Lords Sitting of 23 May 1968

Preamble
The House met at three of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Portsmouth.

ELY OUSE—ESSEX WATER BILL [H.L.]
Read 3a, and passed, and sent to the Commons.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
THE PAYMASTER GENERAL (LORD SHACKLETON): My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.
Moved, That leave be given to the Lord Kennet to advance the Second Reading of the Water Resources Bill from Thursday, the 30th, to Tuesday, the 28th instant, and that the Bill be taken first.—(Lord Shackleton.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

SEWERAGE (SCOTLAND) BILL
3.8 p.m.
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SCOTLAND (LORD HUGHES): My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Hughes.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The EARL OF LISTOWEL in the Chair.]
Clauses 1 and 2 agreed to.
Clause 3 [Construction etc. of public sewers and public sewage treatment works]:
LORD HUGHES LORD HUGHES moved, in subsection (1)(a), to leave out sub-paragraph (iii). The noble Lord said: I think it would be for
804
the convenience of the Committee if I drew your Lordships' attention to the fact that Amendments Nos. 2, 13 and 14 are consequential on Amendment No. 1. The combined effect of these two Amendments to Clause 3, the first Amendment to Clause 58 and the proposed new clause is to ensure that any work carried out under the Bill by any person shall comply with the requirements of Sections 34 to 36 of the Coast Protection Act 1949. Briefly, these sections of the Coast Protection Act provide that, with certain exceptions, it is to be an offence for any person, without the consent of the Board of Trade, to carry our works, deposit material or remove materials from the seashore in such a manner that obstruction or danger to navigation is likely to be caused. The main part of the Amendment is the new clause; the other Amendments are essentially consequential. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 18, leave out from ("street") to end of line 21.—(Lord Hughes.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD HUGHES: I beg to move Amendment No. 2.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, leave out lines 24 to 26.—(Lord Hughes.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 3, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 4 to 9 agreed to.
Clause 10:
Emptying of septic tanks
10.—(1) A local authority may pass a resolution whereby they elect to empty all septic tanks serving premises situated in their area or in any part thereof specified in the resolution, and where such a resolution has been passed and approved by the Secretary of State it shall he the duty of the authority, subject to subsection (2) below, to empty all septic tanks serving such premises, where it is reasonably practicable to do so, at reasonable intervals and at such convenient hours and times as they consider proper.
LORD BURTONmoved, in subsection (1), to leave out "may pass a resolution whereby they elect to", and insert "shall, where reasonable, at the request of the owner". The noble Lord said: I regret that there is a slight error in the drafting of this Amendment; a little more of the

805
clause should have been deleted, but I think that the meaning is clear. It is not easy to argue that rates should be a payment for services rendered as there are anomalies which make rates in fact a form of taxation, but I feel that it is unjust that one should pay rates for a service and then have to pay for the service in addition. That is the effect of this clause as at present drafted. It does not matter whether a person is rich or poor, if one occupies one's own house and there is no public drainage system in the area—a common occurrence in rural areas—the drainage rate has to be paid and the cost of maintaining one's own drainage as well. This hits particularly hard in the rural areas, to the advantage of the more highly populated communities. It hits at areas with the least amenities to the advantage of those already better off.
I may be told that if my Amendment is accepted it will impose a heavy burden on the ratepayers. Indeed, a shilling on the Aberdeenshire rate has been mentioned. Speaking as a member of a county health committee and a finance committee, and as the owner of a large number of septic tanks, I am sure that these costs have been grossly exaggerated. Septic tanks do not require to be emptied every year and many go for a whole lifetime. If the drainage rates have to fall on the ratepayers as a whole then they must do so, although I do not agree with this. But it is wrong to put a part of the drainage costs on to the public rates and to leave the other part to be borne by individuals, in addition to paying rates. I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, has some personal sympathy with this view, as had some of the Government supporters in the Committee stage in another place, and I therefore hope that the noble Lord will accept the Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 5, line 10, leave out from ("authority") to ("empty") in line 11 and insert ("shall, where reasonable, at the request of the owner")—(Lord Burton.)
THE EARL OF CROMARTIE: I should like to support my noble friend Lord Burton. I think this is a reasonable Amendment, and any danger is covered by the words "shall, where reasonable". We know that there are occasions when it would be very expen-
806
sive for a local authority to undertake this work, but for a great many it would be a fairly simple thing to do; and I think it is a service which people who have not the advantage of being in a drainage area would welcome very much. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, will receive the Amendment with kindness.
LORD HUGHES: The noble Lord, Lord Burton, has not in any way exaggerated my point of view when he says that I have a certain amount of sympathy with this proposal. I cannot claim to be the owner of any septic tanks in Scotland, but I am a user of one in a part of Scotland. I am certain that I shall not get any payment from the county council for its clearance, if and when it should be done. Like the noble Lord, I do not suppose that it will have to be cleared out every year. However, sympathy with a proposal and the ability to agree to its being inserted in legislation are two entirely different matters.
We started off on the basis that it would be the correct thing to make this a mandatory duty to be placed on local authorities, but it was made clear to us in the discussions with the county councils that this would impose an extremely difficult burden on local authorities and it would be much better that we should rely on their exercising their discretion in the matter. I must point out that rates are not a payment for services rendered. They are a form of taxation and it has never been accepted that taxation shall be paid only in direct relation to the reward which one gets from it.
Having said that, I must go on to say that we want local authorities to undertake the duty of giving a service for emptying septic tanks. I believe that most county councils take this view, but with the reservation—and it is a reasonable one—that they should be allowed to extend the service as their financial circumstances permit and that they should be the judges of how quickly they can extend it. We feel obliged to attach considerable weight to that point of view.
When the Bill was being prepared we had wide-ranging discussions with the local authorities, and in particular with the county councils, and explored the question of costs, especially in those

807
counties where a substantial rural population would have to be served. It is not a matter of calculations and wrong estimates, because I assure the noble Lord that we did not base our decision on one particular statement from the County Council of Aberdeenshire. In 1966 the counties involved together produced estimates of cost which in the aggregate—and we must remember that these came from people who knew perfectly well that they were not going to be called on to clear every tank every year—amounted to well over £300,000 a year, and that would add from 1s. to 1s. 6d. to the rates in those places. The noble Lord, Lord Burton, shakes his head, but I can assure him that these estimates are realistic and we took them into account in deciding what was a fair burden to place on the local authorities. The immediate impact of a duty to empty septic tanks would therefore be greater initially than the additional burden of providing sewerage under Clause 1 of the Bill. Moreover, it would fall on those authorities with the lowest rating resources.
It is for those reasons that we have not imposed in Clause 10 an unqualified duty on local authorities to empty septic tanks, and it is for these reasons that I ask your Lordships not to adopt the Amendment. This is essentially a matter of timing. With the cost of sewerage falling on the general county rate, no doubt county councils will be under pressure to extend their septic tank emptying services as quickly as they can, but it would be wrong to make this an unqualified statutory duty which would perforce begin to operate when the Bill is brought into effect, since this would impose on these rural county councils an immediate and in some cases unduly onerous financial burden.
LORD FORBES: I wonder whether the noble Lord would let us know what the position would be of a farmer who has sludging equipment to deal with farm waste and uses it for emptying his own septic tank. Do the local authority come along for a second time and empty it once more?
LORD HUGHES: I have heard of the difficulty of trying to get quart out of a pint pot, but this is the first time I have been asked how to take the same thing out of a hole twice.
LORD FORBES: Who pays?
LORD BURTON: The noble Lord, Lord Hughes, said he felt it right that local authorities should exercise their discretion. We received the same answer on the Countryside (Scotland) Bill when we pointed out that local authorities would be the ones who would be most loth to pay. As a member of a finance committee I can assure the noble Lord that this is what has happened and is what will happen. The county councils will be very loth to undertake this extra task unless it is imposed upon them by the Bill. The noble Lord says that the Government will want them to undertake this service. Well, if they want them to undertake the service, why not write it into the Bill? This seems to be the whole argument. Furthermore, the cost he gave is £300,000 for Scotland as a whole, if it became compulsory everywhere. What I should like to ask is that it should be done only where it is reasonable, and I am sure that this will remove a large part of the cost. I cannot feel that the Amendment is in any way unreasonable, and it is not imposing an unqualified statutory duty upon the local authorities, as was suggested.
On Question, Amendment negatived.
Clause 10 agreed to.
Clause 11 agreed to.
Clause 12 [Rights of owners and occupiers to connect with and drain into public sewers etc.]:
LORD HUGHES: With Amendment No. 4 I wish to speak also to Amendment No. 8. These are purely drafting Amendments which delete unnecessary words in Clauses 12(5) and 17(3). Each of these clauses provides for an appeal to the Secretary of State, and the words proposed to be deleted, in both instances, say that the Secretary of State's decision is to be final. The procedure for appeals to the Secretary of State is, however, laid down in Clause 51, and subsection (5) of that clause says that the decision of the Secretary of State on an appeal is to be final. It is therefore unnecessary to say so in Clauses 12 and 17. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 6, line 31, leave out from ("it") to end of line 33.—(Lord Hughes.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 12, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 13 agreed to.
Clause 14 [Direction by local authority as to manner of construction of works]:
LORD HUGHES LORD HUGHES moved in subsection (3) to leave out from the first "may" to "who" and insert "appeal to the Secretary of State". The noble Lord said: Amendments Nos. 5, 6 and 7 are all minor Amendments which will bring similar provisions of Clauses 12 and 14 more closely into line. Each of these clauses confers on a local authority powers of control to be exercised when someone proposes to connect a private sewer or drain to the public sewerage system, and the link between the clauses was more closely defined in Amendments that were made to Clause 14 in another place. Discrepancies between similar provisions of the two clauses are therefor undesirable.
Two discrepancies require to be corrected. First, Clause 12(5) provides for an appeal to the Secretary of State where an owner of premises who has applied for permission to connect his private sewer or drain to the public system is aggrieved by the local authority's decision or by any conditions attaching to it. Under Clause 14(3), if he is ordered to construct a drain, private sewer or private sewage treatment works in a particular fashion, his appeal is to the sheriff. There should not be appeals to different authorities on different aspects of what might be essentially the same matter. We therefore propose that both appeals should lie to the Secretary of State, and the first two Amendments provide for this.
Secondly, there is a penalty not exceeding £25 under Clause 12(8) for making an unauthorised connection of a drain or private sewer to a public sewer or sewage treatment works, or altering a drain or private sewer without a necessary consent. Under Clause 14(6) the penalty for constructing a drain, private sewer or private sewage treatment works otherwise than in accordance with a direction of a local authority, is £50. The two offences are closely comparable, and we think that the penalty in both cases should be £25, which is the penalty under Clause 12(8). I beg to move.
Amendment moved£
Page 8, line 7, leave out from beginning to ("who") in line 8, and insert the said new words.
LORD BURTON: Is it not correct to say that the Association of County Councils desire that the appeal should go to the sheriff rather than to the Secretary of State? By this Amendment, are the Government not running contrary to the wishes of the Association of County Councils?
LORD HUGHES: I had not thought from his previous Amendment that the noble Lord was terribly worried whether we went contrary to the wishes of the county councils or not, but in this case I have no reason to believe that the county councils will suffer any dismay from bringing the two provisions into line in the way we suggest.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD HUGHES: I beg to move Amendment No. 6.
Amendment moved—
Page 8, leave out line 10.—(Lord Hughes.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD HUGHES: I beg to move Amendment No. 7.
Amendment moved—
Page 8, line 34, leave out ("£50") and insert ("£25").—(Lord Hughes.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 14, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 15 agreed to.
Clause 16 [Vesting of sewers and other works in local authority]:
On Question, Whether Clause 16 shall stand part of the Bill?
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: I do not know whether the noble Lord will be able to answer a question which was brought to my attention only a few minutes before the House met and of which, therefore, I have not had time to give him proper notice, concerning any sewer, drain or pipe forming part of a private system on any trade premises. It would appear from the clause that this could be taken over without consultation by the local authority, and some people who are concerned with the management of factories are afraid that this might lower the capacity. I understand that this

811
point has been discussed with the noble Lord's officials, but if he is not in a position to say anything about it now I should be glad to leave it to the Report stage.
LORD HUGHES: I am grateful to the noble Earl for having given me notice, even though it was very brief. Fortunately it was the subject of discussions with the C.B.I. in which I have been involved. We considered whether it was necessary to insert any Amendment in the Bill to cover the point which they have raised, and decided after a fairly lengthy consideration that it was not necessary. We think that what the C.B.I. may fear is that an industrialist might lose the use of a sewer which he has provided or, as the noble Lord suggested, not get the full use from it that he had hitherto. In fact, there would be no question of a sewer passing to the local authority unless it connected with a public sewer. Even then, any restriction on the use of the sewer by an industrialist would call for a decision by the local authority under the provisions of Part II of the Bill dealing with trade effluent.
Any such decision would be subject to appeal to the Secretary of State. We came to the conclusion that this would provide an adequate safeguard against an unreasonable restriction of the use of an industrialist's sewer which might be taken by the local authority. It was for these reasons that we considered that what was in the Bill already provided an adequate safeguard, and came down against amending Clause 16.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: I am grateful to the noble Lord for his explanation.
Clause 16 agreed to.
Clause 17 [Local authority may take over private sewage treatment works]:
LORD HUGHES: I beg to move Amendment No. 8.
Amendment moved—
Page 10, line 32, leave out from ("them") to end of line 33.—(Lord Hughes.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 17, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 18 [Expenses of local authorities and dissolution of drainage districts]:
3.30 p.m.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD moved, after subsection (5), to insert:
"() A Local Authority, where it is unlikely ever to be economically practical to provide a sewerage service to persons living in an area, may waive that portion of the rates represented by the sewerage rate."
The noble Viscount said: I beg to move Amendment No. 9 on behalf of my noble friend Lord Stonehaven, who has asked me to apologise for his unavoidable absence and to move the Amendment for him. This is a very mild Amendment, and I shall be very disappointed if the Government do not accept it. Its object is to enable local authorities to refrain from imposing an injustice, or, at any rate, what my noble friend and I consider an injustice, on certain ratepayers. I personally deplore the proposal to abolish drainage districts and transfer the local authority drainage costs to public expenditure. Be that as it may the point is that as this Bill is drawn, irrespective of whether you provide your own drainage, you are to pay a sewage rate; in other words, you are to pay for other people's drainage, irrespective of the fact that you go to the expense of providing your own.
In the part of Scotland I know best, the drainage we have is merely piped into the sea or the nearest river. Even if one has a septic tank there is no road to it, and it would be quite impracticable for the local authority to send the standard type of vehicle that they send to empty septic tanks, because the vehicle could not get near the septic tank. This Amendment provides that the local authority may waive that portion of the rate represented in a sewerage rate. They do not have to waive it, but if they are fair-minded, as I think on the whole most local authorities are, they may waive it. I should just like to reiterate that it seems wrong that where one provides one's own drainage one should be rated for drainage costs. After all, this does not apply to the consumption of water; you pay to a certain extent for the water that you use. Why should not the same system apply to drainage? If you provide your own drainage, why should you pay for other people's drainage? With

