Lords Sitting of 17 June 1968

Preamble
The House met at half-past two of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR Oil the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Ripon.
The Earl of Oxford and Asquith—Took the Oath.

RETURN OF AMERICAN ARMY DESERTER
2.36 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government on what grounds the Home Office has authorised the arrest of, and proceedings for deportation against, Jeremy Tupper, an American citizen.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE, HOME OFFICE (LORD STONHAM): My Lords, this is not a deportation. Private Tupper is a deserter from the United States Army, and the United States Service authorities in this country requested his arrest under the Visiting Forces Act 1952. The application was in accordance with the provisions of the Act and my right honourable friend the Home Secretary found no reason why it should not be complied with. Private Tupper was accordingly arrested by the Metropolitan Police and brought before the West London Magistrates' Court, which, on being satisfied that he was a deserter, directed that he should be returned to the jurisdiction of the United States Service authorities.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, while thanking my noble friend for that Answer, may I ask whether, in view of the fact that the Visiting Forces Act confirming an agreement of the NATO powers was related to desertion from forces engaged in NATO commitments, it should be applied to a man who has deserted from service in Vietnam which is not a NATO exercise?
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I think my noble friend's question is misconceived. The Visiting Forces Act 1952 applies to countries which are members of NATO and also to Commonwealth countries. It does not apply only to those whose forces are part of the NATO force.
LORD BROCKWAY: Yes, my Lords. But was not the Visiting Forces Act a confirmation of an agreement which had been reached by the NATO Powers in relation to NATO activities? And should it be extended to those who on conscientious grounds are refusing to fight in Vietnam, because they regard it as an unjustifiable war?
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, the 1952 Act applies the relevant provisions of our Army Act 1955. That is the position, apart from the first Answer I gave. I have no comment to make on the question of conscientious objection, on which I have answered my noble friend on a number of occasions.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I am sorry to press this matter, but a great principle is involved. Is it not the case that in matters of this kind we Co not act unless the offender has been guilty of an offence which would be liable in a British court? So in view of the fact that our exemption for conscientious objectors applies to a particular war and the American exemption does not, ought we to hand over this man to the American authorities?
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, the Act in this country applies to members of visiting forces in this country who have deserted. It provides that the police may arrest a deserter from the forces of a country to which the Act applies and bring him before a court of summary jurisdiction, and if the court is satisfied that the man is a deserter it will hand him over to the appropriate Service authorities. That is what has been done. So far as my information goes, this young man was not a conscientious objector in any general sense of the word, as I understand it. He does not object to war as such, or to joining the forces. He was 10 months in the forces before he deserted, and then left the forces apparently because he did not wish to serve in Vietnam.
LORD GIFFORD: My Lords, may I follow my noble friend's question? Is it not a fact, as I think my noble friend confirmed, that the authorities in this country have a discretion in the matter, and will my noble friend confirm whether discretion was exercised against Private Tupper? Are there not circumstances, and is this not one, where that discretion might be exercised in accordance with humanity?
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, the Visiting Forces Act 1952 is an Act of the British Parliament, and the Home Secretary is the Minister called on by Parliament to apply it. He fully considered all the facts in this case and, as I said, could find no reason why the American request, which was made under Section 13 of the Act, should not be applied under Section 13.

PETROL STATIONS AND OIL COMPANIES
LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government why they have decided to allow unrestricted ownership of petrol stations by oil companies, contrary to the recommendations of the Monopolies Commission and the Government's previous decision.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE, BOARD OF TRADE (LORD BROWN): My Lords, the formula recommended by the Monopolies Commission for limiting ownership of petrol stations was, from the outset, considered to be liable to have too restrictive an effect on new entrants to the United Kingdom market. In the recent review of the voluntary undertakings given by the oil companies to my right honourable friend the President of the Board of Trade, it was concluded that the annual sales volume at which the limit on company ownership came into operation (even though it had been set at 50 million gallons as compared with the 10 million gallons which the Commission had originally recommended)
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was still very much too low in relation to the scale of current refinery projects.
While this point might have been met by a substantial rise in the ceiling, the problem remained of devising a formula which was not otherwise arbitrary and discriminatory in its effect on particular companies. It proved impracticable to devise any formula which was not open to considerable objection on those grounds.
LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY: My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for his Answer, may I ask whether, in view of the fact that the situation to which we have now reverted was regarded by the Monopolies Commission as against the public interest, it would not be better to change the limitations and devise a new formula, particularly since there are a number of people who think that a formula, possibly not a perfect one but a perfectly workable one, at a higher level could be applied?
LORD BROWN: My Lords, I find myself in a little difficulty on this matter. A reasonable answer to the noble Lord's supplementary question would involve going into all the very many varied factors which have had to be taken into consideration on this matter. I wonder whether I might ask the noble Lord if he would be prepared to address a series of questions to me in writing, to which I should be pleased to reply, or else to raise this matter as an Unstarred Question, when there will be a reasonable opportunity to give a measured response.

FAR EAST DEFENCE
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, at a convenient moment after 3.30 p.m. my noble friend Lord Chalfont will be making a Statement on the Five-Power Conference on Far East Defence.
Perhaps I might also remind your Lordships that dinner will be served between 7 and 8.30 this evening.

GAS AND ELECTRICITY BILL
Brought from the Commons on Friday last and printed, pursuant to Standing Order No. 45; read 1a.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA (UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS) ORDER 1968
2.44 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD GARDINER)THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD GARDINER) rose to move, That the Southern Rhodesia (United Nations Sanctions) Order 1968, laid before the House under Standing Order No. 62 on Monday, June 10, be approved. The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Shepherd I beg to move that this Order be approved.
The problem of Rhodesia is essentially a racial problem, because it relates to the circumstances in which and the conditions on which white men and black men are to live together, we hope in amity, in a part of Africa. That is why, although of course it is a British responsibility, it has always been recognised that it is a problem on which other countries feel deeply and even passionately. When I say "always", I was thinking back to the time in 1964, on February 22, when Mr. Duncan Sandys wrote to the Rhodesian Prime Minister and said:
"The Press here have been reporting from different sources that Southern Rhodesia may he contemplating a unilateral declaration of independence. I sincerely hope that these reports are without foundation, for I cannot believe that those who may be thinking like this have fully weighed the likely consequences. International reaction would be sharp and immediate. The issue would be raised at once in the United Nations, and we of course would not be able to offer any justification. The whole Commonwealth would be deeply disturbed, and the attitude of the newer members would be extremely antagonistic. Commonwealth and foreign Governments, with one or two exceptions, would almost certainly refuse to recognise Southern Rhodesia's independence, or to enter into relations with her. The African nationalists in Southern Rhodesia would probably set up a Government in exile, which many countries would recognise. Thus isolated, Southern Rhodesia would increasingly become a target for subversion, trade boycotts, air transport bans and other hostile activities organised in other African States."
I am unable, offhand, to remember any other observation made by Mr. Sandys with which I am in agreement, but at that time he was undoubtedly right.
The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, putting the point with his usual brevity, said on December 22, 1965, in this House, in
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Volume 271 of the OFFICIAL REPORT at column 1148:
"The Government clearly had to tale into account not only the reaction of the Rhodesians themselves, but the reaction of the Africans, the Commonwealth and the rest of the Free World. To do less than to impose sanctions might well have created a situation in the United Nations and in Africa,"
and so on.
My Lords, the problem of Rhodesia is one which the Government have always thought and said, and I have always thought and said, has only one right solution, and that is the solution of agreement by negotiation. I have said in this House more than once without contradiction that there are only three possible solutions to the Rhodesian problem. The first is the use of force to remove the illegal régime. Of course, I am bound to recognise that there are millions of people in the 'world who believe that this is the right solution. It is to me always very depressing to discuss this subject with Africans, because however hard one tries it is very difficult to get them to realise that this is not really the right solution. One can point out what a long way we are from Rhodesia, how inaccessible it is, how many of the airports in Rhodesia art: surrounded with African houses, whit the logistic difficulties are, that force cannot be the right solution to what is else a constitutional question, that anybody who to-day starts to use force in any part of Africa in circumstances in which it may develop into a racial war is taking a responsibility which no-one ought to take, and that when you have removed force the real problem still remains.
Unfortunately, the Africans have this deeply ingrained belief. They say: "In every other Colony, when anybody has taken power by force you have always used force to remove them. But, of course, they were black, or yellow or brown, and it is only because the illegal régime are white that you do not use force". I have found it, as I think we all have, extraordinarily difficult in talking to Africans to get this idea a out of their heads, although it is in fact one which is quite unjustified.
My Lords, I do not think I need spend any further time in discussing this possible solution, because, however many people may believe that this is a right solution, the Government have always

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set their face against it and I think that nearly everybody in this House is of the same opinion. I well remember an occasion when the noble Lord Carrington, said that he thought my noble friend Lord Brockway believed in the use of force; but knowing my noble friend slightly better, I said that I did not think that that was so. I have not of course forgotten that the noble Lord, Lord Rea, with his usual clarity, expressed the view that sanctions would not succeed; that unless we were to be utterly disgraced we should have to use force sooner or later; and that probably it was better and cheaper to do it now. But that view, I think, found no support in this House. I take it that we can all agree that that is not the right solution.
My Lords, the second solution is to hand over the 4⅓ million Africans in Rhodesia to the Rhodesian Front. We, that is to say, this Parliament, is of course the only body in the world who can hand over the legal powers in Rhodesia to the Rhodesian Front. That again, I think, finds no support from any of the Parties in this House—certainly not from the Government; not from the Conservative Party; not from the Liberal Party. And we all remember the speech made by the most reverend Primate, who said that this was a moral issue. I am not quite sure whether anyone in this House really thinks that we ought to say, "We have done our best; sanctions have not succeeded and the simple solution for us —and it is a simple solution—is to recognise the illegal régime and wash our hands of Rhodesia".
There are, of course, a certain number of noble Lords who I think are sometimes called "The Rhodesia Lobby". This is a term which I use with no disrespect, for I have frequently in this House accepted the complete sincerity of the views they express; and if I could think of a better group term I would. In December, 1965, on a Motion of the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, specifically on pensions but which ranged very widely, being advised by the Conservative Party not to vote against the Government, twenty-three of them, mostly Peers by succession, did so. And later in that month, on a debate on the Petroleum Order, being advised by their Party not to vote against the Govern-
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ment, nineteen of them, the majority of whom were Peers by succession, did so. In February, 1967, on the first mandatory Sanctions Order, being advised by the Opposition not to vote against the Government, thirteen of them—eleven of whom were here because they are their fathers' sons—voted against the Government. I have never been quite clear whether that fairly small group thinks that this is really the right solution. If so, no doubt in the course of this debate they will make it plain—as I do not think so far they have ever made it plain—whether they think that that is the right solution or whether they would themselves be against it.
My Lords, it occurs to me that there is a possible fourth solution; although I would not describe it as a present one. I remember there was once one of these opinion polls on what we should do about Rhodesia, in which 70 per cent. —which I suppose is a fairly high proportion—was in favour of handing the whole problem over to the United Nations. But that manifestly is not a thing which we can properly do until, at least, we have tried to do everything we can to solve the problem ourselves, it being in fact our responsibility.
If I am right in thinking that the only right solution is a settlement by negotiation, then no doubt in those negotiations there will be questions of principle and questions of detail. On all questions of detail I would hope that everybody concerned would always be prepared to compromise to the greatest extent possible. But there are questions of principle to which we and our predecessors are committed because we have always said that we accept the Six Principles; and Sir Alec Douglas-Home has I think recently said that a Conservative Government—if a Conservative Government were elected—could accept a settlement only on those Principles. If I may, I will remind the House of what they are. First, the principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule already enshrined in the 1961 Constitution would have to be maintained and guaranteed; secondly, there would also have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution; thirdly, there would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population; fourthly, there would have to be progress

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towards ending racial discrimination; and, fifthly, the British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. And to those five Principles the House will remember that the present Government added a sixth; it would be necessary to ensure that regardless of race there was no oppression of majority by minority or of minority by majority. We were, of course, thinking of the position of the Africans before majority rule and of the position of the Europeans after majority rule.
My Lords, the place of sanctions in all this is simply in order to try to effect a change of mind in Salisbury so that they are prepared to reach an agreement based on those Principles. On December 22, 1965 in the same debate, the noble Lord, Lord Carrington said:
"It has been the object of those who sit on these Batches to support the Government and to maintain the unity of the country in this grave emergency whenever possible, though many of us have had doubts what the outcome of the Government's policy would be. I agree with the noble and learned Lord that it would have been impossible that Mr. Smith's Government should not suffer serious consequences as a result of their illegal declaration of independence. If force was out of the question, as it was, and still is, then it seems to me that it was necessary to impose sanctions. If sanctions were to be imposed, then it really was quite impossible to differentiate between punitive sanctions and sanctions which were not punitive, since it was hoped that sanctions would bring home to Mr. Smith and his colleagues the consequences of his act of rebellion, and so impress the people of Rhodesia with the gravity of the situation that moderate men could emerge and take over the Government.
I am bound to say, though I know that this view is not shared by some of my noble friends, that oil sanctions do not seem to me to be very different in kind from the other sanctions which have already been imposed."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, col. 1141.]
My Lords, sanctions, it is said, have not succeeded. Indeed, there seem to me to be two complaints about sanctions: complaints by those who say that they are not sufficiently effective; and complaints by those who say that they are too effective. Sanctions have, I suggest, in part, succeeded; because they have apparently succeeded in persuading some people in Salisbury that there is no good in their going on like this. After two and a half years there is still no country in the world which recognises the illegal régime as the
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legal Government of Rhodesia; their trade shrinks the whole time, and they will have in the end, as the only solution, to make an agreement with the British Government on the basis of this Six Principles.
My Lords, I take as an example, and because it does not come from the Government, an article from somebody who I suppose ought to know, and who is the regular Salisbury correspondent of the Economist. I suppose it is his business to know about the economy in Rhodesia. In an article published on the 8th of this month he says this:
"Rhodesia's industrialists have warned Mr. Ian Smith more bluntly than ever before that economic progress requires a return to normal trading with the outside world. Any new Rhodesian Constitution, they argue, must be acceptable to the world's major trading nations. For some time they have been pressing their points in heated private exchanges with the Smith regime. They have been accused of wanting a 'sell-out'. Now they have brought their demands into the open.
On May 22, at the Annual Congress of the Association of Rhodesian Industries, the theme was announced sharply by the preside it, Mr. William Perry of Lancashire Steel. Delegate after delegate played variations on the theme, accompanied by applause, in the presence of visibly unhappy members of the Smith government. Some 200 manufacturers were present, representing 90 per cent. of secondary industrial production. They heard Mr Perry warn Rhodesia that it could not afford to ignore the looming threat of mandatory sanctions on all its trade—a threat that has become reality with the Security Council's unanimous resolution of May 29.
Just before the 1965 declaration of independence, business was flourishing. Exports of manufactured goods to Zambia and Malawi were going up. Never had Rhodesia's balance of payments been so healthy. But the industrialists' warnings were ignored by the Smith men, the farmers and many top civil servants, and the plunge was taken.
Then came the clampdown on imports to conserve foreign exchange, and the shrinking of Rhodesia's export market under the pressure of sanctions. Hundreds of factories switched to the home market. New industries opened up. To-day it is fairly hard to find imported goods in the shops. Some manufacturers have made a lot of money in this hungry market. They say so frankly. Others, especially the manufacturers of textiles, footwear and radios, did well in the comparatively new South African market until the recent restrictions secured by alarmed South African manufacturers. This is the bitterest blow of all, especially as South Africa has meanwhile captured former Rhodesian markets in Zambia and Malawi.
Now the home market is reaching saturation point. The South African market doesn't

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look so good. Manufacturers need to move into the wider export field again if growth rates are to be maintained, factories kept busy and labour employed. There are fears of inflation and of African unrest.
At the recent annual congress loud applause greeted Mr. Denis Berens, a pharmaceutical manufacturer, who said that: 'Any form of worthwhile sustained economic growth can only come to Rhodesia through a settlement with Britain in the political sphere.' As Mr. Coutthard of the Metal Box Company said: 'That view should have been expressed by us long ago.'"
What I venture to think has happened is that there has been this change of view among manufacturers, churches, universities and most educated people in Salisbury, but they have kept it so far to themselves, and they are only now beginning to press that view upon the artisans and small farmers who are still, of course, the majority of the Rhodesian Front. And it is perhaps also noteworthy that on the Queen's Birthday some 3,000 people took the trouble to go to the Governor and sign his book, a far larger number than in the previous year.
The second reason why sanctions have not so far been completely successful is that to start with we were the only people who operated them at all, and even since the first mandatory resolution of the Security Council, mandatory sanctions have been applied only to those goods which were specified in the resolution. The result seems to have been a pressure among countries to increase their trade with Rhodesia in the unprohibited goods; and, of course, so long as they can trade with Rhodesia in unprohibited goods it is perhaps not surprising if some prohibited goods get in by the back door as well. The third reason, I think, is that for so much of all the time that sanctions have been going on there have also been going on in Salisbury talks about talks about talks. I have, naturally, been familiar with the substance of these talks. Mr. Smith has always been most anxious that he should be able to tell his people in Salisbury that there were talks going on and, naturally enough, this has militated against a change of view by the ordinary white settlers; because they have always said, "There are talks going on; Smith is going to settle it; he has told us that this is the great prize and that he will
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end by settling it with the British Government on his own terms ".
My Lords, of course it was really only about a fortnight before the "Tiger" that any of these talks resulted in any sort of advance on Mr. Smith's position at all. Originally his position was clear. I was in the Cabinet Room at No. 10 when he said (this is on page 72 of the Blue Book) that he must make it clear that the Government party in Rhodesia did not believe in majority rule, and he was always quite plain about that. When it came to asking for a guarantee that the Constitution, if they were given independence, would not subsequently be changed backwards against the Africans, he always said that he could not agree to that. And the reason was that if at any time it appeared that there was actually likely to be an African majority elected, obviously they would have to have the right to change the Constitution backwards to stop it.
He said—and this appears on page 105 of the Blue Book:
"The Rhodesian Government must therefore retain their powers in this field since if it appeared at a future election that an African Government. was probable and the Rhodesian Government felt in the light of developments in countries to the north of Rhodesia that this would still be premature they must have the power to delay such a majority by, for example, a reduction in the B-roll seats in the last resort. This would be their only means of preserving their civilisation."
My Lords, apart from a very brief hour in the "Tiger", Mr. Smith, has usually fairly frankly said that he does not believe in majority rule, and he cannot agree to entrenched clauses or to any sort of guarantee that he would not alter the Constitution afterwards against the Africans.
Some of your Lordships may have seen on April 28 an account of an interview with Mr. Smith by Mr. Ian Waller, of the Sunday Telegraph. The article said:
"An apparent end to all prospect of agreement between Britain and Rhodesia now seems inevitable. In an exclusive interview with me here to-day Mr. Ian Smith, the Rhodesian Prime Minister, rejected any … principle of African majority rule. Mr. Smith said that, failing an early settlement, Rhodesia would introduce its own Constitution, based on the report of the Whaley Commission proposing eventual parity between the 4 million Africans and 250.000 Europeans. Britain and the world would have to accept this as a fait accompli…

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"I put this question to Mr. Smith, 'Do you think that any negotiations with Britain based on the principle of eventual majority rule would be acceptable to your Party or the country?' Mr. Smith replied, 'Not only as a party, but I don't think any white person in Rhodesia accepts this. Maybe Garfield Todd does, and you can perhaps find a dozen people. But generally speaking no one accepts it. They face up to the facts of life. I have never said I accept it, and I hope I have made it clear that on the evidence before me I think majority rule would lead to absolute chaos in Rhodesia at the moment. It may be different in twenty, a hundred years' time. I don't know. It is not a decision for me to make. My children will have to make it. The only way we could sell this would be to try to get people to believe that it did not really mean anything for the next 100 years. Maybe you could sell it to Rhodesians on that basis.'."
If that is Mr. Smith's view, the present difficulty is to see what anybody is going to Salisbury to negotiate about. If we are right in maintaining the Six Principles and the Conservative Party are right in saying that they believe in majority rule; if, so far as I have been led to discover, there is no real difference between us about the word "when"—because the Prime Minister has always said that the Africans before they can get majority rule must show in practice that they are capable of governing the country, and obviously this must be many, many years ahead—what do we negotiate about, if that is Mr. Smith's attitude about that one of the Six Principles and if, as I have no doubt, Mr. Smith would, for his own purposes, like us to start again talks about talks about talks?
Speaking as recently as May 3 at Bulawayo, Mr. Smith said that he could tell in precisely one minute which he considered
"to be the most important ingredient of any Constitution for Rhodesia: the ability to change it, so that if in 10 or 20 years' time our children find that the course along which we have set Rhodesia is drifting, then they will be able easily to amend this and change the course so that it once more moves back on to the true course."
I do not know how this can possibly be reconciled with the second Principle. Therefore, while the Government believe that the only right solution for Rhodesia is a settlement by negotiation, sanctions are for the purpose of inducing in Mr. Smith the same change of mind which has already apparently taken place among the businessmen in Salisbury.
May I then come to the United Nations resolution and the Order? There are still, so far as we know, between 50 and 100 Africans waiting in the death cells in Rhodesia. It was the executions, of course, which led some Afro-Asians to put a resolution before the Security Council. I am aware that those who are in the Rhodesian lobby—I call them this because I cannot think of any other appropriate group word—do not like the United Nations. We could, of course, leave the United Nations, but if we remain members then we must be realistic. I say that because sometimes they speak as if either we control the United Nations or we would control the United Nations if only we were not a Labour Government. But there is no way in which a member can be stopped from putting a resolution before the Security Council.
The Afro-Asians got their draft resolution in first. It was clear that they were not going to allow it to be voted on paragraph by paragraph, and they were entitled to have their resolution taken first. It does not matter whether we have a Labour Government, a Conservative Government or a Government of members of the Rhodesian Lobby, because there were only three things we could do: we could Note for it, vote against it or abstain. To be really practical, there were only two choices—either to vote for it or against it; because as the resolution was a mandatory one, if we merely abstained it would bind us all the same.
The original resolution contained things to which we could not possibly agree. No one with any knowledge of the world to-day would disagree with the proposition that it is a serious thing to use the veto. We have been a member of the United Nations for nearly a quarter of a century and we have used the veto only three times—twice on Suez (the less said about that perhaps the better). After something of a preamble, saying it was all our fault, the resolution then named South Africa and Portugal as the chief sanction-breakers and threatened sanctions against them. We have always made it clear that we were not going to he engaged in any form of trade war with South Africa. It called on us to use force. We have always made it plain that we could not agree to

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use force. It called for a complete cessation of all postal and commercial relations with Rhodesia. This would have meant that we should have had to withdraw our mission from Salisbury. A later draft of the resolution sought to impose on us an obligation to accept no independence before majority rule; whatever we agreed with the Commonwealth Prime Ministers could be altered by agreement. We could not accept that. Also there were to be no further negotiations.
I appreciate the effect throughout the Commonwealth and the whole world if we had used the veto in favour of Rhodesia. I do not believe that there is any other man in the whole world who could have done what my noble friend Lord Caradon did, patiently day after day arguing, negotiating with Africans, Asians and South Americans, with men who respect him for his views on racial subjects and for his integrity. I frankly say that if I had been asked 48 hours before the actual vote in the Security Council what I thought would happen, I should have had to say, strongly as I felt about it, that I was afraid that the probability was that we should have to use the veto. It is solely because of the efforts of my noble friend Lord Caradon and the personal terms on which he is with African, Asian and South American leaders, all of whom, it is right to say, felt that if it was possible to make such adjustments as would enable us to accede to it, that was what they would like, that eventually those clauses went and for the first time a resolution in relation to Rhodesia was passed by the Security Council with, among others, Brazil, Denmark, India, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, America, Russia and (voting for the first time on Rhodesia) France.
The Order which I am asking your Lordships to approve may look rather long, because there are 19 clauses, but the sole reason for its length is that it revokes 11 existing Orders and puts them all together in one. Also, previously we did not have to put in any Order prohibitions with regard to goods not covered by the previous resolution on mandatory sanctions, because from the word "Go" we had stopped all trade with Rhodesia. So this Order extends the
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prohibition to all goods. Therefore, except for one clause dealing with residents in Rhodesia, the Order makes no change to anything at all. Of course, the resolution passed by the Security Council makes an immense change. The change is that now, for the first time, all the countries of the world who are members of the United Nations have to assume the same burden that we have been assuming ever since the start. On many occasions I have heard Members of your Lordships' House complain that we were losing all our trade and that other people were getting it. Now, for the first time, the burden we have assumed from the start will be taken by substantially all the countries of the world.
As this is an Order, I ought just to go through it briefly, and I will do so as quickly as I can. Article I of the Order restricts the importation into the United Kingdom of all goods that have been exported from Southern Rhodesia since the commencement of the Order. The prohibition is so framed that for the purposes of the Customs and Excise Act 1952 it has effect as an enactment relating to customs. The object of this is to attract the enforcement machinery and the ancillary provisions of the Act of 1952; for example, the provisions authorising the forfeiture of goods illegally imported, the provisions conferring powers on customs officers to detect evasions, and the provisions regulating the procedure in prosecutions. The Article is therefore virtually a repetition of Article I of the Southern Rhodesia (Prohibited Trade and Dealings) Order 1966, except that it applies to all goods and not merely to the goods that were specified by the latter Order.
Article 2 restricts the exportation of all goods from Southern Rhodesia and also restricts certain transactions which are ancillary to such exportation. In particular, it will be seen that paragraph (3) of the Article is aimed at dealings in goods that have been illicitly exported. Once again, this Article is, in substance, a repetition of the corresponding Article of the Order of 1966, except that it now applies to all goods and not merely to a list of specified goods. It will be seen that Articles 1 and 2 deal with traffic in goods originating in Southern Rhodesia, whether for export to this country or elsewhere. Articles 3, 4 and 5 deal with traffic in the reverse direction; that is to

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say, with goods consigned to Southern Rhodesia either from this country or from other countries.
Article 3 restricts the exportation from the United Kingdom of goods that are consigned for Southern Rhodesia. As in the case of Article 1, and for the same reasons, the Article is expressed to have effect as an enactment relating to the Customs and Excise Act 1952. And again, this Article—which, as I have already said, merely gives legal effect in a different form to a virtually total prohibition on exports to Rhodesia which has been in force in this country for a considerable time—substantially reproduces the corresponding Articles of the Order of 1966, but covers the whole range of goods and not merely those that were specified in the latter Order.
Articles 4 and 5 deal with the supply of goods to Southern Rhodesia from any place outside that country, and with the importation of goods into Southern Rhodesia. These Articles are also substantially the same as the corresponding Articles in the Order of 1966, again with the qualification that they now apply to all goods and not merely to certain specified goods.
Article 6 deals with the carriage in British ships and aircraft of goods that have been illegally exported from Southern Rhodesia or that are being illegally consigned to Southern Rhodesia. Again, this is very largely a reproduction of the corresponding Article in the Order of 1966. However, it goes slightly wider than the earlier provision in two respects. In the first place, and in order to meet the requirements of the relevant provision in the Security Council resolution it deals not only with carriage in British registered ships and aircraft but also with carriage by our nationals in foreign ships and aircraft which they have chartered. Secondly, and again primarily to give formal compliance with the terms of the resolution, the Article prohibits the carriage of goods in question in land transport vehicles within the United Kingdom.
Given our own interpretation of what constitutes importation into this country, and our effective control over it, I think that this particular provision can be regarded as pretty academic so far as we are concerned, but it was thought desirable to include a reference in the resolution to carriage by land transport,
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since some countries apparently take the view that goods carried in bond across their territory are not to De regarded as having been imported. The House will be pleased to know that this addition to the resolution effectively closes a small but not insignificant loophole in the application of the earlier Security Council resolution. It thus helps to ensure that foreign traders do not have an unfair advantage over our own businessmen.
Article 7 deals with the use or operation of undertakings in Southern Rhodesia for the manufacture or assembly of aircraft or motor vehicles. It also imposes restrictions on certain transactions concerning such undertakings if these transactions might enable the mail provisions of the Article to be evaded or disregarded. This Article is, to ill intents and purposes, a repetition of Article 6 of the Order of 1966, which gave effect to a particular provision of the Security Council resolution of December 16, 1966. It does not directly derive from the latest Security Council resolution, except in so far as that resolution expressly reaffirms the earlier resolution. But since, as I will explain when I come to deal with Article 18, the present Order revokes the earlier Orders, it was necessary to re-enact this particular provision. As I have said it represents no alteration in the law.
Article 8 is, in a sense, ancillary to Article 6. It confers powers on "authorised officers"—that is to say, naval and military officers, customs officers, consular officers and officials of the Board of Trade—to investigate British ships and aircraft that are suspected of being involved in the carriage of goods to or from Southern Rhodesia, contrary to the Order. In the case of ships suspected of being involved in the carriage of goods to or from Southern Rhodesia, authorised officers are given the power to divert and detain ships for investigation or to forbid them to land the cargo in question. Again, this Article is, in substance, a repetition of the corresponding provision in the Order of 1966.
Article 9 is a repetition of the provisions which were inserted into the Order of 1966 by the Amendment made in March. 1967: that is to say, the Southern Rhodesia (Prohibited Trade and Dealings) (Amendment) Order 1567. It

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confers certain powers on the Minister to prevent or restrict the transfer of the ownership of certain property overseas where such a transfer might lead to a contravention or evasion of the Order. The House will recall that when this power was first taken last year directions were given under it to prevent the transfer of the ownership of the pipeline which in normal times carries crude oil to the refinery in Rhodesia from the Port of Beira. No further directions have since been given. Since the earlier Orders are being revoked, it was necessary to reproduce this particular provision, and the House will see that Article 18(3) contains a transitional provision as a result of which the directions about the pipeline that were given under the earlier Order are to have effect from now on as though they were given under this Order.
I turn now to Articles 10 and 11 of the Order, which together give effect to paragraph 6 of the Security Council resolution, the paragraph which deals with the operation of aircraft into and out of Rhodesia and with what it describes as "linking-up" between Rhodesian airlines and other airlines. Article 10 deals with the first half of this topic. As required by the resolution, it restricts the operation to or from Rhodesia of British airline companies and British registered aircraft, and also aircraft that are chartered by British nations. As the House will realise, this is largely academic, since neither B.O.A.C. nor any of the independent airline companies have for some time now operated any flights between this country and Rhodesia.
The second half of paragraph 6 of the resolution—"linking-up"—is covered by Article 11 of the Order. As the House will see, this regulates the conclusion or the carrying out of certain arrangements or agreements which involve co-ordination or co-operation between Rhodesian air transport services and British air transport services. Again, it is not likely that these provisions will make very much difference to our own airlines, but the inclusion of this prohibition against "linking-up" in the resolution may well prove a great hindrance to the attempt by the illegal regime to gain acceptance for the so-called "Air Rhodesia Corporation" which it purported to set up in place of
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the Central African Airways Corporation.
I now come to Article 12 of the Order, which I recognise is the provision which is likely to be of most concern to the House. This Article is intended to give effect to paragraph 5 of the Security Council resolution, which calls upon all Member States of the United Nations to prevent the entry into their territories of certain classes of persons connected with Southern Rhodesia. I will say a word in a few minutes about how we have defined these classes in terms of our own legislation, but it may be convenient if I first of all explain to the House how the machinery established by this Article will work.
The House will see that the Article operates by attracting the relevant provisions of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 as, of course, amended by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968. It was thought desirable to proceed in this way so that the immigration officers, upon whom the burden of carrying out these measures will fall, can use the machinery of the 1962 Act, with which they are familiar and to which their organisation is geared. It was also thought desirable that the procedure for examining the cases of these would-be entrants from Rhodesia should be exactly the same—neither more nor less favourable—as applies in the case of persons coming from other Commonwealth countries.
Against this background, therefore, Article 12 applies to two classes of persons. The first consists of those persons whom the resolution describes as travelling on a Southern Rhodesian passport. This is the class described in Article 12(1)(a) of the Order. There are two comments which it might be helpful for me to make in this connection. The first is that the concept of travelling on a passport is represented in municipal law terms by the concept of tendering a passport to an immigration officer on seeking entry into the United Kingdom. The test, in other words, is what the person concerned holds himself out as being when he arrives at the immigration control point. My second comment is that, as my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary explained to another House when discussing the resolution in its draft form, we do not think it is right,

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in giving effect to this part of the resolution, to deny entry to this country to persons who are our citizens whether or not they also hold Rhodesian passports. Accordingly, the House will see, from sub-paragraph (i) of Article 12(1)(a), that an immigration officer cannot refuse entry to a person who satisfies him that he is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies.
The second class of persons to whom Article 12 applies are those defined in Article 12(1)(b). These are residents of Southern Rhodesia who we have reason to think are active supporters of the illegal regime who are involved in sanctions-breaking activities. The House will see that in this case there is no exception—and this is deliberate—merely because they are citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies. But since the persons concerned are, by definition, ordinarily resident in Southern Rhodesia, they are not being excluded from the place where they have their home.
In relation to these two classes of persons the operative part of the Article —that is to say, paragraph (2)—provides that an immigration officer acting under the 1962 Act may (and I emphasise the word "may") refuse entry to a person who arrives here from abroad, or may admit him subject to conditions. This discretion will of course be exercised in accordance with instructions given by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State, and in dealing with these instructions he will naturally have regard to the exception for humanitarian cases which the resolution specifically makes in the case of persons travelling on Rhodesian passports.
The House will also observe that paragraphs (c) and (d) of Article 12(2) render persons to whom the Article applies liable to deportation if, but of course only if, they are convicted of offences against the Act in the form in which it applies to them by virtue of the Article. What this means in practice is that where a person whose entry is subject to control under the Article evades that control and enters the country illegally, or where he breaks the conditions upon which he was permitted to enter, he can, if he is convicted by a court of the offence which he thus committed, be put in the same position as if he had originally been refused entry.
The powers conferred by Article 12 are of course drastic. I recognise this. They are not powers which we have taken gladly or lightly. They are not and I must emphasise this—intended to operate by way of punishment. They are intended rather to be coercive, in the ordinary sense of the word, and deterrent. That is to say, they are intended, in so far as they impede the travel of ordinary Rhodesians, to bring home to them the isolation and estrangement from the rest of the civilised world which the actions of their leaders have imposed on them. In so far as they affect those who actively support the régime and further its policies, whether in the political field or in the economic field, they are intended to hamper their activities as far as lies within our power and to deter others who might be minded to follow their example.
But, of course, the question whether action should be taken in respect of any particular person for these latter reasons is in every case a matter of judgment. In the nature of things it can be only a matter of judgment, and it is part of the responsibility of the Secretary of State that the judgment must be his. It is a judgment for which he is accountable to Parliament, and he cannot, even if he would, shift that responsibility anywhere else. But he recognises that this is a matter where, in order to assure Parliament and the country that his responsibilities are being exercised reasonably and in good faith, it is desirable to set up some independent procedure for reviewing these cases; and I will say another word about that in a moment.
I should like to make clear at this point that in order to assist all States to apply the United Nations' resolution we propose to declare invalid all existing Southern Rhodesian passports. Her Majesty's Government will retain, as the responsible authority in Rhodesia, the power to issue in lieu of invalidated Southern Rhodesian passports United Kingdom passports where there are special reasons for doing so. I do not want to enter into detail now, but I think that the House will wish to knew that we propose to do this in the case of Rhodesians who are established residents in any country outside Rhodesia as well as in the following cases.
First, family members. If one member of a family holds a United Kingdom passport the other immediate members—husband, wife and children under 21—will qualify for temporary United Kingdom passports when the family is travelling as a group. Secondly, compassionate cases, which will in any case be eligible for entry under the humanitarian clause. Thirdly, political refugees. People in this class will have to satisfy us that they would experience genuine persecution for their political views if they were refused passport facilities. Passports for persons known to be terrorists will of course be refused. As the
House knows, the Government have throughout condemned any actions by terrorists, whether inside or outside Rhodesia. Fourthly, all students as defined in the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 and the instructions to entry certificate officers. Fifthly, a small number of cases approved specifically by the Secretary of State or his deputy when the grant of a passport is in the public interest. We shall apply the same criteria to Rhodesians not possessing United Kingdom citizenship who have obtained six-months British passports in exchange for Rhodesian documents and who seek to have them renewed.
My Lords, I said that I would say something about the review procedure. Having carefully considered this, the Government have decided to set up an Advisory Committee to review the special cases in which United Kingdom passport facilities have been withdrawn in consequence of the Government's policy towards Rhodesia. I have seen Mr. Justice Cairns, who was formerly Chairman of the Monopolies Commission and Chairman of the Executive Committee of Justice when he was at the Bar, and he has agreed to accept the chairmanship of this Committee. My right honourable friend has also been able to secure the services as members of the Committee of Sir William Murray, formerly Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Scottish Office; Sir William Oliver, formerly Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff and High Commissioner in Australia; and Mr. F. J. Pedler, Deputy Chairman of the United Africa Company.
The detailed terms of reference are still under discussion and they will be circulated in the OFFICIAL REPORT as
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soon as possible; but, briefly, they are as follows. The Committee will scrutinise and report to the Secretary of State on all the cases in which the decision has so far been taken to withdraw passport facilities in accordance with the Statement made to the House by the then Commonwealth Secretary on January 25, 1966. They will also scrutinise all those cases in which it is decided that a United Kingdom citizen, or any other person who would ordinarily be entitled to enter this country freely, should be denied entry in accordance with Article 12(1)(b) of the Order now being debated. If a person wishes to have his case reviewed by the Committee the Secretary of State will arrange for this to be done.
As the House knows, the issue of passports has always taken place under the prerogative of the Crown. The final responsibility for the deciding action in individual cases must remain with the Secretary of State, but I can assure the House that he will give the fullest weight to the Advisory Committee's report and recommendations. It strikes me as a Committee such as a good many of us were fairly familiar with a great many years ago, during the war, the 18B Committee, of which Mr. Justice Birkett (as he then was) was Chairman. As an additional safeguard, in view of the public disquiet and the danger of arbitrary action, my right honourable friend has decided to define and make public the categories of persons against whom action will be taken in accordance with Article 12(1)(b) of the Order: first, sanction breakers; second, those who, by reason of the office they hold, must be regarded as giving active support to the illegal régime, for example, Rhodesian Front Members of Parliament; third, those who, in terms of the United Nations resolution, we have reason to believe have furthered or encouraged the unlawful actions of the illegal regime. A person in this last category will in future be notified and will be told the grounds upon which this decision has been taken.
I should like to take this opportunity of expressing the thanks of the Government to Mr. Justice Cairns and the members of the committee for giving their time to this matter. That, a clause of the resolution we could practically have done without, as far as we are concerned is almost the only effect which the Order which your Lordships are being asked

