ADDRESS IN REPLY TO HER MAJESTY'S MOST GRACIOUS SPEECH

HL Deb 05 November 1968 vol 297 cc125-218

2.53 p.m.

Debate resumed on the Motion moved on Wednesday last by Lord Delacourt-Smith—namely, That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty as follows:

"Most Gracious Sovereign—We, Your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, in Parliament assembled, beg leave to thank Your Majesty for the most gracious Speech which Your Majesty has addressed to both Houses of Parliament."

LORD CARRINGTON

My Lords, this is the day that we set aside for a debate on Foreign Affairs, and as is customary the gracious Speech started with reference to Foreign Affairs. I do not think that there will be many of your Lordships who will take exception to anything that was said in that part of the gracious Speech, though perhaps some of it is not entirely clear. I do not think that many of your Lordships will wish to quarrel with the Government's decision to maintain their application for membership of the European Community and will welcome the intention to promote this. Though I do not suppose there are any of us who feel that there is much likelihood of a change of attitude on the part of the French, nevertheless I am sure it is right that we should make plain that we still wish to belong to the Community and that we are not deterred by the veto of one man or of one nation. I think that we should be equally cheered by the support for our entry which we get from the other members of E.E.C., and it is encouraging to feel that the Commission has decided to send a representative—an Ambassador, if you like—who arrived above six weeks ago in London to represent their views and to hear ours.

The main and most important event in foreign affairs in the last 12 months has undoubtedly been the Czechoslovakian crisis and the military occupation of that country by the Russians. I think that it would be right to pause for a moment or two to consider the consequences of that event. If I had been a Russian and had been faced with the situation in Czechoslovakia in August, I should undoubtedly have been seriously worried. For, speaking very generally, what happened was that with the rise in the standard of living, the spread of education and the inevitable questioning which those two things bring with them, there was a great danger from the Russian point of view not only that their political and military and economic grip on Czechoslovakia would be greatly weakened but also that the Czechoslovaks would increase their ties of trade and increase the exchange of information with the West.

If they did nothing, if they allowed events to take their course, that would undoubtedly prove to the more liberal elements in the Iron Curtain countries and in Russia itself that Communism was failing, and it would prove to the Chinese (who had all along said that this was going to be the result of Russian policy) that they were right, and that the only way of spreading Communism was by perpetual militant revolution. But if, on the other hand, the Russians took action, they would run into the danger—which indeed they did run into—of alienating world opinion, of antagonising other Communist parties and of losing the image, which they have so laboriously been creating for themselves, that they are the friends of the "underdog", the underprivileged, and opposed to any kind of military aggression.

It is, in my view, the measure of the failure of Communism as a philosophy and as a system of Government that this crisis arose—and it was inevitable that it should arise. I do not believe that once a country becomes more prosperous, when more consumer goods are in the shops, when life becomes more than just a scramble for existence, a system of Government can be operated in which people have no choice and no opportunity to make their voices heard.

This will not be the last occasion on which the Russians, and indeed later on the Chinese, will find themselves in this difficulty. The standard of living of a country cannot for ever be held back. If it is, and it is compared with the standard of living in capitalist countries, it is a proof of the failure of the Communist system; but if it is not, and the standard of living improves, human beings will revolt against the system. They will demand participation and break away from the rigid disciplines of the mind which Communism imposes.

I think that the Russians were faced with a great dilemma. To do nothing might endanger their own position and certainly make worse their relations with China. To intervene was possibly to lose the support of the uncommitted, to alienate their friends and to make more difficult their task of convincing world opinion that Communism was no longer aggressive. All of us know how in the end the Russians chose to suppress the Czechoslovaks, and in the process I suspect got the worst of both worlds: for by their dilatoriness they allowed pressures to grow up which might not have been there if they had acted quickly, and later they found themselves—and this must have been a great shock—unable to find a Czechoslovak puppet who was prepared to say that he had asked the Russians to intervene.

It so happened that at that time—and this was one of the reasons why I was not back in your Lordships' House—I was in a ship calling at several ports in Bulgaria and the Soviet Union. It was noticeable that when one inquired into the justification of the Russians' action in Czechoslovakia, the answer always was—the Party line always was—"We have been asked by our Socialist comrades to come to the rescue from an imperialist plot". But, in fact, no request was made and no Czechoslovak Quisling was found. This made the Russian task at the United Nations impossible, for they could not claim that they were intervening by request. I think they got the worst of both worlds. Certainly there were demonstrations everywhere against the Russian action. Even those who most usually demonstrate against the United States, for a brief moment demonstrated against the Soviet Union; though I may say, in parentheses, that I have always felt it rather significant, though perhaps not odd, that Soviet actions of that kind seem to wear off rather more quickly among Left-Wing idealists and protesters. One did not see very many banners protesting about the rape of Czechoslovakia in the procession in London ten days ago.

What lessons can we learn from this sad chapter? First, I think that, although there may be talk of a détente, when it comes to the crunch the Russians are as prepared as ever they were to use military force to protect their own interests. It would be very unwise of us to think otherwise. The Russians moved with great military efficiency. Half a million men or more were moved with a minimum amount of trouble into Czechoslovakia, admittedly against no opposition, but still it was an impressive military planning feat. Are we satisfied that in the West NATO is in a fit condition to counter the military efficiency of Russia? My Lords, I do not know, but I am inclined to doubt it, for the support for NATO has been getting pretty lukewarm over these past few years.

We have heard some reactions in this House. "What is it all for?", some noble Lords have said. "Europe is the one place in which there is not going to be a war." That kind of argument has been introduced on a number of occasions in Defence debates. Europe is the one place where there is not going to be a war only if we keep NATO strong; for whatever others may say, I am more than ever convincd that the presence in Western Europe of such an alliance acts as a powerful deterrent to the Russians. No Russian can ignore the military potential of NATO, or the enormous military backing it has from the United States. The dangers to the West are not when the Russians are being aggressive; the dangers are when they are being conciliatory. If we take resolute action to maintain NATO we shall sleep safer in our beds and it is ironic that it might be as a result of what the Russians have recently done. Good things sometimes come out of bad.

Another result of last August's events must be to make us wonder very seriously whether co-existence is any longer possible. If a movement such as that in Czechoslovakia, comparatively mild and wholly peaceful, can cause reactions of so severe a kind by the Russians, how can co-existence in Europe and in the rest of the world survive? I do not think for myself that we need to be quite so downhearted about that, for it still seems fairly certain that the Russians themselves realise only too clearly the consequences of a global nuclear war, and that though they may not have abandoned the ideas in the long run of de- stroying capitalism, they have come to the conclusion that while the West is strong, and in particular while America has a military preponderance, their aim could not be achieved by war. So it may be that, though there has been a setback as a result of Czechoslovakia, the Russians will still want co-existence, and that this, from our part, will be possible only if our American allies, and we with them, maintain our nuclear and military superiority—and, may I say, an American President who is thought and seen to be resolute and determined.

There may be some who think that everything I have said so far is a good deal of old-fashioned nonsense. I do not believe it is so. Nor do I believe that in these matters affecting the super-Powers the United Nations can be at present of anything but nominal use. I am not one of those who are uncritical in admiration for that institution; nor do I think it wholly or very bad. I think it does extremely useful work in its Agencies and in some of the political issues in which it has been concerned. But we really must be very careful not to expect the United Nations to solve problems between great Powers in which their vital interests are involved. It simply is not going to happen. Nor, I think, should we remain silent when its members act and carry the day in passing resolutions of unparalleled stupidity, the latest example being the resolution on sanctions against South Africa and Portugal. Nor should we ignore or sustain the bias and naïvete and double standards of the Committee of Twenty-Four.

It has never been my belief that one makes an organisation stronger by pretending not to notice its faults, or by shutting one's eyes to its shortcomings and congratulating oneself on how useful it is and how lucky one is to belong to it. By all means let us acknowledge the good work that the United Nations does. But it has its faults, and all the decorations along Whitehall and in Parliament Square, and all the parties which may be thrown on United Nations Day, should not blind us to them. What makes an organisation strong is the determination of its members to make it work, but also, at the same time, the realisation and the recognition of its weaknesses and its limitations, and the will to see that those weaknesses are removed.

A great many countries owe their economic existence, their life, to the aid which they obtain from those countries against whom they regularly pass votes of censure and resolutions. Some countries are so small that they are less in size than a medium city in this country. And yet countries in both those categories have a vote of equal importance to that of those great Powers which have responsibilities, populations and resources of a quite different order. is it not asking a great deal of the big Powers to submit themselves to a jury which may know only half the facts and which has no personal responsibility for the outcome?

My Lords, I want to see the United Nations work, and I should like to see some more work (because I know they have done some) done by the Government and the Foreign Office in making a real study as to how procedures at the United Nations could be improved in order to overcome its weaknesses. In point of fact, I think I am right in saying that the Government proposed some improvement in the procedure in the Security Council, and this was vetoed by the Soviet Union. I hope that they will persist and have another try, and I hope also that they will tackle the relationship, which I think is becoming more and more confused, between the General Assembly and the Security Council.

In saying what I have said, I hope no noble Lord opposite will make me out as being anti the United Nations. I am not. I am concerned only that we should be realistic in our expectations of what is likely to happen when the super Powers are involved, and that the Government should give serious thought to suggesting improvements which will make that organisation more effective and, at the same time, more aware of and responsive to the facts of world life.

While Her Majesty's Government here at home have been busy disarming us and removing the British presence both in the Far East and in the Gulf, the Soviet Union has been doing precisely the opposite. It now has a large fleet in the Mediterranean, and all around the world there are reports of Russian trawlers and a Russian presence. They certainly do not seem to take the view that Her Majesty's Government do about military presence around the world. Perhaps they are old-fashioned, or conceivably it is noble Lords opposite who are old-fashioned, but it does not lead me to feel very happy about what is likely to happen in the Far East.

The most immediate and important issue there, of course, is Vietnam, and we must wait and see what the consequences of President Johnson's halt to the bombing will be. We must all hope that it will bring an end to the war, but not, I hope, in a way that is likely to be damaging to American prestige in Asia and in the rest of the world. Those who march, and protest, and advocate peace in Vietnam at any price seem to be totally unaware of the consequences which might follow from a precipitate American withdrawal. Her allies in South-East Asia would lose confidence and faith in her determination to preserve the stability of their area, and the effect on the American people themselves might be disastrous from the point of view of the West.

Whatever the outcome of the Vietnam war, and whenever it finishes, it would be unrealistic not to acknowledge the fact that any future American intervention on land in that area is going to be very reluctant indeed. After all, one cannot expect a great country to experience willingly the trauma of another Vietnam; and if, as a result of the end of the Vietnam war, there is a revival of the "Fortress America" mentality, and a tendency to pull back, the consequences not only to South-East Asia but to the West as a whole may be momentous.

We must all begin to wonder what is likely to happen in that area when the Vietnam war ends and if a British presence is removed. A great deal will depend upon the Americans and their attitude: whether they will retain troops in Vietnam for a time, or whether they will be withdrawn at an early stage, and so on. But surely it will not be claimed that South-East Asia as a whole will feel more secure with the disappearance of American and British troops. The decisions which are facing our friends in that part of the world are exceedingly difficult. There is already a tendency in Australia to talk about "Fortress Australia", and some point out that with the withdrawal of Britain from the area it does not make sense any longer for the Australians to stay in Malaysia and Singapore, and that it would be much better to withdraw to her national boundaries. If Australia does so, certainly New Zealand will. If this happens—and I do not know what the probabilities are—the position in Malaysia and Singapore creates enormous problems for those two countries.

I do not intend to argue this afternoon about British commercial interests in staying in the Gulf and in the Far East area. This was very forcibly put by Sir Alec Douglas-Home in a speech he made in another place last week, and it will be gone into, I believe, by my noble friend Lord Lansdowne later to-day. Leaving that aside, I believe there is a British interest in seeing that South-East Asia does not become the cockpit of international politics; and I very much hope that if we are returned to office in 1970–71 we shall be able to combine with our four friends in the area to create some kind of a force which will make the position more secure for everyone.

There are some who say that the danger from China, if ever it was there, is now over, partly because of rising nationalism in South-East Asia and partly because of the Vietnam war. They say that if there is to be Communist expansion, it will come on the Chinese Western border rather than in South-East Asia. I do not know—and inevitably it must be speculation, for nobody knows what goes on in the minds of the men who rule the 700 million Chinese. But being uncertain I should take great care to build up such bulwarks as I could against any military expansion in that area.

In the gracious Speech the Government say not only that they will press forward with their withdrawal from the Far East but that they will, in consultation with the Governments concerned, maintain their efforts to promote conditions favourable to peace and security in the areas concerned. What does that mean? What are those measures, and what do the Government intend to do? I am one of those—and I think I share this view with others of your Lordships who sit on this side of the House—who feel that Britain has a role to play: not a role motivated by nostalgia for the past or for the British Empire, but a role to help our friends to maintain their independence. I only wish that some of our friends in Europe did more in that regard, and not that we did less. Over the years we have built up an experience and expertise in these affairs which can be of use and can be put to the service of the Western World.

But we cannot be of use unless two things happen. Our first priority is, of course, to put right our economic situation. The damage to British prestige and influence which these last four years have done is incalculable, and no one will take seriously British advice and no one will admit our influence on events until we can show the world once again that we are solvent and economically strong. Tomorrow my noble friend Lord Jellicoe will no doubt make reference to that, and I make no comment except to say that obviously it is the hope of all of us that there will be an economic miracle. But miracles are sent from Heaven, and are not all that common. I wish I had more faith in the everyday competence and policies of Her Majesty's Government.

The second vital thing, if we are to maintain our influence and if we are not to become "little Englanders", is to show that we are prepared to share the burden of the defence of the Free World with our friends and our allies, and maybe make some sacrifices in order to do it. If the Government do both those things they will find that we on these Benches will wholeheartedly, gladly and staunchly support them.

3.17 p.m.

LORD SHACKLETON

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, has delivered a characteristically clear and moderate speech. In the course of my remarks I shall try to isolate one or two of the more obvious points of difference, but I think most of your Lordships will agree with most of the things he said. I am grateful for the fact that in his criticisms of, for instance, the United Nations, he did not fall into an error of which we are so well aware, coming, as it does from certain noble Lords on his side of the House, of either extravagant criticism or even outright condemnation of an institution which still offers great hopes for the world. I shall follow the noble Lord in one respect; I will not attempt a full tour d'horizon but will try to deal with certain of the more important matters; and indeed they are all ones on which the noble Lord has touched.

At the same time I should like to draw attention to the fact that this is the first debate in your Lordships' House on foreign affairs since the Commonwealth Office and the Foreign Office were merged. Inevitably there are regrets. I have heard these regrets expressed by people, particularly in the Commonwealth Office, and there is always regret at the disappearance of an institution with a long history and powerful traditions and one that has served this country and, I believe, the whole world, and has set standards in civilised relations with our former dependent countries of which we can be proud. I am sure all your Lordships—or practically all your Lordships—accept this merger as inevitable. Our relations with the Commonwealth remain particularly close, but of course few of our major problems concern only Commonwealth countries; there is a great overlap. We can be grateful for one thing. We are helped in this matter by having two noble Lords, Lord Shepherd and Lord Chalfont, both as Ministers of State in the new combined Department. My only regret is that they are apt to be away so much, either, in the case of my noble friend Lord Shepherd, in one of the hotter spots of the world, or, in the present case of my noble friend Lord Chalfont, enjoying a delectable visit to Chile and the other South American countries.

We have a number of our most experienced speakers taking part in this debate. Those of us who were at the Memorial Service for our friend Lord Rowley—and I see many noble Lords on both sides of the House who were there—will regret that he is not able to be here with us and to take part in this debate. If I may make one personal reference, I should like to offer a word of congratulation to the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, on his 80th birthday, which I believe was celebrated in style only a few days ago.

I should like to start by dealing with the two areas of open conflict. I will then say a few words on Rhodesia, go on to the United Nations, the Middle East, East of Suez, the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington on NATO, and end with the Common Market, not because it is not a major part of the Government's policy, but because it fits my speech. It is quite likely that the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, may also have something to say on the Common Market and it may therefore be an opener for him.

Noble Lords will know that my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary has welcomed, as do the Government and, indeed, as does the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, without reservation the halting of the American bombing of North Vietnam. It is a step forward that we believe and hope can lead towards a peaceful settlement of the war. I should like to stress—because we all know the very strong feelings this has aroused—that this is the second major decision taken by President Johnson in his search for peace, and that it was in itself a courageous decision to have taken. The first was the decision to stop the bombing over 80 per cent. of the territory of North Vietnam on March 31, and this led to the opening of the Paris talks. Now comes a further decision to end the bombing of the North altogether, and we all hope that this will equally lead to far-reaching moves by both sides to de-escalate the war and to start serious and honest negotiations.

Of course, no one would underestimate the fact that the most serious obstacles lie ahead. There is a great deal of hard negotiating to be done; and of course we have all been disturbed by the immediate difficulty that the South Vietnamese Government have felt that the right conditions do not yet exist for productive talks. We do not believe that this is necessarily going to be a fatal obstacle; indeed we pray that it will not be. But, of course, the South Vietnamese maintain that the North Vietnamese have not shown themselves serious in the search to end the war. The important thing for all of us who have been concerned with negotiations in any area is always to get the people to the negotiating table, and we hope that the South Vietnamese Government will feel able to come to Paris and nut to the test the good faith of the other side.

It is this question of faith that is on test, now that the bombing has been halted and the way is open to ending all the killing and destruction in the South, as well as in North Vietnam. As Mr. Rusk, and indeed my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary, have said, it is for those who have demanded for so long that the bombing should be halted to exert a similar pressure to achieve a constructive response from Hanoi. I think that this is a fair point, and I am sure that noble Lords, whatever their views on the subject, will agree that this is right. I shall not spend any more time discussing Vietnam. We can only hope that this ghastly war, with its divisive repercussions all over the world, will be brought to an end, and certainly this country stands ready to help in any way we can, and in any capacity, to bring this about.

My Lords, let me turn briefly to Nigeria. We have had some fairly lengthy questions and answers to-day on the subject of events in Nigeria, and I should not refer to this were it not for the fact that I am conscious that my noble friend Lord Shepherd has not only borne a great deal of the brunt in this field of operations in trying to bring the war to an end but also had to bear the brunt of criticism which I can only describe as having been at times rather unfair. Our policy has throughout been based on the principle that we believe that the armed breakaway movement is wrong and that it is fraught with dangers for the whole of Africa. Our desire is to see the newly independent African States moving forward to prosperity in this world; and they cannot do so if they are torn by tribal rivalries. This is something on which I am sure most noble Lords who know the situation in Africa will agree.

