Lords Sitting of 13 May 1968

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of St. Albans.

RHODESIA: SIR FREDERICK CRAWFORD'S PASSPORT
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they have any further statement to make on the confiscation of Sir Frederick Crawford's passport.]
THE PAYMASTER GENERAL (LORD SHACKLETON): My Lords, I regret that I am not in a position to make a further Statement to-day. My noble friend Lord Shepherd hopes to do so shortly, probably to-morrow.

BIRMINGHAM CORPORATION BILL
Read 2a, and committed to the Committee on Unopposed Bills.
THAMES VALLEY WATER BILL
Read 2a, and committed to the Committee on Unopposed Bills.

PASTORAL MEASURE
2.36 p.m.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, I have it in command from Her Majesty the Queen to acquaint the House that Her Majesty, having been informed of the purport of the Pastoral Measure, has consented to place her interest, so far as it is concerned on behalf of the Crown, at the disposal of Parliament for the purposes of the Measure.
THE LORD BISHOP OF CHESTER: My Lords, I rise to move that this House do direct that, in accordance with the Church of England Assembly (Powers) Act 1919, the Pastoral Measure be presented to Her Majesty for the Royal Assent. The Pastoral Measure is the longest and most complex enactment ever to have received the approval of the Church Assembly and to come before this House for Affirmative Resolution. Its purpose, in a few words, is to enable the Church of England to meet the demands which the many changes taking place so rapidly in this country require of it, and so to fulfil its responsibility to the nation by making the best possible use of the limited resources in manpower and material at its disposal.
Your Lordships will be well aware of the movements of population taking place all over the country. Large areas once residential are being zoned for industrial and commercial purposes; people are moving to new housing estates and new towns, and provision must be made for their spiritual ministration. Increasing œcumenical good will makes denominational co-operation a real

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possibility. New pastoral techniques may be necessary if the Church is to deploy its skills in the best way possible. It is considerations of these kinds which are reflected in the provisions contained in this important Measure.
Its theme is summed up in Clause 2(2) of the Measure, on page 2, where the duty of the Diocesan Pastoral Committee is set out in the words that, having regard to the traditions, needs and characteristics of individual parishes, they shall
"have particular regard to the making of provision for the cure of souls in the diocese as a whole, including the provision of appropriate spheres of work and conditions of service for all persons engaged in the cure of souls and the provision of reasonable remuneration for such persons".
The Pastoral Measure is in the main a consolidating enactment, and save for certain important exceptions it contains little that is without statutory precedent, as will be seen by the number of repeals set out in Schedule 9. The sections of the Measure which provide new powers are for the most part those dealing with the disposal of churches declared to be redundant and the provision for the creation of group and team ministries. About these I shall have something to say later.
The Measure as it is now presented to your Lordships is the result of a long period of thought and discussion. Its immediate history goes back 14 years when in 1954 the Church Assembly set up a Commission, under the chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Ilford, to prepare in consultation with the Church Commissioners a Measure to consolidate, with such amendments as might seem necessary or desirable, existing legislation relating to the re-arrangement of pastoral supervision and of diocesan boundaries.
Meanwhile, two events of considerable importance took place, the results of which had to be incorporated in the framing of the new Measure. The first was the Report of a Commission, under the chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, advising the course of action which should be followed in solving the problem of what should be done with redundant churches. The second was a report prepared by Mr. Leslie Paul on the payment and deployment of the clergy. This report was a long and con-
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troversial document, and its recommendations are still under survey by the Church. But one section commended itself immediately to the Church Assembly which directed that the proposals should be incorporated in the Measure. This was the recommendation that power should be provided for the setting up in appropriate cases of group or team ministries. So the Measure contains not only the results of the work of the Ilford Commission but as well the outcome of the Bridges Commission and partly of the Paul Report.
The Measure received prolonged and careful scrutiny by the Church Assembly. It was considered for revision at the Spring and Summer Sessions of 1966 and at the Spring and Summer Sessions of 1967. The Measure was given final approval at the Summer Session of 1967. A Division was not requested and only one contrary vote was recorded against it. Your Lordships may therefore rest assured that there has been no undue haste in the preparation of this important Measure. If anything, the contrary is true, for in a rapidly changing situation the Church urgently needs greater flexibility to deploy its resources to the best advantage. The Measure incorporates powers going back in some instances over a hundred years. It includes powers taken to meet the needs of reorganisation as a result of war damage and now found to be needed for wider application. It incorporates powers which the situation to-day makes essential if the Church is to be efficient in its ministration. All these are now brought together in the Pastoral Measure.
Your Lordships will have before you the Report by the Ecclesiastical Committee of Parliament upon the Measure which records the opinion of that Committee that the Measure is expedient. The document contains as an Appendix the comments and explanations of the Legislative Committee of the Church Assembly upon the Measure. The issues raised by the Measure are set out in the Report in such detail and with such clarity that it would be otiose for me to go over ground which is covered so adequately by that document. I will therefore confine myself to one or two points of special new importance or of some controversy and deal with them as briefly as possible.

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First, I refer to the modification in the Measure to what is popularly known as the "parson's freehold". Your Lordships are probably aware that once a clergyman has been instituted to his benefice he has a lifelong tenure and can be removed from it only by his own choice, sometimes for health reasons, or, if he has been found guilty of an ecclesiastical offence, by order of an ecclesiastical court. Clause 24 of the Measure provides that a pastoral scheme may dissolve a benefice (and indeed, in an unlikely circumstance, an archdeaconry) even if the incumbent withholds his consent. This is not a new principle, since under the Reorganisation Areas Measure 1944, which was introduced in order to deal with the problems created by war damage and immediate post-war reconstruction, it was possible in certain carefully defined circumstances to remove a clergyman from his benefice. That Measure is now almost spent; but this power has proved to be so valuable that it is now permanently incorporated in this new Measure.
Perhaps I may illustrate the necessity for this power by outlining a hypothetical case in which it would operate. The Pastoral Committee of a diocese in the exercise of its responsibilities might well decide that drastic reorganisation in the heart of a big urban area was necessary. There might have been re-zoning whereby areas previously residential had now been developed for industrial or commercial purposes. Parishes and their churches which once ministered to a large residential population would have completely changed their character. It might well be essential that a number of parishes should be merged, or that a group or team ministry should be established.
Under the present system, if the incumbent of one of the parishes involved were unwilling to co-operate, the whole scheme could be defeated. If he were a young man, an essential scheme of reorganisation could be held up possibly for forty years. The Measure therefore provides that if, after the most careful scrutiny at more than one level, the scheme is considered to be desirable, it cannot be thwarted by the non-co-operation of a single clergyman.
There is no possibility of victimisation. Under the Measure an incumbent would be an "interested party". He would
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therefore have the right of personal audience before the Pastoral Committee of the diocese. He would receive a copy of the initial proposals. He would have the right to make representations to the Church Commissioners on receiving a copy of the draft scheme. Finally, he would have the right of appeal, either in person or through counsel, to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. If the Bishop and these three bodies, the Pastoral Committee, the Church Commissioners and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, all decide that a Pastoral Scheme was essential for the good of the Church, it could hardly be held that a clergyman was being harshly treated if he were to lose his benefice, especially since he will be very reasonably compensated under the terms set out in Clause 25 and in Schedule 4.
Perhaps the fairest way of putting the matter is to say not so much that an incumbent would be deprived of his benefice but that when, owing to changed circumstances, his benefice is adjudged to be redundant, this fact must be faced, the clergyman found work of comparable scope, or else compensated for his loss of office. Under the Measure he would be compensated on terms which are far more generous than those which are provided elsewhere, under the Redundancy Payments Act 1965.
The second matter to which I would refer specifically is the power to suspend the presentation to a benefice. There already exist under the Benefices (Suspension of Presentation) Measure 1953, which incorporates powers which have been in action since 1946, powers whereby a Bishop may, in certain circumstances and after due consultation, declare that for five years, or a lesser period, the patron may not present to a living, and meanwhile the Bishop must make adequate provision for pastoral oversight. The five-year periods may be renewed after consultation. This is an extremely useful provision because it allows for experiment in, say, holding two benefices together, without the finality of a formal union of benefices. Or it makes possible a waiting period when, for example, it may be necessary to build a new parsonage house, when it may be necessary to see the plans for the development of the area and how roads are going to be constructed. It thus often acts as a protection of the rights of a

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patron, because if, owing to the circumstances of the parish, the patron cannot find anyone ready to accept his offer, then under existing law, after six months his right of presentation passes by lapse to the Bishop. Under the existing Measure the patron's rights are frozen, and when final arrangements are decided upon he may resume his rights under the new arrangements. The present Measure also protects the rights of parishioners, since the Bishop, on invoking suspension, must make proper pastoral arrangements so that the parish is not left for a long period of uncertainty with no-one to look after it.
That is the existing law, and the new Pastoral Measure incorporates this system with certain modifications. Under the old measures the Bishop, with the consent of the Pastoral Committee and the patron and after consultation with the parochial church council, may suspend presentation. Under Clause 67 of the new Measure the consent of the Pastoral Committee must be obtained and the parochial church council consulted, but the patron need only be consulted: his permission is not required. The reason for this is that if the Pastoral Committee decide that certain action is necessary, it is hardiy suitable that the patron, whose rights are concerned with an appointment, should have the power of vetoing the Pastoral Committee's decision. Indeed, one of the underlying principles here is that no individual body shall have the right of vetoing a decision that seems right to the Pastoral Committee of the diocese.
There are two other areas in which the rights of patrons will be affected by the Measure. The first is Clause 69. When it has been decided to initiate proceedings for a scheme of pastoral reorganisation, the patron, on being notified, may not exercise his right of presentation. This, for obvious reasons, is intended to prevent a patron from thwarting the proposals of the Pastoral Committee while the matter is sub judice. The period of restriction in the Measure is up to three years. Under existing powers the period of restriction is only one year. The period can only be three years as a maximum, but it is necessary to have this rather wider scope since a big scheme of reorganisation may well take
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longer than one year to prepare. Moreover, this clause restricts the latitude allowed to the Bishop under the 1949 Pastoral Measure, since he can stop presentation temporarily under the new Measure only when he has directed the Pastoral Committee to consider reorganisation. Under the 1949 Measure, which is in force at the moment, he can act on his personal discretion.
The further point at which the patron's rights are affected is involved in the legal powers provided by the Measure in Clauses 19, 20, and 21, for the establishment of group and team ministries. As I have reminded your Lordships, these reforms are the outcome of the recommendations of Mr. Leslie Paul. It is now widely recognised that the best way of providing pastoral oversight for certain areas is not by having a number of independent parishes, each with their own individual incumbents, possibly with a curate, possibly without. This often leads to an undesirable parochialism in the worst sense of the word, and it leads to isolation and loneliness.
Therefore the Measure provides powers for the establishment, when desirable, of team ministries, in which the cure of souls in an area is shared by a team of ministers in one parish; or of group ministries, whereby a number of independent parishes are established as a unit working together. The advantages of such arrangements will be immediately apparent. There can be a greater sense of fellowship and purpose between the clergy; there can be a co-ordination of special knowledge and expertise. There can be one member of a team, or group, specially experienced in education, another in youth or children's work, another in psychiatric therapy, and so on. Such planning can only lead to greater pastoral effectiveness.
Your Lordships will readily appreciate that such group or team ministries can be fully effective only if there is overall planning of the team or group. The purpose would be thwarted if a patron could appoint one member of the group or team ministry who might not fit into the overall plan. It is important that the person who is to be the chief minister in the new arrangements should be someone who commands the confidence of the diocese. So, when a team ministry is

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created, the appointment of the rector will be made by a patronage board and not by the patron, though under paragraph 1, sub-paragraphs (3) and (6) of Schedule 3 regard must be paid to the interests of the patrons, who can have voting rights on the Board. Should the team ministry at any time be terminated, the rights of presentation revert to the patron.
When group ministries are set up there is a slight modification in the rights of a patron. The first holder of a benefice in a group ministry may be designated by the scheme and not by the patron; and for subsequent appointments the Bishop must be consulted who, in turn, must consult the other incumbents of the group, and there is an appeal to the Archbishop if the Bishop withholds his approval.
My Lords, the system of patronage in the Church of England, whereby a variety of individuals or bodies have the right to nominate a clergyman to the Bishop for institution to a benefice, is one which is under a good deal of criticism and scrutiny at the present time. It is no part of our consideration to-day to go into the wider issues presented by the patronage system. At this time all that is necessary for me is to suggest to your Lordships that the inroads made upon the rights of patrons in the Measure are very modest and are essential if the necessary reforms contained in it are to be effected. It will always be borne in mind that patrons are "interested parties" in any scheme with full rights of objection throughout the system.
Finally, my Lords, I must draw your attention to Part III of the Measure which contains important reforms in the procedure for dealing with redundant churches. This problem has been with the Church for many years and has been the occasion for not a little controversy. The Church has a heavy enough burden to bear in keeping in good condition the churches which are needed for parochial purposes, and you will readily understand that church people are reluctant to spend much needed funds in keeping in repair buildings which are no longer needed for public worship. Who is to decide if a church shall be pulled down? Who is to provide the funds for the upkeep of a building of historic or aesthetic value no longer needed for public worship? These are the sort of questions which were put
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before the Commission under the chairmanship of Lord Bridges, which reported in 1960. It is upon that Report that Part III of the Measure is based.
Briefly, the procedure will be as follows. When, by a pastorial scheme, a church is declared to be redundant, the redundant building will be vested in the diocesan board of finance pending a decision as to its future. The Measure provides for the appointment by the Archbishops, after consultation with the Prime Minister, of an Advisory Board whose function will be to advise on the historic and architectural qualities of any church which is declared redundant. It also requires every diocese to set up a diocesan redundant churches uses committee, whose job it will be to find suitable alternative uses for redundant churches. If the Advisory Board has said that the church may be demolished, or if a suitable use has already been found, then a redundancy scheme may be issued immediately. If not, the diocesan uses committee will have up to three years in which to find an alternative use If it fails to do so, the Advisory Board can again be asked to think about the possibilities of demolition. If the church ought to be preserved, it will be transferred to a Redundant Churches Fund also set up by Her Majesty.
The financing of this scheme is clearly a matter of great importance. The Bridges Commission recommended that the upkeep of such churches should be a charge upon the funds both of the State and of the Church. Her Majesty's Government have agreed to contribute up to £200,000 in the first five years, and the Church Commissioners have undertaken to provide a similar sum. In addition, it has been agreed that one-third of the sale price of redundant churches and their sites, up to a ceiling of £100,000, shall be contributed. In short, therefore, by this part of the Measure a redundant church of no intrinsic importance and for which no alternative use can be fund may be sold or demolished and the site sold. If it is considered to be of historic or aesthetic value it will be preserved by a Redundant Churches Fund. This fund will, for the first five years of its working, have up to £500,000 at its disposal for this purpose.

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The fund will be administered by the Redundant Churches Fund, which will consist of a chairman and not fewer than or more than six other members, all of whom shall be appointed by Her Majesty the Queen on the advice of the Archbishops of Canterbury and York transmitted through the Prime Minister. The function of the fund is to hold such redundant churches as are felt worthy of preservation and to administer such funds as are made available for the purpose. Since these funds are to be derived partly from Her Majesty's Government and partly from Church sources, and since the trustees of the fund would have to be of sufficient standing to secure the confidence of the Government, the Church and the public, it was thought right to propose that their appointment should be in the hands of the Crown. I am able to inform the House that Her Majesty the Queen has been graciously pleased to indicate that she would be willing to appoint the trustees.
Part III contains the details of the working of this scheme, including one important exception to the normal pattern contained in Clause 66, which allows the vesting of certain buildings of exceptional quality in the Minister of Public Building and Works. It is hoped that this part of the Measure will remove what has been a long-standing problem for the Church and provide a smooth and uncontroversial means of dealing with an area of the Church's responsibility which has for long been difficult and perplexing.
These, my Lords, are the main areas of reform contained in the Measure. There are, of course, a number of other detailed changes to which attention is drawn in the Reports of the Ecclesiastical Committee of Parliament and of the Legislative Committee of Church Assembly. I do not think your Lordships would wish me to go into each one of them. I need do no more than to remind your Lordships once more that this long and detailed enactment is the product of many years of prolonged and careful study, and owes much to a number of people, among whom should be noted the noble Lords, Lord Ilford and Lord Bridges, and the Bishop of Warrington, who most skilfully steered the Measure through its many stages of
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Church Assembly procedure. A word of thanks should also be expressed to the officers of the Church Assembly and the Church Commissioners, whose expert knowledge has been essential in the framing of these proposals. The Church has waited long for the powers contained in the Measure. They are not very radical; some would wish that they were more far-reaching. But they will go far to enabling the Church to put its house in order to meet the challenge of the rapidly changing character of society and to use its resources to the best possible advantage in fulfilling its duty towards our people.
I draw your Lordships' attention to paragraph 32 of the Ecclesiastical Committee's Report indicating that Her Majesty has placed Her prerogative and interest at the disposal of Parliament for the purposes of this Measure. Her Majesty has also given Her approval to the proposal that the appointments to the Redundant Churches Fund should be Crown appointments, and the Prime Minister is content with the proposed arrangements outlined in Clause 42 of the Measure for the Advisory Board. I trust that this Measure will receive an Affirmative Resolution from your Lordships.
Moved, That this House do direct that, in accordance with the Church of England Assembly (Powers) Act 1919, the Pastoral Measure be presented to Her Majesty for the Royal Assent.—(The Lord Bishop of Chester.)
3.7 p.m.
LORD ILFORD: My Lords, I rise to add only a very few words to what has been said by the right reverend Prelate. My excuse for intervening in this discussion is that I was the Chairman of the Commission appointed by the Church Assembly to prepare this Measure.
Our task was primarily to consolidate the existing legislation relating to the rearrangement of pastoral supervision, which includes the union of parishes and benefices, the adjustment of parish boundaries and the holding of livings in plurality. Furthermore, we were given certain powers of amendment which we exercised where it appeared necessary or desirable to do so. This proved a formidable task, involving the examination of something like 40 Acts of Parliament

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and Measures of the Church Assembly stretching right across the whole field of the 19th century. The law of the Church has become involved and in many respects highly obscure. The need for a Measure of this nature is urgent and insistent. The obscurity and complexity of the existing law is an obstacle to those changes which are essential if the Church is to keep abreast of changes in the life of the people whom it serves and is to be in a position to make the best use of her resources in manpower and her material assets.
We aimed at furnishing the Church with a reasonably clear, contemporary code of law governing these essential changes and we endeavoured to make it as simple as we could. In dealing with matters of this nature, simplicity is not easily achieved. We have done our best. How far we have succeeded in our purpose the future alone will show. But at least I think we can claim that it is no longer necessary to search through a mass of legislation, much of it passed to deal with circumstances which were entirely different from the circumstances of to-day, in order to ascertain how changes seen to be essential can be carried out. Whether the future will show that we have succeeded or failed in our aim, I do not know. But, at any rate, I hope that this afternoon your Lordships will speed this Measure on its way by accepting the Motion which the right reverend Prelate has just moved in such eloquent terms.
LORD CROOK: My Lords, I should like to help speed the Measure on its way, and for that reason I shall speak for one minute only. There is no need to commend the Measure in greater terms than the excellent statement which the right reverend Prelate made. My only reason for rising is that for the last twenty years I have been the nominee of successive Lord Chancellors on the Ecclesiastical Committee, and, as one member of that Committee, I should like to say that I associate myself with the Motion and think that in these different days the Church needs a Measure of this kind as soon as it can get it.
3.12 p.m.
LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY: My Lords, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chester has explained in
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very lucid terms the main purpose of this Measure but, if your Lordships will bear with me, there is one side of the problem on which I should like to dwell at a little longer length than the two noble Lords who have preceded me, and that is the question of church buildings. It appears to me that of all the questions raised in this Measure, that is the one which more and more will come into the arena between Church and State for general decision by all the various forces in society.
A very large number of churches are already for practical purposes redundant. My definition of "redundant" in this context is that, given the manpower of the Church of England, the expense of keeping up the churches and the size of the congregations which they serve, no ordinary organisation would dream of continuing their upkeep for any length of time. There has not been a great amount of research into how many redundant churches there are, but there is considerable evidence that there are over 300 in the counties of Norfolk, Suffolk and Lincolnshire alone. Particularly in those counties, they are often churches of architectural merit and very considerable beauty. It is fairly safe to say that the number of redundant churches all over the country will increase. Schemes of reunion among the Churches, which show every sign of fulfilment, will mean that a considerable duplication of the Churches' plant will in future be avoided; and it would be unwarrantable optimism for us to look for any evidence that the present decline in the institutional church is likely to be halted.
Faced with this situation, the Church must decide on her prime purposes. In a world coming more and more under the threat of hunger and poverty, it is very difficult to see the justification for spending up to 90 per cent, of one's income on keeping the Church going for its internal purposes. To put it crudely, the purposes of the Church are to preach the Gospel, to worship God and to serve the world. I am not putting those in any order of precedence, since there would be considerable dispute if I did. Neither the first nor the last—that is, preaching the Gospel or serving the world—are helped by the tremendous weight of plant which the Church has to support,

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and it could be argued that the second is not helped very much either. In fact, if we look at the real reasons for the Church to-day, I think we must come to the conclusion of that great Bishop, Charles Gore, who said that the Church of England is an ingeniously devised instrumentality for defeating the objects which it is supposed to promote.
It is sometimes said that we must continue to support these buildings because of the money that was given in the past for their building and their upkeep. I myself reject that argument as being fallacious. It seems to me a principle of equity that people who have given money to an institution have given it to further the basic aim of that institution; and in this case the aim is service to Christ. It may be that at the time the money was given service to Christ demanded the building of churches. It may even be that service to Christ today involves knocking them down, or at least some relief of the burden of the Church.
So what do we do about these churches? I am convinced that the Church will have to say more and more that, as an institution, it cannot necessarily take the responsibility. It will then become the responsibility of individuals, of local authorities and of the State. Here, of course, I am not denying that individual Christians and Christian churches must take their responsibility as part of society as a whole. The present arrangements which the right reverend Prelate has outlined for the redundant churches fund are an admirable stop-gap measure, but we shall see in the course of the next five years whether they are sufficient.
For instance, if you start closing churches of architectural value in small towns, in small villages, in Lincolnshire, Norfolk and Suffolk, are you just going to leave them there subject to vandalism and anything else, or are you going to equip them with caretakers and have regular upkeep as well as architectural upkeep? If you are going to do the latter, then £500,000 will not go very far. Those are problems which are confronting the Church at the moment, and which will confront society as well.
Meanwhile, we have this Measure. In my view, it is a slightly disappointing
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Measure, in that it does not really face the great problems. But, if I may say so, the fault is not by any means to be laid at the door of the Church and its leaders, as a great many interests have been involved in this matter. The procedures under the Measure are extremely lengthy, and in many cases there is duplication of what are quite adequate safeguards. For instance, a diocese concerned, even when it has produced a scheme of pastoral reorganisation which is accepted by everyone as a good one, still will not know for several years whether it will be in a position to dispose of the redundant buildings and thus plan the financial future to support the pastoral reoganisation. The Measure also suffers from over-centralisation. It retains and indeed increases the control of the Church Commissioners over reorganisation and redevelopment of sites. There is centralisation as opposed to devolution, which I think the proposers of the Measure and certain of the Church Assembly would have liked to see. It will undoubtedly tend to stultify initiative at local level when it comes to questions of reorganisation.
This Measure has been 10 or 14 years in the pipe-line and is a result of extremely hard work on the part of a large number of people, to whom I also should like to pay tribute. It is now in a state which really produces a solution for the Church in terms of twenty years ago. In my view, it does not begin to measure up to what the Church needs today. Nevertheless, a crumb is better than no bread, and I sincerely hope that your Lordships will give it an affirmative Resolution.
3.20 p.m.
LORD MOLSON: My Lords, I do not intend to speak on the general provisions of this excellent and, I think, very carefully drafted Measure, but there are two practical results which are likely to ensue from it to which I should like to invite the attention of the right reverend Prelate who has introduced it. Clauses 51 and 65 give a new power to the Church authorities to sell a churchyard and to allow it to be developed. This is an important transfer of power from Parliament to the authorities of the Church. Until now, under the Pastoral Measure of 1944, the only purpose for which a disused burial ground could be used was as a public open space.

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The Commons and Open Spaces Preservation Society, of which I am treasurer, looks at each one of the Private Bills which is brought before Parliament in order to try to make sure that adequate provision is made, especially in thickly built-up areas, for the preservation of adequate open space. For example, there is a Bill before your Lordships at the present time, the Saint Mary, Hornsey Bill, where we have been in consultation with the diocese of London and where I hope it may be possible for some drafting Amendments to be agreed between us. Only four years ago there was the case of the Saint George, Hanover Square Bill, which aroused some controversy in another place, where the local Member of Parliament moved an Instruction, which was carried, that the views of the local inhabitants should be carefully considered before that open space was disposed of.
My Lords, there is a natural temptation—and even the Church can be sorely tempted—to use these disused burial grounds for building development instead of as gardens or playgrounds, such as has been done so successfully in the case of St. Giles's in the Field and St. Luke's, Chelsea. It is the Government's policy, as we know from a recent White Paper, to encourage residents in twilight areas to improve their properties, and all must be done in order to try to improve their environment and ensure that they have a sufficiency of open spaces. Conversion of disused churchyards has already done a good deal to provide additional open space and playgrounds in the centre of London, and I should be very sorry if this Measure were likely to mean that in the future less will be done in that way than has been done in the past.
It is of course true that before making a Pastoral Scheme having this effect the Church authorities must, under Clause 3, consult the local planning authority; but the position is not, however, safeguarded by that. It would seem that if the Church went ahead with a scheme to convert a churchyard to secular use under Clause 65 and the local planning authority refused planning consent for this purpose, the Church could require the local authority to buy the land for the value that it would have if it were developed; and manifestly, in the vast majority of cases no local authority would
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be able to pay the building price of land in order to preserve it as an open space. Schemes have indeed to be approved by Her Majesty in Council, but I doubt whether this would prove to be much of a safeguard. I should far prefer an assurance now that the Church authorities will give adequate consideration to the preservation of at least a part of the burial ground in all suitable cases, and especially in congested areas, even if it is at some financial sacrifice.
My Lords, while looking into this Measure and its effect upon open spaces I suddenly became aware of the extraordinary, costly and antiquated provisions contained in these Private Bills, and now incorporated for the future in this Measure, for the removal and ^interment of all human remains before that part of the burial ground may be built upon. There is no limitation in time. In some of these cases burials haev been stopped by Order in Council since the middle of the nineteenth century, and the cost is really quite excessive The cost of reinterring human remains from St. Mary's, Ealing, was £7,000; in the case of a small burial ground in the City 12 years ago it was £45,000; from St. James's, Hampstead Hill, the cost was £20,000. Some of the remains reinterred under these Bills have been there since the thirteenth century. Excavations have gone down 17 feet; and in the case of a site just behind the Old Bailey the excavations were stopped only when they reached the level of Roman sarcophagi.
Legally, it all results from the provisions of the Disused Burial Grounds Act 1884, which prohibits building, otherwise than of a place of worship, on a burial ground. That means that in each such case, until the passing of this Measure, it is and has been necessary for a Private Act of Parliament to be passed. This particular requirement came from the Home Office, which would have resorted adversely, presumably, on any Bill which did not contain it. I wrote to the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, to ask for £n explanation of this, and he wrote:
"So far as we are able to ascertain in the absence of the papers upon which policy was made, this requirement stemmed from the Home Office and was based upon grounds, firstly, of public health and, secondly, of public sentiment. It is difficult now to be exact about the date of its inception, but it can be traced back with certainty to 1898."

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There can be no valid objection on grounds of public health to building over the remains of persons who have been dead for a century; and I doubt the existence of public sentiment in the case of persons whose children and grandchildren are dead and when, as in the case of St. George's, Hanover Square, the tombstones were removed before 1914 and the burial ground was subsequently used for allotments.
I much regret that this Home Office doctrine, the validity of which (if it ever had any) has surely disappeared, is being given a new lease of life in this Measure. I cannot believe that it is based on any sound grounds at all, or on any grounds of religion, sentiment or public health. I believe Parliament would welcome a new Measure which would save all this expenditure to the Church when disposing of redundant burial grounds, and I am sure we should be willing to give approval to a Measure of that kind.
3.29 p.m.
LORD SANDFORD: My Lords, we are all grateful to the right reverend Prelate for his very lucid exposition of this Measure. He described it as "long and very involved", and so perhaps it is, by Church Assembly standards, but it is nothing like as bad as, say, the Transport Bill, and I am sure it will be a good deal more beneficial. I suppose that owing to this long period of 14 years' gestation it is only natural that some of it should already appear to be a little dated. We have team ministries and group ministries with us now, and we have had them for some time. Although this Measure will assist in the formation of further such ministries, we ought now to be thinking more about the situation which already exists on the ground; that is to say, in which these team ministries and group ministries are not teams and groups of Anglican clergymen but teams and groups of Anglican clergy, Free Churchmen and Roman Catholics.
What we shall need—and need already—is a Measure which will facilitate the working of this kind of co-operation. It seems clear, from what the right reverend Prelate has already told us about Part III, that the provisions in the Measure for dealing with redundant churches will assist considerably when the
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Church of England wants to share, lease or even sell a church building for the use of other denominations. Perhaps before we leave this the right reverend Prelate could just confirm that after the passing of this Measure it will not be necessary, although it will be possible, for Private Bills such as the Saint James, Plumstead, Bill which we shall see at the end of this week, to be proceeded with in future.
I suppose we are some way from the stage where funds from the Church Commissioners can be used to pay the salaries of Roman Catholic or Free Church ministers; but it would be interesting to know whether the right reverend Prelate feels that the bodies set up under this Measure—for instance the diocesan pastoral committees—can have Free Churchmen and Roman Catholics serving on their sub-committees. This should be useful when it comes to consulting about appointments in New Town areas. There is a further point. Are we not going to hear from the Government at this stage about the legislation which is mentioned on page 12 of the Appendix to the Comments and Explanations of the Legislative Committee? Are they going to say anything about when this legislation is coming forward? I think it would be helpful to know that.
I do not think I have anything else to say to delay the progress of this Measure, a Measure with such a good pedigree as this—no fewer than two of your Lordships were on the Commissions from which it originated. It had a very thorough going-over by the Church Assembly; there was no division at the end, and only one dissenting voice and the mildest possible warning from the Ecclesiastical Committee as to some of the things which might follow as the result of its passing.
3.33 p.m.
LORD SOPER: My Lords, I should like to say a few words. I will not make a speech, but perhaps it would be appropriate if, as a Free Churchman, I were to offer, as I most cordially do, good wishes to this particular Measure. Your Lordships may not expect me as a Free Churchman, to profess an excess of enthusiasm for the reference, or submission, of a Pastoral Measure to a secular body, even one as august as your Lordships' House. Nevertheless, as this

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is being done now, it comes to my mind that many of the things now being thought over and already practised in this Measure belong to the welfare of the whole Church; and some of them have already been put into some kind of operation in other branches of the Christian Church. I was interested in the question of the redundancy of churches and the various plans which this Measure now provides for dealing with this hoary problem. As one who has battled with this problem, not too successfully, in the Methodist Church, I would wish the best of British—or perhaps the best of ecclesiastical—luck to them; I think they will need it.
I am well aware of the need for and the modified success of group and team ministries; but I believe that we have a great deal more to think about and to understand before we can make these team ministries as effective on the ground as many of them appear to be on paper. But perhaps I have a more personal reason to wish this Measure success; for, if the Methodist and Anglican Churches come together in the not-too-remote future, then we shall hope to benefit from this Measure and perhaps to improve it. I feel that I can in this respect speak for the Free Churches and I should like to wish this Measure well and commend it to your Lordships, believing, as I do, that that which will be good for the Church of England may in due course be good for the Church in England.
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF HOUSING AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (LORD KENNET): My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Sandford, asked for a word from the Government. I think it is not my place to comment on this Measure now. I simply confirm that a Redundant Churches Bill will be introduced by the Government shortly—I must observe the usual form of words about this; I cannot say in which Session of Parliament, but the Bill is well advanced. It will make provision on the State side for the Exchequer grant to match the Church monies which the right reverend Prelate mentioned and to enable the relevant Minister, to acquire, by agreement, certain other outstanding redundant churches as well as those which go to the redundant Churches Fund.
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The relevant Minister is, at the moment, the Minister of Public Building and Works, but the Redundant Churches Bill will transfer this function to the Minister of Housing and Local Government following the recent transfer of the Historic Buildings Council—that is, the normal grant-giving organisation— from the Minister of Works to the Minister of Housing. The monies in question, the £200,000 Treasury grant over five years, will be over and above the £ 550,000 annually which the Minister of Housing administers for the repair of historical buildings on the advice of the Historic Buildings Council.
3.37 p.m.
THE LORD BISHOP OF CHESTER: My Lords,, may I thank those who have spoken so sympathetically and so constructively about this Measure? I specially thank my noble friend Lord Soper for the particularly gracious way in which he has expressed the good will of the Free Churches for this Measure. It was good to know that the noble Lord, Lord Ilford, approves of the Measure. He is largely its progenitor and it is good to know that he approves of his offspring. The noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, has raised the problem of the upkeep of churches which are still needed for public worship and which will therefore be outside the provisions of the Redundant Churches Fund. His anxiety is shared by a very large number of church people who having, they hope, disposed of the problem of redundant churches, are now turing to the problem of keeping in good repair those buildings which are of great historic and aesthetic value and which yet lay such a heavy burden on church people. There is sitting at the present time a Places of Worship Commission which is thinking precisely about these things.
The noble Lord has voiced the opinion that this Measure is not radical enough. I hope that he will have noticed that there was a note of sympathy in my speech with what he said. Undoubtedly further reforms will be coming before your Lordships' House. Whether he or I shall agree on the nature or the extent of those reforms remains to be seen; but he need have no fear that reform will again be before this House in the near future.

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The noble Lord, Lord Molson, made some points of interest about the disposal of churchyards. May I first deal with the point which he made (and which the noble Lord, Lord Sandford, also raised) about the transfer of this procedure from method of Private Bills to a scheme. I understand that, constitutionally, it will still be possible to proceed by way of Private Bills; but there will now be a simpler and cheaper method of procedure, and no doubt that will be a disincentive to the use of Private Bills. I am also told by those who are more learned in these matters that what is represented in this Measure is really a continuing process in the law, whereby matters which at one time had to be dealt with by Private Bills have now been incorporated into some statutory procedure. That was true, I am told, for instance, of divorce proceedings, which at one time could be proceeded with only by Private Bills but which now are dealt with in an overall measure.
I do not think it can fairly be said that there is anything very serious in dealing with the question of disposal of churchyards under a scheme, especially in view of the safeguards which are built into this Measure. The noble Lord, Lord Molson, reminded us that planning authority has to be consulted. I would remind him that interested parties would be able to challenge a pastoral scheme right up to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, if there were good grounds for doing so. I am reminded that under Clause 65 only the Home Secretary can allow a churchyard to be developed without the removal or reinterment of human remains. The Church itself cannot do this; the permission of the Home Secretary must be obtained.
The noble Lord, Lord Molson, also brought into the discussion the very interesting point about the proper way to dispose of human remains. Under this Measure, if a churchyard is to be used for some purpose which will not disturb human remains, they may be left there. It may be used as a garden, and I am sure that many of us would agree with the noble Lord that it is desirable wherever possible that open spaces should be provided. If it is to be used for a garden or for a car park the human remains need not be disturbed or removed. But if there is development on
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the site which requires the disturbance of human remains, I think that public opinion would require that such human remains should be dealt with in a reverent and decent manner.
The noble Lord brought to light the very interesting fact that the stringent requirements of the Home Office are apparently only regulations. They are certainly very stringent and very costly. Therefore I am sure that I speak on behalf of the Church in saying that if some way can be found whereby human remains which are to be disturbed by development can be dealt with in a less expensive and less complicated way than at present exists, we should all be very pleased indeed. Equally, we should require, as I think everybody would require, that human remains, if they are disturbed, should be disposed of in a reverent and decent manner.
The noble Lord, Lord Sandford, raised the question of œcumenical co-operation. Undoubtedly this Measure will make that more easy. For instance, the Diocesan Redundant Church Uses Committee has to find a proper use for a redundant church, and it may well be that one proper use would be by another Christian communion. There is another way in which co-operation will be made more easy. Under the Measure it will no longer be necessary that in order to establish a parish there must be a consecrated church, because once a church is consecrated there are certain legal restrictions upon its use. Under this Measure a church which is only dedicated, or a place that is suitable for worship, can be provided and at the same time a new parish can be created. In my own diocese in a populous new area I have a dedicated church which is shared equally between ourselves and the Methodist Church. That is another direction in which this Measure will make œcumenical co-operation easier.
The noble Lord, Lord Sandford, raised the question of incorporating on pastoral committees those who are not members of the Church of England. So far as my reading of the Measure goes, that would not be possible on the diocesan pastoral committees, but it seems that it would be possible on the breakdown of the committees throughout the diocese, if that were desirable. Finally, I would remind him that any action which involves another Church cannot of course

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be dealt with by a Church Assembly Measure; it would need a Parliamentary Bill, and there is in mind already the Sharing of Churches Bill which would make it easier for co-operation between Christian communions at that level. I hope, therefore, that I have satisfied your Lordships on the points which have been raised and that you will give this Measure your affirmative Resolution.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

CLEAN AIR BILL HEARING AID COUNCIL BILL THEATRES BILL
Brought from the Commons; read la, and to be printed.

