Lords Sitting of 13 June 1968

Preamble
The House met at three of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Southwark.

SPEECH THERAPISTS' PAY AND TRAINING
3.6 p.m.
LORD SEGAL: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the first Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government how long the present scale of salaries for qualified speech therapists, who have completed a three-year course of training, has remained at its present level, and whether any action is contemplated by the Government in this matter.]
BARONESS PHILLIPS: My Lords, salaries are in the first instance a matter for the Whitley Council who last month agreed to an increase of 4 per cent. from October 1, 1967, for various professions, including speech therapists. The new salary scales supersede those which had been in operation since July 1, 1965, and I understand that negotiations are proceeding on the possibility of a further increase which would be effective from January 1, 1969.
LORD SEGAL: My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that reply. Would she not agree that, Whitley Council or no Whitley Council, a salary increase of only 4 per cent. is totally inadequate to a scale which begins at £695 and, after 14 years, goes up to only £1,320? Is it not utterly wrong that people who are doing this highly skilled work should be made to suffer financial hardships which are not shared by other far less highly skilled technicians in the Hospital Service; and, even if the revision which is due takes place, can my noble friend give an assurance that it will be really adequate to meet the difficulties which these people are now facing?
BARONESS PHILLIPS: My Lords, I am sure my noble friend will appreciate that I should like to be able to give him this assurance. What I can say is that I wholeheartedly agree with him as to the value and skill of speech therapists. I have some personal knowledge o f their work. My noble friend will appreciate that the Minister is aware of this matter. I can say no more than that some discussions have taken place. I should perhaps remind the noble Lord that this is primarily a matter for the Whitley Council.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: My Lords, while not in any sense holding my noble friend responsible, may I ask whether she will bring to the notice of her right honourable friend the fact that, despite these increases, any immigrant unskilled manual labourer is rewarded to a much greater extent than are these women?
BARONESS PHILLIPS: My Lords, I would agree to some extent with my noble friend. Unhappily, that is equally true of some other professions, and it perhaps reflects the strange scale of values which exist in our society. I will certainly bring to the notice of my right honourable friend the points that have been raised.
LORD SEGAL: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the second Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government how many places of entry ale now available annually for training in a three-year course for qualification as a speech therapist, and what increase in the present number is contemplated in view of the very heavy demand for these specialised services.]
BARONESS PHILLIPS: My Lords, there are about 210 places available annually in all speech therapy schools in the United Kingdom. Owing to a shortage of qualified candidates a proportion of these places is not filled. The provision of training places will be kept under review.
LORD SEGAL: My Lords, I thank my noble friend for her reply. Is not the shortage of candidates directly related to the salary scales with which we have just

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been dealing? Is she aware that there are only 1,680 registered speech therapists, who have to cope with the problem of nearly 250,000 children afflicted with speech defects? Could not the Government, during this Mental Health Week, make a special gesture to make more facilities available for the training of these badly-needed technicians?
BARONESS PHILLIPS: My Lords, I am sure that the noble Lord will have achieved a great deal by raising this matter to-day and by getting on record what he has said. Although I cannot answer for my right honourable friend, I can assure the noble Lord that I will take this matter to him. As I have said, I have had personal experience of this wonderful profession. I think it would be fair to point out, as I am sure the noble Lord will agree, that not only the salary but the nature of the work, which is demanding, may be one of the reasons that there are not more people entering the profession. One must also recognise that somebody who is qualified in speech therapy can go into other more congenial professions. I will, however, certainly bring what has been said to the attention of my right honourable friend.
LORD AMULREE: My Lords, is the noble Baroness aware that there are a large number of elderly people suffering from strokes who require the help of speech therapists? Can she tell the House what proportion of therapists' time is at present taken up with dealing with children as opposed to dealing with elderly people?
BARONESS PHILLIPS: My Lords, I have not the breakdown of the figures for which the noble Lord has asked. I shall he happy to let him have them.

CHEMICAL WARFARE RESEARCH AND THE UNITED STATES
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether the results of research at Porton biological and chemical laboratories are made available to the Government
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of the U.S.A., which has not signed the Geneva Protocol, for the preparation of offensive weapons.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (LORD CHALFONT): My Lords, exchange of information with the United States takes place under the terms of the Technical Co-operation Programme, instituted in 1958, and of the Basic Standardisation Agreement of 1964. Details of the information exchanged are confidential.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, accepting that the purpose of Porton is defence, may I ask whether this does not require the production of offensive weapons so that the effectiveness of the defence may be tested'? In this process, have not British chemists produced the active ingredients of the most toxic nerve gases and V-agents? Is not this information supplied to the United States Government which, unlike us, has declined to accept the Geneva Protocol and is using our research work for offensive purposes to which we are opposed?
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, so far as the V agents are concerned, as I have said, details of information exchanged with the United States are confidential and I cannot go into that any further. So far as the work that is being done at Porton is concerned, certainly what goes on there is designed to produce defences against these toxic agents. The way in which that is done is, again, a confidential matter which I cannot at this moment discuss in your Lordships' House. As to the United States' position on chemical and biological weapons, we know that the United States is not a party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol whereas we are: but the position of the United States is very similar to our own. The noble Lord will recall that many signatories of the 1925 Protocol, including the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, reserved the right to use these weapons in retaliation for their use against them. That is substantially the position of the United States of America. But, as I have said, I cannot give the noble Lord any details of the information which we exchange with the Americans.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I am sorry to press this matter with the noble Lord, but there is deep feeling about it

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in the country. Does not the United States now have large stockpiles of offensive agents as a direct result of British research? Is it now not using these nerve gases in Vietnam where there is considerable evidence that they have been fatal? Were we responsible—and I have asked this in a letter—for providing the gases used in the French student demonstrations which have led to blindness among its victims?
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, I am afraid I have no detailed information on the type of agent that was used in the French riots. The only agent of this kind of which we have immediate knowledge is the C.S. gas. That is a riot control agent, as the noble Lord will know, and not a chemical warfare agent, and therefore information about it is freely exchanged between countries. We have no exclusive rights in respect of this C.S. gas or any other riot control agent. So far as the United States' position is concerned, of course I cannot answer for the United States Government, either in terms of what stockpiles they have or how they use them: nor—I fear I have to say it again—can I give details of the information which is exchanged between us.
LORD ROWLEY: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend whether the question of prohibiting the production of biological and chemical weapons or agents is on the agenda of the Geneva Disarmament Conference?
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, we have had this matter on the agenda at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, and the position of the Government is that we should very much like to see the whole area of biological and chemical weapons brought into the arms control field. The noble Lord will know that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is now reaching a decisive stage. We shall have to consider how we go on from there, and certainly this will be one of the matters that we shall have in the front of our minds.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, may I give Notice that I shall desire to raise this matter as an Unstarred Question at a later date?

DUTIES OF THE QUEEN'S REMEMBRANCER
LORD MITCHISON: My Lorth, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what are the duties of the Queen's Remembrancer and whether they include, or can be extended to include, reviving from time to time the Government's recollection of the Royal and Departmental Commissions and Committees about which they were asked on May 8, 1968.]
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, I am sure that my noble friend, as a distinguished member of the legal profession, is more familiar than I am with the duties of the Queen's Remembrancer. I understand, however, that in addition to his duties as senior master of the Supreme Court, he has ceremonial duties formerly associated with the Court of Exchequer, including duties in relation to the warrants of appointment of the Sheriffs of the City of London. I do not think that it would be appropriate or necessary to extend his duties in the way my noble friend suggests, but I appreciate the characteristic and gentle humour of his reminder.
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, while thanking my noble friend for that very informative Answer, may I ask whether he could tell me two things? If the Queen's Remembrancer cannot do it, could not the Government keep a list of the Royal and Departmental Commissions and Committees which they appoint? It is, of course, the prerogative of a Labour Government that the right hand should not always know what t the left hand is doing. Is not this a case of pushing it rather far, and would my noble friend try an elephant—because elephants, I understand, never forget anything? Or, failing an elephant, would he accept from me my small contribution of a sixpenny exercise book and a sharpened pencil to keep the list? May I ask my noble friend one further question? Could he give an indication of the tribal dances which are performed by the Queen's Remembrancer? They might be interesting.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, I am not certain about the value of elephants in this matter, but I have arranged, if the noble Lord will be so good as to accept that invitation, for him to see members of the Treasury so that some of the difficulties inherent in his question of May 8 can be explained to him. I hope he will be good enough to go along and discuss these difficulties with the Treasury. As for the second part of his question about the ceremonial duties, I understand that they involve the Trial of the Pyx and the receipt of quit rents from the City of London in respect of the tenure of the "Moors" in the County of Salop and "the Forge" in the parish of St. Clement Danes. Furthermore, I understand that these rents are payable in nails and horseshoes on the morrow of St. Michael, or between that day and the morrow of St. Martin. The noble Lord will be quick to appreciate that there are certain difficulties involved in extending the duties as he suggests.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: My Lords, if it is the duty of the Queen's Remembrancer to jog the memory of the Government, would it be in order for him to remind the Government that the Labour Party have for the last fifty years promised that equal pay would be introduced?
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, I thought the burden of my answer was that it was not the duty of the Queen's Remembrancer to do what the democracy of this country should do; namely, to jog the memory of the Government.

MR. CORN-BENDIT
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: My Lords, I beg leave to ask Her Majesty's Government the Question of which I have given Private Notice; namely, "On what grounds Mr. Cohn-Bendit has been granted a 14-day extension of his permitted stay in this country".
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, at a convenient moment after 3.30 p.m. my noble friend Lord Stonham will be answering this Question by way of a Statement. After that, my noble friend the Leader of the House will be making a Statement on the Donovan Report on Trade Unions and Employers' Associa
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tions. I would also take this opportunity to say that dinner will be served this evening between 7 and 8.30 p.m.

HEALTH SERVICES AND PUBLIC HEALTH BILL
Read 3ª, with the Amendments, and passed, and returned to the Commons.

LAW REFORM (MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS) (SCOTLAND) BILL
3.22 p.m.
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SCOTLAND (LORD HUGHES): My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Hughes.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The LORD CHAMPION in the Chair.]
Clause 1:
Succession in cases of illegitimacy
1. For section 4 (succession in cases of illegitimacy) of the Succession (Scotland) Act 1964 (hereafter in this Part of this Act referred to as "the Act of 1964") there shall, in relation to the estate of any person dying after the commencement of this Act, be substituted the following section:—
"Succession in cases of illegitimacy.
4.—(1) Notwithstanding anything in section 2 of this Act, where a person dies intestate and is survived by illegitimate children, those illegitimate children and the legitimate children (if any) of the intestate shall together have right to the whole of the intestate estate.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2) of this section an illegitimate person shall be presumed not to be survived by his father unless the contrary is shown.
LORD DRUMALBYN LORD DRUMALBYN moved, in the proposed amendment of Section 4 of the Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, in subsection (1) to leave out "person" and insert "woman". The noble Lord said: We are here concerned with a quite fundamental change in the law. Section 4 of the Succession (Scotland) Act 1964

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says, in effect, that where a woman dies intestate and is not survived by lawful issue any illegitimate children of hers can take the whole of her estate, and where an illegitimate child dies intestate and without lawful issue his or her mother can take the whole of his or her estate. What this clause does, as I understand it, is to extend the right of illegitimate children to share equally with lawful issue the whole of the estate either of the mother or of the father subject to the prior right of a surviving spouse. This is really a very far-reaching change in the law, as has been recognised in the memoranda that were submitted to the Committee which studied this matter, and one is bound to ask: What is the justification for it? I refer, for example, to the memorandum of evidence submitted by the Council of the Law Society of Scotland, which begins by describing
"the occasional hardship of individual circumstances which may be quoted in support of a change in the law as being no justification for so radical an innovation as giving to an illegitimate person the same rights of succession on intestacy as a legitimate person".
The proposals contained in this and following clauses are based on the recommendation of the Russell Committee, appointed jointly by the Lord Chancellor and the Secretary of State for Scotland in 1964. The Committee received written representations from organisations and from individuals, but took no oral evidence. There was a Minority Report submitted by Sir Hugh Munro-LucasTooth, Member of Parliament, which did not agree with this recommendation; or, in so far as it did agree, it agreed subject to safeguards and restrictions. The recommendation stemmed from an idea expressed in paragraph 19 of the Russell Report in the following terms:
"Whatever may be said of the parents, the bastard is innocent of any wrongdoing. To allot to him an inferior, or indeed unrecognised, status in succession is to punish him for a wrong of which he was not guilty."
I should like your Lordships to consider whether this is sound or whether, again in the words of the Law Society of Scotland,
"it represents a sentimental approach to the question".
In so far as it is sound, should it be the dominant consideration when we come to consider the law? Will the change promote harmony, or will it create
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discord? Is it as certain in operation as the present law? Above all, ought we to look at this from the point of view of the individual only, or rather from the point of view of the individual in the community of the good society? The social unit in the community surely is the family. Those who belong to a family bear certain obligations, both moral and legal, and have certain legal rights, because they are members of the family. In recent years legislation has sought to ensure that as many children as possible who belong to families, whether they are born into a family or not, and that all who belong to a family, whether by birth, by adoption or by legitimation, should have equal rights. This, I think, is the right approach, and I think we shall all hope that in t me to come every child will be the member of some family; and, of course, on becoming the member of another family through adoption they automatically, by law, lose any rights they may have of succession to the estate of their original parents.
There is one comment I should like to make on the original idea, as I have described from which these recommendations are derived. There is surely no question of crime or punishment here. The State does not make it a crime to have intercourse outside wedlock. What the State does is to sustain the institution of marriage by distinguishing between lawful issue and the rest, and by according lawful issue a legal status. If illegitimate children are to have the same civil status, the same rights in law, as legitimate children, I fail to see why we should distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate children in name. I fail to see why, in the long run, there should be any institution of marriage at all. There are some children, of course—and there may always be—who are unfortunate enough never to gain admission to a family. I hope that that will not continue to be so, as I have said. I am sure the aim of policy should be to ensure that every child is or becomes a member of a family.
Of course, some children born out of wedlock will be brought up by their mothers, who may or may not marry later. If they do not many, the law already allows an illegitimate child or children to succeed to their mother's

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estate on intestacy. If they do marry later, then it is reasonable to allow them to share equally with the offspring of the marriage because they are members of the same family. The whole of the Russell Committee accepted that this change should be made, and I would also accept it for the reasons I have given. It is also entirely reasonable that children of an illegitimate child should be entitled to share in their grandmother's estate if the illegitimate child dies before his mother.
It is here, however, that the Russell Committee lapse into some confusion. If the purpose of their recommendations is to ensure that an illegitimate child is not to be allotted an inferior status in succession, how can they justify allotting an inferior status to the illegitimate child of an illegitimate child in succession to their grandmother's estate, or even to the illegitimate child of a legitimate child in rightly succeeding to the estate? I am sorry if this appears to be confusing; but it is one of the great difficulties that we have to deal with. This is a Scottish Bill; but I would point out that the Russell Committee was composed equally of English and Scottish representatives with an English Chairman, and we may well expect that the legislation now being put through in Scotland will subsequently be applied to England as well. So I would invite noble Lords who may think that this is a slightly esoteric matter—which was the word that has been used—to realise that it may well affect England as well as Scotland.
The Committee tried to justify this by saying that for an illegitimate child to share in the grandparents' estate might be directly opposed to the grandparents' wishes; so they came back inevitably to the part that the presumed wishes of the testator have to play in the distribution of an intestate estate. Earlier in their Report they had rather pooh-poohed this as a major consideration. Of course, it must be right that the law should have regard to what may be reasonably presumed to be the wishes of the deceased. At the present time, if he does not bother to make a will the law presumes that he would have left his property to his wife and family.
Here I pass on to consider the position of illegitimate children in relation to their
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father's estate. The Russell Committee recognised a clear distinction between that and their position in relation to their mother's estate. They said:
"There is of course the distinction dictated by nature between the association between a bastard and his mother and that between a bastard and his father; and this distinction has both an evidential and a familial aspect."
This language is not mine; it is the Report's. They go on:
"Nature permits that a man may produce more bastards more secretly. Facts dictate that it must be generally far more difficult to establish the paternity of a bastard than the maternity:…"
They did not draw the same conclusion that I draw. They did not draw what in my view is the correct conclusion: that the distinction ought to be reflected in the law. This is what this set of Amendments seeks to do. It seeks to establish that it is only the illegitimate children of the mother that should have the right to succeed an intestacy, and not the illegitimate children of the father. The reason for this I can state shortly. In the first place, the child is rarely a member of the father's family. If he is a member of the father's family, the father can adopt him and so legitimate him. Secondly, an illegitimate child brought up in the mother's family is already known and recognised as part of the family; not so the father's, in the ordinary case. He may not be known at all. It may be that the father does not even know that he has an illegitimate child. I imagine that there may be not a few illegitimate children in Europe at the present time of whom the father has no knowledge whatsoever, all of whom could turn up to claim their share in intestacy of their father's estate.
Another consideration, and an important one, is that the moment when the family is mourning the loss of a father is not the best time for the family to be appraised, for the first time, that there was an illegitimate child of the father. I believe that this will cause a great deal of strife and trouble at the time when the family is mourning the death of the father. Thirdly, there is the difficulty of establishing paternity. As Sir Hugh Munro-Lucas-Tooth pointed out, it may be that this will not arise until, on average—but perhaps this is a little exaggerated-50 years after the birth of the illegitimate child. I think that that goes

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a little far. Let us say that something between 20 and 50 years would be the normal time. It will be difficult to establish paternity—and the proposal is that this is to be left entirely to the courts. As Sir Hugh Munro-Lucas-Tooth has pointed out, the courts would have to build up some case law in this matter. Meanwhile there would be considerable uncertainty.
I imagine that it will give rise to a lot of injustice; because if a claimant came along in the circumstances I have indicated, the tendency will be for the legitimate claimants to the estate to be very reluctant to oppose the claim in open court. I should think that this is bound to be so. So we may find that there is a great deal of injustice and a good many bogus claims will get by. At the very least, the right should be limited to cases where there has been some act of recognition of paternity, as according to the Report, is the case in several other countries, where illegitimates have had conferred on them this right. But the centre and core of my argument is that the right thing is to bring illegitimate children into families and have them brought up there, and not to tamper with the institution of the family. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 4, leave out ("person") and insert ("woman").—(Lord Drwnalbyn.)
House resumed.