That African leaders appreciate this was reflected in the resolution which was passed at the recent O.A.U. Algiers Conference when a solution was put forward in the context of a united Nigeria. And General Gowon has made it clear that he is ready to make peace on reasonable terms on the basis of one Nigeria. But Colonel Ojukwu is at present not prepared to explore these terms, and he is being encouraged in this attitude by an increase in his arms supplies, which is very much to he regretted. We believe that supplying arms to a lawful Government, as we are doing, is one thing, but to supply them in these circumstances to an illegal Government is quite another. I am well aware of the strong feelings this arouses among noble Lords of more than one Party, but I repeat that our object must be peace in Nigeria. It is not a role that commends itself, either to Her Majesty's Government or to my noble friend Lord Shepherd and myself, just to wash our hands in public in regard to Nigeria. Those who are promoting the supply of arms to Biafra carry a heavy responsibility in making a negotiated outcome of the conflict more difficult.

I shall not say much on the subject of genocide, because I think it is at last becoming apparent to the world, and certainly to the majority of Ibos in those areas which have now been taken over by the Federal Government, that there is no such intention or, indeed, sign. The reports of the observers—and I would stress the quite unique circumstances in which a Government has allowed international observers into the observation and right up into the battle areas of a civil war—confirm this. Mr. Nils Gussing, U Thant's personal representative in Nigeria, has just reported that there were no confirmed reports of wanton destruction of civilian life, maltreatment or cruelty to civilians; and only yesterday the observers announced the result of their investigation of a story about several hundred villagers having been massacred on the southern front. They found no evidence of any such massacre by Federal troops, nor evidence of any hostility to Federal troops on the part of the local population. We can only again use our best efforts to help to bring this terrible struggle to an end.

I agree particularly with noble Lords, who, by their Questions, have again stressed the need for every effort to be made to relieve the human suffering. I think noble Lords should recognise, as I believe they do, that Her Majesty's Government have made a great effort, as indeed have the British people by their own voluntary efforts, to minimise the extent of these tragedies.

My Lords, let me now turn, briefly, to Rhodesia. Noble Lords are well aware that my right honourable friend the Minister Without Portfolio is now in Rhodesia, and that consideration of the British proposals on board H.M.S. "Fearless" is continuing. I am grateful to noble Lords, and particularly to the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, for the restraint they have shown in not pressing for a debate at this stage. I am well

aware that, from all points of view, many noble Lords are anxious to debate this subject, and I would say that the Government would be only too prepared to facilitate such a debate. But we are agreed that this is not the right time. None the less, I am bound to take up the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, about the resolutions put forward at the United Nations. I must state plainly that neither resolution is in the least helpful to the search for an honourable settlement. The first resolution, by dictating absolute conditions in advance, sought to derogate from the authority of the British Government and Parliament. We and 16 others in the Assembly abstained.

The second resolution, instead of lending support to the policy of intensified sanctions against Rhodesia adopted by the Security Council this summer, urged the use of force and called for the extension of sanctions to South Africa and Portugal. We all understand the feelings in this matter; and we, perhaps in different ways, should like to see a solution to these problems. But Her Majesty's Government have made their position absolutely clear, and I would reiterate our opposition either to the use of force or to an extension of sanctions to South Africa. The resolution, which was couched in what I can only describe as characteristically immoderate language, was described by our representative, Mr. Evan Luard, as "ill-conceived, unrealistic and extreme". Eight others joined us in the Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee in voting against it, and 15 other countries abstained.

It is right to point to these criticisms, and it is right, as the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, said, that we recognise that, like all human institutions, the United Nations has its imperfections. But I suggest to the House (here I do not accuse the noble Lord, the Leader of the Opposition) that it is a dangerous fallacy to speak as though the United Nations were something apart from its members or to denigrate the Organisation in general terms without regard to how it can be strengthened. For our part, the Government take the view that it is important to Britain to help in every way open to us to build up the capacity of the United Nations to prevent armed conflict. In a world in which no country, and, I would emphasise, particularly ourselves, can alone play the part of peace-keeper, we, like everyone else, need to develop international machinery which will serve this purpose.

The peace-keeping record of the United Nations is a little mixed. They have had successes, some of them important. People are apt to forget these. There have been failures. As a Permanent Member of the Security Council we have special responsibility to use our influence to persuade all members to live by the Charter, so that there are no more failures. I would suggest that there is nothing wrong with the United Nations Charter, but only with the way it is ignored or abused. I appreciate that the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, was anxious to look constructively at the United Nations. I must point out to him that he referred only to the equality of votes in the Assembly, and ignored (though I am sure he did not do so deliberately) the existence of the Security Council, which also comes under criticism because of the use of the veto by certain Great Powers.

We know that this is not an easy problem, but I am sure we must go on having faith, making the best contribution we can, remembering all the time that the United Nations has been doing a tremendous job in making life more worth living in certain areas of the world. The figure so often quoted is that 85 per cent. of the resources of the United Nations go to economic and social work. That gets little notice, but meets real, human needs. We have to bear that in mind, too. My right honourable friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary recently urged on the General Assembly as one of the conditions for its success that it should exercise foresight; that it should be ready to take up new issues as they arise and to find solutions to them. I would say to the House that we, too, should exercise foresight and see how important it is that we continue to support the United Nations and seek to make it a fully effective body based squarely on its Charter.

One of the areas of particular concern to the United Nations is, of course, the Middle East. At the recent meeting of the United Nations there was an opportunity for discussion on this subject when the Foreign Ministers of Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Republic were gathered in New York. The next month may be critical to the success or failure of the work of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General to promote a just and lasting settlement on the basis of Security Council Resolution No. 242 of November, 1967.

A redoubled effort is necessary if his work is not to be allowed to end in failure; and this effort must come principally from the parties to the conflict themselves, since it is only they who can demonstrate the flexibility necessary to break down the deep mutual mistrust which at present exists. We still hope, and we believe it is possible, for the parties to this dispute, without jeopardising their own fundamental security requirements, to arrive at a settlement. This has been said so often about this terrible problem that sometimes one gives up hope. But we cannot afford to despair, because if the work of Dr. Jarring fails, the future outlook for the Middle East will be bleak indeed. It will be a prospect of further bloodshed, further suffering, further concentration on military preparedness at the expense of human needs and economic development. There have been incidents along the Suez Canal which were portents of this pattern. The position of Her Majesty's Government is clear. We deplore all breaches of the cease-fire. We all agree that violence is evil and that it breeds violence.

The world community should not forget, either, that many of the refugees of the successive conflicts between Israeli and Arab will be living this winter in discomfort and hardship. The refugee problem is something that has frequently greatly concerned your Lordships. In this House the noble Baroness, Lady Swanborough, the late Lord Astor, and other noble Lords have made great personal contributions in this respect. Action to relieve the condition of these refugees remains a high priority. Now we have the latest news of fighting in Jordan. I have, I fear, no hard news to give to your Lordships as to what precisely is happening. Such news as we have has been fully reported in the public Press.

I should like now to turn to this question of defence policy East of Suez. The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, raised this issue again. We have debated it several times already and I hesitate to go over the same ground once more. We believe—and I should have thought this was a matter of general agreement—that there can be no military strength for Britain or for our alliances unless it is based on economic strength. Our aim is to concentrate our resources. In defence terms, this means recognising that our security lies fundamentally in Europe and must be based on the NATO Alliance. Hearing the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, I am encouraged to think that the Opposition are beginning to recognise the existence of overstretch of our resources and are now speaking in terms of only a more moderate presence in the Far East. They are prepared to recommend that we combine to create some kind of a force. This seems a fairly modest as well as an imprecise proposal.

My Lords, I do not think I need argue this matter at great length. The case was fully debated in another place. There was a certain and unfortunate tendency to make use of particular figures. It was suggested, for instance, that a figure of £15 million in terms of foreign exchange was a kind of insurance premium. But this figure in relation to the Persian Gulf represents only a proportion of the cost. It certainly represents the foreign exchange cost. To represent the real cost to this country of the demand on resources, which has a direct bearing on our economic position, it would have to be multiplied several times, and it is a mistake to talk only about the £15 million of foreign exchange costs.

The Opposition have, in large part—the noble Lord, Lord Carrington did not do this to-day—based their case on the need to protect our investment East of Suez. My Lords, I think they are coming along; they are beginning to recognise the political realities of the present day, and I am sure, for instance, that if the oil ceased to flow in the Persian Gulf they would not now (although certain noble Lords would) expect us to intervene militarily to try to make the oil flow by force. But I want to stress—and this may help to answer some of the points the noble Lord, Lord Carrington raised—that the withdrawal of our forces does not in any way mean that we have lost interest in the continuing prosperity and stability of those areas.

We are in very close consultation with Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia about matters arising from our withdrawal, and I think we should welcome the way in which they are adapting themselves to the changed conditions that will prevail after we have gone. They have to make their own assessment, but our aim is to help the Governments of the area to establish, before our withdrawal, an effective defence system based on co-operation between Malaysia and Singapore, with such assistance as Australia and New Zealand may decide they can continue to give. We hope that a further five-Power ministerial conference on the lines of the one which took place earlier this year will take place in the first half of 1969. As a sign of our interest, we too plan to participate in a major five-Power military exercise in Malaysia in the mid-1970s. For this we shall be sending forces from Britain.

In the Persian Gulf we have already reached agreement with Kuwait about the future termination of the 1961 Defence Agreement, and we are encouraged by the progress made by the Union of Arab Emirates set up by the rulers of Bahrain, Qatar and the Trucial States to act as the successor authority in this region after our departure. When the structure that they are evolving is more clearly defined and we know on what basis discussions can most effectively proceed we shall continue our talks with the authorities concerned, both on the revision of our existing treaties and arrangements and on the disposal of our military installations in the area. We have every reason to believe that after our withdrawal friendly relations between Britain and the Persian Gulf States will remain as strong as ever.

The resources released by our withdrawal from the Far East and the Middle East will help us to get our economy straight and to remedy the distortions from which it has suffered for far too long. However, it does not mean that we have lost interest in those parts. But it does mean that we shall be able to make a more effective contribution in Europe; and it is here, as recent events have emphasised, that the most fundamental part of our national security lies.

My Lords, I propose to say very little on the subject of NATO. The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, made an interesting speech on the miscalculations of the Soviet Union. He referred, in particular, to the inevitable revolt against what he called "Communism", but I would ask him to be a little more precise here. The interesting thing was that it was Communists themselves who were seeking freedom and, as I pointed out at that time, the whole face of monolithic Communism as equated with the Soviet Union was destroyed by those events. We have watched with interest and enormous sympathy what has been going on. It is astonishing, the determination and the fidelity which has been shown by the Czechoslovak people, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and their leaders. But the invasion has provided a stark reminder that the need is as great as ever for NATO to rnaintain its unity and common purpose in defence.

I think it is possible that that determination may be stronger in the future. Certainly I would agree that we must make plain our own ability and determination to protect ourselves effectively. I should have liked to say something about steps that could be taken, but it is riot possible for me to do so to-day. This subject is, of course, deeply in the minds of the Secretary of State for Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, and it will continue to be so at the forthcoming NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels on November 14 to 16. Again I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, when he poses the question as to whether co-existence is possible. Co-existence is not only possible but it is, in fact, the only key to existence at all; and this means that we should not abandon the ultimate objective of East/West détente.

My Lords, let me turn very briefly to the subject of the Common Market—and I stress that this is not because this important objective of British policy has, so to speak, been pushed to the bottom of the pile. The Queen's Speech made it clear that the Government will maintain their application but at the same time will promote other measures of cooperation in Europe in company with it. This has been and will remain the constant aim of our European policy. We all know why the road to full membership is blocked for the time being. But the question remains very much alive. The Council of Ministers of the Six are discussing it again to-day. The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, also referred to examples of interest. There have been a number of proposals designed to keep up the momentum towards European union against the day when the Community can be enlarged. There was a general welcome from the Five and Her Majesty's Government for the Benelux Memorandum of last January. We support the Benelux proposals, which call for consultations between Britain and the Community and for joint action in fields outside the scope of the Community.

The proposals made by the Belgian Foreign Minister, M. Harmel, as recently as October 21 at the W.E.U. meeting in Rome for closer co-ordination particularly of foreign and defence policies was also generally welcomed, except by the French. We are engaged with our partners in preparing the ground thoroughly for a further discussion at the next W.E.U. meeting in January. The European Economic Community Council have also been examining the possibility of a "trading arrangement" between the Community and other countries, an idea first put forward in a Franco-German declaration of last February. We have said that we are prepared to consider a detailed proposal from the Six as a whole, provided that there is a clear link with full membership. But after eight months, no proposal has yet been worked out.

The one encouraging sign is the rising determination among our friends in Europe—a determination which we share most wholeheartedly—to escape from the doldrums and to work together now for a greater degree of European integration. There is an increasing reluctance to allow one Member of the Six to block all progress, and in these circumstances we are now concentrating on joint action in fields where no single country has a veto. Our main reasons for seeking membership of the Community are both economic and political, and it is natural that we should support action to co-ordinate European foreign and defence policies. Particularly after the events in Czechoslovakia, there is an urgent need for Europe to speak with one voice in world affairs. It is our belief that only in this way can Europe hope to have a proper influence on world events.

3.53 p.m.

LORD GLADWYN

My Lords, I suppose that the object of these debates on foreign affairs is to see where we have got to generally in our international relations, and if we can to try to arrive at some consensus of opinion as to what line the Government, generally speaking, might profitably undertake. We can surely all agree that, apart from the prospective end of the war in Vietnam (about which I hasten to say that I shall say absolutely nothing because nothing I can say on that subject would be of the slightest use) 1968, so far as we in this country are concerned, was dominated by two major political events: the social and economic upheavals of last May and June in France, and the occupation of Czechoslovakia last August by the armed forces of the Soviet Union. The first called in question the French Government's ability to conduct a totally independent and nationalistic foreign policy; the second involved the end of the so-called détente and the consequent collapse, for a long period at any rate, of the European policy of General de Gaulle and his devoted lieutenant Chancellor Kiesinger.

I propose to say a few words justifying these conclusions. Before I do so, I should like to say that I entirely agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, said about the United Nations, and totally disagree with what he said about the right policy for us to pursue East of Suez. I shall not go into that matter now; I hope that we shall have a further opportunity to debate it. All I can say is that we are delighted that the Government should accept the policy which we on these Benches had the honour to put forward in March, 1965, and we hope they will continue upon this course. Nor do we believe that there is any prospect of the Tory Party's reversing that policy when they come to power. They may think that they will, but I do not think it will happen.

The upheavals last spring in France resulted in a large Gaullist majority in the National Assembly, but this large majority is in itself an obstacle to the continued personal policy of the French President. Nor does it, in itself, provide any guarantee for the success of the economic and social policy forced on the French Government by what was, in effect, a minor revolution which is the classic way of achieving substantial reforms in France. Thanks to the intelligent policy now being pursued by M. Edgar Faure and the Minister of Finance, we must indeed all hope that the French economy will be restored and that unrest among the students, which of course is not only a French phenomenon, will also die down. But the possibility remains that there may be another thunderstorm in the spring and that in the circumstances France may hardly be a very satisfactory Member of the European Community.

It will indeed be paradoxical if in, say, a year's time, as a result of the Herculean efforts of the British Government, the British economy is well on the way to recovery, while the weak sister is our neighbour across the Channel! But it would surely be just as silly for us, as for the French, to indulge in Schadenfreude. All the events in our two countries go to show the inherent absurdity of excluding any democratic European State, otherwise qualified, from membership of the E.E.C. For it is only if a greater unity is achieved, and above all if certain supra-national obligations are freely accepted, that any of us can have any guarantee against fluctuations in our economy generally and any assurance of progress towards a rather more satisfactory economic, and indeed political, future for this country.

There is, admittedly, little hope that the present French Government will see matters in this light for some time, though a number of very far-sighted French statesmen such as Valero Giscard d'Estaing and the excellent Pierre Sudreau, both former members of de Gaulle's Government, have publicly stated, along with J. J. Servan-Schreiber, the author of Le Défi Americain, that France's best ally and partner in Europe is the United Kingdom. We even read in yesterday's Press that the most devoted assistants of the General, such as M. Couve de Murville and M. Debré, are beginning to feel that France cannot indefinitely veto British entry into the Community.

I imagine therefore that, pending our admission, most of us, I should hope all of us here, will approve of our Foreign Secretary's constant efforts to achieve, in accordance with the Belgian Foreign Minister M. Harmel's plan, some kind of effective European action in fields lying outside the Treaty of Rome among all those qualified European States that are willing to co-operate. The chief scope for such efforts obviously lies in the possible harmonisation of foreign policies and in the general direction of co-ordination of armaments, with which is intimately associated the whole matter of so-called technological progress, that is to say, such things as space activities, electronics, computers, micro-circuits, supersonic aircraft and in general what have been referred to as "the industries of the future".

There is absolutely no reason why, if France will not take part in any general European ventures in such fields as these, Great Britain should not establish suitable European concerns, if she can, with some or all of the Germans, the Italian, the Low Countries, Scandinavia—and, yes, even with Sweden and Switzerland, if considerations of neutrality permit. As has been pointed out by our Government on so many occasions, this country has a vastly greater research capacity and technological know-how in all these fields mentioned than any of her European neighbours.

Common efforts would therefore make obvious sense, more especially in view of the huge strides now being made by the Americans and the Russians, with whom, unless we combine, we shall in a few years' time be quite unable to compete, always assuming that we want to do so. Judging from this morning's Press, it looks as if the French Government were attempting to put forward some scheme whereby we should supply all our technological know-how to the Community in exchange for practically nothing. I suppose that this is simply a preliminary manœuvre in the great game which we all know is now proceeding.

While I was attending the last meeting of the W.E.U. Assembly in Paris the other day, I heard the German rapporteur lamenting the recent British withdrawal from ELDO—the European Launcher Development Organisation—and hinting that this was not at all a good augury for eventual entry of Britain into the E.E.C., nor very evident proof of a European outlook on the part of the British Government. I therefore did my best to suggest to my colleagues that, in the first place, had it not been for a French veto last December, even on negotiations for a possible British entry into the Community, it was at least probable that, in spite of strong doubts as to its efficiency as at present organised, the United Kingdom would still have been a member of ELDO; and, in the second place, that there was not really much point in continuing British membership of ELDO, or indeed of any similar European body, in the absence of any real decision-making authority or machinery.

Everybody admits that the principle of what is called "a just return" on what individual nations put into shows like this is a wrong one, which cannot possibly give any good results; but nobody as yet has suggested that some rather minimal supra-national element—such as that inherent in the Treaty of Rome—should he embodied in any other European organisation. And yet there is really not much point in talking about "Europe" at all, unless this principle is accepted. General de Gaulle was quite right when he said some years ago that you could not achieve European unity by simply jumping up and down in your chair and shouting "Europe".

So the time has come, as we on these Benches think, when governments—and, more particularly, Her Majesty's Government—should say exactly where they stand on this cardinal issue. It just is no good thinking that if only we can get into the E.E.C. everything will solve itself, and that European unity will be gradually achieved by a sort of inevitable process, in what is always referred to as a "pragmatical way", precedents being gradually established and machinery being slowly developed for arriving at sensible and common decisions in all fields. We British often think that this is all that needs to be done. But if we think so, we are wrong. For unless the Governments concerned are prepared to accept the general notion that in any European organisation their own individual will not always and necessarily prevail, no amount of diplomatic manœuvring will result in anything beyond an alliance of the old-fashioned sort, always dependent for its continued existence on extraneous happenings.

