Lords Sitting of 15 October 1968

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR On the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Southwark

REDEVELOPMENT OF QUEEN ANNE'S MANSIONS
2.35 p.m.
LORD AMULREE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether the proposal to replace Queen Anne's Mansions with 300.000 square feet of office accommodation designed by Sir Basil Spence is in line with their policy on the control of office development in Central London.]
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF PUBLIC BUILDING AND WORKS (LORD WINTERBOTTOM): My Lords, although the Government keep a tight control over new office development in Central London, it is not their policy to prevent the modernisation of out-dated offices. The Queen Anne's Mansions building is nearly eighty years old, has been in use as Government offices for almost thirty years, and does not conform with present day standards of office accommodation. The Government therefore took the view that approval should be given for the redevelopment of this prominent London site, on condition that the offices would be used only by an organisation which had to be in Central London. In view of the proximity of the site to Whitehall, it has been taken for use by a block of Government staff whose work requires them to be in the central area.
LORD AMULREE: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for that reply, but I would ask him one supplementary question; namely, whether he does not think that a site like that in Central London, which is very near to shops and public transport, is fairly quiet and has a public park round the corner, would be more
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suitable for residential accommodation than office accommodation?
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, I think that everybody sympathises with the noble Lord's point of view, but unfortunately civil servants have to be housed. They should be housed in decent accommodation, and the present accommodation is entirely unsuitable.
LORD AMULREE: My Lords, does the noble Lord mean by that statement that this office building is going to lead to more civil servants? I was under the impression that the number of civil servants was coming down, not increasing.
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, over 14,000 civil servants have been moved from the London area by this Government. Nevertheless, those who remain in London have to be house d in reasonably efficient accommodation, and since this office block is converted flats it is extremely wasteful of space.
LORD MOLSON: My Lords, will the effect of the reconstruction of the site mean that there will be a larger number of occupants of the site? And has full account been taken of the undesirability, from the traffic point of view, of adding to the number of occupants of that site?
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, in spite of the very large superficial area of this former block of flats, the number of people using it at the moment is approximately 1,800, which is a very small number for a surface area of this size. That is why I said that the office accommodation was inefficient. But if additional efficient use of space is achieved and a larger number of civil servants is housed on this particular site, then other sites throughout the centre of London will be freed for other purposes.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, can the noble Lord say what will be the increased number of offices consequent upon this redevelopment?
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, I am afraid that I cannot. If the noble and learned Viscount will put down another Question, I will give him an Answer.
LORD BYERS: My Lords, is it not quite wrong that there should be this increased concentration in the centre

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of London? Is it not worth while to reconsider this whole policy?
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, the policy of Her Majesty's Government is well known. We are moving large numbers of civil servants out of the London area, but obviously some must remain.
LORD STRATHCLYDE: My Lords, would the noble Lord say how many bodies will be housed in this new building?
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, again, if a Question is put down, I will answer it.
LORD AMULREE: My Lords, some people have to work in Government or Parliament. Would it not be possible in some future reconstruction to have flats to accommodate Members of Parliament? It would be a convenient place for them to live. Would it not be a better solution to accommodate Members of Parliament, who would not have to live so far away?

POST OFFICE LETTER SERVICE
2.40 p.m.
LORD SALTOUN: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether the report in The Times of September 20 at the foot of page 4 headed "Overnight guard on 4d. mail" is correct or, if not, how nearly correct; and whether the Postmaster General's statements that 5d. mail merely received priority are compatible with this reported expense undertaken to ensure that 4d. mail is deliberately prejudiced; and, whether the dissemination of the opinion that 4d. mail is unimportant among Post Office staff by the Postmaster General is not bound to diminish the confidence which the Post Office has hitherto commanded from the public; and whether, therefore, the time has now come to terminate the monopoly of letter-carrying enjoyed by the Post Office and to allow the public to seek other means of transport if they prefer.]
LORD BOWLES: My Lords, the report referred to a local mistake which was quickly put right. Some anomalies were inevitable at the start of the new letter service. Post Office staff are well aware that postal packets entrusted to them must not be wilfully detained or delayed contrary to their duty, and there is no reason for any loss of public confidence in the service. To the Post Office all letters are important, but under the new scheme some are treated more urgently than others, according to the customer's choice.
The Post Office has a statutory duty to provide a nation-wide letter service. It would not therefore be reasonable to allow letters to be collected, conveyed and delivered by carriers who would seek out the most profitable traffic, leaving the Post Office to carry unprofitable letters over long distances and to remote places.
LORD SALTOUN: My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Lord for that answer, the last part of which gives rise to another question which I should like to ask. Would Her Majesty's Government agree that the property in a letter belongs to the person to whom it is addressed, and that the Postmaster General undertakes only to transmit and deliver it? While he has an undoubted right to invent a more rapid way of sorting and delivering, and charging a higher rate for it, this does not give him any right at all to withhold from their owners, in order to exert pressure on the public to adopt the higher price rate, letters which could in the normal course be delivered.
LORD BOWLES: My Lords, unfortunately, the noble Lord has got it wrong, and from some of the laughter that I heard from noble Lords opposite I feel that they have it wrong, too. The position is that there are 35 to 36 million letters posted every day. A postage rise from 4d. to 5d. was going to take place anyway. What my right honourable friend did was to offer to those members of the public who felt that they had a special desire to get their letters through by the next day the choice of paying this extra charge.
LORD SALTOUN: My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Lord for that answer, but it does not really quite cover the point. Postmen themselves are of opinion, and are telling their customers,

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that 4d. letters are being delayed and will be delivered by the next post—
THE PAYMASTER GENERAL (LORD SHACKLETON): Question!
LORD SALTOUN: —and they are coming round with empty bags. The Post Office staff at least should be informed.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I wonder whether the noble Lord would allow me to intervene.
LORD SALTOUN: My Lords, will the noble Lord allow me to put my hearing aid on?
LORD SHACKLETON: It would be helpful, because we should like to hear a question from the noble Lord, and if he could frame his remarks, which are going rather wide, in the form of a question it would be more in order.
LORD BLYTON: My Lords, does my noble friend think that, if an increase in price was justified, it should have been made all round, without this discrimination? And does he not think this present scheme is barmy?
LORD BOWLES: My Lords, that question is another indication of a considerable amount of misunderstanding. I said a moment ago that discrimination between the two classes of mail, first-class and second-class, derives from the fact that the Post Office could not possibly deal with 36 million letters a day. Therefore the public was given an option. If the charges had all gone up to 5d. the same problem would have remained. My noble friend has not therefore thought about that. May I make clear to noble Lords that the amount of mail posted every year is going to go up by 2 per cent. and it will double in 25 years. These facts must be known to be understood. Ninety-four per cent. of first-class mail is delivered the next day; 93 per cent. of the second-class mail is delivered the day after that, called day "C".
BARONESS HORSBRUGH: My Lords, could the noble Lord say what percentage is delivered four or five days later?
LORD BOWLES: Yes, my Lords, I can. About 6 per cent. And if one considers, again, the amount of postings, I do not think that 6 per cent. is really very many in 36 million. I should also like to point out that there is a certain element of
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human mistake which takes place, naturally. Oh, yes. Noble Lords opposite seem to be infallible! The trains are sometimes late and it is possible for a mail train to miss a connection, and by that means also all the letters in that train would be delayed. That is the kind of thing that happens. Human error is involved in what is taking place. The scheme is new. It has not yet been in force a month. It is a complete change in what the postmen are used to doing. Instead of sorting everything, they now have to discriminate between two classes of mail. I think it is worth bearing in mind, in view of the atmosphere about this matter—some noble Lords rend The Times—that the last letter in The Times to-day is from a Mr. Boston, who says:
"My first-class mail is reaching me promptly and my second-class mail is not unduly delayed. My telephone service is efficient and courteous.
"What am I doing wrong?"
LORD SALTOUN: My Lords, the only reason why I intervene again is that I asked a question and it was not answered. I asked whether Her Majesty's Government would take steps to see that the postmen and the Post Office staff were informed of the answer which the noble Lord had given me because they are under the impression that the 4d. mail is to be delayed, and they say so to their customers. That was the question which the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, wished me to put in the interrogatory form. I had really done so. Perhaps my vice is rather bad.
LORD BOWLES: My Lords, it may be that one or two postmen are a bit disgruntled, but I think the relationship between the Post Office and the Postal Union is very good indeed. There may be one or two people who do not like any change at all, but I do assure the noble Lord that less than a month has gone by since the scheme started; it is getting better every day, and my right honourable friend the Postmaster General is completely confident that very soon none of these questions will be relevant to be raised in this House.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords may I ask the noble Lord whether he is aware that he said the Post Office could not deal with 36 million letters a day, and that that number was going to increase by 2 million a year—
LORD BOWLES: Two per cent.
LORD DRUMALBYN: —two per cent. a year. Can he tell the House whether it is easier to deal with that amount of letters as one lot, or to add in an additional operation of sorting it into first-class and second-class mail? Does that not entail additional work for the Post Office? Would it not be better to have it as it was before?
LORD BOWLES: My Lords, if I understand the noble Lord's question properly, the first-class mail has to go off with priority. Some second-class mail in fact does get in with it if the first-class mail bags are not quite full, and if the postmen's vans and the postmen's bags are not quite full. Mail with a 4d. stamp, although second-class, can go with the first-class and be delivered the next day. However, there are certain periods in the sorting office, as the noble Lord may know, when there is a slack time, and that is the time when the sorting of the second-class mail takes place. When 5 and 6 o'clock comes along, there is a tremendous load on the Post Office in the sorting offices, the clearing offices and soon. Then the first-class mail is distinguished from the second-class. It goes off that very night, and the second-class, which is delayed a bit, will go with the 11 o'clock or the day after.
LORD SALTOUN: My Lords, has not the noble Lord in that answer gone right back on what he said and the purport of my Question. I asked him—and I think he agreed—whether the Postmaster General had no right artificially to delay any letters that are submitted to him. On what the noble Lord says, as I understand him, in a small place which has only two posts a day 4d. letters are withheld until the next post, and that is deliberately and artificially delaying.
LORD BOWLES: My Lords, I am sorry but the noble Lord has admitted that he might be a little deaf on occasions. I did not say anything of that kind. I said that first-class mail was given priority. It was said it would get priority because people put a 5d. stamp on it. Priority is given to the first-class mail, but that does not at all mean the same thing as delay of the second-class mail. Priority is one thing; holding back is quite an active thing, and it is not true about the Post Office.
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, could not all this fuss and bother have been avoided if only the Government had been a little more frank with us in the first place?
LORD BOWLES: My Lords, my right honourable friend the Postmaster General, I think in a speech last night, said that some of the earlier advertising had been disastrous—I think that is the right word. It is in the newspapers this morning, so I think I am entitled to quote him here.
LORD SALTOUN: My Lords, may I ask one more question? If the Government are serious in their demand for more productivity, how does it help productivity if every business firm in the country is getting its important letters by the second post in the day instead of by the first post?
LORD BOWLES: My Lords, that is particularly untrue, and I imagine that the noble Lord has been taken in by a letter in The Times this morning in which a man says that his export business is being affected because every letter takes two days to reach him. It is a most misleading letter and it is not substantiated by any evidence or facts at all. That may have misled the noble Lord. The fact is that 94 per cent. of the first-class mail is being delivered by the first post the next day.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, would not the noble Lord consider it desirable that the Government should provide an opportunity for explaining all this in the course of a debate? Then the noble Lord would have an opportunity of answering the question put by my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn, which so far he has not answered.
LORD BOWLES: My Lords, I find making speeches in your Lordships' House much easier than answering a lot of questions coming from all over the House. My right honourable friend has an Adjournment debate in another place on Thursday night and perhaps he will be able to clarify the position. I think the House ought to know one other thing about the 5d. letters. In this country a 4 oz. letter costs 5d., in Italy 2s. 8d.. in Belgium Is., in Australia 7d. and in the U.S.A. 2s. The mail in most other countries is from 100 per cent. to

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600 per cent. more expensive than our mail in this country.
LORD BYERS: My Lords, before the debate concludes, is the noble Lord saying that the Post Office does not hold its mail back; it simply does not send it on?
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I think we have had 12 supplementary questions and I am not sure whether we are going much farther or faster. Perhaps this would be a suitable subject for an Unstarred Question at some future occasion.
LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord just to confirm one figure? I think he said that 6 per cent. of all letters are delivered four or five days later—is that correct?
LORD BOWLES: No, my Lords. The noble Baroness, Lady Horsbrugh, asked me whether I had a percentage figure of the letters that were delivered within the three days; I think she mentioned 5 or 6, but my figure was over 93 per cent.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, I should like to ask for elucidation of one passage in the noble Lord's Answer. I think he said that 94 per cent. of the first-class mail got there the next day; is not that precisely the same proportion as got there before all this started?
LORD BOWLES: My Lords, the amount of mail is going up rapidly and therefore something has to be done to see that some of it can go the next day and that not all has to wait the two days.

METEOROLOGICAL OFFICE AND SEPTEMBER STORMS
LORD FERRIER: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they are satisfied that the Meteorological Office were unable to foretell the torrential nature of the
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rain of the 15th/16th September in time for a useful warning to be given to the public in the areas concerned.]
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, the onset and persistence of prolonged rains and thunderstorms were we I forecast, although in the present stage of development of meteorology it is not possible to forecast rainfall amounts and intensities in precise terms. At 12.55 p.m. on September 14 heavy and prolonged rain for Southern England was forecast to continue into September 15. Subsequent forecasts on September 14 and 15 for 12 to 24 hours ahead also warned of heavy rain in the affected areas. The numerous regular broadcasts were supplemented by special "flash" warnings of heavy rain on September 15 and 15. Advance warnings were issued from September 14 to 16 to those river authorities and other bodies in the areas conerned which subscribe to the Meteorological Office rainfall warning service.
LORD FERRIER: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for that detailed Answer and I have the temerity to ask a couple of supplementary questions. First, I think there are some 27 river authorities could he say how many of them take advantage of the facilities which are offered? Secondly, as one who feel; that warning of the imminence of exceptional conditions may be more important to people than the inevitably problematical long-range forecasts, would the Minister contemplate encouraging the Metrological Office to concentrate on such short-term forecasting, even at the experse of long-range forecasts?
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, in answer to the noble Lord's first supplementary question may I say that the number of river authorities is in fact 29, of which only 16 subscribe to the Meteorological Office warning service. As to the second supplementary question, I do not think the two types of forecasting are in conflict with one another. I do not believe the attempt to forecast in the longer term is in any way handicapping the short-term forecasting which the noble Lord would like to see improved.

FIJIAN RESIDENCE LAW
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper:
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will use their influence to amend the law in Fiji which does not allow a Fijian woman to reside in the colony with her husband if he was not a resident in Fiji previous to marriage.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS (LORD SHEPHERD): My Lords, this is a matter for the judgment of the Government of Fiji, who have considered it carefully in the light of local circumstances. Unrestricted residence of non-Fiji husbands, who would normally be the family breadwinners, would add to the number of persons seeking employment in Fiji. The Fiji Government are concerned about the lack of employment opportunities available in the country. Individual cases of hardship are considered when the circumstances are made known.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, while thanking my noble friend for that Answer, may I ask whether it is not the case that Fiji is not yet an independent country and therefore Her Majesty's Government have a certain amount of responsibility? Is it not the case that a woman in Fiji who marries a husband from abroad is not allowed to live with him in Fiji, while a man who marries a woman from abroad is allowed to live with his wife? Is not this a disgraceful example of sex discrimination?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, the noble Lord is right in saying that Fiji is not yet independent and Her Majesty's Government have a responsibility there. On the other hand, Fiji has an advanced state of internal government and therefore in matters like this we must take note of the views of that Government. I would not myself have said that this is sex discrimination. It is not dissimilar to the situation which exists in this country, where an English woman who marries an alien does not necessarily give to the alien husband an undoubted right of entry into this country to take up employment.

ENGINEERING INDUSTRY DISPUTE
2.58 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I beg leave to ask a Question of which I have given Private Notice and which, with your Lordships' permission, I would ask leave to substitute for the Unstarred Question standing in my name. The question is:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether there is any progress to report in the negotiations on the pay claim in the engineering industry.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, may I first thank the noble Lord opposite for his understanding about the Unstarred Question? I shall be replying to this Private Notice Question at a convenient moment after 3.30 p.m., when a similar Question is being answered in another place. After that my noble friend the Leader of the House will be making a Statement on Rhodesia.
It may be for the convenience of your Lordships if I say now that dinner will be available to-night from 7 to 8.30 p.m.

RACE RELATIONS BILL
3.0 p.m.
BARONESS SEROTA: My Lords, I beg to move that this Report be now received.
Moved, That the Report be now received.—(Baroness Serota.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
Clause 1 [Meaning of "Discriminate"]:
LORD DRUMALBYN LORD DRUMALBYN moved Amendment No. 1:
Page 1, line 12, leave out from ("persons") to end of line 14.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, it may seem a bit odd that at this late stage in the Bill I am moving an Amendment to the governing clause of the whole Bill. Quite simply, the reason is that it has emerged that the Government intend it to mean something quite different from anything I understood and anything understood by those with whom I have discussed it, including, I may say, solicitors and barristers; it does not coincide

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with what they thought it meant. Perhaps I should read Clause 1. It says:
"For the purposes of this Act a person discriminates against another if on the ground of colour, race or ethnic or national origins he treats that other, in any situation to which section 2, 3, 4 or 5 below applies, less favourably than he treats or would treat other persons …"
and it goes on with the words I propose Ito leave out?—
"… and in this Act references to discrimination are references to discrimination on any of those grounds."
On Second Reading the noble Lord, Lord Stonham (whom we are sorry not to have with us to-day and to whom we wish a speedy recovery), said this:
"For purposes of greater clarity, we have accepted proposals that the Bill should define discrimination more closely than the 1965 Act, and Clause 1 makes clear that to discriminate means to treat someone less favourably than other people because of his colour, race, ethnic or national origin. The Government have also decided that this Bill must extend to a much wider range of public places than is covered by the present Act, and also to the provision of insurance and credit facilities, to employment and to housing."—[0FFICIAL REPORT, 15/7/68; col. 33.]
For my part when the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, spoke of extending the Bill to a much wider range of public places and to insurance, credit facilities, employment and housing, I thought he was indicating the limits to which the Bill extended the definition in the 1965 Act. From a letter he was good enough to write me it is plain this is not so. In case I get his meaning wrong I venture to quote what he said in his letter:
"Clause 1(1) of the Bill contains two definitions. The expression ' discrimination ' in Clause 6 is governed not by the first part of Clause 1(1), which refers to discriminating against another (person)', but by the second part which says that references in the Act to discrimination are references to discrimination on any of the defined grounds, that is to say, on grounds of colour, race, ethnic or national origins. This is done quite deliberately and it is by reference to this definition that Clause 6 prohibits discriminatory advertisements whether or not the act to which they refer would itself be unlawful under the Bill and whether or not they relate to discrimination against a particular person."
It seems, therefore, that we have thus the astonishing position that there are two different definitions of discrimination given in this clause, one a definition of the word as a verb and the other a definition of the word as a noun. Any person who discriminates obviously does an act
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of discrimination. The only difference lies in the omission of the words against another "in the second definition. I can quite see that it is undesirable to permit an act of discrimination against a whole group of people as it is to permit one against an individual. But I car not see how at the end of the day any act of discrimination or intention to do such an act can be other than an act of discrimination against a person, especially as I understand that as a matter interpretation the singular includes the plural. If discriminating is not to mean discriminating against a person or persons, I hope that the Government can explain what it does mean in the words I propose should be left out. So far as I can see, the phrase "act of discrimination" by itself, without the words "against any person," occurs once in the Bill and that is in Clause 6, which deals with advertisements and notices. Clause 6(1) says:
"It shall be unlawful for any person to publish or display, or to cause to le published or displayed, any advertisement o' notice which indicates, or which could reasonably be understood as indicating, an intention to do an act of discrimination whether or not it would be unlawful by virtue of any other provision of this Act."
So far as I can see, this phrase "act of discrimination" by itself, without the addition of the words "against any person," occurs only in this one case. I should like to know from the Government what kind of act is there contemplated which would not be an et of discrimination against a person. If there are no such acts contemplated, w rat is the purpose of the second definition in Clause 1, if it can be called a definition? Is it the intention of the Government that the Race Relations Board should have power to proceed on a voluntary basis on any complaint that an act of discrimination has been done which is not an act of discrimination against another person and which is not an act which unlawful under any provision of the Bill, other perhaps than Clause 6? If it is, why should advertisements not be dealt with in the same way without legal sanctions except where the act referred to in the advertisement is itself unlawful? Either, it seems to me, you leave a whole sector of discrimination to conciliation and to the voluntary side and then define in Clauses 2, 3, 4 and 5 which is the side to be covered by the civil proceedings

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if necessary (and in that case advertisements should be included in the voluntary side), or else you have to define very carefully what you mean by discrimination in the second part of the definition.
The noble Lord, Lord Stonham, in his letter to me gave examples of what he regarded as discriminatory advertisements relating to a matter outside the scope of the Bill, and he gave as examples an advertisement seeking members for a private club or inviting people to join a holiday party. Surely both of those would involve an act of discrimination against a person, for by indicating an intention to restrict participation to persons with particular qualification the advertisement would be discriminating against a person who did not have those qualifications. Perhaps 1 may give a simple example. Supposing, for example, the London Irish Rugby Football Club intended to recruit more members, it would be an act of discrimination if it published an advertisement excluding those who were not Irish and perhaps also those who did not play Rugby football; but at any rate the first would appear to be an offence against the Bill.
I think this is an important point. I cannot conceive of any act of discrimination within the meaning of the Bill which is not an act of discrimination against a person, and that being so, it seems to me that those words are totally unnecessary and indeed confusing. To the extent that the words widen the definition of discriminating against another, I suggest they are wholly undesirable as they would cast doubt on the scope of the Bill without giving any indication of what discrimination in the wider sense is intended to mean. I hope I have said enough to make it clear that I am not in any way trying to restrict the scope of the Bill in this Amendment, but that I am trying to make it more effective. I think these particular words will cause an awful lot of trouble if they are left in the Bill. I beg to move.
BARONESS SEROTA: My Lords, I would remind the House that this clause states in general terms what in the Bill is meant by "discrimination ", and limits it to discrimination on grounds "of colour, race, or ethnic or national origins ". These were the words which were used in the 1965 Act, which in this
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respect was in accordance with the then draft United Nations Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination. While one fully recognises the precision of this formula, particularly the words "ethnic or national origins "—this was certainly recognised during the preparation of the 1965 Bill—in fact we have found that nothing better has been devised in the meantime, and it has proved workable since that Act was passed. The words which the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, wishes to leave out are essential in this Bill, and perhaps in the light of my reply the noble Lord will not insist on or attempt to press his Amendment. I would urge the House to ensure that these words "discriminate "and "discrimination "remain throughout the Bill, because they mean discrimination on the grounds specified in the first part of Clause 1(1).
The noble Lord referred to the relationship of these words to Clause 6—the advertising clause, if I may use that form of shorthand. There are further Amendments which the House will be discussing at a slightly later stage. It is difficult not to overlap with that discussion, but these words "discriminate "and "discrimination "are required to exclude a possible construction of the words as including discrimination on the grounds of religion, politics or perhaps even sex. This is particularly necessary in relation to Clause 6, which seeks only to prohibit advertisements which discriminate on one of the specified grounds. They are also needed, as I believe the noble Lord is fully aware, for other provisions, including those in Clause 16.
It really is essential to keep in the Bill as at present drafted the words which the noble Lord's Amendment proposes to delete, in order to protect the provisions of Clause 6, if I may put it in this way and without trespassing on the Amendments which we are shortly to discuss, when perhaps we can go into this point a little more fully. I would assure Lord Drumalbyn that there are not two different definitions of "discriminate ". The first part of Clause 1 defines discrimination against another, a phrase which occurs again in Clauses 2 to 5. The second part, as I have already explained, defines "discrimination "which occurs not only in Clause 6 but also in Clauses 15 and 16 and certain of the Schedules.

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It is only in Clause 6 that the illegality of a transaction is affected by the definition. It may be that this was the particular point which the noble Lord wished to get clear, and this was the purpose of his Amendment. The other provisions are purely procedural.
I hope that this explanation on an extraordinarily difficult and, to some of us, delicate matter has satisfied the noble Lord. We are most anxious, particularly at this late stage, after all the consideration of the Bill both in another place and in your Lordships' House over many long hours through its various stages, that the clause should stand as it is for the reasons that I have given. We will discuss its relevance to Clause 6 when we come to the Amendments that have been tabled on that particular clause.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Baroness for her courteous reply, but I am bound to say that I do not feel wholly satisfied with it. We shall indeed come on to discuss it further on Clause 6, and it may be that then she will be able to reply to the point that I made about the difference between these two definitions. One is discrimination against another; the other is discrimination quite shortly. There must be a purpose in this and I should like to know what that purpose is. As I pointed out, in the reply that I received from the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, he laid emphasis on this difference. I cannot see how you can discriminate except by discriminating against a person. I hope that the noble Baroness will be able to reply to that.
I realise that the stage is late, but it would be a great mistake if we were to allow the governing clause to pass—presumably we shall have another opportunity to deal with this point—unless we were quite sure that there was a good or adequate reason for the differences in the form of definition. It is most important. But if we are going to be able to come back to this question when we come to Clause 6, perhaps we can leave it at that for the moment. In those circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 3 [Employment]:
3.17 p.m.
EARL JELLICOE EARL JELLICOE moved Amendment No. 2:
Page 2, line 20, leave out ("qualified") and insert ("fit ")
The noble Earl said: My Lords there are two notable absentees from our discussion this afternoon. The first, is my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn, mentioned is the noble Lord, Lord Stonham. Like my noble friend I should like to say how sorry I am that he is unwell, and also to echo his expression of hope that the noble Lord will soon be restored to us in full health. The second absentee is my noble friend Lord Brooke of Cumnor. I am therefore moving this Amendment on his behalf. He is taking part in a Commonwealth Parliamentary Delegation in Australia.
We had quite a long discussion of this part of the Bill on Committee stage when my noble friend Lord Ilford moved an Amendment suggesting that the words "and suitable "should be added after "qualify "in line 20 on page 2; and it was pointed out at that stage of out discussion that the adjective "qualified" may be ambiguous. As my noble friend pointed out, a teacher, for example, may be quite unsuitable for a particular post although he or she may have all the professional qualifications which that post may demand. He went on to say that the wording of the Bill, as it stood then on Committee stage and as it stands now was causing considerable disquiet to two major educational authorities, the Inner London Education Authority and the Greater London Council.
I think it was clear from our discussion last time that a number of other roble Lords were worried about the possible double entendre in the word "qualified ". Some supported the addition of the two words suggested by my noble friend. Some thought that the whole of the latter part of this clause,
"and for which he is qualified."
were better omitted; and the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, from behind the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, felt that the word "qualified" should be spelt out in some definition clause to make it clear that it included the meaning of "suitable' as well as having the right professional qualifications. The noble Lord, Lord Stonham, while not happy about my noble

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friend's Amendment said, I think, that he was most willing to have a look at this matter and added that he would try to come up with a solution that would satisfy everyone. So far as I know, neither the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor nor the noble Baroness have come up with a solution, and, that being so, I hope that I am not being overoptimistic in assuming that they agree that we should substitute the word "fit ", which it seems to me includes the meaning "suitable ", for the word "qualified ", which does have this possible ambiguous interpretation. I therefore beg to move.
BARONESS SEROTA: My Lords, the noble Earl has reminded us of the discussion on this clause at Committee stage on the Amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Ilford, and the concern that was expressed at that time about this particular wording. Since that time my noble friend Lord Stonham (perhaps no one to-day regrets his absence more than I do, and the House will be glad to hear that he is making very good progress) has given an undertaking that he would give very serious thought to various points that have been raised with a view to meeting them, if possible. Nevertheless, I am afraid that I am going to disappoint the noble Earl in replying to the Amendment which stands in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Cumnor, and which the noble Earl has just moved in an attempt to solve this particular problem.
The House will remember the reasons that my noble friend Lord Stonham gave during the Committee stage why the words "and suitable "were unacceptable. He expressed the view that the decision as to which of several qualified people to engage for a job will involve for an employing authority a number of subjective opinions as to their "suitability ". He further expressed the view that under this clause the employers will still be able to make their judgment, provided that they do not base it on race or colour, but he also took the view, with which I think the House broadly agreed, that the word "suitable "would open up a loophole in the Act and could permit unscrupulous employers to reject qualified applicants on value and subjective criteria as to "suitability ". Therefore, after further consideration my noble
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friend felt that the word "suitable "was not acceptable.
During the Committee stage a further suggestion was made, namely, to leave out the reference entirely to "qualified ": and this indeed had a certain attraction for some who participated in the Committee stage because it is true that a refusal to employ a person because he is not "qualified "has nothing to do. as such, with racial discrimination. But, again, after full consideration of this particular proposal my noble friend, and indeed Her Majesty's Government, felt that it would be far preferable to retain the reference to being qualified to make it quite clear on the face of the Bill that Clause 3 does not apply to unqualified applicants for employment, and that there can be no question that an aggrieved applicant in such a case feels that the real reason for rejecting him was his colour.
The purpose of this new Amendment which the House is considering to-day is, as the noble Earl has told us, to replace the word "qualified "with "fit ". In the view of my noble friend and the Government the word "qualified "as at present in the Bill means both qualified and suitable, in the non-technical sense, and therefore imports a requirement that an applicant must be competent and fit. which is saying all that is necessary and desirable in this context.
Certain fears were expressed during the Committee stage about the difficulties of this particular definition, but I would remind the House that under the present wording of the Bill it would not be unlawful, for example, for a local authority to reject an immigrant teacher who is a qualified teacher (I think this was the burden of the representations made by the Inner London Education Authority); that it will be able to reject a teacher who is a qualified teacher but is unemployable as such because, for example, of language difficulties. In our view, the use of the word "fit "in the place of the word "qualified" would not have this particular advantage.
I would conclude by assuring the House that in my own personal experience in London relating to the employment of teachers in London schools I myself see no difficulty whatsoever in the wording of the Bill as it already stands, covering both technical qualifications and also