MR. CORN-BENDIT
3.38 p.m.
THE MINISTER OF STATE, HOME OFFICE (LORD STONHAM): My Lords, I hope it will meet your Lordships' convenience if I reply now to the Private Notice Question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Cumnor.
Mr. Cohn-Bendit arrived at London Airport on June 11 at the invitation of the B.B.C. He said that his purpose was to take part in a programme to be recorded on the following day, and he accepted that a stay of 24 hours would be sufficient for this purpose. Last night his legal representative applied for permission for him to stay on for 14 days to visit student friends and a relative. Naturally, my right honourable friend looked at this with some care, but in all the circumstances he did not think it necessary to refuse the application.
LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR: My Lords, while recognising that the blame for inviting this alien to this country rests upon the authorities of the B.B.C. and not upon the Government may I ask the Government whether they think that their decision to grant him a further stay in this country will be backed by British opinion here, or whether they think some British interest will be served by allowing him to stay here?
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, it is not possible for me to conduct, as it were, an instant referendum to establish what all the people of this country think; but for a great many years we have had in this country a liberal tradition that the powers vested in the Home Secretary to exclude foreign nationals should not be exercised arbitrarily or lightly. I think that is still the opinion of the great majority of the people of this country. I believe that in admitting Mr. CohnBendit, who is not a convicted criminal, we were maintaining that tradition and our reputation as a civilised country. Like any other person in this country, Mr. Cohn-Bendit will be free to express his views. Like them, he will be subject to the law of the land, and answerable for any breach of it. I think that we are serving a useful purpose.
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, is it not a fact that this particular foreign student—if indeed he is a student—is subject to the usual regulations governing the entry of other foreign students, and that there is therefore no particular reason to treat him exceptionally, so long as he behaves himself?
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, that is entirely the view of my right honourable friend. He is also of the opinion that we should not exaggerate this young man's importance and make him, as it were, a martyr. We were informed by his legal representative that he does not intend to cause trouble while he is here. That we shall see.
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, did I understand the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, aright? Did he say that the Government were performing a useful service in permitting Mr. Cohn-Bendit to enter the country?
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I was answering a question from the noble

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Lord, Lord Brooke of Cumnor. I believe that when we allow views to be freely expressed, when we indulge in dialogue and allow people to talk instead of suppressing their talk, we are performing a useful purpose.
LORD BOOTHBY: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether Her Majesty's Government have made any serious attempt to ascertain Mr. Cohn-Bendit's intentions in this country during the next fortnight, particularly in the universities, where at present there is a wave of unrest?
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, these things were gone into with Mr. Cohn-Bendit when he arrived and presented himself for admission; and in my Answer I gave an indication of precisely what it was that he intended to do in this country in the first twenty-four hours, and subsequently.
LORD RATHCAVAN: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether the B.B.C. informed her Majesty's Government that they were going to put on this programme which, by giving free gratuitous publicity and advertisement to these students, was bound to embarrass several foreign friendly Governments?
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, the B.B.C. are, of course, quite free within their Charter to decide what is a matter of public interest and what should interest the public, just as your Lordships on Wednesday of next week are going to debate the question of increasing student unrest. This is a matter of interest which the B.B.C. thought it proper should be the subject of a programme. So far as embarrassing foreign countries is concerned, we must see what is said in this programme.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, may I ask the Minister this question? Did the B.B.C. inform her Majesty's Government that they were inviting this revolutionary to enter this country for reward, or did they think it sufficient to inform Mr. Tariq Ali? The second question I should like to put is this. Was Mr. Cohn-Bendit's imminent arrival known to the Minister at the time he answered a Question on this subject earlier this week?
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I do not know what, if any, communication the B.B.C. had with Mr. Tariq Ali, but they did inform my right honourable friend of their intention, their general intention, with regard to this programme. Whether or not when the young man arrived he was to be admitted, as I made perfectly clear in answer to that Question—I will give exactly the same answer now—would depend on all the circumstances relevant at the time, and those circumstances included what Mr. Cohn-Bendit said on arrival.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, I entirely appreciate that. The question I put to the noble Lord was whether the fact of his imminent arrival was known to the Minister at the time he answered the Question in this House.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I am sorry. We knew that this young man might arrive here to present himself for admission on June 5, and on June 9, but he did not do so. There was a possibility, of course, that he would do so on June 12. We did not actually know until he arrived.
LORD MOLSON: My Lords, having regard to the fact that there is considerable student unrest in this country at the present time, will the Government give an assurance that if this alien visitor engages in agitation in the universities, his permit to stay here will immediately be terminated?
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, as I sure the noble Lord is aware, under the Aliens Order the Secretary of State has power to make a deportation order, whether or not an alien is in breach of his landing conditions, when he considers that this is conducive to the public good. Most certainly, if this young man offends, or is in breach of the understanding by which he was permitted to enter, we shall act.
THE EARL OF MANSFIELD: My Lords, arising out of the last question and answer, can the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, give an assurance that, at the end of the present extension, her Majesty's Government will most certainly not give any further extension?
LORD STONHAM: No, my Lords, I cannot give any kind of assurance like

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that. It is exactly the position that if an application is made for a further extension it will be considered, as always, in the light of the then relevant circumstances. I cannot, therefore, say in advance that if a further application were made it would most certainly be refused.
LORD GRIMSTON OF WESTBURY: My Lords, does the noble Lord recollect that in reply to a Question of mine on May 22 he refused a request for an independent inquiry into the case of the 39 officers at Heathrow who had complained that the Home Office was caving in to pressure over immigrants? That request was supported by an ex-Lord Chancellor and an ex-Home Secretary, but it was refused. Does not the noble Lord now think that this action indicates that there is a necessity for an inquiry, since when pressure was applied immediately the Home Office gave way and granted an extension from 24 hours to 14 days?
LORD STONHAM: My Lords I think that the whole of this case so far is strong evidence that the Home Secretary will not give way to pressure in this matter. I would ask your Lordships: where is the pressure coming from, except from those who want us to send this young man back immediately, or not to admit him? I would ask your Lordships to realise we are acting regarding this young man in exactly the same way as we should act with regard to any other foreigner coming to these shores.
BARONESS GAITSKELL: My Lords, would not my noble friend agree that it is rather refreshing that my right honourable friend the Home Secretary should take a chance on any mischief that Mr. Cohn-Bendit might do in this country, seeing that, despite their grievances, we treat our students here far better than students have been treated in France?
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, while refraining from any comment about France I agree with my noble friend Lady Gaitskell: it is refreshing. And, my Lords, I hope that this will demonstrate that in this country we handle certain situations better than similar situations are handled in certain other countries. I am also sure that Mr. Cohn-Bendit, like many other people, whatever he thinks he may teach us, will learn a great deal more from us than he can teach us.
BARONESS HORSBRUGH: My Lords, can the Minister say why, whim Mr. Cohn-Bendit arrived, it was thought necessary to say that he must leave this country in 24 hours, and what it was that changed the Minister's mind and made him think that 24 hours might he 14 days?
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, the answer is perfectly simple. Mr. Cohn-Bendit was admitted for 24 hours because that was all he asked for at the time as being necessary for a television recording. If at the time of entry he had said, "I want to come in to visit friends and relatives", or even, "want to visit my mother's grave, and I want to stay for 14 days", if the decision had been to admit him—as it was—he would then and there have been admitted for 14 days.
LORD WYNNE-JONES: My Lords, would not my noble friend agree that universities exist for intellectual ferment, and that, provided any visitor to this country obeys the laws of the country, he is welcome in this country, and that it is still a free country?
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, that is entirely what I have been trying to convey in all my answers; and I am so regretful that noble Lords opposite, or many of them, do not seem to take the same pride in our law and custom; as I do.
LORD CITRINE: My Lords, is the Minister aware that for many year; past the Communist Party, as a matter of policy, has been boring into the student movement for the purpose of gaining Communist influence in that movement? Has the noble Lord noticed the coincidence that in this morning's Times there is a photograph of a number of the leading students who are conducting this agitation, all of whom are giving the well-known Communist salute? Does he consider it a good thing that the E.B.C. should provide a platform for the expression publicly of views which are contrary to the interests of this country? If he does not, can he explain why it is reported that this young man, Cohn-Bendit—bended but not broken, evidently!—is not prepared to give any undertakings concerning his activities in this country? I see that he is reported to

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that effect. In the absence of an assurance, can the Minister have the slightest doubt that this man's activities will be hostile to the best interests of this country?
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I did see the photograph in The Times and the clenched hand salute. I know that this young man on television, asked, as his friends were, about his views, said, so far as I could understand him, that the revolutionists in France look forward to going back to Karl Marx exactly as in 1860. We have had that revolution for a long time. I did not hear anything new. What I do know is that the Communists in this country are allowed to express their views and no doubt will continue to he allowed to do so, and so long as any Communist in this country, or Cohn-Bendit, keeps to our laws and does not abuse them, he will he protected by the law.
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, do the Government think that there is any serious danger of the universities in this country being totally or seriously corrupted by the arrival of one young foreigner?
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, that, of course. was part of my right honourable friend's decision. So far it is working quite well.
LORD MERRIVALE: My Lords, if this young man is welcome in this country, as the noble Lord has suggested, can the noble Lord say why he was detained 2½ hours at Heathrow? Also, if this young man is responsible for any social unrest in this country, can the noble Lord give an assurance that he will be sent back to France?
LORD STONH.AM: My Lords, the delay at the airport was occasioned because it was decided that if and when this man arrived the final decision of whether to admit him or not would be taken at a very high level in accordance with the relevant circumstances at that moment. The assurance that the noble Lord asked for I have already given, but I readily repeat it. If this young man breaks our laws, incites revolt or attempts to damage this country, he will most certainly be sent back.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Next business!

LAW REFORM (MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS) (SCOTLAND) BILL
3.54 p.m.
House again in Committee.
THE EARL OF IDDESLEIGH: I wonder whether I may make a suggestion to the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, in these terms. The Code Napoléon does what the noble Lord wants. It gives to the illegitimate child the right to a share in the family inheritance. Nevertheless, it provides careful safeguards which I believe would go far to satisfy the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn. I am certain that the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, could very profitably study those safeguards in the Code Napoléon or in a good manual on that subject.
LORD HUGHES: I am most grateful to the noble Earl for his suggestion, which I shall be happy to follow up. With the same attitude, I have no hesitation in advising your Lordships not to accept the Amendments in the form in which they have been proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn. The purpose of the first Amendment, as the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, has explained, is to limit the succession rights of an illegitimate child to his mother's intestate estate only and to remove the words in the clause which would enable him to succeed also to his father's estate. The latter two Amendments would have the effect of confining the reciprocal rights of a parent to succeed to his illegitimate child's intestate estate to the case of a mother. I should say, in passing, that I am surprised at the narrow approach of the noble Lord to the improvement of the status of illegitimate children in succession matters which these Amendments reflect—particularly in view of the general sympathy which your Lordships' House has always expressed with the position of such children and the support which your Lordships accorded to the Russell Committee's Report during the debate in February, 1967, on the welfare of illegitimate children.
Behind these Amendments is, I think, the view that there is a real difference between a father's relationship with an illegitimate child and a mother's. That seems to me to be very deep water into which we are asked to venture. The Russell Committee, however, examined

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this aspect of the matter and concluded that the simple view should prevail: that an illegitimate child has a moral right in the estate of both parents on intestacy both, after all, are responsible for the existence of the child. This is very much the view which the Government accept. I am sorry to reiterate phrases which I have used before, but I think it is necessary to do so in view of what the noble Lord said. It is in the Government's view morally wrong to allot an illegitimate child an inferior or unrecognised status in succession to both parents' estates, since to do so is to punish him for a situation for the creation of which he was blameless.
I may say that I am surprised at the sweeping nature of the proposed Amendment. Even those—and I include Sir Hugh Lucas-Tooth, who differed from the majority of the Russell Committee, and those who put down Amendments in another place—who were doubtful about the simple principle of the Russell recommendations appeared to accept that, where the father had in some way accepted the child into his family, it was reasonable that that child should have succession rights. I must say that I found this view difficult to understand since it would grant a right to the child who had already had the benefit of recognition and refuse it to the child who had not. The child who has been punished by being deprived even of recognition is going to be deprived even further, whereas the child who at least had the benefit of recognition is going to have succession thrown in as an added benefit.
But the noble Lord does not accept even this limited extension of the rights of an illegitimate child. He has referred to the difficulty of establishing paternity in some cases. One must admit the correctness of what has been said. These are practical difficulties, and it is easy to over-exaggerate them, but they should not divert us from the main purpose of the Bill, which is to accord to illegitimate children a status in succession which has for too long been denied them—a status which must be enjoyed equally with legitimate children in the estates of both parents.
It is only for the purpose of the convenience of this debate that I will
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continue to refer to "illegitimate children". I do not accept that there are any illegitimate children. All I am prepared to admit is that there are illegitimate parents. If illegitimate children are to have a right of succession to their parents, it seems only reasonable that, in accordance with the Russell Committee, recommendations, a reciprocal right should be accorded to the parents. I know there are additional difficulties here, because the father may not be known, but subsection (3) of the clause provides in practice a way around such a situation. Given the existing law regarding the rights of parents to succeed their legitimate children, it seems to us a natural corollary of equating illegitimate children with such children in succession matters that both parents should acquire rights in the estates of their illegitimate children.
I may say, in passing, that although the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyr, said that there was confusion in principle in the Russell Report in the excluded succession rights of illegitimate children to the estate of a grandfather, we do not think there is in fact a confusion of principle. The basic principle which is being accepted in this Bill is that the child should not be penalised for a fault which was not his but was the fault of his parents. But the fact that it was the fault of his parents does not make it the fault of his grandparents. It is for that reason that it is not necessary to extend the rights to grandparents' property.
I have said that these Amendments strike at the root of Part I of the Bill. For practical purposes, a right to the mother's estate will be of comparatively little value in comparison with a right to the father's. We shall not have gone far to improve the succession position of illegitimate children. For that reason, I say to your Lordships that we are faced with a simple question here: Do we accept the moral claim of illegitimate children to succession rights against their parents, or do we adhere to the view, which I am quite certain is not the view of the people of this country to-day, that they should continue to be penalised in succession rights by circumstances of their birth over which they had no control?

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I have only one other point to make. The noble Lord said that the worst possible time at which a family could learn, perhaps for the first time, that they had an illegitimate half-brother or half-sister was when they were mourning the death of a father. But the noble Lord seems to proceed on the basis that it was only the illegitimate children of a father who would be unknown, and that the illegitimate children of a mother would always be known. In point of fact, in many cases it is just as likely to be the other way; namely, that the woman who has an illegitimate child before her marriage has successfully concealed knowledge of its existence both from her husband and from the children of that marriage. Yet the noble Lord is prepared to accept as reasonable that, in these circumstances, the family should learn for the first time of an illegitimate half-brother or half-sister simply because it was the child of their mother rather than the child of their father.
One must accept that if these are the circumstances in which it becomes known for the first time, the addition to grief will be equally great in either case. But it has never been a principle in this country that justice should be denied to anyone because it may cause hardship, grief or suffering to other people. The primary consideration is: What is the right thing to do? We have no doubt that in this matter—and up to the present this House has had no doubt in the matter—the right thing to do progressively has been to remove from illegitimate children the stigmas which have attached to them in the past and such material and other disadvantages as have been attached to that stigma. If noble Lords accept these Amendments as proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, they will be turning their faces firmly to the past and rejecting the path which they have now trodden in relation to the improvement of the status of illegitimate children for quite a number of years.
THE EARL OF MANSFIELD: The noble Lord, Lord Hughes, has rather skated over the difficult question of establishing the paternity of a child. Will he be kind enough to say (I may be dull, but I cannot see where it is expressed in the Bill) how it is accepted who is the father of an illegitimate child? There are, un-
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fortunately, young women who are somewhat promiscuous, and when an illegitimate birth is registered, if this Bill is to become law in its present form, the temptation will be for the young lady to attribute the paternity to those of her lovers who are of the most substantial financial resources.
LORD HUGHES: I do not think the noble Earl is fair to me in saying that I rather skated round the point. I admitted the difficulties. I pointed out that we made an attempt to deal with this matter in subsection (3) of the clause. Obviously, if there were not difficulties about establishing the paternity, the probability is that there would not be so many illegitimate children about; more of them would be legitimate in the beginning.
LORD KILBRACKEN: Is my noble friend aware of the great progress that has been made in the field of haematology over the last twenty years, that has made it possible to establish paternity with a far greater degree of certainty than previously?
LORD HUGHES: I believe that is the case.
THE PAYMASTER GENERAL (LORD SHACKLETON): If the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, is agreeable, I would intervene to move that the House do now resume.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
House resumed accordingly.

ROYAL COMMISSION ON TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLOYERS' ASSOCIATIONS
4.7 p.m.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, with permission, I should like to repeat a Statement which my right honourable friend the First Secretary of State is making in another place on the Report of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations. The Statement is as follows:
"The Report of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations has been published today. I am sure that the House will want me to thank Lord Donovan and his colleagues for this valuable and constructive Report.

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I am initiating as a matter of urgency consultations with both sides of industry on the Royal Commission's recommendations, which are detailed and far-reaching and will require careful study by all concerned. In the light of these consultations I shall present a White Paper setting out the Government's proposals."
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Lord for making this Statement here, and to join in expressing our appreciation of the work of Lord Donovan and his colleagues on the Royal Commission, although we are not yet of course, in a position to appreciate their Report itself. We shall need to study it. I do not intend to comment in any way, except simply to ask the noble Lord how soon he thinks that he will be in a position to present the White Paper setting out the Government's proposals. How long does he expect these consultations with those concerned to go on? Perhaps I might also ask him this question. Have the Government already had an opportunity to give full consideration to these recommendations, and are they in a position to go ahead with these consultations right away?
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I should like to agree with the noble Lord in expressing appreciation of the Royal Commission, hearing in mind also that Members of your Lordships' House—the noble Lord, Lord Robens of Woldingham (I do not know whether he has actually taken his seat), the noble Lord, Lord Tangley, and the noble Lord, Lord Collison—also contributed. I am afraid that I cannot say when the White Paper will be published. The full Report has been in the hands of the Government for only a few days. The Government will wish to study the Report, although of course they will need to have consultations with the Trades Union Congress, the Confederation of British Industry and nationalised industries, and it will be in the light of these consultations that the Government will publish this White Paper. But I am afraid that until these negotiations are under way—and the Government are anxious to get on with them as quickly as possible—I cannot foretell when it will be done. My guess is that it cannot be very soon. The Report will need very careful consideration.
LORD CITRINE: My Lords, I should like to join in expressing appreciation of the work of the Commission. I have read, I think, every one of the verbatim reports that have been issued, and it seems to me that the Royal Commission have made the most objective and certainly one of the most through examinations of this wide subject. Can the Minister tell us whether in the Report is unanimous? Are the recommendations unanimous, or are there Minority recommendations?
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I myself have looked only very quickly at the Report. There are certain reservations on certain issues. I think it would be fair to say—though here I have to be careful—that the broad approach is unanimous. There are some reservations, which are not unimportant, but I should have thought that they were not significant in comparison to the Commission's general approach. For instance, one statement with which the Government agree is that properly conducted collective bargaining is the best way of running industrial relations; another propounds the need to introduce greater order into company bargaining. On issues of this kind there is unanimity.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lards, while I quite appreciate that there will be need to give the most careful study to this Report, I am sure that I speak for all my noble friends when I say that we should like to impress upon the Government the need for taking as early action as possible on the Report, so that we may have the right legislative framework to bring our industrial relations up to modern-day standards.
LORD REA: My Lords, from these Benches I should like to endorse what the noble Lord has said and very much welcome this Report. This matter of course, has been on the stocks, on and off, for many decades and we join heartily in hoping that some quick result will be achieved. We very much appreciate the work that has been done.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, the Government and the Opposition are of course, at one in wishing to proceed urgently, but this is an important and difficult field and it is highly important that we proceed with general agreement.

LAW REFORM (MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS) (SCOTLAND) BILL
4.14 p.m.
Committee stage resumed.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I had hoped that there would be a rather wider debate on this particular series of Amendments of mine. Of course it would have been possible for me to draft them in line with the Minority Report of Sir Hugh Lucas-Tooth, but it seemed to me that it was better to express the view that I myself held. I doubt whether it helps for the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, to describe as a very narrow view the view that has been commonly held for so long. Nor is it helpful to say that what we have been doing, the approach we have adopted for centuries past, has been morally wrong. People have to make up their own minds. We accept that the noble Lord takes this particular view, but I really do not think it is right for him to castigate in this way those who hold other views.
As usual, the noble Earl, Lord Iddesleigh, has made a most useful contribution to a Scottish debate, and we welcome very much his intervention in these debates. If he would refer to Appendix IV of the Russell Committee Report, he will find an extremely interesting summary of succession rights of bastards under some Commonwealth and foreign laws, which completely bears out what he has said. And it may be of interest to the Committee to know that in a great many of the countries mentioned succession rights given in the mother's estate, or in the father's estate, are generally contingent upon the bastard's rights depending on recognition or declaration as to paternity. So here, again, I think that the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, was a bit wild in castigating the suggestion that there should be a restriction of this kind. If he will look at the Summary he will find that in Canada, the United States of America, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Portugal, in every single case the succession rights in the father's estate are contingent upon recognition as to paternity. This is a matter to which we could revert at a later stage.
The only other point I should like to revert to, and challenge the noble Lord upon, is his claim to know what is the
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view of the people of this country as a whole to-day. Surely those who are in the best position to know what the view of people in this country is are those who are responsible for giving them legal advice. I would ask the noble Lord what has been the view of the three Scottish bodies, the Scottish Law Agents' Society, the Society of the Writers to Her Majesty's Signet and the Law Society of Scotland. What has been their view? I have quoted the view of the Law Society of Scotland, which was completely unfavourable to this change, and I do not know what the view of the other two bodies was. But it seems rather strange that, when these are the bodies who are most closely in touch with opinion on this kind of matter, the noble Lord should not mention even what the view was that they expressed to the Russell Committee.
As to the stigma attached to illegitimate children, the fact remains that if a child is not adopted—and, as I said, I hope that most illegitimate children will be adopted—that stigma will go on, presumably, until the point where the succession rights occur. Then at that particular time regarding the stigma, if it is a stigma, there will be what the noble Lord described, I think, on Second Reading as "some compensation at last" I do not think that this is the right way to look at it. I believe that the right way to look at it is as I have said. What we want to do is to reinforce the family, and it is for that reason that I put down my Amendments in the form in which they appear. I hope that the noble Lord will at least reply to the question I have asked about the advice given by those bodies in the best position to know. I am bound to say that I am disappointed with the lack of support I have had, but of course in the absence of more support I would not wish to press the Amendment.
LORD HUGHES: Before the noble Lord withdraws the Amendment, as I hope he will, it is only fair that I should give the further information he has sought. When I referred to his approach as a narrow one I did not in any way wish to be regarded as being unduly critical. People have a right to take a narrow or a wide view of a subject, but the reason why I used that particular term was because of a discussion we had yesterday. I pointed out that on subjects of this kind.