Even the E.E.C. itself is marking time. Beyond the Customs Union and the common agricultural policy, nothing has yet been achieved. Yet it needs only a strong lead in favour of a real Community system for such a system to prevail, in spite of the desperate opposition to any such idea on the part of the Gaullist Administration, or, rather, on the part of its leader. If Her Majesty's Government, for instance, came forward with any concrete plans embodying the establishment of some authority, however embryonic it might have to be to start off with, in, say, the field of defence, there is no doubt whatever that their chances of making a success of M. Harmel's initiative would be increased enormously.

I also believe that if they did give such a lead they would have the enthusiastic support of a very considerable section of their own supporters in another place, as well as, I should imagine, of the great bulk of the Opposition. Naturally, there would be those in both the major Parties—though very few, I should hope, in my own—who would be strongly opposed, on nationalistic grounds, to the acceptance of any supranational principle. But such opposition is not a reason for pushing the issue under the carpet. It is a real and an unavoidable issue which, however much we may dislike ideas, as such, should be presented for debate to the people.

My Lords, I now come to my second point, which is: how does Czechoslovakia fit into all this? The end of the détente ought in itself to give a strong impetus to Western European unification. Naturally, all we can do about it at the moment, as the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, said, is to keep our guard up, and, to some extent, reinforce it if we can. We should not, of course, despair of eventual better relations. The noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, said that we should not despair of co-existence; nor, of course, can we despair of co-existence. As he inferred, I think, we simply have to go on co-existing for so long as there is no atomic war.

But for the time being we must recognise that there is no future in attempts to form some kind of special relation- ship with the Soviet satellite States in Eastern Europe. This will no doubt be possible in the long run, but first there will have to be a complete end to Stalinism in Russia itself; and that may take a long time—I am afraid longer than we think—even though the Stalinist regime has been considerably tempered in recent years. The point is that for us ever to arrive at a real détente in East/West relations, the confrontation of the super-Powers on the Elbe must be ended. If it is to be ended, both the Russians and the Americans must be confident that they would not be at the mercy, strategically, the one of the other, if they withdrew their armed forces to their own country.

For the Americans to have this confidence, it is absolutely essential that Western Europe should be formed as a valid entity; and, further, that it should include Britain and Scandinavia. Otherwise, it simply is not credible. For the Russians, it is absolutely essential that the D.D.R.—the Deutsche-Demokratische Republik—should continue to exist as a separate State, somewhat on the model of Austria. Of course, the one super-Power or the other may be forced by outside events to abandon these essential safeguards; but if they are, the danger of general war will be increased rather than diminished.

It must also be said of General de Gaulle that his own vision of the future has basically not been far removed from this conception of a détente; namely, one resting, so to speak, on the physical separation of the super-Powers by the prior constitution of "Europe". Unfortunately, his own plan embodies two absolutely fatal flaws. In the first place, he seems to be determined, for historical—it might even be said "ancestral"—reasons, to make Europe without the "Anglo-Saxons", of which, in his view, Britain is a representative. In the second, he is resolutely set against any supranational solution of the problem of European unity, which logically means that, if it is to be formed at all, it can be formed only under the aegis or hegemony (as it is called) of one European Power—naturally, France.

As regards Europe generally, we are obviously approaching a very dangerous period. The evident failure of what they call their "Ostpolitik"—their policy towards the East—has had a most unsettling effect on the Western Germans. By far the best way to prevent them from doing something quite rash—which I assure your Lordships is quite possible—is to give them the impression that they are destined, by Fate as it were, to become members of a real European political community in which they will be on a footing of complete equality with ourselves, the Italians and the French. If this country, therefore, came out firmly (and this, again, is my essential point) with a plan for some kind of Western European Defence Community, or even, perhaps, we might say, some European Defence "element" inside NATO, and a real decision-making authority in various technological spheres, it is possible that the Germans would rally to it and thus gradually overcome—and they could overcome—the opposition of the French even to starting negotiations for our eventual entry into the European Economic Community.

But first, my Lords—and this is the point—Britain herself must be genuinely converted to the supra-national idea. It is an excellent thing that the Government should have agreed to join M. Monnet's Action Committee for Europe, and the representatives they have appointed—namely, Mr. George Brown, Mr. Walter Padley and Mr. Michael Stewart—are, I believe myself, willing to accept this basic thesis. So of course is my own leader, Mr. Jeremy Thorpe—who as a Liberal has, naturally, already upheld it for many years. I must say that I am far less happy about the nominees of the Tory Party—in particular, perhaps, Mr. Maudling—who, excellent statesmen though in most respects they undoubtedly are, have never (and this cannot be disputed, I think) in the past, to say the least, manifested any particular enthusiasm for the supra-national principle in however limited a form. I would frankly be much happier if Mr. Heath himself were representing the Tory Party. Perhaps, however, it is a cunning move, like putting the, at the time, rather lukewarm European Lord Butler of Saffron Walden in general charge of the negotiations for our entry into the E.E.C. in 1961. Let us hope so.

For, my Lords, I can assure you that we have now reached a most critical point. It is all too likely, I fear, that the so-called "Harmel" initiative will peter out when the next meeting under its auspices takes place—if, indeed, it takes place at all. It is only therefore, I repeat, if Britain now comes forward as a potential leader of a genuine community—which she might with advantage have done some ten years ago—and herself advances constructive and forward-looking plans for the construction of a real European authority that there is much chance of our becoming anything except an obedient satellite of American big business or a highly directed semi-socialist State in good relations with the Soviet Union.

Your Lordships may think that this is too categorical a judgment. I do not think it is. We live, I repeat, in very dangerous times. Things may happen at any moment in the Middle East, or even nearer home, which may shake our allied unity to its foundations. Frankly, what we now want is a leader who can find the necessary support to play in the "Big League": not a cunning fellow who will be able to compete in Machiavellian tactics with the other leaders, but one with the ability to convince the Continentals that Britain has now had a genuine change of heart and is determined not only to enter the Community, but to abandon old-fashioned nationalism when she does so.

LORD SHACKLETON

My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down perhaps I may say that I was not quite sure, when he was referring to a leader of this character, to whom he was referring. In fact, I wondered whether he was referring to Mr. Jeremy Thorpe.

LORD GLADWYN

I should be only too delighted if Mr. Wilson, the leader of this country, would act in that capacity.

4.15 p.m.

LORD GLENDEVON

My Lords, I will not follow the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, tempting though it be to do so in view of his observations as to the lukewarmth of one or two of my noble friends where the European idea is concerned. One day, perhaps, but not now, I shall pull his leg about his own views not very long ago.

My Lords, what I should like to do—and I shall detain your Lordships for a very short time—is to return to the subject of the United States and Soviet Russia. Of course I agree with the hopes so eloquently expressed by the noble Lord the Leader of the House and my noble friend Lord Carrington that what is happening in Vietnam now may lead to a genuine peace, but at the same time I cannot help regarding this particular moment as extremely worrying. Any democratic Administration is bound to find itself in a difficult position when a war is not going very well as an election approaches; and looking into the far distance one can but pray that the continuing increase in the already incredible speed of communications in the world will not eventually make, if not impossible at least extremely difficult the luxury of Parliamentary democracy.

Totalitarian Powers suffer from no such anxieties. To put it in practical terms, the North Vietnamese and the Chinese must have known perfectly well all along that time was on their side in this particular context. Opinions have always differed as to the rights and wrongs of any great campaign. So far as I am concerned, I see very clearly why the United States are worried by the prospect of Chinese paramountcy in South-East Asia. India is also deeply worried by it, as she must be; and even Russia herself cannot fail to share these misgivings. It is very easy to scoff at all this if you live as far away from the scene of action as Trafalgar Square or Grosvenor Square, but it is, I think, unwise.

My Lords, the last thing I want to say of the United States is this. When all is said and done, my mind still goes back with deep relief and gratitude to the day when in another place I heard Mr. Bevin announce the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. For the first time in history we knew that the United States were pledging their support to collective security and to deterrence of another world war, not too late but in time. If that had been the case in 1914, how much misery the world would have been spared! I thank heaven that they are now fully and irrevocably in the picture.

Concerning the Russians, again I agree very much with what the noble Lord the Leader of the House and my noble friend Lord Carrington said. As for the barbarous cruelty of the Russian treat- ment of Czechoslovakia, this revolted me as much as it could have anyone. But, my Lords, I did not think it was surprising. On the contrary, I thought it consistent with all their history. They have always been a deeply suspicious people, suspicious of each other and suspicious of others. One had of course hoped so much that they were emerging from their past, but there are no real signs of it yet, and it is profoundly disappointing that that should be so. One would have thought that, with China sitting on their tail eager to regain her lost territories, they would hasten to emulate the example of Peter the Great and open a window on to the Western World whose help they may well need sooner rather than later. But instead they prefer to stick to Lenin's dreary injunction: "Why let the people have ideas? Ideas are far more dangerous than weapons." They are the last of the Bourbons; they have learned nothing and have forgotten nothing.

Finally, my Lords, may I give an example from my own experience of Russian suspicion, in this case suspicion of Sweden. It was an extraordinary experience. Two years ago I visited Leningrad and Moscow for the first time. I went in a Russian ship called the "Krupskaya". Krupskaya was the name of Lenin's wife. One of our ports of call en route was Stockholm. In a Stockholm newspaper we saw a photograph of another Russian ship sinking in the Baltic the day before. An hour and a half out of Stockholm, by which time it was quite dark, I was walking the deck with a friend. We were discussing this photograph and hoping that it was not a bad omen when suddenly there was a fearful bang. We were thrown forward along the deck. My friend exclaimed, "God! they've done it again." And they had. We were on a rock.

There were 150 passengers aboard, almost all Russians—who I may say behaved admirably. We were all packed into a small saloon in the stern of the ship. We were kept there for several hours and nobody could possibly have got out. Meanwhile, the ship developed a considerable list. During this time a good-natured Russian gentleman sat down at the piano—which was beginning to slip a bit—and played, not the "Volga Boatman", but the old capitalist air, "Daisy, Daisy, give me your answer, do." Some danced. I did not. I readjusted my life jacket and thought of the "Titanic." At 4 a.m.—not until then—we were told that all danger was passed and that we could go back to our cabins. But we were still on the rocks. It was not until 1 p.m. the next day that we were rescued by Swedish boats. All of this time we had been only one and a half hours from shore. The fact was, as we found out, that the Russians were simply not prepared to admit to the Swedes, until they had to, that they were on the rocks. And by that time at least ten hours had passed. It is an incredible story, but I can assure your Lordships that it is true.

My Lords, as has already been said in this debate—and I agree with it absolutely—whatever the disappointments, whatever the frustrations, whatever the cruelties, we must persevere so far as Russia is concerned and never give up hope. Part of that hope must always be that she will see that it is time that she pulled herself together.

4.25 p.m.

LORD WEDGWOOD

My Lords, when I put my name down to speak to-day in this debate I anticipated that a number of the points that I hoped to make would be covered by other noble Lords who spoke before me. Indeed this is so; and after the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, who spoke so thoroughly and admirably, I feel I have very few clothes left with which to dress my few remarks. Nevertheless, I should like to add my voice in support of the theme which I believe is essential to any hope of our future as a strong and vigorous nation. It is simply this: that, as always, the defence of this country and the defence of our rightful and vital interests abroad must be the very kernel of our foreign policy, whatever Government hold power here in Westminster.

I feel—and I say this with a conviction that has been growing stronger in recent months—that this policy does not seem to be followed by Her Majesty's Government. I also believe, and so it seems do many others, that we are letting slip much to which we should be paying greater attention. Our political vision is becoming fixed not much further than the shores of the English Channel, and we appear to think that what happens in the overseas world in which we used to take such a large part is no longer of great importance to our future wellbeing. Such an attitude was never right in the past, it is certainly wrong to-day and it will always be wrong in the future.

We are all acutely aware that our fortunes are bound up inextricably with world trade, and your Lordships will forgive me for pointing out the obvious: we can live only by world trade and particularly by exporting our own products to lands in every part of the hemisphere. Our ability to do so rests entirely on the freedom for our ships and planes to carry our goods anywhere on the high seas and in the air. In the first place, as your Lordships all know, we have considerable trading interests in the Middle East, in Africa, in Asia, in Australia and in the Far East—areas in which to-day there is much uncertainty and confusion. Diminution and loss of trade and influence in these countries would certainly be the gravest setback to our industry and future prosperity.

We have also, I suggest, another real and vested interest, and that is in preserving the freedom of those nations with which we have so much in common. I speak particularly of the English-speaking nations and of those with whom we have had a long and close political and economic association and where the English language is usually the language of commerce and political discussion. The freedom of these countries from aggression and possible absorption by Powers hostile to our Western concepts should be as much our vital concern to-day as was the case in former times. It is not just a duty or a sense of historical obligation; it is sheer common sense. We stand together, or we shall fall separately.

I would add a third British interest which deserves mention. It is no less obvious but not very well defined. It is our right of access to primary agricultural and mineral products, particularly oil, on which we are very dependent for imports and of which we are not likely to be independent for some years ahead. There is nothing new in all this, but how often do we hear these issues spoken about? How often are they given prominence? Far too seldom in my view.

I should like now to comment briefly on some aspects of our foreign policy which are directly related to these interests and to ask your Lordships to consider how far these interests have been supported by the policies of Her Majesty's Government. First, Suez. We have reached the position, so far as I can see, where our former base at Alexandria is apparently a Russian naval base. We are denied passage through the Canal; our ships and tankers have the more expensive haul round the Cape to India and to the oil wells of the Persian Gulf. Some of our ships are still incarcerated in the Suez Canal. Little is heard about compensation for them, but rather more of loans to the United Arab Republic while that country is now being rearmed by Russia for the next act in the Arab-Israel war.

We relinquished our position in Aden, admittedly under most difficult circumstances, at a time which gave every advantage to our enemies and in a manner which placed our former supporters in the hands of their own enemies. To-day Aden is isolated and of less consequence, but should the Canal be opened, my Lords, with Russian support and control, we can all be sure that we shall hear of Aden again. The consequences, as you may well imagine, to the independent countries in Eastern Africa and those nearby in Asia need no emphasis.

In the Persian Gulf area, whence we draw the bulk of our oil supplies, and where 60 per cent. of the world oil reserves are situated, there is a power vacuum. Her Majesty's Government have announced the total withdrawal of military and naval units in 1971, two or three short years away. We debated this matter last May, on a Motion from the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, and the points have all been made. Nevertheless, I should like to remind your Lordships of what was said on that occasion by the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, because I think his remarks bear repeating. He said: There seems to be an idea in the mind of the Government that when we move our Armed Forces out of any area in the world the position remains exactly the same as when we were there, and that the balance of power in the world remains unaltered. But it does not. When we move out of any area in the world, we create a power vacuum. That vacuum is immediately filled by someone else, and nearly always by someone entirely opposed to all the interests and principles for which we stand. It has happened again and again in the last few years. If it were to happen in the Persian Gulf, it would be a disaster of the first order not only for us but for the whole of the Western World."—[OFFICIAL REPORT. 22/5/68, col. 789–90.] I should like to add to the words of the noble Marquess only this: a token residual force has an advantage because no other Power moves in so long as another nation's forces are in occupation however puny those forces may be. But if those units are once withdrawn, the way is left open for any hostile Power to replace them. Can we doubt, my Lords, that in this case Soviet forces may well be substituted for our own?

In Malaya and Australia we have, I think, what might truly be called a crisis of confidence over British intentions which is repeated, across the Indian Ocean, in South Africa where one of the greatest trade routes is dependent on inadequate naval protection. Those of us who have contacts with these countries know all too well of the astonishment and dismay, even the unbelief, that Britain could place in jeopardy their security and this country's own substantial national and economic interests there by a total withdrawal from the one area and by an embargo on arms and naval equipment to the other. My Lords, Australia and South Africa are the twin southern bastions of the Free World. They are young countries with tremendous energy and potential. They need our help, and we need their custom and stabilising influence on a shaky and ever-changing international scene.

I listened carefully to the words of the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, when he was speaking on these points, and I hone that the noble Lord will not be over-annoyed if I say that I found what he had to say somewhat unconvincing. We cannot afford to allow the impression to grow that Britain is now leaving the people in these areas in the lurch. We can and should re-appraise this unhappy situation and do what we can to correct it. Of course financial limitations need careful scrutiny, but I contend that the defence of our own national interest is now the greater priority in these vital areas, let alone the interests of our allies in two world wars.

Turning to another matter of foreign policy, my Lords, the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government to-day, it seems, in my view, to be based too much on a reliance on the effectiveness and sagacity of United Nations opinions and decisions. The United Nations was a great concept born of the last world war. It has now greatly changed in composition and authority. The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, said much on this subject in a very much better style than I can, bat I should like just to say that I agree very much with most of what the noble Lord said. Whatever may be our individual feelings about UNO, it cannot be said, after the events of the past few years, that it is a real force for peace in the world as it is constituted to-day. While I recognise, as does the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, that in its many forms and organisations—UNESCO; F.A.O.; W.H.O.; and so on—it has brought great benefits to many millions throughout the undeveloped areas of the world, to discard our national defence and rely overmuch on international settlements of UNO is to stake a faith which in my view is clearly not yet justifiable.

We have had two recent examples which affect us—concerning Gibraltar and Rhodesia—and which, in their stupidity, show UNO in a light far removed from that hoped for by the founders at San Francisco. Of course I accept, my Lords, that an international debating forum has undoubted value— "Jaw-jaw" rather than "War-war"—

LORD SHEPHERD

My Lords, I am sure that the noble Lord wishes to be fair, and I think he would agree that the United Nations had a notable success in at least easing the tension between Turkey and Greece last year, when a major war could have occurred.

LORD WEDGWOOD

Yes, indeed, my Lords. Of course I accept the contention of the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd. But I would ask him to remember that on the outbreak of war between Israel and Egypt in June last year the United Nations Observer Force was withdrawn just at the drop of a hat. At any rate, my Lords, it is reassuring to note the recent remarks by the Prime Minister on the last of these ill-considered pronouncements, the one demanding that we should commence hostilities in Central Africa against Rhodesia. I was very pleased to hear the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, refer in his speech to what I think he called characteristically immoderate demands. I also fully endorse his remarks about how unhelpful this resolution was at this time. What an irresponsible resolution, as the Prime Minister said, from an international body founded to secure world peace!

My Lords, there is something more on which I should like to touch, concerning our own trading interests. It is that in the past we have directed criticisms at the internal policies of various countries in Europe, Asia and Africa, and on a number of occasions we have taken active steps to show our disapproval by cancelling or placing an embargo on trade with these countries. I should have thought that if we wish to afford the luxury of discriminating as to who shall be the recipients of our industrial goods we should discriminate against those who are clearly hostile to us; against those who send their troops into neighbouring States to subjugate and browbeat the population, and that whatever opinions we may have, right or wrong, about the merits or otherwise of the internal policies of would-be friendly countries, we should develop our trade in these places and in the process, we hope, of mutual enrichment perhaps influence their thinking as well as inform ourselves more clearly on their problems.

