HL Deb 22 April 1969 vol 301 cc396-421

3.49 p.m.

LORD WIGG rose to move, That an Humble Address be presented to Her Majesty praying that the Army Terms of Service (Amendment) Regulations 1969 [S.I. 1969 No. 245], laid before the House on March 5 last, be annulled. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion that stands in my name on the Order Paper. On March 5 Statutory Instrument No. 245 of 1969 was laid, amending the Army Terms of Service Regulations in such a fashion that if the Statutory Instrument be not annulled a new type of engagement of three years with the Colours and four years with the Reserve will become available in all arms of the Service. The introduction of a regulation of this type is not new; indeed, it has a history. And from the point of view of practical results, the history is not very respectable.

I am not one of those who are wedded to romantic type historians who look at history backwards and then interpret the events of to-day and yesterday in terms of preconceived notions. I hold the view that the First Great War was won before a shot was fired, as a result of the reforms of the Regular Army. introduced first of all by Mr. Cardwell and then subsequently carried through by the greatest Secretary of State for War this country has ever had, the late Lord Haldane. From Mons back to the Marne an action was fought, not by men who were the products of what are called the "upper strata" of our society, and although many from such strata were serving among the officers, there were not, I suspect, many Ph.D.s, M.A.s or B.A.s among them. For the most part the men were drawn from that section of the community from which I myself sprang, who joined the Regular Army because their forbears did, or because, in many cases, it was the only hope of escaping from a drab, dreary, and sometimes an unemployable existence.

The Regular terms of service imposed on the infantry for a period of 12 years, partly with the Colours and partly with the Reserve—for the most part a minimum of seven years with the Colours and five years with the Reserve—meant that the divisions which went to France in 1914 had in their ranks a very high proportion of men of the age of 26 and upwards whose service was basically long-term, who could march and shoot, and who had the physical capacity to out-march, out-shoot and out-point the German Army. So while, in the dash to the Marne, they could not win, the Germans could not win, either; and not having won in the opening phase they could not win the war at all. The same thing applied in the Franco-Prussian War. What I am arguing is that while, I agree, the plans of the General Staff are important, in the long-term the structure of the Regular Forces around which an Army is built is pre-eminently important, and these policies which are introduced require a long time to work through, certainly not less than 20 years.

On November 20, 1951 (and I will now make the point that I want to make against this background), shortly after the Conservative Government took office, a similar engagement to the one now enshrined by this Statutory Instrument was introduced, and during the years that followed was heralded in all quarters as a great success. In January, 1951—that is to say, ten months before the three-year engagement was introduced—the Army recruited 1,999 recruits; in January, 1952, two months after the new engagement was introduced, the enlistment rate shot up to 2,632; and in February, 1952, only three months after, the recruiting figure had more than doubled—no fewer than 3,496 men were enlisted.

From the moment of the introduction of that short-service engagement in 1951 I opposed what was then done and I lost no opportunity, as the pages of Hansard of another place will show, of forecasting the dire consequences that I felt sure would follow. The reason for its introduction was to induce young National Service men, called up for two years, to undertake the three-year engagement, and its apparently successful introduction, as I asserted at the time, was due not to the attraction of the short-service engagement itself but to the simple fact that those men enlisting on the Regular short-service engagement drew a much higher rate of pay for their three years than they would have done had they drawn the pay of a National Service man serving for two years. In other words, it was the differential in the rates of pay and not the engagement that did the trick.

My Lords, I do not want to fight old battles over again this afternoon, but I would remind your Lordships pf one simple fact. It escaped notice in 1951 (and perhaps I might say that there are none so deaf as those who do not want to hear), but from 1951 to 1957, try as I would, I did not succeed even in the limited task of convincing the senior members of my own Party, let alone the Government, of this simple fact. If the number of men who are recruited annually is 100, and they join for three years, one would have an Army of 300, whereas if the period of engagement is seven years there will be an army of 700. Or, to put it another way, once you play around with the periods of the engagement you are really scraping the bottom of the barrel and the test ceases to be the number of men actually serving or enlisting; the test becomes the total number of man-years which your forces command.

I have said that I do not want to job backwards, and I certainly do not want to fight old battles over again. But by 1957 it became obvious even to the most purblind devotees of the military nostrums of the day that the three-year engagement was a failure, and on May 14, 1957. the then Secretary of State for War went down to the House of Commons and announced the end of the three-year en gagement with the exception of certain special categories, these being the Brigade of Guards, who have always, since long before the war, retained the right to enlist men for three years with the Colours and nine years with the Reserve, and certain special categories, such as the Royal Military Police, the Postal Service of the Royal Engineers, the Intelligence Corps and the Army Catering Corps.

The reason which forced the action in 1957 was this. The announcement in the 1957 White Paper that compulsory military service was to be brought to an end faced the Government of the day with the plain truth that a voluntary Army must be a long-service Army. My views on the 1957 White Paper are well known, and although the Minister who I understand is to reply does not agree with me (for reasons which he explained to the House on December 12), I still hold the view that it was a disastrous document which has done more damage to the Regular Forces than any other similar policy in the history of the Armed Forces of this country. And the worst thing about it is that it was linked with nothing more solid than sheer political expediency. The thinking behind it was shallow; it was unrelated to military necessities: it was the handiwork of Mr. Duncan Sandys.