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which are largely moral issues, generally if the public have a strong point of view against it, it is expressed in some form or another, and I do not for one moment accept that the views of the public on moral questions of this kind are formed by telephoning their lawyers. There are comparatively few people in this country who at any time in their lives have contact with their lawyers, but even those who do are not likely to ring them up and say: "What should be my opinion on the subject of the rights of illegitimate children?" If we were always to wait before making reforms, until we were certain that we had the lawyers behind us, there would be a great deal of legislation in the queue.
I should say that on receipt of the Report the Secretary of State consulted the following bodies: the Faculty of Advocates, the Law Society of Scotland, the Society of Writers to Her Majesty's Signet, the Society of Solicitors in the Supreme Courts, the Scottish Law Agents Society, the Sheriffs-Substitute Association, the Social Interest Sub-Committee of Church and Nation Committee of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland and the Scottish Council for the Unmarried Mother and Her Child. Of these the Society of Solicitors in the Supreme Courts, the Scottish Council for the Unmarried Mother and Her Child and the Scottish Law Agents Society were in favour of the Report; the Social Interest Sub-Committee of the Church of Scotland Committee on Church and Nation and the Faculty of Advocates offered no observations.
It is perhaps pertinent in this connection to say that at least the Church obviously had no fears that the institution of marriage was likely to fall under severe attack as a result of this measure. The Sheriffs-Substitute Association commented only on a practical point arising from the difficulty of establishing paternity; and the Society of Writers to the Signet and the Law Society of Scotland were in general against the Report, although the former were most hostile to the provision of equal rights for illegitimate persons in their father's estate and viewed the extension of rights in respect of their mother's estate with "comparative equanimity". Therefore I think I would be justified in saying that in regard to the organisations, including the legal organisations—without expressing any
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opinion because I have no knowledge of the numbers represented by those bodies —the overwhelming majority of the people consulted were either in favour of, or not against, the Report.
THE EARL OF PERTH: The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, said he was sorry that there had not been a greater (expression of views on this particular matter. I think that perhaps some of us have not expressed our views because this is a rather difficult legal question. If I were to try to express a view, it would be this. It would be a bit hard if, because you were the illegitimate offspring of a mother you were all right in the, way of inheritance, but if of a father you were not, more particularly if it is likely that the father has more money than the mother. I would understand it if this Amendment went the whole way, but as it goes only part of the way I think it is unacceptable.
The point that worries me is that raised by my noble friend Lord Mansfield I, but I think the answer must be that even to-day one has the problem of paternity. The number of cases may increase, but over a period of time one would expect a practice to develop, with the assistance of the medical evidence which can be adduced to-day, by which this could be solved, although clearly there is a difficulty. So I was encouraged when I heard my noble friend say that he would probably not press this Amendment.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I do not want to prolong this debate, but I should like to make the observation that if the father wants to leave money to an illegitimate child it is always open to him to make a will to do so. We are dealing now only with the question of succession on intestacy. The other point is simply on the distinction between the mother's and father's estate. I do not know whether I made my point sufficiently clear on this, but perhaps I may read what the Law Society of Scotland said:
"After the birth of the illegitimate child, if it is not adopted it is almost certain to be brought up by the mother alone, and the father neither sees it nor takes any interest in its welfare, except for the payment of alimony under a decree of the court or after admission of paternity, if asked only. In perhaps the majority of cases no claims of any kind are made by the mother upon the father."

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The main point here is simply that the illegitimate child of the mother is brought up in the mother's family, as it were, and remains part of it, whereas the father of the illegitimate child very rarely brings it up within the family and, if he does, he may well adopt it. In view of the debate we have had, I do not wish to press these Amendments and I beg leave to withdraw my first Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 2 [Right of illegitimate children to legitim]:
On Question, Whether Clause 2 shall stand part of the Bill?
4.28 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN: This is a quite different kind of clause. Perhaps I should explain to noble Lords who are not familiar with Scottish law that there is a right enjoyed by the children to a share by law in the moveable estate of the deceased parent. Here we are really up against a quite different problem, because the position seems to be this. A person who intends to make a will often goes to his solicitor to seek advice as to the law, and the solicitor will say: "In order for your wishes to be carried out you must comply with certain legal requirements." Of course the legal requirement is that the children are entitled to one third of the moveable property of the deceased parent if the other parent is still alive, and one half if the other parent is already dead. So the solicitor will advise him as to what kind of will he should make if he does not want it to be upset by subsequent claims.
But again in the case of an illegitimate child we come back to the fact that the testator may not even know of the existence of the illegitimate child, so that in that kind of case there should he no doubt whatever that in giving the illegitimate child the right to legitim, as it is called, the wishes of the testator will be overridden. It will be perfectly possible, of course, for the testator to leave to the illegitimate child, if he so wishes, that part of his estate which is at his disposal, which is in the case where the wife still survives one-third and where the wife does not survive one-half. If he does not do that, it seems to me quite clear that what we are here seeking to do is to override the wishes of the testator. I must confess I do not see any justification
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for this, even though we have already given a right of succession in intestacy to the illegitimate child. The mere name legitim makes it quite clear what the purpose of this is, and I simply cannot conceive that if at the time when legitim became the law of the land it had been intended that it should apply also to the illegitimate there would have been any legitim at all. I do not think it would have made sense, and I do not think this makes sense now. Therefore I beg leave to move to leave out the clause.
LORD HUGHES: When the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, was speaking on Second Reading the way he spoke of his intention of moving an Amendment of this kind was such that I gave special consideration to the matter. I therefore want to emphasise that in what I am about to say I am not asking your Lordships automatically to reject the course proposed by the noble Lord simply because we felt obliged to resist the previous Amendments. I accept that this clause touches on a different aspect of the subject, but I wish to emphasise that it is associated very closely with the previous one if we are accepting the reasons why the Government are doing this.
If the Government are in fact right, as I believe they are, in accepting that the illegitimate and the legitimate child should have equal rights, it would be quite inconsistent for them to say, "But this will not apply when we come to the subject of legitim". Of course, when this was brought into operation it referred only to the legitimate child, because when this became the law of Scotland the position of the illegitimate child was very much worse than it is at the present time. We must accept, I think, that if we are going to improve the position of illegitimate children, if we accept the principle that they should receive equal treatment, then it follows that they should receive equal treatment, so far as is possible, all along the line.
During Second Reading I rather had the impression—though I may be wrong —that the noble Lord suggested that in fact there was a case for abolishing altogether the right to legitim and that testators should be free to distribute their estates in whatever way they wished. As I say, I may have been wrong; I may have read more into what the noble Lord said than he intended. But if he

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was saying that, I must make it quite clear that I am in complete disagreement with that. I do not think that parents should be allowed to distribute their estates on death in such a way as to make no provision for the support of their children, whether the child's right takes the form of legitim in Scotland or the somewhat dissimilar provision enacted for England and Wales in 1938 in the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act of that year.
LORD DRUMALBYN: If I may intervene, of course these two matters are quite different. The noble Lord said "somewhat dissimilar", but they are wholly dissimilar, because this is a question of discretion of the court, which is quite different from the fixed position of legitim.
LORD HUGHES: I said "somewhat dissimilar", but I am quite prepared to accept "wholly" if it meets the situation. In 1938, in regard to England and Wales it was felt necessary to interfere in some degree with the principle that a person could do exactly what he wanted. The Scottish position has been very much more firm on this position for a very long time: that there was an obligation to make provision for the widow and the children. If we accept the principle—as the Government and the vast majority of those organisations to which I referred do—that children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, should be equated, we must go on to say they have the right to participate in legitim. A right on intestate succession is only a conditional right. It can be extinguished by the making of a will. It may well be that it is the illegitimate child who has the best moral claim—the child whom the father has rejected—who is most likely to be deprived of this conditional right by the terms of such a will. If we are going to achieve our purpose of not penalising the illegitimate child for the circumstances of his birth, surely he must have the legitimate child's unconditional right—that is, under the Scots law of succession, the right to legitim.
I know that arguments have been put forward that the existence of an unconditional right of this kind will be specially disturbing to the family situation. I must say that I have wondered from time to time whether it is the exercise of the right or the procreation and non-recognition of
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an illegitimate child which will have that effect. I think, however, that the pictures which have been painted have been exaggerated and that the risk of the fears expressed being realised is small. But even the extent to which they do exist is, I am certain, a quite inadequate reason for not making what I regard as a necessary improvement to the condition of the illegitimate child. For those reasons, if we are to accept the principle and be true to the principle, it would be quite wrong to delete Clause 2 from this Bill.
LORD DRUMALBYN: Once again I should have liked to hear what other Members of your Lordships' House think about this matter. This is, of course, a peculiarly Scottish matter and will not affect any English legislation that may subsequently come along. I should have thought it would be appropriate to have very much the same legislation for both Scotland and England arid to leave this peculiar Scottish legitim subject as it is.
There is perhaps one further comment that I ought to make. Like the noble Lord, the Lord Chairman, I have taken a considerable interest over a period of years on the problems of adoption, and I believe this is of the greatest importance. I should not like to think that anything we are doing in this legislation will cause people to refrain from having children adopted into families. In some circumstances that might be the cumulative effect and I should very much regret it if it sere so. But in view of the fact that your Lordships do not appear to feel at all strongly about this matter, and as it has already been approved in another place, though not without some dissent, I will not press it.
Clause 2 agreed to
LORD HUGHES: I beg to move that the House do now resume for the purpose of hearing a Statement by my noble friend Lord Beswick.
Moved accordingly, and on Question, Motion agreed to.

FUTURE BUSINESS: RHODESIA
4.40 p.m.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, I thought it might be for the convenience of the House if I said that owing to the number of speakers down for the debate on the Rhodesian Order next week it

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now appears that the Business will extend over to the Tuesday. I hope, however, it will be possible to take the Business now on the Order Paper for Tuesday at a time between 5 and 6 p.m.
EARL ST. ALDWYN: My Lords, I wonder whether the noble Lord could give the House some indication how late it is intended to sit on the Tuesday on the Town and Country Planning Bill, after the Rhodesian Order?
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, to some extent I think that would depend upon the progress which we made, but I should have thought to some time between 10 and 11 o'clock.

LAW REFORM (MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS) (SCOTLAND) BILL
4.41 p.m.
House again in Committee.
Clause 3 agreed to.
Clause 4 [Amendment of law with respect to right of illegitimate child to aliment after parent's death]:
LORD HUGHES LORD HUGHES moved, in subsection (1), to add to paragraph (b):
"to the extent that that person was enriched by receiving that property,"
The noble Lord said: Amendments Nos. 4 and 5 go together. In order to understand the purpose behind these Amendments to Clause 4 it is necessary to appreciate the significance of the clause itself. At present, illegitimate children have, as your Lordships may know, a special right to aliment out of the estate of their deceased parents; their right to aliment is enforceable as an ordinary debt and therefore ranks ahead of widow's prior rights, legitim and other legal rights and succession rights. Since, under the provisions of Clause 2, it is proposed that illegitimate children should enjoy a right to legitim, it seems wrong that this preferential position in regard to aliment should be allowed to continue. I may say that this was a point to which the Russell Committee most helpfully drew attention.
The purpose of Clause 4 therefore is to remove this preferential right of illegitimate children to aliment out of their
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deceased parent's estate and to allot to them the like right to aliment as would have been available if they had been born legitimate. There is a rather technical point of law involved here but I am advised that, contrary to what is commonly supposed, there are circumstances in which a legitimate child can, under Scots law, enjoy a right to aliment (quite apart from a right to legitim) out of their deceased parent's estate, whether before or after its distribution. Clause 4(1) extends a similar right to illegitimate children and provides that that will be the sole right that they will in future enjoy in the estate of a deceased parent. In other words, the special position of their aliment as a debt on an estate ceases.
Turning now to the two Amendments, I fear they are rather technical but they are of a drafting nature designed to achieve the intention behind the clause more accurately than the present form of words. We have noted two drafting defects in the clause since the Bill was last discussed by your Lordships. First, I am advised that the words at the beginning of subsection (1) of the clause, and in particular those in Clause 4(1)(b), could be construed as imposing an obligation on those benefiting from an estate who have a Common Law obligation to aliment legitimate children (for example, a grandparent) to aliment illegitimate children in the same way. This is not intended; the right with which this clause is concerned is the right of children to obtain aliment from those who have benefited from the estates of their parents only to the extent that these people have been enriched as a result. The first Amendment makes this clear.
Secondly I am advised that the wording of the latter part of subsection (1) could be construed as removing the general continuing obligation of a surviving parent, who has benefited from the estate of the deceased parent, to aliment an illegitimate child. Again this is unintentional. The subsection is designed to prescribe the limits of the illegitimate child's claim to aliment out of the estate of a deceased parent or from those benefiting from the estate. It was not intended in any way to affect the surviving parent's general obligations, and the second Amendment makes this clear.
I must apologise in that this rather complicated matter may not have been made much clearer by what I have just said. It is difficult to put it into a few words, but at the risk of being wrong on the strict law I would say that basically what lies behind this is that if we are extending the rights of the illegitimate child to those of the legitimate child we must at the same time remove any advantages which he has and put him once again in the same position as the legitimate child. I may have oversimplified the situation, but that is what I think is meant by what I have said.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 7, at end insert the said words. —(Lord Hughes.)
Limp REID: I have not studied this question, but I have listened carefully to what the noble Lord has said and so far as I can see, from a lawyer's point of view, what he has said is quite accurate and these are desirable drafting Amendments. I therefore support them.
THE EARL OF MANSFIELD: Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, would be good enough to say what will happen if the new clause after Clause 7, to be proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, is not accepted by your Lordships' Committee, and a person who dies leaves an illegitimate child who does not immediately claim his rights. In the meantime, the property may have gone to the child or children of the deceased —for this purpose, let us say it is but one child, and that child also has died. Would the illegitimate child then have a right of recovery beyond the first generation?
LORD HUGHES: I hope the noble Earl will forgive me if I defer replying to that question until we come to consider Lord Drumalbyn's Amendment, No. 7.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD HUGHES: I beg to move Amendment No. 5.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 11, after ("person") insert ("(other than the child's other parent)")— (Lord Hughes.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 4, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 5 [Construction of referemes to relationship, in certain circumstances]:
4.49 p.m.
On Question, Whether Clause 5 shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD DRUMALBYN: This clause deals with the interpretation of the word "issue" in the construction of deeds, et cetera. It seems to me that having accepted the principle in Clause 1 we might as well accept this principle, but I should like to know its scope And in particular what is covered by the words "otherwise than by deed", which are quite wide words, in subsection (4). Subsection (4) says:
"This section shall apply in relation to a provision made after the commencement of this Act otherwise than by deed as it applies in relation to a provision made in a deed."
That seems to me a very wide provision indeed, and I should like to know how far it goes. Undoubtedly, it is right that this alternation should apply only to deeds made after the Bill becomes law.
LORD REID: I venture to make a suggestion on this clause. It is quite a different story from what we have been discussing up to date. It applies not only to parents, but to everybody who makes any kind of will or deed or anything else in favour of the children of another pet-son. When you are dealing with the parents, I entirely agree that if either of them leave money or put money or anything else in trust for their children, it is right that the illegitimate children should be included. But when you come to a stranger I am not sure if the position is exactly the same. In many cases the stranger—he may be a grandfather. he may be a cousin, he may be a complete stranger in blood—will not know of the existence of the illegitimate children, and what we are trying to do when we are legislating about deeds or wills—at least, what I hope we are trying to do—is to make provisions which will, on the whole (because there are always bound to be anomalies), reflect the intention of the maker of the deed.
I would venture to think that when a stranger is either putting money in trust or leaving money for the children of somebody else, normally the intent is for the legitimate children—it certainly would be if he did not know about the

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illegitimate children and I think we should get much nearer to carrying out the intention of the maker of the deed if the clause were limited to parents. I perhaps have been rather remiss in not thinking about this subject until it was too late to put down an Amendment. Therefore, I merely raise the point in case it may receive any support.
LORD HUGHES: First of all, may I answer the question which the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, put about Clause 5(4). Subsection (4) is intended to cover bequests made otherwise than by deed—for example, a bequest which has been made orally. I should like to think about what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reid, has said. Obviously, when we go beyond the children, legitimate or otherwise, of the testator, the position is not quite so easy. The Scottish Law Commission, when they considered this matter in their Report Reform of the Law relating to legitimation per subsequens matrimonium, published in April last year, found they disagreed with the Russell Committee who had rejected this particular aspect.
The Government therefore had two conflicting views, that of the Russell Committee, which they generally had been happy to follow, and that of the Scottish Law Commission, and after very careful consideration of all aspects of the question the Government found that the advice of the Scottish Law Commission on this matter was the more persuasive. We agreed with the Commission that the moral claim of an illegitimate child is such that a testator or donor should be squarely faced with the need to exclude him expressly if he so wished. The mere insertion of the expression "legitimate" or "lawful" will be sufficient to effect the exclusion of illegitimate persons from a will, if that is the testator's wish. I should stress that the clause leaves the testator to make up his own mind about this matter. Subject to their claim to legitim under Clause 2 of the Bill, it will be perfectly competent for a testator to prevent illegitimate children from succeeding to his estate.
The Russell Committee were concerned that the use of the term "legitimate" or "lawful" in this context could in some circumstances be construed as
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a gratuitous insult; for example, where a father wished to benefit the children of his daughter—but only her legitimate children. Obviously it might be held that the inclusion of the words "legitimate children" might be taken to mean that the father believed, or suspected, that she in fact had illegitimate children. The Government do not accept this view. Expressions such as "lawful children", "lawful issue" and the like are already quite common in deeds for the very good reason that these expressions obviate any attempts to rebut the existing presumption that the testator intended to benefit only legitimate children. Such expressions used as they are at the present time are not thought to imply any gratuitous insult under the present law, and once they become a legal necessity for limiting the class of beneficiary to lawful children, it is hardly likely that suggestions of insult will suddenly begin to be made.
It may be argued that the rules of construction are designed to reflect the common man's understanding of the expressions, and that when he refers to his "children" he means only his legitimate children. I would not be entirely sure of that point. I would suggest that public policy has, in the past, been to place illegitimate children under disability—optimistic that this might discourage their procreation and that this policy has influenced this and other rules of construction. I see no reason why public policy should not now be reflected in the construction of bequests to children et cetera in another direction: the Government accept the moral claim of the illegitimate person to be included unless expressly excluded. If it is the present position that a man in making provision for his children thinks only of his legitimate children, then this is a situation which, of itself, is worthy of change. It is a possible and desirable result of Part I of this Bill, and this clause as one element of it, that, if this is the position now, it is a position which will alter in future.
I hope, therefore, that the noble Lord will find it possible to withdraw the Amendment. In saying so, I should like once again to say that I should like to consider what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reid, has said and, after further reflection, I would perhaps write

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both to him and to the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, on any further conclusions I come to on the matter.
LORD DRUMALBYN: Before withdrawing this Amendment, may I first of all support very much what my noble friend Lord Reid has said. I am sure that this would be well worth while looking into, and I hope the noble Lord will be able to make an Amendment along these lines. There is another aspect of this. I imagine that there will be quite a number of deeds and other documents falling to be interpreted in Scotland but which are actually made outside Scoland where the tern "issue" may be used. When the noble Lord is looking into this, will he have regard to the practice in other countries where deeds may be made that the word "issue" may be used without the qualification "lawful", in the belief that the person is limiting the gift, or whatever it may be, to lawful issue. I think this is a point that is also worth looking into, because while it is fairly easy for it to become known in Scotland that "issue" will he interpreted as all issue, legitimate or illegitimate, unless this is also the case in other countries the deeds which fall to be interpreted in Scotland, though made abroad, may not fulfil the intention of the maker of the deed.
Clause 5 agreed to.
Clauses 6 and 7 agreed to.
5.0 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN LORD DRUMALBYN moved, after Clause 7, to insert the following new clause:
Restriction on right of illegitimate child to claim legitim
".Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Act, an illegitimate child of any person shall not be entitled to claim a right to legitim after the expiration of six months from the date of that person's death."
The noble Lord said: The purpose of this Amendment is simply to bar any claim to legitim after the expiration of six months. I imagine that legitim must be claimed in many small estates where the amounts which the claimants receive are quite small and where, because of the small means of the claimants, those amounts may well be spent unless a claim is made fairly soon. It seems to me that on that ground alone there is a lot to be said for placing a time limit to a claim for legitim. The case for it could
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also be made simply on grounds of not upsetting arrangements which had already been made by the beneficiaries in the belief that the matter had been finalised and the money was theirs. Otherwise a redistribution would have to take place later because of the subsequent intervention of the claimant to legitim. I hope that the noble Lord will find this a reasonable proposal. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 7, insert the said new clause.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
THE EARL or MANSFIELD: I am in full agreement with the purpose of this new clause, but I think it would be fairer if the period proposed were one year rather than six months. Where the deceased who has left one or more illegitimate children is not a very prominent person, it may be that those children are in a different part of the country, or indeed abroad, and may not learn of his death for some little time, nor be in a position to put in their claim. Therefore I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, will be willing to accept the spirit, if not the letter, of this Amendment.
I now return to the question which the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, properly asked me to postpone until this point in the debate, that is, what happens if this new clause, or something like it, is not accepted. Is a claim to be made legitimately, perhaps ten years afterwards, when somebody returns from Australia, or when somebody living in Bournemouth discovers that his real father had passed away many years before in the North of Scotland? submit that for such a claim to be valid would be an intolerable strain on the beneficiaries who for years had had no idea that any such claim could be made. For that reason, I ask what would be the effect if, in the meantime, the legitimate child or children of the deceased had died and the money or other property which they had received from the deceased had been spread among their children, possibly eight, ten or a dozen of them. It would then be an impossible and ridiculous situation, that the illegitimate child or children, appearing from nowhere, would have to claim from a great many heirs to the original heirs the amounts to which they would