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to approve has, but I had better just shortly complete my review of it.
I turn now to Article 13, which deals with certain activities calculated to promote emigration to Southern Rhodesia. The House may be aware that we were under considerable pressure in the United Nations to agree to the inclusion in the resolution of a provision requiring all States absolutely to prevent emigration to Southern Rhodesia. We made it clear that such a provision was unacceptable to us both because of the probable ineffectiveness and unenforceability of any prohibition in these terms and because it did not seem to us to be justified on its own merits. But we had to recognise that it has for a long time been a matter of considerable offence to our friends in other countries that the régime and its supporters have been able, both in this country and elsewhere, to go around soliciting professional people and skilled workers to take up employment in Southern Rhodesia and thus to help boost the Rhodesian economy and protect it against the effect of sanctions. No doubt employment in Rhodesia is still attractive for those who would enjoy the privileged position of the European population there; and those individuals whose consciences permit them to take advantage of that privileged position must be left free to do so if they wish. But there is no reason why we should make it easy for the régime to run deliberate campaigns to attract them, the sort of campaigns which featured in the Press a few months ago and which justifiably caused indignation among many of my noble friends. Accordingly, we agreed that it was reasonable to insert a provision into the resolution aimed at these activities and for us to include in our own legislation a provision on the lines of Article 13. It will be seen that that Article does not strike at the individual emigrant but only at what may be broadly described as public advertisements or solicitations.
The remainder of the Order deals with such matters as enforcement, interpretation and similar ancillary topics. Article 14, which should be read together with the First Schedule, confers certain powers on the Secretary of State, the Board of Trade and the Commissioners of Customs and Excise. These powers are for the purpose of obtaining evidence
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and information to secure compliance with the provisions of the Order and to detect evasions. Once again, these provisions are substantially a reproduction of the corresponding provisions of the Order of 1966. The same is also true of Article 15. Articles 16 and 17 deal with interpretation, and Article 18 revokes the existing 11 Orders in this field, which are really the substance of the Order. As your Lordships will see, Lord Caradon obtained an amendment of practically every objectionable point contained in the original resolution before the Security Council, but now that the Security Council has unanimously passed this mandatory resolution I cannot see how any Government in this country could possibly do anything except to implement it, whatever Government was in power.
I should like to make two final points, apologising for taking so long. First, I would ask Members in all parts of the House to bear in mind the effect of any adverse vote on the reputation of this country throughout the world, not merely the Commonwealth, and also in the United Nations. Lastly, there is a point in connection with which I have a personal concern and which I hope will not be thought irrelevant. For months past I have been the chairman of the all-Party Committee on House of Lords Reform, a subject which, as we all know, in the past has proved to be one of great difficulty. We have been meeting, week after week, month after month, and while it has been agreed that the details of our discussion should be treated as confidential, I can at least say, not only that the conference has not broken down yet but that it is within a very short measure of a true all-Party agreement. It really seems to me that it would be most unfortunate if any action taken by any group on any side were to be such as to cause the end of these discussions which have been taking place. I am quite sure that we need a Second Chamber, and a Second Chamber in terms which can be defended before the modern world, and I would certainly very much welcome any comments on that which any of the other members of the all-Party Committee might think fit to make.
I am not an expert on constitutional law. I have heard the position stated in this House, and I do not know that I

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have ever thought of contradicting it, because it was people like the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, who were expressing it. But on December 22, 1965, in the debate on the Petroleum Order, he said this:
"We in this House are in a very extraordinary position. Because of our composition, it is more than likely that if the Opposition decided to vote against the Government their vote would be successful. All of us have in the past tried to lay down certain guide lines as to how the House of Lords should conduct itself in situations of deep Party controversy. There is no precedent for the situation in which we find ourselves today. Nevertheless, if this Order
were rejected by the House, although it has passed the Commons with a large majority, certain consequences would follow. The decision of the Government, taken in concert with the United States and supported by a number of other European powers and by the Commonwealth, would seem to be rendered inoperative on a vote taken by this House in defiance, in opposition, to the elected Chamber. Of course, the House is entitled to do that; but, my Lords, surely no Government could passively accept such an adverse vote. Either the powers of the House would be further curtailed or, more likely, there would be a very drastic reform of both the powers and the composition of the House.
"Noble Lords who feel strongly on this matter should, I think, make up their minds whether this issue is one on which the House of Lords should decide to use its ultimate power. Will not those who dislike these sanctions have made their opinion abundantly clear by the end of the evening? What can they hope to achieve by a vote? Is this really an issue on which, or is this the right moment, to face a constitutional crisis? To me, my Lords, the answer is clearly, 'No'; and, if I have carried any of your Lordships on these Benches with me in anything I have said this evening, I would earnestly beg you not to oppose this Order by voting, but to abstain, as I and colleagues who sit beside me on this Bench propose to do."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 22/12/65, cols. 1151–52.]
An even closer parallel was, of course, the debate on the first mandatory sanctions by the United Nations. This was in February of last year, February 6. This really seems to me the very same point. The noble Lord, Lord Harlech, said this:
"I now come to the difficult problem of what we, in this Chamber, should do about these two particular Orders. I suppose it might be argued that however much we disapprove of the Government's course of action
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—and we made this disapproval abundantly clear, I think, during the debate in December —the Security Council has now, wisely, or as we think, unwisely, passed a resolution which makes it mandatory on the British Government to impose precise and rigorous sanctions. If we were now to vote against the Orders and succeeded in nullifying them we should be preventing the Government from acting in a manner in which they are compelled to act by the clear provisions of the United Nations Charter. I do not know how much weight noble Lords would wish to attach to this particular argument, but what seems to me to be the most telling argument against refusing the Government these Orders is that it would be an unprecedented interference by this, a non-elected Chamber, in the executive actions of a Government supported by a large majority in another place. I cannot feel that this would be a proper exercise of our powers."—[OFFICIAL RETORT, 6/2/67, col. 1157]
My Lords, I find it very difficult to see why, if those considerations were right then, similar considerations do not apply at the present time. Here is this unanimous resolution of the Security Council; here is this Order, and the Order—this is the only thing on which the House will vote—apart from this rather complicated matter of Rhodesian residence, does virtually nothing which we have not done all the way through. What the whole resolution of the United Nations really does is to impose on all countries burdens which we had ourselves borne in the past. It is on those grounds that I would ask the House to accept the Order.
I do not wish to say anything further which might in any way lead to any antagonism by one group against some other group. I felt, as Chairman of the All-Party Conference, I was entitled to point out that if in effect an agreement by all Parties of a modernised version of this House could be arrived at it really would be sad, to say the least of it, if because of anything in to-day's events all that were to be lost. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Southern Rhodesia (United Nations Sanctions) Order 1968, laid before the House under Standing Order No. 62 on Monday, June 10, be approved.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

FAR EAST DEFENCE
3.54 p.m.
THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (LORD CHALFONT): My Lords, I had intended to ask the indulgence of your Lordships' House at this time to repeat a Statement which is being made in another place by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence on the Five Power Conference on Far East Defence. The Statement is a long and complicated one, and I hope I may therefore have the approval of the House in present circumstances to circulate this Statement in the OFFICIAL REPORT instead.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Hear, hear!
Following is the Statement referred to by Lord Chalfont, as made in the House of Commons:
"With permission, I should like to make a Statement on the Five Power Conference on Far East Defence, held in Kuala Lumpur on 10th and 11th June, at the invitation of the Prime Minister of Malaysia. My right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs and I represented the United Kingdom Government. The Governments of Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore were each represented by two senior Ministers.
"The conference was held to discuss problems resulting from the withdrawal of British forces from Malaysia and Singapore by the end of 1971. I am glad to be able to inform the House that agreement was reached, and decisions were taken on a number of major issues. Above all, the Governments of Malaysia and Singapore made it clear that they regarded the defence of their two countries as indivisible, and that it required close and continuing cooperation between them. The whole conference welcomed this declaration and regarded it as an indispensable basis for wider co-operation on defence.
"Important specific decisions were reached, affecting defence by sea, land and air. The need for an integrated air defence system covering Malaysia and Singapore was recognised, and the form of its integrated control and management is to be studied further. Singapore and Malaysia agreed to develop their naval forces in such a way that they can co-operate in coastal defence, and the Royal Malaysian Navy will continue to use the Woodlands Naval Base in Singapore. Jungle warfare training is to continue in Malaysia on a multi-national basis, and all five countries agreed that it was desirable that there should be joint exercises in the area after 1971. Australia will contribute to an integrated air defence system by keeping an R.A.A.F. component at Butterworth at least until the end of 1971, and detaching
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aircraft to Tengah. Singapore has decided to buy Hunter aircraft as part of its contribution to the air defence system. Malaysia indicated that it would be prepared to consider making additional contributions to the joint defence of the area over and above the present strength of its forces.
"Her Majesty's Government welcome these important steps of positive co-operation. We are confident that the further work which will now be done on specific naval, army and air matters, and the desire of all participating Governments to hold a further Ministerial meeting in the first half of next year, will maintain the necessary momentum towards a new pattern for security in the area. Further information about the agreements reached is contained in the official communiqué issued at the end of the Conference, and with permission I will circulate this in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
"My right honourable friend the Minister for Overseas Development has already announced the offer of £75 million financial aid we have made to Malaysia and Singapore to assist them to make the adjustments necessary in the economic field as well as that of defence. He has also already stated that we shall hand over, without charge, ail defence lands and fixed assets required by the two Governments for their defence or economic plans. Major progress has already been made in handing over the Singapore dockyard to civilian management. We shall also be assisting, as will Australia and New Zealand, in the build-up, equipment and training of the forces of Malaysia and Singapore. We shall be prepared if necessary and desired to continue to provide British personnel on a loan or contract basis. In some cases, where time is needed to build up expertise, this requirement may extend beyond 1971.
"These steps are designed to help the local Governments to establish, before we complete our withdrawal, an effective defence system based on close co-operation between the forces of Malaysia and Singapore, with such assistance as the Australian and New Zealand Governments may decide that they can continue to give. The four other Governments understand that no British units will be based in the area after 1971, and that we shall therefore have to reach a new understanding about the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement at the appropria1e stage.
"We also made it clear that our decision did not mean that we were turning our backs on an area in which we have appreciable economic interests as well as deep historic ties based on many years of direct association. We explained that we should net maintain a special capability for use outside Europe, but that our forces based in Europe could he rapidly deployed in the area if we judged it necessary. We offered to take part in a Commonwealth exercise in 1970, and to include in our contribution forces temporarily detached from the European theatre. The other four countries welcomed this, and agreed to take part in such an exercise. The NATO Council was informed of this proposal in advance.
"My right honourable friend and I were impressed by the clear demonstration that the other four Governments have accepted the decisions we took last January, and are determined to work out co-operative arrangements for the defence of the area after our withdrawal. The foundation for this has been laid by the declaration by the Governments of Malaysia and Singapore that their defence is indivisible, and by the practical first steps taken towards co-operation in the spheres of naval, land and air defence. The substantial progress made reflects the friendly and constructive spirit in which this Commonwealth conference was held."
Following is the Communiqué referred to in the above Statement:
"On 10th and 11th June, 1968, at the invitation of Y.T.M.Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra, Prime Minister of Malaysia, delegations from the Governments of Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom met in Kuala Lumpur to discuss defence problems arising from the decision to withdraw British forces from Malaysia and Singapore by 31st December, 1971. The following Ministers attended: for Australia, the Rt. Hon. P. M. C. Hasluck and the Hon A. Fairhall; for Malaysia, the Hon. Tun Abdul Razak (Chairman of the Conference) and the Hon. Tun Tan Siew Sin; for New Zealand, the Rt. Hon. K. J. Holyoake and the Hon. D. S Thomson; for Singapore, the Hon Dr. Goh Keng Swee and the Hon. Mr. Lim Kim San; and for the United Kingdom, the Rt. Hon. D. W. Healey, and the Rt. Hon. G. M. Thomson.
"Tunku Abdul Rahman welcomed the visiting delegations and made a general statement on behalf of the Government of Malaysia.
"The five countries concerned reaffirmed at the outset their continuing interest in the peace and stability of the area and declared their intention to maintain close co-operation among themselves The discussions of the Conference proceeded on that basis.
"The United Kingdom delegation described the planned programme for the rundown and withdrawal of British forces and drew attention to the substantial defence facilities and surplus non-operational equipment that would be made available free to Malaysia and Singapore for both defence and economic purposes. They also described in outline the form which their continuing interest might take after 1971.
"A general exchange of views followed.
"The representatives of Singapore and Malaysia declared that the defence of the two countries was indivisible and required close and continuing co-operation between them. This declaration was welcomed by the representatives of the other
three Governments. All representatives at the Conference regarded it as an indispensable basis for future defence cooperation. The representatives of Malaysia and Singapore said that their Governments were resolved to do their utmost for their own defence and they would welcome the co-operation and assistance of the other three Governments.
"The Conference went on to discuss some of the practical defence problems that would result from the British rundown including the assistance that Malaysia and Singapore would require in developing an effective joint defence system. In doing so they drew upon reports prepared by Advisory Working Groups, set up by the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, in which officers from the five countries had participated.
"The Conference recognised that an integrated air defence system covering both Malaysia and Singapore was required and agreed that the Air Defence Advisory Working Group should study the form of the integrated control and management of such a system. They also discussed the elements which the system
might comprise and the phasing of the necessary action and authorised further detailed examination by the Air Defence Advisory Working Group. The Singapore delegation outlined their Government's plans to raise an air force which would contribute to a joint air defence system; this would include a squadron of Hunter Mark 9 fighters to become operational prior to the completion of the British withdrawal. The Australian delegation indicated that as a contribution to an integrated air defence system, Australia would be prepared to provide a Royal Australian Air Force component based on Butterworth with elements deployed to Tengah; the arrangements to operate beyond 1971 would depend on decisions to be taken by the Australian Government on the part which Australia would play in the defence of the area after that date. The United Kingdom delegation stated that in addition to the part that would continue to be played by Royal Air Force elements of the system up to the time of their withdrawal, the United Kingdom Government would be prepared to make available the necessary ground facilities, including airfields, radar and communications facilities and ground-to-air defence equipment. They would also assist in the development of the new arrangements by providing training and, to the extent that this proved to he necessary and practicable, by the provision of specialist personnel on loan to the other Commonwealth Services concerned.
"In the sphere of naval defence, the Conference noted the intentions of the Malaysian and Singapore Governments to develop forces which would co-operate effectively in coastal defence; the agreement of the Singapore Government that the Royal Malaysian Navy continue to use the Woodlands Naval Base and such other facilities in Singapore as might be agreed; and the intentions of both Governments to agree on arrangements for controlling after 1971 what are now known as the Naval Base Waters'. The Conference agreed that the Naval Advisory Working Group should make recommendations for the retention and operation of naval facilities in the area after 1971 in the light of the requirements of the Governments concerned.
"Turning to army matters, the Conference agreed that it was desirable that there should be joint exercises in the area after 1971, and to facilitate this agreed in principle that there should be joint exercise planning machinery

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and a jungle welfare training school on a multinational basis. These matters would be further studied by the Army Advisory Working Group.
"In the context of a discussion on the ability of the United Kingdom Government to deploy forces in the area after 1971, the Conference agreed that there should be a major exercise in 1970 in which all five countries would participate. They noted that British participation would include a major reinforcement exercise from the United Kingdom. It was further noted that the United Kingdom Government also intended to continue training and exercising British forces in the area after 1971.
"The Malaysian delegation indicated that, in the light of the commitments and contributions by the other Governments, their Government would be prepared to consider additional contributions over and above the present strength of their Armed Forces which were already a substantial contribution to joint defence.
The Conference noted that a new understanding about the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement would he necessary in due course. To this end, there would be joint consultations at a later stage.
"The Australian and New Zealand delegations observed that their Governments would take into account the proceedings of the Conference in formulating their longer-term defence policies, and in deciding what part their forces would play in the collective defence and combined training arrangements which the Conference had discussed. Meanwhile they would continue to maintain forces in the area and to assist the Governments of Malaysia and Singapore in the development of their forces by means of assistance in training, personnel and defence aid.
"Representatives regarded the Conference as having pointed the way to further co-operation of a practical kind. They reaffirmed their determination to live in harmony with the other countries of the region. They believed that their co-operative efforts in defence arrangements and in promoting economic and social development contributed to security and stability in South-East Asia.
"The Ministers considered that the present Conference was only the first of joint Ministerial consultations among them on the questions arising out of British military withdrawal and on the larger questions of their continuing interest in the peace and stability of the area. They felt that their discussions had been extremely useful and agreed that they would meet again in the first half of 1969."

SOUTHERN RHODESIA (UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS) ORDER 1968
3.55 p.m.
Debate resumed.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I should like, to start with, to express my gratitude to the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack for the moderation with which he has introduced this Order, and I should like to reciprocate. I approach this grave and complex issue with, I hope, a due sense of responsibility, a responsibility which extends beyond Party or House of Lords considerations, important though these may be. I cannot claim the long and intimate association with Southern Africa which many noble Lords who will be speaking later in this debate have had, but I think I know enough of this problem to know of its importance. I believe it was our former colleague and former Prime Minister, the late Lord Attlee, who predicted in 1964 that the most acute problem which would confront the present Administration would be that of Rhodesia. So it has proved, even though this problem-prone Government has found some other problems along the road. It is a problem, as we have found to our cost, which touches the exposed nerves of our race-conscious contemporary world at one of their most sensitive spots.
I also, I think, know enough of this problem to know of its complexity. Many of us will have some quite harsh things to say about this Order and about the Government's Rhodesian policy. We do not, however, underestimate the immense complications. Let me make it perfectly plain at the outset where we, the official Opposition, stand on the main issues. These of course extend beyond the confines of this Order. I would claim that the policy of the Opposition on Southern Rhodesia these last three-and-a-half years has been straight It and consistent. We have been consistent in that we have not condoned and we do not condone U.D.I.; it was a rash and a foolish act. We have not condoned and we do not condone the police state aspects of the régime. We have not condoned and we do not condone racialism in any form whatsoever.
We have been equally consistent in our belief that an honourable settlement

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was possible and could be reached in an atmosphere—and sometimes we have not had that atmosphere—free from threat and vituperation and ultimatum. Two weeks ago in another place the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs stated that there were three possible courses on Rhodesia. I know the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, also proffered three possible solutions; I am not quite certain whether they were the same. I quote the words of his right honourable friend from Hansard, Commons, May 30, col. 2141:
"There is surrender, there is force and there is the peaceful application of sanctions."
He forgot to mention the fourth course, the peaceful application of persuasion; namely negotiations. It is our belief that a settlement can still, but only just, be reached by negotiations. On January 25, in a short but very interesting discussion in your Lordships' House, my noble friend Lord Alport expressed his belief that an agreement could be reached which would be acceptable to Britain and which would have the support of all races in Rhodesia.
Moreover, Sir Alec Douglas-Home remains convinced that the proposals which he
discussed with Mr. Smith in Salisbury some weeks ago could still, despite all that has happened since, form an acceptable basis for settlement. Indeed, I am empowered by my right honourable friend to say that he has recently received a letter from Mr. Smith confirming that the proposals discussed between them still stand so far as Rhodesia is concerned. I, personally, attach more importance to these communications than I do to some of the quotations, doubtless for public consumption, with which the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack has regaled us.
THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS (LORD SHEPHERD): My Lords, May I ask the noble Earl—because this is a very important point—if he can tell the House whether in those assurances there is any question of a blocking mechanism, so that there is no question of the Constitution being changed?
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I cannot assure the House because I am not
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privy to these communications. I think the only people who are in this country are Sir Alec and the Prime Minister, so I am afraid I cannot say more; I do not know.
We have likewise, I claim, been consistent in our attitude towards sanctions. We supported sanctions, albeit with misgivings, as long as they remained a British responsibility and under our ultimate control. We had, it was true, our misgivings. We were told at the beginning that the effect of sanctions would be short and sharp. The noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, for example, in that debate in December, 1965, from which he has quoted on one or two occasions this afternoon, said he did not think it would now be long before sanctions took effect. That was 29 months ago. Be that as it may, we have been consistent in drawing a sharp distinction between sanctions applied under our own control and mandatory sanctions applied at the behest of the United Nations. As long ago as December, 1966, my noble friend Lord Carrington made our position quite plain, as he usually does. He stated quite flatly in our debate in December:
"We on this side thought that the proposals for mandatory sanctions were wholly and absolutely wrong."
Your Lordships, too, made your position on mandatory sanctions quite plain by voting down the Government Motion of approval.
We were opposed to mandatory sanctions in 1966, and we are opposed to them now, and our reasons I think are clinching. In the first place, we believe that they involve a loss of control by us over the situation in Central Africa. Mandatory sanctions in effect mean that we have become passengers in a vehicle on a steep and slippery slope, without any real control over the wheel, the brake or the accelerator. We believe, secondly, that sanctions cannot work without South African co-operation. Quite clearly, such co-operation will not be freely given. Their logic, therefore, entails in the last analysis a collision course with the Union of South Africa.
Finally, we are convinced that mandatory sanctions can only drive Rhodesians in upon themselves, consolidate support for the regime there, and support for extremist elements within the régime, and thus hamstring such chances

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of a peaceful and honourable settlement as still exist. Given this, I hold, consistent position, it is not surprising that many of us view this Order with dismay. In our view, it is open to all the objections which we, as a Party, have consistently advanced for the past 18 months. But it is also open to a number of special objections of its own. Thus—I speak subject to correction—under the new sanctions provisions an offence will be committed not only by British citizens, but also, I think, by Southern Rhodesians living and working in Southern Rhodesia. That, I think, is not new. But remember, it is now illegal for anyone in Southern Rhodesia to export or import anything at all. How on earth can this provision be enforced while U.D.I. continues? And if, as we all hone will be the case, there were to be a settlement, would not half the white citizens in Rhodesia be liable to prosecution? Does not this absurd provision make a monkey of the law?
I should like to take another example of the sort of, so far as I know, unresolved complication with which mandatory sanctions threaten us. What, for example, about British directors, and the British members of the staffs of South African subsidiaries of British companies? If those subsidiary companies are trading with Rhodesia, are these directors and those staff members of the subsidiary companies liable to prosecution and to up to two years imprisonment? I do not know. I do not think anybody else does, either.
But, far more serious are the new travel restrictions designed to put Rhodesia and Rhodesians "in Coventry". I am dealing here only with those holding Southern Rhodesian passports or passports issued by the illegal régime. As I understand Article 12, anyone holding such a passport may now be refused admission to this country by an immigration officer, or allowed in only on certain conditions. I had a great number of questions to ask the noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack on this point. I am grateful for the long and careful explanation of this part of the Order which he has given us. I would wish to study it carefully, and also carefully to study what he has said about the new review machinery. All I would
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say is that, if this is a step in the right direction, which it seems to be, it is a justifiable reflection of the public disquiet over the arbitrary actions 3f the Administration with which, at least under this Administration, we have become only too familiar.
At first blush, I can only stigmatise these new travel restrictions as vindictive and stupid. The noble and learned Lord has said that they were not coercive. That may be so. But I should have thought that they might have been precisely and expressly designed to turn the moderate White Rhodesian into a rabid extremist. And worst of all, this provision is lifted straight from our own draft resolution. This petty piece of, I hold, pointless persecution was, it seems, dreamed up in Whitehall; it was not imposed upon us in any way.
Apart from the Order itself there is the United Nations resolution. Since that resolution stands behind the Order it is only right to consider it. To my mind, it is, in two vital respects at least, still wholly objectionable, however in which it may have been improved by the exertions of our representative at the United Nations. In the first place, there is the position of the Zambian economy, still heavily dependent on Southern Rhodesia. My information, right or wrong, is that the Zambian economy is now seriously threatened.
Paragraph 6 of our draft United Nations resolution tacitly recognised this great problem by permitting the landlocked States of Southern Africa to apply only such sanctions as their position permits. This has been dropped, and what we have instead is paragraph 15, not of course a mandatory provision, merely requesting Member States and international organisations to be nice to Zambia in her economic difficulties.
The economic collapse of Zambia is now threatened as a result of the policy of mandatory sanctions to which Her Majesty's Government have subscribed. Can noble Lords opposite assure us that they have solid plans to ward off this new threat of economic collapse and chaos at the heart of Central Southern Africa? Secondly, there is the most damaging provision of all, paragraph 13. It is short and it is important, and I

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shall, without apology, read it to your Lordships in full. It reads as follows:
"Urges all States, Members of the United Nations, to render moral and material assistance to the people of Southern Rhodesia in their struggle to achieve their freedom."
That is very wide language indeed. One could certainly provide arms and ammunition to the so-called freedom fighters, and one could certainly infiltrate a brigade of guerrillas into Southern Rhodesia under cover of these words.
In another place the Secretary of State for Commonwealth affairs sought to put a platonic gloss upon these words. He said—and I quote from Hansard of May 3, col. 2140:
"I repeat that they"—
he was referring to the nations with whom we negotiate in the Security Council—
"began with a demand for the use of force. They ended with this resolution, which contained no mention of the use of force. That is the important thing to bear in mind".
Maybe that is important if one is being hunted hard in another place and wishes to put the hounds off the scent. But is it not equally important to bear in mind the possibility that those who have advocated the use of force and wish to see it sanctioned in the United Nations resolution were content with paragraph 13 since its wide language would, in their view, cover subversion and violence?
Those, my Lords, are some of our principal objections to the particular Order and to the resolution which stands behind it. Fundamentally they stem from Her Majesty's Government's decision 18 months ago to abdicate in favour of the United Nations final responsibility for Southern Rhodesia and to pursue through the United Nations a policy of mandatory sanctions. That set us on the slippery slope away from a peaceful settlement. How far down that slope we have now slid is shown by paragraph 13 from which I have quoted. That paragraph, so far as I know, was voted without any specific disclaimer from our representative at the United Nations.
The stark question remains: what should be the course of action to-morrow evening in the Division Lobby of those noble Lords, whatever may be their political complexion, who view, as I do, this Order and all that surrounds it with
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the gravest possible misgiving? We on these Benches must recognise that for us the choice is more complex than it is for our colleagues in another place. Given our composition, it is very possible that a vote by the Opposition against the Order will be carried—I do not know. An Order of this kind has never, I
believe, been rejected by your Lordships' House. Such a decision, therefore, is not a decision which my noble friends should lightly take.
For some of us the decision may be easier than it may be for others. We all know, and we all deeply respect, even though we do not on all occasions entirely share, the views of my noble friend Lord Salisbury on this issue. He and those of my noble friends who share his views on this issue have made their position crystal clear by voting already against two of these Southern Rhodesian Orders. For others among us—for example, those who, like me, were prepared to give the Government the benefit of the doubt, who initially went along, albeit with great reluctance, with their policy on sanctions, the position is more difficult. And it is to these noble Lords to whom I wish particularly to address, if I may, my concluding thoughts.
It can be argued that on a grave national issue of this kind, touching as it does at many points the international relations of this country, we should particularly beware of breaking national unity. Indeed, I so argued myself when the Order banning oil exports to Rhodesia was before your Lordships' House in December, 1965. I then argued, in support of my noble Leader's plea that we should not divide, on the analogy of Ireland. I recalled how British policy towards Ireland had been darkened and be devilled over the years by the lack of a united national will, and how our ability to control events there had been weakened by that lack of national will.
My Lords, I do not unsay one word of what I then said. But I would remind your Lordships that it was not by us, it was not by the Conservative Party, that national unity on the issue of Rhodesia was broken. It was broken by Her
Majesty's Government, and it was broken by Her Majesty's Government when they took the fateful decision to take this matter to the United Nations, and to tread the downward path of mandatory

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sanctions. It was they who by so doing, against the advice, expressed in votes of the Conservative Opposition in both Houses of Parliament, who thus weakened, perhaps fatally weakened, our ability to control events in and around Southern Rhodesia.
Again, it may be argued—indeed, it has been argued—that an Order flowing from the mandatory provisions of a United Nations resolution has a sort of privileged sanctuary. It is claimed that we in this House, however violently we may object to the Order as such, should not take action which could place Her Majesty's Government in default of their obligations under the United Nations Charter. My Lords, I, for one, do not take the United Nations and the United Nations Charter lightly. Nor do I consider our international obligations to be light matters. Indeed, one of the most serious charges which we on these Benches level against Her Majesty's Government is the wanton way in which they have shown themselves ready to default on their international obligations.
In any event, let us make the position quite clear in this respect. A mandatory resolution is indeed binding on Her Majesty's Government, but it is not binding on Her Majesty's Opposition. It is thus for Her Majesty's Government to consider, before they incur an international obligation, whether they will be in a position to honour it. That is their responsibility, and it is certainly not the responsibility of the Opposition to give the Government of the day a blank cheque for whatever they may decide to do abroad, be it at the United Nations or elsewhere. That is one side of the picture. The other is my understanding—and here I speak subject to correction—that even if one or the other House of Parliament fails to approve this particular Order it remains effective for twenty-eight days, and that there is nothing to stop the Government from laying another thereafter.
There remain the constitutional considerations. I do not propose to deal at length with them, as I am sure my noble friend Lord Carrington will wish to dwell on this issue when he winds up tomorrow evening. However, I am impelled to say just this. I noted with interest, and some disdain, the minatory utterances of Ministers over the weekend. I noticed,
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in particular, the threat to abandon the search for an agreed reform of this House. As your Lordships may know, I am a member of the Inter-Party Conference, under the distinguished chairmanship of the noble and learned Lord Chancellor, which is discussing reform. It is common knowledge—indeed, the Lord Chancellor has confirmed it—that the Conference is very close to complete agreement, and I, for one, am glad that this is the case. I have for a very long time felt that reform was needed, and I have also felt that it was highly desirable, if humanly possible, that it should come as a measure broadly agreed between the main political Parties. Nevertheless, my Lords, I think that it would be quite wrong if those who, like me, wish to achieve an agreed measure of reform were to spend our time looking over our shoulders making nice calculations about the effect on reform of our actions in other spheres. No, my Lords, we have our legislative duty to do. The only right, the only honourable, stance for us to take is to treat each issue as it comes before us strictly on its merits.
I recognise, of course, that the issue before us to-day is one of unusual difficulty. It would be unusual—more, it would be unprecedented, I believe, for your Lordships to reject this Order. Yet it is equally clear that this House would be within its constitutional rights in so doing and thus affording to public opinion, to the Government, and, if you wish, to the Opposition as well, a period for reflection. After all, that is what a Second Chamber is for. Furthermore, exceptional measures demand exceptional remedies. For example, I think it is virtually certain that we should have rejected the Stansted Airport Order, had we been asked to take it in its original form. And we should have bee a right to do so.
I believe that this, too, is an exceptional measure and marks a moment of exceptional gravity in the evolution of this tragic story. We on these Benches believe that there is still the possibility of an honourable and peaceful settlement with Rhodesia on the lines discussed in Salisbury between Sir Alec and Mr. Smith. But events are moving fast and there is very little time indeed now left. And now,

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at this crucial moment, we have this misconceived and dangerous Order.
It is misconceived in that the strategy and psychology behind it is wrong. Retribution through harsher sanctions and through enforced isolation will not, I predict—I may be wrong—break the will of White Rhodesians and open the way to negotiations and a settlement. It will only strengthen the very forces in Rhodesia, the forces of extremism, which it should be the task of statesmanship to weaken. But this Order is not only misconceived; it is also dangerous. It marks yet a further stage in Her Majesty's Government's progressive loss of control over events.
First we had the reference to the United Nations—the abdication of ultimate British responsibility. Then we had mandatory sanctions based upon the perverted logic that the régime in Southern Rhodesia, whatever its other vices may be, constitutes a threat to international peace and security. Now, if I may remind your Lordships, we have in paragraph 13 of the resolution on which this Order is based the clearest possible incitement to violence. I would remind your Lordships of the words used by the Ambassador of Guinea at the United Nations in speaking to this part of the resolution. These are his reported words:
"For the first time the United Nations, the highest body, has approved the guerrilla struggle in Rhodesia as well as the assistance by individual States to freedom fighters."
But the danger of international confrontation implicit in this Order, or rather in the United Nations' resolution that stands behind it, does not lie only within Rhodesia and to the North; it lies also to the South. The Government take pride in the fact that the vote in favour of the resolution was a unanimous vote, but they would be unwise if they delude themselves into thinking that international action to enforce it will be equally unanimous. I predict that once again we shall find that sanctions bite more slowly and less effectively than we anticipate.
What then will follow? My prediction is that what will follow, as night follows day, will be a demand, a clamour, for even tougher measures, and measures which
will carry with them even graver risks to international peace. The inexorable logic of the situation would then demand a quarantine around, a blockade of Southern Africa including, not least,
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the Union of South Africa. I readily concede that the Government have up to now resolutely set their faces against the use of force; and I was glad to hear further confirmation of that impression by the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, this afternoon. They have also set their faces as yet against any economic confrontation with South Africa. But can they guarantee that they would veto a resolution demanding such action if it were to be presented at some time in the future to the United Nations? Can we be assured that this Government of slither might not ultimately slither into such a disastrous confrontation?
My Lords, to conclude—and I have not reached this conclusion lightly—it is my belief that in these exceptional circumstances we are almost compelled to say to the Government, "Think again". "Think again", before any irrevocable break between Britain and Rhodesia takes place, while there is still the glimpse of a chance of a peaceful and honourable settlement, before chaos takes over in Rhodesia and perhaps in Zambia as well, before a frontier of violence is drawn between white and black in Southern Africa and before a possible collision course is set with South Africa itself, we should, in my view, pause and ponder. Accordingly, having weighed these exceptional circumstances with exceptional care, I would advise my noble friends to vote against this Order in the Division Lobby tomorrow. I would just add this. Let not noble Lords opposite seek to misconstrue that vote, if it takes place—
LORD SHEPHERD: We have no alternative.
EARL JELLICOE: It will not be a vote in favour of the illegal régime. It will rather be a vote cast in support of common sense, of moderation and of continued negotiation.
BARONESS LLEWELYN-DAVIES OF HASTOE: My Lords, before the noble Earl sits down, could I ask him, as he made great play with Zambia, whether he has official Zambian support for his view that the Zambian Government would not support Her Majesty's Government in this implementation of a United Nations resolution?
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, may I slightly correct the noble Lady, who may

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have misheard me? I was not meaning to imply that the Zambians would not necessarily fall in with the line of mandatory sanctions, but that, if they were to do so and were not to receive adequate economic compensation, then their economy would be in very dire straits indeed.
4.27 p.m.
LORD WADE: My Lords, all those who are taking part and who will take part in this debate are very conscious of the importance of the debate and of the crucial vote which is to take place tomorrow. The constitutional issue in some respects overshadows the debate on the Order itself. As the first speaker from the Liberal Benches, may I make it clear at the outset that, quite apart from the merits and demerits of the Order, I feel that it would he very unwise indeed to reject this Order. I take the view that the advice given by the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, on February 6, 1967, to which the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack has referred, was sound advice and I think that it is still valid. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, when he said [col. 1157]:
"I cannot feel that this would be a proper exercise of our powers."
I do not think that this is quite the same kind of Order as the Stansted Order, which was a domestic matter. It seems to me that the rejection of this Order would be comparable with a case where a treaty had been solemnly entered into by the British Government, had been ratified by the House of Commons, and then is rejected by a non-elected upper House in order to embarrass the Government. It may well be that such action would be a Godsend to the Labour Party; it may be just what they are wanting to try to revive their somewhat lowered fortunes in the electoral field. But it can scarcely be expected that I should accept that argument as a reason for welcoming the rejection of the Order.
There is a distinction which we have to make between an Order and a Bill. For example, on the Transport Bill a number of Amendments have been tabled. I shall be voting for some of those Amendments; some may be carried and will be sent to the Commons in order that the Commons may have an opportunity of reviewing them and perhaps accepting some of them. But an Order is not
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amendable, and the custom has rightly grown up that we in this House do not reject an Order. It has been suggested in some quarters—and the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, seemed to favour it—that this House might reject the Order the first time with the intention of allowing it to go through if presented again. It seems to me that that would make your Lordships' House look rather foolish. It would create the maximum of constitutional controversy with the minimum of benefit to those who dislike the Order. Therefore, if the Order is to be approved I hope it will be approved to-morrow if it passes the Commons to-day, and I hope that those who feel uneasy about it will find it within their consciences to abstain.
I recognise that the attitude to this Order is affected by one's views about. the whole policy of sanctions, and I am sadly aware that some rather rash things have been said from time to time about the effectiveness of sanctions, but I need not go over all that ground again. Surely the basic question remains: Is it right that Britain should condone a rebellion? Is it right that Britain should condone the disregarding of those principles which have been so often stated to be essential if there is to be progress towards a multiracial society in Rhodesia? At the time of U.D.I., all Parties made it clear that they regarded such condonation as wrong, and all Parties accepted the policy of sanctions, though with varying degrees of enthusiasm. I cannot see any great merit or logic in supporting sanctions but in opposing any steps which might help to make them more effective. Furthermore, having taken the matter to the United Nations and having achieved a unanimous vote on the resolution, with some difficulty, Britain is surely under some obligation to observe and carry out the terms of that resolution. If Britain is prevented from doing so by a non-elected Chamber, if Britain is prevented from observing the resolution for which the British representative has voted it the United Nations, then I think the consequences will be serious and far-reaching.
Turning to the Order itself, I recognise that it would cause some hurt and embarrassment, but that, alas! nearly always follows from a rebellion. It is our duty as a legislative Chamber to examine this and other Orders, and I therefore have one or two specific questions to put. Some

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have been dealt with by the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack but, for the record, may I ask one or two questions which I think require looking into? Article 1(1) of the Order provides that:
"Except under the authority of a licence granted by the Minister, all goods that are exported … are prohibited to be imported into the United Kingdom."
That expression
"Except under the authority of a licence granted by the Minister"
occurs throughout the Order. How does a person or a company operating in Southern Rhodesia set about applying for such a licence? What precisely is the procedure to be followed? It is clearly important that the procedure should be known and understood by those affected. Furthermore, it is important that anyone wishing to apply for a licence should know in what circumstances a licence is likely to be granted. That is not a question as to the merits or demerits of the Order, but as to the interpretation of the Order and the steps to be followed by anyone wishing to observe the terms of the Order. An adequate answer is not to be found in paragraphs (1), (2) and (3). In any case, the circumstances under which a licence will be granted are not made abundantly clear to persons and companies wishing to observe the Order.
Secondly paragraph 2(3) of the Order provides that
"Except under such authority as aforesaid, no person shall deal in any goods that have been exported from Southern Rhodesia."
If there is doubt as to the origin of the goods, where does the onus of proof lie? Where goods have had to pass through other countries before arrival in this country, how are persons or firms to know that the goods in question have originated in Southern Rhodesia? How is an individual or firm to know whether or not he is observing the rules laid down in the Order? Again, this is not so much a question of the merits or demerits of the Order as one of the interpretation of the Order for the enlightenment of those who wish to try to observe it.
Thirdly, Article 12(1)(]b)(ii) provides that any Commonwealth citizen whom the Secretary of State has reason to beleve—
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"to have furthered or encouraged or to be likely to further or encourage any unconstitutional action"
becomes subject to the restrictions set out in Article 12. This involves possible loss of a passport, refusal of entry or deportation. Again, I think we should ask: What precisely is meant by the words
"likely to further or encourage any unconstitutional action"?
Are any rules laid down for the benefit of those who wish to know what is the meaning of this provision? What, if any, are the criteria, and have they been laid down in any rules which are or will be made available to individuals who wish to know whether or not they are observing the provisions of Article 12?—and I mean without waiting until they have been individually informed.
If the answer is that it is left to the discretion of the Secretary of State without any reason being given, that will place individuals in a difficult and embarrassing position and may create genuine hardship and injustice. It is true that where a rebellion has taken place there is always a possibility that some individuals may suffer in consequence, but there is a duty upon the Government, in introducing an Order such as this, to lay down as clearly as possible the rules by which the Secretary of State will be guided, for the information of all individuals who may be affected by the Order. I welcome the setting up of the Review Committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Justice Cairns which was referred to by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, and I shall study what the noble and learned Lord has said, but I think it is still important to say that the persons to whom the Order may apply must know as precisely as possible what are their rights and duties.
Turning now from detailed comment to a more general one, I should like to ask Her Majesty's Government what steps will be taken in the future to ensure that other countries will so far as possible observe these sanctions. It is rather hard on Britain that some other countries should break sanctions with impunity—and I am not referring only to South Africa and Portugal—while Britain has briefly to Hansard and to the debate in to take all the blame. May I refer