JUSTICES OF THE PEACE BILL
3.47 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD GARDNER): My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The EARL OF LISTOWEL in the Chair.]
Clause 1:
Appointment of justices, oaths of office, etc.
1.—(1) No person shall be justice of the peace for any area unless either—
(a) he is appointed by name (and not by office) to be a justice for the area by a commission of the peace for the area; or
VISCOUNT DILHORNEmoved, at the beginning of subsection (1), to insert, "Subject to subsection (1A) below,". The noble and learned Viscount said: This is a paving Amendment to Amendment No. 4. It had to be put down to get the drafting right, but the effect of putting it down is that it has taken precedent over Amendments Nos. 2 and 3 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Goodman. It would probably be for the convenience of the Committee if we discussed Lord Goodman's Amendments and my Amend-
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ment No. 4 together. But I do not want to take precedence over Lord Goodman's Amendment because of this paving Amendment, so I would formally beg to move my Amendment now and then, if he explains his Amendment, perhaps the Committee will allow me to explain the purpose of my Amendment thereafter so that all the Amendments can be considered together. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 5, at beginning insert (Subject to subsection (1A) below,").—(Viscount Dilhorne.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I think that that will be a very convenient course to take. No doubt we may be advised by the noble Earl in the Chair, but there are, first of all, Amendments Nos. 1 and 4, in the name of the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, which obviously go together; and so do all those Amendments in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Goodman and Lord Boothby. Subject to the view of the Committee, I agree that it would probably be convenient that we should discuss them all together. That may sound a lot, but there are really three alternatives.
One is that proposed by the Bill which, in substance, is that the City aldermen, like all the other ex officio justices, should cease to be justices ex officio and that there should be an advisory committee to nominate people for appointment as justices on their merits. The second is that indicated in the Amendments standing in the names of Lord Goodman and Lord Boothby; namely, that everything should go on as it does now, so far as the City is concerned. The third alternative is a compromise, and is contained in the Amendments in the name of the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne. If—but of course only if— Lord Goodman and Lord Boothby agree, I agree on my part, if the Committee think it right, that all these Amendments should be discussed together so that we can then choose which of the three alternatives we want. Apart from anything else, Amendment No. 4 proposes to add something at the end of line 28. The Amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, also does this, and so I think there would be some difficulty in deciding on those before discussing the others.
LORD GOODMAN: The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has stated the position with characteristic clarity. I think that it would be best if we discussed together the Amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Boothby and myself, and those of the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne. All touch the same subject. If that is agreed, perhaps it will be convenient if I now make my speech.
As the noble and learned Lord has said my Amendments would achieve the result of restoring the status quo, by putting the City Court back to where it was before it was toppled off the wall by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor. I hope that we can discuss this matter on the basis that there is an agreement on all sides that there is room for two points of view on this matter. I did not detect, in the speeches on Second Reading (which I unfortunately missed, through absence abroad) much recognition on the part of the Government spokesmen of the point of view which I am seeking to adduce, but I will, with generosity, say that I certainly recognise there is room for their point of view, though I disagree with it.
I think that the arguments I shall seek to advance to the House, which have already been presented in lucid and cogent terms by distinguished lawyers, would convince reasonable people that they have an overwhelming force. The argument adduced in favour of changing the present position is the simple one of total uniformity. If we subject any human institution, particularly institutions in this country, to microscopic examination on the basis of total reason and uniformity, there are very few institutions that will not fall short of perfection on that score; but fortunately it happens to be a test that we rarely apply.
The test we apply in this country is the more valuable and valid test—whether an institution works. And by the test of whether it works, the City of London Court has an enormously strong position. No-one has argued—no-one can argue— that this has not been a most successful court. The statistics about the cases that have been before the court were given by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chief Justice on Second Reading.
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I will refresh your Lordships' memories and repeat these figures, for the sake of noble Lords who did not happen to be here on Second Reading, because they are so impressive.
In the last year for which records are available, 19,000 cases came before this court. Leaving aside a few cases that were referred, on case stated, to the Divisional Court or other higher Court, the cases that were heard on appeal were 20 in number, of which six were successful. So this court has a record of having tried 19,000 cases, of which the decisions in only six were reversed by an appellate tribunal. It is difficult to believe that any court anywhere in this country could achieve a better result than that. If we were to judge the matter by normal criteria we should really be down on our bended knees begging the City aldermen to continue in office. We should not be advancing highly theoretical reasons why their court should be abolished.
Two things were said in the course of the Second Reading debate on which I ought to comment. One was that the City has done a good deal of lobbying in this matter; and that was said with some sense of reproach, as if it was wrong for them to do so. I think that they would have been open to reproach if they had not done so. If the City believe so strongly as they do in the value of their court, then they are quite right to lobby and to seek every legitimate means they can to preserve an institution by which they set special value.
The second thing said, which does them much less than justice, was that the whole of this matter resolved itself into the question of whether the City aldermen are prepared to demean themselves by sitting on the bench with ordinary human beings. If I may say so, I think that is an unworthy representation of the whole position. Nobody who knows the City aldermen will believe that that is the matter which concerns them. What concerns them is that they want to preserve a traditional court as part of the whole fabric of the City by which they set great store. What we shall be doing, if we abolish this court, is to tug at one string of a whole tapestry of tradition, and if we do that we shall be impairing and endangering the whole tapestry. I

29
think that that is the real danger of the proposal.
Should we do this? Here is a court that is held in high repute by every branch of the legal profession. The Bar regard it highly. The Judiciary have already come to your Lordships' House to testify how highly they esteem this court, and no doubt they will speak again this afternoon. I think that no member of the Judiciary, except the most lofty member of it, has expressed an opinion adverse or contrary to the standing of this court. The solicitors' profession, through the Law Society, has also expressed its approval of the court. The Magistrates' Association has said that, whatever views may be held about ex officio justices of the peace generally, they do not apply to the Mayor and Aldermen of the City.
On every side where informed opinion exists there is the view that this court ought to survive. There is even implicitly and by inference, the approval of the defendants before the court. I have never seen a letter in any newspaper—nor heard of any complaint by anyone tried before this court—that he had an unfair trial because he became before one alderman and there were not three justices sitting there to try him. I cannot believe that if such a feeling had been widespread over the years it would not have been expressed by the people who have actually been tried in this court. I think that one is entitled to say, therefore, that there is total satisfaction on all sides by all concerned with the administration of justice in this court, including the accused.
On one side, we have a court that is regarded as entirely satisfactory, free from any possible complaint; and, on the other, we have the contention that it is an anomaly. And what are the reasons why it is regarded as an anomaly? I think that they are best found in some of the speeches made in another place. I do not discount those reasons or speeches, but in my view they add up to nothing like sufficient to redress the balance against the weight of overwhelming opinion in favour of the court's survival.
First, it is said that no women sit on the court. There seems to be some view that there is a woman somewhere within the aldermanic structure slowly forcing
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her way to the top. I do not know whether the lady has arrived at this moment, or when she is likely to become an alderman. I have no wish to make the slightest use of this sort of argument. I would say squarely that there are no women. But I make the point to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor that there are many legal courts where women do not feature predominantly. He will go down in history as the first Lord Chancellor to appoint a woman as a High Court Judge. This stands to his credit; but, so far as I know, only one such woman has been appointed, and any High Court Judge who is looking for a female companionship will have to look far and wide before he encounters it in the Divorce Division.
If we look for something to reform in relation to the absence of woman, then the Chancery Division is eminently the place to look, for there we find infancy cases, wardship cases, cases where it is eminently necessary—indeed, imperative—that the opinion of women are sought. Yet they never are sought. So far is judicial opinion is concerned, there is no woman in the Chancery Court. Let us hasten to reform that and put some women in the Chancery Division before we start knocking about the Lord Mayor and aldermen of the City of London. I venture to think that this is not a very convincing argument.
The cases that do require women—cases of juvenile delinquency and matrimonial cases—are few in number, because the City is not a dormitory area. The City is a place where people conduct business, and matrimonial disputes rarely arise in the course of stockbroking activities. The City contrives not to have these matters to deal with. There is a trifling number in the course of a year and they could conveniently be passed to an adjoining court that has the requisite personnel to deal with them. The same is true of juvenile delinquency. The City does not produce an atmosphere which encourages juvenile delinquency. Juvenile delinquents go off elsewhere for their unhappy activities.
So far as the City Court is concerned, there is this to be said: that, having no women, it contrives to produce a better record of successes than the courts which have women. It may be a sad fact for

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feminists to reflect on (I am almost terrified to say this with some of the company present here this afternoon), but it is the fact that if you look at the records of courts throughout the country where there are women on the bench, you find that they do not add up to the record that I have just given your Lordships—that is, of only six successful appeals out of 19,000 cases. Therefore we have no logical reason to suppose that if we were to change this court to have women, we should achieve any better results. The logic and statistics, indeed, establish that we should achieve even worse results.
The other argument advanced is that this court consists of a single magistrate sitting on his own; and it is said that this is a bad thing. But, of course, all the stipendiary magistrates sit on their own; they are single magistrates. Judges sit on their own. Where is this sort of argument to stop? No-one has ever suggested that a stipendiary magistrate should be reinforced by two lay justices because he is sitting by himself. We shall be told, of course, that he is a trained lawyer. I, as a lawyer, can say that I believe that lawyers are no more immune from prejudices than anyone else. I have at times encountered some who are more prone to prejudices than others. I certainly should not regard it as a valid argument that a man may sit alone because he is a lawyer. I hope we shall not hear that suggested; but if it is, I hope that it will not be accepted.
The third argument that is put forward is a startling argument—what I call the levelling argument: that there are no working-class people sitting on the City bench. I do not know what is meant by "working-class". I think it has a very elastic meaning. Do we mean a person who started in poor and humble circumstances and has remained there? Do we mean a person who started in poor and humble circumstances and improved himself, and perhaps has become an alderman of the City? If we mean the latter, there are certainly such people on the bench. If we mean the former, certainly not; and I do not know that the bench is any the worse for not having them. All I would say is that it would be a
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startling thing to introduce these theoretical considerations in order to destroy such a validly established institution.
I think the City Court exists as an anomaly. But it is a most valuable anomaly, and it has justified its existence thousands of times over. Why do the City want to preserve it? I am not going to make a long speech, because I believe everything that has to be said on this subject has already been said, but I think it is important to say a few words on the subject of the City's tradition. At this moment, if I may say so, we should all be very concerned about the preservation of traditions. When we see the things that are happening all over the world, and indeed in some parts of this country, because of the absence of tradition; when we see the uncertainties that are introduced into the masses of young people who have no traditions to guide them, no historic principles by which they are led, I wonder whether we are so wise to demolish traditions with such carefree abandon as we are minded to do in this case.
The City is not seeking for privilege as an inherited right. The City is not saying: "We want the privilege of administering justice because we were born to it." The City is seeking for the privilege to discharge duties; it is seeking for the privilege of retaining rights to which people come over a long graduation of hard work, civil distinction and sacrifice, with an enormous amount of time and effort. I do not think this is a right of which they should be deprived. I think people should be encouraged to retain this sort of privilege. This is the best sort of privilege. It is not open to a shred of objection.
In using the word "City", we are, I think, minded to confuse the great throbbing commercial centre, where people are exchanging share prices, floating companies, selling sterling short, long or whatever they are doing with it, with a community of people in the City who are dedicated to public work—the people of whom we are talking today. The aldermen of the City are appointed by a democratic process. They are voted for by the ratepayers. Having been elected by the ratepayers, they are confirmed by their own body, which means,

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as I think the Lord Chief Justice said, that every City magistrate is confirmed by a panel of 26 or so other magistrates. It seems to me to be an entirely democratic system of appointment. I can see that theoretical objections can be raised to it, but it has a democratic basis; it is a democratic way of appointing them.
What is the doctrinaire system for which we are to change this? If there were some splendid system that we had devised that was preferable; if we were going to knock down this court because the system to be adopted throughout the country was so excellent in itself that no-one could raise the faintest objection to it, there might be an argument even against the powerful arguments which I think we have already heard on this. But what is the system? The reason why we are told that this is an anomaly, and that democracy demands that we destroy this court, is a system whereby every magistrate is nominated by a political officer. This is the system that we are asked to adopt. It is no use concealing the fact that it is a system that has worked over the years. But the whole system of judicial patronage, the whole system of judicial appointment in this country, works because we have people of exceptional personal quality. It does not work because it is a system that is good on its own. No-one can say that it is a good system to have one man nominating everybody.
Some while back I ventured to ask the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor how he came to appoint the judges—what method was employed. He, of course, nominates all the justices of the peace. With quiet modesty, if I may say so, he admitted that he also appointed all the judges, and he seemed rather puzzled that anyone should raise any suggestion that this was not the best way of doing things. But I think that we do need to look at these things very closely. We are not opposing to the system in the City a system that speaks for itself and is self-evidently to be preferred. We are opposing to it a system that has worked, over the years, simply because we have had the good fortune to have Lord Chancellors of exceptional quality, and because the whole of the Bar, as we all know, is an institution of total integrity. But it does not work because it has theoretical advantages. The anomaly, if I may say so, is the method
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that we are adopting elsewhere, not the method that we are seeking to adopt in the City.
It is for this reason—it is not a political matter—that I venture to ask your Lordships to think very hard whether we should destroy this ancient institution; whether we should destroy the opportunity of rendering the services that the aldermen of the City and the Lord Mayor have asked for, in face of the alleged theoretical advantage which, when it is examined, is seen not to be there at all.
I think the City were entirely right to lobby as hard as they could to preserve their court. When this matter was raised in another place one Member said, I think, that having studied the City he could not discover any aldermen of Labour or Liberal persuasion. This I know to be totally wrong. There is one Member of your Lordships' House who is of Labour persuasion, and is an alderman, I do not know what are the political opinions of the present Lord Mayor, but I should have to go a long way to find a more liberally-minded man. It does not seem to me that the question is: What are the politics of the aldermen? The question is: If I were an accused person, should I be safe in their hands? And my feeling is that I should feel entirely safe in the hands of the aldermen whom I have met in the City. If justice responds to that test, then I think it is good justice; and I think that we should be treading on very dangerous ground indeed, and should be showing great temerity, if we were to destroy a great institution which achieves results of this kind simply because it is thought there are theoretical benefits to be gained on account of some theory of uniformity. I do ask your Lordships, when my Amendment comes to be moved, to support it, on the simple ground that there is here something that works well, and that the reasons advanced for destroying it are totally specious.
4.10 p.m.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: The noble Lord, Lord Goodman, has introduced his Amendment in a powerful and persuasive speech. He has made out the case convincingly and, I should have thought, conclusively for leaving the present position in the City of London as it is now, I agree with him. I do not

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think that any case has been made out for any change. The case against change was also clearly and convincingly made on Second Reading. On that occasion there were notable speeches from my noble and learned friend Lord Goddard, my noble and learned friend Lord Parker of Waddington, and my noble and learned friend Lord Denning. I did not speak on that occasion because there was nothing more to be said after they had spoken. But I draw your Lordships' attention to the fact that, unlike on some recent occasions when legal opinion has been considerably divided in your Lordships' House, to some Peers' amusement and entertainment perhaps, on this occasion legal opinion was united, apart from the opinion of the Lord Chancellor, in favour of preserving the City as it now is. I do not intend to repeat any of the arguments advanced on Second Reading or by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, in that powerful speech to which we have just listened, but I think it is right to emphasise that not a single word of criticism has been made of the way in which the Lord Mayor and aldermen administer justice in the City.
I should like to say a word or two about the arguments on the other side advanced on Second Reading by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor and the noble Lord, Lord Leatherland. The Lord Chancellor said—and I read from column 931 of Hansard of April 29:
"So what are we really arguing about? The only thing we are arguing about is this: do we leave the aldermen as they are—sole, well-to-do males? Or can they not so far demean themselves as to have sitting with them two ordinary citizens? That is all it is about, though one must face the fact that one of them might be a woman."
I would say, with great respect to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, that that really is not what it is all about. The real issue is this. If the administration of justice by the Lord Mayor and aldermen cannot be criticised—and it has not been criticised—has a case been made out for any change? Has it been convincingly argued that the administration of justice will be improved by the changes proposed? That surely is the test, and no one so far has
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had the temerity to argue that the administration of justice will in fact be improved.
The noble Lord, Lord Leatherland, thought that a court of three was better than a court of one. That, I suggest, is a very doubtful proposition. The Lord Chancellor said that two heads were beter than one. Sometimes they are, but sometimes they are not. Your Lordships will remember that from time to time pressures are exerted to enlarge the number of stipendiaries who sit alone at the expense of benches, for a considerable body of public opinion thinks that one stipendiary is better than a bench. I myself do not share that view. I think that a good bench and a good stipendiary are equally good. But if it is the real argument here that you should not have any magistrate sitting by himself, why do we not find in this Bill a provision that stipendiary magistrates must sit with lay justices? But that is not there. And what is the distinguishing factor between a stipendiary magistrate and a Lord Mayor and aldermen of the City of London? First of all, of course, the stipendiary magistrates are in receipt of a salary. Secondly, they are trained lawyers. But they have learnt to be justices from their experience sitting as magistrates, and I would say myself that the experience and capacity and capability of the Lord Mayor and aldermen who sit so long and so continuously is comparable with that of the best stipendiary.
I submit to your Lordships that there is no case for change. I shall wait to hear what the Lord Chancellor has to say. I hope very much that he has reconsidered the matter and changed his mind. He and I have known each other for many a long year, and in many circumstances we have met and in many circumstances we have fought. If I may say so, I know him to be very determined and to hold strongly to his opinion. But I also know that he is a big enough man to change his opinion and not hesitate to do so when the weight of argument is against him. So I hope to-day that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, having reflected on all that was said on Second Reading, and having heard the powerful and persuasive speech made by Lord Goodman, will say that he thinks on

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reflection it would be better to leave things are they are.
I hope he will say that, but if he should adhere to his opinion, then I have put down the Amendment which is in my name, Amendment No. 4, in an endeavour to secure a compromise—and the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor recognised that it was a compromise solution. I should like to make it perfectly clear that I do not think it would be as good a solution as the acceptance of the Amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Goodman. I know from my experience in that office how important it is for all Lord Chancellors to have the best of relations with the City; they have to work so closely together. I think it is terribly unfortunate if there should be a row or dissension between them. It is in the hope that, even at this late hour, that can be avoided that I have put down these Amendments which are a compromise solution.
I can tell the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor this. If he is prepared to accept this compromise it would also be accepted by the City. There is this compromise, and I think if it is accepted the City will have given way to a very great extent. Under this compromise they will sit with lay justices, and that would meet the main objection advanced by the Lord Chancellor. That is the objection stated at column 931. That is a tremendous concession for them to be prepared to give. If, on the other hand, the Lord Chancellor is prepared to make some concession, the first concession I ask him to make is this: that the Lord Mayor and aldermen should continue to be made justices by virtue of their ancient Charter of 1741. On Second Reading the Lord Chancellor said this:
"I cannot conceive of a state of affairs in which any advisory committee for the City of London would not include among its recommendations for appointment all the aldermen of the City of London. So what are we really arguing about?"—[col. 931.]
The Lord Chancellor did not say, and of course he could not, that if such recommendations were made by an advisory committee he would make the aldermen justices. But I cannot myself think it likely that an advisory committee recommending aldermen would have their recommendations turned down by a Lord Chancellor, of whatever political colour he might be. Therefore, so far as that is
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concerned, if it be—and it would seem to be from the Lord Chancellor's speech —that he recognised that all aldermen should be made justices, the only issue is whether they should be made justices by the exercise of the Lord Chancellor's patronage, or whether they should become justices by virtue of the ancient Charter of the City. Is that really worth having a row about with the City? I cannot believe it is. It is asking the Lord Chancellor to make a concession; I think it is a small one. And if at the end of the day he recognises, as I think that passage I have read shows, that the aldermen will all be justices, would it not be simpler, would it not be better, just to leave that part of the position as it is to-day?
What about the second part? Your Lordships will see that my Amendment provides:
"Notwithstanding anything in any enactment the Lord Mayor shall be the Chairman and the Aldermen of the City of London the Deputy Chairmen of the justices of the peace for the City of London."
I should like to explain that. If the Lord Mayor of London is sitting as a justice in the City, it seems to me unsuitable that any lay magistrate should be in the chair and should preside over him. If you are going to say that the Lord Mayor shall be a justice but not provide for his taking the chair, you might just as well say that he should not be a justice at all, because in my belief it would be quite out of keeping with his position and with the traditions of the City for the Lord Mayor of London to sit in his own court under any other chairman. I hope the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor will recognise that. Great tributes have been paid to the quality of the men who sit. It docs not seem to me to be asking much to have it recognised that when they sit with lay justices they should preside.
The Amendment then goes on to provide that the Aldermen should be the deputy chairmen. That would mean that when the Lord Mayor was not sitting the senior alderman who was sitting would preside. Surely that is right, having regard to the position of the City, and also to the training and experience which these aldermen have, and which they will continue to have. Of course, if this compromise is accepted it will still be the case that aldermen will

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not sit unless they have had a proper training.
That is the compromise I am putting forward. On the one hand, the Lord Mayor and aldermen, justices by virtue of their Charter, chairmen and deputy chairmen, presiding when they sit; on the other hand, the concession from them, which I think is really a much bigger concession, that they will sit with laymen, and recognising that they are willing to sit with—if I may mention the fact—a woman, if required.
I hope we shall hear soon from the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor what his views are on both these Amendments, and I stress to him that I support the views of the noble Lord, Lord Goodman. I believe it is better to leave things as they are, but if the noble and learned Lord is adamant in his refusal to accept those Amendments, I beg of him to give serious consideration to the acceptance of this compromise.
LORD BOOTHBY: It is unnecessary, after the powerful arguments which have been adduced by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, and the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, to add more than two or three sentences. However, I should like to say this. Here is an element in our judicial system which, by common consent, has worked extremely well—some might say almost miraculously well—in the past, and continues to do so in the present, and I echo the words of the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, that it would be much better not to tamper with it at all.
The point I want to make to your Lordships is that we cannot ignore the weighty advice which was given by the Lord Chief Justice, the Master of the Rolls, and the ex-Lord Chief Justice, Lord Goddard. No-one who heard those speakers, as I did, could fail to be convinced. I think probably there has never been an occasion when the weight of high legal opinion has leaned so much to one side, and to be quite frank I do not think your Lordships can afford to ignore the advice that was given to you by those great experts who know what they are talking about. I am not greatly enamoured of the compromise proposal put forward by the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne. I think the
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best and quickest way of dealing with this is to accept the Amendment put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, and to leave things as they are.
4.25 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: If I say something now on the Government's case, it is not with a view to stopping any other member of the Committee from speaking. On the contrary, I shall very much welcome views, particularly from the many Members of your Lordships' House who are themselves justices of the peace. I observe that there are now present a great many noble Lords who were not here on the Second Reading of the Bill. Therefore, perhaps I may begin by recapitulating shortly what I then said.
This Bill is not in any way aimed at the City of London. I am a great enthusiast, and do not pretend to be otherwise, about the justices of the peace. This is an absolutely unique system. There is no other country in the world in which ordinary citizens play so large a part in the administration of justice. There are 16,500 proper justices of the peace, sitting in a thousand courts every day, all over the country, dealing with 98 per cent, of all the criminal cases in the country and seeing the rest on their way up to higher courts. They deal with a total of 1½ million cases a year and, in relation to that sort of volume, there is an absolute minimum of complaints. They are extremely conscientious, and I think we have every reason to be grateful to them—particularly, of course, the taxpayers.
Naturally, everything is capable of improvement and review, and as your Lordships know there was a review in 1911, when there was a Royal Commission, and there was another review in 1946–48, when there was a second Royal Commission. Twenty years have now gone by and it is thought that certain improvements can be made. The justices of the peace are, as your Lordships know, appointed by the Lord Chancellor on the advice of local advisory committees. I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, that it is absolutely untrue to say that they are nominated by a Political Party. I am afraid that that was the case in the past, but it is certainly not so to-day.
LORD GOODMAN: I never suggested that for one moment. What I said was that they were appointed by a political officer. They are apparently appointed on the recommendation of committees, which, so far as I know, sit in private. Nobody knows what the committees do or how they work. Nobody knows what they may raise against a person proposed, nor has the person any opportunity of replying to them. My point is that this cannot be the ideal method of doing it, but it may work.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, that what he has said simply is not so. It is not that the whole thing is a mystery. On the contrary, I have here, absolutely free—and I will let the noble Lord have one—a document entitled Justices of the Peace: How they are appointed; what they do. There should be no mystery about them at all. I had in my room recently the whole of the Inner London Advisory Committee, members of the Press, the B.B.C., and I.T.V., so that everybody could see who the members of the Committee were, and when we broke up I invited any member of the Press to "nobble" any member of the Advisory Committee and to ask them any question they liked about anything they do. They are not now appointed unless they under take to undergo a course of training and to sit regularly. I would add that I am extremely grateful to the members of my advisory committees, who themselves take a great deal of trouble—
VISCOUNT SIMONDS: I do not wish to intervene, and I am speaking from a rather ancient recollection, as the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor knows, for it is now 15 years since I left that honourable office. But surely he is not right in saying that the names of the advisory committee are made public. It is an absolute secret.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I leave this entirely to the advisory committees. I make no rule whatever that they cannot tell everybody who they are. However, the majority of advisory committees prefer not to do so, because they say that in a small provincial town they would be lobbied to death and their friends would all feel hurt if they were not recommended, although the secretary of the advisory committee is always known.
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In the counties he is usually the clerk of the peace and in the boroughs the clerk to the justices, and most people know that in the counties the chairman of the advisory committee is generally— although not always—the Lord Lieutenant of the County. But I make no rule about this, and when in London the thing had become somewhat Party political I appointed an entirely new Inner London Committee of ladies and gentlemen of such distinction that I do not think anybody would be likely to lobby them. The Chairman is the Master of the Rolls. They said they had no objection to their names being known, and one of the advantages of their names being known is that they could interview those recommended for the office. I make no rule. Some do and some do not. Some committees now advertise in the papers when they are going to fill vacancies so that any local organisation, any individual even, can recommend anybody they like.
This part of the Bill arises because alongside the 16,500 justices, all of whom have been appointed because an advisory committee thought and I thought that they would make good justices of the pease, there are some 2,000 ex officio justices, including some 350 Privy Counsellors, all the chairmen of county councils, all the mayors, chairmen of urban and rural district councils. High Court Judges, the Lord Chancellor, the Chairman of the Council of the Isles of Scilly, the aldermen of the City of London, the Solicitor General, the Lord Privy Seal, and a number of other people. They are ex officio because they hold some other office—a very distinguished office like that of the Chancellor of Cambridge University, or, rather unfairly the Committee may think, the Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and Deputy Vice-Chancellor of Oxford University. It is proposed that they should no longer be ex officio justices, and, as I said on Second Reading, I do not think anybody has opposed that general principle.
But quite a number have said that although they agree with it as a general principle, they think there ought to be one exception, namely, themselves That, I suppose, is human nature. The mayors, for example, say, it is absurd to make the chairmen of small urban and rural and district councils ex officio justices, of the

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peace, but a mayor, which is an historical office, is the number one citizen and always has been; he is the contact between the local authority and the magistrates: it is important that the mayor should remain ex officio a justice of the peace. The chairmen of the rural district councils say that of course they quite agree about the mayor; it is absurd that he is an ex officio justice because the mayor's job to-day is a whole-time job. He comes along and sits once and then he goes away, and what is the point of that? Whereas they have part-time jobs as chairmen of urban and rural district councils.
So far as the City is concerned, the first thing I would say is that I think they are to some extent in a special position. I would also say that I have had the most amicable relations with the City about this matter, and indeed during the whole of the time I have occupied this office. I am, if I may say so, a great admirer of the former Lord Mayor and a great admirer of this Lord Mayor. I have seen two deputations from them about this question, and the Prime Minister has received a deputation from them about it. It has been going on for a long time; therefore, as your Lordships will see, it has had the longest and most careful discussion and consideration. All our discussions have been on a courteous and amicable basis.
The point mainly behind the Bill in abolishing ex officio justices is that one seeks from this unique system to have men and women of different ages and different occupations who come from different walks of life, all putting their heads together. As my noble friend Lord Leatherland said, two heads are better than one, and I think that most courts find that. What is desirable is that anybody who appears before a magistrates' court should know that the probability is that there will be somebody there who is familiar with his habits of speech and thought and his economic and living conditions. This, which is the main object of the justice of the peace court, cannot obtain if justices are appointed ex officio and consist only of well-to-do males, however eminent they may be.
I should like, if I may, to get rid of one or two misconceptions. May I say how delighted I am to see the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goddard, here.
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He reminded us on Second Reading that there had been one or two indictable cases in the City courts which had taken a long time. He said there was one in the City in 1960 which took 14 days, one in 1963 which took 26 days, one in 1964 which took 13 days and one in 1965 which took 15 days. Of course, all courts of summary jurisdiction have experience of some long indictable cases, but that matter, I suggest, has no relevance to what we are considering, for the simple reason that it was before the Criminal Justice Act. The Criminal Justice Act, as all the justices on this Committee know, revolutionised the taking of depositions. Usually now they are in writing and the old business of witness after witness going into the witness box and having everything he said written down in long-hand no longer applies. This is, in any case, one of the occasions on which a court of summary jurisdiction can be constituted by one lay justice.
Then it was suggested that the City deal with a very specialised business; that they have fraud cases and financial matters on which the knowledge and experience of aldermen of the City of London must be much greater than that of ordinary justices. May I just remove this misconception? I take what happens to be the next entry to the City of London, in the Criminal Statistics, which relates to Newport. The turnovers for 1966, if I may put it in that way, the last year for which figures are available, were these: malicious wounding, the City 30 cases, Newport 37; indecent assault on females, the City 9 cases, Newport 11; unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl aged between 13 and 16, the City 1, Newport 5; shopbreaking, the City 366, Newport 347; possession of housebreaking implements, the City 11, Newport 2; embezzlement, the City 14, Newport 15; falsifying accounts, the City 9, Newport 22; obtaining by false pretences, the City 170, Newport 72; fraud by agent, the City 8, Newport 8; larceny from shops, the City 117, Newport 264; larceny from vehicles, the City 306, Newport 345; minor larcenies, the City 832, Newport 867; larceny by servant, the City 159, Newport 72; motoring offences, the City 6,207, Newport 4,196. It is most extraordinary how these are almost exactly similar in the incidence of different types of crime in the two cases. There is

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nothing in the contention that the City business is highly specialised.
One of the difficulties in the City—but I do not want to exaggerate this because there are not a great many cases anyhow—is that they have no woman, and all their domestic court cases and all their juvenile court cases have to be shifted off on to the County of London justices. Then, of course, the City aldermen are all members of local authorities. My noble friend, Lord Leatherland, said he did not think this was a good idea, and it is, I suppose, a matter of opinion. I do not think, and my predecessors have not thought, that it is a good idea to have too many justices who are members of the local authority. Advisory committees used to be asked to see to it that not more than one-third of the justices were members of local authorities; they are now asked to see to it that not more than one-quarter are members of local authorities. It seems odd, in a way, to have an area in which all the justices consist of the leading aldermen of the local authority.
As to the value of sitting together, all I can say is that distinguished and experienced chairmen of quarter sessions, most of whom have been, and some still are, recorders, and therefore have experience of sitting with or without justices, have not in a single instance said that they prefer to sit without justices. I remember that my noble friend Lord Leatherland said he had often arrived at one view when the bench retired and had been in the end led to an entirely different opinion because of views expressed by other people. It is the fact that it is a good thing to talk things over. You find that other justices have thought of something that you yourself have not thought of.
In relation to Lord Goodman's remarks, I should add that I made it plain on Second Reading that there is no complaint about the way in which the City aldermen do their work. Of course, whether people coming before them feel like that one does not know. One does not know how far a woman, perhaps in a case of indecent assault, or in such a case in which she is a witness, would prefer that a woman justice should be present. The noble Lord says that, after all, the aldermen are appointed by the best democratic method: that of
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election. That is no doubt a matter of opinion. We all know that in America a number of judges are elected, not appointed. I should not have thought that that was a good basis for appointment. I have yet to meet any American judge or lawyer who likes that method. The trouble is that they cannot get rid of it because the only people who can get rid of it are the politicians, and the politicians like having this amount of patronage. It is a great difficulty in the field of American law to-day, that most people would like to get rid of their elected judges, but they cannot.
So far as election is concerned, in a sense it is a self-perpetuating body, in so far as nobody can be appointed an alderman unless the Court of Aldermen elects him. If one takes two good City men, each with just as much connection with the City as the other, one may like the life of a City Livery Company, with functions and dinners and the Common Council, and the other may not, or he may not have time to do both that and to sit as a justice. The latter cannot be made a justice under the noble Lord's proposals. He can never be a justice unless he is prepared to start off by canvassing people and standing for election to the Common Council. Then he has to be promoted from the Common Council to the bench of aldermer. I suggest that, on the face of it, that is not a sound method.
With regard to the noble and learned Viscount's suggested compromise, may I say that I have most carefully considered this. It goes a good deal of the way to meet what was my main point: that we ought to try to make up our minds what is the best system of justice for most criminal cases. While we have stipendiaries in large towns where it would not be practicable to find enough justices, if our general system of having a mixture of men and women of different experiences and occupations is right, then it is difficult, on the face of it, to justify that in one place only—it will be the only place in England, of course—we should have an entirely different system whereby one layman on his own can sit as a court of summary jurisdiction.
I have told the City that if there is an advisory committee I should naturally ask the Lord Mayor or an ex-Lord Mayor to be the chairman of that committee,

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because he is the leading man in the City of London; and I always consult with the chairman as to who the other members should be. As I think I said on Second Reading, I should be surprised if, appointing them on their merit, among the justices in the City there would not be all the aldermen. So the Amendment of the noble and learned Viscount on its first point is quite a narrow one. It is, whether they should get there because they have been chosen by an advisory committee on their merits, or whether they should get there ex officio because they have been thought fit for some other and different office. But there is so little between these two, that if it were that alone I should be prepared to accept the Amendment. It is the second point which raises the difficulty; namely, that they should always be chairmen.
May I apologise to those members of the Committee who are justices if, finally, for just a few moments I explain to those of your Lordships who are not justices how important the work of the chairman is? Purely fortuitously, I received on Wednesday last a report of the National Advisory Council on the training of magistrates. They have prepared a training syllabus for senior magistrates and in particular those who may be likely in the near future to become chairmen. They say
"The importance of training for all justices cannot be exaggerated, but there is perhaps one aspect of this which has until now been for the most part overlooked. It has doubtless been right to concentrate first on the instruction of the new justice, but the responsibility of the justice who occupies the chair at the sitting of a magistrates court is heavy. Training in chairmanship on a methodical and organised basis has been ignored, and there is no existing text-book on the subject. This is perhaps surprising, because the chairman of a bench probably has a greater influence than any of his colleagues in formulating their decision. He also largely determines the impression made upon the defendant, the legal profession, the Press and, above all, the public, of the administration of justice at petty sessions and in the juvenile and domestic courts. The conduct of the proceedings is, to a not inconsiderable extent, in the hands of the chairman, and he should manifestly be in charge of them and obviously alert and confident. It is important, too, that he says the right things on the proper occasions and in the right way. A justice who is incompetent in the chair, especially if this is due to lack of training, can spoil the impression created by an otherwise estimable bench
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and the lay magistracy, in the eyes of those who happen to be present in court."
They propose this syllabus of training. Under Part A, penal practice, there are the usual things: fines, supervision orders, costs, compensation, damages, restitution, assessment of amount, enforcement, custodial methods, prison, borstal, detention centres, approved schools, absolute and conditional discharge, suspended sentences, and so on and so forth. Then comes criminal law. I need not trouble your Lordships with that. Then, of course, what is extremely important, comes procedure. I appeal to all those justices present: is it not the fact that when you have sat as a justice for years you think you know the whole thing absolutely inside out; but the first day that you are called upon to take the chair you find it is very much less easy that it had seemed. You discover you have got all the time to answer the questions: "What do I say now?", and, "What do I do now?". It is that, that this course is designed to cover, explaining bail, explaining to an unrepresented defendant his right to cross-examine witnesses, explaining points to be considered after conviction, explaining the effect of a conditional discharge, explaining the effect of a probation order, explaining the effect of a suspended sentence, and so on.
Of course, if there are to be other justices, as well as the City aldermen, and it takes 25 aldermen to get through the work, if there are 50 justices sitting with them in the usual three, this means that 50 other justices will have to be appointed; and it would obviously be foolish, on any view, as I am sure any advisory committee would tell me, to create 50 entirely new justices for that purpose. What one would obviously do would be to leaven any new justices with a substantial number of experienced justices who are qualified for the City and who are serving at the moment on the Inner London and Middlesex benches. Really, as a matter of sheer common sense, if you have three justices sitting in a court in the City, and one of them is a woman who has been a justice for seven years, though she has never acted as chairman, and one of them is a man who has been a justice for 15 years and is a really experienced deputy chairman, and the

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third is an alderman of the City of London who has just been elected and whose first day it is in a magistrates' court, it really would be "barmy", would it not, to say that he ought to take the chair. It is on that ground that I cannot advise the Commitee to accept that Amendment.
So far as Lord Goodman's Amendment is concerned, as the Committee probably know an exactly similar Amendment was most carefully considered in another place. It was considered in Committee and rejected, it was raised again on Report and Third Reading, and was again rejected. And I do not feel able, I am afraid, to advise the Committee to accept it.
4.53 p.m.
LORD PARKER OF WADDINGTON: When I was first called to the Bar I rapidly learned that one ought never to follow one's leader unless the position was so bad that it could not be made worse. To-day I treat the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, as my leader, and after his extremely powerful speech there is really nothing more to say. I should have thought the case was unarguable. Further, on the last occasion, on Second Reading, I am afraid that I wearied your Lordships by a somewhat long speech in which I sought to put forward the pros and cons in regard to this issue. I intended to say nothing on this occasion, but the noble Lord on the Woolsack has gone over, if I may say so, all the ground again—all the old arguments—and for that reason, if for no other, I feel that I ought to say a word to summarise to-day what I said on an earlier occasion.
In Charter after Charter the confidence that we now feel in the Lord Mayor and aldermen of the City has been confirmed. In Statute after Statute it has been confirmed. It was confirmed by the Royal Commission in 1948. It was confirmed by a Labour Government in 1949, in the Justices of the Peace Act of that year, which, by Section 11, specifically preserved the right of the Lord Mayor and aldermen to act as Justices. Under another Government, too, if my memory is right, by the Magistrates' Courts Act 1952, Section 121, there was specifically confirmed their right each to sit alone.
Quite rightly, the whole matter has been taken out of politics, and one asks oneself what on earth has happened since
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1949 and 1952 to cause us to be thinking, even debating the idea, of doing away with an institution in which everybody has had such confidence. The ability and efficiency of the aldermen of the City of London is conceded both by the Lord Chancellor and in another place; and what else could possibly be the case? They devised and underwent a voluntary course of training long before any Lord Chancellor devisee any course of training for lay magistrates. They sit regularly. They sit for long periods; and, incidentally, the Court of Aldermen surely know far more about the candidate to become an alderman, about his life, his ability, in particular his ability to be a justice, than any Lord Chancellor's advisory committee. They know the individual backwards, and they choose him and they choose him only if he is fit to act as a justice of the peace.
Finally, there is the record of the City Court. The noble Lord, Lord Goodman, has given the figures for 1967. Incidentally, from 1945 to date, some 23 years, there have been, I think, only 11 appeals by way of case stated to the Divisional Court, of which only five succeeded; and in living memory there is no case that I have been able to find of any decision of the Court being quashed by an application for certiorari. That is a record which I cannot think any judge, chairman of quarter sessions, recorder, or any body of magistrates could conceivably emulate. One is tempted to say that it is almost too good to be true. But it is true.
Now, what are the arguments against the existing system? Since the debate on Second Reading the argument which has been put forward to me by a number of people is that the Court have not a woman alderman, and therefore cannot try juvenile cases or matrimonial cases. It is a point; but let us please get it into perspective. Out of 19,028 cases dealt with by the magistrates in 1967, there were 158 juvenile cases, 0·75 per cent., which had to be dealt with elsewhere; and of matrimonial cases the figures run at two to three a year. Now is this institution, this system, to be sacrificed on the altar of uniformity merely because it deprives them of dealing with 0·75 per cent, further cases which they might hear?