Finally, my Lords, we have heard much about Russian naval strength in the Mediterranean and along the sea lanes in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Only those in high places can gauge the risks against their knowledge of Allied strength and weakness. As one person trying to assess the situation realistically, and without any benefit of special information, I believe that it is not difficult to see that we are living through a time of great international danger— indeed, this point has been made already by two previous speakers.

We have lost our former position in the Eastern Mediterranean. Africa is being encircled to the West and to the North-East. Our great ally, the United States, on whose dominant nuclear capacity we are in the ultimate vitally dependent—and we can never forget that—is now war weary and beset by her own internal problems, and perhaps by a change of Administration. This is not the time to contemplate any further reduction in our Armed Forces. Indeed, the opposite should be the case. We should now be taking urgent steps to increase our contribution to NATO in the defence of this country, and of all those who look to us for support. Our brains and our industrial capacity are two vital factors which can maintain peace and stability. We have a balance-of-payments problem, but Her Majesty's Government cannot allow this to obscure our national defence requirements. First things must come first.

My Lords, I now have spoken for too long and have not deserved your patience, but I speak with deep concern at what is happening to our international repute and to the prospects of increasing our share of world trade. I believe that our foreign policy needs drastic reshaping; that our national interests and alliances need more encouragement and a far greater care in their maintenance; and that we must ensure that all our Armed Forces shall have the equipment and personnel to undertake successfully any protective duties that may be assigned to them. Let us stand by our principles and our national interests, and stand up for our continuing future as one of the great trading nations of the world.

4.42 p.m.

LORD BETHELL

My Lords, I should like to speak briefly about a point mentioned by other speakers in this debate, and rightly described as the most important event which has happened in foreign affairs in the last year—I refer to the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Army. My noble friend Lord Carrington rightly gave as the main reason for this invasion the fear held by the Soviet leaders that a germ of freedom had been born in Czechoslovakia, and the possibility that this germ would spread throughout East Europe in the countries around Czechoslovakia, and perhaps even to the Soviet Union itself, and that this would be a direct threat to the Soviet Union. I am going to speak in greater detail about a subsidiary reason for the invasion, which I think was very much in the minds of the Soviet leaders and which, though it might not have been the main reason why they decided to invade, certainly played a part in their decision. It is a reason which they have given since the invasion in their attempts to justify it with their own people and with world opinion—I mean the fear in Eastern Europe of Western Germany.

To us this fear may seem rather senseless and exaggerated. We may ask ourselves: how can Western Germany possibly attack the great Soviet Union? It is true that for Western Germany to attack the Soviet Union would be military suicide, but from the East European point of view, the issue is not so simple as this. Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union have not forgiven or forgotten Germany to the same extent that we have. They suffered much more. The Soviet Union had 13 million killed in the last war. Poland lost 20 per cent. of her population. These are matters of the recent past, which many people in Eastern Europe remember and are afraid of.

But there is also the present: in the minds of many East Europeans the present threat from Germany is the fact that Western Germany has still not recognised the frontiers of its country in the East, and still has claims on territory in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and even in the Soviet Union. There will never be a chance of a rapprochement between West Germany and the East European countries until the elementary step of recognising West Germany's frontiers is taken by the West German Government and claims on East European countries are abandoned. It is true that there are many politicians in West Germany who do not press these claims so strongly as they did, but it is, unfortunately, a fact that no responsible West German politician would ever renounce them emphatically. To do so would be political suicide, and it would be regarded as providing a sop to the Right Wing extremists in West Germany. Unfortunately, many politicians in Great Britain and the United States take this view as well, and do not deny the West German claims.

The Poles, Czechoslovaks and Russians, however, are more impressed by the outward signs they find in everyday life in West Germany of claims on their territory. I have myself seen signposts and maps pointing out towns and areas in Eastern Europe, marking them as German, giving them the old German names and generally treating them as German territory. There are large political associations in Germany whose business it is to claim parts of Eastern Europe for Germany; and, of course, there is a political party, the N.V.D., part of whose policy is to make these claims. This is all grist to the mill of the Communist leaders, and is used to provide a basis for such aberrations as the attack on Czechoslovakia. Their explanations are only too easy for citizens of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Russia to accept. Even non-Communist citizens have this fear of West Germany, and are unwilling to reject the policy of their Communist rulers, because they know that the rulers will at least defend them from German aggression, which they believe is still a threat.

What can the British Government do in this matter? Many politicians in this country see the matter as not their concern, as a matter between Germany and Poland, or Czechoslovakia, as the case may be. However, I know that in East Europe we are not going to be allowed to wash our hands of this matter. People remember that it was Great Britain who signed the Munich, Yalta and Potsdam Agreements. We are responsible for these frontiers, and we have a special interest in their maintenance or their abandonment. We shall be expected to take a positive line on whether they are to be maintained or still to be held in question.

There is a deliberate policy among successive Governments in this country to play down this issue and minimise it. At the same time, the issue is played up in East Europe. The more we play it down, the more the Communist leaders play it up, and the more support they gain in their countries by playing on the fear of invasion from the West. The sort of vagueness on this issue which East Europeans find alarming may be typified by a remark made by the then Foreign Secretary, Mr. George Brown, in the summer of 1966, when he was asked straight out by a journalist whether we recognised the frontiers of Poland, and he paused and said, "Yes, in a way". This chance remark, which received very little publicity in this country, was put on the headlines of East European countries and of Germany and it was regarded as very irritating both to Germans and to Poles.

On May 31 this year there was a brief debate on this issue in another place in which a certain clarification was given by Mr. Goronwy Roberts, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. On Czechoslovakia he said: As regards the frontier between Germany and Czechoslovakia, here again the formal position of Her Majesty's Government is that the final determination of the frontier cannot be formalised until there is a peace treaty."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons; 31/5/68, col. 2356.] This, on the face of it, is vague. But he went on to say: — when the time comes for a final determination of Germany's frontiers by a peace treaty, the treaty discussions will start from the basis that Czechoslovak frontiers are not in question." [Col. 2357.] This, one might say, is fair enough. On the other hand, on the question of the Polish frontiers the Minister said: Until such a time as the vexed and central problem of Germany is solved to the satisfaction of all who are legitimately concerned, however, no final 'Yes' can be said to the frontiers."—[Col. 2355.] This statement, I know, was profoundly shocking to very many Poles and Russians, Communist and non-Communist. Poles have said to me, "How can we possibly be friendly with a country which does not recognise the integrity of our State? Is there a more hostile attitude one can take to a country than to challenge its frontiers?" And, I wonder, are there any other countries whose frontiers we challenge? It is seen by Poles and Russians as the most hostile attitude a country can possibly take to them, and I am convinced that it causes us a terrible amount of trouble in our foreign policy there.

Could not the Government adopt the formula taken by the Minister on May 31 with regard to Czechoslovakia? Could the Government not declare that a basis for a future settlement with Germany and a peace treaty with Germany would include the fact that the frontiers of Poland and Germany would not be called into question? It is true that this is the view taken by General de Gaulle, and I hope that it will not be rejected out of hand for this reason. Not necessarily everything that President de Gaulle says is wrong. It remains a fact that, until we take this attitude, until we make this declaration, and so long as we continue, as the East Europeans see it, to challenge the frontiers of Poland, adventures like the invasion of Czechoslovakia will be made and will be justified and regarded as justifiable by a very large number of East Europeans, whether they are Communist or not.

4.54 p.m.

LORD CHORLEY

My Lords, I should like to start by asking for the indulgence of the House because I shall not be able to stay for very long beyond the end of my speech, owing to an engagement which I entered into some months before the date of this debate was known. Like many others this afternoon, I propose to address my remarks entirely to the intervention into Czechoslovakia, except that I should like to address a word to the noble Lord. Lord Wedgwood, who I am sorry is not now in his seat. I must say I thought that when he referred to South Africa—a country in which a comparatively small number of white people are holding in semi-slavery a very much larger number of coloured people, in effect by armed force—as one of the bastions of the Free World, it was really comic if it had not been intensely tragic.

With regard to Czechoslovakia, I found myself much in agreement both with the noble Lord the Leader of the House and indeed with the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition in what they said. I should like to say to the noble Lord who has just resumed his seat that, however true a great deal of what he said may be, it is almost entirely irrelevant to the question of Czechoslovakia. He himself quoted from the speech by Mr. Goronwy Roberts, which made it perfectly clear that there is really no question at all about the Czechoslovak boundary, and, so far as I know —and I am a fairly close observer of the German scene—there is no kind of a movement in Western Germany to undo what was done during the war in respect of Czechoslovakia.

I was unable to take part in the very interesting debate on the invasion of Czechoslovakia which we held at the time, again owing to a long-standing engagement, but I heard a good deal of it. Although I propose to discuss this matter and some general considerations in relation to it, I shall certainly not make to-day the speech which I had hoped to make on that occasion. But I should like to begin by confessing that I had hoped for better things from the Russians. I remember very well as a young man welcoming the Russian Revolution, and I still think that on the whole it has been for the benefit of the world. I have admired over the post-war years the enormous contributions to science and art and the tremendous technological and industrial progress which have been made in that country. It therefore gave me all the more shock and dismay when the Russian armies advanced into Czechoslovakia.

An operation of that kind is, of course, completely at variance with the philosophy of Marx, and indeed with that of Lenin, in spite of one or two snide remarks addressed to the memory of Lenin this afternoon. I can imagine the blistering language which Karl Marx would have used, with which he would have denounced the power politics of the present Russian policy, naked and unashamed; that variety of power politics which we call "imperialism"—because that is what it is; it is an imperial policy. The acid test of imperialism, my Lords, is the establishment by one State of its authority over another against the will of the citizens of that other State. The classic method down the ages has been the use of armed force. Force is the keynote of imperialism, and by that acid test it is clear that the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia in August was imperialist.

In the last resort an empire can be held together only by force, and that is true whether it be a Czarist empire or whether it be a Communist empire. It is one of the ironies of modern history that of all the great empires which began their existence in the 16th and 17th centuries, only the Portuguese and the Russian empires are still in existence. The Russian Empire began, broadly speaking, with the invasion of Siberia by the armies of Ivan the Terrible in the time of our Elizabeth I, before the first steps to the building up of the British Empire had been taken. Russia is now the last great imperial Power; indeed, it is the one great imperial Power of the modern world, ironic as that may be, and its territories are held together by the largest army that the world has ever known and in some ways one of the most powerful military forces which the world has ever seen.

Can it be doubted that it is this which holds together the Russian Empire? Can it be doubted that the Red Army—just that, and nothing else—is what prevents its dissolution into the constituent nationalities which go to make it up and which are held together only by that great armed force? For nationalism is a far stronger force than Communism; it is a centrifugal force; it is a force the tendency of which is always to disrupt imperial power. It has disrupted many of the great imperial Powers which have existed in the past, and will in the end, in my view, disrupt the Russian Empire unless those who rule in that country take steps to ensure, as we did here, the breakup of this militarily-based empire into an association of free States. That, I am sure, was the dream of Lenin; I am quite sure it was also the policy of the Prague Government which Moscow decided to break up; and it undoubtedly is the policy which would be in the best interests of the world.

The constituents of an empire may voluntarily agree to remain together, as the constituents of the British Empire have agreed to remain together and to form the British Commonwealth of Nations; but this means, of course, that as an empire it comes to an end: force is abandoned, and the empire, as such, ceases and becomes in very truth a Commonwealth of nations. The Russians maintain that this is what has happened in the U.S.S.R., but I believe the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August last proves conclusively that this is not so.

The U.S.S.R. could become a Commonwealth of Socialist nations. That might have happened if a different turning had been taken at the end of the last war, if the required leadership had been there, and particularly if Russia had not been under the domination of a tyrant of the old sort—the domination of Stalin, who had developed a lust for power which made impossible any real rapprochement between East and West. It is the tragedy of the modern world that the statesmanship was not there at that time to provide a really sound and solid basis for the building up of a new world on lines of that kind. It is tempting to pursue the analysis of the history of this problem, but I do not propose to do so further. It is sufficient to say that at the end of the war conditions were favourable for such a new approach, but that it was lost in the way that I have endeavoured to describe.

Since the death of Stalin brought about a freer state of affairs—a distinctly freer and more fluid situation in the U.S.S.R.—many of us have devoted a great deal of our time and energy to trying to bring about a better state of affairs. Undoubtedly, much progress has been made in a number of directions—in rapprochement towards culture, towards science, toward trade, and in many other ways. Undoubtedly as a result of this there has been too much optimism—an optimism which has not been justified by the event—and it has been a tragedy to those of us who have put so much time and trouble into the business of building up better relations between East and West to see, apparently, everything fall to pieces, like a palace built from a pack of cards, under the shattering tread of the Russian armies advancing from the North and East. So we seem to be back at square one. But I do not think we really are. I think that forces have indeed been generated in Russia itself which will in the end produce a better situation, although it may well be some years before they are effectively able to make themselves felt.

What, then, is to be done just now in the present situation, which I agree is a difficult and a dangerous one? I think we must do all we possibly can to encourage these forces to which I have referred as existing in the U.S.S.R., and which undoubtedly exist in the Kremlin itself, because Russia is no longer a dictatorship—a dictatorship either in the old-fashioned autocratic type of Stalin, or indeed of the rather liberal type of Khrushchev. Russia is now governed by a sort of Cabinet, and one really cannot have a Cabinet without disagreements, particularly the sort of Cabinet that exists in the Kremlin. As has been pointed out this afternoon, there can be no question that the hesitation which occurred over taking action in Czechoslovakia was due to disagreements in that Cabinet. It would appear that in the end the balance was evenly divided, and it was only pressure from Eastern Germany that decided the matter. We can very well understand that there is exceptional fear in Eastern Germany, because the forces of nationalism in Germany would bring Eastern and Western Germany together again in a few weeks if the military pressure in the opposite direction were removed. So it was only after extreme hesitation that the decision to carry through this invasion was taken, and we should remember that in a situation of this kind majorities can easily change.

As has been pointed out, the operation was far from being a complete success. The almost unanimous resistance of the Czechoslovak people, whose wonderful courage and pertinacity no-one can admire too much, was something which the Russians obviously did not expect, and in Russia itself this is now becoming known. All the stories which the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, told us were put about at the time when his ship was putting into the Southern Russian ports are now perfectly well known inside Russia itself to be falsehoods, and that cannot give the régime strength. The conduct, reported in the Press only a few clays ago, of the Russian tourists subscribing for flowers to be put on the Memorial to the Czechoslovak citizens who were killed at the time of the invasion in August, is a good illustration of that. It shows that all the people coming to Czechoslovakia are perfectly well aware of what has happened, and when they go back into the U.S.S.R. obviously what they have seen will become known to their fellow-citizens. Politicians are the same sort of people all over the world. It is impossible to imagine that the people in the Kremlin are not sensitive to this sort of feeling. That may well result in a desire in the Kremlin to draw back from this position which has been taken up. This may seem too optimistic; we must not be too optimistic any more, I entirely agree.

On occasions of this kind there are in the opposition those who are opposed for reasons of principle and idealism, and I take off my hat to those Russians, particularly the writers and scientists, who have done their best to bring home to their fellow citizens what is going on. They have been persecuted and a number of them sent to prison. These are the men of sympathy and imagination, the people who can look behind the mountain, the people who imaginatively remember that the successful resistance to the forces of Nazism during the war was not inspired by Communism but by Russian patriotism, by a simple nationalism which is an instinct of very old foundation; and they know perfectly well that the Czech and Slovak citizens, when their own country was invaded in August last, felt exactly the same sort of sentiments and felt the will to resist; and indeed if their armed forces had been in any way commensurate with the requirements of the occasion would in fact have resisted.

But of course there are on these sort of occasions large numbers of people who are opposed to an adventure of this kind only because they do not think it will succeed, because they are afraid that it may bring a serious war with it, and that the advent of the Third World War may be the end of the world altogether. Nothing succeeds like success, and it may very well be that this part of the opposition to the Czech invasion has now disappeared in the U.S.S.R. Imperialism can be a paying game if it is carried through in the ways that some of the Russian leaders, at any rate, understand how to carry it through. As the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, has said, the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia was carried through brilliantly as a military enterprise, and if it could be carried out so successfully in Czechoslovakia why not in Rumania? And why not in Yugoslavia, and indeed in Austria and Western Germany itself? But, of course, if it is carried out in Yugoslavia there will certainly be a war, because the Yugoslavs are a people of a very different temperament from the Czechs. They do not fight on patiently, underground so to speak; they come out and fight on the barricades; and if the war started there surely the chances of it spreading through Europe are very serious indeed. I think at this stage it would be right that NATO should make it clear that this would be an attack on Western Europe, and if that were made perfectly clear to the Russians I have no doubt that they would think twice and more than twice before they went on with it.

What are we to do in these circumstances? I should like to close on this reflection. I think this is a time emphatically for a constructive and farseeing diplomacy. I have been much impressed, and I am sure others of your Lordships have been, by reading the extracts from Senator Robert Kennedy's forthcoming book on the Cuban troubles some years ago, and enormously encouraged by the wise diplomacy of the President and his advisers at that time, the firm resistance to the Russian infiltration into Cuba combined with an understanding of Mr. Khrushchev's difficulties, and a determination to provide him with a way out which he could take in honour, with concessions which obviously Mr. Khrushchev thought of value and which he was prepared to accept. In that way that really serious crisis was overcome.

Could not the same sort of diplomacy be applied to Russia in regard to Czechoslovakia under the new President?—because one of the reasons why these international crises always crop up at this sort of time is that the Americans are electing a new President. Within a very few hours they will have decided which of the leaders they wish to have; the whole situation will he clearer, and we shall be able to get a sensitive and effective reaction to these problems.

In Czechoslovakia there are quite a number of the same sort of conditions existing as existed in connection with Cuba and Khrushchev. The Russians themselves are in a difficulty. They have withdrawn a very large part of their military forces already because they realise the hostility of the people to them. I am told by friends who have recently been in that country that you do not see any Russian soldiers in the large cities. The Russian soldiers that are about are behaving very well; there are no attacks on women and that sort of thing.

The Czechs and Slovaks have made very considerable concessions, concessions which some of us may think have gone almost too far. The Russians could withdraw saving their faces; and so far as it is possible for them to preserve their honour after what they did in August, they can withdraw with the preservation of their honour. Surely it is right and proper that at such a time our diplomacy should be concentrated on enabling this to be brought about. I do not say that the leaders now in the Kremlin are men like Mr. Khrushchev, who was a man of flexible disposition and an elastic understanding of foreign policy. But those forces to which I have referred in the Kremlin who undoubtedly were against this adventure might well be ready to take advantage of moves of this kind and in this way, maybe over weeks or over months, the necessary détente could be secured. As has been said to-day, it is essential that coexistence should go on, and I think that in this way that could very well be secured.

5.20 p.m.