The Minister of State for Defence, when he announced to the House of Commons on March 5, 1969, that regulations would be laid providing for a three-year short-service engagement in the infantry, the Royal Artillery and the Royal Armoured Corps, was not describing accurately the scope of the Statutory Instrument which we are discussing today. The provisions of the Statutory Instrument make it possible to enlist men in any arm of the Service for a three-year engagement. The Minister's Statement to the House of Commons was brief and I regret that it aroused no particular interest—certainly none in political circles. But as I understand it, it is intended to introduce a ceiling for the Infantry, the Royal Artillery and the Royal Armoured Corps, and that this ceiling will be fairly low. I presume that the historic right to which I have already referred, that the Brigade of Guards may recruit for a three-year engagement, will continue, and I presume that the provision covering the Royal Military Police, the Intelligence Corps and the Army Catering Corps will also continue. I hope that the Minister will tell your Lordships whether in all arms of the Service the engagement is to be three years with the Colours and four years with the Reserve. The type of engagement, although it is short-service, departs from the other types of engagement which the Army offers. They are for 22 years, or for a minimum of 12 years, and this engagament which is now envisaged shortens both the Colour service and the Reserve service. On the new three-year engagement, as I understand it, it is to be standard practice to have this new short service of three years with the Colours and four years with the Reserve, and I hope the Minister will be kind enough to confirm that fact.

One of the things that worries me more than enough is that when the Minister of State made his announcement in the House of Commons, he said of the new engagement—and I think I am almost quoting him—that it would give the opportunity for people who want to try it out for a shorter period to do so—the "it", of course, being the Army. I think that this is a very dangerous doctrine indeed. The short-service engagement in 1951 was a gambler's throw by men who did not fully appreciate the long-term consequences of what they were doing and, unfortunately, they were supported by senior members of the Labour Opposition. So that the consequences of the actions of 1951 were never faced fairly and squarely. That is the reason why I have put down this Prayer this afternoon. I opposed the three-year engagement in 1951. I have very grave doubts about its reintroduction now, and I warn the Minister of Defence that Gresham's Law applies not only to currencies but in other fields of human activity.

I have no doubt that in the short run the new three-year engagement will give the Minister of Defence what he is looking for: a short, sharp surge of men who, in the Minister of State's words, will want to try it out, but who in fact are taking the easy option. If you merely count heads, they will be very welcome, but they do not make for a stable manpower policy. I sympathise with the Minister's difficulties. Recruiting is falling off. He is discovering a truism that was obvious to those of us who concerned ourselves with these matters years ago. It was obvious in 1951 and in 1957 to anyone who cared to look that we were going to run into a period of very low recruiting catchment in about the late 'sixties and early 'seventies. That, of course, is related to the birth rate eighteen years ago. This fact alone made the policies followed highly dangerous, but when coupled with them we have the adventurous policies of 1962, of lowering the standards of men recruited and lowering the age of entry to seventeen—there is obviously a limit to that unless you are going to go back to the cradle—then what happened in 1968 and what is happening in 1969, and what will inevitably happen in 1970, are a direct consequence of the 1957 White Paper.

In short, the nation is faced with a devastating choice. The fact must be faced that if the nation has turned its back, on the advice of its political leaders, on any form of compulsory military service, even of a mild dose of selective service, then if you want recruits you have to pay for them, and the truth is that the Service rates of pay have not kept pace with the increases of pay in civilian life. Between 1965 and 1968 the index of industrial earnings rose by about 16 per cent. By comparison, Servicemen's pay rose by only 7 per cent. and that as a result of an award by the Prices and Incomes Board effective on April 1, 1968. What is needed desperately is for the Prices and Incomes Board to help the Services by recommending a pay code which is competitive with industry and gives something to spare for the hardships and special conditions of Service life.

There is another point which to my mind is of tremendous importance. This, if I may use the technical term, is the committal element of the pay structure. This, of course, has a direct bearing on the three-year engagement. On present rates of pay (and I apologise for wearying your Lordships with figures) a non-tradesman private Grade IV serving for three years would secure a rise in pay from £6 11s. 3d. per week to £7 17s. 6d. a week for six years or to £9 17s. 9d. a week if he converted to nine years. The pay of a "B" tradesman private Class III would rise from £7 12s. 3d. per week on a three-year engagement to £8 18s. 6d. per week on a six-year engagement or to £10 18s. 9d. on a nine-year engagement. This system provides an important inducement to prolong, and it is of course an extension of the principle of the differential which produced such dramatic results following the introduction of the three-year engagement for the Army in 1951.

I cannot emphasise too strongly to your Lordships that the three-year engagement in itself must lead inevitably to a substantial weakening of the manpower structure of the Army. Once again it is a gambler's throw. It may produce in the short term excellent results, but this will be misleading during the first three years. After three years, when those who have taken the bait reject the hook of prolongation, the situation will have become worse than it was before the three-year engagement was introduced. So that if the situation is as bad as it undoubtedly is now and the voluntary system is in danger of breaking down, then I for one will accept the three-year engagement, albeit with reluctance, but the differential in the form of a committal element in a sharply increased pay structure is of vital importance; and without the immediate pay increase the introduction of the three-year engagement at this stage is an act of madness.