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Secondly, there is the idea that an accused would feel that he was getting a fairer trial if the bench consisted of two or three justices, only one of whom, perhaps, was an alderman. As my noble friend Lord Goodman said, there is no sign that any person has suffered at the hands of the Court. Nobody who has been involved in crime of any sort before them has complained in all these years; hands of the court. Nobody who has circumstance in which it is fairer to be tried by two or three is if the one justice sitting is a person in whom no confidence is felt. If there is confidence in that one, then it is just as fair, I should have thought, putting myself in the position of an accused, to be tried by him as to be tried by three justices, only one of whom do I know anything about and have confidence in. However, I recognise that there are two views about that.
It may be that there should be no court consisting of one person, but that is not the subject matter of this Bill. This is not a Bill to decide whether stipendiaries should sit with others; whether recorders should sit with others; whether, as I think the Lord Chancellor suggested on another occasion, the time is coming when judges will sit with lay assessors, or lay judges, call them what you will. That is not the subject matter of this Bill. What we are considering here is whether, in order to improve the efficiency of the magistracy generally, there are any people sitting who ought not to sit. The answer is that, there are.
As the Lord Chancellor explained on another occasion, there are just over (I think it is) 2,000 persons who can sit by reason of their office. May I get rid of one class—Privy Counsellors. I do that for the simple reason that I do not know any Privy Counsellor who has ever sought to exercise his right. What about judges? I happened to be a justice of the peace before I ever became a judge. I cannot conceive of any judge, with the pressure of work as it is at present, coming forward and saying that he wants to sit as a justice of the peace, unless it is as a chairman or deputy chairman of a county quarter sessions. This Bill is surely aimed at the numbers of chairmen of district councils and local
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mayors who perhaps once in their term of office, merely from the point of view of prestige and with no training or experience, choose to sit on the local bench and perhaps preside. I think that we should all welcome the exclusion of those people, because they do not add to the efficiency of the magistracy.
The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said that the Bill is not directed against the City. Of course it is not, in the sense that it is dealing with ex officio justices; but it hits the City as the one class of ex officio justices who are fully trained, fully experienced and have this magnificence record. I feel I that the case is unarguable for allowing an institution with such a record to carry on. It may be that on a later occasion we may have to discuss a Bill which provides that nobody, however qualified or skilful, shall sit alone. That is a completely different matter and is not something we are considering to-day. I earnestly hope that the Committee will support this Amendment.
5.2 p.m.
BARONESS BIRK: I should like to speak against both Amendments. I see this matter in a wider context of both social and legal reform. I believe that it I would be a mistake to make an exception of the City of London. The noble Lord, Lord Goodman, said that he would feel quite safe in the hands of aldermen, but most defendants have not the eloquence or ability of Lord Goodman, and many judges may be quite afraid to have him in their hands. As a justice of the peace, I feel that one of the most important points to bear in mind is the difficulty involved in having an untrained magistrate sitting alone. The noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, said that nobody had yet had the temerity to answer this argument, although I thought that my noble friend Lord I Leatherland answered it very well on Second Reading.
A point that goes even deeper than the value of two or three heads being better than one is that even judges and justices —and the aldermen sitting in the City of London—are all human beings. We all have certain biases and prejudices, and as long as we are aware of them when we sit on a bench that at least is a start. But this is all part of the human condition, and when one has more than one

53
person sitting on a bench the great value is that they are able to cancel out each other's prejudices. This not only gives the defendant a far better trial but also gives more confidence to the justices. I am sure that many of us would feel quite nervous in sitting alone and would feel a certain arrogance about judging one's fellow men, particularly when one is untrained. The trained judge or stipendiary, presumably, in his or her legal training has a certain amount of objectivity; but I was interested to hear the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor say on Second Reading that he would not be at all surprised
"if some of those in this Chamber live to see the day when High Court Judges sit with a couple of civilians."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 29/4/68; col. 931.]
With great respect to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Parker, I think that this is all part of the trend in social and legal reform. Those of us who sit at quarter sessions, like myself, sit with a chairman as lay justices, and we also have a jury—which is not the case in an aldermanic court. The Beeching Commission, which is now sitting, has already had from various organisations a great body of evidence in support of legally qualified chairmen sitting with lay magistrates.
On the question of the participation of women, I am all in favour of men having certain male preserves if that is what they want; but I think that these should be restricted to clubs or hefty sports. I do not think that this should extend to the administration of justice. The figures for 1966 in relation to England and Wales show that there were 5,742 women justices of the peace, but not one in the City of London. A great deal has been made of the one lady on the Common Council who may eventually emerge on to the aldermanic bench. But with great respect to her: one bird does not make a judicial summer. To concentrate on women in cases involving juveniles and domestic matters seems to me to be a wrong approach. After all, the country is populated by both men and women, and there are men and women capable of being justices. I consider that in the ordinary courts undertaking magisterial duties this work should be undertaken by men and women.
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We have heard from the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor a list of cases on which a comparison has been drawn between the City of London and Newport, and it is clear that there is not a great deal to choose in the number and variety of cases as between the two cities. As for the argument about fraud and other city matters, one could find similar arguments for the cities of Birmingham, Manchester and Liverpool, where the system which is operated in the City of London does not apply. When cases such as rape or unlawful sexual intercourse with a young; girl are heard, I know from my own experience that when I have been sitting with a lay chairman he has been very pleased when I have suggested that it would be a good idea if I questioned the defendant or a witness, because it is far less embarrassing than to have one man alone asking questions on these matters.
There is great importance in establishing a link in many courts with regard to family matters. I refer to matters arising between husband and wife which come up in the ordinary courts, perhaps in a case of common assault or a case involving arrears of maintenance for children who are in an institution; lack of school attendance, and so on. Very often these matters are connected with what has been going on in the juvenile courts and matrimonial courts. In my own court not very long ago we had a case involving common assault where a couple appeared in the ordinary magistrates' court, also the matrimonial court, and the children of the family were before the juvenile court.
In these days, when so much of our work is concerned with welfare is well as interpretation of the law—in other words, when we are trying to deal with the human condition—I feel that we should not isolate these matters as they are now being isolated in the City of London. We do not know whit will happen when the large population moves into the Barbican, but even if there were no need for separate courts the fact that women could sit in the City of London would mean that they would also be available to be appointed to both juvenile and domestic courts in the Inner London area. Another point which bears examination is that while the average age of magistrates and aldermen

55
is around 50, nevertheless the youngest aldermen are, I believe, appointed at around 35, whereas magistrates to-day are now being appointed in their late twenties and early thirties.
I also feel that the argument that aldermen have to come from the Common Council (although I believe there are a few who are appointed direct) is a very important one against continuing the present system, because again, having been a member of a local authority, I am quite aware—as I am sure many noble Lords are aware—that someone who makes an exceptionally good local authority councillor is not necessarily the right person to be on the bench and to administer justice.
On the Second Reading, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goddard, said that the power not to appoint an alderman had been invoked once. He gave us only one example, and that was of someone who had a close connection with the licensed trade. If an alderman was considered extremely good in his work in every other way, but was not considered suitable for the bench, it seems to me that the position would be very difficult; because, after all, if we are honest about it seniority plays a considerable part in this and I think it would be very hard to refuse his nomination.
In this imperfect world we may not be able to get equality of justice, but it seems to me that there should be equality of opportunity. This means that in all the magistrates' courts of the country, apart from the stipendiary courts, there should be more than one magistrate sitting; that there should be men and women; and that there should be men and women with a wide range of antecedents and occupations. It has been mentioned that many aldermen now sitting came from humble beginnings. I think that when people get to that situation they can look back with nostalgia to their humble beginnings, because they have moved into another area of life. I believe it is a good thing that there should be on the benches a certain number of people who are still in the midst of their humble beginnings. With the influx of population which is coming into the City of London, not only as residents but as workers— and, after all, people are brought to the court in the area where the offence was
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committed, not where they live—it is even more important that we should have the same consistent system as we have in the rest of the country. The fact that it has worked very well in the City of London seems to me an argument for congratulating the City, but it does not seem to be an argument for saying that something else will not work better in the future if we are prepared to try it.
I do not feel that the Amendment of the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, which is a compromise, meets the case either, because it retains the principle of ex officios but dilutes it with appointed justices. So there again, as the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor pointed out, we should still be left with a chairman and deputy chairman who, although they may have taken a course, are still untrained but have a life interest in the offices of chairman and deputy chairmen. It is with no reflection on the riches of the City that I say that this solution seems to me to be rather a poor man's quarter sessions, with all untrained people sitting and with no jury. I appreciate how strongly the people connected with the City feel about giving up some of its preserves. But I think there are other traditions in the City which are more worthy to hold on to, and that this one should be given up. I do not believe that to retain it fits into what we shall be looking for in a modern structure of our social and legal system.
5.15 p.m.
LORD CHORLEY: The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has asked for the views of active magistrates, and he seems to be getting them. I should like to start by saying that while I agree with a very great deal of what the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, said in his admirable speech, he is completely wrong about the selection of magistrates. I was a member of an advisory committee for 25 years, which is a pretty long time, and in all my experience we have never put up to the Lord Chancellor nominations from political Parties. No doubt it may occur here and there in some parts of the country, but it is far from being anything like—
LORD GOODMAN: I hesitate to interrupt the noble Lord, but I should like to make it clear—because I should be loth for it to be on the record that I

57
said any such thing—that I never said that any selection committee put up political nominations. I have never said it, I have never suggested it and I do not believe it. I do not know how selection committees work, because their proceedings are in secret.
LORD CHORLEY: Your Lordships heard what the noble Lord said, and I think it was implicit in his remarks. He also said that these committees meet privately. Of course they do. How can you possibly canvass in public the qualifications of people to be magistrates? The noble Lord is a sufficiently practical man to know that that would be quite absurd. Of course they meet in private. They attempt to get the best possible bench and, so far as my experience goes, I believe that to a very large extent they succeed.
I approach this problem without any sort of bias in favour of the City of London, but I approach it with very considerable bias against the present system of a large number of ex officio magistrates. With the sort of experience which I have already mentioned, I am quite satisfied that it does not make for the best administration of justice; and, surely, the best administration of justice is what we in Parliament are concerned to get. That is our job. Everybody who has spoken with knowledge of the administration of justice in the City of London says that they get very good justice indeed in those courts. I am very much impressed with that, and any bias that I had against the system is really negatived, because I am a practical man and I am much more concerned to get really good justice than to carry out some doctrinaire policy. Surely, that is what one wants every time.
I have heard no arguments, except one, against the system in the City. It has been suggested that courts are impeccable in the City, but barrister friends who practice in those courts have told me that in their view the weakness of the court is in its sentencing. I do not know from my own knowledge, but members of the Bar of some standing who practice in that court tell me not that their sentencing is too severe, but that it is a little out of line with that of other magistrates' courts. I can quite see how it could be, because it is at the point of sentencing, in particular, that two or three
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heads are so extraordinarily valuable. I should not like to be a High Court Judge on assizes, having to decide all by myself on the sentence in a very difficult case. It must be a gruelling business. As a chairman of quarter sessions one threshes it out with one's fellow magistrates. So far as my experience of the magistracy goes, I think that the City court would be much stronger if it were reinforced, so that, at any rate when it comes to the sentencing, it is not done just by one alderman but he his colleagues with whom to argue, in order to come to what in all the circumstances is the best decision. That is why I like the compromise proposal of the noble and learned Viscount.
I was impressed by the fact that the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack said that he would have accepted it had it not been for the question of the chairmanship. Surely that can be overcome. Can they not be left to choose their own chairman—which is what, in effect, happens in other courts? I should have thought the noble and learned Viscount would think that a reasonable way out of this difficulty and it would, to a large extent, preserve this system. The arguments of the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack and of the noble Baroness seemed to be directed to trying to persuade your Lordships that this system just could not work, for many reasons. The fact of the matter is that it does work and it works very well, and that seems to be the acid test. If it really works we certainly ought not to destroy it. If we can improve it by strengthening it in the way the compromise solution proposes, then I suggest to your Lordships that you should accept that solution.
5.20 p.m.
LORD CARRINGTON: I wonder whether I might say just one word. I must first disclaim any City connection, other than that I work there from time to time; and I am afraid that I am only a rather inactive magistrate. But I think it would be misunderstood if nobody said anything from these Benches. I have listened with great care to the arguments this afternoon (I was not here on the Second Reading), and two things have struck me very much. Not one single noble Lord has said that the present arrangement works badly. It so happens that I was lunching with a man to-day

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and we were talking about this Bill. He complained bitterly about the administration of justice in the City, and said that he had been fined for leaving his car without lights on in 1936, and that he thought this was unjust. But, even so, he did not seem to think it was a very serious matter. But none of your Lordships—and nobody outside that I have ever heard—has said that the present arrangement works badly. Justice seems to be done, and people seem to be satisfied; and, as the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, said, not even those who have been on the other end have complained about the present system. That is the first point I would make.
The second thing which has struck me is that the arguments from those of your Lordships who have supported the Government, and the Lord Chancellor in particular, seem to me to boil down to the argument of uniformity; that there should be uniformity throughout the country. The noble Baroness shakes her head, but I do not think it amounted to anything else than that. It seemed to me that they were saying that because the position which obtained everywhere else was satisfactory there, it should be made so in the City. I am afraid that I cannot agree with that. After all, this is being done in the teeth of a recommendation of a Royal Commission, which only in 1948 said precisely the opposite. Noble Lords have quoted the passage:
"The traditions and practice of the City have resulted in a high standard of administration of criminal jurisdiction, and we do not recommend any change for the adult Court."
I mean this in no offensive way, but it seemed to me that in this matter perhaps noble Lords opposite were more concerned with uniformity than with justice. It is not that they are not concerned with justice, because of course they would not seek to bring about a state of affairs in which there was less justice. But when we are all agreed that justice is done in these courts it does not seem to me that the change is wanted for any other reason than uniformity.
My noble and learned friend Lord Dilhorne has suggested what is almost a compromise in this problem. I, for one, should be very happy to follow the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, into the Lobby— and. indeed, in certain circumstances I
60
might even do so—except for the fact that that particular Amendment has been twice rejected by another place. So I do not think there is any great likelihood of its being successful a third time. But, as I say, my noble friend Lord Dilhorne has suggested a compromise, and I very much hope that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor will look at the point again. He has accepted most of it. The only thing that he finds difficult to swallow is the question of the chairmanship; and he made out a very interesting case. I must honestly say that in my own experience I have suddenly been called upon to be chairman of quite important bodies. One, for example, was the Board of Admiralty, when everybody else had been there for three years and I did not know anything about it. But I was still required to take the chair; and I do not think that I did unduly badly. I think it would have been very odd if the First Lord of the Admiralty had not taken the chair; and I suspect that it would look just as curious if the Lord Mayor of London did not take the chair in the magistrates' court.
I hope that perhaps the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, who is very reasonable in these matters, will look at this again, because it seems a compromise which would satisfy those in the City, who feel very strongly about these things. I agree very much with what the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, said about tradition. I do not think we should throw all these things away just for the sake of uniformity; and I do not think the noble and learned Lord would be giving up very much.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: I was very much surprised to hear the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chief Justice say that he did not think this case could be argued. He had the opportunity, as the rest of us had, of listening to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, who I thought argued this case with exceptionally convincing logic. The noble Lord, Lord Goodman, made his case mainly by pointing out certain peculiarities of the City justices, the City courts, which they share with some other parts of our justicial system—for instance, that they have a comparatively small feminine representation. In fact, they have none. But he pointed out that

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there were many other spheres of importance in which women play only a small part.
He instanced also the fact that there were objections raised that the aldermen sit alone, and do not have magisterial colleagues. This, of course, is also true of stipendiary magistrates; and it is true of High Court Judges. What the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, did not do was to mention the one peculiarity of the City justices which they do not share with any other part of the judicial system; namely, that they are elected persons—or, at least, they will not share this provided that the other ex officio magistrates, such as the mayors, are abolished. They are elected persons; and, what is more, they are elected by a rather small and certainly unrepresentative electorate. I think that most of us have taken the view that election is not the most suitable way of choosing our justices, and we in illustration of that frequently hear examples brought from the United States—although I do not suggest that this particular form of election is governed by quite the same influences as the election of some American judges.
The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, said that nobody had argued that this institution works badly, that we are all satisfied that it gives justice and that those who have appeared before it have not complained. I do not know what steps he has taken to ascertain whether these complaints are heard. I think it would be very surprising if those who appeared before any court failed to complain. Certainly it has not been my experience. Really, we are in no position to say whether this particular institution works well or badly; and we are not in a much better position to say whether other parts of our judicial system work well or badly, unless we make a very much more exhaustive and concrete inquiry into it.
The plain truth of this matter is that the present Court is an historical privilege, and in the contemporary climate— and, indeed, for a considerable while past —the usual practice in this country in relation to historical privilege is to keep it as ornamental and to preserve historical tradition in that way, and gradually to shear away from it inappropriate powers. That has happened to the Monarchy. If certain rumours are to be
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believed, that is quite likely to happen to your Lordships' House before any of us is very much older—but that is not because it has been argued that your Lordships' House works badly. It is rather given to self-praise, as indeed I am sure are the justices in the City courts. The change is proposed because, admirable though hereditary Peers may be, many of them, in this day and age it is not thought fitting that persons should exercise political and legislative power merely because they are the sons of their fathers. Exactly by the same parallel, it is not fitting that persons should exercise judicial functions merely because they have been elected to this very unusual and esoteric body, the Mayor and Aldermen of the City of London.
5.28 p.m.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: Perhaps I may just say a word in answer to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, because we have got very close, as the noble Lord, Lord Chorley, has said, to reaching a compromise. Under that compromise, the City gave way a great deal from the position they have adopted heretofore, and the position under Lord Goodman's Amendment. I am sure the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor realises that. The second question on which he is prepared to give way is a minor one, I agree, but it is not unimportant in relation to the traditions of the City. So what remains? There is only the question whether the Lord Mayor and aldermen shall preside when they sit—that is all.
The Lord Chancellor, with great respect to him, answered that, I thought, rather cursorily, by saying, "What about the position of a newly appointed alderman and a magistrate who has sat for fifteen years and another one who has sat for seven years?" It is not, of course, necessarily the fact that the best chairman (who must have high qualities, as I recognise, and as the Report which the Lord Chancellor read out also recognises) is the longest-serving magistrate. I ask the noble and learned Lord to recognise this: that unless the Lord Mayor is going to preside over such a bench, it really is impossible for him, I think, to sit with the dignity that he holds. And the same applies to the aldermen.

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If that provision is not in the Bill, it is perfectly true, as the noble Lord, Lord Chorley, has said, that the magistrates can elect their own chairman. I would suspect that, without any of the reluctance that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor shows, they would in fact elect the Lord Mayor as chairman and the aldermen as deputy chairmen. But, however that may be, that is the limit of the concession the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has been asked to make: that instead of leaving it to the election, it should be declared in this Bill that they would hold those positions. Your Lordships must weigh that concession and the concession about the appointment by Charter against the concession on the other side by the City, of abandoning the aldermen's long-established right to sit alone. I do not think it is asking the noble and learned Lord very much to agree to make that concession.
I do not know what the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, proposes to do about his Amendment. As has been said by my noble friend Lord Carrington, it has been before the other place, considered by them and twice rejected. I was hoping, when I tabled these Amendments, that I should be able to persuade the Lord Chancellor to accept a compromise. I feel that it would have been much the happiest solution of a difficult situation. If he cannot do that—and I emphasise that the City has come a long way, and I hope it will go a little further —then if the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, withdraws his Amendment I shall ask the Committee to seek to carry the Amendments that I have tabled. That will give the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor a further opportunity of reflection, and give the other place a chance to consider whether or not it is really necessary to contest the question of whether the Lord Mayor should be chairman and the aldermen deputy chairmen of the magistrates.
I have intervened at this stage because I did not speak on Second Reading, and I cannot be accused on this occasion of having spoken for four and a half hours, or something like it. We have perhaps covered most of the ground and the feeling I have is that a great many of your
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Lordships would rather like to proceed to a conclusion on this matter.
LORD GOODMAN: I do not know if it would be helpful to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor for me to say that I speak only to preserve something that the City wants. If it is the City's wish that they should not incur the risk, if I may so put it, that if my Amendment were carried here it would be rejected elsewhere, it seems to me, as a realist, that I should prefer a bird in hand to anything else in another place. Perhaps I might add one word in urging the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor to accept the Amendment. The noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, said that it is a small Amendment to accept. I wonder if the Lord Chancellor would take into consideration the fact that the City is composed of very fair-minded men; and if, by Statute, they are enabled to preserve something of their privilege, a traditional right, that will compensate them for what they are losing and give them something to work for.
The work of the City has enormous value outside the question of what we are discussing today. The charity work of the City Companies, their work for schools, deserves a small reward. And he might take into consideration the extreme likelihood that, if some member of the bench who was not an alderman showed some aptitude for the job that made him eligible as chairman, the City would show the magnanimity of inviting him, when the occasion arose, to be the chairman. It would be unlikely that a man with real aptitude would be excluded by the City simply because they had the statutory right to the posts of chairman and deputy chairmen. It would be a nice gesture if the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor would recognise this fact. If he is able to accept the Amendment proposed by the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, then I shall have the pleasure of withdrawing mine.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am afraid that, with the best will in the world, I cannot do that. Accepting this Amendment would do two things. I am not concerned with the merits or demerits of the City of London where I have many friends: I am concerned with the new administration of justice. I still

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think it cannot be right that anybody should be appointed to an important judicial office, not because he had been chosen for that office but because somebody has chosen him for some different office.
I invited the House, or anyone, to tell me what was the answer to the evidence given by the County Councils Association to the Royal Commission when they said this:
"The qualities which enable a chairman of a local authority to perform his duties with success are not of necessity those requisite for the office of Justice of the Peace, added to which there is the point that in many areas the office of Chairman is a matter of rotation rather than distinctive merit. In any event if the Chairman of the local authority is suitable for appointment as a Justice of the Peace, the ordinary procedure should suffice to ensure his consideration for that office."
All the ex officio justices can of course be appointed on their merits.
I have gone out of my way to guarantee in advance, that I will ask the Lord Mayor or ex-Lord Mayor to be chairman of the City of London Advisory Committee. I always consult the Chairman as to whom the other members should be. And I said on Second Reading that it
would be unrealistic to suppose that the proper way of doing things will not result in aldermen being, in fact, justices of the peace. So long as they are ex officio you get into the state of mind displayed by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, who said, "If the City think that somebody should be the chairman"—not "if the justices"; not anybody to do with the administration of justice; but "if the local authorities" are kind enough to say that somebody else may be chairman who is not a member of a local authority. This is not, I think, the right principle to employ when dealing with the administration of justice. It cannot be right, if there are three justices, one of whom is of some service and a second of whom is an experienced chairman or deputy chairman, that the most newly appointed City alderman is to take the chair because he is the local authority man. I am afraid that I cannot think that that would be right or that it can be what the administration of justice requires.
5.38 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 1) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 138; Not-Contents, 51.

CONTENTS

Aberdare, L.

Coleraine, L.

Hawke, L.

Aberdeen and Temair, M.

Colville of Culross, V.

Henley, L.

Ailwyn, L.

Conesford, L.

Hodson, L.

Airedale, L.

Cooper of Stockton Heath, L.

Horsbrugh, Bs.

Albemarle, E.

Cottesloe, L.

Howard of Glossop, L.

Alport, L.

Craigavon, V.

Howe, E.

Amherst, E.

Cranbrook, E.

Hurcomb, L.

Ampthill, L.

Cullen of Ashbourne, L.

Iddesleigh, E.

Amulree, L.

Daventry, V.

Ilford, L.

Ashbourne, L.

Denham, L.

Jessel, L.

Ashton of Hyde, L.

Denning, L.

Kilmany, L.

Asquith of Yarnbury, Bs.

Derwent, L.

Kilmarnock, L.

Auckland, L.

Dilhorne, V. [Teller.]

Kinnoull, E.

Audley, Bs.

Drumalbyn, L.

Latymer, L.

Balfour of Inchrye, L.

Ebbisham, L.

Lincoln, L. Bp.

Barnby, L.

Eccles, V.

London, L. Bp.

Beaumont of Whitley, L.

Emmet of Amberley, Bs.

MacAndrew, L.

Bessborough, E.

Erroll of Hale, L.

Macpherson of Drumochter, L.

Bledisloe, V.

Exeter, L. Bp.

Mais, L.

Boothby, L.

Falkland, V.

Malmesbury, E.

Boyd of Merton, V.

Falmouth, V.

Mancroft, L.

Brabazon of Tara, L.

Fleck, L.

Margadale, L.

Bridgeman, V.

Fortescue, E.

Massereene and Ferrard, V.

Brock, L.

Fraser of Lonsdale, L.

Merrivale, L.

Brooke of Cumnor, L.

Gladwyn, L.

Mills, V.

Brooke of Ystradfellte, Bs.

Glasgow, E.

Milne, L.

Burden, L.

Goodman, L. [Teller.]

Milverton, L.

Byers, L.

Goschen, V.

Molson, L.

Caccia, L.

Greenway, L.

Monckton of Brenchley, V.

Carrington, L.

Grenfell, L.

Morris of Borth-y-Gest, L.

Chandos, V.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

Mowbray and Stourton, L.

Chorley, L.

Guest, L.

Newton, L.

Cohen, L.

Hacking, L.

Nugent of Guildford, L

Nunburnholme, L.

Robertson of Oakridge, L.

Strathcarron, L.

Oakshott, L.

Ruthven of Freeland, Ly.

Swaythling, L.

Ogmore, L.

Sackville, L.

Teviot, L.

Parker of Waddington, L.

St. Albans, L. Bp.

Teynham, L.

Pearce, L.

St. Aldwyn, E.

Thorneycroft, L.

Pearson, L.

St. Helens, L.

Thurlow, L.

Perth, E.

Sandford, L.

Trefgarne, L.

Poltimore, L.

Sempill, Ly.

Tweedsmuir, L.

Rankeillour, L.

Shannon, E.

Upjohn, L.

Rathcavan, L.

Sherfield, L.

Vivian, L.

Reading, M.

Simon, V.

Waldegrave, E.

Redmayne, L.

Simonds, V.

Wilberforce, L.

Ritchie of Dundee, L.

Stamp, L.

Wolverton, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Addison, V.

Granville of Eye, L.

Phillips, Bs. [Teller.]

Beswick, L.

Granville-West, L.

Popplewell, L.

Birk, Bs.

Henderson, L.

Raglan, L.

Blyton, L.

Heycock, L.

Rhodes, L.

Bowles, L.

Hill of Wivenhoe, L.

Ritchie-Calder, L.

Brockway, L.

Hilton of Upton, L.

Rowley, L.

Buckinghamshire, E.

Kennet, L.

Royle, L.

Burton of Coventry, Bs.

Latham, L.

St. Davids, V.

Champion, L.

Leatherland, L.

Serota, Bs. [Teller.]

Collison, L.

Lindgren, L.

Shackleton, L.

Delacourt-Smith, L.

Listowel, E.

Shepherd, L.

Donaldson of Kingsbridge, L.

Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, Bs.

Sorensen, L.

Douglass of Cleveland, L.

Lucas of Chilworth, L.

Strabolgi, L.

Fiske, L.

McLeavy, L.

Summerskill, Bs.

Gaitskell, Bs.

Maelor, L.

Taylor of Mansfield, L.

Gardiner, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Mitchison, L.

Wells-Pestell, L.

Garnsworthy, L.

Moyle, L.

Wootton of Abinger, Bs.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Resolved in the affirmative, and Amendment agreed to accordingly.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: I beg to move Amendment No. 4.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 18, at end insert—
("(1A) (a) The Lord Mayor and Aldermen of the City of London shall by virtue of the Charter granted by His late Majesty King George II dated the 25th August 1741 continue to be justices of the peace for the City of London.
(b) Notwithstanding anything in any enactment the Lord Mayor shall be the Chairman and the Aldermen of the City of London the Deputy Chairmen of the justices of the peace for the City of London.").—(Viscount Dil-horne.)
Clause 1, as amended, agreed to.
5.50 p.m.
LORD ROYLE LORD ROYLE moved, after Clause 1, to insert the following new clause:
Advisory Committees
".—(1) There shall be in each county and in each borough having a separate Commission of the Peace an advisory committee for the purpose of advising the Lord Chancellor upon the appointment of Justices of such county or borough.
(2) The Chairman of the advisory committee for a county shall be the custos rotuiorum of the county and the clerk thereof shall be the clerk of the peace of the county.
(3) The Chairman of advisory committee of a borough having a separate commission of the peace shall be such person as the Lord Chancellor may appoint and the clerk thereof shall be the clerk of the Justices of the borough.
(4) An advisory committee shall be elected by the Justices of the county or borough, having a separate Commission of the Peace, in Annual meeting assembled.
(5) The Lord Chancellor may, by rules, made by him give general directions as to the manner in which advisory committees shall carry out their duties."
The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 7, to insert the new clause on the Marshalled List. This Amendment has a relation to what we have been discussing so far this afternoon but covers a much wider field, because it deals with magistrates throughout the country rather than in one small part of the country. As briefly as I can put it in one sentence, the aim of the Amendment is to make advisory committees statutory bodies. I believe that it is a grave omission in the Bill that this has not been done. I cannot find any Act of Parliament that makes reference to advisory committees, though everybody knows they exist. In 1949, when

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we were discussing the Justices of the Peace Bill in another place, I had the temerity to move an Amendment which, roughly speaking, was the same as this Amendment, and it was rejected by the then Home Secretary, Mr. Chuter Ede, and the then Attorney General, now the noble Lord, Lord Shawcross.
In the 19 years which have intervened I believe that more consideration might have been given to this question of advisory committees, and I regard this as a new opportunity for stating a case for some change. Any noble Lord who is a justice of the peace or holds any other magisterial position is regularly asked how magistrates are appointed, and he usually answers by saying that they are appointed by the Lord Chancellor. How does the Lord Chancellor know everybody he is appointing? The answer is that he does not; he is advised by advisory committees in every county and county borough as to who are suitable people to become magistrates.
Then comes the question: who appoints the advisory committees? Again, the answer is: the Lord Chancellor. From that again comes the question: who advises the Lord Chancellor about appointments to the advisory committees? And the answer is: the advisory committees. I regard this as a completely undemocratic procedure. Nobody knows what goes on in the advisory committees. Perhaps that is right. But as I see it, members appointed by the Lord Chancellor to serve for five years can be recommended, when their period on the committee expires, to serve a further term. They are recommended by the advisory committee—by their own colleagues. I know that this is subject to the Lord Chancellor overriding any decision of the advisory committees, but except for that overriding they become in fact self-appointing and self-perpetuating. I do not believe that in the second half of the twentieth century this practice is in accord with our democratic thinking.
I know, and noble Lords will know, that there is a widespread sense of suspicion in the public mind—I put it as high as that—that there is a certain amount of hole and corner activity going on. They believe that there is a secrecy about the appointment of people to responsible office that almost amounts
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to a Star Chamber. I know that in these matters my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor acts as dominus and that if he were not to have any advice and make all decisions himself, he would be deus.
I would never recommend that the alternative method of appointing magistrates was by some sort of public election. Magistrates are in a different category altogether from members of local councils and even from Members of Parliament. It is quite impossible to have a public election. But the public is worried about these advisory committees who, subject to my noble and learned friend, are the people who select magistrates. The public is concerned in making these committees statutory. I feel sure that if this were done it would remove a great deal of the concern which exists in the public mind.
So far as the subsections of my Amendment are concerned, I think they are perfectly clear, but I should like to make one comment on subsection (4) which says:
"An advisory committee shall be elected by the Justices of the county or borough, having a separate Commission of the Place, in Annual meeting assembled."
It might be suggested that this is a form of election. But it is not the election of the magistrates; it is the election of the committee which will advise the Lord Chancellor. At every annual meeting of magistrates in every part of the country certain committees are elected. The magistrates' court committee is elected by the magistrates themselves; the licensing committee, the compensation committee, the probation committee and so on are all appointed by the justices themselves. I cannot for the life of me see why the justices, in their wisdom, should not choose their colleagues who would be the committee of selection, the advisory committee to the Lord Chancellor.
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: Before the noble Lord leaves subsection (4), could he clarify one small point? Does he intend that the candidates for the election referred to in subsection (4) should be confined to magistrates, or that people who are not magistrates should be eligible?
LORD ROYLE: My view would be that the advisory committee should consist purely and simply of magistrates. I

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believe that they are the people who know best the suitability of candidates in the light of their own experience of what is needed of a magistrate.
I do not think it is necessary to go through any of the other parts of my Amendment, but I wanted to make clear that I feel strongly on subsection (4) and regard it as an alternative way in which we can bring about a feeling in the minds of the general public that there is nothing hole and corner about the question. It would be made much more straightforward. Obviously, I am not well up in these matters, but I wonder in how many cases the names of those on public advisory committees are not available for scrutiny of one kind or another. At the moment, I cannot think of any. I think of the Board of Trade, for example, and those names are available if people want them. So far as I can see, this is the only case where an advisory committee in public life is in no shape or form open to public scrutiny.
I do not want to speak for a long time—we have had a long debate on the other subject—but I believe that what I am suggesting is a democratic move forward to abolish some of the suspicion which exists in the minds of the public, and I beg your Lordships to see to it that for the first time advisory committees are made statutory. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 1, insert the said new clause.— (Lord Royle.)
6.4 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This question was given a good deal of consideration by both of the Royal Commissions. The Royal Commission of 1911 recommended:
"The Lord Lieutenant of the County should retain the practice of recommending to the Lord Chancellor for his approval persons to be appointed justices of the peace subject to the following conditions: (1) that the Lord Chancellor should nominate within each county one or more small representative committees to inform and advise the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Lieutenant; (2) the persons to be selected as members of the committees, the practice and procedure of the committees, should be left to the discretion of the Lord Chancellor,"
and in boroughs the Lord Chancellor should have power to appoint similar committees.
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The Second Royal Commission, 1946–48, considered it all over again. They said in paragraph 43 of their Report:
"The Lord Chancellor as head of the Judiciary, and at the same time as a Minister of the Crown, is eminently qualified to be entitled to power of appointment of justices. It is essential that the Lord Chancellor should have local advice, and there has been unanimity among the witnesses that a local committee is preferable to any other method. We agree with this view. We have however heard criticism of the existing system of advisory committees. It has been suggested in evidence that the Committee should be constituted of persons nominated by local bodies."
That is what my noble friend suggests.
"This would make the committee a publicly known body; and a no less serious objection is that the committee would then cease to be the Lord Chancellor's committee. Further, it might in many cases be selected by a vote on Party lines. In approving the appointment of justices, the Lord Chancellor is dealing with judicial appointments; he is responsible for the appointment and we are clearly of opinion that he should continue to have that responsibility unimpaired. If the local committee were to be a public body, the result would be either to weaken the responsibility of the Lord Chancellor or public dispute if the Lord Chancellor refused to appoint persons so recommended. We recommend that the Lord Chancellor should continue to appoint the members of advisory committees, and that their membership and proceedings should continue to be confidential."
I do not want to use any other words of my own. My noble friend Lord Royle is nothing if not consistent, because he put down the Amendment, word for word, in another place in 1949.
LORD ROYLE: Perhaps my noble and learned friend would allow me to say that subsection (4) was not in that Amendment.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am sorry; I thought it was actually word for word. But the substance was the same. It was not carried to a Division in the other place, but was taken up by Lord Templewood here, and all I want to do now is to read what my noble predecessor, Lord Jowitt, said. He said:
"… I think we should be making a great mistake if we accepted it. Let me tell your Lordships what my experience of the whole position is, extending as it does over four and a half years. I believe that ultimately the success of the whole scheme depends on the Lord Chancellor. I believe that it should be made perfectly plain that he is completely dominus of the situation. He shares his responsibility with no one at all, and he is the person who is solely responsible for the appointment of magistrates. I believe that

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we cannot emphasise that too often or too clearly, because I think it is often misunderstood.
"Though the Lord Chancellor is solely responsible he relies on, and is fortunate in getting, the assistance of an excellent staff who, as your Lordships know, are available on all occasions to the many of your Lordships who are Lords Lieutenant. And, secondly, he has the assistance of the Lords Lieutenant themselves."
He then refers to the good relations between himself and the Lords Lieutenant, and the committees. In the next column he says:
"Sometimes I see the representatives of these advisory committees, and sometimes I see that they have a complete misapprehension of their duties. Sometimes they think they are delegates, as it were, of a Party or section, and that their particular job is to try to get people appointed belonging to that Party or section. When I see them I say to them: Do you realise what you are? You are not creatures of Statute at all; you are simply there for one purpose, and one purpose only —namely, to advise the Lord Chancellor. You are my committees, and what you have to do is to advise me.' I believe it is very important that that should be plainly understood.
"Quite frankly, I am against this Amendment in principle—I will discuss the detail of it in a moment or two. I am against it because I regard it as the thin edge of the wedge. If it is proposed to make these advisory committees—which so long as I have anything to do with the matter will certainly continue to function—statutory bodies, then the next step will be to make the Lord Chancellor accept their recommendations; at any rate, it will be said that the Lord Chancellor ought not lightly to disregard their recommendations. I believe that that sins against the principle upon which we ought to insist— namely, that the Lord Chancellor is entirely and solely responsible for this work. I think I may claim (I am not speaking for myself, but for my predecessors; I have merely carried on their work in this matter as best I can) that on the whole the system to-day is worked well. But, as I say, these committees are there merely for the purpose of advising the Lord Chancellor, who may or may not take the advice which they give, and who may, if he is so minded, appoint a magistrate without asking them at all.
"He does not do that often, though sometimes—and I think other Lord Chancellors have found the same—when I seek to appoint a distinguished lawyer who ought obviously to be serving in this capacity, and as a matter of courtesy I generally ask the advisory Committee, I find that they are rather stubborn: and I had to appoint him notwithstanding the advisory committee. We must make it plain that the committees are the Lord Chancellor's committees, set up by him, for the purpose merely of advising him.
"I believe that if you make the Bill tidier by inserting this Amendment in the Bill—
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and I can give your Lordships an assurance, so far as I am concerned, that I will carry out the principles of this new clause—you will weaken the position of the Lord Chancellor and prevent him from being what he is today—namely, complete dominus of the situation. Therefore, I am opposed to this Amendment. I believe that we shall do much better to rest where we are to-day. Let us have these advisory committees all over the country, but let them not be creatures of Statute; let them be appointed, as they are to-day, by the Lord Chancellor, to advise the Lord Chancellor, under the control of the Lord Chancellor".— [OFFICIAL REPORT; 20/10/49, cols, 1017–19.]
At the end of the discussion I see that the Committee divided, Contents, 9; Not-Contents, 43.
All my advisory committees; are not composed of justices of the peace, and I should not have thought it would be at all a good thing that the local justices should elect them. In some cases I have no doubt at all that this would be done on a political basis. I have members of advisory committees who are, for example, doctors, who are not politicians. A doctor has not time to be a magistrate, but he knows a great many different people, both men and women, in different walks of life. He sees them under conditions of adversity, and he may make a very useful member of an advisory committee, although he has not time to be a justice of the peace himself. Therefore, I can only oppose this Amendment on exactly the same grounds as my noble predecessor opposed it in 1949.
6.13 p.m.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: My approach to this matter is pragmatic rather than theoretical. My approach to the other subject which we were discussing earlier was just the same. When something is working well I am not in favour of altering it on theoretical lines. It appeared to me that we had now won the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor to our philosophic side. Frankly, I have some knowledge of advisory committees in the past, and although the whole of their history has not been universally satisfactory, nevertheless I believe it is a system that works better now; that it is working better now than any alternative system based on election by existing justices would. For that reason, on this occasion I find myself in accord with the Lord Chancellor and I could not support this new clause.
But the noble and learned Lord quoted from the Royal Commission's Report,