LORD BARNBY

My Lords, we all, of course, follow the pronouncements of the Foreign Secretary, and in his recent speech on the Address he dealt with the invasion of Czechoslovakia and trouble in the Near East. I felt his manner of dealing with this was insufficiently vehement in its denunciation. To use his own words, he said that there was preoccupation at the United Nations on both issues. Like several other noble Lords who have already spoken, it was this feeling about Czechoslovakia that moved me to speak to-day. It is because I feel so strongly that I am going to presume to make contrasts, and while the invasion of Czechoslovakia has had the universal denunciation of all, I think perhaps that something I may say afterwards will be such as will not have the same general agreement. I say that because I find myself in the happy position of following the noble Lord, Lord Chorley, in his erudite survey of the historical evolution of Russia as a world Power, now an imperial Power and as powerful as anything on earth. Certainly much of his analysis was most interesting and we are grateful to him for it.

Returning to Czechoslovakia, it is because it seems that the denunciation has been inadequate—there was universal disapproval in the Press; there were recommendations as to action in cultural and in trade zones—sanctions have, however, nowhere resulted. In fact, the whole shock seems to have faded away to an appearance of "business as usual" which evidently has stimulated so many speakers to-day to express themselves so strongly. This is in conspicuous contrast with what many speakers, Ministers and the Press have used in the past to express their disapproval of events in other quarters, where the allegation of oppression or suffering was ridiculous. But the United Nations repeat little criticism in regard to the tyranny of Russia and her brutal occupation of Czechoslovakia and her oppression of the captive European peoples. I personally find this inconsistency nauseating.

The United Nations could have been more vehement. My noble Leader dealt with that. The noble Lord the Leader of the House attempted to make a good defence of the United Nations. It is proper that he should do so. There are vast numbers of people who hope that there-from something may emerge to lessen the tensions of the world. Anyhow, so far as Czechoslovakia is concerned our representative there seems to have become resigned to silence. Instead, from the United Nations there pour out resolutions hostile to South Africa.

LORD SHACKLETON

My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lord? Did he say that our representative at the United Nations was silent on the subject of Czechoslovakia, or did I misunderstand him?

LORD BARNBY

My Lords, the noble Lord the Leader of the House misunderstood me. I said that since the early denunciations silence seems to have reigned and there is no continuing condemnation of Russia. I want to compare this with the continuing hostile resolutions which pour oat of the United Nations against South Africa. Anyhow, opposition by our representative gets no headlines here. There is a continuous harassing; threats of boycotts, sanctions or force; suggestions of alternative Government for South West Africa—quite impossible. In the United Nations our defence of South Africa has been woefully inadequate.

Our trade with South Africa, our second largest customer, is in our favour and of importance to us. How different our trade with Russia! It was stated last week in this House that there is an adverse balance of £50 million a year, apart from the political considerations. Then Portugal, our ally in NATO, is also a target for United Nations opposition. The provinces of Mozambique and Angola are parts of metropolitan Portugal. We maintain her. Why the offen- sive blockade of Beira? Merchandise and oil pass freely into the interior by other routes. The blockade has no purpose in it at all.

The closing of the Suez Canal has put on to South Africa responsibility for guarding the passage of shipping to the East. Already we read of 3,000 ships diverted from the Canal route having been serviced in South Africa. Yet we have the presumption to suggest that South Africa is not entitled to support by the provision of arms. The same is true of Portugal. Sir Alec Douglas-Home in another place powerfully denounced this policy, and I think that my noble Leader is in support of that denunciation. What bigoted stupidity it is! We thus contributed to the maritime build-up of Russia which has been so emphasised today, particularly by my noble friend Lord Wedgwood, with much of whose speech I find myself in agreement. We lose valuable exports. This helps to spread Communism in Africa. Look at the disturbance in Nigeria to-day. This we all deplore. It is the terrorist menace in Africa which evolves from this. Whether in Angola or Mozambique, against South Africa or Rhodesia, or even in Israel, I denounce this terrorist menace altogether. These Communist-trained horrors are even referred to by members of the Government as "freedom fighters", when they are using the tools of Communism in their dissolute, barbaric tactics.

Now to Israel, already mentioned. I think that the policy of Her Majesty's Ministers was insufficiently firm at the end of the six-day war. They could have denounced any reversion to pre-war delimitations. We have Russia blatantly arming the Arabs, bringing disorder into the area. Surely our representative could have had more influence in bringing about a directly negotiated settlement. The suggestion of a return to pre-war boundaries, such as the heights of Golan or in the West Bank, is impossible. They were like a sword at the throat of Israel. It is because of all this action, the alarming growth of Communist power, that I think we must remember Czechoslovakia, which should awaken us to the dangers, the tyranny over oppressed peoples, including white peoples, rigid, ruthless and regulatory, unmatched anywhere except in black dictatorships like Haiti and San Dominica.

LORD WALSTON

My Lords, I am glad to be able to follow the noble Lord, Lord Barnby, because he touched on that continent which is close to both his heart and mine, and I propose to spend rather longer on it than he did. However, he will not be surprised if I do not follow him in any of his comments. I was sad to see that, apart from the exception of Rhodesia, there was no mention whatsoever of the continent of Africa in the gracious Speech. I believe this to be a very serious omission because, with the exception of the noble Marquess who is to reply for the Opposition, and my noble friend Lord Shepherd who is to reply for the Government, both of whom I know are well aware of the importance of Africa, I feel that there are many, both in this House and in the present Government, who are not sufficiently aware of the enormous significance that that continent has in world affairs and, in particular, in our own overseas policies.

My Lords, there are two reasons above all for this: one is the economic, and one is the political. Economically, the continent of Africa—and I am speaking of the whole land area there—consists of some 50 countries (I believe it is actually 51 now) and something over 250 million people, a pretty substantial population. More important than that, in 1965, the last year for which figures are available, British investment in the continent of Africa was £800 million, or 19 per cent. of our total overseas investment. I ask your Lordships to compare this 19 per cent. with the 14 per cent. that we have invested in the whole of the continent of Asia, and the 5 per cent. that we have invested in the whole of Latin America. Therefore, with the exception of Europe, it is clear that our investment in the continent of Africa is infinitely greater than it is anywhere else.

It is not only in our investment that Africa is important to us. Our exports last year, 1967, amounted to £532 million, or just over 10 per cent. of our total exports, compared with exports to Asia of 9.3 per cent., and Latin America a mere 3.2 per cent., while imports at £616 million represented 9.6 per cent. of our total imports, compared with 7½ per cent. for Asia and 4½per cent. for Latin America. I do not want to weary your Lordships with any more figures, but these must make it very clear indeed that purely from the economic point of view Africa is a continent to which we are already devoting a great deal of individual attention and to which, therefore, Her Majesty's Government should equally devote a very large amount of attention also.

Politically, my Lords, I believe that the importance of Africa is even greater than its economic importance. As I have said, there are something over fifty countries in Africa and 250 million people. The great majority of those countries are new countries very recently come to independence, and they are countries which are searching for a new way of life. There is a vacuum there waiting to be filled. I am not for a moment suggesting that we should attempt to fill it with our own particular brand of democracy of Westminster, democracy of the two-Party system, whatever you wish to call it, because I have no desire—and I am certain that Her Majesty's Government have no desire—to replace the old Victorian Colonialism with the neo-Colonialism of imposing forms of government on people for which they are not automatically suited and who may not wish to have them.

Equally, we cannot allow this vacuum to remain unfilled. It will not remain unfilled. If we withdraw entirely it will be filled, but it will be filled with something else. Whether it is with the doctrines of Chairman Mao, or whether it is with Marxism Leninism I do not know, but I am quite certain that while our own form of government in the West is not ideally suited to the new countries of Africa, the forms of government in the Soviet Union and in China are even less suited to them. They can choose certain good things, I believe, from those countries; they can choose other good things, and more good things, from us. But it is the job of this country, politically and diplomatically, to make certain that the good aspects of Western democracy—and not only the good aspects but the aspects of it which are particularly suited to the new countries of Africa—do not go by default, but are listened to, are studied and are made easily available to such countries as wish for them.

More important than these new countries searching for a way of government, for a form of government in their own affairs, is the fact that in Africa to-day we find the only area in the whole world where together on one land mass are living a substantial number of white people and a very large number of black people; a substantial number of rich people and a far larger number of very poor people. What is more, the rich and the white, which are virtually synonymous, not only live on the same continent as the poor, or the black, but actually share a common frontier with them. If ever a conflict arises between the rich and the poor, between the black and the white—and this is something which many noble Lords and others have spoken of with a great deal of knowledge and a great deal of feeling in the past; and let us all hope that it never will—it will be in the continent of Africa that that conflict will start. If it starts, heaven knows where it will end! For that reason, above all, we cannot afford to ignore Africa, to let it go its own way.

If we are to retain any control over the future destinies of this country and our own way of life, let alone of the world, wherever this potential confrontation arises in Africa—and signs already exist, as the noble Lord, Lord Barnby, pointed out, with the freedom-fighters, although he does not want us to call them that; with the guerrillas, with the terrorists, as he would like to call them (call them what you like, they are the same people)—we must look at these matters frankly; we must study them in depth, and we must act courageously.

My Lords, right now we are, of course, mesmerised by the problem of Rhodesia. But Rhodesia is only one of several flashpoints in this highly explosive continent. The others are South Africa itself, with its racial policies of apartheid or separate development; Angola and Mozambique, the Portuguese overseas territories, with their social and economic inequalities which disappeared from Europe generations ago, and the question again mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Barnby, of South-West Africa and the United Nations.

LORD BARNBY

My Lords, would the noble Lord allow me to intervene? He is overlooking the fact that in the Portuguese African territories there is no colour bar. It is an equal qualification, whether for black or for white.

LORD WALSTON

My Lords, I am not overlooking the fact at all. I specifically said that in South Africa they had their separate development and their racial policy. In the Portuguese territories they do not have that, but they have their social inequalities and their economic inequalities. I accept that they are not racial inequalities.

We must not so concentrate on Rhodesia that we lose sight of all those other equally dangerous, though not so imminent, problems. And we must not think that if, during the next week or in the coming months, the problem of Rhodesia is settled, we can then sit back and say "South Africa is now a quiet continent. We can once more forget about it." But for all that, Rhodesia is number one on the list. The problem of Rhodesia must be settled, but in order for the settlement to be worth anything at all it is not only necessary for people in this country and people in Rhodesia—whether it be the 4 million Africans, the 200,000 Europeans or all of them together—to be satisfied; it is also necessary for the neighbouring countries of Africa to be satisfied and, above all, for the closest neighbour, Zambia, to be satisfied. For if they do not feel that it is a just and lasting settlement, the tension will continue to mount and the threat of final explosion will in no way have been dissipated.

I do not in any way want to trespass on the delicate negotiations which are at present taking place in Rhodesia. I am quite sure that, if anybody can bring about a satisfactory conclusion, my right honourable friend the Minister Without Portfolio is the man to do it. But so far as I can see from such information as I have been able to glean, the Privy Council is to the Rhodesian Front and its supporters the great stumbling block. They say that they cannot submit to having an outside body interfering with the decision of their own properly elected Parliament. On the other hand, Zambia and the other African countries will not be satisfied, and in my view quite rightly will not be satisfied, with anything that leaves the Rhodesian Government free to alter the Constitution. The Privy Council perhaps appears to constitutional lawyers to be the right way to give this safeguard; but if we are realists—and we must be realists in a matter of this sort—we all know that the decision of a court, whether a magistrates' court or the highest court in the land or in the Commonwealth, is valueless unless there is a policeman to ensure that that decision is carried out.

I do not want to go into the past history of this matter, but in the past Her Majesty's Government have made it quite clear that force is not going to be used against Rhodesia. I suggest, in all diffidence, that the objections of the Rhodesian Front and Mr. Smith to the superimposition of the Privy Council could be overcome, and at the same time the desires of Zambia and her neighbours for adequate safeguards could be met, if Her Majesty's Government gave way on the Privy Council (which, at its best, is only a hollow safeguard) but withdrew the undertaking which they have given not to use force, and made it clear that they would be prepared to use force only in the event of the agreement (assuming an agreement is arrived at) being broken. I suggest that this is something worthy of consideration.

In any case, the dispute over Rhodesia is not solely a matter between this country and Rhodesia: it involves other people; and, above all, Zambia. Would it not be a more effective way of achieving settlement to bring together, if they will come, on the one hand President Kaunda and, on the other, Mr. Ian Smith? After all, it is their two countries which are most at risk and which have most to lose from a continuation of this state of affairs and most to gain from a settlement. While in no way abandoning the responsibility of the British Government in this matter, a confrontation between the two leaders of the neighbouring countries, under the chairmanship of a British Minister, my right honourable friend, seems to me to offer the best way of getting some satisfactory settlement, if that is indeed possible.

My Lords, I should like to leave Rhodesia and turn to the rest of Africa. As I have said, we must not so concentrate on Rhodesia that we lose sight of the rest of this enormous continent. And I am afraid that we have been neglecting Africa. I will not embarrass my noble friend the Minister of State by asking him how many African countries have re- ceived visits from British Ministers over the last four years, or to compare the number of African countries which have received such visits with the number of Asian, European or Latin American countries.

LORD SHEPHERD

My Lords, perhaps I can help my noble friend. I have not the figures in my mind, but I would hazard a strong guess that there have been more ministerial visits to African countries than there have been to European and, I fear, to some Asian countries.

LORD WALSTON

My Lords, my noble friend did not get my question quite right. I did not ask how many Ministerial visits there had been to African countries. I said I would not ask him how many African countries had been visited by Ministers.

LORD SHEPHERD

Yes, that is what I meant.

LORD WALSTON

There may have been a very large number of visits; in fact, I know that one country has received several visits. If my noble friend will give us that information, I shall be delighted. But I should be prepared to have a small bet with him—

LORD SHACKLETON

I should not.

LORD WALSTON

—that, as a proportion, far more countries in Latin America have been visited by British Ministers in the last four years than countries in Africa.

LORD SHEPHERD

No.

LORD WALSTON

I will put half-a-crown on it. However, let us hope that there will be still more visits, however many there have been.

I would also suggest that in the new amalgamation of the Commonwealth Relations Office with the Foreign Office (which I, and I am sure others, welcome) there should be appointed one Minister with special responsibility for Africa. Possibly it has already been done, and I should be very glad if it were my noble friend. I should hope that, Parliamentary duties permitting, he could de vote all of his time to the study of this continent, to visits to it, to talks with its leaders, and in general to evolving long-term policy and putting into effect the short-term implementation of that policy.

Also, I think we should expand our information services there. It is to me remarkable that the effectiveness of British sanctions against Rhodesia and the ineffectiveness of the sanctions of many other countries, some in Africa, some in Europe, some in Asia, should go virtually unnoticed in African countries; that we are so often criticised for the inadequacy of sanctions while sonic other countries—and I will not embarrass them by mentioning them by name, but they are well known—are able to pick up the trade which we have dropped and are at the same time received with open arms by other countries in Africa who are castigating us for our failure in Rhodesia. I think there is an information job to be done there. Similarly, there is the fact that certain countries are now prepared to step in and provide arms to South Africa which we, in deference to our obligations to the United Nations, are not supplying. The breaking of the sanctions is unknown in African countries and, again, the trade relations of those countries are improving, while we are receiving blame. There is a big job there also for our information services.

I think we should spend far more effort in seeing that the right sort of literature is available throughout even the relatively small towns of Africa, instead of its being concentrated in our High Commissions, our Embassies and the British Council offices in the capitals. Here we can take a leaf out of the Chinese book; they are extremely effective. We should give at least as much encouragement to development and self-help in Africa as we do in Asia and in Latin America. As your Lordships may remember, we have promised the Asian Development Bank £12,500,000. We have promised the Inter-American Development Bank £4,000,000. The African Development Bank we have promised £1,000,000. Compare those figures, my Lords, with the figures I gave you earlier of the volume of our trade.

I further suggest that we might consider encouraging African members of the Commonwealth to set up a group of their own, to study the particular problems of Africa and to co-ordinate their own policies. We must not lead a group of that sort—that must be an African initiative under African leadership—but we should give help, encouragement and advice if we are asked for it. Above all, we need not only to do the few specific things which I have suggested—and there are many more which could be suggested—but to realise firmly, and all the time, the enormous importance to us, politically and economically, of Africa. We must also realise that, even forgetting the present problem of Rhodesia, Africa presents us with the greatest potential danger to ourselves and to the whole world, and, at the same time, the greatest opportunity of any country in the world.

5.54 p.m.

LORD MERRIVALE

My Lords, I do not propose to follow the noble Lord, Lord Walston, in his interesting survey of Africa as it is to-day, although, as he knows, I am particularly interested in the Malagasy Republic, which has been independent for eight years, and which is fortunate in having a stable and effective government. This evening I should like to refer to our relations with Greece, a member of NATO, at a time when nerves are taut in Yugoslavia, and when there has been a considerable build-up of the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean.

In another place, last Thursday, the Foreign Secretary said at col. 187 of Hansard: … the continuance of this alliance"— NATO— and its continued use both for defence and for the pursuit of better understanding between East and West is a necessity. He went on to say that … anyone who considered events in Europe would have drawn the conclusion that, in view of what has happened in the East, there is greater need for the nations of Western Europe to pursue unity among themselves and not merely in the military field. But last September, according to the Daily Telegraph, a resolution was agreed in Strasbourg by members of the Political Committee of the Council of Europe that Greece may be expelled from the Council of Europe. The Daily Telegraph article of September 26 went on to say that, unless the Greek Government made sweeping changes in its constitutional proposals, the Council's parliamentary assembly would be asked to vote Greece's expulsion or suspension next January. I understand that the final say in the matter lies with the Committee of Ministers. I therefore hope that Her Majesty's Government will intervene, should it be necessary, to oppose such an expulsion or suspension.

Articles 56 to 86 of the 1968 Constitution, which was submitted to the Greek people by referendum on September 29 last, deal with the election, constitution, powers and operation of Parliament. The Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe called for free parliamentary elections in Greece within six months. In view of the assurance given by the Greek Prime Minister following the plebiscite, that there would be a gradual return to full democracy, should not the timing of this internal matter be left to the Greek Government? Friends in Greece, with whom I have spoken, consider the 1968 Constitution more democratic than the 1952 Constitution, and also better adapted to the realities of Greek life. Having visited Greece last August, and having met the Prime Minister, I have no reason to doubt his word that he intends to bring Greece to a full democratic régime.

At this stage a comment by Peregrine Worsthorne might be appropriate. He said: The Colonels are not ideologues or fanatics. Their exact counterparts could be found in every saloon bar in this country. They are what in happier lands and in former times would be regarded as the backbone of any nation—sincere patriots, deeply concerned with the traditional values of their country. Would the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, be willing to concede that the time might have come for an improvement in relations between our two countries?

In this context, a statement such as "Colonels rig Greek ballot", which appeared in the Observer of September 22 last, and the showing by I.T.V. on August 31 last of the Allan King Associates production, "I was born Greek", with Melina Mercouri, do not seem very helpful. That film was blatant anti-Greek Government propaganda.

LORD SHEPHERD

My Lords, is the noble Lord suggesting that we should control television?

