixties, and indeed the acts of sabotage earlier this year, from wherever they came. As the Committee themselves stated—and I quote their words:
—although the threat of terrorist attacks may not be great, the fear of them is very real, and public anxiety will not be allayed unless precautions are taken and are seen to be taken."
Secondly, my Lords, there is the recognition that, while the final responsibility for military security should rest with the Regular Army and vest in Westminster, it is equally right that the deep and legitimate interests of the Stormont Government and of the people of Northern Ireland in their own security and protection should receive due recognition. It would not be right, in my view at least, even if it were practicable over a long period of time to rely exclusively on our regular forces stationed in Northern Ireland. There is "great merit", to quote again the words used by the Hunt Committee,
"in the continuing presence of a local force, with local knowledge, capable of being at instant readiness …"

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But, my Lords, if that is so, I think we should all subscribe to the third principle: that such a force, whose job it will be to deal with military problems—the defence of key points, coping with guerrilla and terrorist attacks, and so on—should not also have police duties thrust upon it. That is why we on these Benches welcome the decision to relieve the Royal Ulster Constabulary of its military duties. That is why we welcomed last week, in the debate on the Police Bill, the establishment of a purely Police Reserve to support the Royal Ulster Constabulary in those duties. And, by the same token, that is why we welcome the decision to establish this local force, the Ulster Defence Regiment, with purely military duties, under the command of the G.O.C., Northern Ireland, as an integral part of our Regular Army, with a strong admixture of Regular Army personnel—officers. N.C.Os., civilians and the like—subject to the authority of the Secretary of State for Defence and, ultimately, the control of Parliament.
Having said that, I should like to go on to pay my tribute to the way in which the Royal Ulster Constabulary—and, let me add, the Ulster Special Constabulary—have over the years discharged their responsibilities. They have had appalling difficulties to face. They have been burdened with an unduly heavy burden of roles—that dichotomy of the military and the police role—and although some can understandably criticise the conduct of a minority, no one can doubt or has the right to question the patriotism or devotion of the great majority of that force.
My Lords, I should like now to turn briefly to the organisation of the new force, the Ulster Defence Regiment, with which the noble Lord has dealt in some detail. He mentioned the question of its title—a matter which gave rise to a very long discussion in another place. It is not for me, of course, to say that there is not, or cannot be, a lot in a name. I remember very vividly being on the wrong end of a long argument in your Lordships' House five or six years ago over the fairly short word, "Admiralty". I must say that I was secretly rather pleased at the result, although I would have assured my noble friend Lord Thorneycroft, had he still been in the House, that I did my best
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for him. On this particular title, all I can say is that I do not feel passionately either way, although I fully recognise that others do. My own feeling, however, is that, the Government having chosen this particular title, it would be a mistake for them to go looking for another one now.
So far as size is concerned, the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, recommended a force of some 4,000 men; and the Government, as the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, has explained, have chosen a ceiling of 6,000. As he also explained, this figure was the offspring of a Joint Working Party, representing Westminster and Stormont, and both civilian and military. I referred earlier to the Hunt Committee's strong urge that the fears of the population of Northern Ireland about their security are real. If we accept this view, we should not, I believe, skimp on numbers.
But of course, the fears of those in Northern Ireland are twofold. On the one hand, the Protestant community fears a recrudescence of I.R.A. or other terrorism. On the other hand, there are those in the Catholic community who fear that the new Regiment may be only the old B Specials writ more efficient. It is clear that in its initial stages the Regiment will need to draw heavily for recruitment on the present members of the Ulster Special Constabulary. It is equally clear that there are some members of the present B Special force whom the new force will be best without, if it is to win the confidence of moderate Catholic opinion, as indeed it must. But the guarantees here which the noble Lord explained seem adequate to me. The negative side of the coin, the necessary, albeit limited, exclusion process, can safely be left to the military—from the G.O.C., Northern Ireland, downwards—in whom the responsibility for recruiting is firmly vested.
But it is the positive aspect of recruitment which may be more intractable here. Many of the Northern Ireland regiments contain a high proportion of Catholics, but only 11 per cent. of the composition of the R.U.C. is Catholic and there are no Catholics at all to be found among the B Specials. Clearly, we need to attract both communities to this. new force. I have been very glad to

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learn that its commandant, General Sir John Anderson, is actively promoting such recruitment with the full support of Stormont. I feel that a valuable source for recruitment could be tapped among Catholic ex-Servicemen in Northern Ireland. I hope too, with the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, that the Advisory Council can play a useful part in laying the necessary foundation of confidence which is the essential pre-requisite to recruitment for this force among the Catholic community. But, above all, there seems to be here a real opportunity and a challenge to the leaders of Catholic opinion in Northern Ireland, and I hope very much that they will use all their influence to encourage recruitment to this new local force. It is they, above all, who can help ensure that within it there is due balance between the two communities.
Finally, my Lords, I should like to ask the noble Lord the Leader of the House who is to wind up a question or two on training and equipment. Perhaps they may be Committee points, but it looks as if our Committee stage is likely to be upon us very shortly and that it may be rather a quick one. If I do not ask these questions now I may not get the opportunity to do so later. First, training, on which the Hunt Committee and the White Paper rightly laid considerable emphasis. I recognise that this new force will have a different role from our Reserve Forces, such as the TAVR II in this country; although, parenthetically, I must remark that its creation is in part a justification for much that we have been saying about TAVR III. But althoupgh its role would be different, I should have thought that the membership of the new force, the officers and the N.C.Os, would benefit considerably by training in this country with our Reserve Force and, indeed, with our Regular Forces. I hope that this is visualised.
Next, equipment. I agree that this force should be lightly armed and that its chief weapon should be the rifle. I also agree that in certain isolated, remote districts it is reasonable, subject to watertight safeguards, that members of the force should be permitted to keep their rifles at home. It seems to me that the safeguards envisaged here are adequate. I have two questions on actual armament. I think
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the question of the security of armaments highlights the importance of secure armouries. It is my understanding that the Government are pressing ahead with the programme of seeing that secure armouries are established where they are not at present. I hope that this is the case.
Secondly, I hope that the noble Lord can assure us that the rifles with which the force will be supplied will in fact be modern F.N. rifles. Again on equipment—and this is my last word on equipment and indeed on organisation—the White Paper stresses the importance of mobility and good communications for the force. Paragraph 17 of the White Paper refers to the mobile element in the force. Could the noble Lord explain what is intended by this; how the mobile elements will be organised and what will be their means of mobility? Could he also give us some inkling at least of what is proposed by way of communications? It is hardly necessary to stress the importance in isolated areas of good wireless communication down to sub-unit level. I hope that this is also envisaged.
My Lords, may I say just this in conclusion? I hope that I have made my belief clear that with this Bill, with the establishment of this new, local, part-time military force in Northern Ireland coupled with the establishment of the new police reserve for the R.U.C., the two Governments, both Stormont and Westminster, are working along the right lines. But, important though this may be, important though it may be for all of us to get the organisation of the police and the security forces in Northern Ireland on a sounder basis, we must not delude ourselves that by so doing we are going to the root of the problems in Northern Ireland. As we all know, the roots go far deeper in politics, in history, in race and in religion. During these past months I have sometimes felt a certain sense of hopelessness and despair, and indeed foreboding, at the deepening problems in Northern Ireland and the suspicion and fear and hatred surrounding it.
But despair and pessimism, here as elsewhere, are poor counsellors. In the post-war era we have seen other communities riven by very deep differences of racial origin and culture. Some of these problems are problems not entirely

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dissimilar to—although, I would agree, not entirely analogous to—the problems of Northern Ireland, and they fell, like Northern Ireland, within the narrow confines of Western Europe. There was the problem of Trieste and Venezia Gulia; there was the other racial and cultural problem on the northern borders of Italy, the problem of the South Tyrol; and there was, and is, the intensely difficult problem of the two communities, Greek and Turkish, in Cyprus. At one time or another during the last 20 years, all of these problems have appeared to be virtually insoluble. But with none of them to-day is that the position.
So let us hope, and persevere in the hope, that the same may prove to be the case with the problem of Northern Ireland. Of course, that hope must rest on one absolutely essential pre-condition which did not obtain in the years before the First World War—a broad unity of approach at least to the problems of Ireland among the major Parties in this country. It is in that spirit, and also because I believe that it stands on its own feet, that I welcome this measure.
4.30 p.m.
LORD BYERS: My Lords, I should like to endorse the concluding words of the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe. I am glad that he ended on a note of guarded optimism. I spent Friday and most of Saturday of last week in Northern Ireland. It was a short visit but it enabled me to form one pretty sharp impression. I visited Derry and Belfast and listened to a number of extremely well-informed people, and it certainly served to remind me to approach a problem of this nature with the deepest humility. I was horrified, as other people have been, at the devastation and destruction which has taken place in this not very remote part of the United Kingdom. I was horrified at the hatred and suspicion which still pervades the place, despite the obvious senselessness of the violence and the destruction which one can see all around. I was horrified to find that everywhere I went people were convinced that the trouble was by no means over and that the undercurrents of tension were still running very high. There is the ever-present fear that extremists will fix on some minor incident and blow it up into a riot. There are rumours and rumours and rumours, un-
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fortunately often believed, and there is an atmosphere of hypertension in which the police and the Army have to operate. I do not think that we should underestimate the fears that organisations like the U.V.H. and the apprentice boys cause in perfectly normal civilians in Northern Ireland, and it is against this background that we ought to consider the proposals in this Bill.
My Lords, before I went to Northern Ireland I asked myself the usual questions which have been referred to to-day, and I had some deep misgivings in asking them. I asked, first: was the new force really necessary? What was it meant to be defending, and against whom? Why is it to contain 6,000 men when the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, estimated that 4,000 would be required? Why did it include the name "Ulster" in its title? Is it in fact a political face-saver and really only the B Specials in disguise? These were the things that worried me anti as a result of what I was able to see—I know that my visit was only a short one—I am a great deal more convinced than I was about the merits of this force and this Bill. I do not want to sound any note of complacency; I am not suggesting that we are hitting on a solution to the problem, but I am convinced that there are better safeguards in this Bill than I thought there were when I went to Northern Ireland.
As I have said, there is certainly a very real sense of fear on the part of the population there; and in the light of the general atmosphere which prevails I would only hope that I may do a little tonight to try to allay some of the misgivings which people genuinely hold on this question of the Ulster Defence Regiment. I think the best way to start is on the military case rather than the political one. As I see it, the military case is simply this: there are a considerable number of vulnerable points in Northern Ireland which, because of the tension—and the tension is there—have to be guarded. These are such things as Ministers' houses, reservoirs, police stations, power stations, public utilities and so on. These duties require approximately 550 men each night to carry them out, spread all over Northern Ireland. I should like to say, in parenthesis, that I hope this number may be reduced, but at the present moment this is about the measure

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of the task. If you are going to ask members of a volunteer force to be on duty one night a week, and no more, then you need a force of seven times the figure of 550, which is roughly 4,000 men. But that is only a force to carry out the duties, and you need an additional number to back up that force with administration. The point I had missed is that this is a properly worked out military programme on the estimate of what is required at the moment; and that one requires an administrative tail to handle this particular force. Also, I do not think I had appreciated to the full that 6,000 is the ceiling and may never in fact need to be achieved.
Then I asked myself: why a resident domestic defence force? I think the military answer is that if these duties had to be undertaken by Regular British troops it would need several battalions to do so, and we simply cannot afford to withdraw them from our overseas commitments at the present time. Therefore, in the circumstances I think that the right idea is a domestic volunteer force and that this is about the right ceiling for it; although I hope that as peace returns and tension diminishes we shall not have to go to anything like the ceiling of 6,000 people.
The next question which worried me was whether or not this force would be the B Specials in another form. I think there are safeguards here which should prove adequate. As was said by the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, the force will be under the command of the General Officer Commanding, Northern Ireland, whose direct responsibility will be to the Minister of Defence in Whitehall. It will be trained by Regular British officers and, as I understand it, have a cadre of ex-Regulars. What I think is more important is that while it will, naturally, be composed of a number of selected B Specials who have the appropriate qualifications—certainly at the beginning—it should also attract a number of ex-Regular Northern Irish soldiers, and some, one would hope, would be Catholics. I was glad to hear when I was over there that people are beginning to write in already, saying that they were in the Royal Inniskillens, or some other force, that they were Catholics, and asking whether there would be a place for them in a force
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of this sort. It is only an inquiry, but I think it is a healthy one and a trend which we ought to encourage. I would reiterate what was said by the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, and hope that the Catholic leaders who have shown great responsibility in this matter will encourage people to join this force and make it the mixed force which it ought to be. Unless we can get more Catholics in, it is not going to be the force for which we all hope.
A further safeguard is that the training requirements will be far more rigorous than anything the B Specials were ever asked to do. The people in this force will have to be fairly fit and alert and be able to learn new systems and communications. In themselves, these things will cut out a number of the present B Special force, many of whom are rather older than would be required to undertake this type of training and service. In addition, I think the mere fact that this will be an efficient, alert force—and as I have every confidence in the General Officer Commanding I am certain that it will be—will attract the sort of ex-Regular soldier that you want to get into a force of this nature.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, surely in another place an effort was made to reduce the age of joining for the new force, with precisely the point in mind that the noble Lord has just emphasised, and that was turned down by the Government spokesman.
LORD BYERS: My Lords, I am not speaking for the Government, if the noble Earl will understand me. What I am saying is that, despite the attitude of the Government, there are natural forces at work which will lower this age. I think that there is a great deal to be said for lowering it, but this is a political matter, as I see it. What one can hope for is that people will have to pass a medical examination which in itself will preclude some people of my age from joining. I am sure that I could not pass a medical examination in order to join a force some members of which will have to go up and down in helicopters. That in itself will rule out quite a number of people. I think it a serious point that the rigorous nature of the training and the duties will reduce the number of B Specials who will

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be able to qualify. But it is important that we should pay particular attention to ensuring that some of the very high positions should be seen to be undertaken by Catholics, at least in the first year. I think this is very important and that it presents a special problem.
The third point that worried me before I went to Northern Ireland was the name of the force. I shared the fear of many of my colleagues in another place that including the word "Ulster" in the title would make it more difficult to get a mixed force. I discussed this with a number of Catholics in Northern Ireland and the answer I got was that this should not be a major issue; that there was enough trouble without raising the name of this regiment into a large political issue. I believe that if sufficient encouragement were given, Catholics would join the force. I cannot believe that the name would be the one thing which would prove a stumbling block to getting the balanced force that we want.
Regarding where the arms should be kept, a question which occupied so much time during the discussion in another place, I think this is a matter of practical geography and common sense. No army commander is going to take the risk of losing arms if he can help it. In towns, it would be the obvious thing to have central armouries and to distribute the arms as required. In the outlying districts, where only a few men may be required for particular duties, I do not think that central distribution would be on. Apart from anything else, to do that would probably require two trucks, one to guard the truck conveying the arms, and this would create a bigger military problem than was really necessary. Although I have heard a number of horrifying things about the B Specials, losing arms was not one. The B Specials appear to have a better record at the moment in this respect than the Regular Army, although I must say that the Regular Army has not lost many weapons.
My conclusion is that we are dealing with an exceptional situation and that exceptional measures have to be taken. I believe that we shall need British regular troops in the country for quite a long time. We are going to need the reduced police force and the auxiliary police force, and we are going to need
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something on the lines of this Ulster Defence Regiment. It is a tragic necessity, which arises out of the situation. But I hope that we shall not try to build this up into a bigger political problem than we need to do. All kinds of different factors need to be balanced against each other. Let us give the new force a chance. To-day, Northern Ireland is fortunate to have men of the calibre of General Freeland and Sir Arthur Young, who is in charge of the police. They are, I believe, the last men who would allow any of these forces to develop into a threat to the peace in Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, in supporting this Bill, I want to echo the sentiment that has been expressed: that in the long run it is only the Northern Irish themselves who can solve this problem.
4:41 p.m.
LORD HUNT: My Lords, the recommendations in my Report which led to this Bill were the most difficult of all our problems, even though the answers to the questions we asked ourselves were fairly straightforward. Once we had answered those questions in what I hope was a straightforward way, the further details fell outside our terms of reference.
We were quite confident that most of the recommendations we considered necessary for the Royal Ulster Constabulary would be acceptable to a substantial majority, not only within the R.U.C. but outside it; and not only outside it, but across the communal boundaries. We recognised that the radical changes in principles and arrangements for defending the Province from armed guerrillas would be bitterly opposed, not only by virtually the whole of the Ulster Special Constabulary but also by a majority of the Protestant population. We were aware that our recommendations would be opposed as ardently by these people as they were demanded by most Catholics. But we could not ignore the opposing effects of public opinion on this issue, and in particular the risks that would be entailed by extremist opinion and, possibly, extremist action.
I recall vividly a visit I made, quite impromptu, to a drill hall in the depths of the country some miles out of Bally-mena, in County Antrim, in order to see where and how the U.S.C. were training.

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Although we had given no notice of our visit we were astonished on arrival to find ourselves confronted with a large crowd of people, who packed the hall—people of all ages, from children to grandmothers and grandfathers, with current members of the U.S.C. and past members, and even a gang of roadmenders who had parked their steamroller outside and had come in to meet us.
We had a remarkable half-hour, in which every member of that community urged us, warned us, and indeed instructed us, not to touch their men, the B Specials. It was an impressive demonstration of a deep and abiding fear. We were confronted by a combination of emotions which amounted to a wall of resistance to change. The emotions included fear of the I.R.A.; loyalty to Ulster; comradeship and tradition, in which long memories play a very significant part; doubts about the concern of the United Kingdom Government to protect the Province, in contrast to the faith in the Unionist Government in Stormont to do so. And the greatest of these emotions, my Lords, was fear: it was very real, very widespread and very deep.
We based our decisions and our recommendations on two simple considerations. The first was principles, and there were two principles. Where should the responsibility for defence against this kind of threat lie? We were quite clear that this should lie, and indeed by the Constitution does lie, with the Government at Westminster. What kind of operations were involved and who should conduct those operations and the training and preparations for them? We were equally clear that these were military operations and the job of the Regular Army. To associate them with the police any longer would prejudice the civil image of the R.U.C., which was a cardinal point in our recommendations for the police forces. Inevitably so long as the two were controlled by the same Government, the U.S.C. image (and I use the expression in no pejorative sense at all) would continue to rub off on the R.U.C.
Secondly, we based our recommendations on facts. What foundation was there for the kind of threat to-day and its eventual recurrence in the future
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which so many people fear? Here we were confronted by a singular lack of convincing intelligence, but we were satisfied from recent events alone, some of which my noble friend Lord Winter-bottom has recounted, that to discount such threats would be irresponsible. They must be taken seriously. Nor does this threat come only from the I.R.A. I am convinced that for some time to come, there is substance in the fears, not only of Protestants but of Catholics, and the threat, whatever its motivation, is not only a threat but a challenge to every decent citizen in Northern Ireland. We spoke on the subject to Cardinal Conway and I venture to hope that his views on the recommendations which have led to this Bill are not antipathetic. He seemed sympathetic to the general thesis that we put before him.
So, my Lords, in the light of my remarks, I have two reservations about this Bill, and I feel that I must make them. Given that the role of the new force is to protect not one section of the community from another, but all decent citizens against attacks by violent and fanatical men on life, property and amenities; given that this role should commend itself to anyone and everyone, including those who have wider hopes for a United Ireland but who abhor the use of violence to achieve it, I regret that this force has been given a name which, despite what the noble Lord, Lord Byers, said, is anathema to many Catholics, who might otherwise be disposed (perhaps they will, nevertheless) to do their civic duty and join the force.
Ulster, as we know, is a fact, a historic fact, but a fact which has strong Party political and partisan connotations, whereas Northern Ireland is simply a geographical fact of life. I am sorry that that name has not been attached to the force. I realise, of course, the difficulties with which the Government have to deal in this matter, and I am not going to press it. But I cannot help wishing that my Committee, who felt that this subject was outside their terms of reference, had not strayed outside those terms to suggest a name for this force.
My second reservation concerns the time factor. This force is to be operationally effective by April 1, 1970. This