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and one of the reasons given by the Royal Commission for opposing a change of this kind in the appointment of advisory committees was that it was desirable that their membership as well as their proceedings should be confidential. I am wondering whether, before the end of our proceedings on this Bill, although perhaps not to-day, the noble and learned Lord could give us an authoritative statement about this matter of confidentiality. In an earlier stage of the proceedings of the Committee this afternoon the noble and learned Lord described what he had said to the Inner London Advisory Committee. I am paraphrasing it, but broadly speaking he said that so far as he was concerned he did not mind whether they disclosed their identity or not. In the debate on the Second Reading of this Bill in another place on January 23, at column 281 of Hansard (Commons), the learned Attorney General said, with reference to these advisory committees:
"… the danger is that if their names were disclosed, there would be a lamentable attempt at lobbying them and an attempt to bring presssure upon them to appoint this or that magistrate. It is to avoid the risk of that sort of attempted influence that this secrecy is maintained … I hope that, on reflection, and having had some experience themselves of attempted lobbying, my hon. Friends may think that the discreet arrangements whereby the identity of chairmen and members of advisory committees is kept secret is advantageous in this difficult task of selecting the best men for the magisterial bench."
May I say to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor that I have no desire to cause trouble between him and the Attorney General, and I am not seeking to make any Party point by indicating that there appears to have been a discrepancy between the views expressed, on the proceedings of the same Bill, by two very learned authorities. That is why I suggest that perhaps if not now, at some stage before our discussions of the Bill are completed, the noble and learned Lord might see fit to make an authoritative pronouncement which would catch all this up and remove any apparent contradiction, and enable everybody who reads Parliamentary proceedings to know exactly what the position is as regards the confidentiality of membership of these advisory committees.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: If convenient, may I do that at once? I have
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no rule; I leave it to my advisory committees. Most of them are insistent that they must remain anonymous because they say that otherwise they would simply be lobbied to death. I understand that, and if they say that, then I accept it. On the other hand, the Inner London Committee, perhaps the most important committee in the country, do not insist on that, and in fact everybody knows who they are. They make no attempt to conceal their names. It has this great advantage—and there are one or two other places in the country where people do not object to their names being known—that then a sub-committee can interview those who have been recommended to them. This is now always done, for example, in London, and there are one or two other advisory committees that do this.
I feel that I must leave this matter to each of my advisory committees. If they say, "No, we could not serve if our names were known, and this would be impossible where we are", then I feel I must accept that. But I do not try to persuade them to be anonymous at all. If anything, I point out the advantages of not being. On one occasion in order to try to dispel the idea that there is some frightful mystery about how justices are appointed, I referred this matter to the Inner London Advisory Committee. Their Chairman is Lord Denning, and it includes the Chief Magistrate, with the Chairman of Sessions and Lord Rea, and Lord Amulree—men whom nobody would think of lobbying; I should like to see someone lobbying Lord Denning. They did not mind. I said to all the Pressmen, "If any of you want to get hold of a member of the advisory committee and ask exactly what they do, and how it is all done, you can". So I do not want any secrecy, and I would welcome it if more advisory committees said, "We are not nervous of our names being known". But I feel that if most of them say, "This would make things too difficult for us", I must accept it.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for making mat authoritative pronouncement. I do not seek in any way to quarrel with it. He will, of course, bear in mind that if the confidentiality is no longer imposed from above as it used to be, there is the danger in certain cases

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of some members of the advisory committee disclosing their personal identity, when the majority of the members of the advisory committee in that place think it undesirable that the names should be published. I can foresee local difficulties arising out of this change. But I do not want to pursue that matter now. I am sure the noble and learned Lord will bear it in mind. So far as this new clause is concerned, I do not think it would be an improvement to the Bill.
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: Before we leave that point I am far from disagreeing with anything the noble and learned Lord has said on the matter, but I cannot remember ever having seen a letter addressed to an advisory committee telling them they had discretion whether or not to disclose their names. I feel that if such a letter has not been sent—and I apologise if it has, and I did not know —something on those lines should be written fairly soon regarding the decisions of the noble and learned Lord opposite, so that we may know where we are. Then, if we are going to have this discretion whether or not to disclose, we can set about using it.
LORD ROYLE: I have found it rather difficult, sitting on the second Bench immediately behind the noble and learned Lord, to hear all his arguments, and particularly many of the quotations he read to the Committee. I think I heard most of it. He was kind enough to say in the course of his speech that I was pretty consistent in so far as I had moved almost the same Amendment nineteen years ago. It seems to me there is a sense of consistency not only in individuals but in succeeding Lord Chancellors, as the days go by, and if my noble and learned friend is not claiming consistency for himself at the moment he is certainly claiming consistency for Lord Chancellors as a whole in the years that have gone by.
On this little passage which has gone on almost above my head but on my Amendment, I would say only this: why on earth should not the names of members of the advisory committee be known? Surely it is a good idea. Suggestions might be made to members of the advisory committees by the general public which would bring to the attention of the committee suitable names
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which would never be known to them in any other way. There seems to be no objection at all to the names of advisory committee members being made known in a much more general sense.
In reply to some of the points made by my noble and learned friend I would say that nothing at all in my new clause would take away from the Lord Chancellor the overriding and final authority over the committees. He would be the person to make the check, and if he felt there was an undue influence on the part of one political Party or another, or of one section of the community or another, he would have the overriding authority. My Amendment in no way alters the help and the advice which the Lord Chancellor would receive from the local committees set up in the way I have proposed.
The noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Cumnor, and my noble and learned friend talked about a system that works well, and said we should not alter it. My concern is that systems should be improved, and, with great respect to my noble and learned friend, during the previous debate this afternoon he has been resisting the suggestion as far as the City of London is concerned that because it works well it should continue in its present form. There seems to me to be an inconsistency there. I am becoming an old man, but I hope I have not got past the stage where I am able to see that improvements can be made. It is no guarantee that because one system has been going on, it may be for a hundred years (as in this case), it is necessarily the right system to be continued in the years to come. This question of a system working well makes me rather impatient. It seems to me to be much better that we should be looking for improvement all the time.
Well, I moved this Amendment 19 years ago. I know when I am not getting any support in your Lordships' Committee and I do not believe in kicking brick walls, or anything of the kind. All I can say is that in another 19 years I will try again, and if I am not succeeding now and if I did not succeed in 1949, it may well be that in 1987 I shall succeed. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 2 [Age for transfer of justice to supplemental list, or for retirement of stipendiary magistrate]:
6.25 p.m.
LORD SWAYTHLINGmoved, in subsection (1), to leave out "subsection (3)" and insert: "subsections (3) and (4)". The noble Lord said: This Amendment is only, so to speak, a consequential part of Amendment No. 13. Therefore, by leave of the Committee, I will speak to the latter Amendment now.
In Clause 2(2) your Lordships will see it is suggested that stipendiary magistrates should vacate their office at the end of the completed year of service in the course of which they attain the age limit. My suggestion is that the same principle should apply to the chairman of a bench of magistrates.
I considered for a moment asking the Committee to make a change of this nature for all magistrates attaining the age limit, but then I saw there was some disadvantage in possibly a number of magistrates on the same bench having to retire on the same day, and I think it right that they should retire, as at present, on their birthdays, on different dates throughout the year.
The same does not apply to the chairman, and it would be easier for all purposes if he finished his year of office. When a chairman has to leave in the middle of a year the bench has to meet specially in order to appoint another chairman, and there are other complications. It appeared to me that no bench would elect one of their number to be chairman unless they were convinced that he could carry out the duties properly until the end of the year.
I know that it is customary in your Lordships' House to declare an interest but I have not done this because in my case it might be called, in the modern jargon, a 'mini-interest". I have the honour to be chairman of my bench at the moment, and if I am still chairman when the retiring age catches up with me it will be only a fortnight or so before my year of office would be over. As I have said, my Amendment would put the chairman of the bench in the same position as the stipendiary magistrate, which would be for the convenience and efficient working of petty sessional divisions, so I hope that Her Majesty's
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Government will accept the Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 29, leave out ("subsection (3)") and insert ("subsections (3) and (4)")—(Lord Swaythling.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I sometimes think it is a great pity that we cannot vote by a show of hands, because I should like to leave this Amendment entirely to the members of the Committee, although I hope that we shall not have to take a vote in order to find out. Those of your Lordships who are justices have an advantage over me in this regard. The point is that normally the bench has an election in October, with the chairmanship starting on January 1. The noble Lord, Lord Swaythling, asks whether it would not be much better if, instead of chairmen who reach the retiring age (whether it is 70 or 75 does not matter) being put on the supplemental list on the day they become 70 or 75, they went on until January 1 because otherwise there would have to be an election in the middle of the year.
I should be glad to know what the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, thinks of this suggestion. Administratively there is something to be said for it, because it means that the chairman is appointed in October and then, instead of his having to go on the supplemental list on the day he reaches retiring age, he will go at the end of the year, and the new chairman who was elected in October will start on January 1. There are only two difficulties in this regard. In the first place it means that, in practice, 70 will become 70½. On average, it will mean that a person will go on for another six months. In some cases it will be 11 months, and in others, only one month, so that this Amendment would make the practical retiring age six months later.
The second point is that I am told that in practice it is rare to have an election during the course of the year. What usually happens is that at the election in October Mr. Snooks says "I shall be 75 in March, so if I am appointed I cannot complete my year, and therefore I will not stand". Those who have experience of such matters can tell me whether or not that is so. Therefore, although at first sight the noble Lord's Amendment has the effect of preventing a number of

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elections in the middle of the year, I am told that in fact, for the reason I have given, they do not occur at the moment. Although, administratively, there seemed to me at first sight a lot to be said for the Amendment, having regard to the fact that it really increases any age limit by six months I do not feel prepared to accept it, unless the Committee as a whole make it clear they think it preferable, in which case I will.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: I am not a magistrate, so I am not sure whether I have any title to speak with authority on this matter. The only thing I would say with fair assurance is that in my view the skies will not fall whichever way the Committee decide. I am attracted by the suggestion the noble Lord, Lord Swaythling, has put forward, despite the disadvantages which the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, has suggested. If a person is chairman of the bench and if, as the Lord Chancellor hopes, the additional training arrangements for chairmanship are fulfilled, it seems to me that we can look forward with fair assurance to the chairman of the bench being somebody who is thoroughly well qualified to be chairman, even if that does not always happen now. In my view it does generally happen, but I can imagine exceptions.
It still seems to me that if there were a chairman who was ageing it is unlikely that he would press his claim for re-election supposing that his birthday occurred in January or February. I think it likely that he would prefer not to be re-elected. At the same time, there seems to me to be considerable administrative advantage in removing the possible necessity for a special election when a chairman's age limit is going to run out before the end of the year. I would, finally, submit this thought. I do not think there is absolute sanctity about any of these birthdays, the 70th, 71st, 72nd, or whatever it is. We all know that the effect of age varies greatly with different people. I should have thought that if the Government were willing it would be a good thing to allow the noble Lord, Lord Swaythling, to have his way and to amend the Bill in this sense.
LORD CHORLEY: I should like very shortly to support this proposal. It seems to me commonsense, and certainly ad-
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ministratively there is a great deal to be said for it.
VISCOUNT BRENTFORD:If the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, desires the views of the Committee, I would simply say that I would support the Amendment.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: In view of what has been said, I am happy to accept the Amendment.
6.34 p.m.
LORD ILFORDmoved, in subsection (l)(a) to leave out "seventy" and insert "seventy-five". The noble Lord said: This Amendment also deals with the age limit for magistrates. The age at which a magistrate is entered on the supplemental list and his service as a magistrate virtually comes to an end is at present 75. The Bill proposes to reduce the age limit from 75 to 70, and the purpose of my Amendment is to retain the age at 75. This Bill really invites your Lordships to accept the proposition that a man's faculties will have so far decayed at the age of 70 that he is no longer able to discharge the Junctions of a magistrate with full efficiency. I feel sure that, when I put it in that way, the experience of most of your Lordships would not bear out that proposition. Looking around this Chamber, I see -many noble Lords here who have passed the age of 70 and who are fully capable of carrying out not only the duties of this House but the duties of a magistrate as well, if they were invited to do so.
I do not think that anybody would disagree with the view that an age limit should be fixed for the retirement of magistrates. It is a good many years since I went much into the magistrates' courts, but I still retain some very painful recollections of endeavouring to present a case to magistrates whose faculties, particularly their faculties of hearing and of seeing, had begun to decay. It was a very difficult and unrewarding task. That decay does not set in at the age of 70. At one time I had a good deal of experience of old people, and their capacities and incapacities. I am quite sure that the real chang in a man's faculties comes not at the age of 70 but at the age of 75. That is my experience. I always felt, when I was

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responsible for these matters, that we ought perhaps to treat the over-75's rather more generously than we treat the under-75's.
There is another reason why we should retain the present age limit at 75. To adopt an age limit of 70 seems to me to restrict unduly the services which certain classes of persons are able to give as magistrates. I have in mind in particular the sort of men who are engaged in building up a business or professional practice. The difficulties of these men, or the obstacles which they encounter in accepting appointments as magistrates, are not met by the payment of travelling allowances or subsistence allowances, or indeed loss allowances. Their difficulty is that they cannot quantify in terms of currency what their loss really amounts to. It is not a financial loss which deters them: it is the disturbance to their office routine, the additional work which their absence from the office would throw upon their partners. It is considerations of that sort which deter men engaged in this way from accepting appointments as magistrates.
By the time a man reaches 60 these considerations are no longer of the same importance. He can give the necessary time to the work of a magistrate and is prepared to accept appointment to the bench. But under the provisions of the Bill when he reaches the age of 70 his service as a magistrate comes to an end. That, I think, is imposing an unnecessary, an undue restriction on the particular type of man who I think all our experience shows makes a good magistrate when he comes on the bench. The noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, told us in the Second Reading debate that he does not ordinarily appoint a justice over the age of 60. As this class of person of whom I am speaking is more likely to be able to give the necessary time from his business or profession when he is over 60, his opportunity for serving as a magistrate is still further restricted.
I said a moment ago that these are the persons who normally make good magistrates, and it seems to me to be wrong to restrict their opportunity of serving as magistrates both at the upper age limit and the lower age limit. It
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means, in effect, that a man engaged in this sort of occupation can hope to be made a magistrate only for a relatively short period between the ages of 60 and 70. The noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, told me during the Second Reading debate that there was no difficulty in getting magistrates— indeed, I think he said there were more recommendations from the advisory committees than he was likely to be able to appoint. I think that the noble and learned Lord rather missed the point that I was then endeavouring to make.
I was endeavouring to make the point that I have been making to-day: that the restriction on the age limit imposes an undue restriction upon this class of individual. I do not imagine that the noble and learned Lord has on his advisory committees an excessive number of persons in this class. The point I was endeavouring to make on Second Reading was that this restriction prevented this class of person from taking the part which he otherwise would take as a magistrate. I am not sure that the answer that the noble and learned Lord gave me on Second Reading really reached that point. The difficulty that I feel about this particular class of person is, I think, a real difficulty. I think that more would be lost than would be gained by reducing the age limit to 70. For that reason I hope that the Committee will see fit to amend this Bill and retain the age limit at 75. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 32, leave out ("seventy") and insert ("seventy-five").—(Lord Ilford.)
6.42 p.m.
LORD CHORLEY: I should like strongly to support this Amendment. I suppose I ought to start by declaring an interest as one of the magistrates who, in due course, will feel the axe if the present proposal in the Bill is carried through; but my withers are not wrung on that. I think we start with the findings of the Royal Commission. I have noticed that the noble and learned Lord was prepared to quote the Royal Commission on more than one occasion when it suited his case. Here we have a most important and quite categorical finding by the Royal Commission, which in all the circumstances recommended the age of 75. They evidently gave a great deal of thought to

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it. I remember that at the time doubts about it were expressed in various quarters, and, as I understood it, the Home Office, which at that time was much more in the picture than it is now, felt that this was wrong and that 70 would be a more appropriate age. But when it came to Parliament, so far as I know no effort was made, either in another place or here, to substitute 70, and 75 was in fact fixed. In my view, 75 has worked very well indeed.
This is another case of interfering with something which, in all my long experience of this particular matter, has worked, and is working, well. I do not think there is any real case made out, except again this rather doctrinaire one that some people are rather old after they pass 70 and that therefore all the people who are over 70 but who are still very much compos mentis should, not so much to their own loss as to the loss to the community, be removed from the bench. This is a serious matter.
As shortly as possible because it is getting late, I should like to make a number of points which seem to me to be most relevant to this discussion. In my experience—and I have been chairman of quarter sessions now for 25 years—magistrates are at their best between about the ages of 67 or 68 and 75. Experience is of immense value in judicial work. I do not think that one can stress that too much. I remember when I was a young barrister its being said that a judge was only really good after he had been on the bench for ten years, and that between his tenth and his fifteenth year he was at his best. There is a great deal to be said in support of that. Judicial work is quite different from executive and administrative work, which was referred to by the noble and learned Lord when he pointed out that civil servants have to retire in their sixties. The work that the civil servant does and the work which the executive in business does is quite different from bringing one's mind to bear, in association with colleagues, other magistrates, upon whether a charge is made out and, if it is, what punishment should be imposed.
I have found that the experienced magistrate of 10, 12 or even 15 years' service is of the greatest value in the discussions which take place in the magistrates' room, particularly at the time
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when it comes to deciding what is to be done with the convicted person. If I were deprived of them I say, quite frankly, that I should lose those on whom I particularly rely. The noble Lord, Lord Ilford, has referred—and I agree with every word he said about this—to the difficulty of recruiting good men from the business world at much below the age of 60. The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor is no doubt perfectly right when he says that there is no difficulty about finding people who are ready to become magistrates. Of course there is not. There are a number of people who are always working as hard as they can to become magistrates, many of them reasonably well qualified. But they are not as well qualified as many of the others whose names are discussed in the advisory committees and who are then approached. Time after time we have been told, "So-and-so says he cannot do it because he is too busy with his business. In a few years he will be able to accept the suggestion". That is exactly what the noble Lord, Lord Ilford was saying.
It is most interesting to look at the Report of the Royal Commission, where they discuss how far magistrates attend to their duties. At page 9, paragraph 31, they point out that those in business on their own account and the lesser employers represent a low proportion of those who do not attend at all, but their average of attendance is low. They just cannot do it if they are to attend to their business. Now that the requirements of the Lord Chancellor are quite properly more stringent than they were in the 'forties, the man says, "I could not give the time which is now required of me. I shall get into trouble if I do not turn up, and I just cannot afford to ruin my business."
These types of people are valuable, and I am sure that Lord Ilford is absolutely right when he says that we shall to a large extent lose them if we put the retiring age to 70. In effect, we shall deprive ourselves of these people, because in the short time allowed they will not have the opportunity of getting the experience which is most essential to the making of a good justice. You just cannot do it effectively if you are not appointed until you are about 60, and then you have to retire at 70. Of course,

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there are certain types of people in the community whom you can get very easily; and they are very good people, people who teach in schools and people who are engaged on that sort of work. They can get away, and they make good justices, but it would destroy the balance if you were to compose the benches entirely of people of that kind. The schoolmaster or schoolmistress can bring a certain quality of mind to the work, which is of great value, but the real value of our benches of lay magistrates is that they bring a balance of experience and knowledge to the work. If you rely too much on school teachers, and people of that kind, then you get an unbalanced bench, and you deprive yourself of the sort of people you really need if you want to do this work effectively.
Unfortunately, I was not able to be present at the Second Reading. I had to preside at my own quarter sessions on the day that was taken, but I have read what was said by the noble and learned Lord with very great care. The two main points that he made were based on infirmity and on waning powers. They are not quite the same thing. Definite infirmities like deafness or ageing lead, as he said, to momentary failure of attention which may lead to a wrong decision. With regard to the main infirmity—and, of course, deafness is the main infirmity from which magistrates suffer—retirement at 70 is really no safeguard. This point was made by the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, in his speech on the Second Reading. The deaf really must be eliminated, or the deaf who are so deaf that they cannot really hear what is going on, and it is quite absurd to try to do this by means of establishing the retiring age at 70. In actual practice, of course, if somebody does become as deaf as that, then steps are taken, and as a rule it does not take more than a few weeks to persuade the person in question to leave the bench. That has happened to my knowledge on more than one occasion. However, it would really be very much better to have some proper method of dealing with this problem rather than just establishing the age of 70, and it may be that the suggestion of the noble Baroness is right.
My own suggestion would be that the advisory committee ought to have a
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meeting every year in order to go over the list of magistrates and decide whether so-and-so has, in fact, become so deaf that he or she ought to be asked to retire. When I am told that this is invidious, I really cannot see why that should be so. After all, the committee have the job of choosing the people and advising the noble and learned Lord as to their appointment. Is there any earthly reason why they should not also have the job of looking through the list and deciding whether these people are really fit to go on?
LORD MITCHISON: Would my noble friend tell me whether there is an age limit for members of the advisory committee?
LORD CHORLEY: The age limit of the advisory committee is the age limit for magistrates, but it is within the hands of the noble and learned Lord, and he can see to it that they are so constituted that they are properly qualified to carry out this task. The power of concentration and momentary inattention is, of course, a different matter. The great safeguard here, I suggest, is that magistrates sit in groups, and if one of them loses attention for a time, then when they consult together in the magistrates' room those who have kept their attention and remained awake know what happened, and there is no particular difficulty about it. It is quite different from the case of a single stipendiary or, indeed, for that matter, a single judge. Stipendiaries are to retire at 70, but Judges of the High Court go on until they are 75, sitting by themselves. The type of work with which judges deal is infinitely more difficult and exacting than that which is dealt with by groups of magistrates who, as a rule, do not sit so long and so continuously as the judges. Yet this group of magistrates—who can put one of its members right when there is some momentary lack of attention of this kind—is to be deprived of the services of their more elderly members. It seems to me that this is quite wrong, and that the argument in favour of it really does not hold water.
There is a better case for getting the chairmen to retire at 70 than the others. It may well be sensible that the chairmen should not go on beyond the age of 70 or thereabouts, and certainly in regard to a chairman of quarter sessions—which

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the noble and learned Lord has now taken a line about, and in which again I have an interest—I feel that he is quite right, because the position of the chairman at quarter sessions is altogether a more exacting one. It is much more like that of the Judge at a Court of Assize. He has the very difficult task of summing up the case to the jury. He has to deal with questions of whether evidence is admissible or not, and he has to be very much on the qui vive right from the sitting of the court early in the morning, often until pretty late at night—a good deal later at night than most Judges of the High Court are prepared to sit. The strain on recorders and chairmen is a very heavy one, and there is a much stronger case there, I think, for requiring that they should retire at the age of 70. But with groups of magistrates who are sitting, so to speak, in colleges, I think that the case is not made out at all, and I hope the noble Lord, Lord Ilford, will insist on this Amendment.
6.58 p.m.
LORD ROYLE: I hope that my noble and learned friend will resist this Amendment. I take the exactly opposite line from the one my noble friend Lord Chorley has taken. I remember being told a story by the then Mr. Chuter Ede of when, after the recommendation came from the Royal Commission that there should be a retiring age for the first time, and they suggested it might be 75, a conversation took place between the then Home Secretary, Mr. Chuter Ede, and the then Lord Chancellor, Lord Jowitt, as to what age should be put into the Bill. Mr. Chuter Ede said: "I know this House of Commons; they will insist on 65, the retiring age from industry, the retirement pensionable age, and so on. I think that is a bit low. We will put 75 in the Bill. They will move an Amendment to make it 65, and we will graciously accept 70". Nobody moved an Amendment, and that is how 75 came into the 1949 Act. From that day forward I have always felt that the age of 75 was too high.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Ilford, that there are very many Members of your Lordships' House over the age of 75 who are quite capable of doing their work in this House. Their contributions towards the debates and discussions of the House are first-class. But
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it is a very different matter making a reasonable contribution to a discussion and debate in your Lordships' House from sitting on the bench and judging one's fellows. This is a very responsible task indeed, and when you remember what lay magistrates are able to do in these days in the way of imposing penalties and sentencing people to imprisonment, I suggest to your Lordships that we must be terribly careful. There are many able people over 75 who are competent to sit on a bench of magistrates, but this is something on which one has to generalise. No man or woman is able to judge himself or herself.
LORD ILFORD: I was dealing with persons who were under 75, these between 70 and 75. I was not dealing with those above 75.
LORD ROYLE: I am talking of the suggestion in the Bill that the present age limit of 75 shall be reduced in easy stages to 70. I would at once put it down to 70. As my noble and learned friend knows, when I attained the age of 70 I voluntarily went on to the supplemental list because, in the light of what I had seen of other people, I felt that I might not be able to judge my own capacity to carry on in a job of that description. Experience is important, but in this matter capacity is even more important.
My noble friend Lord Chorley talked about businessmen. We are not asking them to leave their businesses for hours upon end. A petty sessional court in a borough often sits only once a week, for a few hours. In the counties many courts are not called upon to sit more than fortnightly, or even monthly. This is not a great sacrifice for businessmen under the age of 70. There is no doubt that people actively engaged in business and in industry can spare that kind of lime.
Drawing from my own experience (and this is relevant to the Amendment by my noble friend Lady Summerskill about deafness), I remember sitting with an elderly magistrate who was very deaf and who was in the chair. It was during war time, and the court had before it a conscientious objector. When he had given evidence on his own behalf, the chairman cupped his hands round his ear and said, "Have you any witnesses to

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call?" The man replied, "God is my witness". "Then," said the chairman, "put him in the box". That chairman at that time was not 75, but he was very deaf; and he thought that he could hear and was not too old. Who is going to judge? As I have said, generalisation is called for in this matter. We must be sure that people who are judging their fellows are capable of judging them and of imposing penalties. I hope that the Committee will have nothing to do with this Amendment.
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: I am not sure that I would put down the same Amendment as my noble friend Lord Ilford, but I am sure that, as I am over 70, little notice will be taken of anything I have to say. But I should like to make one or two points. In the 16 years during which I have been chairman of an advisory committee in Shropshire— and each year we have taken notice of any reports we hear or any knowledge about the state of magistrates' health—I have never had any occasion to think that justice had not been done simply because anybody on the bench was 75. That is my own experience. I am simply putting forward that experience against possible theories elsewhere. I have always felt that 70 was far too low as a rigid age limit. That led me to wonder whether the Royal Commission which reported last had ever read the Companies Act. I was reminded of that because I saw the noble Lord, Lord Cohen, in the Chamber. The noble and learned Lord opposite will not need me to tell him that the rule in the Companies Act about directors is that if you want to get rid of a director under 70, you show cause why he should go; but if you want to keep him on over 70, you show cause why he should stay. Is it impossible for some sort of arrangement to be made for magistrates between 70 and 75, whereby healthy or valuable magistrates should be recommended to the Lord Chancellor and to advisory committees, say, from year to year? I throw out this idea as a possible halfway house as something which is worth consideration.
THE EARL OF CRANBROOK: I became a magistrate as a young man in my early 30s, and I found that some older ones, although they tried very hard, were completely out of touch with the
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outlook of my generation which made up the bulk of the criminals with whom we had to deal. I do not think any of us would say that there are not men over 70, even occasionally over 75, who are not fully capable of carrying on, but as we get older we all realise that we are not so closely in touch with the younger generation as we were. I made up my mind then that, come what may, I would retire at 70; although I must confess that now I am so fascinated by the arithmetic of the clause which says when we are to retire that I cannot make out whether it is to be 71 or 72. Therefore, I am inclined to wait until the noble and learned Lord opposite solves the problem for me by telling me to go. I am quite certain, after well over 30 years on the bench, that it is not so much that people on the bench are getting too old and are incapable of carrying on, but that there are just as good fish in the sea as come out of it. It is those "fish" we want to get on the bench, rather than to keep the old fish—who, I must confess, from listening to the debate to-night, remind me of a song of the First World War, which those of us who are near 70 can probably remember. The song ran:
"Send out me brother,
Me sister or me mother;
But for Gawd's sake don't send me."
That seems to me to be the outlook of one or two of the more elderly Peers here to-night, and I hope that this will not go out as the outlook of this House as a whole. I believe that 70 is the age at which the limit should be set, since we should like to see the young men coming along and taking our places.
LORD PARKER OF WADDLNGTON: This subject is one for considerable emotion, according to one's age. Therefore I would declare my interest as nearing "zero" under the Bill. Despite being a magistrate—not ex officio—I would certainly leave the Bill as it is and vote against the Amendment. Many people, whether one is considering magistrates or judges, are good, and extremely good, at 75, at 80, and even over 80; but there are some who are not. We are all agreed that it is far simpler to have one definite age. It was suggested that something in the nature of an extension might be granted by the advisory committee. I always find any extension of retiring age an invidious

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matter and something difficult to do. To choose one person and say that he shall sit on for two years or five years and not another person is, in effect, only asking for trouble. Therefore, there must be one date.
What should it be? Most of us if we are honest with ourselves would say that 65 is perhaps the optimum age. After that, perhaps what one loses in physique and in keeping in touch with the modern generation is made up, one hopes, by expertise. But a time does come when, as it were, expertise has to give way to not keeping up with the modern world, and I myself think that, while there are plenty of people over 70 who are fully capable of doing the job, 70 is about the right age, and we ought to stick to that.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I hope the noble Lord, Lord Ilford, will not press this Amendment. I did not, I think, say that I received more recommendations than I could appoint, because advisory committees do not ordinarily recommend more than there are vacancies for. I meant that the advisory committees get more people recommended to them than there are vacancies for.
I think there is general agreement that one must have a retiring age; and, indeed, we have one already. I respectfully agree with what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Parker of Waddington, said about making the retiring age extensible. I have some powers in the case of the lower judiciary, but in practice I never do it, and I do not think my noble and learned predecessor did, either. It is very difficult to say, "Yes, the senior Queen's Bench Master can have another couple of years, but the senior Chancery Master cannot." You offend so many people trying to do that, that in practice I am afraid it is impossible. So it is really only a question of what the age should be.
It is true that the Royal Commission recommended 75, but up to that point there had been no retiring age, and experience shows that when a retiring age is laid down for the first time it is usually made high. I remember that in the case of the High Court Judges, the Young Barristers' Committee of the Bar Council said, "There ought to be a retiring age for High Court Judges. We think it ought to be 65." We older ones on the Council
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thought that 65 was very young, particularly for a start; so we recommended 70. Then the Government, I suppose to be on the safe side, made it 75. The reason given by the Royal Commission was that the change had to be spread over five years, even if 75 was introduced; so, obviously, if you tried to impose a retiring age of 70 at that time the magistrates would have been decimated.
One realises what a very delicate subject this is in your Lordships' House. What is the right age is entirely a matter of opinion. I am told that a few years ago the Magistrates' Association passed a resolution expressing the hope that all justices would go on the supplemental list at 70. I think I spoke last time of the accumulation of experience of the Lord Chancellor's Office, which relates in the main to judicial appointments rather than to life in general. If one has to choose an age at which, on the whole, people are not quite so good after it as they were before, I would put it at 65. But, with respect, I think that 70 is right for justices of the peace.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: I think it was very right that my noble friend Lord Ilford should move this Amendment and bring the matter before the Committee. I also venture to say that this is a field in which it is impossible to do perfect justice. At the beginning of this debate I was not at all sure on which side I should come down, but, having listened to it, I am much impressed by what was said by the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chief Justice. He and the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor are at one in thinking that the Bill should remain unamended. We shall be losing thereby a number of people who could continue to give very definite service on the bench. We have to weigh that against the alternative: that some people may be staying on when they arc really past it, and it is extremely invidious for any Lord Chancellor at that stage to get rid of them. I do not know whether the new clause in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Summerskill, will open up fresh possibilities, because deafness is surely a still greater disqualification than being over 70.
In the circumstances, I fear that I cannot urge my noble friend to do other than withdraw his Amendment, having ventilated the subject, because it seems

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to me that there is a case for reducing the age and seeing what happens. If, in fact, we lose a great number of admirable justices and it is hard to replace them, then Parliament will have to think again. We have heard the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor say that there are, as it were, long waiting lists in the files of the advisory committees, and I should think that justices are replaceable. It is sad to lose anybody who is so capable of doing good service, but this is a case where one has to weigh one consideration against another and, on the whole, I am on the side of the Bill.
LORD ILFORD: I have no wish to press the Government about this. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD SWAYTHLING: This Amendment is consequential on Amendment No. 8. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 4, line 27, at end insert—
("(4) A person who holds office as chairman of a petty sessional division of justices on the date when his name falls to be entered in the supplemental list in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this section shall have his name so entered on the 31st December next after that date.")—(Lord Swaythling.)
Clause 2, as amended, agreed to.
7.16 p.m.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL BARONESS SUMMERSKILL moved, after Clause 2, to insert the following new clause:
Medical Tests
".—(1) The Lord Chancellor may by statutory instrument make rules, which may be annulled by a resolution of either House of Parliament, prescribing medical tests to be taken by justices of the peace at such times as he thinks fit, and in particular requiring that justices of the peace shall have their hearing tested by such means as may be prescribed.
(2) Rules made under the last preceding subsection shall prescribe standards of fitness, and the name of any justice of the peace who is shown by such a medical test as aforesaid not to be of the prescribed standard of fitness shall be entered in the supplemental list."
The noble Baroness said: It seems to me that the discussion Which we have just had has been an excellent curtain-raiser to my Amendment. I hope that
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the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, who has kindly sat throughout this long debate, will keep an open mind on this question, because it is quite clear that opinion is moving on these subjects. He quite rightly said that this is a delicate subject, the delicacy being that an individual does not like to admit that when he has reached a certain age he should retire; and, indeed, an individual finds it extremely difficult to be objective on this subject. My Amendment is of such a character that I am hoping the Lord Chancellor will realise that all delicacy can be removed by making it compulsory for medical examinations to take place at certain stated intervals.
The noble Lord, Lord Chorley, said that it was invidious to suggest, for instance, that a justice of the peace could not hear; in fact, that his powers were waning. I shall never forget the joke of the noble Lord, Lord Royle, about the justice of the peace who could not hear. When somebody mentioned God he said, "Well, put God in the box". This is something which we must approach in a logical manner, and I want to develop a logical argument.
I think we all agree that our modern legislation seeks to afford protection to the individual who is at risk. The latest piece of legislation of this kind is about the breathalyser. Of course, there are people who object; there are the publicans who object and the motorists who object. Again, it has been said, I think only comparatively recently in this century, that because bus drivers, train drivers and pilots put people at risk they must have a periodical medical examination to ensure that they can perform their duties adequately in the interest of the public. Let us put first not the delicate feelings of a justice of the peace but the interests of the public, the interests of the person who is being charged.
It is not surprising that methods have been introduced, some of them by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor and some by his predecessor, for protecting the individual whose reputation is at risk and whose whole future can be jeopardised if our legal system is not the best which we can design; and in consequence free legal aid was introduced. More attention is now being directed to the quality of the justice of

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the peace who is dispensing justice, and the Lord Chancellor, particularly during his term of office, has been exercising great discretion in his choice, because, as he has told us on other occasions, 98 per cent, of crime in this country is reviewed by justices of the peace. His predecessor, Lord Dilhorne, introduced a course of training, again because he felt that the justice of the peace should be the best that we could provide. This Bill to-day reduces the age of retirement to 70; and my Amendment seeks to improve the quality of the justice of the peace further by ensuring that he is not suffering from some disability which will impair his efficiency.
Nobody likes to admit to waning powers. Everybody else's powers wane, but never one's own. It is extremely difficult to be objective in this matter. We were discussing ages just now. Frankly, I would rather be tried by a justice of the peace of 75 with perfect hearing than by one of 65 whose hearing was unreliable. Surely a cardinal feature of our law is that a man is acquitted or convicted according to the evidence, and in the main this will be oral evidence. If justice is to be done, this evidence must be heard perfectly. Human nature being what it is—or, let us say, human vanity being what it is—if an individual cannot hear, or can only partly hear, he may conceal the fact, or pretend to hear. In my opinion, if this is done in the case of a justice of the peace then justice is not served. In my Amendment—and your Lordships will see it is very widely drawn—I am simply asking the Committee to ensure that justice is served by allowing the Lord Chancellor to arrange for medical examinations at certain times, and particularly to ensure that the hearing of a justice of the peace is not defective. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 2, insert the said new clause. —(Baroness Summerskill.)
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: I think we should all have a good deal of sympathy with the purpose underlying this new clause proposed by the noble Baroness, but its method strikes me as somewhat rigid. It would be helpful, I think, if the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor could describe to the Committee what his policy and the policy
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of previous Lord Chancellors has been in seeking to ensure that no one sits as a justice who has reached a stage of infirmity, particularly a stage of deafness, which disqualifies him from dispensing justice and may indeed impair the reputation of the local bench. One is well aware that, in the main, those who are no longer fit to sit drop out. I am afraid one is also aware that there are exceptions, and from time to time there are well-authenticated complaints that so-and-so is continuing to sit on a particular bench when frankly he is no longer up to the job. My criticism of this new clause is its rigidity rather than its purpose. I hope the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor will be able to satisfy the Committee that the arrangements already are such, or alternatively that he is tightening up the arrangements so that they will be such, as to ensure that no-one whose powers are waning, and in particular no-one whose hearing is deteriorating, shall continue to be free to sit on the bench and dispense justice.
7.24 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I have a great deal of sympathy with this Amendment, but it raises, I think, an extraordinary number of difficulties. If it is right in principle, then it must be equally right that judges, recorders, chairmen of quarter sessions, county court judges and county court registrars should also have an annual test, because it is just as important that they should be able to hear as it is that justices of the peace should be able to hear But, then, why should this be confined to the legal profession? I do not know whether it is true or not—my noble friend will know better than I do—but I read in the paper this morning that there are believed to be between 10,000 and 20,000 epileptic motorists. If anybody ought to have an annual medical examination, ought it not to be motorists? It says on the form, "Do you suffer from any disease which…?" Has anybody answered that, "Yes"?
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: That will be the next step.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: But it would be a difficult thing. What about Members of Parliament, and what about the 20,000 people sitting on tribunals, if we are to have a test, annual or whatever

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it is? Then the Amendment does not make it plain whether it is to be merely of hearing. It speaks of "standards of fitness". But is not sight just as important as hearing, and perhaps even not having a bad liver? And if it is hearing, one doctor will say "Yes", and another will say "No" unless we lay down the number of decibels, I suppose, that they are required to hear. Further, is this with a hearing aid or without a hearing aid? Because in the case of driving a car the form says, "Using glasses if you use glasses".
Frankly, I am afraid that the policing of all this would really be too much. There are 16,500 justices. My unfortunate staff are working flat out. They are taking work home every night; and there is a freeze on the number of civil servants—no more may be employed. It is quite impossible for me to take on an operation of this kind. What we rely on is the advisory committee. All my advisory committees know that when they make their annual report at the end of the year it is part of their business to satisfy themselves that no justice on their bench suffers from an infirmity which makes him unfit to go on. I hope the noble Baroness may be reassured if I tell her that I shall certainly undertake to remind all my advisory committees that that is what they must do; because if there are any deaf people who ought to be removed from a bench and put on a supplemental list, this is really a reflection on the advisory committee concerned. These committees, as far as I know, are discharging this difficult task as efficiently as they do any other, and perhaps those with experience of this subject may care to let the Committee know. For those reasons, while I have a great deal of sympathy with the Amendment, I am afraid I cannot advise the Committee to accept it, and I hope that my noble friend will think it right to withdraw it.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: Of course, I have no intention of pressing this Amendment. I am grateful to have the sympathy of my noble friend. I thought at the beginning of the debate I had not got even that. I should be grateful if he would do as he suggests and tell his advisory committees to keep their eyes open. As the noble Lord,
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Lord Chorley, said, it is an invidious thing; it is very difficult for people to tell somebody else that their powers are waning. As to the other points my noble friend has mentioned, I do not think there is any comparison between an epileptic driving a car and a justice of the peace, with the functions he performs. But I am not going to pursue that matter because the hour is late. I want only to thank my noble friend for his promise. I feel that we have at least gone a little way towards what might be the final goal.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clauses 3 and 4 agreed to.
Clause 5 [Justices' clerks]:
THE LORD CHANCELLORhad given notice of his intention to move, in subsection (3), to leave out "questions of law" and insert "law on questions". The noble and learned Lord said: I do not propose to move either Amendment No. 15 or No. 16. The reasons why I will explain on the Motion, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
On Question, Whether Clause 5 shall stand part of the Bill?
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: I should like to put a few questions on this clause. I find it difficult to understand what Clause 5(3) as it stands is directed to, or the need for it. The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor did not say much about it on Second Reading. First, what are the "sessions" referred to in line 12? Are they the petty sessions? Presumably they are, because we are dealing here with justices' clerks. Why is it necessary to have a special statutory provision for the giving of advice by a justice's clerk in connection with the discharge by justices of their functions as justices out of sessions? What is the need for any statutory provision of that sort? I should have thought it was the sort of thing that goes on now if some question arises about the discharge by the justices of their functions when they are not sitting as justices in a magistrates' court. I should have thought the person to whom they would turn immediately for advice would be the justices' clerk, and that he would give it. Therefore, I find it difficult to understand at first sight the reason for the inclusion of this subsection.