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which the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, took part, which has already been quoted? I then asked a question about the breaking of sanctions and referred to an earlier speech by the then Lord Privy Seal. I said:
"In the debate on December 8 last, the noble Earl, the Lord Privy Seal, in column 1238 used these words:
'Our present sanctions are having a marked effect, but there are breaches in the sanctions wall which must be closed if the sanctions are to satisfy the test of effectiveness, and these breaches must and will soon be closed.'
I suspect that the words:
`will soon be closed'
are too optimistic."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 6/2/68, col. 1160.]
I am afraid that is true.
I was in Rhodesia last July and I also visited South Africa and Zambia. I travelled entirely alone and therefore not under the auspices of any organisation, and I was not beholden to anyone. I met with great kindness, although sometimes perhaps with a little suspicion. In Salisbury I stayed in the same hotel as the noble Lord, Lord Alport, although that was just a coincidence. I was there to listen and I met with a wide range of views varying from an evening in a Salisbury club to a long talk in a less comfortable place with an ex-detainee. In passing, may I say that I told the ex-detainee what a lot of harm I thought had been done to his cause by the disputes between the two African Parties in Rhodesia. I find it extremely difficult to give any fair summary of what I ascertained, but may I make one or two brief observations?
The first is that I think our relations with Rhodesia are like a Greek tragedy, but it is a Greek tragedy which started long before U.D.I., and among the white Rhodesians the feeling of distrust of British Governments attaches as much to Conservative Governments as to the present one. Coupled with that is the feeling that the British people have gone soft. Secondly, since U.D.I., on Britain's part there have been far too many words and too little action. By that I mean that there has been far too much verbal denunciation and not enough effective action; and it would have been very much better if it had been the other way round. Therefore I shall try to be as objective and as dispassionate as possible. Thirdly, since U.D.I. Rhodesia
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has, alas!, moved away from, rather than towards, a multiracial society. If only, after U.D.I., Mr. Smith had said: "Now that we are independent, we will prove that our critics are wrong: we will in fact hasten towards majority ruse; we will do out utmost to remove racial discrimination", then, perhaps, there might have been very great sympathy for him. But, alas! it has moved just the other way.
I made a visit to the University; and, if I may say so, I think that the University, in spite of the limits on its political freedom should continue. I hope it will. I had lunch with a number of the staff and the students, and I met one very interesting African graduate. After lunch I went up to his room and had a very long talk with him. He told me of his difficulties in obtaining employment. He had got a very good degree. He was obviously suited for work tinder the equivalent of our Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. He specialised in developing food production, in productivity. But all his efforts at obtaining employment had been unsuccessful. He had managed to get a post as a research student, but the future was not bright, and he thought that probably in the end he would have to find a job in Zambia or in Malawi. I mention that just as an example. There are many others.
My Lords, if I thought that throwing out this Order would really lead to a complete change of heart, and that there would be a spontaneous effort to achieve progress towards a multiracial society, that there really would be unimpeded progress towards majority rule, then I might have some hesitation about the Order. But all the evidence seems to be to the contrary. In fact what would happen, and what I fear, is that Africans who still look to us as those who will uphold the principles of which we have so often spoken will feel that this is the final "sell-out", while some at any rate of the Rhodesian Front would merely regard the rejection of this Order as another example of British weakness. It may be that some noble Lords will regard this as a choice of evils. I admit that there is no easy way out; but if it is a choice of evils, then surely to go back on our resolve to stand firm until there is an honourable settlement would

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be the greater evil. As to the constitutional issue, to flout the House of Commons, to overrule the elected Chamber, would undoubtedly be the greater evil. I believe that it would be one of the greatest mistakes this House has made for a long time. I therefore hope that this Order will be allowed to pass.
4.43 p.m.
THE EARL OF PERTH: We are, my Lords, one and all, I believe, deeply concerned, deeply worried about what to do in this debate; whether to throw cut the Order or whether to vote for it, with the extension of sanctions. Your Lordships have already heard arguments, fierce arguments, on this question, and we know that over the rest of to-day and to-morrow the argument will rage hard and with real conviction on both sides. What is the best way of bringing about a solution of the Rhodesian tragedy, which is what we all desire? And at the end, my Lords, none of us will know for certain. It will remain a matter of opinion.
If that were the only issue I, for one, should be inclined, I think, to reject the Order on the ground that sanctions are unlikely to bring the Rhodesians to the conference table. But this is not the only issue, and we are not alone; we are not on cur own. All the nations of the world are now concerned. The action proposed follows a resolution passed unanimously by the United Nations, and we must never forget this. Some of your Lordships will feel—and I think the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, was of this inclination—that this is really not the business of the United Nations; that this ought to be our affair; that it is a colonial matter, or a matter between the Rhodesians and ourselves. My Lords, the pass on that was sold long ago. It was sold in the days of the Conservative Governments, when we allowed the United Nations to discuss and debate colonial affairs. I must confess that at that time I was much dismayed. I, as a Minister of State, felt that this was a mistake. But that was the policy, and this is the sequel.
I repeat: we are not on our own; and we are, I believe, under obligation to give effect to the latest United Nations resolution. Support of the United Nations is surely a cardinal matter of policy for
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us all. Certainly it is for me, and those of your Lordships who knew my father and his life will not be surprised at this. One cannot support the United Nations when it suits us to do so and not support them when it does not. If it were a matter of conscience—if, for example, the resolution had advocated the use of force—then I think we should have been bound to use the Veto. But otherwise we must go ahead and carry out the resolution passed by the United Nations.
So, my Lords, I believe that we must support the Order, even though we may be doubtful whether our action, and that of the other nations which will follow, will lead to that settlement which we all so deeply desire. Whether it will or not remains a matter of opinion, but our obligation to support the United Nations is, I believe, something of a matter of principle, vital to us and vital to the future of the world. This compels me, and I hope that it will compel others of your Lordships, to vote for the Order, or, if this is asking too much, at least to abstain.
4.48 p.m.
LORD WALSTON: My Lords, I do not propose to enter at all into the constitutional matters of this coming vote and of this Order. All I wish to do is to put forward some of the reasons why I believe it is right for this country, right for Africa and right for Rhodesia that the Order should be supported. Perhaps the strongest reason of all has been given by
my noble friend Lord Perth. We cannot dismiss from our minds the fact that we are to-day living in a world—and we are deliberately living in this world, because I am glad and proud to say that it is to a large part of our own making—where the individual power of individual nations counts for less and the collective will of collective nations, the United Nations, counts for more. That is something for which we in this country, including the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, among others, fought hard and achieved, and it must be right for us in a matter of great international importance of this sort to adhere to the decision of the United Nations.
My Lords, so far as Rhodesia itself is concerned, what are the reasons for taking the action that we have so far taken and which we are now proposing

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to take? These reasons have nothing whatever to do with false pride or personal antipathy. Surely the past record of the efforts of the Government and of the Prime Minister shows that this is not a question of pride. And whatever may be the personal relations between the Prime Minister and Mr. Smith there can be no accusation of failure to make every effort—culminating in the "Tiger" talks—to bring about a settlement. It is not any reason of that kind which prompts the action which this House is now considering. Surely, the first reason must be our responsibilities toward the 4 million Africans who are part of what was, and still is, the self-governing Colony of Rhodesia. We have a responsibility to them which, however much it might suit our convenience to do so, we cannot disregard.
I would remind your Lordships that this responsibility is not simply a recent invention of the present Labour Government, neither was it an invention of the late Conservative Government. It goes back much further. If I may, I will read to your Lordships the words of the then Duke of Devonshire from a White Paper of 1923. He said:
"His Majesty's Government think it necessary definitely to record their considered opinion that the interest of the African natives must be paramount, and that if, and when, those interests and the interests of the immigrant races should conflict, the former should prevail."
Those were words at the time concerning Kenya; but they would be as relevant to Kenya or to any other country for which we are responsible in East Africa, in Central Africa or elsewhere.
So, my Lords, first of all it is our responsibility to those people that prompts us to take this action. Secondly, it is our own national honour. We are on trial in the eyes of the world—particularly of Africa, but also of other countries—to see whether we are prepared to match by actions the fine words which have been promulgated by politicians and Ministers of all Parties; or whether we have become that sort of a country which is prepared to say fine words but which, when the bill for those fine words comes home, is prepared to turn its back, to get up and leave. National honour demands that we bring the declaration of independence to an end and that we do
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it by any means we believe to be effective.
There is also self-interest. There is the self-interest purely of business, of trade; because—let us be under no illusions about this—South Africa, though important trading partner, is not by any means the only trading partner on the Continent of Africa. There are very many other countries with whom we trade and with whom we could trade a great deal more. There are already signs that weakness with regard to Rhodesia has a very bad effect on our trade and makes the efforts of our exporters more difficult. I have only to point to the Zambian pipeline, which is now being constructed by the Italians rather than by the British, as an example of the sort of thing which could happen.
Finally among the reasons why we should take this action are the political ones—political so far as Africa itself is concerned. Africa to-day is a political vacuum. It wants (and it is right that it should so want) to create its own forms of government. It does not want to have imposed on it Western, Russian, Chinese, or any other form of government. It wishes to work out those forms which suit its own particular circumstances. I believe that it is right that it should do so; but I also believe that what the West can offer, and, in particular, what the United Kingdom can offer, to Africa by way of example and as the result of experience is of enormous importance and of enormous help to the developing countries there—of far more help, of far more importance, I believe, than what they can gain from, shall we say, Russia or China. But both these countries have their eyes on Africa. Both are anxious to step in and extend their influence, and to achieve, if possible, a Chinese or a Russian form of government in as many countries of Africa as possible.
My Lords, there can be no doubt in our minds that the more that we being mainly representative in Africa of Western civilisation, are discredited, the easier it is going to be for Russia or China to exert their influence. I ask your Lordships a very simple question. If you were sitting to-day in the Kremlin, or in Peking, charged with the responsibility for your country's policy towards Africa, for what would you pray?—to whatever gods they pray in those places.

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Would you pray for U.D.I. to come to a rapid end with the collapse of Mr. Smith and the triumph of the United Kingdom? Of course, you would not. You would pray for a continuation of U.D.I. for as long as possible, for the eventual success of Mr. Smith and for the discomfiture of the British; because that would make your job easier. That is surely a sufficient reason for supporting this present Order.
My Lords, we know perfectly well that it is difficult for President Kaunda, in Zambia, and President Nyerere, in Tanzania, to maintain their forms of government—Governments which I personally respect in many ways. Both Governments—and particularly that in Zambia—are doing their best to remain neutral in the struggle between the great Powers and to hold a fair balance between us. Further North, in Kenya and Ethiopia, there, too, are Governments which are no doubt friendly towards the Western way of life. But before many years, regrettable though it may be, President Kenyatta and the Emperor of Ethiopia, both great men, but both in their seventies, will no longer be with us. There will then be a struggle for power, a struggle for succession; and, using loose terms, the Left and the Right will compete for power. How much easier it is going to be for the Left to gain control in these two countries if, once more, we have been discredited in the eyes of Africa and the Smith régime is in unfettered control of that country! We do not want any form of neo-colonialism there; but I believe that Africa and the whole world will be a better place if Western standards, and particularly British standards, are respected and, sometimes, followed.
My Lords, to summarise, the reasons why I believe this Order should be accepted are these: first of all, that we may be able better to fulfil our obligations to the 4 million Africans in Rhodesia; secondly, to preserve our national honour in the eyes of the world, and especially of Africa; thirdly, to help by our example in the evolution of good government in Africa; and, fourthly—a smaller point but not to be disregarded—the promotion of our own material interests, of our own trade.
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That is what we must try to do. How can we do it? We have abjured the use of force. That is out; it is not allowed. The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has repeated that. I am sorry. I am not an advocate of force; but I do not think it was right to say at the outset that we should never use force. I think it weakened our position. But that is the position and we have to accept it. Therefore we must rely solely on peaceful means—non-force means: we must rely solely on sanctions. And, my Lords, sanctions, to be effective, must be as wide as possible, as far-reaching as possible; and they require collective action. It is no good for us individually, as one country, to impose sanctions. We must have the support of all the members countries of the United Nations in order to make them effective, and that is what we are now attempting to secure.
In my view, we are too late in making the attempt. We should have done it many months, even years, ago. I know that I am now criticising my own Party, when I say that we have been beguiled in the past, as are noble Lords opposite to-day—as the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, showed that he was to-day—by false hopes; by wishful thinking; by a Micawber-like attitude of "Let us hold on; let us do nothing, let us make' no decisions that are irrevocable or difficult or awkward—something is bound to turn up sooner or later" In other words, my Lords, we have been beguiled by a refusal to face facts.
We have heard from the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, that months ago Government Ministers told us that sanctions were beginning to bite, and that it would be weeks, not months, and the rest of it. Those are indications of the way in which, unhappily, Her Majesty's Government have suffered from the same disease that noble Lords opposite are suffering from to-day; that of hoping against hope that they would be spared the harsh decision to impose wider sanctions; of taking really tough action which would hurt innocent people as well as those who are guilty of bringing about this state of affairs.
My Lords, we cannot bury our heads in the sand any longer, and I am glad that Her Majesty's Government have now realised that. Even now, to my mind, they are not going far enough, but

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they have at last put procrastination aside and are beginning to face reality. I am afraid that before this situation comes to an end they will have to go still further. I can only hope that they will go as far as is necessary and as quickly as possible; because they must realise, and noble Lords opposite must realise, that the longer hard decisions are put off, the more likely you are to be faced with the need to make even harder decisions. I can only hope that to-day's actions have not come too late.
5.3 p.m.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I have listened with great interest to all that the noble Lord, Lord Walston, has said. I do not think that he beguiled me—I do not think that I am beguiled by anyone; at least I hope not. It certainly is a gross misrepresentation of the position of members of the Party on these Benches to say that we sit here hoping against hope that something will turn up. The noble Lord, Lord Walston, cannot have listened to the excellent speech made by my noble friend Lord Jellicoe, who pointed out that we still believe (I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Walston, rejects it) that there is a possibility of reaching a favourable and satisfactory settlement by negotiation.
I should like to start my speech by saying that, looking back over the past, I am not at all sure that the prospects of a satisfactory settlement have not been gravely impeded by the mishandling of the present Government, accompanied always by a threat of some kind of sanction or something unpleasant. I had not intended to start by dealing with that particular issue. I wanted to begin what I have to say this afternoon by considering some of the arguments which have been advanced, to the effect that there is something wrong, something improper, something unconstitutional and that it would be something which we should not do if, out of principle and not at all for expediency, we came to the conclusion that it was right to vote against this Order.
The noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, gave us a very interesting review of past history, and another edition could easily be written. It was not until some time on that he made any reference to the Order that we are now
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discussing. But as I expected—and the noble and learned Lord did not disappoint me—at the very conclusion of his speech he gave vent to veiled hints of the kind of consequences that might ensue to your Lordships' House if we on these Benches decided that it was our duty to vote against this Order.
Last Saturday, The Times was even more explicit. Where they got it from one does not know, but they published, with all their authority, a statement that the Government had given a warning that if we take the course of rejecting this Order—I quote their words:
"the question of abolishing the House of Lords as presently constituted must become an immediate political issue."
And the Chancellor of the Exchequer has spoken to the same effect. It is thus clear, is it not? beyond doubt that if we vote against this Order and carry the vote, we must expect the imposition of sanctions upon us. But, my Lords, I would think it equally clear that whatever may be the consequences to this House, or the consequences to any Member of this House, we should not be deterred by any threats of that kind from doing what we conceive, whether rightly or wrongly, to be our duty.
Why is it that that kind of threat is being uttered? Should we, if we voted against the Order, be doing something so very wrong, something we have no right to do? The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, laughs, but this is a serious issue, and it is no use trying to misrepresent the argument by suggesting that anyone who doubts the wisdom of the Government is a supporter of Mr. Smith and the illegal régime. I should like, if I may, to be able to carry on with what I hope will be a serious contribution to this debate without the undertones of the noble Lord's laughter.
If I may get back to what I was saying, it has been said—and I want to deal with the argument—that it is unprecedented for this House to throw out an Order. I entirely agree. But Orders such as the one we are now considering are a form of subordinate legislation, usually used to fill in the details of a measure contained in a Bill approved by Parliament. This Order is made under very wide powers contained in the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965, and its contents are such that in my opinion (I will

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give reasons later for saying this) its provisions ought really to be enacted by a Bill and not by a piece of subordinate legislation.
My Lords, I have a great regard for precedent, as, I have no doubt, has the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor—perhaps I might claim to have a greater regard for it than he has. However that may be, I do not think that the fact that we have not rejected an Order before is a valid argument for not rejecting this Order now. For, after all, it is the Government's decision to introduce the contents of this Order in an Order and not in a Bill. Had they introduced the contents in a Bill no one who knows anything about our Constitution could say that we should have been acting improperly in passing Amendments to it, or indeed in rejecting the Bill at some stage—it might have been on Second Reading, or at the end. That would not be unconstitutional, and it would be only when the Commons had disagreed with us and we had stood firm that there would be any issue between the Houses to which the Parliament Act would apply. And the Government know that as well as anyone.
When the Parliament Act was passed I suspect that it was thought unnecessary to make it do so, for Orders were then in truth subordinate legislation. But since then the normal legislative procedure has been more and more by-passed by the use of Orders. Perhaps this is partly due to the practice that grew up during the last war. When the Government seek to by-pass the normal legislative process, it does not seem to me to lie in their mouths to complain if this House takes the course it can take in relation to Bills. That right was given to this House by a Labour Government in 1965. So that it does not seem to me that Mr. Jenkins, or anyone else, can legitimately complain if we decide to exercise a right which the Government of which he was a member so recently gave us. I think it odd if this Government seek to rely upon precedent.
I am not addressing myself at the moment to the question of how we should vote, or saying how I should vote, because I want to brush on one side
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considerations that seem to me to be irrelevant in determining that. There is another consideration which has been advanced. The noble Lord, Lord Wade, gave expression to it to-day. It is that if we reject this Order we shall be flouting the opinion of the elected Chamber. The expression of that opinion has been supported by reference to observations made by my noble friend Lord Harlech. Of course, the other place has not yet expressed any opinion, but we may assume that, with the aid of the Government Whips, and of course the Liberal Party, it will do so in the course of to-night. But I think, if I may say so with great respect, that the observations of my noble friend Lord Harlech did not set out the position quite fully or quite accurately. Surely a distinction requires to be drawn between a decision of the elected Chamber on a matter on which they have a mandate from the people of this country and one on which they have no such mandate.
In the past, Parliament, and particularly the other place, has been vigilant to resist encroachments by the Executive; and when the Executive—not nowadays the Crown—seeks to make a law in this way it may be that that role which the Commons formerly discharged has now passed to this House. If this House exercises its right and rejects the Order, the contest will not be with another place, but once again will be a contest between Parliament and the Executive.
But, my Lords, however that may be, the Government have no mandate from the people to make what is contained in this Order law. In the whole course of his speech the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor never for one moment suggested that. Indeed, I do not think that the Government claim it. They claim that their mandate comes from the United Nations. I shall have a little more to say about that. But it is clear, is it not? that they have no mandate from the people, and equally clear that they dare not seek for one, for they know what would happen if they did. Yet constitutionally is not that just what should happen? If one of the Government's important measures is defeated in Parliament, is not that what has happened in the past, and is not that, I suggest, what the Government should do, if defeated on this Order?

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But they dare not. Instead, they threaten to alter the rules while the game is being played. I feel that it is an abuse of power. I cannot, and do not, say that it is illegal for the Government to seek to do by subordinate legislation and not by a Bill what they propose in this Order. Deprived, as we have been by the course the Government have deliberately taken, of power to make amendments, can it really be argued that it is not open to us to take the course which we could properly take if this were a Bill, and reject it? I do not think that it can.
I should now like to come to the question of whether it would be right to vote against this Order. This is a very important and serious issue. I have given it as much thought as I can, and I should like to explain the reasons which have led me to my conclusion. I start by fully appreciating the consequences of either voting for or against this Order to-morrow night. If I may go back to history, the Southern Rhodesia Act was passed through Parliament within five days of U.D.I. We all gave it a speedy passage. No one objected to it. It was not subjected to a critical examination. It was an Act intended to be in force for only one year, though I agree that it was extended later.
When it was passed, the Prime Minister told the people of this country what sanctions measures it was proposed to take. On November 12 in the House of Commons, he said:
"It is our view that these measures will be effective … we have no other measures in contemplation."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, col. 635.]
No doubt some were influenced by that assurance and consequently did not criticise the width of the powers taken in the Act. The Prime Minister also said:
"These measures are harsh. They will involve hardship. But the Government consider that quick and effective measures will involve less suffering than a long-drawn-out agony."
Two and a half years, my Lords. Is that not a long-drawn-out agony? With no other measures contemplated, and with the assurance I hat measures would be quick and effective, I do not think that Parliament can be blamed for giving the Government the very wide powers they now seek to exercise. For I do not suppose that anyone thought that two and a half years later not only would the Act
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be still in force, and "quick and effective measures" still in operation, but also that we should have the Government introducing even harsher measures.
On November 12, the Prime Minister said—and this is my last quotation:
"Every measure has been judged and must be judged against its ability to restore the rule of law and the functioning of a democratic constitution in Rhodesia."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, c. 632.]
I ask the Government: Is that still the test? I think that we ought to be given a definite answer to that question. Having listened carefully to what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said this afternoon, I draw the inference from what he said that this is no laver the test.
Let me remind the House of his argument. There was a resolution before the United Nations—a resolution advocating the use of force—and by skilful work Lord Caradon got that dropped a id another resolution—the resolution which is in force—was passed in its place. We are told that that was a great triumph; that we are right to accept this second United Nations resolution, because if the first had been put forward and passed we should have had to veto it. I think that summarises the argument of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor at that point. I refer your Lordships to that for this reason: that if that what led to the tabling of this Order, the test laid down by the Prime Minister I as not been the governing test for the introduction of these particular sanctions.
I should like to know whether the noble Earl, Lord Perth, who thinks that we must vote for this Order because it has been passed by the United rations, and without our veto, would accept the same proposition if a resolution advocating the use of force had been passed and we had not exercised our veto. Great respect as have for the United Nations, I do not think we can transfer to them all our duties and our responsibilities. We have a duty not only to the people in this country but to all races in Rhodesia. I should be the last to suggest that that was not the case. But I entirely agree with the observation of my noble friend Lord Jellicoe, that the great mistake made by Her Majesty's Government was in trying to divest themselves of some part of the responsibility for the

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discharge of that duty by transfer to the United Nations.
If we are to apply the test of the Prime Minister—namely, the ability to bring back the rule of law and the restoration of a democratic Government in Rhodesia—surely we are in a far, far better position to judge to-day of the effectiveness of sanctions than we were 2½ years ago. My Lords, what is the position? We have heard from the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor that no one has recognised Rhodesia. But that is not the effect of sanctions. We have heard him say that some businessmen are trying to exercise some influence—two and a half years after their imposition. What other consequences are there? I wish that they had been more favourable. Has any opposition sprung up in the political circles in Rhodesia to Mr. Smith? I do not see any sign of it.
LORD SHEPHERD: It is a police State.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: Indeed, some may say that he is more firmly in the saddle than other people who exercise the functions of Prime Minister elsewhere. But whatever the reasons may be (the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, says, "It is a police State"), all I say is this: that I myself can see from the application of sanctions up to date little, if any, sign that they have been proved in these two and a half years to be inducing a change of attitude in Rhodesia. I wish that were not the case, and I hope that it is not; but there is nothing which the Lord Chancellor said which convinced me that it is not.
One goes on from that. Fears were expressed that the imposition of sanctions might consolidate people behind the regime. I always thought there was a grave risk of that. Supposing that other countries tried to impose sanctions of this kind on us, I know what our attitude would be. We should all unite; we should forget our political differences and our disagreements, and we should be united in our determination not to give in. I find it difficult to suppose that the white population in Rhodesia would react very much differently from the way that we should react in these Islands. So I must confess that I am frankly disappointed at the effect of sanctions so far.
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Then the question remains: Is it established that this further turn of the screw of sanctions will, or may, do the trick? We have heard little about that from the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor. If I were satisfied that there were grounds for supposing that the imposition of further sanctions would do the trick, I think I would not vote against this Order. But if it be the case that they will not contribute to the result that we want to see, and, further than that, that they will have an adverse effect, then those who really want to see a settlement are, I think, left with no option but to vote against this Order.
Ought we not to be told, also, what the cost of sanctions to this country in loss of trade with Rhodesia and with South Africa has been? The Government must know. I suspect that it runs into many millions of pounds. If it be the case that the imposition of sanctions up to now has not brought about any indication of a change of attitude—in this connection the Lord Chancellor said that Mr. Smith, who is in control, is quite intransigent—and if it be that this policy is costing this country an enormous sum of money, surely those are effects that we ought to take into account in deciding whether to impose these further sanctions.
These measures, we are told, are not intended to be punitive. My Lords, they are. They may involve (and I think the Lord Chancellor will agree) great and prolonged hardship to innocent people, and, what is more, to innocent people many of whom cannot have the least influence on the course of events. The Home Secretary allows a notorious troublemaker to stay in this country in the belief that his visit will be beneficial to him. No holder of a Rhodesian passport, however innocent he be, however opposed to the Smith régime, will be entitled to free entry into this country in the future. We are told that this resolution was introduced by the United Kingdom delegation. I feel that the hope for the future lies, not in severing all contact with the people in Rhodesia, but in securing more contact with them and exercising to the full all powers of persuasion. It is clear that the only reason why this Order comes before us now is not because it is believed that it

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will bring about a settlement, but because of the resolution passed by the United Nations.
I have said that I think it was wrong to transfer responsibility for Rhodesia to the United Nations, and I must say that I should doubt whether it is really within the Charter. I think I am correct in saying that under the Charter there is no right to interfere with the internal affairs of any other country, and that the reason why this is sought to be justified is because it is said that the present situation in Southern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace and security. My Lords, that is a very easy thing to say, but to me it carries very little credibility, for to me it seems that all the threats to international peace and security come not from within Rhodesia, but from outside. If the situation in Rhodesia is such as to warrant United Nations' intervention, one could think of many other countries where the same could easily be said, and perhaps with more force. However much one deplores and is opposed to the illegal regime—and I have never said a word in its support—however much one hates some of the actions that that régime has taken, certainly it has not been demonstrated to my satisfaction that the present situation there constitutes a threat to international peace and security.
My Lords, we cannot I think divest ourselves of our responsibility, and I am certainly not prepared to vote for this Order just on the ground that it implements the United Nations' resolution, which I would say and submit the United Kingdom Government certainly ought to have vetoed and had the courage to veto—leave all the sanctions out on one side, but because of the inclusion in that resolution of paragraph 13. Bearing in mind the prohibition on all imports and exports to Rhodesia, what does "the provision of material" mean to the people of Southern Rhodesia in their struggle for independence? Although the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, sought to put a gloss upon it, surely it can mean only the supply of arms and materials, and it was so interpreted. I cannot understand a Government of this country, in order to avoid putting a veto on a resolution advocating the use of force, accepting without vetoing a resolution
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which enabled, I think clearly, and indeed encouraged, the provision of material for a civil war.
I cannot myself—and this is the conclusion to which I have come—vote for this Order on the ground that it implements a resolution to which the Government have agreed. They did not consult Parliament in advance, but, as usual, they require Parliamentary approval of what they have done; and that I am not prepared to give on the information at my disposal. As I have said, if the Government could satisfy me that a further turn of the screw of sanctions had a reasonable chance of bringing about the end of the illegal régime, my view would be different, but so far that has not been done.
I shall vote against the Order for another reason, too. If this Order is not approved the Government may hate time to reconsider it before reintroducing it, if they decide to reintroduce it, and it has in my belief grave defects. I shall draw attention to two of them. First of all, Article 2(3) makes it an absolute offence to deal in goods exported from Rhodesia in contravention of Article 2(1). This means that a person can be convicted and is liable to a fine of any amount, and imprisonment for two years, if he deals with such goods, in complete ignorance of the fact that they are goods of that character and with no reason to suppose that they have been exported from Rhodesia. I should have thought that the recent drug case showed the difficulties which arise from the creation of absolute offences.
Then, Article 12(1)(b) gives the Secretary of State power to refuse entry to any Commonwealth citizen, and under paragraph (ii) of that particular provision he can refuse entry if he has reason to believe that the citizen has
"furthered or encouraged or is likely to further or encourage any unconstitutional action … or any action calculated to evade or contravene or to facilitate the evasion or contravention of this Order".
Those are very wide powers. I listened with care to what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said about this at the end of his speech, He spoke, if I heard him correctly (I want to study what he said), about an Advisory Committee presided over by Mr. Justice Cairns. But he referred to it as perhaps

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fulfilling the same role as the Committee on Regulation 18B. Those who remember what happened in relation to that Regulation did not find that a very convincing argument. But the fact remains that the decision there will be left at the end of the day—I think the Lord Chancellor made this clear—to the Secretary of State, and from that decision there will be no appeal. When I remember the opposition there was to restrictions on entry of Commonwealth immigrants, it really staggers me to find the Government seeking to take such wide powers themselves to exclude the entry, even for a visit, of a Commonwealth citizen who happens to be resident in Rhodesia.
Those are two of the matters I should like to have further considered. On those grounds alone I do not think we should pass this Order now. Unless the course of the debate makes me change my mind, I shall vote against the Order, not only on this ground but because in my belief it contributes nothing to the solution of the problem. It is likely to make it worse and likely to make it more difficult, if not impossible, to obtain a satisfactory settlement.
If the Order is defeated, what then? The noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, spoke about a period for reflection. A period for reflection may be short, but it also may be useful. If as a matter of principle the Government decide to reintroduce this Order, while we can then consider the position again, I myself would say at the moment that if this Order came before this House again I should feel disposed to vote against it again, not out of sympathy with the illegal régime, for I have none of that, but on principle. And I do not think that in this matter principles should be sacrificed to what may appear to be political expediency. However, we have not to decide that issue now. If the Government are defeated on this Motion, then, my Lords, the proper constitutional course for the Government to take, though a course which I fear there is no risk of their taking, is to seek a mandate from the people of this country.
5.38 p.m.
LORD POLTIMORE: My Lords, I rise with considerable trepidation, and I have been warned by several noble kind friends that I have chosen a very bad
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subject on which to make a maiden speech and that I may lose my reputation. I do not worry much about that, because I have no reputation to lose, but I do feel rather like a small boy who has been told by his mother that he may go and paddle in the sea but must not get his feet wet. I am determined to keep my feet dry, but if, by any chance, I should stumble and fall into troubled waters, I hope and trust that your Lordships will attribute it not to any bad taste on my part but really to the musings and ramblings of an ignorant octogenarian.
Yesterday I spent a very comfortable afternoon reading in Hansard fifty pages of the debate on November 15, 1965. After I had read it I realised that only once had I seen the word "conciliation". Then I looked again, rather hoping that I should see words which I have always maintained are synonymous with, and even embody, that word: the words I was looking for were "Field Marshal Smuts". Field Marshall Smuts was a man who knew Africa. He knew it like the back of his hand and he was a wonderful servant to his country. I am not here to go into panegyrics of anybody, but I think he deserves well and I should like to know what his feelings would have been had he been here to-day. If he had been here to-day I think he would have taken a very sensible and strong view.
He was a man who held strong views, and I think that what he would have said to-day, if he had been asked, would be something like this: "You know, I have been through all this in my life. I fought against aggression; I fought for the freedom and the independence of my country, and I lost. Hundreds of my compatriots were killed, my country was overrun, my women and children were put into concentration camps, my farms were burned and I was vanquished and completely beaten. I had to sue for peace and I came eventually to the conference table—which I was forced to do. And when I came to the conference table I suddenly found I was no longer a vanquished man; I was a victor. Everything for which I had been fighting I suddenly got—my freedom, my independence, my country, my laws, my farms, even my language. Then, for the first time, I realised the stupidity and the senselessness and the futility of bitterness and squabbling, which only lead to war."

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My Lords, I think he would have said something more. He had very definite views. Probably some of your Lordships knew him intimately, and I think that those who did would probably agree with me that he had strong views and almost a downright way of saying things. Twice during the East African campaign I came into personal contact with him when I was a young and inexperienced subaltern of the King's African Rifles. The first occasion was to earn from him (and I am proud of it) a mild rebuke, and the second time was to receive from him a friendly word of encouragement. But I think if he had sat here to-day among your Lordships he would have sent a message to us all. To all those who lead us to-day in this country, and all those who lead the different factions in Rhodesia, and to the Africans on both banks of the Zambesi I think his message would have been this: "For heaven's sake come to the conference table! Come down to earth; bury the hatchet! Do as I did in the hour of my humiliation and in the moment of my triumph. Forget and forgive. The lion of Rhodesia will, and must, lie down with the African lamb; and the British Commonwealth and no-one else will lead them."
My Lords, the sands of time—and, I expect, your patience—are running out. If I have said too little—which I do not think for a moment I have—it is because I have been afraid to overstep the bounds of your conventions. If I have said too much (which I probably have) I can only crave your indulgence, but I can tell your Lordships this: that whatever I have said or expressed or implied, it has come from the bottom of my heart, because in Africa I have always had a great friend and I owe her people, both black and white, a great debt of gratitude. In the early decades of this century I had the privilege of going and living in what was then called British East Africa, where any white man or white woman could ride or walk through its veldt or its valleys or its fields or forests, or even the native reserve, and he or she could go unarmed and unaccompanied and would be always welcomed with a happy smile or greeted with a hearty handshake.
And I knew another Africa—the neighbouring Africa, invaded by hordes of European and South African and Asiatic
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troops, bringing death and destruction to a kindly and innocent people who gave their lives in their tens of thousands for a cause of which they knew nothing and for which they cared less. And then I knew another Africa, that same Africa which had changed its name, and you all know the horrors that were perpetrated there; but on that I shall draw a veil and only beg your Lordships, with all the emphasis at my command and with all respect and all humility, do not, for heaven's sake, let that happen to Rhodesia!
5.48 p.m.
THE LORD BISHOP OF CHICHESTER: My Lords, I am grateful to the two noble Lords who have allowed me to alter my place in the long list of speakers, not least because it gives me the opportunity to be the first to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Poltimore, on his maiden speech. As he said, he chose a subject of critical concern to us all, but he has spoken from a long knowledge of Africa. He also spoke movingly, in a way which we should like to remember, and we should like to tell him that his speech was neither too long nor too short but was just right. We acclaim what he has said, and we hope that on many other occasions he will add his wisdom and his counsel to our debates.
On this well-worn theme I hope to be brief. The imposition of sanctions must always be acutely distasteful to us. It involves great loss, it involves suffering and hardship to many people, and it brings dislocation and estrangement between countries. Any debate on the extension of those sanctions with those results clearly needs our careful scrutiny, although it is fair to add that, whereas no doubt sanctions will fall most heavily upon the African population of Rhodesia, they have—so far as they have been able—expressed their willingness for the cause in which they believe. For anyone to speak, as I and others do, abort sanctions when other people are involved and we are not, is something that requires great humility from us.
It is the duty of Parliament not only to make actual decisions at particular moments but to keep in mind the long-term objectives; and sometimes in our discussions on this subject we halve given

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to the world outside, and especially to the people of Rhodesia, an impression of far greater division of opinion than actually obtains. At least, I hope so. I hope there has never been any question Lord the Lord Chancellor has said. It among us, in this and previous Governments and all Parties, that we have a common objective: that we do not want to see a Rhodesia which is either dominated by a white minority or by a black majority, but a people consisting of white and black who are coming steadily to share freely and fully in the life and government of their own country, and that the steps towards this end should be made clearly, stably, reliably and manifestly built into the Constitution and policy of the Government concerned.
We recognise that this is the creation of a new society and not the continuation of something that is there, and we have on many occasions recognised also the difficulties of this. I recall in a previous debate one menace noted in the present policies by the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition, Lord Carrington, when he denoted in them what he called a whiff of apartheid, and that whiff may grow stronger over the years. Equally, we are aware of the other danger, of the rise of black consciousness in Africa, which itself constitutes a danger for a multiracial society like Rhodesia. But in all this I hope our discussions may not obscure from the world our objective: it is Rhodesia as a whole, and there is tragic misunderstanding about that. We have comments sent back to us from people in Rhodesia on the way in which our policies are presented to them—an attempt to crush Rhodesia, a challenge to every Rhodesian, and emotional phrases of that sort. Rhodesia can mean, I suppose, what you like it to mean, but to us it must mean all the peoples of Rhodesia, the 4 million black as well as the 200,000 white there, and our desire to see them established in a new and freer society. I hope that nothing that we say in our own issues at home would take away from that common objective.
It is indeed unfortunate that our own constitutional questions should in some way seem to get involved in something which belongs to a quite different part of the world. But let us please assert to the world that we stand ultimately for the same thing, and the sincerity and
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the consistency with which we assert this and pursue our objective of a fully free Rhodesia in any decision that we make will obviously affect our own standing in the world, as the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has said. It will be seen to be a moral question for us as well as a political one always, and it will be judged to some extent on the grounds of those Christian principles of human dignity which our own countrymen have taken to Rhodesia and elsewhere in the cause of Christian missions. All this I hope we might ourselves be agreed upon, and therefore our debate must be a much more realistic one, whether this or that proposal helps us towards this final end.
We have had already a good deal of examination of the proposed mandatory sanctions. They have been dubbed a downward path. We would all recognise that there are in them elements of uncertainty which only the future can unveil. They have been termed "the turn of the screw". That is perhaps a more realistic description of them, although I think that would miss the real point, that is, that the mandatory sanctions would exhibit in a far more unmistakable way the condemnation which the world as a whole extends to the present policies of Rhodesia. This is, I think, important, for the isolation of Rhodesia must be seen to be self-isolation and not something we are ourselves creating.
If we were not to consider this raising of the temperature in sanctions, we have a right to ask whether the alternatives are achieving the objective we have in mind: is it to be assumed that the present sanctions, painful though they are, are achieving the objective? I think it is conceivable that they are doing more than is commonly realised. Yet they have not yet produced that round of negotiations for which a number of speakers have appealed. They have not indicated that there is any particular change of mind or a readiness to talk in ways that would lead to some new solutions. Where is the moderate element in Rhodesia to which reference has been made? Has it emerged seriously in the course of this period, and can we really suppose that the continuation of the present situation will itself produce the result we want?