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presupposes a pretty rapid and successful recruiting campaign. I imagine that, despite certain breaks in hallowed traditions, many members of the B Special Constabulary will come forward readily enough; and I would say that this is a splendid thing. But the first force—and I would stress that the figure we suggested was a calculated figure—is appreciably smaller than the U.S.C., and I suppose that recruits from this force could easily till the ranks of the new force, to the exclusion for the time being of all other men from other communities. If that were to happen, it would be a tragedy and would make something of a farce. So I would ask the Minister to say, when he winds up, whether April 1, 1970, is really the deadline or whether the timetable could be extended to give time for Catholics, in particular, who might be more reluctant and need more persuasion, to come forward.
Secondly, can the Minister say whether, in the new force, any percentage will be reserved for Catholics? We felt that there should not be a percentage reserved as there had been hitherto in the R.U.C., but I think that special considerations may apply here, in view of the importance—I would say the crucial importance—of ensuring that the task is shared on the spot by men of both named persuasions, by all men of good will. I was relieved to hear what the noble Lord, Lord Byers, had to say about the steps being taken to safeguard the possibility of Catholics coming in. I have the greatest regard for and confidence in Sir John Anderson and the G.O.C., General Ian Freeland, and I realise that they are well alive to this problem and danger. I have a few other queries, but I am confident that they will be mentioned by other noble Lords. I naturally support this Bill.
4.51 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, for obvious reasons I do not want unnecessarily to lengthen this debate, because I hope to initiate a discussion about European security later, but I think that the doubts and disquiets which many of us feel about this Bill should be expressed. In doing this, I want to pay the highest possible tribute to the contribution which the Home Secretary has made in this matter: it has impressed me as quite remarkable in the difficult circumstances
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of Northern Ireland. I would add to that my tribute to the conciliatory behaviour of the British troops there under conditions of extraordinary difficulty.
I am not going to reflect the criticism at any length, because other speakers will be taking part in this debate, but I think it honest to say that I am not convinced of the necessity for this Bill. Its purpose is not to control riots and disturbances in Northern Ireland itself. It is, in the words of my noble friend Lord Winterbottom:
"To assist the Regular Forces in the case of armed attack from outside or from sabotage."
In relation to armed attack, there is the very definite statement of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland that there will be no attempt to change by force the frontiers between South and North. With some knowledge of Southern Ireland, I believe that when he said that he reflected not only the view of the Opposition, but of the great majority of the people of Southern Ireland. Secondly, there is the fear that the I.R.A. might make some forceful intervention in Northern Ireland. But I think we are inclined greatly to exaggerate the importance of the I.R.A. to-day. They made boastful claims at the time of the riots on Belfast and Derry, but in fact their presence and their influence was minimal. I am not convinced that it is necessary to create a force of 6,000 men to meet these two problems, and it seems to me that it will be some provocation if this force is created.
I do not intend on the Second Reading of the Bill to deal with other matters which disturb us, but I want to give notice that I shall be moving an Amendment to change the Title of the Bill. I would add that I am strengthened in my view about that by what the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has said. I apologise for not making comment upon his speech, but it is because I want to be short. However, as he knows, I have the highest respect for all that he has done in his Report on these issues, as well as in other respects. Therefore, on the Committee stage I shall move an Amendment for the alteration of the Title, and on different clauses of the Bill I shall

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raise a number of issues which I do not want to detain the House by mentioning now.
4.56 p.m.
LORD RATHCAVAN: My Lords, before dealing with the new force which is to be set up under this Bill, I should like to say a word or two about the future role of the British Army in Northern Ireland. The Government have made it quite clear that the defence of this part of the United Kingdom is the responsibility of the Army. In the past, I do not think that the Ulster people have ever been too sure about that. Now, however, I feel that the Border and the existence of Ulster as a self-governing Province of the United Kingdom has never been more secure.
With regard to the actual contents of the Bill, first of all I should like to reecho what has been said by so many noble Lords in this debate and express gratitude and thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, for the wonderful work which he did, and for the most admirable Report, which he produced in record time. We should also pay tribute to his two colleagues, Sir James Robertson and Mr. Robert Mark. Their terms of reference included the examination of the Ulster Special Constabulary, and they were charged to recommend any change in its composition which they thought necessary. As noble Lords know well, the Ulster Special Constabulary is colloquially known as the B Specials, and was formed in the early 'twenties when the newly created Ulster Constitution was being subjected to violent attacks, accompanied by assassinations on the part of the I.R.A.
It is a purely Protestant force, and for that reason it has never commanded the support of the Roman Catholic minority. It has been maligned a great deal by many people, but, on the whole, with possibly small exceptions, the Ulster Specials did their duty with impartiality. Referring to the Report of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, one finds that it says in Chapter 9, paragraph 170:
"We know that to a man, members of the U.S.C. are devoted to the cause of Ulster and that they and their forbears have done gallant service, and we recognise the value of the anti-guerrilla patrols and armed guard duties they have carried out, particularly in times of emergency. We consider, however, that the
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protection of the Border and the State against armed attacks is not a role which should have to be undertaken by the police, whether they be regular or special."
Under this Bill, the former Ulster Special Constabulary will cease to exist and will be replaced by this new Ulster Defence force. As has already been stated, opponents of the Bill say that it is only the B Specials under a different name, but, as has been explained already by the noble Lord, Lord Byers, and other noble Lords, this is not so. It is part of the British Army; it is not confined to Protestants; it is under the General Officers Commanding, Northern Ireland. It is, therefore, completely different from the B Specials. Something has already been said about the fact that in exceptional cases arms are to be kept by the new forces at their own homes. This was done throughout the whole period of the B Specials, and I have heard of very few, if any, cases where it was abused. Much has been said by noble Lords who have already spoken about the necessity that this new force should contain a large number of the Roman Catholic minority in Ulster. That, in my view, is absolutely vital.
When the scheme was first announced, if I remember rightly there were many words of welcome for the new force from the leaders of the minority. I trust that that is still their opinion, although I am afraid I have not heard so much of a welcome for it from that source in recent times. It is in the highest degree desirable that they should join, otherwise the whole object of the new force will be damaged. The old B Specials had in the past to deal mainly with raids over the Border by the I.R.A. But the new force may have to deal also with an underground militant Protestant organisation recently formed, which is supposed to have been connected with various sabotage efforts shortly before Captain O'Neill ceased to be Prime Minister. If the new force, therefore—and I hope it will not—has to deal with sabotage of that kind, it may be dealing with sabotage not only from the I.R.A., if that happens, but also from the extreme Protestant organisation to which I have referred.
Something has been said about a change of name of this new force. I notice that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, was inclined to favour a change. It

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was made quite an issue in the debate that took place at the Committee stage of the Bill in the House of Commons. So far as I am concerned, I do not see that the name matters at all. If, by changing the name, the force will be made more acceptable to the minority, well and good, then let us change it.
I should like to ask the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, who is going to reply, a couple of questions on details. In the White Paper dealing with this force, on page 5, there is set out the amounts of the bounties to be paid to members of the new force. The White Paper states that a member of the Ulster Special Constabulary who joins the new force will be entitled to take into consideration the years he has served in the Special Constabulary in order to qualify for the bounty in the new force. Does that mean that a man who has served five years in the Ulster Constabulary will automatically qualify for a bounty of, I think, £35? It seems to me that he will. Another question I should like to ask is: are there sufficient drill halls in Northern Ireland for carrying out training which will be so necessary in this new force?
As I have already said, I welcome this Bill which has been welcomed by nearly every noble Lord who has spoken except the noble Lord, Lord Brockway. I hope very much that it will lead to better times, and particularly to a diminution of the communal feelings which exist in that part of the United Kingdom.
5.7 p.m.
Loan BOOTHBY: My Lords, I strongly support this Bill, and also the Report of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, which gave rise to it. I do not propose to detain your Lordships for more than a couple of minutes, and my remarks will concern themselves solely with one aspect which has already been touched upon in several speeches; namely, the Title of the Bill.
The use of the word "Ulster" is evocative of a past that is best forgotten in this particular connection. The borders of the Province of Ulster are not co-terminus with those of Northern Ireland and the Free State. Although I do not go all the way—or even a very large part of the way—with Miss Devlin, I thought that some of her arguments on this point in the long debate which took
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place in another place had considerable point. I am old enough to remember the days of the First World War when I was a small boy at a private school in Rottingdean and Sir Edward Carson lived at the end of the village. At intervals he used to drive past in a car under the slogans, "Ulster will fight" and, "Ulster will be right". "Ulster" was a flaming word in this country in those days. The memory of all that has faded in this country, but it has not altogether faded in Ireland, as anybody who visits either North or South will know. "Ulster" is not only an evocative but a rather provocative name. I want to suggest to Her Majesty's Government this afternoon that they might give serious consideration to a title which I should have thought would be acceptable to Stormont—the Royal Defence Regiment. They would like the word "Royal", and it is a good name. It is not, alas! an original idea on my part. Last week I thought I would make this suggestion to the delighted surprise of your Lordships, and of Her Majesty's Government, but unfortunately on Saturday the Economist came out with precisely the same suggestion, which proves, as I have had no contact with them whatsoever, that great minds think alike. I still think that the name Royal Defence Regiment is not a bad idea.
I remember very well when the Local Defence Volunteers were formed in 1940. It was just no good. It did not work; it did not catch on. Immediately the title was changed to "Home Guard" the thing caught fire and worked for the rest of the war. So titles do matter. If it comes to that, "Home Guard" would not be a bad title for this new Regiment. I am frightened of the word "Ulster" for this single reason. It is not simply a revival of the B Specials; it is not intended to be by anybody, and it is not wanted to be. This is part of the British Army, and, so far as possible, we all hope it must be non-sectarian. Every speaker, I think without exception, has emphasised the importance of persuading the Catholics to enlist in this Regiment.
I would conclude my remarks by saying to Her Majesty's Government: if this is to be achieved, and the title is found to be a difficulty; if they come to the conclusion that it would be easier to

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make this defence Regiment what we all want it to be, then do not let them hesitate to change the Title—if it is not found possible before the remaining stages of this debate, then at a later stage. I am greatly fortified in the remarks I have made by the weighty opinion which has been delivered to your Lordships by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt.
5.11 p.m.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I strongly support the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, in his objection, which was also voiced by other speakers, to the term "Ulster". Before I come to my own observations, I hope that it will not be otiose once again to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, on his Report, and of course on his speech to-day. And I hope also that it will not be impertinent to single out the noble Lord, Lord Rathcavan, on the sheer moral honesty with which he faced certain facts that must have been particularly unpalatable.
The last time, in the middle of October, that we debated the question of Northern Ireland the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor pointed out, as he was entitled to, that the Government appeared to be criticised by no one. Well, that was true. But, of course, there were many criticisms that could be made, could have been made then and could be made now, of the records of all British Governments in this connection in the last fifty years: the fact that there has been this deplorable discrimination against a minority; the fact that the Catholics have been treated as second-class citizens in the United Kingdom for fifty years. Of course, these facts have been the ultimate responsibility of British Governments, and as one who has served in British Governments for nine years, and as an Irishman, I must bear my share, and if you like more than my share, of the blame.
But, as last time, so today we are anxious so far as possible—it is not altogether possible—to put aside the past and concentrate on the future. The last time that I ventured to raise my voice—I do not flatter myself that it carries very far in Northern Ireland—I expressed the hope that as many Catholics as possible would join the various police and
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security forces, including the one we are discussing this afternoon. I repeat that hope today, but with a good deal less optimism. I should be lacking in candour if I did not say that very clearly to your Lordships straight away.
A famous Oxford philosopher, Dr. Bradley, was once asked his opinion of a Fellowship thesis. He replied that he was on the whole favourable. "It is nonsense, of course," he said, "but I am inclined to think it is the right kind of nonsense." That reflects my attitude to this proposed force. I am not convinced by the eloquent arguments of the noble Lord, Lord Byers—although he put them, if I may say so, extraordinarily well—in favour of a military necessity. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, in believing that the military necessity is of the slightest; and certainly that there is no need for a force of this size and type.
I look upon this as an exercise in collective psychiatry. I cannot believe that, if the B Specials did not exist already, anybody would think it necessary to create a force of this kind. But the fact that I call it a psychiatric exercise, does not mean that I regret it; it does not mean that I think we ought not to persevere with it. But it does mean that, unless we get the psychology of this right, it will turn out to be a curse and not a blessing to Northern Ireland. So the psychological factors are all-important. Although other speakers have not been quite so blunt, their arguments in fact come to very much the same thing. Of course, one cannot separate here the presentation from the actuality. One hopes, one wants, to see this idea sold as diplomatically as possible. But what will matter will be the actual composition of the force, say, six months or a year from now. It is the composition of the force in the early days that will determine its influence for years to come. I was very much interested by the idea of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, that there should be some postponement in bringing the force into operation. I had not myself thought of that, but I think there is a great deal in what he said.
There is one point of which I have given the noble Lord the Leader of the House some slight notice—and I am glad that he is going to reply to the debate, because he himself has a background of

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Southern and Northern Ireland. Indeed, he can be said to have been attacked in the past for the liberality of his Irish beliefs. The point of which I have given him slight notice is this. We are told in the White Paper (and this follows something analogous in the Hunt Report), in paragraph 7:
"The battalion commanders will be local members of the force; during its early life these appointments may be filled by present County Commandants of the Ulster Special Constabulary".
It does not say they must be filled; it says they "may be filled". I do not want to press the point. therefore, unduly. But there was very much force in what the noble Lord, Lord Byers, said: that if this is going to be a balanced force, it must not be a question of all the leading people being Protestants, and the Catholics being all the private soldiers. That would make a nonsense of it. There must be balance at all levels. I do not know whether my noble friend the Leader of the House will be able to comment on this paragraph in the White Paper and explain how the Government here and the Government in Stormont propose to try to cope with this admitted problem.
As is well known, a number of Amendments were moved in another place and pressed to a Division. They affected, for example, the name, the number, the age, the membership, the composition, and other matters. I have no doubt that if I had been a Member of another place I should have voted for all those Amendments. My ambitions, of course, in respect of the other place were terminated 25 years ago by Mr. Quintin Hogg, who, incidentally, made a notable speech in Dublin on Saturday in which he set out a whole programme of friendship between these two islands. I do not wish this afternoon to deal with those aspects, some of which I understand will be brought up at the Committee stage, but to discuss the matter in more general terms.
We all agree—it has been said by every speaker—that the image of the new force as an impartial body is of supreme importance if it is to win any kind of acceptance from the minority. The Secretary of State for Defence, in introducing the Bill elsewhere, laid impressive stress indeed not only on its military role, not only on its immediate effect in that direction, but on its role in healing
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divisions. I think that he was looking rather far ahead, but let us accept that as part of division. I am afraid—and I must speak from what I hear—that great harm, perhaps irreparable harm, has already been done by such muddles (if you like to call them that) as the circulation of documents headed "Application form" to the members of the B Specials, and by the stress that appears to have been laid on the fact that the new regiment will be substantially composed of B Specials.
I am aware that Government spokesmen in another place have made earnest efforts to correct those mistakes. It remains doubtful whether the ground thus lost can be recovered. I am using words deliberately, after making adequate inquiries, and I repeat that I am all the more impressed in these circumstances by the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, that one should not bring this force into operation so quickly that there is not a chance for these impressions to be set right. I should have thought it was now generally accepted that the danger of subversive explosions is greater at the present time from the extreme Protestant side. They are more numerous; they are better armed, and they are much more hostile to what is going on. So I think it is generally conceded that the main danger comes from there. That does not mean that I wish to do anything but deplore the activities or the very existence of the I.R.A. They have been a handicap to all sorts of causes, and perhaps most of all to the cause of those who want one day to bring about a united Ireland by peaceful means. I think most people agree that the explosions last April were caused by the U.D.F. and not by the I.R.A. This underlines the supreme importance of the force being mixed and balanced.
I recognise that the difficulties are considerable, and it would be a total failure in experience not to place oneself here in the shoes of the Government and to recognise, with them, that this is no easy problem. Yet I must record the widespread feeling among Catholics in Northern Ireland that more attention has been devoted in recent weeks—not so much here, but in Northern Ireland—to making the U.D.F. appear palatable to the B Specials than to making it appear

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welcome to all sections of the community. I say that because in this House it is right that those who feel they have any knowledge about widespread opinion should record it. I am sorry that it should be in this atmosphere, but it is right to place that before the House. I am the spokesman for nobody, and I am bound to say that I should speak a great deal more sharply about many of the activities of various parties and groups in Northern Ireland if I did not still cling to the hope that the original purpose set out in the Hunt Committee's Report, that of a balanced force, could be achieved.
I should just say this, since I seem to be talking in terms of woe. Since we last discussed these matters, and following the debates in the House of Commons, the Government have announced the establishment of an Advisory Committee, which was referred to by the noble Lord who introduced the Bill. I think the fact which was all along in the mind of the Government, that all that goes on there is to be brought ultimately to Parliament in this country, must be set on the encouragement side of any ledger. The noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, is well qualified—if anyone in the Government is—to say words of reassurance to the minority who have been very much disturbed by the events of the last six weeks or so, and I hope that he will go as far as he feels he can in view of his obligations in a number of directions.
My Lords, I will end with one slightly more general thought. The attitude of the Protestants in Northern Ireland towards the Catholics is not exhibited by Protestants in England or Scotland, where they are also in a large majority; it is not exhibited by Catholics towards Protestants in Southern Ireland, where the Catholics are in a majority. When we discuss this problem we are told that it is due to a deep-seated historical fear, and I have no doubt that in a sense that is true. The fear goes back a long way beyond 1920. It goes back 300 years beyond that, to the time when Protestants in Ireland (including, incidentally, my own family) were in a minority. It was the fear of a minority in Ireland as a whole which produced this particular attitude that has lingered on.
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It arose in days when religious toleration was nothing like we know it at the present time, among either Protestants or Catholics. For fifty years the Protestants in Northern Ireland have been in a large majority in their own area, and all the most intelligent members of their community are now well aware that there is no possible danger of armed attack from the South. Apart from anything else it would be a physical impossibility. No intelligent person in the North—Protestant or Catholic—supposes that such an attack is remotely likely. All intelligent Protestants in Northern Ireland are perfectly well aware that they will never be what is called "betrayed" by this country. That is a lurking hysteria among the less intelligent elements of the community.
Nevertheless, these fears are human. They do not disappear overnight. I pay my special tribute to the relative of the noble Lord, Lord Rathcavan—I am referring, of course, to Captain Terence O'Neill, who sacrificed everything in his power and who went down with his ship. His name will always be held in honour on the roll of history. I also pay tribute to all, including the Church leaders of the various denominations, who are trying to cure this historic fear. I myself believe that the world-wide Ecumenical movement, and gradually also the European movement, will supply a large part of the answer. Meanwhile, I will only say this: if this new force can help to eliminate fear—and I believe that this is still a possibility—it will have earned the gratitude of all who seek peace and harmony in human relations.
5.27 p.m.
THE EARL OF CORK AND ORRERY: My Lords, I understand that it is the least coveted place on a music hall bill to follow one who is undoubtedly a star. Without wishing to compare your Lordships in any way to a music hall, I find myself in difficulty in feeling that I ought to follow the speech made by the noble Earl, Lord Longford, who is undoubtedly a master in this subject and who has ranged widely, with great authority and with great civility and courtesy, if I may say so, over almost the whole of this enormous field. I hope, therefore, that he will forgive me if I do not follow him precisely, as that would leave me panting somewhere in the rear. I hope he may

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find that some of the things I have to say (which are few) will link up with his remarks.
My only other feeling is one of recollection going back to a day in the war against Japan when I came upon six Burmese soldiers sitting by a path. They were sitting on a wooden box which they had found under a culvert. The box appeared to contain some kind of rations. Food was somewhat scarce at that time and I was interested to see what it was they were so contentedly chewing. It appeared to be all right and they evidently found it quite palatable. It was in fact gelignite. It is of the utmost importance that your Lordships should not be tempted to swallow this Bill without making certain that it contains no explosive. I confess that I think it does.
That is not an original thought; it was touched on by a number of speakers in another place, and very much more forcibly than it has been this afternoon. I refer to the matter of the name, and I am not thinking particularly of the name "Ulster". There have been references by various noble Lords this afternoon to the word "Ulster" by itself. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, regretted having had to allow that name to go forward without some other recommendation. We know that there are few people who really care whether or not the name "Ulster" is used instead of "Northern Ireland". In fact in the debate in another place on the Committee stage of the Bill, the Minister replying for the Government actually said this:
"… the Government consider that the use of the word 'Ulster' is, frankly, unimportant. There are respectable military precedents for the use of the word in other regiments of the British Army. It is for this and the other reasons I have given that the Government have decided in favour of using this word."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, 1/12/69, col. 1041.]
That is not a reason which could very well be allowed to overcome a very strong opposition, I suggest. If you do not care, is it not reasonable to defer to those who do? I think I would go a little further than my noble friend Lord Jellicoe—or perhaps I would not follow him at all—when he said that, the Government, having chosen this name, it would be a mistake for them to go looking for another one now, and I noticed
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sage nods of agreement from the noble Lords, Lord Shackleton and Lord Winterbottom. This seems to me a fairly outstanding non sequitur. It certainly is no reason for not looking for another name now. The mere fact that the Government have chosen this name and printed and published it, I hope is not going to overweigh any other considerations and close their minds to any possibility of changing it.
What reasons are there for changing the name? I have indicated already that the fact that "Ulster" is not synonymous with the Six Counties is not all 1 have in mind. I have in mind something else. What I am attaching importance to is the fact that many people cordially dislike the words, "Ulster defence"—and I do not think those words have been mentioned: together in the debate this afternoon. What is more, I have some sympathy with them. In these words they still find—and here I join very closely to what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Boothby—echoes of the voice of Carson. "Ulster will fight; Ulster will be right", said Lord Randolph Churchill. And who was Ulster going to fight? "Home Rule is Rome rule", said Carson, as quoted by the noble Lord, Lord Boothby—and Carson was a fighter, if ever there was one. And from that time on the words "Ulster defence" have meant to many defence against Rome.
Some have used and still use this notion—a factitious one in the first place—for political ends. Thus we have now to name but one body only that uses these words, the Ulster Constitution Defence Committee, which was formed by Mr. Paisley and governs the Ulster Protestant Volunteer Force, an extremist militant body whose membership is open only to those who were actually born as Protestants. Is it illogical for Roman Catholics—and perhaps even some moderate Protestants—to look with suspicion on something called the Ulster Defence Regiment, to suspect it of standing for something of that same militant anti-Catholicism that Ulster defence has stood for in the past and still in the person of such people as the Paisleyites stands for to-day? Is it illogical? If it is, what of it? Does it matter one hoot if it is illogical or not? What does matter is the fact, surely, that some people can and do look on these words

