HL Deb 22 May 1968 vol 292 cc778-800

7.29 p.m.

LORD BOOTHBY rose to ask Her Majesty's Government whether, in view of recent developments in the Middle East, they will now reconsider the decision to withdraw the British naval and military presence in the Persian Gulf. The noble Lord said: My Lords I am afraid that I cannot follow the advice of the noble Lord, Lord Denham, and listen to all the previous speeches in this debate, because mine happens to be the first. But I can follow his advice to the extent that I will not speak for more than ten minutes.

I have put down this Unstarred Question because I confess that I am at present bewildered by the whole defence policy of Her Majesty's Government. On the face of it, the problem is not complicated. Taking a global view, the naval threat in the North Sea, which has overshadowed the lives of most of us in this House, has gone; in the Mediterranean our vital interests have virtually disappeared since the closing of the Suez Canal; on the Continent of Europe, Russian policy against us is at least clear. Anyone who thinks that the Russians intend to march ground troops into West Germany ought to have his head examined. What the Russians want is the maintaining of the Warsaw Pact, a divided Germany and the maintenance of the Oder-Neisse frontier. I cannot find myself in violent opposition to any of those objectives. Finally, there is no visible threat in the Indian Ocean.

There are in fact, in my submission, two spots, and only two, where we have interests which are vital to the economic wellbeing and even to the survival of this country. They are, first, the Persian Gulf, and, secondly, the Cape. You have only to go and see them, as I have recently done, to realise what the Iranian oilfields, operated by the consortium, and the Kuwait oilfield, perhaps the greatest single oilfield in the world, and Bahrein mean to us, and what the means of getting the products of those three oilfields to this country mean to us. Cut them off and we should be in a pretty mess. Cut the Cape route, and not only the oil trade but the whole of cur trade with Australia, India, New Zealand, Japan and the East Indies would virtually "go West".

When we talk about the Suez Canal do not let us be under any illusion. The Suez Canal may be closed for a considerable time to come, and meanwhile the great oil companies are rapidly building large tankers, which will be unable to get through the Suez Canal, even if it is reopened, and must go round the Cape. When I came back from the Cape the other day I stood with the captain on the bridge, and he said to me, "We could go for days in the old days without seeing a single ship; and look at it now". There was hardly any occasion, by day or night, when there were not at least three ships within visibility of ours. It is now a tremendous trade route and most important to us.

I say that Her Majesty's Government have been clearly right to confine our nuclear deterrent to the Polaris submarines, right to close the naval bases in the Mediterranean and at Singapore and Aden; but surely wrong to keep the greater part of our available ground forces kicking their heels, at enormous expense and to no purpose whatsoever, in Germany. We have had the benefit of the views of the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bourne, upon this subject, and I know of no high-ranking soldier who really believes there is a menace which can be contained by ground forces in Germany, and who does not think that the stationing of all these ground troops in Germany at the present time at enormous expense is quite unjustifiable from any point of view. Finally, I would say that Her Majesty's Government were wrong to give tacit approval and, therefore, moral support to the war in Vietnam, which was described to me not long ago by the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Montgomery, as the cruellest, most purposeless and senseless war that has ever been waged.

Wrong, I think, again—and this is the point of my Question—were the Government to announce the pending withdrawal of the British naval and military presence in the Persian Gulf; and finally, wrong to deny to South Africa arms which they badly need for the defence of the Cape, even if they be limited to naval power, and give them instead to Nigeria and Jordan, which is like throwing a lighted match into a powder keg. We know from our experience in Malaya (which we have twice saved since the war, the first time from Communism and the second time from the Indonesian confrontation) and in Kuwait, that brushwood fires can be put out with comparatively small forces, provided they are there. The object is to prevent the fires from spreading.

I am not asking in this Question for the stationing of large forces in the Persian Gulf; but something of the order of a brigade or even a couple of battalions, and a frigate or two at Bahrein. The Sheiks, who have so much to lose, have offered to pay their share for their own defence, as against the West Germans who do not need it to anything like the same extent. But what is the reply of the Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Healey? He says, with exquisite courtesy, "We do not intend to become mercenaries". With all due respect to Mr. Healey, for whom I have a great admiration, I say that that is childish nonsense. Most wars prior to the present century were fought by mercenaries, and we should not be mercenaries if we accepted some aid from the Sheiks of the Persian Gulf for their own protection and the protection of their oil.