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We must be realistic about this. If it does not, what again can we expect? Do we honestly think that the present régime, as it has been exhibited to us in its past policies, is leading towards a solution that will pass the test of time? I recall a book by a very famous English humorist which was called Leave it to Psmith. But I suspect that this is precisely the policy which so many elements in Rhodesia and so much Christian opinion with which we are in touch would regard as not funny at all at the present time. If not this, then are we not bound ourselves to go forward along the line which the Government in this Order have produced for us? In what way otherwise can we say that the United Nations Security Council resolution is being interpreted except by way of rejection by us, unless we are going to show determination to stand firm by the consequences of it?
I hope I may just say one more thing. We have—and we have recognised this—particular responsibilities towards Rhodesia. In the Security Council resolutions lately, and sometimes phrased in ways which many of us would find objectionable, there is a constant reminder of the responsibilities of the administering Power, which is the United Kingdom. And we ourselves have never disputed this, since our claim before U.D.I. that the decision rested with us; and we have not repudiated it since. But beyond the constitutional position we have—and we must not abrogate this—a peculiar responsibility towards Rhodesia because of our position in the world. We are a world Power able to take a world view of it. We may not understand the internal situation of Rhodesia as well as many of them, but we understand the situation outside Rhodesia a good deal better than the people of a country who have been until lately very much cut off from any information at all. We have had, in addition, the painful experience, for which we have shed much blood, of leading dependent nations into their own freedom. We are the centre of a Commonwealth of many nations and races, and above all we have always sought to stand by that one organ of world opinion and authority, the United Nations, for which, in this present instance, I submit we have a very special responsibility.
Do we accept responsibility for Rhodesia as a whole and for all its peoples?
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Have we a special relationship to them and others which means that we cannot stand aside? We know that there is a great temptation in the country, out of weariness or particular sympathy, to hope that the issues may be resolved without our having to take any further decisions ourselves. But this is really to that we give up our responsibilities, and if we are going to do that, let us do it publicly and not privately. But, of course, we do not wish to do this, and I cannot myself see any other way in which we can assert that responsibility than by accepting, however painfully, the consequences of a step which will set out before Rhodesia the cost of their pursuance of policies which we ourselves abhor and from which we want to rescue them.
6.0 p.m.
LORD WEDGWOOD: My Lords, first I should like to add my congratulations to those offered by the right reverend Prelate to the noble Lord, Lord Poltimore, on the occasion of his maiden speech. We listened to him with the greatest sympathy for his championship of Africa and of its inhabitants. I thought he made his points with admirable clarity, and I hope that we shall hear him again quite soon in the future. When I first had the privilege of speaking in your Lordships' House it was in a debate on Rhodesia. On that occasion I completed my remarks by saying that I was certain that threats and international sanctions and hatred were not the right way to deal with Rhodesia. In company with many of your Lordships, I have repeated similar remarks ever since, and I do so again to-day.
I listened to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor with the greatest attention, particularly to his information on Article 12. I hope to say something later on his remarks about the Six Principles. I listened, too, to the moss admirable speech of the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, who I am sorry is not present at the moment. I found myself in almost complete agreement with everything he said, and later on I should like to support some of his remarks about Central Africa.
In my view, to those who believed in them, sanctions originally made sense only if they achieved the object of pelting the negotiators round a table. This has now happened on a number of occasions, on H.M.S. "Tiger" and in Salisbury, and

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they have all failed; and it becomes obvious from what we have heard from the Prime Minister that talks will not now be possible without what is virtually a complete surrender by the Government of Rhodesia. Your Lordships will judge for yourselves the likelihood, or not, of that happening. So what do Her Majesty's Government really believe that they can achieve by introducing these petty and vicious sanctions and regulations, under the guise of an Order in Council and at the behest of their masters, the Afro-Asian Group at the United Nations, and. incidentally, expecting your Lordships meekly to agree to these provisions?
There is a Latin quotation from the 17th century with which your Lordships may be familiar, of which the well-known English translation is:
"Whom God would destroy He first sends mad."
There are those who think that they can achieve their aims by depriving Rhodesians of access to this or other countries because they may—and here I quote from the Order—
"be likely to further or encourage any unconstitutional action in Southern Rhodesia"—
et cetera. How can any one judge who is likely to be for or against unconstitutional action? The noble Lord, Lord Wade, particularly raised this point in his speech just now, and I should like to support him in it. We should like to hear from the noble Lord when he replies how this Article can be interpreted. Do they think their aims can be achieved by imposing criminal and heavy financial penalties, as in Article 13 of the Order, on those who might suggest in public here that Rhodesia was perhaps a good place to live in, or in which to go and settle? Or do they think they can achieve them by refusing to allow newspapers, books, periodicals or any other documents to go from this country to Rhodesia, as is the case under Board of Trade regulations? If so, they must be mad, and their reasoning, and, indeed, it would seem their humanity, thoroughly bad.
Indeed, I say with restraint that there are some features in this Order, in the Articles and particularly in the first Schedule, which lay citizens of this country open to obligatory investigation and examination under something close to those conditions more normal in a police
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State. I do not think the British people realise what are the provisions of this Order, as there has been little publicity about them. When they do, I hope public protest will be thoroughly suitably voiced. It appears to me that it is nothing less than a 20th century Inquisition which is contemplated.
Some of your Lordships may know that I have spent many years in Africa. There is a gulf between the physical and political background and thinking of this country and the realities of life in primitive and emergent Africa; and those who plan our policies here, in Whitehall and Westminster, should go and live in Africa for a year or two, and then, on their return, we might have different and much more objective, and perhaps even more understanding, views expressed in responsible circles. The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, might agree with me on this; he mentioned it in an earlier debate.
Incredible though it is, I have come to the conclusion that Her Majesty's Government do not want a settlement with Rhodesia. On H.M.S. "Tiger", a Constitution was agreed—by far the most difficult part of the exercise. This was jeopardised and thrown away by those stupid clauses on the return to legality. Then the noble Lord, Lord Alport, on his return from his mission to Salisbury, indicated that negotiations could be productive. When Mr. Thomson went to Salisbury he chose to disagree about the number of Chiefs in the Legislature, claiming that they were not representative of African thinking. But, to my mind, by far the worst of the Government's failures to try to reach agreement was the flat refusal by the Prime Minister of Sir Alec Douglas-Home's offer of his disinterested services, on his return from Salisbury, when he claimed—I am sure that Sir Alec's claims must be given the greatest attention—that he could have achieved a settlement in Salisbury had he had members of the Government with him. That refusal shows that Her Majesty's Government's intentions towards a settlement cannot be taken seriously.
Her Majesty's Government extricated themselves from the unpalatable prospect of Sir Alec reaching a settlement, which they did not want to endorse and which would have been so much in the interests of Rhodesian Africans, for whom Her

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Majesty's Government profess to be so seriously concerned, and they are now trying to commit us, through this Order, to economically destroying them along with the whites. The Prime Minister and others talk about "moral issues" and "clean hands". Aden? Arms for Federal Nigeria and tribal genocide? Sanctions against Rhodesia—and what next?
Indeed, what next? I should like to turn to that now. As a number of your Lordships have already said, there does not seem to be any prospect of Rhodesia's capitulating, and there is going to be a continuation of nothing less than cold war hostilities. Who knows what next the United Nations will propose for us—arms and material assistance for glorious freedom fighters, trained in Communist camps in various parts of the world, and proceeding to their nefarious ends through Zambia? The noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, touched on
this subject earlier on. Is this what Her Majesty's Government want? Perhaps they do not want it.
LORD SHEPHERD: This is the most disgraceful speech I have ever heard.
LORD WEDGWOOD: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, has said that this is a disgraceful speech, but I am saying what I believe to be true. I believe that this is what might be likely to happen. And what then? Retaliation by Rhodesia along the Zambesi possibly, and further inflammation of Zambia's relations with her neighbours. You will have seen in the papers, as I have, that Zambia does not intend to operate these sanctions. She cannot, as she is dependent, for example, on coal from Rhodesia for her copper mines, and for passage for Zambian copper through Rhodesia to Beira. If
these arrangements were to collapse, what then? There would be grave risk of severe difficulties in Zambia. You have heard from the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, how delicately things are poised at present. Who in the wide world, as the noble and learned Lord Chancellor said earlier on, could wish for troubles which could eventually lead to the most awful calamities such as happened in the Congo in the past and in Nigeria at the present?
I spoke to your Lordships on this point in the last sanctions debate in
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February of last year. Do Her Majesty's Government expect Zambia to continue in her present state indefinitely? Do Her Majesty's Government expect that we shall underpin her economy if, by any chance, her industrial productivity declines? Our investment there, which is substantial as it is, is already under attack. In my view Zambia is far more realistic about sanctions than Her Majesty's Government. Doctor Banda also, looking to his own Malawi economic interests, has stated that he has no intention of operating sanctions; but of course Doctor Banda's views are now not as important as they appeared to be formerly. They do not impress Her Majesty's Government because they do not fit in with their present political thinking. The geographical circle, we know, is completed by
Portuguese Mozambique and the Republic of South Africa, and we all know that they do not intend to string along with United Nations sanctions. It is my view that if sanctions which have no hope of success continue we shall see an inevitable procession of events for which we in this country shall bear full responsibility.
I have spoken previously about the paramount importance of stable government, on which all else depends; all hopes for the future, all progress to prosperity and a tolerable life for all. Look around Africa and see what happens when stable Governments, c f whatever complexion, collapse. The chief sufferers are the vast majority of inhabitants who do not have the means of adequately protecting themselves. Can we not learn from our own mistakes and be humble enough to realise that we here in Britain do not have to live or die from the consequences of an out-dated political thinking about what is right or wrong for Africa and its inhabitants. I am sure that in the impasse that we have come to we should refuse to give authority to this Order in Council. I suggest that the right approach now is for Her Majesty's Government to take up Sir Alec's offer of mediation, and empower—
BARONESS GAITSKELL: My Lords, what is his offer?
LORD WEDGWOOD: Sir Alec and the Prime Minister apparently, according to the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, as you heard earlier, are the only two people in

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this country who know the provisions of this offer.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, if the noble Lord will permit me to say so, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, so I understand, is still bound by the Five Principles of his own Administration, one of which was that there should be a blocking mechanism in order that there should be no change in the Constitution that would deny the African advance in course of time. In view of what my noble friend said at the beginning when he quoted the speeches made recently by Mr. Smith, does the noble Lord believe, in the light of what Mr. Smith has said so recently, that there is a chance of finding a solution within the Five Principles by which the previous Administration are bound?
LORD WEDGWOOD: My Lords, I cannot comment on what may be in the mind of Sir Alec Douglas-Home. We understood that he had heard from Mr. Smith that the proposals that were placed before him in Salisbury were still open for agreement, and I should not like to go any further than that. I believe that he should now be empowered by Her Majesty's Government to try to negotiate the sort of settlement which will lead to the recognition of an independent Rhodesia under the Crown and with a Constitution which offers the best possible prospect for the future for all the inhabitants of Rhodesia.
I should like briefly to refer to the Six Principles which the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, mentioned earlier and about which the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, has just spoken. The implication of the Six Principles, of which the last was added recently, is that no one race should be able to dominate another. My Lords, with deep regret I do not believe that it is possible to devise a Constitution that will endure on that basis. A Constitution is possible of operation only by those who have the will to operate it. Therefore, I come to the conclusion that the Six Principles should not be a limiting factor. In the context of present-day realities—I believe the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, may disagree—they are out of date, and no settlement can be reached by binding the hand of a negotiator from fixed positions.
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An agreed settlement, with the chance of peace in Central Africa, is worth incomparably more, my Lords, than a blind insistence on past dogma. Rhodesia has much to gain from a settlement, and so have we. The dividing factors can be reduced if there is a real desire to reach agreement and a determination to resist the clamour for more and more ill-advised action by the Afro-Asian group at U.N.O. All countries involved in Central and Southern Africa need a peaceful solution. The dangers are obvious if this is not achieved. Support for this Order is support for further confusion and an invitation to further anarchy and bloodshed along the Zambesi, let us be in no doubt about that.
Finally, and I apologise for taking up your Lordships' time for so long, I would refer to the constitutional position here as I see it. I am enjoined by Her Majesty's Writ to be present at Parliament
"… considering the difficulty of the said affairs and dangers impending … to treat and give counsel upon the affairs aforesaid."
Threats of what will happen to your Lordships' House if it does not do what the Government of the day require of it make no impression upon me at all. There is no future for this House if it yields to threats of its extinction. I shall vote as my counsel indicates, and that, I believe, is my first duty so long as I am a Member of your Lordships' House and sit on these Benches.
As to the Order, the British electorate, as the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, has pointed out, have had no opportunity of expressing their collective view on the question of sanctions against Rhodesia, and I have some reason for thinking that if these matters were referred to the country these measures would not find support. I shall vote against the Order, and I very much hope a majority of your Lordships will do the same.
6.19 p.m.
THE LORD BISHOP OF SOUTHWARK: My Lords, on the last two occasions that I have addressed your Lordships' House it has been on matters relating to personal freedom and justice against the interests of the Government, and with encouragement and support from the Opposition. That was with regard to Court Lees School, and also to

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Sir Reginald Verdon-Smith and Bristol Siddeley, and I am very grateful for the support that I received from the Opposition in what I believe to be a necessary claim that people, no matter how unpopular they might be, should have a chance to defend themselves. Once again one is on one's feet in the interests of individual liberty and justice. But this time I find myself in sympathy with the Government and not with the Opposition Party.
As the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster said over the weekend, one must not be selective in the causes which one chooses to defend. On this occasion I am seeking to defend not an individual but the majority of a country. I find time and again, as the right reverend Prelate, the Bishop of Chichester, said a short while ago, that we forget this fact. People refer to "Rhodesia", and so often refer just to 219,000 Europeans, equivalent to the inhabitants in a borough roughly the size of Croydon, forgetting the 4 million Africans, many of whom are in prison without a charge being brought against them and without being given an opportunity to defend themselves.
Your Lordships may remember that when we debated this matter some time ago I referred to a situation which was known to me because I had some friends out there in the academic world. This was before the recent student revolts, but there was a mild students' revolt there when a number of students questioned something which Mr. Smith had said. For daring to question what the Government
had said, 149 students were taken off to a camp by the police, their trousers were taken down, and on their bare behinds they were thrashed with a cane, six strokes each. I cannot think what on earth would happen to the professional workers at the Sorbonne if similar things were to happen there, or indeed in our own universities. If such a thing were to happen here in this country, every single Member of your Lordships' House would be outraged. Noble Lords would say that they had no sympathy for certain extremist views expressed by the students, but the fact that people could be treated like that was intolerable and
something which no civilised country could tolerate. Yet that is what happened to those students in Rhodesia for daring to criticise Mr. Smith's régime. That is the reason why
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I am on my feet this afternoon to do as I have done on two previous occasions; that is, to speak in the interests of justice and of freedom on behalf of those who are oppressed.
The noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, and I were partners in the Court Lees affair, and I got to know him sufficiently well, if I may say so without impertinence, to know that he would not be taking the side which he is to-day if he did not believe passionately that this was the way forward. I respect his view and respect what he said, but it all depends upon the assessment one makes of the situation. The noble Earl said—and I hope that I quote him correctly—"We believe that an honourable settlement is possible". If I could believe that, as quite clearly the last noble Lord who spoke believes, then things would be very different. I know that the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, believes that to be true; but all my information suggests the contrary.
When Mr. Smith tells members of the Opposition, and others, that he seeks an accommodation, I take that as seriously as some accommodations that we, were promised thirty years ago: "This is my last territorial demand, and then I am satisfied." Those of us who belong to that generation, having had our fingers bitten, should be very careful about having them bitten again. It was not the promise that was made to passengers through Germany, but something that was spelt out in black and white in Mein Kampf.
To-day, I am not impressed by what is said by people who are wined and dined by the white Rhodesians just for a day or two and then come back with all these promises. What I am much more impressed by is what appears day after day in the Rhodesian Press and in the utterances of Mr. Ian Smith and his colleagues. Mr. Smith has said flatly that he has no intention of allowing the coloured people to have a majority in that country. From his point of view that is a fair and reasonable thing to say; that is his outlook. But at least let us accept what he says for what it is worth, and do not let us pretend that what he really means is something other than what he has said and to which he is committed.

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I would ask the Opposition to believe that I speak to-day not as a member of a political Party but as a member of the Bishops' Bench, believing that a multiracial community is a necessary consequence of a Christian view of life. What depresses me is that we are losing Africa to Christianity because the African believes that Christianity is identified with those in comfortable positions who are enjoying privilege and affluence and who are treating Africans as second-class citizens. Even those who have fought great battles there for justice—people like the late Bishop Ambrose Reeves of Johannesburg, was so identified in the eyes of some of the coloured people that when he was thrown out of Africa, coloured people said to him, "Go, and take your white God with you." Such is the image of us so-called Christians in that Continent.
Perhaps your Lordships think that what I have said is an exaggeration and that I
am just depending on things which students say or which are said by extremist
movements in this country. I can assure your Lordships that is not true. I wish it were. I have with me a letter from a brother Bishop in Rhodesia, and this is what he tells me:
"The drift towards apartheid is increasing in momentum. You will have heard of the decision in Salisbury to segregate public parks and that Africans occupying offices in Salisbury are being given notice to leave white areas. The idea that Smith is a moderate is quite absurd. The Rhodesian Front is officially committed to a policy of separate development and it will go as quickly in that direction as it can. While pretending to disapprove of those who speak too loudly about these intentions, it can pursue the policy with quiet determination."
Why do not honest people see it for what it is?—because I would not for one moment wish to question the integrity of those who hold a different view, both here and in Rhodesia itself.
I say that for three very simple reasons. First, for those in Rhodesia there is a censorship. The Bishop says that this is largely due to the tight censorship and the fact that few white Rhodesians ever hear any news from the outside world. I am quite sure that in the Rhodesian papers to-morrow all the speeches from the Opposition side, and certainly the speech of the noble Lord who preceded me, will be printed in full. I do not sup-
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pose for one moment that a single sentence I have said, or anything said by any Member of the Government, will appear. Such is freedom in this wonderful peace-loving country of Rhodesia! That, then, is the first reason that they do not have the opportunity to know the facts—because censorship does not allow it.
Secondly (this is very convenient and, Heaven knows!, we do this in our own country; all Governments, all Oppositions do it, and no doubt I am as guilty as anybody), if we are faced with a basic issue we try to avoid facing it and to prevent other people from seeing that issue by getting away from principles and turning it into a squalid personal battle. As the Bishop himself says:
"This has become a war between Wilson and Smith, and it is said If only we can hold on in Salisbury, in Rhodesia, then Wilson will be defeated and the Conservatives will come to power and will then ratify our independence'."
I am quite sure that no member of the Opposition would want that. I am quite certain that they would disapprove of views expressed in terms of that sort. Nevertheless, I ask them in all seriousness: is it not possible that this debate will be interpreted as a pro-or an anti-Wilson approach to the multiracial problem?
The third reason why people find difficulty in understanding is because of the use of the word "terrorists". If our country were occupied by a strong coloured
group who had it all their own way, you and I, my Lords, would try to win freedom for ourselves. I am sure of that. We should regard ourselves as freedom fighters, but, of course, the other side would describe us as terrorists. I think we need to be very careful when we are told that by certain decisions which we are making—for instance, about approving sanctions—we are aiding and abetting terrorists. I just do not believe it. What will really happen if we pass this Order is that we shall then encourage those who love their country and are seeking freedom for it, whereas if we do not pass it the consequences of such a British sell-out will be incalculable.
In conclusion may I just make two points, the first of which I hope your Lordships will not dismiss as sentimental. I believe that noble Lords opposite will realise that I am as deeply concerned as they are to find a solution. But only

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yesterday morning, in a part of my diocese where there is a very large coloured minority, I was celebrating the Holy Communion and it was my joy and privilege to give the Sacrament to dozens of white and coloured people who knelt side by side at the Table. Then the mothers brought up their children again, both white and coloured, for me to bless them, and afterwards I had my refreshments with
them. That is the vision which motivates me and which I believe basically motivates all of us. To this we are pledged and it is our prayer that we shall achieve it.
The second point I want to make is that my diocese is linked with a diocese in Chicago. I was there and in Detroit last summer, and I saw with my own eyes the consequences of "too little and too late". There I saw the appalling devastation and the terrible hatred, and on the very day I left the mayor had got through the local parliament some vast sum of money for the buying of machine guns to be used, if need be, this year.
My Lords, those are the two pictures. Which is the one most likely to be realised in Rhodesia? If we sell out now, there is no doubt that though, like Danegeld, we may buy temporary peace, in a matter of years there will be a situation even worse than that which I encountered last year in Chicago and Detroit.
It is my longing that what shall be achieved in Rhodesia is what I experienced yesterday morning at the Table of the Lord in South London.
6.35 p.m.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, the right reverend Prelate who has just spoken was good enough in the course of his speech to credit my noble friend Lord Jellico with sincerity. The right reverend Prelate was supporting the Motion; I hope he will be prepared also to credit with sincerity others who oppose the Motion. I find it easy to credit Her Majesty's Government's Ministers with sincerity in supporting this Motion, because I greatly respect all three Ministers who are to take part in this debate.
My noble and learned friend Lord Dilhorne reminded the House of some provisions of the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965, under which this Order is brought
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forward. I do not think I go as far as my noble and learned friend in thinking that it is improper for Her Majesty's Government to use that Act in order to make, or seek to make, this comprehensive Order, because that is the Act which the Government themselves passed in order to enable them to deal with the Rhodesia problem. It provided expressly in Section 2, that such Orders can be made but that they shall expire at the end of a period of 28 days unless they have been approved by Resolution of each House of Parliament.
What I find quite incomprehensible and, I may say, intolerable, is that the Government should say there is anything improper in this House coming to an honest conclusion whether or not it should approve an Order, when that is the very method they have laid down as the right way of dealing with the Rhodesia problem. It may perhaps be said that wherever there is provision for the approval of something by a House of Parliament it always says "each House of Parliament", but that is not so. In an Act passed as recently as the 30th of last month, the Industrial Expansion Act 1968, there was express provision for the approval of a scheme by a Resolution of the Commons House of Parliament. It is not always that an Act says "each House of Parliament", but where it does say "each House of Parliament" it cannot be wrong for each House of Parliament to decide the question before it upon its merits, because that is what Parliament is for.
The Government now seek our approval of the Order made on June 7. What principles should guide us in coining to a conclusion on whether or not to approve that Order? Clearly, the first consideration, I should have thought, was the merits of the Order itself, and to that I shall return. Of course, every noble Lord who thinks this Statutory Order wise and good will vote for it. But is any Member who is sincerely convinced that it is a bad Order justified in not voting against it? I can find no such justification. As the noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood, reminded us in his speech a few moments ago, certain things are stated in our Writ of Summons to this House. We are summoned here to give our counsel. That must mean our honest counsel; and counsel must include how we vote as a result

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of our debate. To-morrow we shall vote under the express provisions of a Statute only two years old. Is it therefore so remarkable that we have not yet had a vote against any Order made thereunder? The long tradition that is alleged for not voting against such an Order applies, in the special conditions of this Statute, to a period of two years and no more. Let me say quite clearly that to-morrow, in my view, every noble Lord must be guided by his own conscience. I propose to vote according to my views of the merits of the Order. I should think it shameful to do anything else. I should further think it inconsistent with my constitutional duty to the Crown and to Parliament.
My Lords, there are Ministers and writers in the Press who urge that it would be contrary to our personal interests to vote against this Order. Ministers even hold out threats or concealed bribes to induce us to refrain from acting on our convictions. I think that these threats and bribes perhaps cast more light on their own character than on their knowledge of your Lordships' House.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, if the noble Lord will allow me to interrupt him, I am not quite sure what he is referring to, particularly when he talks about bribes.
LORD CONESFORD: I referred both to Ministers and to writers in the Press. The noble Lord will find one or two examples this morning of an allegation that if we vote against this Order to-morrow, all chance of a certain Lords reform which is said to be otherwise possible, and which might result in a quite considerable increase in salaries to certain noble Lords, would go. I am certain that the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, would never hold out such a bribe. I think he had not come to the House at the beginning of my speech, when I expressed my belief in the honesty and sincerity of the Ministers who are to take part in this debate; and I think that he makes the same assumption about me. What I was referring to were the writers in the Press and some ministerial utterances. I may say that one was made by a not wholly obscure member of the Government—namely, the Chancellor of the Exchequer —which certainly contained threats or bribes. I am saying that those threats
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and bribes reveal the character of those who made them more than they reveal knowledge of the character of your Lordships' House.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I am sorry to return to this point—and I was here at the beginning—but it is just this word "bribe" that I am bothered about. I should not have thought this alleged offer of £1,500 a year would have carried very much weight. Perhaps the noble Lord would just like to leave it at "threats", although I personally would deplore that.
LORD CONESFORD: Perhaps the noble Lord prefers the word "inducements". I am sorry if I have shocked the noble Lord the Leader of the House, but I think the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack is quite familiar with lawyers sometimes referring to threats of disadvantages or offers of advantages, and I was using "bribes" in the sense of offers of certain advantages which might come in certain circumstances and which would be threatened should we use our votes honestly to-morrow night and should that lead us to defeat this Order.
I now come to the merits of the Order. So far, I admit, I have said nothing in reply to the right reverend Prelate who spoke just before me, and who frankly and rightly, from his point of view, commended the Order on its merits. I take a different view from him of the merits, not because I am any fonder than he is of certain things that are happening in Rhodesia. The main reason I have come to so different a conclusion, the main gap I found in the speeches of both right reverend Prelates, is the absence of any ground for believing that the imposition of these further sanctions would lead to any of the results that they sincerely seek. The purpose of this Order, as a simple perusal shows, is to do whatever we can to ruin Rhodesia economically and to bring about a breakdown of law and order in that country. Let me say at once that I have never been a pacifist, and I admit at once to those who take a different view that it may be true that you must sometimes use cruel means to bring about a good result. But surely, if that is your motive in imposing cruel means, you must have some reason for expecting a good result.

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Her Majesty's Government may once have believed that the effect of their sanctions would be the fall of the Rhodesian régime and its replacement by a régime with which they could come to an agreement. If they did think that, can they really believe that still? Do they really believe that these sanctions will cause the downfall of the Rhodesian Government, or that, if that were the result, that Rhodesian Government would be replaced by men with whom they would find it easier to deal? All the indications from our experience since sanctions were first imposed is that, whatever else they have done, they have not weakened the Smith régime; and, if there is any feeling developing against it, it is just as likely to be on the part of those who would be more extreme than of those who have hitherto been considered more liberal.
Many people have mentioned the Six Principles. Of course, there was a great deal of merit in what was sought to be expressed in those principles. Why does anybody suppose that the adoption of any of those principles will be brought nearer if a further attempt, doomed to failure, is made to apply more coercive sanctions? I have spoken, I think, in one debate a year on Rhodesia. I spoke on November 15, 1965, on December 8, 1966, and on February 6 last year, and I attempted to analyse the legal considerations as I saw them. Whatever else these sanctions do, it does not seem to me that they bring about any of the results hitherto put forward as desirable, and least of all the results which are embodied in the Six Principles. Sanctions may indeed make the world a poorer place and spread hardship and poverty in areas much wider than Rhodesia. They will do absolutely nothing to help the Africans, whom the Government say they wish to help and whom, I am sure, the right reverend Prelates also wish to help.
It is said that the purpose of these sanctions is to carry out a United Nations resolution. I am not going to examine all the obligations set out in the Charter but I suppose the one that expresses most strongly the obligation is Article 25:
"The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter."
Those last words are not unimportant, as those who have studied the legal com-
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mentaries on the Charter will know. The position under the United Nations sanctions is not simple; but if those are right who take the view that I and others—including a former United States Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Acheson—have put forward quite recently, as well as some years ago; if, that is to say, there was not a threat to peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter, there is a great deal that the United Nations has done on this matter which is unprecedented and which, in the view of some of us, is legally most dubious. Certainly nothing like this has ever been attempted before by the United Nations.
But, dealing further with these sanctions, are Her Majesty's Government quite sure that they are wise to discourage travel and intercourse between this country and Rhodesia? Will that make Rhodesia more, or less, dependent upon South Africa and Portugal? Those are matters that should be carefully considered. Reference to the United Nations' resolution has been made, quite rightly, in many speeches and in that with which the noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack opened the debate. Reference has been made not only to the Order before the House but also to that resolution. Paragraph 13 of the United Nations' resolution is widely interpreted as an invitation to the use of force and to civil war. Her Majesty's Government tell us—and I accept their sincerity—that that is not how they wished it to be understood. But it is how it was quite certain to be understood in many countries thoughout the world, and particularly in Africa.
I wonder how many noble Lends saw the Press report which appeared, I think, in many papers—the cutting before me is from the Daily Telegraph of June 1—of the remarks of Lord Caradon in New York. He said that the resolution in no way requires Britain to use force or to encourage terrorism. But he went on—and perhaps so as not to be unfair to him I had better give the exact words:
"He said that perhaps the most important point about the resolution was that it was adopted unanimously. All of us, no doubt, had reservations on the final text, but nevertheless it was important that for the first time we achieved a unanimous vote on Rhodesia'."
What does that mean? Everybody understood it differently but it was a great thing that everybody signed it! That is really

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not the recipe either for wisdom or for peace.
My Lords, I suppose that ever since I have been in politics I have urged, both in domestic disputes and in international disputes, that we should get rid of the hateful habit of trying to find a formula.
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, I was trying to follow the noble Lord's argument. Is he seriously denying that decisions taken by the Security Council under Article 39 and 41 are legally binding on this country if taken by the requisite majority?
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, I read Article 25 of the United Nations Charter and I called attention to the words, "in accordance with the present Charter". And I say, speaking for myself, that I think, if I am right, that there was not, within the meaning of the Charter, a threat to peace. I think that that throws a good deal of doubt on some of the United Nations conclusions. I do not go as far as the noble Lord sought then to put in my mouth; but I think that is a question that needs and justifies further investigation. While I do not wish to indulge in a long argument with the noble Lord, I would only say that it would be even more unfair of him if he tried to make me agree with his law than if he tried to make me agree with his politics. I regard both demands as almost impossible.
My Lords, I was dealing with the matter of seeking to find a formula. Finding a formula can mean one of two very different things. A formula may be a means for honest men to express their agreement; it may also be a means for politicians to conceal their differences. There is a great deal of difference between the two; and to seek to find a formula in such a matter as a resolution on sanctions before the Security Council is very dangerous indeed, unless actual agreement is really reached.
There is just one matter mentioned by the noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack on which, out of respect for his speech, I should like to make one comment. In previous speeches on many occasions I have always deplored the use of the word "veto" when it means that one of the Permanent Members has not
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concurred in, or voted for, a majority decision of the Security Council. It gives many people the idea that there is something called a Veto provided in the
Charter which it is generally improper to use. I know that the noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack said that it was serious to use it. With that I agree. Nevertheless, I am certain that if the United Nations is to be a useful body, and is to make progress in the development of International Law and practice, at least two things are absolutely necessary.
It must pay the greatest regard to the provisions of the Charter—which, to my mind, it did not do in finding that the situation in Rhodesia was a threat to peace—and secondly, no Power must hesitate to vote against a resolution in the Security Council if they disagree with it. All that voting against that resolution means is that they disagreed with the other people on its merits. I think that not even the Liberal Party will say that it is always improper to be in a minority.
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, the fact is that we were not in a minority. We voted for this resolution and we are therefore bound by it. We voted for it and our country is therefore committed.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Why?
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, I am sure that is the noble Lord's view. I do not know quite what is his conception of the purposes of the British Parliament, but that is another matter. I explained at the beginning of my speech what I understand is the obligation of every Member of either House to vote on the proposition before it in accordance with the merits. I agree of course with the noble Lord that the fact that this resolution has been passed is one argument in its favour. I have tried to give the reasons why I do not regard it as conclusive and why I feel reasonably certain that history will not think that it ought to have been regarded as conclusive.
My Lords, let me conclude by saying this. It seems to me horribly irresponsible, in the present state of the world, to do anything to promote civil war. I believe that this is precisely what this United Nations resolution has done. It also seems to me to be wicked to take active steps to make the world a poorer

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place, in the misguided hope that the possible punishment of a régime may compensate for the widespread injury done to the innocent. My Lords, unless Her Majesty's Government deploy convincing arguments to the contrary not yet put forward, I must vote against the Order.
7.2 p.m.
LORD ROWLEY: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, expressed very forcibly, and claimed very forcibly, his right to vote according to his conscience. I do not think that any noble Lord on this side of the House would take exception to the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, or any other noble Lord opposite, voting according to his conscience. We are not looking at the matter from that point of view. For the last sixty years, ever since the days of the Parliament Act controversy, we have had a built-in majority on the Conservative Benches, and a kind of convention has developed that, at any rate regarding Orders, the built-in Conservative majority in your Lordships' House would not vote against an Order put forward by a Labour Government. May I put it in this way? Suppose during the Suez adventure, when there was a Conservative Government, with a Conservative majority in the House of Lords, it had been necessary, for some purpose or other, to have an Order put through both Houses, would there have been any practical difficulty? Of course there would not. The Whips would have been put on and the Order would have gone through the House of Commons and through your Lordships' House. But the position to-day is entirely different. Here we are—
LORD SALTOUN: My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord, but it does happen. I think it was in 1937, when there was a Conservative Government, an Order was laid which was withdrawn in your Lordships' House because it was objected to by the whole House.
LORD ROWLEY: My Lords, "One swallow does not make a summer". I will not deny that on occasion that might have happened. But here we have this vitally important Order which, no doubt within their rights, noble Lords opposite will defeat when the vote comes to-
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morrow. All through this debate there has been a thread of severe criticism directed against the word "sanctions". The trouble is—I say this in a kindly spirit—that many noble Lords opposite have no use for the United Nations—let us be frank about it—and they have no use for sanctions. But it is no use our taking a merely negative attitude of that kind. This terrible problem faces us all.
Like other noble Lords, I have been to Southern Rhodesia and I have been filled with admiration at the work which has been done and the development which has resulted from the know-how of the white minority—the modern factories, the building up of the economy, and so on. But, as the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Southwark very rightly pointed out, there are 4 million Africans living in Southern Rhodesia and they have their human rights. This year we are commemorating International Human Rights Year. What human rights are they enjoying in Southern Rhodesia? The whole trouble is due to the fact that we are not able to relate the rights of the 220,000 white minority, having regard to what they have done for the country, to the rights and aspirations of the 4 million Africans.
The noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, argued that we had no right to ask the House to pass this Order because we have not a mandate for it, but the question of a mandate would not arise if there were a Labour majority in your Lordships' House. It never happened, even in the case to which the noble and learned Lord referred. It has never been argued when a Conservative Government were in office that they had to have a mandate when asking your Lordships to pass either Bills or Statutory Orders.
I thought that the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, made a very balanced speech, and I am sorry that when he ceased to balance he came down on the wrong foot and advised his colleagues to vote against the Order. He said that the mere fact that the Government might be bound by a resolution of the Security Council did not mean that the Opposition was bound by it. That is an extraordinary constitutional theory, my Lords. I have never heard it before, but even if it were true, surely no one would justify a loyal

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Opposition to a Labour Government preventing a Labour Government from carrying out their responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations. Our country is one of the founder members of the United Nations. We have accepted the obligations of the Charter. Surely it would not be argued that the Opposition are not bound by sanctions imposed under the Charter.
The noble Lord, Lord Conesford, is in grave doubt whether the resolution passed by the Security Council is legal, but I can see no reason to doubt its legality. Article 39 does not place the responsibility upon lawyers or the International Court of Justice of interpreting the Articles of the Charter on whether or not there is a threat to peace. It says:
"The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace."
It is a responsibility under the Charter which is accepted, as I understand it, by both sides of the House, and it is placed upon the Security Council which has unanimously decided in favour of mandatory sanctions whatever mental reservations may exist among members of the Council. The noble Lord, Lord Conesford, has been in Parliamentary life a long time, as I have, and we have often had to agree to Motions put forward by our own Parties about which we have had mental reservations. We cannot take into account mental reservations on the part of those who voted in the affirmative when they sat on the Security Council. We were told by my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor that
all the permanent and temporary members of the Council unanimously voted for the passing of this resolution. The noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood, has left his seat and I am sorry to have to say this in his absence, but his reference to "Afro-Asian masters of the Government" at the United Nations seemed to me to be a cheap jibe quite unworthy of any Member of this House.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, I appreciate what the noble Lords says about the uselessness of mental reservations and that the same might possibly apply to an express reservation. The Government say that paragraph 13 of this resolution is not interpreted by them as an invitation to civil war. But all the
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countries that do interpret it as an invitation to civil war are, according to the noble Lord, equally justified.
LORD ROWLEY: My Lords, I should like some evidence from the noble Lord that any one member of the Security Council interprets paragraph 13 as an open sesame to supplying arms to or authorising the sending of bands of guerrillas into Southern Rhodesia. I do not believe that that is consistent with a proper interpretation of paragraph 13. I believe that to take the view that it permits the despatch of arms or guerrillas into Southern Rhodesia would be to drive a coach-and-horses through the resolution passed by the Security Council. If they had been going to authorise the despatch of military forces, they would have said so.
Whether our Government are right in saying that they have given material aid to Southern Rhodesia, I do not know, but I can see nothing to justify the interpretation of the word "material" as consistent with the word "military". Indeed, the action is taken under Article 41 of the Charter, which says:
"The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions."
I think it would make nonsense of this resolution if Member States were to consider that they were entitled to send arms or guerrillas into Southern Rhodesia in order to make things difficult for the Government or for Mr. Smith's régime in Southern Rhodesia.
I was impressed by the point made by the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, in his speech about the value of negotiations. He said that the Secretary of State had informed the House that there were three possible methods of dealing with the situation in Southern Rhodesia. There was the use of force; there was the possibility of surrender and there was what has been done, the imposition of sanctions. The noble Earl said that there was a fourth method—negotiations. I agree with that, and I do not agree with the right reverend prelate the Bishop of Southwark that there is very little hope of securing a negotiated agreement with the illegal régime in Salisbury. I was shocked by the statement of the noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood, that in his view Her Majesty's Government did not even