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with suspicion of that sort. So why do it? Why use it? Why insist on a name which, while incapable of inspiring passion in its own defence is bound to arouse resentment and hostility in at least some of those on whose good will and support the success of this Bill so largely depends?
In some ways the Government seem to have gone almost out of their way to deepen suspicion and mistrust. I will mention one example only, already touched on by the noble Earl, Lord Longford, though perhaps in not quite the same way. The White Paper says that:
"The battalion commanders will be local members of the force; during its early life these appointments may be filled by present County Commandants of the Ulster Special Constabulary."
You disband an irregular police force and raise battalions of soldiers in its place, insisting as you do so that there is no connection or similarity between the two. And then you flatly contradict yourself by announcing that the battalions may be commanded by officers from the disbanded police. Can you seriously believe that nobody will suspect the new regiment of having any connection with the old police? There is another thing. Are these officers qualified by training or experience to command a battalion of this kind? Yes, I think they are, for reasons that are mentioned in the White Paper. Then by all means let them be so appointed but for that reason, and not merely stating that they are being appointed because they are experienced policemen.
To return to the question of the words "Ulster Defence", in the course of the Committee stage in another place there was a long debate on this subject and the point that I have tried to make in objection to those words was made with very considerable force. But in his reply the Minister ignored it, as indeed it was ignored, I think, by the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, this afternoon. He made a spirited and in my opinion misguided and unnecessary defence of the word "Ulster". Of the two words which were really under fire, "Ulster Defence", he said nothing at all.
To sum up this point, if I may, the name "Ulster Defence Regiment" is not sacred, good name though it may be,
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political considerations apart. So why cling to it in the certain knowledge that to do so will arouse suspicion and hostility in some of those persons whose good will we chiefly need? Why can we not have some other name—the Northern Irish Regiment perhaps—of which everyone can approve? I am not so sure about the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, for one reason which may perhaps not appeal very much to everybody: that there is a certain feeling in Royal regiments that they have acquired the name "Royal" as some kind of accolade or distinction in the past. One does not always look entirely kindly on a regiment which is raised with that prefix ab initio. However, that is something aside. What I suggest with the greatest possible respect is that in this matter of the name a little common sense is required and really that is all it comes to.
I have spoken at some length on that matter because I believe it is very important indeed, and now I shall be brief. I should like to refer to only two other points, one of which arises in Clause 1(2)(b)(ii). Here we find that any member of the force (and, incidentally, why "force" which is a police word, and not "regiment", which is what we are talking about?):
"…shall be subject to military law …at any time … when he is required or authorised to be in possession of … any prescribed description of equipment belonging to Her Majesty."
I find that a little puzzling, and the words that puzzle me are, "any prescribed description of equipment". It is a matter of common observation that soldiers often wear an arrangement of straps that is known as "web equipment" or "equipment" for short, a kind of military foundation garment on which can be suspended all kinds of containers and receptacles, and they are also classified under the general heading of "equipment". I find it reasonable to suppose that equipment of this sort will be prescribed or issued to members of the regiment and that they will keep it at home. Are they all for that reason to be permanently subject to military law? I do not suppose so. It seems more likely that in this case "prescribed" must be intended to mean prescribed for the purposes of this clause. But even if that is so, it still means that a man can be

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brought under military law by a minor regulation made (under Clause 4(1)) by the Secretary of State, and that seems to me, to put it mildly, to be of somewhat dubious propriety.
It is of some importance to a man to know whether or not he is subject to military law, and I have no doubt that he will understand that he must be so if in possession of arms or ammunition. In any case, that is clearly stated in the Bill. But equipment? Suppose he is ordered by an officer to take into his possession, say, a wireless set or a motor bicycle. If he objects to being placed under military law when neither called out nor undergoing training, can he refuse on the ground that he is not subject to military law and that, therefore, the order is not a lawful command? Apparently not, because although he was not subject to military law before the order was given, the giving of the order has made him subject to military law. I feel that this subsection is capable of causing a great deal of difficulty if it is not tightened, or possibly changed, and I must say it is possibily not the only one about which that can be said. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, will say something about this matter when he comes to speak at the end of the debate.
I turn finally to Clause 2(2) relating to the powers of officers to "call out the force or any part of it." Here, I must say, I experience a rather more complicated sense of bafflement, which I can perhaps explain most briefly by means of a series—not a very long series—of questions. What does "call out" mean? How is it done? Do you have to issue an order in writing through the usual channels, or can you do it by knocking on a man's window as you go past and saying, "Come on Fred!"? The point is of some importance, since the fact of calling a man out both places him under military law and entitles him to be paid.
Then, how small can "any part of" the force be? Can it be a single man? A single man is certainly a part of the force, and therefore can presumably be called out on his own in case of some sudden and local emergency, such as an attack on the police station. But on page 2 of the Bill, in line 34, Clause 1(5) says that members of the force shall not be required,
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'to give whole-time service except during any period during which the force or the part of it to which they belong is called out …"
What does that mean? When can a man be said to have been called out? When can it be done, and how? For the purposes of law it can be vitally important to know—and it is important to the man himself—whether a man has been called out or not. Surely it ought to be made clear in the Bill. The act and the procedure of "calling out" must be defined. How about a man who has his rifle at home—a rare but possible thing? Is he being ipso facto under military law, already in a state of having been called out? Presumably not, because otherwise he would have been paid. If he is not, can he legally fire his rifle in an emergency? What will happen if he does? If he cannot, what is the point of having it? Here again I think that we need rather more definition and a great deal more precision. Perhaps here also the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, will give us the benefit of his views.
That is about all I have to say, my Lords. I believe that it is, on the whole, a good and necessary Bill, and I wish it well. Above all—and speaking particularly as a former Ulster or Northern Ireland soldier—I wish the Regiment well. But, wishing it well, I am particularly anxious that it should not find itself unknowingly lunching on dynamite; and for that reason I greatly hope that your Lordships will look with considerable caution on the Government's anxiety to get this Bill on to the Statute Book by Thursday.
5.44 p.m.
LORD WIGG: My Lords, may I add my voice to those of your Lordships who have already expressed their appreciation and thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, for his excellent Report. My thanks are underlined by the fact that when I spent many hours in the last few days trying to understand the Bill and relate it to its military background, I reached the same conclusion as his Committee that in approaching the problem it is evident one must start from the principle that it can be dealt with only by military methods. When, some months ago, the Stormont Government was on the verge of ceasing to be a de facto Government the maintenance of law and order passed into the hands of the Armed Forces of

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the Crown, and the responsibility then rested with Her Majesty's Government and with the two Houses of Parliament. Having reached that point, I wonder why we should try to rush this measure through your Lordships' House as it was rushed through another place. It reached its concluding stages in the middle of last week after an all-night Sitting; we have the Second Reading on Monday and a Committee stage on Thursday. This is a measure of great constitutional importance and it needs to be seen against the background not only of the events that led up to it but of the general situation in the military field which faces this country at the present time.
The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, is right when he refers to military solution by the Armed Forces of the Crown, and this new force is to be part of those Regular Armed Forces. I noticed that the Minister of State in another place, in the concluding words of his speech on Third Reading, said, in speaking of this new force:
"It will become part of the regular forces, subject to military law …it is now integrated into the regular forces of the Crown."—[Official Report, Commons, 1/12/69; col. 1254.]
My Lords, that state of affairs is not brought about by a Minister making a statement in another place. We operate under the rule of law, and the juxtaposition of authority in the Armed Forces and the Houses of Parliament has been a vital and delicate matter down the centuries in first asserting and then maintaining the rule of law.
The Bill of Rights asserted that it should be not lawful to maintain an army in time of peace unless it be with the consent of Parliament. That conception now includes the new force. If one looks at this Bill, I must confess—and I am wholly at one with the noble Earl who has just spoken—that I have my doubts about it. I tried this afternoon to elicit a reply about the application of military law because I wanted to save your Lordships time, and I hoped to clear up the obscurity which exists in my mind on this subject. The Minister who replied at the Despatch Box suggested that I should go away and read the Bill again. Well, I have done just that, and I can now almost repeat it like a parrot. I sat for two and a half
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years on the Select Committee which produced the Army Act. It may well be that my intellectual stature, or my memory, has declined since that time, but I have spent this weekend again trying to relate what is in this Bill with the functioning of the Army Act, as I understand it.
Let me take an example, a very simple one, which I am sure will be familiar to everyone who has served in the Army. A man is in possession of his weapons and is at home; so there is no doubt, according to all that we have been told, that he is subject to military law. I must mention, in parenthesis, that Ministers change their tune, and I am not absolutely sure that they recognise when they have changed their tune. Sometimes it is "military law", sometimes it is "military discipline", and sometimes it is "military control"; and it seems to me that, poor dears, they think those things are one and the same, but clearly they are not.
To take discipline first, obviously under Clause 4 of the Bill it is possible for the Secretary of State for Defence to make regulations which would make the Queen's Regulations apply—although I noticed that when the Secretary of State for Defence was questioned on that point in another place he did not answer it but promised an answer later on and no answer was ever given. But I will now, under no greater authority than what I think myself, say that I believe that as far as the Queen's Regulations and discipline are concerned it is all right; but I must point out that if that is so it is unlike the Territorial Army, because they have regulations of their own.
Let us assume that the effective control is exercised by the G.O.C. Northern Ireland through the presence of the 200 officers, warrant officers, and N.C.O.s in the force. Now we come to military law. Our soldier, our member of the force, has his rifle at home; he commits some offence, and he is charged under Section 69 of the Army Act with conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline. We all know that one. He is wheeled in, and he says, "You cannot try me, for you are trying me under the Army Act, but the definition of those who are liable under the Army Act to military law is contained

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in Section 205, and the definition of 'regular forces'"—of which the Minister in another place said this force was a part—"is contained in the definitions in Section 225 of the Army Act and expressly excludes the reserve forces, the Territorials and the Home Guard." So I hope that when the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, comes to reply he will be able to deal with this. Obviously, there is some confusion here, and it is not clear from the Bill as drafted exactly what the position is. I must confess that it seems to me that it will be necessary to amend the Army Act if in actual fact this force is to be subject to military law and is to be considered a part of the regular forces. Does the noble Lord want to interrupt?
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (LORD SHACKLETON): My Lords, I do not want to interrupt the noble Lord, whom I regard, as he knows, as a tremendous expert in this field, and with whom, therefore, I should always hesitate to argue. But I find some difficulty, and it may be that I have missed his point. Subsection (2) of Clause 1 declares members of the force to be members of the Armed Forces of the Crown, and specifies the circumstances in which they will be subject to military law. As I understand it, this means that they will be subject to the Army Act 1955. I am really seeking information, because I suspect that I may have missed some part of the noble Lord's argument.
LORD WIGG: I am sorry. If that is so, if the words in Clause 1(2)(a) mean what the noble Lord says they mean, then indeed this is most surprising, because why does the clause not say so? As I understand it, the Army Act is itself something more than merely a code of military law. It is all-embracing; and if you have a list of definitions of those who are subject to that Act, and if you have in that Act a definition of "regular forces" it seems to me that the common sense thing to do, to remove any possibility of doubt, is to amend the Army Act in both those two places, and not to leave it as it is now, because otherwise those who are responsible will one day face the possibility that this point will be decided in the courts.
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The point I am making, if I may repeat it, is this. If the roles of the Home Guard, the Reserve Forces and the Regular Forces are defined, and if it is spelt out just who is liable to military law, it seems to me very odd that, when you introduce a new method—and by common consent this is something quite new—you should leave the position quite obscure. But I am quite content to leave it to the noble Lord. He can perhaps reply this evening, or he may care to engage in correspondence with the noble Earl who has just spoken, in which case perhaps he will let me know what he thinks. But at the moment it is anything but clear, and in the interests of what I would regard as law and order and good military discipline it seems to me that it ought to be cleared up.
But I want now, if I may, to move on to something much more important. What led up to the introduction of this Bill? It was not, I suggest, exclusively Northern Ireland. Once the decision is taken that the responsibility for the situation in Northern Ireland is the responsibility of the Army, then obviously the units in Northern Ireland—two battalions and a squadron of the 17/21st Lancers—had to be reinforced, and we have now stepped it up to nine major units. If I may say this to noble Lords on this side of the House, never in their worst days of scraping the barrel did they ever scrape it quite as it is being scraped at the present time. Of course, the Secretary of State for Defence is in an appalling dilemma; and there has been nothing like his conversion since the Journey to Damascus.
In every speech that I have made in this House since I ceased to be a Minister I have stressed the need for the Territorial Army—not for military reasons (that has been the difference between noble Lords on that side of the House and myself) but for just the reasons which the Secretary of State now advances: that it is absolutely essential in a modern society to give young men the opportunity, if they so desire, as volunteers, to give service to society, to the Crown, and prepare themselves for the defence of their country. This has always seemed to me an essential requirement, and it seems to me that it is a highly civilised requirement. I congratulate the Secretary of State on recognising, at long last, the wisdom—of

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course, in the face of events—of this principle, and that it is a sound one. He has been generous enough, not necessarily specifically to recant—that would be asking too much—but to say that ever since he became Secretary of State for Defence he has always recognised the healthy social need for integrated forces. Well, my Lords, we live and we learn.
But the facts are (and I will not do more at the moment than touch on the general defence question) that last week the Secretary of State was in Brussels. Of course he is on pretty thin ice, because his NATO partners really know what the situation is. Members of this House or Members of the House of Commons can be refused information about what the establishments of units are or what their strength is—as if this information is unknown to the Russian Intelligence Service or to our NATO partners. But of course they know what the figures are, and they see the Canadians fading out next year. What they want is the return of the Sixth Brigade, which at the present moment is counted as being part of the Rhine Army although it is sitting around Colchester. If the Secretary of State takes it back then he will be under pressure in Northern Ireland. This is the measure of his difficulties. So we have this hurried, ill-thought-out measure brought before the House of Commons, rushed through and brought to your Lordships to-night.
I do not oppose the principle of the Bill, given the situation in which we find ourselves, subject to certain conditions. The first condition is that the Bill is designed and worked in such a way as to make a solution possible. I, too, like the noble Earl, do not worry very much about the title of this force, but there are those who fight on the difference between Fulham and Chelsea or, in my part of the world, between Port Vale and Stoke-on-Trent or Wolverhampton and West Bromwich Albion. These things really matter; and when I listened to the debate in the House of Commons the other night on this very point—and I read it again—it was perfectly clear that tremendous importance is attached to the name of the force. It therefore seems to me that the Government would be wise if, in the interests of getting general agreement and of giving their own measure a fair chance, they had
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second thoughts. I understand that the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, and perhaps the noble Earl and the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, are going to put down Amendments. I will not follow them, but I shall choose which Amendment is best and give that one my support. For I think it essential that the Government should give their own measure a fair chance.
I should like now to turn for a moment to the very difficult question of whether or not the members of this force should have arms at home. This evening the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, gave us a long catalogue of attacks which have been made by the I.R.A. at different times -not only perhaps by the I.R.A., but by other subversive forces, and one must recognise the fact that it is regarded as a danger. Anyway, whether it is true or not, the myth is, as it were, for practical purposes, a reality. There are those deep apprehensions against the possibility of these attacks, and therefore the Government say: "So far as the towns are concerned, we will hold the arms in central armouries; and so far as the country is concerned we would hold in central armouries, only we have no central armouries." I noticed that that point was not made to-day; and it was not made by the Secretary of State for Defence; but it was made at the end of the debate in another place by the Minister of Defence for Administration. One of the things that puzzles me—and it puzzled me when I read the White Paper the first time—is the talk about rifles. What rifles? Are these 303 Short Lee-Enfields?
LORD SHACKLETON: Yes.
LORD WIGG: The noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, says, "Yes". Very good. So we have the interesting situation that the Regular Army to-day is armed with the F.N. 762 m.m. self-loading rifle; while the forces with whom they are working are armed with different weapons using different ammunition. This seems to me to be rather quaint—surely a rather odd military arrangement. If you are going to have men in selected cases who may themselves have to face automatic or repetition fire, it seems to me that they should be given the most modern weapons, that they should train in the most modern weapons and they ought to be using the same weapons as the

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Regular forces with which they are engaged. This seems to me to be common sense. But to-night, for the first time—it has not been mentioned before, either here or in another place or in the White Paper—we learn that these men are to be armed with what is, after all, a personal weapon that is obsolete.
I notice another point; it fell from the mouth of the Secretary of State for Defence. He said that the reason for these men possessing these weapons was the need to protect dispersed vulnerable spots. That was not the case made by the Minister of Defence for Administration in the other place. He made the case that these men were really in danger of their lives; that they wanted them for personal protection. Which is it. If they are engaged in the important role of protecting public utilities, then they must be armed with modern weapons. If, on the other hand, it is a deeply apprehended fear for their lives and safety, then there may be a case for the 303. But the Government cannot have it both ways. The House needs to make up its mind which it is. Another point which has been quite often made is that few weapons have been lost. I miss the significance of this point.
I was also deeply puzzled by a remark of the Secretary of State for Defence to the other place. He made what I thought was a truly remarkable statement. During the Second Reading of the Ulster Defence Regiment Bill in another place, he said:
"It is not the general custom for members of Army reserves to keep arms at home, and it is our intention that as a general rule, and to the greatest possible extent, the arms of the Ulster Defence Regiment shall be kept in central armouries."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, 19/11/69; col. 1325.]
Note the words "it is not the general custom". That means, I suggest, that if it is not the general custom it is the practice of some sections of the Army Reserve to keep weapons. If I am unfair in that interpretation I should like to be told so. If I am right and that statement was intended to convince the House of Commons that there are those serving in the Reserve Forces who keep their arms at home, I should like the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, when he comes to reply, to tell us who they are—because I will now say that that statement is completely false. No section of the Army Reserve keep their weapons at home. The Secretary
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of State must have known that when he made that statement. That is a serious thing to say, but I am quite confident of my facts.
This leads me to my second point, the question of recall. This is of fundamental importance. Under the Reserve Forces Act, when a national emergency is apprehended the Sovereign can call out the whole of the Reserve. But notice what must happen. If the Reserve is called out, the House of Commons, the Houses of Parliament, must be informed at once. If they are not in Session they must be recalled for that purpose. It is true that under another section of that Act men serving in Volunteer Reserve units can be recalled merely by the Secretary of State giving notice to them in writing. But these are definitely controlled procedures. They are controlled procedures in the interests of democracy itself. They have been jealously guarded down the centuries and under different Administrations as a check on the Executive—not, perhaps, any of those living to-day, but down the centuries. From the Bill of Rights onwards this right of control by the Houses of Parliament has been safeguarded.
Now we have a situation in which we are told—I am not convinced that it is right, although I am open to conviction—that men who are members of the Armed Forces can have their arms at home and can be called out under procedures which, as the noble Earl who spoke before me said, are ill defined. Somebody can knock on the door and (to use his words) say: "Come on, Fred. Come out!" This can be done by an officer not below the rank of Major or by anyone whom that officer delegates—and the Houses of Parliament remain in complete ignorance. Obviously, if some trouble is apprehended and you have to call Fred out, always assuming that the procedures are clearly laid down and adhered to, that is all right. Nobody in his senses would expect the Secretary of State for Defence or his subordinate to come immediately to the Houses of Parliament and inform them. But some procedure ought to be worked out—even if only a procedure that at monthly intervals or quarterly intervals both Houses of Parliament are informed of the number of occasions on which these men are called out under these Acts. Because the principle of Parliamentary control over the

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Armed Forces of the Crown is absolutely vital and is the basic safeguard of our democratic procedure. I think that that is self evident.
My Lords, we have dealt with the title; we have dealt with the weapons. I have my doubts as to whether this measure deals with the difficulties of this force falling within the scope of the Army Act. And we have dealt with the question of the call-out. It now remains for me to say this. I wish this Bill well. But I am old enough, I regret to say, to remember being attached to a Regiment of the Line which had two detachments in Ireland during "the Troubles". I remember that it was a matter of months from the time the Black and Tans arrived in Ireland in 1920—and note that the original forces were described by Winston Churchill, as he then was, as men of high intelligence—before the situation deteriorated. Before the year ended they were supplemented by the Auxiliary Cadets, and from then until 1921 the situation got worse and worse. For both Black and Tans and Auxiliaries were out of control. They left behind a memory which took a long time to disappear.
I think that the control by the Army is right, but the Army have a very difficult job to do. They have to recruit, and they are to have the assistance of an Advisory Board, which is good. I happen to know, as a result of part of my Ministerial experience, the state of security in the Army when the present Government asumed office in 1964. Let us put it very modestly and say that a number of administrative changes were made, and the situation has greatly improved. I wonder sometimes that some Minister of this Administration does not draw attention to the fact that during the five years of the Labour Government there has been no major security scandal. But perhaps that would be taking a bit of a risk, because one never knows what the future may hold. To those who remember the circumstances, the last five years contrast very favourably with the previous five years—but I will not press on old wounds.
I would personally vouch for the ability and integrity of those men who are engaged in a very difficult task of security vetting, but they will have to rely on fairly "dodgy" sources in Northern Ireland. Security vetting in Northern
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Ireland is going to be a different proposition from security vetting in this country, and therefore there is one thing that I should like to see—and here I want to choose my words with great care. I think that the Prime Minister should institute certain procedures; not novel ones and certainly not by burdening the Security Commission. The Security Commission is working well, and I think that it would be wrong to seek to alter its terms of reference. The Prime Minister has around him men who are wise and good and of great ability. That is why I sometimes find my temperature rising a little when I see stones cast at the security services. During the three years when I came anywhere near them I can vouch that there were no more patriotic, devoted, liberal-minded, intelligent and good men to be found anywhere in these Islands than those who comprised our security services. They have a difficult job to do, and they can make mistakes—indeed, I am surprised that they do not make more. But I think that the country is well served.
Whether Northern Ireland is to be turned into a "Hell's kitchen" or whether we are going to move forward—as Mr. Quintin Hogg hoped in his very able speech in Dublin this week-end—into a concept where civilised men respect the law and the rights of others depends very largely on how this force is recruited. There is suspicion on both sides; there is hatred on both sides. We have to find a bridge. I am now speaking over the head of the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, but I hope that the Prime Minister will heed my words. What he should do is to draw on those who are near him—he could do it quite easily—and set up a small committee, answerable to him, which would ensure that the vetting procedures in Northern Ireland are carried through strictly, fairly and with a supreme concern for the objects which this Bill seeks to advance. If that were done, I do not think that the Minister of Defence, or the G.O.C., Northern Ireland, or the Stormont Government, would lose cast. The people I am talking about are men of the greatest experience, and in these critical times they could render a service not by breathing down somebody's neck or leaning over somebody's shoulder, but by making their expertise available whenever it becomes necessary.