I suppose that apart from pay the most important factor influencing recruiting is the conviction that the Army is a rational and worthwhile career. Despite excellent publicity, I am not convinced that this is getting across to the general public. The things which the British people must come to understand, if the voluntary principle is to be maintained, are, surely, that there is a real need for an Army to preserve our security; that the Army provides a satisfactory and enjoyable career; that the Army provides the sort of training which gives a man the best possible start in life; and, finally, that the Army plays a genuine part in serving the community in peace time by providing trained manpower capable of exercising responsibility.

As I understand it, last year the Army carried out 151 exercises in 27 different countries. This year, I understand it is to be 208 exercises in 30 countries. There has been a valuable element of community service in much of this training, since certain units have been able to combine training overseas with constructive work such as road and airfield construction and well-boring.

Another most important factor which the community must be brought to realise is that many Service trades and qualifications are to-day recognised by academic and professional bodies, by craft and technical institutes and by trades unions. Emphasis is now being placed on giving men as many opportunities as possible to obtain these qualifications, which can be used both within the Service and to facilitate resettlement when soldiers return to civilian life. The needs of the Service must always come first, but the search for manpower inside a voluntary system is something which must be accepted, certainly, I should have thought, by every Member of both Houses of Parliament and, perhaps even more important, by the community as a whole.

My Lords, it is because I am convinced of these facts that I trouble you to-day. I am not going to press this Prayer to a Division, and I end on a personal note. It is something that I have said before and I mean every word of it. Just fifty years ago. having had some taste of the Army, I decided to enter into a Regular engagement. I owe the Army a debt I can never wholly repay. I am trying to repay some of that debt to-day. If I could put the clock back and start all over again I would go back those fifty years and enlist in the ranks of the Regular Army for the friendship that I so readily found and because I am grateful for the opportunities which the Army gave me in later life. I beg to move.

Moved, That an Humble Address be presented to Her Majesty praying that the Army Terms of Service (Amendment) Regulations 1969 [S.I. 1969 No. 245], laid before the House on March 5 last, be annulled.—(Lord Wigg.)

4.13 p.m.

LORD THURLOW

My Lords, we on this side are very glad that the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, has moved this Motion to-day. We are having a Defence debate next week, but this Order certainly merits a little debate on its own. We on this side certainly share the apprehension expressed by the noble Lord about the consequences of the Order. As he described, this scheme has been tried before and it was abandoned. Presumably this Order has only one aim: to get more recruits; and in that connection it smacks rather of an act of desperation. I understand that it is aimed to apply only to a proportion of the corps and the regiments of the Army. If this is so, it leaves the authorities free to vary the application of the Order according to the results of the first period of experimentation, perhaps increasing or decreasing the proportion. However, I hope that the noble Lord who is to reply for the Government will note what Lord Wigg said about the short, sharp upsurge that can come about in recruiting because of such an Order as this, but that it may not be continued.

In certain arms and regiments the record of re-engagement is encouraging, and obviously we must hope that this will spread to those recruits who take advantage of this scheme. I have considerable experience of training infantry, both recruits arriving at the depot under my command just after the war and those on arrival in units in the late 'forties and early 'fifties. Training overheads are high. That is one reason why I am against the reintroduction in peace time of National Service. The shorter the engagement the higher the turnover and the bigger the training overheads, unless one gets a big proportion of re-engagement. Certainly we hope that this will be the result, as otherwise this scheme will make matters worse and the return of National Service in some form will be the consequence. There will be some men who will be prepared to take an engagement of three years with the Colours—I think "three years with the carburettor" would be a more suitable term to-day, in the highly mechanised forces that we are considering—and it remains to be seen whether the response will be worth while.

It is not an economical scheme unless a high proportion of re-engagement results. A soldier to-day is a most expensive person. He gives no value for money during his training, when he and his family have to be kept by the taxpayer, and paid, clothed and fed, and trained by other highly-paid soldiers. If he leaves after only a short period as a fully-trained man he is not worth the cost of his service, except so far as his use as a Reservist is concerned. In these Regulations the reserve period is only four years—I think I am right in saying that. This I regret, because I should have liked to see a longer period on the Reserve. Perhaps the noble Lord opposite could tell us why the period is only four years, and what are the reasons against making it a longer period.

This scheme is a gamble. Its success depends on whether the financial inducements of a six-year Colour engagement are sufficiently enticing. If they are not, few men will join for six years if they need not commit themselves for more than three years. I should like to see this three-year scheme applied to single men only, so that marriage allowance and quarters and all the expense of the families are provided only for men who take on a longer engagement and really give worthwhile service.

But I do not believe that pay and allowances are necessarily the answer to the shortage of recruits. There is a lack of confidence in the future. The men in the Services see cuts, amalgamations and abandonments of old commitments, and the disappearance of popular overseas stations. This, I believe, is even more marked among the young civilians, the potential recruits, than in the Forces, where, I am glad to note, morale is high, as re-engagements show. I believe that what is needed is a clear call, not only by the Service Ministers in Parliament but by the leaders of the Government and in particular the Prime Minister, to show the public that the nation needs its Forces, with all the qualities that the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, mentioned so well just now; that the nation is proud of its Forces, is grateful to them and can assure them that they are an essential part of national life and will be looked after accordingly.