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want a settlement. That is really complete nonsense. Of course we want a settlement, but we must have regard to the interests not only of the 220,000 whites but also of the 4 million Africans living in that country, and that is what we are seeking to do.
The key to the solution of the Rhodesian problem lies in Salisbury and not in London. If the leaders of the white minority are prepared to agree to a just and equitable settlement, from the point of view of both white minority and black majority, there will be a settlement and an end to the terrible position that exists to-day. I cannot understand why there should be this difficulty. Ever since U.D.I. was announced, in November, 1965, Her Majesty's Government have made repeated attempts to bring about a settlement. There have been three Secretaries of State at the Commonwealth Office since 1965—Mr. Bottomley, Mr. Bowden and now Mr. Thomson. All three of them have been to Salisbury with the intention and hope of securing some kind of agreement.
Reference has been made to the discussions on the "Tiger". I have always understood that the Prime Minister and Mr. Smith got very near to achieving a provisional agreement, and that that agreement was torpedoed by the extremists in Salisbury. How can we get an agreement unless it is to be on the basis of equity. Are we to surrender? Is that what is wanted? Are we to appease the white minority in Rhodesia?
Even if the United Nations, as they well could do under Article 41, were to decide that force had to be used, I hope and believe that Her Majesty's Government would think a great deal before they went along with that policy. If we are going to rule out force, if we are going to rule out appeasement and if we cannot get anywhere for the moment with negotiations, pending another conference, we must go ahead bringing pressure to bear on the illegal régime, even though it brings some sacrifice to the people of Rhodesia. I should think that it is better for them to undergo this economic sacrifice than to have a blood bath such as is happening in Nigeria at the present time. If we had sent armed forces into Southern Rhodesia, we might have had a holocaust there which we could not visualise.
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The people of this country do not want to use force. They want a settlement.
THE MARQUESS OF SALIS13URY: My Lords, is it not a fact that one of the reasons for the present blood bath in Nigeria is that the white Government ceased to obtain and was succeeded entirely by a black Government.
LORD ROWLEY: My Lords, with great respect to the noble Marquess, I would not accept that. I. think that the mistake made in Nigeria was that they did not do what we have done in the case of Southern Rhodesia. They should have taken their problem to the United Nations or to the meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers. They did not do that. That is what happens when force is used. They are perfectly entitled to do that under International Law, as we should be. The precedent or analogy of Nigeria is not one that makes much appeal to my mind.
In conclusion, I would say that I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, that every noble Lord must vote according to his conscience, but I would ask the noble Lords opposite to think once, twice and even thrice before they reject this Order. This is an international matter now, and if this Order is rejected it will be construed as repudiating the resolution or the United Nations Security Council itself. It would also be an abrogation of our responsibilities under the Charter, and it would not only have international repercussions, for the reasons I have just stated, but also have national consequences of which noble Lords are fully conscious.
7.21 p.m.
THE EARL OF LYTTON: My Lords, I hope I can qualify as a genuine Back Bencher without any crypto-relationships with any other side. I hope, also, that my various speeches—although I am not a frequent attender— which have been made mainly on behalf of African peoples and their particular problems will not disqualify me in their eyes for what I am going to say now. I am in fact a freeman of a small African town—I daresay I am not the only one of your Lordships who is—simply because I have espoused the cause of the nation of which it is a part in debates in your Lordships' House. Therefore I am fully aware that we are

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dealing with the destinies of 4 million Africans; they are principally in my mind, and have been throughout.
I have started our debates on Rhodesia in this House three times, and once I arrived here without knowing that the debate had already been cancelled, so what I am going to say now would have been said earlier, and not specifically in connection with this Order. I had intended to come with two proposals. The first proposal was that exercise "Topple" should be called off; and the second that negotiations in accordance with a new principle should be started not under duress.
When we first discussed sanctions, and when I joined the majority of your Lordships in voting for them, I think we all supposed that the sanctions would be not grievous, not vindictive, not punitive, would last for a short time and so on. I level no reproach whatever at those who proved to be mistaken; I knew no better myself. Nevertheless, I presume that we all had in our minds that there might be no better than a 50–50 chance of the "topple" taking place. Now that the "topple" has not taken place and the illegal régime has been consolidated, I think the proper line is not to persecute it further, but to negotiate.
It has always been a principle in my life in negotiations that you cannot expect genuine negotiations when one of the parties is under duress. That is why I see no very valid difference between the Conservative point of view and that of the Government. So far as I understand it, on the Conservative side they want to go on throttling the victim while negotiating, so long as their own fingers alone play on his windpipe and nobody else has a hand; whereas on the Labour side they will not talk; they will throttle alone. I do not think that either of these methods shows any chance of success.
I should like to ask the question of Her Majesty's Government, as to whether they are free to negotiate, because (I may be out of date) I am sent a photostat copy of all resolutions of the United Nations, and I note resolution No. 2262 of the General Assembly, which reads as follows:
"Recalling further that the Government of the United Kingdom, Great Britain and Northern Ireland has declared on several
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occasions that the racist minority régime is illegal; that it will not negotiate with that régime on the future of Rhodesia, and that it will not grant independence until majority rule is established in the territory."
Is that a commitment of Her Majesty's Government, or is it not? If it is a commitment, then all thought of negotiations is futile; we go on and on, and I agree that where we are heading for is the use of force. Perhaps an answer may be given before the end of the debate to the question as to whether or not this is the standpoint of the Government. It is not what has been said in this House.
I would propose that a new policy be announced at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, which I understand is to take place in October, and that a commission of all Parties be sent to Rhodesia, with, of course, the cooperation of the Smith régime, if that is obtainable, in order to study the matter on a different principle from that adopted hitherto. The principle that I suggest arises from what is said in a resolution of the General Assembly, one that is constantly referred to by the United Nations in every one of its resolutions, in every one of those of the General Assembly, and in the vital one of the Security Council. It is a resolution of 1960, No. 1514. There are two paragraphs, one of which I should like to read. It says:
"3. That inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence."
My Lords, I think that we have put the cart before the horse. There are constant talks of political advance, whereas the proper sequence is a plan extending over a number of years to raise up a community—not just a few odd individuals, but a whole community—to parity in all respects, educational, political and economic, with the white community before political maturity is granted. I think one is obliged to take stock of what is happening in the rest of Africa. I look around at my African friends with genuine horror and a feeling that we are at least half responsible for the massacres that are occurring. We have done two evil things in Africa. First of all, we have made them independent in accordance with the colonial boundaries as they existed before independence. This has forced together people who detested each

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other, and dismembered others who wanted to be together, and placed them under one, two, three and four separate sovereign States. That is an intolerable
situation which the Secretary-General of the Organisation of African Unity, Mr. Diallo Telli himself recognised, since in 1967 he said:
"The chief task of this year is the correction of boundaries."
That is one problem. The other problem is putting the poor in pence in the seat of the Mighty and hoping for the best. The result is that you get legal and practical situations in country after country where the canvasser addresses the elector in something like the following language: "You, man, you have one vote. Do you understand?" And when he says that he does, the canvasser says: "You man, you have one man to vote for. Do you understand?" That is "One man, one vote". That is the kind of swindle democracy to which we have no obligation to subscribe. It happens as one of the consequences of an African not keeping himself in power. He can no longer educate his children. His income goes down from perhaps £1,000 to £80 a year, or something like that, and the situation is unacceptable to him. We have attempted to put into African society what it is not capable of assimilating.
Nobody knows how many people have died because black cannot get on with black. My own estimate (I can give details if anybody wishes to know) is approximately 2 million since 1960, because we flung people together who cannot be expected to get on. I think of a Syrian I met, an agronomist of the Food and Agriculture Organisation, who was at the time in the Somali Republic and who had come from the ex-Belgian Congo. He said, "In this country the kind of problem existing is that they have only two vets, instead of 200. In the Congo they have four or five large ethnic groups who cannot get on and who detest each other, and no national progress in any economic field is possible". These things have to be cured.
My Lords, I think that majority rule should be put in the deep-freeze. It is the aim, but there are other things. Let us concentrate on the conditions which will make majority rule work, or make it much more likely to work. What I
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feel we have done in Africa, because we cannot distinguish one African from another, is something that we should not have dreamt of doing in Europe; and if we had done it there it would have had equally bad results. Owing to the fact that I have come here so often and prepared something like twenty versions of a speech, I arrived to-day having prepared virtually nothing. Therefore I am in rather a state of confusion in dealing with my notes. All I wall say is that I am prepared to listen to the final speech of the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, though I have in fact come here to vote against the sanctions.
7.32 p.m.
LORD PEDDIE: My Lords, the noble Earl who has just resumed his seat informed us that he had prepared twenty versions of his speech. It is fairly obvious that he brought the wrong one along with him, because never in the whole course of my experience in this House have I heard such effrontery as I heard expressed by the noble Earl. The whole point and purpose of his contribution was: the only future that rests for the black populations is under a white domination. I would suggest to him that it is that idea, that attitude of mind, that is responsible for a great deal of friction between race and race to-day.
I have heard during the course of this debate a great number of strange arguments in support of the point of view against this Order, but I have not heard expressed clearly and in so many words support for U.D.I. and the racialism upon which it is based. Yet, at the same time, speech after speech from the opposing Benches was in opposition to any effort, no matter what it may be, that would bring an end to U.D.I. and the racialism upon which it is based. We heard from the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, who is not in his place, that he intends to vote in accordance with what he considers to be his constitutional duty. I think in point of fact that he has at the back of his mind certain doubts and reservations. He has the fear that if he follows out his intention to vote against this Order it would not be in furtherance of what he considered to be truly his constitutional duty.
It has already been stated that this Order is based upon a unanimous decision

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of the Security Council. It imposes comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia. It was clearly indicated by my noble friends, and the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, in an intervention, that it is one of the solemn obligations under the United Nations' Charter for this country as a member of the United Nations to respect and obey those mandatory economic sanctions. I detected a certain amount of embarrassment on the part of the noble Lord, Lord Cones-ford, when replying to Lord Gladwyn's interjection, an embarrassment which he tried to cover up with an extremely rude reply.
There is no doubt that the United Nations expresses the will of the majority of the world community that no people should be oppressed. In the case that we are
discussing a black majority is oppressed by a small white minority. Both Conservative and Labour Governments have given support to the United Nations, and to the principles upon which it is based. If the United Nations fail, there is no doubt that the universal disillusionment that would follow would have serious repercussions not only upon this country but upon the entire world. However, my Lords, there is more at stake than even the rights and liberties of the black population of Rhodesia. I would suggest to your Lordships that what is at stake is the whole concept of the rule of law, and Ito individual or Party can seek a transient advantage by challenging the rule of law—only at their peril.
The noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, made a desperate attempt to find all sorts of arguments; he was really scouring the barrel to find arguments in support of his point of view against this Order. One of them was that the Government had no mandate for their attitude towards Rhodesia. I would remind the noble and learned Viscount that not only is there a mandate but there has been a continuing mandate, and a mandate even through the period of Tory Governments, because from 1947 both Parties in Government have subscribed to a policy that aimed in the old colonial areas at the development of a society that would move towards racial equality and full democratic rights for native people. That has been, so I understand, part of the policy
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of successive Tory Governments, as well as of Labour Governments. The attitude towards Rhodesia to-day is based upon that concept. Therefore, the mandate lies there; the mandate lies at the very basis of that policy. It is utterly foolish to indicate, or to try to suggest, that there is no mandate for the action of the Government towards Rhodesia.
I would suggest that Rhodesia's challenge to that principle of racial equality is the root of the trouble. We are all aware of the actions and the record of the minority in Rhodesia who have been prepared to defy world opinion and hang on to their privileges. In their determination to hang on to their privileges
U.D.I. was declared; and U.D.I. was denounced by every responsible Party leader. The strange thing is that the majority of the speeches opposing the Order have all gone out of their way to indicate denunciation of U.D.I. Denounce U.D.I. but do nothing to bring it to an end, apparently is the attitude of mind of noble Lords opposite.
Since November, 1965, the sanctions policy has been accepted by all three parties. There is no doubt about that: the sanctions policy was accepted. The noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, objects to the sanctions because they are implemented by the United Nations. Apparently, if we "went it alone" he would be in perfect agreement. But did the rest of his speech give support to that contention? Certainly it did not. He then went on to say that he objected to sanctions because they were not effective, and in the next breath he condemned this Order because it is likely to be too effective and to be damaging so far as Rhodesia is concerned.
I would advise noble Lords opposite, some of whom I am quite sure have not yet made up their minds, that there is a strong Rhodesian lobby which is determined, by every means in their power, to give aid and sustenance to the illegal régime. I am not saying anything about their objects, I am merely stating that the lobby exists and it would be disastrous for the standing of this House—never mind about the threats; I am talking about the integrity and standing of this House—if Members were misled for a variety of specious reasons.
I would remind the House how fallacious is the argument that has been

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repeated so often in this debate, that because sanctions have not achieved a swift surrender on the part of Rhodesia we should give up and accept the situation and try to "negotiate"—whatever that means. That is indeed incredible reasoning. On that basis, one could argue that if there is a law
breaker who is not swiftly brought to justice then the law should be abrogated. Did anyone ever hear such ridiculous reasoning!—because there is not an immediate effect from the steps you have taken you should forget about it and let the law breaker get away with it.
One noble Lord quoted the words:
"Those whom the gods seek to destroy, they first make mad".
I would apply it to some of the noble Lords opposite and say that a variety of emotions and motives actuate them. I know that a great variety of motives have been expressed and a great many emotions have been stimulated, but if every noble Lord examines the situation and pays due regard to the basic principles on which all this is based, I am quite certain that he or she will accept his or her responsibilities as a Member of this House. They will then recognise, first, their own obligations through the United Nations, and, secondly, their obligations to the principles which have been enunciated by all Governments to seek the development of racial equality among nations. In the light of that, and with the full recognition that this Order is the expression of the policy of an elected Government, I am quite confident that, because so many Members will appreciate their responsibilities and the full repercussions of any decision they make, many to-morrow will go through the Lobby in support of this Order.
7.45 p.m.
LORD MILVERTON: My Lords, a glance at the list of speakers yet to come in this debate enforces the desirability of being brief. The case for and against sanctions has been fully presented to your Lordships, and at this late hour there is no need for me to dot the i's or cross the t's. Perhaps it is enough for me to say that I agree with practically every word that the noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood, said, and I disagree with almost every word that the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Southwark said.
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Over the years I have spoken in all these debates on this subject, and I have always opposed sanctions and have voted against them from the very beginning of this sad business. My conviction is that this attempt to strangle the economy of Rhodesia and thereby ruin the peace and happiness of 4 or 5 million people—I make no difference in regard to their racial origin; they stand together to lose by this kind of action—is a wrong approach and that it is an evil and uncivilised method of interfering in the domestic affairs of a potentially great country. I regarded it initially, of course, as a grave error of judgment on the part of the Government, and all that has happened since reinforces and confirms my view that statesmanship is rapidly being submerged in spite.
My Lords, I speak as an administrator. We have heard to-night the representatives of various other distinguished professions, but. I think perhaps I look at this matter inevitably from a slightly different point of view, owing to my own background. I should like to make one brief comment on the basic problem of Rhodesia. It is this. Democracy cannot be handed out as a gift, or merely by providing a constitution and the formal symbols of democratic government. I know these are truisms. It has to have its roots in the habits, thoughts and customs of the people. Our rule has always bad two sides: negative in checking the abuse of power, and positive in building a framework of government on the British concept. By a premature insistence on "one man, one vote" and the rest of the popular claptrap which appeals to the United Nations, you will be merely using the forms of Western democracy in order to stultify its aims. You cannot finance success with a flow of words—we know that only too well in this country.
Democratic slogans such as those we have been listening to from some speakers to-night, and the expectation to reap where you have not sown, form an unsound currency anywhere. In sound administrative practice you must distinguish between ultimate ideals and present possibilities, and this is most applicable to Rhodesia. You cannot blueprint an ideal; you will be making a mess of the whole thing if you try to do that. Rhodesia is an outstanding example of general principles being stated as an objective, but the detailed application of

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those principles must be modified by time and experience and increasing correction and adjustment. If only the Rhodesian Government could be left alone to work this out for themselves, I do not think it is an exaggeration to say that the population of Rhodesia, in all its colours and racial origins, would benefit immensely, both materially and spiritually, as indeed would this country also.
My Lords, the only hope for a multiracial country such as Rhodesia must lie in economic progress married to educational advancement, and you must allow during that process a good and strong Government to superintend it. Perhaps I might at this point say that I resent the implication that has been apparent in some speeches to-night that the Rhodesian Government—which incidentally was an elected Government, under a constitution that was approved in this country—is peopled by a group of oppressors of the black Africans. That is totally and utterly untrue. They are far more capable of giving the African a fair deal and helping him to progress than most Members of your Lordships' House.
LORD GARNSWORTHY: My Lords, could the noble Lord then tell us, if what he is saying is accurate, why the coloured majority have to endure such a much lower standard of living than the white Rhodesians?
LORD MILVERTON: My Lords, I should have thought that so elementary a question would not require an answer in this House. It is quite obvious that the European has had greater opportunities to progress. He came to help the African in the country. He came also to profit by developing the country, by which he benefited both himself and the people there; and it was his energies and enterprise that enabled the increasing standards of education to be spread as they are being in Rhodesia.
The steady elimination of racial differences would come, I think, with the steady elimination of cultural differences. But all this takes time, and the present policy of Her Majesty's Government seems to me to be an insistence on the suicidal imposition of an impossible speed. Let us try to remember sometimes that the British Empire itself was just a long-term investment in civilisation. I am convinced that even at this late hour an hon-
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ourable settlement in Rhodesia is possible. Is it not time that our Government stopped preaching about civilised methods and began to practise them?
To my mind the calling in of the United Nations on the plea that the domestic affairs of Rhodesia were a menace to world peace was a shameful subterfuge of dubious justification, even under the United Nations Charter. And when the accused de facto Government of Rhodesia was refused even the right to state its case to the Security Council, the mask of righteousness slipped and the face of malicious prejudice peered out. Why, it is reckoned that at least 37 of the members of the United Nations who have called for the sanctions, and so forth, and taken pleasure in approving them, represent countries under the rule of minority Governments whose people have not a prospect of as happy or as prosperous a future or anything like as much real freedom as the people of Rhodesia.
Do let us try, at any rate when we are in a serious discussion, to drop these hypocritical assumptions. Sanctions up to date have failed, and this attempt to tighten the noose and strangle the economy of the country can only bring misery, unemployment and hardship to the very people whom the authors of this shameful policy profess to be helping and defending.
I have said nothing about the petty personal vendetta against citizens of Rhodesia. There is no need to take up your Lordships' time in restating that catalogue of discredit. In Rhodesia you are dealing with men, not with the helots of the discredited dictatorship of Whitehall. But for this fixed attitude the Rhodesian question could have been settled long ago, to the benefit of all the races in that country. I do not believe in boycotts or sanctions as instruments of diplomacy, but each country should be left free so far as possible to solve its own economic, social and racial problems without dictation from external sources, and without having to grovel before the interference of other countries of immature status.
The Government of Rhodesia insists upon guiding its own affairs so that it can ensure the existence and the continuance of civilised government. Is that an unreasonable determination? Differences of race, colour, culture and language
present problems which are best

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settled by the people who are trying to found a State in which the standards of civilised government can be maintained in amicable agreement. I have always believed in justice and fair play, and in the many virtues which history has associated with British government, and I am spelling "government" with a small "g". I shall therefore have no alternative but to register my vote against this inhuman Order and the fratricidal stupidity of sanctions.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, would he answer the question I asked originally? Is not his solution of the Rhodesian problem really that we should hand over the 4 million Africans to the mercies of the present illegal r6gime, recognise them and then wash our hands of it?
LORD MILVERTON: My Lords, with due respect to the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, the question he has asked me contains several assumptions with which I totally disagree. To say that 4 million Africans are being handed over to the tender mercies of a group of apparently European thugs is such a misstatement in every word of it that I think it requires no answer. Are we not aware that the standard of education in Rhodesia for the black Africans is surpassed in Africa only by that in South Africa; and that in every other way within their means they are devoting a great deal of attention and paying a great deal of money to help their brothers of the country who have had less opportunity of progress than they have had; and are endeavouring to do what every civilised Government would do to enable people who have had fewer opportunities ultimately to reach that status?

FUTURE BUSINESS
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, I thought it would be for the convenience of the House if I were to say that tomorrow it is proposed that the House shall sit at 2 o'clock, instead of at 2.30. I hope that will help to ensure that we reach a decision on this Motion by the agreed time between 5 and 6.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA (UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS) ORDER 1968
8.0 p.m.
Debate resumed.
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, I will do my best to take the hint and be short. It is a little difficult. This debate has ranged very widely indeed—far, I should have thought, from the particular subject matter we are discussing; and perhaps in the circumstances one is allowed to say a word or two about the merits. There was one thing which was said by the noble Lord who has just resumed his seat with which I agree. There has been a great deal of spite in this. I agree with that. But I heard nothing else in his speech with which I agreed.
I think that moral questions are involved here, and I would say that there are three of them, and not just one. The first is the obvious one, that, after all,
"A man's a man for a' that"
whether he is white or whether he is black; and those who get up and say that 230,000 (I think it is) whites, who are at present governing a Police State in Rhodesia, are entitled to do so against the wishes of the 4 million—is it?— blacks in the country, seem to me to be talking wicked nonsense. There it is. I should not like to say a thing like that without a certain amount of support from the right reverend Prelates. But they have agreed about this, and I am sure your Lordships know more about what is right and wrong than they do. But I happen to agree with them, rather than with the Rhodesian lobby.
The second of the questions which seems to me to be involved is this. I do not think it is false to say that the position of affairs in Rhodesia at present is a threat to world peace. On the contrary, I think it is a serious threat—though not perhaps an immediate one. But I think: that if we are going to get matters settled as those who are in power in Rhodesia would wish them to be settled, we are going, without any doubt, to provoke war in Africa on a scale that I shudder to contemplate. It will be the beastliest and the nastiest kind of war. There will be no mercy, and there will be little that is conceded by way of

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decency in its carrying on or in its settlement; and that goes for both sides.
I am far more afraid of what may happen by way of a war on racial grounds in Africa than I am of any conflict between East and West in Europe, or in Europe and Asia. Let us be clear about this. I have had Nehru to dinner, and I liked having him to dinner. I have read Kaunda's stuff. I do not set myself up, by way of intellect or morality, as the equal of either of these two men; and they happen to be two conspicuous instances. But, as I see it, it is nonsense to say that nothing can come from black rule, and black rule at an earlier stage than most people would contemplate. It is better to have freedom, I believe, with a certain amount of blood and muddle at the start, than to put it off until too late and have it turn sour on your hands, and to pretend that there is a racial distinction which has no justification in morals that I can see; nor, so far as I can see, any justification in practice either.
I turn from that to the third moral question. You do not join the United Nations for nothing. You join it because you believe that it is an alternative to the threat of another world war. I have seen two world wars. So have many of your Lordships. Largely, the purpose of the first one was to abolish an aggressive and hereditary aristocracy in Germany, and I am glad to say that it succeeded. The purpose of the second one was, I think, to meet something far more dangerous. It was not merely racialism; it was a belief in privilege and violence of a most curious character. After all, the man whom we now regard as no doubt a gifted lunatic, but a wicked lunatic, succeeded in killing in gas ovens several million Jews in Germany—and that in the middle of the superior white civilisation which some of us say is so wonderful and so faultless.
I believe that these wars do teach us something. Among other things they teach us that if you are to avoid a third world war you must avoid these terribly dangerous errors of thinking—errors, as I see them, partly of selfishness and partly sometimes of failing to look clearly at the question before you. If any of us read Hansard to-morrow I think we shall find a number of things in it that could hardly be defended on any reasonable
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position at all. So, when you go into a society such as the Society of Nations, you must not assume that you are the only people who are right; and when you come to a settlement in the United Nations you must expect concessions, since people will not all be of the same mind.
I should like to do what I think has not been done for some time, at any rate to-day—to pay a high tribute to Lord Caradon, for the manner in which he managed this most successful result of his efforts. It was a remarkable contribution to civilisation in the world, a remarkable contribution to the cause of peace; and I think we in this country might at least have some pride in our countryman for what he did in that respect. No doubt he did it because, from past experience he understood the people he was dealing with. There is a lot to be said for "Foots". But that is another thing. I hope that we are not going to treat this matter lightly. Those are the three things I wanted to say and, if I may pick them up again, the first one is black and white, the second one is peace and war, and the third one is the position of a country which joins a community of countries, in this case a community which comprises practically the whole of the civilised world.
Having said that, I must admit that, like some of your Lordships, I should have been hopelessly out of order if I had said this in the Commons, and we are getting a long way from the question that has to be answered to-day. The United Nations resolution for mandatory sanctions was, of course, no part of the domestic law of this country, and it did not bite here except to the extent that we applied it. If we reject effectively—I shall come to this in a moment—this Order to-day, it will have no effect whatever on the mandatory sanctions that have been imposed on itself by practically the whole of the civilised world, and imposed because the civilised world thought it right to do so. So if your Lordships think that by rejecting this resolution to-day you are, in effect, rejecting a resolution of the United Nations, then I would say at once that you are doing nothing of the sort and that, so far as there has been argument about this, it has the same value, or thereabouts, as arguments in the Hampstead or Hackney debating societies.

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On the particular point with which we have to deal in this resolution I would welcome one thing. I took a note of it. I quite understand that the Tory Front Bench must have been having a great deal of difficulty with their supporters. I have seen abundant signs of this. When somebody gets up and says he is going to vote as his conscience dictates, and you know that there is a three-line Whip, you just wonder which is the more effective of the two. The next speaker I think said that he would think once, think twice, and, if necessary, think three times before he came to his conclusion. My advice is this. If it is a one-line Whip, one think will do; if it is a two-line Whip you had better have two but if it is a three-line Whip, three really are required before your conscience functions with sufficient obedience.
My Lords, what I was glad to hear was this. I heard the Tory Front Bench say quite definitely and deliberately, as part of a speech which was obviously very carefully considered and, if I may respectfully say so, I thought was a very good speech indeed from the noble Earl who spoke first from their Front Bench, that they did not hold with the U.D.I.—of course, they have been having a lot of difficulty about that with some of their supporters, including, I think, the last speaker—and they did not hold with a police State. Nobody has said very much about a police State, but it is important. Somebody has said there is no urgency about this matter. Perhaps there is not for you and me, but
what about the chap who has been shut up without trial for month after month? What about the man who has been punished without any charge against him? What about the people who have been killed, or who are the relatives of those who have been killed, with, I say, doubtful legality? I say no more because I think at the moment the question is to some extent at any rate sub judice.
The third thing was "no racialism". My Lords, what a time they must have had with their supporters about this one; because there have been some wonderfully racialistic speeches to-day. It really cannot be right. I just wonder what motives the Rhodesian lobby have. Some of it I think is spite, as the noble Lord said. I do not put that very highly, and I think they believe what they are
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saying. I hope it is not entirely a matter of interest or anything of that sort, and I have come to the conclusion that they sincerely believe that the capacity of people to govern themselves and their right to be free must depend on the colour of their skins. If that is their conclusion, it seems to me, if I may say so, lunatic in this present society in this present age.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether he is able to say with conviction his belief that the South African Republic would to-day be governed with greater economic success and prospect of advancement for the black Africans if it were governed entirely by black Africans?
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords. I am not going to enter into a debate on the economic success of South Africa, the price of gold and things of that sort. I say this to the noble Lord, and with a good deal of feeling: I think it right that there should be no apartheid in South Africa and I hope that we do not live in a society in which we are compelled to do something which we believe fundamentally wrong just because it is thought to pay somebody or other.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, if the noble Lord were addressing that homily to me, he still did not answer my question. Does he believe that the black African in the Republic of South Africa would be better off under a black Government than the present Government—that was my question.
LORD MITCHISON: What I mean by "better off"—and I repeat it and ask the noble Lord to listen this time—
LORD BARNBY: I am doing my best.
LORD MITCHISON: I think it would be better because it would be doing something right instead of something wrong. I hope that is clear enough and that the noble Lord can understand it. I am sure he does.
My Lords, I must not take too much time. I listened to hear at what point the Conservative Front Bench—because I am replying to them at the moment in a personal capacity—felt that the Government had really gone astray. They conceded that U.D.I. was wrong, that the

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police State was wrong and that racialism was wrong.
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, the noble Lord invited my noble friend behind me to listen; I would have invited him to listen to my noble friend Lord Jellicoe this afternoon.
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, I did listen to Lord Jellicoe with great attention and I am just referring to what he was saying. He said that the point where they broke away was the handing the matter over to the United Nations. There is apparently a representative of the Opposition, and a vocal representative, sitting on the Front Bench. Would he tell us whether he agrees with that or not?
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, agrees with what? I do not recognise the question concerned in that.
LORD MITCHISON: I do not think that was a very clear answer.
LORD ST. OSWALD: I cannot give a clear answer when no clear question is asked.
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, I thought it was a perfectly clear question. The noble Lord and I, whatever else we do, are not going to quarrel personally about any of these things, and he need not think so. What I should like to remind your Lordships of, and then I am going to sit down, is this. I am now coming to the difficult problem of what we, in this Chamber, should do about two particular Orders. These were the Orders about petrol and Rhodesia, and I am quoting from column 1157 of the OFFICIAL REPORT for February 6, 1967, Lord Harlech's speech from the Front Bench:
"I suppose it might be argued that however much we disapprove of the Government's course of action—and we made this disapproval abundantly clear. I think, during the debate in December—the Security Council has now, wisely, or, as we think, unwisely, passed a resolution which makes it mandatory on the British Government to impose precise and rigorous sanctions. If we were now to vote against the Orders and succeeded in nullifying them we should be preventing the Government from acting in a manner in which they are compelled to act by the clear provisions of the United Nations Charter."
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My Lords, is that not exactly the position to-day? What is the difference? Why was the attitude of the Conservative Party so different in those days from what we have heard now, partly from them and partly from their supporters? Lord Harlech continued:
"I do not know how much weight noble Lords would wish to attach to this particular argument, but what seems to me to be the most compelling argument against refusing the Government these Orders is that it would be an unprecedented interference by this, a non-elected Chamber, in the executive actions of a Government supported by a large majority in another place."
Are things any different now? Why have the Conservative Party gone right round? Why is what was right or wrong then so different from what it is now?
"I cannot feel that this would be a proper exercise of our powers."
He rubbed it in.
"We may think that the Government are acting rashly and foolishly. Indeed we do think so, and have said so."
Your Lordships can applaud.
"But, at the end of the day, in a democracy such as ours, the duly elected majority must be allowed to govern and it must also of course accept the consequences and the blame resulting from the pursuit of unwise policies."
I found nothing to disagree with in that at all.
"I would therefore urge my noble friends not to vote against these Orders, in spite of the concern and even the strong hostility some may have regarding them, and in spite of their doubts about the whole present attitude of Her Majesty's Government towards the Rhodesian problem—doubts which I most emphatically share."
My Lords, the position is exactly the same to-day, and I repeat: why have the Conservative Party gone right round? My Lords, I can only find one answer: that they have been led away by their own "wild men".
LORD INGLEWOOD: My Lords, I am just wondering if the noble Lord, in considering the "consequences and the blame", to quote his words, considered that the inability of his friends to win a by-election unless they had a majority of at least 20,000 had no effect at all.
LORD MITCHISON: I thought I should get that sort of comment.
LORD INGLEWOOD: It is very relevant.
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, what earthly right has a non-elected Chamber to decide about by-elections or about the next Election, or about the opinion of the country? In this peaceful place you represent only yourselves.
LORD INGLEWOOD: Noble Lords can read the newspapers.
LORD MITCHISON: No doubt. I would concede that. The noble Lord also can read the newspapers, and I hope that he
will not be unduly influenced by them. I fear it is the only thing that matters
in this place.
I promised that I would sit down, and I will. But I want to point out to your Lordships that by voting against this Order to-day you will not nullify it; none of you expects you will. I tcan be reintroduced early in July. I hope that the Government will not do that. That is simply asking for trouble. I think that the damage that will have been done by your Lordships' action—and quite a lot of the world will have heard about the House of Lords for the first time—to our reputation would only be increased by going on presenting Orders again. I have a much better course to suggest to them.
LORD ST. OSWALD: A General Election.
LORD MITCHISON: I do not think you need that.
LORD ST. OSWALD: But the country does.
LORD MITCHISON: I drafted a very simple little Bill, and I have two or three copies of it here. There are others to be had in the Printed Paper Office. I shall be only too glad to let the Government have a copy. In Clause 3 they will find these words, which meet the case admirably:
"In any Public Act a provision requiring the approval by Parliament of any Statutory Instrument or a provision that any Statutory Instrument shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of resolution of either House of Parliament or provisions (however worded) to the like effect shall have effect as if references to the House of Commons were therein substituted for references to Parliament and for references to either House and each House thereof."
In other words, as regards the past, the present and the future, the House of
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Lords' power to deal with these Statutory Instruments should be removed and disappear completely. If the negotiating Peers, here or elsewhere, have nearly come to an agreement, I venture to prophesy from reading their previous utterances that there is not the least doubt that one item of the agreement will be the total disappearance of the power of dealing with Statutory Orders. The instruments of the Executive are not, I think, to be annulled here because, for one thing, the responsible Ministers are not, and ought not to be, here. I hope they will do this and will do it quickly. I see my noble friend Lord Beswick in front of me, and I shall drop a copy of the Bill on him for him to study.
This is quite indefensible. If your Lordships want to keep any powers you had better limit them. The Tory Front Bench may have had difficulty with some of their supporters, but it is nothing to the difficulty the Labour Party will have with some of its supporters if your Lordships get above yourselves.
8.22 p.m.
LORD GRIMSTON OF WESTBURY: My Lords, I do not think that this is the occasion to debate the Bill which the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, has just recommended to the Government, and I do not propose to do so. In his opening remarks introducing this Order the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor expressed the view that sanctions, with the extra twist which this Order will give them, will at last work. We have heard these prognostications before. At the beginning of sanctions there was the remark that they would work in weeks rather than months. That was two and a half years ago. They were not 0 be punitive, we were told. This Order is nothing if it is not punitive. All that has been proved false. It is partly for that reason that we have now arrived at the stage where the policy of Her Majesty's Government has become one of a vendetta against Rhodesia. My remarks will be directed to showing that this is so and that this Order should be thrown out, not only for the reason that it is in furtherance of a policy which has failed, will continue to fail, and is costing: this country millions of pounds in terms of balance of payments, but also that the policy is immoral, inhumane and thoroughly hypocritical.