LORD MERRIVALE

No, my Lords. I am just drawing the attention of Her Majesty's Government to the fact that there is this definite anti-Greek government propaganda. In view of the popular support—and I stress the words, "popular support"—which appeared to be enjoyed by the régime when I visited Greece last August, when I spoke to a number of people—trade union leaders, agriculturalists and so forth—I trust that the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, will agree that such remarks as have appeared, such as, "The barbarous methods in use in Greece to-day", might be replaced by a more constructive approach.

So far, my Lords, I would agree that our trade balance is still favourable, with our exports to Greece in 1966, 1967 and January to September, 1968, running at £35.2 million, £33.1 million and £28.3 million respectively, while our import figures for the same periods are as follows: £11.3 million, £12.6 million and £8.5 million. But I think we should not overlook the fact (which has its political implications) that the Communist Eastern bloc countries have been buying up increasing quantities of the large surplus of tobacco in Northern Greece by means of bilateral agreements. It is an important problem for that country, for, to quote just one example, the unsold stocks of tobacco in 1964, 1965 and 1966 amounted to 63,532 tons. The time could well come when the Eastern countries, particularly the U.S.S.R., might be prepared to buy greater quantities of tobacco provided more machinery and consumer goods were bought from them. This could have the effect of reducing our exports to Greece.

To turn now to NATO, Northern Greece being one of the most sensitive areas of Western defence, with the shadow of Russia's invasion of Czechoslovakia lying heavily over the Balkans, one can understand America's restoration of military aid to Greece. Could I therefore ask the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, in what way we are assisting or contributing to the combined defence of that area, apart from the few British officers who are, I believe, in Salonika, and also in Izmir and Ankara? My Lords, I have already referred to the systematic build-up of Russian naval power in the Mediterranean, whilst Moscow's penetration of the Arab world brings it nearer to Greece's frontiers. No doubt, too, Moscow is capable of considerable mischief-making in Cyprus.

My Lords, Lieutenant-General Anghelis, the Greek Chief of Staff, when inaugurating a new NATO guided-missile firing range in Crete last May, said that it was yet another example of the important achievements of the Alliance whenever its members, in a spirit of co-operation, solidarity and mutual understanding, join forces for a common purpose". My Lords, eight member countries are co-operating in the use of the facilities provided in Crete. These eight countries are: the U.S.A., West Germany, Italy, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Turkey and Greece. Can the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, say why we are not participating in any way in taking advantage of this firing range?

In conclusion, my Lords, bearing in mind the popular support of the régime in Greece and the trade implications to which I have also referred, should we not also remind ourselves that the penetration of the Soviet Union in the Eastern Mediterranean increases the strategic importance of Greece for NATO, and, therefore, might it not be appropriate to seek more friendly and closer links with that country?

6.5 p.m.

LORD BROCKWAY

My Lords, I hesitate to begin with a personal reference, but after the congratulations which were expressed by my noble friend the Leader of the House on the fact that I had celebrated my 80th birthday this weekend I should like to express appreciation, not only to him but to Members on all sides of the House, from all Parties, who have sent me messages. I shall think it much more appropriate in 20 years' time. Under the proposals for the reform of this House I should become a voteless Member, but I can assure your Lordships that you will have to put up with me by way of Questions and speeches until I am 100 years old.

My Lords, I want to make only a brief reference to what the noble Lord, Lord Merrivale, has said. I have been almost stunned in amazement by that speech. In Greece we have had a military coup; we have had the destruction of a democratic system; we have had an election which has been controlled just as much as elections in Communist countries. The feeling of the people of Greece has been reflected in that amazing demonstration at the funeral of the ex-Prime Minister, Mr. Papandreou. That any Member of this House, in our democratic society, should express sympathy and solidarity with that régime just astonishes me. Those of us in this House who have democratic sentiments are indeed critical of our own Government for recognising that régime. No one could possibly condemn what Soviet Russia did in Czechoslovakia to destroy those democratic liberties in which we believe and at the same time extend praise to the Government in Greece.

LORD MERRIVALE

My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord but he referred to the demonstration which took place on the occasion of the funeral of Mr. George Papandreou. I should have thought, first of all, that such a demonstration was in bad taste; but, secondly, I should have thought that the fact that 92 per cent. of the votes cast in Greece were in favour of the Constitution put forward by the present Government when people were not under any obligation to vote for it—they had two ballot papers, "Yes" and "No", and they could just put one in an envelope, seal the envelope and put it in a ballot box; no pressure was put on the people—meant something.

LORD BROCKWAY

My Lords, I would not accept that there was no pressure. I would just say I regard that result in exactly the same way as I regard the 98 per cent. support for the Communist régimes in Communist countries.

My Lords, I propose to discuss a number of matters, but I want to be telegraphic in my expression about each of them. The first speech which I delivered in this House was on the subject of the danger of nuclear weapons. That remains. In America and Soviet Russia there are nuclear weapons which can destroy all human life on earth; and now there is the greater danger of biological methods of war, which could be even more destructive than nuclear weapons. I want to express appreciation to Her Majesty's Government for their initiative in the Non-proliferation Treaty; but the nations of the world which do not have nuclear weapons are urging very strongly that it should be supported by the nuclear Powers, including Great Britain and France, and unfortunately unreachable China, cutting down their own nuclear weapons. But, much more important, they are urging that this should be made the occasion for advanced, progressive disarmament; and I hope very much that the British Government will revert to the situation of some three years ago when both Soviet Russia and this country and, indeed, America, were making proposals for deep, progressive disarmament.

My Lords, the great factor to-day in our discussion of foreign affairs is the hope of peace in Vietnam. The American Government has now decided to stop its bombing of the North. I wish this had been done months ago when U Thant and many leading voices all over the world urged it. But, late as this decision is, I deeply hope that it is going to lead to peace. The one difficulty is that the Saigon Government—very mistakenly referred to as the South Vietnamese—have decided not to attend the peace conference in Paris. I hope they will reconsider this decision. I would add only this: if the Saigon Government comes into conflict with the American Government in this matter, and if it is left alone, there could be no greater assurance of a Communist triumph in South Vietnam than that the Saigon Government should, on their own, attempt to resist the N.L.F. and North Vietnam. They are probably awaiting the result of the Presidential election which is taking place in the United States of America to-day. I hope that they will join the peace conference and that it will lead to a decision that the people of South Vietnam shall have the opportunity, in free elections, to decide their own Government, and to decide their relations with North Vietnam. I hope also that there may be some provision for international supervision of that election, which might be under the United Nations auspices.

My Lords, when we turn from the situation in South-East Asia and Vietnam, I think that the greatest danger of war now lies in the Middle East. I want very sincerely to congratulate Her Majesty's Government, and particularly my noble friend Lord Caradon at the United Nations who took the initiative in proposing the resolution on the Israeli/Arab conflict. That resolution has unfortunately not been accepted by the Israeli Government. I hope Her Majesty's Government will continue to press it as the means to a solution. I have been deeply interested for many years in trying to make some contribution to a solution of the Israeli/Arab conflict because I have a profound admiration for what the Jewish race have done in Israel, for the amazing way in which they have turned deserts into towns and swamps into fruitful agricultural areas, and also because I have sympathy with the Arab nations in their desire for recognition in the Middle East. I would urge very strongly that a solution to this problem may be found by a withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the territories they have occupied but that there should be some modification of the old frontiers. I think the Israelis are entitled to say that there should be some reconsideration of the frontiers on the Syrian heights over the area of Lake Galilee, which is at the mercy of any army occupying them. I also think the Israelis are absolutely entitled to urge that there should be free passage of their ships through the Suez Canal and through the Akaba Gulf. But even if the Arab nations refuse entire recognition of Israel, I hope that on the basis of non-belligerency between those nations peace may be secured.

I turn now to Europe where I think lies the third danger in foreign affairs. I am deeply moved by the struggle of the people of Czechoslovakia for their democratic and libertarian rights. I regard it as one of the most hopeful things that have happened in the Communist world since the 1917 revolution in Russia. Over the years many of the leaders of Czechoslovakia have been my personal friends. But, having said that, I hope Her Majesty's Government will resist the provocation and the tendencies which have arisen from that struggle to strengthen the military conflict in Europe between East and West. I hope Her Majesty's Government will resist the temptation to pursue a more challenging policy in Berlin itself. I urge that, because the strengthening of a military challenge from the West will merely increase the tendency of Russia to hold on to Czechoslovakia by military means.

In contrast with that policy, I urge strongly that when NATO comes to be reviewed next year we should seriously look at the possibility of establishing a European Security Pact to replace both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The Warsaw Pact Powers themselves, prior to the Czechoslovakian incident, indicated that they were ready to enter such a security pact to cover the whole of Europe. I hope that our policies will tend in those directions.

I have great sympathy with the speech that my noble friend Lord Walston delivered about Africa. I do not propose to enter into details about Rhodesia this evening: I understand that we are to have another opportunity for doing that. I would only say to the Ministers—and say it with a little knowledge of Africa—that we have to consider not only Rhodesia, but the Commonwealth itself. We have to consider what would be the reaction to any settlement in Rhodesia; whether it would mean the deep disagreement of Commonwealth countries. We have to consider also what is one of the most alarming dangers in the world today; that is, the possibility of a racialist war throughout the whole of Southern Africa. My Lords, I shall have much to say about Rhodesia when we come to the debate, but at this moment I will limit my observations to that.

I want to say a little more about the situation in Nigeria. I regard it as one of the tragedies of the present day. That Africans in a large part of Nigeria should be in conflict with the Ibos in Biafra is not only a disappointment to those of us who struggled for Nigerian independence, but to those of us who had hoped that in independent Africa an association on the basis of Africa rather than of tribes would develop.

My first comment on this situation is that it is becoming a scene of a most unseemly competition in traffic between arms from different countries. I suppose that I first gained any kind of reputation at all in this country by my exposure of the arms traffic of the world in books which I wrote forty years ago. We now have a situation in which there are the armament firms of this country and of Soviet Russia, with Egyptian pilots flying the planes, on the one side, and on the other side the armament firms of France, indirectly supplying Biafra through the Ivory Coast and Gabon. And there is the black market which is going on through Portugal, at Lisbon, to which contributions have been made by Communist countries, even when Soviet Russia is supplying Nigeria. This is one of the most evil reflections of the bloody traffic in which armament firms are engaged for their own profit, resulting in the death of thousands of people all over the world.

My Lords, I have repeatedly made the appeal to Her Majesty's Government to seek to end this traffic in death by the great armament firms, and the answer has been that the Government cannot control this black market. The Government can control the black market. Every Government in the world can prohibit the export of arms from its territory. The greatest scene for the exports of this market is Lisbon, in Portugal. The Portuguese are our allies, our oldest allies. Portugal is part of NATO. Is the influence of Her Majesty's Government now so small that they cannot even exert their power over Portugal to end this black market in arms which means death to thousands in Nigeria?

LORD STRANGE

My Lords, is the noble Lord suggesting that we can control Russia?

LORD BROCKWAY

Yes, my Lords, we can influence Russia. I must not reveal too much, but I have had repeated conversations with representatives of Soviet Russia urging them to stop the supply of their arms; and, different from what Her Majesty's Government have said through their Front-Bench spokesmen, I think it possible that Soviet Russia would be prepared to stop her supply of arms if Britain would stop her supply of arms, and if we could get a similar arrangement between other Governments.

My Lords, I am deeply concerned about this, because it is not only the deaths which come from military action in Nigeria and Biafra but starvation also. The relief organisations estimate that if this war goes on there will be two million deaths by the end of this year. That is more than a political and military calamity: it is a human calamity, and there should be an effort by all Governments and all people to avoid it. I believe that the British people in the last months, despite their almost indoctrination in violence, have been more moved by the sight on television of those starving babies in Biafra and Nigeria than by anything else. In that situation, we should now be thinking of every kind of effort to bring this war to an end.

We have reached a situation in which Biafra, with the increased supply of arms received indirectly from France, is holding back the Federal troops. At this moment there is a stalemate. I have differed on this issue, to some extent, from my friend Margery Perham, but in The Times last week she very strongly urged that, in view of the stalemate in the military situation between Nigeria and Biafra, the opportunity should be taken for negotiation and agreement. I beg Her Majesty's Government to accept that view. I hope the Government will not feel that the supply of arms must be increased. If this war in Nigeria and Biafra becomes a conflict between the arms supplied by Soviet Russia and Britain, on the one hand—very strange allies!—and by France and the black market and Czechoslovakia, on the other, we shall face a massacre and starvation in one of the Commonwealth countries that we have established which would be a calamity for the world.

In this situation I beg Her Majesty's Government not to expand their arms supply to the Federal Government, but to say to the Federal Government that they should seek negotiation. I know what the answer is: that Colonel Ojukwu has said, "We will fight on". Three months ago I proposed to Colonel Ojukwu a formula which I believe will ultimately be accepted by both the Federal Government and by the Biafrans. As my noble friend Lord Shepherd knows—and this was the reason why he went to Lagos with hope—there were members of the Biafran Administration who supported this approach.

My proposal was an association of Biafra with common services with the rest of Nigeria; that Nigeria should give up its rigid idea of unity and that Biafra should give up its rigid idea of secession. As my noble friend knows, that idea received considerable support from influential people on both the Biafran and Nigerian sides, even if it was rejected publicly by Colonel Ojukwu. The British Government, if they are thinking of the future of Nigeria (and there can be no unity if the war goes on; it is a psycho- logical impossibility), and if they are seeking to save thousands of lives, must now use their influence for a truce on these lines rather than an expansion of military aid.

My Lords, I conclude on a point about which I feel just as deeply: not the starvation of two million in Nigeria by the end of this year, but the great danger of starvation in the world by the end of this century because of the absence of food to meet the expansion of world population. Family planning, yes; but that will not be a solution to the problem. I want to urge Her Majesty's Government, as they look at the next decade, to put right in the priority of their thinking about world affairs the possibility of increasing food production throughout the world. The possibility is there. It is now possible to make the desert fruitful land and to control the depths of the sea to produce a wealth of food for millions of people. For these purposes we need world economic organisation. I would urge Her Majesty's Government to make one of their first priorities a determination to assist in the solution of that problem.

6.32 p.m.

THE EARL OF CORK AND ORRERY

My Lords, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, will forgive me if I do not follow him in his speech, except in regard to his declaration of personal policy. My noble friend Lord Salisbury has described the debate on the humble Address as a grand inquest on the nation, and it seems to me appropriate that the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, should choose this occasion to indicate that he means to continue for another twenty years as Grand Inquisitor of your Lordships' House. I wish him luck and I am sure that we all look forward to a proper "Brockway benefit" at the end of it.

My noble friend Lord Erroll of Hale, likened the gracious Speech to the American war-time K-rations we used to have in Burma—and not a bad comparison either, so far as it goes. I cannot remember that there was anything very nasty in K-rations except possibly when the flavour of chewing gum got into the powdered soup. I would take my noble friend's comparison a little further and remind him that if he tasted K-rations, possibly he will also have been exposed to the soya links, a kind of skinless vegetarian sausage from America, of which the Americans were as bitterly ashamed as we were on our side of our equally revolting V-cigarettes.

This ration pack contains for me a couple of soya links, the second of which is at the bottom of the second page, where it says: My Government will press forward their policies for strengthening the economy"— I have not strayed into the wrong debate: your Lordships will find it is all right— so as to achieve a continuing and substantial balance of payments surplus. This will enable us to meet our international obligations, rebuild the reserves, develop industry and safeguard employment. The second of those two sentences I think stamps this document as being historically—and alas!, deplorably—unique. It means that last Wednesday was the first occasion, I believe, on which a British Sovereign ever came to Parliament and announced that we were actually unable to meet our foreign international obligations. We have come to a pretty pass, my Lords, when The Queen is asked to state that publicly to the world.

A little further up on the same page comes another curious paragraph, the one which says: My Government will continue to take the necessary steps to withdraw British forces from Malaysia, Singapore and the Persian Gulf by the end of 1971. I am not going to harp on that. It has been debated this afternoon and before, and I wish to say nothing more on the matter of defence. But I have been trying to imagine how I should feel if I were a foreigner and read the next sentence that comes after, which says this: Furthermore, in consultation with the Governments concerned. My Ministers will maintain their efforts to promote conditions favourable to peace and security in the areas concerned. I think that my imaginary foreigner would find that puzzling. He would say to himself, "If they are trying to promote conditions of safety in the area, that must mean presumably that those conditions do not exist now, so why are they making this precise announcement of their intention to withdraw?" And if he were a well-informed foreigner and had noted that apparently Soviet Russia is the only country in the world that seems seriously anxious to get the Suez Canal reopened, I think that he would wonder a little more.

I am not thinking of defence—not this time. I am thinking of the kind of figure we, the British, are cutting in the world just now. Having read those two passages, what weight are people in other countries likely to give to the assortment of vague promises that the Government make in the gracious Speech concerning the lofty part they mean to play in world affairs? I fancy that my ear catches an echo from last year's debate on the gracious Speech, and your Lordships may possibly recall these words: … I do not recollect a time in my lifetime when British prestige abroad has been so low or this country has been held in such low a regard. I recollect that the Foreign Secretary once said that now, once again, Britain's voice was being listened to in world affairs. I fear that nothing is more untrue than that remark, and that our allies have deteriorated and weakened in a way which I, for one, find alarming."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 2/11/67; col. 157.] My noble leader will forgive my quoting him in those words, I am sure. I wish I could be equally sure that those words were any less true to-day than when he spoke them a year ago. Where overseas has our national prestige been enhanced in any way? Perhaps the Government find comfort in the fact that negotiations have been reopened with Rhodesia. If so they are entitled to it. But suppose a settlement should be achieved? The long struggle would still not be over, for another hurdle, and perhaps an even higher one, looms ahead —that of selling it to the United Nations. If the Security Council says, "No", what then? I do not see where anywhere in the world the Government still retain initiative cf any kind in foreign affairs. I am not sure I even see anywhere outside Rhodesia where they are taking a line of firmness, except in pursuing policies of weakness.

Think of the Falkland Islands. The Argentine wants those islands. The British Government reply that they will not hand them over unless the inhabitants approve. If there is one thing in the world that is more certain than another, surely it is that the inhabitants have not the slightest intention of approving any such thing, so the answer is, "No"—not "Well, yes, perhaps, but if …", but, "No".

Perhaps I may return to Europe, and once again, like other noble Lords, to Czechoslovakia, but from rather a different point of view. Last Thursday the Foreign Secretary said in another place that it was noticeable that—and I quote: nations have realised that what has happened in Czechoslovakia, and what has been said by the Soviet Government since, brings into international affairs an alarming element of unpredictability".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons; 31/10/68, col. 185.] I cannot make out what that is supposed to mean. Does it mean that before the invasion of Czechoslovakia there was no element of unpredictability?—because, if so, I should like to know why the invasion itself was not predicted. Or does it mean that the invasion itself was the first unpredictable thing that the Russians had done? If so, it is simply idiotic and untrue. Whatever the remark may mean, it certainly implies the admission that the Russians are able in time of peace to plan and mount a full-scale operation of war and to bring it into full and complete effect without the Western military and diplomatic intelligence services having the slightest idea that they are going to do it. If that is what the Foreign Secretary means by "an alarming element of unpredictability", then, by golly, I think he is right!