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qualifications as to suitability, language ability, and general ability, if I could put it in this way, to control a class. I hope that, in those circumstances, the noble Earl will withdraw his Amendment, leaving the Bill as at present printed.
LORD HAWKE: My Lords, as the noble Baroness intends the Bill to be read, she is probably perfectly right. But how can she be sure that the courts are going to interpret the word "qualified" as meaning "qualified by technical degree" or something as well as "suitable"? And unless the courts are going to interpret it in that way we get back to the narrow meaning of "qualified", as qualified by some form of letters after the name, or examination, which is precisely what she wishes to avoid.
BARONESS SEROTA: My Lords, by leave of the House, may I suggest, with the greatest respect to the noble Lord, that it was this very point that was discussed at some length at the Committee stage. I remember my noble friend Lord Stonham referring to the single man who applied for a post which was advertised for a married teacher. Such a man would not be qualified. That was a particular illustration that my noble friend gave. An employing authority, in my experience, always interprets the word "qualified" to mean both "technically qualified" and also "suitable" or "fit" for the particular post for which the advertisement is phrased. I really cannot see the difficulty here. With all the skills of the Parliamentary draftsmen at our disposal we have been unable to find a better solution to this problem, and I would only remind the House that the basis of this Bill, the objective of this Bill, is voluntary conciliation backed by statutory limitation. It is in that context that I would ask the House to accept the drafting as it stands at present.
THE MARQUESS OF ABERDEEN AND TEMAIR: My Lords, would it not be complete to say "fit and qualified"?
BARONESS SEROTA: My Lords, if I may again trespass on the time of the House, this particular point, or something very similar to it, was discussed at Committee stage. The addition of the word "fit" to "qualified" could be open to some quite serious objections
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within the objectives of this particular Bill.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, with the leave of the House I should like to say just a word in reply to the noble Baroness, and I can perhaps relieve her of any momentary anxiety by saying straight away that I do not intend to pursue this matter to the bitter end. I should, however, like to put this point to her. She has explained the preference of both the Government and the Parliamentary draftsmen for the term "qualified"; she has not—at least I cannot recollect it—said what objection there was to the word "fit". I should have thought that, with all the resources of the Parliamentary draftsmen at her disposal, she might have been able to tell us that, because it still seems to me that "fit" would be a better word. The noble Baroness says that "qualified" means both qualified professionally and suitable. Surely, as my noble friend Lord Hawke has said, there is still some ambiguity here and there might well be a difficulty of interpretation, whereas I should have thought that, without any shadow of doubt, a person could not be fit unless he was qualified, and "fit" ipso facto includes general suitability or particular suitability. I wonder whether the noble Baroness could explain. I understand her preference for "qualified". Apart from anything else, it happens to to in the Bill, and Parliamentary draftsmen always like to keep what is in the Bill. But can she explain why she dislikes the word "fit"?
BARONESS SEROTA: My Lords, this is in a sense a matter of opinion. The Government are acting on the best advice they can command. "Fit" could well be a subjective criterion, influenced by personal predilections—and possibly even by personal discrimination. It would not, in our view, be the appropriate word in this particular case. As I have tried to explain to the noble Earl, albeit inadequately—and I certainly appear not to have satisfied him so far—"qualified" covers both technically qualified in the sense of academic or practical qualifications, together with those qualities of personality and experience which have to go together with technical qualifications to make a person suitable for a particular job.
EARL JELLICOE: And which are therefore a matter of subjective judgment.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, I have listened carefully to the discussion and have tried to apply common sense to this matter. I agree that it is a difficult thing to decide what is the difference between "qualified" and "fit". I will give an example, which I hope the noble Baroness will not think frivolous. Suppose an advertisement referred to a person being required who was qualified to ride an animal, say a camel. If the person, through having ridden for some considerable time, had a temporary disability, with blisters on a part of his anatomy, he would not be "fit" to ride. Therefore this is a distinction between someone having full qualifications to do something and yet not being "fit" to carry it out.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I am sure it is the wish of your Lordships that we should not detain the House any longer on this matter. The noble Lady has disarmed me with the charm of her reply, if she has not convinced me with its intellectual validity. In expressing my deep dissatisfaction with the Government's obstinacy on this point, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

ENGINEERING INDUSTRY DISPUTE
3.33 p.m.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, with permission, I will answer the Private Notice Question which was put earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn. Representatives of the Engineering Employers' Federation and the full Executive of the Federation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions met under my right honourable friend's chairmanship last night. Detailed discussion then continued for four hours in a small joint working party under official chairmanship. This morning a further plenary meeting received a report on the working party's discussion, and the two sides then met separately at the Department to consider matters arising. My right honourable friend is chairing further discussions this afternoon. I am sure the noble Lord will appreciate that it would be inappropriate for me to say anything further at this stage.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I should like to start by thanking the noble Lord for the statement which he has made to the House. I am sure that he is aware of the very great importance which the country attaches to this matter. May I ask him this question? Whatever view we may take about who is to say what is in the national interest and what is not, would the Government agree that there are two things which are quite clearly in the national interest at the present? The first is that the threatened strike next Monday should be avoided; and the second is that in any settlement which provides for a substantial rise in wages there should at the same time be an arrangement for increased productivity. Is the noble Lord aware that this, as we all know, is in line with the Government's prices and incomes policy, and may I ask him what steps the Government are taking to make sure that this is brought about?
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, I agree with what the noble Lord said about the importance of the discussions which are at this very moment taking place. I agree with him that anything which sets back production and interferes with our export drive is to be avoided. He asked me about the prices and incomes policy and, of course, that is a matter which will be very much borne in mind by those who are taking part in the discussions which are now taking place under the chairmanship of my right honourable friend.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, may I thank the noble Lord for his reply?

RACE RELATIONS BILL
3.36 p.m.
Report stage resumed.
Clause 6 [Advertisements and notices]:
LORD DRUMALBYN LORD DRUMALBYN moved Amendment No. 3:
Page 3, line 34, at end insert ("but no proceedings shall be entertained under sections 19 and 20 of this Act in respect of any act of discrimination which is not unlawful by virtue of any other provision of this Act.")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, we now turn to a rather different matter. I ought to start by declaring a kind of interest, since I am chairman of the Advertising Standards Authority, in

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which capacity I naturally have had representations, and your Lordships may think that I have had some relevant experience in this matter.
The purpose of this Amendment quite clearly is to provide that civil prceedings cannot be brought in respect of acts of discrimination which are not unlawful under the other provisions of the Bill. I see the force of the argument that it is highly undesirable that there should appear in advertisements any indication of an intention to do an act of discrimination against any person or persons. I cannot conceive of any other kind of discrimination. But it seems to me wholly undesirable, if I may put it this way, that an act of discrimination should be made by this clause against advertisers. They are in a sense being segregated into a particular class and a particular class of offence is being introduced here.
In Clauses 2 to 5 one has set out the kinds of actions which are to be the subject of complaints, investigations and, if necessary, proceedings; that is to say, the provision of goods and facilities, questions of employment, questions of trade union, employers' and trade organisations, housing, accommodation, and business premises. I agree that it is undesirable that any kind of discrimination should be mentioned in advertising. With the experience I have, it seems to me that this is the kind of thing that can be dealt with very much better by voluntary methods than by civil proceedings and all the rest. I hope the Government will be able to accept this Amendment. Its effect is intended to be, and I hope will be, that the Race Relations Board would be able to proceed in any cases where there existed in advertising the expression of an intention to do an act of discrimination. In any such case the Board would be able to investigate and would be able to do exactly the sort of thing which is done under the voluntary system in the control of advertising.
I should have thought it was quite clear that those responsible for carrying advertisements—what are broadly called "the media"—would not willingly lend themselves to publishing intentions to do acts of discrimination, particularly if the Bill makes clear that it is unlawful for
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them to do so. I should have thought it would be quite enough for the Race Relations Board, in any case of in act which was not unlawful under the Bill, to intervene and point out that such-and-such an advertisement indicated an intention to do an act of discrimination. I am certain that the various media would then very willingly give an assurance that that kind of thing would not occur again and that that kind of advertisement would not be carried. That would be much more desirable than creating this wide and very indeterminate area of offences.
Some may think that, phrased in a certain way, there was an indication of an intention to do an act of discrimination, while others may not, and it would be a great pity if this kind of matter came before the courts. As I say, I have no reason to believe that the same results could not be achieved without the provision for civil proceedings. Therefore I hope that the Government will be able to accept this Amendment. I beg to move.

RHODESIA: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR. SMITH
3.42 p.m.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, with permission, I should now like to repeat a Statement which my right honourable friend the Prime Minister is making in another place on the talks about Rhodesia which were held on board H.M.S. "Fearless", in Gibraltar, from October 9 to 13. These an his words.
"First, I should like briefly to mention the events which led the Government to conclude that it would be right to have such a meeting.
"As my right honourable friend the Commonwealth Secretary and I myself have repeatedly made clear in the House, we were prepared at any time to engage in discussions if it seemed that there might be a chance of a settlement and provided it were understood that such a settlement must fully implement the requirements of the Six Principles which have been laid down.
"As the House knows, I have more than once before the Recess expressed the doubt whether, even if Mr. Smith's

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position changed sufficiently markedly to make talks worthwhile, there could be any guarantee that any agreement initialled by him would be endorsed by his colleagues. During the Recess there were changes in the membership of his regime, involving the disappearance of intransigent racialists, and we have also had evidence of the firmness with which he dealt with his Party Congress last month. Honourable Members will also have noted the regime's decision to introduce measures designed to end mandatory death sentences for certain offences.
"At the same time, reliable reports reached us that Mr. Smith would be prepared to enter into meaningful talks.
"Accordingly, an Assistant Under-Secretary of State in the Commonwealth Office was sent to Salisbury on 20th September. He had discussions first with His Excellency the Governor of Rhodesia and the Head of the British Residual Mission; and secondly under the ægis of the Governor, with Mr. Ian Smith. In addition he had discussions with other Rhodesians of different races, occupations and political views who asked to meet him.
"On his return to London he reported that he found a widespread feeling in Salisbury that the recent changes in the political climate there offered some prospect that a fresh attempt to achieve a settlement might be successful. At the same time, however, he reported that Mr. Smith had not given him any indication of a change of position on the fundamental issues which have over these past five years made agreement impossible. This was particularly the case in relation to certain non-negotiable requirements on which any British Government must insist as the condition of a settlement. Mr. Smith had expressed his readiness however for an early meeting.
"Further probings were conducted under the Governor's ægis by the Head of the British Residual Mission. We insisted that Mr. Smith should fully understand that, if talks were to be held, there could be no concessions by us which would undermine or weaken the Six Principles. We insisted also that Mr. Smith should confirm that he understood this. He did in fact give
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this confirmation, at the same time indicating that he in turn regarded certain matters as of fundamental importance to himself and to those he represented. Despite this re-affirmation of his own position on the Six Principles, it nevertheless seemed reasonable to assume that he would be unlikely, before coming to the conference table, to show his negotiating hand, and in particular to indicate any concessions he was ready to make.
"Accordingly we met at Gibraltar. On the British side I was accompanied by my right honourable friend the Commonwealth Secretary and my right honourable and learned friend the Attorney General. On the Rhodesian side were Mr. Ian Smith, Mr. Howman and Mr. Lardner Burke. The Governor of Rhodesia was present in Gibraltar for the duration of the talks.
"It would not be helpful to go over the hard-hitting exchanges in 30 hours of talks except to record that they confirmed that there was and remains a deep difference between the two sides, not only on the requirements for a settlement, but even more on the basic political philosophies which underlie the attitudes expressed. At the same time the talks were conducted in a good atmosphere, having regard to all the circumstances, and within the limitations created by the fundamental differences to which I have referred.
"By Saturday night, October 12, it was clear to both sides that it was unlikely that a settlement could be reached on board H.M.S. "Fearless" and that this would become no more likely if the discussions lasted several more days. I decided, with Mr. Smith's agreement, to prepare a statement setting out our proposals for a settlement of the Rhodesian dispute.
"This statement took account so far as was possible of points made in the discussions. I made clear to Mr. Smith that, while there could be no change in the British Government's attitude on the fundamental issues, on other matters there could be further discussion; and that of course we should be ready to consider alternative drafts on these non-fundamental matters.
"The Government have set out in a White Paper the text of the British

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statement and the text of the communiqué which was issued in agreement between the two sides. The White Paper also includes yet again the text of the Six Principles, since we have made it clear before, throughout and since the discussions that there could be no agreement except on the basis of those Principles.
"The proposals which I gave to Mr. Smith on October 13 incorporate the changes to the 1961 Constitution which were worked out on board H.M.S. "Tiger". In certain cases these changes have been set out with greater precision, particularly as regards the powers of the Senate and the circumstances in which appeals would lie to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council—the instrument which, in our view, is the best fitted to provide the reinforcement required to guarantee the fulfilment of the second Principle. While no doubt alternative instruments to this end could he proposed and considered, I am sure honourable Members would agree that the Judicial Committee would provide the most effective guarantee.
"The changes suggested in the 1961 Constitution were, and are, designed to meet the first, second, third and sixth Principles. The statement makes clear that, provided that there is at all times a 'blocking quarter' of directly and properly elected Africans as a safeguard against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution, the British Government do not insist on any particular composition of the legislature.
"The statement further sets out the basis on which the Government would be prepared to accept, as part of an otherwise satisfactory settlement, new procedures to deal with the problem of the return to legality.
"Finally, I would draw attention to three further important features of our proposals. First, and this reinforces the "Tiger" proposals relating to the fourth Principle, is our insistence on the importance of a vigorous and extended programme for African education, particularly in technical education, including agriculture. We have said that we would be prepared to contribute to this programme a sum of up to £50 million spread over ten years on a pound-for-pound basis. We regard this as imperative in the interests of
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the African population and of Rhodesia; it would also have an important bearing on the number of Africans able to qualify for the A Roll franchise. Secondly, arising out of our discussions, we have included the proposal that the Royal Commission to be appointed for testing the acceptability of any settlement to the Rhodesian people as a whole should be instructed also to inquire into the arrangements for the registration of eligible voters under the widely extended franchise which is proposed, with a view to encouraging greater African participation in Rhodesian political life. Thirdly, the House will note what has been said about the need for a broadbased Government, including Africans, to carry Rhodesia through the whole process of introducing the new Constitution, right up to the election of a new Parliament under that Constitution.
"The House will recognise the relevance of these three proposals, as well as certain other events, to the creation of the 'substantial change of circumstances' which repeatedly I have said in this House must exist to justify our raising with our Commonwealth partners the question of 'no independence before majority rule'.
"And the House will recognise too that we will not agree to the implementation of any settlement that has not first been shown to be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole—the fifth Principle, on which all else depends.
"As was stated in the communiqué, Mr. Smith said that he would take the British Government's proposals back to Salisbury, without commitment, for consideration with his colleagues there. I said that the Commonwealth Secretary will be available to fly out to Salisbury if Mr. Smith and his colleagues feel that this would assist them in their consideration of the British proposals. Our position at the end of the talks, as throughout these past years, maintains the position repeatedly stated by the Commonwealth Secretary—no sell out, no slamming the door by us.
"We have insisted that our proposals have to be taken as a whole. Any concessions we have been prepared to offer

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on matters which do not involve the safeguards required for the Six Principles are available only as part of an agreement which incorporates the clear guarantees on which we have insisted to safeguard those Principles. Now decisions have to be taken in Salisbury. We for our part are keeping the door open. But the key to a settlement is and must remain the Six Principles, which are cardinal to the future of Rhodesia—the future of Rhodesians of all races, for whom the British Parliament stands trustee."
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I should like to express my thanks to the noble Lord for repeating this important Statement to your Lordships this afternoon. In view of the length of the Statement, and the fact that it is accompanied by a White Paper, I shall refrain from commenting on the substance of the Statement which the noble Lord has just read, since I am sure that many of your Lordships will wish to read it with care, and indeed to read the accompanying White Paper, before entering into a discussion on what is in both. I hope I am right in assuming that there will be an early opportunity for this House to discuss both the Statement and the White Paper.
It is, of course, a matter of deep regret to us on this side of the House that the settlement through negotiation for which we have always pressed still eludes us. Nevertheless, I feel that we can at least derive some gratification, albeit of a modest kind, that on this occasion the talks have been suspended (if "suspension" is the right term to use) in a civilised and adult fashion, and not in an atmosphere of sterile recrimination.
LORD BYERS: My Lords, I also should like to thank the noble Lord the Leader of the House for repeating this Statement, and to say that we share the deep and widespread disappointment that these talks should have been inconclusive at this stage. Like the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe. I do not wish to comment in detail on this, but may I ask the noble Lord the Leader of the House whether an early opportunity can be given for a debate on this subject, and whether he
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will consider what form that debate could take?
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, if I may answer the two noble Lords, I am much obliged to them for their attitude. Obviously there is disappointment, and I think that probably the place where there is the greatest disappointment is Salisbury and Southern Rhodesia. Those of us who have contacts there know how much many people are hoping for a settlement; and therefore I agree with the noble Lords that it is a comfort that at least, as my right honourable friend's Statement makes clear, the door is still open. I think it would be wise for noble Lords to study the White Paper, which is now available, and I agree that this is a matter which we should have an early opportunity to debate. I think this is a matter which we might discuss through the usual channels in the hopes of having a debate, if not this week at least before the end of this Session—perhaps next week.
LORD SALTER: My Lords, in order to suggest a general background against which to consider the particular problem which has just been explained to us, may I ask the noble Lord whether he would agree that the combination of universal suffrage and majority rule, which we are attempting to impose upon Rhodesia, with such immense loss and damage both to us and to them, had no place in our own country until about fifty years ago? It had no place at all throughout all the previous centuries of our not ignominious history.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I think the noble Lord would do well to read the White Paper. He is taking far too simpliste a view of the situation.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, all I would say, as one who has taken special interest in the subject of Rhodesia, is how disappointed I am, like the noble Lord the Leader of the House. that there has been no settlement; how glad I am to hear that the door is not yet completely closed; and how greatly I hope that we can have an early debate.
LORD SHACKLETON: I am much obliged to the noble Marquess.

RACE RELATIONS BILL
3.57 p.m.
Report stage resumed.
BARONESS SEROTA: My Lords, in this general spate of movement it is difficult for me to tell whether any noble Lord is rising on the Amendment which the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, moved before the very important Statement which we have just had from the Leader of the House. In view of that interruption, perhaps I might remind your Lordships that the purpose of this Amendment to Clause 6 is to ensure that no proceedings can be taken in relation to discriminatory advertisements concerning acts which are not unlawful under the Bill—and that, I think, is the whole burden of the argument which the noble Lord put to us. I should first of all like to assure him that the wording of the Bill as at present drafted is in no sense discrimination against advertisers.
In the request which the noble Lord made to the House he was really, in my view, undermining the whole principle on which this Bill is based. The purpose surely is to declare discrimination wrong in principle and to throw the weight of legislation behind voluntary efforts to eliminate it. The noble Lord was pleading that in this particular field of public advertisements we should rely solely on voluntary conciliation methods, without the statutory backing which goes through the rest of the Bill. That is why I say that this Amendment raises a major question of principle and is therefore unacceptable to the Government. Investigation and conciliation in respect of discriminatory advertisements cannot proceed without the support of sanctions; and an advertisement in respect of an intended action which is not unlawful under the Bill can be just as objectionable in our view as one that is.
The House will remember that this point was discussed at great length in Committee. I will not go over the details again; but my noble friend Lord Stonham has given serious consideration to the points then raised and has been in correspondence on them with many noble Lords, including the noble Lord. Lord Drumalbyn, during the Recess. I hope that the House will not think that proper consideration has not been given
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to the case which is now put before us again. For the reasons I have given, and certainly not for the purpose of discriminating against advertisers, the Government feel that this Amendment should not be accepted by the House. Moreover, we are confident that in practice the question of proceedings in respect of advertisements which are clearly not objectionable will not arise.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I am afraid that the noble Baroness has not really convinced me that full consideration along the lines of the Amendment has been given to this matter. In her reply she almost suggested that this Amendment would remove the sanction of proceedings in cases where the act of discrimination which was intended is not lawful—and mark this, my Lords! it is one that is intended and not one that has actually been committed. The case I was making is that where the act is not unlawful then it is not unreasonable to take it out of the sphere of the courts. The noble Baroness could have said, but did not since it was almost unnecessary, that this particular clause makes it unlawful; but that is really what we are complaining about. We are complaining about making unlawful an advertisement indicating an intention to carry out an act of discrimination which is not unlawful except in the case of advertisements. This is the case that we are trying to argue. The noble Baroness has not given any answer to that at all.
It is all very well to say that you must have sanctions to back up the conciliation procedure in cases of an unlawful act; but this is an act which is not unlawful except under this clause. I should have thought that there was ample scope for conciliation procedure here. If we were to have a clear definition of what discrimination is to mean, what circumstances it is to cover, what the evil is that it is expected to eliminate, this would be quite a different matter; but it seems to me quite wrong in principle to say that it is unlawful to advertise something which is not unlawful and that civil proceedings can be brought in those cases.
If it is only an intention, surely no question of damages can arise. Admittedly a court could give an injunction against doing it again or against advertising it again; but my submission was that it was

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not necessary. I agree that there is a difficulty in the matter of notices; but most of these notices are related to matters of employment or something like that. Most of them would not be advertisements in the proper sense. They would not be "at large". An advertisement must be "at large". A notice would be confined to members or to a factory. That is the difference between a notice and an advertisement. But surely it would be possible to cover that point. The point I am concerned with is only this matter of advertisement.
I am with the noble Baroness all the way in barring advertisements, in making them unlawful, where there is a question of an intention to carry out an act of discrimination which is unlawful under the rest of the Bill. All I am saying is that it should not be a matter subject to civil proceedings where the act is not in itself unlawful. I am bound to say that I do not think the noble Baroness has addressed her mind to that point at all.
LORD GIFFORD: My Lords, may I support my noble friend Lady Serota in this matter? We are concerned not with the Personal Column advertisements in The Times or in the Evening Standard. I am sure that media of that kind would not carry discriminatory advertisements and would never go near the courts; they would not be worried by the clause as it stands. We are concerned with notices in tobacconists' shops—even in the windows of private houses; but particularly in tobacconists' shops—where we have seen these most objectionable notices saying, "Room to let. No coloureds." It could be that the landlady with a room to let will see, after reading this Bill, that she is exempt from it and will put in an advertisement of this kind. If there is no sanction behind the conciliation efforts of the Board she is in a position to snap her fingers at anything the Board may intend to do. This is the intention, if I have it aright, in resisting this Amendment. I should have thought that it was of great importance, because it is at this level that you get the obstinacy which requires, in my opinion, after all else fails, the sanction of a court order.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, I should like to support my noble friend Lord Gifford. I usually agree with what
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the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, says about advertising, but in this case I am afraid I do not. With my noble friend Lord Gifford, I believe that the noble Lord. Lord Drumalbyn, is thinking about the kind of advertisements he deals with as the chairman (and a very distinguished chairman) of the Advertising Standards Authority. Here, as was said in the Second Reading debate, we are in deep and murky waters. The kind of advertising we have to deal with throughout in this Bill is the kind that will incite racial hatred and racial discrimination quite outside the ambit of Clauses 2 to 5. I think the Amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, will considerably weaken the Bill for the reasons that my noble friend Lord Gifford has given.
The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, conceded that this might be justified in the case of a notice but not in that of an advertisement. On the other hand, his Amendment would also include notices and would weaken the effect of the Bill on them just as much as on advertisements. I hope that my noble friend Lady Serota will stand firm on this, because I think the Amendment is unhelpful to start with and, secondly, would weaken the Bill.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, with the leave of the House, may I reply—
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, I wonder whether we could come to some agreement about this, as we did on the Transport Bill. The noble Lord has the right to reply, but not to reply more than once unless it be to explain himself.
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, may I attempt to come to the rescue of my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn by suggesting to the noble Lords who have just spoken, the noble Lords, Lord Gifford and Lord Strabolgi, that they have perhaps taken a rather unfortunate example. The example quoted by the noble Lord, Lord Gifford, was the example of an advertisement which said, "No coloureds". If the landlady answered the door and said to a coloured man, "Sorry, no coloureds", she would come within the mischief of the Bill; but I think that the noble Lord. Lord Drumalbyn, is concerned with the position that under the advertisement clause, which is Clause 6, something can be unlawful whether or

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not it would be unlawful by virtue of any other provision in this Bill. Therefore it is not helpful to select an example of something which would be unlawful quite apart from the advertisement.
LORD GIFFORD: My Lords, may I speak briefly again? I was assuming the case—
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, we have just come to agreement that on the Report stage only the mover of a motion has the right to reply.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, on the Committee stage I put down an advertisement which did seek to deal with this—
EARL JELLICOE: Not an advertisement, an Amendment.
LORD CONESFORD: I am much obliged—an Amendment which attempted to deal with this difficulty. I admitted that probably my Amendment went too wide, and that view was taken by the Government. Since then I have consistently taken the view that if this clause were to be amended in any form to make it both agreeable to its critics and satisfactory to the Government, it could be done only by Parliamentary draftsmen, because it is an extremely difficult matter. For that reason I feel fairly certain that my noble friend will not press this Amendment because, frankly, it is not possible for the amateur to get this matter in order.
I should like briefly to reply to the two noble Lords who assumed that the only things hit by the clause as it stands are things that are offensive. That is not so. If you take the two subsections together, as I pointed out earlier, if an English family were living abroad and advertised in The Times for a French cook or for a Scots nanny they would be doing something unlawful under this clause. That is perfectly absurd, but I think it irremediable unless the Government ask their Parliamentary draftsmen to produce something more sensible. I think the clause is very bad indeed as it stands, but I do not believe that any attempt by an amateur draftsman could put it right.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, in view of what has been said, I can only hope that the Race Relations Board will
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be more sensible than is the clause itself. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
4.14 p.m.
EARL JELLICOE EARL JELLICOE moved Amendment No. 4:
Page 3, line 40, at end insert ("or that, in relation to the particular employment concerned, the ethnic or national origin of a person is a bona fide occupational qualification.").
The noble Earl said: My Lords, your Lordships have just been reminded by my noble friend Lord Conesford that he moved an "advertisement" at the Committee stage designed to cope with the anomaly to which he has just referred. It then became plain, as he has again reminded us, that subsection (2) of the clause, as drafted, could lead to the most absurd results. Pace the noble Lord, Lord Gifford, it means, as my noble friend has said, that it would be unlawful to advertise in The Times of Evening Standard if you are living abroad and want to employ a person concerned abroad. It would be unlawful, as I read the clause, to advertise for a French cook or a French governess or a Scots nanny. It means that while it is lawful to advertise for a French chef or a German au pair girl for employment here, it s not lawful to advertise, for employment here, for an Indian chef or a Pakistani au pair girl. This seems to me an absurd anomaly.
I wonder whether I might take one more example of the sort of anomalous position which would arise. These of your Lordships who knew the London night life scene of some ten years ago may be aware that there was a very good Jamaican or Trinidadian steel band which rejoiced in the name of "Lord Kitchener's Band". I am told by those who know the Caribbean night life scene better than I do (I do not know the Caribbean at all) that there is a "Lord Jellicoe's Band", either in Trinid or Jamaica, at the present time. As I read the Bill, the absurd position would arise that if the calypso singer in "Lord Jellicoe's Band" fell sick, it would he possible to advertise in this country for a replacement without breaking the law, but it would not be legal to advertise for a replacement for the calypso singer in "Lord Kitchener's Band". This seems to me to be anomalous. We all