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My Lords, if the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, either by correspondence or during this debate, can clear up my doubts about the Army Act; if he would go as far as the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and the noble Earl, Lord Cork and Orrery, and do something about the title of the force; if he would clear up some of the points made during the debate (I have not by any means exhausted my list of statements made in another place which are completely devoid of fact), I do not think we shall have any difficulty during the Committee stage. But I believe that the noble Lord would be serving the House, and serving the purposes of the Government, if he postponed the Committee stage from this week to next week to allow us all an opportunity to give this Bill the further careful consideration it needs.
6.16 p.m.
LORD KILBRACKEN: My Lords, I listened with extreme interest to every word the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, said. I must say that I share a great many of his apprehensions and would support his suggestion that the Committee stage should, if possible, be postponed. The noble Lord will forgive me if I do not follow him into the intracacies of his argument. I want to commence by considering something that I think highly relevant but has not so far been raised in this debate; that is the greatly changed political situation, compared with a year ago, that will be faced in Northern Ireland by the proposed new Regiment when it comes into existence.
My Lords, what is the position there at present? I think that the great majority in the North is not politically active. Those people do not take part in parades or demonstrations, they want to live their own quiet lives peacefully and succeed in doing so. But those who are active politically are, unfortunately, still very bitterly divided between two great extremes. I suggest that the religious side of this division has always been over emphasised. We have on the one hand representatives of the Unionist majority who are wishing to maintain the dominant position, the position of ascendancy, that they have held since the plantation; and, in general, to remain part of the United Kingdom. On the other hand is the Nationalist minority of
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which the number is growing larger every year, and which in my belief will not remain a minority for ever. Throughout this last year, indeed throughout the last ten years, this minority has sought an end to the discrimination it has always suffered; discrimination in jobs, in housing and voting rights. It is a minority which, in general, hopes for integration with the Republic by constitutional means—and I emphasis "by constitutional means".
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: Hear, hear!
LORD KILBRACKEN: It is no more than an historical accident, the fact that the plantation of Ulster came after the Reformation, that most of the former, but by no means all, are Protestants, and most of the latter are Catholics. My own family, like the family of my noble friend Lord Longford, have lived in Ireland, and in what is now, thank God! the Republic of Ireland, for several hundred years; I am not quite sure how many. My family, like my noble friend's, has formed part and parcel of the Protestant ascendancy. I have not learned to "dig with the other foot" as has the noble Earl; I am not quite sure that I dig with any foot.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: You are young yet!
LORD KILBRACKEN: But despite my background, I fully support the Nationalist movement and the Civil Rights Association, and look forward to a united, independent Ireland as a nation once again.
My Lords, I ask: Where does the main danger of civil disturbance in the Six Counties of Northern Ireland now lie? The Stormont Government have agreed, they have been forced to agree—and this is a measure of the success achieved by the oppressed minority—to a series of reforms which, if they are fully implemented, would remove to a great extent, or could remove entirely, the grievances suffered by that minority and lead to the possibility of peaceful co-existence. The only real danger to such co-existence is that full implementation of the reform programme will be opposed by force by the extremist members of the unionist majority. I shall name no names.

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Therefore, I suggest that the real problem is whether the proposed Regiment would be suitable and effective in countering such force, in dealing with civil disturbances provoked by Protestant extremists to prevent the implementation of the proposed reformed programme. I very much fear that it will not so prove. It is essential to be realistic. I say, with regret, that I believe that this Regiment will end up by being almost exclusively a sectarian force. I was most interested in the remarks on this matter by the noble Lord, Lord Byers, and I hope that he is right. I accept that the Government are completely sincere in the hope they have expressed that large numbers of the minority will join the Regiment. But that minority, rightly or wrongly, believes, and they have considerable justification for believing, that the main function of this Regiment will be to see that they remain an oppressed minority, to deny them the rights they have been promised, to impede peaceful demonstrations, to harry and terrorise them.
The noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, pointed out that not a single Catholic was among the 8,500 members of the U.S.C. I hope, as my noble friend Lord Longford hoped, that 2,000 Catholics will now come forward to form one-third of this new Regiment. But it is going to be so closely identified in the minds of that minority with the Specials that I see little possibility of that hope being fulfilled. We have to remember that it was originally intended that 30 per cent. of the R.U.C. should be Catholic, and that even in the R.U.C. the figure has always remained at 10 or 11 per cent.
I want to emphasise that it is the unhappy dichotomy between Unionist and Nationalist within Northern Ireland that has been responsible for all these terrible disturbances, for which nobody is sorrier than I, and which now lead to the proposed formation of this Regiment. I believe that it is merely fanciful to imagine that any threat exists to the integrity or internal harmony of Northern Ireland from outside—that is to say, from the Republic of Ireland. That suggesttion was given rather undue emphasis in the otherwise excellent Report of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. In his opening remarks, my noble friend Lord Winterbottom
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began to enumerate a series of acts of terrorism in the North and, when I intervened, he said that he could not state whether these had come from across the Border. I maintain that there is no evidence whatever that they did so come. The only act of cross-Border sabotage was the completely unsuccessful attempt by a Protestant extremist to blow up the dam at Ballyshannon in the Republic.
It is true, and no one can deny it, that from 1956 to 1962 there was a series of serious armed raids from across the Border by the I.R.A., which is an illegal organisation in the Republic of Ireland and which has been denounced in the Dáil over and over again and by the leaders of both Churches. No one deplores more than I do that these took place but, as the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, says in his Report, their campaign of terrorism "gained no public support and was defeated." There have now been no such incidents for over seven years. I live seven miles from the Border, on the right side, and I believe that it is most unlikely that there will be a recurrence.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend what he means by being "on the right side"? It would really help us.
LORD KILBRACKEN: My Lords, I wondered if anyone would rise to that fly. I meant on the Republican side of the Border but in Ulster, in one of the three Ulster counties in the Republic of Ireland.
On the question of the functions of the Regiment, on Committee stage in another place the impression was most definitely given by the Government, whether intentionally or not, that the Regiment would be used almost exclusively for the guarding of vital installations. This can be inferred from the mathematics used by the Minister, Mr. Ivor Richard, to justify the ceiling of 6,000 men. He argued that at times of greater tension this year a maximum of 800 men a night was needed for this duty of guarding installations. Members of the Regiment could not be expected to serve more than one night a week. By multiplying 800 by the number of days in the week and allowing for wastage, Mr. Richard reckoned that up to 7,000 might be needed for this purpose.

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If this ceiling might be required at times of great tension for guarding vital installations, that would leave nobody available for any other duty. If this were the case—that guarding these rather mythical installations was to be the Regiment's nearly exclusive function—I should have no objection to it, though there would be little for it to do if the reform programme goes through. But my fear is that this will not be the only duty.
How else will the Regiment be employed? An assurance was given in another place that it will not be employed in industrial disputes and that this will be included in regulations. The assurance was also given in another place on Committee stage that the Regiment would not be engaged in crowd control. I myself do not want the Regiment to come in contact in any way with unarmed members of the public. I do not think it should be used for breaking up peaceful demonstrations. I do not think that it should ever enter the Bogside or the Catholic districts of Belfast. I do not think that it should operate road blocks, except on cross-border roads if there were a resurgence of armed terrorism from Republican bases.
I do not want the Regiment to be used on riot duty. My noble friend Lord Winterbottom said today that it was not intended that it should so be used. But when this matter was considered in another place on an Amendment of my honourable friend, Miss Devlin, the Minister, Mr. Roy Hattersley, gave an important assurance on this point, and then greatly qualified it for a reason that seems to me invalid. The Minister gave an assurance that
"… it is essentially the intention of the Secretary of State …"
that the Regiment should not be used for riot duties. If he had stopped there, as my noble friend Lord Winterbottom did, well and good. But the Minister went on to say that the Regiment, like any other body, had a common law obligation to protect life and property and added that it would be fantastic to "write out" such an obligation by including such a provision in the Regulations. That was his only reason for not agreeing to do so.
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I cannot see the validity of his argument. If the Regiment has been called out, if armed members are despatched each night on specified assignments (which, in my view, should consist of guarding vital installations or patrolling the border), and on the way to these assignments they happen to encounter a body of extremists of either persuasion which seems to constitute a threat to life and property, they can surely be expected—in fact, they would be duty bound—to fulfil the common law obligation to which the Minister referred, even if it were written in the Regulations that they should not be employed on riot duties, as is, after all, the essential intention of the Government, because the common law obligation would remain. Such circumstances would be a very different matter from being specifically despatched by their commanding officer to undertake riot duties. The undertaking of such duties, I believe, would be disastrous. Whenever the Royal Ulster Constabulary, and in particular the B Specials, were called in during the disturbances this year, it always had the effect of exacerbating the situation. It was only when the British Army intervened, and were at once accepted as the first representatives of impartial law and order ever seen by the community, that peace was restored.
There is a further point concerning which I feel serious apprehension. The mathematics used by Mr. Richard to justify a ceiling of 6,000 men were based on the Regiment being a part-time force, as it will be, in principle, its members serving not more than one night a week. But under Clause 1(5) it is clear that full-time service may be required. I would ask: in what circumstances would that full-time service be required? It would clearly never be necessary to have 6,000 armed men on duty at the same time for guarding vital installations. Can we have any assurance—or, better still, can it be written into the Regulations or into the Act itself—that full-time service will be required only if there is a threat from outside to the integrity of the Province?
I say the "Province", but it is, of course, only two-thirds of a Province. I cannot avoid mentioning the proposed name of the Regiment, although it has been mentioned already here several times and at length in another place,

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because, as I have indicated earlier, it happens that I myself live in the other one-third of that Province. I woke up this morning in Ulster—I flew across from Dublin this afternoon—and was at the same time happily within the borders of the Republic.
LORD SHACKLETON: Why happily?
LORD KILBRACKEN: I am afraid I did not hear my noble Leader.
LORD SHACKLETON: The noble Lord keeps using interesting phrases. He said that he was "happily" in the Republic. I feel that there must be some particular reason for this.
LORD KILBRACKEN: Well, I was happy that I was in the Republic, otherwise I would not live there. I said that I was happy to wake up there this morning, and I am sorry to be back here now. I do not think the Regiment will ever come to defend me—in fact, I am sure it will not, and I am grateful that it will not—in County Cavan. Indeed, I may say that I consider it no less than an insult to the Republic that the Regiment should by inference claim to defend an ancient and well-defined Province of which one-third, no less, is within the borders of the Republic, which is a neighbouring, sovereign State.
I will say no more on this occasion about the name of the Regiment, because it has already been mentioned so fluently by the noble Lords, Lord Brockway, Lord Hunt, Lord Boothby and Lord Cork and Orrery, and because I will be putting my name to an Amendment in my noble friend's name that the title of the Regiment should be changed. But I must ask noble Lords to accept that the word has special significance; that it is a kind of password, almost a secret sign; and that it is, in fact, an indication that this will be predominantly a Unionist force. Call the Regiment what you will, it is unlikely that many Catholics will come forward to join it. Call it the Ulster Defence Regiment, and it is sure that practically none will. In principle, I am opposed to the establishment of this force. I accept that it will be established, but I am deeply apprehensive of how it will be employed, and hope that some of these apprehensions will be removed in the course of my noble friend's reply.
6.35 p.m.
VISCOUNT BARRINGTON: My Lords, I apologise for not having put my name down to speak in the debate, but I hope to be not more than five minutes. I want to speak on only one subject, which has been touched on by many noble Lords, and that is the Title of the Bill. My only justifications for speaking are that I have a Northern Irish title and I am speaking from a Back Bench, and opinion seems to have been divided on the subject of the Title in a way that I do not entirely understand. It has been argued here, and was argued at length in another place, that the Title was so unimportant that it was a waste of time to discuss it. It was also argued that it was so important that to introduce an Amendment on it, or to pass an Amendment, would wreck the Bill itself. I am prepared to believe either of those propositions, but I am not prepared to believe both.
It seems to me, having listened to this debate, that there is a division of opinion as follows. Those who believe the Title to be supremely unimportant sit mainly on the Front Benches, and those who believe it to be important seem to sit on the Back Benches. I should like to express solidarity with those who sit on the Back Benches, that it is important. I understood the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, in his extremely fair statement, to say that we all know that Ulster consists of nine counties and not six. I may be wrong, but I thought I heard a murmur from the Front Bench saying: "You mean six counties and not nine". There are a great many in the country, though not in your Lordships' House, who are a bit doubtful whether Ulster does mean nine counties which include six counties, or six counties which include nine, or what. It is sufficiently ambiguous to raise doubt in people's minds.
From another point, the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe—and I agreed with almost all his remarks—said that he had doubts about the Title; but he added, as the noble Earl, Lord Cork, said, that he did not feel that we ought to alter it "now". I think there are only three choices: to alter it now, to alter it never, or to alter it in Committee. We cannot alter it now, we shall not alter it "never", and if any-body proposes to alter it in Committee I

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would certainly vote for the alternative that I thought best for the purposes.
I was able to agree with everything that was said by my noble friend Lord Byers. But, to be quite fair to the Back-Benchers, my only difference—not disagreement—with him is that I did not think he went quite far enough, in so far as he said: "We ought to give every encouragement to Catholics to join the new force". I believe this Title is not one of the things that will encourage them. He also said: "I cannot believe that the name, Ulster Defence Force, will be the one thing on which the new force will founder." I entirely agree with that, but it might be one of the things which would help it to founder.
I do not want to keep your Lordships, but I should like to touch very briefly on the Back-Bench view. I was interested in the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, whom I think we can regard as entirely impartial and who is perhaps the person whom most of us have come to hear. He did regard this matter as important. I do not know whether the noble Earl, Lord Longford, does, because, owing to a failure of timing, I was not in the Chamber when he spoke. I know that the noble Earl, Lord Cork and Orrery, made the point which I should like to reiterate: that it is not only the word "Ulster "or Defence", but the juxtaposition of the two, which is crucial. In conclusion, I will illustrate this by saying that I do not object to being called British—although I like to sign my name as "English" in the hotel book. I do not object to the name "humanist". Like the Archbishop of Canterbury when he was interviewed by Mr. David Frost, I would say I am a humanist, although I hope a Christian one. I should resent being called a British Humanist, not because I have any doubts about the idealism of the British Humanist Association, but because they are apt to argue in a way which I think has been employed in this case, by attempting to get the best of both worlds. I mean that if you produce a logical argument they are apt to say, "That is all academic and pedantic". If, on the other hand, you produce an emotional argument, they say, "Oh, that is emotive".
A great deal of emotion is felt about this subject on both sides, and there is no reason why it should not be voiced;
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but when one is trying to be impartial and has to judge between the two emotional attitudes, one can only listen to the arguments. The arguments I have listened to and read in another place, and which I have heard here tonight, convince me that the Title is important. I believe an Amendment which alters it would help the cause which all your Lordships have at heart, which is a peaceful Ireland.
6.42 p.m.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, this debate has gone rather wider than I had expected and, indeed, some noble Lords—in particular my noble friend Lord Kilbracken—took the opportunity, which they were entitled to do, to make the speech which they might have made when we were debating Northern Ireland a few weeks ago. It is interesting to see the emergence above the Bishops' Bench of almost an "Irish Bench". To judge by what the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, covers I think it is also sometimes a "Biafran Bench", or an "Irish Bench ", or even a "Rugby Union Bench" as it was on the last occasion.
It will be difficult for me to cover all the issues that have been raised, although there are a number of small points, and some rather tricky points—particularly those from my noble friend Lord Wigg—which I will endeavour to answer rather quickly, and then return to some of the central issues. In speaking, I am very conscious of what my noble friend Lord Longford said (and I appreciate his reference to myself) and I should like, indeed, to speak in the same tone as he did. I hope we are all deeply anxious—and this is the purpose of the debate—to arrive at decisions which will contribute to peace in Northern Ireland, and not the reverse.
I particularly appreciated—as I think did the House—the moderation and understanding in the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Rathcavan. I can give him one piece of information, and that is that a man who has served for five years in the U.S.C. will reckon that service for bounty in the new Regiment, and will go straight on to the £35 rate of bounty. I will give answers to a number of the purely military points now. The noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, asked a number of points on wireless equipment. Each battalion will have some transmitting and