I am glad the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, is not carrying his Motion into the Lobbies, because I do not think I could advise my noble friends to support him, but I hope the Government will watch the results very carefully, as certainly we shall, and will not hesitate to repeal the Order if it does not have the desired effect in the long term. I, for one, certainly hope that it will have the result not only of bringing in many much needed recruits but that a large number of such recruits will re-engage. Therefore, though I am apprehensive, I wish it success. If it does not produce long-service soldiers it will do a grew deal of harm and should be dropped.

4.22 p.m.

LORD CLIFFORD or CHUDLEIGH

My Lords, I am in the invidious position of being what I might call a part-time Colonel between two Major-Generals. However, in rising to support the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, in his Motion this afternoon, I should like to point out that ever since I left the university I have been one sort of a soldier or another, Regular, irregular (very at times), and part-time. I am the father and the father-in-law of young soldiers, officers, and I allow my property to be used by two training establishments, the Royal Marines and the local infantry. Therefore. I hope that I may claim to have some idea of the views of the younger people in the Services to-day. However, my views, of course, are entirely my own.

I look on this three-year term business as a gimmick: a gimmick that has been tried before by the Conservatives and found wanting. This is about recruiting to a minute, comparatively speaking, Regular Army, and to such a Regular Army a three-year short-term engagement for the Colours is, to my mind, in this day and age impracticable and is bound in the long run to be inefficient. To my mind there are two ways in which the Army of this country can be run. First, we can have a National Service Army. This would mean two years training, and the reserves so formed would enable the permanent units and the Territorial Army units to be ready for any emergency at any time.

To my way of thinking, the Conservatives to their everlasting shame, abolished National Service for, I think, vote-catching reasons. The result has been from the word "go", "Mods" and "Rockers" and their modern equivalents, and a whole lot of other signs of lack of national discipline. But worse still, I think, is the creation of two nations, the dividing line nowadays being that of the two "A" levels plus, just at the period when I think they should be together; and to my mind the intellectual snob is the worst of all snobs. Secondly, there is the all-Regular volunteer Army. I had 15 years as a Regular soldier and I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, that we did not like National Service. Why? Because our best officers and our best N.C.Os. were taken away to train them. However, to my mind that is a purely parochial view.

The idea of an all-Regular volunteer Army, if it can be achieved, is fine; but the Governments—I put it in the plural—of this country have so knocked the stuffing out of the defence forces that they have made it impossible to appeal recruiting-wise to the borderline cases. All ex-soldiers will know how much morale building and espirit de corps depended on our being able to teach regimental history. To-day I do not envy the young regimental officer trying to put that across, what with amalgamations, re-amalgamations and yet further amalgamations, quite apart from abolition. One officer so concerned (this is apropos this new divisional set-up which has been arranged) plaintively said to me only last week, "How can we come to Chudleigh"—which is my local village—"and appeal for recruits to the Prince of Wales's Division which no one has ever heard of locally". It may be said that they will at some time. Meanwhile, what is happening? The Devon and Dorset Regiment will soon be going to Malta—which should be a great draw—but it will consist 25 per cent. or more of Welshmen. I quote that just as one example of what is happening.

To my view, it is the Governments who are responsible for knocking the glamour, and therefore the recruiting value, out of the defence services, and they are bringing in this three-year term purely as a stopgap. The Regular element in either a volunteer Army or a National Service Army must be on at least a five-year engagement, and preferably a seven-year engagement. In these days when our prospective enemy has more submarines than our total Navy, we cannot afford to have a half-trained Army. By abolishing Civil Defence the Government have removed the credibility of our nuclear deterrent. Again, we are forced back on what is left of our Army.

The noble Lord, Lord Wigg, is to be congratulated on putting down this Prayer, if only to spell out the parlous state into which politicians, of both Parties, have got the Army and its Reserves to-day. I only wonder that some thing like this was not done in another place; but there they have not the advantage of having the Cross-Benches.

4.28 p.m.

VISCOUNT MONCKTON OF BRENCHLEY

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, for telling us what he has this afternoon. It was good to hear of his pride as a soldier, and I have the same feeling. It is clear that the measures we are considering are desperate measures for desperate reasons. But if they are for desperate reasons, then desperate measures may have to be taken, because it is true that there is a shortfall in the birth rate and, therefore, recruiting in the next few years will be more difficult. I think it would also be right to say that the Household Cavalry and Brigade of Guards are two of the most efficient bodies in the British Army. They exist well on this three-year engagement, and therefore that must be taken into consideration.

Another point is that when young men of to-day come into the Army they have often held six or seven jobs before they have decided to join. This three-year engagement will give them a chance—rather like the short-service officer engagement, which was extremely successful; the S.S.C. three-year engagement—to see whether they like the Army and it the Army likes them. If it suits, one hopes they will take on. Those are the advantages and they, I presume, are the reasons why the Government have introduced these schemes.

Some of the disadvantages have already been mentioned by my noble friend Lord Clifford of Chudleigh, and there are others. How can you control the numbers who will opt for the three-year engagement? It would be disastrous if everybody went for the three-year engagement, but it would be difficult legally to stop them. If they went to the recruiting office and asked to sign on for three years, it would be difficult to say, "No, you must come in for six years or nine years. Otherwise we cannot take you." I can see a real problem there. But there is the compensating advantage that with a three-year engagement there will be more chaps going through the Army, and I believe, as the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, said, that when they have seen it they will like it.