813
those words, and in the hope that the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, will be fair-minded, as I know he always is, or I am sure certainly tries to be, I beg leave to move this Amendment.
Amendment moved—
Page 12, line 7, at end insert the said subsection.—(Viscount Massereene and Ferrard.)
THE EARL OF MAR: I have already asked the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, about this point. I think there is a slight discrepancy in the Explanatory Memorandum as to councils being charged approximately £100,000 a time in regard to rates and the provisions of Clause 18(3). We in Haddington have a population of 7,000. We get the rate support grant, which will bring our rates up another 1s. But would it be possible to have a specific grant? I know that most councils would like a specific grant for their water systems.
LORD HUGHES: May I first of all deal with the Amendment? I am trying to be fair-minded. In fact, although the noble Viscount does not realise it, what he was asking me to do was to stop being fair-minded, because if one is fair-minded one must reject the Amendment. I hope to produce reasons which will satisfy your Lordships that that is a perfectly tenable point of view. First of all, the Amendment is based on the assumption to which I have already referred: that the payment of rates is a payment for services rendered. Rates are not sums extracted for services rendered; rates are local taxation, and sometimes people throw out councils because they do not think they are getting general value for the rates which are levied. And that, of course, they are perfectly entitled to do. But no one has ever suggested that at any given time what an individual ratepayer is going to receive in return for the rates which he pays is going to balance up in value with the services which he receives in return. Some people receive a great deal more from the rates than they ever pay for, and some people receive a great deal less. It will always be so in any system of local taxation, in no matter what way it may be changed.
Perhaps I can give some explanation of what we are trying to do in Clause 18. The clause, as the noble Viscount has said, abolishes special drainage districts. We take the view that they are now an
814
anachronism, a legacy from a time when services were provided by parish councils, and an obstacle to the improvement of sewerage services because there is a disincentive to county councils to extend such services outside the special districts. On the Amendment which the noble Lord, Lord Burton, moved earlier, we were in agreement that what we wanted the local authorities to do was to provide the service, not to provide them with reasons for not doing it. We came to the conclusion that a continuance of special drainage districts was a most decided disincentive against spreading a service throughout the county.
In Clause 1 of the Bill we oblige local authorities to provide sewers, where reasonable, throughout their areas, and in Clause 10 we empower local authorities to empty septic tanks throughout their areas. It would be quite illogical to preserve artificial areas within counties with an implication that sewerage need not be provided outside them. I think it follows from this argument that we should have similar objections to any form of differential rating which assumed that, for an indefinite period into the future, there would be sizeable areas of counties, or sizeable numbers of people, who will receive no sewerage service. Clause 18 therefore provides far the whole cost of sewerage in counties to fall on the general county rate. The transition from existing to future arrangements may be spread over a period of up to seven years, provided for in Clause 18(4).
There is a tendency to regard Clause 18 as far more revolutionary than in fact it is. The cost of sewerage is not at present borne entirely by people who receive a service from the local authority. The cost is split three ways. There is a sizeable contribution from the national Exchequer, which may amount to 60 per cent. or more of the cost of the service. Secondly, that part of the cost which is borne on the rates is in most counties already divided between special district rates and the general rate, from which there is statutory power under the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1947 to subsidise special district rates. The subsidy is seldom less than one-third of the rate-borne expenditure, and there are a number of counties in which it is substantially more than one-half. Therefore,

815
while the Bill provides for the whole rate-borne part of the cost to fall on the general rates, this merely carries an existing tendency a stage further, and it is accompanied by a clear incentive to the local authority to provide a service to match.
I would not of course deny that, especially in the early years following the coming into operation of the Bill, there will be ratepayers who will pay increased general rates and who will not yet have received a sewerage service. I cannot, however, accept that they should pay rates only in respect of services they receive. This is a perfectly correct principle in relation to commodities like groceries, or gas, electricity or water, where it is accepted that people pay for what they get, but in the field of rating the correct comparison is surely with national taxation. A car owner on a Hebridean island, who has no intention of travelling to the mainland, is not permitted to contract out of paying taxes for the upkeep of motorways. Rates are in the same position.
Therefore I would say that the Amendment errs, in the first place, in proceeding on the assumption that those who do not receive a particular service are entitled to be relieved of paying rates towards the provision of that service. Secondly, the Amendment would tend to defeat one of the main objects of the Bill in that it would provide local authorities with a disincentive to expand their existing services. We do not want a county council to be able to draw a line beyond which they do not intend to provide sewerage, and to salve their consciences by relieving a few people of a fraction of their rates. They should be providing the service, and we must also bear in mind the substantial contribution from the national Exchequer which is intended to help them to do so.
Finally, I think it would be difficult to operate the exemption which is embodied in the Amendment. The local authority, in order to be able to waive the payment of rates, would have to be satisfied that it is unlikely ever to be economically practicable to provide a sewerage service to persons living in an area, and in this context a sewerage service would mean the emptying of septic tanks. I doubt whether it is possible for
816
any local authority with a clear conscience ever to say that they are going to be in the position that they will never be able economically to provide either one part of the service or the other.
I have spoken at some length on this matter, because I recognise that there has been a good deal of opposition to this clause of the Bill, and I think your Lordships are entitled to a full explanation of our reasons for including it. But I believe that a great deal of the feeling against the clause has stemmed from ignorance of the fact that it merely extends a principle which in many cases is already more than half way conceded. It is not breaking new ground at all. For these reasons I must ask your Lordships not to accept this Amendment.
3.43 p.m.
THE DUKE OF ATHOLL: The noble Lord seems to have put forward excellent arguments for starting a North of Scotland Sewerage Board, which would collect accounts only to the extent that their particular sewers were used. This would seem to be a far fairer system, but I recognise that there are difficulties in it. Seriously, would the noble Lord not agree that many of these difficulties could be resolved if the assessors, in their next quinquennial valuation, were to disregard the advantage of having sewers, where those sewers have been provided privately? Thereby the reduction in the rateable value of the houses and premises concerned would come to much the same as the advantage that the houses and premises have at the moment by not being in special sewerage districts.
LORD HUGHES: I should like to answer that point, and also I must apologise to the noble Earl, Lord Mar, for not having dealt with the point which he made. I confess at once that I am not aware of all the mysteries in which county and city assessors involve themselves in deciding what the rateable value of a property shall be. It may well be that the point made by the noble Duke is one which they could quite properly take into consideration indeed, it may well he one which they already take into consideration. Beyond that, I am afraid I cannot go at this moment.
However, not only for the purpose of being able to inform the noble Duke, but for the purpose of informing myself I

817
should like to make some inquiries in order to ascertain this position. While I cannot undertake to do so during the passage of this Bill through your Lordships' House, I will undertake to have a look at it and to let the noble Duke know the answer. It may well be that in the light of the information I am able to obtain he would find it desirable to put a Question before your Lordships' House, so that if he felt the information was likely to be of interest to anybody else it could be shared by the rest of your Lordships.
Perhaps I may now come to the point made by the noble Earl, Lord Mar. I think he is referring to grants under Section 1 of the Rural Water Supplies and Sewerage Act 1944. Under this Act the Secretary of State is empowered to grant aid local authority expenditure for sewerage and sewage disposal in a rural locality. Grants can be made only where the work is consequential on the provision of a supply of piped water to a locality. The 1944 Act was intended to improve the water service, and consequential disposal of sewage in rural areas where the cost would otherwise have been a prohibitive charge on the rates. In defining a rural locality we have excluded any burgh with a population of more than 3,000. This is necessarily an arbitrary figure, but I think that our experience of the working of the Act over more than 20 years suggests that the standard is not unrealistic. There is provision under Section 7 of the Local Employment Act 1960 whereby the Secretary of State may grant-aid basic local services, including the provision of sewerage and sewage disposal facilities, where the work is closely related to the provision of employment in the district. There is no population test in relation to this grant, but it is not paid in relation to work which is not so closely and directly related.
The noble Earl has mentioned the difficulties about the provision of sewerage at Haddington. The existing sewage treatment works there are not 100 per cent. effective and there is pollution of the river Tyne. The Lothians River Purification Board are requiring the town council to produce a standard of effluent which would require new sewage treatment works costing, as the noble Earl has said, in the neighbourhood of £100,000. The Minister of
818
State received a deputation from the town council and he made it clear to them that there is no prospect of special financial assistance from the Government towards these works, and that they are not eligible for grant under either of the Acts mentioned above. However, there is provision in the Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) (Scotland) Acts for the town council to appeal to the Secretary of State against the conditions that the River Purification Board seek to impose. It is for the council to decide whether they wish to take advantage of this right of appeal. So far, they have not done so.
THE DUKE OF ATHOLL: I thank the noble Lord for what he has said. I think the position at the moment is that the assessors usually take account only of whether or not there is adequate drainage, and not of who provides the drainage concerned. This is obviously right at the moment, because if it is provided by the local authority the chances are that you are in a special drainage district and therefore pay the extra in your rates. But when this Bill becomes law the assessors should differentiate between the drainage provided by local authorities and that provided by private individuals, and they should assess the latter at a lower rate. I should have thought that an easy way of achieving this might be for the Secretary of State to send a circular to the assessors to this effect.
LORD STRATHCLYDE: I would like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, for the time he has taken and the trouble he has gone to in explaining the Government's position in regard to this matter. At the same time, I think many of us, while accepting, as I do, the noble Lord's statement that rates are a measure of taxation, will feel that it is hard luck on people that they should be taxed twice for the same thing—because that is what it comes to.
The noble Lord has said that it should be practicable (I think he said something like this) for the local authorities, the county councils, to provide sewerage in the great majority of places, but that there are some places at which it is absolutely impracticable to provide any sewerage system whatever. The noble Lord knows as well as I do, as we served on the same Board, that it is quite impracticable to provide electricity in many

819
places in the Highlands; it is quite impracticable to provide a drainage system in these places for the county council. One has to rely on a private system. Why the wretched fellow in these distant parts should have to provide his own sewerage system and also pay tax to provide one for people living in towns and villages I do not understand. It does not seem to me that such a man is getting a fair deal, and I am sure that this is the opinion of a great many noble Lords who are aware of the situation.
LORD HUGHES: If I may briefly answer that point, the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, knows that I find great difficulty in disagreeing with him on many occasions, and this is one of them. The fact remains that what we are doing in this Amendment is to say that a local authority will relieve people of rates where it is not going to be practicable for "donkeys' ages" ahead to provide a sewerage service, and I have pointed out that the emptying of septic tanks is part of a sewerage service. There must be some places in the country where even the emptying of a septic tank would be impracticable except at extraordinary expense, but there will be few such places, and it would be quite wrong to include in the Bill something which would give an authority who did not want to do anything a reason for putting off the extension of the service, when what the Bill is primarily aiming to do is to give as many people as possible a service at minimum cost. I think if this Amendment were made it would be unworkable, because there is practically no authority in the country who could certify, in the terms laid down by the Amendment, that it was not a practicable proposition to provide a sewerage service of one kind or another.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: I should like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, for the great deal of time he has taken on this Amendment and for his explanation. I would also thank my noble friends on this side for supporting the Amendment, and of course I heartily agree with them. I still stick to my point, that it is wrong, as my noble friends Lord Strathclyde and the Duke of Atholl have pointed out, that ratepayers should have to pay for a
820
service which they do not receive. The noble Lord, Lord Hughes, made the point that perhaps in ten or twenty years' time the local authority may be able to provide a drainage service to these ratepayers. Of course, if they can provide it in ten or twenty years they can then charge the ratepayers in those areas accordingly.
I appreciate what the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, said about rates coming under general taxation, but at the same time I think that it is wrong. I believe that at some period, and I hope it will be soon, the law on this matter ought to be altered. I should also like to point out, before asking leave to withdraw the Amendment, that in my Amendment all I say is "may waive"; it is entirely up to the local authorities. If they want to charge the full rate they can do it. It is really a very mild Amendment. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 18 agreed to.
Clauses 19 to 28 agreed to.
Clause 29 [Decision on application]:
LORD HUGHES: This is a minor drafting Amendment which puts the reference from the singular into the plural. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 17, line 30, leave out from ("such") to ("as") in line 31 and insert ("inspection chambers or manholes").—(Lord Hughes.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 29, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 30 to 40 agreed to.
Clause 41 [Breaking open of streets, etc.]:
3.57 p.m.
LORD HUGHES: This Amendment is consequential on one which was made in another place. Clause 12(7) of the Bill originally required the local authority to do any work under Clause 12 which involved breaking open a street. However, the Bill was amended to leave the local authority with a discretion—and not a duty—to undertake any work which involves breaking open a street, and a private person may therefore undertake such work. It therefore seems right

821
that the provisions of Clause 41, relating to the breaking open of streets, should apply equally to local authorities and private persons doing such work, and not solely to local authorities. Private persons breaking open streets will have powers to do the necessary work, will be liable to pay compensation for any damage that they do, and will be subject to the provisions of the Public Utilities Street Works Act 1950, which regulates the relations between, on the one hand, highway and street authorities and, on the other, statutory undertakers who place apparatus in streets— for example, water, gas and electricity undertakings and the General Post Office. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 23, line 8, after ("authority") insert ("or other person").—(Lord Hughes.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 41, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 42 to 44 agreed to.
Clause 45 [Production of plans and furnishing of information to authorities]:
LORD HUGHES LORD HUGHES moved, in subsection (1)(a), after "without" to insert "unreasonable". The noble Lord said: Under Clause 45(1) (a) a local authority can require an owner or occupier of land to produce to them plans of a sewer or drain, situated on or under the land, which empties, or is intended to empty into a public sewer or sewage treatment works. The owner or occupier is not obliged to produce plans unless he already possesses them or is able to obtain them without expense to himself. The effect of this Amendment is that he could be required to produce plans which he can obtain without "unreasonable" expense to himself. As paragraph (a) is now, unfortunately, faultily drafted, it could be held that an owner or occupier could not be required to obtain plans if this involved any expense to himself at all, even if it was only the cost of writing or telephoning to a place at which the plans were available—for instance at a builder's office. It is not the intention that owners and occupiers should be obliged to prepare elaborate plans, at great cost to themselves, but it seems equally undesirable that they should be able to withhold information which could be ob-
822
tained by them at trifling cost. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 24, line 8, after ("without" insert ("unreasonable").—(Lord Hughes.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 45, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 46 to 55 agreed to.
LORD HUGHES LORD HUGHES moved, after Clause 55, to insert the following new clause:
Saving for Coast Protection Act 1949
". Nothing in this Act shall affect the application to any operation of sections 34 to 36 of the Coast Protection Act 1949 (restriction of works
detrimental to navigation)."
The noble Lord said: This is the new clause upon which I have already spoken. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 55 insert the said new clause.—(Lord Hughes.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clauses 56 to 57 agreed to.
Clause 58 [Interpretation]:
LORD HUGHES: I have already spoken to this Amendment, which I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 31, line 1, at end insert—
(""land" includes land covered with water and any interest or right in or over land").(Lord Hughes.)
On Question, .Amendment agreed to.
LORD HUGHES LORD HUGHES moved in subsection (2) to leave out "pumps" and insert:
"pumping stations, storm water overflow pipes, outfall pipes".
The noble Lord said: Amendments Nos. 15 and 16 are related. Subsection (2) of this clause lists certain installations, which may be necessary to the operation of a drain, sewer or sewage treatment works, which are to be regarded as part of the drain, sewer or works as the case may The two Amendments, which give effect to suggestions by the Association of County Councils in Scotland are intended for clarification. In line 26 we substitute "pumping station" for "pump", because I am informed that the word "pump" may not adequately

823
describe the whole pumping installation on a drain or sewer. Secondly, we provide that an outfall pipe from a sewage treatment works is not to be regarded as part of the treatment works. An outfall pipe in fact has the characteristics of a sewer, and it seems reasonable that it should come under the provisions of the Bill relating to the construction, maintenance, and so on of sewers. Finally, the Amendment makes it clear that a storm water overflow pipe may be regarded as a sewer, and not as part of sewage treatment works. A storm water overflow is a kind of safety valve. When a main sewer is so swollen with rainwater that the sewage treatment works cannot handle the volume, the storm water overflow pipe diverts the surplus past the sewage treatment works to reserve tanks or to the river. Again, it is essentially a sewer, and it is appropriate that the provisions of the Bill relating to sewers should apply to it. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 32, line 26, leave out ("pumps") and insert the said words.—(Lord Hughes.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD HUGHES: I beg to move Amendment No. 16.
Amendment moved—
Page 32, line 30, leave out ("and outfall pipes").—(Lord Hughes.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 58, as amended, agreed to.
Remaining clauses and Schedule agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported with Amendments.