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I am supported in this view from a source which, to put it no higher, cannot be lightly brushed aside. In a speech prepared for delivery the other day to the American Bar Association, Mr. Dean Acheson, a former Secretary of State of the United States, said this:
"The United States is engaged in an international conspiracy, instigated by Britain and blessed by the United Nations, to overthrow the Government of a country that has done no harm and threatens no one. This is barefaced aggression, unprovoked and unjustified by a single legal or moral principle."
That was what Dean Acheson said. What this Order which we are asked to approve
is really in aid of could not be better described than it has been by Mr. Dean Acheson. He added, by way of comment for the benefit of his own country, drawing attention to his own country's part in the conspiracy:
"How fortunate the American colonies were to have no United Nations to confront in 1776."
Let us contrast the attitude of Her Majesty's Government and the United Nations to Rhodesia with their attitude to other States in Africa. It is said that the Smith régime is illegal. But what about the legality, in our sense of the
word, of other African States? There is hardly one which, having been granted
independence under a democratic constitution, has not torn it up and had it superseded by a military dictatorship or single Party rule. Does this call forth condemnation from Her Majesty's Government or the United Nations? Not at all. They immediately recognise them. Let us take the case of Nigeria in particular. The present régime took over after two military coups, accompanied by assassinations, and followed by a ghastly civil war. In the eyes of Her Majesty's Government and the United Nations this is all quite legal and, moreover, arms are supplied to stoke up the civil war. In contrast, the Rhodesian Government was legally elected, has not been thrown out by a military dictatorship, but is the only one against which this vendetta of which this Order is a part is pursued. Looking around Africa, what cant it is to claim that this vendetta against Rhodesia alone is in support of a great legal and moral principle! Such a claim is made by Her Majesty's Government, and it is nauseating.
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To turn to another point, Rhodesians are castigated as rebels. Let me remind your Lordships of what Mr. Ian Smith said on the declaration of U.D.I.:
"The Union Jack will continue to fly, the National Anthem will continue to be sung."
Rhodesians are not rebels at heart, but Her Majesty's Government are doing all they can to drive them into declaring a Republic.
Let us come to what is perhaps the biggest humbug of all in this conspiracy at the United Nations, that Rhodesia is a threat to the peace. They threaten nobody. They are supposed to be a threat to peace, simply because the United Nations says so, for no other reason than a dislike of the Smith Government in certain quarters of the United Nations and by Her Majesty's Government. Let us take the conception of what is a threat to the peace a little further. On the same hypothesis, why should not Russia mobilise the United Nations to say that Czechoslovakia is a threat to the peace because Russia does not like the new régime? Or, to bring one nearer home, why should not Roman Catholic Eire attempt to get the United Nations to declare Ulster is a threat to the peace because she does not like the Protestant régime there? There would be no threat to the peace from Rhodesia if the United Nations did not exist. But if war should come to Southern Africa, it will be against Rhodesia through the agency of the United Nations which Her Majesty's Government called in originally to sanction the use of force to stop seaborne supplies of oil.
Now for another piece of hypocrisy with which this Rhodesian situation is
surrounded. Her Majesty's Government know, and so does everyone else, that South Africa will pay no more attention to the U.N. resolution on sanctions than Her Majesty's Government themselves do to the U.N. resolution on handing Gibraltar over to Spain. South Africa has broken, and will continue to break, sanctions—and what is Her Majesty's Government's attitude to that? On no account, and rightly, will they contemplate a confrontation with South Africa—which incidentally, of course, practises apartheid—because if such a confrontation were to occur the jobs of thousands of workers

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would be imperilled. It has been computed that one in ten of the employed population of this country owe their jobs to trade with South Africa, which is our second or third largest customer. But are Her Majesty's Government quite sure that the United Nations is not going to push them into a confrontation with South Africa?
This brings me to paragraph 13 of the United Nations resolution with which this Order is concerned. That paragraph
"urges all State members of the United Nations to render moral and material assistance to the people of Southern Rhodesia in their struggle to achieve their independence and freedom."
The noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, in reply to the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, at column 1259 of Hansard on May 30, said this:
"We are against the use of force; we are against the use of violence. I repeat that had we thought that this paragraph condoned it, or implied it, we should not have voted for the resolution."
How naïve can one be? In future the import of arms into Rhodesia by terrorists will be construed, and is already being construed, by those who want to introduce arms as the rendering of material assistance in accordance with the U.N. request. South African assistance to Rhodesia in combating terrorism may then give rise to a demand in certain U.N. quarters for a confrontation with South Africa.
Bearing in mind that at the outset of U.D.I. we were told that it was not the intention of Her Majesty's Government that sanctions should be punitive, and now having in front of us this punitive Order, I ask your Lordships: What credibility can be attached to present ministerial statements, that on no account will they be drawn into a confrontation with South Africa? I suggest that that is going to be the inevitable result of pursuing the policy embraced in this Order. But, if that happens, let the Government go to the factories of this country and tell the people that they must walk the streets as a result of it.
Let us take one little look inside Rhodesia, as I do not think anyone else has done that. Let us see what is going on there, and for that purpose I should like to quote a letter from Katuba, Rhodesia, written on May 3, which has come into my hands. It reads as follows:
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"The world ploughing match was a great success, in spite of the British Government telling the Scandinavian countries that they could not guarantee their safety here This put them all off, but one of the Swedish executives of the World Ploughing Association decided to come, and who should he meet on the plane but the British team who had defied their Government? The Swede was most annoyed.
The whole thing was a great success. Thousands of Europeans and African farmers all mixing naturally with one interest—the poughing—and, of course, a glass of beer afterwards. Here again the black Rhodesians joined in, much to the surprise of our visitors. The visitors have travelled all over the country and will he able to go to their own countries and tell everyone what Rhodesia is like, and not just what the papers tell them."
That letter has a very direct bearing on this Order, because this Order is going to prevent people from going to Rhodesia and bringing back a picture of that country which is contrary to what Her Majesty's Government would like them to believe.
I do not think that the general public are fully aware of the extent of the damage which is being done to our balance of payments by this vendetta against Rhodesia, nor of the hypocrisy which surrounds it. So I urge that it is the dui y of your Lordships' House, and a service to the nation, to bring the truth before them in no uncertain way by throwing out this Order.
My Lords, I cannot conclude without a reference to the threat that, in so doing, your Lordships will bring to an end the talks on an agreed reform of your Lordships House. In The Times of last Saturday, it was said that the proposals which may be imperilled
"include payment of a salary to peers in the reformed Chamber—said to be £1,500 a year—plus a daily untaxed attendance allowance of six guineas. There are still signs that sufficient Tory peers, mindful of this factor in the dispute, will abstain to enable the Government to escape with a small majority."
If your Lordships' votes, and not only those of Tories, are to be influenced by that sort of consideration—I think corruption and bribery is not too bad a name for it—then the British public—
LORD MITCH1SON: My Lords, I wonder whether the noble Lord will allow me to interrupt him for a minute. He is not being fair.
LORD GR1MSTON OF WESTBUR: My Lords, I am not giving way. I did

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not interrupt the noble Lord. As I was saying, if that happened, then the British public, who are not fools, would do well to demand our abolition or the abolition of a Chamber which, by failing to throw out this Order, shows that it can be bought. In conclusion, there is every reason, material and moral, and, also, in view of this threat, for the sheer honesty of your Lordships' House, why this Order should be thrown out. I pray that your Lordships will do so.
8.38 p.m.
LORD SALTOUN: My Lords, it used to be a common place of Governments on appropriate occasions to say in your Lordships' House that agriculture was still the most important industry in Britain, but for the past two or three years that truism has ceased to apply. I think your Lordships will all admit that for the past two or three years blackmail has been the most important industry in Britain and, as your Lordships know, the professional tool of the blackmailer is the threat.
I have been under threat ever since I opened my Times on Saturday morning, and my first reaction, as it would be for any one of your Lordships, was to say, "Very well, I must vote on Tuesday against this Order." But then I reflected and noticed that the threat was directed against the Peers who sat by hereditary succession. I realised that we, from time immemorial, have spoken in your Lordships' House upon our honour and that it was not consistent with my honour to be swayed by a threat into voting against this Order. I therefore put that aside and started to consider the matter afresh.
I could not help remembering that on a previous occasion when Rhodesia was discussed the then Leader of the House attacked the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, most violently because he said he had spoken on Rhodesia without declaring an interest. The attack was so great that Lord Salisbury sacrificed that interest in order to free himself to talk about Rhodesia, although, as a matter of fact—and nobody in this House would ever have dared to challenge his honour —he spoke on exactly the same basis as his father, his grandfather and those who had been Lord Salisbury before him. I am bound to say that I resented that
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attack very much. But I reminded myself that I spoke on my honour and that I must put all these threats behind me and must not leave in my mind any trace of resentment that any Minister of Her Majesty's Government had so far been carried away by his professional enthusiasm as to forget his manners.
To turn now to the matter in front of us, I do not want to go into the early beginnings but I remember that in the first debate upon this matter the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor justified Her Majesty's Government by pointing out to your Lordships that the difficulty of Her Majesty's Government was that we had responsibility without power. Now the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor suffers from a great disadvantage in your Lordships' House in that his speeches are so beautifully put together, so beautifully phrased and so attractively delivered that they remain in the mind long after they have served their immediate purpose, and they get carefully considered for that reason. My reflection, on considering the noble and learned Lord's speech, which was the fundamental support of the Government, was that you cannot have responsibility if you have not got power. The power that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor regretted and that the Government regretted had been given away by Her Majesty's Government forty years before.
It would have been much better, I think, for the moment, and much more likely to achieve a proper settlement, had Her Majesty's Government held their hand at that time, had not been in favour of sanctions and had seen what developments ensued. I think it would have been quite possible. But, instead of that, they imposed sanctions and went to the United Nations. Before turning to that, I should like to say that I listened with great interest to the noble and learned Lord this afternoon, and to what he told us about Mr. Smith. What he said about Mr. Smith convinced me of what I had always thought before, and that is that the personalities engaged on either side are completely incompatible. On an earlier occasion I suggested that it would be much better to explore possible agreement through civil servants or subordinates rather than to bring the principals into immediate and violent contact. I

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have always thought that that was much the best way to negotiate, if you wanted to.
Now I come to the matter which so many noble Lords have mentioned—I will not be very long over it—and that is the appeal to the United Nations on the ground that Rhodesia was a danger to world peace. My Lords, I must believe that when Her Majesty's Government did that, they must have had some cogent reason to justify them in that course, but I am bound to say that to me, as one who is stupid and slow minded and does not see things very clearly, it seemed the most arrant piece of chicanery that I have ever heard. I must have been mistaken in that, because I am sure Her Majesty's Government would not be guilty of that, but I am bound to say that that is how it must have appeared to the world.
That seems to me to be very unfortunate, because I do not look upon the General Assembly of the United Nations as being a proper, deliberative body like a House of Parliament. Your Lordships' House is a proper, deliberative, constitutional body. Your Lordships are going to vote to-morrow, I presume, on what you have heard in the debate to-day. People say there is a built-in Conservative majority here. I remember a case—I wonder if there is anybody else here who remembers it—when the Liberal Party, led by Lord Beveridge, and the Conservative Party, led by Lord Cranborne, had united and said they were going to put the friendly societies back into a particular Bill. I forget which particular Bill it was, but they had decided on that. It happened, unfortunately for me, that I was on the side of the Government, and I thought that the Bill was right in that respect, so I had applied to me the full pressure of the Whips—and the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, and, if he were here, the noble Earl, Lord St. Aldwyn, will know quite what that pressure was. I went into the debate very unhappy, and I sat immediately behind Lord Cranborne. The Amendment was moved and supported, and then the noble Earl, Lord Jowitt, went to the Box. I do not think he uttered ten sentences, but he smashed the Opposition. Lord Cranborne looked round, and thought that if he went into a Division he would not have 20 votes in the House; and I do not believe he would even have
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had his own. That is what I call being a deliberative Chamber.
Is the General Assembly of the United Nations quite on that basis? I do not think it is. There are speeches there, of course, and one hears them on the wireless. They are a little bit like the speeches in Thucydides. They serve to illuminate a situation or state the policy of a Government, but do they really have any effect on the debate? Surely the votes are cast anything up to 12,000 miles away, and the delegates merely record them. Any body like that cannot be a fully-fledged, deliberative Chamber. For that very reason I should have thought that Her Majesty's Government, who are so eager to support the United Nations, would be particularly careful not to bring before it a case which was so riddled with holes w this case about Rhodesia being a threat to world peace. It seems to me a cardinal mistake.
Now Mr. Dean Acheson, as the noble Lord, Lord Grimston of Westbury, and others have said, has explained much better than I could possibly do what he thought of that transaction; and it is only fair to say that at a much earlier stage the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, sitting here, did just the same. But the noble Marquess rather forfeited my sympathy, in a way, because it has always seemed to me that the General Assembly of the United Nations has just about the same relationship to a properly constituted political assembly as a Punch and Judy show has to the legitimate stage. The noble Marquess made his point with great lucidity, and I agreed with him entirely, but I could not help reflecting that he had been one of the architects of the Punch and Judy show. I felt that his worldly experience should have shown him that the instrument that he was creating might be misused in the way lat it has been. What I greatly regret is that it should have been misused by a British Government, because it is a precedent which will certainly be followed. There are a great many more people in the world who envy us than who love us, and it is the kind of precedent which nay inure in the end to the great damage of the British people.
My Lords, for the rest of it I want to say only that it always seems to me that the Government, our own Government, have always taken far too pettifogging a

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view of this matter. I will take one example to illustrate it. Take the little business with the Cenotaph two years ago. Surely that was an opportunity for a certain amount of generous feeling. Mr. Smith has just as much right to the Cenotaph as any one of us. Would it not have been a great opportunity to say: "Your interest in this transcends the quarrel between us. Come over or send your representative, and be represented with us". What happened? Mr. Smith was warned off; you might say that he was warned away from the graveside of his comrades; and we were told that the Commonwealth Secretary is the only legal representative of the people in Rhodesia. Could there be any meaner belly to earth announcement than that? There was no generosity about it.
It hits on a point which was prominent in the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Peddle. He always talked about the legal Government of this and that. Legalism is not the rule of law. The law of murdrum after the Norman Conquest did not promote the rule of law in the least. If you make a law that everybody with blue eyes and fair hair is to be subject to instant execution, it may be law but it does not promote the rule of law. The rule of law is a different thing. It is easily damaged by mean, low abuse.
My Lords, I have said everything I have to say except one thing. Even the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor could not refrain from suggesting serious consequences to any hereditary Peer—was it?—who ventured to vote against this Order. I do not need any inducement to vote against this Order; I have been against sanctions all the time. But I say this. I think it is unworthy of the Government to make such suggestions to people who are anxious only to do their duty to the best of their ability in the way they see it.
8.52 p.m.
BARONESS GAITSKELL: My Lords, I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Milverton, is not in his place. I find myself in very unnatural agreement with him—not, I may hasten to add, with his views, but with his plea for brevity. As I am the nineteenth speaker in a list of 43, I think it would be sheer indulgence if I were to make a long speech. I am
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not particularly interested in the constitutional issue, and I do not propose to speak on that aspect. I love this House but, quite simply, I do not think that it should have powers to overrule a decision made in the other House. The Sunday papers this week-end must have given great comfort to the Smith régime; but I must say that the picture they drew, of many noble Lords swooping down, some, but not all, like absentee land-lords, to defend the freehold of this noble House was not particularly an attractive one, either constitutionally or politically. I shall simply make some rather brief comments resulting from my experience at the United Nations. I am not going to give a lecture to noble Lords about the United Nations. As I grow older I am inclining less and less to lecture people on any issue, for I find that the arguments for and against a particular issue very often balance out; and unless a principle is involved either indecision or cynicism takes over. Here, in this debate, there is a simple principle involved which I will come back to later.
My Lords, everyone in this debate has said that sanctions are rough justice. They can be evaded; they can hurt those who impose them; they can hurt some of those whom one wishes to help—for example, Zambia. I have never myself believed that sanctions were produced to ruin a country. I agree with the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor about this. I believe that sanctions are introduced simply to demonstrate that one is serious, that one stands on the principle, and to give the offending country time to think again.
On the question of Rhodesia there is one thing which is very obvious but, somehow, very little understood even in this House. After hearing the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Saltoun, I am reinforced in my belief that people do not understand how the Afro-Asian countries in the United Nations and in the world feel about apartheid and colonialism. The developing countries in Africa see colonialism and apartheid as the greatest threat to them. They are simply dedicated to stamping out the last remnants of colonialism. Rhodesia is a Colony for which we are responsible and they blame us for the way it is going hand-in-hand with apartheid. From many of the speeches of noble Lords opposite,

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I felt that they believe still in a kind of make-do-and-mend colonialism. Still believing this, they brush off apartheid as a complex among these African countries. They regard these African countries as being too sensitive about apartheid because South Africa is a thriving, prosperous State. But the Africans see South Africa as a State prosperous and thriving on cheap, voteless, black labour; and unless noble Lords in this House understand how the developing countries in Africa see us and see the West, and see the affluent countries, there is absolutely no communication between us at all.
I wish I could convey to noble Lords the strength of their abhorrence and passion against South Africa and apartheid —and this bears directly on the Rhodesian problem. My Lords, this thing is really understood only by the United Kingdom mission at the United Nations. We cannot do much about South Africa. It may be our concern; but it is not now our responsibility. But the countries in the United Nations see that we can do something to stop Rhodesia going the same way as apartheid in South Africa. So they mobilised all the members of the United Nations, who now agree with them, to take concerted action. The result is that we have this Order, and we have increased sanctions.
If the Six Principles were very revolutionary (and I myself do not think they are revolutionary at all; I think they are extremely moderate), and there had been any sign from Mr. Smith that he would go along with something in them, we should have had a case in the United Nations to argue with other members of the Security Council. The Six Principles are really very moderate and Mr. Smith could have gone along with them. But Mr. Smith and his more reactionary colleagues have decided to live for to-day, and not to give a thought for what happens in the next ten or twenty years—when there is bound to be a threat to the peace.
It is said that Rhodesia is a threat to the peace. Of course it is a threat to the peace—not an immediate threat, for these developing countries are not strong; they are weak. Article 13 of this Order talks about aiding the terrorists, but we must realise that there is this strong country of Rhodesia; there is the strong country of South Africa. And though we talk about
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these terrorists, of course they are not terrorists; they are freedom fighters. As was said by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Southwark, we should ourselves be doing exactly the same thing were we fighting for independence.
It is difficult for me to understand Mr. Heath, the Leader of the Opposition in the other place, for whose courage and integrity I have an enormous respect. He did not go scavenging for votes after Mr. Enoch Powell's speech, and I simply do not understand why he is supporting the opposition to this Order. He is not simply supporting it; I believe that there are votes in it. Incidentally, my Lords, I respect the Government in that during this phase of unpopularity they are sanding by the principle in the Six Principles and are going to implement this resolution of the Security Council at the United Nations.
My Lords, I wish to comment on only one or two points which have been made by other speakers. The noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, made a brilliant speech in which his main point was the consistency of his Party, a consistency which revealed absolutely no evidence that the ideas they have about negotiation could be put into effect. The noble Earl objected to our putting Southern Rhodesia into Coventry, but they are themselves becoming more and more in quarantine. They are one of the white enclaves that: we have in Africa. There is Rhodesia and South Africa, white enclaves living in quarantine among a majority of black Africans.
As we did not wish to use force at the beginning, my Lords, we simply could not deal with the problem of Rhodesia by ourselves, and I cannot follow the argument: Why are we going to slither into using force against South Africa when we have rejected it against Rhodesia? We had to transfer our role to the United Nations: it was too difficult for w to deal with alone. Also there was great strength of feeling among the countries in the United Nations and the Security Council. I listened with interest to the speech of the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, but I thought he had a completely and utterly defeatist attitude which would simply result in leaving Mr. Ian Smith to go on lust as he is. One thing I am worried about is that I think it would be a great pity if we cut off communications with Rhodesia. There

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are people in Rhodesia who, presumably, are moderate, and perhaps agree with the Government, but who cannot make their voices heard. We know that. I am not sure that it would be a good thing if they were cut off from all liberal opinion. What I should like to ask of noble Lords opposite is, what concrete proposals have they for the solution of this problem? I see absolutely none. They talk about negotiating, but how? They attack the Prime Minister when they should be attacking Mr. Ian Smith. Why did not Mr. Smith accept the "Tiger" proposals when the Prime Minister bent over backwards to try to get a negotiated solution?
My Lords, I should like to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Poltimore, on his charming and gentle maiden speech, in which he asked us to forget and forgive; but there again, he did not suggest that we could do anything to stop the illegal regime. As for the noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood, I found his speech rather disagreeable, not because I absolutely disagree with everything he said, but because he said—and it was very unworthy of him; I have heard the noble Lord speak before and he has never spoken in that spirit—that the Government did not wish for a settlement. I thought that both unworthy and untrue. What was the gist of the noble Lord's speech? He was simply saying, "Let us string along with South Africa, with Mozambique, with Portugal"—
LORD WEDGWOOD: No, my Lords. If I may intervene, I did not say what the noble Baroness has said. I did not say, "Let us string along with South Africa and Portugal", and after she reads my words in Hansard to-morrow I hope that I shall receive a letter from her saying that she misunderstood what I said. If I may remind the noble Baroness, what I suggested was that the Government should take up the offer of Sir Alec to achieve a settlement which he had said three months ago he believed was possible.
BARONESS GAITSKELL: My Lords, if I have misinterpreted the noble Lord's speech, I shall certainly write him a letter full of apologies, but I am not sure that I am wrong about this. The noble Lord also said that the Six Principles were outdated. Like other noble Lords, he spoke
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about Sir Alec's ideas on this, but no one in this House, no one in the other place has said what these proposals are. How can we possibly judge proposals about which no one knows anything? It is simply flimsy, vague ideas floating in the air.
My Lords, I have more or less come to the end of the things I wish to say. I wish to ask only one final question. Do those who oppose this Order believe that their flimsy suggestions and their wishful thinking will get Mr. Smith to the negotiating table? I think that their attitude is absolutely unrealistic and defeatist.
9.8 p.m.
LORD VERNON: My Lords, like the noble Baroness who preceded me, I will be brief. I myself abhor as much as anyone the system of white supremacy, whether as practised by Mr. Smith and his colleagues in Rhodesia or as practised in the Republic of South Africa. I believe it to be unpleasant in application, morally wrong and, quite apart from its effect on the Africans, contrary to the long-term interests of the white population. I say that because I am not a frequent speaker in your Lordships' House and I think it right to clarify my attitude on this basic issue.
But, having said that, I cannot go along with the policy of Her Majesty's Government. When Rhodesia declared its independence there were, in my opinion, only two real alternatives open to us. We could stamp out the rebellion—and technically it was a rebellion—by force of arms. This was the course recommended by a certain number of people, particularly by certain noble Lords on the Liberal Benches. I did not support it myself at the time because I thought that, quite apart from the practical difficulties, it would not be supported by public opinion in this country. But whatever our view, it was a least a logical attitude to take at that time. The alternative was to express our disapproval of what had happened, refuse to recognise the independence officially, but to take no further action. It will be suggested no doubt that this is a rather cynical attitude. I do not think it is cynical. I think it is a realistic attitude and takes account of the fact that we no longer wield the power and authority in the world which we used to wield.
But the Government took neither of those courses. Instead they adopted the

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policy of sanctions. First we had what amounted to token sanctions, sanctions which, as the Prime Minister informed the Commonwealth Prime Ministers at Lagos, would be successful in a matter of weeks. Then we had rather more effective sanctions. And now the screw is to be still further tightened. But what evidence is there that these further sanctions will in fact bring about the result that we desire? The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has told us that they will bring about this result, and he has quoted certain articles from the Press purporting to show that the Smith régime is tottering on the verge of collapse. But we have heard all this before. I myself find it difficult to believe, because the contrary evidence is altogether too strong. The Government have been warned repeatedly that so long as the Smith Government has the formidable backing of South Africa on the one hand and of the Portuguese territories to a lesser extent on the other, sanctions will not work.
But they took no notice. I do not believe that mandatory sanctions will be any more effective than the sanctions which have already been applied. The test of sanctions is surely their effectiveness. I do not think that any mandatory sanctions will be effective because only those countries whom it suits will apply them. The results so far have been wholly disastrous. The Rhodesian whites have been strengthened by bitterness in their determination to resist; the Africans and the rest of the world despise us for our half-hearted policy, and we have put further strain on our economic position at a time when we could ill afford to do so.
There is one further aspect of Government policy which I find peculiarly distasteful: that is, the double standards which appear to be applied between Rhodesia and South Africa. If we are not to trade with Rhodesia because of its Government's resistance to the advance of the coloured peoples—and that in effect is what the whole quarrel is about—how much the more should we not trade with the Republic of South Africa for whom the doctrine of white supremacy is enshrined as an article of faith. But we are told by the Government
that we cannot afford economically to antagonise South Africa. My Lords, what sort of morality is this? What it amounts to is that only so long as it
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does not affect our purse are we prepared to stand up for our principles.
THE PAYMASTER GENERAL (LORD SHACKLETON): Cheap!
LORD VERNON: For those reasons, and because I agree with the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, that the new Order may pave the way for further armed conflict in Rhodesia, I cannot support the Government. Where, however, I disagree entirely with the Conservative Party is in their advocacy of continued negotiations with Mr. Smith. I do not myself believe that any settlement can be had with the Smith Government except on dishonourable terms for ourselves. Nor do I think that any assurance which may be given by Mr. Smith to Sir Alec Douglas-Home or to anyone else will make the smallest difference, because I believe that fundamentally the Smith régime when the chips are down will fight for its own idea of white supremacy, and whatever they may agree on paper they will effectively get round subsequently.
In conclusion, I should like to indicate, as a Cross Bench Peer, my attitude to the vote that will be taken to-morrow night. As I have already said, I cannot support the Government. I must therefore either vote against the Government or I must abstain. The point has been made by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, and by other members of the Government, that a vote against the Order may well prejudice, the all-Party agreement for reform of the House which is now near. I am personally strongly in favour of this reform; and I am also in favour of the abolition of the hereditary element in the House, of which I am a representative, but I fail to see what it has to do with the matter which we are discussing this evening. Until I am finally disillusioned, I shall continue to believe that any reputable Government of this country will look at such an important matter as the reform of this House on its merits and will not kick the issue about like a football in the political arena.
What does sway me, however, is the subject of the Order on which we shall be voting. A parallel has been drawn in this debate (I think it was by the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe) between this Order and the Order which might have been

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made on Stansted, on which a majority of the House, I think, including myself, would probably have voted against the Government if it had come to a vote. But I believe the analogy to be false. I am one of those who believe that where a major issue on foreign affairs such as this is concerned, it would he quite improper for your Lordships' House to challenge the elected Chamber. If it were otherwise, any Government, of any political complexion, could he placed in a most embarrassing and even humiliating position. All the time they would be looking over their shoulder to see whether their policy was being endorsed by
the House of Lords. Subject, therefore, to the powers of subsequent speakers in this debate to persuade me otherwise, I shall abstain from voting to-morrow evening.
9.19 p.m.
LORD SOPER: My Lords. I ought to begin with an apology. It has been impossible for me to be present in your Lordships' House for the substance of this debate because at this moment the Methodist Conference is in session, and I have a responsibility there. It may be, therefore, that I shall reiterate things that have already been said, and for that I should like, also, to apologise in advance. I dare say that my noble and ecclesiastical friends, whom I am much fortified to see in such august and splendid array, have already pointed out that there is widespread opinion, amounting to conviction, in the Christian Church, both inside and outside of this unhappy Southern Rhodesia, which would commend the passing of this particular Order.
I should like to begin with the Methodist Conference. It so happens that this morning a resolution was proposed at the Conference supporting entirely this Order as consequential upon the attitude taken by the Security Council. The vote was overwhelming. There are 646 delegates, or rather representatives, to that Conference: 644 voted in favour and two voted against, though one of them was not, I think, fully conscious of what was going on. I am quite sure of that, but I will not go into that particular matter as it raises other issues. But it may be argued that here is a cross-section of the godly which is not necessarily a cross-section of the com-
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munity. Yet when I have heard what I have heard in your Lordships' House to-day, the assumption being made by those on the opposite Benches that they are the custodians of an enlightened public opinion which is being travested by an arrogant Government, I find this so far from the truth that it strikes me as having almost the air of being completely ridiculous.
I wonder whether noble Lords realise to what extent this vote of the Methodist Conference reflects a greater amount of public opinion, and informed public opinion, than perhaps they have been prepared to realise. This is at least my experience; and it is the experience of a group of people who to-day come not necessarily from Left-Wing allegiances, for although the Primitive Methodists have a tradition of Left-Wing enthusiasm, the Wesleyan Methodists, I have to say with some regret, have a strong capitalist background. Nevertheless, it is, I believe, one of the essential characteristics of this debate that those who speak in favour of this particular Order should speak from the basis of an enlightened opinion, fortified in their judgment by what has in fact been the studied and careful examination of the facts.
I believe that that careful examination of the facts yields nothing less than a very fervent and convinced idea on the part of so many people that this Order is relevant; a rough justice, if you like; a rough weapon, if you please; but a necessary one. This is not, in my judgment, a constitutional peccadillo; this is a profound moral issue. I have had the opportunity to-day of listening to missionaries and others, teachers, who have just returned from Southern Rhodesia and who are in no doubt, as I am in no doubt, that there has been a slow and inevitable process towards apartheid ever since the first days of U.D.I.; that the number of those who are in detention tends to increase; that the prospects of any speedy trial for those who are kept in prison recedes; that the continual process is away from any prospects of some kind of agreement, and that any slight winds of change which may appear on the horizon have no real substance and do not presage any real difference at all, except that Southern Rhodesia is becoming more

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and more a northern extension of the South African Republic.
This is documentary; it is not just the wild enthusiasm of one who is not prepared to face the facts. There are innumerable facts which could be attested to demonstrate that this has in fact happened. Therefore, 1, like the overwhelming number of my compatriots in the Methodist Church, regard this as a moral issue, and one on which we are confronted with four options. First, we can seek to resolve this matter by force. I, as a pacifist, reject that. Your Lordships' House has rejected it; the country has rejected it, and I believe will continue so to do. Yet to venture into Hyde Park on Sunday afternoon is to be made well aware that the more articulate Africans in this country are quite sure that it is the only answer, and they are telling us that if we wait long enough —and it may not be too long—we shall see that violence will in fact be the last arbitral. I cannot accept that, and therefore I must turn to one of the other three options.
Am I, as has been suggested by the last speaker, to leave the matter alone? I find that idea intolerable. I could not look the black man in the face again if I were prepared to accept this as an inevitable evil in which I could take no part except reluctantly to acquiesce in it. Then, am I to regard the matter as still a matter open for negotiation? I see not the slightest evidence, and I have heard not the slightest evidence in your Lordships' House to-day while I have been here, that there is any prospect that negotiation will prove in the future more fruitful than it has been in the past.
If there were a tittle of such evidence surely we should have heard from those who have had correspondence with Mr. Ian Smith in the last few weeks. We have heard nothing, and I cordially agree with my noble friend Lady Gaitskell in her assertion that it is a little impudent to parade in some mysterious way the prospect of negotiations without adducing a tittle of evidence that those negotiations have the slightest chance of ever coming so fruition. I do not believe that Mr. Ian Smith is amenable to such negotiations, because I have every confidence that if he were to yield he would be replaced by the Rhodesian Front, of which he is not the leader but the megaphone.
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Finally, the question becomes one as to the last option. What about sanctions? I am well aware that hitherto sanctions have not been fully effective. One thing that commends this Order to me immediately is that if the United Nations can make sanctions more effective by collaboration then it is of the very nature of the case that if these sanctions are the only way to preserve our dignity and our honour, and to present an alternative attempt to that of violence. I must accept them. Of course, they are a rough weapon. I recognise that there are people who must suffer, but the idea that in this wicked world any particular action can be 100 per cent. effective is a will-o'-the-wisp; it is living in Cloud Cuckoo-land.
I have been a pacifist for many years and only recently have I learned that there has to be a compromise in any absolutist position. I accept that compromise, and I accept that there w ill be people in Rhodesia who will suffer, and it will be black people who will suffer. But there is a difference in the suffering that will be inflicted in Southern Rhodesia and that which would tie inflicted in South Africa by the imposition of sanctions if they became more punitive and effective. For one thing, the larger proportion of black people in Southern Rhodesia live in rural communities, whereas a large proportion of the Bantu in South Africa are urbanised, and it is highly likely that the rural community would stand a much better chance, even if crippling sanctions were imposed, than those people living in the shanty towns of Johannesburg. That may or may not be a pertinent point, but the whole idea of sanctions is not to bring Southern Rhodesia to its knees but to bring it to its senses, and I could not tolerate the situation in which there was the alternative of doing nothing or using violence. Here is an opportunity for us to look our black friends in the face again and say, "We are genuine and sincere. We have not been genuine and sincere If you level at us the accusation that if this had been a black revolution we should, in past years, have adopted a different technique, then I accept that, with shame." If I am told, "You are not consistent because there
are other places in the world where similar actions which are right should be taken", I accept that as

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well. But I cannot accept that we should not seek to do something which approximates to the right thing in one situation merely because we have not sought to apply it everywhere.
For that reason I hope that those who are susceptible to this kind of argument will think again, not for the constitutional reason (which I do not propose to deal with to-night), but for the deep moral issue that is involved. If there is to be a conflagration in Africa (which please God there will not be) it is much more likely to come when they have completely lost confidence in our credibility than when, even with blunt instruments, we seek at least to justify our honour. For that reason I hope very much that those who have hitherto believed that sanctions are an imperfect and a disagreeable Weapon will, as a pis aller (if that is what it is), regard it again in the light that it is the one thing in a highly complicated and tendentious situation that can offer a glimmer of hope, a ray of honour reclaimed. And maybe out of it can come a new understanding, as those in Southern Rhodesia who are now opposed to the Smith régime—and there are many of them—will feel strengthened that we are neither going to war with them nor sitting back and doing nothing, but are, indeed, applying the only constitutional instrument that is available, and are doing it, together with other countries in the world, unanimously, seeking to right a very great wrong.
9.30 p.m.
LORD SALTER: My Lords, I do not propose at this hour to inflict upon you the speech that I had contemplated had the circumstances been different and the hour at which I was called been earlier. I will limit myself to making just a few remarks. I think that the extent to which our external balance of payments has been adversely affected by the whole Rhodesian affair is a very serious factor indeed in the whole of our economic position at this moment, of which I will say now no more. I would only remark that almost exactly a year ago, on June 21 last year, I entreated the Government to assess what was the effect upon our external balance of payments, and when they had come to their conclusion to inform this House and the world. That question has never really
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been answered. I hope that it will in time be answered.
I do not ask that it should be answered now, or in the debate which will go on to-morrow. But I want to express my conviction that it is a very serious factor indeed in the whole of our economic position at this moment, including the restriction of our trade, the question of prices and all the "stop-go" and other matters which constitute the immediate problems of this country. It is a very serious factor indeed. I cannot now, as I say, give the reasons, but anybody who would care to follow up the matter will find in the debate that took place on June 21 last year the reasons why I hold these opinions. I propose to add nothing to what I said then.
9.32 p.m.
LORD ANNAN: My Lords, I shall be not only brief but very brief. All I want to say from these Benches is that I am astonished that the Opposition should wish to create a constitutional issue by pressing this matter to a Division. I can understand that they want to express their disapproval of this Order. I can understand that they think it misguided. I can understand that they want to humiliate the Government and make it appear weak and impotent in the United Nations and throughout Africa. I do not happen to share these aims, but it can be argued that it is the duty of an Opposition. But what the Opposition is doing is claiming to dictate foreign policy and to dictate it, not from the elected Chamber but from your Lordships' House. The noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, called on the Government to resign and get a mandate from the electorate for their action. This seems to me very odd. The present action of the Government, whatever one may think of it, follows naturally from their Election Manifesto of 1966. Perhaps Lord Dilhorne's memory was short or his sense of drama too great.
I would describe this particular decision to divide your Lordships' House as an act of astonishing arrogance, and it is an act which should put an end to any agreed policy between the political Parties for the reform of your Lordships' House. If the hereditary Peers want to see themselves totally excluded from sitting as of right in a reformed House of Lords they could not have chosen a better way to bring this about.

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There is a further point. What will happen if, with their built-in majority, the Opposition reject this Order? What will happen when the Government pass this Order again in another place and send it back to your Lordships' House? On this matter the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, held his cards very close to his chest, and I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, in winding up, will tell us what they feel about this matter. If the Opposition decide to reject the Order each time it comes up, that will simply bring Parliament into disrepute. This is the kind of political manœuvre which people in this country are getting very tired of, because it seems incomprehensible to the general public. If, on the other hand, the Opposition allow the Order to pass when it comes back to us, what will have been achieved? Dismay abroad, and yet another piece of evidence that Britain is not really consistent in her dealings with the Rhodesian problem or sincere in her attempts to safeguard the interests of Africans.
I may be prevented to-morrow, by reason of carrying out another statutory obligation to the University of London, from recording a vote in your Lordships' House; but if I am able to do so, I shall cast it for the Government, because despite the grave and moderate words of the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, about the extraordinary circumstances in which the Opposition feel themselves, I do not think that those on the Cross-Benches should give their support to a Party manœuvre on an Executive issue of foreign policy.
9.37 p.m.
LORD ROWALLAN: My Lords, I had intended to take no part in this debate. I have not taken any part in any of the debates on Rhodesia up to the present time. At the same time, I want to declare that I have no interest whatsoever in Rhodesia; I have no financial interest, nor, I believe, have I even a distant cousin there. But I have many happy and lasting memories of my visit to that country, and of the tens of thousands of men and boys whom I met as I travelled throughout the whole of Africa, covering many tens of thousands of miles and visiting almost every little village as well as every town and city. What struck me most was the happiness of these people, their contentment and also their loyalty to the Crown. Many of them told me how
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their relations, going back several centuries, had served the Queen and the King; and they in Africa were proud of that connection with the United Kingdom. They were intensely loyal to their officers and to the officials in the r territory.
If this whole attitude has changed, it must have been a quite sudden change, and there must have been some good cause behind it. But I do not think that that attitude has changed so suddenly as we are led to expect. Is it not ratter remarkable that, with 4 million Africans and only about 200,000 Europeans, there has been no attempt to help the so-called freedom fighters in their attempt to release the people who are supposed to be so oppressed? Is it not rather remarkable that the freedom fighters should have been driven out of the country
by Africans themselves in the Rhodesian Army? I notice that noble Lords on the Front Bench think it exceedingly funny, but to me it seems tragic that we should at this time be trying to destroy that country; because, do not let us forget that it is those Africans and Indians who will suffer most and first. As happens in every case where there is insurrection, if not the leaders, the middlemen, those who might form the bridge, those who are trying to bring together tribe and tribe, race and race, and colour and colour are the ones who suffer. It is they who, if this Order is to be a success, are going to be driven into unemployment, who are going to be intimidated and threatened, as has happened in so many of the other African States.
I should like to go back a good many years, if your Lordships will excuse me for a moment. I was in West Africa at the time of the Kibi murders whey certain chiefs were condemned to death for human sacrifice and ritual murder. Day after day the execution was put off, and all the time the supporters of those chiefs were going round to the simple Africans and telling them, "You see, the British Government's 'Ju Ju' is not half as strong as our 'Ju Ju'. Our 'Ju Ju' will not allow them to be killed. You will see what happens when we get our 'Ju Ju' to deal with you unless you fall in with us". That intimidation is going on, I am absolutely certain, in Rhodesia to-day, and yet in spite of that the Africans, the so called suppressed people,

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are being loyal to their officers and loyal to their friends who are to be found all over Rhodesia in the towns, the villages, and in the countryside.
My Lords, it is for those people that I am anxious that nothing should be done to prejudice their continued standard of life and their continued progress in education. I have counted them my friends. I remember on one occasion when Ham Mukasa, that great Christian and great man in Uganda, said to me, "If only the young ones could remember." I asked him, "Remember what? "He said," What happened before the white man came, when there was human sacrifice and slavery, and nobody was free." are we going to deliver the Africans back into that condition? That has happened in a great many of the so called "free" countries. No man's life is free no man can go to bed at night knowing that he will not be taken away by the morning. Surely to-day the threats that have been made to us if we obey our consciences are one of the reasons why Ian Smith is fearful, as he is, of the consequences for his country, and why many of the moderate men have been driven into his camp.
My Lords, do not let us make another mistake. Let us think of what has been done in the past and not let it drift away into limbo. Let us try to keep these people in the progress that they have already made. Let us bring them up, as we have done to so large an extent already, into an understanding of democracy and freedom, and let us remember that we were responsible for them; that they were happy people, that they were contented people, and let us do the best we can to make sure that they return to that happy condition.
9.45 p.m.
LORD ILFORD: My Lords, the noble Lord who has just spoken speaks with great and intimate knowledge of the subject. a knowledge which few of us can pretend to possess. It is a long time since I have taken part in a debate of this nature in your Lordships' House. I usually find myself engaged in topics of a more pedestrian character with which your Lordships are called upon to deal. To-night I particularly welcome an opportunity to say something about this
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matter and I promise that I shall be brief.
I have voted hitherto in favour of the different Orders which have been brought before your Lordships' House dealing with the topic of sanctions. I readily accepted the assurances which were given that sanctions were likely to prove effective in a relatively short time. The noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, to-night asked the question, "What has happened since those votes were given to persuade my friends and myself to change our attitude to-morrow?" It is to the answer to that question that I propose to address myself for a few moments.
Before I do so there is one matter about which I should like to say something. It has been suggested that if this Order is negatived to-morrow afternoon negotiations which have been taking place about the future of your Lordships' House would be prejudiced; indeed, I think it has been put as high as to say they would be abandoned altogether. I was rather surprised to hear that suggestion made by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor. I was astonished to see it made in The Times on Saturday, coupled with a suggestion, which seemed to be altogether unworthy, that in some way your Lordships were going to be influenced by the suggestion that, if these negotiations succeeded, Members of your Lordships' House would be paid on a more generous scale than has been the case hitherto. It would be absolutely wrong for us to be influenced by any consideration about the future of these negotiations. This Order will impose on the people of Rhodesia great hardship. It will vitally affect our relations with them and with the United Nations. Such an Order ought not to be affected by questions concerned with the future of your Lordships' House. Whatever effect to-day's debate or tomorrow's Division may have upon those negotiations, I am sure we ought to disregard entirely any consideration of that nature before we give our votes tomorrow.
I will return to the question which was put by the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison.
There are two considerations which have induced me to depart from the course which hitherto I have followed in these matters. First, I believe that the Government have been wholly mistaken in taking this problem of Rhodesia