Above all, I agree that it is the matter of confidence which is holding back recruiting at the moment. In fact, it is something more than that. There seems to be a lack of will, both in the Government and in the country. I suppose that one follows from the other. One has heard noble Lords this afternoon saying, "Of course there is a place for the Army, and we admire the Forces and what they do." But the Army and the other Forces are there to fight, and unless the people of this country realise that those Forces are basically there to fight, and realise that they may well prevent fighting because they are ready to fight, we shall never get recruits. The biggest recruiter is one man wounded in a regiment in Aden. More people will go to that regiment. If there is a really good beat-up somewhere else in another regiment, people will join that regiment.

They join partly for excitement, adventure, duty and service, and partly for pay, and I very much agree with the proposition that pay must be increased. I hope we are going to get a proper "whack" when the Prices and Incomes Board come up with their decision on Forces' pay. It is a very large factor, particularly when a young man has a good job—and most of those who want to join are unlike some of the others to-day—and he wants to have a look at whether it is going to be good for him financially. If two opportunities are equally good, he will take the one he really wants to go for, and I believe that very often it is the Forces. I imagine that next Tuesday in the Defence debate we shall hear about the difficulty on the Reserve side, because recruiting is equally difficult there. There are great areas of this country which never see a soldier, Territorial or Regular, in uniform and it is very difficult for them to realise that there is an Army to join. So there are points in favour of this engagement, but I believe the dangers are great, and the matter of confidence is even more important.

4.33 p.m.

LORD LEATHERLAND

My Lords, noble Lords have been in a reminiscent mood to-day. My noble friend Lord Wigg told us that it is 50 years since he joined the Army. I have just been reckoning up and I find that it is 55 years since I joined up in 1914. The noble Lord, Lord Clifford of Chudleigh, told us of his family's connections with the Army; that he was a soldier, his s xi was a soldier and his son-in-law was a soldier. My father was a soldier who served for more than the three years mentioned in the Order before us, I was a soldier who served for more than three years, my son was a soldier who served for mole than three years, and my son-in-law came in a similar category. So I approach this question of the Army from a very sympathetic and friendly point of view.

I have made it clear to your Lordships on a number of occasions that I felt that the virtual abolition of the Territorial Army as we used to know it was a mistake. I still hold to that view. I think that a large force of well-trained men in this country would help to give a stable backbone in the event of any crisis that might arise. But I am afraid that I could not go so far as the noble Lord, Lord Clifford of Chudleigh, in suggesting that there are virtues in conscription. There are very few indeed. Men went into the Forces most unwillingly, determined to show that spirit of unwillingness throughout a great part of their Service. That did not apply to all of them; some of them were naturally born to that kind of service. But, on the whole, it was not a willing service that the conscripts gave. Secondly, it was a most expensive service. You gave a man two years' training and before he could begin 10 pay you any dividends he went back again into civilian life. I do not think it was good for morale, either of the people in the Service at the time or of those youngsters who knew that they would shortly have to go into the Service.

All this trouble that we are experiencing to-day about the lack of recruits for the Regular Services, particularly the Army—because the Navy and the Air Force are in slightly different categories—seems to me to date from the 1957 Defence White Paper of Duncan Sandys, when, without my going into meticulous detail, we gathered the impression that the defence of this country in future was to be based upon the atomic bomb and not upon the ordinary infantry soldier or upon a member of the other Armed Services. I think the Services became very unfashionable from that moment. There came a feeling in the minds of young people of, "Well, it is not going to be a permanency if I join the Forces. We are going to rely upon the atom bomb. There will from time to time be reductions in the size of the Forces". Of course there have been reductions in the size of the Forces—not solely because of the atom bomb element of our defence—and it is a fact that young people to-day, hesitating before they enlist, ask themselves, "Will there be another wave of economy cuts in three or four years' time?". One cannot blame them for taking that view.

It is recognised that recruiting for the Army to-day is not good. It is not bad; it is not disgraceful. The numbers coming forward are fairly large, but they are not as large as we need. I think there are two or three reasons for this, apart from the question of morale and uncertainty. First of all, we are reaping the results of the low birth rate 20 years ago. I am afraid that I can make no contribution to the remedying of that this afternoon. Secondly, and equally important we are—I will not say suffering, but trying to recruit men for the Regular Services at a moment in history when there is no large-scale unemployment of young people. There may be some unemployment, but it is largely in the older age groups, and the day has gone when a recruiting sergeant could gather twenty street corner boys and put them into the local regiment.

We have to bear in mind that people will go into the Army now, not because they are driven into it by unemployment but only because, individually, they feel that they have a vocation there. Of course there is the further factor which we are seeing exemplified in all sections of young society, from young strikers in the factories to young university students, that they resent discipline. Throughout the younger generation to-day there is a general resentment against discipline imposed from above. I think I can understand it, but we have to face this fact and to recognise that young people do not want to sacrifice the liberty which they now get every evening, and find themselves forced to live in a barrack or convent community where they can go out only when somebody above them tells them that they can go out.