LAW REFORM (MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS) (SCOTLAND) BILL
4.5 p.m.
LORD HUGHES: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a second time. The Bill is for the most part based on recommendations made to the Government by the Scottish Law Commission and other independent bodies. I should like to express the Government's thanks to the Commission, on whose proposals six of the clauses of the Bill are based, for finding the time to formulate
824
these useful proposals when they are so fully occupied with the long term studies they are undertaking as part of their First Programme of Law Reform. The other body to whom we owe much for the provisions of this Bill and to whom we express gratitude is the Committee set up by the previous Government under the chairmanship of Lord Justice Russell to study the succession rights of illegitimate children.
The main provisions of the Bill deal with two fields of law: the law concerning succession and related matters, and the law of evidence. Parts I and II of the Bill and the first two Schedules are concerned with the former, Part III with the latter. Part IV of the Bill deals with four other miscellaneous reforms of the law, while Part V contains what are broadly speaking standard supplementary provisions of any Bill.
Part I of the Bill deals with the succession rights of illegitimate persons. Clauses 1 to 3 implement the main recommendations of the Russell Committee that illegitimate children should enjoy the same rights of succession as legitimate children in the intestate estate of both their parents and to legitim The arguments in favour of extending the succession rights of illegitimate children will, I am sure, find considerable sympathy among your Lordships. First and most obviously, to allot an illegitimate child an inferior or unrecognised status in succession to his parents' estates is to punish him for a situation for the creation of which he was blameless. Secondly, there is the argument to be derived from comparative law that in a not inconsiderable number of countries in the Western world illegitimate persons have rights of succession in the estates of both their parents. Finally, in this country the general trend of legislation this century has been towards the removal of disabilities from illegitimate children. The law already recognises the right of an illegitimate person to succeed in his mother's estate—albeit in very limited circumstances. Appendix III of the Russell Committee's Report lists a number of instances of legislation passed this century which accord some degree of recognition to illegitimate relationships.
Clauses 1 and 2 of the Bill are drafted in the form of amendments to the

825
Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, which is the general code of law on succession. Clause 1 replaces the present Section 4 of the 1964 Act (which deals with the limited circumstances in which an illegitimate person may succeed to his mother's estate); Clause 2 inserts a new Section 10A into the Succession (Scotland) Act to deal with the right of illegitimate children to legitim Clause 3 together with Schedule 1 of the Bill make consequential provision to the 1964 Act. Clause 4 of the Bill implements a suggestion in the Russell Report and gives an illegitimate child exactly the same right to aliment out of his deceased parents' estates as is enjoyed by a legitimate child. Again the aim has been to equate the entitlements of legitimate and illegitimate children.
Clause 5 of the Bill deals with testate succession, and provides that where persons are described in wills and other deeds in term of their relationship to other persons then the description shall be taken to refer to illegitimate as well as legitimate relations and to persons related by illegitimate as well as by legitimate links. This provision will not affect the normal type of bequest or gift, which is to a named person, but it will mean that in future when a person makes a bequest in favour of his "children" that bequest will be construed as benefiting both his legitimate and any illegitimate children. If he wishes to exclude his illegitimate children from his will—which, subject to their claim to legitim, he is perfectly entitled to do—he will have to make it clear that the bequest is in favour of "legitimate children" only. These new rules of construction apply only in relation to deeds executed after the commencement of the Bill. The Scottish Law Commission have also advised the Secretary of State that in the light of Clause 5 it would be desirable to extend the scope of three legal principles bearing on the construction of deeds so as to apply the benefit of those principles to illegitimate persons as they apply to legitimate. The Government have accepted this proposal also, and Clause 6 gives effect to it.
Clause 7 of the Bill implements a further recommendation of the Russell Committee that special protection should be provided for those who distribute estates — trustees and executors — in
826
ignorance of the existence of an illegitimate person who could have claimed a share in the estate. The main effect of Clause 8 is to abolish primogeniture and preference of miles in intestate succession to crofting tenancies and to assimilate such succession to the general rules of succession to property which in future will admit claims of illegitimate persons in the estates of their parents. If in this context we were to give effect to the recommendations of the Russell Committee without any further change in the present law of succession to crofting tenancies, the result would be that the tenancy of a croft might pass to an illegitimate son of the crofter (if he were the eldest son) to the exclusion of the widow, or any subsequent legitimate issue which the crofter might have had. This, obviously, is not a situation that could be seriously entertained.
Alternatively we could have disapplied altogether in relation to crofting tenancies the provisions implementing the Russell recommendation. This in effect would mean that there would be no improvement in this field for illegitimate children, and the law of intestate succession to crofting tenancies would be isolated even further from the general law of succession. We consulted the Crofters Commission, who advised that rather than adopt either of these unsatisfactory courses the Bill should abolish the principle of primogeniture and preference of males in intestate succession to crofts.
The Government fully support the Commission in the conclusion they have come to on this important issue. Your Lordships may have noticed from proceedings in another place that there has been some criticism, and I do not think I am wrong in saying it is misinformed criticism, which has suggested, first, that there has been lack of consultation, and second, that the provisions were not welcome to crofters generally. I am able to assure your Lordships that proper consultation took place with the Crofters Commission who are, as your Lordships know, appointed by Statute to advise my right honourable friend on crofting matters. My right honourable friend has just received a memorandum from the Federation of Crofters' Unions. The Federation suggest that the Bill has some disadvantages compared with the

827
law as it stands, but the Memorandum appears to be based largely on misunderstanding of the proposed measure, which has had widespread approval throughout the crofting community. Subsequent to the publication of the Bill, the Commission explained its provisions to their assessors at a series of conferences. These conferences now provide as democratic a cross-section of crofting opinion as the Commission have found it possible to arrange for. Your Lordships will remember that the assessors are elected assessors now. I am glad to say the assessors gave the proposal their almost unanimous support.
I should now like to turn to Part III of the Bill, which is concerned with two aspects of the law of evidence in civil proceedings in Scotland. Clause 9, which was the subject of lengthy discussions in another place, implements a recommendation of the Scottish Law Commission. The present law of corroboration is rather complex but, broadly its effect is that a court cannot accept as sufficient proof of a material fact the evidence of a single witness unless he is corroborated by other evidence. Looking to the generality of cases, the Commission found this rule of law unnecessary and the cause of possible injustice, and concluded that, having regard to the hardship which the present rule is causing particularly in accident cases, reform is a matter of some urgency and should not await their presentation of a draft code of the whole law of evidence. In the preparation of the necessary legislation we reached the conclusion, in consultation with the Commission, that the most satisfactory reform was that the rule requiring corroboration in such actions should be removed, not only where evidence is given by a witness in person (which was the circumstance to which the Commission specifically re-referred in their report) but from all types of evidence. Clause 9 of the Bill applies accordingly both to oral and documentary evidence.
The effect of the clause is that corroboration will cease to be a sine qua non in the type of civil case covered by the clause. This does not mean, however, that corroborating evidence will never be required in future. After the evidence in any particular case has been led, the court will have to consider
828
whether they are satisfied that the material facts in the case have been established by it, and where evidence is not corroborated the court may well be less easily satisfied about the matter. Parties will still no doubt lead corroborating evidence if it is available, but lack of corroboration will no longer, as at present, be fatal to the case and result in the party being unable in law to establish his claim.
It should be noted that the clause in no way affects the rule of corroboration in criminal proceedings. The Law Commission reserved their position on this, and, of course, quite a different set of considerations may arise in that field. They also recommended that consistorial actions and actions for affiliation and aliment should be reserved until they could consider the consequences of the fact that, to some extent, they attract criminal standards of evidence. The Bill excludes such actions and for similar reasons proceedings before juvenile courts. The Government accept that the balance of Scottish legal opinion—although by no means unanimous—is against its abolition. The point I would make is that a rule of law, unless it serves some useful or necessary purpose, is a disadvantage; it comes between the parties and the court and the establishment of the truth on the balance of probabilities. Few other countries—only Portugal among Western nations—find the need for this rule of law, and it is the Government's view that it is right to abolish it for ordinary civil proceedings in Scotland.
I do not think that I need spend much time on Clauses 10 to 12, which some of your Lordships may recognise as old friends. They came before this House in respect of the law of England and Wales in the Civil Evidence Bill, and are based on a report of the Law Reform Committee. The Scottish Law Commission, whom the Government consulted on the report, have advised that the amendments proposed by the Committee should also be made to the law of Scotland. Clause 10 makes convictions on criminal proceedings, so far as relevant, admissible in subsequent civil proceedings. Clause 11 makes similar provision about finding of adultery and paternity. Clause 12 makes criminal convictions conclusive evidence of guilt in any action for defamation.

829
I should now like finally to turn briefly to Part IV of the Bill, which gives effect to four minor reforms—three of them recommendations of the Scottish Law Commission. Clause 14 implements a recommendation of the Commission that the law restricting the creation of liferent interests in property in favour of unborn persons should be amended and re-enacted. The present law in Scotland recognises that it is against public policy to allow liferents to be created for too lengthy a period. The Law Commission do not question this policy but have pointed out inadequacies in the form and drafting of the present statutory restrictions. Clause 14 gives effect to their proposals for improvement of the law. Clause 15 of the Bill is designed to remove a doubt whether a probate or other title of an executor granted by the court in England, Northern Ireland, or certain other Commonwealth countries, duly resealed in Scotland in accordance with the normal procedure, can be used by the executor as a link in title to heritable property in Scotland comprised in the estate.
Clause 16 implements another recommendation of the Commission. It has come to light that some moneylenders require their clients to enter into agreements to submit, when court proceedings relating to their indebtedness are raised, to the jurisdiction of a sheriff court convenient to the moneylender. The court which would normally have jurisdiction in such cases is, of course, the court where the defender is resident. Similar agreements to submit to the jurisdiction of a particular court in the case of hire purchase transactions were rendered void by Section 4 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940; and Clause 16 of the Bill extends that section to cover moneylenders' agreements.
Clause 17 is a simple measure to remove anachronistic restriction which at present prevents trade unions in Scotland from owning or dealing in more than an acre of land. The restriction was imposed by the Trade Union Act 1871, which first gave trade unions the right to possess land. The restriction was removed in England by an Act of 1922. We have come to the conclusion that we cannot be accused of rushing into hasty legislation on this matter! I hope that I have been able to give your Lordships a reasonable explanation of the Bill, though I fully appreciate
830
that in a Bill dealing with miscellaneous subjects it is difficult to cover every item fully in a Second Reading speech unless one were to go to such a length as to become an abomination to everybody present. I beg to move that the Bill be now read a second time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Hughes.)
4.22 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I should like to start by thanking the noble Lord for a painstaking explanation of the purposes of this Bill. I join with him in thanking the Scottish Law Commission and the Russell Committee, but I should not like our congratulation; necessarily to entail accepting blindly all their recommendations.
The Bill contains an astonishing variety of provisions and covers such a wide field that there is no single principle to be debated on Second Reading. I should have thought that it was essentially a Committee stage Bill, in much the same way as, for example, an Expiring Laws Continuance Bill is a Committee stage measure. Most of the provisions have a strong social content, and to that extent it is possible for a layman to express an opinion on them with rather more conviction than he could do on a law reform Bill which is purely lawyers' law. All the same, I approach the task with diffidence, and I should like to make it clear that any opinions I may express are mine and mine alone—although I have reason to believe that some, at any rate, are shared by quite a number of people.
First, may I say that it seems to me clearly right to bring the law of succession in crofting tenure into line with the general law of succession in Scotland. I was glad to hear that there was consultation with the Crofting Commission and with the crofters' representatives, since I know that in another place some doubt arose on this matter. May I also, in passing, express satisfaction that the Government have provided a Keeling Schedule for the convenience of all concerned, to show the alteration in the Crofters Act. I do not want to deal with the provisions in Clauses 10 and onward because these can be dealt with more conveniently in Committee.

831
I should like to say a word about Clause 9. I was glad to see that just at the moment when the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, started to talk about Clause 9 my noble and learned friend Lord Reid came into the Chamber. I believe that he, too, wishes to say something about Clause 9, so I shall keep my remarks very short. It seems to make a far-reaching change in the law of Scotland by abolishing the rule of law requiring corroboration in civil proceedings. The Scottish Law Commission stated the case for this change in the Report which they submitted in February, 1967. As a layman, I found the Report very clear. They had, however, to admit that the comments of the Lord President of the Court of Session, the Faculty of Advocates and the Law Society of Scotland were generally unfavourable. These comments evidently related not to the proposal contained in Clause 10 but to a much more limited proposal confined to corroboration in actions for damages for personal injuries.
I understand that the Faculty of Advocates objected in principle to the change and also objected to the difficulties and anomalies which would arise from confining any new rules to that particular class of actions. The Law Commission seem to have decided to adhere to the principle to which the Faculty of Advocates objected and to widen their original proposal to all civil actions except consistorial and affiliation proceedings. They did so apparently on the ground that in their view there was "some urgency"—to use their expression—for a change so far as actions arising out of personal injury are concerned. I cannot see the logic of this. Since such urgency as there may be relates to personal injury cases, surely the logical thing would be to confine the change to personal injury cases, in spite of any temporary difficulties that may arise.
I feel fairly sure that while the Scottish Law Commission's recommendation as to civil proceedings may be highly contentious, it is not nearly so contentious as a proposal to dispense with the need for corroboration in criminal causes in Scotland, no matter what the law in other countries may be or what were the personal views of Napoleon, which the Scottish Law Commission quoted with some
832
relish. For my part, I would not advocate carrying the Auld Alliance so far as to adopt the Code Napoleon. Moreover, I should like an assurance that if the proposals in the Bill are accepted we shall not be told later that, because we have accepted the change for civil proceedings, we must in consequence accept them for criminal proceedings.
I come on to the question of the rights of succession which Clauses 1 to 4 would confer on illegitimate children. The noble Lord said that the arguments would command sympathy in many parts of the House. They certainly command my sympathy, but not, I am afraid, my support. These clauses implement the recommendations of the Committee on the Law of Succession in Relation to Illegitimate Persons, which reported in July, 1966. This was a Committee (and the noble Lord did not mention this) of nine, composed of four from Scotland and four residing in England or Wales, under the chairmanship of Lord Justice Russell. Quite rightly, it did not consist only of lawyers, since the subject was one of social as well as of legal significcance. On the other hand, I am not sure that it was right to appoint one Committee to try to apply a single policy on both sides of the Border when the law is fundamentally different in Scotland.
The mere fact that in Scotland legitim involves the absolute right of the legitimate children to claim a specific share in their parent's moveable estate (subject to the prior rights of the other parent), makes it impossible to devise a common policy. For England and Wales the main issue is succession on intestacy, whereas in Scotland it is succession whether there is a will or not. Although the Committee invited views from the public, it seems that they received little response. They had before them no statistics on which they could base conclusions, and they found it impossible to estimate the effect of any extension of rights in relation to illegitimates.
The main general consideration on which the Committee based their recommendation, which was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, was that:
"to allot to a bastard an inferior or indeed unrecognised status in succession is to punish him for a wrong of which he was not guilty."
They want, therefore, to put the illegitimate offspring in the same position as