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recognise the purpose behind this part of the Bill, which is to rule out of court offensive advertisements of the sort referred to by the noble Lord. Lord Gifford, and the noble Lord. Lord Strabolgi. I am in sympathy with them on that point. They said that the advertisements to which they referred were offensive, and I agree with that point of view.
During the Committee stage discussions the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, seemed to think that it was beyond the wit of Parliamentary draftsmen to devise a formula which would exclude the offensive type of advertisement but not catch the perfectly inoffensive type to which I have just been alluding. I am very sad to see that my noble friend Lord Conesford has now joined the ranks of the pessimists. He also seems to believe that it is almost beyond the wit of man to devise such an Amendment. I find it a little hard to accept that contention. I think it would be wrong to leave the clause as it stands when we know it to be riddled with possible anomalies. Your Lordships may feel that that is just too bad, but I cannot agree with that view, and I should be very unhappy if we allowed this part of the Bill to go forward when it would seem to have such fatuous consequences.
It seems to me that my noble friend's Amendment rules out the more absurd sort of anomalies without in any way weakening the defences of the Bill against the offensive type of advertisement. The Amendment may not be perfect. We all know the difficulties of drafting without the help of the Parliamentary draftsmen though at the moment I cannot, for the life of me, see wherein lie the imperfections of this Amendment. I very much hope, therefore, that the noble Baroness, who has been not only charming but unyielding over Amendments of substance which my noble friend has been moving—and she was not only charming, but also unyielding, on the Amendment of a narrower scope which I moved just now—will, on my second try, which is also in connection with an Amendment of fairly narrow intention, be not only charming but yielding. My Lords, I beg to move.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, I am sorry that my noble friend misunderstood me so much as to think that I was aligned with the pessimists who thought that this could not be done. On the contrary, I did my utmost by letter to persuade the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, to get it done, so confident am I that it could be done, but only by really skilled draftsmanship. The reason I am pessimistic about the noble Lord's Amendment is that it was specifically dealt with in Lord Stonham's letter to me. While I wish the noble Earl luck, I am a little pessimistic about the late of this Amendment. I said I was pessimistic about getting into the clause by amateur draftsmanship both sense and something that would satisfy Her Majesty's Government. Throughout his letter the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, assumes that we could not do anything to remedy these absurd anomalies unless we permitted something that was offensive. Parliamentary draftsmen are constantly providing efficient legislation against things that are offensive; it is child's play to them. Where I am pessimistic is in devising from my own ingenuity something that would be completely satisfactory.
BARONESS SEROTA: My Lords, I hope that I shall not be misunderstood by the House when I say that I only wish I could yield to the noble Earl. I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, has not been convinced by all the efforts of my noble friend Lord Stonham in correspondence during the Recess. From what the noble Lord said earlier, I hoped that he would not be speaking again on this subject, having seen the wisdom of my noble friend's comments. It would be less than fair not to admit that this is an extraordinary difficult area. That is why your Lordships, both in Committee and now, have given such close attention to it. It would be equally unfair to say that the Amendment put down by the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Cumnor, and moved to-day by the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, is so defective that it would make the Bill unworkable, although one could criticise the drafting.
We come back to the general point, that certain strange and odd situations can arise on the fringes of our area of consideration. I will not add to the numerous examples given during the

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earlier stages and again to-day. Surely the real point is that made by my noble friend Lord Stonham, during Committee stage, and supported to-day by my noble friends Lord Gifford and Lord Strabolgi—namely, that discriminatory advertisements of any kind are a particularly offensive form of discrimination. I would very much support the point my noble friend Lord Gifford made about notices, as opposed to bona fide advertisements. I can see the problem of the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, in accepting that what is a legal act in private is not legal in public. That really is the crux of our difficulty. I would remind him that this applies also in certain other fields. What he is really complaining about is that under the clause, as it is at present drafted, it is unlawful to advertise for something that is lawful under the Act.
I am sure, knowing the great regard in which your Lordships' hold my noble friend Lord Stonham, that the House will believe that he has given the most careful thought to this Amendment. But it is still the view of the Government that, although there may be some difficult situations on the fringes, it is essential that the Bill should stand in this form in the interests of educating public opinion and of giving a lead, which is part of the purpose of this Bill. In spite of some of the cases mentioned, I do not believe that real difficulties will arise.
For these reasons we cannot meet the very reasonable proposals of the noble Earl. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Cumnor, gave great thought to this point and was in corespondence with my noble friend during the Recess. I can assure the House that every effort has been made to try to secure a drafting of this particular area of the Bill which would meet the points made in Committee yet stand firm on the principles of the Bill. I am sure that the House as a whole will not wish the Government to depart in any way from the principles of the Bill. We are discussing to-day a detailed matter which all of us regard as of the greatest importance for the happiness and well-being of the people of this country. We believe it is important that the public should know that anything which gives rise to any form of discrimination, even those which have been excepted because of the proximity argument, the personal
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argument and the domestic argument, should not be the subject of public advertisements and that only the personal exercise of discrimination in those categories that are allowed in the Bill should be permitted.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, again I must confess to considerable disappointment at the noble Baroness's reply. I would like to make absolutely clear that in this Amendment it is far from my intention, as I know it is far from the intention of my noble friend Lord Brooke of Cumnor, to ask the Government to depart from the principles of this Bill. The Amendment suggests a way in which, without departing from these principles, we could avoid what the noble Baroness has called "some strange and odd" anomalies but which I would call perfectly absurd anomalies which arise from the clause as drafted.
The noble Baroness has said that all discriminatory advertisement is objectionable. I believe that that is perhaps overstating the matter. There are certainly forms of discriminatory advertisements, like those singled out by the noble Lord, Lord Gifford, which are objectionable. But the sort of discriminatory advertisement to which I was alluding is, in my contention, perfectly harmless and I am disappointed that in the two months which was available to them, and with all the resources of Parliamentary daftsmen, it has not been possible for the Government to find some formula by which the first type of objectionable discriminatory advertisements could be Ailed out while permitting those obviously and patently perfectly harmless. I am exceedingly reluctant to withdraw this Amendment, and I do so almost in spite of my better judgment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 7 [Exception in the case of residential accommodation]:
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD GARDINER): My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Stonham I beg to move Amendment No. 6. This is a technical Amendment. Your Lordships may remember that during discussion in Cammittee the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, suggested that the word "other", on page 4, line 3, was quite unnecessary and should not be there. My noble friend

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said that he would consider it. The matter has been considered; the noble Lord is absolutely right, and accordingly it is the terms of this Amendment to take out the word. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 4, line 3, leave out ("other").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
4.30 p.m.
EARL JELLICOE EARL JELLICOE rose to move Amendments Nos. 6 and 7:
Page 4, line 28, leave out ("six") and insert ("twelve")
Page 4, line 30, leave out subsection (3) and insert—
("(3) The Secretary of State may, if at any time it appears to him expedient to do so, and without prejudice to his power to make a further order, by order reduce below twelve, although not below six, the number of persons specified in subsection (2) above, but no such order shall be made unless a draft of the order has been laid before Parliament and approved by each House of Parliament.")
The noble Earl said: My Lords, I think it might be for the convenience of the House to take this Amendment and No. 7 together. First of all, I should like to make clear that many of us on this side of the House think that the Government have been unwise in drawing the definition of "small premises" in Clause 7 so narrowly. My noble friend Lord Brooke of Cumnor made this perfectly clear on Committee stage, but he succeeded in getting no more change out of noble Lords opposite on that occasion than I have so far succeeded in doing this afternoon. However, this is not the point in connection with these two Amendments. My noble friend is not seeking in any way by these Amendments to strike at Clause 7, as such, or to extend in any significant manner the definition of "small premises". All we are asking the Government to do in these two Amendments—and we are asking them to do it in their own better interests—is to introduce more flexibility into this Part of the Bill than it at present possesses.
As the Bill is drafted, there will be a period of two years from the time when it becomes law when the immune premises—that is, the small premises—will he considered as those where there is not normally residential accommodation for more than 12 persons in addition to the
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landlord and the members of his household. However, the ceiling on small premises will automatically drop after that two years from 12 persons to 6. This is the area where we feel that greater flexibility is needed. We do not know how long it will take the Board to "get their eye in" on this part of their activities. We do not know how many cases of discrimination over housing will come before the Board. We do not know how quickly the Board will be able to adapt and extend their machinery to deal with such cases, nor how much time those cases will take to investigate. However, one way or another I am inclined to suspect that more than two years will be required before the Board are able to digest the really small premises—that is, those with only six persons.
If the Board are likely to need more than those two years, then the Government would, I suspect, welcome in two years' time the sort of Amendments that I am now moving. But if it turns out that the Board need less than two years to "get their eye in", then the Government will presumably like the definition of "small premises" to be narrowed in a shorter period of time than the two years' period. Without this Amendment such action would be impossible; with it, it would be possible. I think the Government would be wise to opt for the more flexible procedure which these two Amendments envisage, rather than the more automatic and more rigid two-year procedure which at the moment is written into the Bill.
Apart from this consideration of flexibility—and it is one to which we attach considerable practical importance—there is another reason why we think that these Amendments are right. We feel that it would be right, before the ceiling is lowered, before we get down to dealing with discrimination in the really small premises, in the situations where the personal relationships are likely to be the most acute and the difficulties at their most ticklish, for Parliament to give itself a chance of seeing how the Act is working in this particular sphere, which at the present time is totally unexplored, and to be consulted before the definition of "small premises" is further contracted. We believe that this would be a sensible precaution to make. It is for those reasons that I hope the noble and learned Lord

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the Lord Chancellor may feel disposed to give a favourable reception to these two Amendments, which I beg to move on behalf of my noble friend.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, as the noble Earl has so clearly explained, the purpose of these Amendments is to provide that any reduction below 12 must be made by order to any number below 12 though not less than 6. These Amendments follow discussion in Committee between the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, and my noble friend Lord Stonham. As your Lordships know, this is a Bill which the Government are anxious should accord with the views of all Parties, and therefore they have been most anxious to accept any Amendment which they felt that they could. Your Lordships know how conscientious my noble friend Lord Stonham is in these matters, and he considered this very carefully. My noble friend wrote to the noble Lord, Lord Brooke and said:
"… the phasing arrangements fixed in the Bill must to some extent be arbitrary; but it is important that these two areas, in which it is generally accepted that the initial scope of the Bill should be extended, employers and landlords should have a clear indication in advance of the date at which they will have to come in line with the provisions of the Bill. The position under Clause 8(5), to which you referred, and under Clause 17(2), is different, because both of these are looking to the very much longer term. I think that the existing phasing arrangements are reasonable; they were introduced in the light of criticisms in Committee in the Commons that those originally proposed were too restrictive and rigid, and are, I understand, acceptable to the Race Relations Board."
The noble Earl will remember that the Government's view (and I think the general view) was made quite plain: that there ought to be an exception from the Bill for small premises. Then the question arose: What do you mean by "small premises"? I do not think the Government's view has ever changed about that. They thought that small premises ought to be the landlord, the man and his family, the residential accommodation for not more than four other people. That being so, my Lords, why have we now 12 for two years and then 6? The answer is because the Government were very anxious to meet different views. Their view being that the figure ought to be 4—in small premises, after all: a man and his family, and residential accommodation for 4 more people—
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somebody said 20. This was discussed at great length in another place both in Committee and on the Report stage. I believe I say what is true when I say that 12 to start with, and after two years 6, really represented the middle view.
As to staging, so far as I have been able to make out, there being no staging in the Bill which the Government introduced, the suggestion of staging came from the Opposition side of the House. Again, the Government thought at out it, and they came to the conclusion that there were some advantages in this, for two reasons. The two reasons why they still feel that the Bill as it left the other place is right are, first, that it really is necessary for landlords and employers to know ahead so as to make their arrangements. A man may be told that the Bill does not apply to him at the moment because he has less than 12, but that in two years' time it will. He then has time to make his arrangements. It perhaps applies with even more force to employers. The second reason was that the Government were apprehensive that the Board might be rather overwhelmed to start with if the number was set too low. They have consulted the Board, and the Board are satisfied with these provisions as they are.
My Lords, as I have said, the Government have throughout been most anxious to make this as far as possible an all-Party Bill, and noble Lords gill be aware of the length at which this question was discussed in Committee and on Report in another place. While some might think that the number ought to be more than 4, and others might think it ought to be 20, some might think no staging and others some staging, it appeared to us that the most sensible thing was to say 12 and after two years 6. I hope that, having taken all those considerations into account, the noble Earl may be inclined to think so, too.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor for his reply and for what he has told us about the Government's responsiveness to suggestions from the Opposition and their desire that this point should be agreed as possible. All I can say is that my colleagues in another place were either luckier or more persuasive in their arguments than my colleagues and I have been. There was

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one point I should like just to mention. I may have read or heard the implication wrongly. I think the noble and learned Lord implied that this Amendment in some way represented a departure from the principle of staging. I do not know whether that was his intention, but it seems to me that, although there is not a rigid staging written into the Amendment, it does permit staging, but of a more flexible nature than hitherto envisaged. I still believe there is a great deal to be said for that.
Nevertheless, I have listened very carefully to what the noble and learned Lord said and there seemed to me to be force in parts, at least, of the arguments he was deploying: in the argument that there is something to be said for everyone's knowing a good deal clearly in advance and precisely where he stands; that the Bill as drafted already in a certain measure—this Part of it—represents a compromise. I also consider what he said about the reactions of the Board, for whose membership I have very considerable regard, and their attitude to this Part of the Bill. In view of the views which the noble and learned Lord has expressed, I beg leave to withdraw these Amendments.
Amendments, by leave, withdrawn.
4.42 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN LORD DRUMALBYN moved Amendments Nos. 8 and 9:
Page 4, line 42, at end insert—
("() a grandson or granddaughter of the other or of the other's wife or husband;")
Page 4, line 44, at end insert—
("() an uncle or aunt of the other, or of the other's wife or husband;")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move the Amendment No. 8 standing in my name. If it is convenient to your Lordships, perhaps we could take Amendment No. 9 at the same time. Amendment No. 8 is a very simple Amendment. It is designed only to draw the attention of your Lordships to the very precise way in which it has been thought fit to draw the definition of what is a member of the family. As I understand it, the exempt small premises under the provision in subsection (2), taken together with subsection (4), lose their exemption in a case where the landlord has a son and daughter-in-law or a
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daughter and son-in-law living with him and they have a baby. Immediately the exemption is lost. In the same way, supposing auntie comes to stay, becomes ill and takes up residence and is looked after in her nephew's house, the exemption is lost. I cannot believe that that is right. After all, suppose the landlord were an Indian. By the age of 35 or 36 he would be having grandchildren, probably, because his children would probably marry very young. I really cannot think that this is right and that we should make the rules as narrow as this. I beg to move.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, here is a point which must inevitably be a matter of opinion. One speaks of a man's family. What does one mean? One has always to draw the line somewhere. Where have we got to on the Bill? Well, it includes the man, of course, and it includes his wife; it includes the man's sons and daughters; it includes the man's father and mother; it includes any illegitimate children; it includes the man's son-in-law or daughter-in-law; it includes the man's adopted son or daughter-in-law. It includes his wife's sons and daughters; it includes his wife's father and mother; it includes his wife's children; it includes her sons-in-law or daughters-in-law, and it includes adopted sons and daughters. As I say, the line must be drawn somewhere.
On the Committee stage of the Bill I remember the noble Earl, Lord Iddesleigh, moved an Amendment to include foster children. In resisting that, my noble friend Lord Stonham explained that it is intended that the exception should be confined to the landlord and his immediate family, and if the definition were extended to foster children it would be difficult to resist extending it to other relatives. And the noble Earl withdrew the Amendment. Now the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, says, what about the children and the others and what about uncles and aunts? And, of course, if we have uncles and aunts, why do we not have cousins? One has to draw the line somewhere. Parliament has recently considered this very point and this definition is exactly the same as the definition in Section 7(7) of the Leasehold Reform Act 1967. It was felt that as last year Parliament had already considered this

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question, "What do we mean by a man's family?", it was reasonable to take the same view here.
This is not, I would suggest to the noble Lord, a point on which we can say, "Here is the House of Lords, as usual, improving the drafting", because it is not a question of drafting; it is purely a question of opinion. Anybody is entitled to his opinion. Opinions may well differ. The line has to be drawn somewhere, and I hope that, on reconsideration, the noble Lord may feel that there is no overmastering reason why we should change the Bill on this point.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his reply. He seemed to suggest, by a kind of statistical fallacy, that all the people whom he enumerated would be included in one household. I am sure he did not mean that. I do not think it very much matters who is included. The need is to get some provision that will work. I do not want to be unduly patriarchal about this, but I should have thought that going to the second generation was not going too far in considering what is one's family. I would not carry it to cousins. That is going too far; it is taking it down the collaterals and I do not think that would be right. Obviously this is not something one can stand on, but I consider it is something that the Government, if they think it worth while between now and the next stage, might themselves change.
The mere fact that there is another Act dealing with something quite different—admittedly, house property—is no more convincing than it would be to quote the example of something we dealt with fairly recently, succession on intestacy, which is rather different. So, my Lords, I do not think that this is conclusive. The trouble is that it is not really a matter of opinion; it is going to be a matter of hard, practical reality to some people, and whatever our opinions may be about it, there are going to be some very hard opinions expressed about it by the people who are excluded. My Lords, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendments.
Amendments, by leave, withdrawn.
4.48 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved Amendments Nos. 10 and 11:
Page 5, line 21, leave out ("in connection with") and insert ("for the purposes of")
Page 5, line 23, leave out ("therewith") and insert ("with the disposal")
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, it may be convenient to dell with Amendments Nos. 10 and 11 together, and they also affect, of course, Amendment No. 12. The Government introduced an Amendment on Report in the other place excepting from the housing provisions of the Bill the disposal of property by a person owning and wholly occupying it, provided that he does not use an estate agent or advertise. Et was not intended that anyone disposing of his property in this way should be prevented from obtaining advice from a third party as to the value or state of the property even if that third party was in business as an estate agent. An owner might well use the services of a person who is also an estate agent for doing various jobs in connection with the sale of a house, such as providing reps its as to its value or condition. Many persons are in business as estate agents surveyors and valuers.
Your Lordships may remember that it was argued in Committee in this House that the clause as drafted could be interpreted to prevent the use of the services of such a person for valuation and surveys, and it is accepted that it would be desirable to make some Amendments in order to make the position clear.
Amendment No. 12 (if I am not out of order in just referring to it) would make it clear that a person could use the services of an estate agent solely for the purposes of obtaining a valuation. But that Amendment does not go far enough. It does not, for example, meet the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, in Committee, who said (col. 1352):
"Valuation is not the only … matter on which an owner may wish to consult a house agent. He may want a report on dilapidations, which is something he might wish to have for the fairest of reasons".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 25/7/68.]
Therefore I hope that these two Amendments put forward by the Government will meet the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, as well as the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Cumnor.

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The effect of the Government Amendments is that a person who sells a property owned and wholly occupied by him will be excepted from the housing provisions of the Bill, provided that he does not use the services of an estate agent (as defined in Clause 7(8)) to find a buyer, and does not publish an advertisement or notice in connection with the sale. I hope the noble Earl will realise that this is another case where the Government are being most anxious to adopt the suggestions made to them. I beg to move.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor for these two Amendments. I have no intention whatsoever of looking these two gift horses in the mouth. So far as I can see they completely meet the points which were made in Committee, and I do not think my noble friend Lord Brooke of Cumnor would mind my saying that I believe, as the noble and learned Lord said, that they cover the particular point more comprehensively than Amendment No. 12 was designed to do. Therefore, I should like to say how much I welcome these two Amendments.
On Question, Amendments agreed to.
4.52 p.m.
LORD ABERDARE LORD ABERDARE moved Amendment No. 13:
After Clause 7, insert the following new clause:
Exceptions in the case of education, instruction, or training
".Clause 2 shall not apply in the field of education, training and instruction—

(a) where services and facilities are provided on favourable terms to certain racial, national and ethnic groups as part of a programme of technical assistance.

(b) where services and facilities are provided for particular racial, ethnic or national groups of children to facilitate their integration into schools.

(c) where numbers of students and pupils of certain national, ethnic or racial groups in certain classes and schools are adjusted in the interests of better teaching.

(d) where the service or facility is of the nature of private tuition, classes are of 12 or less persons and the tuition is given in private houses."

The noble Lord said: My Lords, my noble friend Lord Sandford and I put
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down this Amendment arising out of a discussion on the Committee stage on an Amendment proposed by my noble friend, Lord Jellicoe. The general object behind our Amendment is to protect the position where there is at present a form of discrimination in the field of education but where it seems to us, and I think it will seem to most of your Lordships, to be in the general interest of the community and in the particular interest of the immigrant population. Perhaps I can best explain myself by giving two examples.
The first is the example of the policy of dispersing immigrant children among different schools in cases where they would otherwise form a large proportion of one individual school. Circular No. 7 of 1965 from the Department of Education recommended this policy to local education authorities in the general interest of the children where otherwise immigrant children would constitute more than one-third of a particular school. Not all education authorities have accepted that advice, but some have done so. For example, Bradford, with an immigrant school population of 9 per cent. has practised dispersal on the basis that the immigrant children should not make up more than 25 per cent. in primary schools and 10 per cent. in secondary schools. Ealing also has particular difficulties which have been met in this way. Eighty per cent. of the Indians and Pakistanis in the Borough of Ealing live in Southall, and in the interests of a multiracial society Ealing arranges to transport by bus roughly 1,000 of these Asians daily to other schools in the borough, including those in places as far afield as Acton, some five or six miles away. I am sure your Lordships will agree that this is a valuable practice and one that is in the interests of a multiracial society. Certainly it is Government policy, according to the Department of Education circular which I have mentioned.
On the other hand, from the point of view of the individual immigrant parent, it may be seen as a form of racial discrimination. A person might consider that her children were being pushed around like parcels simply because they were immigrants, and in Southall the Indian Workers' Association and the West Indian Association have both come out against the policy of dispersal, so they may well lodge a complaint under

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this Bill. As I see the position, if the Bill passes in its present form they will have every legal ground for complaint to the Race Relations Board. There is no doubt that this discrimination is on racial grounds although it is undertaken to improve race relations.
Perhaps I may give another example, that of reception classes and special language centres in local education authority areas. It frequently happens that children from immigrant families speak little or no English, and in many schools concerned with these children they often spend up to the first year in a reception class which, incidentally, often has a specially favourable pupil-teacher ratio, which is sometimes as low as twenty to one. In other areas they attend a special language centre until their English is good enough for them to attend an ordinary school. Surely this kind of effort to integrate the immigrant children into a school is worthy of support. But again it could be held to be discrimination on racial grounds and might form the basis of a complaint to the Board from either side—from the immigrants who objected to the segregation of their children in a special class or language centre, or from the indigenous parents who objected to preferential treatment being given to the immigrant children.
All these cases were covered in the original Bill as drafted, in Clause 2(3) which allowed them to operate. If I may quote that subsection briefly, it read:
"Nothing in this section shall render unlawful anything which is done in good faith for the benefit of a particular section of the public and which has the effect of promoting the integration of members of that section of the public into the community."
Unfortunately for the case I am arguing, this provision was deleted in another place, mainly by the votes of Government supporters on the grounds that it opened the door too wide and might lead to the justification of separate but equal facilities. The Government themselves defended the subsection vigorously. They stated that it was necessary to bring special assistance to certain groups, especially where language was a consideration. They stated that this subsection was specifically to legalise the policy of dispersal and reception classes. Indeed, they went further: they said that it was necessary for the protection of language
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classes run by the Indian Workers' Association and similar bodies, and the activities of community relations councils. I am not clear why they have now changed their minds.
At the Committee stage the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, tried to argue that subsection (3), which was thrown out, was not necessary. He argued that the Race Relations Board would not persist in such cases. But my point is that we should put into the Bill what is and what is not illegal and not leave it to the Race Relations Board to decide. After all, the complaint will come—and, as I have indicated, I think it likely that complaint may be made in these cases. When it arrives at the Race Relations Board, if they
"form the opinion that an act has been done which is unlawful by virtue of any provision in Part I"
of the Bill they have to take action. As I see it, there would be no question certainly in the first case, the dispersal policy, that an act had been done which was included as illegal in Part I of the Bill.
I should like to mention one other point that arises on this Amendment under paragraph (d). This is a somewhat separate case but one that was also raised by my noble friend Lord Jellicoe in Committee and put very forcibly by him at that time. We had been discussing the question of small accommodation where there are not more than 12, or later not more than 6, people other than the landlord. There is also an exclusion clause in the case of employment which excludes employers of not more than 25 persons, reducing after two years to 10, Surely, if we are going to make these exclusions in the case of housing and employment, it is only fair that we should make some exclusion in the case of education, particularly to cover casts of private tutors teaching such subjects as music or dancing or languages and similar activities taking place in private houses in classes. I should have thought that if we are allowing an employer to employ up to 25 people without coming within the ambit of the Bill, and equally a landlord to have up to 12 people without initially coming within the ambit of the Bill, certainly it would be right to put in some figures for those who are running small classes.

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After what has been said to-day, I would agree that the Amendment is far from perfect in form, and the last thing I would expect would be for it to be accepted in its present form. But I hope it puts quite clearly to the Government the two points on which we should like a clear explanation: first, are the Government satisfied that existing educational policies with regard to immigrant children will remain legal when this Bill becomes an Act and, secondly, would they not consider making some exception for small private classes. I beg to move.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, the Government have given anxious consideration to this Amendment, as they have to all the others. If I may deal first with the factual side of the matter, the Government of course are aware of the circulars which they have sent out in regard to dispersal, and that some authorities—such as Bradford, as the noble Lord mentioned—are following dispersal. The Government's view is that there is nothing in that which in any way contravenes the provisions of the Act; it is not being done on racial grounds, but on educational grounds.
As to small classes, of course exceptions can always be made. The real object, of course, in relation to small premises is where you have people living in a house in close proximity, maybe sharing accommodation and so forth. But a small class is in a somewhat different position. Either you hold yourself out to give services to the public or a section of the public or you do not. Of course, a purely private matter can be arranged privately and there would be no infringement, but if you hold yourself out to be giving services, education or whatever it is, to the public or a section of the public, is it not desirable that there should be a restriction on discrimination? We always felt that there might in a sense be discrimination for a good purpose, for instance, the man who says: "I am sympathetic to these Pakistanis. They do not speak English very well, so I will get a class together to teach them English". There is no reason why you should not have a class to teach English, and there is no reason why Indians should not attend. There is no reason why one should discriminate and say: "I am not taking anybody except Pakistanis".
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The Government originally put in the Bill Clause 2(3), which said:
"Nothing in this section shall render unlawful anything which is done in good faith for the benefit of a particular section of the public and which has the effect of promoting the integration of members of that section of the public into the community."
That was obviously meant to cover that sort of case I have suggested of language classes for immigrants. Everybody said, "No". This was the Government's view. They had been very anxious throughout to have as much accord on this Bill as possible. When it was moved in Committee that this subsection should be deleted, the Government fought it and there was a Division and they were defeated. They then had to think: "We are always saying how anxious we are to accept the view of the House as a whole. Are we going to put the Whips on "—as I suppose they could have done —"and force it through on Report?". On the whole they thought that they had better accent the view of the Committee.
I can quote the Government view as subsequently put on Report by the Under Secretary. On Report stage there was another Amendment put down, the first subsection having been taken out. This time the Amendment was from an Opposition Back-Bencher and was in these terms:
"It shall not constitute any offence under this Act to advertise offer or provide special facilities for education instruction or training primarily or solely for the members of a minority community resident in the United Kingdom provided that the provision of such facilities is restricted to the members of such a minority community."
What the Under-Secretary said was this:
"The matter was fully debated in Committee but the views which I then argued were not shared by honourable Members. The arguments adduced against putting in such a protection were threefold. The first was the feeling that such a protection was not necessary. There was a recognition of activities specifically designed to assist minority groups, such as Pakistanis, Italians and Japanese. We thought that it was extremely unlikely that such an activity would be open to criticism or brought before the Race Relations Board. It was argued in Committee that there was nothing wrong in discriminating in favour of a minority group since we are concerned with discriminating against. It was argued secondly that such a provision might open the door to various forms of abuse. Some honourable Members feared that it might lead to the sort of separate but equal

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argument which we debated earlier. The third argument—and this is the essence of the matter, particularly in relation to new Clauses 5 and 6—was that it was best to rely on the good sense of the Race Relations Board and the conciliation committees. This I believe is the soundest argument of all."
The Member who moved this new Amendment was generally speaking shot down on all sides.
That being the position, the Government originally being sympathetic to the views put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Aberdare, but having been defeated in the Committee, having accepted that that seemed to be the view of the House as a whole, appreciated that there was this much to be said for it, that this is really a Bill in which you are almost bound to do one of two undesirable things; either leaving pieces of real racial discrimination unprovided against by not covering enough or covering too much; you cannot deal specifically with every single particular case. That being so, the general view in the other place was, as I understand it, that it is better really to cover too much rather than too little, because, after all, first, you are not constituting any criminal offence: you are at most leaving people open to civil proceedings; the proceedings can only be brought by the Race Relations Board, and they will have the good sense not to pay any attention to the sort of case to which the noble Lord has referred.
I would venture to hope that that being the state of things as they left another place, the other place having argued for hours about this matter, both in Committee and on the Report stage, there is no good reason on the Report stage of this Bill here for starting again at the beginning and saying, "No, the whole House in another place was quite wrong; it ought to have left in the Government's original clause." I say that, although I am speaking on behalf of the Government. In those circumstances I hope that the noble Lord may feel able to withdraw his Amendment.
5.10 p.m.
LORD SANDFORD: My Lords, I would certainly start by reiterating what my noble friend Lord Aberdare said when he began: that neither of us has any intention of pressing this Amendment. This is only a probing Amendment
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designed to elicit further explanation from Her Majesty's Government about the working of this Bill when it becomes an Act, in the field of education, training and instruction. I must say that I am a little disappointed that most of what we have got the noble and learned Lord is an explanation of how the Government have got into the situation where they now stand on this Bill, and we are not really much clearer about the way in which it is going to work out in this field.
We felt that the House was owed a further explanation, for two reasons. The first reason is that there was no recommendation in this matter in the Street Report, to which so much is owed in this field. The Street Report described legislation in various countries and recommended further legislation in various fields in this country. It did so notably in the fields of employment and accommodation. So far as I can see, the Report recommended little or no action in the field of education, training and instruction. The Government have decided to legislate in this field, and when we moved an Amendment on Committee to leave it out in order to get an explanation from the Government of their action in including this field in the Bill in spite of its absence from the Street Report, the reply that we got was, to say the least of it, unconvincing.
The second reason for our Amendment is to discover how and why the law covering discrimination in education, training and instruction—a wide field—can possibly operate justly and effectively and in the way in which we all desire, in the way my noble friend describes it as now operating, without certain exceptions and exclusions that we have all found it necessary to introduce in the fields of accommodation and of housing. It cannot possibly be reasonable and sensible and just to include these exceptions and exclusions in one field and to have this sweeping, comprehensive clause covering education.
It is true that at the start there was included in this Bill subsection (3) to Clause 2, which both my noble friend and the Lord Chancellor have read out. This would have protected some, probably all, of the activities that are cited in our Amendment, the need for which has been outlined by my noble friend.