I have thought about this as well as I could, and I feel that this three-year service is likely to help recruiting. There are many young men to-day who hesitate to join the Forces because they feel that they are committing themselves for a long period, probably until they are getting on for 30 years of age when it will be too late to pick up the threads of a civilian career. But if they feel after three years that they do not want to continue in the Forces, then they have an opportunity to come out at an age when they can enter with confidence into civilian employment, feeling that their full-time civilian career has not been interrupted or damaged.

I think the scheme will lead to many re-engagements. The Army is a nice life to-day, and this is proved by the large number of re-engagements that we are getting. I think those re-engagements will continue, probably at an increased level when, after three years, the young people have done the hard graft of their training and find that their military life is going to be easier in the future, probably with the prospects of promotion. I, feel that with the three-year engagement, the possibilities of promotion for bright young men are going to be much better than they are to-day, when the "old sweats" are hanging on and filling the ranks of sergeant, company quartermaster sergeant and company sergeant-major. And, of course, company sergeant-major is a very nice position in the British Army. It was one which I occupied for a few years, and I must say that I enjoyed it very much indeed.

My Lords, when a young man has to commit himself for a lengthy period he has to think, "What is going to happen if I start courting?"—and young men have a habit of doing that kind of thing. "What is going to be the prospect of my being able to marry if I am still in the Army and probably serving abroad for long periods?" He is also going to say, "Am I jettisoning at one stroke all hopes of a progressive civilian career, when I could be working in the day-time and studying at the local technical school or commercial college at night?".

One thing I like about the proposal in the Order is that it will provide us with an increased number of Reserves. One of the reasons why I did not like the abolition of the Territorial Army was that it was denuding us of some very valuable Reserves. This three-year service with the Colours, coupled with a period in the Reserve—I should like to see it seven years rather than four, if it is to be four—will, I think, provide us with a body of manpower that will be very useful indeed. My noble friend Lord Wigg spoke of 1914. He spoke of the fine mettle of the Regular soldiers of that day. He did not seem to speak in quite such enthusiastic terms of the Regular Reservists who had been called up in 1914.

LORD WIGG

My Lords, would my noble friend forgive me for interrupting him? I am sorry, but he seems to have missed the whole point of the argument, and, if he will forgive my saying so, he is doing it consistently. The point about the Regular Army of 1914 is that it was composed of 60 per cent. Reservists. I talked about the Cardwell reforms and the part which was played by Lord Haldane. It was based upon an efficient call-up of Reservists. If my noble friend would be good enough to read, for example, the first volume of The Official history of the First World War, or the first few chapters of General Fuller's Diary of an Unconventional Soldier, he will see what it is all about.

LORD LEATHERLAND

My Lords, as a progressive soldier I never believe in reading too much or paying too much attention to the generals of the last war or the last war but one; but the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, and I are at one if he is saying that when he paid his tribute to the Regular soldiers of 1914 he was including those Regular Army Reservists who had been called up and fought in that war, because I was with quite a lot of them for a couple of years and they were very fine men indeed.

My Lords, I am very glad indeed that every noble Lord who has spoken has put his finger on the essence of the situation: that is, the pay in the Army. I would not draw too many conclusions from a comparison between the present rates of Army pay and the present rates of civilian pay. During the last two years there have been several civilian pay increases, but the Army's pay increase, if I understand it correctly, comes round only once in two years. We know that another consideration of Army pay is to be undertaken in the next few months. I sincerely hope that the authorities who undertake that investigation will do so realistically, not in the spirit of saying. "Well, we shall have to give the soldiers a little bit more to keep them contented", but that they will say, "This is a very honourable and dignified profession, one which deserves to be remunerated and rewarded at least on the same level as the people who are doing skilled work in industry". Because, my Lords, the Army to-day is a very skilled occupation. And, lest anything which has been said here is likely to create the impression outside that there is a poor slate of morale in the Army, may I say that my extramural relationships with it today seem to indicate that there exists a very high tone of morale indeed.

4.45 p.m.

LORD WINTERBOTTOM

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, has placed before this House his Motion, which seeks to annul the Army Terms of Service (Amendment) Regulations 1969. As the noble Lord has explained, these Regulations would allow a greater number of men that at present to join the Army for a period of three years with the Colours and four years with the Reserve. The previous Regulations applied only to the Guards and a few specialist trades. The new Regulations seek to extend this opportunity to men who wish to join most Corps in the Army, though there are some limitations about which I shall have something to say later.

Before I launch into a discussion of the details of this subject I should like to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, on a most helpful and illuminating speech; and, if I may say so, my personal views are not as distant from his as might have seemed the case during our recent very brief discussion on the Army and Air Force Acts (Continuation) Orders. But the House will agree, I am sure, that very few people are better qualified than the noble Lord to speak about the Army generally and about Army recruiting in particular. Indeed, few can match the noble Lord's experience as a practical soldier and as a formidable commentator and critic of various Governments. Whenever the noble Lord raises problems about the Services, particularly the Army, he does so with a sincere wish to promote the Services' interests; and I think the closing words of his speech to-day gave a clear indication of his profound interest and concern. It is therefore a welcome pleasure to debate this subject with him, and I hope that when the debate is over he will agree that the interests of the Services as a whole are being served by the present Government.

