HL Deb 15 October 1968 vol 296 cc1210-6

3.42 p.m.

LORD SHACKLETON

My Lords, with permission, I should now like to repeat a Statement which my right honourable friend the Prime Minister is making in another place on the talks about Rhodesia which were held on board H.M.S. "Fearless", in Gibraltar, from October 9 to 13. These an his words.

"First, I should like briefly to mention the events which led the Government to conclude that it would be right to have such a meeting.

"As my right honourable friend the Commonwealth Secretary and I myself have repeatedly made clear in the House, we were prepared at any time to engage in discussions if it seemed that there might be a chance of a settlement and provided it were understood that such a settlement must fully implement the requirements of the Six Principles which have been laid down.

"As the House knows, I have more than once before the Recess expressed the doubt whether, even if Mr. Smith's position changed sufficiently markedly to make talks worthwhile, there could be any guarantee that any agreement initialled by him would be endorsed by his colleagues. During the Recess there were changes in the membership of his regime, involving the disappearance of intransigent racialists, and we have also had evidence of the firmness with which he dealt with his Party Congress last month. Honourable Members will also have noted the regime's decision to introduce measures designed to end mandatory death sentences for certain offences.

"At the same time, reliable reports reached us that Mr. Smith would be prepared to enter into meaningful talks.

"Accordingly, an Assistant Under-Secretary of State in the Commonwealth Office was sent to Salisbury on 20th September. He had discussions first with His Excellency the Governor of Rhodesia and the Head of the British Residual Mission; and secondly under the ægis of the Governor, with Mr. Ian Smith. In addition he had discussions with other Rhodesians of different races, occupations and political views who asked to meet him.

"On his return to London he reported that he found a widespread feeling in Salisbury that the recent changes in the political climate there offered some prospect that a fresh attempt to achieve a settlement might be successful. At the same time, however, he reported that Mr. Smith had not given him any indication of a change of position on the fundamental issues which have over these past five years made agreement impossible. This was particularly the case in relation to certain non-negotiable requirements on which any British Government must insist as the condition of a settlement. Mr. Smith had expressed his readiness however for an early meeting.

"Further probings were conducted under the Governor's ægis by the Head of the British Residual Mission. We insisted that Mr. Smith should fully understand that, if talks were to be held, there could be no concessions by us which would undermine or weaken the Six Principles. We insisted also that Mr. Smith should confirm that he understood this. He did in fact give this confirmation, at the same time indicating that he in turn regarded certain matters as of fundamental importance to himself and to those he represented. Despite this re-affirmation of his own position on the Six Principles, it nevertheless seemed reasonable to assume that he would be unlikely, before coming to the conference table, to show his negotiating hand, and in particular to indicate any concessions he was ready to make.

"Accordingly we met at Gibraltar. On the British side I was accompanied by my right honourable friend the Commonwealth Secretary and my right honourable and learned friend the Attorney General. On the Rhodesian side were Mr. Ian Smith, Mr. Howman and Mr. Lardner Burke. The Governor of Rhodesia was present in Gibraltar for the duration of the talks.

"It would not be helpful to go over the hard-hitting exchanges in 30 hours of talks except to record that they confirmed that there was and remains a deep difference between the two sides, not only on the requirements for a settlement, but even more on the basic political philosophies which underlie the attitudes expressed. At the same time the talks were conducted in a good atmosphere, having regard to all the circumstances, and within the limitations created by the fundamental differences to which I have referred.

"By Saturday night, October 12, it was clear to both sides that it was unlikely that a settlement could be reached on board H.M.S. "Fearless" and that this would become no more likely if the discussions lasted several more days. I decided, with Mr. Smith's agreement, to prepare a statement setting out our proposals for a settlement of the Rhodesian dispute.

"This statement took account so far as was possible of points made in the discussions. I made clear to Mr. Smith that, while there could be no change in the British Government's attitude on the fundamental issues, on other matters there could be further discussion; and that of course we should be ready to consider alternative drafts on these non-fundamental matters.

"The Government have set out in a White Paper the text of the British statement and the text of the communiqué which was issued in agreement between the two sides. The White Paper also includes yet again the text of the Six Principles, since we have made it clear before, throughout and since the discussions that there could be no agreement except on the basis of those Principles.

"The proposals which I gave to Mr. Smith on October 13 incorporate the changes to the 1961 Constitution which were worked out on board H.M.S. "Tiger". In certain cases these changes have been set out with greater precision, particularly as regards the powers of the Senate and the circumstances in which appeals would lie to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council—the instrument which, in our view, is the best fitted to provide the reinforcement required to guarantee the fulfilment of the second Principle. While no doubt alternative instruments to this end could he proposed and considered, I am sure honourable Members would agree that the Judicial Committee would provide the most effective guarantee.

"The changes suggested in the 1961 Constitution were, and are, designed to meet the first, second, third and sixth Principles. The statement makes clear that, provided that there is at all times a 'blocking quarter' of directly and properly elected Africans as a safeguard against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution, the British Government do not insist on any particular composition of the legislature.