In conclusion, I want to put two questions. Have Her Majesty's Government any evidence that the Soviet Union has, or contemplates, a naval and military presence in the Persian Gulf?—because we have had some pretty authoritative reports in the newspapers in the last three weeks that they do. Secondly, why in any event should we remove our presence when we have so much at stake? I am asking only for the continuation of the naval and military presence, and in considering this matter I beg the Government to get back to first principles. It is not difficult to stop the seizure by a foreign nation of the Persian Gulf oil fields. It is not possible to contain Chinese and Russian military power on the mainland of Asia by military forces alone, and that, I think, is the great mistake the United States Government have made. In my submission—and it is my final submission—sea power is the answer to this question and to the problem of defence, as it has always been with us: in the Pacific and China Seas by the United States, in the Afro-Indian Ocean by the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa—and I add South Africa deliberately—acting in co-operation from bases in Australia and at the Cape. Nobody can deny that these are absolutely vital interests for this country. So it proved in the Old World, so it will prove in the New.

7.36 p.m.

LORD THURLOW

My Lords, we on this side are very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, for raising this most important Question, even at this late hour. It does seem to us extraordinary that it is planned to withdraw from the Gulf in 1971, regardless of what the situation may be then. It was only on July 27 that Mr. Healey the Minister of Defence said: I am equally certain that we are right not to attempt to fix, still less to announce, a date for a withdrawal from our positions in the Persian Gulf. At the moment, we are making a vital contribution … welcomed by the local States, who are not yet in agreement on how to handle the situation if and when we should withdraw."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, 27/7/67, col. 993.] Now, six months later, he announces our intention to withdraw in 1971. But we have been given no convincing reason for this change of policy, nor a convincing reason why, as the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, said, their offer to defray the expenses of a military garrison remaining after 1971 is not acceptable to the Government.

We note that the world situation, particularly in the Near and Middle East, has far from improved since the Minister's earlier statements, with which we were in full agreement. Russia is more and more active in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. There are no indications that peace and order will be maintained after our departure. No progress has been made towards any federation of the Gulf States; indeed, a very recently arranged meeting has just been cancelled. Despite the increasing power and influence of the Soviet Union in these areas, we do not believe that she intends or wishes to precipitate a crisis; but it is indisputable that Russia will do a great deal to wreck the Western alliances and treaties and endeavour to secure a position where she will have power to cut the air and sea communications between the NATO Powers in Europe and their allies in the Central Treaty Organisation, as well as with the countries of SEATO, in an emergency.

If our physical presence is removed we lay ourselves open to political and naval harassment. We have already seen how easy it is to sink a ship without notice, and the source of attack, whether it is from the land, from under the sea or from the air, can be concealed. If we try to bolster up confidence and stability in the Gulf States with only a seaborne force—and here I do not go all the way with the noble Lord, Lord Booth by, although I agree that a seaborne force is necessary—the Government must not put that force into such a position that its only defence is retaliation, unless the politics of retaliation is acceptable to the Government; and I cannot see that being likely.

As I have said before, throughout the world to-day there is a battle for men's minds, and nowhere is the power of propaganda more effective than in Arab countries. I have lived in Arab countries for thirteen years, and I am in close touch to-day with Arab opinion from the position that I occupy as head of a big charitable organisation which works throughout the Near and Middle East. Propaganda can be countered best by a sympathetic, but not necessarily large, presence on the ground which shows our intention and willingness to give our protection and to contradict lies. Remove that presence and the job is twice as difficult; the lies stick.

In addition to this presence we have one tremendous national asset. Over hundreds of years we have produced a remarkable number of men and women, who in the countries where they work, whether as diplomats, Government agents, explorers, businessmen or missionaries, give an example of devotion, integrity and wise advice to the people among whom they live. And this counts for much in the Middle East. To-day the opportunities for such people are fewer; the need is greater, when we are no longer in a position to back them up. The world is not yet in such a state that a vacuum caused by the removal of one Power can be filled by a few words of cheer by the United Nations Secretary-General and the confidence that right will always triumph.

So I beg the Government not to commit themselves to a policy which might well have disastrous consequences. We need only a small presence and the ability to increase and reinforce, if we are asked to, which we may be able to do only if we are present on the ground. To try to restore a serious situation is much more difficult and expensive than to prevent such a situation from occurring, particularly if there are other Powers around who are determined to exacerbate it. Therefore, we on this side can assure our friends that we will support our country's friends and allies, and, if it has to be, will restore the good name of Britain if it has been sullied by broken pledges.

7.44 p.m.

LORD WIGG

My Lords, my intervention in this debate tonight will not, I hope, be too lengthy. It is primarily intended as a compliment to the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, who during the whole of my active political life has inspired my thinking. I have not always agreed with him, but on whatever subject he talks he speaks with sincerity and with great clarity of mind. Tonight, however, I think that he has perhaps fallen just a little short of that high standard. Just remember for a moment his opening remarks. He made two assertions. First he regarded British defence policy as something about which he was completely uncertain. Secondly, he spoke as if all the secrets of the Russian intelligence service were open to him, or he laid it down, as obiter dicta, what Russian defence policy was in Europe. This seems to me to be slightly contradictory.