As I said earlier, the noble Lord and I agree on many points, but we differ on one fundamental which lies behind his Motion before the House to-day. In 1957 the Conservative Government announced that National Service would come to an end, and that from 1962 we should have an all-Regular Army; and noble Lords—not only the noble Lord, Lord Wigg—have commented extensively and adversely on this decision. It is no part of my purpose to discuss the rights and wrongs of the issues which were debated before the present Government took office, but this Government have never veered from their purpose to maintain an entirely Regular and professional Army, and to that extent they have endorsed the decision that was made in 1957. Unlike the noble Lord, I do not believe that this purpose is an illusion. First of all, may I say something about recruitment? Between 1964 and 1967 we succeeded in maintaining an Army of over 170,000. In fact, by March, 1967—and that is not a long time ago—we were only 65 men short of the previous Government's target of 180,000 men. In the financial years from 1963–64 to 1966–67 we were obtaining an annual average of about 20,000 adult male recruits. But, as noble Lords know, and have said, unfortunately during the last two years we have suffered a severe setback, and last year recruited only 11,500 adult male recruits.

What are the reasons for this setback? Personally, I can think of two—and these views have also been expressed by other noble Lords in to-day's debate. The first—and we must face this—is the quite natural reactions to the Government's radical reshaping of the Defence policy, and the cuts which this policy instituted. All noble Lords who have spoken to-day have pointed to the uncertainty that this reshaping of the Defence forces has brought about in the public mind. I have every hope, however, that with a Defence policy which matches our resources to our needs, we shall be able to give the Forces the stability which they need. The con fidence which this will generate should counteract the doubts which many have had about the Army as a career.

The second reason for the recruiting decline—and it is one on which many noble Lords commented—may largely be attributable to demographic factors. By 1974, the number of fit young men in the recruiting ages will have decreased by one-third from the number available in 1965. Fortunately, thereafter the demographic tendency improves. Against this, we must remember that our requirements for recruits will also fall. Nevertheless, it is clear that our efforts to get recruits must be as great as they have been in the past, if not greater, particularly when one takes into account the claims of higher education and the greater opportunities available in civilian life. All noble Lords except my noble friend Lord Leatherland have used strong words about the present situation. There have been phrases like, "A gambler's throw", "Dispiriting", and so on. But I believe that there are grounds for optimism, and not foolish optimism.

I have already mentioned the confidence which we hope will be engendered by a rational defence policy and, most important of all, as all noble Lords have pointed out, the Prices and Incomes Board are at this moment carrying out a very full examination of the pay structure of the Services. I am indebted to the remarks made by all noble Lords on the importance of pay in maintaining a volunteer Army and one of the reasons why I particularly welcome to-day's debate is that I am certain that the message given to-day by your Lordships will be noted by the Prices and Incomes Board. I know that they are not studying the case put to them by the three Services without the benefit of extremely competent professional advice. We cannot dictate to the Board, but I think we can await their decision with some confidence. However, I should like to endorse strongly what noble Lords have said on the subject of committal pay and the importance of getting now an actual substantial increase. There is, as noble Lords will know, a somewhat cynical attitude. I have heard it said jokingly, "I don't think I can afford another pay increase." But let us hope that the nay increase that the Prices and Incomes Board give the Forces will be actual and substantial.

I hope that one most important result of the Report will be that for the first time we shall have a pay structure which can be compared with the rates of pay in industry so that any recruit can see at a glance what is being offered. The noble Lord, Lord Wigg, made the important point that while the cost of living and prices have increased by (I think he said) 16 per cent., wages within the Armed Forces have risen only 7 per cent. Clearly, young men who are considering what to do with their lives are naturally going to wish to compare, in material terms, what a military career will give them compared with a civilian career. In addition to recognising the need for a good pay structure, we are trying to use our human resources more intelligently. We are breaking new ground in the selection of recruits and in the matching of men to jobs. As the White Paper states, schemes for centralised selection should go a long way to cut down wastage both of recruits and of trained men. Wastage has always been a problem. By these means we can reduce it to a minimum by ensuring that job satisfaction is achieved early in a man's career.

Finally, as part of this operation we have introduced these regulations which the noble Lord has caused us to debate. I am glad that he is not going to ask us to annul them. The discussion itself has been most useful. It must be realised that the three-year engagement is designed to attract the recruit who is now deterred from joining. Many young men are not prepared to commit themselves to long contracts of employment and I believe that we shall find with this engagement a category of recruits who would not have considered joining the Services before, however attractive the life itself appeared. There is a tendency, I think, among young men to-day, perhaps because of the greater security of our environment, to take their time in choosing the career in which they will pass most of their lives. As the noble Lord, Lord Monckton, pointed out, many young men come to the Army after trying six or seven jobs in civilian life. This is true also of the R.A.F.

Having got these three-year men, we all hope that we will encourage them to sign on for longer periods; and I think we shall be successful in doing that. Recruiting last year was unsatisfactory, but prolongation remained remarkably good. For the six-year men, prolongation rates have risen from 36 per cent. in 1964 to a steady 50 per cent. in the last two years. These figures show that those who are now serving enjoy the life, find it worth while and wish to continue. I think we have good reason to feel confident that a significant number of those on the three-year engagement will also prolong their service.