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certainly have been entitled had they been in a position to make their claim within the statutory period, which I hope the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, will be willing to accept as being six months, or at any rate a year.
5.14 p.m.
LORD REID: I venture to hope that the Government will accept this new clause as it stands. I fully appreciate the point made by the noble Earl, but there is a technical difficulty. Executors are normally entitled to distribute the estate if six months has elapsed and no creditors have appeared, or have all been satisfied. A child claiming legitim is, for practical purposes, a creditor. If, as not infrequently happens, the executor does not discover, either from members of the family or from the deceased's papers, that there is an illegitimate child and the child keeps silent for more than six months, everybody is put in a most difficult position.
I am not going to express an opinion as to what would happen if the executor in bona fide distributes the estate after six months and a genuine claimant appears and wants his share. But whatever the law about it, there is going to be very great practical difficulty. It is not asking very much in the ordinary way that any illegitimate child who has any genuine claim should make his existence known within a period of six months. If he does that, all is well. From the practical point of view of the solicitor and the executor administering the estate of the deceased, there is a great deal to be said for this Amendment and I would support it.
LORD HUGHES: If I may first of all deal with the point which was raised by the noble Earl, Lord Mansfield, the answer is simple, and I think he will find it acceptable. It is that the claim runs only against beneficiaries so far as they are enriched and is not transmitted against a second generation.
To come to the Amendment, I cannot claim—nor do I claim—that in this case the objection which I have to offer is one of principle, as was the case on previous Amendments. This is not an Amendment which strikes at principle: it seeks merely to regulate the procedure. As I am informed, legitim is a right which under
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Clause 2 will be shared by the illegitimate child with the legitimate child. It is not something which a person has to claim, although obviously his existence has to be known before he can get it; it is something which he is to be given. If the executors, using due diligence, find someone entitled to legitim they must pay it to him without any initiative on his part.
I am told that it is rare for an estate to be distributed within six months of a person's death. I have had infrequent experience of this, but on the two occasions when I was the executor of a will it was more than six months—in one case nearly a year—before a distribution was possible, yet there was nothing very complicated about it. So that in my own limited experience I cannot argue with the information I am given by my adviser, that it is rare for an estate to be distributed within six months. Indeed, executors who distribute more quickly than this put themselves at risk of personal liability from creditors under an Act of Sederunt of 1663—which is going back a bit. Whether or not there should be a limitation on the right to legitim, it seems quite unnecessary to restrict it to so short a period as six months, which comes back to the point made by the noble Earl. Lord Mansfield.
I can see the point that delay in the discovery of an additional beneficiary, or a person holding himself out to be a beneficiary, until after the estate has been distributed is undesirable. It disturbs existing property rights or the quiet enjoyment of property rights. I cannot see why the noble Lord has limited his provision to legitim and has not extended it to rights of intestate succession, where similar considerations arise. It would seem anomalous that under the terms of this Amendment an illegitimate child could have his right to a share of an intestate estate under the new rules of intestacy accepted belatedly but not a claim in the same estate to legitim. I am not sure either (I say this just in passing) why the noble Lord has limited the Amendment to illegitimate children, although it could arise with legitimate children—the unknown great-grandchild in Australia.
The present law recognises that there may be good reasons for legitimate issue not being able to have their succession rights recognised timeously and provides

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in such cases for the disturbance of property rights. In implementation of the principle of equality of status this must surely also apply in the case of illegitimate children. It could well be, for example, that a father had recognised his illegitimate child and supported it in childhood, but that—as in the case of many legitimate children—they had in later life drifted apart and the executor, in going through the papers, failed to light upon his existence. There is also the case of a child who for one good reason or another—perhaps absence on service abroad—did not hear of his father's death.
True, in such circumstances property rights which have been acquired may be disturbed, although I think it is too easy to exaggerate the likelihood of a successful belated claim being made by someone who claims to be an illegitimate child, but of whose existence no one—relatives or executor—knows. I doubt very much whether it will happen to an extent that will cause serious inconvenience. But where such a right exists and can be proved then, as in the case of legitimate issue, I think it is only right that no unreasonable obstacle should be put in the way of its being exercised. For all these reasons I find myself unable to accept the Amendment.
THE EARL OF MANSFIELD: I wonder whether the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, ever reads that admirable Scottish paper, the Sunday Post, because if he does he will see in it, week by week, various legal problems which readers send in. Throughout the years I have noticed on a number of occasions that a child who has been born illegitimate has that fact revealed to it, or finds it out by chance sometimes, only when he has grown up. Therefore the chance of such a claim being made is nothing like so remote as the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, seemed to think. I ask him, therefore, to reconsider this point very carefully.
There is one question arising out of a possible belated claim which the noble Lord might also be able to answer, or at least discuss with his legal advisers. What happens if the legitimate issue of the illegitimate child discover that the illegitimate child would have had a claim had he known that it was possible? Is that claim going to be continued also to the first generation?
LORD HUGHES: I think I was to a certain extent mistaken when I said that there was not a principle involved here, because as I went on I realised that a principle was involved. What we are facing on this question is whether or not there should be a period after which the right to receive or to continue to enjoy property should not be interfered with. As I read on I realised that, under the law as at present, where a legitimate child has a right which has net been implemented because of inability Dr lack of knowledge on the part of the executors, the fact that the child comes along belatedly does not prevent him from establishing his right, even to the extent of disturbing the rights of property which have been transmitted to other people.
We therefore come up against the principle that if we are to apply a time limit we shall be following the principle of equality only if we apply it equally against legitimate and illegitimate. children who claim or whose existence becomes known belatedly. To do so, of course, so far as legitimate children or their descendants are concerned, would be to interfere with a procedure which has been in existence for a considerable time. I cannot therefore commit myself to the acceptance on this matter of a solution which involves dealing with the claims of illegitimate children in a different way from the claims of legitimate children.
If the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, wishes to consult me about an alternative form which he would wish to propose at the next stage, which accomplishes what he wants of helping the executors and helping to stop people subsequently having their rights interfered with, and can do so in a way which is acceptable to the profession and which maintains this principle of equality, then it would be quite wrong for me to refuse to look at it or even to refuse to look at it sympathetically. But I must warn the noble Lord that, having regard to the principle in these circumstances about interfering with property rights, it would be a rather difficult hurdle to get over.
As regards the further question put to me by the noble Earl, Lord Mansfield, who asked whether the legitimate children of a dead illegitimate child could exercise their right if they discovered that their father should have been a

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beneficiary, I think that on this occasion the answer which I give him will not be as satisfactory as the one I gave to the last question, because the answer is, Yes.
LORD REA: May I ask the noble Lord a question, for information? It may be a very elementary question, but I am not "up" in this subject. This clause seems to mean that the right to legitim must be claimed before the expiry of six months. I am thinking of the posthumous illegitimate child, who may not be born until eight months after the testator's death. What would be the position of such an illegitimate child?
LORD HUGHES: I think that in those circumstances, if the Amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, were accepted, the child would be, in the words of Sam Goldwyn, "included out".
LORD DRUMALBYN: I am bound to say that the point which the noble Lord, Lord Rea, has put escaped my notice when I put down this Amendment, so I am grateful to him for raising it. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, will not be too doctrinaire in his approach to this, and will not be too insistent that the rights should be exactly the same because, for the reasons I have given, one needs to be a little more flexible. For the first time so far, he has shown some flexibility in his reply to this debate, and I welcome that very much.
I think it has to be borne in mind with legitim—and this is the difference from intestacy—that the inclusion in legitim of the illegitimate child could upset a will which on the face of it seemed absolutely cut-and-dried. But I should have thought that that happened very rarely, proportionately, in wills in general. That would be my answer to the noble Lord on the question of equating legitimate and illegitimate children, and also on equating intestacy and legitim. On the question of the time, I would not wish to stand on six months. I thought it was quite a good idea that all claims from illegitimate children to legitim should be lodged within six months, like any other claim.
I shall be very glad to respond to the noble Lord's invitation to discuss this with him. It is easy to conceive how in this case the misdrafting of a claim to
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legitim could be altered to an exercise of the right to legitim, although I think that that could be quite simply changed. But I do not think we need pursue this at the present time; and although I think this Amendment has perhaps received rather more support than the previous ones I have moved, I would not wish to press it on this occasion.
LORD HUGHES: Before we finally conclude this matter, I should like to say that I was rather surprised to find the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, applying to me the adjective "doctrinaire". It is a new one to me in your Lordships' House, and I do not think I have ever heard it applied to me outside your Lordships' House, either. But we must remember that in these matters we are dealing not with problems of politics but with problems of the law, and if there is anybody one could meet who is more doctrinaire than the most doctrinaire Left-Wing Socialist, it is a lawyer.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 8 [Application of Succession (Scotland) Act 1964 to tenancies of crofts]:
On Question, Whether Clause 8 shall stand part of the Bill?
5.22 p.m.
LORD BANNERMAN OF KILDONAN: I propose that Clause 8 be removed from this Bill, first on the general premise that radical change in the great volume of crofter law in Scotland should not be made in a Bill of bits and pieces like this, and, secondly, because the existing law governing succession in intestacy is abandoned and crofters are now to be brought under the general Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, although specifically left out of it only four years ago, I presume for very good reasons. As soon as I, at any rate, see this ubiquitous term "Miscellaneous" appearing in the title of a Bill, I become suspicious. This term seems to convenience the Government and their lawyers, but not always the people these miscellaneous laws purport to benefit. Crofter law in Scotland is the result of a century of fierce endeavour, against strong opposition, to protect the small man, the crofter in agriculture, from extermination.
From the period of the Napier Commission, 1886 to 1911, when the security

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land laws were finally promulgated, there has been continuing special legislation for crofters, The establishment of the Crofters Commission was a recent further advance by Government to help the crofter, though its powers fall lamentably short of those powers recommended for it by the Taylor Report. There is to-day a great volume of crofter law, and if it is desired to alter the major tenets of succession, why include these changes in a Bill which I see now belatedly concerns itself with the law for computers as well as for crofters—surely the most miscellaneous mixture even lawyers could conceive!
Another more serious case against the inclusion of this clause is the lack of consultation with the crofters' unions or the Land Court. On May 14, 1968, the Federation of Crofters' Unions said of meetings with the Crofters Commission:
"These consultations were not exhaustive; nor (lid the crofter representatives have sufficient time to study the consequences to crofting should the Bill be published in its present form".
In a letter dated as recently as May 27, 1968, from the Scottish Land Court, and signed by Harold R. Leslie, Lord Birsay, to the Secretary of the Lochabor Crofters Union it states:
Dear Mr. Cameron, I have received your letter dated 24th May. 1968. I fully appreciate your apprehension about the new legislation and possible consequences to crofting tenure. The answers to your questions are: (1) no consultation has taken place with regard to Clause 8 or any other aspect of the legislation".
As to the answer to the second question, the letter says:
"So far as I am aware, no provision has been made in this Bill for a valuation by the Land Court. The only existing statutory provisions relating to the valuation of a crofter's improvement by the Land Court are those set forth in the Crofters Acts of 1955 and 1961, and are exercisable only on the crofter's renunciation or removal from the croft".
I pay one tribute to the forthright replies of Lord Birsay. He is trusted, and is regarded by the crofters everywhere as a friend, and I think his words should have weight with the noble Lord the Minister.
In 1955, Lord Gibson, the then Chairman of the Scottish Land Court, said from the Bench that the question of succession was a legal one, and that in being deprived of the services of the Scottish Land Court the crofters were
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finding that their ancient birthright was in danger of being sold over their heads. Crofting needs not only law reform but also the restoration of the Land Court's right to administer the law. The crofters remaining in the Highlands and Scotland have emerged from a century of penury and persecution. They are now entering an era of constructive attention by Government, and comparative prosperity. I would ask the noble Lord the Minister to at least take back this clause for further consultation over these fundamental issues of succession. Changes to include the widow as first in succession and the illegitimate in the line of succession are beneficial; but, listening to the noble Lord. Lord Drumalbyn, even that situation is not an easy one.
Of the law as it stands just now, the Highland Development Board had this to say in its first Report on the Highlands and Islands in 1967:
"Bearing in mind all that has been said about the system"—
that is, the crofting system—
"if one had to look now for a way of life which would keep that number of people on such relatively intractable territory, it would be difficult to contrive a better system"
That is the system before its alteration as proposed in this Bill.
Finally, having regard to the accumulated volume of crofter law, it is reasonable to suppose that a full and deliberate study of crofting law—indeed, tenure and succession—is urgently required, so that all existing legislation can be codified, and amended legislation produced which would be of real benefit to the crofter. But if the Government are too busy for this, the present changes envisaged in Clause 8 are surely basic enough to require real consultation and a special Crofter Act if that is found to be necessary. One could find such a Crofter Act after some search in the large department of crofter law. But Clause 8 is pushed into a computerised miscellaneous law reform Bill far removed from the interests of the crofter or his land or his law, and I think it should be left out of the Bill.
5.30 p.m.
LORD HUGHES: I must admit that I find it very distasteful to disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Bannerman, but I must confess that as I listened to what he had to say I found it difficult to maintain my ordinary attitude to his remarks;

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because while much of what he said might very well have been relevant to a eulogy of the late Mr. Gladstone it had very little relevance to the situation we are facing to-day. There is nothing objectionable in the word "Miscellaneous". For a number of years we have sought to deal with minor reforms of the law in a Bill of this kind.
The reason why the crofters are mentioned in the Bill is because the position of the crofter is affected by other aspects of it. At the present time the principle of primogeniture and the preference of the male in succession which was abolished in 1964 in the general law of succession was retained in respect of intestate succession to the tenancies of crofts. We had to consider how this part of the law was to be affected by the recommendations of the Russell Committee. If we leave as it now is the law of crofting succession while at the same time giving effect to the recommendations of the Russell Committee—which we are doing—it would mean that illegitimate children would be given the same rights as legitimate children. There would then he the possibility of the tenancy of a croft passing to an illegitimate son of the crofter (if that son were the eldest son) rather than to the widow or to any subsequent legitimate issue which the crofter might have.
If there is one thing which I am certain that the crofting community would not want it would be that a situation of that kind could develop. But if we leave out Clause 8 there remains this possibility. I would remind the Committee that it is at least more likely than not that the illegitimate son would have been horn before marriage rather than during the marriage; so there is a fair chance that the widow would be deprived of the tenancy of the croft in favour of the eldest illegitimate son. Alternatively, from the law of succession relating to crofting tenancies, we could have disapplied altogether the provisions implementing the Russell recommendation. This, in effect, would mean that there would be no improvement in this field for illegitimate children and would isolate the law of crofting succession even further from the general law of succession.
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If I had to disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, on the previous Amendments on the basis that what the Government were seeking to do was to extend to illegitimate children the same position as was given to legitimate children, I could not possibly accept the situation that merely because the father was a crofter the inequality of illegitimate children should be perpetuated in this field. I should be guilty of the grossest discourtesy to the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, if I were to accept that position.
LORD BANNERMAN OF KILDONAN: I should make it clear that the crofters do not set their faces against the direct succession of the widow and the illegitimate son being taken in line of succession. I stated that when I spoke. That is not the point which I was trying to make concerning this clause.
LORD HUGHES: It matters little what the noble Lord intends to do. We have to deal with what the noble Lord is doing. If the Committee delete Clause 8 from the Bill, as the noble Lord proposes, there will be created a situation where the widow and the legitimate sons can be deprived of the croft because the law of primogeniture will result in the croft going to the eldest son, even though he be illegitimate. We could have created that situation by leaving out Clause 8. Alternatively, we could have said: "No. there is to be only one field in which the illegitimate child is to be subject to disability and that is where he is fathered by a crofter." We thought that wrong.
On this subject of consultation, the Crofters Commission were consulted about this matter; and the noble Lord, Lord Bannerman, has gone out of his way to pay a compliment to them. It seemed to the Government that they were the obvious people to consult on matters affecting the crofters. The advice of the Crofters Commission was that rather than adopt either of the two unsatisfactory solutions to which I have referred, the Bill should abolish the principle of male primogeniture in intestate succession to crofts and bring this part of the law into line with the general law of succession.

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Clause 8 accordingly applies the provisions of the Succession (Scotland) Act 1964 to the succession to the tenancy of a croft. The main effect of that Act is that in the case of an intestate estate which is less than £2,500 (or, where there is no issue, £5,000) the widow will receive the whole estate including, as the result of this Bill, the tenancy of the croft. Where the estate is greater than these figures the widow is entitled to a £2,500 or to a £5,000 share of the estate. Where there is no widow or where the estate exceeds these limits, the executor will have to choose a successor to the crofting tenancy from among those entitled to a share in the estate and to transfer the tenancy to him or to her towards that share.
The Government are in complete accord with the views of the Commission. We have no doubt whatever that this provision is superior to the present situation where the heir-at-law may well take over the tenancy of the croft to the exclusion of the widow. Reverting to this question of consultation, the Crofters Commission panel of assessors were brought into account. The Crofters panel was recently reconstituted in all the areas where there are grazings committees (that is, in almost all the main crofting areas) and the committees elected their representatives for the area to the panel of assessors. As some noble Lords may know, and as the noble Lord, Lord Bannerman, must certainly know, the grazings committees themselves are elected by the crofters of the township and are, perhaps, the smallest unit of democratic government to be found anywhere in the world.
Since there are grazings committees in the vast majority of the crofting areas, and certainly in almost all the main crofting areas, your Lordships will appreciate why I feel able to assure you that the explanation of the provisions of the Bill which have been made to the grazings committees can be regarded as a true reflection of the crofting position. I understand that at the most recent meeting of the Federation of Crofters' Unions in Inverness they expressed no objections to the basic provisions of the Bill, although they had reservations on certain aspects of it.
A long time has been spent on this question of consultation and, as happens
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in any case of consultation, we have had criticism in the other place about what the Government have done—despite the fact that we consulted the body whose statutory duty it is to advise the Secretary of State on crofting matters. I am not aware that any consultations which were undertaken by the Government of the day in 1964 have not been again undertaken by the present Government. There are enough difficulties in the Highlands for any Government without the Government going out of their way to make difficulties. The one thing we know is that there should be consultation and that it should be on the widest possible basis. This is what the Secretary of State did. We are satisfied that we are doing the right thing.
If I may, I will sum up what the clause as it stands does. In essence, the State is trying to make a will for the crofter who dies intestate. The question is whether the will that the State will make as a consequence of present legislation is better than the will which the State makes under the law as it stands at present. I am advised that in the large majority of cases the bulk of the crofter's estate consists of the croft, and the most important asset there is the croft house. The kind of will it is proposed that the State should now make gives the primary estate to the widow. Then, apart from the widow, the remainder of the estate is divided equally among the members of the family or relations nearest to the crofter. The Crofters Commission, my right honourable friend the Secretary of State and I are in no doubt 'whatever that this proposed new will that the State will make will be an improvement on the present situation, in which the widow may very well be omitted altogether, and where, so far as the croft is concerned, one person among the members of the family is picked out to have the lot.
I think this is the first time I have had occasion to disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Bannerman of Kildonan, for a long time. It may not be the last—although I sincerely hope it is—but your Lordships will agree that if I had to choose a subject on which to disagree with him I could not have disagreed more fundamentally.
LORD BANNERMAN of KILDONAN: I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, for his exhaustive answer,