833
the legitimate offspring, the legitimised child and the adopted child.
I see things quite differently. Are we not nowadays far too ready to confer new rights without any corresponding duties? The position of parent and child in a family is one of reciprocal duty and affection. I cannot believe it is right that one who has never formed part of the family, who may never even have known either of his parents, who has never helped or comforted his parents in any way at all, should have conferred on him by Statute when his parents die, perhaps in old age, intestate, and he has perhaps reached middle age, an absolute right to share equally in an estate with a half-brother or half-sister and to deprive him or her of half his or her birthright. I cannot believe that that is right. In that case, it will be the legitimate child who is punished for a wrong of which he or she was not guilty, and is deprived of half of his or her expectations and of the reward, very probably, of a lifetime of filial devotion.
Of course, I recognise that a father of an illegitimate child has a legal duty to maintain him until he is 16; and in Scotland that duty continues after the father's death and can be enforced against his estate. But that is an extra-family duty, and that is why there is no corresponding duty on the part of the child. Of course, I recognise also that the sort of case I have mentioned, though a common one, is not the only kind of case that arises. There may be no legitimate children, and an illegitimate child already has the right to succeed to his mother's estate, as the noble Lord mentioned, if there are no legitimate children.
I concede at once that if the illegitimate child has been brought up in his mother's family, it is right that he should be treated on a par with any legitimate children. But there ought to be nothing to prevent him from being adopted by his mother and so acquiring equal rights. And in any case his mother can ensure that he is treated equally in her will. To cover the cases where she does neither of these things, I would gladly see the rights of succession extended to the illegitimate child brought up in the mother's family, simply because he is then a member of the family with all the
834
rights and duties of a member of the family.
In my view, the Russell Committee gave far too little weight to the thought, which it expressed in paragraph 31 of its Report, that:
"provisions for intestacy are basically designed to carry out the presumed wishes of the deceased who has not expressed his or her wishes by will."
This is surely so. A person still has during his lifetime the right to dispose of his property at his death as he wishes, subject to the Inland Revenue's cut and to legal rights of legitim in Scotland. If he does not exercise his right, lie is presumed to want his property divided between his spouse and his heirs as the law provides. If he wants it divided differently—for example, by making provision for illegitimate children—he can do so. But if he divides his property without making such provision, I cannot see why one who is not a member of his family should have a right to take part of his estate. He can have no such right in England once he has passed the age of dependency. Nor, indeed, do I see why he should be given a right on intestacy either in Scotland or in England.
The Russell Committee laid considerable stress on the blood relationship. But the law has been tending away from the blood relationships. If an illegitimate child is adopted by foster parents, he becomes part of his adoptive family and loses any rights to his natural parents' estates. There are also the provisions for legitimising children by subsequent marriage, which the Scottish Law Commission recommended and Parliament has recently passed into law. Of course, everyone recognises that it is a grave misfortune for a child to be born illegitimate. But, surely, the right course is to take every possible step at the earliest possible stage to see that he becomes part of some family, not to give him rights of succession 30, 40 or 50 years later to the estate of the head of a family to which he has never belonged or contributed in affection or service or in any other way. But it is one thing to try to give every child as far as possible an equal start in life. It is a quite different thing to present, at somebody else's expense, an occasional bonanza to an illegitimate child late in life who may

835
or may not stand in need of it. I believe that this will cause quite disproportionate strife and unhappiness. After all, it is far worse in life to be disappointed about something which one has long had reason to expect, than not to get what one has never expected, even though one may resent that one cannot get it.
I believe that attempts to claim entitlement under these proposals will be difficult to justify, difficult to prove, and will cause untold complications and anxiety. At the very least, I beg the Government to fix some limit of time from the death of the owner of the estate within which such a claim must be made. I suggest to your Lordships that it is a bad thing to introduce so strong an element of uncertainty into the law. The Succession (Scotland) Act abolished the principle of primogeniture and removed the distinction between heritable and moveable property except, I think, in respect of legitim. It seems to me absurd that an illegitimate child should have conferred on him a right to legitim.
If they really meant to bring the law as regards the rights of illegitimate children into line on both sides of the Border, it seems to me that there were three courses open. One was to leave the law as it is. The second was to abolish legitim and leave the testator free to dispose of his property as he thought fit, subject to the right of dependants to apply to the courts. The third was to confine the succession rights of illegitimate children to cases where is no will.
There is something to be said for the law allowing illegitimate children to share with legitimate and adopted children in an estate on intestacy, although I think there is much more to be said against it. In my view, there is nothing to be said for giving an illegitimate child a right to override the expressed wishes of a testator, even in cases where the testator is not even aware of his existence. I hope, therefore, that when we come to the Committee stage the House will at least agree to omit Clause 2.
4.38 p.m.
LORD REID: My Lords. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, and his colleagues in the Scottish Office are to be congratulated on finding a fairly high place in the legislative queue in such a busy Session. I make no complaint of
836
the fact that this is in every sense of the word a "miscellaneous" Bill. In present circumstances, it is probably impossible to expect anything else. I do not intend to say very much on the earlier part of the Bill. On Part II have no very strong views, but I feel great sympathy with what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn. This is a most difficult field, in which I think it is quite impossible to prophesy the result.
The different circumstances in which these proposals may come to be applicable will vary enormously. I have no doubt that in some cases, if these proposals become law, there will be a just result; but equally I have little doubt that in a great many other cases there will be a very unjust result. It is a question of proportion—and I cannot offer any useful views on this question—as to how many cases there will be in which these proposals will promote justice and how many there will be in which the proposals will do exactly the opposite. I still have an open mind on the matter, but, as I say, I am inclined to agree with the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn.
With regard to Part II, I shall say nothing. Clauses 10 and 11 seem to be admirable technical improvements, and the sort of thing that one expects to find in a "miscellaneous" legal Bill of this kind. Clause 12 certainly makes some improvements, although I am bound to say that I have my doubts about making anything conclusive evidence. I think that is a point which may require to be looked at when we come to the Committee stage. It is going a very long way to say that when a man has been found guilty in some remote magistrates' court he is for ever forbidden to dispute the validity of that conviction, however strong his evidence may be. But I quite see that there are arguments the other way, and again I do not wish to press that matter at all strongly.
But when I come to Clause 9, there is a very different picture. So far as that clause is concerned, it is undoubtedly, from the lawyers' point of view, the most important clause in the Bill by a long way, because it makes a fundamental change in the law of evidence in Scotland. The noble Lord, Lord Hughes, was good enough to give an explanation which I found accurate, I think. One

837
cannot, on an occasion like this, go into great length about the technicalities. but I make no complaint about his legal expertise in explaining this matter. Let me make one or two observations before I come to the real point of my objections.
As those noble Lords who have had any experience in the matter will know, the difference between Scotland and England on this question of the law of evidence is even greater than in most other departments of the law. In England, with very few exceptions, it is possible to prove any case by the evidence of one witness. He may be contradicated by other witnesses, but if the court or the jury choose to accept that one witness they may do so. I am not at all sure that that is a good thing; and, indeed, I have noticed that lately there has been a good deal of criticism in the Press about mistaken identification on the evidence of one witness. I have a shrewd suspicion that if one could look closely at a great many of these cases one would find that this one-witness rule does a good deal of injustice in England. But it is not for me to start discussing that now.
In Scotland, however, for hundreds of years there has had to be corroboration. That sounds formidable, but it is not. You can have corroboration by having two witnesses, of course, speaking to a fact—that is straightforward. But you can also have corroboration if the circumstances of the case as disclosed by circumstantial evidence, or as disclosed by other oral evidence, are such as to make it more probable than not that the one witness who is speaking to the crucial facts is telling the truth. There cannot be very many cases where it is not possible to discover that amount of evidence if the witness is telling the truth, and therefore this is, I would have thought, a dubious change.
I am bound to say that until very recently—in fact, during the whole time I was practising in Scotland—I never heard any serious criticism of this system at all, even with regard to the matters which are now put in the forefront. But I quite agree that there has been some criticism in recent years, as noticed by the Law Commission, although only in one class of case. I have not seen any reference anywhere to any criticism going beyond cases of actions of damages for personal injuries. Of course, there are
838
a few cases where an honest pursuer, by some misfortune, is not able to satisfy even the simple elements of corroboration to which I have alluded. But then one must also remember that there are dishonest people in this world, and if we remove this bar we are undoubtedly increasing the risk that undeserving people will succeed when they ought not to succeed. I would remind your Lordships that whereas in England accident cases are almost all tried now by a judge alone, in Scotland we still preserve the jury, and it is very much easier for a plausible witness to mislead a jury than to mislead a judge. But I agree that there is a case here, and I do not suggest that there are not two sides to this argument: there are.
That limited change I really would not object to, but it is a very different thing when we come to this very extensive change which is proposed. I do not intend at this stage to enter into a detailed explanation of all the difficulties —that will be more appropriate later—because the objection I have to make is a very different kind of objection, and I shall come to it in a moment. But I might just say that litigants will be put at risk with regard to evidence about old contracts, old property rights, one thing and another. Our law of prescription allows much longer periods than the law of limitation in many cases in England, and I think it is very risky.
But the real trouble about this clause is this. When the Scottish Law Commission looked into the matter they found, as they thought, that this question of corroboration in actions of damages for personal injury ought to have priority—and I do not question that: it is more or less in a class by itself. They consulted the Scottish Law Society and the Faculty of Advocates, and no doubt others, and the reactions were unfavourable. That is only a factor, and tie Law Commission were quite entitled to say, and the Government are quite entitled to say, backing them up; "We prefer the other view". If the matter had stopped there, if the original proposal of the Law Commission had appeared in this Bill, I should not have opposed the proposal. I should have feared that it would do more harm than good, but I should not have opposed it. But then a very unfortunate thing happened. Haying

839
received these unfavourable comments, the Law Commission suddenly changed their minds and, instead of bringing in a proposal for a very limited measure relating only to actions of damages, they expanded the thing to cover the whole of civil procedure, with one exception. And they consulted nobody about that—not one single person, so far as I can discover. I think that that is extremely unfortunate when we have a proposal of this very great importance in the way of legal reform.
The legal profession is extremely worried about this. There is very great dissatisfaction. I have received letters from a number of persons, and I propose to read from two of them. Before I do so, let me also say that the Lord President, on behalf of the Judges, has written to me to say that the new proposal was put forward without any consultation with the Judges and that the Judges are very strongly opposed to it. I know that there is an idea that lawyers should not have the final word—or indeed, perhaps, the most important word—in legal reform; but here, at least, it cannot possibly be suggested that there is any personal advantage to be gained by the legal profession in supporting this change. If the change will make any difference at all it will promote more litigation and not less. The Lord President goes on to say that he would not object, broadly speaking, to the original proposal of the Commission.
Now I come to the Law Society of Scotland who represent all the solicitors there. Solicitors in Scotland are a much larger body of legal practitioners than their English counterparts and, in proportion to their number, they have a much larger experience of court work than is the case in England; because, whereas in England you have the Provincial Bar who do a great deal of work at assizes, county courts, quarter sessions and the other courts, in Scotland comparatively little work is done in any other court but the Court of Session by anyone but solicitors.
The President of the Law Society of Scotland says this:
"Earlier, in February, 1966, the Council were informed by the Commission that they were undertaking a general review of the law of evidence and that they proposed in
840
the meantime to make a recommendation more restricted in scope than that contained in their paper of February, 1967, namely, that corroboration should not be required in actions of damages for personal injury. The Council were asked for their observations on this restricted recommendation and informed the Commission that they did not support it, and took the view that the proposal should be considered when the Commission had completed their general review of the law of evidence. Subsequently, without any further reference to the Council, the Commission published their paper making a recommendation on the lines of Clause 9 of the Bill."
He goes on to say:
"… any such alteration ought not to be made without full consultation with interested bodies including the Society, the Faculty of Advocates and the Judiciary."
That seems to me to be an extremely reasonable position to take up.
My Lords, I come now to the Faculty of Advocates. The Dean of Faculty writes in these terms:
"Paragraph 19 of the Law Commission's Report is misleading. Two Members of Faculty each advised the Law Commission that, in his opinion, the Faculty would be opposed to the only suggestion submitted for comment, viz., a change in the law of corroboration in actions of damages for personal injuries. It was made clear that the general question of corroboration as a principle would require thorough study in the context of a review of the Law of Evidence as a whole before any reliable expression of Faculty opinion could be given upon it. At no time thereafter was the Faculty's opinion sought on the general question whether the whole law of corroboration should be altered, or upon the particular recommendations which were presented to the Secretary of State in the Commission's Report."
The letter goes on to state that as a result of representations made by the Dean of Faculty there was a meeting with the Lord Advocate attended by the Dean, the Vice-Dean, the President of the Law Society and the Chairman of the Law Commission,
"at which it was accepted by the Lord Advocate and the Law Commission that no proper consultation with the profession had taken place on the subject of corroboration, and that in future no recommendations affecting the principles of the law of Scotland would be made by the Commission, until it had obtained the considered views of the profession as a whole."
My Lords, how it comes about that, having admitted that there was no proper consultation, they still ask the Government to proceed with this Bill just passes

841
my comprehension. However, here we are; we have the Bill. What is to be done? It seems to me that we have to try to heal this rift—because it is a rift —between the legal profession in Scotland and the Scottish Law Commission, and it seems to me that the only way to put things right is to revert in this Bill to the original proposal of the Law Commission which was the subject of consultation with these bodies although it was not accepted by them.
As I do not oppose the Second Reading, I propose to put down Amendments on Committee in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Guest who has authorised me to say (because owing to illness he cannot attend this afternoon) that he entirely agrees with my views. I shall put down Amendments to restrict Clause 9 to the scope of the original provision for actions for damages for personal injuries. I would not ask the noble Lord, Lord Hughes—or, if he is going to speak, my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor—for any reply on the matters which I have raised to-day; unless, of course, they have inside knowledge of the matter. But I think that something will have to be said before this Bill comes to an end to clear up this very serious misunderstanding.
My Lords, I think I had better leave it there until the Committee stage, subject to this one remark: that, in any event, there will have to be a further examination by the Law Commission of the law of corroboration because there has been omitted from this proposal—for reasons which have no practical significance at all to my mind—actions of divorce and the like. Looking at the practical realities of the situation, I can see no justification for that. And, of course, nothing has been said about criminal law. It is not as if we are asked to accept the law of England; we are asked to accept half the law of England —for reasons which I find it difficult to understand. But as, in any case, there has to be another review before the matter is finally settled, I think it will be very much better to go back to the very limited proposal, about which alone is there any urgency, and to take out this additional proposal and keep it until we can have a proper review after proper consultation.
4.59 p.m.
LORD HUGHES: My Lords, when I was furnished with a list of speakers in this debate—it was, I must confess, a very limited list, consisting of the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reid—it filled me with greater foreboding than would a much longer list such as we had on the Highlands debate. I have had the opportunity of working across the Floor with the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, many times and I know that he will go into the subjects he proposes to raise in meticulous detail, having previously briefed himself. To-day was no exception. He was, of course, good enough to give me prior intimation of that part of this very miscellaneous Bill with which he was primarily to deal. I agree with him that what he said would be much more appropriate for a speech in Committee; because by its very nature this Bill—and this point was also made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reid—is essentially a Committee stage Bill.
I cannot pretend that I am in agreement with much of what the noble Lord said in relation to the position of the illegitimate child, but it would be wrong to enter into what are really arguments of principle on what is most important in this matter—the rights of the legitimate members of the family, family affection and so on. The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, it could be argued, talked as if it was the illegitimate child who reused to give family affection. We know, of course, that in many cases it is the other way round; the illegitimate child is denied the opportunity either of receiving or of giving family affection. It could be argued I do not put it any stronger than that—that what the noble Lord was advocating was adding to the deprivation of family affection this subsequent and final deprivation of the right to share in property. But these are arguments which I think we could more properly examine when Amendments to the Bill are tabled.
I had my trepidation in relation to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reid, somewhat tempered by the recollection of some very pleasant meetings which I had in London when I was a member of a Committee which was fortunate enough to be presided over by the noble and learned Lord. My recollection of that assured me that whatever weight of legal opinion the noble and learned Lord might throw at