Let us examine his proposition, the uncertainty about British defence policy. There is one thing that one can be sure about: a defence policy does not grow overnight. It is no good the noble Lord who has just spoken, except for the purpose of making a convincing peroration, on which I compliment him, coming along and talking in the terms that he does, because a defence policy which is extant at the moment is born of the thinking and the inactions and, if you like, the mistakes or the correct decisions of the last 20 years.

The starting point, of course, of contemporary defence policy is to be found in what was perhaps the most diabolical doctrine that has ever been inflicted upon this country, the 1957 White Paper. This laid down that Britain must in future depend upon an independent British deterrent, which we did not possess, never have possessed and never could in any circumstances possess. Even if we had acquired Blue Streak, this was the greatest example of hocus-pocus and humbug ever inflicted upon us. This weapon was not British at all; it was American. When, finally, it became impossible to sustain it and it had to be given up, even then the Government of the day ran away from the consequences of that action.

I am not claiming for a moment that one can expect every Government in the field of defence policy to get everything right. Of course they cannot. They are acting upon limited evidence. But what is incumbent upon any Government, and, may I say again, with respect to the noble Lord who has just spoken, what is incumbent on all of us who are engaged in public life, is to speak the truth as we see it. Our country fought two devastating wars, actions indeed for which we have no need to apologise to the rising generation. In the first, one million men gave their lives for what they regarded as a noble cause. They fought, as they believed, in defence of freedom. In the Second World War, too, ours is a proud record, for which none of us need apologise. We stood alone; and had we not done so, it would be a quite different world from what we see to-day.

But I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Boothby: let us go back to first principles. Let us see what is the object, or what should be the object, of British defence policy. What does a country of 50 million people, with a rising population, with a built-in adverse balance of trade, which must exist or die according to the extent to which it can succeed as a trading nation want above all? It wants stability. It is impossible to get expanding international trade; commerce cannot flow across national frontiers; capital investment cannot go into raising the standard of life in the backward areas, raising the standard of life of our own people. All the time we simply stumble from crisis to crisis. Yet the policy that we have pursued (though sometimes I am not sure whether we are now pursuing it) is a policy for engaging in the furtherance of stability. If one looks at one of the major faults that has permeated both Parties, one finds that it has been based upon the conception, in which many noble Lords here present certainly believed, that what we should do at all costs, or so it sometimes appeared, is to get into the Common Market: that we should link our forces with Europe.

It was a Conservative Prime Minister who committed this country to the proposition that we would maintain to the end of this century four divisions on the European land mass. If any noble Lord on the opposite side of the House wants to use expressions about the fulfilment of obligations, or wants to use the word "honour", I commend him to do one thing, to read Lord Moran's diaries, to read his account of his discussion with the then Prime Minister, the late Sir Winston Churchill, on October 1, 1954. He recounts that the previous day, in Paris, Lord Avon had committed us to maintain four divisions. Lord Moran was full of glee. He pointed out the great triumphs that had been achieved; how Mr. Mendes-France had leaned across and congratulated Lord Avon. And Churchill said to him "Oh, that! We do not mean a word of it. This could be abandoned at any time."

Again, those on Conservative Benches who use the word "honour", should consider that the men in regard to whom we were committed from the time these words were signed, if we are to believe Churchill, were never intended to amount to four divisions. If the noble Lord will turn to the Defence White Paper of 1958 he will see that they were written down to 77,000. Before the ink was dry, the figure was 64,000. Then it became 55,000. Later, Mr. Duncan Sandys—held up to us as a model of propriety and probity in public life—even wanted to cut it down to 45,000.

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Boothby: the maintenance of the British Army on the Rhine is a military joke. It could not fight for five minutes, left on its own. Its major support weapons are—what? American; and obsolete at that. The weapons are American weapons manned by Germans. This is a long story. I have told it before, and it needs to be told again; but the price that was paid for that was to get the whole problem out of focus and to fail to recognise the first principle, where power now lies. The power struggle in the world has moved from Europe; it has moved from Europe and it has gone South and East. The concluding passages of the late Sir Louis Namier's. Vanished Supremacies, tell the story how in April, 1945 at Torgau, a Russian soldier shook hands with an American soldier. He said that on that day the supremacy of Europe was ended. The great power bloc is now with the Soviet Union and with the United States.