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but he has not referred to the consultation aspect as fully as perhaps he should have done. The Land Court is the judicial body in Scotland concerned with the valuation, if you call it so, of the croft—though it is not a valuation at all, as it would seem to be in this Bill, but merely a claim to improvement. This claim has to be assessed by the Land Court as the judicial body, not by the Crofters Commission. It would appear to be a serious omission from this Bill and this clause that there is no reference to the Land Court, although it is clearly concerned with the bequest of the crofter. Surely, so far as the croft is concerned, there can be no capital value, but merely a claim to improvement.
I would impress on the Committee that, as the noble Lord himself has said, this is not an easy matter of law. It is a most complicated matter even to discuss legitimacy in a Bill, and to throw this matter into a very controversial sphere and branch of law, the crofter law of Scotland, is to invite tremendous difficulties. The Land Court cannot assess a claim to improvement on a croft until the croft is renounced, or the crofter removed. So far as I can see, there is no reference at all to this. Lord Birsay, the Chairman of the Land Court, the judicial Court concerned with succession in crofts, says that there has not been any consultation about this. Surely the Government and the Minister should take cognisance of his viewpoint and at least agree to take back this clause and look at it again, so placating a great deal of worry which is prevalent throughout the Highlands concerning this clause.
LORD HUGHES: I must completely repudiate the suggestion that there is a great deal of worry throughout the Highlands about this clause. All the evidence the Government have is that the crofters accept this position. According to the information which I have been given, at their most recent meeting those on whose earlier proceedings the noble Lord, Lord Bannerman, is relying did not maintain their attitude when they fully appreciated what was the position.
I cannot possibly agree to the deletion of this clause without knowing what is to go in its place. I must repeat, for the benefit of the noble Lord. Lord Banner
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man, what the consequences would be. If I take out this clause, the position would be that a widow could be deprived of the tenancy of a croft. The noble Lord has said that is not what he wants to do, but the onus is not on me to take out of the Bill a clause which deals satisfactorily with the position and then to find something else to put in its place. If the noble Lord wishes to do something quite different from his present motion, it is for him to work out what he proposes to do. I have pointed out that what he seeks to do is totally unacceptable. He must work out his own salvation, and I suggest that this would be achieved by his going back to the Federation of Crofters' Unions, and I am certain that if he does so he will find that he is flogging a dead horse.
LORD DRUMALBYN: May I get the point clear? If I may put it in a colloquial way, this question of adapting the succession in croft to the Succession (Scotland) Act has been "knocking about" for quite a long time, and it seems rather strange if, in the course of all that "knocking about", the Chairman of the Land Court has not been consulted. I should have thought it would satisfy my noble friend if the Chairman of the Land Court were consulted to see whether there are any points arising out of this on which he could help, and on which it would be possible to introduce an Amendment if necessary—we do not put it any higher than that—at the next stage of the Bill. It seems to me that is all my noble friend is asking for. He has raised it in this form as the only way in which he could raise it because of the great complication of the matter. I suppose it would have been possible for him to consult Lord Birsay, but I think it would be less appropriate for him to do so than that the Government should do so—if indeed they have not already done so. Perhaps the noble Lord could clear up this point.
LORD HUGHES: I should be very surprised to discover that when this matter was last considered in 1964 the then Government found it necessary or desirable to consult the Land Court in this matter. The obvious body to consult is the body which looks after the interests of crofters; that is the Crofters Commission, and through them the direct

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representation of the crofters. The Land Court is concerned with the valuation of crofts. It is a judicial body which assesses compensation when a crofting tenancy is renounced. There is no need to have a special provision for valuing crofts on death. There is machinery for doing so, as there is for estate duty purposes or in connection with compulsory acquisition. None of these has presented any difficulty. We have not had to create special machinery in relation to this situation. There is no greater difficulty at the present time in settling a crofter's estate than there will be in the future. The suggestion is that we should have consulted the Land Court. Consulting the Crofters Commission as I have suggested, is the next best thing to consulting individually every crofter in the Highlands. I do not see how we could possibly carry consultation further than that.
I have no objection to finding out, between now and the next stage, whether in the past the Land Court have ever been consulted on a matter of this kind and whether the Chairman of the Land Court thinks that an illegitimate son should have preference over a widow. But we are being asked to take something out of the Bill and I am pointing out that I find the consequences of taking this clause out to be totally unacceptable. Therefore I advise your Lordships to let the clause remain.
LORD BANNERMAN of KILDONAN: Is it not possible then for us to have an Amendment to this clause produced at the next stage, as the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, suggested, and that in the meantime those who complain, whether rightly or wrongly, that they have not been consulted, should be consulted? The representatives of the crofters are the unions, not assessors appointed by the Crofters Commission.
LORD HUGHES: The noble Lord should at least do me the justice of listening to what I say. The present assessors are not appointed by the Crofters Commission: they are elected. And what can we do better than to consult the elected representatives?
LORD BANNERMAN OF KILDONAN: I am asking that the crofters' unions, representing crofters throughout the Highlands, should be con
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sulted and not just the selection of crofters that the Crofters Commission might have. Apart from that, surely the Land Commission, as a judicial body determining the amount of money to be distributed among the succesors—the widow, the illegitimate son or otherwise—should be consulted on this matter. They are very much concerned about bequests.
LORD HUGHES: The noble Lord started by asking me whether it was possible to have an Amendment. Almost anything is possible in your Lordships' House. What I cannot guarantee is that the noble Lord will be successful in finding an Amendment which will be preferable to what we have in the Bill. For my part, I am content with what is in the Bill. I think that it is good. I have grave doubts about whether it is possible for the noble Lord, even with consultation with the Federation of Crofters' Unions, to find a better one. But if, after further consultation, he can find a better one, I shall be delighted to look at it. I merely cast doubt on the likelihood that this will be possible.
On Question, Clause 8 agreed to.
Clause 9:
Rule requiring corroboration not to apply in certain civil proceedings
9.—(l) Subject to subsections (3) and (4) of this section, any rule of law whereby in any civil proceedings evidence tending to establish any fact, unless it is corroborated by other evidence, is not to be taken as sufficient proof of that fact shall cease to have effect, and accordingly, subject as aforesaid, in any civil proceedings the court shall he entitled, if they are satisfied that any fact has been established by evidence which has been given in those proceedings, to find that fact proved by that evidence, notwithstanding that the evidence is not corroborated.
5.54 p.m.
LORD REID LORD REID moved, in subsection (1), to leave out "subsections (3) and (4)" and insert "subsection (3)". The noble and learned Lord said: There are five Amendments on the List in the names of my noble and learned friend Lord Guest and myself. The second is the substantial one; the other four are consequential. Accordingly, it may be convenient that I should discuss the second one and that the others should stand or fall with it. I raised this matter on Second Reading in order to give adequate notice of the point which I intended to make, and I

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shall only restate briefly the point I had in mind.
Corroboration is a somewhat technical subject. It means that a case cannot be proved with the evidence of one witness alone. There must be a second witness to the essential facts, or something in the nature of circumstantial evidence, built up by the general picture which the evidence paints, so that the story of the single witness appears to the court to be more consonant than not with the rest of the evidence as disclosed by the rest of the case. That is not an onerous requirement. The problem in cases of corroboration is this. If we loosen the law we may let in one or two cases where a man is telling the complete truth but cannot get any support anywhere, either circumstantial or otherwise, but, on the other hand, we may create the risk that somebody will succeed when he should not succeed. He might be a deliberate liar but it is much more likely that he is a witness who has persuaded himself that something, which is in fact untrue, is true. Everybody with any experience of the law knows that that happens.
The question is: what is the best solution? This is a matter which comes within the general law of evidence, and the Law Commission very properly took as one of their early subjects the general examination of the law of evidence. They gave priority to it and they were right. It is here, above all things, that it is essential that there should be proper consultation between the Commission and those who practise the law. Here, more than in any other chapter of the law. theory must give way to practice. And the only way to assess practice is to have the widest consultation with those who have day-to-day practice in the courts. Sometimes it is said that the advice of practising lawyers is biased to some extent, but that cannot possibly be said here, because the profession cannot get anything out of retaining the present situation as against the change.
That being the position, the Law Commission received certain information or representations and thought that there was a special case for urgency in altering the present law with regard to one—and only one—chapter of the law; namely, actions for damages for personal injury.
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Very properly they consulted all the legal bodies on that narrow question. They received, it is true, unfavourable replies, but they did consult and did all that was proper. Unfortunately, in the course of some representations objecting to the change a false point was taken. It was said that if we dealt with this matter as a single small chapter by itself we should create anomalies. It is perfectly true that in theory one can imagine cases where this would create, not anomalies, but certain difficulties which would require some care on the part of the judge who was hearing the case in order to separate it up, but such a case is not going to happen once in five years. This is purely a theoretical objection. To my mind, if one or two cases did happen, what would it matter?
The alternative has been most unfortunate. The Law Commission were apparently impressed by this theoretical objection and decided that it would be better to avoid it by greatly widening the scope of their first proposal. So far, so good. But then they absolutely failed to consult anybody about that much wider proposal. I have gone into this matter; I have had letters, and one thing and another, and I have not a scrap of information to show that anybody at all outside the walls of the Law Commission was consulted about widening the small proposal to alter the law with regard to actions for personal injury to cover the whole of the civil law, with one exception which I shall come to in a moment.
This has created the utmost dissatisfaction in the legal profession. In the Second Reading debate I read out to the House excerpts from two letters, one from the President of the Law Society and one from the Dean of Faculty. In the course of the letter from the Dean of Faculty he said that the Lord Advocate and the Law Commission had agreed that there had not been adequate consultation. The Lord Advocate has sent me a letter in which he objects to that and says that he has never so agreed. I accept that at once. But he has said things which have made it perfectly plain that there was no consultation. Let me read out the first paragraph of the Minute which was settled with regard to the meeting at which all these bodies met together in

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order to arrange a better system for the future. Why it should have been necessary to have a meeting to arrange for a better system for the future if all had been well up to date, I just do not understand.
Be that as it may, here is what was said by the Lord Advocate:
"The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the question of consultation on reforms in the law proposed or to be proposed by the Law Commission."
He referred to the case of
"corroboration in which the Commission had only informed itself with the Faculty of Advocates and with the Law Society of Scotland in connection with a proposal which was different from that ultimately submitted to Ministers."
That is all argument. It was a very different proposal; and, in fact, there has been no consultation. It does not matter whether the Lord Advocate agrees or not. If he says that he does not agree, I accept that implicitly. But the fact remains that there was no consultation. Why not?
What is the position to be? If this Bill goes through, is it to be a final settlement of the law of Scotland, so that there is to be no going back on it because it is something which has been determined; or is it a purely interim measure awaiting a further measure later on? If it is a final measure, then I must insist on my Amendment and seek to divide the Committee. But if it is not a final measure, what is it? What is the point in making a much bigger bite than the one about which there was consultation? I do not understand why we should not go back, as my Amendment proposes that we should, to the point on which there was proper consultation. That is the only point that the Law Commission had in mind before it was suggested to them that they should make a wider change. If any point has any urgency, that is the only point which has urgency. Why make it any wider? really do not understand.
What the Commission have done is very odd indeed. They have extended this provision to all civil evidence except consistorial actions, actions of affiliation and alimony, and proceedings in a juvenile court. How can anybody draw a line there? For generations the courts of Scotland have been trying to ease the position with regard to actions of affiliation and alimony. If there was to be
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a change at all, I should have thought that that must come right at the top of the list for a change. But that has been left out. Anybody who knows anything about the practice of divorce knows quite well that thin cases get through in the divorce court just as much as they do anywhere else. Looking to the way the law is administered, why on earth have actions about property, contracts, trusts and all the rest of it, in so far as oral evidence will prove them, had the law altered in respect of them, and not these other matters which are just as clamant? I do not understand it.
Therefore it seems to me that if this is a final decision, it is a very bad one. If it is not a final decision, the line has been drawn entirely in the wrong place. It would be much better if we dealt with the matter logically and restricted our change at the moment to that change about which there has been consultation, leaving for further consideration the other, much wider, change about which there has been absolutely no consultation. That is the purpose of my Amendment. I do not intend to say any more about the merits of the matter, because I think my noble and learned friend Lord Guest will probably wish to say something. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 6, line 8, leave out ("subsections (3) and (4)") and insert ("subsection;3)").—(Lord Reid.)
6.7 p.m.
LORD GUEST: It is not disputed that Clause 9 makes a substantial alteration in the law of Scotland. The law of corroboration is firmly embedded in our legal system and has existed for hundreds of years. I do not intend to elaborate on the explanation of the doctrine which has been given by my noble and learned friend Lord Reid. I should add, however, that it is probably the most important principle in the law of evidence, because it arises in every single, what you call in England, witness action. In every proof, and in every jury trial in which witnesses are heard, the question of corroboration arises. I had always thought until now that it was a salutary safeguard against unreliable or dishonest evidence. As your Lordships have been

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told, Clause 9 arises from a recommendation of the Scottish Law Commission, who, according to their Report,
"are engaged on a review of the whole law of evidence with a view to its reform and modification".
One would have thought that in those circumstances the Government would have awaited that general review and not made what must at best amount to a piecemeal modification of the law.
The justification which is given by the Scottish Law Commission of urgency is that injustice occurs in actions of reparation due to the failure to obtain corroboration; and it is said that a number of these actions have failed due to lack of corroboration. I have spent 35 years in the law in Scotland, partly at the Bar and partly on the Bench, and I have never heard any criticism until now of the law of corroboration. I have never heard of any agitation; I have never known a case in which I have had to advise a pursuer that he had no case because there was no corroboration. It is easy to imagine how simple it can be in cases to obtain sufficient corroboration; that is to say, not another witness, but some fact or circumstance which makes the evidence of that witness more consistent with his case than any other. If there is such a number of cases, I suggest it is comparatively recent and that the cases are comparatively few.
I would remind your Lordships that when it is said that an injustice is done to a pursuer because he has not got corroboration, that is really begging the question, because until the case is tried and until the jury or judge determine no-one can tell who was telling the truth. It may well be that injustice to a defender has been prevented by the necessity for securing corroboration. The case therefore made out on the Commission's Report is for urgency in actions of personal damage, personal injuries. If that is so—and I take up the point made by my noble and learned friend Lord Reid —there is no suggestion in the Report or in any other publication that the injustice occurs in any other cases at all except personal accidents and personal damage. why, I ask, extend it to all civil proceedings?
The reasons, apparently, given by the Law Commission for extending it are two in number, and I should like to read,
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in the first place, paragraph 16 of their Report, which starts off in this fashion:
"We have already indicated our view that the law of corroboration requires immediate reform. Any serious and unexpected difficulties or anolomies to which that reform may give rise can be dealt with as opportunities occur and as the branches of law in which they arise become the subject of examination".
I read that to mean that the Law Commission are saying: "Let us have a trial run of corroboration in all cases, and then we will see by the time we come to our general review of the law of evidence whether there are any difficulties or anolomies". It strikes me that that is a most extraordinary method of procedure: throw the matter into the melting pot and then see, after you have tried it out, whether it works or not. I should have thought it would be better, and I suggest it should be better, to wait and deal with the matter in the large way after they have reviewed the matter generally.
The next matter which is referred to, and was referred to by my noble friend Lord Hughes on the Second Reading of this Bill, is the difficulties and anomalies which it is said the modest proposal made in this Amendment would cause. I just do not see these difficulties occurring at all. In the first place, it is suggested that where an action of damages for personal injuries and for damage to a motor car occurs, then there may be a different standard of proof. I never, in all my experience in Scotland, raised an action for a pursuer concluding for damages for his personal injuries and his motor car, for the simple reason that in every case where insurance companies are involved there is a "knock for knock" agreement and you do not include the damages for the motor car: so that is not a case of difficulty or anomaly.
Then it is suggested that there may be a difficulty or anomaly in a case of professional negligence; that is to say, where a solicitor fails to raise an action due to negligence and the client suffers loss. In that case there is no difficulty about it. The action of damages for personal injuries would require only one witness, and the claim for professional negligence would require two witnesses. There is no difficulty at all. In fact, our procedure, which is by means of pleas in law, would advise the judge before

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the case came to trial. If this question arose it would be a case which would be tried by a judge and not by a jury; and I really cannot see that there would be any difficulties at all in having these two different standards of proof.
The last matter, which of course has already been referred to by my noble and learned friend Lord Reid, is that the legal profession in Scotland are opposed to this general change in the law; and one would have thought that their advice might have been accepted by the Government. Therefore, I suggest to the Committee that it would be wiser (would it not?) to take the modest step which is suggested by this Amendment and wait for the Commission's Report on the general law of evidence before making such a radical change.
6.15 p.m.
LORD HUGHES: These Amendments propose that the abolition of the requirement of corroboration should be limited to personal injuries cases. I do not want to weary your Lordships with a repetition of the reasons which I have already given at Second Reading why the Government are of the view that the requirement of corroboration as a sine qua non in civil proceedings is wrong and should be abolished or of the social considerations that have led them to include this clause in this Bill. I would only remind your Lordships that it is the requirement of corroboration as a sine qua non which is being abolished; that is not to say that corroborating evidence will never be called for in future. It is a rule of law that has not been found necessary in any other Western country, with the exception of Portugal. As an unnecessary rule of law so far as it has effect it is likely to come between the court and the best decision to be reached in all the circumstances of the case before it.
One of the principal reasons for the putting down of these Amendments was the question of consultation. It is true, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reid, has said, that the Law Commission consulted the Faculty of Advocates and the Law Society about a proposal to abolish the requirement of corroboration in personal injuries cases. The arrangements for these informal consultations were agreed previously with the two bodies concerned. They did not again
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consult them before they submitted their Report recommending its abolition over the generality of civil proceedings. But the question must be considered whether or not there has been ample opportunity for those concerned with the working of the law in Scotland to study the proposals and their effects. If there has, then I cannot think that your Lordships should be asked to refrain from making a useful change in the law because it is suggested that, at an earlier stage, some different course of consultation should have been pursued.
There has been this ample opportunity. The Law Commission's Report was published in April, 1967, and the Government immediately announced that they were considering it with a view to legislation and would welcome views on it. That is over a year ago. The Government have had useful memoranda on the subject from the Faculty of Advocates, the Writers to the Signet, the Royal Faculty of Procurators in Glasgow and the Glasgow Bar Association. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Reid, was good enough at Second Reading to accept that consultation does not necessarily mean acceptance of the views of those consulted. I agree that a substantial body of legal opinion in Scotland is opposed to the abolition of the requirement of corroboration—alike in the field of personal injuries and in the wider field. But, despite the ample opportunity for study of the extended proposals since the publication of the Report, none of the legal bodies who have commented have brought out any practical working difficulties—granted that the requirement of corroboration is to be abolished—in its abolition over the wider field.
I accept, of course, that apprehensions have been expressed—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reid, touched on this himself—about the possible effect of abolition, relating it to the periods of prescription under Scots law and the possibility that litigants will be put at risk in actions in respect, say, of old contracts and old property rights. I think that too much can be made of this risk. If there has been unreasonable delay in raising an action the standard of proof required to establish any part of it increases, and the courts would in any case be slow, on the evidence of a single