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But, as the Lord Chancellor has described, this subsection was lost in Committee in another place. It was lost at the instigation of the noble and learned Lord's supporters, who rose against the Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office and defeated him.
In resisting the deletion of this subsection, the Under-Secretary of State used a number of phrases which I should like to quote. The first is from column 243, where he said:
"I think, therefore, that there needs to be some protection unless we are simply to say that the Bill is so unenforceable that we need not worry about writing in this sort of protection for bona fide activities."
Is that the position? Are we now saying that this law is so unenforceable that we have to do that? Nothing else that bears on this point has been changed. He went on later to say in relation to this subsection:
"If we were to delete it as a whole we would be in great difficulty with many very worthwhile activities"—
and my noble friend Lord Aberdare has shown that to be the case—
"which might be carried out by all sorts of organisations—local authorities and others."
That is still the position. That was on May 21. The Government were defeated on this clause and, incidentally, just to put the record straight, although I think the noble and learned Lord has really done that, the Government were defeated not by the Conservative Opposition, as the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, said, but by their own supporters.
We now come to the situation described by the Lord Chancellor on the Report stage. By then the Under-Secretary of State had changed his mind and, as the noble and learned Lord reminded us, he admitted that there were perhaps objections to this clause as it was originally drafted. It was not thought necessary to protect discrimination in favour. He agreed that it would encourage the separate but equal approach, and he said that we could rely on the good sense of the Race Relations Board and the conciliation committees.
But let us examine those three propositions which the Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office thought six weeks later to make the deletion of this subsection acceptable. Discrimination in
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favour—yes, certainly and obviously that is all right; but in the case of facilities and services which are in short supply, and certainly teachers in reception classes in primary schools are one of those, discrimination in favour of one group is quite certainly discrimination against another, and discrimination against another on grounds of colour, race, or ethnic or national origins, is illegal. So the argument about there being no need to protect discrimination in favour simply does not stand.
The second justification for leaving out this clause put forward by the Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office was that we could rely on the good sense of the Race Relations Board. Of course we should all like to do that. We may do so when they are operating within the proper sphere of their responsibilities. But I submit that it is Parliament and not the Race Relations Board and the conciliation committees which should make the law of this land. Her Majesty's Government are in this field now proposing legislation which is so vague and comprehensive and woolly that what we shall end up with is a case law made up by the Race Relations Board as they go along. This seems to me to lay us wide open to creating more illegal discrimination than we are curing. However, that having been said, it is the Government's responsibility, and while reserving our right to put down a fresh Amendment, perhaps incorporating some part of the Amendment which we have tabled to-day, I beg leave to withdraw this Amendment as it now stands.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 8 [Exceptions in the case of employment]:
5.19 p.m.
EARL JELLICOE EARL JELLICOE rose to move Amendments Nos. 14 and 15:
Page 5, line 36, leave out from beginning to ("to") in line 37.
Page 5, line 41, leave out paragraph (b) and insert?
("Provided that the Secretary of State may, if at any time it appears to him expedient to do so, and without prejudice to his power to make a further order, by order reduce this number, but no such order shall be made unless a draft of the order has been laid before Parliament and approved by each House of Parliament.")
The noble Earl said: My Lords, again I think it would be for the convenience of the House if we were to consider this Amendment and Amendment No. 15 together. A little time ago I tried, and failed, to get the Government to introduce more flexibility into the housing provisions of the Bill. My purpose here is a similar one. It is to try to get more flexibility built into the employment provisions of the Bill. As it stands at present, the Bill gives exemption from these provisions for a period of two years for an employer employing more than 25 people. After a further two years the exemption ceiling is lowered to 10 employees; and thereafter—that is to say four years after the Bill becomes law—there is no exemption whatsoever. What we are suggesting is a more flexible machinery. The exemption level would start at 25; it might indeed remain there if the Government of the day thought that this was wise. However, if they and the Race Relations Board thought it could be safely and wisely lowered, then under Amendment No. 15 this could be done quite easily by order.
I should like to remind your Lordships briefly that in their Report the Street Committee suggested that, initially, the employment provisions of the Bill might bite only on firms with more than 50 employees. They also made it clear that in some of the American States exemption was always given for employers of not more than 4 employees. Now the Government are starting with a lower exemption level than Street tentatively suggested-25, rather than 50—and they are not providing for any exemption whatsoever after four years. I am not myself suggesting any particular level, apart from the starting figure of 25. It may well be that experience will show that the Board are perfectly capable of coping with the tiny firm in the pretty short period of four years envisaged in the Bill, but the hard fact is that we just do not know. I suggest that it would be far wiser for the Government to see how all this works out in practice and, therefore, to embrace the more flexible procedure provided for in these two Amendments.
The Government cannot possibly be certain now whether the Board will be ready to reduce from 25 to 10 in two years' time. Likewise they cannot possibly know now whether in four years'
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time they and the Board will be able to digest the great mass of tiny firms employing 2, 3, or 4 employees. Given the Government's inflexibility on the housing Amendments where I was attempting to introduce this same principle of flexibility, I am not particularly optimistic that they will be disposed to accept these Amendments, but I am pretty sure that they would be wise to do so. My Lords, I beg to move.
5.24 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I am afraid that almost inevitably all the arguments on these Amendments are really exactly the same as they were on Amendments 6 and 7. As your Lordships will remember, I then pointed out that what was proposed had not come from the Government at all: they had set out with different views and less flexible arrangements. They had heard what happened in Committee. They made certain agreements there, and I think the matter was discussed again on Report. I also think I am right in saying that the first suggestion of phasing came from the Opposition side of the House, and the reasons why the Government are not unhappy about it is for the reasons I ventured to give before: namely, first of all, that it seems sensible to try to have a larger number first for exemptions and then to reduce it, partly because the Government were apprehensive that the Board might be snowed under to start with and also because, in a short-term matter like this, it really is necessary for the people concerned to know.
It is not only necessary for lardlords to know, it is perhaps even more important for employers to know and to be told: "As you have fewer than 25 the provision does not apply to you now, but it will apply to you in two years' time"—or whatever the period may be. If that is done, they know where they are. To find that the matter is to be dealt with by a mere Affirmative Resolution, for which very little notice is necessary, and which may be sprung on employers at any time, without any real notice having been given, is quite different, because they may urgently need to rearrange their businesses accordingly. If they know from the very start that it does not apply to those with under 25 now, but that on a date which is specified it is going to apply to those who have 10

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or more, then they know exactly where they are and in sufficient time in advance.
It is for those two reasons, first because the Government would be reluctant, unless there was some completely new reason for it, to go back to another place to disturb an arrangement made amicably at the end after much discussion, and secondly because, on reflection, they themselves feel that with short-term matters of this kind a phasing arrangement of this sort has, as I say, these two advantages—first, that it is acceptable to the Board and secondly that the employers, like the landlords, will also be able to see in advance exactly where they are and have plenty of time to make their own arrangements—that I hope I may have been able to persuade the noble Earl, who was so extremely gracious in withdrawing his Amendments Nos. 6 and 7, to take the same course with regard to Nos. 14 and 15.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack prefaced his remarks by saying that his response to these Amendments dealing with employment would almost inevitably follow the same pattern as his interesting but negative response to the Amendments which I moved on behalf of my noble friend on the housing provisions. Indeed, save in one respect, to which I will come, I think the noble and learned Lord was right that the pattern of his reply was similar. He mentioned that in the first place, as with the housing provisions, the Bill as at present drafted to some extent represents a measure of compromise reached in another place; and I accept that that is the case although I myself am inclined to think that the compromise has been pitched a little low.
Secondly, he referred to the fact that if the more flexible procedure were to be introduced then one would inevitably lose a measure of certainty, and that it was important that employees, and even more so employers, should know in advance where they stand. I accept that there is force behind that particular argument, although it would of course be open to the Government of the day—and I think any wise Government would take this course—to give plenty of notice if and when they were proposing to introduce an order lowering the ceiling. Certainly I envisaged that this would happen if
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these Amendments proved acceptable to the Government.
The third argument (I am not trying to read any particular significance into this) which the noble and learned Lord did not use was this. When he was referring to the housing Amendments he assured us that the Government had consulted the Board regarding the housing provisions and that they were happy with them as they stood. He did not use this argument with regard to the employment provisions, and it is not for me to speculate about the attitude of the Board on these matters. I only draw attention to the, fact that this argument was not deployed by the noble and learned Lord. I personally am inclined to think that there is not sufficient flexibility here, and that the numbers are pitched too high initially; and I think we may find that the Government and the Board are biting off rather more than they can easily digest in this employment Part of the Bill. That said, I will respond as graciously as I can—I am getting rather bored withdrawing my Amendments at the noble and learned Lord's suggestion—I beg leave to withdraw these two Amendments.
Amendments, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 9 [Charities and acts done for charitable purposes]:
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved Amendments Nos. 16 and 17.
Page 7, line 15, leave out from ("affecting") to ("benefits") in line 16 and insert ("a provision which is contained in a future charitable instrument and confers")
Page 7, line 20, leave out from ("with") to second ("of") and insert ("any such provision or with the provisions of")
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, I think that it will be convenient to take Amendments Nos. 16 and 17 together. The Government introduced an Amendment on Report in the Commons to protect the position of any future charitable instrument having as its main object the conferring of benefits on persons of a particular race, descent, ethnic or national origin. The Amendment was welcomed by the Opposition in this House but criticised on the grounds that it was too restrictive, in that it did not cover a charitable instrument which had such a provision as one of its main objects. The noble Lord, Lord Brooke, sought to insert the words "or as one of

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its main objects "and said in particular that
"it would be undesirable if a charitable trust, acting in all good faith, were found to be in conflict with the Race Relations Act, because it was argued that the 'conferring of benefits on persons of a particular race' et cetera was not its main and exclusive object ".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 25/7/68; col. 1384.]
In resisting Lord Brooke's Amendment, I explained in column 1383 that it would
"appear to make it possible for a charitable trust to be set up to do two different things. In one clause it might be a beneficial object of the kind proposed; in the next it might be to set up something for the benefit of everybody except Jews. … A court can be asked what is the main object of the charity, but I am not sure that, strictly, there can be more than one object. The word 'main' means 'chief' or 'principal'. I doubt whether it is possible to have more than one main object."
Further consideration has been given to this delicate point and it is thought that Lord Brooke's criticism of the clause is valid. The Government Amendments now proposed meet his point but avoid the difficulties which I have mentioned. Here, again, we see the Government very anxious to adopt suggestions which have come from the Opposition. My Lords, I beg to move.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I rather expect that a gracious noise is now expected from me by the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor. I am not absolutely certain that I fully understood everything connected with this particular Amendment, but, at the risk of receiving a sharp rebuff from my noble friend Lord Brooke in the Antipodes, I should like to welcome these Amendments.
On Question, Amendments agreed to.
Clause 13 [Liability of employers and principals]:
5.33 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN LORD DRUMALBYN moved Amendment No. 18:
Page 8, line 21, leave out from ("him") to end of line 22 and insert ("unless the employer proves that it was done without his knowledge and approval.")
The noble Lord said: Subsection (1) of Clause 13, which this Amendment seeks to amend, says:
"Anything done by a person in the course of his employment shall be treated for the purposes of this Act as done by his employer as well as by him …"
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and then it goes on
"… whether or not it was done with the employer's knowledge or approval."
My Amendment would insert instead the words:
"unless the employer proves that it was done without his knowledge and approval".
This firmly places the onus on the employer to prove that something was done without this knowledge and approval.
I should have thought that it is only fair that this should be a valid defence. It is not always so. One can think of safety provisions in factories, for sample. I have in my hand at the moment the Trade Descriptions Act in which defences are provided. It might be better to say that he should prove that lie has taken all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence, but even that is not appropriate in this Bill where one is dealing with personal relationships. I hope that nobody will feel offended if I remind your Lordships that case; have occurred when there has been strike action by employees against an employer which might come within the terms of this provision. It would be ridiculous in such a case if the employer were to be held responsible for something which gave rise to strike action against himself. That is the sort of thing which needs watching carefully. There is no question that this is absolutely mandatory upon the Board since it says:
"Anything done by a person in the course of his employment shall be treated for the purposes of this Act as done by his employer …"
I look forward to hearing what the Government have to say on this matter. It seems to me that this is a case where we must have regard to justice in individual cases. My Lords, I beg to move.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: My Lords, I should 1ike to support this Amendment. The poor old employer has a rather thin time of it today. We have to do all our employees' tax; we have to see that their cares are stamped for national insurance, aid so on, and we have to do all sorts of other things. Of course if we have an unfortunate employee we are only too pleased to help him. But as the Bill is now drawn, are we employers also to be responsible for the prejudices of our employees? I think that this is carrying

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things too far. We are a very long-suffering breed, but if we have to be responsible for the prejudices and passions of our employees heavens knows where we shall end up.
I should like to reiterate what my noble friend said about strike action, since the whole matter could become most involved. Does one also understand that if this Bill becomes law the nationalised industries will have to abide by it? I presume that they do.
LORD DRUMALBYN: Yes, they do; and so does the Crown.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: Well, that may lead to an extraordinary state of affairs. If the Crown is "had up" by the Race Relations Board, then what happens? It would be most helpful if I could have some guidance on this matter. At any rate I fully support the Amendment.
BARONESS SEROTA: My Lords, the noble Lord has reminded us of the contents of subsection (1) of Clause 13, but he perhaps did not put as great emphasis as he might have done upon the fact that it was subject to the saving in subsection (3), which provides that it will be a defence to a charge of unlawful discrimination for an employer to prove that he took such steps as were reasonably practicable to prevent the employee from discriminating. This also covers the noble Viscount's point. An employer cannot, however, avoid responsibility under the Bill by claiming that the act complained of was not his but that of art employee.
Your Lordships will remember that we had a full discussion of this matter in Committee when noble Lords drew on their own personal experience. The difficulty which the Government see in this Amendment is that it seeks to provide that the employer shall be liable only if the act was done with his knowledge and approval. This would mean that the employer could, without contravening the Bill, deliberately neglect to instruct his employee or to make himself aware of his employee's conduct. One of the purposes of subsection (1) surely is to encourage an employer to issue clear instructions to his employees and to ensure that they do not discriminate in their employment. For these reasons the Government
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are unable to accept the Amendment, and I hope that the noble Lord, even though he has yielded so much this afternoon already, will once again withdraw his Amendment.
LORD HAWKE: My Lords, I hope that the noble Baroness does not think that it is going to be easy for employers to instruct foremen and the like in the intricacies of this Bill, because it is really not "on".
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I am bound to say that I did not think that the defence provided here was nearly good enough. Subsection (3) says:
"he took such steps as were reasonably practicable to prevent the employee from doing … "
One knows how very stringently the courts have interpreted such defences in cases of this kind, and it seems to me that they might well expect a very high degree of care and activity, going far beyond what should be necessary in cases of this sort. I should have thought, especially in a case where a warning has been given and that warning had been conveyed by the employer to the employees, that it was really sufficient as a defence for him to say that what was being done was being done without his knowledge and approval in that case. I think I heard my noble and learned friend say that he wanted to ask a question before I withdrew this Amendment. I therefore sit down at this stage.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I did not know whether or not the noble Lord was going to withdraw the Amendment. But there is one question which I want to put to the noble Baroness, and it is this. She has drawn attention to subsection (3), which provides that it is a defence if an employer proves that he took such steps as were reasonably practicable, and it is only a defence if he proves that. What is the position if there are no steps that are reasonably practicable? He will not have satisfied the requirement of that subsection, and it would therefore seem, on the wording as it stands, that he is not protected by subsection (3) and has no defence.
BARONESS SEROTA: My Lords, I should have thought that in issues of this kind there were always steps that one could take which are reasonably practicable.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 15 [General provision as to investigation of complaints of discrimination]:
5.43 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved Amendments Nos, 19 and 20:
Clause 15, page 9, line 37, leave out from ("complaint") to ("is") in line 38 and insert ("which is made to them within two months of the act complained of and also, if the Board think that special circumstances warrant its reception, any complaint made to them or a conciliation committee after the expiration of that period, if in either case the complaint")
Clause 17, page 11, line 33, after ("notice") insert ("or such longer period as the Board may in special circumstances allow")
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, may I take Amendments Nos. 19 and 20 together, and refer also to Amendment No. 29, to Schedule 2, all of which really relate to the same point?
The purpose of these Amendments is to allow the Board discretion in "special circumstances" to authorise the investigation of cases which would otherwise fall outside the time limit of two months. It has always been the Government's intention that there should be a time limit for the making of complaints. As my noble friend Lord Stonham explained in Committee, the period chosen must to some extent be arbitrary. It must be short enough to enable events to be accurately recalled—and a person wishing to make a frivolous complaint is likely to delay doing so, so that it will be difficult to refute his allegation—and long enough to enable probably busy people—perhaps leaving the country for a short period—to submit their complaints. Two months (which is acceptable to the Board) was chosen as a reasonable period to meet both these interests. Arguments were put forward in Committee in the other place for both a longer and a shorter period than two months, but no compelling case for any change was made.
In Committee in this House the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Gifford, moved an Amendment to give the Board discretion "in special circumstances" to receive complaints after the time limit had
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expired. In resisting the Amendment, my noble friend Lord Stonham argued that:
"a discretionary power to extend the time limit would probably result in such pressure to entertain out-of-date complaints that there would be no opportunity for the proper exercise of discretion; and in that case it would be as if there were no time limit". —[OFFICIAL REPORT, 30/7/68, col. 187.]
He also said, as was certainly the case at the time, that the Race Relations Board had not expressed any wish for a discretionary power to extend the time-limit.
The Amendment was withdrawn on the understanding that my noble friend Lord Stonham would consider further a specific problem raised by my noble friend Lord Gifford: that the person may have no chance of learning about the discrimination until more than two months have elapsed. Lord Gifford subsequently wrote to my noble friend Lord Stonham about this, and asked the Government to reconsider the possibility of amending the Bill so that the time limit of two months within which complaints must be made would run from the time the complainant became aware of the alleged act of discrimination, rather than from the date of the act itself.
The question of the time limit has now been re-examined by the Government, in consultation with the Race Relations Board. We have come to the conclusion that the specific proposal of my noble friend Lord Gifford must be resisted, since the effect would be that there would in practice be no time limit at all; the victim of the alleged discrimination could always claim that he did not become aware of it until months or even years afterwards.
Further consultations with the Board indicate, however, that although they firmly support a time limit they are satisfied that this should be two months, and do not wish to be exposed to unreasonable requests to consider cases out of time, yet they would welcome power to consider delayed cases in the sort of special circumstances to which my noble friend Lord Gifford has drawn attention—for example, a man seeking to buy a house, who is told that a higher offer has been received and that his offer is unacceptable, discovers some time later that no such offer has been received and that the house was sold at a lower price.

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They consider that if the Bill were amended to allow the Board to exercise discretion "in special circumstances "they would be able to withstand such pressure as might be applied in cases where the delay in coming forward was not justified.
The Government have therefore decided that Amendments should be moved to enable the Board in "special circumstances" to authorise the investigation of cases which would otherwise be out of time. In all cases it will be for the Board—not the conciliation committees or the voluntary machinery (or the Department for Employment and Productivity in employment cases)—to decide whether there are "special circumstances". In this way the discretion will be exercised uniformly. The Government are confident that the Board can be relied upon to exercise their discretion judiciously. My Lords, I beg to move.
LORD GIFFORD: My Lords, my noble and learned friend very generously drew attention to the part I played in the formulation of these Amendments. I am very happy to reaffirm, in case it was ever doubted in quarters opposite, that the Government are able and willing to yield to reasonable argument, particularly, if I may say so, when reason goes hand in hand with justice, because I spoke to the Amendments moved in Committee which sought to do very much the same as the Government seek to do to-day.
The way I put my argument, and have always put it, was that this kind of circumstance (there may be others) was peculiarly suitable for the exercise of the Board's discretion. A discriminator will rarely give the reasons for his rejection of a particular applicant for a job or a house, and after the Bill is published it will no doubt be rarer still for him to do so. It may be only some time later—perhaps quite fortuituously, perhaps after making inquiries, perhaps even never—that the victim of discrimination will discover that he has been discriminated against. It would obviously be very wrong to debar someone from his lawful remedy when he had had no opportunity of discovering that he had ever been wronged. For those reasons I very much welcome these Amendments. I think they are a very substantial im-
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provement to the Bill and will remove what might have been a number of injustices.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I should just like to ask the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack one question. I see the point of these Amendments. While I would hold that in normal circumstances two months was a reasonable maximum, I fully accept the point of view that there may be special circumstances which warrant a special procedure. The only point which worries me is this. While I accept the case for special machinery in a small number of special cases, is there not also a case for a cut-off point? What I am worrying about is that there may be cases resurrected after one, two, three, four or even five years. Would this really be desirable?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, the Government have considered that point. They were not thinking of anything quite so long as that: they were thinking of a final limit of six months beyond which no complaint should be entertained. But they felt that if one did that it would in practice amount simply to extending the time limit to a fixed period of six months, and the problem of the person with a genuine complaint who did not discover for more than six months that he had been discriminated against would not be met. An open-ended discretionary power is therefore the only one which is of real use; but the longer the period which has elapsed since the incident occurred the less likely the Board will be, I apprehend, to consider that the complaint is justified out of time. That being so, it is not thought there is any real risk of the Amendments leading to the investigation of any substantial number of very late complaints unless these are fully justified by exceptional circumstances.
On Question, Amendments agreed to.
Clause 19 [Nature of proceedings in England and Wales]:
5.52 p.m.
LORD CONESFORD LORD CONESFORD moved Amendments Nos. 21 and 22.
Page 13, line 12, leave out subsection (7).
Page 13, line 18, leave out subsection (8).
The noble Lord said: My Lords, we now come to Clause 19, which deals with

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legal proceedings. Through their spokesmen in both Houses the Government have made it quite clear that they hope that most questions which arise under this Bill will be solved by conciliation, and of course I appreciate that desire and fully accept their good faith in that matter. It is their wish, as it is the wish of the whole House, that only exceptional cases shall come before the courts. When cases have to come before the courts noble Lords in every section of the House, I am convinced, will want the proceedings to be such that all concerned will have a sense of justice and fair play. However much the views of Members of this House may differ about what should constitute unlawful acts of discrimination, I see no reason a priori why we should not all be of the same opinion on the subject of enforcement, because I feel that in every case our desire will be the same.
It is because I am convinced that the compulsory provision of two assessors to assist the judge is likely to do much more harm than good that I am again venturing to bring the matter before this House. On July 30 I brought the matter before the Committee, and on that occasion the Committee was very evenly divided: 65 approved of my Amendment to leave out subsection (7), and 70 opposed it. Since then I have given further study to the subject, including, of course, a study of the very careful and useful speech of the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack; and I dare say the Government have also given further consideration to it, and particularly to the urgent plea made by my noble friend Lord Brooke of Cumnor in his last speech on the occasion to which I have referred.
May I remind the House of some of the characteristics of the proceedings for which this clause provides? As the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack recently reminded us, they will not be criminal proceedings at all; they will be civil proceedings, but civil proceedings of a novel kind. They will be proceedings for a quasi tort or civil wrong—a tort or civil wrong that owes its existence to the Bill now before us. But the plaintiff in the action will not be the person injured, or alleged to be injured, by the unlawful act of discrimination. The plaintiff (if that is the right expression)
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will in every case be the Race Relations Board—a body appointed by the Government, I think the Home Secretary, and no doubt appointed by them having in mind the suitability of the members for their character and knowledge and experience of race relations. I think that is probably a fair way of putting it.
The judge will be one of such county court judges as the noble and learned Lord selects for that purpose. But there will be two assessors who are compulsorily to sit to assist him, and, if I may quote from the Bill about how they will be chosen, it says that they will be
"… appointed from a list of persons prepared and maintained by the Lord Chancellor, being persons appearing to the Lord Chancellor to have special knowledge and experience of problems connected with race and community relations".
I therefore think it is fair to say that the Race Relations Board, who are the plaintiffs, and the assessors, whose description I have just read out, are the same type of person; that is to say, anybody who would be suitable to be chosen for the one body would be suitable to be chosen for the other.
My Lords, what is likely to be the effect of that on the defendant, brought before the court, who is probably a nativeborn inhabitant of these Islands? I am very anxious that he should not have any sense of grievance. But what w ill be the position in which he finds himself? He finds himself accused of a wrong of a totally novel kind; something that is a wrong only because of this Statute. It has not hitherto been a wrong. He finds himself brought before the court by this body, the Race Relations Board, and he finds, not giving evidence in court but sitting next to the judge, two gentlemen who can give advice to the judge that he does not hear at all. Let me say at once that I can well imagine that in some of these cases expert evidence may be required to deal with the matter before the court. An expert on race relations might well give evidence; but if he gives evidence, of course, he can be examined and cross-examined, and his evidence can be tested. My Lords, the defendant will ask: "Why is it that this matter is too difficult to be heard and decided by a judge? Why is a judge not good enough?".
May I remind the House that this use of assessors is wholly exceptional in English practice. If I might give two well-known examples where it may be found, the best example, perhaps, is in Admiralty jurisdiction—for instance, the trying of cases concerning collisions at sea—where the judge is assisted by two nautical assessors who are Elder Brethren of Trinity House. That example is well known. Then occasionally a wholly novel subject comes up as the creation of Statute. One example of that is monopolies and the Restrictive Practices Court. Under the 1956 Act a number of judges are appointed, and so are persons of experience in industry, commerce and public affairs.
What seems to me to have happened here is that this provision is a sort of compromise—and, I think, an unnecessary and unwise compromise—between two rival views. One view that was put forward—I think the noble and learned Lord reminded us last time that it was recommended by the Street Committee—was that there should be a special tribunal to try these race relations cases. That has been, rightly I think, rejected by Her Majesty's Government, and reading the speeches both of the noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack and of the Attorney General in another place I think their views are certainly not in favour of the unnecessary creation of special courts. I do not believe that this compromise will help the Government at all. I do not think that subjects will arise under this Bill that are not of the type that a county court judge can decide unaided. I believe that the introduction of these assessors, for whatever reason, will not achieve the purpose that the Government have in mind. I believe it will do more harm than good and I move to delete the subsection. I beg to move.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Is the noble Lord moving Amendment No. 22 as well as Amendment No. 21?
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, that might be the most convenient. I would otherwise have dealt with it as consequential. I should not be moving it if I did not carry Amendment No. 21. But I adopt the suggestion of moving them both together.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, may I take it that Amendments Nos. 23 and 24, which relate to Scotland, may be considered at the same time?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I agree that all four should be considered together. The noble Lord, Lord Conesford, has of course, inevitably, very largely said what he said on the Committee stage of the Bill, and I am inevitably going to say very much what I said then. This is a matter on which there are three perfectly rational views which anyone might take. The first view, strongly put forward by the Street Report, was that there ought to be special race relations tribunals; and many people agreed with that view. The second view, mainly taken by the lawyers was that they did not like the idea of special tribunals; that being lawyers they liked the ordinary courts. And that, again, is a natural and proper view to take. The third view is what you might call a compromise; but I do not think there is anything necessarily wrong with a compromise. It may be the most sensible thing to do. That was that there should be selected county courts but that, while the judge should be the only person to decide the case, he should have assessors consisting of people with special experience in race relations to advise him.
As I say, anybody can quite well take one or other of those three views. But the first thing I should like to make plain is this. It may be that at one time the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, had a very extensive county court practice, but I imagine that it is some little time since he was in a county court; so he will not, I am sure, mind my reminding him that Order 31, Rule 1, provides:
The registrar of every court shall, on the direction of the judge, prepare and submit to the judge a list of persons who are in the opinion of the registrar fit and proper persons to act as assessors.
"2. The registrar shall apply to such persons as the judge may approve to ascertain if they are willing to act as assessors.
"3. The registrar shall cause a list of the persons approved by the judge and willing to act as assessors to be posted in the court office.
"Every assessor named in the list shall continue to be an assessor until a new list has been completed…"
and so on.