Now, my Lords, it is my belief—and here I base it on no more than my reading of the situation—that one of the great stabilising factors in the world at the present time, although it is not explicit, although it has not been spelt out, is that in fact there is at the moment a détente between the Soviet Union and the United States. There was an incident at the time of the recent Israeli war, the last one, when a weather ship was sunk, and I noted that the Americans were left in the water to drown. The Sixth Fleet did not put off one helicopter until they had been on the "hot line" to Moscow, because if they had dared it would have shown up on the radar screen. This is the basic fact of the situation.

But here, of course, the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, begins to go off the rails. Stability, yes; but also the economic necessities of the time in which we live. This country, if one reads the Press and listens to week-end speakers, is in a terrible state. In actual fact, I see very little sign of people starving in the streets. By many indices our standards are improved. But let us stop for a moment concentrating our attention on the will-o-the-wisp of getting into the Common Market. This is a concept, let me say, to which I was never opposed, and should not be opposed now, if it were practicable. But, for me, one of the few requirements of a politician is to distinguish between those things I want and those that I can get. By going for the Common Market, which was way over the horizon, we have forgotten where the power lies.

Britain's position in the world (and here I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, is with me) has depended on the fact that Britain was a great Islamic Power. One of the great stabilising factors in the world which has now been removed was that Britain could carry on a dialogue between Islam, which is basically xenophobic, and the Western World. For the Israeli war, at which we stood on the side-lines and some of us cheered—and by all means cheer, if you like—there was a price to be paid, and there is a price to be paid now. This country is in economic difficulties, but stop to think what that war cost. The closing of the Suez Canal costs us not less than £20 million a month. And that is only part of the price, because, as the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, pointed out, the Suez Canal may never be open again, may never operate again on the terms it once did. It may become a permanent loss.

In addition to that, here is a vast market in which there has been built up a fund of distrust for Britain. What the economic consequences of this are, what the figures are, I do not know; but I would hazard a guess and say that if "the moving finger" had not written, if we could put the clock back, we should no longer be in the red. If it had not been for what happened in June, 1967, this country's immediate economic prospects would be clear to the whole world and there would be no talks about lack of confidence.

It is no good talking about keeping the Cape route open, or keeping the Mediterranean clear, for we lack the resources. The forces have been run down by the policies of both great Parties. It was the Conservative Party that started it. First they abolished conscription. They believed they would be able to raise voluntary forces. The did not succeed but they managed to put up the cost of pay and allowances to the point where they could not afford to arm the forces they recruited.

LORD BOOTHBY

My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord one question? Does he really think that the British Navy, in co-operation with the South African Navy, is incapable of keeping the Cape route I open at the present time?

LORD WIGG

The keeping open of the Cape route does not depend either upon the British Navy or the South African Navy. If the Soviet Union at any given time cared to undertake the major act of closing sea communications, I assert there is nothing that this country, or the South African Government, could do to stop it. The only Power in the world that could take counter-action against such an act as that is the United States. The fact is that we now live in an era when it is not the Pax Britannica, but the American equivalent of it, whatever those words are in Latin.

Those are the basic facts. What we have to do here is to try to find a way in which the things about ourselves in which we believe shall be applied throughout the world. I happen to believe that one of the major facts in the world is the survival of a working democracy in this country. It is the most civilised way men have yet found of governing themselves. It has been copied all over the world without very much success, but the fact that we here are a working democracy, in a world in which instability is increasing all the time, is something which is of greater importance to us than the maintenance of two or three thousand troops in Bahrein, or two or three thousand troops in Sharja.

If I had my way we would not have withdrawn from the Middle East. I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, I would have come out of the Rhine Army; I would have run down the Rhine Army, and I would have built up and maintained our strength in the Middle East, not because we should ever be capable of meeting an attack by the Soviet Union but because—and I agree with him—the presence of the troops in that area widens the area of stability which enables us, and the interests we represent, to operate not only in our interests but in the interests of the whole world.

My Lords, I have inflicted myself on you for far too long, but I am convinced that unless we begin to grapple—and it is very late in the day—with our defence policy long-term, then we shall increasingly be paying a very high bill and getting very few results. I conclude on the note on which I started. I found myself taking exception to some of Lord Boothby's opening words, and the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, who spoke from the Opposition Front Bench made points which one would not have much difficulty in rebutting. But if one wants to find the silliest words ever written in the English language, I would ask noble Lords to turn to the opening paragraph of the 1958 White Paper, which says: The world today is poised between the hope of total peace and the fear of total war. The fear of total war?—catastrophe, oblivion, annihilation, not only the end of civilisation as we know it, but perhaps the end of all physical life. But total peace? Surely, that is the Kingdom of Heaven. Look around us. There is not much sign of the Kingdom of Heaven. We live in a world of evil men, men struggling for short cuts to power, men and nations struggling to dominate their neighbours, not caring tuppence about anyone's interests but their own.