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receiving stations, including some vehicle mounted stations in the mobile patrol element. Perhaps I should have dealt with that first. There will be a small mobile element in each battalion equipped with both troop carriers and small four-wheel drive vehicles—which seems to me to be a longer way of saying Land Rovers, but the military talk in these terms, and I assume it is a Land Rover. Some vehicles will be equipped with wireless. The mobile element will carry out patrols and enable check points and road blocks to be set up quickly.
On the subject of armouries, I can only say that the G.O.C. is giving special attention to the provision of the necessary armouries, and a preliminary survey of the accommodation that is likely to be available for the Regiment, including that available for armouries, is now being undertaken. There will be opportunities—but essentially on a purely voluntary basis—to undertake training in the United Kingdom.
The noble Lord, Lord Wigg, and other noble Lords, referred to the kind of rifle. I am happy to be able to give him the information that it will be a single-shot Lee-Enfield, though I cannot remember which Mark. I feel extreme diffidence, almost amounting to nervousness, debating with somebody who is as well informed as the noble Lord, Lord Wigg. The rifles they are having are their personal weapons, they are not status symbols, and the simple fact is that they do not need the F.N. rifle. It has been my experience, and it must have been the experience of the noble Lord. Lord Wigg, that it is still not unusual, particularly on guard duties (and I have seen this in recent years in various parts of the world) for particular people, say the R.A.F. guarding a particular installation in Aden, not to be armed with F.N. rifles. The rifles these men will have are considered suitable for the purpose for which they will use them.
LORD WIGG: My Lords, I understood—perhaps I am wrong—that the common rifle now is the 762 mm. self-loading rifle, and that the Mark IV Lee-Enfield, to which the noble Lord referred, has now been re-barrelled, so that it took the NATO bore. As I understand it, these chaps will have the old Mark IV Lee-Enfield with the 303 ammunition.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, this is the point at which I have gone as far as my certainty goes. I promise to give the noble Lord any further information on this point. It is the single-shot rifle and not the F.N.
Also on the subject of equipment, the noble Earl, Lord Cork and Orrery, who always speaks so reasonably, but seems sometimes (I hope he will not mind my saying it) to make very heavy weather with relatively small points, is obviously worried that a member of this force, if he takes his webbing—I think he called it his "foundation garment"—home would immediately have a prescribed piece of equipment, and, therefore would come under military law. The noble Earl really need not have worried. The Army may at times appear to be rather silly to some noble Lords—and the noble Earl was himself a soldier, so perhaps he is prejudiced on this—but they do know what they are doing. The purpose of including equipment is to cover circumstances in which a member of the force might be authorised to take home a Service radio or vehicle whose loss or misuse would be a serious matter. It is not meant to apply to uniform or personal equipment. Hence—and this is the beauty of the Bill—the equipment is to be prescribed for the particular purposes of this provision. I hope that the noble Earl will now cease to worry on this point.
THE EARL OF CORK AND ORRERY: My Lords, if the noble Lord will forgive me for intervening, I entirely appreciate the point about the "foundation garment". I think I made that point myself.
LORD SHACKLETON: Yes; the noble Earl did.
THE EARL OF CORK AND ORRERY: I did not think it really meant that. Apparently it does say that. But it does not say—does it?—that the equipment is to be "prescribed for the particular point of this section". If you look in the definition you find that it is to be prescribed. Prescribed equipment is prescribed equipment. So all the Bill need say is that it is "prescribed for the particular purposes of this section", which is to define how a man comes under military law.
LORD SHACKLETON: I am very sorry, my Lords. I think the noble Earl is still worried. I have done my best. It is to be prescribed—he is quite right—and it will be prescribed in a sensible way.
I should like now to come on to a difficult area; namely, the question of call-out. "Call-out" is a term which is, as noble Lords know, frequently used in reserve forces legislation; and I could quote a number of Acts. It means summoned from civilian life to military duty, and it is not defined in any Statute. A part of the force generally means a unit or sub-unit, but it could be any group other than an individual. A man who has his arms at home is subject to military law under the provisions of Clause 1(2)(b)(ii), but he is not thereby called out for service. That is to be done by specific order; namely, that he must turn out for guard duty at such-and-such an hour. And he is not to use his arms except as ordered. I hope that this answers the noble Lord's points. This has some bearing on what the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, said later.
It is not going to be easy, I think, for me to answer some of the technical points in this debate. These are early days in the formation of the force, and before it becomes operational these matters will have been thoroughly examined; exact procedures will have been devised, and instructions will have been written. But this is a very unusual force, and both the matters raised by the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, and the noble Earl point the difficulties of organising a military force of this kind; of reconciling both the legislation and the military precision to which we are accustomed with the flexibility and informality needed for a really rather unusual part-time citizen force. We are very conscious of the difficulty, and the Ministry of Defence are, I am sure, studying it with great care in the context of the regulations. And I am sure they will be reinforced in their determination to do so thoroughly by some of the remarks that have been made.
It is worth pointing out that the role of the Ulster Defence Regiment is quite different from that of any of the other reserves. I have already made that point, but it applies even if we compare it with TAVR, which could be called out for
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home defence service only under the liabilities of actual or apprehended attack or imminent national danger. They could not be used on emergency service of the kind which this force will undertake under Clause 2.
Perhaps I might deal here with the point of military law. I suspect that we may have an opportunity even to continue this discussion further. But, as I understand it, subsection (3) of Clause 1 (and I am quite certain that the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, will not have missed this) seems to have the effect of applying the relevant parts of the Army Act 1955; and by this reference to them this has the effect, not of amending the Army Act 1955, but of bringing these forces within the relevant sections of that Act. But I want to look very closely at what the noble Lord said, because he always argues his case in a very closely and tightly reasoned way, and I want to make sure that I have covered the points to which he was referring.
I should now like to turn to another aspect—an important point which seems to raise what could be an important libertarian issue. It relates to the control of Parliament over the Army. This is a matter to which Parliament has always attached the greatest importance, and the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, has probably been the most active Parliamentarian in this field, certainly in my generation. I always regarded him in this respect as a somewhat Cromwellian figure, although Cromwell himself subsequently disposed of Parliament. The point of reporting to Parliament in the case of this particular force is, I believe, quite other than the point of reporting to Parliament in the case of a call-out of reserves in the circumstances with which we are familiar. It is certainly true that it was pointed out in another place—and the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, has done the same here—that there was no provision for reporting to Parliament any exercise of the power. My honourable friend the Under-Secretary of State has undertaken to see whether machinery could be devised in this connection.
I think the House will agree that the routine guarding of vulnerable points or the call-out of a few men to meet a local threat would not realistically justify a Parliamentary debate. But the call-out of the whole force raises a quite different

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issue; and if they were called out on permanent service, under subsection (3) or (4), provision already exists for a report to be made to Parliament. The call-out of the whole force on emergency service does not depend on a prior decision in Parliament. This would destroy its speed of action, and it would be inconsistent with Clause 2(2) of the Bill. But if there were a need for a general call-out undoubtedly the Government would expect—and I think we must face that Governments must be prepared—to give an assurance and to report to Parliament and, if necessary, arrange a Parliamentary debate.
LORD WIGG: My Lords, if I may intervene, I do not think the noble Lord quite understands the importance of this. When the Army Act was revised, both Houses agreed to the amendment of the Bill of Rights. I understand this has been done only once before. This was a pretty serious step to take, and it was taken—this was the last item the Select Committee left to themselves—on the absolute and specific understanding that Parliament would have an opportunity, not necessarily to debate but to be kept informed. If this is an extension of a regular forces requirement, it seems to me necessary, not, again, that a debate should take place, or that the Houses of Parliament should be informed the next day, but that they should be kept informed in some way.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I am not sure in logic. It is a question whether within the spirit of the under-taking a force is unusual and is carrying out a different type of role. But I fully acknowledge that there can be an important constitutional point here. I do not believe that anyone would expect that the call-out of this force for the particular duties which, for instance, the B Specials are performing now, in the way of guarding, would warrant a report to Parliament. But I think it would be desirable for us to look a little further at this—and it may be that there is some further assurance I can give on this point. I have taken the point off the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, and so have the Government, but I do not think it is quite as serious for the routine activities of this particular force as he implies.
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Concern has been expressed about the officer who has the power to call out these particular men. This power can be delegated only to a regular officer. He must not be below the rank of major, and at all times it is within the control of the G.O.C. Northern Ireland, who is directly answerable to my right honourable friend the Secretary of State, and so to Parliament. I hope that this very carefully thought out arrangement provides the assurance that this will not be some irresponsible force.
Let me add that, despite what may have been said about the B Specials in the past (and I am familiar with the problems, as the noble Earl, Lord Longford, knows; and I have heard the arguments for many years), I do not know of any recent cases, except within the context of the particular troubles just recently, when in fact in ordinary circumstances there have been reports of irresponsible action. But the important thing—and I stress this to my noble friend with anxiety in this matter—is that this force is now being brought within the control of the British Army. This is the most decisive argument in favour of the Bill and of proceeding with it in the way we are doing.
My Lords, I should like to mention one or two other points. The G.O.C. Northern Ireland will aim at the selection of the best qualified applicants for appointment as officers in the Regiment. This point was raised by my noble friend Lord Longford. There will certainly be no automatic appointment to the Regiment of officers of the Ulster Special Constabulary, but it is likely to be found that the present county commandants, provided they meet the other requirements, will be best qualified to be battalion commanders during the early life of the Regiment. I appreciate that this is a source of anxiety to some of my noble friends.
That brings me to the points about security vetting. I gladly echo the tribute paid by my noble friend Lord Wigg to the security services. He knows that I also have had some experience of them. Obviously we shall consider closely what he has said. The security screening of applicants to determine their suitability or otherwise to be members of the Ulster Defence Regiment will, of course, be

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entirely the responsibility of the G.O.C. Northern Ireland. This process will be done entirely by the Army. But as my noble friend knows, this is perhaps a matter which I ought not to pursue further, beyond saying that it is obvious that the advice of the security services is available to any proper Government institution. The greater part of the screening will be done by the Army, and the purpose will be to ensure that applicants are of good character and are not extremists in the context of the general situation in Northern Ireland.
My Lords, I should now like to say something about the Advisory Council. The purpose of the Council is to achieve a proper balance in the force, and clearly it would be important that in arriving at the total numbers of this force some regard should also be had to the balance. It could be argued that if we had a lower number it would almost automatically be filled up with eager applicants from the old Ulster Special Constabulary, but there will need to be an appropriate balance of experience as well as of community background. Although an applicant's religion is not normally a relevant consideration for entering the Army or for determining technical competence, applicants for the Ulster Defence Regiment are being asked to state their religion on their application form, so that during the progress of recruitment Her Majesty's Government can watch this question of the balance as applicants come in.
I should have liked to go on and discuss the question of the size of the force. I would only emphasise again that the figure of 6,000 is a ceiling and not a recruiting target. The policy on the actual size of the force will be determined in the light of experience as the build-up proceeds, but in any case will not ultimately exceed 6,000 officers and men. In my view it would be foolish to set a ceiling figure lower than 6,000 which is, as I have said, based upon a broad assessment of the military operational requirement. Noble Lords who have had experience in military planning on occasion may doubt the precision of military operational requirements, but the Army have done this pretty thoroughly, and the noble Lord, Lord Byers, having recently visited Northern Ireland, has come to the view that this is a reasonable figure. In all these matters the Government can
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only, in a very difficult area of judgment, make the best judgment that they can.
This brings me to the highly contentious question of the title of the Ulster Defence Regiment. Powerful arguments have been put forward by nearly every noble Lord who has spoken. Even the noble Lord, Lord Rathcavan, said that if this was important he would in fact be prepared to see a change. I must say that this is important to both sides in the argument, and the Northern Ireland Government have shown, I believe, a great deal of courage—although one may have criticised them in the past—in accepting a number of measures which will provide a large-scale programme of fundamental reforms in Northern Ireland. Two of these Bills stem from Westminster, and the Police Bill we debated in this House only a few days ago. Responsibility for other legislation lies with the Northern Ireland Government, and they really have recognised fully the extent of the problem posed by the existence of the two communities.
My Lords, they have gone much further than we have in this country in a number of respects regarding the freedom of the individual. They have not only set up a Community Relations Commission but there is comprehensive machinery for the making and investigation of complaints—and this does not consist merely of our own Parliamentary Commissioner acting in a similar capacity for the Northern Ireland Government, but takes the form also of the Commissioner Complaints Act which is already on the Statute Book. Your Lordships know the range of advance in difficult circumstances that the Northern Ireland Government have made, under very heavy pressure and, if I may say so, in an inflammable situation—and the Government, having considered all the aspects and having considered the very arguments that noble Lords have put forward, of which I myself am only too well aware, have come to the view that in the circumstances it was right to agree that this should be called the Ulster Defence Regiment.
When noble Lords suggest that the name should be changed, are they suggesting that some of the other Ulster units should now change their names—that the 6th Battalion the Royal Ulster Rifles (which is in fact a TAVR

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cadre) or the 40th Signals Regiment, or the 102nd Ulster and Scottish Light Air Defence Regiment should change their names? I think the noble Earl put his finger on a crucial point—and this is the only one that gave me doubts. It is the association of the word "defence". I want to urge that, although this is an important point, we can make too much of it; and I would beg your Lordships now to let this Bill go forward. I have listened to all the arguments; I have been disturbed by them. But I am bound to say that I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Byers, who only last week—he will not mind my saying—expressed strong criticism to me of the title of the Ulster Defence Regiment. Having been over there, under no influence of mine, he has come back and believes that we ought to leave the title as it is. I would appeal to my noble friend Lord Brockway and ask him to consider—and this is a dangerous argument even to use because it can be used as an argument against freedom of discussion—whether in moving an Amendment on Thursday he is making a contribution to peace in Northern Ireland. I hope very much that we will now let this Bill go through.
I appreciate what the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, has said, that one would like more time to consider these technical matters, and if the House wished to put off the Committee stage beyond Thursday, of course we would consider it. If we are to proceed with measures of this sort at this moment, however, we do seek the co-operation of the House in getting them through, and I hope that we shall be able to take the Bill on Thursday. I shall certainly not complain if the noble Lord decides to proceed with his Amendment, but I would ask him to consider that in this situation, where people in all Parties will acknowledge that the Government have done the best they can—they have had difficult judgments to make and they have made those judgments—after all these discussions we should now go ahead with the Bill. I am grateful to your Lordships for the moderation, and indeed the helpfulness and the detailed reasoning, that has been used in this debate, and I hope that we shall be able to pass this Bill into law fairly soon.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord one very short question? Have the Government considered the practicability of laying down as a condition of recruitment to this new force that a certain percentage of it must be Catholics, say roughly corresponding to the adult Catholic population of Northern Ireland?
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I really do think it is a little late for the noble Viscount to join in the debate.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: My, Lords, I was simple saying that we have heard a great deal from the Southern Irish Bench over there of the supposed fears of the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland. If we had such an arrangement as I suggest it would calm their fears. But I think their fears are highly exaggerated.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

RENT (CONTROL OF INCREASE) BILL
7.14 p.m.
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF HOUSING AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (LORD KENNET): My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Kennet.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The LORD DOUGLAS OF BARLOCH in the Chair.]
Clause 1 [Restrictions on increases in local authority rents]:
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR moved Amendment No. 1:
Page 1, line 18, at end insert (" or
(d) the tenants of such houses are effectively safeguarded against hardship liable to arise from rent increases by the local authority operating a rent rebate scheme which conforms with the principles recommended for this purpose by the Minister of Housing and Local Government in Circular 46/67 dated June 29. 1967.")
The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 1. The object of the Government in this Bill, so far as one can tell, is to prevent hardship arising to individual tenants through rent increases. My Amendment suggests a better and a fairer way of accomplishing this object. That is by bringing in the principles which were not only stated but recommended by Ministers to local authorities in 1967, essentially the principles of a fair and effective rebate scheme. If I may remind the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, of the circular to which my Amendment refers, it was in fact a joint circular issued by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government and the Welsh Office. The final paragraph of that circular read:
"The Ministers hope that the advice contained in this circular will enable local authorities to review their rent policies and to construct effective rebate schemes which direct help to those who need it most."
If a local authority acts on the principles that are set out in that circular, surely it will then be complying with the Government's desire to give help to those who need it most.
The proposals in the Bill are, as I have said, designed to prevent hardship. The proposals in the Amendment will do exactly the same; they will prevent hardship. What the proposals in the Bill will also do, however, is to keep down artificially the rents payable by council tenants who could well afford to pay fair rents without receiving rent subsidy from the ratepayers. That is the weakness in the Bill. The proposals in my Amendment will enable local authorities to charge fair rents, subject to an effective rent-rebate scheme. I do not imagine that the Minister has withdrawn from the circular of 1967. It has been Government policy of successive Governments to try to get local authorities to adopt effective rent rebate schemes. Indeed, the noble Lord will recollect that the circular of 1967, issued in the time of a Labour Government, replaced a circular on the same subject issued by the Conservative Government in 1956. Why, therefore, should not these principles which are set out in policy approved by the present Government be implemented to solve the problem to which the Government's Bill is addressing itself?
If the Bill goes through unamended, ratepayers in certain areas are going to
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be hit very hard indeed by it, and I hope that the Government are honest enough to admit that. Those who are likely to be hit hardest are those in Greater London, principally because, over many years when the Labour Party held control of the London County Council, council rents were kept low at the expense of rate contributions from the ratepayers, and now, unless an Amendment of this kind is carried, those rate contributions will have to rise to enormous figures. In fact the Greater London Council has stated that if the Bill goes through unamended it will have to subsidise the rents of G.L.C. tenants by £9 million in the year 1970-71; and it is well known that many of those tenants would suffer no hardship if they were called upon to pay a full fair rent. Perhaps when I say "fair rent" I should explain how I am using that term.
The Greater London Council's desire is to raise the rents of Council property to the levels at which those rents for those properties would be fixed if they were private property, and the fair rents were fixed under the 1968 Rent Act by a rent officer or, on appeal, by an independent rent assessment committee. That appears to be a perfectly reasonable course of action—
A NOBLE LORD: No.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: A perfectly reasonable course of action, because in every place where any hardship is liable to accrue through charging fair rents the Greater London Council applies an extremely generous rent rebate scheme, a scheme much more extensive and generous than the Labour controlled County Council used to do.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, on Second Reading of the Bill, asked "Why does the Greater London Council not solve its problem by applying to the Minister for special increases under Clause 3?" Well, I can only give the answer which I should certainly give if I were an elected member of the Greater London Council: that that would be far too risky a thing to do. The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, himself said, in his Second Reading speech, that the Ministers expect that they will be justified in permitting such increases only in quite exceptional circumstances. By "such increases" he meant increases under Clause 3.

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The arrangement, so far as I understand it, is that if under Clause 3 the local authority submits proposals for increases beyond the limits allowed by the Bill, the Minister can either accept those proposals or reject them; he cannot amend them. Therefore, if the Minister does not accept them in full and in detail, the local authority is back to square one, all that time having been lost. And the authority then has to submit a new and revised set of proposals which again it cannot tell whether the Minister will accept or reject. For every week that the local authority would in this manner be prevented from raising rents, it would be suffering a loss of revenue of £60,000, and I certainly do not see how any responsible local authority could take that risk, in view of that sharp warning given by the Government in the noble Lord's speech that it would be only in exceptional circumstances that the Minister would be prepared to act under Clause 3.
However, we are not discussing only the Greater London Council; there are other local authorities which will undoubtedly, if this Bill goes through unamended, have to place on their ratepayers excessive demands for rate contributions to keep down the rents to tenants who could well afford to pay the full fair rents. That is why I am moving this Amendment. I am of course well aware that the Amendment is worded in terms most suitable to England, and if the Government accept it there will be no difficulty about the Government's moving an Amendment on Report to get the wording precisely right for Wales, and also for Scotland.
Perhaps the most powerful of all the speeches made against this Bill on Second Reading was made by my noble friend Lord Molson, who has explained to me that unfortunately he is prevented from being here this afternoon. My Amendment would meet in full his strong objections to Part I of the Bill. The noble Lord. Lord Kennet, will recollect that the Bill received no support at all from his noble friends behind him; he alone was left to try to defend this almost
indefensible Bill. I suggest that by accepting this Amendment he would meet the case of those local authorities who otherwise will have to act unfairly to
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their ratepayers and would at the same time bring the Government's action into consistency with its own circular which, as I have said, suggests the reasonable method of solving the problem before us. I beg to move.
7.26 p.m.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: I should like to support this Amendment very warmly. The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, may remember that this summer I asked him a question regarding the incomes of council tenants, and speaking from memory I think the noble Lord told me that there were 64,000 council house tenants in this country earning incomes of £2,000 a year and over. When I further questioned him as to whether any council house tenants were earning incomes of £4,000 a year and over, he told me that he could not give me the reply, but that he thought there were probably quite a few thousands who did have incomes of £4,000 and over.
This Bill is really just a Bill for subsidising. It is a hidden subsidy for subsidising council house tenants. Of course, it is a vote-catcher. It is quite iniquitous that some ratepayers who are far poorer than some council house tenants should have to subsidise their so much richer neighbours. I will not delay the Committee, but I should just like to make that point. This is an unfair Bill.
My noble friend's Amendment covers the poorer council house tenants. The rich council house tenants—and, as we know, there are probably two or three hundred thousand of them; perhaps four hundred thousand, perhaps more—are well able, on the whole, to pay these small increases. If we take the amount of their income which is now used in rent, compared to that of a similar family before the war, there is no comparison. The percentage of the income of some of these council house tenants now used in rent is infinitesimal. I doubt very much whether it is 5 per cent. of their income, if that: it is probably 3 per cent., or even 2. I therefore warmly support this Amendment of my noble friend on the Front Benches.
7.28 p.m.
LORD KENNET: The broad intention of the noble Lord's Amendment is clearly to exclude from control local authorities