But there are dangers, and noble Lords have pointed them out. The Government are fully aware that there is the danger that men who might otherwise have joined for longer periods may be attracted to the shorter option. That is an obvious danger. But we are trying to attract a new class of recruit and not to draw off men who would otherwise have joined on a longer engagement. The Government are also aware of the danger that the structure of the Army may suffer by reducing the number of long-serving soldiers and creating a greater degree of turbulence. To guard against these dangers a very careful watch will be kept on the trends of recruiting into the new engagement. If too many men seem to be joining on the shorter engagement at the expense of the longer engagement, manning controls will be imposed.

I hope that this is some reassurance to the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, who put this point to me. This will be done by imposing limits on the number of trained men allowed to serve at any one time in each corps and trade on the three-year engagement. If the limit is reached, recruiting of three-year men for particular corps or trades will be stopped. I must say that I have some sympathy with the noble Lord, Lord Monckton, in thinking that recruiting officers may turn away young men because of this situation. I hope that they will not have to face this problem but that if they do their tact and persuasive powers will get these young men to serve for longer. We have also restricted recruiting by administrative means to men enlisting in the lower grade trades and to non-tradesmen. It is obvious that we could not open this engagement to those who wish to enter trades which have a long and expensive training. While I am at this point, I might mention that the recruitment of Army juniors, on whom we rely for the skilled tradesmen and the senior N.C.O.s of the future, has remained reasonably satisfactory in comparison with adult recruiting rates.

My Lords, I have mentioned the dangers of the new engagement, as have noble Lords in the debate. To sum up, I should like to mention the advantages which we believe will be derived from it. First, a new source of recruits will be tapped; second, more men will be introduced into Army life who, we hope, will stay on to join the men on the longer engagements; third, the under-manning in the short term caused by the recent shortfall in recruiting will be checked; and fourth, there will be a valuable short-term increase in the number of men available for Reserve service.

In the course of the discussion the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, asked me why the three years with the Colours were followed by only four years in the Reserve. In fact, after these four years in the Reserve, the men will fall into the Long Term Reserve until they are aged 45. The difference is that in the first part of their Reserve service they are liable to be called out whenever war-like operations are in preparation or in progress, for instance, in the case of limited war. On the long-Term Reserve they are liable to be called out in imminent national danger or great emergency; that is, for general war. This is a matter of judgment, but it was felt that a short period of service with the Colours, followed by a slightly longer period on the most active branch of the Reserve would be the sort of package which would attract the young men whom we are trying to get.

My Lords, may I thank the House for the sympathetic way in which it has considered the problems facing the Army today. May I thank noble Lords for what I am certain will be a most valuable message to be sent to the Prices and Incomes Board, and may I thank the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, for initiating the debate and for being so co-operative about withdrawing the Motion.

5.1 p.m.

LORD WIGG

My Lords, before I ask leave to withdraw the Motion standing in my name, may I make just one or two comments? The first thing is the discovery of this new world, if I can get it right—

LORD WINTERBOTTOM

"Demographic".

LORD WIGG

Yes, my Lords—the "demographic factor". I never became quite so intellectual as to contemplate the use of such a term. Twenty years ago, when I thought about this problem, there were too few fish in the pool. But this factor was of course perfectly obvious in 1957 and in 1962. What I note as significant is that the factor is discovered only now, when it is convenient to discover it. That is the first point I would make.

The second point is that when the noble Lord, anxious to explain the recruiting figures, mentions how near he got to the targets claimed under the previous Administrations, he must also, in all fairness, explain to the House just how far off those targets were from reality. I do not charge the noble Lord with being disingenuous, but he informed your Lordships that the present Administration had got within a short head (if I may use a term that is familiar to me) of the previous Administration, so it must also be pointed out that the previous Administration were well down the course. They had started off with a quite dishonest figure of 375,000, which they did not break down. That was in 1957. In 1958, when they did break down the figures—165,000 to the Army; 135,000 to the Air Force and 88,000 to the Navy—they added up to 388,000. But a year later, when there was some elbow room, the then Secretary of State for War said that the Army figure was not 165,000 at all, it was 180,000. We had 15,000 added to it which made the total figure 403,000. They never got within a thousand miles of it. So I would warn the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, to be a bit careful about where he takes his justification from. It would be better for him to invent his own rather than to borrow one from the other side of the House.

My Lords, I will not pursue this matter now—perhaps next week there will be an opportunity to make a comment or two—but I will make one further point. All the things which the noble Lord said this afternoon were based on his optimism. I prefer to be numeral, as a result of my training as a lance-corporal, rather than to be literate, which, I understand, is the product of the classic school. I should be much obliged if next week—I do not ask for an answer to-day—the noble Lord, having consulted his Department, would tell the House in figures what rate of prolongation he expects to get (a) to make up for what he is going to lose as a result of this engagement, and (b) to satisfy him and in order to meet this target. If I may draw again on my other experience, I will lay him ten to one in any sum he cares to mention that the Ministry of Defence will not get their target of 150,000. On the present recruiting figure the number will be nearer 130,000, and I am taking a very large measure of protection. This nation must face the fact that if the present recruiting trend is continued we shall have an Army of fewer than 130,000, and I am on offer as betting the noble Lord ten to one that I am right and he is wrong. My Lords, I beg leave to withdraw the Motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.