The truth is that the British soldier, sailor and airman down the ages has played the role of policeman. I am proud to say that many of my forebears in a humble capacity have played that part. I believe that Britain's interest is in playing the policeman. We cannot run away from that role because there is nobody else at the moment willing to take it on. We cannot have as big a police force as we had, whether it be airborne, seaborne, or on land. But at least we can start by getting clear in our minds what it is all about and securing, so far as we can, that in the interests not only of ourselves but of the world as a whole, the 50 million people in these Islands realise that down the ages they have had an essential part to play, and that if they do not play it nobody else will.

8.3 p.m.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

My Lords, I had not intended to speak in this debate, but I feel I must say just one word. In spite of an extremely interesting speech by the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, I must say how strongly I should like to support what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Boothby. There seems to be an idea in the mind of the Government that when we move our Armed Forces out of any area in the world, the position remains exactly the same as when we were there, and that the balance of power in the world remains unaltered. But it does not. When we move out of any area in the world, we create a power vacuum. That vacuum is immediately filled by someone else, and nearly always by someone entirely opposed to all the interests and principles for which we stand. It has happened again and again in the last few years. If it were to happen in the Persian Gulf, it would be a disaster of the first order not only for us but for the whole of the Western World. I simply do not believe, with respect to the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, that we could not undertake this particular obligation if we really wanted to do so.

What is now contemplated in the Persian Gulf, as I understand it is far more dangerous to us and to the cause of Western civilisation even than the abandonment of Aden. I beg the Government even now to revoke the disastrous decision to which they have come and accept, if it is required, the offer which I understand has been made by the local rulers to subsidise our forces and lighten the financial burden upon us. This would be a decision which I feel sure this country would never regret. To run away from all our obligations overseas is not the right way to maintain the stability and prosperity of this country, to which the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, attaches so much importance.

8.5 p.m.

LORD CHALFONT

My Lords, as I said in your Lordships' House last night I could, if this were not an Unstarred Question, answer it very briefly indeed—I think in a way which would satisfy even my noble friend Lord Leatherland, who spoke so eloquently in an earlier debate. The decision to withdraw our forces from the Persian Gulf by the end of 1971 was taken after prolonged consideration and we do not now intend to reverse it. That is the answer to the Question. However I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, for giving us the opportunity for this short debate. It surprised me to find the noble Lord, who had distinguished service in the R.A.F. in the war, extolling the virtues of sea power. I wondered for a moment what we were coming to. I thought we might even hear the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, extolling the virtues of inter-continental rockets.

LORD BOOTHBY

My Lords, air power in the modern world is a component of sea power.

LORD CHALFONT

My Lords, the noble Lord is partly right. If he would like to take up with me matters of strategic doctrine, I should be delighted to reply to him, but not at this time of night. It may help if I explain the background to the decision which we have taken, and perhaps give a short account of recent developments in the Persian Gulf.

This debate has ranged rather wide. We went rather outside the framework of the Question on to broader problems of strategic doctrine and defence policy. The noble Lord, Lord Wigg, displayed his customary mastery of the subject of defence policy, a subject on which he gave long and distinguished service in another place. I was interested in what he said about the community of interest between the super-Powers, which is one of the important factors we have to recognise in our political and military life.

I would take issue with him on two points, one of detail and one of general policy. I know that he is an old and distinguished soldier and that he would not want to cast any kind of doubt upon the efficiency and morale of the troops of the British Army of the Rhine. I know that he was talking about the argument as to their political presence or as to the military worth of their presence. On that he is entitled to his own view, with which I am familiar. But I am sure, whatever those arguments may be, that the British Army of the Rhine is a fine fighting force, high in morale, well equipped, and carrying out a very difficult task superbly well. I make that point because I am sure the noble Lord would not want any reflection of that kind to remain in anybody's mind.

LORD WIGG

My Lords the last thing I should wish to do is to reflect in any way on the efficiency of the personnel of the Army of the Rhine. My remarks were not directed to that. I wanted to make clear that the Rhine Army is not equipped with the major weapons that would enable it to discharge the task imposed upon it, but it is filling a very highly important political role which the Government have imposed on it—a role which, as I have said, is political and not military.

VISCOUNT DAVENTRY

My Lords, could a Back-Bencher get a word in for one moment? What has the Rhine Army got to do with the Persian Gulf?

LORD CHALFONT

My Lords, I said at the beginning that we had ranged rather wide. In fact, the Rhine Army has a great deal to do with the Persian Gulf, but I shall not follow that particular argument.