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Then, what he is to be paid. It goes on:
"6. A party who desires an assessor to be summoned to assist the judge shall, not less than 10 clear days before the day fixed for the hearing, file an application in Form 247, and deposit the amount of the assessor's fee in the court office, and thereupon the registrar shall send a copy of the application to the judge.
"7.—(1) If the judge grants the application, the registrar shall give notice to the parties in Form 248."
So, my Lords, there is a special order under which anybody in the county court has a legal right to ask for an assessor. This does not, in fact, happen often. I have no personal experience of it. For that very reason, I should think that a judge asked by one of the parties to sit with an assessor would be much more likely to say "Yes" than to say "No", because it would be a nice change for him. He would think that it does not do any harm. As the Race Relations Board are going to be the plaintiffs, they have an absolute legal right to ask the judge for an assessor. Ought we not to decide what is to happen? Do we want half the courts saying "Yes" and the other half saying "No"? The only difference really is that under the order the party applying for the assessor has to pay the assessor's fees in the first instance; and then it is for the judge at the end to say who shall pay them according to the result of the case. But, of course, under the Bill the Government pay for the assessors.
I should have thought, with great respect, that as the order is there and as there is a strong view that there should be assessors, it is much better to apply a proper procedure and make it clear in the Bill whether there are to be assessors or not. Although the noble Lord is right in saying that at the Committee stage I said that this was not my favourite clause, the reason why, on balance, I suggest that this is right is simply, as I said all the way through, that the Government are most anxious that this Bill in the form in which it is ultimately to be enacted should receive the largest measure of support possible. On the whole, most people seem to think that a profesional judge who alone will decide but who will have people sitting with him with special experience in race relations is most sensible. I appreciate that some lawyers still say that they would
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like the judge alone; and that a number of people who support the Street Report say that on the whole they would sooner have special tribunals.
But this course seems to meet general approval and we are at the stage when this matter has been specifically considered in the other place and has been specifically the subject of revision when an exactly similar Amendment was put forward in the other place. The other place decided, "No, we shall leave the Bill as it is." Then it came here. Then the same Amendment was moved on the Committee stage. Then, again, we had a Division; and this House also thought it was better to leave the Bill as it is. In those circumstances, would it be sensible to send the Bill back to the other place saying: "It is true that you thought that this was on the whole the best plan; and it is true that we thought this in Committee, too; but now we have changed our minds about it"? For those reasons, I hope very much that the noble Lord may think it right not to press this Amendment.
6.9 p.m.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I have listened with the most careful attention possible to what the noble and learned Lord has said. Like my noble friend Lord Conesford, I have also studied the speech he made during the Committee stage. I for one do not feel in the least affected in my view regarding this Amendment by the fact that it has already been considered in another place. This House has functions as well as another place. We have heard that argument advanced before, implying that we should not reconsider a matter which has been the subject of a Division in another place. That is an argument, but I think it is one that this House should reject. We have also considered this subject in Committee. It is true the Amendment was not carried; there was a very small majority against it.
This is the first time I have spoken on this Bill, and I would rather approach this question entirely by considering the merits of the proposal. With regard to those, the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, has been very frank. He said there was the view that there should be a special tribunal or court to deal with these matters, and that that view was

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tenable. I dare say it has a number of supporters. Then there was the view that he attributed primarily to lawyers, that this matter should be dealt with in the courts. Then there was the view that he says is embodied in this Bill as a compromise. Well, my Lords, compromises are not always bad; sometimes they are very good; but, in the light of me information I now have I must say that this compromise does not seem to me at all satisfactory.
My approach to this question is, in some respects, a little different from that of my noble friend Lord Conesford. It is of course the case that there is power to secure the appointment of assessors in the county court. I cannot recollect a single case in which that power has been exercised—I do not think that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor can—but he is quite right in saying that there are rules which enable that to be done. It is a long time since I looked at those rules, but I apprehend that it is within the power of the county court judge to refuse the application to sit with assessors. I hope that the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, will correct me if I am wrong. Of course, if it were a technical matter of a highly complex character, I feel sure that the county court judge would grant an application, if it were made, in the same way as the Admiralty cases are tried with assessors. But what I want to come to in relation to this particular proposal is to ask your Lordships to consider what it is that the assessors are to be required to do.
In this case it is not a question of a party applying for it and the judge deciding whether or not there should be assessors. They are compulsory—assessors with special knowledge of race relations problems. What is it that the assessors are to be required to do? It does not suffice just to say that they are to be there to assist the judge. To assist him in deciding what? That is the question I want to put to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, because I think it is worth bearing in mind the task that will confront the county court judge when a case is brought before him under the provisions in this Bill.
As my noble friend has said, the case will be brought by the Race Relations Board and it is clear from the Bill that
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it can be brought only if the Race Relations Board have come to the conclusion that there has been a breach by the defendant of the requirements of the Act, as it will then be. So the defendant will start knowing, as the county court judge will know, that the Race Relations Board have found against him on the facts. Then the proceedings are started. They come before the county court judge and he will have to do what he does in every other case where there is a trial—listen to the evidence called before him, weigh it up and, where there is a conflict of evidence, determine where the truth lies. He will have to perform that task in these cases just as he has to perform it in every other case where there is a trial and he is sitting without a jury.
Having decided what facts are proved, he will then have to decide (and, as the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said, it is a matter entirely for him) whether or not those facts proved establish a breach of the requirements as defined in this Bill; whether they amount to unlawful discrimination as defined in the Bill. In that part of the judicial task what part are the assessors having special knowledge of race relations problems to play? Are they to express a view on whether a particular witness should be believed or disbelieved? Are they to express the view that certain facts have been established and that those facts amount to unlawful discrimination?
My Lords, during the Committee stage discussions the noble Lord, Lord Leatherland, suggested that their function would be similar to that of a jury. Of course it would not be; they are no jury. They have not to decide any question of fact. The judge has to decide questions of fact—that has been made clear—and it would, I think, be very wrong if the judge turned to the assessors and asked them to act in private as if they were a jury when in fact they are not. I could understand it—I do not say that I would support it—if there were to be a special body of people who were to find the facts like a jury, but this Bill does not provide for that. It merely provides that there will be these two people, with special knowledge of race relations problems, to assist. Are they intended to assist in the discharge of that part of the judicial function by the judge? If so, we ought to be told what it is that they are intended to do,

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and we ought to be told it with the greatest clarity and precision.
Suppose the judge has found that there has been unlawful discrimination. Then one can see from the Bill that he has power to grant an injunction. That depends on whether the conditions in Clause 21 are, or are not, satisfied. They are laid down precisely and the learned judge would have to satisfy himself that those conditions were satisfied before he granted an injunction. Are the assessors with special knowledge of race relations problems to assist him in determining whether the conditions laid down in Clause 21 are, or are not, satisfied? I should have thought not. That, again, is a question of evaluating the evidence and considering the provisions in the Bill. Of course, an injunction is always a discretionary remedy, but here the discretion is limited by Clause 21; and I cannot believe that the mere presence of assessors would assist a judge in determining whether or not, in a particular case where those conditions are satisfied, an injunction should be granted. Because whether or not an injunction should be granted depends on whether or not there appears to be a real risk of a repetition of the conduct. That is one relief which may be claimed.
The next is damages on behalf of the person who is alleged to have suffered loss. Well, my Lords, what room is there in that respect for assistance by assessors? If the loss is proved to the satisfaction of the judge, he will award damages in compensation. It does not seem that there is any room for assessors. If a judge does neither of those things but is satisfied that there has been unlawful discrimination, he can grant a declaration to that effect. So when one deals with those three things that the judge can do, which are set out in terms in Clause 19, it does not appear to me that there is any real assistance that may be given to the court by the presence of two persons with special knowledge of race relations problems.
Also in Clause 19 there is power given to the county court judge to revise the terms of any contract which run counter to the provisions of this Bill. That is a pure question of law and I should not think that on that assessors could give any assistance of any value at all. So, approaching this matter pragmatically, it
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seems to me that in reality there is no need for assessors of this or of any other kind to assist the judge in the performance of duties which are similar to his duties when trying any other case.
This is a compromise, the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said. It seems to me, with the greatest respect, that this is really a compromise with a good percentage of window-dressing attached to it. I do not think it is a good thing. It is really an innovation to have assessors sitting compulsorily in matters of this kind. I entirely agree with my noble friend Lord Conesford in what he said with regard to the position of the defendant, who is not charged with a crime but is charged with conduct which a great many people will condemn; and a condemnation under this Act will be a reflection on his character. I do not think that, in the hearing to determine whether or not he has been guilty of the conduct alleged, he will think he has had a fair trial if, sitting with the county court judge, there are two persons with special knowledge of race relations problems appointed by the Lord Chancellor, whose advice will presumably be tendered to the county court judge without the defendant having the least idea of what that advice is.
When we come to consider the great care we have taken, in relation to criminal proceedings in magistrates' courts, to see that the clerks to the justices do not go beyond their sphere and express views on the facts and evidence behind the scenes to the magistrates without the accused knowing anything about it, I must say that I think that to provide here by Statute that there will be two people who will be able to express views in private which will never be known to the defence is a retrograde step and one to which this House should not agree.
6.24 p.m.
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, I think that people are going to be very surprised when they discover that county court judges, who are entrusted with sitting alone in judgment upon a wide variety of cases are not to be allowed, in this one class of case of race relations, to sit alone, but only with assessors sitting beside them. In the experience of two Lord Chancellors, county court judges have

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never been known to need assessors with them to hear a case. I can well understand that a High Court Judge trying Admiralty cases may need expert advice from assessors when he has before him a question of the intricacies of the navigation of ships upon the high seas. But what is so special about a race relations case tried in the county court that it cannot be tried by the judge alone?
The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has made it clear from extracts from the County Court Rules that it would be open to the Race Relations Board, as plaintiff, to ask for an assessor, and it would be open to any county court judge to suggest to the parties that an assessor should sit with him and no doubt that could be achieved. Can we not see how this works out in practice, and see whether it is not possible for county court judges to try race relationship cases alone, unassisted by assessors, as they deal with the other cases that come before them? If they cannot, then they have powers whereby they can suggest that assessors sit with them. As experience is gained, the matter can be resolved. But I think it is a mistake at the outset to insist on assessors in this one class of county court case. I should think that this was blowing up race relation cases to give them a special importance and magnitude which they do not deserve, as well as drawing more public attention to them than they deserve.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, may I ask a question and make an observation purely from the Scottish point of view? I should like to know whether it is customary for assessors to sit with sheriffs, and who will appoint the panel of assessors in Scotland? The difficulty we are always up against in Scotland is that we do not have a Lord Chancellor. Your Lordships will see that, so far as Scotland is concerned, it is the Secretary of State who is to be given power to designate sheriff courts where actions are to be taken and to prepare the panel of assessors. One must have regard to the separation of powers. I am not entirely happy about this. Here we have a double possibility of political influence. Cases may be referred to a court which may be expected to take a certain line in general. In addition, there are to be assessors who are considered to have certain views
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which are acceptable from this point of view. I do not want to overstress this, but it is a danger. To my mind it is one reason why we should not give the Secretary of State both the power to say in what sheriff court cases may be heard—after all, it may cause considerable inconvenience to parties if the court is outside their area—and power to nominate panels. I express this misgiving only because it is one which has some influence with me personally.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, those of us who have listened to this debate obviously feel in a difficulty. I gather from my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor that two different views have been expressed by two groups of people and I also gather than they have not been along the lines of political Parties. The Government have come along with a compromise, and, as the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has said, a compromise is not necessarily a bad thing; it just depends on the compromise. My own view is that the compromise already exists in existing legislation. Under the county courts procedure, if in the opinion of the judge an assessor is required, he can ask for the appointment of an assessor. It seems to me unreasonable that there should be assessors appointed in all cases, whether they are necessary or not. I hope that the Government will think again about this, and be content to rest on the existing county court procedure. To have this matter settled on Party lines, as it would be if there were a Division, would in my view be most unsatisfactory. It is not something that ought to be decided according to one's political complexion.
THE EARL OF ENNISKILLEN: My Lords, I should like to support the last remarks, because I feel that from the ordinary person's viewpoint this is a compromise with a bias, and will be so construed. There is nothing wrong with British justice, and nothing wrong with British courts; but we are by this means setting up precisely what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor described as one of the means they wish to get rid of—a special court. This is what I should have thought Englishmen required: it is British. It is bad enough that we have to have legislation on this subject. The people whom we are trying to assimilate are to be assimilated as

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subjects of the Realm and as such they should be treated in the ordinary fashion of the British people in law.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, perhaps I may have leave to speak again, quite shortly. I have already referred to the county court rules. I should have started with the Act itself, because the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, asked: What exactly are the assessors going to do? The answer is that they will help the judge in whatever way the judge wants to be helped, which is indeed the position in law now. Section 91 of the County Courts Act reads as follows:
"In any proceedings the judge may, if he thinks fit, on the application of any party"—
so my noble friend Lord Silkin will see that the judge has no power to do it himself, other than on the application of the party—
"summon to his assistance, in such manner as may be prescribed, one or more persons of skill and experience in the matter to which the proceedings relate who may be willing to sit with the judge and act as assessor. The remuneration of assessors for sitting as afore-said shall be of such rate as may be prescribed…"
and so on. There is nothing in the Act as to exactly what he does when he gets there beyond what I have read.
What I was suggesting, my Lords, was that we cannot really leave the matter there, because if these Amendments are passed the Race Relations Board will have a legal right to apply to a county court judge in every case for assessors, but the registrar will not have a list of assessors. It is necessary to provide some machinery obviously appropriate to this kind of case.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, if the noble and learned Lord will give way, I should entirely agree that it might be necessary to produce a list of assessors; but all that would be needed would be to add names to the existing list of assessors. What he has said already makes it quite clear I think (and I should like him to confirm this), that the learned county court judge has a discretion to refuse an application for assessors where he does not think they will help him.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: He has under the County Courts Act. But I should have thought that this would have been undesirable in the case of this Bill
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—undesirable, that is to say, that entirely different practices should grow up in different parts of the country, and that in some places the judge should always sit alone, and in other places should always sit with assessors. No doubt it is for Parliament to make up its mind as to what is the right thing to do.
I said to start with that these are three perfectly tenable views: the very strong view taken by the Street Committee, that there ought to be a special Race Relations Tribunal; the view taken, mainly by lawyers, that one wants just the ordinary courts, and what has been called the compromise view, that there should be a judge with two persons with special experience of race relations.
Finally, I would say that I never intended to suggest that this House is not entitled to differ from the other p1ace. Of course it is. It is not only its right, but very often its duty. All I was suggesting was that this is the unusual case of Leaders of Parties feeling that, in the national interest, the more we can agree on the terms of this Bill, the better that it is a case in which the Government who of course, with their majority, can always push things through in another place, have time after time on this Bill deliberately not done so but have accepted the view of the opposition. All I was suggesting was that when there is a Division in this House, and this House takes exactly the same view as the other House has taken, then it would seem odd on a later occasion in this House to use the power which one political Party always has in this House, whoever is the Government, to change the decision which this House in Committee has already made.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, in view of the late hour and the very complete speech of my noble and learned friend Lord Dilhorne I shall be very brief. The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor was quite right to remind me that my county court days were very long ago, and I think I might have forgotten about the provision for assessors had he not been good enough to remind us on the last occasion, when I found out that, as usual, he was quite right. I take some comfort from the fact that all the time that I had my meagre practice in the courts I never knew a case where assessors were appointed in the county

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court; the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has never known such a case, and my noble and learned friend his predecessor on the Woolsack has never known such a case. So I do not think we need treat this as something that is constantly arising or particularly likely to arise.
My view of the matter, my Lords, is quite clear. If I thought that the Race Relations Board were themselves as plaintiffs likely to ask for assessors—assessors of exactly the same type and chosen from the same milieu as themselves—I should have thought that we probably ought to provide in this Bill that they should not be provided with assessors. I am prepared to leave the law as it is, as suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, but I object to compulsory assessors.
The only other matter is this. I respect greatly a decision of the other House, but I think that some Members may have been under the impression from what the Lord Chancellor said (what he said was quite accurate, and I do not complain about it) that it was a decision of that House sitting as a House. In fact it was a decision of a Committee, and by a majority of 12 to 8. I think
that that does put a slightly different complexion on it. I think I am right in saying that the other House as a House has never had anything like the full discussion that we have had.
On the question of reversing on Report something done in Committee, that is done very frequently in this House. I have very often been the victim of it myself, when I have succeeded in carrying something in Committee and it has been reversed on Report. That is not an uncommon occurrence in this House. In this case there was a very small majority against me in Committee. My last words are these. My real object in this Amendment—I hope this will be accepted because I am speaking the absolute truth—is to improve this Bill. I believe that this Bill with this Amendment will carry more confidence in the country, will give more sense of justice among litigants, than this Bill as it will be without this Amendment. For that reason, I wish to take the view of the House.
6.41 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Amendments (Nos. 21 and 22) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 57; Not-Contents, 36.

CONTENTS

Aberdare, L.

Drumalbyn, L.

Milverton, L.

Ailwyn, L.

Emmet of Amberley, Bs.

Monson, L.

Airedale, L.

Enniskillen, E.

Mountevans, L.

Albemarle, E.

Falkland, V.

Mowbray and Stourton, L.

Audley, Bs.

Falmouth, V.

Moyne, L.

Barnby, L.

Ferrier, L.

Oakshott, L.

Barrington, V.

Fortescue, E.

Rankeillour, L.

Boston, L.

Gridley, L.

St. Aldwyn, E.

Brecon, L.

Guest, L.

St. Just, L.

Carrington, L.

Hanworth, V.

Sandford, L.

Clifford of Chudleigh, L.

Hawke, L.

Sandys, L.

Colville of Culross, V. [Teller.]

Headfort, M.

Somers, L.

Conesford, L. [Teller.]

Holford, L.

Strange of Knokin, Bs.

Cork and Orrery, E.

Ironside, L.

Strathclyde, L.

Craigavon, V.

Jellicoe, E.

Stratheden and Campbell, L.

Cromartie, E.

Kirkwood, L.

Swansea, L.

Daventry, V.

Long, V.

Teviot, L.

Denham, L.

Massereene and Ferrard, V.

Vivian, L.

Dilhorne, V.

Merrivale, L.

Younger of Leckie, V.

NOT-CONTENTS

Addison, V.

Carron, L.

Hilton of Upton, L. [Teller.]

Archibald, L.

Champion, L.

Kennet, L.

Arwyn, L.

Collison, L.

Latham, L.

Asquith of Yarnbury, Bs.

Fiske, L.

Leatherland, L.

Beswick, L.

Gardiner, L. [L. Chancellor.]

Lloyd of Hampstead, L.

Bowles, L. [Teller.]

Gifford, L.

Morris of Grasmere, L.

Brockway, L.

Granville of Eye, L.

Morris of Kenwood, L.

Buckinghamshire, E.

Henderson, L.

Peddie, L.

Burden, L.

Henley, L.

Phillips, Bs.

Rusholme, L.

Shepherd, L.

Taylor of Mansfield, L.

Serota, Bs.

Sorensen, L.

Williamson, L.

Shackleton, L.

Strabolgi, L.

Wynne-Jones, L.

On Question, Amendments agreed to.

Resolved in the affirmative, and Amendments agreed to accordingly.
Clause 20 [Nature of proceedings in Scotland]:
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 23. I think noble Lords will agree that it would be quite inappropriate that we should have assessors in Scotland if there are not to be assessors in England.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, does the noble Lord wish to move Amendment No. 24 with No. 23, or separately?
LORD DRUMALBYN: Together, my Lords. I beg to move.
Amendments moved—
Page 14, line 32, leave out subsection (7).
Page 14, line 38, leave out subsection (8).—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I agree with what the noble Lord has said. I cannot, of course, accept the Amendments, for the reasons given in relation to the previous Amendments. On the other hand, I shall not ask the House to divide against them, because plainly that would be a waste of time.
Clause 27 [Application to Crown, the police and public bodies]:
BARONESS SEROTA: My Lords, to facilitate progress perhaps we may take Amendments Nos. 25, 26 and 27 together. These Amendments are purely technical. The provision in the Bill which is now being amended was added at Committee stage in your Lordships' House. Unfortunately, the Amendment then moved did not apply, as it should have done, to proceedings in regard to police cadets. These Amendments now proposed correct this omission. I beg to move.
Amendments moved—
Page 19, line 34, after ("(4)") insert ("or (5)").
Page 19, line 35, at end insert ("or police cadet").
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Page 20, line 5, after ("(4)") insert ("or (5)").—(Baroness Serota.)
Schedule 1 [Provisions as to the Race Relations Board and conciliation committees]:
BARONESS SEROTA: My Lords, this Amendment also is technical and merely corrects an error in the way it was printed. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 24, line 13, after first ("of") insert ("Schedule 1 to").—(Baroness Serota.)
Schedule 2 [Complaints relating to employment, trade unions and organisations of employers]:
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, in moving this Amendment on behalf of my noble friend Lord Stonham, your Lordships may remember that this was the third of three Amendments, Nos. 19, 20 and 29, with which I deal: fully when moving Amendment No. 19. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 24, line 25, leave out from ("applies") to ("is") in line 27 and insert ("and which is made to them within two months of the act complained of and also, if the Race Relations Board think that special circumstances warrant its reception, any complaint made to the authority after the expiration of that period, if in either case the complaint").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, may I ask whether exactly the same circumstances apply here? The example given in the previous case related to accommodation; here we are dealing with employment. Is it really believed that cases of this sort may arise after two months?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Yes, my Lords. The Government are satisfied, together with the Board, that the same considerations should apply.

TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING BILL
6.55 p.m.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, I have it in command from Her Majesty the Queen to acquaint the House that Her Majesty, having been informed of the purport of the Town and Country Planning Bill, has consented to place Her interest, so far as it is concerned on behalf of the Crown, at the disposal of Parliament for the purposes of the Bill.
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF HOUSING AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (LORD KENNET): My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a third time. Before any Amendments are called, I will, with the leave of the House, make a short statement. First, I want to comment on the fact that there is a large number of Amendments—larger than usual on Third Readings in your Lordships' House. The House will see that by far the greater part of them are pure drafting, while most of the remainder are regroupings of material in the interests of clarity, and only a small number have any points of substance. I will indicate when we come to those. There are two points that I wish, as it were, to "pull out of the bag": first, a point about statutory undertakers and, second, a point about advertisement appeals.
Dealing first with statutory undertakers, the House will recall that the present Clause 70 in this Bill was moved in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ilford, on Report and inserted in the Bill on a Division. The effect of the clause is to make compensation no longer payable to statutory undertakers for certain kinds of planning restrictions. The proposals of the Government which it replaced were rather less drastic, but we have considered the matter in the light of the action taken by your Lordships' House on Report. We have borne in mind the strong views expressed, in this House and elsewhere, about the cumbersomeness of the earlier proposals; about the continuing right of statutory undertakers to compensation in circumstances in which no one else would be entitled to it; and about the effect of having to deal with the kind of case which has focused attention on this issue, for instance,
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Abingdon. After this consideration the Government have, on balance, concluded that Clause 70 as amended by the noble Lord, Lord Ilford, should stand. I regret that the noble Lord, Lord Ilford, is not in his place to-night. He is to be congratulated that his clause will need only one small drafting Amendment simply to bring up to date the wording of paragraph (2)(b), because the definition to which it refers has already been altered during the passage of the Bill.
I turn now to the question of advertisement appeals, that is to say, appeals to my right honourable friend the Minister of Housing and Local Government against refusal by a local planning authority of consent to display an advertisement. As I explained to the House on July 29 during the Report stage of the Bill, the Government had concluded that the control of advertisements was essentially a local matter which ought to be left to the locally elected council. The proposal of the Government made it desirable to ensure that these advertisement decisions, against which there would in future be no appeal to the Minister, should be taken by elected members and not by officers of the local authority.
Clause 63 of the Bill empowers local authorities to delegate certain planning decisions to officers, including advertisement applications. So at that time, when I was moving the Amendment to delete the relevant part of Clause 63 in order to prevent these decisions being delegated to officers, I announced the intention of the Government to lay regulations abolishing advertisement appeals. It was this Amendment which the House rejected at an earlier stage. My right honourable friend has naturally been considering the situation thus created, and I had hoped that it would be possible to make a statement.
In general, I am not sure whether the proposal has been fully understood. For example, do those who have misgivings in connection with amenity recognise that the power that the Minister contemplates relinquishing is one which only enables him to allow an advertisement against the wishes of the local authority and never vice versa? Do they appreciate that the abolition of appeals to the Minister would be accompanied by a strengthening of the provisions about appeals to the courts, making it easier for applicants

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to appeal against a local authority refusal to the court, and thus making local authorities more careful about issuing refusals?
Within the last few days my right honourable friend the Minister of Housing has received from the Outdoor Advertising Council proposals for alternative arrangements for appeals. These, briefly, envisage the appointment by the Minister of local panels of barristers and solicitors to whom advertisement appeals could be referred. The cost would be met by local authorities who would recoup it by charging a fee on each application.
The Outdoor Advertising Council also sent to my right honourable friend the results of a public opinion poll. This poll asked questions on public attitudes towards outdoor advertising, both in general and according to types of advertising and area; whether outdoor advertising should require permission from the local authority. It also included (and this is what concerns me to-night) the following question:
"If the local authority refuses to give permission. there is a right of appeal. It has been suggested that this right should be abolished. Do you think it should be abolished or not?"
According to the poll, 75 per cent. believed that the right of appeal should continue.
I should like to point out at this stage, for the sake of getting it on the Record (although this is not the time to discuss it), that this question did not inform those who were expected to answer it of two facts: first, that many people who want to display an advertisement do not have to apply for permission at all. A shopkeeper who wants to advertise what he does and what he sells does not even have to apply for permission, so the question of appeal or abolition of appeal does not touch him. The second fact of which this question left the answerers in ignorance was that at the same time as the Government proposed the abolition of appeal to the Minister they proposed a facilitation and broadening of the grounds of appeal to the courts.
The time to discuss this will be if and when the Government lay proposals before Parliament for abolition of appeals to Ministers. I do not wish to raise any false hopes that the Government will be able to accept proposals for an alternative
1278
method of appeal, but what has been done represents a constructive attempt to provide an alternative to the present arrangements and deserves consideration. The Government must consult with the various interested bodies, not least the representatives of local authorities who would, under the Outdoor Advertising Council's proposals, be largely responsible for operating the scheme. These consultations and the consideration which must follow them will be carried through as quickly as possible. I have myself already, yesterday, met the representatives of the Outdoor Advertising Council for a preliminary discussion. In the meantime my right honourable friend thinks it would not be right to lay regulations which would end advertisement appeals. As soon as the consultations and considerations are completed I will inform the House of the results, and of course any proposals for changing the arrangements now in force will come before your Lordships.
So much, my Lords, for a preliminary statement. We can discuss the matter further when we come to the Amendment down in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross. I beg to move that the Bill be now read a third time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 3a.—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, may I clarify one point? The noble Lord says that those who voted in this public opinion poll were not aware that there were a number of advertisements that did not require planning consent. I am a little puzzled by that statement. We are talking of outdoor advertising. Is he referring to advertising by shopkeepers in their own windows or to any class of outdoor advertising for which planning consent is not necessary?
LORD KENNET: My Lords, generally speaking, if you are carrying on any trade or commerce in some premises and you want to advertise on the premises your name, and what is the nature of your trade and the sort of things you sell there, and even the brand names of the things you sell, you do not have to apply for planning consent to display that advertisement.
On Question, Bill read 3a, with the Amendments.
Clause 17 [Certification of established use.]:
LORD KENNET LORD KENNET moved Amendment No. 1:
Page 18, line 16, leave out from ("of") to end of line 17 and insert ("procuring a particular decision on an application (whether by himself or another) for an established use certificate or on an appeal arising out of such an application")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment is designed to ensure that the offences created by Clause 17(8) apply not only where the object of the fraudulent act is to obtain an established use certificate, but also where the object is to ensure that a certificate is refused. I beg to move.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, I would support this Amendment. It seems to me a sensible extension of this particular provision and cannot be objectionable in any way.
Clause 18 [Grant of certificate by Minister on referred application or appeal against refusal]:
LORD KENNET LORD KENNET moved Amendment No. 2:
Page 19, line 10, at end insert—
("(4) Before determining an application or appeal under this section the Minister shall, if either the applicant or appellant (as the case may be) or the local planning authority so desire, afford to each of them an opportunity of appearing before, and being heard by, a person appointed by the Minister for the purpose.")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment rectifies an unintentional omission in Clause 18, which does not contain an express provision giving the parties to a called-in application for an established use certificate or an appeal against refusal of a certificate a right to have an opportunity of appearing before and being heard by a person appointed by the Minister for the purpose. I beg to move.
Clause 19 [Power to stop further development pending proceedings on enforcement notice]:
LORD KENNET: My Lords, Amendment No. 3 is a drafting amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 20, line 4, leave out ("is in force") and insert ("has effect").—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD KENNET LORD KENNET moved Amendment No. 4:
Page 20, line 22, at end insert—
("() Where a person (in this subsection called 'the contractor') is under contract to another person (in this subsection called 'the developer') to carry out any operations on land and—

(a) a stop notice takes effect (whether in relation to the developer or the contractor, or both) prohibiting the carrying out or continuance of those operations; and

(b) the operations are countermanded or discontinued by the contractor accordingly,

then, unless and in so far as the contract makes provision explicitly to the contrary of this subsection, the developer shall be under the same liability in contract as if the operations had been countermanded or discontinued on instructions given by him in breach of the contract.
This subsection applies only to contracts entered into on or before 1st November 1969, whether before or after the commencement of this section.")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, Amendments Nos. 4 and 5 hang together. They are designed to give protection to contractors who are obliged to discontinue operations on land as a consequence of a stop notice being served. These are essentially transitional provisions. I think they are quite clear. I beg to move.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, there is rather more to this than perhaps the noble Lord has indicated, since this matter was first raised in another place, I think at the Committee stage, and it was at that time that the Minister of State who was in charge of the Bill said that he would look at this point again. I know that negotiations have been going on as to the right way to deal with it, and very recently this Amendment has appeared. As I understand it, those who wish to have the matter dealt with are not wholly satisfied with this. However, one is in the position either that nothing is put in the Bill specifically about the matter and it has to remain to be dealt with simply under the compensation provisions as they now are with the word "directly", or that one accepts the Amendment because there will be no other opportunity.

