HL Deb 29 July 1968 vol 296 cc137-54

Section 138 In subsection (1), after the words 'this Act' there shall be inserted the words 'and section (Power of mortgagee to serve blight notice) of the Act of 1968'. In subsection (5), after the words' those sections' there shall be inserted the words' and section (Power of mortgagee to serve blight notice) of the Act of 1968'.

After subsection (5), there shall be added the following subsection— '(6) In these provisions and in section (Power of mortgagee to serve blight notice) of the Act of 1968, "blight notice" means a notice served under the next following section or under the said section (Power of mortgagee to serve blight notice)'.

Section 139 In subsection (4), for the words' a notice served under this section' there shall be substituted the words' a blight notice'.

Section 140 In subsection (1), for the words' Where a notice has been served under the last preceding section' there shall be substituted the words' Where a blight notice has been served under the last preceding section or under section (Power of mortgagee to serve blight notice) of the Act of 1968)'. In subsection (3), for the words' a notice under the last preceding section' there shall be substituted the words a blight notice'; and after the word' subsection' there shall be inserted the words' or, as the case may be, section (Power of mortgagee to serve blight notice) (8) of the Act of 1968'.

Section 141 In subsection (1), for the words' notice served under section one hundred and thirty-nine of this Act' there shall be substituted the words' a blight notice'.

Section 142 In subsection (1), for the words 'Where a notice has been served under section one hundred and thirty-nine of this Act' there shall be substituted the words 'Where a blight notice has been served'. In subsection (2)(b), for the words 'the notice under section one hundred and thirty-nine of this Act' there shall be substituted the words 'the blight notice'.

Section 144 In subsection (1), for the words 'a notice has been served under section one hundred and thirty-nine of this Act' there shall be substituted the words 'a blight notice has been served

Section 146 In subsection (1), for the words' a notice under section one hundred and thirty-nine of this Act' there shall be substituted the words 'a blight notice'.")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, we have already discussed this under Amendment No. 40. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Schedule 3 [Control of works for demolition, alteration or extension of listed buildings]:

LORD KENNET

My Lords, this and the next Amendment, No. 102, are really machinery. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 83, line 43, leave out sub-paragraph (1) and insert— ("(1) Regulations under this Act may provide that an application for listed building consent, or an appeal against the refusal of such an application, shall not be entertained unless it is accompanied by a certificate corresponding to one or other of those described in paragraphs (a) to (d) of section 16(1) of the principal Act (requirement of certificate that the applicant is the owner of the land or has given notice to the owners of his intended application or has tried to do so) and any such regulations may—

  1. (a) apply for the purposes of this subparagraph the provisions of subsections (2) to (4) and (6) of that section, with such modifications as appear to the Minister to be requisite; and
  2. (b) make provision as to who, in the case of any building, is to be treated as the owner for the purposes of any provision of the order made by virtue of this subparagraph.")—(Lord Kennet.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD KENNET

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 102.

Amendment moved—

Page 84, line 13, at end insert— ("() Where provision is made by regulations in accordance with sub-paragraph (1) above, the regulations may also include provision corresponding to section 17(3) of the principal Act (duty of local planning authority, and of the Minister on appeal, to take into account representations made by others interested in the land and to give them notice of the decision on the application or appeal.")—(Lord Kennet.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD KENNET

My Lords, these three Amendments, Nos. 103, 104 and 105, which beg to move en bloc, are all drafting.

Amendments moved—

Page 90, line 48, leave out ("(3), (4), or (6)") and insert ("or (3) to (7)")

Page 91, line 3, leave out ("14(6)") and insert ("14(7)")

Page 91, line 11, leave out ("paragraph 14(3) and (4)") and insert ("sub-paragraphs (3) to (6) of paragraph 14").—(Lord Kennet.)

On Question, Amendments agreed to.

BARONESS SEROTA moved Amendment No. 106: Page 92, line 22, after ("notice") insert ("(without prejudice to their power to serve another)")

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, this is another Amendment corresponding to Amendment No. 17, but in this case it relates to listed building enforcement notices. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Schedule 5 [Procedure in connection with orders relating to footpaths and bridleways]:

BARONESS SEROTA moved Amendment No. 107:

Page 96, line 25, at end insert— ("() In the foregoing sub-paragraph 'council' means a county council, a county borough council, a county district council, the Greater London Council or a London borough council.")

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, this Amendment defines the word "council" used in the Schedule on procedure for footpath and bridleway orders. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

BARONESS SEROTA

My Lords, Amendments Nos. 108 and 109 are purely drafting. I beg to move.

Amendments moved— Page 97, line 7, after ("or") insert ("over"). Page 97, line 30, after ("or") insert ("over").—(Baroness Serota.)

On Question, Amendments agreed to.

Schedule 7 [Adaptation and interpretation of enactments, etc.]:

BARONESS SEROTA moved Amendment No. 110: Page 99, line 46, after ("Act") insert ("this Act").

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, this Amendment deals with machinery. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

8.25 p.m.

LORD AIREDALE moved Amendment No. 110A:

Page 101, line 35, at end insert— (". In section 14(8)(b) after "1959" there shall be inserted the words "except sections 72, 73 and 74 thereof".")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment is similar in terms to one which I moved in Committee and which has been inspired by a recent court case, Westminster Bank, Limited, v. Beverley Borough Council, which was reported in The Times on May 31 last. It was a case which was heard in the Court of Appeal and which is sub judice, an appeal having been lodged with this House.