LORD BOOTHBY

My Lords, we can put some of it in the Persian Gulf.

LORD CHALFONT

My Lords, the other point I want to make to my old friend Lord Wigg is that I know he will not expect me to agree with everything he said about our European policy and about the Common Market.

Our special relationship with the nine Protected States in the area which I thought we were debating—the Persian Gulf—rests on a series of agreements and treaties which date back to the 19th century—to 1820, in fact; and it is from these that we derive our responsibility for their external defence and for the conduct of their foreign policy and their foreign relations. But we have consistently accepted that this is an evolving relationship. It is not something which can remain static. We have regarded our obligations, both for the external affairs of those countries and more particularly for certain administrative responsibilities which we have acquired over the years, as a temporary trust and not as a permanent affair.

In recent years we have not only been transferring to the local Governments some of their internal administrative duties as their own administrations have developed, but we have also encouraged the larger and more advanced of these States to take an active part in the international scene by joining international agencies such as the World Health Organisation. We have looked ahead always, and long before it was announced last January that our forces were to be withdrawn within a certain time limit we had recognised that there would have to be a term to our actual military presence in the Persian Gulf. We believe, and I believe, that the foundations for genuine stability, in spite of what one noble Lord said so powerfully and so cogently, are there in the Persian Gulf independent of any extraneous military forces at all; and that there is every reason why the sheikhdoms in the Persian Gulf, who at present still look to us for protection, should face the future with optimism.

Our special position in the Persian Gulf was, I believe, in many respects a political anachronism, and we were in any case already on the way to shedding it. This process is now simply being accelerated, and as our position comes formally to an end the commitments arising from this anachronistic presence in the Persian Gulf are being reviewed, together, when it is appropriate, with the treaties and agreements themselves. For example, although our protection responsibilities towards Kuwait ended in 1961 we then undertook a residual defence obligation towards the State of Kuwait. Now, in view of their own successful development and of our changing position in the Gulf, the Kuwait Government itself has decided, in negotiation with ourselves, to arrange for the ending of that agreement. The Kuwait Government has decided upon this, and has decided to arrange to end the agreement that constituted our defence commitment towards Kuwait. In other respects, of course, our relationship with Kuwait remains unchanged, and we have every intention of fostering it. This is part of what seems to me to be a perfectly understandable evolutionary process. The continuance of the Protected States under a form of tutelage, however limited it may be and whatever name one might give it, simply does not accord with the facts of modern life; nor indeed with the essentially sovereign and independent status of the sheikhdoms.

We have never considered maintaining forces in the Persian Gulf indefinitely. This is not some new and revolutionary decision. Until January we had not set a time limit for this, as one noble Lord has pointed out. As my right honourable friend, who was then the Foreign Secretary, said at the time, we could have wished that the time-scale had been different. But in our economic and financial position as it is now it would not have been right, as he explained then, to prolong our stay unless we could be certain that this would secure a notably better and sounder result, than a departure by the end of 1971; and of this there was no such certainty.

My Lords, I know that this limitation, this setting of a date for our withdrawal, imposes difficulties and problems for our friends in the Persian Gulf area. No one would attempt to conceal that. But the years in which we shall exercise an effective military capability in the area—and let us all remember that we are not withdrawing from the area tomorrow—

VISCOUNT DAVENTRY

My Lords, may I speak for one moment? I am a sailor, and the Persian Gulf is a naval commitment, not a military one. The noble Lord keeps on talking about "military". The Air Force did for a short time try to run Iraq and to do things of that sort; but it was a failure in the end. The Navy has always been in command in the Persian Gulf. The nobly Lord should not keep on saying that it is a military commitment. It has been a naval commitment the whole time.

LORD CHALFONT

My Lords, I think the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, like myself realises that "military" covers all three Services. We are not engaged in an exercise in Staff duties. If the noble Viscount wants me to say "Army, Navy, and Air Force" every time I want to use the word "military", I am afraid we shall all be here a good deal longer. When I say "military" I mean all three Services, as I did when I was military correspondent of The Times and frequently wrote about the Navy.

LORD WIGG

My Lords, on a point of fact to get our history right, the military power—using the term in the widest sense—of the Ottoman Empire was not broken by the Navy. The Navy tried to do it in Gallipoli and had a calamitous failure and could not do it. It was broken by the Army in three major campaigns, with mighty little assistance from the Navy.

LORD CHALFONT

My Lords, this is a fascinating exchange between these two great experts. I may say, from my own point of view, that this form of inter-Service rivalry has bedevilled our military policy for many years and I wish we could get rid of it. As my right honourable friend the then Foreign Secretary said in the days that I am speaking of, we shall have an effective military capability in the area for long enough to allow the States concerned to complete their arrangements for an entirely independent existence, and I believe that is so. As your Lordships know, we have no intention of withdrawing to-morrow or next week. We have set a date and left a period within which we believe, and are confident, that the States can make their own arrangements for an entirely independent existence.