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to the United Nations. Rhodesia is, of course, a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations and our relations with her are essentially a Commonwealth matter. It was not necessary to introduce the United Nations into a dispute between two members of the British Commonwealth. If the Commonwealth still means anything to-day, surely it means that the relationship between two members of the Commonwealth ought to he treated as a Commonwealth matter and not introduced to the United Nations.
A second factor which will influence me to-morrow is the effect which I believe these sanctions will have upon the future of the United Nations. Sanctions hitherto have not been a success, in spite of the confidence which the Prime Minister has expressed in them, and I believe that these proposed sanctions, too, will fail in their intended purpose, as their predecessors have done. I do not think that the nations of the world will be willing for very much longer to enforce a complete embargo on their overseas trade, in a quarrel between Britain and a member of the British Commonwealth in which they feel they have no part and no great interest. The nations will no doubt adhere to whatever legislation they have adopted to comply with the decisions of the United Nations, but the enforcement of the embargo will grow weaker and weaker as time passes, and as it becomes more and more obvious that the sanctions have failed in their purpose.
That is what has always happened to sanctions. It happened with the sanctions imposed against Mussolini during the Abyssinian war. I was in another place when the Abyssinian war was going on, and I remember the uncertainty and anxiety which the employment of sanctions inflicted upon us then. I also remember how they failed. As time passed, the nations ceased gradually, step by step, to enforce them, and I recall how disappointed those Members of another place who had advocated the use of sanctions became. In my view, exactly the same thing is going to happen new. Indeed, the sanctions against Rhodesia are failing to-day.
The United Nations is essentially a diplomatic body which can enforce its authority only by diplomatic means. If the United Nations is to survive, then its
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more irresponsible admirers must refrain from forcing upon it tasks which it is beyond its capacity to enforce. Otherwise, the result will be that the United Nations will fail as the old League of Nations failed. The United Nations is more likely to be killed by its friends than by its enemies.
The people of Rhodesia are a sturdy, high-spirited people. They are determined that these sanctions shall, fail no matter what the cost or sacrifice to themselves. Failure would bring great humiliation on the United Nations and the British Government, but I am bound to say that it seems to me a humiliation
which has been richly deserved. But failure will do worse than that. It will erect a barrier of hatred and mistrust between the, people of Rhodesia and the people of this country, which this generation is not I to see removed. I am sure that this Order is a profound mistake, and that time will show that the Government are completely mistaken in endeavouring to enforce this policy of sanctions against Rhodesia at a time when it has already substantially failed. In spite of my earlier votes, shall vote against this Order to-morrow, and I hope that other Members of your Lordships' House who may feel the uncertainty that I have felt will do the same.
9.54 p.m.
LORD GARNSWORTHY: My Lords, much has been said in this debate by a number of my noble friends on these Benches with which I profoundly agree. But they have said it much better than I could possibly do, so when I rise to speak at this hour of the evening it is only because, on the subject of Rhodesia and the need for this country to keep its trust towards the coloured majority in that country, I feel as deeply as any of them.
We have been reminded this afternoon that this House has the right to vote against this Order. We have been reminded that this House, if it sees fit, has the right to inflict defeat on the Government. If that happens to-morrow, then, as I see it, we on these Benches have not only a right but a duty to remind the country and the world at large that this House has a large built-in Tory majority. A great deal has appeared in the weekend Press which suggests that many among that majority may not be entirely free of a desire to use this issue to embarrass the Government. Be that

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as it may, I could wish that there were more sign than there has been this afternoon that we in this House were united in a determination to bring the rebel Smith régime to an end.
As it is, the decision to divide the House seems to me to indicate a fundamental difference between the two major political Parties—a fundamental difference not only so far as means are concerned but, as the debate has continued, in the matter of ends as well. I have found it very difficult, in listening to this debate, to discern what those who want sanctions called off and those who object to an attempt to make sanctions more effective would do if to-day they had the responsibility of power instead of the ambition for it. They
would talk, they would negotiate. They would then talk some more, and they would carry on negotiating. But one thing is quite clear: they would do nothing that would hurt the rebels. Some of them, it seems to me, my Lords, would capitulate, and I get the impression that for them capitulation could not come too soon.
As this debate has developed it has seemed to me that far too often there has been more enthusiasm for attacking the British Government than for attacking the Rhodesian rebels, and what many noble Lords have said from the Benches opposite—and, indeed, what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood—can only give comfort to the caucus in Rhodesia who stand in defiance of constitutional law under the Crown. My Lords, it would be tragic if this country failed to act on the United Nations resolution. I shall go into the Lobby tomorrow in support of that resolution, content in the belief that it is right so to do.
9.59 p.m.
LORD FERRIER: My Lords, having listened to the noble Lord who has just sat down, and having read over the weekend the newspapers to which he and other noble Lords have referred, one would think that every opponent of sanctions must be a supporter of Mr. Smith. But this is not—I repeat "not"—so. To oppose sanctions is not to be pro-Fascist, as one of the papers described it. Indeed, the reverse is the case—a point which was very well made by the noble Earl,
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Lord Jellicoe, in his opening speech. The way to promote in Rhodesia what people call Fascism is to thrust more power into the hands of Mr. Smith's Government, encouraging that Government to believe that they are—as in fact at the moment they are de facto—the Government of Rhodesia. Sanctions are driving more and more Rhodesians into Mr. Smith's camp. That is why I oppose, and have always opposed, sanctions.
It is nonsense to talk wildly about a Smith lobby. I expect that several noble Lords in their ominium gatherum references to a Smith lobby would include me in it. I do not regard myself as one of a Smith lobby. I always thought that his action in proclaiming U.D.I. was a stupid mistake, and I think that nearly everybody is agreed that the declaration of independence was a mistake. Are we not capable of forming our own individual opinions? The noble Lord, Lord Connesford, put very precisely what I have in mind. Surely we are entitled to form our own opinions without being tagged with some label such as the Members on the other side of the House seem so glad to apply to anybody—especially when, like myself, they are people with no investment or interests in Rhodesia.
Like most people in this country, I have friends and relations in Rhodesia. I also have contact with people from that country, with one of whom I happen at the moment to be in close touch. He is an ex-Regular soldier who has property in Rhodesia, which he himself created, and he now finds himself with an ancestral property in Scotland. As a result of sanctions his affairs are in complete Gilbertian disorder. How they are to be disentangled, I do not know; although perhaps the difficulties of this ex-soldier may be overcome by finding himself bound to live abroad. I would say that he was not for many years a supporter of Mr. Smith. Moreover, he has another point in his favour to which I would make reference, as it is relevant to something said by noble Lords opposite this evening. To his credit, he is desperately concerned, through loyalty, about his staff of several hundred Africans, men whose livelihoods stem from his brains, his energy, his skills and his capital. As I say, he was at first opposed to the Smith regime but is gradually being driven to believe that there will soon be absolutely

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no alternative but to find himself aligned with the present Government. Meanwhile, the most practical solution for him is to live in a foreign country.
My Lords, some newspapers have suggested that our best course is to go to the races to-morrow and to come back too late for the Division. What rubbish! Anyway, I am simply not made that way. I did not accept the task of being a Life Peer—a task, I may say, whose image has been somewhat tarnished as the years go by by the inclusion of Life Peerages in the Honours List. In my view there should be a separate list altogether. I did not accept this task and all that goes with it (or, at least, all that I thought went with it) to trim my sails over matters of conscience. For instance, on the occasion of Lord Harlech's speech, to which reference has been made and which has been quoted more than once this evening, I frankly did not agree with him. I abstained from voting in that Division. I spoke and voted against the War Damage Bill, which our Front Bench did not support. I divided the House against the British Standard Time Bill for which in fact the Opposition voted. So what do I expect myself to do in the present issue? The point I make, my Lords, is the one which was described so well by the noble Lord, Lord Conesford—it was also referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood—that we have come here on a Writ from which it is perfectly clear that we should vote according to our conscience, regardless.
My Lords I am not a member of the Monday Club, but that does not mean that I do not greatly respect the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury. I am not a member of the Anglo-Rhodesian Society, but I have lived so long in underdeveloped countries that I am constantly amazed at the apparent absence of real consideration for the really underprivileged, for the really poor—what in India we used to call the Gharib-log—the illiterate masses who know nothing of politics and care less (this point has already been made), but who suffer most from the effect of Orders like this or when there is a famine. Their worry is to secure a square meal, a roof over their heads, justice and freedom from oppression by their own people.
I am satisfied, my Lords, that in the Rhodesian way of life most of them find
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just that. Not only that, but there is a real chance of their children growing up in peace and having the education which was denied their parents. The noble Lord, Lord Milverton, made that point, but he could have added that had it not been for sanctions a great deal more could have been done for these poor people; there would have been more money available.
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, will the noble Lord allow me to interrupt hint for a minute?
LORD FERRIER: Only one.
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, I thoroughly respect the views of the noble Lord, but I should like to know the alternative to sanctions, not only in this case but in others. It seems to me that it can be only war or the rule of might.
LORD FERRIER: Perhaps noble Lords will allow me to digress in reply to this rather irrelevant question. I take the view that sanctions imposed by the United Nations are becoming rather a giggle; in fact the United Nations is becoming rather a giggle, and have to face it. I know that it is marvellous to have this organisation which may be in a position some day, God grant, to lead to World Government. But at the moment they are a giggle. Some other speaker, whose name I regret I cannot recall, pointed out that we pay as much attention to their rules about Gibraltar as South Africa pays to sanctions against Rhodesia.
I do not think that sanctions have ever proved successful. Surely the Government to-day is led by a leader who says, "Let us be pragmatic". Well, for goodness' sake! let us be pragmatic. Sanctions simply have not worked. Two-and-a-half years have gone by, and Rhodesia is doing all right; and the more her people are tormented in this way (this is why I am going to vote against the Order) the stronger they will get in their determination to resist any attempt to interfere with what they believe to be, and what I believe to be, the best way of doing good to the humble people in Rhodesia.
I am sorry, my Lords, for that digression, but the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, led me a little up the garden path. I was

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talking about education and the availability of money being affected by sanctions. The right reverend Prelate's letter from his brother Bishop illustrated the point which I now want to make. It is that the pressures of the last two and a half years are making the whole position more and more difficult for Rhodesia. The noble Lord, Lord Soper, and other noble Lords made this point. Sometimes I feel that we are like Alice Through the Looking Glass. The noble Lord, Lord Soper, said that from U.D.I. the condition of the people had begun to deteriorate. Surely it was not from U.D.I., but from the sanctions imposed thereafter. I remember saying, ten years ago, in the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland when the Church was raising objections to the Central African Federation, "Look out; if you go on like this, you will drive the Rhodesians into the arms of South Africa." Let us be pragmatic. That is what is happening.
When people talk gaily about the nearness to a system of apartheid, I feel so downhearted because we just go on with this programme of sanctions and this pressure, when we know perfectly well what is happening. There is less and less freedom in Rhodesia for the African. The noble Baroness, Lady Gaitskell, asked what noble Lords on this side have done to help towards a settlement. What is there to be done without power? More especially, what can we do when our approach to the whole subject lies so far apart? I try to help our unfortunate countrymen who have got into the meshes of sanctions. It looks to me as if I shall end up in "jug" if I go on. What about some of the mischiefs and "tizzy-snatching" things that are going on? Am I right in thinking that pensions paid in pounds by the Rhodesians to their pensioners in this country are paid out in devalued pounds in Britain? Perhaps some noble Lord opposite might care to look into that point.
I feel that the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, was grossly misleading and, indeed, offensive. It was misleading because he said that the white Rhodesians ruled "against the will of 4 million Africans". This is simply not so. Noble Lords who know more about it than I will support me, I feel sure; and my friends and contacts in Rhodesia
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say that since the Smith regime have got under lock and key the African agitators, the law-abiding, hard-working, sensible common people have been very much happier than they were before. The one anxiety they have is that circumstances may so change that these agitators will be let out. The noble Lord, Lord Rowallan, has already made the point of how the guerrillas, the so-called "freedom-fighters", get rolled up pretty quickly as soon as they cross the frontier. We all know. It is because the Africans catch them.
I say that the noble Lord was in a measure offensive because of the implications in what he said about the Opposition Whip. I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, was not here when the noble Lord was speaking because I am pretty sure that he would have got a Roland for his Oliver. What he said is no more acceptable to me than the extraordinary remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Annan, whose speech seemed to me quite terrifying in its pusillanimous sentiments which he set out. When I think, too, that he is in charge of some university education, it terrifies me.
As to the constitutional issue, I speak from a slightly peculiar position in that I am one of the original Life Peers, and one of the few on this side of the House who have had no connection with the House of Commons. Indeed, I can say that I regard the House of Commons with somewhat less respect than I did when I joined your Lordships' House some ten years ago. It is all very well to strike attitudes about the powers of the House of Lords. But what are we discussing tonight? We are discussing an Order which the Government can introduce, consulting Parliament later, and then go on and on applying the sanctions. This smells to me of dictatorship. Apart from the sanctions issue, per se, if this debate and the Division to-morrow bring home to the people at large the risks they run under this Government, then it will not he for the first time that your Lordships' House has stood between the people and unfettered power, whether from below or from above.
The noble Lord, Lord Garnsworthy, made some reference to force, as did the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor. Everybody seems to say: What is the alternative to force? Of course,

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force is simply out of the question. I personally would rather be hanged as high as Haman than draw a bead on a member of Mr. Smith's Government. And I am the sort of chap, like a lot of others, who would not ask anybody else to do what I would not do myself. So force is right out. That is my feeling about it, and it is no use talking about it. And sanctions are also out.
In his, to me, quite delightful maiden speech, the noble Lord, Lord Poltimore, said what he thought General Smuts would have said on this issue, that is, "Get round the table and talk about it, and let us cut out our pride." As for the constitutional issue, I am thinking particularly of the closing sentences of the Lord Chancellor's speech, and also the speech over the weekend by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, which seemed to me to be made with something closely akin to a bludgeon. It was quite the other way with the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, but no matter how exquisite the texture of the velvet glove with which the noble and learned Lord conceals his mailed fist, I am quite unimpressed. But I was immeasurably heartened by the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Conesford.
I am, of course, not indifferent to the possibilities of what may happen if the vote goes one way or another. Who would be? But I do not propose to let any such hypothesis weigh with me in the honest concern for the merits of the case. As I say, and as I have said before, in a matter of this nature, I did not accept a seat in your Lordships' House to pass by on the other side.
10.20 p.m.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, after what is now quite a long period of service in this House, I reflect again what a pleasure it is to listen to speeches made by those who one has good reason to know speak with authority and knowledge, rather than from ideology. So it is that today we have listened to some who are outstandingly qualified by their experience and their knowledge to express views to which we should pay attention. My noble friend who has just sat down has a long period of administration behind him in the Indian area and speaks with that particular knowledge.
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On the other hand, I have been rather surprised at the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, in referring to past Divisions in this House on the subject of Rhodesia. I thought he made a point of a rather insinuating derogatoriness in referring to the fact that among those who voted a very large proportion were hereditary Peers. I should not have thought it necessary to insinuate that those of us who are hereditary Peers have any less intelligence or experience by a long stroke than those who have just come up from another House. It is the same with regard to the manner in which we are recommended to vote. I was not particularly impressed with the advice given in the Press by some who sit on this side of the House, particularly after a very short period of service in this House, who are presuming to give advice as to what should be the manner in which we should vote.
I have voted consistently against sanctions. I do not believe in them. I do not believe they are practical; I do not believe they are going to succeed. They certainly have not succeeded up to now. I have also felt great regret that the Prime Minister saw fit to renounce this, question to the world, to say that this was not a matter for the British Government to settle, and to shovel it off on to the United Nations. He took the decision. Whatever may be the merits—and there are many—of the United Nations in social questions, certainly in political questions they have been a miserable failure. From Kashmir to the Congo or to Israel, they have produced as much bloodshed as success.
The Press being my informant, I learn that it is Mr. "Mannie" so well known and whom we all admire, who is credited with the statement, in a retort to the Prime Minister, that lie was beholden to a leader older than he, as he was a descendant of Moses. That brings me to Israel and the Six-Day War. The United Nations had a distinct part in causing that, and I think that here is an outstanding example where matters have been left to the United Nations, and they have been a particular failure. So it is that I think Israel presents another example of a difficult situation, and one certainly which can best be healed by patience. I have taken the trouble to go to Israel several times

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lately. I am dedicated in my respect for the State of Israel and I admire what it has achieved. I have travelled recently from Habbaniyah, in the North, to Eilat, in the South, seeing what is being done, and I think it unlikely that any pressure through the United Nations will swerve them from their intention of holding on to their position until they get what is suggested consistently with regard to Rhodesia; namely, negotiation rather than pressure of any political kind.
So I come to the course of the United Nations in its actions, continually hostile to the South African Republic. It is not unnatural that the South African Republic feels a growing resentment at the sort of attacks that it receives from the United Nations. There is the absurdity of what we have done towards South Africa, allegedly at the dictation of the United Nations, stopping the shipment of arms to South Africa while at the same time expecting her to implement the Simonstown Agreement and to keep open the sea routes to the West. I think it was only yesterday that I read in the Press that 50 million tons of shipping have passed round the Cape since the Six-Day War—50 million tons more than would have passed had it not been for the war and the closing of the Suez Canal.
I wish to return for a moment to South West Africa. The United Nations have presumed to say that they should take steps to give substitute rule for South West Africa. Everybody knows that it is absolute nonsense, because you could not possibly get any other form of government when you have not got the ports and have not got the rolling stock. That is why I suggest that there is hypocrisy with regard to this fuss about white minority rule. We want to trade with South Africa. The noble Lord, Lord Mitchison said (and I see that he has now left his place), that the South African industrial complex could be just as well run by an African Government as it could by a white Government. What utter nonsense ! The unpracticality, the hypocrisy, the abysmal ignorance of those who would suggest it ! If you are going to recognise South Africa as needing a white Government it is equally true of Rhodesia. You cannot have a black Government right away. The fact
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of the matter is that Africans in South Africa and in Rhodesia are not yet fit for sovereignty.
I seem to recollect a time when Hungary made a great bid for freedom. Perhaps at that time the right reverend Prelate might have given expression to the thoughts of what salvation could have been offered to the Hungarians, but white minority rule over white majority non-Communists is something that appears to arouse no objections. I turn to Mozambique for a moment. Mozambique, as a metropolitan province of Portugal, has presented the United Nations with a bill for the damage caused to it by these sanctions. Nothing has been paid. No respect is made to it. The Beira patrol, causing them a great disadvantage, certainly is piracy on the High Seas by international rule, and is not the intention of that patrol the application of force? Of course it is, by all international law. We want normal trade with South Africa. South Africa intends to have normal trade with the Central African areas. Portugal intends the same. As my noble friend Lord Ferrier said, those two countries are not likely to give it up. They will continue to trade with Central Africa, be it Malawi, Zambia or Rhodesia, just as they have always done—and how, with a long frontier like that, can you expect sanctions to succeed?
The question of terrorists, whether from Tanzania into Mozambique or Zambia into Rhodesia, is equally a matter for the South African Republic. Remove the protection of the troops that Portugal is mobilising and paying for in Northern Mozambique, and the pressure is bound gradually to come down to South Africa, and it is natural that they are not going to surrender their need for defending their people.
Reference has been made to a Police State several times. Incidentally, I wonder how many of those who are going to vote tomorrow remember that Rhodesia is the only one out of, I think, 44 States on the Continent of Africa in which the police are unarmed. The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor gave us a good example of how we should read from quotations. I take his example by reading from a letter from Mrs. Elspeth Huxley, who certainly is a person

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of compassion and a well known public character. She said:
"Rhodesia is labelled a Police State, but detention Acts operate with greater severity in most of the African countries we flatter and subsidise. Legality, presumably, cannot spring from revolution, so what about Russia and its satellites, or France even for that matter? We should save a lot of money in the Diplomatic Service if we dealt only with countries whose Governments conform to our standards of legality and constitutional government."
No more need be said about that.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, if the noble Lord will forgive me, I do not think I used the expression "Police State". I thought a Police State was Mr. Heath's description of Rhodesia.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, when I quoted the Lord Chancellor it was not in the sentence where I referred to a Police State. My memory may not be right. But he has no monopoly of the phrase "Police State"; I have heard it said by many, but if he has a claim to monopoly of it I withdraw.
If sanctions succeeded, undoubtedly any other Government than the Government of the day in Rhodesia, constitutionally elected, would result only in grave disorder and chaos—and who would be hurt most? The Africans. What hypocrisy to suggest that this action is going to defend the Africans when everybody knows that in a state of chaos and disorder you cannot get improved education, higher economic conditions and greater agricultural instruction. And these are the conditions we want.
I have been travelling widely in Rhodesia as well as in South Africa. I have this year travelled hundreds of miles in Rhodesia, to a great number of stations, and have spoken with the managers on stations employing hundreds of black Africans and I have some little knowledge of the situation. The tribal influences are the problem. Whether in Rhodesia or in South Africa the differences between the Basutos, the Zulus and others are as wide as the differences between the Finns and the Portuguese, or the Chinese and the Indians. It is wrong to regard them all as one people because their skins are black. Do we regard the nations in Europe as exactly the same? Surely their customs, religions and influences are different. And so it is in Asia.
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Drought has been to Rhodesia a greater disaster than sanctions. Perhaps the right reverend Prelates will E ay that the Rhodesians have brought this on themselves; but it is a fact that the drought has been more serious than have sanctions. Many of the difficulties of sanctions have come more certainly through drought. One has only to travel to see the effect of the drought. One has only to see how the first crap was destroyed to realise that. The noble Lords, Lord Wedgwood, Lord Milverton and others, who have great experience of the conditions, have given us, I feel, a true picture of the situation and I associate myself entirely with what they have said.
I do not agree with sanctions. They are morally vicious, and quite contrary to the spirit of compassion and of the age. The Rhodesians are of British stock and they will never surrender, just as we should not surrender in equivalent circumstances. They will not capitulate. I am not one who believes that principle and conviction and tradition should be sacrificed for expediency. Nothing, not even the suggestion that it will imperil the future existence of this House, will daunt me from saying that we must vote against this Order. We should vote as our consciences dictate, and in accordance with the knowledge that God may have put at our disposal.
This is what happened in a previous crisis with another Government. The Asquith Government was trying to coerce the North of Ireland. Anyone may read Hansard of the Spring of 1914, and from that can realise the attitude of this House. The forefathers of many who are here and who may vote to-morrow had no hesitation then in expressing their feelings. The feelings were intense, so much so that a whole brigade at the Curragh thought it necessary to resign their commissions. That was thin the strength of the convictions of our forefathers. In these conditions, my Lords, I have not the least hesitation in following the lead and advice of my Leader on this side of the House in recording my vote against this Order.
10.39 p.m.
LORD WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, your Lordships have been discussing this matter for nearly eight hours, and during

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that time all that can be said on this matter has, I think, been said; and since we have a good distance to go, it is not my intention to speak for any length of time. Let me confess that I rise with some apprehension, because this is the third speech that I have made in your Lordships' House in the last three years on the Rhodesian question. On the last occasion, in December, 1965, a fair number of noble Lords opposite walked out in protest. I was grateful to them at the time for the compliment they paid me. But I am hoping that I shall not say anything this evening which is going to bring about a recurrence of that kind of situation, although I confess that, having re-read that speech within the last two or three days, I am sorely tempted to make it again.
I should like to say to the noble Lord, Lord Barnby, who has just sat down and who talked about the possibility of what would happen if there were an African majority to-morrow, that there cannot be an African majority to-morrow because the Prime Minister and the members of the Party of which I am a member have have made it perfectly clear that in our view the Rhodesian Africans are not ready to take over the Government of Rhodesia; this must be a planned, longterm matter. So the question of having a Rhodesian African Government in the near future does not arise.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, I liken that to the State of Israel. The persecution of the Jews has been a long-term problem for nearly 2,000 years.
LORD WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, I do not see the relevance of that, if I may say so. As I, too, have been in Israel quite recently, I would agree that they are doing a magnificent job. I do not know whether that is a suitable answer but it seems to me to be just as relevant as the noble Lord's intervention.
I rise to-night, not out of any sense of emotion, not because I have to support the Government on every occasion—the fact that I have not always supported the Government has on more than one occasion been the concern of the Front Bench—but in this matter I believe that they are absolutely right. The Order before your Lordships to-day seems to me
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to be the logical outcome of a series of unpleasant (I admit this) but, nevertheless, necessary actions. When the Smith regime behaved illegally its action was strongly condemned by all Parties in your Lordships' House, as well as by all Parties in another place, and it was generally agreed then that something had to be done, and done quickly, to bring Rhodesia back to legality.
Every effort was made by the Government to do this, and I find it a little surprising that the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, in his opening speech should make reference to the need for further negotiations. I find it a little surprising that the noble Lord, Lord Ferrier, should quote from a speech of another noble Lord that we should "get round the table". I wonder what noble Lords think the Prime Minister, a number of Commonwealth Secretaries, the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, and the Attorney General have been doing over the period of the last two and a half years. They have made repeated efforts. They have been out to Salisbury. They have met Mr. Smith time and time again, with the very purpose of trying to negotiate something which would be acceptable to all sides: but the fact remains that all efforts have proved unsuccessful. I want to say this, and say it quite bluntly: the utterances and attitudes of some of the noble Lords opposite have not helped the situation. The present situation has not been
created by the Government of this country. They have done everything in their power to find a solution, but we have to face the fact that Rhodesia has shown little desire to find a solution to this problem.
In such a situation what can be done? Noble Lords, one after another, have said, "We must not apply sanctions. We must try to negotiate." How do we resolve this situation? Not a single noble Lord opposite has come forward with a suggestion as to how the matter can be resolved. Are we merely to accept the situation, to surrender, and to say, "All right then, have your own way"? Do we not have some responsibility for the 4 million Africans at present living in Southern Rhodesia? I suggest that in the circumstances sanctions were, and still are, inevitable.

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But if sanctions are to work, they must be applied effectively; and we have to face the fact that they have got to be punitive and must be used for that purpose. After all, this is the object of the exercise. The steps which we are
being asked to take in this Order should have been taken a long time ago. It is all very well for the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, to talk about the failure of sanctions. Of course sanctions have in some measure failed, because they were never applied in the extreme. This Order is a sincere and determined effort to do what perhaps has never been done before; that is, to apply sanctions in such a way that they will be felt. The noble Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, said that to increase sanctions will put Smith more firmly in the saddle. I suggest that if noble Lords opposite vote against this Order tomorrow it will be they who will be putting Smith more firmly in the saddle. This is something I ask them to think about very carefully.
It may well be that noble Lords opposite, or some of them, have lost sight of the real position. It has been referred to in your Lordships' House today that this is Human Rights Year. To listen to the speeches of some noble Lords opposite, one would not think so. One would think that human rights meant the rights of whites, and certainly not of the blacks. We on this side of the House are concerned, and always have been concerned, for the 4 million Africans who have less hope under the Smith régime than they have had under any other previous Government in Rhodesia. Some of us may be a little out of date, but we see in this a grave moral principle. It is on that score that I feel as strongly as I do about the whole Rhodesian question, and in particular on the need for this Order to go through.
The noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, said (I think I am right in quoting him) that principles should not be sacrificed. I suggest to noble Lords opposite who are thinking seriously about opposing this Order that here is a moral principle which should not be sacrificed for the benefit of a mere handful of people. I think that we have a moral responsibility not only to look after the health, the wealth and the happiness of four million Rhodesian Africans but also
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to see that they too ultimately have a say and a share in their own government.
We in this House, and particularly on this side of the Chamber, are very familiar with Mr. Smith's view—a view which is shared not only by his supporters hut, I strongly suspect, by a number of noble Lords opposite. Let me quote what he has said, among other things:
"If ever we have an African majority in this country, we shall have failed in our policy of trying to make a place for the white man."
The more one thinks about it, the more disgraceful it is, and I should be ashamed if I found myself for a brief second even beginning to accept a statement of that kind. Mr. Smith probably sees—and, again, I am sorry to say that I think a number of noble Lords opposite also see—Rhodesia as a white man's private profit-making preserve which must be protected, at the expense of 4 million Africans who are living in appalling conditions (because I, too, have been there to see them for myself) with appalling standards and a complete absence of education in the real sense.
I agree—and I am sure the noble Marquess will take me up on this unless I say it—that Southern Rhodesia is probably spending more on primary education than any other African country. I accept that. But they are taking jolly good care that they spend precious little on secondary education, because if they spent more, more and more Africans would qualify for the vote.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE, AND FERRARD: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lord for a moment? He said that the Rhodesian African had an extremely low standard of living. I have pointed out several times in this House, although it never appears to sink in with noble Lords opposite, that the Rhodesian African has an average income of £112 a year. The Africans in the Republics of Africa—many of them our former Colonies, and in spite of the vast amount of free aid that the British taxpayer pours into them every year—have an average income of only £30 a year. So put that in your pipe and smoke it!
LORD WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, I am always grateful to noble Lords who presume to give me advice and information. But the noble Viscount might have been more correct if he had said that

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the average income of an African family working in the towns or urban areas was included in that figure. The figure he gave is not the average income of the African, because if he investigates the matter I think the noble Viscount will find that his figure relates only to a very small percentage of African families. The present situation has been brought about by the unwillingness of Rhodesia to face the situation. I think that the ultimate peace of the world is much more bound up with what is happening, and with what will happen, in Africa than with capitalism on one side and Communism on the other.
I think noble Lords opposite have not been wise in their choice of a battleground today. It would have been much more to their credit, and perhaps more understandable, if they had chosen one of the pieces of legislation which they are constantly complaining has been ill-conceived or ill-scrutinised in another place. There might have been much more justification for taking action there than in this connection. I believe that noble Lords opposite, who are threatening to vote against the Order, are doing a very grave disservice to the international image of this House and of Her Majesty's Government, even if one does not agree with all that the Government are doing. I believe that by voting against this Order—and I think somebody has to say it—they are in fact, whether they recognise it or not, giving aid and comfort to the Smith régime; and if they decide to throw this Order out they must not mind if somebody levels the accusation against them that Mr. Smith really has a very good "fifth column" in the British House of Lords.
10.56 p.m.
LORD FORESTER: My Lords, after the last speaker I will certainly declare that I have an interest in Rhodesia. I will not detain your Lordships for more than a few minutes, but as I have only recently come back from Rhodesia there is one point that I should like to make. When out there I rather sensed that the British were becoming less popular. I think one can hardly blame the Rhodesians for that. I tried to make the point to them that these vindictive measures, these sanctions, were not the desire of the British people but of the
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British Government. Of course, I got the answer that a people get the Government they deserve.
LORD WELLS-PESTELL: Would the noble Lord allow me to interrupt him?
LORD FORESTER: Yes.
LORD WELLS-PESTELL: Could I ask him by what yardstick he is able to judge what the British public really think about sanctions?
LORD FORESTER: Recently I have been travelling a great deal. I went down one very full train the other day asking everybody whether he was for or against these Rhodesian measures. I had an 80 per cent. count in my favour. A country may get the Government it deserves, certainly, but I think that that lasts only for a year or so. I think that after two and a half years the electors may wish otherwise. I think it would give enormous relief and pleasure (I am not talking so much now of Mr. Smith) to the many liberal and middle-of-the-road politicians in Rhodesia—and there are a great many of them—if they heard that this House had thrown out this Order. It would give them heart not to become a Republic, not to join the Union, but to "hold their horses" in the high hopes that some day, and anyhow at the next Election, a peaceful solution will be reached.
I am not going to talk any more about sanctions: that subject has been covered time and time again. As regards the constitutional issue, surely it is up to us to vote for what we think is right, not what we think is expedient. I leave that sort of chicanery to another place. There is only one other thing that I should like to say, which I think will please some of your Lordships here, though it may surprise some on the other side. When I came away, petrol was 3s. 6d. a gallon, and I was offered as much as I required.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down I think he ought to withdraw his remark about "chicanery" in another place. It is not the custom of your Lordships' House, or indeed of another place, to cast aspersions of that kind.
LORD FORESTER: Certainly I will withdraw it.
10.59 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I have too much respect for this House to wish, at this late hour, to repeat many of the arguments which have already been urged. I have had some sympathy with the Opposition Front Bench during the last three speeches which have been delivered from that side of the House. I hope that the tone of those three speeches may, even at this late hour, make them reconsider their decision to vote against this Order.
Because I do not want to repeat what has been said at some length to-day, I propose to approach this issue, at least at the beginning of my remarks, from the point of view of political philosophy, rather than from the point of view of a protagonist. I recognise that in the Rhodesia issue we are faced with a conflict between principle and realism, between moral values and what is practicable. I recognise the European point of view in Rhodesia. I remember reading the biography of Sir Roy Welensky in which there was an illustration of the town of Salisbury 60 years ago. It was a ditch in a marsh. There was also a photograph of exactly the same place today, with a beautiful boulevard and modern buildings. No one who is looking at the issue of Rhodesia can fail to appreciate the attitude of the European minority community there who have seen the advance of their country under the European enterprise which has been practised there. And I want to say that I recognise it at once.
My Lords, the Europeans take the view that although they are a minority of little more than 200,000, compared with 4 million Africans, they are the civilised community and that the future of Rhodesia must be in the hands of those who are civilised rather than in the hands of the great majority of Africans, many of whom are illiterate. I want to contest that view from the point of view of political philosophy. The illiterate man has as much right to decide his future as the educated and intelligent man. The illiterate African in Rhodesia, living in his village, denied his land (a case was reported in the Guardian this week of the eviction of an African family whose land had been appropriated by Europeans under the Land Apportionment Act), has as much right to express
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his view about his future as the most educated and the richest man in his territory.
This is the fundamental issue of democracy. It was an issue in this country when the Chartists at the beginning of the last century first demanded democracy in Great Britain. Most of the British people were then illiterate; but they were suffering appalling injustices: children working in the factories; women working down the mines; the appalling slavery of our working class; and the Chartists demanded, in the name of democracy, that they should have the right to vote. That is exactly the situation in Rhodesia today, with 4 million Africans
exploited; their land taken from them; those in towns living in conditions which are just shocking for any civilised human beings, and those in the villages denied even the land for subsistence. They are demanding the right to express
their grievances in a democratic way by the vote. A minority of 200,000
Europeans are asserting the right to dominate them and control their lives. Everyone who is supporting the white dictatorship of Ian Smith in Rhodesia is claiming the right of a small privileged, rich, exploiting race over the vast majority of the people there whom they dominate.
My Lords, I wish to say at once that although I have been very closely associated with the struggle of all the African peoples for their right to self-government, I am deeply disappointed by what has happened in many of the independent African States. It is the most disappointing fact of my political experience. But I would say to the House that there are two points that we should bear in mind. One has been made by Mr. Iain Macleod, one of the best Colonial Secretaries that this country has ever had. I pay my tribute to him as a Conservative, as I pay it to Mr. Oliver Stanley who preceded him as a Conservative Colonial Secretary. Mr. Macleod made the point that even though independent African countries have shown us some disappointment, the position would have been immeasurably worse had we not recognised their right to self-government and independence. We should remember the eight years of war in Algeria and the Mau-Mau crisis in Kenya. If British Governments, beginning with the Labour

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Government which followed the last war and continuing with subsequent Conservative Governments, had not recognised the right of colonial peoples to self-government, we should have had in Africa a continental scene similar to that of Vietnam at this moment. No one can possibly look at African history
without recognising that, with all the disappointments which have occurred, it has been a progressive act to recognise the right of the African people to self-government and independence. My Lords, the other point—
LORD GRIDLEY: My Lords, I apologise for interrupting the noble Lord. Would he not agree that we have, systematically over the years, trained the people for whom we were responsible up to self-government? I think the noble Lord would admit, even in the case of Malaya where we have Chinese Communists and terrorists, and infiltration internationally inspired, we had trade union advisers from this country out there helping the people and representing their views at that time. The noble Lord indicated that we have held these people down. I think that all the time we led them on.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I am not going to reply to that intervention in detail, but I could do so. I was putting a point to the House which was reflecting not only my view but also the view of Mr. lain Macleod, who was a distinguished Colonial Secretary representing a Conservative Government.
The other point I want to make is this. When we are thinking, as the white Rhodesian minority are continually thinking, of the failures of African independent Governments, we should recognise that these territories are now passing through a stage of political development similar to that in Europe when national States were being created. It is quite accidental that I am writing a book at this moment which has compelled me to look at European history. If one looks at European history during the period similar to that through which Africa is now passing, the conflicts, the massacres, the wars, the religious intolerance, the brutalities and the revolutions make what is happening in Africa seem
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almost superficial. If one looks at Africa with an understanding of history one sees that the difficulties, the disturbances, the civil wars, like that in Nigeria at this moment, mark a historical period which is necessary for ultimate self-government and democracy in these territories. That is a consideration of our problems from the point of view of political philosophy.
When I begin to look at them in a practical way, may I remind your Lordships that no Government in this country, either Conservative or Labour, has ever recognised the right of a colonial territory to independence before majority rule has been granted in that territory. There is only one unhappy exception—the independence which was given to the whites in South Africa, not by a Conservative Government or by a Labour Government, but by the Liberal Government at that time.
I admit that the present policy of sanctions has largely failed. It has in fact succeeded to a greater degree than is recognised, but it has taken a much longer time than was anticipated. We have had the statement of the Prime Minister that it might operate within months. We have had the anticipations of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor. But it is clear from the attitude of businessmen in Southern Rhodesia today that the effect of the present sanctions has been greater than is generally recognised. Now the Government are asking this House to pass an Order which will endorse a decision of the United Nations, not only for mandatory sanctions, but for comprehensive sanctions: that is to say, that the United Nations will have the responsibility of seeing that every Government in the world applies the same sanctions which this country has applied during the last two and a half years, very often defeated by the aid which other Governments and countries have given to Southern Rhodesia.
I regard as one of the most important items in the resolution carried by the United Nations the instruction to the Secretary-General to survey the situation so that he can report when Governments of Member States of the United Nations do not fulfil the decision which the United

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Nations has laid down; not only to report those failures to the United Nations, but to recommend actions by which the decision of the United Nations may be carried out. I do not think we recognise the significance of the fact that this
resolution was carried unanimously by the Security Council. It is a quite extraordinary event. No one who has followed the discussions of the United Nations can fail to be aware of the opposition of Governments like that of France. One finds it particularly remarkable, in view of the present situation in France. Here is the French Government for the first time supporting the resolution of not only mandatory but comprehensive sanctions. I hope I am not being ungenerous if I say that a good deal of the breach of the economic sanctions in Southern Rhodesia in the past has come from France.
I see the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, in his seat. Will he, before the Division tomorrow at five o'clock, begin to realise the critical significance of a vote being given in this House against the unanimous wish of the Security Council of the United Nations? It is a defiance against the world, of which no Party in this country, and no responsible Opposition, should for one moment be guilty.
I recognise at once that even the comprehensive sanctions, which are now made mandatory, may have their flaws in the refusal of both South Africa and Portugal to co-operate. I would say this: that if the Secretary-General of the United Nations is to be given power to report to the United Nations the failure of any Governments to co-operate in the resolution which it has carried, that must apply to any supplies which can reach Southern Rhodesia either through Mozambique or through South Africa. I do not take the view that it is impossible for the Secretary-General of the United Nations to be able to identify breaches of its decision. Assistance goes through the Portuguese Colonies, mostly through Lourenco Marques. I do not know why, if you apply United Nations authority for a blockade of Beira in Mozambique it should not be applied also against Lourenco Marques in Mozambique.
So far as South Africa is concerned, every business company in this country or
in any other country which supplies goods to South Africa destined for
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Southern Rhodesia is breaking the decision of the United Nations. I know that British and other businesses may say that they are just exporting to South Africa, but noble Lords on the opposite Benches who have such close knowledge of company practices know very well indeed that no company which is exporting to South Africa is innocent of the ultimate destination of goods if those gods are to be sent to Southern Rhodesia; and no one who is making an investigation of this issue, as the Secretary-General has been asked to do, can fail to recognise those breaches of the United Nations resolution.
It has been urged from the opposite Benches, and urged even from its Front Bench, that the Order which is before the House to-day will encourage the use of force in Southern Rhodesia. I say very sincerely indeed that this Order is the last opportunity which our country and the United Nations will have to avert the use of force in Southern Rhodesia. Already there are guerrillas in Southern Rhodesia; there are formidable revolts in Mozambique, in Angola, in Portuguese Guinea. There are beginnings of revolt in South-West Africa. Let the African nations which are in the United Nations, and which have accepted the resolution which is the basis of this Order in Council, feel that the official Opposition in this country, reflected in the Vote in this House, turns down the United Nations resolution, and definitely the effect will be that they will become cynical about this country's using its influence at all, and it will encourage them to turn to force.
I wonder whether the Opposition will accept that I think from their own point of view they are making an extraordinary mistake in urging that this House should vote against this Order. They are adding to their opposition to democracy in Southern Rhodesia opposition to democracy in this country. I am going to admit at once that it is possible that apathy in this country might lead to indifference on the issue of Southern Rhodesia. But I say to them definitely that there will be no apathy in this country if those in this House who are hereditary Peers, who have the right to vote only because they are the sons of their fathers, turn down democratic decisions by the elected House in this country.