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Secondly, I should like to ask the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor to explain what are the particular functions of the justices out of sessions. Perhaps he will give me some indication of those functions to which this particular subsection is intended to apply.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Clause 5(3) is a declaratory provision to the effect that the functions of the justices' clerk include the giving, at the request of the justices, or at the request of an individual justice who is exercising his functions out of court—for example, issuing a warrant of arrest or search— of advice on matters of law. The subsection also covers the possibility that the justices' clerk may not actually be present in court when the point of law arises and provides that in those circumstances the justices may request advice. The subsection refers only to questions arising out of sessions; that is to say, out of quarter sessions, since it would not be practicable or appropriate for county justices sitting at quarter sessions to seek the advice of the clerk to the bench of justices of which they are members. The concluding words of the subsection make it clear that the clerk may take the initiative by drawing the attention of the justices to a point of law of which they might otherwise have been unaware.
The subsection is based on the Practice Direction given by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goddard, as Lord Chief Justice, in 1953. During the Second Reading debate the noble and learned Lord, Lord Parker of Waddington, questioned whether the wording was right, and the two Amendments which I put down were intended to meet the points he had raised. But I gather that the matter has been discussed to-day, and the reason why I have not moved the Amendments is that I understand that he would rather that the Amendments were not moved to-day but that we consider the matter between this stage of the Bill and the next.
LORD PARKER OF WADDINGTON: I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack for considering the point that I raised on Second Reading. I am gravely concerned with subsection (3), because I think that in many ways (though I hesitate to say
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this) it is the most important provision in the whole Bill. We know that magistrates deal with some 97 or 98 per cent, of all the crime in the country. What is sometimes forgotten is that over 80 per cent, of indictable offences are dealt with by those magistrates. I venture to think that they simply could not function without the help of the justices' clerks. The justices' clerk is in many ways the most important person in the whole set-up of the administration of justice. Why I am worried about Clause 5(3) is that it is stated to be a declaration of the functions of the justices' clerk. True, it is said to be inclusive. It is said to include advice on law. I should have thought that one thing was certain in our administration of justice—no one has doubted it: that the justices' clerk can advise on law. The question really is how much further can he go in his advice.
We are functioning at the moment under a Direction given by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goddard, my predecessor, which was given on November 16, 1953. He then stated:
"It is clear that they "—
that is, the justices—
"may seek his advice on questions of law or mixed law and fact and also on questions regarding the practice and procedure of the court. The latter are indeed questions of law."
I always hesitate to differ from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goddard, but I venture to think that practice is not law. However, it is accepted that justices' clerks can advise on practice and procedure. Then Lord Goddard went on:
"They may, for instance, ask him for information of the sentences which have been imposed by their bench or by neighbouring benches in respect of similar offences to that which they are trying. It is indeed most desirable that penalties for such matters as obstruction by vehicles, lack of lights and other what may be called public order offences should have some degree of uniformity."
Everything that Lord Goddard said in 1953 is abundantly true to-day, and it is, I venture to think, accepted law as a result of that Practice Direction that the justices' clerk can advise on law, on mixed law and fact, on practice, on procedure and on sentencing—not the sentence that should be given in the particular case under consideration, but the level of sentences throughout the

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country, in neighbouring benches and what the bench itself has been doing. If Parliament declares—true, it is inclusive —that the functions of the justices' clerk include the giving of advice on law, it will, I think, inevitably be said by everybody that that has driven a coach-and-four through the Practice Direction; because the one thing that was settled was that the justices' clerk could advise on law. Yet Parliament has here thought fit to make a declaratory statement that that is so.
What of practice and procedure? What of mixed law and fact? What of sentencing? Honestly, I am terrified; because my whole object has been to get uniformity of sentencing, so far as it is possible. Why should not the justices' clerk be able to advise on what neighbouring benches are doing? He knows; the justices do not. Is there ever a question of law alone? Is it not always mixed law and fact, and so on?
Therefore I venture to say that this subsection is terrifying in its present form. I have considered very seriously whether to table an Amendment; but it would inevitably be very complicated. It would provide for mixed law and fact, practice, procedure and sentencing. And at the end I should have left out something. I wonder whether it is really necessary to have subsection (3) at all. Is it not better to leave it to the Direction of the Divisional Court?—certainly, as it stands at the moment: the Direction given by Lord Goddard? I am told that this was introduced at the request of the justices' clerks, to try to clear up any possible ambiguity. I think that if those concerned were to consult with the Justices' Clerks Society, and with the justices' clerks again, they would learn that they now realise that this subsection, so far from being in their favour, will be used as an argument against them, to limit their powers in the future merely to questions of law. Therefore, I would ask the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack whether before the Report stage he would consider again—if necessary with the justices' clerks—whether subsection (3) is needed at all.
7.40 p.m.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: I should like to say a word in support—I will make it
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as short as I can—of what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chief Justice has said. When we reach the Report stage, the question will be whether this subsection should remain in the Bill. I hope that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor will have discussions before then, because in the light of what my noble and learned friend has said I feel very disposed to put down an Amendment to leave out this subsection entirely. As the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor pointed out, it is purely declaratory, and unfortunately it is only partially declaratory of the present position. I do not believe that it serves any useful purpose to include the subsection in the Bill. In fact, I think that it could be very harmful.
Although I listened carefully to what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said, I am still puzzled as to what precisely the subsection is meant to do. The declaration is limited to
"advice on questions of law arising in connection with the discharge out of sessions of their or his functions as justices…"
That must mean, I should have thought, outside the sessions at which the justices sit. I think the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor referred to quarter sessions, but it seems to me that this can be directed not to quarter sessions but to petty sessions. Then you get the slightly confusing element:
"including questions arising when the clerk is not personally attending on the justices or justice…"
That again must mean questions arising out of court. Why is it necessary to have that? The clerk will be personally attending on them when they are sitting in the magistrates' court. If it is quarter sessions, surely it will be the clerk of the peace and not the justices' clerk. Therefore, I ask the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor to look at this again, and I hope that before the next stage of the Bill, unless the arguments for its inclusion are more cogent than has so far appeared, he may consider then that it is better to leave it to the Practice Direction which I do not believe causes any difficulty or doubt at all.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I will certainly consider this point. I have no personal views about this clause at all. As I understood it, there was lack of

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uniformity in the country, and the justices' clerks wanted to get something clear about what was the position so that they would know where they were?—and I dare say the justices did, too. No point was, I think, raised on Second Reading, except that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Parker of Wadding-ton, took some point on the wording. The Amendments were put down with a view to meeting that point. But I will certainly consider how far the clause is really necessary, or, if it is to remain, what form it should take.
I do not wish to be thought to be saying something on which I am giving a considered view, because the point had not occurred to me before, but after what the noble and learned Lord has said, I am not sure where we get to if a clerk is to be entitled to say in a particular case, "Every other bench would give this man twice what you are suggesting that you should give him." If that is not interfering on sentence—at any rate, it is quite a different thing for him to say to the bench as a whole, or to the chairman, "You know, I think that in this or that class of case we are getting a bit out of line with other benches". But if you are once going to have a clerk called in by the bench, in effect, to say, "This is what we are thinking of doing on sentence; now please, teacher, do you agree?", I do not think that would be a very good thing.
LORD PARKER OF WADDINGTON: If the noble and learned Lord will allow me to intervene, may I say that the Practice Direction to which I referred was issued by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goddard, after consultation with the Lord Chancellor of the day, and I am sure it was never thought that the magistrates' clerk should be entitled to say, "In this case you must give so-and-so because other benches are doing that". That is a very different thing from asking advice, and from saying, "What are the magistrates of the county in general doing?", on whatever it may be—parking offences, obstruction, and so on. That was all it was intended to cover, and I
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should have thought that it could be left to the good sense of the Divisional Court to give a Direction as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goddard, did, to control magistrates' clerks, and yet allow justices to get the advantage of their advice.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Yes. If it is possible for a Divisional Court to put that into words, rightly, ought not it to be possible for Parliament to put it into words, rightly?
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: If I may say so, it certainly should. But if the words are not adequate when uttered by the Divisional Court, they are more easily amended than the words in an Act of Parliament. May I also put this to the noble and learned Lord in relatian to the example which he gave? It is, of course, one thing for the clerk to volunteer, "The sentence you propose to give is half what the other courts would give for that offence"; or to volunteer, "The sentence you propose to give is double what the other courts would give". But, surely, if the administration of justice is going to be right, it ought to be open to the chairman to ask, "What is the scale of punishment for this class of offence imposed by adjoining benches?" I think that is all that is wanted. I know that in some counties a scale has been drawn up. I believe that unless there is to be a real advantage from enacting this, it would be much better to leave it to the Practice Direction. I do not want to put down an Amendment to leave out this subsection at the next stage. If the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor feels that it should be left out, I would much rather that he did it. Perhaps he could give some indication before that time comes; and, of course, one would be only too willing to discuss this with him if that would help.
Clause 5 agreed to.
Remaining clauses agreed to.
Schedules agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported with the Amendments.

CONSERVATION OF SEALS BILL [H.L.]
7.49 p.m.
THE EARL OF CRANBROOK: My Lords, it has been suggested to me that it would be to the advantage of your Lordships if I were not to move the Second Reading of this Bill now. But I must confess that I feel bound to express a feeling of regret that the business of the House has been so arranged that this course is necessary. This matter has been the first item on the list for some little time now. It was suggested to me last week that it might come after the Committee stage of the Justices of the Peace Bill which we have just concluded. It is clear now, in view of the long stint we are going to have on the Countryside Bill, that it would be a most inappropriate time to move it, but I confess that in not moving it I do this with the greatest regret.
LORD KILMANY: My Lords, I wonder whether I could add my voice in protest at the very late stage when this decision was taken to alter the published business of your Lordships' House. In doing so, I readily accept the courtesy of the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, who was good enough to tell me that this Bill would have to be postponed until Friday week, and I am much obliged to him for that. But what was not so good was that I was bound to confess—and surely there is no crime in having engagements —that I should be engaged in Scotland, the country I come from, on that day and it would be highly inconvenient. I have not seen any other Scottish names on the list of speakers and Scotland's point of view certainly requires to be put. I am bound to say that I feel a little aggrieved that I am just left with the fact that it will have to be Friday week, whether or not I, as a Scottish Member, shall be able to come.
I am too new a Member of your Lordships' House to dare talk about bad Parliamentary practice, but surely it cannot be good Parliamentary practice for Order Papers to be circulated to us all, so that we know what business is to be on a certain day, and then, without any shadow of warning and without giving a reason for the alteration of timetable, for it to be sprung upon us at the last minute,
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first, that the Seals Bill was to come below the Committee stage of the Justices of the Peace Bill, a Committee stage which noble and learned Lords might have foreseen was likely to take quite a long time, and then, not content with that being after a lengthy Committee stage, for the Seals Bill to be put forward to a day which, of all days, is inconvenient to those who live a long way from London, in the West, in the North of England and in Scotland. If I were to dare to say, "bad Parliamentary practice," I feel that surely this is an occasion for saying so. I would ask the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, whose courtesy again I acknowledge, to avoid such inconvenience to the House in future.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: My Lords, I feel a great deal of sympathy with my noble friend Lord Cranbrook and with other noble Lords who came to-day hoping to speak on the Seals Bill. I think it is generous of my noble friend in the circumstances not to move the Second Reading. It would be awkward for many of us if he were to do so, because I am well aware that a pledge was given from this Bench on Thursday last that we should finish the Countryside Bill to-night and I am prepared to cooperate in that. But I hope that any inconvenience will be imposed as seldom as possible on noble Lords who come from a distance, and in this case I would express the hope that there may be conversations to try to find a new date for the Second Reading of the Bill which will be generally acceptable to those who are interested in it.
LORD MOLSON: My Lords, perhaps if the noble Lord the Leader of the House would kindly allow me to intervene, he would have something else to reply to. I complained last week about the way in which the Countryside Bill has been handled. We now have down two Amendments which I think, without completely committing myself, are entirely satisfactory. They carry out, so far as I can see, the promises which were made many weeks ago in another place. But that we should come back on Monday morning and find Amendments which were promised in another place, and be obliged, as I have been to-day, to ring up the London representatives of county councils to ask whether they really

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meet the points they have made, is not an entirely satisfactory state of affairs. There have been complaints from Scottish Members, from English Members, from Members concerned with the Seals Bill and Members concerned with the Countryside Bill, and I would ask that the business of this House and the drafting of Amendments by the Government should be organised in such a way that we do not have to come back to London and find Amendments, long since promised, on which we have to come to a decision within a few hours.
7.56 p.m.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I feel that it is rather inappropriate, in discussing the business at the moment, to deal with the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Molson, because I confess I am not familiar with them. I know that there has been argument on the Countryside Bill. My noble friend Lord Kennet is much more familiar with that issue than I, and the noble Lord, Lord Molson, is probably more aware than I am of the reasons why we are taking it at this time.
As a normally good-tempered and peaceable Member of your Lordships' House, I slightly resent the remarks in relation to the Seals Bill. I have no power to tell the noble Lord, Lord Kilmany, what can and cannot be done in this House. As a former Deputy Speaker in another place he is more aware of the authoritarian approach to the conduct of business. All I did was to go to the noble Earl, Lord Cranbrook, and suggest that in the circumstances this Bill was more likely to get a better run if we took it at another time. I said that it was entirely up to him. I spoke personally to every single Member of your Lordships' House who had his name down and got his agreement, and every noble Lord, with the exception of the noble Lord, Lord Kilmany, was delighted that it should be taken off the Paper.
I appreciate the noble Lord's problem. When we looked at business last week there were three speakers down for this Bill and one for the Pastoral Measure. It is not possible within the conditions in which we run business in your Lordships' House, without restriction on what individual Peers do, to programme in this sort of way. All we can do is to cope with it in the best way
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we can. I am personally satisfied that this is much better for the Seals Bill. The noble Earl knows that I have a certain sympathy with what he is trying to do.
I do not feel encouraged in taking the sort of initiative I personally did if it is to be the subject of protest in. regard to circumstances which cannot be in the control of any Leader of the House or of any Government Front Bench. We have a great deal of business to do. There may be arguments in regard to the legislation which we have to face. I am very grateful, and I have already written to the noble Earl to say how grateful I am, for his co-operation, but it was only advice that I gave. I must make it clear that I am not able to direct your Lordships as to the business your Lordships may take at a particular moment, once it is on the Order Paper. On this occasion I had hoped that I had the willing agreement of the noble Lords concerned. I appreciate that the noble Earl may have lost a pleasant day's fishing as a result of this change, and this strikes genuinely to my heart, but we have done our best for seals on this occasion.
THE EARL OF CRANBROOK: My Lords, I am sorry if the noble Lord does not think that I fully appreciate all the advice he has given and in particular the trouble he took, at my request, to see noble Lords who had put their names down to speak and tell them, that I thought it would be for the convenience of the House if I did not move this Second Reading to-day. He has been exceedingly helpful throughout, and if he feds that I suggested otherwise I apologise for having given him that impression. None the less, I think it is worrying that the business of the House can get to such a pitch that we can now be at 8 o'clock when we had anticipated that the previous business would have been completed at about half past four, a though this is probably the fault of noble Lords and not in any way the fault of the Leader of the House. But I am talking rather longer than I should and also keeping your Lordships from the Countryside Bill.
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, there is just one point as to whether Friday is a suitable day to discuss a measure which particularly affects Scotland.

COUNTRYSIDE BILL
8.1 p.m.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, That the House do again resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Kennet.)
House in Committee accordingly.
[The LORD CHAMPION in the Chair.]
LORD KENNET LORD KENNET moved, after Clause 26, to insert the following new clause:
Riding of pedal bicycles on footpaths and bridleways
".—(1) Any member of the public shall have, as a right of way, the right to ride a bicycle, not being a motor vehicle, on any footpath or bridleway, but in exercising that right cyclists shall give way to pedestrians and persons on horseback.
(2) Subsection (1) above has effect subject to any orders made by a highway authority, and to any byelaws.
(3) The rights conferred by this section shall not affect the obligations of the highway authority, or of any other person, as respects the maintenance of the footpath or bridleway, and this section shall not create any obligation to do anything to facilitate the use of the footpath or bridleway by cyclists.
(4) Subsection (1) above shall not affect any definition of "footpath" or "bridleway" in this or any other Act.
(5) In this section "motor vehicle" has the same meaning as in the Road Traffic Act 1960.
(6) It is hereby declared that sections 9, 10, 11 and 13 of the said Act of 1960 (offences connected with riding of bicycles) apply to footpaths and bridleways as being highways which are "roads" within the meaning of that Act.
(7) Section 12 of the said Act (regulation of cycle racing on highways) shall have effect as if the expression "public highway" included a footpath or bridleway, and subsection (4) of that section (which defines a public highway as not including a footpath or bridleway) shall cease to have effect."
The noble Lord said: This is the Amendment which I promised to the House on Second Reading about pedal cyclists on footpaths and bridleways. This matter attracted a great deal of attention in the other place, and a good deal of interest among the public and in the Press. We have found it extremely difficult to get it right. The Government feel that the new proposals are the right
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ones, and I think it will be best if, rather than go over all the arguments again, I tell the Committee what the effect of the Amendment would be.
The main provision in the Amendment is that the public would acquire a right to ride a bicycle on any footpath or bridleway. The provisions would also protect the rights of walkers and horse riders by requiring cyclists to give way to pedestrians and persons on horseback. This seems to be a more sensible phrase than the one which the other place did not favour, about actually dismounting, and being liable to pay a fine of £20 if you did not. You can give way in several ways, and this requires cyclists to do the sensible and courteous thing to the already established users by right of bridleways and footpaths. The Amendment also excludes motor vehicles. It clearly applies only to cyclists.
Subsection (2) of the clause preserves the effect of traffic orders. Subsection (3) prevents possible increased standards of maintenance being required because of use by cyclists; in other words, footpaths and bridleways carry on on exactly the same provisions and standards as before, although cyclists are using them. Subsection (4) maintains the present definition of footpaths and bridleways, so that we are talking about the same types of path.
I think the only other provision that I should point out to your Lordships is subsection (7), which amends the Road Traffic Act 1960 in order to include the footpaths and bridleways we are talking about in the definition of a "highway" so that racing can be controlled on it by the requirement that it must be authorised. With that brief explanation, I commend the new clause to the Committee, and hope that it will meet the bill. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 26, insert the said new clause. —(Lord Kennet.)
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: The history of this matter is that on Report stage in another place the Government produced a new clause which after debate was found to be so entirely friendless that the Parliamentary Secretary, who was in charge, decided to withdraw it for further consideration. I am sure that his action was right. I must say that it

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would have been helpful if the consideration could have been given by the Government quickly enough for this substitute clause to be tabled immediately after the Second Reading in your Lordships' House, because we should then have had rather more time to examine something which we knew was coming to us as a result of the inadequacy of Government drafting, and indeed inadequacy of Government policy in another place. The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, will appreciate that this new clause has not been on the Marshalled List for many days, and therefore I must ask a number of questions about it. I will not, however, go so far as to follow the example of honourable Members of both sides in another place who urged that the Government clause should be withdrawn.
If I understand this clause rightly, it is an attempt to provide by Statute for pedal cyclists on footpaths and bridleways rights of way which have hitherto been rights of way only for pedestrians and persons on horseback. It does this by laying claim under this Bill to a right for cyclists to pass over every right of way which hitherto has been open to pedestrians or those on horseback, unless a by-law is made under subsection (2), which may restrict the right of the cyclists. This is establishing an extensive new claim for pedal cyclists against the owners of the land, and if this claim is to be granted I think we need to examine for a minute or two what safeguards there are. Let me hasten to say that I want cyclists, as well as pedestrians and those on horseback, to enjoy the countryside. But, as I say, this appears to me to be a substantial change in the law, and we need to examine it.
Is this likely to lead, for example, to the enlarging of footpaths? One may have a footpath across a cornfield which has hitherto been used only by pedestrians. Cyclists are now to have a statutory right to ride through the corn. They can hardly mount or dismount, as they may well be required to do by subsection (1), without getting either their cycle or their feet into the corn and beating it down. This is bound to be a matter of concern to farmers, and I am anxious to discover whether the Government have thought out all that is involved in this. Secondly, subsection (2) enables the high
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way authority to make orders, and it empowers somebody unknown to make by-laws. It is not clear to me, on the face of the clause, under what powers these by-laws are to be made, of what right of representation there will be to those who may either object to the making of a by-law or think that a by-law should be made and wish to prod those concerned into action. It appears to me that the clause is incomplete in this respect.
Then we come to subsection (3), which says:
"The rights conferred by this section shall not affect the obligations of the highway authority, or of any other person, as respects the maintenance of the footpath or bridleway…"
But it does not indicate what is to be the position of the landowner who under Clause 25 has been subjected to certain statutory obligations to keep stiles and gates on footpaths and bridleways in order. If there is to be constant carrying of cycles over stiles, or through or around gates, this is liable to cause additional expense on maintenance. It appears to me that the position of the highway authority is specifically protected under subsection (3), but the position of the landowner who has these responsibilities for the maintenance of the stiles and gates under Clause 25 does not receive attention here.
I ask those questions, not because I want to see this clause out of the Bill, but because it is most important that if we are having a new clause we shall get it right and make sure that it makes proper provision in all respects. The Government will grant that they have not been wholly successful in efforts to solve this problem, and, as I say, none of us has had many days to examine this matter, which is a substantial new departure in the law. It therefore seems to me right that the Committee should ask questions of the Government about it.
8.12 p.m.
LORD HENLEY: Those of us who get our living from the land view this new clause with very great alarm. On the one hand, we feel very much that the bicyclists have a raw deal in the modern world. They cannot bicycle with comfort on the roads, and there is nowhere for them to go. I have felt this about my own children. When I was a child I

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bicycled everywhere. Now, I dare not let my children go on to the road until they are virtually grown up, for fear of their being killed. So one feels sympathy for bicyclists. But here the Government are acting at the expense of those who earn a living off the land in enlarging rights against us, which I feel could lead to very great financial loss.
I know that at the moment bicycling, unlike most other forms of sport, is diminishing, but I do not think that this trend will necessarily continue. There are all sorts of bicycling sports, such as "scrambling", in the countryside which are going to increase. It is a very attractive sport to pursue, and in fact I hope that it may increase. But if the Government are going to enlarge these rights against one section of the community they must do something else about it. I was very struck when the noble Baroness, Lady Summerskill, was speaking half an hour ago on the Justices of the Peace Bill and used certain words. I was so struck by them that I wrote them down. She said, "Modern legislation seeks to afford protection to individuals who are at risk". We in the country are at risk by this enlargement of the roads against us; we really are.
I do not want to go over all the arguments that were put forward, almost ad nauseam, in another place on this particular clause. All of us know that stiles must inevitably be worn out and damaged as a result of the way the pedestrian uses them. As the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Cumnor, says, fields of corn must inevitably be damaged. There is only one way for cyclists to "give way", and that means that people walk through the corn. Fields which are pleasant for the ordinary person are going to be "chewed up" by bicycle wheels. This kind of thing will happen. It is not only the interests of the owner of land and the occupier which are at stake. Also at stake are the interests of the people who go into the countryside to enjoy the countryside quietly.
The by-laws clause will not really help at all. Who is going to persuade a local authority to go to the trouble of making a by-law to do what is required by this clause? It just is not "on". It will not happen. The noble Lord looks quizzi-
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cally at me when I say that it will not happen. Nevertheless, I am certain it will not happen, except in certain cases where it would be scandalous if it did not. More than this will have to be done if it is going to help us at all. I feel that unless something is done with regard to compensation here the good will of a section of the community will be lost, and this is what we want to avoid so far as this new Bill is concerned. I hope that the Government will think about this problem. They are not really aware of it at all. I made this point on Second Reading because I felt that it had not been made sufficiently on Second Reading in another place. The point is that by this clause the Government are enlarging the rights of one set of citizens against another, yet are doing nothing to compensate for the loss that will be caused.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: I should like to point out that on bridleways cyclists should give way to pedestrians and persons on horseback—but will they? I very much doubt whether the average cyclist will read this Bill, or reads the law, and I can foresee quite a number of rather nasty accidents if cyclists come round a corner on a narrow path and confront somebody on a high-spirited horse. Probably the cyclist will be badly kicked, and there might be a nasty accident. This Amendment will create all sorts of complications. On the whole, I am all for allowing cyclists as much free range as possible, but I should like to point out that difficulty.
EARL WALDEGRAVE: I think I must go a little further than noble Lords who have spoken from this side, because it seems to me that we are now reaching a new principle with regard to access to the countryside. In the past, there have been carriageways, bridleways and footpaths, and it is very important that the traffic on these different routes should be kept distinct. We know that we may get motor cars for scrambling, or something of that kind, on carriageways. We know there will be pedestrians or horse traffic on a pathway. A man riding a horse and a pedestrian are much more on terms with each other than a man riding a bicycle and a pedestrian, or a cyclist and a man riding a horse. If

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horses are allowed on a pathway, it will soon be in a condition which will make it rather difficult for foot passengers. That is why I think horses are not allowed on footpaths and must go on bridle paths.
If we allow bicyclists on footpaths we will encounter exactly this sort of trouble. They will churn up the ground so that it will be uncomfortable for the pedestrian to walk upon it. Also, if we have horses on bridle paths, they are not going to make a surface on which one can ride a bike. What will happen is that either the horse or the bike, or both, will diverge very widely from the path they are using, and this enlargement of the path may be quite dangerous.
I should like to take up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Henley, because it seems to me a very important one. In everything we do in this Countryside Bill we must try not to set town against country. I should have thought that if you are going to have horses, bikes and pedestrians all trying to use the same track, this is just the kind of situation that will get rid of all the good will; this is what is going to cause the rows. If people are asked to lift a bicycle over a stile (I know that this point has been argued in another place, but it is nevertheless still true) they will not do it more than once or twice. They will make a gap in the hedge next door. What will happen is that we shall have to put up opening gates, and we know what happens when we do that—they are opened and left open. Footpaths are used by persons who can climb over a stile, but you really cannot get people to lift bicycles over stiles. Therefore, we shall not have stiles; we shall ultimately have gates, and in this way we shall have made another principle.
I think that this is a much more serious new clause than it is thought to be. I am afraid that the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, is optimistic if he thinks we are going to take this quite so easily as he envisaged.
LORD BARNBY: In the first place I must admit that, anticipating a rather late sitting, I took some refreshment and therefore missed hearing the Parliamentary Secretary introduce this Amendment. I apologise to him and, of course, I am at some disadvantage. However, I was
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able to listen to my noble friend Lord Brooke of Cumnor, who drew attention to the many considerations facing us in regard to this Bill and the caveats which have to be entered. I sympathise with the Parliamentary Secretary for it is extremely difficult. If the principle is to endeavour to give some further consideration to cyclists—and I am not violently against that—it is extremely difficult to do it by means of legislation, and I associate myself with the remarks made by my noble friend with regard to the difficulty of surmounting obstacles. Also there is the question of the gate that swings to automatically, and if somebody is cycling along die path and another person comes in the opposite direction on a horse there may be a mix-up. Who would be liable for any injuries caused or for damages in the event of an accident of that kind? Much of the difficulty of interpretation appears to be in regard to what is to go on the particular type of passage. I will not enlarge on that now, but I hope the Parliamentary Secretary will be able to find some way of elucidating that difficulty, and I look forward to hearing his answers; to the questions put by my noble friend Lord Brooke.
I would draw attention to a point in subsection (1). In line 3 "any footpath or bridleway" presumably means any kind of passage, whether it is on normal land, common land, or anything else; but that is not defined. Then, again, the words "shall give way to pedestrians and persons on horseback "seem to suggest that the people on horseback may go on both. I am sure that that is not the intention of the Parliamentary Secretary, so I will presume to suggest that there should be inserted after the word "and" in line 4, the words "on bridlepaths to persons on horseback". Further down, in subsections (4) and (6), there is again the difficulty about the definitions of "footpath" and "bridleway". They are clearly defined, but of course we have to look at the Road Traffic Act.
LORD KENNET: I perceive that the clause raises various doubts in the minds of noble Lords, but I have been thinking as hard as I could while your Lordships have been speaking and I hope to be able to allay these doubts. It seems to me that this is the best way to do it.

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I readily admit that the way suggested in another place was inferior to this way, and it seems to me that the chances of finding a better way are very low. Before I give my reasons I would apologise to the Committee for the short time which has elapsed between the tabling of this Amendment and this Committee stage. I expect I shall have to repeat that apology later in regard to other Amendments, and I can only say that it is a well-known fact of Parliamentary life that towards this time of the year things get hectic. I hope your Lordships will bear in mind the seasons in Parliamentary life. It has always been so and I think it will be so for many years to come.
The noble Lord, Lord Brooke, asked whether this provision will lead to the widening of footpaths. Of course it will not legally lead to their widening. It is certainly true that a cyclist may go over the edge of the footpath; so may a pedestrian, especially if three or four are walking abreast, and so may a person on horseback on a bridlepath. It seems to me there is no reason why this provision should lead to any greater de facto widening of footpaths than already exists. The noble Lord, Lord Brooke, asked who is to make the by-laws and what representations may be made to that body. They will be made by local authorities under the Local Government Act 1933. On towpaths they will be made by the British Waterways Board. In both these cases the draft by-laws are to be advertised and may be objected to, after which they will be confirmed or otherwise by the Home Secretary. I hope the fact that these are like most other by-laws in adjacent fields of law will convince the Committee that there is nothing wrong with that part of the provision.
The noble Lord, Lord Brooke, raised the bogy of the constant carrying of bicycles over stiles and asked whether it would not impose a further burden on the landowner in maintaining the stiles. I think one should use common sense in this matter. If there are a number of stiles on a footpath, cyclists will not want to use it. If they have to dismount every 100 yards or so that is not the path they will use. The more stiles there are on a footpath the fewer cyclists there will be on it and therefore there will not be a great increase of maintenance to be car-
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ried out on that footpath. Nevertheless, I think we might return to this topic at the end of the day, when we come to the Amendment which the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, was not able to move the other day and as a result we postponed it. It is an Amendment to Clause 25, which refers to the criteria governing the I judgment of the local authority in making demands of landowners for the maintenance of stiles, gates, and so on. I hope to be able to meet the noble Lord's point on that Amendment, and if things go as I hope—and as I know he hopes— I submit that that might have a relevance to the clause we are now considering.
The noble Lord, Lord Henley, asked whether the local authorities will make by-laws and who will persuade them to do so. In common political judgment I would say it will be the land owning members of local authorities who will persuade them. That is what usually happens and I expect it will happen in this case. In those parts of the country where there is a strong, legitimate farming interest in the countryside the farmers will be well placed to see that the bylaws are made, and in other parts of the countryside it will not matter so much if the by-laws are not made.
The noble Viscount, Lord Massereene and Ferrard, asked whether the cyclists will give way. We might say that they should give way, but will they do so? I have no doubt that most will, but some will not. However I would point out that exactly the same situation prevails at the moment, when cyclists are not allowed on bridleways and footpaths. That law is not well-known. I have never had the least compunction about cycling on footpaths and bridleways, and in point of fact I do not think I actually knew that I was not allowed to until I began to look into this matter. I think the observation of the law is likely to remain at about the same level as at the moment, and therefore there should not be a deterioration from the point of view of the landowner if this provision is adopted.
We should not forget that in this case there are two provisions for regulating what goes on and what the cyclist may or may not do on the bridleway and foot-path. First of all, the local authority may make by-laws about it and they will

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be subject to confirmation by the Home Secretary. Secondly, the highway authority can also make traffic orders about it, and these will be subject to confirmation by the Minister of Transport. Here is a belt and braces, and I do not regret it because I agree that it is a most important matter. I can give the House a pledge that the Minister of Transport will not approve traffic orders permitting cycle racing on footpaths and bridleways. I think that ought to remove one legitimate fear which may be exercising the Committee.
The noble Lord, Lord Brooke, said that he did not want this provision out of the Bill; he did not want the Government to withdraw it. Other speakers would rather the Government withdrew it altogether and maintained the present law whereby cyclists are not allowed on these paths at all. I think to withdraw it altogether and leave things unchanged would be to lean excessively against the interests of new classes of users and enjoyers of the countryside. Of course it increases the problems for the farmer and landowner, but I think the net addition to the problems they face will be so very small that the farmer and landowner should agree to accept them, bearing in mind that they can be represented on the bodies making the by-laws. Suppose the Committee were to take another view and say that although it will be desirable to permit cyclists on bridleways and footpaths this is not the way to do it and some other system ought to be adopted. I should be the last to say that one could not think of anything better, but no noble Lord has proposed an alternative system which would be better.
The first alternative system of doing it would be the creation of an entirely new category of paths; you might call them cycle paths and say that on these cycle paths the cyclist shall be allowed to go and on other footpaths and bridleways he shall not be allowed to go. We should then require the highway authority to redesignate a lot of existing bridleways and footpaths as cycle paths. We should then have to face the question with regard to the newly designated class of paths, the fourth class: shall pedestrians and persons on horse back be allowed to go on them or not, and, if so, who gives way to whom? This
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would be excessively rigid. I think this is the right way, because this is precisely the effect that will be achieved by the provision now before the Committee.
If we were to make a new class of cycle path the highway authority would have to choose which were the cycle paths. This is what they will be doing. They will be making traffic orders and the local authorities will be making by-laws to determine which particular path in what circumstances shall be used in which way by whom. I think to go further into it would be wrong for Parliament and the central Government. It is right for the local authorities to go further into it, and this is the effect of the clause, to leave it to them in making the by-laws and traffic orders which will affect the situation in detail en the ground according to local needs. I hope that what I have said will convince the Committee that this is the best v/ay of doing it, and once again I commend the Amendment to your Lordships.
EARL WALDEGRAVE: Before my noble friend Lord Brooke decides what to do, may I say this? The thing that worries me is that bridleways and foot paths are put together in all this. I should have thought there was a distinction between them. It is not a question of making a new category and calling it a cycle track. I do not think this is a matter only for landowners and farmers; I should have thought that pedestrian associations would be worried by this Amendment. The noble Lord said that if there were many stiles the cyclist would not use a path. I am not quite sure that I wholly agree. I think the cyclist might say, "We have a right to use this path, and there should not be so many stiles". How far they will get, I do not know. I should have thought a compromise would be to allow the cyclist on the bridleways. These already have horses on their; you will not get cars, but you can have bicycles and horses. These are nearly always broader paths, and if they are used much by horses I suspect that there are not many stiles on them, because not everybody who uses a horse is able to jump over stiles and would rather have a gate. If cyclists are allowed on to the footpaths there is no reason why horses should not be allowed. I should have thought it is a pedestrian interest which is going to be breached here.
8.37 p.m.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: I think the whole Committee appreciates the care with which the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, obviously listened to the debate, and the thoroughness with which he has sought to answer the points. I doubt, however, whether he has wholly satisfied any of us. For my part, I would not urge my noble friends to vote against this new clause. I think there is a problem here, but I would rather we all put our heads together to find a satisfactory answer to the question raised. The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, was good enough to apologise to your Lordships for the short period of notice we received before we had to consider this Amendment. My concern is that we are now to have only a short period between Committee Stage and Report, because I have heard rumours that the Report stage may be put down for this day week. I think there is a good deal of work to be done on some of the provisions of this Bill, and as we are all approaching it in a constructive spirit it would be a pity if we did not have a rather larger gap between Committee and Report in which we could think out how the blemishes in the Bill can be removed.
The noble Lord has helped me over a number of points that I have raised. It may be that he misunderstood what I was saying about lifting bicycles over stiles—perhaps I did not express myself clearly enough. What I had in mind was exactly what my noble friend Lord Waldegrave has expressed. We are by this clause turning footpaths into footpaths plus cycleways. The rambler raises objections when he finds a footpath blocked by barbed wire. I think that in future the cyclist will raise objection if he finds what he considers by law to be a right of way for him blocked by a gate or stile. He will ask the reason for it and, offended if he cannot ride straight through, he will sooner or later make a hole in the hedge. I am not suggesting that everybody will do this, but one day a cyclist will come along and will barge through the hedge with his cycle; then there will be a gap, and that will be enlarged. It seems to me that we ought to consider whether we can give the landowners and farmers more protection against this.
Moreover, while the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, has helped me by making ref-
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erence to the Local Government Act under which these by-laws would normally be made, he will recognise that there will be an initial period when there will be no by-laws or restrictions under subsection (2) because they will not have been made by the time this clause comes into operation. Quite a lot of ill-will and quite a lot of damage can be caused during this initial period before any bylaw or order is made restricting cyclists from using paths which they quite clearly ought not to be allowed to use because they are not suitable for cyclists. That is another aspect of the matter to which I think we must give attention, and we need some time to think these things out.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, was good enough on Thursday, when I was not able to attend your Lordships' House (and I should like to express my sincere apologies for that fact), to make an offer to discuss with my noble friend Lord Nugent of Guildford and myself an earlier new clause in my name which was moved by my noble friend. Perhaps that opportunity could be taken to discuss this clause further. It may indeed be that other noble Lords who have spoken would like to join in this discussion. As the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, will see, my approach is a constructive and not a destructive one, and I do not think that this clause as it stands is satisfactory.
LORD MOLSON: I should be prepared, broadly speaking, to accept the clause as it has been moved by the Government. I think they have made a genuine effort to meet the different interests concerned. I do not take any particular line about it. The Council for the Preservation of Rural England includes pedestrians and cavaliers and cyclists. I should like to suggest to the Parliamentary Secretary that he might look at this clause again. The Government have shown broad-mindedness in looking at it when it was criticised in another place. I wonder whether it would not be wise to include only bridleways, towpaths, long-distance routes and other paths specifically so designated by local authorities. I think there is a real danger that footpaths, which ought to be confined to pedestrians, may be included under the wording of this clause. But I think that the Government have made a real effort, and I am trying to make