Much praise has been given to the Russians, and with justice, for their efficiency in doing it. But the corresponding inefficiency of the NATO Governments, including the British, is something that I, for one, really feel alarmed about. The next sentence that fell from the Minister was this: It would be a bold man or a fool who would like to make positive prophecies as to where next the policy of the Soviet Union might move."—[Col. 185.] Well, if that is how the Foreign Secretary feels, all I can say is that I hope there are some men in the Foreign Office who are neither fools, nor necessarily bold, but simply efficient.

In any case, I can tell your Lordships something else about the invasion of Czechoslovakia. I can tell you of an embittered remark made to me by a Czech-born British citizen who with his English wife was on holiday in Prague at the time of the invasion. "A British passport," he said to me, "means nothing in the world any more". By "nothing," he meant nothing in the way of help or protection for its holder. For he told me how, in order to get out of the country, he had to appeal for help to the Americans in Prague, because it was they who were working all night to collect petrol to organise convoys, while the British Consulate was shut. He described to me how, when he eventually reached the frontier, on a road through Pilsen towards Nuremberg in West Germany, in an American convoy, with his tank full of American supplied petrol, he found reception centres organised and laid out on the ground, with field kitchens, supply dumps, fuel and, if necessary, money. They were American (an American one was there), French, Danish, Swedish, Swiss—all there for the purpose of helping their own nationals. But there was no one to help the British; no British organisation at all, not even one military field kitchen. That man, I am sorry to say, is a little less proud now than he was of being a British citizen.

There is a feeling abroad in the air, which you must all have come across, that because we no longer have an Empire, and are no longer a great world Power, we are no longer a great world people. Where, then, has the greatness gone? How about the Czechs and the Slovaks? They are by no means a world Power, and they are very far from rich, but would you say that the greatness has fizzled out of them? I doubt it. England was no world Power in 1588, when the first Queen Elizabeth rode out ahead of her troops at Tilbury and said: I know I have the body of a weak and feeble woman, but I have the heart and stomach of a king, and of a King of England too and think foul scorn Parma or Spain, or any other prince of Europe, should dare to invade the borders of my realm. The voice of a leader! A voice to set the youth of England all on fire! The voice has been heard in other mouths and at other times, including our own. But not now. Our leaders now in Whitehall and Westminster speak a different language. Not so long ago a politician or a statesman would say, "I think …" or, "I believe …". But now he is more likely to say, with exquisite caution, "I should have thought …". He used to say, "I will try" or, "I will do my best". But now he seeks. My Government will continue to seek to bring about a return to constitutional rule in Rhodesia …". Ministers will seek to use all available means to achieve a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam conflict. "Will seek to use all available means"—the composer of that gem must surely have earned at least a bronze medal of the lightweight class.

Some noble Lords, whether they are here or not—at least one is —will remember, as I do, singing in boyhood a song called "Giants". It goes like this—words only, my Lords, I promise you, unless, that is, the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack would care to join me in chorus:

• "There were wonderful giants of old, you know,
• There were wonderful giants of old.
• They grew more mightily all of a row
• Than ever was heard or told.
• All of them stood their six feet four
• And they threw to a hundred yards or more
• And they never were lame or stiff or sore.
• And we, compared to the days of yore,
• Are cast in a pigmy mould".

There are two more verses in that self-depreciative vein, and at the end of each refrain the song goes:

• "For all of we, whoever we be,
• Come short of the giants of old, you see
• For all of we, whoever we be,
• >Come short of the giants of old, you see."

But the fourth and last verse begins like this:

• "But I think all this is a lie, you know,
• I think all this is a lie.
• For the hero race may come and go,
• But it doesn't exactly die.
• For all of we, whoever we be,
• Come up to the giants of old, you see.
• For all of we, whoever we be,
• Come up to the giants of old, you see."

I commend the thought to Her Majesty's Government, in the hope that perhaps some day the flame may kindle in their hearts and cause the voice of Britain to sound across the frontiers a little less like a squeak and more like a lion's growl.

6.47 p.m.

THE EARL OF BUCKINGHAMSHIRE

My Lords, the Free World was shocked and disgusted at watching Press, radio and television reports on the brazen rape of Czechoslovakia by Soviet Russia and four of its puppet régimes last August. This new crime revives the painful memories of the Kremlin's brutal assault on Hungary less than 12 years ago. Directly, and through the United Nations, this earlier crime was condemned by free men and their Governments, including us here in Britain. But because the words were not accompanied by action they were futile. They never stopped the rapists, and while the great democracies stood aside in hand-wringing sorrow, this has given the Soviets their lust for more to-day. The only immediate and positive approval of the Soviet outrage against Czechoslovakia came from the most violent elements in the Middle East; and these are Nasser's Egypt, Syria and Iraq. In Moscow's brutal defiance of world opinion, these Arab States saw at once a happy Portent for the destruction of Israel with direct help of Red Russia.

Unless the major democracies immediately invoke meaningful diplomatic, and especially economic, sanctions against these acts of international banditry, Soviet Communism will be hardened in its belief that it has a hunting licence against any nation or region which it plots to dominate; and to-day, my Lords, that means the Near East, in particular. So I would say, let us safeguard ourselves against aggression. We have, as all your Lordships are aware, a nuclear force which is not strong enough to be a credible deterrent. I would therefore strongly urge Her Majesty's Government that our Polaris submarines be increased to the original aim of five (at the moment we have four) and that, when practicable, the nuclear fleet should be built up to eight Polaris submarines, which would provide Britain with the effective means of self-defence. This would give Britain security against aggression, and real independence for our people. I would mention here that a Polaris submarine costs some £50 million, which is about one-third of one per cent. of what the Government spend annually.

I will conclude by saying that we should keep NATO strong, and at the same time, as one of the free nations of the world, we must keep striving for peace.

6.51 p.m.

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

My Lords, from some personal experience of the task that I understand is to fall to the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, I know how difficult it can be, and tonight all the more so, when foreign affairs include what used to be colonial affairs and the affairs of the Commonwealth Relations Office. So I think the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, will have his work cut out to reply to all the questions and all the points which have been raised. For this reason I took the opportunity of sending to the noble Lord a note of the points to which I hope to call your Lordships' attention, and a list of the questions to which I am seeking answers. I know the noble Lord will do his best to help me.

I was interested to read in the Report of the debate on the Queen's Speech in another place that the right honourable gentleman the Foreign Secretary had based his policy on his answer to what he described as the fundamental question of how best we can look after our own immediate interests, and how we can contribute with other nations to finding a mechanism for peaceful change in the world. He asserted that Britain's permanent long-term interest was the establishment in the world of peaceful methods of settling disputes. He considered that Britain could not deal with its problems, "by any kind of withdrawal from the world". So far as they go, these observations seem to me to be unexceptionable, but we must consider how Her Majesty's Government propose to act. The right honourable gentleman suggested that a peaceful method of settling disputes was probably in the interest of all nations, though particularly in the interest of a nation like our own, which lives by world-wide trade. I wonder whether Her Majesty's Government have been giving enough consideration to the possibility that this is not at all what all nations consider to be in their best interest.

It is my opinion that the U.S.S.R. welcomes strife and unsettled disputes (outside her empire), and that it is now, and always has been, her policy to provoke and to foment them. The U.S.S.R. unlike ourselves or Japan—another highly industrialised trading nation to which I shall refer again later—has within her territories vast natural resources so that, like the U.S.A., she is virtually self-supporting. Let us not forget that the genesis of the great dynamic behind Russia's remarkable and brutal material progress was the drive for world revolution —the establishment of a completely new order. Has the U.S.S.R. abandoned its dream of world revolution? The noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, in his interesting observations about the possibility of a rapport with the satellite nations, asserted his view that it was quite impossible for this to take place until Russia had completely abandoned Stalinism. I think I have not misquoted the noble Lord's words.

LORD GLADWYN

My Lords, I think I said something to that effect. I said that Stalinism has already been tempered to a considerable extent, but that I think we shall never get a real détente unless Russia abandons the main principles of Stalinism.

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

My Lords, I made a note of the noble Lord's words, and I think he said "a complete end of Stalinism". He will be able to see his words in Hansard tomorrow, but virtually speaking I think we are in agreement.

We are a nation of peace-loving shopkeepers, traders, contractors and developers. It was in order to trade that we travelled; it was in order to get rich that we traded; it was in order to protect our trade routes that we developed the most powerful navy in the world, and it was in order to consolidate our overseas trading posts that we built up our Empire, upon which the sun never set. We were never at any time in our Imperial history engaged upon a programme of ideological indoctrination. It is the very essence of Communism that it respects no frontiers. The Foreign Secretary has told us that in the General Assembly of the United Nations Mr. Gromyko reaffirmed this principle when he referred to what he called the "Socialist Commonwealth", and on being questioned said that this concept had no geographical limits. In my opinion the greatest danger for the West would be a failure to appreciate that Communism is activated by a quite different impulsion from that which propels the non-Communist world. It is the false doctrine which ensnared such men as Burgess and Maclean. It is the power which, unhampered by the inhibitions of truth, respect for the dignity of the individual, or of Christian charity, will unhesitatingly indulge in the pursuit of its evil ends in merciless oppression and ruthless cruelty.

My noble friend Lord Carrington has drawn your Lordships' attention to certain aspects of the Communist front. My right honourable friend Sir Alec Douglas-Home gave us in another place figures to illustrate the scale of the Soviet's naval force—375 Soviet submarines, 160 of them long-distance craft deployed in Atlantic and European waters, compared with a total of 200 United States submarines and 33 of the Royal Navy. These figures have a significance. They are important, and I quite agree with the noble Earl, Lord Buckinghamshire, that that is something we need to think about.

In the view of Her Majesty's Government it would have been wrong and unnecessary, following on the events of August 21, for NATO to have embarked upon some plan of gigantic rearmament and provocative response. Those are the words of the Foreign Secretary. In my opinion, there would be grave danger in any hesitation on the part of NATO, or the appearance of any lack of determination in its member States—and here I was glad to note that the noble Lord the Leader of the House entirely echoed my views. It seems to me essential that there should, without further delay, be clear evidence that the NATO members are taking the necessary steps to fulfil their obligations.

I feel that the Foreign Secretary is to be congratulated on his clear statement that the Soviet Union considers itself entitled, if necessary, to invade the territory of other countries according to its judgment of where its, and their, interests lie, and he considers that this attitude brings—and these are the words the noble Earl, Lord Cork and Orrery mentioned— "an alarming element of unpredictability" into the situation. I am sure that the right honourable gentleman will have the full support of the Tory Party when he tells his NATO colleagues that all members will have to be prepared to make some increased commitment to the efficiency of the Alliance". My ear, perhaps like the ear of the noble Earl, Lord Cork and Orrery, has perhaps grown unaccustomed to the restrained speech of politicians, but I only hope that there are undertones of a greater sense of urgency and determina- tion in those words of the Foreign Secretary than I am able to detect. I believe that the forthcoming meeting of the NATO Ministers will be of paramount importance and we on these Benches will await its outcome with deep concern. I was very much gratified to learn from the noble Lord the Leader of the House that these meetings are to take place, I understood him to say, on the 14th to the 16th of this month in Brussels.

Like many others, no doubt, I had the unpopular thought in my mind that it was perhaps a pity that some of the young men and women engaged in the demonstration against the Americans fighting in Vietnam were not voluntarily occupied in the drill halls of the Territorial Army or perhaps incorporated in the National Service. I wonder whether those same young men and women, and for that matter many others of us besides, fully appreciate the extent to which we rely for our survival upon the power of the United States of America. An examination of the forces available to the Warsaw Pact members and of the totally unexpected invasion of Czechoslovakia would, one would have thought, have brought it home to all of us in Western Europe how essential it is for us to work together. The absence of France from NATO seems to me a tragedy. It is most fervently to be hoped that she will resume her place beside her old allies. Meanwhile, can the Minister tell the House what would be the position of France if it were to become necessary for the NATO members to act in accordance with their treaty obligations? Has France perhaps made bilateral agreements with her allies? Can the Minister tell us? I firmly believe that to accept the idea of the broken entente would be very much against our own interests and the interests of Europe as a whole.

We have been informed that, despite the obstacles to our entry into the E.E.C., Her Majesty's Government are pursuing co-operation with nations both inside and outside the Common Market in all those fields not actually precluded by the Treaty of Rome. I understand that a plan of M. Harmel, the Belgian Foreign Minister, is a new basis upon which we have been discussing European co-operation and that discussions have been taking place within the Western European Union. I am also informed that after the meeting of the Council of Western European Union in Rome the week before last, five E.E.C. Ministers, but not the French Minister, met with the British Minister.

As noble Lords will know, the Harmel plan covers such questions as finance, monetary policy, politics and technology. I do not know what was discussed at this meeting of the five E.E.C. Ministers with the British Minister, but can the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, tell the House whether in fact the questions that I have mentioned could be discussed by us with the five Ministers in the absence of France? I understand that another such meeting is planned shortly, and I therefore ask the Minister whether it is the policy of Her Majesty's Government to by-pass the French and to seek to negotiate with the five other E.E.C. members. If there is to be a change of emphasis in the Government's policy towards Europe, Parliament should be informed. In this connection, can the noble Lord who is to reply tell the House whether there is any special significance in the forthcoming visit which I am informed the Prime Minister proposes to make to Germany?

The gracious Speech asserts that it remains the aim of Her Majesty's Government to work for genuine East-West understanding and of course we should all like to see that achieved. Despite the many setbacks we have had to endure, I sincerely hope that Her Majesty's Government will never falter in their determination to continue in close co-operation with France. I cannot conceal my dismay over the French intervention in Biafra. The arms and other assistance received from France have certainly prolonged this tragic conflict. Can the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, tell us whether there have been diplomatic exchanges with our French friends concerning aid to Biafra? Does he not think —and here I was particularly interested in the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Walston that it is high time that the countries of Western Europe, and in particular France, Belgium and Britain, attempted to work out a concerted plan together to guide them in their relations with the newly independent African States? Are there, in fact, some regular exchanges of this kind? In my experience they were infrequent and mostly only at official level.

I wish now to turn for a few moments to the decision of Her Majesty's Government to withdraw British forces from Malaysia, Singapore and the Persian Gulf by the end of 1971, and to have no special capability for operations outside Europe. On March 4, 1968, the Secretary of State for Defence said in another place: Any forces we provide for operations outside Europe and the Atlantic area—whether under U.N. auspices or otherwise—will have to be drawn from the capability which we maintain for the defence of Europe."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, col. 59.] In view of the Foreign Secretary's statement that all NATO members will have to be prepared to make some increased commitments to the efficiency of the Alliance, will the Minister inform the House how Her Majesty's Government will provide forces for operations outside Europe and the Atlantic area?

There seems to me, as to the noble Earl, Lord Cork and Orrery, to be a contradiction in the words of the gracious Speech, where it is announced that Her Majesty's Government are to withdraw British forces from Malaysia, Singapore and the Persian Gulf by the end of 1971, while at the same time Her Majesty's Ministers will maintain their efforts to promote conditions favourable to peace and security in the areas concerned. The noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, was naturally at great pains to justify the decision of the Government of which he is so distinguished a member to withdraw from East of Suez. I am bound to say that in this part of the noble Lord's speech I thought he spoke with less assurance. I was grateful to him for his helpful observations over Nigeria, but I felt that on the subject of East of Suez he was less confident and rather rushed things.

I shall not this evening attempt to go into the detailed argument of the financial advantages for and against withdrawing from East of Suez. I understand that a long debate took place on this subject some time ago. But I must put it on record this evening that it seems to me extraordinary that we should be deciding to make this move. Sixty-two per cent. of all our oil supplies comes from the Gulf. We have very considerable investments in Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Burma, Thailand and Indonesia, and in the Persian Gulf, and these, I understand, total something like £1,115 million in value. I understand that British commercial activities in these areas contribute a net £300 million per annum towards the United Kingdom balance of payments. All these things appear to be good reasons for keeping things safe and as they are. I know that a great deal of play was made in another place over the question: how can you protect your investments by military force? The noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, again raised this point.

LORD BROCKWAY

My Lords, would the noble Marquess allow me to intervene? is it not the case that we have actually spent more on defence East of Suez than all the interest that has been obtained upon investments?

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

My Lords, I have not the figures, so I cannot give an answer, yea or nay. But perhaps the noble Lord will allow me to develop my theme in my own way. I am going to fortify my argument by using the arguments of those who were then distinguished members of the Opposition.

I begin with the present Prime Minister, when he was in Opposition, speaking at the National Press Club in Washington in 1963. I know that this was some time ago, and in different circumstances, and that of course one has to change one's views. Politicians are often accused of being dishonest men because they change their views; but circumstances change, and it is necessary to change one's views according to the circumstances. But here is something that was said with great conviction by the present Prime Minister at the National Press Club in Washington. He said: I believe it to be a mistake to evacuate key bases where we have the chance to remain. So do I, my Lords. We are going to evacuate key bases where not only have we the chance to stay, but the local people are begging us to remain. I go on with the Prime Minister's remarks: It is a hundred times easier for Britain to remain there"— that is to say, in these bases— even with a token force, than for us, still less the United States, to seek to enter if trouble breaks out. Here, of course, I am at one with the noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood, who raised this particular point. The Prime Minister went on to say: I believe, therefore, that our maintenance of these bases should be regarded as a specific and invaluable contribution to the alliance. Those are the words of the present Prime Minister in Washington in 1963.

Further to reinforce my views, I take the opinion of the present Defence Secretary who spoke in Canberra in 1966, in these terms: It would not make any military sense at all for us to leave Singapore unless we had to. From every point of view I think it is in our interest to stay in that part of the world as long as we can do so with the consent of the local people". On the same occasion he also said We have no intention of ratting on any of our commitments. We intend to remain and shall remain fully capable of carrying out all the commitments we have at the present time"— "the present time" was 1966— including those in the Far East, the Middle East and in Africa. Now all that has to be forgotten.

Bearing in mind the figures that I have given your Lordships, and remembering the policy opinion expressed by Mr. Wilson which I have quoted to your Lordships, and on top of all this the outspoken statements of the Defence Secretary, it is my view that the abandonment of any role East of Suez was agreed to, not because Britain could not afford it, nor indeed as a deliberate act of policy, but purely as a bribe to appease certain recalcitrant elements of the Socialist Party. When a prudent man discovers that he is living beyond his means he cuts down on his own personal expenditure. He does not take risks with the sources of his income, and he endeavours through greater enterprise and effort to earn more.

It is deeply to be regretted that once again the difficulty over the Philippine claim to Sabha is bedevilling her relations with Malaysia. Can the Minister give us any information on this subject? It has for many years seemed to me that the importance of South-East Asia and the Far East, and the possibility of many countries in South-East Asia and the Far East all progressing peacefully towards great wealth and a high standard of living, is a subject which deserves more of the detailed consideration of your I Lordships. It is too big and significant a subject to be tacked on to the end of a debate on foreign affairs. I have mentioned it this evening only because of the proposed withdrawal of the British Forces from East of Suez. Perhaps at some time in the future it may be possible for us to have another debate on this subject. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, will realise that I do not mean a debate purely from the angle of withdrawing from East of Suez, but a general discussion on this part of the world.