The noble Marquess, in his brief and powerful intervention, accused the Government of thinking that when they withdrew their military presence from an area things remained the same, and said that we did not realise that a vacuum of some sort was being created. I assure him that we are not guilty of that particular sin of omission. We do realise that when a military force is withdrawn from an area in which it has been for some time, of course things change. We realise full well that the States which are now under our protection cannot be expected to emerge successfully, when we have gone, into unqualified independence unless there is close co-operation among themselves and unless they have the support of their larger neighbours. We realise that things have changed, and will change when we go.

A declared aim of our policy, realising this, has been to encourage the development of an alternative system of security for the area, because we believe that in that way we can maintain the stability of the region when we eventually relinquish our responsibilities there. We have worked for the emergence of a consensus among the countries—both large and small countries around the Persian Gulf—so that any differences which they have between them can, as we expect, be amicably settled, and so that the major Powers in the area can work in co-operation and not in competition. The noble Marquess may disagree with the way in which we have tried to solve the problem, but I beg him to realise that we have not ignored it. Within the sort of consensus that I am speaking about in the area, we believe, then, that the smaller States could exist without fear of attack from outside, and indeed without fear of infiltration and subversion which was mentioned in the debate to-night.

I think it would be idle to suggest that the Persian Gulf is different from any other part of the world by being free from local rivalries and tensions. Of course it is not. It is possible that in that part of the world local rivalries bedevil the situation more than anywhere else. But there is no doubt—and I believe everyone in your Lordships' House Will agree with this—that all these countries along the Persian Gulf have a common interest, whether or not they can perceive it now. I also believe there is good reason to think that there is enough good will and statesmanship in the area to bring about what we hope for in the time that we have allowed for it to happen. I shall move on quickly, because I do not want to take up too much of your Lordships' time.

LORD SEGAL

Will my noble friend forgive my interrupting him? Do I take it that he can assert that the State of Iran and the State of Bahrein have common interests in the Persian Gulf?

LORD CHALFONT

My Lords, yes, I can certainly state that they have common interests. I did not actually say "common interests in the Persian Gulf." I said that the States that border the Persian Gulf have common interests, whether they perceive it or not. I make that statement unequivocally.

I should like to deal very quickly now with two points that have been raised. First of all, there is the question of Soviet expansion in this area—the possibility, which has been canvassed in many places and which has been mentioned in the debate to-night, that the Soviet Union might rush in and fill this vacuum which is sometimes described as being the result of our withdrawal from the area. I will say no more about this than simply that I believe the fears which have been expressed about the expansion of Soviet influence in the area and the subversive activities which are reported to be going on in the area will prove in the end to be very greatly exaggerated. I know this is a very dangerous thing to say, and that one might always be proved to be wrong. One often is proved to be wrong in making this kind of statement. Of course, we have read these reports which have appeared in the Press. I can only say—and I can go no further than this, I fear—that the information I have indicates to me that the activities as at present described are described exaggeratedly; and I believe that the danger of the Soviet Union attempting any kind of occupation of this area in any real military sense which would be dangerous to us is exaggerated.

On the question of oil, although we are not wholly or even necessarily largely dependent for our oil on the States of the Gulf, we do not underestimate the importance of this area as an oil supplier. I will say that.

LORD BOOTHBY

Surely, my Lords, "largely" is not an exaggeration, if you take in Kuwait. "Largely", I should have said, was not unfair.

LORD CHALFONT

My Lords, we will not argue about that particular word. I will give the noble Lord the word "largely" and simply say that we are certainly not entirely dependent on them as oil suppliers. But we have made it clear, I think, that our Forces in the area are not there merely to ensure the continued flow of oil. This is not the exclusive purpose for having the troops there. As I have said before, one of the results of our presence there in the past has been to contribute to the maintenance of stable conditions generally, and, of course, it is in a condition of general stability of this kind that the risk of interference with oil supplies is automatically reduced. But I have said, and I believe it to be true, that when we withdraw in the time-scale that we have laid down there is no reason to believe that conditions for continued stability will not remain in the area.