843
me, it would undoubtedly be done with the greatest fairness, and I have no reason to be dissatisfied on that point.
In relation to this question of corroboration, about which both noble Lords spoke, the point emerged that whatever disagreement there might be about any change in the law, both noble Lords would, to a certain extent, accept the change if it were limited to personal injury cases, about which, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reid, has pointed out, there was considerable disagreement with at least some of the legal opinion consulted. At any rate, there can be no question at all that there was consultation. A note has been passed to me on this subject in an attempt to put me in a position to answer the question about consultation, pointing out that the full proposals of the Law Commission were published a year ago, in April, 1967. There has therefore been a lot of opportunity for comment on those proposals since that time, and the Government in fact have encouraged comment.
LORD REID: My Lords, I think that there has been a lot of comment, but nobody has paid any attention to it.
LORD HUGHES: I do not quite agree with that, because at least one of the bodies, the Society of Writers to the Signet, have expressed themselves as being in agreement with the proposals, and there is no reason to expect that even in a body of lawyers unanimity is any easier to get than it is anywhere else. I was about to say that although I have been given this note, I incline to the view that the opportunity to comment after proposals have been published is not exactly the same thing as the opportunity to be consulted before proposals are published. Having said that, I would also say that I, and I am sure my right honourable friend the Secretary of State, would wish to consider very carefully what has been said on this point by both noble Lords this afternoon; and we shall, of course, look with considerable interest at the Amendments which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reid, has stated that he will submit.
844
My Lords, if we had done what has been suggested by both noble Lords and confined the change to personal injury there might well have been criticism, but we might not have had much difficulty in getting your Lordships to accept the provision. The difficulty in which we were placed—and this is all I propose to say about the matter at this stage—was that there is difficulty in drawing a line. I must confess that in this matter I am not talking about anything of which I have personal knowledge, but the advice which I am given is that to draw a line between personal injury cases and other civil actions, other than the ones which have been excluded, would be extremely difficult; that there could arise within a single action a claim which related to personal injury and other aspects of civil action, and it would be very difficult to have two different sets of evidence applied in the single case. I mention that with extreme trepidation because, as I said. I have no personal knowledge; and in this place, unlike another place, I do not have the advantage of having a legal Officer sitting alongside me, as in years gone by Ministers in another place had when the noble and learned Lord sat there in another capacity.
I will say that I am completely satisfied with the reception which your Lordships have given to this Bill. One of the advantages of bringing forward a Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill is that even the most wilful Government could not possibly bring forward a collection of proposals which did not include some which commended themselves to one or other section of your Lordships. I am fortunate that so much in this Bill excites nothing other than a welcome. I shall be happy to co-operate with your Lordships in looking at those two particular aspects which have been the subject of disagreement to-day, and I hope that what emerges will be another Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act which will prove generally acceptable to the people of Scotland.
On Question, Bill Read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

JUSTICES OF THE PEACE BILL
5.7 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD GARDINER): My Lords, I beg to move that this Report be now received.
Moved, That the Report be now received.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
Clause 1 [Appointment of justices, oaths of office, etc]:
VISCOUNT DILHORNE VISCOUNT DILHORNE moved to add to subsection (2)(a)
";but notwithstanding anything in the charters of the City or in section 10(1) of the Justices of the Peace Act 1949 a commission of the peace may be issued for the City as a county of itself, and

(a) the Schedule (Justices of the Peace in the City of London) to this Act shall have effect to regulate the position as justices in the City of those holding the office by virtue of the charter and under the commission respectively; and

(b) Parts I and III of Schedule 2 to this Act shall have effect for the adaptation or clarification of the law and other transitional purposes relating to justices of the peace for the City."

The noble and learned Viscount said: My Lords, I expect that some of your Lordships were surprised to see so many Amendments tabled in my name for this stage of the Bill. If there be any fears among your Lordships that this means that we are to have as heavy and as bitterly contested a Report stage as we did on the Theft Bill I should like to put those fears at rest immediately. These Amendments have been tabled to give effect to a compromise which, I am delighted to say, has been reached since the Committee stage; a compromise which I understand is as acceptable to the Government as it is to the City. Here I hope that your Lordships will permit me to pay tribute to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor for the part that he has played in reaching this compromise. I need not remind your Lordships of the occasions when we have had to speak on different sides or of the battles that we have fought in your Lordships' House. In view of the fact that we have had to fight so many battles in the past (and no doubt we shall fight many more in the future) it gives me particular pleasure on this occasion to be able to say that for once we are agreed.
Your Lordships will remember that in Committee we discussed an Amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, which sought to preserve the position of the Lord Mayor and aldermen of the City of London in relation to the administration of justice in the City. I think it true to say that if there had been a Division that Amendment would have been carried by a substantial majority. And if that had happened the Amendment would have gone to the House of Commons which had already considered and rejected a similar Amendment. It seemed to me before we had our Committee stage that the chances of another place changing their attitude were slight, and that although we might carry that Amendment in this House, the battle might ultimately be lost and the City would be the losers. That is why I tabled my Amendment in Committee, the Amendment which is now substantially embodied in Clause 1(2).
It went a long way to meet the views expressed by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor. It made it possible for the Lord Mayor and aldermen to sit with lay justices. It provided for their being created justices by their ancient Charter. The point, and the only point, on which we parted completely on Committee stage was with regard to the last part of the Amendment I proposed—namely, the provision that the Lord Mayor should be ex officio chairman of the justices and that all the aldermen should be deputy chairmen. The argument put forward was that, if that were so, there would be no opportunity for a lay justice appointed to the City of London, no matter how well qualified or how experienced, ever to preside over a bench. I confess that I thought that there was force in that argument. It seemed to me that it would be most unfortunate if, on that narrow issue, a compromise which had been so nearly reached could not be achieved.
After Committee stage I was considering whether steps could be taken to meet that point, which I recognised had force in it, when the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, whose mind perhaps had been working in the same way as mine, in seeking to secure that an amicable solution could be reached, asked me to see him; and it is as a

847
result of our conversations that these Amendments have been tabled.
If I may explain their effect quite shortly, it is this. The Lord Mayor and aldermen of the City of London will continue to be ex officio justices of the City of London by virtue of their ancient Charter, a Charter to which, rightly, they attach considerable importance. But their position as justices will differ in no respects, other than those I have mentioned, from the position of ordinary justices. They will be subject to the same age limits and conditions with regard to the supplemental list and matters of that sort. They will sit with lay justices. The Lord Mayor will be ex officio chairman and will preside when he sits. If these Amendments I am about to move are carried, the Bill will provide that the Lord Mayor will continue to be the Chief Magistrate of the City. It is in that capacity that the Lord Mayor goes down to the Law Courts to be sworn in before the Lord Chief Justice.
With regard to the aldermen the Amendments provide that the senior aldermen—that is to say, those who have passed the chair—will, ex officio, be deputy chairmen, up to the number of eight. If there are more than eight, the others will not be ex officio deputy chairmen, and those who have most recently passed the chair will be the eight deputy chairmen. They will form about one-third of the total number of deputy chairmen. The others will be elected in the ordinary way. In this way there is ample provision for the election of lay justices to the office of deputy chairman. All those who are not ex officio justices are eligible in this way. I think that this is satisfactory.
May I now turn to what the Amendments do to this clause? They create a power to issue a commission of the peace for the City of London as if it were a county. That will enable the appointment of lay justices. It has one further' significance. Making a commission of peace for the county enables the justices, be they lay or ex officio, to attend at the City Quarter Sessions. If it were commission of the peace for a borough, that would not be possible.
Most of what I have said is covered by Amendment No. 10 to Schedule 1, but I thought it right to give your Lordships
848
a brief summary of what this compromise achieves, and to commend it to your Lordships. I hope that it will be accepted and speedily passed into the Bill. I do not think that it is necessary for me to say anything more on Amendments Nos. 2, 3 and 4, and perhaps they can be taken together. I beg to move the first Amendment.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 22, at end insert the said words.—(Viscount Dilhorne.)
5.16 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I agree that all the Amendments which stand in the name of the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, can be discussed together. As he made clear, they cover three points: first, whether the Lord Mayor and aldermen of the City of London should be justices ex officio or be appointed by the Advisory Committee secondly, the Lord Mayor's title as a justice, and, thirdly, the question of deputy chairmen.
I have made it plain throughout that in the Government's view anybody appointed to a judicial office should be chosen on his merits and not because he holds some other office. On the other hand, I have always been realistic about this. On the Second Reading of the Bill I said:
"I cannot conceive of a state of affairs in which any advisory committee for the City of London would not include among its recommendations for appointment all the aldermen of the City of London."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 29/4/68, col. 931.]
When the noble and learned Viscount moved his Amendment on Committee stage on this point I said that, while I preferred that they should be appointed on their merits, had this been the only point in the Amendment I would have accepted it. Therefore, I accept it now. The second question is whether the Lord Mayor should be chairman of the justices, with the title of Chief Magistrate. We know that the City are interested in titles and ceremony, and that does no harm at all and there is no reason why I should object to that.
Let me now come to the question of deputy chairmen. As the House will remember, the original Amendment would have provided that the Lord Mayor and aldermen had a monopoly of the deputy chairmanships. For two courts,

849
sitting six days a week, one would only allow 75 justices; and, sitting in threes, this means about 25 deputy chairmen. There are 26 aldermen. As I pointed out, it could not be right that an alderman who was selected only yesterday should perform the difficult task of taking the chair if there was another experienced justice who could be deputy chairman. I might also have added that it would have made it impossible for me to get people to be justices in the City, because most, though perhaps not all, hope that if they sit regularly and do well, the day will come, after years, when they will be appointed deputy chairmen, and I could not ask people to sit in the City of London, alone of anywhere in the country, knowing that, however long they sat, and however well they did, they would never become deputy chairman.
It is now suggested that the Lord Mayor and the eight ex-Lord Mayors should be deputy chairmen. I believe that there are just over twenty aldermen who sit, because some of them are too infirm to do so. I am not sure that eight ought not to be six: eight will give them a little more than perhaps their fair proportion. But, in substance, it means that the aldermen will have their fair proportion—and perhaps a bit more—while the other justices will in substance have their proportions. I feel that this is a happy compromise, which I can recommend my noble friends to accept and which I hope will be welcome in all quarters of the House. I was quite sincere when I saw a deputation of the aldermen and told them I was quite sure that they would like sitting with other justices. I am equally sure now that after two or three months the aldermen will say: "What mugs we were to get up that enormous campaign! How much more interesting it is to be able to talk over the cases with people who have had other experience than it was when we used to sit in great grandeur entirely on our own!" I hope that it will so prove.
I should like to thank the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, who has done so much to achieve this compromise. I am sure that the whole House is grateful to him for it. It is always better to agree things if one can, and, as I have said, the association between the Lord Chancellor and the City of London
850
is, after all, a very long one. As the House knows, my distinguished predecessors have included three Saints and one woman. In particular, if may mention St. Swithin, the allegation that he "mucked about" the weather I indignantly deny; but when hi: was appointed Chancellor in 827 he put a tax on the City of London, and of course they did not like that. So in this long history of association we have at times had our ups and downs. On the whole, however, the relationship between the Chancellor and the City has been cordial, and I hope that this compromise accepted to-day will lead to a long continuation of that cordial relationship.
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, I cannot think that the aldermen will ever think of themselves as having been "mugs" for having got up a campaign, because if they had not done so I feel sure that this happy compromise would never have been worked out.
LORD LEATHERLAND: My Lords, in view of the discussion we had yesterday, when it was drawn to the attention of the House that certain noble Lords had made long speeches, I hereby declare on my own behalf that I now introduce the era of shorter speeches. But on the Second Reading of this Bill I did speak at some length, mainly against the propositions that were advanced by the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne. I think the line that I took on that occasion was that it was not right that the City aldermen should sit alone; it was not right that the City Corporation should have the monopoly of local government administration, should have a monopoly of the administration of justice by monopolising the bench, and should also have a virtual monopoly of the control of the police inside their area. I think that was rather too authoritarian for our liking. But these negotiations that have proceeded between the two sides have, I think, produced a happy solution to what was a very difficult and delicate question.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 2.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 23, leave out from beginning to end of line 2 on page 2.—(Viscount Dilhorne.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 3.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 38, leave out from ("is") to ("mayor") in line 39.—(Viscount Dilhorne.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 4.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 8, leave out subsection (8).—(Viscount Dilhorne.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 2 [Age for transfer of justice to supplemental list, or for retirement of stipendiary magistrate]:
THE LORD CHANCELLORmoved, in subsection (4), to leave out "a petty sessional division of justices" and insert "the justices in a petty sessions area". The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, your Lordships will remember that at the Committee stage of the Bill the noble Lord, Lord Swaythling, moved an Amendment the effect of which was to provide that instead of a chairman being put on the supplemental list on the day on which he reached the age of retirement, he should continue in office until the end of the year. This looked administratively convenient, though it meant that the chairman, on average, will not retire until he reaches retiring age plus six months. It seemed to me that there were some things to be said for this proposal and some against, and I left it to the Committee to decide; and the Committee, as the speeches tended to show, assisted by the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Cumnor, decided that it should be accepted. So I accepted the Amendment.
There are, however, two small technical defects in it, on which I have communicated with the noble Lord, Lord Swaythling, and he has been good enough to agree. The first is that the Amendment as put forward by the noble Lord referred to "petty sessional divisions". Of course, that would apply only in the counties, and this Amendment provides instead for the words, "the justices in a petty sessions area". If it is convenient for me to mention the second point at the same time, I would point out that under the Bill, as amended, the chairman's office would come to an end on Decem-
852
ber 31. That would give rise to the difficulty that it would automatically happen at the first moment of December 31, and there would not be a chairman left at all for that particular day. There are, in addition, other technical difficulties. It is to meet them that it is proposed to leave out the date and insert instead:
"expiration or sooner determination of the term for which he holds office on that date".
That cures those technical defects. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 4, line 31, leave out from ("of") and insert ("the justices in a pretty sessions area").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
LORD SWAYTHLING: My Lords, I did not have the opportunity at the Committee stage to thank the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor for accepting the Amendment. Therefore I should like to do so now and to express my gratitude to him for making this Amendment, and the next one to subsection (4) of Clause 2, which I am sure your Lordships will accept.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I have dealt with Amendment No. 6. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 4, line 35, leave out from ("the") to end and insert ("expiration or sooner determination of the term for which he holds office on that date").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 5 [Justices' clerks]:
THE LORD CHANCELLORmoved, in subsection (3), to leave out "on questions of law" and insert "about law, practice or procedure on questions". The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment and Amendment No. 8 are two Amendments intended to meet criticisms of the wording of this clause which were first raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Parker of Waddington, on the Second Reading of the Bill; and we had some further discussion about it on the Committee stage. Unless any Member of your Lordships' House wishes me to deal with the matter in detail, I do not think I need do so. It is a question of wording. My main concern has been to see that whatever wording

853
was put forward received the approval of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chief Justice and of the Magistrates Clerks' Society. The form of words now proposed has the approval of both. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 6, line 12, leave out ("on questions of law") and insert ("about law, practice or procedure on questions").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I have already covered this Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 6, line 17, leave out from ("bring") to end of line 18, and insert ("to the attention of the justices or justice any point of law, practice or procedure that is or may be involved in any question so arising; but the enactment of this subsection shall not be taken as defining or in any respect limiting the powers and duties belonging to a justice's clerk or the matters on which justices may obtain assistance from their clerk.").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 7 [Commencement, and power to provide for transitional matters]:
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, this Amendment is simply an Amendment to make it possible to bring in on an appointed day the Schedule which is the subject of Amendment No. 10, as there is power to do in relation to the other Schedules. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 6, line 41, after ("1") insert ("Justices of the Peace in the City of London)").—(Viscount Dilhorne.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
5.30 p.m.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE VISCOUNT DILHORNE rose to move, after Schedule 1, to insert the following new Schedule:
Justices of the Peace in the City of London
1. The persons holding office as justice of the peace for the City of London shall constitute a single body of justices, without distinction between those holding office by virtue of the charter and those appointed by the commission of the peace, and the powers and jurisdiction of the Lord Mayor and aldermen as justices by virtue of the charter shall be the same in all respects as those of justices appointed by the commission.
2.—(1) Subject to paragraph 4 below, the Lord Mayor for the time being shall be chairman of the justices, with the style of Chief Magistrate, instead of a chairman being elected under section 13(2) of the Justices of the Peace Act 1949; and the aldermen who have been Lord Mayor and are not disqualified for the office of deputy chairman (or, if there are more than eight such aldermen, tie eight who were last Lord Mayor) shall le deputy chairmen in addition to any deputy chairmen elected under section 13(2).
(2) Section 13(3) and (4) of the Justices of the Peace Act 1949 shall apply to any Lord Mayor or alderman as chairman or deputy chairman of the justices as they apply to a chairman or deputy chairman elected under section 13(2)
3. Section 4 of the Justices of the Peace Act 1949 (which provides for the entry in the supplemental list kept in connection with a commission of the peace of the names of certain persons appointed justices by the commission) shall in the City of London apply to persons holding office by virtue of the charter as it is to apply to those appointed by the commission of the peace; and accordingly paragraph 2(1) above shall no: apply to any Lord Mayor or alderman whose name is entered in the supplemental list.
4. In the event of a Lord Mayor being disqualified for the chairmanship of the justices, then during his mayoralty the senior of the aldermen designated as deputy chairmen in paragraph 2(1) above shall, instead of being a deputy chairman, be chairman of the justices as acting Chief Magistrates; but section 2(4) of this Act shall apply in relation to the Lord Mayor as Chief Magistrate and to am acting Chief Magistrate as it applies to chairmen elected under section 13 of the Justices of the Peace Act 1949."
The noble and learned Viscount said: My Lords, I have already explained to the House to a considerable extent what this Schedule seeks to effect. I perhaps should reiterate that, apart from the ex officio provisions, the ordinary Law as to supplemental lists, age limits, and so on, will apply to the ex officio justices just as it does to those who are appointed to the commission. There are, however, two points to which I must draw attention, because I shall seek, with your Lordships' agreement, to more this Amendment with slight alterations to the words as printed in the Marshalled List. I think the changes have been agreed.
In paragraph 4 of the new Schedule as printed your Lordships will sec that if a Lord Mayor is disqualified for the chairmanship of the justices:
"then during his mayoralty the alderman who was last Lord Mayor and is riot so disqualified shall he chairman…as acting Chief Magistrate".