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who operate a rebate scheme not less generous than the illustrative scheme in Circular 46/67, the present Government circular. It would not be easy to assess in practice whether a rebate scheme was in fact as generous as the illustrative scheme. The alternative would be to insist that the authority must adopt the illustrative scheme in toto. But this would be against the policy adopted in the circular itself on which the noble Lord relies and which makes it clear that it is for each authority to decide what adjustments, if any, are needed to meet local needs and conditions. I would point out to the Committee that the circular introduced in 1956, when the Opposition party were in power, did not go even so far in recommending an illustrative rent rebate scheme as the 1967 circular. The policy in the circular which the noble Lord seeks to build into the Bill reflects the statutory position, because under Section 113 of the Housing Act 1957 local authorities are given discretion in the matter of rent rebate schemes. All this Tory legislation the noble Lord seeks to go back on.
My main objection to the Amendment is that it would allow authorities with a sound rebate scheme to make any increase, however large, for unrebated tenants. The noble Lord said that the circular was designed to direct help to those who need it most, and indeed it is; but those who need it next most may also need tiding over and gentling along in relation to these rent increases, and that is the Government's purpose in the Bill as drafted. Any reasonable rent rebate scheme would ensure that tenants of small means or with large family commitments would either not be affected at all by a rent increase or only to a small extent, and that I freely admit. But that is not taken by the National Board of Prices and Incomes to be a sufficient reason for doing what the noble Lord wants. In their Report they recommended that if local authorities wished to increase average standard rents by more than 7s. 6d. a week in a 12-month period they should be required to seek the permission of the Housing Departments. The Government have adopted this advice, and Clause 2 of the Bill incorporates it precisely. The National Board of Prices and Incomes also recommended that the principle of moderation should be observed for individual households—and
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this is the 10s. individual maximum provision.
An average weekly rent increase of much more than 7s. 6d. in a year would often take away from a man the whole, or nearly the whole, of any increase in take-home pay in that year. Here I am not speaking of rent-rebated tenants but of the average run of tenants. It would therefore have an inflationary effect, and provoke larger pay claims which, if granted, would necessitate more stringent fiscal or monetary measures on the part of the Government. The agreement with the local authority associations recognises the cost of introducing or improving a rent rebate scheme as a legitimate cost towards which rent increases averaging up to 7s. 6d. a week may be made. And it was the present Government, I would remind the Committee, who were the first ever to recommend local authorities to adopt rent rebate schemes at all and to use subsidies for this purpose.
It is not true that in every case the only alternative to a rent increase averaging more than 7s. 6d. a week is an increase in the rate fund contribution. I am not speaking of any individual authority at the moment. But there may be other alternatives; for instance, the reduction of housing account balances. But even where the alternative is a rate fund contribution, it does not follow that it is better to increase the rents of unrebated tenants by a very large amount suddenly in order to avoid that rate fund contribution. The National Board of Prices and Incomes recommended that rate fund contributions should be used to avoid average increases of above 7s. 6d. a week. A rate fund contribution can be repaid in any of the nine subsequent financial years. The poorer domestic ratepayers can obtain rate rebates, and next year all domestic ratepayers will receive rate relief of 1s. 8d. in the pound in England and Wales and 3s. 4d. in the pound in Scotland.
The picture painted by the noble Lord, therefore, of bleeding the ratepayer on behalf of the council tenant is one which appears to the Government to be an exaggerated one. I hope the noble Lord will not press his Amendment, but if he does I would ask the Committee to reject it for the reasons I have given and, above all, for the reason that you simply cannot

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build an illustrative circular into Statute Law.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: I am grateful to the noble Lord for having taken this Amendment seriously and for having given a considered reply to it, though his reply does not convince me. Nevertheless, he paid me and your Lordships' Committee the compliment of examining the effects of the Amendment carefully. At one point I thought he feared that if the Amendment was carried some local authorities would really sting some of their tenants whom they thought could afford to pay by swingeing or unreasonable increases of rents. But I think he will agree that, at any rate so far as Statute Law is concerned, it is still the duty of a local authority to fix reasonable rents. I grant that by this Bill the Government are proposing to prevent local authorities from doing so, but I believe I am right in saying that it is still their duty. Certainly the noble Lord indicated in his Second Reading speech that that remained the fact, and one of my difficulties about the Bill is that local authorities are told in one Statute to fix reasonable rents and, if this Bill goes through, will be prevented in many cases from doing so.
The noble Lord rested the greater part of his case on a Report from the Prices and Incomes Board. Some Reports from that Board have been impressive documents. This one is the least impressive of all that I have seen, and I think that that view is very generally held among local authorities who are particularly affected and particularly interested in it. I found it a completely unconvincing document, written entirely from the standpoint of the interests of the tenants and not at all from the standpoint of the interests of the general public. I appreciate the point that the noble Lord made, that it is difficult to write a circular into a Bill. I do not think it is impossible, though it may be it passes my drafting skill to do so. I do not consider that my Amendment would compel all local authorities to accept as their actual rent rebate scheme the illustrative scheme which forms the appendix to that 1967 circular. It would compel them to adopt the principles on which that illustrative scheme is based, but they would certainly receive freedom to be more generous, if
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they wished, than that scheme itself would indicate. I was surprised when the noble Lord said that the Government were the first to recommend local authorities to adopt rent rebate schemes, because I personally remember often doing that in speeches when I was a Minister; but I may not have published a new circular, following so soon after the 1956 one, which was sent out on the authority of my immediate predecessor.
My real concern here is that the local authorities are asked to do something which is unreasonable. They are asked by this Bill to keep down artificially rents to tenants who could well afford to pay higher rents, and they are thereby compelled to place that extra burden on the shoulders of the ratepayers. After taking into account the domestic rate relief, the individual rate relief that can be obtained by individual ratepayers and everything else, it still remains unreasonable for a local authority to be compelled to place on its ratepayers in general the extremely heavy costs which it will incur through being forced by this Bill to subsidise tenants who do not need subsidies.
In normal circumstances I would press this Amendment. If I do not do so tonight, it is in part due, frankly, to the fact that I have had difficulty in writing a circular into an Amendment. I know that we are dealing with this Bill under pressure of time, because if the Bill is to be passed at all it must be passed before both Houses rise for the Christmas Recess; and as the noble Lord has indicated that it is not acceptable in principle to the Government, it does not sound as though I could hope for his assistance in getting the wording right. I withdraw the Amendment with great regret, because I believe this is the proper and sound method by which the Government could have solved this problem; but, for the reasons that I have stated, I am willing to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
7.40 p.m.
LORD WINDLESHAM LORD WINDLESHAM moved Amendment No. 2:
Page 2, line 12, after (" him ") insert (" and was, in the opinion of the local authority, entitled to succeed to the tenancy ").
The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 2. The effect of Clause

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1(5) is that when the tenant of a local authority house either dies or moves out, a relative who has been living with him is entitled to pay the same rent as the previous tenant even though it is a new tenancy. It is easy to see what the aim is here, and no one would quarrel with it. Clearly, a member of the former tenant's family with a moral right to succeed, such as a widow or widower, should not have to pay more than before their bereavement, simply because there has been a legal change of tenancy. But as the clause is drafted at present it goes a good deal wider. It could benefit any member of the former tenant's family who had come to live in the dwelling only shortly before the death of the tenant and who might not be considered to have any great claim to take over the tenancy.
There are also cases where the former tenant moves away, and therefore a vacancy occurs not through death but through the tenant moving elsewhere. He too may leave a member of his family in occupation. An example is a widower who marries again and vacates the dwelling leaving adult offspring in occupation. The granting of a new tenancy in these circumstances will normally be considered by the housing authority on the merits of each case. It is true that the housing authority need not grant the tenancy to the relatives of the outgoing tenant. It is within its discretion whether a relative is granted a new tenancy or not. If the housing authority decides not to allow a relative to succeed, it could put the rent up for the incoming tenant, provided he was not a relative living in the house of the outgoing tenant. On balance it may be sensible housing management to allow the relative to remain in the dwelling. But if the rent cannot be put up, there might be a disincentive in marginal cases to the housing authority leaving a relative in occupancy.
The Minister probably knows that the Greater London Council has already expressed its concern on this matter to his Department, and I understand the Council fully supports the terms of this Amendment. If subsection (5) of Clause 1 is amended by the addition of the words on the Marshalled List, the relative's right to protection from rent increases would be retained, but local authorities would be allowed some dis-
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cretion in deciding on the cases in which the protection would operate. I beg to move.
LORD KENNET: Let me first welcome the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, to the cockpit of Committee stages on Housing Bills. I hope that we shall hear more of him on this subject. The Housing Act 1957 gives a local authority very wide discretion in selecting tenants and no one has a legal entitlement to succeed to the tenancy of any particular council house. An authority could therefore readily decide that the wife or daughter of a former tenant, who was living with him in the house, was not entitled, on the death or departure of the former tenant, to go on living in the house. Under the Amendment the authority could, without reference to the Minister, increase the rent payable by the wife or daughter by any amount whatsoever as a condition of becoming a tenant of the house in which they were formerly living.
It is true that most authorities could be expected to exercise reasonably the discretion which the Amendment seeks to give them. But others might not exercise this discretion reasonably. They might, for example, decide that the wife or daughter of the former tenant ought to move into another dwelling—maybe a smaller one—and might therefore declare that she was not entitled to succeed to the tenancy of the dwelling in which she had been living. She would then no longer be protected by the Bill either if she became a tenant of her old house, because of the Amendment, or if she moved to another house, because under Clause 1(5), as drafted, a new tenancy in a different dwelling is exempt from the control in the Bill. This situation would be unfair, because she would have been as much a sitting tenant of the council as her husband or father, even though he happened to have signed the tenancy agreement. The whole object of the Bill is to protect sitting tenants from sharp rent increases—not, I would remind the Committee, from any rent increases; but from sharp ones.
The Amendment may be designed merely to deal with the case of the member of the tenant's family who moves into a council house a few days before the tenant leaves. The noble Lord did not mention this; but it is something

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often mentioned in housing legislation of this kind—for Instance, someone who moves in to nurse the dying former tenant and who then claims the right to live in the house as tenant at the same rent. But Clause 1(5) already specifies that the member of the tenant's family must have been residing with the tenant and the local authority would be entitled to distinguish between residence which implies a degree of permanency and of factual community and a visit. Local authorities are familiar with this distinction. I would say that my right honourable friend the Minister of Housing has no reason to suppose that they will not be able to continue exercising common sense about this distinction as they have under existing legislation if the Bill goes through as drafted. I hope that with this explanation the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, may be prepared to withdraw his Amendment.
LORD WINDLESHAM: That is an, extraordinary answer because there were two contradictory replies given. The first was that if local authorities are left with discretion to decide whether or not a relative has a moral claim to succeed they might not, in all cases, use this discretion wisely. Then, in the second part of the answer, concerning the interpretation of residence and length of stay, the Minister says that local authorities can be trusted to use their own judgment. I am sure that his second answer is a good one. These things have to be looked at in the circumstances which apply in each case; how long somebody may have been nursing a dying relative, or whatever other circumstances apply.
As the purpose of the Amendment is to give housing authorities some discretion to decide whether or not a wife or daughter should succeed (the wording of the Amendment is somebody who "was in the opinion of the local authority entitled to succeed to the tenancy") there will be an element of judgment. But that judgment will be used sensibly and responsibly. So it seems to me that the two legs of the noble Lord's answer contain an internal contradiction. I do not want to press this Amendment this evening.
VISCOUNT ADDISON: Will the noble Lord pardon this interruption? It seems to me that the noble Lord, Lord Kennet,
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made the point in the discretionary matter which was referred to by the noble Lord as the second part of the answer; that is, that it was only to deal with the odd local authority and not local authorities in general. I wonder whether the noble Lord followed that argument. That is how it seemed to me. Perhaps the noble Lord might be willing to make that clear.
LORD KENNET: There may have been apparent discrepancies in what I said, but if one observes the way these things have been going under existing legislation, I believe that the way I put it will in practice not be found discrepant to those who run these things.
LORD WINDLESHAM: I do not want to extend this discussion. As I mentioned, the Greater London Council does not share the noble Lord's view, and of course it has very wide and extensive experience in this field. Clearly, therefore, there is room for some difference of opinion. The matter has been aired and ventilated; and I and others interested in this point will want to look carefully at the terms of the noble Lord's reply. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 1 agreed to.
Remaining clauses agreed to.
Schedule [Phasing of rent increases]:
7.52 p.m.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR moved Amendment No. 3:
Page 7, line 5, leave out ("two years") and insert (" one year").
The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 3. The Committee will probably perceive that Amendments Nos. 3 to 11 inclusive are all linked, and it may be convenient if we discuss them all in one debate. I apologise for the number of these Amendments and the complication of them, but it is really no more my fault than that of the Government. The Schedule is an exercise in the new mathematics; and whether the professional advisers will succeed in advising their clients as to what the whole of the Schedule means, I do not know. I have such respect for Parliamentary draftsmen that I must suppose that the Government's

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intentions could not have been set out more simply. But I think that the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, and I will probably be at one on this, at least; that the Schedule is a bit of a brain-teaser.
To come to the Amendments which I seek to incorporate in the Bill, these all deal with the subject of fair rents. As the Committee are aware, under the Rent Act 1965, which is now consolidated in the Rent Act 1968, fair rents are fixed for privately owned tenanted property by a rent officer. On appeal they may be finally determined by a rent assessment committee which is independent. Therefore, when a fair rent is fixed it must be presumed to be genuinely fair. At any rate, in terms of the Statute and Parliament's intentions it is a fair rent. The purpose of Part II of the Bill and this Schedule is to prolong the payment of unfair rents—I have no hesitation in saying that—because once a rent has been determined as a fair rent then, clearly, any other rent, either higher or lower, must be an unfair rent. This is my criticism in principle of Part II and the Schedule as a whole. I am seeking these Amendments to mitigate the unfairness.
On the general point that I have been making, I am backed by no less a body than the Committee of the Chartered Land Societies, headed by the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, a highly respectable body. I know that that Committee has told the Minister that it regards the fair rent system as the best machinery yet devised in the country to achieve an equitable basis of rent assessments; that much of the present housing problem is attributable to the artificial restrictions imposed by legislation since the war and that the Rent Act 1965 was a welcome move towards a system of fair rents for all. The Committee said that in this context the proposal in the Bill to defer the payment of the full fair rent could only be regarded as retrograde. That is what was said by myself and by the noble Lord, Lord Molson, and others, on the Second Reading of the Bill.
My Amendments do not seek to do more than mitigate the application of Part II and the Schedule and to reduce the period during which a rent remains unfair, Under the Bill, if I understand it right, if a fair rent is registered at some date in the year 1970, two years
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are to elapse before the tenant can be required to pay the full fair rent. If the fair rent is registered in 1971, one year is to elapse. These periodical provisions in the Schedule are, presumably, based on the assumption by the Government that if a rent goes up a whole year must elapse before the tenant can be asked to adjust himself to a further increase, even though the rent he is paying is, by an independent standard, less than fair.
The purpose of the nine Amendments in my name is to halve the periods in the Bill. They are based on the belief that where a tenant is paying less than the independently fixed fair rent of the house or flat in which he is living it is not unreasonable to expect him to adjust himself to upward steps at six-monthly intervals, instead of twelve-monthly intervals, as the Bill proposes, until the fair rent is reached, when of course the increases stop. I repeat that these Amendments are not designed to undermine and destroy Part II and the Schedule. They are based on the conviction that the fair rent stage should be reached as early as is reasonably possible once the rent has been determined to be a fair rent, and that it is not unreasonable for a tenant to be expected to adjust his arrangements to upward steps from the present rent to the full fair rent at intervals of six months. I beg to move.
LORD KENNET: As the Committee know, the object of Part II is to protect tenants of regulated tenancies against steep rises in their rent following the registration of the fair rent. Of all the registrations involving increases over the previous rent made in the first half of 1969, 52 per cent. were of more than £1 a week and 17 per cent. of more than £2 a week. The Government therefore consider that increases of this order registered in 1970 should be spread over two years by means of three annual instalments, subject to a minimum annual instalment of 7s. 6d. per week. The size and frequency of such instalments are certainly no less than is required to be consistent with the average increase to be allowed in one year without reference to the Minister for local authority rent increases under the Bill as drafted.
By making the phasing period basically six months per instalment, but leaving the size of each instalment unlimited, this

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Amendment would allow rent increases to be charged twice as quickly as is envisaged in the Bill. In the context both of the prices and incomes policy and of hardships that would be caused to tenants and their families, the Government consider that such increases would not be sufficiently spread out. We feel that the Bill as drafted holds the balance fairly between landlord and tenant. To introduce changes in the permitted rent level, with service of notices of increases, and so on, at six monthly intervals would be a departure from the pattern established by the Prices and Incomes (Regulated Rents) Regulations 1968 and by the Housing Act 1969, both of which were based on increases at annual intervals. It would be confusing to both landlords and tenants to introduce a different system in this Bill from that now operative under the Housing Act 1969. "Phasing" is complicated enough without having to have a different system, depending on whether one Act or another applies.
In conclusion, I would remind the Committee of the noble Lord's phrase that the purpose of Part II of the Bill is to prolong unfair rents. Since all legislation is designed to rectify something which is perceived by Parliament as an injustice, it seems to me to follow from what he has said that all transitional provisions are provisions which prolong injustice. I hope that with that explanation, especially about the 6-monthly phasing which I have given, the noble Lord will be content not to insist upon his Amendment.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: The inference from the noble Lord's ingenious final argument is that he would have been better pleased with me if I had suggested that there should be no phasing at all and that all increases should come into effect at once. He should thank me for my moderation.
LORD KENNET: If that is what the noble Lord had wanted, no doubt that is what the noble Lord would have moved.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: I can certainly say that it would have taken me much less time to draft an Amendment of that kind than to find my way all through that arithmetic. I am relieved that at
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least I have not been told that I have got my arithmetic wrong.
What the noble Lord's speech amounts to is that there is a difference of judgment. The Government think it is not possible for people to adjust themselves to higher rents except at 12-monthly intervals. I do not believe that this is so. I believe that people should be prepared to adjust themselves at 6-monthly intervals in cases where the ultimate rents have been fixed as fair by an independent authority. The noble Lord's argument, based on existing Regulations, seems to me to be a thin one, because I am sure that I am right in saying that these Regulations are going to lapse on December 31 and we must be prepared to have a change some time. I would agree that there was more substance in the noble Lord's point that there would seem to be some conflict between the Schedule with my Amendments in it and the Housing Act 1969. I do not myself think that that is sufficient reason for rejecting my proposal.
The only consideration which leads me not to seek to divide the House is that I am aware of the pressure of time and I am in an especially reasonable mood this evening (as I have already shown in my comments on the noble Lord's speech) and what he has said gives me no hope that if we send this Bill back to another place on this one point, wiser thoughts would prevail there. Those are the circumstances in which I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Schedule agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported without amendment.
Then, Standing Order No. 41 having been suspended (pursuant to the Resolution of December 4), Bill read 3a and passed.