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Probably in the circumstance it would be better to accept the Amendment, but I would do so with reservations, for this reason. There are two ways in which this matter might be dealt with. One is the method the Amendment puts forward, which is that where a contractor has been employed he must seek his compensation first of all from the employer, the building owner, and then the building owner can go to the local planning authority in his turn, thereby involving two transactions; or it could be dealt with by the contractor going straight to the local planning authority. Of course, the situation is going to arise only where the stop notice has been, as it turns out, wrongly served; where it has been rightly served there will be no question of compensation anyway. The result of this method of doing it is to complicate the matter and it will put an extra burden on the building owner who, ex-hvpothesi, has been wrongly frustrated and thwarted by the local authority. Therefore, I do not think it is perhaps the best way of doing it; but of course we have no other chance.
I wonder whether the noble Lord could tell me why he says that it is only transitional? Then, why is the date November 1, 1969, chosen for this purpose? The noble Lord has not explained that, and I do not think he explained what is expected to happen thereafter. I may have seen certain information about this which is not available to the rest of the House, but I think that that matter needs explaining because I understand that it is not going to be simply a transitional problem; it will go on after November 1, 1969, as well, and I think the House ought to know the answer now.
7.10 p.m.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, the Government conceive it to be transitional because in the long run we hope that this new law on stop notices and compensation in the event of a wrongful stop notice will work through and be expressed in clauses in standard contracts. A lot of work is being done under contracts which are already in vigour, and many contracts are nearing signature in respect of which it is advantageous to legislate in order to ensure that a reasonably just situation exists between now and the time when contracts would nor-
1282
mally contain provisions to cover this point. The reason for November 1, 1969, is that which I have just given: that we want to give people warning that a new statutory provision is in effect, and give them time to adapt contracts and standard forms of contract; and that seems a reasonable period to give.
Clause 20 [Compensation for loss due to stop notice]:
LORD KENNET: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 5.
Amendment moved—
Page 21, line 15, at end insert ("o of any liability arising by virtue of section 19(8) of this Act").—(Lord Kennet.)
Clause 21 [Determination of planning and similar appeals by persons appointed by the Minister]:
LORD KENNET: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 6. This is drafting.
Amendment moved—
Page 21, line 29, at end insert ("(default powers and appeals in connection with tree preservation orders)").—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD KENNET: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 7 which is also drafting.
Amendment moved—
Page 21, line 36, leave out ("publicity to be given to any directions made") and insert ("the giving of publicity to any directions given").—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD KENNET LORD KENNET moved Amendment No. 8:
Page 22, line 1, leave out ("section") and insert ("Part of this Act")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, Amendments Nos. 8, 10, 13, 14 and 15 are all drafting and hang together. I beg to move Amendment No. 8. I am conscious of the fact that the noble Lord who occupies the Woolsack has a lot of reading to do on this Bill, and probably during the course of our discussions this evening will actually talk more than I or any other noble Lord. It seems to me that the alternative procedure, which would be for me to move Amendments

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en bloc, would in the case of this particular Bill be most taxing on your Lordships' powers of computerisation, and that therefore it is far better not to risk it, because the Amendments do not come together in blocks. I should be jumping about and moving blocks with intermissions in them. So with the patience and consent of your Lordships, I will proceed as I have been doing, moving each Amendment separately. Amendments Nos. 8, 10, 13, 14 and 15 hang together. I beg to move Amendment No. 8.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (LORD CHAMPION): My Lords, I am grateful for the noble Lord's consideration.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, the only difficulty is that I think there is a point of substance under Amendment No. 11, and the noble Lord, while explaining the procedure, has not explained the substance. This is a paving Amendment to Amendment No. 11.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, if the noble Viscount would not mind, I would sooner discuss Amendment No. 11 under Amendment No. 9, to which we are coming next.
7.15 p.m.
LORD KENNET LORD KENNET moved Amendment No. 9:
Page 22, leave out lines 17 to 21.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, Amendment No. 9 is, I believe, a paving Amendment for Amendment No. 11, which is substantial, so let us discuss them now. Amendment No. 11 replaces subsection (7) of Clause 21 with two new subsections. The new subsection (7) is partly concerned to achieve an effect similar to that achieved by the present one, but the provision contained in paragraph (b) is new. This paragraph is aimed at preventing an inspector's jurisdiction to determine an appeal being challenged for the first time after he has given his decision. It will not prevent an inspector's jurisdiction being challenged for genuine reasons while the appeal is in progress. What it will do is to prevent a party to an appeal having the
1284
best of both worlds—that is, keeping his doubts about an inspector's jurisdiction to himself during the appeal, in case the decision should turn out in his favour, and then seeking afterwards to upset it and get a second hearing from the Minister if the decision has gone against him.
That is the Amendment of substance in the group of Amendments Nos. 9, 11, 48, 49, 84 and 85. I beg now to move the paving Amendment, Amendment No. 9. I shall move the others formally when we reach them.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 10.
Amendment moved—
Page 22, line 27, leave out ("section") and insert ("Part of this Act").—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD KENNET: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 11.
Amendment moved—
Page 22, line 38, leave out subsection (7) and insert—
("(7) Where an appeal to which this section applies has been determined by a person appointed under this Part of this Act, his decision shall be treated as that of the Minister and—

(a) except as provided by Part XI of the principal Act, the validity of his decision shall not be questioned in any proceedings whatsoever;

(b) it shall not be a ground of application to the High Court under section 179 of that Act or of appeal to the High Court under section 180 or 181 thereof, that the appeal ought to have been determined by the Minister and not by that person, unless the challenge to the person's power to determine the appeal was made (either by the appellant or the local planning authority) before his decision on the appeal was given.

(8) Where in any enactment (including this Act) there is a reference to the Minister in a context relating or capable of relating to an appeal to which this section applies, or to any thing done or authorised or required to be done by, to or before the Minister on or in connection with any such appeal, then so far as the context permits it shall be construed, in relation to an appeal determined or falling to be determined by a person appointed under this Part of this Act, as a reference to that person.").—(Lord Kennet.)
Clause 22 [Determination of appeals by the Minister]>:
LORD KENNET LORD KENNET moved Amendment No. 12:
Page 23, leave out line 14 and insert—
("section 16 of this Act;
section 18(2) of this Act;
Part I of Schedule 5 to this Act; and")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is the first Amendment that falls into the class which I shall call "machinery". It is not drafting—it is a little more than drafting; but it affects nobody's rights, and it affects nobody's duties. It affects merely the route by which rights and duties are laid down, and if your Lordships agree I will move this Amendment and other subsequent ones by simply saying "machinery". Accordingly, I beg to move Amendment No. 12, with the assertion that it is an Amendment of machinery.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: Nevertheless, my Lords, I have one question on it. There is a reference to Section 18(2) to (4). We have just added a new subsection in the middle of Clause 18, and I wonder whether, when this is reprinted, it will read "Section 18(2) to (5)" or whether it will still read "Section 18(2) to (4)". I do not know whether the noble Lord can tell us about that. It is, in any event, a matter that should be looked at when the Bill is printed because the right decision has got to be made.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, I will ensure that all the numberings in the Bill when we have finished with it here take account of anything that may have been added.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 13.
Amendment moved—
Page 24, line 5, leave out subsection (2).—(Lord Kennet.)
Clause 24 [Local inquiries and hearings]:
LORD KENNET: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 14.
Amendment moved—
Page 24, line 24, leave out ("section 21 or 23 above") and insert ("this Part of this Act").—(Lord Kennet.)
Clause 26 [Supplementary]:
LORD KENNET: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 15.
Amendment moved—
Page 25, line 20, leave out ("section 19 or 21 above") and insert ("this Part of this Act").—(Lord Kennet.)
7.20 p.m.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS moved Amendment No. 16:
After Clause 26 insert the following new clause:
Regulations to provide for appeal against refusal of consent to display of advertisement
".Notwithstanding anything in section 34 of the principal Act any regulations made thereunder whereby the consent of a local planning authority is required for the display of any advertisement shall include provisions granting a right of appeal against the refusal of such consent by the authority."
The noble Viscount said: My Lords, this is the Amendment about advertising appeals which the noble Lord foreshadowed, and I was glad to hear what he had to say, because I am sure it is correct that he should now look at the matter afresh. I hope that what seemed to me to be a touch of reluctance to have his ideas changed on this matter is not really true, and that he will find there is a possibility of applying a genuine new look to this matter. So far, then, I very much agree with what he has to say but I think it is worth while moving this Amendment this evening because there may be other noble Lords, perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, who may have something to say about it and we can have an enclosed debate.
I also have seen the Outdoor Advertising Council's proposals, and they certainly look to me as though they are a basis for discussion. Whether in fact they will come out in the end exactly as they are now, I would not know. It also seems to me that they would save public money (which, I believe, is one of the objects) and also the time of public officials, which at one time was put forward as an argument by the noble

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Lord and his right honourable friend in another place for this proposed change. Although it would require a little ingenuity among the provisions of Sections 34 and 44 of the 1962 Act, I think it would be within the powers that already exist under the Statute. The provisions of Section 44, of course, relate to an independent tribunal, which was an idea of the noble Lord, Lord Silkin. I do not believe that has ever been implemented, but this may be the opportunity. Equally, if the matter was dealt with by regulation under Section 34, it looks to me as though it would be possible, if the tribunal were called an advisory committee, to deal with the payment of that body under Regulation 34(2)(d), because there is a specific power to make provision by regulation for payment of advisory committees. I do not know whether that is too ingenious, but at any rate it may be possible that something could be done.
I must confess that, although I have not studied this as fully as the noble Lord and perhaps others in this House, I suspect that some appeal system is needed in this matter. The local planning authorities do not all stick to the rules, and they do not all stick to the same rules. At least, if they do it is a strange thing, because it was only in 1960 that the Ministry themselves issued Circular No. 3 of that year which has this passage in paragraph 11(b):
"The Minister has noticed that in some cases which have come to him on appeal the reasons given by the local planning authority for refusing consent appear to be outside the powers which are conferred by the regulations. The regulations provide that these powers are exercisable only in the interests of amenity and public safety and do not provide for consent to be refused because, for example, (i) there is no need for an advertisement, or (ii) the advertisement advertises a particular kind or brand of commodity, or (iii) it is not the Council's policy to permit advertising in a particular way or in a particular area."
Perhaps all those sinners have repented in the last eight and a half years, but I wonder whether there does not lurk in the bosom of some councils a desire to go back to some of those reasons which they have been told by the Minister are wrong reasons for refusing advertisement consents. The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, said on the Report stage that the Ministry does not necessarily accept
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that the local authorities might act like that, but I would require a certain amount of convincing that there would always be a very strict sticking to the rules if that has been the experience in the past.
I do not see how, even if the full reason for the decision is to be given—and that is one of the things that is being suggested—there is going to be very much source of rejoicing in an appeal to the High Court. I have not seen particular arrangements for strengthening this right of appeal and I do not know of what they consist, but I think one thing is quite clear, that is, that it is notoriously difficult to go behind what is called a "speaking order". If the council gives a reason for refusal and says in its reason that the refusal was based on amenity—and amenity is one of the grounds in the regulations for refusing consent—it is singularly difficult to impugn the good faith of the authority in the High Court. Of course, I can very well envisage that it would not necessarily be a matter of bad faith. A local authority might very well say that in a certain area there is a proper amenity consideration that there should be no advertisements at all perhaps in the whole of their area. That may be a perfectly sincerely held view based on pure amenity grounds, and I do not see what one could do about that in the High Court.
Then again it is an historic accident that the right of appeal in this matter is not in the 1962 Act as it now is. It was left to regulation when Lord Silkin's Act was passed. I think it was because the actual method of arranging the appeals had not been finally decided, and it was thought better to leave this to be dealt with subsequently by regulation. But, as I understand it, the Government have suggested that the abolition of rights of appeal here is in line with their general policy of allowing devolution of local matters to be dealt with locally and locally alone, and if this is so then we are dealing with a matter which is rather broader than the pure advertisement appeals alone. It so happens that this is the only matter that the Government can tackle without specific legislation in this particular realm of local government, because it is the only one that can be done by regulation. But the question

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of policy goes much wider, and I do not think it should be tested in this way by regulation, for this reason. It is all very well the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, saying that the matter will be brought to this House and, indeed, to another place, but every noble Lord knows perfectly well that once the regulations have been laid no power on earth can get them amended. There is no method of getting them amended in this House, and unless the Government withdraw them and relay them nothing can be done. I do not think this is a matter, involving as I believe it does a wider question than just advertisement appeals, which ought to be dealt with without a Parliamentary debate and the possibility of amendment.
There is another difficulty, if I am correctly informed, which is that there are still in force in various parts of the country local Acts or by-laws, or something of that sort, which used to govern the display of advertisements before Lord Silkin's Act came into force in 1948. I do not know whether any of these contain rights of appeal, but a fascinating situation would arise if they did. Suppose the advertiser applies for and is refused consent under the advertisement regulations, and suppose there is another power, another right to apply a still existing local Act which provides for a right of appeal. I dare say the advertiser could get his appeal heard under the old legislation despite the fact that it would not necessarily get his advertisement up, and we would have an extraordinary and chaotic situation whereby these two separate powers were still running side by side and could be played off, as I think, against each other.
To be perfectly honest, I believe the Government's approach on this, in dealing with it in isolation, is wrong. I do not say this in any way in order to protect the advertisers; I am not saying it from that point of view at all. I am treating this as a matter of principle, and I believe it goes rather further perhaps than this very issue, because in the complicated society in which we live there is an ever growing number of things that you cannot do without getting consent. If the public interest demands that you have to get permission for that and consent for the other thing from one source or another, so be it, but I believe there is a concomitant duty on Parliament and on the Government to see that at least
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people are allowed to have an appeal when their consents and their permissions are refused.
The growth of control by quasi-administrative rather than by purely legalistic decisions may be useful and effective, but it is still part of a system of control by law. From the early days of our legal system in this country our law has developed systems of appeal whereby unmeritorious decisions in the first instance can be overturned by appeal tribunals and appeal courts. I strongly suspect that, in their desire to get things which are local dealt with locally, the Government with utilitarian motives, may be making a move directly contrary to the whole direction in which our thinking about quasi-administrative tribunals ought to go. I cannot believe that the reason given, that this is a purely local matter, to be dealt with locally, holds any water at all. Precisely the same thing can be said about an enormous number of the planning appeals which are dealt with under the 1962 legislation; but the Government cannot do anything about rights of appeal there because they would have to alter the law by Statute to do so. Those matters are just as local as advertisements. I do not believe that there is any difference between the two which warrants a different approach. The only difference is that it can be done by regulation, which Parliament cannot amend.
I hope that it will not be necessary to press this Amendment. If it is pressed, it would still allow, by the breadth of its wording, for the sort of appeal tribunal which the Outdoor Advertising Council have suggested, because I have not said what sort of appeal there should be. Nevertheless, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, will be able to go further than he has already and maybe persuade your Lordships that there is not quite so much need to fear on this matter as was perhaps at one time the case. My Lords, I beg to move.
7.33 p.m.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, I should like strongly to support the Amendment. Unless my noble friend the Minister is prepared to go very much further than he has gone, I would strongly urge the noble Lord to press his Amendment to a Division, in which case I will support him in the Lobby. When this matter

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came up on Report—and I was unaware that it was coming up—my first reaction was that this was a gross breach of faith, but I gave no reasons for it. I should like to elaborate on this matter and tell the House why I feel that the withdrawal of the right of appeal constitutes a grave breach of faith.
Prior to the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act, outdoor advertising was controlled by the Town and Country Planning Act 1932. Under that Act outdoor advertisers did not need to get planning permission at all. They could put up their advertising as they thought right, but if the local authority disapproved of the advertisement it had the right to call upon them to remove it. The advertisers could then go to the court of summary jurisdiction and get the matter dealt with. The advertisers were under a great advantage because the initiative for the withdrawal of the advertisement had to come from the local authority. They were also at a great advantage in being able to go to the court of summary jurisdiction, because the matter was quite open at that stage and the court was not limited or restricted by any rules: it could decide just as it thought fit.
This position was changed by the 1947 Act, under which outdoor advertisers, as in every other case of development, were required to apply for planning permission. An outdoor advertisement was regarded as development, and the intending advertisers had to apply for permission. In that way they were restricted. They were restricted in another way in that they virtually were not allowed to advertise in rural areas or in other areas which the Ministry decided were areas which ought to be restricted in respect of advertising. These were two valuable concessions which the outdoor advertisers made as a result of lengthy negotiations. I remember those negotiations very well, although they took place some twenty years ago. Fortunately, the Secretary of the Association of that time is still the Secretary to-day, and I have been able to refresh my memory.
The fact is that we had lengthy and strenuous negotiations, and the advertisers gave way on these points—or, rather, they accepted them—in exchange for a definite assurance that in the same way as any other developer, they were
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to have the right of appeal. To take that away unilaterally to-day seems to me to be a grave breach of faith, and I am very sorry indeed that my Government, the Government which I support, should be guilty of even contemplating such a thing, let alone actually doing it.
The noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, discussed the reasons as to why this was being done. If one is to take facts at their face value, this whole question arises out of a casual suggestion by a member of the Committee in another place when the Bill was being discussed there. He thought that it would be a good idea if this right were taken away from advertisers, as advertising was merely a matter of local concern and was not important enough to bother about. As I mentioned the last time we discussed this matter, the particular person who raised it happens to be a partner of mine, and I feel pretty sure that had he first talked to me about it he would not have raised the matter. But he did raise it, apparently the Government were most attracted by the suggestion, and all this has followed from it.
But are these matters purely local matters? Are they only of local concern; and what is the significance of saying so? If to affix an outdoor advertisement is a piece of development, it is as much a piece of development as any other kind of development which may be of very minor interest. Whether one has a door leading on to the street, or whether one puts an extra window into a house, these are all matters of local concern; and if one is refused permission one can appeal. Nobody so far has suggested—and I hope that it is never going to be suggested—that in these other matters of local concern the right of appeal should be withdrawn.
The right of appeal is surely inherent to-day in any kind of public decision. We accept that local authorities may go wrong—they may be prejudiced or even ignorant. After all, one knows that a large number of local authorities are involved in this matter. As the noble Viscount said, even the Ministry know that some of them in the past have been rather prejudiced in dealing with outdoor advertising. We know that officers who make recommendations may be prejudiced, and we also know that they may be wrong. We know that generally some 25 per cent. of appeals are successful,

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which means that local authorities are wrong in 25 per cent. of cases—and they may be wrong it 25 per cent. of appeals on advertising. In fact, on the figures that have been given there are something like 1,400 advertisers who have been successful on appeal and who, but for the right of appeal, would not have been allowed to carry out their undertaking. Surely this is something more than a local matter. It would be a grave injustice if these people, who have actually been successful on appeal, were not to be allowed in future to appeal at all.
I have frequently contended that the citizen has a right to do what he likes with his own property so long as he does not act contrary to the interests of the community. In my view, this is a most important right, and interference by the local authority can be justified only if it is a matter of the interests of the community as a whole. We have instituted an admirable system for enabling administrative mistakes of local authorities to be put right, and, generally, we are extending this right. We do everything we can to give people a right of appeal against possible errors by the local authority. Why, then, are we withdrawing it in this particular case? I must say that I find it extremely puzzling. If it is a matter of expense, then I think the expense is trifling. In any case, are we justified on the ground of expense in taking away people's rights and acting contrary to what I regard as natural justice?
It seems to me unthinkable that the Government can seriously proceed with this matter, and I hope the Minister will be able to give us some more satisfactory assurance than he has done so far about these matters. The assurance we want is that there will definitely be a right of appeal. On the question whether it should be in one form or another, as the matter has gone as far as it has I should be willing to have a discussion about it; but to satisfy me, at any rate, the Minister must stand up and say that there will be an unconditional right of appeal. We can discuss the method of appeal, but there should be one. Only that will satisfy me and prevent me from voting against the Government if there is a Division.
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, very briefly, I should like to support this Amendment on the ground that the right
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of appeal is what secures uniformity of practice throughout the country, which I regard as desirable. If you are a large company selling petrol, tea or ice cream all over the country and you are making your advertising decisions, you surely ought to feel entitled to say to yourself that an advertisement which is satisfactory in Sussex will be satisfactory in a similar situation in Yorkshire. It would be intolerable if you had to say to yourself, when considering your advertising programme, "This will do for Lancashire and Northumberland, but it will not do for Cardigan and it will not do for Dorset. We must have some thing quite different for those counties."
I should have thought that a Government, which allowed obstacles of that sort to stand in the way of large companies in regard to their advertising could not afterwards go to them and say, "You must keep your costs down. You must not raise your prices for the goods that you sell. "It seems to me that this right of appeal is what secures the uniformity of practice throughout the country which commercial people are entitled to feel they can have. For that reason I warmly support this Amendment.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: My Lords, may I, in twenty words, warmly support this Amendment? As I see it, if this right of appeal is taken away from advertisers it wil1 be a dangerous precedent. Where is it going to stop? It may well be that other categories of people will have their right of appeal taken away from them. If the reply of the Minister is not satisfactory I sincerely hope that my noble friend will press the Amendment to a Division. This his is a very serious matter and I sincerely hope he will do that.
LORD FERRIER: My Lords, if the noble Viscount presses this Amendment to a Division, I will support him on the principle of the matter, which was so clearly set out by the noble Lord, Lard Airedale. The principle is what seems to me to matter. I hesitate to criticise the advocacy of the noble Viscount, and even of the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, who seemed to assume that all the appeals meant the upsetting of decisions of local authorities, but I imagine that that is not the case at all. Appeals cut both ways.

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It is a matter of the right of the individual to feel that he is entitled to appeal, and for that reason I support the Amendment.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, in answering this interesting discussion, I want to speak with some caution because, as I have already informed the House, we are going into a period of consultations about this matter and I do not want to say anything which is going to prejudice the chances of success coming out of those consultations. So I am sure your Lordships will understand if I leave unanswered a good many of the points which I should have liked to answer, because I feel that I could not answer them without running the risk of jeopardising the consultations and negotiations which I must now have. Some points, however, I shall take up.
The noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, welcomed the proposals of the Outdoor Advertising Council as a basis for discussion. I share his welcome. I, too, welcome them as a basis for discussion. Discussion has already begun—I met them yesterday—and this will continue. The noble Viscount also mentioned the three things in the 1960 circular which the then Minister found that councils had been doing and which they should not have been doing. These were, in essence, all grounds for refusal which were incompatible with the only two permissible grounds of refusal; namely, amenity and public safety.
I beg the House to remember that this is not a proposal to abolish appeals against refusals of permission to exhibit advertisements. This proposal, which I am not pressing on the House, is a proposal to abolish the appeal to the Minister, while at the same time strengthening the grounds of appeal to the courts. It would not be right to take away the appeal to the Minister without at the same time facilitating access to the courts. The decisions affected by the three things which the noble Viscount Lord Colville of Culross, rightly reminded the House the Minister had warned local authorities against in 1960 were decisions taken because those local authorities did not like something about an advertisement, and had nothing to do with amenity or public safety. If a local authority takes a decision on those other
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grounds, then the applicant has a right to appeal in the court against the decision.
He has that right now, but the Government freely admit that it has been a bit difficult to exercise it, because if all a local authority has to say is, "It is against amenity", or, "It is against public safety", and, in point of fact, it has taken the decision for quite a different reason, you cannot win against the authority. If, on the other hand, you insist, as the Government propose you should insist, that the local authority should say, "The advertisement is against amenity in that blank-blank-blank", or, "It is against public safety in that blank-blank-blank", and should go on and say why it is against amenity—such as that something was in the wrong place and spoiled the view, or ruined the look of the High street, or was against public safety because it stuck out into the street or took the eyes of the driver off the road—you would ensure that some detail, some reason for a decision, was given. This will then give the applicant a chance to go along to the courts and say, "This is perfectly ridiculous. This is not a reason for holding that the advertisement is against public safety or against amenity".
LORD SILKIN: But we are in some difficulty about this. Of course, if it is the intention that the courts should have exactly the same jurisdiction as the Minister has, and should be able to decide, on the basis of evidence presented to them, that the reasons given by the local authority are not satisfactory, then we are merely changing the tribunal, and I do not suppose anybody would seriously object to that. But is my noble friend in a position to go as far as that?
LORD KENNET: The courts would have power to quash the decision; to say that the local authority decision—in this case the refusal—was wrongly taken; and that would be that.
LORD SILKIN: But that means only that they have gone beyond their jurisdiction, and that, of course, the courts already have the right to say. One can always go to the court and say that the local authority has gone outside its jurisdiction. But the real point is would an appeal be available if a local authority decides within its jurisdiction but

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where the applicant feels that the decision is a wrong decision?
LORD KENNET: I do not think I can improve on what I have just said. The Government's proposal was to provide that local authorities should justify their decision; that they should not simply say, "Against amenity; full stop; turned down," but, "Against amenity in that blank-blank-blank", and put some reasons on it. The point of this, of course, is that it opens a flank by way of appeal to the courts, and the knowledge in a local authority's mind that it has got to do this will perhaps make it think a bit more before refusing permission than it already has to.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord one question on this, becaus I should be glad to have his views on it? It is all very well to say that you will ask the local authority to say, "It is against amenity because …" The authority may say, "It is against amenity because, for amenity reasons, we do not wish to have an advertisement at this place in the High Street"; and that may on the face of it be a perfectly reasonable thing to do. But the difficulty is that they may have already done it 15 times on every other advertisement application up and down the High Street; and they have every intention of doing it again with every other advertisement application that comes in for that same street, simply because they have taken a policy decision that they will have no advertisements there. You cannot take any of those to the court. You cannot compare one with the other. You cannot say, "The local authority has been doing this systematically". You take each one on its own merits, as I understand it. In each case the decision is made on amenity grounds, and there is no possible method that I can see for getting that quashed.
LORD AIREDALE: Whereas, if you went to the Minister the Minister would say, "Ah, I remember this. This has been coming before me a number of times recently".
LORD KENNET: My Lords, there are great difficulties in the way of the House considering how the courts are likely to interpret provisions which have been drafted, but there are almost insuperable
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difficulties in the way of the House seeking to guess how the courts would interpret provisions which have not even been drafted yet. If at the end of the consultations the Government propose to go forward with these proposals, then they will be brought before your Lordships, and that will be the time to discuss them. I shall be coming to that point in a moment. I think that perhaps we are getting a little far ahead of ourselves in the present discussion.
Another point I want to take up is that very one. The noble Viscount, Lord Colville, said, "Ah, but of course the House cannot amend regulations"—and this of course is true. It can throw them out, however, and I would say that any Government which drafted regulations without bearing in mind that Parliament was not able to amend them and had a simple "Yes" or "No" choice would not be proceeding very sensibly. The regulations, if they offend your Lordships, and if they are laid, will no doubt be thrown out by your Lordships. They are not at present before your Lordships. Let us wait until the time when they may or may not arise. I cannot say at the moment whether they will or not.
My noble friend Lord Silkin made many interesting points in his speech, most of which I will not take for the reason I gave: for fear of fouling up the discussion. I am sure he will understand my reason for saying that. He said that there is a right of appeal inherent in any kind of public decision. My Lords, I wish there were. I think your Lordships should bear in mind the fact that a person who lives opposite a site on which an advertiser wants to display a poster, and gets permission from the local authority to do so, has no right of appeal. There is nothing he can do. He cannot go to the Minister and appeal against a poster which may be ruining his view and, if he is a sensitive person, ruining his life. He cannot go to the court about it. There is nothing he can do. This is not the time to pursue that line of thought, but it is not true in all circumstances that there is a right of appeal inherent in any public decision.
Just as a gloss on the figures given by my noble friend Lord Silkin, may I point out that he said that local authorities were wrong in 25 per cent. of the cases, when the appeal was allowed by the

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Minister. No, my Lords, it is in rather less than 1 per cent. of the cases. More than 99 per cent. of the applications are either allowed by the local authority, and that is that; or they are refused by the local authority, the applicant accepts the decision and that is that; or—
LORD SILKIN LORD SILKIN: But, my Lords—
LORD KENNET: May I just finish running through my statistics, if my noble friend would allow me? Or they are appealed against to the Minister and again refused by the Minister. That accounts for 99-plus per cent. of the cases. The less than 1 per cent. in the last year were those cases which were refused by the local authority, appealed against and allowed on appeal by the Minister. It is this less than 1 per cent. of which the Government proposal would deprive the advertising industry.
LORD SILK1N: My Lords, the noble Lord is really confusing the issue. The real point is: of those cases that go to appeal, how many are allowed? And the fact is that about 25 per cent. of the cases that go to appeal, amounting roughly to about 1,500 cases a year, are successful. That means that the local authority has been wrong in 1,500 cases a year. Now is that not a justification for the right of appeal?
LORD KENNET: I would have to check the figures, but I just took the noble Lord up on his words. He said that the local authorities were wrong in 25 per cent. of cases. He could have said that they were wrong in 25 per cent. of those cases against which there had been an appeal.
LORD SILKIN LORD SILKIN: Yes.
LORD KENNET: Not in 25 per cent. of all the applications during the course of the year.
To my mind the most important thing about the present situation and where we stand on this subject in this House tonight is this matter about which I have already told the House. The Government proposed to abolish the right to appeal to the Minister while yet strengthening the right to appeal to the court. That was the proposal which told your Lordships the Government
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would be laying before Parliament. Since then, the Outdoor Advertising Council has made a counter-proposal which, in the Government's opinion, is constructively intended. It clearly is constructively intended. It is well thought out. It is a compromise. Whether it will be acceptable in the long run I cannot say. We must examine it. It does not rest solely on the willingness of the advertising industry to operate it, or on the willingness of the Government to operate it; it rests also on the willingness of the local authorities to operate it. We have not yet talked to the local authorities about it. We must do so. I submit to the House that it would be wrong to tie the hands of the Government in this matter during the negotiations we are about to enter into with the local authority associations and other interests—and there are other interests concerned—by passing this Amendment.
I turn back for one moment to an earlier stage of the argument about the figures of my noble friend Lord Silkin. I think he has confused the appeals allowed with the appeals received in the Ministry. The 1,500 is the number of appeals that come to the Minister in the year.
LORD SILKIN LORD SILKIN: No.
LORD KENNET: And about a quarter of those—in fact, rather less; 23 per cent. of them—are allowed. That is about 400 a year. So, although the number of appeals allowed is nearly 25 per cent. of appeals received, yet it is not 1,500 cases a year in which the local authorities, in the opinion of the Minister, were wrong. It is about 400.
To conclude, I hope that the noble Viscount will agree, in view of the fact that no amending regulations are going to be laid before your Lordships in the immediate future, until after a period of consultation and discussion, and in view of the obvious undesirability of tying the Government's hands about what they are to do at the outcome of this period, that he will not find it necessary to press his Amendment to a Division.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, I am grateful to those who have taken part in this debate. I think the noble Lord, Lord Ferrier, will now realise that in fact he is perfectly correct