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witness, to disturb a long-standing situation. There is also the point that this clause will in no way encourage the use of a single witness where other evidence is available. Again, the court would be slow to accept the party's case if other evidence was available or likely to be available and there was no adequate explanation of why it was not led. I do not think that these apprehensions are any substantial argument against the clause.
However, the Commission's consultations elicited one practical difficulty about their original limited proposals which they felt it impossible to ignore. This, of course, has already been referred to by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reid, although he disagreed with the conclusions which the Commission drew from it. The members of the Bar who commented when the Faculty of Advocates was consulted made strong objection to a proposal to abolish the requirement of corroboration which was confined to damages for personal injury. It was they who drew attention to the fact that in actions based on delict the same delict frequently gave rise to damage to property which was greater than personal injuries If a pursuer wishes to claim damages both for personal injury and for damage to property, with both claims arising out of a single event, are two different sets of evidential requirements to apply in a single action? Is it tolerable that the pursuer might succeed in one claim and fail in the other for lack of corroboration? Is think it is fair to say that it was this objection which led the Commission away from their original proposal in a limited field to their consideration in principle of the requirement of corroboration in civil proceedings and their later proposal for its abolition.
This is a practical objection, not a hypothetical one. No one can deny that cases of joint claims for personal injury and damage to property do occur. My own Department has to deal with them, for example, in actions where it is alleged that the condition of the road is responsible for a car crash. I do not make any claim about the frequency of such cases. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Reid, did not say that they would not arise; he said that they would be infrequent and that there might not be more than
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one in five years. But since this has resulted from the objection made by the profession which the Law Commission has found to be one of substance it would be quite wrong for the Government to ignore it. For this reason, I must advise the Committee against accepting the Amendments proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reid.
I have been asked by the noble and learned Lord whether this is an interim measure. It is certainly not a final measure. I have explained to the Committee why the Government regard the requirement of corroboration as a sine qua non as wrong in principle; that is the Government's firm view on the subject. But as the noble and learned Lord has stated, the Law Commission are at present engaged in a full review of all aspects of evidence, both in civil and criminal proceedings, with a view to producing a comprehensive code on the subject. In that review all possible aspects of evidence, including corroboration, will be open for consideration. The Government will certainly look with an open mind on any proposals that come out of that review.
Since I am speaking of possible further legislation, I might refer to consistorial actions, on which the noble and learned Lord merely touched. The Government have sympathy with the view that the requirement of corroboration should also be abolished in all, or at least in most, of these proceedings. They are not included because this is not a final measure. The Law Commission were not at the stage of reaching any conclusion on the question of the requirement of corroboration in criminal proceedings, which may well be found to raise quite different considerations. When they came to consider consistorial proceedings they found—a difficulty which does not arise with the civil proceedings dealt with by this clause —that the standards of evidence in consistorial proceedings were to some extent influenced by those in criminal proceedings.
LORD REID: That is very old-fashioned.
LORD HUGHES: It may well be, but I can assure your Lordships that it is new to me. I think your Lordships will appreciate that, particularly with my right honourable friend, the Lord Advocate,

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sitting on the Steps of the Throne, I must stick closely to the brief which is agreed both by my own Department and by the Lord Advocate, and I am certainly not departing from the wording when it is on strictly legal aspects.
I appreciate that there is room for argument about the extent and importance of this influence; but it cannot be denied that it exists. In these circumstances, the Law Commission took the view that they would not be justified in bringing consistorial proceedings within the scope of their recommendation until they had had time to consider corroboration in criminal proceedings and its effects on consistorial proceedings. The Committee will no doubt accept that since, for this reason, no detailed consideration has been given to the requirement of corroboration in consistorial proceedings, the Government would have been unwise to include such proceedings in this clause.
I think it was also the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reid, who spoke of actions of affiliation and aliment in juvenile court proceedings, and I am advised that these actions are excluded for the same reason as the consistorial proceedings were excluded. I was asked for an assurance that the legal profession would be consulted and have an opportunity for discussion and the expression of views during the preparation of the proposed full code of evidence. I should perhaps interject here, on the subject of consultation generally, that, in the light of the experience gained from the controversy over these proposals, a meeting was convened by the Lord Advocate at which the Law Commission and representatives of the legal profession and the Scottish Office had a full and useful discussion on the machinery of consultation in respect of future proposals by the Commission.
So far as consultation on this subject of evidence is concerned, I can give both the noble and learned Lords, Lord Reid and Lord Guest, the assurances for which I have been asked. The Law Commission have asked me to say it is their intention that there should be consultation under the new arrangements as part of their full review of evidence, and that there will be ample opportunity, in accordance with these arrangements, for consideration of the rules relating to
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corroboration as part of the whole law of evidence.
I have said why the Government believe that the clause as it stands is justified. I have explained the practical difficulties to which the Government must have regard in their attitude to the Amendments put down by the noble and learned Lord, and I have given assurances about the position of future proposals on this subject and about future consultation on the review of the law of evidence. I hope that, in the light of what I have said, the noble and learned Lord will find it possible not to press his Amendments.
6.29 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN: It is difficult for a layman to intervene in what are essentially legal matters, but I think my noble and learned friends and I would certainly feel that the procedure which has been adopted, and indeed the arguments in support of that procedure, are both most peculiar. There seem to be three courses open. The first is that, as the Amendment says, we limit the change to that section of the civil law where there is said to be urgency. This seems to be a sensible suggestion. Then it is said that this will give rise to some practical difficulties, which is generally admitted, though the amount of those practical difficulties seems to be in some dispute. The noble Lord, Lord Hughes, and his Department seem to think that these practical difficulties can arise fairly frequently, while the noble and learned Law Lords who have spoken think that they are unlikely to arise at all.
LORD HUGHES: I think I would be being unfair if I allowed it to proceed on the basis that I said it would arise frequently. I said I was not prepared to argue about its frequency, but I said the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reid, had said it might be about once every five years. I did not venture to give a frequency myself at all.
LORD DRUMALBYN: At any rate, this is the proposition. The second proposal is that over all civil cases now, with the exception of the consistorial and affiliation cases, we should make this change in the law, about which it is admitted that there was not full consultation, and the noble Lord gives assurances about consultation in the future. The

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third proposal is that we should wait until the Law Commission has carried out its inquiries into the effects on criminal as well as civil cases and then at that stage we should cover the whole area of corroboration. I should have thought that common sense would indicate that the Government were unwise to make up their mind on the general principle until they had had experience in the matter which is giving rise to the greatest urgency. I should have thought, speaking as a layman, that the sensible thing, if it is at all practicable, is to make a change in one sector and see how it works in the particular conditions of Scotland, given the legal traditions in Scotland. That is what we ought to do, and not for the Government to make up their mind that this is a useful change that they have determined upon, without consultation, and carry it out over the whole field of civil law except in the case of consistorial and affiliation actions. I should have thought this was all the more so as the Law Commission has not yet completed its study of the effects on criminal actions.
I should have further thought that if we do this now in so far as civil actions are concerned over the wider field the Government want, it is virtually certain the Government will later come along and say that this will apply also to all criminal actions. I should have thought that this was bound to be so. I do not think that we ought to prejudice the case in this way. It would be very much better to limit it to the particular area about which consultation took place and which is said to be the area of urgency. I hope that the noble Lord will agree to accept the advice of those who are so very experienced in these matters, rather than rely only on the advice of the Law Commission. It seems, on what we have been told, that, by and large, the legal profession does not share the Law Commission's view on this subject and, that being so, it would be discretion on the part of the Law Commission to say, "If you do not accept this, let us do it in the area in which there is special difficulty now". That would be the sensible course.
LORD HUGHES: The only point of comment I wish to make on what the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, has said
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is in regard to the danger he envisaged that the acceptance of this clause as it stands would lead on inevitably to the acceptance of this principle in criminal proceedings. In the notes from which I read I was very careful to emphasise that there were very different considerations in relation to criminal proceedings and that the Government did not feel that anything which was done on civil proceedings necessarily gave any guide to what the Government would do in relation to criminal proceedings. I must emphasise that.
THE EARL OF MANSFIELD: Not necessarily; but surely it is a logical sequence that if one is put into effect the other will be later on.
LORD HUGHES: Not at all. If one is considering different circumstances it could be illogical to arrive at the same conclusion. If you are considering two sets of circumstances which are the same it is logical to arrive at the same conclusion, but if you are considering different circumstances it would be illogical.
LORD REID: I find this position most astonishing. The Government know that the great bulk of the profession support the necessity for corroboration, and yet they make up their mind as a matter of principle that corroboration is bad, without having given the profession a chance of stating their reasons. For these reasons I can do nothing else but support this Amendment in the Division Lobby.
THE EARL OF PERTH: As a layman, even more hesitant on these things, I feel that the Government ought to consider accepting this Amendment. I have tried to understand it. I remember that the noble Lord a short while ago, when answering the noble Lord, Lord Bannerman of Kildonan, said it was a principle that one should consult on the widest possible basis. I know he was talking about the Highlands. If that is true of the Highlands, why is it not true of Scotland as a whole? Here we have something of major importance for Scotland, and yet the Government admit that, without having consulted, they have decided to do something which is going to affect the whole of Scotland, which is going against the advice of two noble and learned Scottish Lords to whom we must listen with the greatest possible respect.
We are told that there is shortly to be a general review and that then it can be

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looked at again; if there are some anomalies they can be corrected. That is the wrong way round. Do not bring in an important change now and then afterwards, if it does not work, say, "We will make an amendment here and there". Do the most limited damage, if it is damage, on the case of urgency now, and let the other wait for the full report. I feel sure that any others of your Lordships who are laymen must have the same sort of feeling as I have on this particular matter.
LORD HUGHES: On this point I think the noble Earl, Lord Perth, does the Government injustice, quite unwittingly. He has confined his remarks on consultation to what took place before the Law Commission submitted their Report. Whether or not the Law Commision undertook adequate consultation, there can be no dispute at all that the Government gave perfectly full opportunity for the expression of views to the whole of the legal profession. Their Report was submitted in April, 1967, and here we are legislating on this matter in the spring and summer of 1968. The views of the legal profession were made known to the Government. If we had acted immediately we received the Report and produced these proposals before receiving the views of the profession, we should in fact have been guilty of doing the thing of which the noble Earl, Lord Perth, has accused us. But the Government did not do that. We received all those views and, having received them, decided to act on the views of the Law Commission rather than on the views of the legal profession. That may or may not be a proper way to do it in the view of any individual, but it is obvious that the Government cannot properly be accused of having failed to consult on the matter.
As I pointed out, if you ask people for advice and find you have to accept the advice, you are not in fact receiving advice; you are receiving orders. We sought advice. We sought the opinions of the profession. We received that and weighed it against the opinion, the advice
which had been given by the Law Commission, and we elected to act on the Law Commission's advice. That is a perfectly fair statement of the position, and the position is not as the noble Earl has, I think quite unwittingly, represented it.
THE EARL OF PERTH: I certainly should not wish to misrepresent the Government's position, but the fact is, as I understand it, that the feeling has been that this method of consultation was so unsatisfactory that there has been consultation subsequently so that in the future things should be better done.
LORD STRATHCLYDE: In view of all the circumstances, would it not be wise to await the Report of the Royal Commission?
LORD HUGHES: All I can say further on the matter is that my right honourable friend the Lord Advocate has sat on the Steps throughout the whole of these proceedings, and I have no doubt—
VISCOUNT GOSCHEN: I think that, unwittingly, the noble Lord is breaking a custom of the House in referring to someone who is sitting on the Steps, however distinguished he may be.
LORD HUGHES: I am grateful to the noble Viscount for not drawing my attention to that fact earlier, so that at least I got the information over. I apologise for infringing the custom of the House. I do not know how I can usefully draw attention to the fact, but I can refer to the Lord Advocate. I have no doubt that, in the circumstances to which I have improperly referred, the Lord Advocate is fully apprised of the consideration which your Lordships have given to this proposal, and I should be most surprised if he did not have further consultations with me in future. Once again, I apologise to your Lordships.
6.41 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 8) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 43; Not-Contents, 27.

CONTENTS

Atholl, D.

Burton, L.

Craigavon, V.

Auckland, L.

Cohen, L.

Cullen of Ashbourne, L.

Audley, Bs.

Conesford, L.

Daventry, V.

Boston, L.

Cork and Orrery, E.

Dilhorne, V.

Drumalbyn, L.

Jessel, L.

Redmayne, L.

Dundee, E.

Killearn, L.

Reid, L. [Teller.]

Elliot of Harwood, Bs.

Mansfield, E.

St. Aldwyn, E.

Falkland, V.

Mar, E.

Sandys, L.

Glasgow, E.

Merrivale, L.

Sempill, Ly.

Goschen, V. [Teller.]

Milverton, L.

Somers, L.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

Monckton of Brenchley, V.

Strange of Knokin, Bs

Hanworth, V.

Nugent of Guildford, L.

Strathcarron, L.

Hawke, L.

Perth, E.

Strathclyde, L.

Hodson, L.

Rankeillour, L.

Vivian, L.

Ilford, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Addison, V.

Garnsworthy, L.

Moyle, L.

Beswick, L.

Hill of Wivenhoe, L.

Plummer, Bs.

Birk, Bs.

Hilton of Upton, L. [Teller.]

Rowley, L.

Bowles, L.

Hughes, L.

Serota, Bs. [Teller.]

Burden, L.

Kennet, L.

Shackleton, L.

Crook, L.

Latham, L.

Sorensen, L.

Douglass of Cleveland, L.

Leatherland, L.

Strabolgi, L.

Fiske, L.

Longford, E.

Strang, L.

Gardiner, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Mitchison, L.

Willis, L.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Resolved in the affirmative, and Amendment agreed to accordingly.
LORD REID: I beg to move Amendment No. 9. The rest of my Amendments are consequential.
Amendment moved—
Page 6, line 9, leave out ("civil proceedings") and insert ("action of damages for personal injury").—(Lord Reid.)
LORD REID: I beg to move Amendments Nos. 10, 11 and 12.
Amendments moved—
Page 6, line 12, leave out ("civil proceedings") and insert ("such action").
Page 6,line 15, leave out ("those proceedings") and insert ("that action").
Page 6,line 20, leave out subsection (3).—(Lord Reid.)
Clause 9, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 10 agreed to.
Clause 11 [Findings of adultery and paternity as evidence in civil proceedings.]:
On Question, Whether Clause 11 shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD DRUMALBYN: I should like to ask a question about affiliation proceedings here. The Russell Committee recommended in paragraph 39:
"We cannot regard affiliation orders as sufficiently reliable to be taken as conclusive proof, for the purposes of succession, of paternity."—
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I am not certain how far this clause would make for conclusive proof for the purposes of paternity.
LORD HUGHES: Perhaps the noble Lord would forgive me if I defer an answer on that point to a later stage. He did not give me any notice of his intention to raise it, and this is a somewhat complicated matter. Rather than chance my arm I should like to have a completely legally backed answer to this question.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I quite understand.
Clause 11 agreed to.
Clause 12 agreed to.
6.52 p.m.
LORD HUGHES LORD HUGHES moved, after Clause 12, to insert the following new clause:
Admissibility of statements produced by computers
".—(1) In any civil proceedings a statement contained in a document produced by a computer shall, subject to the provisions of section (Procedure) of this Act, be admissible as evidence of any fact stated therein of which direct oral evidence would be admissible, if it is shown that the conditions mentioned in subsection (2) of this section are satisfied in relation to the statement and computer in question.
(2) The said conditions are—

(a) that the document containing the statement was produced by the computer during a period over which the computer was used regularly to store or process information for the purposes of any activities regularly carried on over that period by any person;

(b) that over that period there was regularly supplied to the computer in the

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ordinary course of those activities information of the kind contained in the statement or of the kind from which the information so contained is derived;

(c) that throughout the material part of that period, the computer was operating properly or, if not, that any respect in which it was not operating properly or was out of operation during that part of that period was not such as to affect the production of the document or the accuracy of its contents; and

(d) that the information contained in the statement reproduces or is derived from information supplied to the computer in the ordinary course of those activities.

(3) Where over a period the function of storing or processing information for the purposes of any activities regularly carried on over that period as mentioned in subsection (2)(a) of this section was regularly performed by computers, whether—

(a) by a combination of computers operating over that period; or

(b) by different computers operating in succession over that period; or

(c) by different combinations of computers operating in succession over that period; or

(d) in any other manner involving the successive operation over that period, in whatever order, of one or more computers and one or more combinations of computers,

all the computers used for that purpose during that period shall be treated for the purposes of this Part of this Act as constituting a single computer; and references in this Part of this Act to a computer shall be construed accordingly.
(4) In any civil proceedings where it is desired to give a statement in evidence by virtue of this section, a certificate doing any of the following things, that is to say—

(a) identifying the document containing the statement and describing the manner in which it was produced;

(b) giving such particulars of any device involved in the production of that document as may be appropriate for the purpose of showing that the document was produced by a computer;

(c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in subsection (2) of this section relate,

and purporting to be signed by a person occupying a responsible position in relation to the operation of the relevant device or the management of the relevant activities (which, ever is appropriate) shall, subject to the provisions of section (Procedure) of this Act, he sufficient evidence of any matter stated in the certificate; and—

(i) for the purposes of this subsection it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person stating it;

(ii) any such certificate as aforesaid shall be lodged within such time as may be pre-
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scribed, not being later than the expiry of the time prescribed for the furnishing of information under section (Procedure) (3) of this Act;

(iii) any person lodging such a certificate as aforesaid shall. within the time prescribed under paragraph (ii) of this subsection, send a copy thereof to every other party to the proceedings.

(5) For the purposes of this Part at this Act—

(a) information shall be taken to be supplied to a computer if it is supplied thereto in any appropriate form and whether it is so supplied directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment;

(b) where, in the course of any activities carried on by any person, information is supplied with a view to its being stored or processed for the purposes of those activities by a computer operated otherwise than in the course of those activities, that information, if duly supplied to that computer, shall be taken to be supplied to it in the course of those activities;

(c) a document shall be taken to have been produced by a computer whether it was produced by it directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment.

(6) Subject to subsection (3) of this section, in this Part of this Act "computer" means any device for storing and processing information, and any reference to information being derived from other information is a reference to its being derived therefrom by calculation, comparison or any other process."
The noble Lord said: It would perhaps be for the convenience of the House if I discussed together all the new clauses and the Amendments to Clauses 13 and 18, since they are all related to the same subjects. I admit that these new clauses appear formidable, and I say with some trepidation, having made that remark, that they deal with a comparatively simple point; that is, to make prevision regarding the admissibility in civil proceedings of records kept by the modern business methods such as computers and microfilms.
This is not the introduction of any new principle. There are already provisions in the law facilitating the introduction of business records in evidence. The modern provisions will be found in Section 7 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act, 1966. This is only an extension of the principle to cater for modern developments. This House has already approved the extension in English law in the Civil Evidence Act which it passed earlier this Session. Indeed, your Lordships will possibly have

287
recognised the provisions of the new clauses as being the English provisions adapted to meet the existing Scottish law. In these circumstances I do not think that I need say much about the detail of the provisions.
The first new clause (Amendment No. 13) makes provision for the admission of computer records. The next two are procedural provisions, consequent upon the first clause. The fourth clause (Amendment No. 16) amends Section 7 of the 1966 Act to make it clear that records kept, say, in the form of microfilm copies are admissible under that Section. The Amendments to Clause 13 define "document" and "copy of document" to enable the provisions of the four clauses to be worked.
Perhaps I might say just a word about the reason the Government are moving these Amendments. One of the incidental purposes of the comparable provisions in the English Civil Evidence Act was to facilitate the use by business of modern and economical methods of record keeping. After this Bill had been published the Government received an approach from a business association to the effect that businesses, particularly large businesses operating throughout Great Britain, would not be able to take advantage of the provisions of the English Act if they were in doubt about the position in Scotland. They pointed out that it would not be practicable to introduce modern forms of record keeping for England and Wales only or to introduce them for the whole of their business, unless they were sure about the position in civil proceedings in Scotland. They therefore felt that the introduction of similar provisions, if approved in Scotland, was a matter of some urgency.
Informal inquiries following this approach showed that there would be advantage and no practical difficulties about making similiar provisions for Scotland. Of course, it is the position that the whole of civil evidence is under review by the Law Commission. The Government have consulted them and have established that this minor change is acceptable to them without prejudice to their general review. I should also say that the Lord President of the Court of Session has been consulted by the Lord Advocate, particularly in view of the pro
288
cedural nature of the change, and that he has no objection in principle to the admission of such evidence. We are satisfied, as a result of the consultations, that the new clauses constitute a workable arrangement for the admission of evidence from modern business records. I beg to move Amendment No. 13.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 12, insert the said new Clause.—(Lord Hughes.)
LORD DRUMALBYN: This is a long and complicated series of Amendments, but for my part—and I am sure my noble friends will agree with me—I think it is obviously right that we should do this. The only doubt, of course, is whether the actual proposals give full and reasonable effect to what the Government intend here. I am afraid that it is a matter for the lawyers to judge whether, in the light of their knowledge of computers and modern machinery, the kind of evidence that they will get will be such as they require. Subject to that, I certainly would not oppose these Amendments.
LORD REID: It appears to me that this is an admirable Amendment, and I do not take the least objection to this being done before the general review, because it obviously stems from the chapter by itself. There is only one thing I should like to say. There must surely be something wrong with our methods of drafting if it takes five pages of close print to introduce what is apparently a simple Amendment of this kind. I am not complaining, because I have no doubt that it is drafted—and I have read it not as carefully as I should have done because it would take too long—in the traditional style, but it seems to me to add point to the growing demand that the traditional style of drafting ought to be radically altered.
LORD HUGHES: I have two things to say. First of all, I am extremely grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reid, for what he said in the first part of his remarks, which must allay any fears which the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, might have. It certainly allayed my own fears, because the thought which immediately occurred to me was that if, in fact, we had gone the wrong way about it, it must have been the longest detour to arrive at the wrong

289
destination that anybody has taken for a very long time indeed. I am also grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his remarks about the drafting of the Amendment. What I should like to ask him to do—and I do not intend this in any way to be impertinent; it is because he has had such a long experience in this matter—is, if he ever has the time, to sit down and look at our Amendment and draft a simpler form of covering this point, it would give me the greatest of pleasure to pass it on to those where it might serve a useful purpose. I doubt, however, whether his Lordship will ever have time to do it. If he has, he will render a service to Her Majesty's Government and to your Lordships' House.
LORD REID: Perhaps if this were delayed until the Long Vacation, I could manage it, but not otherwise.
LORD HUGHES: Even if it were delayed to the Long Vacation, if we were undertaking consolidation it would be magnificent to substitute four lines for five pages. Perhaps I could give a bonus to the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, by answering the question which he put a little earlier on the subject of affiliation and aliment. The answer which I have been given is that the clause does not make a decree of affiliation and aliment conclusive evidence in an action for paternity. It makes them admissible, but the party to whom the decree is made will still be able to bring evidence to disprove paternity.
LORD HUGHES: I beg to move Amendment No. 14.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 12, insert the following new clause:
Provisions supplementary to section (Admissibility of statements produced by computers)
".—(1) Where in any civil proceedings a statement contained in a document is proposed to be givin in evidence by virtue of section (Admissibility of statements produced by computers) of this Act it may be proved by the production of that document or (whether or not that document is still in existence) by the production of a copy of that document, or of the material part thereof, purporting to be certified or otherwise authenticated by a person responsibile for the making of the copy or in such other manner as the court may approve;
290
and any such copy shall be taken to be a true copy unless the contrary is shown.
(2) In estimating the weight, if any, to be attached to a statement admissible in evidence by virtue of section (Admissibility of statements produced by computers) of this Act regard shall be had to all the circumstances from which any inference can reasonably be drawn as to the accuracy or otherwise of the statement and, in particular—

(a) to the question whether or not the information which the information contained in the statement reproduces or is derived from was supplied to the relevant computer, or recorded for the purpose of being supplied thereto, contemporaneously with the occurrence or existence of the fact; dealt with in that information, and

(b) to the question whether or not any person concerned with—

(i) the supply of information to that computer, or

(ii) the operation of that computer, or

(iii) the operation of any equipment by means of which the document curtaining the statement was produced by that computer,

had any incentive to conceal or misrepresent the facts."—(Lord Hughes.)
LORD HUGHES: I beg to move Amendment No. 15.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 12, insert the following new clause:
Procedure
".—(1) Subject to subsections (6) to (8) of this section, a statement shall not he admissible in evidence in civil proceedings by virtue of section (Admissibility of statements produced by computers) of this Act unless the procedure laid down by or under this section has been complied with.
(2) A party to any civil proceedings who wishes to rely on any such statement as is mentioned in the said section (Admissibility of statements produced by computers) stall, at such time as may be prescribed, send to every other party to the proceedings a copy of the statement together with a notice in writing

(a) intimating that the party intends to rely on the statement;

(b) stating that the statement is contained in a document produced by a computer;

(c) directing the attention of the other party to the provisions of subsection (3) of this section enabling a counter-notice to be given.