855
That provides for what I should have thought was a very unlikely event, of a Lord Mayor being disqualified by age or infirmity, or for any other reason, from acting as chairman of justices or Chief Magistrate. So it was thought that if that did occur, which was very unlikely, it would be best that the acting Chief Magistrate should be the immediate ex-Lord Mayor. But then it was realised that the custom is, after the Lord Mayor has finished his year of office, to give him six months' leave of absence from performance of his City functions—and I dare say that he has earned it and wants it very badly. It would therefore be very odd to say that you would have as acting Chief Magistrate a man who had in the year following his year of office six months' leave of absence.
Therefore, it is proposed, if your Lordships will agree, to provide that, if the Lord Mayor is himself disqualified, then during that period of his office the senior alderman past the Chair, who is ex officio a deputy chairman, and who is not disqualified, should be acting Chief Magistrate. To do that one has to make a very slight Amendment to my proposed new paragraph 4 as printed and I have handed in to the Clerks a manuscript Amendment: that is, in line 2 of the proposed new paragraph 4 as shown on the Marshalled List, to leave out from the second "the" to the end of line 3, and insert:
"senior of the aldermen designated as deputy chairmen in paragraph 2(1) above shall, instead of being a deputy chairman,".
I have no doubt your Lordships have found that perfectly easy to follow. The effect will be that paragraph 4, with that change, will therefore read as follows:
"In the event of a Lord Mayor being disqualified for the chairmanship of the justices, then during his mayoralty the senior of the aldermen designated as deputy chairman in paragraph 2(1) above shall, instead of being a deputy chairman, be chairman of the justices as acting Chief Magistrate; but section 2(41 of this Act shall apply in relation to the Lord Mayor as Chief Magistrate and to any acting Chief Magistrate as it applies to chairmen elected under section 13 of the Justices of the Peace Act 1949."
LORD ROWLEY: My Lords, before the noble and learned Viscount continues, is it possible that there might not be a senior alderman past the Chair; and should the Amendment not be even wider
856
than that to bring in a lay deputy chairman?
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: We thought not, for the actual chairmanship—the acting Chief Magistrate which has a particular provision. This particular provision is ex abundanti cautila, because I think it very unlikely in these days you would ever have a Lord Mayor either disqualified or incapacitated actually acting as a Chief Magistrate. But that amendment means a slight amendment also to paragraph 2(1); namely,
"to leave out the words 'and are available for the purpose' and insert in their place not disqualified for the office of deputy chairman'"
Then we require to leave out the words "each of". That is really in the nature of drafting and consequential. So, if I may, I move the Amendment, No. 10, in the new form.
Amendment moved—
After Schedule 1, insert the said new Schedule.—(Viscount Dilhorne.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I have of course seen the changes which the noble and learned Viscount wishes to make in the Amendment as shown in the Marshalled List, and I have agreed them with him. The Question is that the new Schedule, in the form proposed by the noble and learned Viscount, be agreed to.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Schedule 2 [Supplementary Provisions as to City of London and local Act stipendiaries]:
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: It may be that your Lordships would think it right—it is a matter for the noble and learned Viscount—to take Amendments Nos. 11 to 20 en bloc.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, that suggestion is agreeable to me, and will be also, I think, to the House as a whole. These are all consequential Amendments on the other Amendment—with perhaps the exception of Amendment No. 13, which provides that no order shall be made for the division of the City of London into petty sessional divisions. The reason is this. If an order were made for the City of London to be divided into petty sessional divisions the Chief Magistrate would then be Chief Magistrate of one petty sessional division and

857
not of the City as a whole. That is not what is intended, and so special provision is made so that that cannot happen. Having explained that point, I think that all these Amendments could be put en bloc. I beg to move.
Amendments moved—
Page 9, line 15, leave out from first ("peace") to ("shall") in line 16 and insert ("holding office as provided by that section")
Page 9, line 15, line 19, leave out ("so issued") and insert ("issued for the City")
Page 10, line 38, at end insert ("; nor shall paragraph 3 above authorise the making of an order under section 18 of that Act for the division of the City into petty sessional divisions.")
Page 11, line 23, leave out from ("when") to ("to") in line 25 and insert ("by virtue of section 1 of this Act persons appointed by a commission of the peace are to take office as justices of the peace for the City.")
Page 11, line 27, leave out ("(and no others)")
Page 11, line 32, leave out from beginning to ("justices") and insert ("of")
Page 11, line 33, leave out ("persons thereby designated as")
Page 11, line 39, leave out ("persons") and insert ("justices")
Page 11, line 39, leave out lines 44 to 46 and insert—
("10.—(1) At the time from which persons are first appointed justices of the peace for the City by a commission of the peace in accordance with section 1 of this Act,—")
Page 11, line 48, leave out ("new").
On Question, Amendments agreed to.
Schedule 4 [Enactments repealed]:
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 21.
Amendment moved—
Page 19, line 8, column 3, at end insert ("except in relation to the City of London.")—(Viscount Dilhorne.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, Amendment No. 22 is consequential upon the repeal of Section 45(2)(c) of the Criminal Justice Act 1948. This is to be repealed on the enactment of Clause 1(9), which abolishes the arrangement for appointing stipendiary magistrates under local Acts of Parliament. Section 45(2)(c) of the 1948 Act provides that for the purposes of the Act relating to probation an area which is not a petty
858
sessional division may be designated as such by the Secretary of State. The provision relates only to the area of the jurisdiction of a local Act stipendiary magistrate. Subsection (3) merely empowers the Secretary of State to adjust the administrative arrangements for probation Provided in the Act to accommodate the special circumstances of a local Act stipendiary area. It should therefore also be repealed. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 19, line 49, column 3, at end insert ("and (3)")—(The Lord Chancellor.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 23, which is consequential.
Amendment moved—
Page 21, line 25, column 3, after ("(2)(b)") insert ("except in relation to the City of London").—(Viscount Dilhorne.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.

TRADE DESCRIPTIONS (No. 2) BILL [H.L.]
5.40 p.m.
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF PUBLIC BUILDING AND WORKS LORD WINTERROTTOM): My Lords, I beg to move that the Commons Amendments be now considered. In moving this Motion, I should like to draw your Lordships' attention to an error in Amendment 29. The words "(and 32)" should read
"and section (compensation for loss, etc. of goods seized under s. 27)",
which is the correct way of describing the clause which will now become Section 33. I beg to move.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, is the noble Lord proposing to move the Amendments together?
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, I have not made that request, but I understand a suggestion to this effect may be made at a later stage.
Moved, That the Commons Amendments be now considered.—(Lord Winterbottom.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
[References are to Bill 77 as first printed for the Commons.]
[No. 1]
Clause 2, page 2, line 13, at beginning insert ("approval by any person or").
LORD WINTER BOTTOM: My Lords, this Amendment widens Clause 2(1)(g) to cover the special case that arises where, for example, a claim is made that an encyclopedia has been approved by the local education authority. We were advised that this could scarcely be regarded as an indication that the book conforms with a type approved but that it is, rather, an indication that the literary content of the book—and thus every book having that literary content—was approved. The Amendment fills this gap. I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Lord Winterbottom.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
[Nos. 2 and 3]
Clause 2, page 2, line 33, leave out line 33
Clause 2, page 2, line 43, at beginning insert ("any description applied in pursuance of the Fertilisers and Feeding Stuffs Act 1926 to an article included in the first column of Schedule 1 to that Act")
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, with the leave of the House I will move these two Amendments together. They correct a mistake in Clause 2(4). This originally exempted all descriptions applied to goods in pursuance of the Fertilisers and Feeding Stuffs Act 1926 from being trade descriptions under this Bill. In fact, however, it is only descriptions applied to articles included in Schedule 1 to the 1926 Act which may be the subject of a criminal offence under that Act. The Amendment narrows the exemption accordingly. I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(Lord Winterbottom.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
[No. 4]
Clause 11, page 6, line 41, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—
("(a) an indication that goods were previously offered at a higher price or at a particular price—

(i) shall be treated as an indication that they were so offered by the person giving the indication, unless it is expressly stated that they were so offered by others and it is not expressed or implied that they were, or might have been, so offered also by that person; and

(ii) shall be treated, unless the contrary is expressed, as an indication that they were so offered within the preceding six months for a continuous period of not less than twenty-eight days").

LORD WINTER BOTTOM: My Lords, this Amendment elaborates the general rule laid down in paragraph (a) of subsection (3) for the interpretation of indications of the price at which goods have previously been offered. Its chief purpose is to deal with ambigious indications, so that shoppers will be able to know whether any price reduction claimed represents a reduction on the seller's own previous price and is, therefore, one that may be trusted because it is subject to the provisions of subsection (1). The House will recall that when it was earlier discussing this clause my noble friend Lord Brown mentioned the desirability of finding some better means of ensuring that the public would know which kinds of price-claim could be trusted and which must be viewed with caution. The Amendment will help to ensure that.
Ambiguity arises when a claim that prices have been reduced is framed in such a way that it is not clear whether the reduced price is being compared with the price at which the seller has previously offered the goods or with a price which has been or is being charged for such goods by someone else. Either meaning is possible, and one is not more likely than the other. In these circumstances the shopper is encouraged to think that the reduction may well be a genuine one in the sense that the seller has cut his own price, but he cannot be sure that the reference is not to some other—and quite possibly meaningless—comparison. Moreover, if such ambiguity were permitted, it would be impossible to bring a successful prosecution against a dishonest supplier who had in fact

861
previously sold the goods at a lower price than the one with which he was now comparing, because he could always say that the price in question was the other person's, not his own—and we have unfortunately not been able to bring false comparisons with other people's prices within the scope of this clause.
Sub-paragraph (i) of the Amendment would prevent these ambiguous claims by ensuring that if an indication is given of the previous price of any goods it shall be treated as an indication of the seller's own previous price unless he makes it absolutely clear that it is not. He will not be allowed to say or imply that it may be his own former price or that it may be something else. Sub-paragraph (ii) of the Amendment restates the original provision of subsection (3)(a), with one modification. It provides that an indication of the previous price of any goods shall be treated, unless the contrary is expressed, as an indication that they were offered at that price within the preceding six months for a continuous period of not less than twenty-eight days instead of, as originally, for a substantial period. The reason for the change is to avoid possible uncertainties about what period is or is not substantial and to enable traders and enforcing authorities to know precisely for how long goods must have been offered at the previous price before a reduction can be claimed, and for how long thereafter it is allowable to continue to make the claim. I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Lord Winterbottom.)
LORD HAWKE: My Lords, this Amendment, which has been made to what I shall always regard as a remarkably silly clause, will create further anomalies. By including a period of 28 days it will preclude the retailer who has managed to get a line of particular goods, sold them at a certain price and sold them out quickly—perhaps in five days—from buying another line and being able to say that these are at a shilling less than he had sold them last week, because he had not sold the others for 28 days, not having had them in stock for 28 days. I will not go over the arguments against the clause in general. It is what I describe
862
as a "spoilsport clause". It will spoil any form of sales as normally undertaken, and I suspect it is intended to affect the competition among the High Street grocers, whereas the people who will really suffer are the departmental stores.
LORD DONALDSON OF KINGSBRIDGE: My Lords, this Amendment seems to me to be a strengthening of a weak clause. I do not want to seem ungrateful by niggling at this clause. Those of your Lordships who have worked so hard to get this Bill through in its improved form will know how much my predecessor at the Consumer Council, the noble Baroness, Lady Elliot of Harwood, has done, and it would be ungrateful if we did not express our pleasure that the Government have got this Bill into its present form. But though we welcome it without reservation, we have on Clause 11(4) one or two points which uncharitable people might think of as reservations. It seems to us to leave open to traders a number of simple variants which could have been covered and which have not been so covered, such as, for example, "The West End price is 25s, and ours is 19s. 11d.", or "The price elsewhere is 25s, and our price is 19s. 11d.". That kind of thing, if false, ought to be caught by the Bill, but as we see the position it is not. Having said that, I must say that we support the Amendment as it strengthens the clause, but in our opinion it does not go as far as it could have gone.
5.48 p.m.
BARONESS BURTON OF COVENTRY: My Lords, with regard to Amendment No. 4, which I gather we are discussing —and I must apologise to your Lordships for having come in so late—may say that I find the whole clause unsatisfactory. The Ministers have repeated this statement through this House and through debates elsewhere. I feel that they are allowing the Bill to go forward with a clause about double pricing which every dishonest retailer and every dishonest manufacturer will be able to sidestep. I believe—and I say this very strongly to my noble friend on the Front Bench—that however small this minority may be, I believe that the clause as it stands at present is an invitation to fraud, and I am wondering whether the Board of Trade, or the Minister who presumably will reply on behalf of the Board of

863
Trade, realise the tremendous temptation that is being provided by them to evade this clause.
I wonder whether my noble friends' advisers would not agree that the simple use of the word "elsewhere" would solve the problem for those wishing to defraud. Would I not be correct in saying that all that such retailers will have to do will be to say, "Our price 29s. 11d., elsewhere 39s. 11d."? In such a case I believe that I am correct in assuming that this dishonesty would have complete protection under Clause 11(3)(a)(i). If so—and I am sure the Minister will give me an answer when he comes to reply—this is not a very satisfactory state of affairs, and I am wondering whether the Government really wish to open the door to such fraudulent practices. I hone that my noble friend will give me an answer to that.
While we are on phrases like this, I wonder what the Minister feels about the term "list price". Obviously this can apply equally to the manufacturer's price or the retailer's price. It seems to me, and I shall be glad if I am told I am incorrect, that this could well be another means of defence. I am wondering whether I am right in assuming that the expression "list price", as well as two others that we have discussed a good deal in this Bill—that is "worth" and "value"—are not affected by Clause 11 and these Amendments we are discussing. If I am right in this—I hope I am not—I am wondering what the Board of Trade intends to do about such expressions. If they are not caught by Clause 11 and these Amendments we are discussing at the moment. I am sure my noble friend will know they could be defined and regulated by definition orders under Clause 7, by marking orders under Clause 8 or by information orders under Clause 9. I hope that my noble friend will be able to give me an answer to this.
I do not know whether I might ask for guidance on this point. Our Rules of Order are very lax; people are kind, and I apologise for being late. I will ask my noble friend on the Front Bench whether we are discussing Amendments Nos. 4 and 5 or only No. 4?
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: No. 4.
BARONESS BURTON OF COVENTRY: I thank my noble friend.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Lord for having introduced this Amendment. I must say that I do not altogether share the fears of my noble friend Lord Hawke on this subject. It seems to me that the purpose of the clause has now been made fairly clear; that is, unless the contrary is stated any comparison between prices is to be taken as a comparison with a price at which the same seller had been previously selling. And, what is more, again unless there is a contrary indication—you may have any kind of indication you like—that is a price at which he has been selling for a continuous period of 28 days. My own view is that this is about as satisfactory as one could get that provision in this sphere. We shall have to see how it works out.
With regard to what the noble Lord, Lord Donaldson, said, I think it is fairly obvious that if the Board of Trade had been able to discover a formula for dealing with false comparative prices we should have had it before us now. I suppose we are to some extent ourselves to blame for not being able to suggest a formula to the Board of Trade on this matter. But there is, of course, a difference in character between the price at which the same person sold previously and the price at which other people are selling elsewhere, in that at that point in time the shoppers can go round the corner and see the prices elsewhere and they can check for themselves. Of the two evils, quite plainly the Government have dealt with the more serious one, and I hope the House would support them.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENT
[No. 5]
Clause 11, page 6, line 45, at end insert—
("(b) an indication as to a recommended price—

(i) shall be treated, unless the contrary is expressed, as an indication that it is a price recommended by the manufacturer or producer; and

(ii) shall be treated, unless the contrary is expressed, as an indication that it is a price recommended generally for supply by retail in the area where the goods are offered.")

LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, this Amendment is designed to strengthen the prohibition in subsection (1) of false comparisons with a recommended price, by stipulating the meaning which is—in the absence of an express indication to the contrary—to be attached to references to a recommended price. The first subparagraph of the Amendment provides that an unqualified indication of a recommended price is to be treated as referring to a price recommended by the manufacturer or producer of the goods. This is what most people think of as the ordinary meaning of a recommended price. The provision would not prevent the quotation of other kinds of price recommendation. But if the recommendation quoted was by someone other than the manufacturer or producer—that is to say, by a wholesaler or an importer—it would be necessary to say so expressly. The public would then be clear about the origin of the recommended price.
The second sub-paragraph provides that a recommended price—by whoever it is recommended—shall normally be taken to be a price recommended generally for the retail sale of the goods in the area where the goods are offered. If anyone quotes a recommended price which has not been so recommended, he will, again, be obliged to make the limited nature of the recommendation clear. This Amendment is, as I am sure my noble friend will agree, by no means a complete answer to the problem of "phoney" recommended prices. We have regretfully concluded that there is no practicable way of dealing, in this legislation, with the case where a manufacturer recommends a price to all retailers but at an unrealistically high level. But it would help to check the sort of deception where a grossly excessive price is recommended by a complaisant supplier to just one or a few retailers. Consumers will obviously be better able to assess the worth of claims related to recommended prices if it always has to be clearly stated when the recommendation has been made by someone other than the manufacturer or producer and when it has been made, not to the generality of retailers, but only to selected people.
I should explain that the reference in the second sub-paragraph of the Amendment to the area in which the goods are offered is intended to cater for those
866
commodities where marked differences in costs of distribution lead manufacturers to recommend retail prices at different levels in different parts of the country. I beg to move.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Lord Winterbottom.)
BARONESS BURTON OF COVENTRY: My Lords, I realise that when we are discussing these Amendments of course we have to keep strictly to the Amendment, but did not know this meant that the Minister did not reply to questions asked. I find myself somewhat nonplussed in regard to the previous remarks I made, in which I asked questions in all sincerity and got no answer at all. There is obviously nothing I can do about it, but I should be glad if my noble friend, if he does reply, could perhaps answer the points I wish to put now concerning Amendment No. 5.
I am not proposing to repeat to-night the examples of "phoney" recommended prices that I have given in previous debates on the Bill. These were quite unanswerable, and the Government did not try to answer them or to excuse them. I gathered from what the Minister has said that these phoney recommended prices, which I gave last time and which others gave are not covered by this Amendment No. 5 because, I am informed, the Government cannot do so. I do not think this is good enough. I must confess that I find myself completely nonplussed about the attitude of a Government which is against resale price maintenance and yet so in favour of protecting recommended prices. This seems to me quite extraordinary. I am against resale price maintenance, and I am against "phoney" recommended prices, because I think these are an invitation to defraud the shopper. If it seems impossible to the Government to differentiate between "phoney" recommended prices and genuine recommended prices then what I have been saying for a long time is that the phrase "recommended price" should not have the protection of the law.
I do not know whether it is a case of the Government being slow of understanding or whether I am bad at explaining, but I should have thought that if the Government wished to keep the term

867
"recommended price", all right; anybody should be able to use it. You can say that something has wonderful value. What I am objecting to is that the term "recommended price" should be able to be used by a defendant at law; because I maintain that the "phoney" recommended price is absolute dishonesty.
I have here, and I will show it to the Minister afterwards, if he wishes, a price ticket of 39s. 11d. for a shirt. This particular price ticket is a completely "phoney" one. It is used all over the country on shirts which are sold retail. Great emphasis is laid in these shops and in window displays and at the point of sale, that "The retail price here is only £1"; that, "This is a great bargain. Shop here and save money". Regarding the price of £1, experts tell me that this is probably just about right although a little on the high side, for which, will the Minister note, the recommended price is 39s. 11d.
These price tags, of which the one I have here is an example, are tags that come with the boxes of shirts from the manufacturer to the retailer. The shirts are boxed and each shirt has one of these tags tucked inside. These tags are recommended prices from the manufacturers to the retailers. I am sure, as all men will know much better than I do, although they may not buy this particular type of shirt, that in the shop these shirts have a price tag tucked into the front inside a most attractive box or packet in cellophane. I believe that men find it difficult to get the cellophane off, but that is beside the point. On this tag it says 39s. 11d., but the price to the customer is only £1—due to the generosity of the retailer, presumably selling at a loss. This really is a complete nonsense, my Lords. What is more, I think it is fraudulent nonsense.
If I could have an answer to this point I should be glad: I wonder whether the Government realise that all these people will have to do when this Bill becomes an Act, if this Amendment we are discussing now goes through, is to take the price tag here of 39s. 11d. and put on it the words "Recommended price", or "Made to sell at", and they will be home and dry under this Bill. This sort of abuse will be repeated over and over
868
again. I need not tell everybody that; we know it will.
I protest most strongly that the Government—I am sorry that it is my Government: I should be equally sorry if it were a Tory Government, but it seems to me that it is even worse that it should be my Government—should allow this sort of abuse to go on the Statute Book. Would my noble friend tell me whether I am right in saying, with regard to price tags like this, that if this Amendment is passed it will allow them to put on "Recommended price" or "Made to sell at" and be home and dry? Further, does he not agree with me in all honesty that such fraudulent practices should be stopped?
LORD DONALDSON OF KINGS-BRIDGE: My Lords, I should like in a more pale and far more gentle way to echo some of the remarks of my noble friend Lady Burton, but I should like to take issue with her shortly. I do not think the solution to her problem is to remove from the Bill the recommended price, because that means that if there were a recommended price and you told a lie about it you would not necessarily be caught. I think it is necessary to keep in the recommended price. But we feel that the Government were a little too easily discouraged by the difficulty in finding a legal formula. Lawyers do sometimes take a long time, but I think that if given time, they eventually find an answer. We believe the Government wanted the answer as much as we did, but, frankly, we think they were fainthearted. We feel fairly certain that new legislation will be required within the next year or two. We freely offer our services to assist the Government in finding a formula that will catch this real evil which my noble friend has so vividly illustrated. We hope that something of the kind will eventually be done.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, this is a case where I am bound to say that I regret that the Government did not accept my original suggestion, that we should use the words "genuine and current recommended price". I should have thought that the courts would have been quite capable of interpreting those words. But we should like to hear from the noble Lord whether in fact the recommended prices will have to be genuine and current.
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, I hope that my noble friend Lady Burton of Coventry will not accuse me of discourtesy. I was trying to inform myself adequately so that I could give her an adequate reply to her questions. At this late stage of the Bill I believe that both Houses of Parliament have done their best to provide a text, which is as rascal-proof as is possible. After all, we had a most thorough debate in this House. I remember at this stage the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Hawke.
Clause 11 is probably one of the most difficult clauses to define; its intentions are the most difficult to legislate for. Both Houses of Parliament have done their best to produce a text which is as rogue-proof as possible. My noble friend has accused us of incompetence and of not in fact achieving that particular end. All I can say is that we in both Houses have done our best to draft a Bill, and when it becomes law I presume that it will be up to the various organisations who set out to protect the consumers to institute prosecutions under the Bill if they think that the Bill is being evaded; and presumably the adequacy of our definitions will then be proved or disproved in the courts. I cannot see any other way out of the difficulty at this moment.
The offer of my noble friend to assist the Government after the Bill has passed into law in the drafting of future or amending legislation I accept with gratitude. He, too, will doubtless watch the interests of the consumer and will perhaps institute prosecutions if he finds that this particular clause is being evaded by the methods which have been described by my noble friend Lady Burton. I think that today I cannot do more than commend this particular Amendment to the House as it is, as the best draft that we can produce for your Lordships after the Bill has passed through both Houses. I am sorry I cannot do more than that.
BARONESS BURTON OF COVENTRY: Perhaps I might say that I would never accuse my noble friend of discourtesy, but I am sure that, even with the utmost courtesy, he cannot think that he has answered the point I put to him. I asked a specific question as to whether, if these "phoney" recommended prices had put on them "recommended price" or "Made to sell at" when this Bill became law, they would then be outside the scope
870
of this Bill. I asked for an answer on that. With the greatest respect, I have not had it.
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, the best I can do is to take legal advice on the subject and write to my noble friend subsequently.
BARONESS BURTON OF COVENTRY: My Lords, that will not affect the Bill.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENT
[No. 6]
Clause 12, page 7, line 8, after ("are") insert ("or are of a kind")
6.10 p.m.
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 6. It might be to the convenience of the House if your Lordships would agree that we consider Amendments Nos. 6 and 8 together. These two Amendments are linked and can conveniently be taken together. Their purpose is to tidy up Clause 12 by keeping all the offences concerning Royalty together in one clause while making subsection (3) into a separate clause. The first Amendment, No. 6, would extend subsection (1) to cover false indications that goods or services are of a kind supplied to members of the Royal Family. The second Amendment would then separate off the two subsections relating to false indications of Royal patronage, approval and award from subsection (3), which would become a new clause dealing with false indications that goods or services are of a kind supplied to any person. We think this arrangement would be more logical and, because what has hitherto been Clause 12(3) would consequently be mentioned separately in the "Arrangement of Sections" index at the front, would make it easier for persons referring to the Bill in later years to see that it contains provisions dealing with false representations about the supply of goods and services to persons other than Royalty.
An incidental effect of the Amendments would be to narrow the offence in subsection (3) of Clause 20 of assisting or inducing the commission in another country of an act which, if committed here, would be an offence under Clause 12, so that it would not extend to false claims that goods are of a kind supplied to any private person. This change is

871
consistent with the purpose of Clause 20 which is only to deal with certain kinds of acts which are likely to be particularly harmful to British interests in export markets. My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 6.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Lord Winterbottom.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENT
[No. 7]
Clause 12, page 7, line 13, leave out ("an award by Her Majesty") and insert ("the Queen's Award to Industry").
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in this Amendment, which narrows the scope of subsection (2) of Clause 12 so that it no longer refers to any kind of award by Her Majesty. The offence is limited to the unauthorised use of a device or emblem signifying one particular award, the Queen's Award to Industry. This provision was originally drafted, for inclusion in the 1966 Protection of Consumers (Trade Descriptions) Bill, with the Queen's Award to Industry in mind. It was worded in general terms because this Award had not then been publicly announced. It has, however, since been suggested that there might be some doubt about the interpretation of the expression "an award by Her Majesty" and we think it is best to remove any such risk by amending the clause to say exactly what we mean. My Lords, I beg to move.
Moved, that this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Lord Winterbottom.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENT
[No. 8]
Divide Clause 12; subsections (1) and (2) to constitute Clause 12, and subsection (3) to be another Clause.
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with their Amendment No. 8.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Lord Winterbottom.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
[Nos. 9–10]
Clause 16, page 8, line 34, after ("proprietor") insert ("or registered user").
Clause 16, page 8, line 37, after ("proprietor") insert ("or registered user").
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, with the leave of this House, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 9 and 10, which go together. Their purpose is to extend to registered users of a trade mark the right which Clause 16 originally conferred solely on the proprietor of the mark; namely, to call on Customs to prevent the import of specified consignments of goods bearing an infringing trade mark. This extension provides for the case where a registered user of a trade mark wants prompt action to be taken and cannot get the proprietor to move in time. I beg to move.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(Lord Winterbottom.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
[Nos. 11–13]
Clause 23, page 13, line 14, after ("person") insert ("or to reliance on information supplied by another person")
Clause 23, page 13, line 17, leave out from first ("the") to ("he") in line 18 and insert ("hearing")
Clause 23, page 13, line 19, leave out from ("writing") to end of line 21 and insert ("giving such information identifying or assisting in the identification of that other person as was then in his possession")
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, with the leave of the House, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 11, 12 and 13. I believe that these three Amendments to subsection (2) of Clause 23 can conveniently be taken together. This subsection, providing in its original form that a person who intends to rely on the defence that his offence was due to the act or default of another must give the prosecution certain information in advance, was added to the Bill by an Amendment put down by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, on Report. On that occasion my noble friend Lord Brown, when welcoming the principle of the Amendment, mentioned that drafting might need further examination.