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in supposing that the appeals are not all successful. The only one I ever did, I lost, I well remember. At any rate, I think the situation is clarified. The decision your Lordships have to take—I cannot withdraw this Amendment without your Lordships' leave—is this. To what extent, if at all, do we wish to tie the hands of the Government?
The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, very rightly said that in these negotiations with the Outdoor Advertising Council he does not want to be tied. The Amendment would not tie him in any way, because as long as the Government are prepared to accept that there shall be a right of appeal by Statute, as applies in all other town planning matters of this sort, he can negotiate to his heart's content with the Q.A.C. to decide what sort of appeal is best. We must decide, therefore, whether this House ought to make a decision of principle this evening or not. If the noble Lord does not wish to have his hands tied so that he can revert to regulations abolishing the right of appeal, this Amendment will not do. If the House wishes to leave that matter open, then I must withdraw this Amendment. But, without in any way suggesting what might occur if regulations having this effect were to be introduced at some subsequent date, I hope that the noble Lord will realise from the speeches made this evening that he is likely to have a fairly rough ride if he does not take substantial account of what has been said.
I think my inclination is to ask your Lordships' leave to withdraw this Amendment, because I believe that the noble Lord, when he reads what has been said, will find that perhaps there is a certain amount of force in what we have been talking about and that this is an anomaly of which the Government ought not to take advantage. But, of course, if other noble Lords do not wish to have this Amendment withdrawn by leave then I will have no objection to having it tested by the House as a matter of principle. I would ask your Lordships' leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 33 [New descriptions of land qualifying for protection]:
LORD KENNET: My Lords, Amendment No. 17 is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 29, line 19, leave out third ("the")—(Lord Kennet.)
8.4 p.m.
LORD KENNET LORD KENNET moved Amendment No. 18:
Page 29, line 33, leave out paragraghs (a) to (c).
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment is the first of a series. The first of the series is Amendment No. 18, the present one, followed by Amendments 21, 30, 87, 88 and 91. The purpose of the series is to clarify the presentation of the blight provisions in the Bill. The object is to state more directly the changes made in the Bill, and to gather into an expanded Schedule 4 the verbal amendments of provisions of the Act of 1962 which flow from the changes already made by this Bill. The Amendments to be moved make no change in the substance of the blight provisions as the House left them at the previous stage: they are concerned solely to rearrange, redraft or make consequential references. I shall move the subsequent five Amendments formally when I come to them. I now beg to move Amendment No. 18.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords., the blight provisions, either as originally enacted or as amended by this Bill, must be a draftsman's nightmare. Although I appreciate that a great deal of hard work has been put in to clarify this matter, it is not going to be easy to see what the law is when this part of the Bill is brought into effect; and I shall be asking about this in general. I hope it will not be too long before a great deal more clarification takes place and before we have some consolidating legislation to do it properly.
Clause 34 [Power of mortgagee to serve blight notice]:
LORD KENNET: My Lords, Amendment No. 19 is consequential. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 30, line 15, after ("Act") insert ("or, as the case may be, section 33(3) of this Act").—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD KENNET: My Lords, Amendment No. 20 is consequential upon a change made in the Bill at an earlier stage. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 31, line 39, after ("section") insert ("and in a case to which section 35(1) below applies, the ground specified in that subsection").—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD KENNET LORD KENNET: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 21 formally.
Amendment moved—
Page 32, line 11, leave out subsection (9).—(Lord Kennet.)
Clause 35 [Extension of grounds of objection to blight notice]:
LORD KENNET: My Lords, this is an Amendment of substance. I regret that it is one of infinite complexity. I am sure that the noble Viscount understands it. In the hope of saving the time of the House I should like to ask him straight across the Table whether he wishes to have it explained to the House or not.
Amendment moved—
Page 32, line 18, leave out from ("within") to end of line 21 and insert—
("section 138(1)(c) of the principal Act or section 33(1)(a) of this Act; and
(b)not falling within section 138(1)(e) or (f) of that Act or section 33(1)(d) of this Act ").—(Lord Kennet.)
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, I thought the noble Lord was going to ask me to explain it. No, I think this is a technical matter which will work out all right.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, Amendment No. 23 is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 33, line 4, leave out ("and") and insert ("or").—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD KENNET: My Lords, Amendment No. 24 is also a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 33, line 22, leave out from ("area") to end of line 28 and insert—
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("references in those provisions to the affected area being construed as references to the hereditament").—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD KENNET: My Lords, Amendment No. 25 is a drafting Amendment in the interests of style. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 33, line 43, leave out ("the Tribunal is") and insert ("they are").—(Lord Kennet.)
Clause 37 [Miscellaneous amendments of Part VIII of principal Act]:
LORD KENNET: My Lords, this is a drafting Amendment; but it is the first of a series which hang together. The series starts with Amendment No. 26, is followed by Nos. 27, 28 and 29 and then jumps to Amendment No. 92. With your Lordships' leave I propose now to abandon my previous procedure and, for the sake of the Chairman's voice, to move Amendments Nos. 26, 27, 28 and 29, all of which are to Clause 37, together.
Amendments moved—
Page 34, line 33, at end insert—
("(3) For a person to be treated under section 149(1) or (3) of the principal Act (definitions for purposes of blight notice provisions) as owner-occupier or resident owner-occupier of a hereditament, his occupation thereof at a relevant time or during a relevant period, if not occupation of the whole of the hereditament, must be or, as the case may be, have been occupation of a substantial part of it.
(4) In subsections (1)(b), (2)(b) and (3)(b) of the said section 149, the period of six months ending not more than six months before the date of service shall in each case be replaced by a period of six months ending not more than twelve months before that date.")
Page 34, line 36, after second ("Act") insert—
("(a)")
Page 34, line 40, at end insert—
("and
(b) subsections (1)(b), (2)(b) and (3)(b) of section 149 of that Act shall apply with the substitution for the reference to twelve months before the date of service of a reference to that period extended by so long as it takes to obtain a determination of the question.")
Page 34, line 41, leave out subsection (4).—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD KENNET: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 30 formally.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 37, insert the following new clause:
Consequential amendment and modification of sections 138 to 149 of principal Act
(". The provisions of the principal Act specified in Part I of Schedule 4 to this Act (being provisions about blight notices and proceedings in connection therewith) shall be amended as shown in that Schedule.—(Lord Kennet.)
Clause 44 [Penalties for non-compliance with notice under section 43]:
LORD KENNET: My Lords, Amendment No. 31 is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 42, line 18, leave out from second ("notice") to end of line 20 and insert ("as that within which the steps specified in the notice are required thereby to be taken, or such extended period as the local planning authority may allow for taking them").—(Lord Kennet.)
Clause 46 [Enforcement by, or by direction of the Minister]:
LORD KENNET: My Lords, Amendments Nos. 32, 33 and 34 are all drafting Amendments. With the leave of the House I beg to move them en bloc.
Amendments moved—
Page 43, line 2, after ("authority") insert ("(and, in Greater London, also with the Greater London Council.")
Page 43, line 9, leave out ("41") and insert ("44(5)")
Page 43, line 26, after ("of") insert ("subsections (3) and (4) of").—(Lord Kennet.)
Clause 61 [References to a Planning Inquiry Commission]:
LORD KENNET: My Lords, Amendment No. 35 has the effect that development to be carried out on behalf of a Government Department may be referred to a planning inquiry commission as well as development to be carried out directly by the Government Department itself. The obvious example, of course, is a regional hospital board. There are two consequential Amendments, Nos. 40 and 103. I beg to move Amendment No. 35.
Amendment moved—
Page 52, line 29, after ("by") insert ("or on behalf of").—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD KENNET: My Lords, Amendments Nos. 36, 37 and 38 are drafting. I beg to move them en bloc.
Amendments moved—
Page 52, line 38, leave out ("evaluating") and insert ("evaluation")
Page 53, line 15, after ("him") insert ("or them")
Page 53, line 23, leave out ("shall").—Lord Kennet.)
LORD KENNET: My Lords, this is a little more than a drafting Amendment. It is a matter of machinery, but it is extremely complex and changes no important matter of substance. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 54, line 6, after ("appeals)") insert ("and sections 21(6) and 22(4) of this Act").—(Lord Kennet.)
Clause 62 [Procedure on a reference to a Planning Inquiry Commission]:
LORD KENNET LORD KENNET: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 40:
Amendment moved—
Page 54, line 13, after ("by") insert ("or on behalf of").—(Lord Kennet.)
Clause 63 [Delegation of planting functions to officers of local authorities]:
LORD KENNET: My Lords, Amendments Nos. 41 to 47 inclusive are drafting Amendments. I beg to move them en bloc.
Amendments moved—
Clause 63, page 56, line 31, leave out ("in respect of it, as the case may be").
Clause 63, page 57, line 3, leave out ("had been") and insert ("was").
Clause 64, page 58, line 8, leave out ("or").
Clause 64, page 58, line 11, at end insert ("or").
Clause 65, page 59, line 24, leave out ("any conditions under subsection 3") and insert ("the conditions required by subsection (41").
Clause 66, page 60, line 6, leave out ("the proviso to section 65(3)") and insert ("section 65(6)").
Clause 66, page 60, line 9, at end insert—
("(a) in the case of planning permission granted by an order under section 28 of the principal Act (requirement of discontinuance of use of land or alteration or removal of buildings or works) is the local planning authority making the order or, where the Minister in confirming the order exercises his powers under section 28(5) of that Act, the Minister;").—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD KENNET: My Lords, Amendments Nos. 48 and 49, to Clause 66, hang together with Amendment No. 9 to which the House has already agreed. I beg to move Amendment 48.
Amendment moved—
Clause 66, page 60, line 13, leave out from ("granted") to end of line 17.—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD KENNET LORD KENNET: My Lords I beg to move Amendment No. 49:
Amendment moved—
Clause 66, page 60, line 23, leave out from ("Minister") to end of line 26 and insert ("grants the approval, on the date of the determination of the appeal").—(Lord Kennet.)
Clause 67 [Termination of planning permission by reference to time limit]:
LORD KENNET: My Lords, I am taking a hint from the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, about his willingness for me to put my foot on the accelerator. I beg to move Amendment No. 50.
Amendment moved—
Page 62, line 10, leave out ("for the purposes of") and insert ("whether the original period specified under subsection (2) above or a longer period substituted by the Minister under").—(Lord Kennel.)
Clause 68 [New provisions as to what is "operational land" of statutory undertakers]:
LORD KENNET LORD KENNET: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 51:
Amendment moved—
Page 63, line 11, after ("a") insert ("special").—(Lord Kennet.)
Clause 70 [Restriction on entitlement of statutory undertakers to compensation for adverse planning decisions]:
LORD KENNET LORD KENNET moved Amendment No. 52:
Page 65, leave out line 1 and insert—
("(b) it is not development which has received specific parliamentary approval").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is a drafting Amendment although it is one of some note since it is the only minor change which the Government consider it necessary to make to the new clause about statutory undertakers introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Ilford, at an earlier stage. I said a few words about this important matter of substance at the beginning of the debate. I beg to move.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, I simply want to slow down the machine for one moment in order to say, "Thank you" to the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, and to the Government for, in effect, accepting my noble friend's new clause. I think it extraordinarily clever of him to have drafted it with only this minor change required. Much more important, of course, is the fact that the substance of the matter has now been changed and that the provisions in the Bill are agreed between both sides of the House. This, I think, is a most satisfactory situation to have achieved. On behalf of my noble friend Lord Ilford and, I think, all on the Opposition Benches, I should like to thank the Government.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, I should like to take advantage of the momentary pause imposed by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, upon our headlong rush to thank him on behalf of the Government for his kind words. I agree with what he says about the drafting feat performed by the noble Lord, Lord Ilford. This whole matter of compensation to statutory undertakers has, in my view, been a remarkable example of the dialogue between Government and Parliament in the many stages in the passage of a complicated Bill of this nature.
Clause 71 [Modifications of s. 164 of principal Act]:
LORD KENNET: My Lords, I beg to move Amendments Nos. 53 to 57 en bloc.
Amendments moved—
Page 65, line 11, leave out ("under the section")
Clause 74, page 67, line 27, leave out ("to") and insert ("of")
Clause 80, page 71, line 34, leave out from ("order") to ("be") in line 36 and insert ("instead of requiring the confirmation of the Minister in accordance with section 29(4) of the principal Act, may")
Clause 82, page 72, line 30, after ("development") insert ("or precluding it from containing any office floor space")
Clause 88, page 78, line 10, after ("section") insert ("153").—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD SHEPHERD LORD SHEPHERD moved Amendment No. 58:
Page 78, line 16, leave out ("path or way") and insert ("highway")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Kennet I beg to move Amendment No. 58 to Clause 88 and speak to Amendments Nos. 74 and 75 to Clause 93. This Amendment is little more than drafting. Clause 88(3) already recognises that it will sometimes be necessary or expedient to create an alternative highway over which there are rights of way with vehicles as replacement to a footpath or bridleway which is being stopped or diverted. As it stands, the clause would not permit the alternative highway to be provided by the improvement of an existing vehicular highway, although it does permit the improvement of a path or way. The Amendment will remedy this. Regarding Amendments Nos. 74 and 75, Clause 93 provides powers for local authorities similar to those in Section 153 of the principal Act which are transferred to the Minister, that is to say, powers to stop up or divert footpaths or bridleways. Clause 93(3)(a) enables an order to provide for the creation of an alternative footpath or bridleway as a replacement for one stopped up or diverted.
The purpose of these Amendments is to enable the order to provide for replacement, either by the creation of a new highway or the improvement of an existing highway, a term which goes
1310
wider than merely footpaths or bridleways. This brings the provision into line with that in Clause 88(3) as proposed by a previous Amendment. I beg to move.
LORD SHEPHERD LORD SHEPHERD moved Amendment No. 59:
Page 78, line 24, at end insert—
("() In section 32 of the Mineral Workings Act 1951 (power of Minister of Transport to make temporary stopping-up or diversion order in connection with surface working of minerals),—

(a) in subsection (1), after the words 'Minister of Transport' there shall be inserted the words 'or the Minister of Housing and Local Government'; and

(b) in subsection (2), after the words 'Minister of Transport' there shall to inserted the words 'or the Minister of Housing and Local Government, as the case may be'")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, the Bill has already extended powers to make orders for stopping up or diverting footpaths or bridleways to the Minister of Housing and Local Government. This Amendment similarly extends the powers to the Minister of Housing and Local Government in relation to orders for temporary closure or diversion to permit mineral workings. I beg to move.
Clause 89 [Procedure for making orders for stopping-up and diverting highways]:
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, Amendments Nos. 61, 62, 63 and Amendment No. 64 to Clause 90 are drafting. I beg to move.
Amendments moved—
Page 78, line 35, leave out ("had")
Page 80, line 4, after ("bridleway") insert ("only")
Page 80, line 6, leave out from beginning to ("the") in line 7 and insert—
("(b) otherwise")
Clause 90, page 80, line 10, leave out ("given") and insert ("granted").—(Lord Shepherd.)
LORD SHEPHERD LORD SHEPHERD moved Amendment No. 65:
Page 80, line 26, leave out ("(4)") and insert ("(5)").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment to Clause 90 makes the

1311
necessary additional application of Section 153(5) which specifies that the powers conferred are to have effect without prejudice to any power conferred by any enactment on the Minister of Transport to authorise the stopping up or diversion of a road; the provision of Section 3 of the Acquisition of Land (Authorisation Procedure) Act 1946, "Power to extinguish certain public rights of way over land acquired" and the provisions of Section 155 of the principal Act, "Extinguishment of the public rights of way over land held for planning purposes." I beg to move.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, Amendments Nos. 66, 67 and 68 are drafting, basically for clarification. I beg to move.
Amendments moved—
Page 80, line 31, after ("order") insert ("made by the Minister of Transport").
Page 80, line 32, leave out ("the Minister of Transport") and insert ("that Minister").
Page 80, line 34, after ("Minister") insert ("(as defined by subsection (2) above)").—(Lord Shepherd.)
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, the purpose of this Amendment is to secure consistency of provisions relating to the extinguishment of rights of statutory undertakers in respect of their pipes and cables and other apparatus when roads are closed and diverted. I beg to move
Amendment moved—
Page 80, line 34, at end insert—
("(4) In section 32(3) of the Mineral Workings Act 1951 (rights of statutory undertakers in respect of their apparatus where order made under section 153 of principal Act), after the reference to the said section 153 there shall be inserted an alternative reference to this section.").—(Lord Shepherd.)
Clause 91 [Conversion of highway into footpath or bridleway]:
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, this Amendment is drafting. I beg to move Amendment No. 70.
Amendment moved—
Page 81, line 7, after ("the") insert ("responsible").—(Lord Shepherd.)
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, this Amendment is drafting. I beg to move Amendment No. 71.
Amendment moved—
Page 81, line 24. leave out ("being made") and insert ("coming into force").—(Lord Shepherd.)
Clause 92 [Provision of amenity for highway reserved to pedestrians]:
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, this Amendment is drafting. I beg to move Amendment No. 72.
Amendment moved—
Page 82, line 43, leave out ("in, under or over") and insert ("under, in, on, over, along or across").—(Lord Shepherd.)
Clause 93 [Powers for local authorities analogous to s. 153 of principal Act]:
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, this Amendment is drafting. I beg to move Amendment No. 73.
Amendment moved—
Page 83, line 16, leave out ("for the purposes of this section").—(Lord Shepherd.)
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I spoke previously to Amendments Nos. 74 and 75 when I spoke to Amendment No. 58. I beg to move Amendments Nos. 74 and 75.
Amendments moved—
Page 83, line 33, leave out ("footpath or bridleway") and insert ("highway").
Page 83, line 36, leave out ("path or way") and insert ("highway").—(Lord Shepherd.)
LORD SHEPHERD LORD SHEPHERD moved Amendment No. 76:
Page 83, line 40, at end insert—
("() for the preservation of any rights of statutory undertakers in respect of apparatus of theirs which immediately before the date of the order is under, in, on, over, along or across any such footpath or bridleway.")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment adds a further matter for which an order made by a competent authority—in this case an authority granting planning permission for development occasioning the footpath or bridlepath order—may provide. It is made to secure consistency and adequacy

1313
in the machinery dealing with the rights of undertakers. I beg to move.
LORD SHEPHERD LORD SHEPHERD moved Amendment No. 77:
Page 84, line 4, at end insert—
("(5) Section 32(1) and (2) of the Mineral Workings Act 1951 (power of Ministers to make temporary order for stopping-up or diversion of highway in connection with working of surface minerals) shall apply to an order made by a competent authority under this section as it applies to an order made by a Minister under section 153 of the principal Act, with the substitution—

(a) for references to Ministers of references to a competent authority for the purposes of this section; and

(b) for the reference in subsection (2) to section 153(3) of the principal Act, of a reference to subsection (3) of this section.")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment applies to the case of a footpath or bridleway order made by a competent authority—the local planning authority or a delegate planning authority—the extended powers already conferred by the Mineral Workings Act 1951 in relation to similar orders when made by a Minister. These powers under the Mineral Workings Act enable a highway to be stopped up or diverted temporarily in connection with the surface working of minerals. They permit the imposition of requirements as to maintenance of alternative highways for the period of closure or diversion and also as to the reinstatement of the original highway at the end of that period. It is only right and consistent that these powers relating to temporary diversion and stopping up should be available in the new circumstance created by the Bill—where the footpath closure or diversion order is originated by a competent authority under the section, and not the Minister. I beg to move.
Clause 96 [Miscellaneous amendments of Part IX of principal Act]:
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I am advised that this Amendment is drafting—a matter of style. I beg to move Amendment No. 78.
Amendment moved—
Page 84, line 42, leave out ("which statutory undertakers have") and insert ("of statutory undertakers").—(Lord Shepherd.)
Clause 99 [Miscellaneous amendments of principal Act]:
LORD KENNET LORD KENNET moved Amendment No. 79:
Page 85, line 26, leave out subsection (1).
The noble Lord said: My Lords this Amendment removes an otiose subsection, and Amendment No. 141 is consequential to it. I beg to move Amendment No. 79.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, I have not understood this and I wonder whether the noble Lord could explain it a little more. What is being done in the Bill as it stands is that Clause 99(1) repeals Section 187 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1962, and that is what happens in Schedule 11 as well, but now apparently they are both to stay in force. I am afraid that I have missed the point and I should be grateful if the noble Lord would tell me exactly what is going on.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, I missed the point, too, but in fact this section has already been repealed earlier this year by the National Loans Act.
Schedule 1 [Special provisions as to development plans in Greater London]:
LORD KENNET LORD KENNET moved Amendment No. 80:
Page 90, line 21, after ("5") insert (",6")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, the general principle in the Bill is that proposals for the alteration of a structure plan or a local plan shall go through the same procedure as the original plan. This Amendment ensures that proposals for alteration of the structure plan for a London Borough shall follow the same procedure as the original plan, coming to the Minister through the G.L.C. I beg to move.
Schedule 2 [Provisions as to established use certificates]:
LORD KENNET: My Lords, Amendments Nos. 81, 82 and 83 and later Nos. 93, 94 and 95 are addressed to machinery and change the substance of nothing. I beg to move Amendments Nos. 81, 82 and 83.
Amendments moved—
Page 91, line 41, after ("certificate") insert ("in such form as may be prescribed by the order and")
Page 91, line 46, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—
("(a) include requirements corresponding to section 16(2) and (3) (contents of certificate), section 16(4) (planning authority not to determine application for a certain period) and section 17(3) (duty of planning authority and Minister on appeal to take into account representations by owners, tenants, etc.) of the principal Act;")
Page 92, line 12, leave out sub-paragraph (3).—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD KENNET: My Lords, Amendments Nos. 84 and 85 are consequential on Amendment No. 9. I beg to move them together.
Amendments moved—
Page 92, line 29, leave out from ("Minister") to ("shall") in line 31 and insert ("grants an established use certificate, he")
Page 92, line 39, leave out from ("Minister") to end of line 40.—(Lord Kennet.)
Schedule 3 [General vesting declarations for land compulsorily acquired]:
LORD KENNET: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 86, which is drafting.
Amendment moved—
Page 95, line 1, leave out paragraph 9 and insert:
("9.—(1) Subject to the following sub-paragraph, the supplementary provisions contained in Schedule 3 to the Land Commission Act 1967 (being provisions as to exclusion of power of entry, objections to severance, compensation and other miscellaneous matters arising on the making of a general vesting declaration under Part II of that Act) shall have effect for the purposes of paragraphs 6 to 8 above as they have effect for the purposes of section 10 of that Act.
(2) For the purpose of applying the said Schedule 3 to paragraphs 6 and 8 above, the
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following substitution of references shall be made therein—

Original reference in Land Commission Act 1967, Schedule 3

Substituted references for purposes of this Schedule

The Land Commission

An acquiring authority

The Land Commission Act 1967

This Act

The Land Commission Act 1967

Section 9(3)

Paragraph 4 of this Schedule

Section 10

Paragraphs 6 to 8 of this Schedule

Section 10(2)

Paragraph 7 of this Schedule

(3) In the said Schedule 3 as so applied, 'land' shall have the same meaning as in this Schedule.")
Schedule 4 [Consequential amendments of planning blight provisions of 1962 Act]:
LORD KENNET: My Lords, Amendments Nos. 87 and 88 are consequential on a series of Amendments which I explained on Amendment No. 18. I beg to move Amendments Nos. 87 and 88.
Amendments moved
Page 96, leave out lines 37 to 42 and insert—
("In subsection (1)—

(a) after the word 'Act', where occurring for the first time, there shall be inserted the words 'and of sections 33 to 37 of the Act of 1968';

(b) paragraphs (a) and (b) shall be omitted; and

(c) in paragraph (c), for the words in parenthesis there shall be substituted the words '(otherwise than by being dealt with in a manner mentioned in section 33(1)(a) or (b) of the Act of 1968)';

For subsection (5) there shall be substituted the following subsections:—
(5) In this section and in the said sections 139 to 151 'these provisions' means the provisions of this section, those sections and sections 33 to 37 of the Act of 1968; and 'the specified descriptions' means the descriptions contained in paragraphs (c) to (f) of subsection (1) of this section and paragraphs (a) to (d) of section 33(1) of that Act.")
Page 96, line 46, at end insert—
("In subsection (3)—

(a) in paragraph (a) the word 'designated' shall be omitted, in both places; and for the words any of paragraphs (a) to (c) of subsection (1) of the last preceding section' there shall be substituted the words paragraph (c) of section 138(1) above or paragraph (a) or (b) of section 33(1) of the Act of 1968'; and

1317

(b) in paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) for the words 'that subsection' there shall be substituted, in each place, the words 'section 138(1) above'.")—(Lord Kennet.)

LORD KENNET: My Lords, Amendments Nos. 89 and 90 are drafting. I beg to move them together.
Amendments moved—
Page 97, line 2, leave out from ("(1)") to end of line 10 and insert—
("for the words 'Where a notice has been served under the last preceding section' there shall be substituted the words 'Where a blight notice has been served'.
For subsection (3) there shall be substituted the following subsection—
'(3) Any counter-notice served under this section in respect of a blight notice shall specify the grounds (being one or more of the grounds specified in subsection (2) above or, as relevant, sections 34(8) or 35(1) of the Act of 1968) on which the appropriate authority object to the notice'.")
Page 97, line 22, at end insert—
("In subsection (3), for the words from the beginning to 'that notice' there shall be substituted the words 'Where the appropriate authority have served a counter-notice objecting to a blight notice'.").—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD KENNET: My Lords, Amendments Nos. 91 and 92 to Schedule 4, and 93 to 95 to Schedule 5, are all consequential. I beg to move them together.
Amendments moved—
Page 97, line 26, at end insert—
("Section 145
Subsections (3) and (6) shall be omitted.")
Page 97, line 30, at end insert—
("Section 149
In subsections (1)(a), (1)(b), (3)(a) and (3)(b), for the words 'the whole or part' (wherever occurring) there shall be substituted the words 'the whole or a substantial part'.
In subsections (1)(b), (2)(b) and (3)(b) for the words 'six months before the date of service' there shall be substituted the words 'twelve months before the date of service'.
Section 150
Subsection (5) shall be omitted.")
Schedule 5, page 98, line 4, after ("certificate") insert ("in the prescribed form and")
Schedule 5, page 98, line 10, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—
("(a) include requirements corresponding to section 16(2) (contents of certificate), section 16(4) (planning authority not to determine application for a certain period) and section 17(3) (duty of planning authority and Minister on appeal to take into account
1318
representations by owners, tenants, etc.) of the principal Act;")
Schedule 5, page 98, line 26, leave out subparagraph (3).—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD KENNET LORD KENNET moved Amendment No. 96:
Page 100, line 21, at end insert—
("or—

(a) in the case of a building to which section 39(10) of this Act applies, that the Minister should give a direction under that section with respect to the building; or

(b) in the case of a building subject to a building preservation notice under section 47 of this Act, that the building should not be included in a list compiled or approved under the said section 32").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment, No. 96, to Schedule 5, is a matter of machinery. It provides that a ground of appeal which is already applicable in the most likely case should be also applicable in the least likely. I beg to move.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, I think that in paragraph (a) "section" should be "subsection" but this may be beyond power of recovery at this stage.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, Amendment No. 98 is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 105, line 38, leave out ("of the owner").—(Load Kennet.)
LORD KENNET: My Lords, Amendment No. 99 is a matter of machinery. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 109, line 3, leave out ("of this Act committed by him") and insert ("or 44 of this Act committed by him with respect to the said building").—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD KENNET: My Lords, Amendment No. 100 is a matter of clarification. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 109, line 12, after ("thereon") insert ("under Part IV of this Schedule").—(Lord Kennet.)
Schedule 6 [Construction of references in sections 61 and 62 to "the responsible Minister or Ministers"]:
LORD KENNET: My Lords, Amendments Nos. 101 and 102 are both drafting Amendments. I beg to move them together.
Amendments moved—
Page 109, line 36, leave out paragraph 3.
Page 110, column 1, line 13, at end insert ("or to land in the case of which the circumstances mentioned in section 69(2) of this Act are present,").—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD KENNET: My Lords, Amendment No. 103 is a consequential Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 110, column 1, line 29, after ("by") insert ("or on behalf of").—(Lord Kennet.)
Schedule 7 [Procedure in connection with orders relating to footpaths and bridleways]:
LORD KENNET: My Lords, Amendments Nos. 104 and 105 hang together. They are addressed to machinery. I beg to move.
Amendments moved—
Page 111, line 9, at end insert—
("(iii) any statutory undertakers to whom there belongs, or by whom there is used, for the purposes of their undertaking, any apparatus under, in, on, over, along or across that land; and")
Page 112, line 24, at end insert—
("4.—(1) The Minister shall not confirm an order under section 93 of this Act which extinguishes a right of way over land under, in, on, over, along or across which there is any apparatus belonging to or used by statutory undertakers for the purpose of their undertaking, unless the undertakers have consented to the confirmation of the order; and any such consent may be given subject to the condition that there are included in the order such provisions for the protection of the undertakers as they may reasonably require.
(2) The consent of statutory undertakers to any such order shall not be unreasonably withheld; and any question arising under this paragraph whether the withholding of consent is unreasonable or whether any requirement is reasonable, shall be determined by whichever Minister is the appropriate Minister in relation to the statutory undertakers concerned.")—(Lord Kennet.)
Schedule 9 [Adaptation and interpretation of enactments, etc.]:
LORD KENNET LORD KENNET moved Amendments Nos. 106, 107 and 108:
Page 115, line 45, leave out from beginning to ("references") in line 47 and insert ("References in any Act to the acquisition of land under Part V of the principal Act or to land acquired thereunder (including references which, by Schedule 14 to that Act, are to be construed as such) shall be respectively construed as, or as including (according as the context requires)")
Page 115, line 49, after first ("and") insert—
("(a)")
Page 116, line 5, at end insert—
("and
(b) in section 130(2) (effect of purchase notice accepted by local planning authority or statutory undertakers) and section 133(1) (confirmation of purchase notice by Minister) of that Act, references to compulsory acquisition shall, in the case of statutory undertakers, be construed as references to any statutory provision (however expressed) under which the undertakers have power, or may be authorised, to purchase land compulsorily for the purposes of their undertaking.")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, with your Lordships' permission, I propose to move Amendments Nos. 106, 107 and 108 together
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, I should like the noble Lord to explain Amendment No. 108, at any rate.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, perhaps I should explain the three together, since they are closely bound up. So far as No. 106 is concerned, it is necessary for the Bill to provide for the bringing forward of references to powers of acquisition under earlier enactments so that other provisions expressed in terms of those powers may be enabled to continue working as was intended. The provision in paragraph 6 of Schedule 9—the general adaptation schedule—is not wide enough.
First, it has not dealt with references which there may be in enactments other than the 1962 Act to acquisition (or to land acquired) under Part V of that Act. It is necessary that it should do so, otherwise the effect of those provisions could become entirely uncertain on the repeal of the powers of acquisition in Part V of the 1962 Act (effected by Clause 27 of the Bill). Second, paragraph 2 of Schedule 14 to the Act of 1962 provided that a