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a constructive suggestion which might meet some of the criticisms that have been made by my noble friends.
LORD KENNET: Perhaps I can shorten the debate by speaking again. The noble Lord, Lord Brooke, asked, "What about the period after this Bill comes into effect, and before the by-laws are made?" As a matter of fact, there are already a good many by-laws affecting this matter, because even without this provision cyclists have been using footpaths in various parts of the country. That is a point which constitutes a problem. Lord Molson made an alternative suggestion as to the definition of the type of path over which cyclists should have a right of way under this Bill. These are two concrete suggestions, both of which I recognise are made in a constructive spirit. That being so, I should like to take a day or two to think about this again, in the hope of being able on the Report Stage to put down something after consultation with both noble Lords. I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
LORD BARNBY: Before the noble Lord withdraws his Amendment, may I point out that much has been said in the earlier stages of this Committee about the need for an equitable balance between different considerations. It seems that in this case there is some doubt as to the rights of different users, and before we leave this Amendment—and we all appreciate the attitude and the readiness of the Parliamentary Secretary to give it consideration—I should like to reinforce the remarks of my noble friend Lord Waldegrave regarding the position on these footpaths. He emphasised the rights of people on foot. In this case I am going to urge consideration for horsemen. Perhaps when he makes further explanation on this Bill the Parliamentary Secretary may be able to say what is the position with regard to horsemen riding on footpaths. All of us who have ridden to hounds know that people ride on footpaths. That is an offence in many ways. It is that sort of confusion which I hope the Parliamentary Secretary will think about.
LORD KENNET: Perhaps I should say that the rights of horsemen are not in any way affected by the Amendment before the Committee.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 27 agreed to.
Clause 28:
Traffic regulation orders for special areas in the countryside
28.—
(2) The Road Traffic Regulation Act 1967 shall have effect as respects such roads as if the list of purposes for which a traffic regulation order may be made under section 1 of that Act as set out in the paragraphs of subsection (1) of that section, included the purpose of conserving or enhancing the natural beauty of the area, or of affording better opportunities for the public to enjoy the amenities of the area, or recreation or the study of nature in the area.
8.46 p.m.
LORD MOLSON LORD MOLSON moved to add to sub-section (2):
"or of preventing interference with the quiet enjoyment of the area by the public."
The noble Lord said: Clause 28 is a clause of really great importance. It extends the wide powers of traffic regulation outside Greater London contained in the Road Traffic Regulations Act 1967 to include amenities. My friends in the Amenity Movement feel that the clause goes a long way, and I am moving to insert at the end of line 42 the words:
"or of preventing interference with the quiet enjoyment of the area by the public."
I do not apologise for having put down I this Amendment again for debate, despite the answers that were given in the Committee stage by the noble Lord's colleague, Mr. Skeffington, the Parliametary Secretary in another place, when this I Amendment was discussed. Through the mouth of Mr. Skeffington, the Government said:
"In view of the concern expresssd, of which we always take careful note, we shall certainly look at this again."
Then, on Report stage, it was put down again, this time by a member of the Opposition—I think on the first occasion it had been put down, or at any rate supported by, Mr. Jackson, the Member for the High Peak—and Mr. Skeffington said:
"We have had another look at this and have consulted the Minister of Transport, who has had a great experience of these; regulations in different conditions."
He made it quite plain that, in the view of the Government, this clause enables regulations to be made so that in National Parks it will be possible to ensure that

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traffic is strictly regulated in order that it may not be destructive of the beauty and quietness and amenity of the countryside.
In view of the pressure which has been brought to bear upon the Government that they should not impose restrictions which will preserve the peace and quiet of the countryside, I thought it as well to raise this matter again, in order that the Parliamentary Secretary can make it quite plain here that it is the intention that in National Parks, whither people go to enjoy bird-watching and the study of nature and all the charm of rural seclusion, these traffic regulation powers, which are so wide in their extent, will in fact be used for the purpose of preserving the enjoyment of those people who go to the countryside to enjoy the quiet. This is really a probing Amendment, but I think it is of sufficient importance for me to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 28, line 42, at end insert the said words.—(Lord Molson.)
LORD KENNET: I can give that assurance in terms. Let me explain why: first of all, because this Bill itself, in the same clause, says that a traffic regulation order can be made, among other reasons, for the purpose of conserving or enhancing the natural beauty of the area— which does not touch on what we are concerned with now—or of affording better opportunities for the public to enjoy the amenities of the area. It seems to me that if you suppress unwelcome noise it is beyond doubt that you provide better opportunities for the public to enjoy the amenities of the area.
But that is not all. In the Transport Bill which will be coming shortly before your Lordships, there is at present a provision, and I hope it will still be there when it comes here and still be there when it leaves this House, which again provides a new reason for making a traffic regulation order. The wording is slightly different; it is "shall preserve or improve the amenities of the area through which the road runs". So in this Bill we have "better opportunities for the public to enjoy", which introduces the concept of improvement, and in the other Bill we have the preserving or improving of the amenities of the area,
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which once again includes the concept of improvement and which not only keeps things as good as they are but aims at getting them better. Each of these provides a major departure, a major addition to the existing reasons with which traffic regulations have hitherto been concerned—traffic movement and road safety. So my advice to the House is that this Amendment—and the noble Lord said he would not press it—need not be carried into the Bill in order to achieve the effect that the whole Committee desires, because it is already achieved first by this Bill, and it will be reinforced by the Transport Bill shortly.
LORD MOLSON: I am much obliged to the Parliamentary Secretary for his reply, which is entirely satisfactory, and I have much pleasure in asking leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
8.54 p.m.
EARL HOWE EARL HOWE moved, after subsection (2), to insert:
"() No traffic regulation order shall be made for the purposes described in subsection (2) of this section if it would interfere with the reasonable requirements of members of the public as users of traffic of the description proposed to be restricted whether as residents in or visitors to the area affected by the order. The authority having power to make any such order, before proposing to do so, shall consult with organisations representative of the users of the vehicles which would be affected by the restrictions."
The noble Earl said: I also should like to apologise, as my noble friend, Lord Barnby, did, for being absent when the Parliamentary Secretary made his speech, but I was also taking refreshment—not enough, in the short time available, but it was something. If the noble Lord the Parliamentary Secretary has already given certain assurances that I am going to ask for now I apologise to the Committee, but the object of this Amendment is to make sure that the proposed powers to make traffic regulation orders for special areas in the countryside will not be exercised in a manner which will interfere unreasonably with the rights of vehicle users, whether residents in the areas or visitors to them (including, in I some instances, participants in motor I sporting events) and also to ensure that organisations representing affected vehicle users will be consulted before proposals are made for such Orders. I know that

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certain assurances have been given by Government spokesmen in another place.
I should like some assurance that exercise of these powers within the limits described will be suitably controlled by the Government to prevent unnecessary or unreasonable restrictions being imposed upon motor vehicles users. For instance, if a landowner is willing to permit his land to be used for motor sporting purposes, it would be unfair, to my mind, to prevent this by restricting vehicular access on roads leading to the property. Would the landowner's invitees be covered by any exceptions from any restrictions affecting traffic generally? Would this extend to participants in and spectators at a motor sporting event?
Moreover, some of the speakers during the debates so far seem to have given the impression that the need for realistic policies relating to the provision of facilities for vehicles in such areas is not appreciated in all quarters. This Amendment stresses the importance of adequate control by the Government to ensure that satisfactory constructive policies will be adopted rather than restrictive measures which will seriously limit access to such areas, especially prejudicing the interests of those unable to walk long distances, such as the elderly and families with young children, and often adversely affecting the economic prosperity or such areas which may be largely dependent on tourism.
Again, I hope that adequate assurances will be given that officials of the Department of Housing and Local Government concerned with the Bill would consider it helpful to discuss the matter with the Royal Automobile Club and the Auto-cycle Union representatives appointed by the Ministry of Transport to operate these regulations, and possibly the Sports Council, before proposals are made to make traffic regulations or to make regulation orders within these powers, not only in regard to the general effect on the interests of motorists and motor cyclists but also with special reference to the effects on motor sport of which the Royal Automobile Club and the Autocycle Union are the controlling bodies.
I think it should be recognised that policies relating to the preservation of the countryside and the provision of recreational facilities must make adequate pro-
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vision in accordance with public opinion for the requirements of those using motor vehicles. It is known that the Sports Council recognises the importance of motor sporting activities, and I hope that its liaison with the Countryside Commission will help to secure satisfactory developments in this respect. This Amendment in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Chesham is really a probing Amendment. I have the backing of the Royal Automobile Club, of which I am a member of its Competition and General Committees, and I am hoping that I may get some assurances. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 28, line 42, at end insert the said subsection.—(Earl Howe.)
LORD MOLSON: Whether the Amendment which my noble friend is moving is a reasonable one or not depends upon the interpretation that he puts upon the word "reasonable" in his Amendment, about the "reasonable requirements of members of the public". I need not labour what I said on the previous occasion, that it is quite definitely the purpose of those who are supporting the Government in this measure that there should be traffic regulations in order to prevent motor-cycle scrambles in the middle of National Parks, and to prohibit the use of Land Rovers for going, shall we say, in the Lake District from one valley to the next in order to test whether or not a new mechanical contrivance can get over from one valley to another.
I think it is just as well, when an Amendment of this kind is moved, to make it quite plain that it would be quite unacceptable to some supporters of this Bill if the Government gave an assurance which was as wide as to meet many of the suggestions that have been hinted at by my noble friend. One of the great virtues of this Bill is the powers that it gives for the provision of country parks, where people who enjoy gregarious and noisy outdoor sport will be able to go to enjoy it without being a nuisance to other people whose country tastes are of a more quiet and peaceful kind. I think there should be room for both. I think this is a well drafted Bill and that it will, I hope, be administered in such a way that the motor-cycle scramblers and other people interested in these

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motoring sports will have scope in appropriate parts of the country; but I hope that the Parliamentary Secretary will not in any way go back upon the assurances that he has given on the last Amendment in order to meet the claims of my noble friend.
The Royal Automobile Club and the Automobile Association are members of the Council for the Preservation of Rural England, and they have shown themselves to be most reasonable and broadminded in these matters. I wholly accept that there are places where motor sports, and even motor-cycle scrambles, should be authorised and should be enjoyed, but it is very important to make it quite plain that this Amendment, if it were accepted, is not intended to provide for noisy recreation in places where it is hoped that there will be peace and quiet.
LORD KENNET: It is not my intention in any way to go back on the assurances that I gave in connection with the last Amendment. I think there may be some confusion in the mind of the Committee here. The Amendment to Clause 28 which we are now considering deals only with traffic regulation orders on roads, and so it does not touch on the equally important or more important question of what goes on off the roads.
One is anxious to reconcile the needs of those who want peace and quiet in the countryside with the needs of those who want to get home, or wish to visit friends, or to do some reasonable thing which would not annoy anyone else. I give the Committee the fullest assurance that no orders will be approved by the Minister of Transport which deny the right to anyone to get to his own house, or to his friend's house, or to keep on using the road in a way for which the road was provided. The Minister of Transport will make regulations about this new traffic control order-making power under the Transport Bill when that is through, and will issue a circular. These regulations will be the place for laying down the law as to what is to be done about this, and that circular will be the place for giving detailed advice to highway authorities on what to do in this or that circumstance. There is no danger that residents will be denied access to their own property through
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the imposition of a traffic regulation order on the grounds of amenity, and local authorities will have a statutory duty to maintain access to premises by virtue of Clause 145 of the Transport Bill. I know that it is not much use mentioning a clause of a Bill before it has reached this House, but that is where it is to be found unless it is changed in the House of Commons beforehand.
It is already standard practice for local authorities about to make one of these orders to consult the chief officer of police and any other bodies or organisations they may think fit before making the order. Among those bodies the A.A. and R.A.C. are invariably consulted, and they will continue to be consulted in the case of orders made for the purpose of enhancing amenities, just as they have been so far with orders made for the purposes of improving the safety of the roads. So the rights of consultation and the rights of objection to draft orders will be in no way diminished by the Countryside Bill.
EARL HOWE: I thank the noble Lord for giving me certain assurances. I had thought that the noble Lord, Lord Molson, was an opponent on this Amendment, but I am very happy to feel that he has gone along with me to a certain extent. I also am a member of the C.P.R.E.; I am chairman of a county branch so that I have similar feelings to the noble Lord's. I assure the noble Lord that motorists and motor cyclists have no intention of spoiling other people's enjoyment of beautiful parks. I am pleased to hear that the R.A.C. and the A.C.TJ. will be consulted. In fact the A.A. are not the controlling body of motor sport in this country; it is controlled by the R.A.C. and A.C.U. and is nothing to do with the A.A. at all. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
9.4 p.m.
LORD KENNET LORD KENNET moved, after subsection (4), to insert:
"(5) Subject to the following provisions of this section, section 1 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1967, as applied for the purposes set out in subsection (2) above, shall have effect so as to authorise the making of traffic regulation orders as respects Crown roads, and orders (hereafter also referred to as 'traffic regulation orders') may be made under subsection (3) above as respects Crown roads.

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(6) The consent of the appropriate Crown authority must be given before a traffic regulation order is made as respects a Crown road.
(7) A traffic regulation order made as respects a Crown road, notwithstanding section 97 of the said Act of 1967, shall not apply to vehicles or persons in the public service of the Crown except so far as is expressly provided in the order, and the inclusion of any such express provision in an order not made by a Minister shall require the approval of the appropriate Minister.
(8) If a traffic regulation order is or is to be made as respects a Crown road, the local authority concerned may, after consultation with the appropriate Crown authority, place and maintain, or cause to be placed and maintained, such traffic signs of any type prescribed, or authorised, under section 54 of the said Act of 1967 as the local authority may consider necessary in connection with the order.
The powers conferred by this subsection shall be exercisable subject to and in conformity with any general directions given under section 55(1) of the said Act of 1967, and any other power conferred by the said section 55 to give directions to a highway authority shall include power to give the like directions to the local authority concerned as respects the Crown road, but after consultation with the appropriate Crown authority."
The noble Lord said: At this point I should like to repeat the apology I made earlier about the short time available to noble Lords to consider this Amendment. This is the long-promised and long-awaited Amendment to bring Crown roads under the traffic control order-making provisions of the Countryside Bill. At present considerable areas of National Parks, and particularly that of Dartmoor, are owned by the Crown and used by the public. Tourist traffic using roads on Crown land has posed exactly the same problems as on roads in National Parks which are not Crown land. So after reflection and consultation the Crown Departments concerned and the National Parks Commission are agreed and are in favour of having these roads brought within the ambit of traffic regulation. This should simplify problems of traffic control and, in effect, achieve the same situation there as we shall achieve in other National Parks.
The Amendment which I propose to the Committee achieves this. It provides that traffic regulation orders can be made applying to Crown roads in the specially designated areas of countryside under the relevant sections of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1967 or by the Minister under the Countryside Bill which is now before the Committee. It
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provides that before a traffic order for a Crown road is made, the appropriate Crown authority must give its consent. It provides that these orders shall apply only to Crown vehicles and servants to the extent provided in the order This is analogous to the right of the person who happens to live in a country park to get home along a road, even if there is a traffic control order on it. It provides for the erection of traffic signs to indicate a traffic regulation order by applying provisions already existing in the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1967. The rest is definition. I will not weary your Lordships with it. I think this achieves the effect desired by all sides of the Committee.
Amendment moved—
Page 29, line 20, at end insert the sail words.—(Lord Kennel.)
EARL WALDEGRAVE: Speaking on behalf of one of the Crown Duchies, the Duchy of Cornwall, I may say that we welcome this new clause and feel that it will be effective. This Amendment is a rather good example of the difficulties under which some of us are working in regard to this Bill. I first heard that there was to be a new clause coming up on Report stage. I have a draft clause which I know in detail is satisfactory to the Duchy which I represent, but I had not seen this Amendment until this morning, and I hope that it is all right. It is very difficult to have to take action on a new clause when one has not been able to consider the matter or when one's advisers have not been able to see whether any amendment is necessary. Subject to that, I do not wish to seem ungracious, since the noble Lord has been very good to the Committee this evening and I should like on behalf of the Duchy of Cornwall to say that we welcome this new clause.
LORD MOLSON: I am at an even greater disadvantage than my noble friend Lord Waldegrave who has seen a draft of the clause. I saw it only this morning and I have not had an opportunity of consulting the Dartmoor Protection Association or any of the other people primarily concerned, but I have given to it the best consideration I could since this morning, and I think that it completely fulfills the promise made by the Government in another place. I am very

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appreciative of what has been done, despite the fact that I must reserve my position if, after further consultation, I find that it does not meet the wishes of some of those for whom I speak in this House. I think that it is satisfactory, and I again repeat my gratitude to the Government.
LORD KENNET: This Amendment is consequential on the last one. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 29, line 21, at end insert—
("'the appropriate Crown authority', in relation to any land, has the same meaning as 'the appropriate authority' as defined by section 101(11) of the Act of 1949.").—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD KENNET: This Amendment also is consequential. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 29, line 24, at end insert—
("'Crown road' means a road, other than a highway, to which the public have access by permission granted by the appropriate Crown authority, or otherwise granted by or on behalf of the Crown, and
"local authority concerned', in relation to a Crown road, means the authority having power to make an order as respects that road under section 1 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1967 as extended by this section,").—(Lord Kennel.)
Clause 28, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 29 agreed to.
Clause 30 [Exchequer grants for countryside]:
LORD KENNET: As the Bill stands at present, grants for tree planting and the acquisition of land for it are confined to National Parks and areas of outstanding natural beauty. Throughout the Bill the general purpose has been to extend the powers of grants hitherto associated with those restricted types of areas to the whole countryside. This Amendment remedies the omission in the present text of the Bill and brings it into line with what was promised in the White Paper by extending these grants also to the whole countryside. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 31, line 13, at end insert ("and expenditure in or in connection with the acquisition of land for the purposes of the functions conferred by the said section 89(1)").—(Lord Kennet.)
Clause 30, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 31 and 32 agreed to.
Clause 33 [Protection for interests in countryside]:
9.10 p.m.
LORD MERRIVALEmoved to leave out "and forestry" and insert, "forestry and the minerals industries". The noble Lord said: The purpose of this Amendment is to ensure that due regard is paid to the needs of the minerals industries, in the same way as, for instance, those of the agricultural industry. As the legal definition of a mineral undertaker is:
"any person engaged in the winning and working of minerals by way of trade or business in, on or under land, whether by surface or underground working".
and agriculture appears to consist in the working of land, I trust the Minister will agree that there is a certain amount of logic in what I am now trying to put forward.
I should agree with some noble Lords who felt that mineral workings were, by their very nature, unpopular locally, but that should surely not mean that their interests should be totally disregarded. I believe the Minister cannot say that mineral works are covered by the phrase in Clause 33, which says that due regard must be paid to the economic and social interests of rural areas. I have three reasons for saying that. First, the actual output of minerals in a rural area is likely to be used in an urban area; secondly, the extractive industries are not labour-intensive; and, thirdly, the rate-support grant system means that it makes little difference to the rural areas whether they get the benefit of rates on mineral production or not. The Minister must surely bear in mind that minerals can be worked only where they are found, and the necessity for working them in a particular locality can be decided only on a national basis.
The specific reference to agriculture and forestry in Clause 33 as at present drafted could well be interpreted by some

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conservationist bodies as meaning that the factors of agriculture and forestry are of overriding importance, thus providing an automatic ground of objection to any application for planning permission to work minerals. I feel, too, that the volume of objections is likely to increase, and this could no doubt influence local authorities and, possibly, inspectors in their decisions. In order to redress the balance, I sincerely hope that the Minister will be willing to accept this Amendment so that the minerals interest is taken into account under this clause at the same time as other interests. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 33, line 45, leave out ("and forestry") and insert (", forestry and the minerals industries ").—(Lord Merrivale.)
LORD MOLSON: I hope that the Minister will not accept this Amendment. It is already clear from Clause 33 that all the bodies concerned must pay
"due regard to the needs of agriculture and forestry and to the economic and social interests of rural areas."
There is no need to refer particularly to minerals. They are already included in the economic and possibly the social interests of rural areas. In so far as the Act of 1949 and this Bill are seeking to preserve the beauty and charm of the countryside, it is natural that there should be provision that due regard should be paid to agriculture and to forestry. It is implicit in what is said in this clause that due regard will also be paid to the winning of materials. I hope that not more than due regard will be paid. There is no doubt that the winning of minerals is one of the greatest causes of the defacement of the countryside; and therefore it would be completely wrong, from the point of view of the general purpose of this Bill, to make special provision for it.
LORD KENNET: I am going to advise the Committee against this Amendment. Let me say first of all that I think the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Merrivale, about minerals having to be won where they are is a very strong one. This gives the extractive industry, the mineral industry, a prima facie claim to figure in this clause along with forestry and agriculture, because you cannot
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have forestry anywhere except in the I countryside, you cannot have agriculture anywhere except in the countryside, and you cannot extract minerals anywhere except where they are, which is usually in the countryside—and when they happen to be under towns it is not convenient to extract them there, for obvious reasons. I hand the noble Lord all that; and these are very strong points. But there are two points which seem to me to outweigh them.
First of all, there is the fact that although agriculture and forestry are economic, wealth-generating activities, and although they can take place only in the countryside, yet they are precisely what the countryside is made up of. What is the countryside if it is not agriculture? What is the countryside if it is not forestry? This is what has made the countryside what it is; and this is still what makes it what it is for the great majority of the acres in our country. Secondly, although minerals must be mined where they are, yet there are other things which can be done only in the countryside and which do not, and in my sub mission should not, figure in Clause 33. If you have to build a road or a motorway between two cities, you can build it only in the countryside. If you have got to make a reservoir, you can make it only in the countryside. Yet I do net think the Committee would think it wise to add in this clause a "due regard" provision about roads and reservoirs.
One can go further than this. It may be that in the future we shall have hover-trains and monorails between the more closely built-up parts of our country; and they, too, can be built only in the countryside, because once again they have to join cities, or cities and airports. I do not think the Committee would wish to add a saving provision for them in this clause. In the last resort I would even go so far as to mention houses themselves With our increasing population, apart from slum clearance and the replacement of old towns, houses can be built only in the countryside. That is what town expansion means; that it what New Towns mean. Yet I do not think the Committee would feel that the purposes of this Bill would be best served if we added a provision that authorities must have due regard to the interests of new housing.

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So, all in all, I would sooner group the extractive industries, for all their special claim, along with roads, reservoirs, hovertrains, monorails and housing, on the side of the fence which does not get mentioned in this clause, and leave the clause as it stands, mentioning simply forestry and agriculture, which are the very stuff and fabric of the countryside. So I would recommend the Committee not to accept this Amendment, for all the good reason there is behind it.
LORD MERRIVALE: I thank the noble Lord for his answer. I was hoping he would deal with one point, and it is this. There was a very definite statement made by my noble friend Lord Molson that, in effect, the interests of the extractive industries, the minerals industries, would be covered in this clause by the words,
"the social and economic interests of rural areas".
Before I act one way or another, I should like the Minister to confirm that point, whether in fact the minerals industries are covered by these words.
I think, too, that my noble friend Lord Molson has rather overstressed the idea that the minerals industries would deface all our countryside. On the other hand, I think he rather minimised the importance of our extractive industries. We live by our industries and our exports, and I do not think one could minimise the importance to our country of, for example, the cement industry or the china clay industry. I feel that to some extent the Minister has failed to bear in mind the interests of those industries. I appreciate that this Bill is primarily concerned with amenities; but I think that the industrial aspect should perhaps be considered a little more than it has, because the industrial interests of this country will be affected by the Bill. I would end by asking the Minister whether he would reply to the point raised by the i noble Lord, Lord Molson, on this question: that the interests of the minerals industries are covered by the "economic and social interests" mentioned in the clause.
LORD KENNET: I meant my silence to indicate consent. It is clear that the minerals industries are covered by this part of the clause, "the economic and
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social interests of rural areas" in two ways: first, because the industries themselves directly generate employment and wealth in the immediate locality; and, secondly, because by producing the materials and selling them at sensible prices to town and country dwellers alike they thereby contribute to the creation of national wealth as a whole which is enjoyed, on rising standards, by rural dwellers as well as town dwellers.
LORD MERRIVALE: Am I to understand that the Minister is giving an assurance to that effect?
LORD KENNET: Perhaps I could make it clearer. It is not an assurance that anybody will or will not do anything, which is the usual form of ministerial assurance. I was not asked for that. I must not trespass on the rights of the courts to interpret Statute law. I cannot imagine people differing from the interpretation that the extracting industries are covered by these words.
LORD MERRIVALE: I am grateful to the Minister for that assurance. There will be other opportunities to raise this matter again if need be. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 33 agreed to.
Clauses 34 to 36 agreed to.
LORD MOLSON LORD MOLSON had given Notice of his intention to move, after Clause 36, to insert the following new clause:
Amendment of 1962 c. 38, s. 3
".The power of the Minister under section 3 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1962 to authorise or require local planning authorities to delegate certain functions under that Act shall not be exercisable as respects functions relating to a National Park or to land in a National Park."
The noble Lord said: I understand that this matter has been raised in relation to town and country planning in another place. It was also debated on this Bill in another place, and I understand the assurances given by the Government were reasonably satisfactory. Therefore, without necessarily undertaking that I shall not raise it at the Report stage, I do not propose to move this Amendment.
LORD HENLEYhad given Notice of his intention to move, after Clause 36, to

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insert a new clause dealing with National i Park Wardens. The noble Lord said: This Amendment, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Inglewood, Lord Molson and myself, we do not propose to move because the Government Amendment No. 64Z, so far as we can see, satisfies all our requirements. I say "so far as we can see", because your Lordships will have heard the words of the noble Lord, Lord Molson, at the beginning of this evening's debate to the effect that he had done his best to find out whether all our points had been covered. On the face of it they appear to have been covered.
Clause 37 [Power to make byelaws and related provisions about wardens]:
9.25 p.m.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSSmoved in subsection (1), after paragraph (c), to insert:
"() any land across which a footpath or bridleway runs, as respects which land the owner of it has consented to the application of the powers contained in this section to the land."
The noble Viscount said: On behalf of my noble friend Lord Brooke of Cumnor, and hoping that I shall say to the Committee what he would have wished to say, I beg to move this Amendment.
It aims to extend the by-law-making powers and warden control of local authorities to land to which access is lawfully gained by means of footpaths or bridleways and where, as a result, trespass occurs and damage is done to the land and the fixed equipment on it. The initiative would be taken by the owner of the land who wished to have some by-law and warden control. This additional enabling power safeguard would, I hope, appeal to the owners of land in and near to urban development, access to which is lawful by means of the proper use of public rights of way, which leaves the land open to unlawful trespass and damage.
The greatly increased leisure use of public rights of way through private land is shown to give rise to increased damage to fixed equipment, and I am bound to say that in my experience of public inquiries up and down the British Isles I have heard this said many a time by those who live near urban development. Nevertheless, as worded, the Amendment leaves the local authority with an absolute
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discretion whether or not it is going to accede to requests for by-law and warden control. On behalf of my noble friend, I beg to move the Amendment.
Amendment moved—
Page 35, line 8, at the end insert he said paragraph.—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)
LORD KENNET: This is a very wide extension of the 1949 Act by-law-making powers which are confined to National Parks, areas of outstanding natural beauty and access land. There is a lot of the country which is not that, and I think that in view of the enormous square mileage of the country which is to come in, and in view of the fact that it will include, as the noble Viscount said, quasi-urban or nearly urban areas (and it would probably include actual urban areas where there were footpaths) I think that the Committee should consider the enforcement problem.
Suppose local authorities choose—and I take the point that a local authority does not have to do so—to use this power outside the National Parks and A.O.N.B.s and access land who is to enforce the by-laws they make? The police cannot do it. We have been into this, and it appears to be out of the question. With everything else that they have to do at the moment, and with the present manpower shortage, it would not be reasonable to expect the police to take on this duty as well. So we are forced back on to the question of wardens. Should local authorities recruit wardens to do it?
It has not been possible for me to find out the exact mileage of footpaths and bridleways in England and Wales in the areas which would be covered by the Amendment, but it would certainly run into many hundreds of thousands of miles. If only a small fraction of this were to be covered by by-laws under the provision suggested by the noble Viscount, and even if many of those by-laws would be largely unenforced, I think that one would have to expect a large increase in the number of wardens. The gross cost of a paid warden is about £1,200 a year, so that even if local authorities were to appoint a number of wardens in the low hundreds to do this, as they might have to for all these hundreds of thousands of miles, it would mean quite a sizeable sum in the total

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moneys available for the whole of the countryside expenditure.
On those grounds I would advise the Committee not to adopt this Amendment. But I do not want to be rigid about it. I have already said that I shall consider so many things, and have invited so many noble Lords to meet me about them, that I am anxious not to do that again, unless there is a very strong feeling in the Committee that something like this should be introduced. So my advice is not to accept this Amendment, but I should not wish the Committee to divide on it. Sooner than that, I would consider the Amendment.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: I wish to apologise to the Committee for not having been in my place when this Amendment was reached, a little earlier than I had expected. I was trying to get some physical sustenance after sitting in the Chamber for six-and-a-half hours continuously. I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Colville of Culross for having moved it on my behalf.
I do not wish to press this Amendment in its present state. No doubt it is capable of improvement, but I think that the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, is making an excessive case against it when he calculates the immense cost that might be involved. This would only be effective where both the owner of the land and the local authority—the by-law-making authority—were in agreement that it should be done. Where they are both in agreement, it seems to me a pity that it should not be possible to do it. Under this Bill there will be wardens in many places, but I certainly was not envisaging that this would happen on a vast scale, leading to the employment of hundreds of wardens. I was putting it forward rather in the belief that there might be cases where a power of this kind would be valuable and acceptable to both local authority and landowner. If the local authority thought that it was going to be difficult or expensive, they would have nothing to do with it, and I can imagine that a considerable number of owners would not be interested. But it seems to me a pity if we let this Bill go without making a provision for those cases where this kind of power would be valuable.
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I do not want to press this to a Division, because I do not think that it is a matter on which there should be controversy. On the other hand, I am not disposed just to withdraw it and let it be. If the noble Lord will say that he will consider this matter further and perhaps discuss it with me, I will be happy to withdraw it. If, of course, noble Lords get up and say that they do not want any more to do with this, I would have to accept that situation. Frankly, I cannot see that the acceptance of some kind of provision of this kind would do any harm, bearing in mind that no local authority would be compelled to commit itself if pressed to do so by a land owner or farmer. I hope that the noble Lord will go so far as to say that he is ready to examine this further and perhaps have a discussion with me, as in all the other matters which we have agreed to discuss.
LORD HENLEY: I hope that the noble I Lord will not forget that even if this costs a certain amount of money, a certain amount of money must be spent if this Bill is going to work. The noble Lord maximises the cost of this and minimises the costs to individual landowners and occupiers. He cannot have it both ways. He cannot have it on the cheap, paid for by landowners and occupiers, and then say that he cannot safeguard their interests by providing a warden service because it will be too expensive.
LORD KENNET: I will certainly agree to reconsider this matter and talk with the noble Lord about it, if he so wishes, between now and Report.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 37 agreed to.
LORD KENNET LORD KENNET moved, after Clause 37, to insert the following new clause:
Wardens
".—(1) A local planning authority whose area consists of or includes the whole or any part of a National Park may appoint such number of persons as may appear to the authority to be necessary or expedient to act as wardens as respects any land within the National Park to which section 193 of the Law of Property Act 1925 (Common land) for the time being applies, whether or not within the area of the local planning authority.
(2) Before a local planning authority first exercise their powers under subsection (1)

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above as respects any land, they shall, if practicable, consult the person entitled to the soil of the land.
(3) The foregoing subsections shall be construed as one with section 92 of the Act of 1949 and shall be subject to subsection (4) of that section (saving for interests of landowners).
(4) The purposes for which wardens may be appointed by an authority under the said section 92 (as amended by this Act) as respects any land or waters are—

(a) to secure compliance with any bye-laws, with the provisions of the Litter Act 1958 and with any requirements imposed by or under section 193 of the Law of Property Act 1925,

(b) to advise and assist the public, and

(c) to perform such other duties (if any) in relation to the land or waters as the authority may determine.

This subsection shall have effect in substitution for subsection (2) of the said section 92."
The noble Lord said: This is another long-awaited Amendment about the appointment of wardens. I do not think the committee will wish me to run through the rather long history of this matter in another place. Various attempts to get it right were made, and none met with general consent. I will go into that later if any noble Lord wishes me to, but for the moment I will confine myself to the effect of the proposed new clause, which is to empower local planning authorities in National Parks to appoint wardens to operate on commons within the Parks, subject to Section 193 of the Law of Property Act 1925; that is, commons to which the public have a de jure right of public access. At present, such commons are excepted land and, therefore, not open to access and may not be wardened.
In the Lake District National Park especially there are large areas of what are called, in the jargon of Section 193, "commons"—that is de jure access commons—within the Windermere and Lakes Urban District Council area, and this has inhibited the planning board from making arrangements to secure proper public behaviour on these commons. Subsection (2) of the proposed new clause provides for consultation with the owner of the common. In certain cases, of course, the owner may be the local authority, and therefore that eases the consultation problem. The purposes for which wardens may be appointed are set out in subsection (4), and I think the Committee would expect. I think the purpose of the clause is self-evident, and
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I hope that it will commend itself to the Committee. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 37, insert the said new clause.—(Lord Kennet.)
LORD MOLSON: I should like to express our appreciation to the Government for drafting and moving this clause. It is on the general lines that were put forward by a number of National Park authorities in the other place. It took the Government a little time to make up their minds to accede to the requests that were made, but they have now done it, and done it, so far as I can see, very handsomely.
LORD CHORLEY: I am glad to know that my noble friend Lord Molson is quite satisfied with this. The new clause has only just been put down, and it has not been possible for me, at any rate, to ascertain the views of the joint planning board for the Lake District and the other National Park authorities who are concerned in this matter. I mentioned at an earlier stage the tremendous enthusiasm of the warden service ii the Lake District. This has been carried on in the Lake District in a way which has been of somewhat doubtful legality because of the provisions of the 1949 Act. It is not peculiar to the Lake District, because a number of other National Parks have been in the same position. It has been found sensible, in all the circumstances, not to enter into access arrangements with the landowners.
In the Lake District particularly, the landowners have been most generous. They have given free access over the fells to walkers and climbers for many years, and it was felt reasonable that this policy should be adopted by the planning hoard. It had the disadvantage that the provisions of the 1925 Act were not applied, and undoubtedly this gave rise to some legal difficulties. On the face of it, it appears that the proposal in this new clause covers the situation. But it is a complicated position, and I should like to reserve the right, if on further study some defect should be found in this proposal, to bring the matter up again at the next stage of the Bill, and possibly put down something by way of Amendment
Clause 38 agreed to.
Clause 39 [Power to amend local Acts concerning local authorities]:
LORD KENNET: This Amendment fulfils a promise made at the Commons Report stage and provides that in making an Order under this Bill the Minister shall not repeal or amend any enactment so far as it relates to a water undertaking of a local authority. I think the purpose of the Amendment is self-evident; I believe it is uncontroversial, and I commend it to the Committee. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 37, line 32, at end insert—
("() shall not repeal or amend any enactment so far as it relates to the water undertaking of a local authority").—(Lord Kennet.)
Clause 39, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 40 agreed to.
9.41 p.m.
LORD MERRIVALE LORD MERRIVALE moved, after Clause 40, to insert the following new clause:
Designation of areas of outstanding natural beauty
".—(1) This section has effect where the Commission makes an order under subsection (1) of section 87 of the Act of 1949 designating an area for the purposes of that Act as an area of outstanding natural beauty.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 87 of the Act of 1949 the Minister may not confirm an order under subsection (4) of that section nor vary an order under subsection (7) of that section so long as any representations made under subsection (2) of that section and not given effect to by the order as submitted to the Minister have not been withdrawn unless—

(a) if the representation is made by a local authority he has caused a local inquiry to be held, and

(b) in any other case he has either

(i) caused a local inquiry to be held, or

(ii) afforded to any person by whom any representation has been duly made and not withdrawn an opportunity of being heard by a person appointed by him for the purpose,

and he has thereafter considered the report of the person appointed to hold the inquiry or to hear representations."
The noble Lord said: I beg to move the new clause standing in my name on the Paper. The purpose of this clause is to ensure that objections to the designation of areas of outstanding natural
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beauty are properly considered. For instance, mineral undertakers have found in the past that such designation by the Commission has created difficulties when they have come subsequently to apply for planning permission to work minerals in the area, in spite, I believe, of Ministerial protests to the contrary. Consequently, in the past the mineral undertakers have in their own protection made representations against proposals for designation. But they have been ignored by the National Parks Commission, which at present is required to consider only objections from a local authority. Also, I believe that the psychological effect of designation is to stimulate local objections to proposals to work minerals. I would add—I believe this is true—that planning permission is generally given, but after considerable and unnecessary delay.
I should like, for the Record, to give your Lordships two examples, one of a refusal of planning permission, and the second of an objection to the inclusion within a designated area of a quarrying area which was providing the raw materials for three existing cement works. The first example which I quote to your Lordships concerns a mineral undertaker who has a lease on gravel-bearing land in the Cannock Chase area of outstanding natural beauty. The lease ran from April 15, 1939. Following the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act application was made for planning permission, which was given for a 20-year term which will expire on December 31 this year. The gravel deposits are not exhausted, and application has therefore been made to continue working by deepening the existing pit, possibly another 42 feet to about 150 feet. But I should like to stress that no extension of the surface worked is involved.
The Committee of the statutory county council which is responsible for the administration of county council land for public access has objected to the proposal for continued working, giving as its first reason that—and I quote:
"the site is located within the Cannock Chase area of outstanding natural beauty adjoining the attractive village of Brockton and continued working of the quarry will form an increasingly damaging scar on the landscape and injuriously affect the amenities of the area."