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They will do a great disservice to their own cause about Southern Rhodesia if they submerge it in the right of this House to reject what the democratically elected House has carried.
I want finally to say this. I have in my hands a letter which has been issued by the Anglo-Rhodesian Society to its members. It is a confidential letter, and the members of the Society are requested to make no mention whatsoever to the Press of its contents. This letter indicates in detail the campaign which the Anglo-Rhodesian Society proposes to carry out in this country. It involves the collection of signatures to a petition. I want specially to draw the attention of this House to one sentence in this letter:
"Collectors must explain that we, the British can no longer afford sanctions against a friendly State."
A friendly State! A State which is in rebellion against the Government of this country; a State which has ignored the Prerogatives of Her Majesty the Queen; a State which is expanding apartheid, to which all our Parties have been opposed!
VISCOUNT DAVENTRY: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lord for one moment?
LORD BROCKWAY: No.
VISCOUNT DAVENTRY: He has been talking for a long time, and I only wished to say—
LORD BROCKWAY: No, no, no!
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Order!
LORD BROCKWAY: I will sit down as soon as I have finished what I am saying in this paragraph. I will then give way to the noble Viscount, but it is not gentlemanly courtesy to attempt to interrupt me in the middle of a sentence. What I was saying is that this is described as a "friendly State"—a State which is in rebellion against the Government of this country, which has ignored the Prerogative of Her Majesty the Queen; a State which is extending the vicious practice of apartheid; a State which has denied the right of a majority to rule for another hundred years.
This campaign by the Anglo-Rhodesian Society is a campaign against all the
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principles and all the tolerances for which this country has ever stood, and the vote which is given to-morrow in this House against the Order which has been introduced by the Government will be interpreted everywhere as a confirmation of the doctrines which that society is advocating. My Lords, I will now give way.
VISCOUNT DAVENTRY: My Lords, if I may interrupt the noble Lord for one moment, he has talked about Rhodesia as a country which is against us. This was a country which was for us during two world wars. I am old enough to have fought in both wars, and to abuse that country as the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, has done, revolts me. They are our friends, and he should realise it, instead of thinking only of his particular coloured friends. I think it is really dreadful.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I will make only one point in answer to that. Rhodesia has only 200,000-odd white people, with 4 million Africans; and among those 4 million Africans there were those who fought and died in the war, equally as there were among the minority of white people.
LORD FERRIER: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down I should like to ask him a question, which I can do as a Life Peer. He seemed to indicate that no hereditary Peer, whether in receipt of Her Majesty's Writ or not, has the right to take part in a Division such as we have to-morrow, despite the fact that he may, like the noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood, the noble Lord, Lord Forester, and half a dozen others, have an intimate knowledge of the matters being discussed in your Lordships' House. I understood the noble Lord to say that nevertheless, because they are hereditary Peers, they ought not to be allowed to take part in the Division.
LORD BROCKWAY: Not a bit, my Lords. A hereditary Peer has, under the present rules of this House every right to vote. But I say this: that if it becomes an issue between the right of those who are Members of the House for legislative purposes only because they are the sons of their fathers and a democratically elected House of Commons, the electorate of this country will decide

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in favour of democracy rather than in favour of the maintenance of hereditary powers.
11.30 p.m.
LORD GRIDLEY: My Lords, I should like to take a certain amount of heat out of what has transpired in the recent speech we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, and I think I would try to be constructive in this matter. I think it would be easier for us on both sides of the House if we tried most sincerely to take class politics out of the consideration of the Rhodesia situation. The fact that there happen to be Europeans settled in Rhodesia who may at the present time enjoy a higher and better standard of living than the Africans is simply because they have gone out to that country and have taken responsibility out there, in which situation they are at present. If one brands all of them as exploiters of people in holding down the Africans, it does not make it one whit easier in a situation of this kind to get a settlement, which I am sure both sides of the House most sincerely desire.
I well remember, I think about 10 or 15 years ago, when my father was a Member of the other place and I used to come home on leave from Malaya, where I served as a colonial civil servant. In those days, and even in the earlier days when debates were held in another place, the House seemed to be empty. The situation then would appear to be that there was very little with which Parliament at that time concerned itself with our overseas relations, or anything in the Commonwealth which really caused us great concern. The facts were that over a great area of the globe there was peace and contentment, and people were being steadily led along under an enlightened paternal Administration towards their own interests and their eventual self-government.
I want to emphasise that I suppose our experience as a nation in dealing with colonial Commonwealth matters must be second to none, and must certainly be the envy of some other nations. Certainly I cannot conceive that they know anything like as much about these problems as we do. Our policies have always been for most of these areas to lead the peoples to their own self-government, giving them independence,
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understanding their problems and so on. If I may mention this in a constructive
sense, Britain has been most ably served by her colonial servants. If I may draw a parallel, I believe that if it were possible for British colonial servants under an able Secretary of State for the Commonwealth to be sent into South Vietnam tomorrow, in no time we should have peace in that territory. I say that because this is an experience we have, and I say it not wishing to cast any aspersion against our American friends.
In the time I served in Malaya we had a distinguished Member of another place, who was then Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. James Griffiths, who I believe is still in the House of Commons and a member of the Labour Party. We had the noble Viscount, Lord Boyd of Merton, who was formerly Mr. Alan Lennox-Boyd, and the noble Viscount, Lord Chandos, who was formerly the Right Honourable Oliver Lyttelton. Both are now distinguished Members of your Lordships' House. The accumulated experience of this country was, and still is, enormous. These are the facts.
I well remember the time when the noble Viscount, Lord Chandos, came out to Malaya. It was after our High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, had been shot and murdered by Chinese Communists, and we were in a state of some concern and turmoil at the time. This was when Chinese international Communism was trying its best to get a foothold in South East Asia, and to establish Malaysia as the thirteenth province of China. It had nothing to do with any of the ways in which we were administering those territories. I wish to emphasise that. I wish it to be borne in mind, whatever may be said about us in this day and age, that these were the facts operating at that time: that we had an enlightened Government, we had policies that were enlightened, passed by this Parliament and given executive form by whatever Government happened to be in power.
After that experience in Malaya it gives me the greatest pleasure and satisfaction, and even happiness, to think that tomorrow we have the Prime Minister of Malaysia, an independent country, Tunku Abdul Rahman, here to receive the Freedom of the City of London.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord, but may I remind him that this is a debate about Rhodesia and not about Malaya? I think he is out of order.
LORD GRIDLEY: My Lords, I am coming to my point now—is just this. I hope to show that, with our accumulated experience, it would be possible to achieve an understanding and a settlement with Rhodesia. I am coming to that particular point at this moment.
At the beginning of this debate I listened with care and respect to what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor had to say. It seemed to me that the Government have no intention at the present time of entering into any form of negotiation with Mr. Smith, and that their main concern was to make the imposition of sanctions more effective. My noble and learned friend Lord Dilhorne called attention to some Articles of the new mandatory Sanctions Order, which seemed to him, and seem to me, to make it more permissive in facilitating the African nations to take up arms by armed infiltration into Rhodesia.
In reply to a question the noble and learned Lord said that Mr. Smith was worried about early majority rule. There was some conversation in which Mr. Smith suggested that, conditions being different, others might want to impose a Constitution at a time when Mr. Smith's children had grown up. In the early part of my speech, when I was interrupted in my theme, I had said that from my experience I could well understand the fears of the consequences that could follow on armed intervention and infiltration; and I sometimes wonder whether members of Her Majesty's Government, whether they be Conservative or of any other Party, fully understand those fears when they go out and are considering self-government for some part of the world. The conditions are so entirely different from those in this country, especially in a country like Rhodesia where people have severed all their connections with their homeland and have decided to live and work there and even educate their children there. These fears must be understood, and if there is to be some guarantee of safety and protection to them in the future they
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must understand clearly what this will mean.
I regret the tendency there is in arguing this matter to bring class into it. That has happened in speeches in this House, and I honestly do not think that it is particularly helpful in considering the situation. If we want to consider this problem of Rhodesia dispassionately, can we not ask ourselves, "Have we made any mistake whatsoever in the case of Nigeria?". At the moment, the Nigerian Government is faced with a most terrible civil war. Were we right at that particular time to give self-government to Nigeria? Is there anything we have done which is wrong? My Lords, I can only say that if one has been abroad
in the conditions which I have described as affecting myself, these things are burned into one's mind. One wonders, one asks oneself, is one's country doing right? I am not here to fight against the Government or noble Lords opposite. I bring what experience I can as an hereditary Peer in your Lordship's House to put these points to you and to try to be constructive. It is not a question of class with me. It is a most sincere desire to try to be helpful in this matter.
In the case of Rhodesia I know the situation is more difficult than with many territories. In our own case in Malaya we were working towards our own destruction, if you like to put it that way. We were working ourselves out of a job. We were training up people to take our positions. The last position I had was filled by a Malayan. That was the logical sequence of events. But in Rhodesia the Government is faced with a more difficult problem. They have their own white population there, their own white kith and kin of European descent, and it is infinitely more difficult and harder; and, as I said, with all the accumulated experience we have which I was trying to illustrate earlier in my speech, that is the way I should like to see the matter settled, and I think it could be done.
My Lords, I have come to the end of what I wanted to say, but I should like just to refer in this debate to what has appeared in the Press. I am not going to do it at great length, but I see it is reported that the noble Lord, Lord Alport, has been on the wireless purporting to represent certain views held

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by the Conservative Party. Well, I do not know for whom he speaks. I should not have thought he was speaking for the Conservative Party but was possibly speaking for himself. He said in a radio programme that a confrontation with the Commons on the Rhodesian Order would do great damage to the Conservative Party:
"If there is a recovery of the Labour Party it will date from the day that action was taken in the House of Lords.… We are on the edge of getting agreement",
and so on. He referred to a certain madness on the part of Lord Salisbury, and more or less indicated that the noble Marquess had used his best endeavours with Peers as to how they should vote in this House. There is not one word of truth in that. I have the greatest respect for the noble Marquess, who will be speaking to-morrow. Let us get it quite straight that the noble Marquess has made no attempt to influence any Conservative Peers in the way they will vote.
Hereditary Peers who regularly attend your Lordships' House come here in an honest endeavour to make a sensible contribution to your Lordships' discussion—I am talking in that sense about regular hereditary Peers. They try to do that out of a sense of duty and in a sincere desire to be helpful. I thought it rather deplorable, judging from reports of certain
speeches which appeared in the Press, that some pressure was put on hereditary Peers as to how they should vote, with certain possible inducements. This will not influence the way I vote. I would never compromise with my principles. I have always endeavoured to be sincere and constructive with your Lordships. But I believe firmly and with deep conviction that, with all the accumulated experience we possess, it is possible, with determination and will, to get an agreement with Rhodesia. I do not believe in these mandatory sanctions by the United Nations, I think they complicate the issue enormously, and therefore I shall vote against the Government tomorrow.
11.48 p.m.
THE EARL OF CORK AND ORRERY: My Lords, I do not want to be a bore, but I thought that I would say a few words, if your Lordships will allow me to do so, about this little pamphlet
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called Statutory Instrument No. 885. That is the Order in Council which forms
the subject of this debate. To that alone I mean to confine my attention, and I hope—I do not know—that your Lordships will be slightly obliged to me for doing so. I do not propose to argue much about the sanctions or to go through them in detail. My concern is not to argue that they are immoral in intention, which I do not believe they are, or even that they are counterproductive in effect, which I do believe they are. But I should like to show why I believe that the Security Council resolution is a prescription for disaster for all the Rhodesians—and therefore, because there are more of them and they are more vulnerable, chiefly for the African Rhodesians—and why I oppose the Order that dispenses the prescription.
May I say that, in common with the noble Lord, Lord Rowallan, I have no connection whatever with Rhodesia. I have never been there and I do not know anybody, so far as I am aware, who lives there. I am opposed to the Smith régime and I deplore the fact of U.D.I. The noble Lord, Lord Brockway, will be delighted to know that I have nothing whatever to do with the Rhodesian Society. I speak as well as I can and reason simply from the facts as they appear to me from where I sit. These two documents, the resolution and the Order, have one aim only. Whatever the long-term aspirations of the men who drafted them, they are designed in themselves solely to end the rebellion in Rhodesia—in themselves they are purely destructive. I do not criticise them on that score. I simply state it as an essential and perhaps obvious fact. They inflict damage, but they do it in order that good may come.
The question is, how great will the damage be and upon whom will it chiefly fall? It appears, though I am not certain about this, that Her Majesty's Government would not negotiate with Mr. Smith and his Government even if they returned to legality. So if I am right in thinking that, what is required is the fall of the Smith Government. That, therefore, is what these documents are intended to bring about. I believe it will be generally agreed that there exists no external force of any kind that can ever bring about directly, and by its own

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agency alone, the fall of any Government in Rhodesia or anywhere else. The one absolute prerequisite for the fall of any Government is the existence of a body of people able, ready and willing to take its place. In this case something else also is required if our Rhodesian policy is to succeed. It is required that the potential alternative Government shall immediately renounce U.D.I. and return to the 1961 Constitution.
If the Smith Government resigns or falls, it must be succeeded by one that will run immediately into the arms of the British Government who have set out deliberately to destroy the status of Rhodesia as a viable independent State. Do your Lordships think that that would happen? I am inclined to regard it as a non sequitur based, I am afraid, on wishful thinking. I think that they would turn South, not North. I am thinking of an alternative Government of no particular colour or race though presumably it would be predominantly white, and I take it that the Government are thinking of the same thing, and not of an overthrow of whites by blacks. Perhaps all this is a little academic, but I do not think that the sanctions will succeed. I will not repeat the arguments concerning the great gap in the cordon sanitaire that is represented by South Africa and Portugal, and very likely Zambia, though those arguments are probably conclusive, but I have two more to add to them. The first can be simply stated in the form of a question. If the United Nations have failed to persuade member States to apply fully the milder sanctions already called for, what makes anyone think that they will succeed in persuading them to apply the full treatment?
The second of my two extra reasons for thinking that sanctions will fail is a little less obvious. We are still a responsible Power, so it is vital that we should be meticulous in carrying out the United Nations' requests, for if we do not obey it is hardly reasonable to expect anyone else to do so. What is our record in this respect? The Government may fairly complain that the record is good. We have done what we were asked to do and have done what we asked others to do, and have done it at great cost to ourselves. We may feel that our standing with the United Nations is beyond re-
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proach. If we do so feel it may be with sensations of pained surprise that we read the General Assembly resolution of November 8, 1967, in which we learn that the General Assembly
"condemns the failure and the refusal of the Government of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland to take effective measures to bring down the illegal racist minority régime."
Perhaps the Government are not, after all, the blue-eyed boys of the United Nations. Not that I make any general complaint on that score. I should be the last to insist on their regarding everything that fell from the General Assembly as sacrosanct.
Resolutions of the Security Council, on the other hand, are another matter. Let us therefore turn to the Security Council resolution of May 30, the one on which the Order in Council is based. In the second paragraph of the preamble, we find that the Security Council takes note of Resolution 2262 of the General Assembly, and 2262 is the resolution from which I have just quoted. So the Security Council is so far from thinking that resolution negligible that it takes it as one of the bases on which to found the demand for full-scale mandatory sanctions. I presume that "takes note" has some meaning, and, in fact, it can have only one of two meanings. The first possibility is that it means "takes note and approves or confirms". In that case, the condemnation of Her Majesty's Government that was voiced by the General Assembly is implicit in the resolution, which means that the United Kingdom stands branded as a defaulter in its obligations to the United Nations. This, in turn, means two other things: first, that Her Majesty's Government have already brought the United Nations into some measure of contempt, thereby undermining the authority of the resolution in advance and making it less likely—a good deal less likely—that other member States will comply with its requirements; secondly, that Her Majesty's Government are not setting quite such a good example after all, with similar results to be expected.
The second possible meaning of "takes note" is simply, "takes note": simply that the Security Council notes what the General Assembly has said without committing itself to either agreement or disagreement. It sits on the fence. In that

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case—and I must say that I find it less probable than the other case—the whole document is founded on a piece of equivocation that is bound to render it suspect and correspondingly less likely to be regarded with respect by those member States who find it unattractive in any case.
Taking all these factors together, I find it almost totally impossible to believe that the proposed sanctions have any real chance of success. In this view I enjoy the support not only of my noble friends and others but also of the General Assembly of the United Nations, as endorsed by the Security Council, for the same resolution. No. 2262, in paragraph 7, says—and I quote again:
"Affirms its conviction … that sanctions, in order to achieve their objective, will have to be comprehensive and mandatory and backed by force."
My Lords, by limiting their efforts exclusively to the application of comprehensive and mandatory sanctions, while ignoring the widespread belief held even at the United Nations that without the backing of force they cannot succeed, the Government are playing with fire, are they not? For, supposing sanctions do not succeed, what then? There is no further step in the same direction which either the Government or the United Nations can take, for only force remains.
This point has been made before, and it is worth making again, I think: that the Afro-Asian nations will put down again the kind of resolution from which so far they have been dissuaded and restrained. Backed in advance by Resolution No. 2262 and other resolutions, they will call again for the use of force, and the United Kingdom Government will have no option but to block that resolution by means of the veto, thus conceding victory in the Wilson-Smith struggle to Mr. Smith.
But that is far from being all, for nobody, I take it, supposes that the frustrated Africans will shrug their shoulders resignedly and quietly go away. When the British veto comes down in New York, that will be the signal for the turning on of the taps of the blood bath. British colonial policy in Africa will have ended by turning her most successful Colony into a second Congo.
And what if the sanctions were, against all probability, to succeed? In that case, the virtually certain outcome would be, I
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believe, the one I adumbrated at the beginning of my speech—a Rhodesian Republic linked not with Great Britain but with South Africa. That, my Lords, would be the price of so-called success—total failure for Great Britain and a situation calculated in time to set the whole of Africa ablaze.
I further believe that the whole of this policy is not only materially but also morally and spiritually pernicious. Your Lordships are perhaps all too familiar with the seventh paragraph of the preamble to the resolution, which reads as follows:
"The Security Council … condemning the recent inhuman executions carried out by the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia, which have flagrantly affronted the conscience of mankind and have been universally condemned…".
This follows almost exactly the wording of the original British draft tabled at the Security Council on April 23. The one difference is that where the original had the word "deploring", the final resolution has the infinitely more powerful "condemning".
Let us look a little more closely at this paragraph. It says, "condemning the … inhuman executions". My Lords, these were no more inhuman than any other executions, and a great deal less so than many, including many that pass totally unremarked. What was inhuman was making the condemned men await execution for two or three years; but that is unremarked. What was inhuman was the Security Council. The executions were illegal; but that is a matter between Rhodesia and ourselves, and in any case is not mentioned in the resolution. That by their inhumanity they have "flagrantly affronted the conscience of mankind", I simply do not believe; while to say that for the same reason they have been "universally condemned" is to say something that we all know to be untrue. Do the Government not understand that to confer the status of martyrs in this way upon particularly disgusting murderers is to foment inter-racial hatred? Is even that stick to be used to belabour the Smith régime? Is that the way to found a happy multiracial State? I am deeply saddened that a British Government should have lent itself to a trick so wrong in its intention, so devious in its method and so evil in its inevitable effects.

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I have concentrated on this one passage because for me it epitomises the whole of one unpleasant line of policy that finds its culmination in this Order. To encourage the exploiting of animosity and hostility where they already exist and to spread them into quarters where they do not exist; to use questionable methods for the purpose, and to do all this as a means of considered policy in time of peace—this is not only opposed to all morality; it is deadly dangerous. For it foments the evils of hatred and bitterness not on one side only but on both.
My Lords, do I exaggerate unjustly in saying that this is the policy of the Government? I call the Foreign Secretary as witness and leave the judgment to your Lordships. On April 24 Mr. Stewart spoke these words in another place:
"I believe that it is of vital importance to make quite clear to the whole world that, however long it takes, the illegal régime in Rhodesia will not get recognition, investment or support, but will continue to attract the hostility and detestation of mankind."—[col. 236.]
I do not want the illegal régime to get recognition, investment or support, nor am I saying that existing sanctions should be removed; but a policy of drumming up "hostility and detestation" in the hearts of all the world is something that I passionately condemn.
If possible, I condemn it all the more because the Government have long since forsworn negotiations. As long ago as November, 1966, the General Assembly was already recalling in its resolutions—as it is doing still—that the United Kingdom had declared on several occasions that it would not negotiate with the illegal régime. That was even before the "Tiger" talks. Yet all the time, right up to the executions of March 6, the Government have been telling us, the Prime Minister has been telling us, that the door to negotiations was still not closed.
My Lords, are we to believe the Prime Minister in England or Lord Caradon in New York? Or are there times when we are supposed to believe what the Government says and times when we are not? And how can anyone in Rhodesia be seriously expected ever to believe them at all? Everybody has been told
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in the course of this debate that all kinds of things are at stake—from the future of the House of Lords to the preservation of the prestige and standing of Great Britain at the United Nations. These things may or may not be true. So far as the preservation of the prestige of the United Kingdom is concerned, I think the Government might have thought of that long ago. But what I am certain of is this: what is chiefly at stake and has been all the time is not some silly question of prestige or of who trusts or talks to whom; it is not even solely the political future of Rhodesia. It is the future well-being, living standards, even the lives, of 4½ million men and women and their children. It is against these that this Order advances like a juggernaut, using not justice but hatred as its motive power. My Lords, the time has come to say "No", and I believe that most of our compatriots will say the same.
12.5 a.m.
LORD NOEL-BUXTON: My Lords, I must report briefly to your Lordships the impressions which I gained in Southern Rhodesia at the beginning of this year. I have been to Rhodesia three times altogether, and I say this briefly to give your Lordships an idea of my perspective. I was first there when the Central African Federation was being mooted in 1953, when I spoke in your Lordships' House violently against that Federation. I was also in Rhodesia in 1960, when the Federation was in full flow, and I spoke in your Lordships' House, perhaps less basically and obsessionally pro-African. I should like now to report what I feel currently, having seen Mr. Smith and most of his Cabinet and having loitered in the bars of Salisbury and around and been pledged or obligated to no one about anything.
There are so many threads to this debate that I should like to leave out from my speech, which will be as brief as possible, any direct reference to the constitutional issue. I think, late as it is, that we must concentrate on Rhodesia, as it is a Rhodesian Order we are debating. I must say that when I look at this document I think that it is strange that so much tragedy should be concealed in so much words. I should report on my view of Mr. Smith, as such.

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One is apt in Europe to get a false impression, as indeed in Rhodesia one probably gets a false view of the Prime Minister. I found Mr. Smith essentially worried about the deterioration of relationships between our two countries. He emphasised to me, very patiently and at length, that this was not a quarrel with Queen or country but with successive Governments, as Desmond Lardner Burke also emphasised. It is not a quarrel with one British Government but with one attitude. I think one must realise what it is to be in seige. In a sort of miniature way—and comparisons are invidious—they are now in a 1940 situation of their own. My Lords, it is strange that in 1890, when the pioneer column first reached Salisbury, or fought at Salisbury, they were then in danger from the Matabele tribe and, to a lesser extent, from the Mashona. Now they are in danger from sanctions supported by their own Mother Country, and it is not surprising that there is a certain confusion of thought.
I should like straight away to say something about Mr. Smith which I think is relevant. It is that he has a very good television performance and a relaxed attitude; but I regard one or two other people who are in the background as more important and older. I do not think there is anything directly sinister about any of them, but when you have your back to the wall you cannot progressively and properly think about your own attitude, least of all can you think something with which I do not agree; namely, that majority rule must come at some specific time in the future.
In the main, the African is still a bush African. The township African probably has heard of a unilateral declaration of independence. Most of our own Europeans, to whom, in my view, our major obligation is due, are not necessarily statesmen. I do not want to imply an insult to Mr. Smith when I say that I know of replicas of that attitude of mind, in New Zealand for instance, where I worked on a sheep farm. It is the attitude of ourselves gone overseas that now leads to certain troubles when seen in another race. It is O.K. in New Zealand; it is all right in Australia, but I think that in Africa you have to be either a saint or, up to a point, prepared to change your view about Africa when
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you get there. I would guess that almost every noble Lord, if he were to spend the next month in Salisbury, when he woke up in his hotel bedroom every morning would gradually find himself having to take a different point of view from that which we have heard from so many to-day.
There is a certain imprecision that comes about in words, and I thought of this while I listened to the speeches to-day. How does this compare with passing an African in Baker Avenue or in Thames Street, and what is the truth of it? Again, it is not meant to be an anti, a hostile, thought to say that we must give them the benefit of the doubt over their strategy. I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, has not spoken in this debate, as he was in Rhodesia at the same time as I was. I found it interesting when he said that, short of the Simonstown base, it was 10,000 miles from Plymouth to Sydney.
When I say "give them the benefit of the doubt", I mean that and Big Brother South Africa. They are not being forced into the arms of South Africa. Big Brother is already there. We must give them the benefit of the doubt of being at the bottom of a vast continent. It is vital not only to our own welfare but obviously to that of all the Western World to have stability based on the Anglo-Saxon at the bottom of Africa. I know how tragic it is to think of the detainees and the Government security that exists in Rhodesia, but I feel that they will never start thinking seriously about African education or befriending an African middle class while they feel they are completely on the defensive and imagine the world to be against them.
But they have also a rather false view of us. I came back thinking that they thought of everybody in Victoria Street as pale and casual and that in a sense the only true Britishers were now abroad. I do not agree with that, but it is important that we should think clearly about this matter. We cannot buy democracy this afternoon like a television set. They must via the Rhodesian Herald, which is a smaller version of our Guardian, begin to learn more, now that censorship is ended. They must learn more, particularly of your Lordships' debate to-day. They must learn more of what

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we really think. They must learn that we are not weak. And we must begin to realise that they are not weak and far from being entirely sinister.
12.13 a.m.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: My Lords, I will be brief, as I have spoken on this matter a few times before. If I had not a great respect for my own Front Bench, some of the speeches I have heard from the Government Back Benches would have made me physically sick, but I should like to congratulate the noble Lord who spoke last on his speech, which I found interesting. I shall vote against this Order because it is a very bad one. I happen to have read the Charter of the United Nations once or twice and it is definite in the Charter that the United Nations cannot interfere in the internal affairs of a country; it can take action only if a country threatens another country with war. Nobody can say that Rhodesia is threatening any other country with war. The reverse is the case. Rhodesia is being threatened. It is because of that that I intend to vote against this Order. We have had some very emotional speeches to-day. I should like to mention a secondary factor which is perhaps not very important. The Prime Minister assured Parliament over two years ago that he would not bring this matter before the United Nations, but he has not carried out that promise.
Another point which has been mentioned several times is that if these further cruel sanctions are to become valid, it is bound to drive Rhodesia into South Africa, and they will have apartheid; and it is bound to make a lot of the moderates in Rhodesia go over to the the extremists. It is for those reasons that I think this is a bad Order, and I will vote against it. I cannot help thinking that the United Nations would have been far better occupied if they had tried to do something about the terrible holocausts there have been in Africa—in Zanzibar and Southern Sudan, and recently the civil war in Nigeria, the slaughter of the Watutsi in Ruanda-Urundi. There have been terrible blood baths in Africa, and the United Nations appear to have done nothing about it. I should have thought that those
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events were far more dangerous to the peace of Africa and the general peace of the world.
I cannot help thinking that if this Order is accepted it will be very hypocritical. I never thought that politics would get so hypocritical. It has surprised me, because we have had a United Nations resolution on Gibraltar—and I am glad that the Government have rejected it. I have to be tactful here, but the conscience of the Government appears to be rather elastic. Perhaps I should not say this, but I have wondered privately (I am sure I am wrong) whether, supposing the Government of Spain were a very Socialist Government, an extreme left Government, would Her Majesty's Government have then rejected the United Nations resolution on Gibraltar? I just put that forward as a point. It do not want to be rude, but it occurs to me that the conscience of the Government is a little elastic.
We have had several speeches from noble Lords opposite, and to hear them one would think that the Rhodesian Government was the most brutal kind of oppressor of the African. I can only think that those noble Lords who have said that cannot ever have been in Africa. We have heard frequently about 200,000 white people dominating 4 million black people, but in actual fact the figures are wrong, because the white people in Rhodesia now number 270,000, and of the 4 million black people I am told that about 3 million are under 21. I agree that material prosperity is not everything, but we must bear in mind that the Rhodesian African has far greater material prosperity and a higher living standard than the Africans in the republics. Another point is that the Rhodesian Government spends more money on primary education than any other Government in Africa, perhaps apart from South Africa—I do not know the figures. Certainly it spends more money in this way than many parts of Africa.
One always tries to be constructive in a debate. If this Order goes through presumably we cannot come to any agreement with the Smith régime. Although it has been cut down slightly, we grant to the underdeveloped countries every year about £200 million in aid. I am wondering whether we cannot offer the Smith Government £1 million, £2 million or £3

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million, or just £500,000, of that aid, free and gratis, to help them in secondary education and with education generally
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, if the noble Viscount will allow me to say so, that is exactly what we did. We offered increased aid to Mr Smith to help him with education, but he replied that he did not propose that they should have further education because he did not believe in that; the Africans would then be given the vote sooner.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: It is true, as the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, says, that we offered further money for education, but I thought that we had several strings attached; I thought there were all sorts of other reservations that had to be made before we gave that money. But could we not offer this aid free of any strings? It would obviously have to be spent on further education, but could it not be offered with no other strings attached? I put that suggestion forward. But I am afraid that if this Order goes through, and if this United Nations resolution is implemented, any hope of coming to an agreement is out, and I suppose that in self-defence the Rhodesians must go into the arms of South Africa eventually. They cannot have all their imports and exports stopped without some such result, and of course it is going to hurt the African a great deal.
I deplore apartheid; I should hate to see Rhodesia practise apartheid. I think it is perfectly appalling that the African cannot travel in the same bus, or cannot sit on the same park bench, as a European. But I really fear that we are doing a very foolish act here. It rather amused me to hear the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Southwark refer to one matter. Perhaps I did not hear him aright, but I thought he was objecting because some students had had six with the cane on their backsides for being unruly. I know at any rate of one African country where at one time if the President dictator was driving along the road and you did not drive in smartly to the verge and jump out of your car and bow, you were liable to be flogged. It is all very well to criticise the Rhodesian Government in these matters, but African Governments are far more tyrannical.
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There is a point on which I can never see eye to eye with the Government. It would appear that they get independence and freedom completely mixed up. I have always been interested in the freedom of the individual, but the Socialist Party appears to be more interested in the independence of a country. I cannot see how you gain anything by handing a country over to a clique of tyrants who completely agree with the enslavement of the individual. We have done that a great deal in Africa and I hope that this will not happen eventually in Rhodesia, with the whole breakdown of law and order ensuing. It is a fact that there are quite a few terrorists now coming into Rhodesia, but the Africans are coping with them, and the average African in Rhodesia is loyal to the present Government there.
I conclude by saying that I was rather surprised to read in the Press the things that Mr. Jenkins and one or two other people have said. Mr. Jenkins appears to object to the fact that a non-elected assembly should veto the Order. I might point out that the majority of members of the United Nations represent Governments that are not elected by popular vote, so I do not think he was on very sound ground there. People in glass houses should not throw stones. But if this House is just to become a rubber stamp, always to do the bidding of the Government, you might as well do away with it. If we cannot vote according to our consciences and what we believe to be right it is utterly absurd.
I shall certainly vote against this Order, but I should like to repeat the words I have uttered before. When the first crisis came up, two and a half years ago, I likened the Prime Minister to Robespierre, in that to a great extent he has created this crisis, and just as Robespierre was destroyed by the guillotine which he created I think that if the Prime Minister is not careful he will be destroyed by the Rhodesian crisis.
12.28 a.m.
LORD MACPHERSON OF DRUMOCHTER: My Lords, it is difficult for those of us who speak at the end of a main debate to present a new line, but a great many of us wish to participate in these major issues and can do so only by speaking, even if our contributions

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are small and it means delaying the proceedings. I made my maiden speech on November 15, 1965, on the first main debate on Rhodesia, and if the threats that have been bandied about come to pass this could well be my swansong. I am one of the lowest category—a hereditary Peer who intends to vote against the Government. No doubt my name will be entered by the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, in his little black book, as I notice he keeps a record of these things.
My main reason for not agreeing with the Government is that, like my noble friend Lord Wedgwood, I am not convinced of the sincerity of Her Majesty's Government's wish to settle this unhappy issue by negotiation. When I heard the noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack state that the only solution is an agreement by negotiation, and then later an agreement based on the Six Principles, I wondered whether that was a true reflection of Government policy. I make this statement with some justification, as I negotiated what I considered a reasonable compromise solution with Mr. Smith in April, 1967. I reported this to your Lordships in the debate last June. I quote from Hansard of June 21, 1967. I said at col. 1474:
"My proposals were that the Governor should be requested to call a General Election under the 1961 Constitution. The present Government would continue in office until the election of the next Government, which would be formed by the majority Party. The first task of the newly elected and legal Government would be the testing of the opinion of the people as a whole to ascertain whether or not they wished to have independence under the 'Tiger' proposals. With the return to legality, the Press censorship would be raised and
a tribunal set up to consider the release of detainees and restrictees, again on the lines suggested in the 'Tiger' document. Lastly, in the event of the answer being, Yes, the British Government would grant independence to Rhodesia on the basis of the 'Tiger' proposals, including the six principles and the 1961 Constitution.
Mr. Smith indicated to me that a solution on these lines would be acceptable to him. I also discussed these proposals with Sir Humphrey Gibbs, and he found them acceptable, provided that Her Majesty's Government concurred. This left only the agreement of the United Kingdom to complete the triangle. On my return to this country I submitted these proposals to Her Majesty's Government, and they were turned down. I was advised:
'As the Prime Minister has made clear, the constitutional future of Rhodesia can
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only be negotiated with a legal Government. I also remind you that Her Majesty's Government have declared that they would not be prepared to agree to independence before majority rule'".
This reply which I received from Downing Street made it quite clear to me that this Government do not wish to settle this problem by negotiation except by complete and absolute surrender of the Smith régime.
I suggested in November, 1965, that a mission of respected Members drawn from both Houses of Parliament should visit Rhodesia, led by someone such as Sir Alec Douglas-Home. Sir Alec has made the trip and returned with some sort of solution. What I cannot understand is why we have this prolonged secrecy. In view of the importance of these proposals, would it not be possible for either the Prime Minister or Sir Alec to inform us of the details before the close of this debate, as it may have a profound effect on the outcome. I regret that on this all-important issue I must vote against the Government unless they convince me before the end of this debate of their genuine desire to reach a negotiated settlement.
12.34 p.m.
THE EARL OF LINDSEY AND ABINGDON: My Lords, I came here this afternoon still to be convinced that this was an issue on which I was prepared to vote against Her Majesty's Government. I still wish to reserve a decision, and I will make up my mind tomorrow. Having said that, I would remind your Lordships that in my maiden speech just after U.D.I. I stated that I had lived 13 years of my early life in Southern Africa, some of which was spent in Rhodesia. I therefore felt at that time that I was able to assess an unbiased attitude towards life in that country.
Furthermore, as a young hereditary Peer, I should like to state that I have voted only once against Her Majesty's Government on the various debates and Orders that have passed through this House since U.D.I. That one occasion was after the debate on whether mandatory sanctions should be imposed through the United Nations; and now we are discussing the consequences of that ill-advised move. To me, the political and economic consequences to this country and Rhodesia are frightening, because I

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believe, rightly or wrongly, that the issue should be a domestic affair between Her Majesty's Government and Rhodesia. These mandatory sanctions are an incitement to rebellion from without, and if it starts as a black versus white civil war, it will surely end, because of the tribal traditions in Rhodesia, as a black versus black civil war, and I want no part in having contributed to that.
12.36 a.m.
LORD BOLTON: My Lords, your Lordships have listened to a great many people on this subject in this House and in another place, not only to-day but on many occasions since U.D.I. I think that we must now have before us all the facts and figures explained from every possible angle. Therefore, I do not intend to weary your Lordships with repetition. This is a subject which, to those of us who know and love Southern Africa, tends to make us emotional. It is also easy to become emotional when one remembers that many of the Rhodesians whom we are discussing fought for us between 1939 and 1945, and for that alone we owe them a debt of gratitude.
It is also hard for those of us who go out there to think of the sane, reasonable and nice people that we know as the ogres that they are sometimes portrayed from this country. I have visited many of the Southern African countries, and I have always noticed that the lot of the black African in Rhodesia is, if anything, far better than the lot of the African in some of the countries to which we have given independence in that Continent. For instance, I would
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rather be a black African in Rhodesia than a black African in Biafra. Many times in this debate it has been said that it is the Africans who are suffering most from sanctions. This is extremely noticeable to those of us who go out to Rhodesia. This applies not only to the Africans in Rhodesia, but particularly to those in Malawi and Zambia, too. It is most annoying to hear criticisms by people from this and other countries, who have never visited Rhodesia before, and who would pull that country down like termite ants pull down the work and the progress of some seventy or eighty years.
I am going to vote against the Government tomorrow for three reasons. The first is that my conscience tells me that mandatory sanctions are not the way to achieve the end which we all desire, which is an honourable and a just settlement between the two countries. The second is that I genuinely and honestly believe that the bulk of the population of these Islands would be behind us if we rejected this Order, and I would not vote for rejecting it if I did not feel that the country was behind us. The third reason is that, bearing those two first facts in mind, I think that if we were not to reject the Order we should be betraying both this country and Rhodesia.
LORD SHACKLETON: On behalf of my noble friend, Lord Shepherd, I beg to move that this debate be now adjourned.
On Question, Motion agreed to, and debate adjourned accordingly.

MERSEY DOCKS AND HARBOUR BOARD BILL [H.L.]
The CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES in formed the House that the opposition to the Bill was withdrawn: the Order made on February 15 last discharged, and Bill committed to the Committee on Unopposed Bills.
CUSTOMS DUTIES (DUMPING AND SUBSIDIES) AMENDMENT BILL
Brought from the Commons, endorsed with the Certificate from the Speaker that the Bill is a Money Bill, within the meaning of the Parliament Act 1911; read 1a, and to be printed.
EDUCATION BILL [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons agreed to, with Amendments: the said Amendments to be printed.

AGRICULTURE (MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS) BILL
Returned from the Commons with certain of the Lords Amendments agreed to, and with one Lords Amendment disagreed to, with a Reason for such disagreement: the said Reason to be printed.
House adjourned at eighteen minutes before one o'clock.