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reference to an enactment repealed by the 1962 Act should be construed as, or as including, a reference to the corresponding provisions of the 1962 Act. By this means references to the powers of acquisition contained in the Town and Country Planning Act 1947 fell to be construed as references to those in the Act of 1962. But they will not be carried forward under the Bill unless now referred to in the manner of the Amendment.
Amendment No. 107 paves for Amendment No. 108, which arises out of the repeal by this Bill of Section 67 of the 1962 Act, which is the provision conferring powers of compulsory acquisition on statutory undertakers.
My Lords, if that is sufficient explanation of the way in which the three Amendments relate to each other, I beg to move them together.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, Amendment No. 109 is a consequential Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 116, line 19, after ("by") insert ("the Minister of Transport or").—(Lord Kennet.)
8.35 p.m.
LORD AIREDALE LORD AIREDALE moved Amendment No. 110:
Page 116, line 30, at end insert—
(". In section 14(8)(b) after "1959" there shall be inserted the words "except sections 72, 73 and 74 thereof")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move, not for the first time, this Amendment, whose purpose I am afraid is not too self-evident upon the face of it. It refers to Sections 72, 73 and 74 of the Highways Act 1959. Those sections deal with road widening schemes and the like. What they provide is that such schemes are to be achieved by prescribing improvement or building lines in consequence of which any landowner whose land is injuriously affected by the road widening scheme is entitled to immediate compensation.
No doubt, my Lords, Parliament's reason for so enacting in the 1959 Act was Parliament's experience of the time that it takes for road widening schemes and such schemes to be effected. It may take 25 years or more for this to happen.
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So unless the person whose land is injuriously affected, and who is no longer allowed to develop this land, is to receive immediate compensation, it is tantamount to saying that he will not get compensation at all, because in 25 years' time, when the scheme is put into force, he may no longer be with us.
The Ministry of Transport apparently discovered what they thought was a way round this intention of Parliament, and they published a circular which they addressed to local authorities in which they said that they need not proceed under the Highways Act in the manner that Parliament said they were to proceed, but could proceed under the planning legislation instead. The consequence of acting under the planning legislation was that the landowner whose lard was injuriously affected, and who Parliament had specifically indicated was to receive immediate compensation, would not receive immediate compensation. Indeed, I think it is right to say that in some cases he might receive no compensation at all.
This circular earned for the Ministry of Transport the following rebuke in the Court of Appeal from Lord Justice Salmon, who said of the circular, in a case which was reported in The Times on May 31 last:
"Ever since the circular was published it appeared that improvement lines were not prescribed under the Act, but planning powers were used to sterilise land without property owners having the right to compensation. That practice was to be deplored. It was a practice to defeat the express intention of Parliament in the Highways Act."
LORD KENNET: Before the noble Lord goes on, would he tell us from what case he is quoting the judgment?
LORD AIREDALE: As a matter of fact, I have only one more sentence to quote. The case is the Westminster Bank Limited v. Beverley Borough Council.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, the House will be aware that this matter is sub judice in that an appeal lies to your Lordships' House in its judicial capacity.
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, that was a matter which I explained when I moved this Amendment on Report; I explained that this case was sub judice. I am not proposing to quote any part

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of the judgment which affects the facts of the case. I am citing a general observation of Lord Justice Salmon. The conclusion of the quotation is:
"It was an unjust practice designed to save money."
My Lords, I suggest that it is not a feather in the cap of a Government Department when it incurs for itself that kind of rebuke from the judiciary. There is one, and only one, proper constitutional way for a Minister to have the intention of Parliament as expressed in the Statutes changed, and that is to go to his colleagues and explain that a particular provision in a Statute is inconvenient, and for Parliamentary time to be found to bring the matter before Parliament for repealing the Statute and putting something else in its place. I suggest that that is the only proper way in which this matter could have been dealt with. What we have to decide, my Lords, is whether we are to have Government by Act of Parliament or Government by Ministry circular, not published for the benefit of the public at large but addressed and forwarded by the particular Ministry to whom they choose.
I am sorry to say that in the replies I have so far received from Government spokesmen to this Amendment, I have not detected much in the way of what I would call humanity. I have not detected that the Government appreciate that what we are here dealing with is a specific intention of Parliament, expressed in an Act of Parliament, saying that if land is taken away for the public use in certain circumstances the person from whom the land is taken shall have immediate compensation. Is it the Government's intention that the immediate compensation which Parliament has said the landowner is to have shall change? Is this compensation no longer to be given? Are we to have government by Ministry circular or are we to have government by Act of Parliament? That is what this Amendment is about. I very much hope that it will be accepted, and that if the Government wish to change the law in this matter they will do so in the constitutional manner. I beg to move.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, the House considers this Amendment for the third time on this Bill. I think that the noble
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Lord, Lord Airedale, rested his case mainly on some remarks by a judge in a certain case, which he alleged were a rebuke. But this case has not finished: it is sub-judice; an appeal is now pending to the House of Lords. I do not wish to go much further into it, but I do not think it was wise of him to rest so much of his case on this amendment to the law on the remarks of a judge in a case where an appeal is allowed and a further appeal is pending. As to relating that with the highly emotive question of whether we are to have government by circular or by Act of Parliament, I think that really is pushing it a bit.
I do not know how much more the House would wish me to say on this third occasion, in addition to what has already been said at earlier stages, but I would assure Lord Airedale (I think he was assured before; I am speaking generally now and forgetting the Case) that the effect of his Amendment would be against developers, in that it would prevent the Government from coming to their rescue in certain awkward cases by dictating that one Act should be used rather than another. I think it would probably come out the other way from what he intended. We could go into an enormous explanation of it, but that is the essence of the matter: that if it is the intention of his Amendment to help developers, as I think it is, then it would not have that effect.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, I should like to say just this. With great respect to the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, I do not think that this is a matter that can be put right by an Amendment in a Schedule to this Bill. What is really at issue here—in fact in this case it may not turn out to be an issue under this particular set of legislative provisions, but it is nevertheless a general issue—is the relationship between conditions that can be attached to planning provisions, which have some sort of restrictive effect, and similar powers which are granted to local authorities by other Statutes but which carry rights of compensation. Whether or not it is right that the power that does not carry the right of compensation should be used in lieu of the one that does is a much broader matter than something that just arises under the Highways Acts. It applies over a broader field, and I think

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it ought not to be isolated in this particular case.
I hope that the Government are not simply waiting for the decision in the House in its Judicial capacity in the particular case that has been mentioned. I hope that the Government have some thoughts about the generality and are not simply going to drop this matter altogether, depending upon what happens in the Westminster Bank v. Beverley case. I believe that this matter would repay a little thought on the part of the authorities, and I hope that that is something which will be given.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, if I can add anything to that it is to say that the noble Viscount should be assured that the Government are giving it a lot of thought, but it seems that the next thing to do is to wait for the final determination of the Beverley case.
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, I am willing to wait for the final determination of the Beverley case. Before I withdraw this Amendment I will simply say this. When you are looking to see what the intention of Parliament is with regard to highways you look at the Highways Act, and if you find that what is in the Highways Act may be in some way in conflict with something which is contained in planning legislation, you still adhere to what is contained in the Highways Act, because you say to yourself, "When Parliament was considering the Highways Act it had its mind riveted upon this kind of problem, whereas when Parliament was considering planning legislation Parliament was considering planning generally and was not riveting its mind upon highways in particular".
I can only bitterly regret that any Government Department should have thought it fit to issue a Ministry circular in those terms which earned that rebuke from the Judiciary, because I want to see the Executive held in high repute in the country, and it does not do the Executive one little bit of good when it gets its actions criticised in terms of that sort from the Judiciary. Having said that, I will await the result of the Beverley case, and I hope that I shall then be encouraged to return to the attack. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, Amendments Nos. 111 and 112 are both drafting. I beg to move.
Amendments moved—
Page 118, line 15, after first ("of") insert ("the provisions of").
Page 118, line 17, leave out ("in both subsections") and insert—
("(a) in subsection (1), after the words 'this Part of this Act' there shall be inserted the words 'and Part II of the Act of 1968'; and
(b) in subsection (2)").—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD KENNET: My Lords, Amendments Nos. 113, 114 and 115 are addressed to machinery. They have that in common. I beg to move them together.
Amendments moved—
Page 119, line 44, leave out ("91") and insert ("90, 91, 93, or 94")
Page 120, line 9, at end insert—
("(h) any decision of the Minister on an application for an established use certificate referred to him under section 18(1) of the Act of 1968;
(i) any decision of the Minister on an appeal under section 18(2) of the Act of 1968").
Page 121, line 33, at end insert ("o 91").—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD KENNET,My Lords, Amendment No. 116 is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 122, line 16, at end insert—
("(b) subsection (2) shall be omitted; and").—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD KENNET: My Lords, Amendment No. 117 tidies up the machinery and improves and clarifies the right of appeal to the courts in certain cases. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 122, leave out lines 20 to 29 and insert—
(". In section 183 (orders subject to special parliamentary procedure), after the word Act', where first occurring, there shall be inserted the words 'or section 90 or 9l of the Act of 1968'").—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD KENNET: My Lords, Amendments Nos. 118 and 119 are both drafting. I beg to move them together.
Amendments moved—
Page 123, line 38, leave out ("section 28, 48 or 90") and insert ("section 20, 48 or 91")
Page 124, line 8, after ("a") insert ("completion").—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD KENNET: My Lords, Amendment No. 120 is consequential. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 124, line 8, at end insert ("and for the words (in the proviso) from 'an enforcement notice' to 'this Act' there shall be substituted the words an enforcement notice under section 15 or 43 of the Act of 1968 which is served by the Minister, the provisions of sections 47 to 51 of this Act or, as the case may be, sections 44 and 45 of that Act'; and").—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD KENNET: My Lords, Amendments Nos. 121, 122 and 123 are all drafting. I beg to move them all together.
Amendments moved—
Page 125, line 11, leave out ("this Act") and insert ("the Act of 1968")
Page 126, line 14, leave out from ("the") to second ("Act") in line 15 and insert ("Town and Country Planning Act 1968 (hereafter in this Act referred to as 'the 1968 Planning Act'), for all purposes of the Planning Act and the said")
Page 126, line 24, leave out ("said Act of 1968") and insert ("1968 Planning Act").—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD KENNET: My Lords, Amendment No. 124 is machinery. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 126, line 36, after ("24(4)") insert—
("(a) After the words 'Planning Act' where first occurring, there shall be inserted the words 'and of the 1968 Planning Act (except sections 17 and 18 of that Act)';
(b)").—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD KENNET: My Lords, Amendments Nos. 125, 126 and 127 are all drafting. I beg to move.
Amendments moved—
Page 126, line 45, leave out ("Act of 1968") and insert ("1968 Planning Act")
Page 126, line 47, leave out ("subject to the next following paragraph")
Page 127, leave out lines 1 to 7.—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD KENNET: My Lords, Amendments Nos. 128 and 129 go to machinery. I beg to move them together.
Amendments moved—
Page 127, line 47, at end insert—
("(d) in subsection (5), for the words 'section 46(1) of the Act of 1962' there shall be substituted the words 'section 16(1) of the said Act of 1968'")
Page 127, line 50, leave out from ("the") to end of line and insert ("said Act of 1968; for the words 'paragraph (a) to (c)' there shall be substituted the words 'paragraphs (a) and (b)'; and for the words 'section 177(1)' there shall be substituted the words 'section 177(1)(a)'").—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD KENNET: My Lords, Amendments Nos. 130 and 131 are both drafting. I beg to move them together.
Amendments moved—
Page 129, line 7, at end insert ("and for the words 'that Act' there shall be substituted the words the 'Planning Act'")
Page 129, line 29, leave out from ("16(2)") to end of line 32 and insert ("(3) and (4)(a) of the Planning Act of 1968 and so much of section 16(5) of that Act as enables the Minister to give directions").—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD KENNET: My Lords, Amendments Nos. 132 and 136 hang together. They are both addressed to machinery and achieve the same effect as the Bill as drafted, but by another route. I beg to move Amendment No. 132.
Amendment moved—
Page 129, leave out lines 33 to 35.—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD KENNET LORD KENNET moved Amendment No. 133:
Page 130, line 25, at end insert—
("The Leasehold Reform Act 1967 (c. 88)
In section 28(6) (description of development which, if proposed to be undertaken by a local authority, public or other body, may restrict

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the rights under the Act of tenants of the land affected) for the words from 'in order to secure' to comprehensive development' there shall be substituted the following:—
'in order to secure—

(a) the development or re-development of an area defined by a development plan under the Town and Country Planning Act 1962 as an area of comprehensive development; or

(b) the treatment as a whole, by development, re-development, or improvement, or partly by one and partly by another method, of any area in which the property is situated'").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, Amendment No. 133 is a little more than machinery. It ensures that certain provisions of the Leasehold Reform Act shall carry forward in terms of the new language used in this Bill about the development and improvement of an area, as well as in the old language used in the 1962 Act. I beg to move.
On Ouestion, Amendment agreed to.
Schedule 10 [Transitional Provisions and Savings]:
LORD KENNET: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 134.
Amendment moved—
Page 130, line 43, at end insert ("this Act").—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD KENNET: My Lords, this is a matter of the machinery of transition. I beg to move Amendment No. 135.
Amendment moved—
Page 131, line 3, leave out from ("shall") to end of line 4 and insert ("be taken to prevail for the purposes of Parts III, IV, V, VI and VIII of the principal Act, Parts II and VI of this Act and Schedule 5 to this Act").—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD KENNET: My Lords, this Amendment, No. 136, is consequential. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 132, line 25, at end insert—
("11. Section 9 of the Control of Offices and Industrial Development Act 1965 shall, in relation to an enforcement notice served before the commencement of Part II of this Act, have effect as originally enacted and not as amended by paragraph 64 of Schedule 9 to this Act.
12. The amendment of section 14 of the Civic Amenities Act 1967 which is made by paragraph 73 of this Act shall not have effect
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in relation to a notice served under that section before the commencement of Part II of this Act.").—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD KENNET: My Lords, once again this Amendment No. 137, is a matter of the machinery of transition. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 132, line 45, leave out paragraph 14 and insert—
("14.—(1) Notwithstanding any amendment by this Act of sections 138 to 151 of the principal Act, the description of land contained in section 138(1)(b) of that Act (land allocated by a development plan for the purposes of a government department, etc.) shall continue as one of the specified descriptions for the purposes of those sections in their application to any district to which this paragraph applies.
(2) This paragraph applies to any district for which no local plan is in force under Part I of this Act—

(a) allocating any land in the district for the purposes of such functions as are mentioned in section 33(1)(a) this Act; or

(b) defining any land in the district as the site of proposed development for the purposes of any such functions.

(3) To the extent that section 138(1)(b) of the principal Act survives by virtue of this paragraph and for so long as it does so, the amendment by this Act of section 139(3)(a) of that Act (definition of 'relevant date' by reference to section 138(1)(b)) shall be treated as not displacing the reference in that paragraph to section 138(1)(b).")—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD KENNET LORD KENNET: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 138.
Amendment moved—
Page 133, line 21, after ("of") insert ("Part V of").—(Lord Kennet.)
Schedule 11 [Enactments repealed]:
LORD KENNET: My Lords, Amendments Nos. 139, 140, 141 and 142—that is, all the remaining Amendments—are consequential on various earlier provisions already taken into the Bill. I beg to move them together.
Amendments moved—
Page 135, column 3, leave out lines 14 to 16.
Page 135, column 3, leave out line 18 and insert—
("In section 145, subsection (3), in subsection (4) the words 'and (6)' and subsection (6)")
Page 135, column 3, leave out lines 50 and 51.
Page 136, column 3, line 17, at end insert ("and (3)").—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD KENNET LORD KENNET: My Lords, I beg to move that the Bill do now pass.
Moved, That the Bill do now pass.—(Lord Kennet.)
8.57 p.m.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, I do not think I should be in favour if I made a long speech at this stage of the Bill and at this time of the evening, but there are two points I want to ask the noble Lord, Lord Kennet. The first thing that catches my eye is Clause 104, dealing with the commencement of the Bill. Can the noble Lord give any indication of the stages at which this Bill will be brought into effect, and when they are likely to be? This information will be of great interest to almost everybody in this country, as in one way or another a large number of people are affected by its provisions.
Secondly, not only have we "blight" provisions but we have yet another instalment of chaotic amendment of the provisions relating to industrial development certificates and office development permits. We had Section 38 of the 1962 Act, which was the original I.D.C. provision; then it was changed by the Control of Offices and Industrial Developments Act, which added the O.D.P.s and changed the I.D.C.s in 1965; the Industrial Development Act, 1966, changed the I.D.C.s again, and here we have a Bill in 1968 which changes both of them again. It is already virtually impossible to understand what any of this means. It is far more difficult than "blight" provisions, and I hope something will be done fairly soon about consolidation and that any loopholes which have been discovered have now been satisfactorily stopped up by this Bill.
I am also interested in the matter of commencement because the moment this Bill comes into force all the way through, I have no doubt the whole thing can be consolidated. Can the noble Lord help on either of those points? They are really of some importance.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, we are speaking on the Motion, That the Bill do now pass, and I want first of all to
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pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Kennet for the way in which he has handled this Bill. I know that I have been in conflict with him, but I hope he will not feel that there has been anything personal about it: I really do strongly disagree with the decision on advertisement appeals. But generally I have nothing but praise for the way in which my noble friend has handled this Bill. He has been calm, serene, helpful and conciliatory, so far as his instructions permitted. I would say the same thing about the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Cumnor. He has been ideal as an Opposition spokesman. He has never taken a political or Party view about this Bill; he has treated it as a measure which is for the common good, and I think I can say quite truthfully that every single speech of his has been of a non-Party character, and made with the sole desire to improve the Bill. I wish I could say the same about all Bills which go through this House.
It is now twenty years since the Town and Country Planning Act 1947 was passed, and as one who was very largely responsible for that Act I must agree that the time has come to look at the planning proposals once more, and I am very glad to find—it is a personal gratification to me, at any rate—that the structure of the 1947 Act, by and large, has not been greatly changed. This Bill introduces a considerable number of improvements and modifications which experience has shown are necessary, and I do not complain about them in the very least. I think they are all for the better.
What I wonder is whether there was any urgency about this Bill. I can see no great dramatic changes in the law, and I cannot see why there was this great urgency to get this Bill through at this time. I recognise that there was a problem in connection with planning appeals. They were getting hopelessly congested, and I agree that something had to be done about it. But as regards the rest of the Bill I wonder whether it could not have waited. I should have thought it might have waited until we had had the Report of the Royal Commission on Local Government. Undoubtedly that Report, when it is produced, is going to recommend very great changes in the structure of local government and in the powers of local authorities.

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I myself feel that we have too many planning authorities in the country with jurisdictions which, by and large, are too small, and we have got ourselves in the further difficulty of having a very large number of local authorities who have delegated powers but who in fact are carrying out very important functions without very much interference from the bodies that have delegated those powers to them. If we take the total number, there must be over 1,000 local authorities that are exercising town planning functions to-day. They cannot do this efficiently, and it would have been far wiser, in my view, if we could have held over the major changes that we are making in this Bill until we had had the Report from the Royal Commission on Local Government and had decided what to do and altered the structure of local government. Only at that time, I feel, would it have been appropriate to introduce a measure of this kind in town planning; and had that course been taken it would have been a much more drastic measure.
I think the general trend to-day is towards more and more regional government, and undoubtedly in this small island of ours a reasonable unit for planning development is the region, and not the generally artificial local authority of to-day. You cannot have a development plan for the country which is based on the separate development plans of 124 local authorities. Yet that is the position to-day, and that is the position which has largely been maintained in this Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, shakes his head: but he does not know what is going to be the structure of local government; he does not know what is going to be the future, and undoubtedly there will have to be great changes in the future.
There is one final matter that I want to touch on, and I do so with great diffidence. The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, some years ago, in the early days, held out high hopes of the simplification of our legislation. We were going to have legislation which would be understood, if not by the man in the street, at any rate by even the least experienced practitioner in the law. We were going to bring an end to the complicated highly technical legislation which we are getting to-day and which we have had for so many years. Certainly this
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Bill is not an example of such a change—though I quite realise (I want to be quite fair) that it cannot be done in the present outlook of legislation. If we are to have legislation intended to provide for every possible contingency in planning, for the exceptional cases and for the normal cases, then of course we must have a highly technical Bill.
I understand that some thought is being given by the Law Commissions to some method of simplifying Bills, possibly by laying down principles and having more regulations, more statutory orders, or some other way by which a Bill will be readily understood by most of its readers. I am sorry to say that that is not the case with this present Bill: even I find it very difficult to follow in a number of places. I remember that when the 1947 Act was before the House it used to be said by friends that there was only one person who understood it, but by those who were not friends that nobody understood it; but it was not quite as bad as that.
However, I will say this as regards recent legislation: that already there are several matters coming up before the courts for decision. May I quote one, the Leasehold Reform Act? The Lands Tribunal are inundated with cases in which a decision is sought on what is the proper amount of payment to be made for the redemption of leaseholds. We all know what was meant in the Bill. What I understood the Bill to intend way that it was to be a payment representing something excluding the value of the house, only the land. Certainly there is a strong feeling throughout the country that that is not what the Act says, and it is being argued that all the great labyrinth of words means simply that a person wanting to redeem the lease has to pay the full market value of the lease. That is one example. Another example, which no doubt your Lordships have had drawn to your attention, concerns the Landlord and Tenant Act, where there is some doubt as to a large class of cases which have been left out of the Act although it was intended that they should be included. Again there is a great pressure on the Government to amend almost immediately after the Act has been passed.
I feel that some kind of simplification of legislation is called for, and I am only sorry that the ambitions of my noble and

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learned friend the Lord Chancellor have not yet been realised. I hope that before the end of this Government we shall have this simpler legislation. Having said that, I once more congratulate my noble friend Lord Kennet on having got through this monumental Bill, with no friction in this House, with great pleasantness, and, I think, with the general good will of the whole House.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, may I be allowed to associate myself and those on these Benches with the tribute that he has paid to the noble Lord, Lord Kennet? I have not been intimately involved in this Bill, but I have read the proceedings and I appreciate that the tribute is well deserved. May I also, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Brooke of Cumnor, thank the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, for the kind words he said about my noble friend.
9.10 p.m.
LORD HOLFORD: My Lords, to add any words at all to what has been said by what I may call the three statesmen of planning, Lord Silkin, Lord Brooke, and finally Lord Kennet, needs a certain audacity at this hour of night; but Lord Silkin did encourage me to say a few brief words on the passing of this Bill as one who has been teaching and practising town and country planning for thirty-five years.
What I want to say is that the Bill seems to me to try to resolve a great number of conflicts, the biggest of which, as I have listened in the course of the passage of the Bill through this House, has been the wish to get greater public participation in planning and at the same time to increase the speed of the machinery, to have fewer appeals and delays. These are obviously complex matters. I should like to associate myself with what the noble Lord and also the noble Viscount have said: that here, in a situation where you have a fast driver on a rather skiddy road, the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, has shown himself to be a wonderful steersman.
The only other thing I want to say is that I believe that although there is no great urgency for this Bill it is timely. I happen to be one of the guinea pigs in regard to this Act, in that I have
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just put up an application for planning permission in full display in the Royal Exchange, in the middle of the City of London, for a building which has not yet received planning permission. In the course of the eight days for which this exhibition, with its models and photographs has been exposed, we have had, to my surprise, 20,000 people visiting it, and comments which run into several thousands. Whether those comments are for or against I am not prepared to say; I do not think any of us know. But it is at any rate a measure of the interest which people are taking in this subject, and therefore, although the Bill may not be urgent, it is certainly timely.
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, was most lavish in his praise for the efforts of others upon this Bill; but it all rests upon the foundation of the 1947 Act, the indefatigable pilot of which was the noble Lord. Lord Silkin, himself.
9.14 p.m.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, let me thank for their kind words all those who have uttered them, and if I may, I should like to pass on a due share of them to my noble friends Lady Serota and Lord Shepherd, who have borne the brunt of some of the most incomprehensible parts of this Bill, and also tell my noble friend Lord Silkin of my impression that he got it right first time in 1947. I think it is remarkable that the principles laid down in that first Planning Act ever really to bite on the British situation should have stood the test of time so well and needed so little revision twenty years later. I am only sorry that he did not agree with me on all the details of this Bill. I have great sympathy for what my noble friend Lord Silkin said about too many planning authorities, and I would point out that if the Royal Commission recommend fewer, and the recommendation is adopted by the Government, that will fit very well with this Bill. In the meantime, there is a de facto reduction going on among the authorities whom we have invited to operate the new provisions as soon as they can—indeed, they are already beginning to work on it.
A couple of statistics may be of interest. The House has considered about 400 Amendments to the Bill. We have carried in 21 new clauses, and three new

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Schedules. This is quite a lot. It is an unusual score, and I would not draw it to your Lordships' attention if I were not perfectly confident that we have very much improved the Bill by doing this. It is one of those occasions when my noble friend Lord Silk in was able to speak about the lack of Party animosity in this Bill. There has been virtually none. And how pleasant it is to find something on which the Parties really do agree; and how pleasant it is to legislate in such an atmosphere!
On the question of compensation and consolidation, I have told the House at earlier stages that an overall review of compensation is going on inside the Government machine. It is still going on. It is going on well but, as all Members of the House will know, there is probably nothing in the country, or hardly anything in the country, so complicated as land compensation; and tempting as it sometimes is to say, "To hell with the details: let us decide the principle", that is not possible, because the details "come back at you" the next day and you find that you have decided the principle the wrong way and got it upside down. But I assure the House that this review is active; it is going forward. There is progress. We are further forward than we were last time I mentioned it. I cannot yet give a date when anything will come before Parliament from it. As the House knows, the programme is pretty congested these years, and in any case it is an open question yet how many of all the matters which are now under review should he put in one Bill, whether we can wrap it all up or whether it may be necessary to go ahead with some parts of it before others.
The noble Lord, Viscount Colville of Culross, also asked when the Bill would be coming into effect, and I am glad he did so, because I think it may be useful to get certain intentions of my right honourable friend known among those who will have to operate it. Because of the varied nature of the alterations and additions to planning law which are made by the Bill, the various parts of it will have to come into effect on different dates.
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There are some provisions which must be brought into force as soon as possible, and the Order for this purpose will be made as shortly as possible after Royal Assent is given to the Bill. These provisions include Clause 38 and Clauses 68 to 72, "Statutory undertakers".
A number of other varied improvements in the detail of planning lays contained in Part VI which do not require the making of regulations or administrative preparation will also be brought: into effect as soon as possible after Royal Assent. The Planning Inquiry Commissions provisions need a small set of regulations. My right honourable friend intends to bring them into force at the end of November, so that all that should be ready if ever a case arises in which it would be appropriate to refer to a Planning Inquiry Commission.
Nearly all the rest of the Bill, including the provisions for transfer of appeals to inspectors, the strengthening of protection for listed buildings, and the improved enforcement code, but with the exception of Part I, my right honourable friend plans at the moment to bring into force on January 1 of next year. Time is required between now and then to get the regulations and circulars drafted, and some of these will have to be the subject of consultation with interested organisations. A very few provisions, such as Clause 87, dealing with ministerial responsibility for the Location of Offices Bureau, will fit more conveniently with the term of the financial year, and accordingly will be brought into force later next year.
My Lords, we take leave of a long Bill. I regret that it is in places an obscure Bill, but if it were any clearer than the surrounding landscape it would give rise to greater obscurity. It is a Bill which has to its credit two records: probably a record number of Amendments on Third Reading in your Lordships' House, in recent years at any rate, and a record degree of concordance and agreement among all Parties.
On Question, Bill passed, and returned to the Commons.
House adjourned at twenty-one minutes past nine o'clock.