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That in spite of the fact that there will be no extension of the surface worked.
The second example I should like to quote concerns the Sussex Downs area of outstanding natural beauty. Here, representations were made on November 26, 1959, against the inclusion of a chalk-quarrying area owned by a company, part of Which was already being excavated and part forming reserves to ensure the continued supply of important raw materials for production at the adjacent Shoreham cement works. In February, 1962—that is, a full two years after the original representations—and following various reminders, the case was turned down. The company was told that it had been forwarded to the Minister along with the draft designation order, but no opportunity was given for discussion of the representations. Then later, when revised proposals for the Sussex Downs area were publicised in December, 1964, representations were again made and were again turned down without discussion. It is the lack of discussion about which I am complaining.
I also understand that when assistance is sought from the Minerals Division of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government the invariable answer is that designation will not affect the working of minerals. I am wondering whether in future that will still be true, in view of the assurance given by the noble Lord on Second Reading, when he said that in those areas of outstanding natural beauty amenity must be the overriding consideration. For that reason I am wondering whether, when this Bill become an Act, the Minerals Division of the Ministry will be able to give a similar assurance. Perhaps the noble Lord can answer that point.
Under these considerations which I have mentioned, will the Minister not agree that there should be the right to a formal hearing of objections to proposals for the designation of areas of outstanding natural beauty, and that there should be reference to the Minister of the inspector's report? In conclusion, I would add that the Confederation of British Industry believe that a full public discussion, when objection has been made; to an application for designation, would often result in an assurance that supplies of raw materials for what can be, in effect, very costly works will not be
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prejudiced and therefore much of the delay later on could be saved. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause; 40, insert the said new clause.—(Lord Merrivale.)
LORD KENNET: The objections of the noble Lord to the present procedure have not been based on any assertion that areas of outstanding natural beauty are declared when they are of insufficient outstanding natural beauty, but on the ground that the representations of the mineral industry against the establishment or enlargement or inclusion of certain places in those areas have not always been heeded. I think we need to keep a sense of proportion about this. The question at issue is whether or not it is of outstanding natural beauty. In regard to this question the mineral extractive industries have no special expertise which they can bring to bear or the subject.
When there is a proposal to designate an area of outstanding natural beauty the National Parks Commission are required to consult the local authorities concerned, to publish a notice of the Commission's proposals and to consider representations. In forwarding the order to the Minister for confirmation the Commission are required to forward any observations made by a local authority, and any representations made by other parties to which effect is not given in the order.
So, if the Commission cannot satisfy the mineral extractors by varying their proposals, they must tell the Minister they do not propose to satisfy them and the Minister will think about it at his level. This means the Minister is aware of sustained objections. He is not required to cause a local inquiry to be held, and I would recommend the; Committee not to insert a requirement that he should in future cause a local inquiry to be held. The reason is that the interests of the mineral extractive industry are touched for the first time only when the question of planning permission arises. In the designation of an area of outstanding natural beauty nobody's rights are changed. This is merely a line on the map in which certain values and, hitherto, certain grants are to prevail. Even the grants in future are to be spread

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over the countryside. Nobody's rights are touched until the question of planning permission arises. If the mineral extractor is refused planning permission, he then has a right of appeal to the Minister, and that is the time for the Minister to take into account the needs of the mineral industry, if the local authority has not already taken this into account by granting permission in the first place.
I do not think the noble Lord would go so far as to say that in settling the question, in issuing a decision on the planning appeal, the Minister should not take into account the fact that the appeal related to an area of outstanding natural beauty. He does, and should, and I cannot believe that the industry would wish otherwise. It seems to me that if the full protection for the economic rights of this industry can be obtained at the moment when a planning application is made it is a needless duplication to write in anything about a public inquiry and public discussion in the designation of these areas.
There are analogies to it in the Civic Amenities Act which this House passed not long ago, in which there is a proposal for conservation areas. There is no appeal against that. There is no public inquiry against or about designation of conservation areas. When there is an appeal and a public inquiry is when anybody is ordered to preserve his house against his will, because it touches his individual rights. This is the same situation that applies to the mineral industry in an area of outstanding natural beauty. I hope that the Committee will be content to leave the law unchanged and that the mineral extractive industry will be content to defend their rights and plead their case when their rights are in question and the matter is susceptible of a decision.
LORD MERRIVALE: I am grateful for the considered reply of the Minister, which I shall read with great interest; and perhaps I shall revert to this matter at a later stage. There is a point he did not touch on. He said that the interests of the extractive industry were considered, but he did not say anything on this question of undue delay and also about the considerable expense. Could he look into
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this question of undue delay, which does arise? I agree that in the end planning permission is given. There is a difficulty about objections being considered when they are put forward by the mineral industries, but I think their main concern is this question of delay and lack of public discussion. Could the noble Lord say anything now, or at any rate consider it for a later discussion on another Amendment which I might put down?
LORD KENNET: If the noble Lord will send me examples of delay in reaching planning decisions in the case of the mineral extractive industry which he believes have been more extensive than the normal delays encountered by industry in general in seeking planning permission, I will go into them. But so far he has not produced any evidence that the mineral industry is worse off than others.
LORD MERRIVALE: I will certainly look into this and supply whatever information I can. With that assurance, kindly given, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 41 agreed to.
Clause 42 [Crown land]:
LORD MOLSONhad given notice of his intention to move in subsection (5) after "25" to insert "and section 28". The noble Lord said: In view of the Amendment put down by the Government which the Committee has accepted, I do not move this Amendment.
Clause 42 agreed to.
Clause 43 agreed to.
Clause 44 [Interpretation]:
EARL HOWEhad given Notice of his intention to move, in subsection (2), after the definition of "land", to insert "'road used as a public path' has the meaning I given by section 27 of the Act of 1949;". The noble Lord said: This is a consequential Amendment which I do not move.
Clause 44 agreed to.
Remaining clause agreed to.
Schedule 1 agreed to.
Schedule 2 [Procedure for taking common land]:
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR had given Notice of his intention to move to leave out paragraph 3. The noble Lord said: In view of the explanation given by the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, when we were discussing the Motion, That Clause 9 shall stand part, there is no need to move this Amendment.
9.56 p.m.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNORmoved to leave out paragraph 5. The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 69, for two reasons. The first is that this paragraph does not seem to make sense. I have compared it with the Commons Hansard. Perhaps I should mention that this Schedule was moved into the Bill at short notice at a quite late stage in another place, so there was little opportunity for all Members there to examine it in detail. May I read it to your Lordships to see whether your Lordships can understand it better than I can, It says:
"No restrictions apply to commons generally, or to any particular common, contained in or having effect under any enactment, and no trust subject to which the common land is held, shall prevent a local authority from taking part of common land in accordance with this Schedule."
If this paragraph said:
"No restrictions which apply to common generally,"
or
"no restrictions applying to commons generally",
I could read it in a way that would make sense. But I cannot help thinking that something has gone wrong here, and I hope I am not infringing Commons privilege in saying that the trouble really arose in another place, because I can assure your Lordships that this precisely repeats the words which were printed in the Commons Hansard. Perhaps the noble Lord will look into that. If he can read that out to your Lordships in a way which makes sense—
LORD KENNET: Before the noble Lord goes on to the substance of his Amendment, may I say that I cannot read it out, but I can tell him what was the intention of the Government in these circumstances. It was to overcome any
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statutory restriction on trusts which night otherwise prevent a local authority from taking part of the common under Clause 9. But I will look into the drafting.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: I am grateful to the noble Lord. Considering that Parliament is most careful about watching matters referring to common land, and because this was moved into the Bill at such a late stage in another place, I thought it right to raise this question, quite apart from the drafting. It is a most surprising and sweeping provision that no restrictions which apply to commons generally—I think that is what it means—or to any particular common shall prevent a local authority from taking part of common land in accordance with this Schedule. This means that whatever restrictions may originally have been imposed, or whatever trusts were drawn up subject to which the common land is held, we are providing that they shall be swept aside.
This is a sweeping decision in every sense. It may be right, but I think Parliament should take note of it and should be aware of what it is doing. I realise that there is a case for Clause 9, and that this Schedule is really the deailed; implementation of Clause 9, but I think I it would be wrong if your Lordships allowed this to go through without drawing attention to it and without asking the representative of the Government whether it is really essential that this far-reaching provision should be made.
Amendment moved—
Page 44, line 43, leave out paragraph 5.—(Lord Brooke of Cumnor.)
LORD KENNET: Further on the drafting point, it is, of course, a printing error. It is not true to say that no restrictions apply. Perhaps they do. That is what the subsection is there for. It should read, "no restrictions applying", and then as before. The error will be rectified. I agree with the noble Lord that I the need for this power is not self-evident. That is so because the restrictions, covenants, trusts, and so on, which one would empower the local authorities to override in the context of this Bill are invariably, I think I am right in saying, to the effect that the common shall be kept open and shall be for the enjoyment of all. The intention of most

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owners of commons is the very same. Indeed, there are manifold legal obligations on them to do precisely that, but the Government have still thought it unavoidable to give local authorities compulsory purchase powers over small parks and commons in order that they may do things on them which might, at first sight, appear to conflict with the intentions of the owner, or the owners and the law governing commons, in that they might enclose a minute portion of a common. For instance, you cannot build public lavatories without enclosing a few square feet of common, and it may be that in a multiplicity of commons owners a tiny handful of them, or one or two, might object to this out of sheer cussedness.
All the Schedule does is to ensure that these powers shall run, even in the case of commons where there are old covenants and restrictions of one sort or another. The overriding purpose of the local authority in these cases will be, as in all other, to increase and improve the access of the public to all commons, and the view of the Government is that the creation of compulsory powers is as much justified in the case of commons subject to old trusts and covenants as it is in other commons, a view that the Committee has already accepted.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
On Question, Whether Schedule 2 shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD BARNBY: I wanted to ask the Parliamentary Secretary whether he would find it convenient to give some additional explanation on paragraph 2(4) of Schedule 2. There appears to be some confusion as to how this shall work. There are in the Bill many clauses which have suggested action in various directions which would involve the question of an appeal to the Minister. Paragraph 2(4) of Schedule 2 definitely outlines how the Minister shall give his decision, et cetera, shall take all steps to give the necessary information, or shall cause a public inquiry to be held. Now it is certainly right that the Minister should
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protect himself by taking care that he gets every kind of representation before he gives a decision, and that is provided for. That would not be any hardship to anybody.
But the owner of land who might be affected is here subjected to uncertainty as to the decision of the Minister after he has given each person making such a representation
"an opportunity of appearing before and being heard by a person appointed by the Minister for the purpose…"
That is clear procedure, and it goes on to say: "or cause a public inquiry to be held". Presumably, the owner of the land will be the one to be subjected to some action which the Minister contemplates or which somebody appeals to him to take, and it would appear that the owner of the soil will have to pay the costs of defending himself against possible demands in certain circumstances, when the Minister will want to satisfy himself as to the propriety of such action.
LORD KENNET: I am not sure that I take the noble Lord's point, but it is beyond doubt that a compulsory purchase order cannot be made under this Bill if there is an objection to it from a person having a locus to object and if that objection is maintained, without there being a public inquiry. Does that meet the noble Lord's point?
LORD BARNBY: I am grateful to the Parliamentary Secretary for that explanation, but he has not made clear who pays the costs of the owner of the soil in his defence against any proposed action.
LORD KENNET: It is not a defence against a proposed action; it is an objection against a proposed action, and in the normal case the objector pays his own costs.
LORD BARNBY: If the Parliamentary Secretary is satisfied, I would only say that I am trying to be helpful in seeking an interpretation of something which may cause confusion. Perhaps at the next stage the noble Lord may see fit to add something to the provision.
Schedule 2 agreed to.
Schedule 3 [Public Rights of Way]:
LORD BARNBY LORD BARNBY moved, at the beginning of Schedule 3, to insert:
"LAW OF PROPERTY ACT 1925 (1925 c. 20)
Section 193 (rights of the public over commons and waste lands)
It is hereby declared that the right of access of any land specified in this section is a right of access on foot only."
The noble Lord said: This Amendment seeks a clear-cut definition of something which has produced a great deal of confusion. It is brought about by the nebulous wording of the Law of Property Act 1925, which was not made clear when the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949 was drafted. As a result, the definition is uncertain, because access granted by the 1925 Act to the public to commons did not indicate how this was to take place. It was not made clear whether it was to be on foot, on horseback, in a vehicle, or whatever it may be. As it stands, it appears that the 1925 Act is not taken into account and clarified in the 1949 Act. For that reason it is now suggested that a clear interpretation should be given.
Considerable reference has been made during the proceedings of this Committee to the definitions clearly set out in Section 27 of the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act, which define a footpath, a bridleway and so on. There has also been reference to the Gosling Committee which made clear its views. It was said in another place that the Government accepted in principle the need for definition, and it was therefore thought likely that a Government Amendment would be introduced into the House of Lords to give effect to the recommendations. That was said on February 20, at column 1103 of the Commons OFFICIAL REPORT. But it does not seem that that promised Amendment was introduced, unless there was an intention of some definition tied up with the Amendment moved by the Parliamentary Secretary with regard to passage on wheels.
I shall refrain from taking up the time of the Committee by referring to the Report of the Royal Commission on Common Lands, which gives a great deal of information, but I would remind your Lordships that in the area of com-
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mons there are a lot of forests, woods, barren lands, open lands and, of course, areas of special scientific interest. The commons are owned in turn local authorities, by the National Trust and by private individuals, and there appears to have been a lack of uniformity in their treatment. Local authorities have power to make by-laws, but the National Trust is in a different category. In the case of certain commons, such as Esher Common, the Minister appears to have issued an order forbidding passage on horses.
I am given to understand that there is a legal difference between "access" and "passage". It is very difficult for the lay mind to understand how one can have access to, without also having passage on, a common if one is going to have any use for it. That was certainly envisaged by the Gosling Committee when they made their recommendations to the Minister. The present misfortune for both people on foot and horse riders, is that they are in ignorance about what is permitted with regard to commons. Footpaths are considerably "chewed up" by horsemen, and in many areas there is asperity of feeling between people who want to use a certain footpath. It would be to the benefit of all, as I am sure the Parliamentary Secretary will agree, if no uncertainty were left in this legislation which might tend to produce contention between different users of commons. Because it seems so clear that there is need for this definition, I shall not make the further points which might be of interest to the Committee in coming to a decision, and I hope that the Parliamentary Secretary will be able to accept this Amendment and dispose of the present unfortunate situation.
I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 45, line 15, at end insert the said words.—(Lord Barnby.)
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: I hope the Government will be able to help my noble friend, and indeed the Committee, by clarifying this matter. On a new clause moved by the Government earlier this evening and then withdrawn, rights of way for foot passengers were about to become rights of way for cyclists.

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Now we are discussing a separate but related issue, the right of access to common land. That unquestionably means in all cases, I believe, right of access for pedestrians. Does it mean also right of access for persons on horseback? Does it mean right of access for cyclists? Does it mean right of access for people with certain types of vehicle?
LORD MOLSON: It is of course the case that only the courts can decide exactly what is the meaning of a Statute, but it has been the task of the Commons Preservation Society over a large number of years to advise the owners of commons and of commonable rights, and they have for many years, ever since the passing of the Act of 1925, given the advice that the rights of the public as regards access to commons under Section 193 applies only to access on foot. I hope, therefore, that the Government will confirm that they take the same view.
EARL HOWE: As to the question of the right of access by people on foot, I am afraid I must dissent from that. I feel that if right of access is to be given it should be given to all members of the public, whether they are on foot or on a motor vehicle. I suggest that if access is to be given, it might be given to a motorist to park his vehicle within 15 yards of the highway. I gather it follows the general pattern of the law that this should be permitted—and possibly at a greater distance than 15 yards. Also, I think the Royal Commission on Common Lands gives some justification for this kind of action.
LORD KENNET: This is a difficult situation, because the advice available to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government is exactly the opposite to that which has been given by the Commons Preservation Society, and therefore, presumably, to that given to them by highly-qualified lawyers. The advice which my Ministry has been able to obtain is that the famous Section 193 includes horses. How much does this matter? The noble Lord has said that there is confusion about this and that it ought to be cleared up by an Act of Parliament. Of course, one is always emotionally inclined towards clearing up confusion, but I verily believe that in this case it is not so im-
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portant whether one should do that or not, because the owner of a common— it may be a local authority, it may be a private person or it may be any number of different sorts of people—has the right under the present law to apply to the Minister for an order under that same section, Section 193, to impose limitations and conditions on the exercise of the rights of access, or indeed to limit the extent of the land to be affected by those rights. Quite a number of these orders of limitation have been made over the years doing precisely this—restricting the riding of horses to specified parts of a common, or to specified parts on it. I believe the noble Lord may be familiar with the facts I am giving to the Committee, since he has himself applied for such an order very recently, to which there have been objections and into which there must therefore be a public inquiry.
I would advise the Committee that this situation is a tenable one. There is doubt in the law, but if it is felt by the owner of any common that there are too many horses on it and that they are spoiling it for other people, or that they are chewing up the grass, or whatever it is, all he has to do is to apply to the Minister for an order, which will instantly clarify the matter. The Minister will either make an order, in which case there will be no horses, or he will refuse to make an order, in which case it will become more likely that the horses are permitted everywhere—a great deal more likely, I would say. Of course, one may say that there has perhaps been something not quite serious in what I have been saying, and that Parliament must always seek to clarify confusion. I would agree with that: in the long run it must. But I hope the Committee will take the view that this is not the Bill to do it. Major legislation is coming forward on commons. It is an absolutely colossal subject, far wider than the confines of this Bill which simply seeks to spread grant over the country and to provide for access orders in particularly difficult places. The whole of the commons legislation has to be cleared up. It is a major task; but it will be done. I think that the overall clarification that the noble Lord desires—and I can see his reasons—should be produced within the context of commons legislation in

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general rather than under a Countryside Bill, given that the owners of the commons already have a perfectly good administrative recourse in the meantime.
LORD BARNBY: I am obliged to the Minister for his explanation but I must admit it is quite disappointing. He adopts the attitude of contemplating a continuation of confusion. Many passages in the course of this Bill have brought vividly to light the need for clarification and definition; and, in the absence of this, a great deal of the value of what has been legislated is thrown into confusion. I cannot refrain from asking the indulgence of the Committee to make some remarks about common lands. The noble Lord himself admits that this is a very wide subject and perhaps, at this stage of the Bill, it is a pity that time has to be taken up on it. But so great will be the disappointment to pedestrians and riders at what the noble Lord has said that I say, with the greatest regret, that I cannot let it pass without inflicting on the Committee some views on its broader aspects.
Let me remind the Minister that common land in the country extends to over 1 million acres. There are an enormous number of commons. Does he suggest that each one is to be interpreted by special order on application to the Ministry? Who is to pay the cost of it? That is a point that I raised earlier. I admit, as I did on Second Reading, that while I am discussing the broad question I have a particular interest in that I am responsible for a common and, as the owner of the soil, I am familiar with these conditions and see them in practice. With that knowledge I say that what the noble Lord suggests— that any case that arises throughout the country on the conditions of a common has possibly to be the cause of a hearing by the Ministry which may take six months of a year to resolve—produces a great deal of confusion and discord over what is permissible in one community and not in another.
I think it unfair to the community that the Minister should presume to put that kind of legislative handicap on the whole of the country as it affects commons, distributed as they are so widely. I would remind the Committee in regard
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to the interpretation of this Act that there are places where the commons are on heavy London clay, with tracks quite impassable in the winter and wet weather but baked hard and deeply cracked in summer. This is the sort of place we are talking about, where the conditions are quite chaotic and pedestrians find themselves condemned to use what the Act calls footpaths but which are in reality only rides for horsemen. Speaking as one who has been associated with horse riding all his life, I speak with feeling for the horsemen. They are ignorant about where they can go and what they can do.
LORD HENLEY: I wonder whether I might interrupt the noble Lord. I think he has missed the point of what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Kennet. The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, was sympathetic to the difficulty which the noble Lord, Lord Barnby, was in, but he pointed out that the whole question of the law on commons is in a state of hopeless confusion and the subject of an inquiry from which we all hope that some legislation will come which may help the noble Lord, Lord Barnby. That being so, I think that possibly the noble Lord, Lord Barnby, has said enough.
LORD BARNBY: With due respect and thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Henley, for the homilies he addresses to me and the advice he has given, I should say that is exactly the point I made. It is this absence of definition. I ask for a simple definition.
LORD HENLEY: My point was that the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, was most sympathetic.
LORD BARNBY: I must ask the permission of the Committee to read a line from the 1925 Act and remind the noble Lord of Section 193. The rubric is:
"Rights of the public over commons and waste land."
and the section states:
"Members of the public shall, subject as hereinafter provided, have rights of access for air and exercise.…"
I should have thought that quite simple phraseology. But how are the rights to be exercised? Do you go on foot; on a horse; on wheels?

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It would be the simplest thing to insert a definition, and I must remind the noble Lord the Parliamentary Secretary that if that Amendment were adopted it would mean that the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949 would immediately become effective. Under Section 127 that clearly defines what is possible for a bridlepath and what is possible for a footpath. The Gosling Committee recommended that that should be adopted. Surely I am not doing anything unreasonable in pressing that the Committee should ask for an interpretation and acceptance by the Minister of what has been recommended by the Gosling Committee, which was set up, as the Minister said, to advise him on these difficult matters. Because of that I would remind the Committee also that the present legal position, as I am informed by the Footpaths Association, who are the official and best-informed organisation in the country on the matter, is that horse riding on a public footpath is a trespass against the owner of the soil, but it is not a criminal offence. That is one of the difficulties, there is no definition and no understanding—
LORD KENNET: I wonder whether the noble Lord, Lord Barnby, would confine his remarks to the Amendment before the Committee, which is about riding horses on commons.
LORD BARNBY: I can only repeat that I thought I was dealing with the Amendment; and there was no way of explaining it except by bringing in all that. I hope that the noble Lord may yet give consideration to this point and that on Report stage he may be able to give us some definition, because it seemed that, although in another place some Amendment on this subject was promised, it has not yet come. In that belief I thought it would be simpler for the noble Lord to agree to these words which would correct the legal difficulty with regard to the Law of Property Act 1925. I assure the noble Lord that it is a pretty widespread complication, and I hope that before Report stage he may be able to reconsider this. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
10.30 p.m.
LORD CHORLEY LORD CHORLEY moved, in Part I [Miscellaneous Amendments, Act of 1949], after the proposed amendment to Section 33, to insert:
("Section 37 (Powers of Minister to expedite survey)
The power of the Minister in section 37 to expedite the preparation of maps and statements shall include the power to direct a surveying authority to prepare a revised map and statement in draft form where the period referred to in section 33(3) has expired and where, after consultation with the surveying authority, it seems to the Minister that because of changes since the relevant date the definitive map, or the las preceding map prepared in definitive form, as the case may be, is no longer a reasonably accurate record of public rights of way in the area of the authority.")
The noble Lord said: We now come to a part of the Schedule which deals with Amendments to the 1949 Act. The Government are asking for an Amendment to Section 33. I wish to ask them to take rather more rights than they have at present under Section 37 of the Act. This is a section which the Commons and Footpaths Preservation Society have found rather defective in operation and which they, and those who work with them, feel could with advantage be amended. It is a rather technical matter and I hope your Lordships will forgive me if a stick closely to the brief with which I have been provided.
The present position is that the surveying authority has to prepare a revised draft map within five years of the relevant date of the previous definitive map. Rather unexpectedly, the relevant date is not the date on which the definitive map was published, but the date on which the original draft map was published. In nearly all cases, this was a date shortly after the passing of 1949 Act, usually during the years from 1950 to 1953. The procedure in reaching the definitive stage has been so long in many cases that the definitive map is completely out of date before it is published. The definitive map published to-day— and these maps are still being published —reflects the footpath pattern of no less than 15 years ago and therefore revision has become urgent. The revision procedure is much quicker than the original procedure. The Bill, by Schedule 2, Part II, will make it still quicker. Counties which have done the revision already frequently manage to do it in

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from one to two years. Hampshire is a good example. Thus the really useful document is not so much the definitive map as the revised definitive map, because, since this can be completed in as short a time as from one to two years, it means a fairly recent relevant date.
In view of the great value of the revised maps, it is extraordinary that the Minister has no power to expedite publication of these maps. The need for such powers has become evident during recent years. It can be illustrated by the case of the Yorkshire East Riding, in respect of which, by means of a Question, I succeeded in stimulating the department to take action. The Council published its draft map in 1953. Then it did absolutely nothing, until it was spurred on by the Minister, who directed the publication of the original map in 1966 and the definitive map in 1967. Under the expedited procedure, only non-controversial paths have been shown on the East Riding definitive map. All disputed paths have been left to be determined at revision stage. Yet there is nothing to oblige the East Riding Council to commence the revision state. The Minister has no power to do so under present law. It is that situation which we ask to have remedied.
Again, there are counties which reached the definitive stage some time ago, and they have taken no steps since then towards commencing the important review stage. These counties include Herefordshire and Oxfordshire, both of which published definitive maps in 1961 and have done nothing whatever since. I am sure your Lordships will agree with me that this is an unsatisfactory state of affairs, and that the Minister ought to have power to spur them on and stimulate them. This is the object of the Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 45, line 46, at end insert the said words.—(Lord Charley.)
LORD KENNET: So far as we know, there are only two counties where the definitive map is really out of date and who are not going as fast as they should with the review. I do not want to make a meal of this point, but we in the Ministry of Housing and Local Government would be just as happy chasing a couple
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of counties at any one moment rather than having the sledgehammer powers of default to order them to get on with it. In other words, I would advise the Committee that it is not really necessary to extend the default powers, which are always slightly unpopular, and are to be taken only in cases of crying need. I do not think the evidence suggests that this problem cannot be solved by other means.
LORD CHORLEY: I am very disappointed with that reply. From what the Minister has just said, one would think that this was a very minute problem in which only one or two counties are engaged. But this is not the case. During the last year or two I have put down quite a number of Questions, and they have by no means covered all the defaulting counties. I am surprised that the Minister should, in effect, refuse to have these powers conferred upon him. I do not think he realises how unsatisfactory the position is. I do not wish to press this Amendment at the present stage, but I should like to collect a dossier, as it were, and perhaps return to the matter at the next stage of the Bill. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
LORD MOLSON: Before the noble Lord withdraws the Amendment, I should like to ask the Parliamentary Secretary whether he agrees with the statement of the facts made by the noble Lord, Lord Chorley. If it is the case that these local authorities are under an obligation to produce these revised maps and are neglecting to do so, are we really to understand that the Minister prefers not to take powers to require them to carry out their obligation?
LORD KENNET: Let us go into detail on this, after all. The noble Lord quoted, I think, three authorities which were late in preparing their maps—I assume the noble Lord's agreement Two of them, I think he said, were two years late—that is, they have to produce the revised maps five-yearly, and they have gone seven years—and the third authority is later than that. A further question arises. If an authority is late in doing its review, one must consider now much it matters; that is, how much evidence there is that the existing definitive map is out of date and inadequate. I am

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advised that there are only two definitive maps in the whole country (the noble Lord, Lord Chorley, mentioned one of them, but there is another) which are clearly out of date. In one of these two cases the review is already under way, and in the other is about to be dealt with urgently.
I can only repeat that I do not think this is a case where the Minister should go out of his way to seek default powers. But it may be that the Committee will feel that he is not going out of his way to acquire them, and why should he resist them? I should not like to resist too hard if the Committee thinks that the Minister should have these powers. I think it would be illogical for me to refuse to do anything about it, even if the evidence is that it is not necessary. After all, if the Minister takes them, he does not have to use them.
LORD BARNBY: In the course of moving his Amendment Lord Chorley referred to the obligations of county authorities. Section 27 of the Act of 1949 directs them clearly to prepare a draft map for their area showing thereon a footpath or a bridleway. Is it to be understood from what the Minister said regarding the maps clearly setting out bridlepaths and footpaths that the interpretation of the Act as to a bridle path or footpath is to continue to be invalidated by the uncertainty of the Act of 1925? Are we to have the chaotic position that, in spite of the provision of maps by the county council, they are invalid? What is the good of spending money on producing them?
LORD KENNET: No, it is not to be so understood.
LORD BARNBY: I could not hear.
LORD KENNET: The noble Lord asked me whether it was to be understood that these maps were to continue to be invalidated by the uncertainty attaching to Section 193 of the Law of Property Act 1925. My answer to him is, No, it is not to be so understood.
LORD BARNBY: But with due respect to the Minister, they are in valid now—is this not so?—by virtue of the Act of 1925.
LORD CHORLEY: When we remember that this duty was first placed on local authorities nearly twenty years ago now, surely we must realise that some rather greater stimulus towards getting on with their duty is required. However, having said that I reserve the right to return to this matter at a later stage, in the meantime I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
10.42 p.m.
LORD CHORLEY LORD CHORLEY moved, in paragraph 4(5), after "authority", to insert:
"publish in the London Gazette and in one or more newspapers circulating in the area of the authority a notice stating his intention to make such a direction and shall".
The noble Lord said: Here, I am asking for rather more rights for the public, so that they may be made aware of decisions which very much affect them and of which at the present time they are unaware. Moreover, no provision exists to provide them with the necessary information.
I think the matter can be explained most clearly and succinctly by taking the two distinct cases which may arise. First of all, we have the case where the authority publishes a map omitting what a local amenity society believes, on the evidence before it, to be a public footpath. The society then makes representations to the Minister under Schedule 3, Part II, paragraph 4(1), and if the Minister decides that the society's representation is correct, under paragraph 4(5) he must give notice to any person who is "adversely affected". That is the phrase which is used: "adversely affected". This obviously includes, and everybody will say rightly, the landowner. So that the two sides which are affected—that is, the local authority and the landowner— can then put their views and have the matter properly cleared up. That is very fair and reasonable.
However, when you come to look at the reverse of the situation it does not work the same way: what is sauce for the goose is not sauce for the gander. The authority publishes a map including a path to which a landowner objects. The Minister decides that the landowner is right, and he then has to decide who are the persons who are "adversely affected" (the same phrase being used,

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of course) under paragraph 4(5)—this your Lordships will find at the top of page 49. In fact, the persons "adversely affected" are in this case the general public, the people who have taken the right to use the footpath. Unless there is provision for advertisement, members of the public, and local voluntary bodies of which they are members, and which are concerned with these matters, will have no standing whatever, and will in fact have no knowledge of what has happened: that a path which they had believed to be safely put upon the map has in fact been challenged by the landowner and the challenge has been allowed by the Minister.
It is true, of course, that under the existing wording of the paragraph the Minister would have to notify the authority, but that is quite insufficient from the point of view of those people wishing to use the path and of the various societies which are interested and concerned in the matter. And the object of this Amendment is to enable all those who are concerned in this way to know what has happened, so that they can make representations. The wording used is similar to that which is used whenever notices have to be issued, and I think it is sufficient and satisfactory to meet the case. I hope that the Minister will be rather more forthcoming on this occasion. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 49, line 4, at end insert the said words.— (Lord Chorley.)
LORD KENNET: In my view there is a lot in what the noble Lord has said. I am not quite sure that I followed all his reasoning in detail, but if he would be kind enough to withdraw his Amendment and come and talk to me about it, I should like to investigate the possibility of putting down something to the same effect on Report.
LORD CHORLEY: I am grateful for the Minister's reply, and in view of it I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Schedule 3 agreed to.
Schedule 4 [Local Authority Committees and Joint Boards]:
10.48 p.m.
LORD MOLSON LORD MOLSON moved, in paragraph 4(1), to leave out "Not less than one-third" and insert, "The Chairman and not less than one-half". The noble Lord said: This is similar to an Amendment that I moved in 1949 in another place, when the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, was piloting his National Parks and Access to the Countryside Bill through that House. If National Parks are really to be National Parks, and to follow national policy, then the committees which are responsible for their administration should be to a larger extent representative of the national interest, and the national representatives should not be in a small minority, as they are at the present time.
This has become an increasing cause of friction and irritation during the last twenty years, and in a number of cases —not, I think, in the case of the High Peak National Park or the Lake District, but in a number of the other National Parks—the policy has been limited and controlled by the policy of the local authorities. When National Parks were originally set up it was not the intention that this should be so, although I admit that this provision was contained in the original Act. Therefore I take this opportunity of again arguing that there should be a small majority representative of the national interest. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 51, line 21, leave out ("Not less than one-third") and insert ("The Chairman and not less than one-half").—(Lord Molson.)
LORD KENNET: I welcome the appearance once again of this old friend in our debates, because its very appearance in this Chamber will remind the public and all those concerned that the National Parks are indeed National Parks; that is to say, that their importance transcends local considerations, although it can never be separate from them or living above them on a different plane altogether.
Having said that, I wonder how much further the Committee would wish me to go. The Amendment as it is framed would take the National Parks out of local government altogether for planning purposes but would leave many of the functions which will be in question on the rates. I think probably the noble Lord would agree that the Amendment

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must fall on the fact that it places the Parks in national power but does not place all the expenditure on the Exchequer; and this would be an unacceptable compromise between true national control and the present local control mitigated by a strong national element.
LORD MOLSON: This Bill has progressed a long way through Parliament and it is based upon a White Paper. This principle for which I am contending has been consistently rejected all the way through, and while I still maintain it is a right one I will not press it any further upon your Lordships tonight. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
10.52 p.m.
LORD GRIMSTON OF WESTBURY LORD GRIMSTON OF WESTBURY moved, in paragraph 4, after sub-paragraph (2), to insert:
"() At least one of the members of a joint board or joint advisory committee or a planning committee or sub-committee of a planning committee referred to in sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph, who is appointed by each county council, shall be a county district councillor from a county district wholly or partially included in a National Park."
The noble Lord said: My noble friend Lord Gainsborough has asked me to move this Amendment on his behalf. Whatever happens with regard to old friends, which we have just been discussing, I think there is no doubt that there is no provision for district councils to appoint representatives, and such councils within the National Parks feel that their views go unheard for want of representation and because all too often members appointed by county councils do not live within the National Parks.
This Amendment is put forward by the Rural District Councils Association, of which my noble friend in whose name this Amendment stands is President, and supported by the Urban District Councils Association. I think it is a modest one. It does not ask for separate representation for urban, rural or borough councils, and it does not preclude a county council from appointing a county councillor who is also a district councillor. What it does ensure is that at any rate one local authority representative will be a district councillor within a National
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Park and so able to speak for the inhabitants of the Park in a way which county councils in parts of the county distant from the National Park would be unable to do. All the Amendment seeks is to ensure that a limited number of district councillors are elected to Park authorities from councils within the National Parks so that the views of the inhabitants within the Parks are given proper attention.
In these days I think there is a widespread feeling—one sees evidence of it in the Scottish nationalism and so on— that many matters closely affecting people in areas are discussed and controlled at a great distance. I hope that this modest Amendment to bring in district councils in this very modest way will go some way to alleviating that feeling, and I hope that the Amendment may be favourably considered. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 51, line 38, at end insert the said subparagraph.—(Lord Grimston of Westbury.)
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: I attach a great deal of importance to this Amendment which my noble friend has moved. I think it is not only in the interests of district councils that we should move something like this into the Bill but also in the interests of the National Parks and the public generally. Perhaps I may remind the Committee, even at this late hour, that the original theory was that the two-thirds of the members of these committees who were to be appointed by the county council were to represent the local interest, and the other one-third, who were to be appointed by the Minister, were to bring in the wider national considerations.
Unfortunately, it has not worked out exactly like that, because it has not always been secured by the county council concerned that their representatives are truly local representatives of the local interests of the Park itself. I know that there are notable exceptions to this. In the case of the Dartmoor National Park Planning Committee, for example, the Devon County Council secures that the purpose of this Amendment is most generously met. The Devon County Council ensures that among its nominees to the committee there are always at least one urban district councillor and one rural district councillor from

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councils within the Park. That shows that it is perfectly possible, and that my noble friend is not asking for anything unreasonable.
But if one can contrast with that the situation in the Yorkshire Dales National Park Planning Committee, I believe I am right in saying that out of the 12 members appointed by the county council, only two are resident in the National Park. Yet these are the people who, under the theory as presented to Parliament in 1949, were to be the people who on the Park planning committee were to represent the specifically local interest. It so happens that of the six nominees of the Minister only one is resident in the National Park. I am not taking exception to that, because under the theory which I have outlined, and which has been accepted by Parliament, it should be the duty of the county council and not of the Minister to ensure that there was local representation.
It seems to me that if the Committee were to accept this Amendment, or something on the same lines, we should be achieving a quite definite purpose. We should be going far to ensure the achievement of the original purpose that was set before Parliament nearly twenty years ago. By this Amendment we should guarantee that at least one of the members of the planning committee appointed by the county council was a member of either an urban district council or a rural district council situated within the Park. That person could ensure that the strictly local aspects of all matters were fully considered by the planning committee.
I think your Lordships are already agreed that it is desirable that this legislation should work in a way that will create the maximum of good will rather than generate suspicion. I ask your Lordships to believe that it does generate suspicion if hardly any members of the Park planning committee, which has such considerable planning powers over a National Park, are in fact resident in the Park. I would strongly commend my noble friend's Amendment as a way to correct this defect.
LORD KENNET: I am not sure whether I heard the noble Lord aright, but when he moved the Amendment I think he said that there is no provision
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for one or more of the members of a board to be a district councillor. I am sure he did not mean to say that. If he did, he would not have been right.
LORD GRIMSTON OF WESTBURY: Absolutely to ensure it, was how I put it.
LORD KENNET: The position is that there is no obligation that one should be. Let me say, first, that the Government entirely agree that the immediate local interest should be fully and properly represented on the board or joint committee. Whether or not it must always be done by a district councillor I think is an open question. It might well be done by a county councillor who lives right in the middle of the Park; it might be done by a county councillor who was also a district councillor. There are any number of ways in which it could be done. Lord Brooke gave the example of the Dartmoor Board where they already do it, and this seems to be a great success. What we are talking about really is whether to proceed by compulsion or by exhortation to ensure that this is done. On the whole, I think that the Committee ought to be chary of accepting powers of compulsion, ought to be chary of imposing upon the boards or councillors as constituting the boards, the duty of doing it this way rather than that way, and also of telling them that they must do it rather than urging them to do it.
Now when the Bill is through, as I have so often had occasion to say, the Minister of Housing and Local Government is going to issue a circular; and if the Amendment is not carried tonight he will most certainly make this very point in the circular. Therefore, my advice to the Committee is that, for the sake of lightness of touch, and in order not to stimulate resentment amongst those interests which might be against doing it by force (although I am sure that nobody will be against doing it voluntarily) it will be better to put it in the circular rather than in the Bill itself.
LORD GRIMSTON OF WESTBURY: I thank the Minister for what he has said. It is obvious, I think, that he views the object of this Amendment with sympathy. I am not sure that I entirely agree with him in this case that it should be done only by persuasion, followed up by a circular, which may or may not be

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observed. But I wonder if he would give an undertaking to look at this again between now and the next stage, and perhaps have some discussions about it. If he would be ready to do that I would gladly withdraw the Amendment at this stage. In spite of his sympathetic attitude I cannot say I am entirely satisfied with what he has said.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: I confess that I am not satisfied, although I know that the noble Lord the Minister is doing his best. Nineteen years have passed since the original Act reached the Statute Book. I believe I am right in saying that for nineteen years successive Ministers have been urging county councils to pay attention to the idea embodied in this Amendment, and with certain honourable exceptions, of which the Devon County Council is one, the encouragement has fallen on rather stony ground.
I entirely understand my noble friend's suggestion that, instead of pressing this now, he should ask that further consideration should be given to it between now and the Report stage of the Bill, but I hope that if he does withdraw the Amendment it will be appreciated by the Committee that this is a change which must be brought about, and that mere repetition of the general urgings by the Minister to various county councils to do this will not suffice. Frankly, I should like to see this written into the Bill, but I appreciate that there is another stage, and maybe it can be done by agreement when we come to the Report stage.
LORD KENNET: While it is true that this issue has been around for nineteen years and the district councils have
wanted compulsion for nineteen years, the county councils have resisted compulsion for nineteen years, and I think there is little more to find out about the situation. No doubt concrete evidence of matters which have been misplanned because of the absence of district councillors from planning boards might cause the Government to take a different view. But for the moment, if the Committee will allow me, I think I should perhaps quote a letter which was written by the Minister of State to the Rural District Councils Association after a series of meetings which he had with them recently. In that letter he said:
"In view of what it has been found possible to do in some parts of the country under the existing legislation, we have it in mind to commend the practice of including district council representatives among the members in one of the administrative circulars that in due course we shall issue."
I am now telling your Lordships that we will put it not in one of the circulars, in due course, but in the circular about this Bill. And I doubt very much whether it would be realistic to hope that we can remove this long conflict between the county councils and the district councils as quickly as necessary to get something in at the Report stage, although having said that, I would add that I shall never refuse to meet any representative of any local authority association on any point.
LORD GRIMSTON OF WESTBURY: I am sorry, but I think in view of that statement we should come to a decision, and I wish to press the Amendment.
11.4 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 74) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 21; Not-Contents, 16.