873
Amendments Nos. 12 and 13 make two small changes in the drafting which were found to be desirable. The first provides that the time limit for giving the relevant information to the prosecutor shall be seven clear days before "the hearing", the word "hearing" being more appropriate than the expressions originally used to describe the various kinds of proceedings that may be taken under the Bill. The second ensures that the defendant must give any information he has that would identify or assist in the identification of the other person concerned. The original wording might have allowed him to withhold the other person's name and address even though he knew it, and yet to satisfy the requirements of the subsections by giving some vague and less helpful information.
Amendment No. 11 extends the requirement of the subsection to cases where the person charged intends to rely on the defence that the commission of his offence was due to reliance on information supplied to him by another person. The same considerations apply as when the intention is to plead that the offence was due to the act or default of another person and it is sensible that the prosecution should be entitled to the same information in advance of the hearing. I beg to move.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(Lord Winterbottom.)
BARONESS BURTON OF COVENTRY: My Lords, concerning particularly Amendment No. 11, I spoke against the inclusion of these words during the stages of discussion in this House. Since then, in common with the rest of your Lordships, I have followed very carefully all the discussions at Committee stage in another place, and at Report stage, and I still regret their inclusion. I believe, and I am certainly not alone in my belief outside the House among people interested in consumer affairs, that their inclusion weakens the Bill. I really and truly believe this. I would say to my noble friend that obviously the weakness has been corrected to a limited extent by the later Amendment, No. 13 on the Paper, which we are also discussing, which requires the defence to provide information, et cetera, as to the name of the informant. Although I think it is rather hopeless asking for comments on what
874
I say, I believe that this provision still leaves the informant himself completely out of the clutches of the law, since the information may well have been given orally. I wonder whether the Minister, when he comes to reply could let me know if I am correct in assuming that this Clause 11, and the inclusion of these words, does mean that if they were given orally the person concerned would be out of the clutches of this particular Amendment.
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, the noble Baroness has me at a disadvantage. I am afraid that, as I said earlier, I cannot give her an undertaking now to that effect. I can inform her later of the legal position. I hope that she will accept this assurance.
BARONESS BURTON OF COVENTRY: My Lords, I accept that the Minister is at a disadvantage: I know that this is not his Bill. But, equally, we are at a disadvantage. We are supposed to be discussing the Commons Amendments, and there is not much point in discussing them, and asking for genuine information, if one is always told that one will be written to, because by then the Bill will have gone.
LORD SANDFORD: My Lords, I do not think we on this side worry too much to find noble Lords and Ladies on the opposite side squabbling among themselves, but I am sure that they ought not to do this at this stage of the Bill. Surely the procedure is that each Member speaks once only on each Amendment.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENT
[No. 14.]
Clause 26, page 14, line 33, after ("goods") insert ("and to authorise any of their officers to secure the provision of such services, accommodation and facilities").
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons Amendment No. 14. This Amendment would extend Clause 26 to enable local weights and measures authorities, in addition to making test purchases of goods, to authorise their officers to secure the provision of such services, accommodation and facilities as may appear expedient for the purpose of determining whether the provisions of

875
the Bill are being complied with. Since these authorities will have a duty to enforce all the provisions of this Bill, including Clause 13, it seems sensible that they should have power to spend money on services etc. for this purpose, as well as on buying goods. I beg to move.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(Lord Winterbottom.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
6.20 p.m.
LORD HAWKE: My Lords, I have two regrets about this addition. First of all. I cannot help feeling that it will increase the army of weights and measures inspectors who will be required. In my opinion, the increase in the numbers of weights and measures forces will more than counterbalance any economies which the Government may make by slashing the Territorial Army. But "inspectors not defenders" is Socialism, so it looks as if we shall have to put up with it.
My other point is that the test purchases of services will land the person from whom they are purchased in a substantial loss, and he may prove to be innocent of any attempt to defraud. Normally speaking, in services such as hiring of articles the hirer has to rely on a far lengthier period than the minimum period in order to recoup himself of the cost of installation. Although there is an Amendment to insert a compensation clause after Clause 31, it applies only to goods which have been seized and are lost or damaged or deteriorate therefrom. There is no attempt to compensate an innocent hirer for the inspectors having entered into the matter purely for the purpose of testing some statement of prices with no intention whatsover of fulfilling the normal habit of the hirer, which is to keep the apparatus or whatever it may be well beyond the minimum period. For that reason I regret this. We cannot do anything about it, but perhaps the next time the Board of Trade have legislation in mind they will remember that compensation is due equally in regard to these sorts of losses as with goods which have been seized and deteriorate.
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, I am certain that the Board of Trade
876
will note what the noble Lord has said, and will bear it in mind in future.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
[Nos. 15–18]
Clause 27, page 15, line 31, at end insert ("either (i)")
Clause 27, page 15, line 34, after ("premises") insert ("and that their inspection is likely to disclose evidence of the commission of an offence under this Act")
Clause 27, page 15, line 34, after ("or") insert ("(ii)")
Clause 27, page 15, line 45, at end insert ("and it might defeat the object of the entry to await his return")
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, with the leave of the House, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 15, 16, 17 and 18. These four Amendments are linked and could conveniently be taken together. Their effect is to narrow the range of circumstances in which a magistrate may issue a warrant under subsection (3) of Clause 27 authorising an enforcement officer to enter or force an entry into premises. These Amendments would, I hope, meet the objections that the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, saw to the original subsection.
The first three Amendments would alter paragraph (a) so that before issuing a warrant a magistrate would have to be satisfied that there was reasonable ground to believe either that the inspection of goods, books or documents on the premises would be likely to disclose evidence of the commission of an offence under the Bill; or, as in the present provision, that an offence has been, is being, or is about to be committed on the premises. This would mean that there would be no power to issue a warrant when there was no suspicion of an offence.
The fourth Amendment would modify paragraph (b)(ii) in respect of the temporary absence of the occupier of the premises. It would mean that a magistrate could not issue a warrant just because the conditions of paragraph (a) were satisfied and the occupier was away for a time. He would also have to be satisfied that it would not be reasonable to wait for the occupier to return because to do so might defeat the object of the entry.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(Lord Winterbottom.)
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, I welcome these Amendments very much indeed. This subsection in its original form would have operated very harshly. I was not able to get an Amendment accepted when the Bill was before the House initially. I was so concerned about the matter that I wrote a letter to The Times about it, which they published. If it was as a result of that that these Amendments have been put down and incorporated into the Bill, it is as much to the credit of The Times as anybody else that this has happened. Newspapers come in for a great deal of criticism—even The Times gets criticised sometimes. When a newspaper ventilates a grievance which leads to that grievance being remedied, it is only right that credit should be given.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENT
[Nos. 19 and 20.]
Page 16, line 19, leave out from ("shall") to ("be") in line 20.
Page 16, line 20, at end insert ("unless the disclosure was made in or for the purpose of the performance by him or any other person of functions under this Act").
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, with the leave of the House, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 19 and 20. These two Amendments are linked and could conveniently be taken together. They make a necessary change in the wording of Clause 27(5) in order to permit the disclosure by one local weights and measures authority to another of information obtained in pursuance of the Bill. The original wording would have prevented authorities from exchanging such information among themselves, because the disclosure would not have been in the performance of their duty—their duty being confined to enforcement in their own area. The Amendments would remove the obstacle to this obviously desirable co-operation among enforcing authorities by permitting officers to pass on information
"in or for the performance by him or any other person of functions under this Act".
I can assure your Lordships that the only respect in which this goes further than the
878
present provision is in permitting disclosure to other enforcing authorities under the Bill.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(Lord Winterbottom.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
[No. 21.]
Page 16, line 20, at end insert—
("(6) If any person who is not a duly authorised officer of a local weights and measures authority or of a Government department purports to act as such under this section he shall be guilty of an offence.")
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in this Amendment. This Amendment, which is based upon Section 45(2) of the Weights and Measures Act 1963, would make it an offence for a person who is not a duly authorised officer of a weights and measures authority or a Government Department to purport to act as one under Clause 27. I think the Amendment speaks for itself.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Lord Winterbottom.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENT
[No. 22]
Page 16, line 20, at end insert—
(7) Nothing in this section shall be taken to compel the production by a solicitor of a document containing a privileged communication made by or to him in that capacity or to authorise the taking of possession of any such document which is in his possession.")
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, I beg to move that the House doth agree with the Commons in Amendment No. 22. The purpose of this Amendment is to preserve the traditional privilege which applies to communications made by or to solicitors in their professional capacity. It ensures that the powers conferred on authorised enforcement officers by Clause 27 cannot be used either to compel a solicitor to produce a privileged communication or to seize such a document.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Lord Winterbottom.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENT
[No. 23]
Clause 29, page 17, line 11, leave out from beginning to ("and") in line 20 and insert—
("(2) No proceedings for an offence under this Act, other than an offence under section 27(5) or 28, shall be instituted by a local weights and measures authority unless they have given to the Board of Trade notice of the intended proceedings and either a period of twenty-eight days has elapsed since the giving of the notice or the Board of Trade have before the end of that period issued a certificate under this section.
(3) A notice under subsection (2) of this section must be accompanied by a summary of the facts on which the charges are to be founded.
(4) A certificate of the Board of Trade that a notice under subsection (2) of this section was given on a date specified in the certificate and was accompanied by the summary required under subsection (3) of this section shall be conclusive evidence that the notice was given on that date and was accompanied by such a summary.")
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in Amendment No. 23. This Amendment would modify the present rule in subsection (2), that no prosecution may be started by a local weights and measures authority until 28 days after they have given notice of the intended proceedings to the Board of Trade. In effect it would make two changes. First, offences under Clauses 27(5) (disclosure of information obtained by virtue of that clause) and 28 (obstruction of enforcement officers) would be excluded from the requirement to give notice, because we really cannot see that any question of co-ordinating action by different authorities—or of the Board taking over the case—could ever arise in respect of those particular offences. Secondly, the Board of Trade would be able to dispense with the full 28 days' notice in appropriate cases by issuing a certificate on receipt of which the local authority would be free to go ahead with the prosecution at an earlier date. The Amendment would not weaken the Board's ability to perform its intended co-ordinating function under this clause. It would merely enable them to avoid unecessary delays in the institution of proceedings in cases of purely local interest.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Lord Winterbottom.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
6.30 p.m.

COMMONS AMENDMENT
[No. 24.]
Clause 30, page 17, line 35, at end insert—
("(3) In any proceedings under this Act in Scotland, a certificate received in evidence by virtue of this section or, where the attendance of a person issuing a certificate is required under subsection (2)(b) of this section, the evidence of that person, shall be sufficient evidence of the matters stated in the certificate.
(4) For the purposes of this section any document purporting to be such a certificate as is mentioned in this section shall be deemed to be such a certificate unless the contrary is shown.")
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 24. This Amendment remedies two deficiencies in Clause 30, which is designed to enable evidence to be given by certificate about technical matters which are not in dispute, so that witnesses should not have to attend court to testify to those matters. The new subsection (3) is needed if the clause is to achieve its purpose in Scotland, because evidence in proceedings in Scotland must be corroborated unless it is provided that it shall be sufficient evidence. The new subsection (4) is necessary to ensure that if the prosecution enters a certificate in evidence, they will not have to prove that it is what it purports to be. It puts the onus on a defendant who wishes to challenge the certificate to prove that it is not genuine.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Lord Winterbottom.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENT
[No. 25]
After Clause 31, insert the following new Clause—
Compensation for loss, etc. of goods seized under s. 27
(".—(1) Where, in the exercise of his powers under section 27 of this Act, an officer of a local weights and measures authority or of a Government department seizes and detains any goods and their owner suffers loss by reason thereof or by reason that the goods, during the detention, are lost or damaged or deteriorate, then, the owner is convicted of an offence under this Act committed in relation to the goods, the authority or department shall be liable to compensate him for the loss so suffered.
(2) Any disputed question as to the right to or the amount of any compensation payable

881
under this section shall be determined by arbitration and, in Scotland, by a single arbiter appointed, failing agreement between the parties, by the sheriff.")
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 25. With the permission of the House I should like to take with this Amendment No. 29 which is consequential upon it. This new clause has been introduced in fulfilment of the undertaking given by my noble friend Lord Brown to seek to implement the principle of an Amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, during the Committee stage (on recommitment). It would give people a right to compensation for loss suffered as a result of their goods being seized under Clause 27, provided that they are not convicted of any offence in relation to the goods. The consequential Amendment No. 29 would simply ensure that the provisions of the new clause extended to Northern Ireland.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Lord Winterbottom.)
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, I am sorry to say that I am not at all happy with this new clause. As the Minister has said, this new clause deals with the question of compensation for loss of goods which have been seized under Clause 27, and if your Lordships will be Rood enough to glance at Clause 27 for a moment you will see that it gives officials power to seize and detain goods for two purposes which are set out in paragraphs (c) and (d) of subsection (1). The two purposes are, first, to ascertain whether an offence has been committed; and, secondly, to use as evidence before the court.
It follows, therefore, that the power to seize and detain goods under Clause 27 ends at the moment of trial, and I think it follows—I am sure the Minister will put me right if I am wrong here—that the moment the trial is concluded there is no longer power that the goods which have been seized and detained shall go on being detained. Whether the person tried is acquitted or convicted it matters not; he is entitled to have his goods back, and there is no power under the clause for the goods to continue to be confiscated.
882
This new clause deals with the position where the goods have been seized and detained but have then been lost or destroyed or have deteriorated. In that event, the new clause says—and this seems to be quite right—that the person shall be liable to be compensated for the loss that he has suffered. But the words in this new clause to which I draw attention and to which I take exception are the words of the proviso
"unless the owner is convicted of an offence under this Act".
We appear to have the position that, if goods have been seized and detained and have been properly looked after, then the owner of the goods will get them back when the trial is over, whether he is convicted or acquitted. But under this new clause it appears that, if the goods have been seized and detained and have then been lost or have deteriorated or have been destroyed while in the hands of the official who detained them, whether the owner is entitled to compensation for loss of the goods is dependent upon whether or not he is convicted of an offence. This is certainly quite wrong and unjust, and I do not believe that that is in law the effect of this new clause.
I believe that the owner of the goods which have been lost or destroyed in the hands of the official who seized them has at Common Law, or possibly under other Statutes, his right to be compensated for loss of the goods. I should have thought that the words of the proviso "unless the owner is convicted" ought to be qualified by putting into this clause a further subsection to say:
"This subsection is not to be taken as removing from the owner of goods his right under Common Law, or under other Statutes, to be compensated for loss of the goods which have been detained and taken out of his possession."
It is a great pity that this is not made clear in the new clause. I feel quite sure that if this were not the very latest stage of the Bill in Parliament there would have been time to do something about removing the very unfortunate impression which has here been created that, for some mysterious reason, although a person whose goods have not been lost gets them back after his trial, whether he is convicted or not, yet if his goods have been lost by the person who detained them he gets compensation only

883
if he is not convicted of an offence. I am sorry that this new clause has not been drafted in a way which removes that apparent misconception, because I think that people are going to be misled about this.
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for his courtesy in giving me advance notice that he was going to raise this point. All one can say at this late stage is that the Bill lays down that if the individual who is convicted suffers loss he has, in fact, no right to compensation. One can only presume that this is part of the penalty of infringing against this particular clause of the Bill. Although everyone is grateful to the noble Lord for bringing to the notice of the House what may be an injustice in the Bill, nevertheless I cannot give him any undertaking that at this late stage we could alter it. All I can say is that we shall note what he says, as I expect will the Departments which have to administer the Bill when it becomes law.
LORD HAWKE: My Lords, is it not an example of ill-considered legislation being pushed through the sausage-machine at much too fast a speed?
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
[Nos. 26–28.]
Leave out Clause 37.
Clause 38, page 20, line 37, leave out ("and")
Clause 38, page 20, line 39, at end insert—
("'premises' includes any place and any stall, vehicle, ship or aircraft; and
'ship' includes any boat and any other description of vessel used in navigation.")
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, with the leave of the House I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 26 to 28. Your Lordships will recognise the wording of Clause 37 as one which has been used time after time in the various Acts of Parliament conferring powers on the Board of Trade. It really is pretty pointless that such a clause should have to be drafted, printed and formally considered by both Houses every time we have a Bill before us involving Board of Trade functions.
When the Trade Descriptions Bill (or Consumer Protection Bill, as it was then
884
called) was put before your Lordships, we none the less had to include the clause. But since then we have been considering the Industrial Expansion Bill. To overcome the constant repetition of the old "Board of Trade clause", Clause 14 of that other Bill would provide that, for the purposes of that Act and any other Act passed before or after that Act, any functions given to the Board of Trade shall be performed by, to or before the President or any person acting with his authority. Since one obviously should not have two slightly different provisions in force as regards one Act, Clause 18(2) of the Industrial Expansion Bill would go on to repeal all the Board of Trade clauses in existing Acts.
I am sure your Lordships will agree that we ought not to have the Industrial Expansion Bill and the Trade Descriptions Bill on the Statute Book with Clause 14 in the former and Clause 37 in the latter. That is why it is now proposed to take out Clause 37. I might perhaps remind your Lordships that whereas the Industrial Expansion Bill would come into force as soon as it passed, the Trade Descriptions Bill would not come into force until six months later. I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(Lord Winterbottom.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENT
[No. 29.]
Clause 39, page 21, line 15, after ("28") insert ("and 32").
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, I beg to move the Amendment to which I drew your Lordships' attention at the beginning of today's discussion. The words "and 32" should read
"and section (compensation for loss etc. of goods seized under s. 27)",
which is the correct way of describing the section which will now become Section 33. I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in the Amendment as I have indicated.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Lord Winterbottom.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING BILL
Brought from the Commons; read 1a, and to be printed.
BRISTOL CORPORATION BILL [H.L.]
The Queen's consent signified, and Bill reported from the Select Committee, with Amendments.
LONDON TRANSPORT BILL
Reported, with Amendments.
UNIVERSITY OF SALFORD BILL
Reported, without amendment.
GREAT NORTHERN LONDON CEMETERY COMPANY BILL [H.L.]
The CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES The CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES informed the House that the opposition to the Bill was withdrawn: the Order made on February 7 last discharged, and Bill committed to the Committee on Unopposed Bills.