(3) Any party who receives such a notice as is mentioned in subsection (2) of this section may, within such time as may prescribed, by counter-notice in writing addressed to the party who served the notice, require him, within such further time as

291
may be prescribed, to furnish him in writing with all or any of the following information—

(a) any such information as might be the subject of a certificate under the said section (Admissibility of statements produced by computers) (4), except in so far as such information is the subject of a certificate lodged under that subsection;

(b) particulars of a person occupying at the material time a responsible position in relation to any of the matters mentioned or referred to in sections (Admissibility of statements produced by computers) (4) and (Provisions supplementary to s. (Admissibility of statements produced by computers)) (2)(b) of this Act, and, if he is not included among such persons, of any person who signed any certificate lodged as aforesaid.

(4) Within a prescribed period after receipt of the information requested under subsection (3) of this section, the party to whom the information was furnished may require that the party wishing to rely on the statement should call as a witness any person of whom particulars were furnished under paragraph (b) of the said subsection (3), unless that person is dead, or beyond the seas, or unfit by reason of his bodily or mental condition to attend as a witness, or cannot with reasonable diligence be identified or found, or cannot reasonably be expected (having regard to the passage of time and to all the circumstances) to have any recollection of matters relevant to the accuracy or otherwise of the statement in the document.
(5) In deciding for the purposes of this section whether or not a person is fit to attend as a witness, a court may act on a certificate purporting to be a certificate of a fully registered medical practitioner.
(6) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred on the Court of Session by sections 15 and 34 of the Administration of Justice (Scotland) Act 1933 to regulate by act of sederunt its own procedure and that of the sheriff court respectively, the said powers shall include power—

(a) to prescribe the form of any notice or other document authorised or required to be used under section (Admissibility of statements produced by computers) of this Act or this section;

(b) to prescribe the manner in which, the time within which, and the conditions on which any thing authorised or required to be done under section (Admissibility of statements produced by computers) of this Act or this section shall or may be done;

(c) to prescribe exceptions to any of the requirements prescribed by or under this section; and

(d) to modify, amend or repeal any of the provisions of this section; and in section (Admissibility of statements produced by computers) of this Act and this section "prescribed" shall be construed accordingly.

(7) Any act of sederunt made for any of the purposes mentioned in subsection (6) of this section, in so far as it relates to civil proceedings in the Court of Session, shall
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(except in so far as its operation is excluded by agreement) apply, subject to such modifications as may be appropriate, in relation to any other civil proceedings (other than proceedings in the sheriff court) in like manner as it applies in relation to civil proceedings in the Court of Session and if any question arises as to what are, for the purposes of any such civil proceedings, the appropriate modifications of any such act of sederunt, that question shall, in default of agreement, be determined by the court before whom the proceedings take place.
(8) The court in any civil proceedings shall have a discretion, where it appears to them that the interests of justice so require, and subject to such conditions (if any) as to expenses or otherwise as the court may think fit, to allow a statement falling within section (Admissibility of statements produced by computers) (1) of this Act to be given in evidence notwithstanding that any requirement laid down by or under this section has not been complied with.")—(Lord Hughes.)
LORD HUGHES: I beg to move Amendment No. 16.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 12, insert the following new clause:
Amendment of section 7 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1966
(". Section 7 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1966 shall be amended as follows

(a) in subsection (1) the words "on the production of the document" shall be deleted:

(b) after subsection (3) there shall be inserted the following subsection—

"(3A) Where a statement contained in a document is proposed to be given in evidence by virtue of this section it may he proved by the production of that document or (whether or not the document is still in existence) by the production of a copy of that document, or of the material part thereof, purporting to be certified or otherwise authenticated by a person responsible for the making of the copy or in such other manner as the court may approve; anti any such copy shall be taken to be a true copy unless the contrary is shown.".").—(Lord Hughes.)
Clause 13 [Interpretation of Part III and savings]:
LORD HUGHES: I beg to move Amendment No. 17.
Amendment moved—
Page 10, line 23, at end insert ("and "court" shall be construed accordingly.").—(Lord Hughes.)
LORD HUGHES: I beg to move Amendment No. 18.
Amendment moved—
Page 10, line 27, at end insert—
("( ) In this Part of this Act—
"computer" has the meaning assigned by section (Admissibility of statements produced by computers) of this Act;
"document" includes, in addition to a document in writing—

(a) any map, plan, graph or drawing;

(b) any photograph;

(c) any disc, tape, sound track or other device in which sounds or other data (not being visual images) are embodied so as to be capable (with or without the aid of some other equipment) of being reproduced therefrom; and

(d) any film, negative, tape or other device in which one or more visual images are embodied so as to be capable (as aforesaid) of being reproduced therefrom; "film" includes a microfilm;

"statement" includes any representation of fact, whether made in words or otherwise.
(2B) In this Part of this Act any reference to a copy of a document includes—

(a) in the case of a document falling within paragraph (c) but not (d) of the definition of "document" in subsection (2A) of this section, a transcript of the sounds or other data embodied therein;

(b) in the case of a document falling within paragraph (d) but not (c) of that definition, a reproduction or still reproduction of the image or images embodied therein, whether enlarged or not;

(c) in the case of a document falling within both these paragraphs, such a transcript together with such a still reproduction; and

(d) in the case of a document not falling within the said paragraph (d) of which a visual image is embodied in a document falling within that paragraph, a reproduction of that image, whether enlarged or not;

and any reference to a copy of the material part of a document shall be construed accordingly.").—(Lord Hughes.)
Clause 13, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 14 to 17 agreed to.
Clause 18 [Short title, interpretation, repeals, extent and commencement]:
LORD HUGHES: It might be for the convenience of the Committee if I move Amendments numbers 19, 20, 21 and 22 en bloc. I beg to move.
Amendments moved—
Page 13, line 7, leave out ("12") and insert ("(Procedure)")
Page 13, line 9, leave out ("12") and insert ("(Procedure)")
Page 13, line 11, at end insert ("and different days may be appointed under this section for different purposes.")
Page 13, line 14, leave out ("12") and insert ("(Procedure)")—(Lord Hughes.)
LORD DRUMALBYN: When we talk about procedure, I am entitled to ask the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, to give us an assurance that we shall no: have another five pages of Amendments introduced among the miscellaneous pro visions on the Report stage of the Bill. I understand that the Government have to take such opportunity as they can to gut miscellaneous law provisions through the House, but one does not want to feel that opportunities are abused. The introduction of these very long provisions in this House, which have to go back to another place and which have not yet been considered there, comes fai:1:r close to an abuse. Perhaps their length has been responsible in part for the fact that they have been delayed so long—I do not know. But, whatever the reason, I hope that our patience will not be tried too far and that we shall not have what is virtually further legislation introduced on the Report stage.
LORD HUGHES: I think that t le furthest I can go is to say that I should be very surprised if we tried to repeat this on the Report stage.
Clause 18, as amended, agreed to.
Schedules agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported, with Amendments.

GAMING BILL
Brought from Commons; read 1ª, and to be printed.

HEARING AID COUNCIL BELL
7.8 p.m.
LORD SORENSEN: My Lords I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, That the House do new resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Sorensen.)
House in Committee accordingly.
[The LORD JESSEL in the Chair.]
Clause 1 [Hearing Aid Council]:
LORD SORENSEN: In moving Amendment No. 1, may I say that this is a non-contentious Bill, and I am happy to inform the Committee that all those noble Lords who contributed so valuably to the discussion on this matter last week have been fully satisfied with the proposals embodied in the various Amendments which have been put down to the Bill. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 10, leave out ("the retail selling of") and insert ("dispensing").—(Lord Sorensen.)
LORD SORENSEN: This Amendment is no more than a drafting variation. The definition of "suppliers" in the Bill relates only to persons employing dispensers, and as drafted the Bill requires a self-employed dispenser to register as a dispenser. Such a person would ordinarily be described as a supplier. It therefore seems right that the Bill should draw a distinction between dispensers and employers of dispensers rather than between dispensers and suppliers. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 20, leave out ("suppliers") and insert ("persons employing such dispensers"). —(Lord Sorensen.)
LORD SORENSEN: This Amendment and No. 8 seek simply to improve the grammar. "Variation of" seems a little better than "variation to", though I am not quite clear why. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 3, leave out ("to") and insert ("of").—(Lord Sorensen.)
LORD SORENSEN: This Amendment, No. 4, and the next three Amendments are designed to meet a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn. May I say that he has explained why he cannot be here now, and I quite appreciate the reason. I also appreciate the very great help he gave in regard to this and other Amendments. He suggested that where the Board of Trade approved a variation of a standard or code they should have
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power to require other variations made to the relevant standard or code as a condition of their giving approval, as well as the power already conferred by the Bill to require the variations to be modified. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2. line 5, leave out ("code or variation") and insert ("or code").—(Lord Sorensen.)
LORD SORENSEN: I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 7, at end insert ("and in approving any variation may make their approval conditional upon the modifying of that variation or the further varying of the relevant standard or code in such manner as they may require:").—(Lord Sorensen.)
LORD SORENSEN: I beg to move Amendment No. 6.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 9, after ("modification") insert ("or further variation").—(Lord Sorensen.)
LORD SORENSEN: I beg to move No. 7.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 12, after ("modifications") insert ("or further variations").—(Lord Sorensen.)
LORD SORENSEN: I beg to move this Amendment.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 15, leave out ("to") and insert ("of").—(Lord Sorensen.)
Clause 2 [Registers of persons selling hearing aids]:
LORD SORENSEN: The reason for this Amendment has already been given in regard to Amendment No. 2, and it carries out the purpose described previously. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 26, leave out ("suppliers of hearing aids") and insert ("persons employing such dispensers").—(Lord Sorensen.)
LORD SORENSEN: Amendments Nos. 16 and 25 go with this Amendment, No. 10. It paves the way for the employment of the definition of "prescribed" set out in the new Clause 14. The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, suggested the inclusion of this definition. As the Bill itself specifies the amount of the fee and only provides for the Council to vary it, it is not correct to describe the fee as "prescribed". I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 30, leave out ("prescribed") and insert ("appropriate").—(Lord Sorensen.)
LORD SORENSEN: This Amendment does not make any very great change in the Bill. As the Bill now covers the hiring of hearing aids, it is thought that the reference to "selling" in Clause 2(5)(a) should be widened so as to permit the registration as dispensers of persons who have been dispensing aids on hire terms. This the Amendment does. It also makes it clear that persons registering by virtue of paragraph (a) can aggregate a series of periods in which they have acted as dispensers, in order to satisfy the six months' requirement. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 34, leave out lines 34 to 42 and insert—
("( ) Any individual other than a disqualified person shall he qualified to be registered under this section as a dispenser of hearing aids if—
(a) during the period of two years immediately preceding the commencement of this Act he has acted as a dispenser of such aids for a period of, or periods totalling, at least six months; or").—(Lord Sorensen.)
LORD SORENSEN: This Amendment is purely drafting. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 1, at beginning insert ("he").—(Lord Sorensen.)
LORD SORENSEN: This Amendment really goes with Amendment No. 31, and again is mainly an attempt to improve the drafting. The main change is that bodies corporate which are controlled by, or wholly or partly managed by, persons who have been struck off either of the
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registers are prima facie ineligible for registration as employers of dispensers. It is to be noted that bodies corporate are not, in any event, eligible for registration as dispensers and that on appeal pursuant to Clause 2(7) the Disciplinary Committee may direct that paragraph (b) of this subsection shall not apply in a particular case. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 4, leave out subsection (5) and insert—
("( ) Subject to subsection (7) of this section, any person other than—

(a) a disqualified person or a person carrying on business in partnership with a disqualified person; or

(b) a body corporate which has Among its directors one or more disqualified persons or in which a disqualified person has a controlling interest or in the management of which a disqualified person participates,

shall be qualified to be registered under this section as an employer of dispensers of tearing aids if he employs or proposes to employ any person to dispense such aids.")—(Lord Sorensen.)
LORD SORENSEN: This is a simple Amendment. It would appear a little odd if a person had a right of appeal to the Disciplinary Committee because the registrar refused to register him, but no right of appeal if the registrar simply sat on the application without expressly refusing to register. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 14, after ("refused") insert ("or the registrar fails to enter the name of the applicant on the appropriate regisier")— (Lord Sorensen.)
LORD SORENSEN: This Amendment goes with Amendment No. 10, and should also be considered with Amen intent No. 25. The object is to make it clear that a fee of £10 or £1, as the case may be, is payable upon registration, and that a similar fee is payable annually in. respect of the retention of a name in the register, and that the Council has power to vary these fees. Technically, the fee for retention of a name will require to be paid only by the appropriate rules, while the obligation to pay a registration fee is imposed by the Bill. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 17, leave out ("Company ") and insert ("body corporate").—(Lord Sorensen.)
LORD SORENSEN: I beg to move this Amendment.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 20, after ("section") insert ("' appropriate fee' means in the case of an application for registration as a dispenser a fee of £10 or such other amount as may be prescribed and in the case of an application for registration as an employer of such dispensers a fee of £1 or such other amount as may be prescribed; and").—(Lord Sorensen.)
Clause 2, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 3 [Offences by unregistered persons]:
LORD SORENSEN: This Amendment meets the point made by the noble Viscount, Lord Simon. He pointed out that Clause 3(1)(b) of the Bill related only to the employment of unregistered dispensers by unregistered employers, and suggested that the provision needed revision. As revised, paragraph (a) of the subsection makes it unlawful for a person not registered as an employer to employ anyone to act as a dispenser of hearing aids, whether or not that person is registered as a dispenser: and paragraph (c) makes it unlawful for a registered employer to employ an unregistered dispenser. To save repeating lines 35 to 37 on page 3 in relation to each paragraph of the subsection, an abbreviated concept, "to act as a dispenser of hearing aids", has been used. These words are to be interpreted in the sense used in Clause 14. The words "and acting under the supervision of a registered dispenser" at the end of paragraph (c) are included at the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 35, leave out from beginning to end of line 6 on page 4 and insert—
("to act as a dispenser of hearing aids;

(b) any person whose name is not for the time being entered in the register maintained pursuant to section 2(1)(b) of this Act to employ any person to act as a dispenser of hearing aids; or

(c) any person whose name is entered in the register which is so maintained to employ a person other than—

(i) a person registered under this Act as a dispenser of hearing aids; or

(ii) a person whose name has been notified to the Registrar of the Council and who is undergoing full-time training with a view to being registered as a
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dispenser of hearing aids and acting under the supervision of a registered dispenser,

to act as a dispenser of such aids:").—(Lord Sorensen.)
LORD SORENSEN: The two Amendments proposed to line 7 of page 4, Amendments Nos. 18 and 19, are purely drafting Amendments suggested by the Home Office. I beg to move Amendments Nos. 18 and 19.
Amendments moved—
Page 4, line 7, leave out ("contravention of") and insert ("person who contravenes")
Page 4, line 7, after ("be") insert ("guilty of").—(Lord Sorensen.)
LORD SORENSEN: Subsection (3) is now superfluous because of the definition of an employer of dispensers in the new Clause 14. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 4, line 10, leave out subsection (3). —(Lord Sorensen.)
Clause 4 [Rules]:
LORD SORENSEN: This Amendment deals with the issue of certificates to registered persons. The matter was dealt with by Clause 2(4) of the Bill, but not in a very satisfactory manner. It is suggested that it should be left to the Council to deal with the details of issuing certificates. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 4, line 16, leave out ("and in particular") and insert ("and with respect to the issue by the registrar of certificates of registration and such rules may in particular"). —(Lord Sorensen.)
LORD SORENSEN: The next three Amendments are all minor drafting changes. I beg to move Amendments Nos. 22, 23 and 24.
Amendments moved—
Page 4, line 17. leave out ("regulating") and insert ("regulate")
Page 4, line 18. leave out ("providing") and insert ("provide")
Page 4, line 20, leave out ("providing") and insert ("provide").—(Lord Sorensen.)
LORD SORENSEN: This Amendment has already been discussed on Amendments Nos. 10 and 16. It is to be read in conjunction with the Amendment on page 3, line 20. The Amendments distinguish between the fee payable on first registration and annual fees for the retention of names on registers. There is no change of substance. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 4, line 22, leave out paragraph (c) and insert—
("(c) require persons whose names are for the time being entered in the said registers to pay in respect of the retention of their names in the relevant register an annual fee of i10 in the case of persons registered as dispensers and El in the case of persons registered as employers of such persons;
(cc) vary the amount of either of the fees payable under section 2 of this Act upon first registration or the amount of either of the fees referred to in paragraph (c) of this section; ").—(Lord Sorensen.)
LORD SORENSEN: This and the following two Amendments are pure drafting. The clause lacks a couple of verbs, I believe. They also pave the way for a new proviso, placed, as it should be, at the end of the clause. I therefore beg to move Amendments Nos. 26, 27 and 28.
Amendments moved—
Page 4, line 28, at beginning insert ("provide for")
Page 4, line 38, leave out the proviso.
Page 5, line 3, at beginning insert ("provide for").—(Lord Sorensen.)
LORD SORENSEN: This proviso replaces the misplaced proviso at the end of paragraph (d) of Clause 4. There is one change of substance. The consent of the Board of Trade is required for any rule under this section, and not just rules varying fees. I beg to move.
Amendment moved
Page 5, line 5, at end insert—
("Provided that the Council shall not—

(i) make any rule under this section unless the terms of that rule have been approved in writing by the Board of Trade; or

(ii) make any rule pursuant to paragraph (d) of this section without first consulting any organisations which appear to the Council to he representative of the interests of dispensers of hearing aids or of persons employing such dispensers.").—(Lord Sorensen.)