"The statement further sets out the basis on which the Government would be prepared to accept, as part of an otherwise satisfactory settlement, new procedures to deal with the problem of the return to legality.

"Finally, I would draw attention to three further important features of our proposals. First, and this reinforces the "Tiger" proposals relating to the fourth Principle, is our insistence on the importance of a vigorous and extended programme for African education, particularly in technical education, including agriculture. We have said that we would be prepared to contribute to this programme a sum of up to £50 million spread over ten years on a pound-for-pound basis. We regard this as imperative in the interests of the African population and of Rhodesia; it would also have an important bearing on the number of Africans able to qualify for the A Roll franchise. Secondly, arising out of our discussions, we have included the proposal that the Royal Commission to be appointed for testing the acceptability of any settlement to the Rhodesian people as a whole should be instructed also to inquire into the arrangements for the registration of eligible voters under the widely extended franchise which is proposed, with a view to encouraging greater African participation in Rhodesian political life. Thirdly, the House will note what has been said about the need for a broadbased Government, including Africans, to carry Rhodesia through the whole process of introducing the new Constitution, right up to the election of a new Parliament under that Constitution.

"The House will recognise the relevance of these three proposals, as well as certain other events, to the creation of the 'substantial change of circumstances' which repeatedly I have said in this House must exist to justify our raising with our Commonwealth partners the question of 'no independence before majority rule'.

"And the House will recognise too that we will not agree to the implementation of any settlement that has not first been shown to be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole—the fifth Principle, on which all else depends.

"As was stated in the communiqué, Mr. Smith said that he would take the British Government's proposals back to Salisbury, without commitment, for consideration with his colleagues there. I said that the Commonwealth Secretary will be available to fly out to Salisbury if Mr. Smith and his colleagues feel that this would assist them in their consideration of the British proposals. Our position at the end of the talks, as throughout these past years, maintains the position repeatedly stated by the Commonwealth Secretary—no sell out, no slamming the door by us.

"We have insisted that our proposals have to be taken as a whole. Any concessions we have been prepared to offer on matters which do not involve the safeguards required for the Six Principles are available only as part of an agreement which incorporates the clear guarantees on which we have insisted to safeguard those Principles. Now decisions have to be taken in Salisbury. We for our part are keeping the door open. But the key to a settlement is and must remain the Six Principles, which are cardinal to the future of Rhodesia—the future of Rhodesians of all races, for whom the British Parliament stands trustee."

EARL JELLICOE

My Lords, I should like to express my thanks to the noble Lord for repeating this important Statement to your Lordships this afternoon. In view of the length of the Statement, and the fact that it is accompanied by a White Paper, I shall refrain from commenting on the substance of the Statement which the noble Lord has just read, since I am sure that many of your Lordships will wish to read it with care, and indeed to read the accompanying White Paper, before entering into a discussion on what is in both. I hope I am right in assuming that there will be an early opportunity for this House to discuss both the Statement and the White Paper.

It is, of course, a matter of deep regret to us on this side of the House that the settlement through negotiation for which we have always pressed still eludes us. Nevertheless, I feel that we can at least derive some gratification, albeit of a modest kind, that on this occasion the talks have been suspended (if "suspension" is the right term to use) in a civilised and adult fashion, and not in an atmosphere of sterile recrimination.

LORD BYERS

My Lords, I also should like to thank the noble Lord the Leader of the House for repeating this Statement, and to say that we share the deep and widespread disappointment that these talks should have been inconclusive at this stage. Like the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe. I do not wish to comment in detail on this, but may I ask the noble Lord the Leader of the House whether an early opportunity can be given for a debate on this subject, and whether he will consider what form that debate could take?

LORD SHACKLETON

My Lords, if I may answer the two noble Lords, I am much obliged to them for their attitude. Obviously there is disappointment, and I think that probably the place where there is the greatest disappointment is Salisbury and Southern Rhodesia. Those of us who have contacts there know how much many people are hoping for a settlement; and therefore I agree with the noble Lords that it is a comfort that at least, as my right honourable friend's Statement makes clear, the door is still open. I think it would be wise for noble Lords to study the White Paper, which is now available, and I agree that this is a matter which we should have an early opportunity to debate. I think this is a matter which we might discuss through the usual channels in the hopes of having a debate, if not this week at least before the end of this Session—perhaps next week.

LORD SALTER

My Lords, in order to suggest a general background against which to consider the particular problem which has just been explained to us, may I ask the noble Lord whether he would agree that the combination of universal suffrage and majority rule, which we are attempting to impose upon Rhodesia, with such immense loss and damage both to us and to them, had no place in our own country until about fifty years ago? It had no place at all throughout all the previous centuries of our not ignominious history.

LORD SHACKLETON

My Lords, I think the noble Lord would do well to read the White Paper. He is taking far too simpliste a view of the situation.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

My Lords, all I would say, as one who has taken special interest in the subject of Rhodesia, is how disappointed I am, like the noble Lord the Leader of the House. that there has been no settlement; how glad I am to hear that the door is not yet completely closed; and how greatly I hope that we can have an early debate.

LORD SHACKLETON

I am much obliged to the noble Marquess.