Finally, my Lords, I should like to say this. I think I have explained why Her Majesty's Government do not intend to move from the present time-scale for the military withdrawal. I might also explain that within this period there is no rigid time-table set for the evolution of our relationship with the protected States. We are now in the process of working out a programme which will take full account of the views of the Governments concerned. This need not mean the end of our relationship with the Persian Gulf countries. The departure of the last military unit does not mean the end of our relationship with these States. But the nature of that relationship will change and must change. After the winding up of our military presence there we shall still be ready to help them with technical aid and any other forms of assistance which might be appropriate; but after 1971, instead of our presence being chiefly in the form of troops and aircraft, we shall be concentrating on the constructive task of helping in the economic and administrative development of the States in the Persian Gulf who want help from us.

If I may trespass upon your Lordships' patience for two minutes longer, I should like in conclusion to advance a slightly more general proposition arising out of the noble Lord's Question, his speech and some of the other speeches that were made. He and the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, asked us to go back to first principles in considering these matters of defence and foreign policy. Although I know the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, to be a thoughtful, civilised and imaginative man, there seems to me to be something about his Question that perpetuates something which seems to me to be a fallacy—the fallacy that the influence of a country in international affairs depends directly on its ability to deploy military force overseas. I think this is a fallacy. Without beginning an exhaustive examination of this subject to-night, I should simply like to say two things. The first is that even if military power were assumed to be the prime factor in the influence of this or any other country overseas, it is very old-fashioned indeed to suppose that this means maintaining bases and garrisons and ships and aircraft overseas.

I thought at one time that the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, with his great military background and experience, was going to agree with me, but he did not; and in the end I thought he was saying something which disturbed me and concerned me a good deal. I hope I misunderstood him, but I thought he was saying that this kind of policy stood in danger of being reversed in the unlikely event of certain political circumstances supervening in this country. I hope I did not understand him aright, because that would seem to me to be a very dangerous idea to allow to get about.

LORD THURLOW

I am sorry; my attention was diverted for a moment. Which point was the noble Lord afraid I had transgressed?

LORD CHALFONT

It would be dangerous for me to try to quote the noble Lord without seeing the OFFICIAL REPORT, but I thought he hinted that his Party would reverse the policies that we were putting into effect in the Persian Gulf. If I misunderstood the noble Lord, I am sorry, but that is what I thought he was implying.

LORD THURLOW

We say that if our presence is needed, and is necessary, we shall reverse the present Government's policies.

LORD CHALFONT

I thank the noble Lord. I am grateful to him for making that clear. I should like simply, then, to make this point. I believe it to be a fallacy, even if you believe that military power is the prime factor in influence abroad, to think that it means keeping bases and ships and garrisons overseas. We live in a world in which military technology has made, and is still making, astonishing advances every day; and we live, if we look at the political side of this for a moment, in a world in which the forces of nationalism are becoming irresistible. I submit that in this kind of world it makes no sort of sense at all to suppose that the future of this or that part of the world, the Persian Gulf or anywhere else, can be prescribed and determined by the presence of men in tanks or aeroplanes, or even in ships. Even if we accept that military power is still, in the Clausewiczian sense, a natural extension of a country's foreign policy, let us at least realise that military power in the nuclear age is a very different thing from the military power of the days of the Charge of the Light Brigade.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

My Lords, I simply want to say that I fundamentally disagree with every word that the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, is saying. I believe that you cannot have a foreign policy at all unless you have armaments behind it. Otherwise no one listens to a word you are saying; and, if I may say so, that is just what is happening to the present Government to-day.

LORD CHALFONT

My Lords, I am delighted to know that the noble Marquess disagrees fundamentally with everything that I have said. I was in some doubt before he said that as to the validity of my remarks: now I am in no doubt. But even if we accept the noble Marquess's view that power grows out of the barrel of a gun, that no one listens to you unless, in the old Clausewiczian sense, you are prepared to extend your foreign policy by the use of force, I ask the noble Marquess to believe that the nature of military power has changed, and that it cannot be wielded as it used to be wielded unless we are prepared to risk the fate which the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, held up in front of us. That is what we shall risk if we go on using 20th century military power according to 19th century political philosophies. If we want to do all this, let us handle this power intelligently and with restraint.

But—and here I come to my final words—I am not sure that we should accept so readily this thesis that influence depends so crudely upon the exercise of military power. We have much else to offer to the world. We have incomparable scientific and technical skills; we have a political expertise based on centuries of democratic evolution; we have a culture and a civilisation that will bear comparison with any in the world, past or present. We are not the sort of people who need to be sustained with these Hobbesian fallacies about sovereignty and power. My answer to the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, is that when we look at what is happening, not only in the Middle East but all over the world, it should not be necessary to reconsider our decisions on military deployment but rather to congratulate ourselves that we have taken them.

My Lords, if I may paraphrase a comment which was once made in The Times newspaper on this very subject of defence policy: The future of this country in the affairs of the world, in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere, depends not upon the sort of military bases we have, but upon the sort of people we are.