EUROPEAN SECURITY: PROPOSED CONFERENCE
8.6 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY LORD BROCKWAY rose to ask Her Majesty's Government: What decisions have been reached regarding the proposal to hold a conference to further European Security. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg leave to

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ask the Unstarred Question in my name on the Order Paper. I regret that it should be at what is a late hour for this House that this important issue is being discussed tonight. I will say only that I gave notice of it many days ago and that I postponed the discussion in order that my noble friend Lord Chalfont might be here. I appreciate the fact that he is in New York on urgent business but, without disrespect to my noble friend Lord Shepherd, I regret that the Chief Whip's Office have made arrangements by which this important debate should be taken so late and that the Minister mainly responsible is unable to be here to participate in it.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, I think that it ought to be made clear that the Whip's Office have made no arrangements at all. If other noble Lords tend to speak longer on other subjects than was anticipated, I am afraid that we have no control over that.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I am not going to respond to that, except to say that I think it deplorable that an issue of this great importance, of which long notice was given, should be arranged at a time when there is a small attendance and when those of us who have been in the House since half past two this afternoon are a little tired when approaching the subject. Despite the late hour, and despite the circumstances, I propose to deliver the speech which I have prepared because, fortunately, even if the arrangements in this House are such that after due notice an important debate of this kind cannot be discussed in the presence of a sufficient number of Members, debates in this House are reported in other countries and will have some influence on decisions which are reached.
I appreciate the fact that when we are discussing the proposal for a European Security Conference it cannot be seriously considered in a political vacuum. It was first proposed at a conference of the Soviet Union and Communist countries at Bucharest in 1966. I think then it was a propaganda enterprise. Now it has become a practical issue. For two reasons, the situation is now favourable to a European Security Conference. The first reason is the new climate which is in Europe itself. Since the Second World
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War Germany has been the critical and dangerous sphere. Western Germany has now changed from being a menace to peace to being a hope for peace in Europe. This is largely due to the fact that the last elections in Western Germany returned a Social Democratic and Liberal Coalition Government, and that it is under the leadership of Herr Willi Brandt. I may say that I have been an associate of Herr Willi Brandt ever since the days of the Spanish Civil War, when both of us opposed not only Fascism in that country, but also the tyranny of the Stalinists. Since then, I have on many occasions been able to retain my association with him. I regard him at this moment as the greatest statesman in Europe and the greatest hope for the peace of our Continent.
When I say that the change in the climate in Europe is largely due to the new Government in Western Germany, I have these facts in mind. First, to-day there are conversations in Moscow between representatives of West Germany and of the Soviet Union to renounce force in their future relations. This is an historical occasion which may mean for Europe more than we immediately recognise. Secondly, the new West German Government has had similar discussions with other Eastern European countries and is building up an association with them. Thirdly, that Government is having discussions with the Government of Poland regarding the borders of their two territories. Fourthly, it has given de facto recognition to the State of East Germany. Fifthly, West Germany has now signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That these great changes should have taken place in a few weeks means a change in the whole climate of the sphere which was most critically dangerous in Europe. When we add to those contributions which the West German Government has made the fact that talks are now to take place between the United States, France and the United Kingdom with the Soviet Union about Berlin, it indicates the extraordinary developments that have occurred.
I appreciate that even changes in Germany and in Europe would be of little significance unless there was a background of international reconciliation between East and West. But here, too, we may take hope. There

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are the talks about strategic weapons between the United States of America and the Soviet Union in Moscow, which appear to have begun well. There are the four-Power talks on the Middle East, about which I am sorry to say one cannot immediately be so optimistic. There is the fact that both the United States of America and the Soviet Union have encouraged the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty on Nuclear Power. Then there is the consideration at the Geneva Disarmament Conference both of the limitation of modern weapons on the seabed and in relation to biological and chemical warfare. I recognise that there are factors on the other side, but I do not propose to mention them, because I do not want to be controversial in this speech. To sum up on this first point, a climate has now been created for an historic advance to peace in Europe.
The second reason why the situation has changed from propaganda to practicality is this. In the case of the Soviet Union and its allies there is now a far more conciliatory tone and a realism of what can be achieved. I have a vast file on this subject, and I have taken the trouble over the weekend to read the declarations of the series of conferences which the Soviet Union and its Communist allies have held, beginning with Bucharest in 1966, Karlovy Vary in Czechoslovakia in 1967, and during this year at Budapest in March, Prague in October, and Moscow as late as last Thursday. A study of these documents shows two very significant developments. First they are more conciliatory in tone. At the Bucharest Conference in 1966 a declaration was issued making a polemical attack on the United States of America, on NATO and on West Germany. There is a complete absence of that tone in the last declaration which has been issued from the conferences held this year. This significant change in approach has been recognised by Herr Willi Brandt and others.
But, secondly, there is the more realistic approach. At Bucharest, and at the earlier conferences, it was suggested that the conference should deal with the recognition of Eastern Germany, the border line between Poland and Ger-
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many, the dissolution of both NATO and the Warsaw Military Alliance in favour of a security pact. At the conference at Prague in October, reaffirmed by last Thursday's conference at Moscow, only two proposals are now made for the agenda. The first is an agreement on renunciation of force by both sides and by all European Governments; and, second, a discussion on economic and scientific co-operation between the Soviet Union, the Communist countries, the West and the neutral nations. The very practical proposal is made that if anything further is proposed for the agenda of the conference it should be made through diplomatic channels.
As a consequence of this more conciliatory tone by the Communist countries, and by their realism, there has been an extraordinary support in Europe for the Security Conference. There was the first meeting of the Western European Union, its Ministerial Conference at The Hague in June, where it discussed this proposal in detail. At the end of it Dr. Luns, the Foreign Secretary of the Netherlands, who was chairman of the Conference, stated that a European Security Conference might well come about during the latter part of next year. Secondly, there was the meeting of NATO at Brussels, only last Thursday. I think I am fair in summing up the reports of its proceedings by saying that it was receptive to the idea of a European Security Conference. It insisted on careful preparations and the prospect of concrete results. It had reservations and proposals for the agenda and (I will refer to this later) insisted upon the presence of the United States of America and Canada.
Thirdly, we have had this quite extra-ordinary event in European affairs, the initiative by President Kekkonen, of Finland. He has suggested that the European Conference should be held at Helenski and he has toured both the Communist countries, the countries of Europe and the countries of North America to invite them to attend. The response to this initiative has been quite overwhelming. We not only have the earlier declaration by Willi Brandt, the head of the West German Government, of positive support for the proposals; we now have support from Canada and from

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21 European nations, including Italy, The Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Switzerland and the Vatican. The support of the Vatican is especially significant, because it influences the Christian Democratic parties in Europe. Yesterday the Christian Democratic Party in Western Germany modified its attitude towards this proposal as a result of what the Vatican has decided.
There are three controversial points which have to be settled if the European Security Conference is to meet. The first is the question as to whether the United States of America and Canada, as members of NATO, should be invited. The Western' European Union, NATO and President Kikkonen of Finland, have urged that they should. The Soviet Union has now responded by saying that it accepts the presence of representatives of the U.S.A. and Canada at the convening conference, when the procedures shall be decided. It has asked on its side that representatives of East Germany shall be present, and West Germany has now accepted this proposal. Therefore, on this issue of the representation of the conference, there is less danger of disagreement.
The second point of controversy was raised by the American Secretary of State, Mr. William Rogers, in a statement reported yesterday. He said that America would not join any European East/West Security Conference that recognised Moscow's doctrine of limited sovereignty in the Soviet bloc. I might rather mischievously remind Mr. William Rogers that there is a place called South America. I will refrain from developing that point. I hope, however, that no one will assume that presence at the conference implies recognition of the Soviet invasion and domination of Czechoslovakia. But can there be any doubt that a lessening of the confrontation in Europe would give a greater opportunity for those who claim democratic rights in Czechoslovakia and stand for liberty of thought and expression? It is in circumstances of insecurity that authoritarianism thrives.
There is a third point of controversy regarding the proposed Conference. France, on the Western side, and Roumania on the Communist side, have objected to agreements between blocs, and both have urged that it would be better
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that bilateral discussions should take place. I hope that bilateral discussions will take place. Those which are now taking place between Western Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union, and between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., will all prepare the atmosphere for a successful European Conference. But there will be overall issues for Europe which cannot be settled by bilateral discussions and which should be subject to an All-European Conference.
The fundamental issue now is of the sponsorship of the Conference. It has so far been assumed that it would be by NATO and the Warsaw Military Alliance. I want to suggest, for two reasons, that a European Security Conference cannot be left only to NATO and the Warsaw Military Alliance. The first reason is that this Conference will be attended by neutral nations which are not members either of NATO or of the Warsaw Pact. Herr Brandt, in an interview which appeared in our Tribune of August 1, used these words:
"We start from the assumption that, in addition to the members of NATO (including America and Canada) and of the Warsaw Pact, the Conference would also be attended by the neutral and non-aligned European countries."
The list of those countries which I have already given shows how the neutral and non-aligned countries would be prepared to co-operate. Secondly, this Conference cannot be left to NATO and the Warsaw Military Alliance, because it will discuss political issues as well as military issues. The Times of Saturday last said:
"NATO would not be a suitable body for talks on European security and détente."
I want to conclude with suggestions of a constructive kind to resolve these points of dispute. First, I hope that diplomatic exchanges will proceed regarding the agenda of a Conference. The West as well as the East have put forward many proposals. In fact, the subjects are similar, although the conclusions are different—Berlin, access to Berlin, East Germany. I hope that they may all be included upon the agenda. But there is one important omission in the proposals made from the East but which is included in the proposals made from the West. It is that there should be discussion of a mutual reduction of the forces on both sides. I regard this as the most

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important issue which should be discussed. Psychologically, if East and West decided mutually to reduce their forces, the effect would be greater than anything else, and it would be an indication of serious purpose. I hope that the West will continue to press for the inclusion of this item upon the agenda of the Conference.
I suggest that the diplomatic exchanges regarding the agenda of the Conference should be followed by calling a meeting of representatives of all the accepting Governments. I do not suggest that all these complicated issues can be discussed at one conference. I should hope that at the first Conference there would be an agreement on the broad objectives of seeking peace in Europe, and a declaration of the renunciation of force in settling all problems. I would suggest that at that first Conference future proceedings might also be arranged, perhaps by working parties reporting to the Conference on particular issues.
On the question of the presence of the United States of America and Canada, they would not be directly interested in all the problems which would arise—for example, on economic co-ordination and cultural relations. They would, however, be interested as members of NATO in the military problems. Therefore, thirdly, I would suggest that there should be a reference of military matters to NATO and to the Warsaw Military Alliance acting as a working party to the fuller conference. The Times has remarked that NATO is the right body to talk about troop reductions, even if it is not the right body to speak about security and détente.
My Lords, I do not know whether I ought to apologise for making this detailed speech on this important subject. I hope the suggestions which I have made will be considered, not only by Her Majesty's Government but in other spheres which a speech in this House will reach. I want to conclude by saying this. Fifteen years ago there was a great hope in Europe, a great hope in the world. We had the Geneva Conference. Everyone spoke of the "spirit of Geneva" as meaning the opportunity for peace in the world. That peace was destroyed by the intensified conflict between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.,
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and particularly by the Vietnam war. I believe that we now have an opportunity to recover the spirit of Geneva of fifteen years ago—it may be called "the Helenski spirit".
There are very big difficulties in trying to solve the problems of Europe which I have tried to describe, but we should have in mind a determination to overcome these difficulties because of the incomparable aim of peace which is the object. We must not allow this opportunity to pass, and if this opportunity is seized we must not allow what destroyed the Geneva spirit to destroy the Helenski spirit. My hope is that if the Conference meets it may, with expanding agreement, progress to justifying the name of European security by ending the division of Europe into opposing military blocs and replace NATO and the Warsaw alliance by a comprehensive Pact of peace. I believe that this is now within our reach. I beg our Government to take every possible action to further its realisation.
8.41 p.m.
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, I join the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, in regretting the lateness of this debate and the emptiness of the House, but it has had the effect of considerably reducing my speech, and thereby perhaps reducing its weight and force. It seems to me fairly appropriate as a day for this Motion set down by the noble Lord. There are factors inside and outside the field of military defence which make it so. Factors and opportunities, however, we have to recall, have often seemed fortuitous in the past, yet we can think of many saddening occasions and setbacks.
At the Summit Conference in Geneva in 1955, to which the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, referred in his closing words, President Eisenhower began his speech on behalf of his country, and also on behalf of civilised mankind, with these words:
"We are here for a simple purpose: to find a basis for accommodation which will make life safer and happier, not only for the nations we represent but for people elsewhere."
It is that same endeavour which I am sure, the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, has in mind to-day, in his own diligent and indefatigable efforts on behalf of all

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those who suffer in many ways and in many parts of the world. It is a simple purpose, as President Eisenhower said, because it is a natural purpose. But I doubt whether anyone can claim that we are closer to its achievement than on that date fourteen years ago.
It has not been the fault or the failing of the Western democracies that the credibility in success has withered rather than flourished in the meantime. That particular Summit was killed as much as anything by Marshal Bulganin's stern rejection of any raising of the question of the Central and Eastern European countries. Earlier he had praised the idea of a European security system, but when this point of the Eastern European countries was raised he called it "interference in the internal affairs of those countries". My Lords, we have lately seen how tenderly Russia respects the internal affairs of those countries; how free of interference she is prepared to leave them.
Now, as the noble Lord has reminded us, we have a new proposal from the Russians for a European Security Conference. The NATO Council had an opportunity in Brussels last week, on Thursday and Friday, to study that proposal, and they have responded cautiously. I think that caution was wise. It was described thus in the statement of the Foreign Ministers after the final meeting. They affirmed that the fundamental problem of Europe could be solved "only on the basis of sovereign equality, political independence, territorial integrity of the States, the right of each people to forge their own future, peaceful settlement of differences, non-interference in the internal affairs of one State by another, regardless of their political and social systems, and renunciation of the use of force".
There could scarcely be a clearer catalogue of conditions which Soviet Russia has savagely breached in the immediate or recent past. There was something inauspicious, to me even sickening, in the choice of localities from which these Soviet proposals officially came. The revived idea of a general Conference on European Security was first floated, for the world to observe, on March 17 in Budapest. That meeting lasted only two hours. The proposals were actually issued from a subsequent Warsaw Pact meeting held in Prague. There were the two
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capitals of two countries whose attempts at winning sovereign equality, political independence and the right of a people to forge its own future had been crushed by tanks and troops and war planes, invading upon the orders of Moscow, in one case only seven months before the Budapest meeting.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, may I just interrupt the noble Lord for one moment? Does he forget that the chairman of the first Conference which made this proposal was Mr. Dubcek, of Czechoslovakia?
LORD ST. OSWALD: And does the noble Lord know where Mr. Dubcek is now?
LORD BROCKWAY: I do.
LORD MILFORD: My Lords, is the noble Lord leaving out American interference in Vietnam, in Cuba, in South America and in the Far East?
LORD ST. OSWALD: I am sorry, but if the noble Lord really equates all those then he is speaking with considerable prejudice.
My Lords, they were the capitals of two peoples against whom the Soviet Union, so far from seeking a peaceful settlement of differences, so far from adhering to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of one State by another, so far from renouncing the use of force, had rejected peaceful settlement, had interfered with crushing and overwhelming force in the internal affairs of another State. To complete the irony, they were also countries whose territorial integrity had been plundered after the war by Soviet arms.
There is small wonder in my mind that the NATO Ministers, in their statement on Friday night, from which I have already quoted, should have concluded that conditions were not yet right for real and lasting improvement in East/West relations. Having said that, I also think it was proper for the British Foreign Secretary to suggest to the meeting, as he did, that NATO diplomats should study whether a general European conference would be the best way of dealing with Europe's future, and report to the next meeting in Rome in May of next year. I am glad that his colleagues accepted Mr. Stewart's suggestion, and I agree with his reported statement that

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such a Conference would have to be at the appropriate time, with the appropriate agenda and appropriate participation.
It has to be the duty of every Western leader to press on in the search for possible, tenable solutions to the slow agony in which Europe finds herself to-day, to the undoubted danger of world peace. My right honourable friend, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, when he was Foreign Secretary, and later Prime Minister, sought areas, however small, of possible agreement, due to mutual advantage, with the Communist powers. That was right then. It must be right now. Almost all the Ministers at last week's NATO Council Meeting stressed again the importance of proposals put forward earlier by NATO, of a possible balanced, mutual reduction of forces in Eastern and Western Europe. The invitation to study such proposals was put forward by NATO in June of last year and repeated in April of this year. So far as I know, there has been no response from the Warsaw Pact Government. In the face of this indifference, NATO is pursuing the task it set itself in the April meeting, to draw up and examine a list of items which might be profitably negotiable between East and West. This list of 26 items, as I understand, was to be examined last week. I have seen nothing very specific about its discussion, and I wonder whether the noble Lord who is to wind up this debate could say some-thing about some of those items.
My Lords, I am not so sanguine as the noble Lord, Lord Brockway. The record of Soviet Russia in Europe does not encourage me. It seems to me it could well be that the true purpose of this proposed Security Conference may be another step in the Soviet effort to split the United States of America from her European partners, and to split off West Germany from the rest of the Treaty Organisation. Success in either of these intentions would leave Europe debilitated, and largely submissive even to the threat of Soviet attack. As General Lemnitzer, that thoughtful and experienced strategist has said,
"We do not know what the Soviet leaders have in mind. Perhaps they themselves do not know what they intend, in the near or distant future. Intentions can and do change over
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night. It takes years to develop and refine military capabilities."
The Soviet armies, as they stand to-day, have the capability for further moves, without serious redress. Yet there are always people, good hearted people as often as not, who would prefer to ignore those capabilities and their implications. A kind of euphoria settles over the Free World at the very mention of détente, without any clear appreciation of why that mention may have been made at that particular time. Even if talks were to begin now, or at some future date, on balanced reductions of forces, there would have to be considerable thought as to how an initial balance, a valid starting point, was to be obtained; and here is a factor that is often ignored.
Apart from the major and overwhelming crime of crushing a fine nation, the invasion of Czechoslovakia gave Soviet Russia a military advantage which she did not possess when these proposals were first visualised at the NATO meeting in June of last year. I will name some of the advantages outlined by General Lemnitzer. Soviet divisions are in Czechoslovakia, on the borders of NATO, a position they have not occupied since 1945. This deployment, superbly carried out in military terms, has placed large and immediately responsive forces further to the West than at any time in recent years. An extensive mobilisation of men, communications and transport has been marshalled to sustain forward deployed forces. Those forward divisions are there in strength, at a high state of readiness, sustained by continuous practical exercises. These are facts and not phantoms. The military balance in Europe has been, and remains, very significantly altered to our disadvantage.
So I would say, in the light of this, for every reason, human, political and military, that I hope a prerequisite of talks on troop reductions would be a complete withdrawal of Soviet forces from the soil of Czechoslovakia. That was, your Lordships will recall, the demand made by both Houses in this Parliament, by speaker after speaker, when we were very properly recalled in August of last year. There has been no sign or hint of such movement by the Russian occupying forces. Instead, their presence has been used to inflict further and further humiliation on the people

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they invaded. Last week it was learned that 400 journalists had been dismissed from their jobs on Government orders, including 30 editors. The International Federation of Journalists passed a strong resolution condemning this persecution. But the Russians dare not permit the circulation of truth in the countries they have conquered, or in their own. Earlier of course we have seen, more dramatically, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Hejek, dismissed, the Minister for the Interior, General Pavel, arrested and dismissed, the Economic Overlord, the brilliant Otto Sik, dismissed; and we have seen the heroic secretary of the Party itself, Mr. Dubcek, dismissed and humiliated.
It may be argued that these are not strictly matters of military security. But they are part of a wider aspect of security and they concern the need for security and caution. If that is the way that Soviet Russia treats her own allies, who pledge themselves to the Communist cause, what sort of treatment could we look for for the despised bourgeois democracies if we went too trustingly to the conference table? Negotiators from the West would have to ask themselves, I believe, whether if a Security Pact such as the noble Lord visualises, and such as I would welcome, were signed, it would be treated with any more reverence than was given to Czechoslovakia as a signatory of the Warsaw Pact Agreement.
That leads to another reason for approaching the Soviet proposals with consummate prudence. It was Lenin's dictum that any deceit was permissible in dealing with the bourgeois enemy. His successors and disciples have observed that dictum most faithfully in all political dealings, not simply outside but even inside their own sphere of influence. Last week I listened for two hours in London to Anatol Kuznetsov, the young writer and poet, lionised and privileged in Moscow, who defected and abandoned it all because, as he said, "I could no longer write, no longer sleep, no longer breathe". In that room in Kensington he described how the total deceit of life in Moscow had stifled him; that deceit which everyone in official or semi-official position was forced to promote, to which all were victims.
With controlled passion he declared, "Nobody dares to tell the truth to any-
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one else in Russia, unless they are close relatives or friends from childhood; and seldom even in those cases". When the question was put to him, on my behalf, what had been the reaction of the Russian public to the news of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, he replied that the people had been told that Soviet forces had gone in to ward off an invasion from Western Germany. if the leaders of the Russian nation cannot trust or be trusted by their own people, what sort of negotiations would they conduct with an organisation they are intent to undermine, dismember or destroy?
This morning, only a few hours ago, I spoke at some length to Petr Vodrazka, the Czech youth who last Thursday knowingly risked his life to smuggle himself out of Prague to London by stowing away in the freezing baggage hold of an airliner. He had taken into account the discomfort and the risk, but he found that he could no longer live in the climate of falseness and injustice which exists in Czechoslovakia since the invasion of his country.
As an example of the way in which lies are used at the highest level to support policy, there can be nothing more apposite than the speech of Mr. Malik to the Security Council on August 21 of last year, when he blandly declared:
"The armed units of the Socialist countries as is well known, entered the territory of the Czechoslovak Republic on the basis of the request of the Government of that State, which had applied to the allied Governments for assistance including assistance with armed force."
My Lords, anybody who could believe that could believe anything. But this is the official pretence still maintained within the country itself. The present rulers have even gone to the extent of compiling a so-called "White Book" of spurious documents to support this fiction. Fortunately, there also exists, smuggled out of Czechoslovakia, a batch of the true documents, bound into what is I suppose mockingly entitled the "Black Book". I have here the English translation. It makes painful reading as one follows the extinction, amid courageous protests, of Czechoslovakia's endeavour to attain liberty even within the Communist world. To-day many of those whose utterances are recorded in this book have been obliged to swear that