CONTENTS

Albemarle, E.

Denham, L. [Teller.]

Redmayne, L.

Barnby, E.

Glasgow, E.

St. Aldwyn, E. [Teller.]

Bessborough, E.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

Sandford, L.

Bridgeman, V.

Ilford, L.

Sempill, Ly.

Brooke of Cumnor, L.

Jellicoe, E.

Thurlow, L.

Brooke of Ystradfellte, Bs.

Mills, V.

Vivian, L.

Carrington, L.

Mowbray and Stourton, L.

Waldegrave, E.

NOT-CONTENTS

Bowles, L. [Teller.]

Hill of Wivenhoe, L.

Raglan, L.

Champion, L.

Hilton of Upton, L. [Teller.]

Rowley, L.

Chorley, L.

Kennet, L.

Segal, L.

Cranbrook, E.

Milner of Leeds, L.

Shepherd, L.

Greenway, L.

Molson, L.

Strabolgi, L.

Henley, L.

Resolved in the affirmative, and Amendment agreed to accordingly.
11.13 p.m.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR moved, in paragraph 4, to add to subparagraph (3):
"and in making appointments the Minister shall have regard to the importance of ensuring that each such joint board, joint advisory committee, planning committee or sub-committee of a planning committee, as the case may be, shall include persons with practical experience of agriculture and forestry."
The noble Lord said: This Amendment deals with a different point, because the Amendment which we have just been discussing refers to appointments by a county council, whereas this one refers to appointments by the Minister. I am urging in this Amendment that, in exercising his right to appoint one-third of the members of these various bodies, the Minister shall have regard to the importance of ensuring that each body includes persons with practical experience of agriculture and forestry. Again, I have no doubt that this was part of the original idea of the 1949 Act; that is to say, that each of these bodies, whether a joint board, a joint advisory committee, a planning committee or a sub-committee of a planning committee, should include people with practical experience of agriculture and forestry.
I think we are all agreed, and have been agreed for twenty years, that the administration of the National Parks should not be such as to freeze the life of the Parks. The people who live in the Parks are just as important as the visitors, and a large proportion of the people who live in them are dependent for their living on agriculture or, to some extent, forestry. It has given me concern—it gave me concern when I was the responsible Minister—that among persons appointed by the county council to these various bodies, there did not always appear to be enough persons who were concerned in farming or the management of woodlands. As I said on the previous Amendment, it was the original concept that the Minister's nominees should be those who would supply the national element and ensure that on the appropriate Park board or committee national considerations relating to the whole idea of a
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National Park were well represented. But as things have worked out, it has regrettably occurred that we have had some of these local bodies, with most important administrative responsibilities towards National Parks, which have not had included among their numbers a sufficient representation of agriculture and forestry—two occupations which are at the heart of the life of most of the National Parks.
One may well say, of course, that there are other interests which are important; that not everybody in a National Park lives by agriculture or forestry. But I venture to submit to the Committee that these are the main industries of the National Parks, in so far as they have industries at all, and I think it would be very regrettable if one continued to have any of these administrative bodies for the National Parks on which agriculture and forestry were unrepresented. It seems to me that it is time we laid down in a Statute, now that we have the opportunity of legislation, that each of these bodies, whether a joint board, a joint advisory committee, a planning committee or a sub-committee of a planning committee, should include persons with practical experience of agriculture and forestry. It is of course thoroughly desirable that the county council or county councils setting up the body should look after this themselves, but if in any instance they fail to do so then I suggest that Parliament should make it clear that it becomes a duty of the Minister to make good that defect and, in choosing his own appointees, to ensure that practical experience of agriculture and forestry is represented on the body concerned. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 51, line 40, at end insert the said words.—(Lord Brooke of Cumnor.)
LORD HENLEY: I quite agree with the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Cumnor, that agriculture and forestry together are the single most important thing, so far as industry goes, in the National Parks. Indeed, I think it would be almost inconceivable if some of the representatives on these joint bodies were not highly expert in agriculture and forestry. Nevertheless, I sometimes think that the interests of any particular subject like agriculture or forestry can be best served by people getting on to these bodies not

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necessarily because they are experts in agriculture and forestry but because they are something else—because they are county councillors, or what you will— and that in the long run this is where the right kind of influence (and I am speaking now for the agricultural and forestry influence) can most effectively be applied.
I voted against the last Amendment because I thought that it was constricting; that if you try to make room on every kind of committee for every interest you end up by having a committee which is really not so good as it would be if you left it entirely open to put the right people on it. I take the same view here. Nobody can have been stronger in trying to argue, as it were, the lobby of the agriculture and forestry interests throughout this Bill than I have, to try to see that fair play is done within the context of this Bill, which in every other way I regard as an extremely good Bill. So I feel I am on fairly sure ground in saying that, because I have argued their interests effectively, I am in no sense running away from them here. I think that their influence would be better felt by not making it statutorily essential for them to be put on to these bodies, but to let them get on in their own way, and possibly in other directions, as it were.
EARL WALDEGRAVE: I think there can be a certain amount of misconception here. I think that there are people who have the interests of the National Parks at heart who feel that their natural enemy, so to speak, is the farmer or forester in the Park; that everything that he wants to do is to restrict the access of people to the Park and that he does not like people wandering over his fields. Of course, there must be always an element of this; but I would support the Amendment that it should be the duty of the Minister to see that there are sufficient expert agriculturists and foresters on the Committees, not because those are hostile to the purposes of the Park, but because it is only by having expert and skilled advice on the Parks that you can ensure that proper and sensible agriculture is done and undue restrictions are not brought about. The Park should be a vital living thing, not a museum. If it is to be more like
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a zoo than a museum, if things are to be alive in it, you must have agriculturists and foresters on the Committees.
11.22 p.m.
LORD KENNET: Once again, the question is between statutory compulsion on the Minister to do this and on relying on the Minister to do it anyway— which he has said in Parliament that he will do, and I have repeated it here and will repeat it again. He will do it. I think the Committee should be swayed by the words of the noble Lord, Lord Henley, about this matter which I think put the issue better than I could have put it from the Government Benches. There are two fundamental objections to doing it in this way, two objections to putting a statutory duty on the Minister; and, of course, the objections do not apply to leaving the matter to be done by common sense and by the kind of balancing act which all Ministers are used to doing without statutory compulsion.
The objections which apply to putting this in the Bill are the following. First, forestry and agriculture, though infinitely important, are only one group of interests among several which are concerned with National Parks. If the Minister is bound to see to it that foresters and agriculturists get on the Committees, then we must logically write into the Bill provisions that will bind him also to see that the amenity people get on, that representatives of the users of the National Parks get on. I am not sure that we should not also see that those capable of protecting the scientific interests of the National Park areas get on. In other words, once you start telling a Minister that such and such a person must be there, you must go on to say that all relevant people must be there and that they are as follows.
The second reason against doing it this way is that throughout the history of these provisions successive Ministers have always set their faces against having delegates on these planning boards. The noble Lord may argue that he is not asking for delegates but only for people with experience. That is true. That is what his Amendment says. But let us think what will happen. We must imagine that the county council has not provided an agriculture or forestry person. Then the Amendment of the

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noble Lord, Lord Brooke, comes into effect and the Minister is bound to remedy the defect. It is all there in the Statute. He must do it the proper way.
The first thing he does is to get his right honourable friend the Minister of Agriculture to approach the National Farmers' Union for their suggestions about a suitable person. If he did not do that, the farmers might complain that they were not consulted on the exercise of his statutory duty to put an agricultural person on the board. He does that; and the N.F.U. comes up with the best man that they can. Now this man knows he is the candidate of the N.F.U. for the job. I think one is bound to admit that such a person will become a delegate for particular interests on the planning board.
Hitherto the practice has always been that the Minister's appointees have been chosen because of their merits as individuals and the contribution they could make to the running of the National Parks, and particularly because of their lack of local involvement and their ability to see national rather than local considerations. The noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Cumnor, may say that the persons with agricultural experience that he has in mind could well not be local people and not be bound by parochial considerations, but I think they would still feel themselves bound to act solely, or at least overridingly, with regard to the farming interests—that is what they would have been put there for—and we should be back with the delegate situation which successive Governments, I think rightly, have always avoided.
During the Second Reading debate I quoted, and it may be worth while to remind the Committee of it again, the letter sent by the Minister of Housing and Local Government to the National Farmers' Union on January 31 this year. He said:
"It seems to me that the best course will be for me to give an assurance in the course of debates on the Bill that the Minister, in making appointments to the planning committees and Joint Planning Boards should bear in mind the need to redress any imbalance there may be, having regard to the known qualifications and interests of the elected members."
That assurance I gave in similar terms on Second Reading and I repeat it now. The Committee may care to be reminded that an Amendment in rather similar
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terms was tabled by Mr. Rippon in the Standing Committee of the House of Commons and was withdrawn in the light of the assurance which I have just repeated here. All this being so, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Cumnor, may agree to withdraw his Amendment. The effect will be achieved by the terms under the assurance I have given that the Minister will redress any imbalance which appears from among the elected representatives.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: I am obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, for what he has said, and I am sure that my noble friends will be also. With respect to him I think that his first counter argument was more convincing than his second. There is, of course, a difference between the situation under this Amendment and the situation under the previous one. In the previous Amendment we were seeking to ensure that the county councils concerned did something, and it was because of my fear that all the county councils might not take notice of the communication they received from the Minister—and they would be within their rights not to do so—that 1 supported the Amendment so as to write something definite into the Bill. Here it is a question of action by the Minister. Naturally, I accept everything that the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, has said about the Minister being pledged, by one means or another to secure the result which I, by this Amendment, would have sought to move into the Bill. I accept what he has said; I have no doubt that that promise is given in full sincerity; and therefore I feel that it would be right to beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Schedule 4, as amended, agreed to.
Schedule 5 [Repeals]:
LORD MOLSON LORD MOLSON moved, in the proposed repeals to The National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949, to insert:
"In section 8(2) the proviso.
In section 8(3) the words "or while a direction under the proviso to the last foregoing subsection is in force as respects any such authority".
Section 8(4)."
The noble Lord said: I beg to move to insert the words in the Amendment The

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effect of the Amendment is to insert them in the list of provisions of the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949 which are repealed under this measure. It was always the intention that in the case of National Parks which cover part of more than one county it would be normal to have a joint board. In the original Act the Minister was given power to dispense with the formation of a joint planning board in a multi-county National Park, leaving the constituent parts of the Park to be planned and administered separately by several county councils, with a joint advisory committee as the only unifying factor.
In the Peak District and Lake District National Parks joint boards have been established, and I think that it would be generally agreed that they are the most satisfactorily administered of all the National Parks. In Snowdonia, where there are three counties; in the Yorkshire Dales, where there are two; in Exmoor, where there are two, and in the Brecon Beacons, where there are three, the Minister has used his power of dispensation. It was originally intended that this power of dispensation should be used only where there were special circumstances—that was, where a Park lay predominantly in one county and only a small part of it lay in another. In practice, it has been used by successive Ministers of Housing and Local Government in response to pressure from local authorities fearful that the administration of a National Park might prove too national for their comfort. It is the considered opinion of the Standing Committee of the C.P.R.E. on National Parks that in no case has greater efficiency resulted.
The present Government admitted in their White Paper on Leisure in the Countryside that the present state of affairs is unsatisfactory. In paragraph 13, they said:
"No immediate major change is proposed in the administrative arrangements within the National Parks."
And because of that sentence I am apprehensive that the Parliamentary Secretary may not welcome my Amendment. The paragraph goes on to say:
"The Government have, however, been impressed with the weight of opinion in favour of joint planning boards for those Parks which cover more than one county. They hope that
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the planning authorities concerned will consider very carefully the possibility of the change. The Government will consider whether it will be desirable to exercise their power to revoke existing arrangements if further experience shows this to be required."
I voted against the provision for ensuring that representatives of district councils should be selected to serve upon these committees and boards. I believe that it is generally in the interests of the sound administration of the National Parks that these should be in the hands of people who take a broad view of their responsibilities. I believe that it is desirable that they should have a staff of their own and should not be unduly under the influence either of the local authorities or, still more, of the local ratepapers. I move this Amendment in order to deprive the Government of the power to grant continued exemption from the purpose of the Act of 1949 to have joint planning boards. If the Government are not prepared to go so far as to accept this Amendment, I should at any rate be glad to hear that they have given further thought to their own paragraph 13 in the White Paper and to bringing some pressure to bear to ensure that there are joint planning boards in all National Parks and not just the two I have mentioned. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 52, line 12, column 3, at end insert the said words.—(Lord Molson.)
LORD KENNET: Once again, this Amendment seeks to remove a freedom of action from the Minister. I would remind the Committee that if we leave the law unchanged, the Minister is perfectly free to impose a joint board on any group of county councils which does not have one at present. He can direct it to be set up. The Amendment would simply force him to direct it to set up forthwith, whether his judgment was that it should be set up or should not be set up, and even whether his judgment was or was not that it was going to be set up anyhow without his having to use his powers to enforce its setting up.
My advice to the Committee is that we should not put this in the Bill—and I do not think the noble Lord is going to press the Amendment—because several things are coming forward from the Royal Commission on Local Government. We have already got the recommendations for Wales—and I know that

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Wales will be uppermost in the minds of some noble Lords. We have the Report on Wales; this will be followed by a decision on English local government; and we want to get a bit of experience of the Countryside Bill itself in the National Parks. This matter— and by "this matter" I mean the desirability of the Minister's exercising his present powers to compel the setting up of a joint board—is under continuous review. The situation outlined in the White Paper is not really changed. If the Government had the power at that time to do so, they still have the power. No immediate major change is proposed in the administration, and the Government are considering now, as they were then, whether it would be desirable to exercise this power in this or that case.
Having said that, I should say that I think the establishment of some objective criteria of efficiency in National Park planning boards, and in single county National Parks, too, by which the performance of different boards could be judged would be an interesting exercise. When the criteria had been established the performance of different boards could be tested against them and a body of opinion might develop which would enable the counties themselves which adhered to their independence to modify their views, if they so wished, about what ought to be done.
LORD MOLSON: In view of the "unsatisfactory" nature of that reply, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Schedule 5 agreed to.
Clause 25:
Duty to maintain stiles, etc., on footpaths and bridleways
25.—(1) Any stile, gate or other similar structure across a footpath or bridleway shall be maintained by the owner of the land in a safe condition, and to the standard of repair required to prevent unreasonable interference with the rights of the persons using the footpath or bridleway.
(4) The highway authority shall, in exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (3) above, contribute not less than one quarter of any expenses shown to their satisfaction to have been reasonably incurred.
11.38 p.m.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR moved, in subsection (3), after "contributions" to insert:
"of such amount in each case as they shall, having regard to all the circumstances, consider reasonable".
The noble Lord said: We now revert to the postponed Clause 25, and I am grateful to the Government for having moved to postpone it so that I could be present to deal with these Amendments. This clause, as the Committee will remember, concerns the duty placed on the owner of the land to maintain stiles and gates on footpaths and bridle-ways. The point at issue here is the amount of contribution that the highway authority shall make towards the cost of that maintenance. Subsection (3) of Clause 25 says:
"The highway authority shall have power to make contributions towards expenses incurred in compliance with subsection (1) above",
And subsection (4) says that the highway authority's contribution shall be not less than one-quarter of any expenses shown to their satisfaction to have been reasonably incurred. This matter was debated at some length on the Report stage in another place, and the Minister of State, speaking for the Government, said at column 1173, on the 9th April:
"If hon. Members think it would be helpful, I would be prepared to consider introducing in another place a wording … that the authority shall make such contribution as in all the circumstances appears to be reasonable, or words to that effect, and then provide for a minimum contribution of 25 per cent."
The Government did not put down an Amendment that required the highway authority to make a contribution of such amount as they shall consider reasonable, and therefore I tabled this Amendment. It seemed to me necessary that the Bill should contain a definite indication to the highway authority that this is intended to be a flexible provision as regards their contribution, and that the 25 per cent, minimum is not to be in fact a fixed figure. Unless we make some Amendment of this sort in the Bill I can hardly see how any owner who was dissatisfied with receiving the minimum of 25 per cent, would have any ground on which he could challenge the highway authority's decision. All he could do would be to point to what the Minister

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of State had said in the House of Commons, which of course is not part of the law.
The matter was further debated on that occasion, and the Minister of State finally (in column 1186) advised the House to accept a Government Amendment that was tabled, and to reject an Opposition Amendment to the Government Amendment. Then he went on:
"If that is done, there is my undertaking to move in another place an Amendment to amend the wording of subsection (3) in the words I have indicated."
All I am doing now is to put down the Amendment which I understood that the Government had already promised to table here. I can perhaps facilitate proceedings by saying that if the Government are prepared to accept this Amendment, either in this particular wording or at any rate in principle, I will then shorten the proceedings by not moving the subsequent Amendment which is designed to raise the minimum from one quarter to one half. I can see that if the second Amendment were carried it might be open to challenge as an infringement of Commons' Privilege. But I cannot think there is any such objection to this first Amendment of mine, which appears to me to be carrying out an undertaking given by the Government; and it is in that friendly spirit that I move it.
Amendment moved—
Page 26, line 29, after ("contributions") insert the said words.—(Lord Brooke of Cumnor.)
LORD KENNET: It may shorten the debate if I say instantly in the same friendly spirit that I accept this Amendment.
LORD BARNBY: I am grateful to the noble Lord for having agreed that we should, to use his own phrase, "leapfrog" this clause, because I was anxious to hear what the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Cumnor, was going to say about it. The Minister has certainly been patient and forthcoming in his definitions throughout the course of the Bill, but I am just going to encroach once more on his patience and ask him in regard to this clause, which I should have—
LORD KENNET: I wonder whether the noble Lord heard what I said. I am
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recommending the Committee to accept this Amendment.
LORD BARNBY: I thought we were dealing with the Motion, That the clause shall be agreed to? I beg your Lordships' pardon.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
On Question, Whether Clause 25, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?
11.45 p.m.
LORD BARNBY: This clause, together with Clause 24, seems to impose requirements which involve some expenditure by the owners of the land. I refer particularly to Clause 25(1). As this seems to be in similar strain to the clause on signposts, may I ask the noble Lord whether it is to be understood that this land also includes commons, because those of us who have made a particular study of commons realise that this can put considerable obligations on the owners. So often commons are immediately contiguous to towns, and therefore there is need for indications as to the paths and where they lead. If signposts are put up by the owner of the land, as is suggested here, and they are continually pulled down, is it to be understood that some of the cost of replacing them can be recouped under this clause? And as the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, has expressed the belief that the authority's contribution ought to be one half and not one quarter, is it to be understood that this includes common land as well as any other land?
LORD RAGLAN: I am sorry that my noble friend so readily accepted the Amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, because I am opposed in principle to Clause 25(1), where it says that the footpath or bridleway
"shall be maintained by the owner of the land in a safe condition".
I know that in opposing this principle I shall lay myself open to being called merely a reactionary land owner, but I do not mind being accused of that when it is my belief that my reasons for opposing it are both logical and fair.
I believe there is some misapprehension about the reasons for which most footpaths came into being. The vast majority were not created by the general

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public. They were used by people who lived and worked in the locality, and some of them were access paths to fields or to wells. Others were used by the local population for all sorts of other business, such as going to their work or to the "pub" (I include going to the "pub" as business) and, most importantly, many footpaths came into being at a time when it was legally compulsory to go to church.
I am sorry to make a speech at such a late hour, but I think it is an important point. I have a farm where there was once a Quaker meeting house, and the 1921 ordnance survey map shows no fewer than nine footpaths going to this house. As my noble friend Lord Chorley mentioned, under the 1949 Act a great many of these footpaths were abolished, but the ones which are left, certainly in the area around my farm, follow exactly the same lines as the paths laid down centuries ago. They are of course the same paths, but now they are to be used, kept open and maintained for an entirely different purpose from that for which they originally came into existence. They are not to be used by and maintained for local people going on their business. They are for the public in general and for tourists in particular. They are no longer just local footpaths but public highways, and under this Bill the landowner would be required to maintain part of a public highway. If he did not maintain it he would be required to be charged quite a considerable part—we do not know how much—of the cost.
As a dweller in some very lovely countryside, I welcome ramblers, and I am glad townspeople and strangers can look at it and get pleasure from it. But I and all other landowners will be placed in this position. The Bill is saying, in effect: "You will open your house to tourists. You may not charge a fee, but you must keep the carpet clean, and if you do not keep it clean and in good condition we will have it cleaned and mended and charge you part of the cost."
I must emphasise the difference between maintaining a path and stiles for the convenience of the local inhabitants and keeping them for general tourists. For one thing, I feel—perhaps I should not—much more of an obligation to the
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local inhabitants than I feel for tourists; and for another thing the regular user of a footpath knows its weaknesses and dangers and looks to them, and perhaps does something about them from time to time. But under this clause, so far as I understand it, a hiker strolling along the road with a pack on his back and a map in his hand can demand the proper upkeep of some footpath which he has never seen before and which he may never use again. He is even less likely to want to use the footpath again if, under the combined weight of his sturdy body and a 75 lb. pack, the stile breaks and he breaks his leg. The landowner is liable, and it is a very unfortunate situation for him to be in. I do not think he should be liable.
I suggest to your Lordships that a footpath is a public highway or it is not a public highway. I have several stretches of public highways on my land used by public vehicles. In law and in theory I own the land underneath, the tarmac, but I am not responsible for the upkeep of it, and nobody expects me to be. I see no reason in principle, in fairness or in moral obligation, why a landowner should be expected to maintain a public highway because it is called a footpath. The owner or occupier is merely being turned into a kind of charity for the benefit of the Ramblers Association and others like them. In my opinion, if the general public wish to use footpaths they should be prepared to pay entirely for their upkeep. As your Lordships know, the occupier is already at a disadvantage in that he cannot put a bull in a field or plough up the path. No occupier likes footpaths, and now it is intended to impose this additional statutory burden.
I am sure that the Government have had weighty advice from various bodies on this matter. I do not know whether it has occurred to any of them what an unfair imposition is now proposed. I am sure that there should be some radical look at the whole matter. If my noble friend replies to what I have said I shall read very carefully what he says, but I believe that in the end we should come round to the principle that the entire onus for the upkeep of public footpaths should be on the public who use them.
LORD HENLEY: I have one question to ask the noble Lord on the clause. There was an undertaking in another place that the responsibility for public rights of way would be transferred to the local planning authority. Has this been lost sight of?
11.55 p.m.
LORD KENNET: TO take the questions in turn, as far as I can remember at this time of night the answer to Lord Barnby is Yes, Clauses 24 and 25 do apply to commons. They apply only to footpaths and bridleways, but they apply to footpaths and bridleways whether they cross common land or private land. I should perhaps say a word about the general outline of Clause 25. It does something new in putting the duty on the landowner to keep up his stile or gate. We should not lose sight of the fact that the landowner presumably has a stile or a gate there in the first place because there is something on one side of it that he wants to prevent going to the other side—cattle, usually.
LORD RAGLAN: Tourists.
LORD KENNET: Tourists are another point. Cattle, I would say, or sheep. The noble Lord is complaining that this is a duty laid on the owner to keep up his stile or gate. This suggests that he thinks that in certain cases the landowner may wish to ignore that duty of keeping up the stile or gate, and to keep on doing as he was doing before; namely, allowing the stile or gate to decay. Because he is not worried about his stile decaying, therefore he is, by definition, not worried about whether what is on the one side of it moves over to the other side. In those circum stances he would be better advised to remove his stile, when he would no longer have any liability to keep it up. Beyond that what this clause does—
LORD RAGLAN: May I ask my noble friend further upon this issue: Is not the landlord obliged to put the stile there if a footpath is shown on the map? I do not know the law on this matter; perhaps my noble friend does.
LORD KENNET: No; he can leave a gap there if he wishes. He is obliged to put a stile there only if there is what would otherwise be an impassable fence
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there. He is then obliged to put a stile there so as to allow the tourist to get over.
To turn to the subject of the liability of the landowner, this question is one which I had hoped to be in a position to answer, but I regret to tell the noble Lord that I cannot at this moment. I will write to him, or perhaps he can raise it again on Report. The main point of this provision is the institution of grants, because one must expect that the Countryside Bill will increase the number of people using footpaths and that will increase the wear and tear on the stiles and gates which are there and which the landowner wants to keep up for his own reasons—perhaps because he has cattle or sheep in the field. To meet that, the provision is that there shall be a minimum grant of 25 per cent, as of right. All the landowner has to do is to ask for it. If he has a stile on a footpath or right of way he asks for his 25 per cent, on all his repair costs and he gets it. Because of the Amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, which has just been carried, the local authority will be bound to go further than that if, in its judgment, it is reasonable to do so. Thus, the 25 per cent, is not a standard rate or indeed the maximum rate but it is positively the minimum rate. That being so, I think there is a balance of new obligations laid on the local authority by the clause.
On Question, Clause 25, as amended, agreed to.
In the Title:
11.59 p.m.
LORD MOLSON LORD MOLSON moved, in line 4, after "for" to insert
"the conservation and enhancement of natural beauty and for".
The noble Lord said: I do not think there should be any difficulty about this Amendment. On the first day of the Committee stage the insertion of similar words in subsection (2) of Clause 1 of the Bill was carried against the Government, making that subsection read:
"The functions conferred by this Act on the said Commission… are to be exercised for the conservation and enhancement of natural beauty".
Since that is now the first of the general functions of the Commission, it is only natural to include similar words in the

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Title to the Bill. I am confident that at this late hour of the night the Parliamentary Secretary will not want to resist this Amendment, which is really entirely consequential on a decision which has already been taken. I hope, therefore, that he will be prepared, with a gracious demeanour, to accept it.
Amendment moved—
In the Title, line 4, after the word ("for") insert (" the conservation and enhancement of natural beauty and for").
LORD KENNET: Accept it I will, but I cannot promise a gracious demeanour because it is not quite clear to me at this time of night how far this is consequential on a decision which was carried against the Government's advice. I do not want to end on a sour note, but I would just point out that I do not know what they will want to do about this in another place. However, I accept the noble Lord's arguments that this Amendment hangs together with the other one.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Title, as amended, agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported with Amendments.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS BILL [H.L.]
12.2 a.m.
THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS (LORD SHEPHERD): My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Shepherd.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The LORD AIREDALE in the Chair.]
Clause 1 [Organisations of which United Kingdom is a member]:
On Question, Whether Clause 1 shall stand part of the Bill?
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: At this witching hour—the very witching hour—I am not going to delay your Lordships more than a moment. I was grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, for answering most of the points which I raised during the debate on Second Reading, but I should like to
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raise again one general point with which I think the noble Lord did not deal very fully, and that is the question of reciprocity. Referring to the granting of these privileges, he said in his opening speech:
"It is difficult to rest this on a basis of reciprocity since reciprocity will occur between the host Government and the organisation, but in practice there are many organisations which are operating in many other countries and we may well be a member of those organisations."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 29/4/68, col. 933.]
But the point, as I see it, really is this: Will these organisations have the same privileges in practice when operating in other countries as they do in Britain? Presumably the 1961 and 1963 Vienna Conventions laid down a certain scale of immunities which the countries who signed these Conventions observe.
Does this Bill give additional—and I underline the word "additional"— privileges and immunities which are not included in these Conventions?. If so, how can we be sure that other countries will accord similar immunities to international organisations that we do? I should be grateful if the noble Lord could clear up this point.
It so happens that over the weekend I was speaking to a friend who had recently returned from our Embassy in Moscow, and he was complaining that in certain matters there was no reciprocity between our two countries. He said, for example, that members of the Soviet Embassy in London were able to drive to their country place at Hawkhurst quite freely, whereas members of our Embassy in Moscow were not given similar freedom. I wonder whether the same practical lack of reciprocity would apply as between the headquarters of an international organisation situated in Moscow and those of an organisation in this country. No doubt the accepted ground rules are much the same in our respective countries, but in practice certain diplomats from other countries seem to have greater freedom in this country than ours do in theirs I do not doubt that this is so, and I should particularly like to make the point, that, in the main, it may be in our true interests to give more than we receive in this respect. Even so we should watch this situation carefully, but I hope that in the long run certain

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other countries will reciprocate fully by respecting not only the letter of international agreements but their spirit. I hope that the noble Lord may be able to say something on this point.
LORD SHEPHERD: The instance given by the noble Earl was in relation to diplomatic immunities and privileges. Here we are dealing with a different aspect; that is to say, with organisations which may have their headquarters or place of meeting in this country.
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: But the same principle applies.
LORD SHEPHERD: In practice, certainly among European countries, we fall behind what is granted by others. One of the purposes of this Bill is to be able to match them in the privileges and immunities which are granted to the type of organisations covered by this Bill. As the noble Earl is aware, no grant of immunities or privileges beyond Schedule 1 can be made, and in any case all the immunities and privileges must receive Parliamentary consent. Therefore, we shall have the opportunity to look at each and every one as it is presented to Parliament.
Clause 1 agreed to.
Clause 2 agreed to.
Clause 3 [Commission of the European Communities]:
LORD SHEPHERD: Amendment No. 1 seeks to bring Clause 3 into line with Clause 2, by making it possible to confer on families of senior staff of delegations from the Commission of the European Communities the customs privileges which may be conferred on the senior staff themselves. A similar provision is contained in Clause 2(3) in regard to senior staff members of Specialised Agencies of the United Nations with their headquarters in the United Kingdom. It is intended that the privileges given to senior staff of the Commission and to Specialised Agencies situated in the United Kingdom should, so far as possible, correspond. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 5, line 6, at end insert:
("and, where the exemptions, privileges and reliefs referred to in paragraph (b) of this
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subsection are so conferred on any such officers, Her Majesty may by the same or any other Order in Council confer the like exemptions, privileges and reliefs on persons who are members of he families of those officers and form part of their households".)—(Lord Shepherd.)
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: We accept this Amendment.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 3, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 4 to 11 agreed to.
Clause 12 [Consequential amendments, repeals and transitional provisions]:
LORD SHEPHERD: This Amendment is consequential upon the passing of the Consular Relations Act 1968. Since this Bill is intended to replace the 1950 Act, it is necessary to insert a reference to it in the Consular Relations Act. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 8, line 45, at end insert—
("() In the Consular Relations Act 196S, at the end of section 1(3) there shall be inserted the words "or the International Organisations Act 1968"")—(Lord Shepherd.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD SHEPHERD: This Amendment is of a drafting nature. Its purpose is to make sure that the terms of the Bill give effect to its intention. I beg to move;
Amendment moved—
Page 9, line 13, at end insert—
("and, while any such Order in Council continues to have effect in relation to an organisation,—

(a) the enactment in question shall continue to have effect in relation to that organisation as if that enactment had not been repealed, and

(b) section 8 of this Act shall have effect as if in that section any reference to this Act or an Order in Council made there-under included a reference to that enactment or that Order in Council ")—(Lord Shepherd.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 12, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 13 agreed to.
Schedule 1 [Privileges and immunities]:
LORD SHEPHERD: With the permission of the House I shall move Amendment No. 4, but will speak also to Amendments Nos. 5 and 6. These are purely drafting Amendments. The present drafting suggests that the domestic servant of a representative could receive exemption from income tax in

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respect of his employment only to the extent that the representative himself was entitled to exemption from income tax in respect of the employment of his domestic servant. The revised drafting removes this incorrect implication. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 13, line 16, at end insert ("and")—(Lord Shepherd.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD SHEPHERD: I beg to move Amendment No. 5.
Amendment moved—
Page 13, leave out lines 17 and 18.—(Lord Shepherd.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD SHEPHERD: I beg to move Amendment No. 6.
Amendment moved—
Page 13, line 21, at end insert "and shall be entitled to exemption from taxes on his amoluments in respect of that employment to the like extent as, by virtue of the relevant Order, that representative is entitled to exemption from taxes on his emoluments as a representative ".—(Lord Shepherd.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
12.12 a.m.
LORD SHEPHERD LORD SHEPHERD moved, after paragraph 23, to insert:
"() Persons who are members of the family and form part of the household of such a member of the official staff as is mentioned in paragraph 20 of this Schedule shall be entitled to the privileges and immunities set out in Part II of this Schedule to the like extent as, by virtue of that paragraph, that member of the official staff is entitled to them.
() Persons who are members of the family and form part of the household of such a member of the official staff as is mentioned in paragraph 21 of this Schedule shall be entitled to the privileges and immunities set out in paragraphs 9 and 13 of this Schedule to the like extent as, by virtue of paragraph 21 of this Schedule, that member of the official staff is entitled to them."
The noble Lord said: Paragraph 23 of Schedule 1 already provides for immunities and privileges to be conferred, if required by the terms of the relevant international agreement, on members of the families of representatives to international organisations. This Amendment extends the provisions of paragraph 23 to cover the families of members of the official staff of such representatives. Under the relevant international agreements, permanent representatives of Governments to international organisa-
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tions, such as our noble friend Lord Caradon in New York, and their official staffs are treated like members of a diplomatic mission. By an extension of the same principle, the members of their families may also be treated like members of diplomatic families.
At present there are no families entitled to this treatment in the United Kingdom, but the proposed provision may be required in the future to enable us to accord to the families of permanent representatives to international organisations in this country similar treatment to that which the families of our permanent representatives to international organisations in other countries are given. In this special event we should not want to introduce special legislation for this purpose. It is not our intention to take action, but we felt it right to have this provision in the Bill so that we shall not have to come to Parliament for authority to do so if the need arises. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 13, line 34, at end insert the said subparagraphs.—(Lord Shepherd.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
On Question, Whether Schedule 1, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: Of course we agree to the Amendments which the noble Lord has proposed and which we have adopted. But there is one point which I must raise on the Question, That Schedule 1, as amended, stand part, and that is the social security aspect. The Explanatory Memorandum, when dealing with Schedule 1, states that there will be exemption from social security obligations, and this is expanded in paragraph 13 of the Schedule 1 on page 11. I should like to ask the noble Lord whether this means that the National Health Service is available to members of missions in this country, without their having to pay National Insurance stamp contributions. I fully understand why they should have a limited exemption from estate duty, but surely if they are to have the benefit of our National Health Service they should pay for it. I do not know whether the noble Lord will answer me on this point.
I should also like to say in regard to Schedule 1, that I am most grateful to the noble Lord for having written to me

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in regard to the word "family" in paragraph 23(2), which we discussed on Second Reading. Although, as he said in his reply to me, it may seem a little confusing, it is in my view entirely satisfactory. I see that in his letter to me he states that in the Schedule to the Act of 1950 the term used was "wife or husband and children under the age of 21", and that the reasons for proposing a change are that the 1961 Vienna Convention introduced the concept of members of the family who form part of the household. I gather that this term has not been defined in International Law or in domestic law, but that in our administrative practice—and I accept this—it is regarded as including the spouse and minor children resident with the entitled children, but may also include other persons in special circumstances—for example, a dependent parent or a sister managing the household for an unmarried officer. I fully understand, however, that under our administrative practice each claim to privilege will be considered on its merits, and therefore I am glad to accept the noble Lord's assurance on that point.
LORD SHEPHERD: I am grateful to the noble Earl, who has accepted the position in regard to families. I confirm that persons who are covered by this Bill and the orders that may be made under it, who are exempt from liability to make contributions under the National Insurance Act, are also exempt from the liability to pay National Health Service contributions. It is true that these persons, particularly the representatives and high officers who are entitled to diplomatic treatment, and the staff of organisations having establishments in the United Kingdom, will be exempt, but will have the facilities provided by our National Health Service. I believe that to make an exception would mean considerable administrative difficulty in dealing with a relatively few people. On the other hand, of course, there are certain countries, in the Commonwealth, in particular, and also in Europe, where they do not have a Health Service like ours but where some kind of reciprocal treatment is provided. As the noble Earl will know, if he is travelling abroad and falls sick there is some reciprocal treatment.
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I think that at this present moment of time the numbers are so small and the administrative difficulties so out of all proportion that it is right we should still let them receive treatment provided by our National Health Service, but that by this Bill they should be relieved of all liability under the two Acts concerned. This is a matter which could be looked at in the future, but at the moment I understand the administrative difficulties are such that it would be far better to leave it as it is.
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: The only point I wanted to suggest was that the Government of the country concerned might pay these charges.
LORD SHEPHERD: It may well be that this could at some time be permitted, but in many cases, of course, as the noble Earl knows, there are arrangements for reciprocal treatment for our people in these countries, as there is for their people in ours. But I will certainly look at it.
Schedule 1, as amended, agreed to.
Remaining Schedule agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported, with Amendments.