By our departure we shall be leaving a part of the world where the consent of the local people for us to remain has been readily given. And more, my Lords: our friends in these countries are expressing grave anxiety over the vacuum which they consider will be left by the departure of the British forces. This withdrawal from East of Suez carries with it, of course, a weakening of our links with Australia and New Zealand. I do not for a moment question that it is right and proper for Australia and New Zealand to rely less upon British forces and more upon their own. I have the figures for Australia. In 1962–63 Australia spent 3 per cent. of her gross national product on defence. Now the proportion has gone up to something over 5 per cent. So certainly Australia is making far more of an effort than previously.

As I am sure your Lordships are aware, Australia and New Zealand participate with us in the Commonwealth Brigade, based in Malaysia. In 1971, the plan is for us to leave. Can the noble Lord tell us what the Australians and the New Zealanders will do? This may be a question that he is unable to answer. According to what my noble Leader said, it looks rather as though we shall all be going. Well, here we are in another vacuum.

My Lords, we on these Benches wholeheartedly approve the declaration in the gracious Speech that Her Majesty's Government will continue to support Britain's alliances for collective defence". We have been given assurances about NATO. But it looks to me as though we shall not be able to play any part in SEATO. Our defence agreement with Malaysia is to be scrapped, and there will be little reason for Australia, New Zealand and the U.S.A. to consult with us in Anzan. The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, may perhaps be able to assure me about Brunei; but I fear that, as in the Persian Gulf and Malaysia itself, it will again be a case of a unilateral declaration to scrap an agreement.

I will not end on this gloomy note, but I will ask your Lordships to consider something more constructive than Her Majesty's Government's shameful catalogue of scrapped agreements and the abandonment of loyal friends. My Lords, is it not time that Japan were again invited to participate in an alliance for collective defence? Your Lordships may remember that in 1957 President Eisen-hower attempted to persuade Prime Minister Ikeda to increase the Japanese army to 300,000. He failed. Japan has insisted on abiding by her decision only to raise what she calls "Self defence forces". Her air, maritime and ground "Self defence forces" total only 245,000. There is at present a reluctance, and perhaps it is understandable, to join the S.D.F. None the less, might there not be merit in our exploring, with Australia, New Zealand and the United States, the possibility of persuading Japan to participate in ANZUS? I would have added, but for the present intention to abandon the "third world", that the United Kingdom should be invited to participate in ANZUS, too.

My Lords, I was rather distressed to hear the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, refer a little scornfully, I thought, to the ideas of noble Lords on this side of the House about combining to create some kind of force. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, said that we had shifted a point or two from a rather more robust attitude, but it is the policy of the Tory Party to combine. The old idea of imperialism has gone by the board years ago, as the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, well knows, but it seems to me that, even at this late hour, we should not be considering getting out of everything but seeing whether we cannot combine with other people of good will with similar interests to our own to make collective defence arrangements together.

LORD BROCKWAY

My Lords, the noble Lord has spoken from the Front Bench. Has his speech really represented the point of view of the Conservative Opposition?

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

My Lords, where I have been certain that I was representing the view of the Conservative Opposition I have said so; where I was speaking for myself your Lordships will have noticed that I used the first person.

7.22 p.m.

LORD SHEPHERD

My Lords, may I first of all thank the noble Marquess, Lord Lansdowne, for his sympathy in my task tonight in winding up not a very long debate but certainly a very wide ranging debate. I am sure his sympathy would have been a little bit warmer, if it could have been warmer, had he known that this is a maiden speech, so far as I am concerned, on this subject. It is true that I have spoken on numerous subjects, but this is the first occasion that it has fallen to me, either in Government or in Opposition, to speak on foreign affairs. Therefore, it is with great trepidation that I approach this task. I think this trepidation will be shared by my officials, who await with great anxiety what I have to say. May I also join with my noble friend Lord Shackleton in congratulating my noble friend Lord Brockway on his eightieth birthday. I hope that twenty years hence I shall be part of the same Government, answering the noble Lord's Questions at Question Time.

There have been many themes in this debate but I think that we can in the end isolate them to three main ones. There is the Commonwealth; there is NATO, and there is the East of Suez policy. In regard to the first two, the Common Market and NATO, I think that all Parties are in broad and general agreement. My Lords, I come as a supporter to the Common Market rather late in the day. Like some of my noble friends, I have been brought up in the Commonwealth, and I saw the consequences of the Common Market on the Commonwealth. That was some years ago. A good deal of water has passed under the bridge since then, and I believe that many of the problems that would have confronted the Commonwealth in those early days would be a good deal less if we were now to enter the Common Market.

I do not think there is any doubt—and I fully accept this—that Britain has a need to enter the Common Market, to enter a much larger European community, and that Europe needs us. Therefore it is right, and I am glad the whole House has joined with us in agreeing that our application should continue to lay before the Common Market countries. We hope that in the not too far distant future we may find unanimity among those members for our entry.

The noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, suggested that we should make firm proposals for closer co-operation with the Common Market countries, and perhaps even the creation of a supra-national organisation. We have made a number of suggestions in the course of time, and we will continue to study what can be done in discussions, not only among ourselves but also among the countries of Europe. The noble Marquess, Lord Lansdowne, asked me whether, in our efforts to find a bridge for European cooperation before we can get into the Common Market, we would go behind the back of France—whether we would bypass France. I think I should answer this. We do not seek to isolate France: we seek greater co-operation in Europe. If it cannot now be done within the ambit of the Common Market itself, then we must seek other ways of co-operation in Europe, and we hope that France will understand this.

My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, that although we have already shown that we seek to be Europeans—and in many ways we are far more European than France pretends—we must not only continue to maintain our application firmly in the Common Market but must also find other ways, perhaps through defence, to create a greater degree of co-operation in Europe. The noble Lord, Lord Bethell, spoke about the problems of the boundaries between Poland and Germany, and he wanted us to make a specific declaration. Our view is that this can be done, the boundary can be finally determined, only in the context of negotiation of a peace treaty with Germany; and the main factor in such negotiations would be the wishes of the inhabitants of the territories concerned.

I now come to the second theme: the question of NATO. The events of Czechoslovakia have perhaps brought our attention more closely to NATO, to see what steps should be taken to strengthen not only its forces but also its administration. As my noble friend Lord Shackleton has said, the Ministers of NATO will be meeting shortly in Brussels. But whatever we do in strengthening NATO, we must not close our eyes to the question of co-existence, of the need in the end to find a settlement between Western Europe and the Soviets, and of the Soviets with the rest of the world. I think it was my noble friend Lord Shackleton who said that there would be no existence if there is no co-existence; and, my Lords, we must proceed there.

The noble Lord, Lord Barnby (and I apologise that I did not hear all his speech) complained that the Foreign Secretary had not been sufficiently vehement in his condemnation of the Soviet Union on the Czechoslovakian invasion. All I can say to the noble Lord, Lord Barnby is: little does he know! My right honourable friend has a very sharp tongue, and those who come across him know that there can be no misunderstanding his views.

LORD BARNBY

My Lords, if the noble Lord will permit me to say so, I have already had access to a report of his speech in the Press.

LORD SHEPHERD

On the question of NATO, I would end by saying that the need for the Alliance is as great to-day as it ever was, and it has proved its worth. We must, and shall, continue to support it and to play a full part in it. I believe that this is the will and determination of the countries within NATO to-day. The noble Marquess, Lord Lansdowne, drew our attention to the position of France. Although France has withdrawn her military forces from the integrated command structure of NATO she is still party to the North Atlantic Treaty and is a member of the Council. There is no indication about French policy after August, 1969, the first date on which parties to the Treaty can give notice of their intention to withdraw. I do not, of course, know what is in the French mind, but I greatly hope and believe that France will find some way of meeting her point of view while continuing to give her present collaboration—indeed, I hope she will increase her collaboration—with NATO.

My noble friend Lord Chorley spoke about future relations with the Soviet Union. I assure him that, although we have had a setback, if we have the opportunity to develop our relations with them we shall not fail to pursue it. Although the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia came as a great shock to all of us, I am convinced that it was also a fundamental shock to the Russian people themselves. I cannot believe that the Russian sportsmen at Mexico were not very conscious of the very special and warm welcome accorded to the Czechoslovakian team as they entered the arena at the beginning of the Olympic games.

I now wish to turn to the question of our forces East of Suez. Here again we have debated this subject many times before. There is deep division. For my part, and I will be frank, it is a matter of regret that we have had to make this decision: it is a matter of regret to Her Majesty's Government. But when we consider the matter of military support, we must look at certain economic facts. Noble Lords opposite, and we on this side of the House, believe that our fundamental effort must be made in Europe in support of NATO. We are being asked to increase our support to NATO. We cannot continue to do that and at the same time provide sufficient forces which are in any way viable in the Far East. If we were to do what many noble Lords opposite wish to do, within the broad economic facts and the resources required, we should need a population in this country of 100 to 150 million people, whereas, of course, we are a country of only 50 million people. Already our ability to provide our forces is far stretched.

I regret that a decision had to be taken in this matter, but it was a choice of whether one was to be in Europe or whether one was to be in the Far East. I do not think there can be any doubt that the interests of this country lie in Europe. But this does not mean that our interest in the Far East will disappear. I do not accept, as some noble Lords do, that a military force is necessary to safeguard one's investments I have lived overseas; I have lived in the Far East. I have never seen that German warships or German soldiers were necessary for the large German investments in the Far East. I do not see that British naval ships, German naval ships, or Spanish naval ships are necessary in South America to protect the investments in those countries. I believe that this view to which I have referred is quite wrong. I know it seems a reasonable argument to put forward; but when it is examined, particularly with people who have had experience in those parts of the world, it does not stand up.

As I have said, it is a matter of regret, not merely on the question of defence, but because of the impact on the economies of Singapore and Malaysia of the withdrawal of British forces. As the noble Marquess, Lord Lansdowne, will know, we have made arrangements with both those Governments for considerable sums of money to cushion the effect of our military withdrawal from the Far East. The noble Marquess, Lord Lansdowne, asked how we were to provide forces outside Europe. We shall have an infinitely stronger base; we shall have stronger reserves either in the United Kingdom or in Germany, and we shall have a major airlift capability. As we have already said, there will be a major exercise in the Far East between the five Powers, and clearly we shall have lessons to learn from it. I do not believe that we shall not have the capability of moving the size of force that is likely to be necessary.

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

My Lords, I understood that it had been stated categorically that we would not have a capability for deployment outside. Is this the case or not?

LORD SHEPHERD

My Lords, what we have said is that we shall not have a special capability—that is to say, a capability which is set aside and specifically trained for it. But, clearly, we have a base in this country; we shall have soldiers, as we do now, who, if they are called upon to carry out a task, will have the ability to move.

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

Presumably with the agreement of our NATO allies to remove part of our force if required.

LORD SHEPHERD

That is so, but we have never before had any experience of not being able to withdraw them. The noble Marquess also spoke of the situation as between Malaysia and the Philippines on Sabah. I should say that the situation is a good deal easier, and we are grateful for the restraint by both parties in this dispute. So far as we are concerned, the sovereignty of North Borneo, when that country was part of Her Majesty's Dominions, was undoubted, and it was only on that basis that we could have agreed to the transfer of the sovereignty to Malaysia.

My noble friend Lord Brockway spoke about disarmament; in fact he was the only noble Lord who raised this most important subject. Progress has been made, and I agree with him as to the general line of advance. But as the noble Lord will know, in the end disarmament will depend on bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. Only after that can we really move to a more general agreement.

I would say to my noble friends and to other noble Lords who mentioned the important talks on Vietnam which are taking place in Paris this week, that Her Majesty's Government have a special concern in the Vietnam conflict by virtue of their Geneva co-chairmanship and the desire, which we share with many others, to see an end to this tragic war. We think that all parties to the dispute should participate in the talks which are due to begin in Paris to-morrow. We hope that the South Vietnamese Government will soon think it right to join in and to test the good faith of the other side. The South Vietnamese are fighting a brutal and insidious enemy, whose terrorism has fallen on their civilian population and whose declared objectives are still to take over the country. The reason for President Thieu's present attitude should be understandable to us, but we must hope that the Paris talks will pave the way to a settlement. In the immediate future, however, it is for Hanoi to match the stopping of the bombing by reducing the scale of their military activities. As my noble friend Lord Shackleton said, we stand ready to do anything we can to bring this war to an end.

The noble Lord, Lord Merrivale, spoke about Greece. Our views are known, but we welcome very much indeed the Greek Government's decision to close the prisons on the island of Yiowra, as recommended by the International Committee of the Red Cross, just as we welcome the release since the referendum of a further 200 political prisoners. We are also encouraged by the Greek Prime Minister's statement that trade unions will be allowed full rights of association when the Constitution is shortly brought into force, and by his promise to expand the democracy with the passing of each day. I hope that we we shall see continuing evolution on these lines during the coming months. If the Greek Government has the support which the noble Lord says it has, then I should not have thought it had much at risk in seeing that this evolution was speeded up. The noble Marquess, Lord Lansdowne, asked me about the Prime Minister's visit to Germany. As I understand it, there is no special significance in it, in that it is usual for the two Prime Ministers to meet at regular intervals. I understand that the last occasion was in October, 1967.

The noble Earl, Lord Cork and Orrery, raised the question of consular staff and their behaviour during the Czechoslovakian crisis. I was rather sorry that he did so. On occasions our consular staff throughout the world have had to perform in very difficult circumstances. Theirs is not an easy task. I am thinking particularly of the consular staff in Shanghai recently, and also of the staff in another country where things were very difficult and where we even took over for a bigger Power than ourselves. I do not know on what his complaints were based, but if the noble Earl will give me details I will look into them. It is one thing to attack Her Majesty's Government; we can stand and defend ourselves, but our staff overseas cannot, just as soldiers cannot—until they retire. I hope that if he has future complaints the noble Earl will feel that there is always a Minister whom he can contact, and that that would be fairer and perhaps, in the end, more satisfactory. If he was not satisfied with the explanation of the Minister he could then raise the matter in the House.

The noble Marquess, Lord Lansdowne, spoke about Brunei. As he knows, the Sultan of Brunei visited London between September 20 and October 24 and discussed with the Minister Without Portfolio—who was then the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs—the implications for Brunei of the major changes in British policy decided earlier in the year, including the decision to withdraw British forces from South-East Asia by the end of 1971. Mr. Thomson explained that these changes made it necessary to review the existing relationship between the two countries. Both sides wanted the friendly association between Britain and Brunei to continue, and we looked at various possible fields where we might help Brunei. Both sides are now studying the stage reached. It is expected that there will be further discussions shortly.

My noble friend Lord Walston spoke about Africa. I think his statistics about Ministerial visits are wrong and mine are right, but I agree with him that, perhaps, this House has given too much attention to the question of Rhodesia and Nigeria and not enough to Africa as a whole. However, I assure my noble friend that in the new Department formed by merging the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Office we have been able to "go geographical", and for the first time we now have a Minister who is solely responsible for Africa. With the merging of the various offices, this should give us increased efficiency and, I hope, increased attention for Africa.

LORD BROCKWAY

My Lords, can my noble friend say who will be the Minister specially responsible for Africa?

LORD SHEPHERD

I can, my Lords, I think it is Mr. Maurice Foley. I agree with my noble friend that it is not for us to impose Constitutions or methods of Parliamentary assembly on African countries. But, of course, they were colonial territories and, as he will know, when these countries have moved towards independence we have had to give them a Constitution which was broadly acceptable to the people of the territory. In practice, the Constitution that they have taken over has been the Constitution current prior to their becoming independent. It is for them, if they so wish, to change their Constitution, but I hope it will always be with the agreement of the people of the territory as a whole.

My noble friend Lord Brockway raised the queston of Nigeria. I am sure he would not expect me tonight to make a long speech on that subject, as we have discussed it on many occasions. I will only say, as I said in a previous debate—and I have given this matter tremendous thought and with a great deal of anxiety—that if I believed it would quickly bring peace to Nigeria if this country gave up the supply of arms, then I would support the giving up of that supply. But I do not believe that to be the case. I believe that if the United Kingdom were unilaterally to give up the supply of arms to the Federal Government, the consequence would be that Colonel Ojukwu would be more determined to carry on his civil war.

Perhaps the most significant part of all our negotiations to try to bring peace is that when both sides went to Addis Ababba after the talks at Niamey, when there was a real and genuine feeling that peace could be obtained, there was a marked reaction by Colonel Ojukwu's supporters and negotiators, because of the recognition, or token recognition, of the Biafran regime by France. On my last visit, when I went with high hopes—and my noble friend knows the situation as well as I do—there was a change of attitude when the promise of military aid became a reality, because at that time there was a significant increase in the supply of arms to Biafra. I would say to the noble Marquess, Lord Lansdowne, that we have had no diplomatic exchanges with France. I think it is a matter for Nigeria to decide what steps they should take if France is supplying arms to Biafra. May I make one last point in regard to the Middle East? My noble friend Lord Brockway was quite right to draw our attention to the great dangers that exist in the Middle East and to how much we depend upon Dr. Jarring in his talks in New York about bringing that tragic war to an end.

My Lords, this has not been the speech I should have made had I not been replying on behalf of the Government. I should have liked the opportunity to put some of my own thoughts and experiences before the House. I have, how- ever, sought to answer the various points which have been made. But I think the House must accept this: that we are not the Colossus that we were at the turn of the century, when our Army and Navy straddled the world. And even then we could not prevent war. We are not that to-day. Neither is the Soviet Union, nor the United States. Each has its limited field of operation. I do not myself believe that there is a grave risk of war between the Soviet Union and the United States: the mere balance of power and the strength of the military might of both is sufficient to deter. The greatest danger lies in the breaking out of small wars which can escalate and involve more and more countries.

There is only one organisation which can solve such disputes, and that is the United Nations. I accept the strictures of the noble Lord, Lord Carrington. The United Nations is not perfect, because the men who created it and the men who work in it are not perfect. But I am bound to say that I had a feeling of gloom when I heard the growls of "Hear, hear!" from various corners of the House when criticisms were being made of the United Nations, because I believe that those voices are the voices of people who dislike the idea of a supra-national power like the United Nations. But, my Lords, at the end of the day it is only the United Nations which can bring us peace, and the United Nations can survive only if the countries which are in it are prepared to support it, are prepared to take the rough with the smooth, prepared to argue, prepared to talk, and prepared to take knocks, but all the time seeking to make the United Nations stronger so that, even if at one stage it may be able only to conciliate, perhaps at the next stage it will be able actually to prevent a war from breaking out.

LORD DENHAM

My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Jellicoe, I beg to move that this debate be now adjourned until to-morrow.

Moved, That the debate be adjourned until to-morrow.—(Lord Denham.)

On Question, Motion agreed to, and debate adjourned accordingly.