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they said no such thing and to swear approval of the Soviet invasion. It is a strange kind of morality to bring into international dealings.
Yet dialogue there has to be. It cannot be easy. I do not envy anyone engaged in it. The very survival of our civilisation may depend on the good faith of all the negotiating Governments. Good faith is, unhappily, an element which Communist Governments, or at least Soviet Governments, have by calculation all too often eschewed in the conduct and promotion of policies. But in these days, when a great effort is being made to bring Europe together in one partnership, we cannot suffer that some of the noblest and finest nations in Europe's evolution should be excluded from the Europe to which they belong as rightly as do we ourselves. If their inclusion is one day to be accomplished, it is with the Russians that we have to talk. We must talk watchfully, though not furtively, with our eyes on a happier horizon, on a day when all nations may contribute freely and valuably to peace and advancement. That is my goal. It is I know also the goal of the noble Lord, Lord Brockway.
9.0 p.m.
VISCOUNT HOOD: My Lords, like the rest of your Lordships who have persevered and stayed here so late, I was deeply impressed by the sincerity with which the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, spoke. I was a member of the British Delegation at the Conference in Geneva in 1954, and it is precisely because I share his disappointment at the outcome that I should like, before embarking on another conference, to have some assurance, or at any rate reasonable hope, that it will achieve positive and worth-while results.
The first test, I suggest, is this question of American participation. I do not see how new arrangements for security in Europe can be sensibly discussed or agreed in the absence of the United States, who are so active and so major a participant in the present arrangements. If the Russians were to continue to make difficulties about United States participation, I should take that as a sure sign that they were not taking the Conference seriously and that they regarded it simply as a device to sow dissension among the West. As the noble Lord said, the recent
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pronouncements from Warsaw have only been silent on this point, but at any rate I had entertained reasonable hope that this meant that if the West stood firm for the inclusion of the United States and Canada in any conference, this would not meet with objections from the other side.
I submit that the second test is whether the Conference will be able to discuss what I believe to be the real causes of insecurity in Europe, and notably what I regard as the unnatural features of the situation in Germany. The first unnatural feature is the line running first along the Elbe and then southward, which divides Germany and Europe. That line was drawn for purely administrative convenience during an exceptional and what was thought to be a purely temporary period of military occupation. It was never intended to be an international frontier, and the efforts to make it such are responsible for many of the strains and stresses in Europe to-day. One of them—and this is what I regard as the second unnatural feature in Germany—is the position of Berlin, an essentially western city situated 100 miles to the East of the dividing line, and itself divided by the Wall. These are the problems which need to be resolved, or at least eased, if European security is really to be furthered.
The Western Powers have on a number of occasions made proposals for resolving those problems. There have been two constant themes; the first, in accordance with the principle of self-determination to which we all subscribed in the United Nations Charter, is that the Germans in both parts of Germany should have the opportunity to express their views freely on the future of their country. The second constant theme has been that this process of reunification—because we in the West believe that that would be the outcome of a free German vote—should be accompanied by new arrangements for European security, political and military. These Western proposals offer a comprehensive solution, but I am sure it is not the intention of the Western Powers to make the best the enemy of the good. If it is still impossible to talk with the Russians about a comprehensive plan for reunification, there are still grounds for useful talks: talks about ways of bringing the two parts of Germany closer together, ways of improving the situation in and around

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Berlin. These essentially are problems of the access to and from and within that city. Moves are already on foot, as the noble Lord said, to explore these possibilities, and I hope very much that the Eastern response will be positive.
Other topics for discussion at a conference are the military measures which I mentioned. Those range over a wide selection of arms control and disarmament measures to be applied in Europe, or in parts of Europe. Many of those ideas will, or may, run up against the obstacles which are all too familiar to those who followed disarmament discussions in Geneva or New York, and notably the problem of verification. But even if that continues to block the more ambitious plans for reduction of forces or armaments in Central Europe, it may still be possible to reach agreement on measures which are capable of being verified nationally—and by that I mean about systems at the disposal of either the West or the East—without the need for on-site inspections, or measures which do not call for verification at all in the sense that they are less measures for arms control and more measures for building mutual confidence, exchange of information, exchange of observers, and so on. This field, I understand, is now being studied by a group in NATO, and until they have come up with specific recommendations—and one knows what the likely Eastern reaction to that is—it is too soon to say whether these will produce worthwhile results.
I should like to take a brief look at the proposals of the Warsaw Pact to which the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, referred. The first was a declaration renouncing the use of force. My Lords, we have all done that in the United Nations Charter, and some of us did it again in the North Atlantic Treaty; and Germany, because she is not a member of the United Nations, made a special declaration to this effect in 1954. Repetition seems to me only to depreciate the value of the assurance. If such a declaration were part of a wider package which included agreements of substance, that would be one thing. But by itself such a declaration seems to me a pretty puny infant, not worthy of having a conference convened for it.
The second subject mentioned was economic, technical, scientific and cul-
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tural co-operation. My Lords, the British Government and other NATO Governments have been striving for some time precisely to develop such co-operation with the countries of Eastern Europe, and they have done so with some success. There are trade agreements and there have been technical exchanges. I was reading only over the weekend of Polish art treasures coming here for exhibition at Burlington House. Certainly it would be nice to have freer exchanges of people and ideas as well as trade; but would a conference really help to do that? A declaration would not get us much further; and if a conference attempted to deal with the practical problems involved in developing such co-operation and attempted to put this into a multilateral agreement to which all would subscribe, I believe the result would fall far short of what has been and what may in future be achieved bilaterally.
This brings me to my final point. When this Conference takes place it is bound to be preceded by a great concerting of policies within NATO covering all the issues likely to come up at the Conference. Exactly the same process will take place among the countries in the Warsaw Pact, and possibly even among the neutrals, if they aspire to operate at the Conference as a group. The Western Powers, I suspect, will still, within their unity, display a measure of diversity when they get to the Conference, but the Soviet Union will insist on their allies speaking with one voice, or in very well orchestrated harmony. Indeed, the opportunity to enforce discipline may be, in the eyes of the Soviet Union, one of the great attractions of this Conference. In order to arrive at common positions there will be a tendency on each side to revert to traditional and fixed positions, and we may thus forfeit the opportunities which seem to be opening up for developing closer relations bilaterally between individual States of Western and Eastern Europe. This may be a price worth paying if we are confident that the Conference would produce worth-while results, but it points to not rushing into a conference simply for the sake of having one.
9.6 p.m.
LORD MILFORD: My Lords, I, too, am sorry that Lord Chalfont is not here

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to-night, because a few weeks back, when we had a Defence Debate in your Lordships' House, Lord Chalfont presented a picture which I thought showed tremendous hope and really was constructive about what could be done in the near future now that the whole situation in the world has changed. Since that speech I have been disappointed in the way that Her Majesty's Government have not followed up the enthusiasm which Lord Chalfont seemed to express in this House. but have been dragging their feet on the whole, wonderful vista which is now on the horizon if we take our chance to work in it. Since the Second World War we have lived through tremendously dangerous moments. We have had the vicious cold war, nearly breaking into hot war; and we have had the ghastly invention of more and more weapons. I must say here that I have never heard a stronger or more vicious cold war speech than I have just heard from Lord St. Oswald; and I am very glad that that speech is going down on the record to show the people of Britain what the Tory Party stand for if they get into power.
Some years ago the Rapacki Plan was put forward by Poland for nuclear-free zones in the centre of Europe, and Mr. Gaitskell and Mr. Wilson, in Opposition in those days, welcomed that Plan very strongly. To-day even bigger proposals have been put forward to bring security to Europe. The Gaitskell-Wilson Party is now in power, but it does not seem to be coming forward to grasp the nettle and carry forward this security idea wholeheartedly. All over Europe to-day and in the European Press in these last two days the description of our Foreign Office is that of a sort of grey ghost at a feast, pulling things back, with no enthusiasm, no imagination at all, on this vital question of peace. Our Press is focusing all its doubts and innuendoes on the Soviet Union: "Are they serious?" "Is it a trap?" "Is it merely propaganda?".
Success for such a wonderful possibility for a European security pact depends on the attitude of both sides—we on this side, the NATO side, the West European side, and the Eastern side. I put this attitude as one of the biggest
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priorities for to-day. The noble Lord, Lord Brockway, put forward priorities with which I thoroughly agree; but I think that what is of vital importance, if we are to get forward at all, is the attitude of people in this country and of our Government: do we want a security pact or do we not? If suspicion (in speeches like that just made by the noble Lord, Lord St. Oswald), is what Britain stands for, we shall not get anywhere at all.
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, I wish that the noble Lord would put more precisely what he thinks I stand for instead of making these vague generalisations.
LORD MILFORD: My Lords, we this evening should concentrate on Britain. The people of Britain are sick of suspicion, of arms bills, of nuclear bombs, of more and more chemical warfare talk and all that. They want peace; they want security; they want the arms bill cut down so that there is more money for social services. But this, apparently—I may be wrong—is not right in the forefront of the Foreign Office, or of the picture that the Foreign Office is giving. Cannot the Foreign Office be a little more imaginative and give out a better image of themselves? Can they not produce an atmosphere more free from smog, pollution and poison and go for careful preparation on questions on which agreement is possible?
While the possibility of a conference on European security is in the air, why must our Defence Minister go on talking about tactical nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons for first strike, more troops for Germany and so on? It does not help this vitally important position we are now in. Only a few years ago the Defence Minister himself was saying that if nuclear arms are used this island will be completely destroyed.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, dealt with the history of these proposals for a security pact and how in 1966 the Scandinavians supported it. Three members of NATO supported it, Denmark, Iceland and Norway, and Finland offered itself as host. There have been 23 acceptances and only Albania has refused; Italy, a NATO country, is very interested indeed and Yugoslavia, a neutral, is also interested.

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So what are the Warsaw proposals? They say absolutely clearly that the conference should be prepared by preliminary discussions of all States—I repeat "preliminary discussions". So far as I can see, we are even dragging our feet on that. They suggest a preliminary meeting as early as possible of all interested European States to establish, by mutual agreement, procedures for calling a Conference—I repeat "procedures" for calling a Conference.
When this was received with a cool, dubious attitude by the West they then, in October, offered talks first in the form of bilateral or multilateral consultations. Is this not really the voice of somebody who wants to try to get a Conference and wants to try to get forward to some security? The Warsaw Pact countries themselves suggested two items on the agenda: ensuring European security and the renunciation of the use of threats by force, and the extension of trade, economic, scientific and technological relations. That was their suggestion. Cannot we start a conference? Why not go forward on what we can agree? Surely we could agree to talk about these things instead of cold-shouldering them. If you get round a table you are far more likely to arrive at an understanding and a real desire to get to grips with things than by shooting away verbally at one another when you are thousands of miles apart.
In passing, my Lords, I would say that it is odd that none of the British capitalist Press printed the text of the March or the October communiqués of the Warsaw Pact. I wonder why they did not. To-day the British Press picture the British Government as less enthusiastic than the others of the West and as more wary and suspicious than the others, and particularly claim that Britain applied the brakes in NATO. The great thing that our Foreign Secretary seems to go on saying is that the agenda must be carefully prepared. But the Warsaw Pact countries also say that, and they ask us to come together to discuss that agenda and to prepare it together. Somehow the Foreign Office seem determined to drag things on or to "shoot down" the conference. For some reason, they seem to fear it like the plague. The Secretary of State goes on talking about more nuclear tactical weapons and first
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nuclear strike in Europe, and that kind of thing.
The British people want this Pact. If you went to the country to-morrow and asked, "Pact or no Pact?" you would find that they want it. They want peace, and they see this as a new, wonderful hope on the horizon: the possibility of getting rid of the present military obligations; or even their increase as is now being suggested, with the proposal that we should have more troops in Germany. They are sick of all this military expenditure which only brings on more and more financial crises and which means cutting down on the social services. "For heaven's sake!", they say, "stop this idea of first nuclear strike which means the total destruction of Britain". The working people are told that wages must be held down and the squeeze continued. Our Defence Ministers pour more and more money down the drain over more and more troops and weapons for Europe and Germany.
9.19 p.m.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, although the hour is late I have found this an interesting debate. I listened to the noble Lord, Lord Milford, with his known views and support for the Soviet Union and the Communist Party, and the calm, cautious words of the noble Viscount, Lord Hood, who spoke after many years of service in the Foreign Office, and then the forthright words of the noble Lord, Lord St. Oswald. I am not quite certain whether the noble Lord, Lord St. Oswald. was speaking for his Party or for himself, but I will attribute his views to him so that he will not be in difficulties with his Party tomorrow.
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, I hope that the noble Lord did not find me vicious.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I never find the noble Lord, Lord St. Oswald, vicious. Sometimes I think he may be off-beam, but never vicious.
We have had the speech of my noble friend, Lord Brockway, which had a great deal of historical content in it, with most of which I would agree although there were certain aspects with which I would disagree. I thought that my noble friend Lord Brockway was less than fair to my

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noble friend the Chief Whip. I know that this is an important debate and that it is a matter to which Lord Brockway attaches very considerable importance. I must say that there is no one who has used this House for the interests which he has at heart more than my noble friend Lord Brockway. He asks perhaps more Starred Questions than any other noble Lord and certainly he asks more Unstarred Questions than any other noble Lord. On this occasion, when the hour is late and the Benches are empty, I think it is wrong to blame my noble friend the Chief Whip. It is due to the fact that other noble Lords also have matters of great interest to them which they wish to debate, and our earlier debate went on a little longer than was anticipated. I think that on reflection my noble friend will regret his remarks about the Chief Whip.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, may I interrupt my noble friend? I did not mean any attack on the Chief Whip at all. What I reported was that several days ago I indicated that I wanted to raise this matter. I had a discussion with the Chief Whip's Office and my arrangements were made with them. This date was particularly suggested in view of Lord Chalfont's return. I doubt whether the Chief Whip himself knew anything about these discussions at all, and I was not making any attack on him.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I am glad. My noble friend Lord Chalfont should have been back but matters in New York have kept him there. Therefore it falls to me, another Minister of State in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to reply to my noble friend.
As my noble friend and the House will know, there was a full and useful discussion of this subject at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council which my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs attended in Brussels on December 4 and 5. I agree that we all wish peace, but we also wish to maintain our freedoms. The noble Lord, Lord Oswald, read out paragraph 2 of the declaration attached to the Ministerial communiqué of December 5, describing the purpose of the coming
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into being of NATO. A communiqué was also issued after the Brussels meeting and I have arranged for a copy to be made available in the Library of the House. The communiqué recalls that,
"Since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty twenty years ago, the Members of the Alliance have dedicated their efforts to the preservation of their freedom and security and to the improvement of East-West relations in the aim of reaching an ultimate peaceful solution of outstanding problems in Europe. They will continue to do so".
These are the twin aims of the Alliance, defence and detente.
On the basis of these two concepts of defence and detente, the Ministers issued a Declaration, in which they set forth their views on the future development of relations between East and West. With permission, I will circulate this Declaration in the OFFICIAL REPORT.*
The first essential point that is made clear in the Declaration is that the West is ready for constructive East-West talks on practical matters. As the House knows, the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session has drafted a list of concrete issues for possible negotiation between East and West. This list was presented to Ministers last week. It is an exercise which has led the Alliance into a very full study of the areas where real progress is possible. In the meantime, members of the Alliance, both individually and collectively, have pursued practical initiatives towards a reduction of tension.
These initiatives have been aimed at the central problems of European Security: the problems of Germany and Berlin, and the problems of the arms race. My noble friend Lord Brockway mentioned some of these initiatives and there is no harm in repeating them. Her Majesty's Government, together with the Governments of the United States and France, as my noble friend Lord Hood told the House, have been conducting exchanges with the Soviet Union to improve the situation in and around Berlin and the access to that City. This is a question which is not only at the heart of European security but also has a determinant effect on the simple day-to-day freedom of movement of people in Berlin; our objective, surely, must be to improve their welfare. The Federal German Government has already begun
*See col. 544.

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exchanges with the Soviet Union on mutual declarations on the non-use of force and non-intervention in internal affairs; and hopes to have similar discussions with her other Eastern neighbours.
On the arms side, there are the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks—the most important talks that have begun between the United States and the Soviet Union on the possibility of the limitation of strategic armaments. There is also NATO'S invitation to the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe to join in discussion of mutual force reductions. This invitation was first issued by NATO Ministers at Reykjavik last year. It has never been answered: but it remains open, and, indeed, NATO Ministers reiterated and reaffirmed it in their meeting last week, and requested that a report of the Council in Permanent Session on the preparation of models for mutual force reductions be submitted as soon as possible. An important point here, brought out in the Communiqué and Declaration, is that the vital security interests of all parties should be maintained. We are most anxious to promote regional disarmament, but must guard against de-stabilising the situation. Equality of security is what we need. And in this process it is all the more important that NATO should not reduce its overall defensive strength until an agreement on disarmament has been obtained which preserves the vital security interests of all parties.
In the passage in their Declaration about mutual and balanced force reductions, NATO Ministers quoted a phrase from the communiqué of the Moscow Meeting of the Warsaw Pact Powers on December 4. The Ministers said that an agreement on this matter would be another concrete step in advancing
"along the road of ending the arms race and of general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament."
We must hope that this evident coincidence of interests can be translated into practical results.
This brings me to the question of a conference. The communiqué of the Moscow Meeting (a copy of which I have again placed in the Library of the House) made only a passing and general reference to the question of a conference. The Warsaw Pact's proposals for a conference are set out more fully in the
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Declaration following their meeting at Prague on October 31. They are somewhat vaguely formulated and are limited, so far as the agenda is concerned, to agreements on the renunciation of force and of interference in internal affairs on the one hand, and increased economic, scientific and technological co-operation on the other. Except the two parts of Germany (and this is what my noble friend Lord Hood stressed), we are, of course, all signatories of the United Nations Charter, which enshrines the principles of non-interference and non-use of force; and, as I have said, the Federal. German Government has already made initiatives on this question. And discussions on economic and scientific co-operation are continuously under way, both bilaterally and in international organisations. It is hardly appropriate to convene a full-scale conference for these two items.
The difference in approach between the West and the East is this. We are talking about the problems of European Security; the Soviets and their friends are talking about procedure, or, rather, about one possible method of procedure. There is no evidence that they have done the essential homework that NATO has done with its list of issues. The noble Lord, Lord Milford, stressed the need for carefully prepared work in this matter. This is not to say that we reject the idea of a conference out of hand. We are willing to pursue all practical means of reducing tension and resolving outstanding problems. We have made certain proposals for negotiation, which I have outlined, on the most important of these problems.
It is quite plain from this and from the Declaration issued in Brussels last week that there is, on the part of the West, a genuine will to negotiate. But a genuine will to negotiate does not put one under the obligation to accept without qualification the first proposal that is put forward by the other side as to how it should be done. We are entitled to say that their proposal seems to us in some respects to be unsatisfactory and inadequate, that it should be modified in this way or that way, and see how we go from there. Above all, we have the right to decline to be rushed into a conference before we know that it has a reasonable chance of resolving the major problems. I am sure that noble Lords would not want Her Majesty's

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Government to enter a conference whose sole purpose would be the ratification of the status quo in Europe, with all that that implies—for instance, a highly questionable doctrine of sovereignty.
So, my Lords, where do we go from here? Well, so far as a conference is concerned, as the Declaration records, Ministers agreed in Brussels that progress in the bilateral and multilateral discussions and negotiations that I have mentioned, which have already begun, or could begin shortly, and which relate to the fundamental problems of European Security, would make a major contribution to improving the political atmosphere in Europe and to help to ensure the success of any eventual conference. We look for evidence of a constructive Warsaw Pact approach in connection with these practical initiatives towards détente that the West has already taken.
We shall also seek, in our bilateral contacts with the Warsaw Pact Powers, to probe their intentions for a conference further and discover whether they would be willing to agree a meaningful agenda. There have been some signs that they are geuinely interested in progress. I have mentioned the exchanges on Germany and Berlin that have already taken place. Noble Lords will notice that the Moscow communiqué shows some signs of a rather greater open-mindedness towards the Federal German Republic.
So far as NATO'S own initiatives are concerned, Ministers, on the suggestion of my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary, instructed the Permanent Representatives to look closely into the question of machinery and to report to the next Ministerial Meeting in May. We are doing our homework. The NATO Ministers also recorded their belief that progress is most likely to be achieved by choosing in each instance the means most
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suitable for the subject. This is a prudent and practical task, and an indication of our continued seriousness of purpose.
Here I might add one essential point which Ministers in NATO have already made clear; namely, that the North American members of the Alliance must participate in any conference and in the preparations from the outset. Their right and interests as members of the Alliance entitle them to an equal rôle from the very beginning. I am sure that from what I have said the House will agree that NATO countries and Her Majesty's Government, in particular, are moving, as President Nixon himself said, into an era of negotiation in the right spirit of determination to achieve practical results and to prepare a way thoroughly in order to make this possible.
My Lords, we are entering a decade which could see great changes in Europe. As I said, NATO pursues the twin aims of defence and détente. We shall still need all our determination in defence of our freedom. In addition, we shall need firmness, flexibility and imagination, We shall need the courage to talk with the other side where it seems that progress can be made, and courage to refuse offers of talks, no matter how they may look, whose motivation may be far removed from any intention to negotiate about things which matter. This is why we and our allies agree that the defence of the Alliance must be fully maintained during any period of East-West negotiations. We have to strike the right balance between our firmness to defend and our readiness to negotiate and to conciliate. The two are not incompatible. They indeed go hand in hand. My Lords, I certainly will take note of the suggestions my noble friend made in his speech, as we always do.
House adjourned at eighteen minutes before ten o'clock.