Clause 4, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 5 agreed to.
Clause 6 [The Disciplinary Committee]:
LORD SORENSEN: This Amendment is purely drafting. I beg to move
Amendment moved—
Page 5, line 35, delete ("These rules") and insert ("Rules under this section")—(Lord Sorensen.)
On Question, Amendment agreed, to.
Clause 6, as amended, agreed Ito.
Clause 7 [Erasure front the registers for crime, misconduct, etc.]:
7.25 p.m.
LORD SCRENSEN: This Amendment has already been discussed under Amendment No. 13. It goes with the Amendment at page 3, line 4, in that the Bill now strikes at bodies corporate controlled by disqualified persons as well as bodies managed by such persons or of which such persons are directors. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 6, line 22, after ("of") insert (`or has a controlling interest in ")—(Lord Sorensen.)
Clause 7, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 8 agreed to.
Clause 9 [Appeals]:
LORD SCIRENSEN: This Amendment is put down to comply with Scottish law. Apparently the Scots call costs "expenses", although I imagine a rose by any other name smells just as sweet. Anyhow, in order to defer to our Scottish brethren, I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 7. line 8, after ("cost") insert ("or expenses")—(Lord Sorensen.)
Clause 9, as amended, agreed
Clause 10 [Procedure of Disciplinary Committee]:
LORD SORENSEN: This Amendment i purely drafting. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 8, line 20. leave out ("dispensation") and insert ("dispensing")—(Lord Scrensen.)
LORD SORENSEN: This Amendment is self-explanatory. Steps must be taken to ensure that persons affected by findings of the Disciplinary Committee are notified of them. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 8, line 30, at end insert—
("( ) for ensuring that persons likely to be affected by any finding of the Committee are duly notified of that finding:")—(Lord Sorensen.)
LORD SORENSEN: This Amendment, again, is the embodiment of a very valuable suggestion by the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, and I therefore beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 8, line 38, leave out from ("organisations") to end of line 40 and insert (" as appear to the Council to be representative of the interests of dispensers of hearing aids or of persons employing such dispensers.")—(Lord Sorensen.)
Clause 10, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 11 agreed to.
Clause 12 [Expenses, receipts and accounts of the Council]:
LORD SORENSEN: This is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 9, line 40, leave out ("dispensation") and insert ("dispensing")—(Lord Sorensen.)
Clause 12, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 13 agreed to.
Clause 14 [Interpretation]:
LORD SORENSEN LORD SORENSEN moved, to leave out Clause 14 and insert the following new Clause:
Interpretation
"14. In this Act—
"dispenser of hearing aids" means an individual who conducts or seeks to conduct oral negotiations with a view to effecting the supply of a hearing aid, whether by him or another, to or for the use of a person with impaired hearing; and references to the dispensing of hearing aids or to acting as a dispenser of such aids shall be construed accordingly;
"employer of dispensers" includes any person who enters into any arrangement with an individual whereby that individual undertakes for reward or anticipation of
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reward to act as a dispenser with a view to promoting the supply of hearing aids by that person; and references to the employing of dispensers and their employment shall be construed accordingly;
"hearing aid" means an instrument intended for use by a person suffering from impaired hearing to assist that person to hear better but does not include any instrument or device designed for use by connecting conductors of electricity to equipment or apparatus provided for the purpose of affording means of telephonic communication;
"prescribed" means prescribed by rules made by the Council pursuant to section 4 of this Act;
"supply" means supply by way of retail sale or by way of hire: but does not include a sale to a person acquiring for the purposes of trade."
The noble Lord said: This new clause introduces a new set of definitions. The important points to note are that "dispensers" are people who try to sell by word of mouth. The definition includes persons trading on their own account and employees, agents or representatives of any sort. An "employer" is so defined as to exclude anyone who employs a person gratuitously. The definition of "hearing aid" is intended to exclude an instrument which the Post Office provide to enable persons with impaired hearing to hear better on the telephone. The definition of "prescribed" was suggested, again by the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn. We think the definition of "supplied" includes hire purchase. The second and third lines make the position clear. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Leave out Clause 14 and insert the said new clause.—(Lord Sorensen.)
Clause 14, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 15, agreed to.
Schedule [Constitution and Powers of the Council]:
LORD SORENSEN: I beg to move Amendment No. 38 formally.
Amendment moved—
Page 11, leave out paragraph 1 and insert—
("1.—(1) The Council shall consist of a Chairman and eleven other members who shall be appointed by the Board of Trade.
(2) The Board shall not appoint as Chairman a person who is in their opinion capable of representing any of the interests mentioned in sub-paragraph (3) of this paragraph.
(3) The Board shall when appointing persons as members of the Council ensure that the members of the Council include—

(a) six persons who are capable of representing the interests of persons registered under section 2 of this Act and who are either so registered themselves or are directors of, or participate in the management of a body corporate which is so registered; and

(b) five persons who are not eligible for appointment under head (a) of this subparagraph and who either have specialised medical knowledge of deafness or audiological technical knowledge or who are capable of representing the interests of persons with impaired hearing:

Provided that in relation to the appointing of persons before the expiry of six months from the commencement of this Act head (a), of sub-paragraph (3) of this paragraph shall have effect as if references to persons registered under section 2 included references to persons who are, in the opinion of the Board, eligible to be registered under that section; and ")(Lord Sorensen.)
LORD SORENSEN: These lines are just bread and butter provisions. The proviso spells out what is meant on page 11, lines 9 and 10, by the Chairman having a single casting vote. The next paragraph amplifies the existing Paragraph 4 of the Schedule. The words are borrowed from the Opticians Act, where they are used in relation to the General Optical Council. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 11, line 29, leave out paragraph 4 and insert—
(". The procedures of the Council in the discharge of its functions shall be such as the Council may from time to time determine:
Provided that the Chairman shall not have the right to vote at a meeting of the Council except in the event of an equality of votes on any question when the Chairman shall have a single casting vote.
The powers of the Council and any of its committees may be exercised notwithstanding any vacancy, and no proceedings of the Council or of any of its committees shall be invalidated by any defect in the appointment of a member.")—(Lord Sorensen.)
LORD SORENSEN: With permision, I beg to move Amendments 40 and 41 together. They are adaptations following hard on the Opticians Act and the provisions regarding the General Optical Council.
Amendments moved—
Page 11, line 31, leave out from ("registrar") to end of line 32.
Page 11, line 33, at end insert ("to d 3 anything which in the opinion of the Council is calculated to facilitate the proper discharge of its functions and shall in particular have power—
( ) to appoint in addition to the registrar such other officers and servants as the Council may determine;".—(Lord Sorensen.)
Schedule, as amended, agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported with Amendments.

SEWERAGE (SCOTLAND) BILL
7.34 p.m.
LORD HUGHES: My Lords, I beg to move that the Report of Amendments be now received.
Moved, That the Report be now received.—(Lord Hughes.)
Clause 10 [Emptying of septic tanks]:
LORD BURTON: My Lords, I am afraid that the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, and the noble Earl, Lord Cromartie have both had to leave at this late hour, but they have asked me to move this Amendment on their behalf. With the permission of the House I will speak to Amendments Nos. 1, 2 and 3 together. I spoke at some length on Second Reading and in Committee about this particular clause, and in reply the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, said that we want the local authorities to undertake the duty of giving a service for emptying septic tanks. We feel that with this Amendment we are imposing upon the local authorities a duty to do so. They must then pass a resolution saying why they do not intend to do so; rather than that it should be left to the local authorities to pass a resolution which would say that they will, in fact, empty then. It is really a matter of an affirmative or a negative resolution from the local authority. 7 think the Amendment needs no further explanation. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 5, line II, after ("elect") insert ("not").—(Lord Burton.)
LORD HUGHES: My Lords, at first glance it would seem that this was a very reasonable Amendment, and I must admit that I looked at it very much from the

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point of view of being disposed to accept it, because it did not seem to me to make a great deal of difference at the end of the day whether the local authorities should contract in or contract out. But it does make a basic difference. At the present time, as the Bill is drafted the local authorities are given a discretion to empty septic tanks serving premises in their areas, with an option to put themselves under a duty to do so. The Amendments would make it a duty of the local authority to empty septic tanks with the option of renouncing that duty.
For that reason I cannot accept the Amendments; and, incidentally, they are defective in so far as they do not make any provision for a change of mind. If a local authority made a decision electing not to provide a service, it would be making that decision in perpetuity—which I think would be the last thing that the noble Lord would wish them to do.
LORD BURTON: My Lords, could the noble Lord please explain why they would be doing so in perpetuity? Surely they can make such a resolution specifying a number of years.
LORD HUGHES: My Lords, the Amendment does not in fact permit the authorities to make an amendment. It does not say that they may make a decision for a period of time. It says that they may elect not to provide the service. If the Amendment had been that they may elect not to do so for the next two years, the noble Lord would have been right. It may be that if this provision had been going in I would have said that we accepted the Amendment in principle but would have to ask that it be withdrawn and brought back in a proper form. But I have to advise your Lordships not to accept the Amendment. Therefore it does not matter at this stage whether the Amendment is defective or not, unless the noble Lord is going to try to insist on carrying his Amendment into operation.
I looked at this point very sympathetically because, as I have freely admitted to the House already, we have a position where in the populous areas people are going to pay for a drainage service which they are going to get and in the less populous areas some people are going to pay for a drainage service that they are not going to get. This state of affairs
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the noble Lord, Lord Burton, seeks to remedy by trying to create a position where those people who rely on septic tanks will get something for the money they pay. I have dealt already with the general principle from the point of view that rates are not payment for services rendered but are a form of local taxation. One of the unfortunate things about taxes is that neither the Government nor the local authorities ever guarantee that the return for the money paid is necessarily going to be value received.
Your Lordships know that this Bill will come into operation not immediately but when the Secretary of State declares the appointed day or appointed days; because it makes provision for different sections of the Act for different purposes of the Act, to be subject to different appointed days. The reason why it was decided that not all the provisions of the Act should be laid as duties on the local authorities is that we are doing two things. We are trying to bring about a long overdue reform and consolidation —because it is both—of the law on sewerage. We did not think we should be justified in deferring action on that any longer; but the fact remains that we are doing this and creating additional responsibilities which will fall on local authorities at a time when, because of the economic climate, the Government are asking local authorities to be careful about the way in which they spend money. The Secretary of State, accordingly, I think quite logically, said, "There must be a limit to the additional duties which I will place on local authorities at a given time". It may therefore be that the appointed day will not be fixed in relation to this service until the Secretary of State is satisfied that local authorities who will have this burden placed on them can properly carry out the service in relation to the general national position that exists.
My Lords, let us look at the position as the Bill is drafted. The local authority can do nothing until the appointed day is fixed. Once that is done the local authority can elect to provide the service. We must expect that the Secretary of State, when he fixes the appointed day, will have come to the conclusion that the time is ripe, at least in the greater part of the country, to bring the service into operation. But it may be

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that although the time is ripe over the greater part of the country it may not be in every part. Under the Bill as it stands, if a local authority passes a resolution electing to undertake this service it becomes operative only if the Secretary of State approves. If he is satisfied that it is the proper thing to do at that time, he will approve the resolution, and there the matter will end. If he does not think so, he will not approve the resolution and the service cannot be undertaken at that time in that area.
If the Amendment is accepted, the Secretary of State will have the opportunity to say to an authority which elects not to provide the service, "I think that you are wrong to refuse to provide this service, and I am not prepared to agree to your resolution". This would have the effect of laying down that where the Secretary of State thought that the service should he provided he could require it to be done. But if it were the other way round, if the authority, by omitting to pass such a resolution, were to go ahead with the provision of a service which the Secretary of State thought ought not to take place at that time, he would be powerless in the matter. There would be nothing requiring his approval or otherwise.
It may be said that this would be quite reasonable and would be leaving the maximum amount of discretion in the hands of the local authority, and if I thought that that was the way in which it would work I do not think I would necessarily depart from it in these circumstances. But, my Lords, that is not the way in which it would work. What would happen would be that the Secretary of State, no matter who he was, would be obliged to delay the fixing of the appointed day until he was satisfied that there were few areas in the country where the service could not be provided. As a result, the Secretary of State might find his hands tied, in the sense that, although he was willing, by naming the appointed day, to have the service provided over the great part of the country, he would have to delay fixing the appointed day, perhaps for another six months, a year or two years, because he did not know what would happen in counties A, B and C. The net result of this might well be contrary to what the noble Lord, Lord Burton, wants, which
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is to have the service provided as quickly as possible in the maximum number of areas. As I am at one with the noble Lord in wishing, from a health point of view, to see this service provided as rapidly as is reasonably possible all over the country, I urge him not to press this Amendment which inevitably, in these circumstances, must have the contrary effect to that which he intends.
THE DUKE OF ATHOLL: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, to say a little about the idea which I put forward during the Committee stage discussions; that there might be a differential rateable value where a sewerage system was supplied by a local authority and where it was provided by a private individual or by some non-local authority organisation?
7.44 p.m.
BARONESS ELLIOT OF HARWOOD: My Lords, I feel strongly about this matter, and I am sorry that the noble Lord, who I think is on the side of those who wish this to become a local authority service, was not able to persuade his right honourable friend tart this would be a good way to do it. In my county we have for some time had a county service to empty septic tanks. It costs little and is a valuable service. We pay a small amount, according to the number of tanks that are emptied. I hope that if the noble Lord does not feel it possible to make it compulsory for local authorities to provide this service (which I think is just as important as having a good drainage system or a water supply in urban areas), he will urge them to provide it. Otherwise we shall have the same old story: that people who live in urban areas may enjoy this facility—though of course they have to pay for it —but those living in rural areas, where we want people to stay in order to encourage development, will not get the service. I hope therefore that, if the noble Lord cannot accept the Amendment, he and the Secretary of Stare will urge local authorities to provide this service which I regard as being as important as the provision of a proper water supply or a drainage system.
LORD BURTON: My Lords, I appreciate that the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, has found a flaw in the Amendment, in that there is no provision for a period

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of time, but I feel that this is a small matter in comparison with the principle involved, and something that could be put right. The noble Lord must be aware that local authorities are adverse to incurring more expenditure than they need to, and that they have to account to the ratepayers. I am disappointed that he failed to persuade his colleagues that this was a good Amendment, and I am disappointed at the reason which he has given for turning it down.
It appears that the noble Lord's colleagues have no confidence in the local authorities. He has suggested that there might be delay in fixing the appointed day because one or two local authorities might not he ready to accept this. I do not think this a good reason for refusing to accept the Amendment. To say that St. Andrew's House is wiser than the local authorities in relation to their own affairs is to make a rather dangerous statement.
LORD HUGHES: My Lords, I may speak again only with the permission of the House, but if the House wishes me to reply to the questions which have been asked, I shall be happy to do so. First, in reply to the point raised by the noble Duke about the question which he asked at the previous stage, my Department has made inquiries and I am afraid that I have nothing very heartening to report. As we had supposed, the assessors are essentially concerned with fixing an annual value on which property may reasonably be expected to let. In arriving at their valuations the only sewerage factor they take into consideration is whether a service or apparatus is provided, not whether it has been provided as a public service.
The Secretary of State has no power to instruct the assessors in the carrying out of their duties under the Valuation Acts, and any change here would require legislation. But I think that, so long as there is a system of raising local revenues by reference to the letting value of property, it is only logical that the assessor should fix his valuation in the light of the factors that affect the letting value, taking no account of whether these factors are the result of public or private enterprise. I accept that there is room for more than one point of view about whether local authorities should empty septic tanks, but I doubt whether it would be feasible to
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amend the rating law to deal with any shortcomings which might be thought to exist in relation to sewerage.
My Lords, I must make quite clear that I have not been trying to persuade my right honourable friend the Secretary of State to do something he has failed to do. What I have done is to discuss the matter with the Secretary of State. It is not a case of my having one point of view and the Secretary of State having another, and of his view prevailing because he is the Secretary of State. We had a full discussion of the pros and cons, and we started off from the point of view which I always try to take on Amendments, particularly when they are not matters of Party controversy, to find the best way of doing a thing, of accepting the Amendment as right and then examining its possibilities. But after full consideration, both the Secretary of State and I were of the opinion that the better way to deal with this point is the way provided for in the Bill. I would not like noble Lords to think that I am on the side of the angels, and that there is a big bad wolf over in Dover House who has stopped this. If the angels are sitting on the Benches opposite, then I am afraid that there are two big bad wolves in St. Andrew's House —and I am the second one.
I have made it clear that I sympathise with what the noble Lord suggests, and so does my right honourable friend. It is a question of priorities. Personally, I have a vested interest in what the noble Lord is seeking to do. Up to a few years ago my permanent home in Dundee was served by a septic tank, but it is now connected with the main drainage system and that is perfectly satisfactory. But I have a temporary home in Angus, which does not have a main drainage system and it would suit me down to the ground if what the noble Lord is asking came into operation. But the last thing on earth which I can possibly allow to influence my judgment is that I might get my septic tank in Angus emptied if I agreed to what the noble Lord, Lord Burton, wishes. It must in fact persuade me to lean over backwards in the other direction, to make certain that no one can say that I have acted in this matter out of personal interest.
LORD BURTON: My Lords, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD HUGHES: My Lords, this is a minor drafting Amendment. Subsection (2) of Clause 18 requires the Secretary of State to make regulations, under which a local authority would compensate any of their officers or servants who suffer loss of employment, or loss or diminution of emoluments, because of the dissolution of a special drainage district. Line 12 of page 11 refers to the payment of compensation "to" such officers or servants, but I am advised that this is too restrictive, because it might not cover a payment to the legal representatives or dependants of an officer who has died before the payment was made. The insertion of the words "or in respect of" removes the doubt. The revised wording is precedented in similar legislation elsewhere. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Pase 11, line 12, after ("to") insert ("or in respect of").—(Lord Hughes.)

WATER RESOURCES BILL
House in Committee: clauses agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported without amendment; Report received.

SALE OF VENISON (SCOTLAND) (No. 2) BILL
7.55 p.m.
THE DUKE OF ATHOLL: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a second time. I think that perhaps I should briefly explain the background to it. The Deer Act 1959 charged the Red Deer Commission with the control and conservation of red deer in Scotland. It gave them powers to obtain the number shot from the various estates and from other people entitled to shoot deer under the Act. The impracticability of obtaining these figures from the smaller estates, more especially from the crofters and farmers who have the right to shoot marauding deer on enclosed land, has meant that the Red Deer Commission have not been able to obtain satisfactory figures of the number of deer shot each year and the sexes and ages of the deer shot.
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It is therefore proposed by this; Bill that venison dealers should be registered, that they should keep a book recording these facts and that the Red Deer Commission or the Secretary of State, or someone authorised by either of these, should be entitled to inspect these books. This will enable the Commission to obtain much more accurate figures about the number of deer being shot and the sexes of the deer. Perhaps I should point out that the Bill applies to all deer and not only to red deer, so it will have useful scientific purposes when the roe deer and fallow deer come to be counted and some form of control is applied to them.
Clause 1 of the Bill requires dealers in venison to register with the local authorities. Once a year the local authorities have to return to the Red Deer Commission a list of dealers in their areas. Under Clause 1(1)(b) people will only be allowed to sell venison, or to offer or expose venison for sale, only if they are registered dealers, except in the case of people who have legally shot or killed deer in some other way. Clause 2 requires registered dealers to keep a book, in which they record the various details laid down by the Bill. Clauses 3 and 4 are respectively the interpretation clause and Short Title.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a. —(The Duke of Atholl.)
LORD HUGHES: My Lords, I rise to congratulate the noble Duke, the Duke of Atholl, on the pleasant: and commendably brief way in which he has introduced this Bill and to say that the Government are happy to leave the progress of the Bill to the wishes of the House. The Bill has been based on the recommendations made by the Red Deer Commission in their Report for l967 and, as the noble Duke has explained, its purpose is to enable the Commission to obtain more easily information about the numbers of deer which are killed annually in Scotland.
I do not think it would be right if I were to let this occasion pass without paying tribute to the excellent work that is being carried out by the Red Deer Commission. The Government ar3 very appreciative of the work they have done, during their nine years of existence, in

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conserving and controlling deer, and they hope that if this Bill is passed it will assist the Commission in their task.
THE DUKE OF ATHOLL: My Lords, I should like to echo what the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, has said about the Red Deer Commission and to thank him for the benevolent neutrality which the Government are showing towards this Bill. I should also like to point out that this Bill has been agreed not only by all the bodies represented on the Red Deer Commission but also by the venison
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dealers and the local authority associations.
On Question, Bill read 2ª and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

GREAT NORTHERN LONDON CEMETERY COMPANY BILL [H.L.]
Reported, with Amendments.
House adjourned at eight o'clock.