The question which arises, and with which we are dealing in this Amendment, is whether or not, when a road improvement scheme is made, people owning land beside the proposed road improvement area shall or shall not receive immediate compensation for losing their right to develop their roadside land. Legislation of 1925 made it abundantly clear that in these cases there was to be immediate compensation paid to any person who was injuriously affected by such a road-widening scheme.

We then had the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act, the first of the Town and Country Planning Acts, and in 1954 the Ministry of Transport issued a Circular No. 696, paragraph 8 of which says: In view of the powers now available to local authorities as planning authorities for the control of development it is no longer necessary for councils to safeguard future road improvement schemes by using their powers … to prescribe building and improvement lines. It then quoted the 1925 Statutes, to which I have referred.

Your Lordships will have guessed that the point of this was that by proceeding under the planning legislation persons whose land was injuriously affected were not to be entitled to immediate compensation. They might get compensation when the road improvement scheme went through, but that of course might be in 25 years' time, and it would not be the landowner at the time the scheme was made but probably his grandson who would get the compensation.

In 1959, Parliament passed the Highways Act of that year, Sections 72, 73 and 74 of which re-enacted specifically the provisions of the two 1925 Statutes which had said that there was to be immediate compensation payable in these road-improvement scheme cases, a procedure which no doubt had been followed from 1925 right up until the Ministry of Transport Circular of 1954. Of course, when Parliament passed the 1959 Act it had before it the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act, but Parliament specifically re-enacted that in these cases persons injuriously affected when road-improvement schemes were made should have the immediate compensation to which they had been entitled ever since 1925. One would have thought that the 1959 Act put paid to the Ministry's Circular of 1954, but in fact it was the opposite.

In Committee in reply to my Amendment the noble Baroness, Lady Serota said this—and may I say that I was a little disappointed that nowhere in the Minister's reply does any reference appear to the fact that what we are discussing here is whether people shall or shall not have immediate compensation. But the noble Baroness did say this: The Highways Act Provisions go back to the time before the universal planning powers of the 1947 Act were available to local planning authorities and are now moribund."— OFFICIAL REPORT, 8/7/68, col. 740.]

I think that observation from the Minister entitles me to quote an observation of Lord Justice Salmon in the Court of Appeal, and I am going to he very careful not to breach the sub judice rule; I am not going to quote anything said in the Court of Appeal with regard to the facts of the particular case, but referring exclusively to general principles and general policy what Lord Justice Salmon said, as reported in The Times, was this: … a Ministry of Transport circular seemed to say quite plainly that it would be very stupid to prescribe an improvement line under the Highways Act 1959, because the highway authority would have to pay for the damage suffered by the landowner. Ever since the circular was published, it appeared that improvement lines were not prescribed under the Act, but planning powers were used to sterilise land without property owners having the right to compensation. That practice was to be deplored. It was a practice to defeat the express intention of Parliament in the Highways Act. It was an unjust practice designed to save money.

I am perfectly certain that Parliament, in passing the 1959 Act, was reflecting public opinion, public opinion being that when land is taken for the community or is prescribed to be taken for the benefit of the community the individual landowner who is injuriously affected thereby shall have immediate compensation. If the procedure of the 1954 Ministry circular goes on being adopted, which is quite contrary in what is said in the provisions of the 1959 Highways Act, I humbly submit that that is a piece of impertinence on the part of the Executive.

We must decide in these cases what is to happen. Is Parliament's intention, as expressed in the Highways Act, to be observed, and are people to have their immediate compensation? Or is the practice of an out-of-date Ministry circular going to be observed, and are people going to be denied their immediate compensation? Or are local authorities going to be given the choice to exercise their whim or their judgment and in some cases to grant compensation under the Highways Act and in other cases to deny compensation by proceeding under planning legislation? I suggest that we must come to a decision upon this matter in this Bill. I submit to your Lordships that the observations of Lord Justice Salmon which I have quoted ought to be followed and adopted and this Amendment ought to be accepted, which makes it quite clear that in the future the provisions of the Highways Act 1959 are to apply and people are to get immediate compensation as provided in that Act in cases where they lose the right to develop their land by reason of the land being prescribed as required for the community for road widening schemes and the like. I beg to move.

8.35 p.m.

BARONESS SEROTA

My Lords, this Amendment, as the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, has indicated in his speech in moving it, is a very technical one requiring great knowledge of previous legislation and the relevant Acts of Parliament. It might be helpful to the House if I were to explain a little of the background. Section 14(7) and (8) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1962 empowered the Minister to facilitate development by making development orders which direct that certain enactments shall not apply or shall apply with modifications to the development specified in the order. The enactments in respect of which this power can be exercised are those passed before the passing of the Town and Country Planning Act 1957 and those provisions in the Highways Act 1959 which are a re-enactment of provisions dating back from before the passing of the 1947 Planning Act. The 1959 Act was a consolidating measure, and Sections 72, 73 and 74, referred to in Lord Airedale's Amendment are re-enactments of old Road Improvement Act and Public Health Act provisions concerned with the prescription of improvement lines for street widening and building lines and frontage lines where a building is to be rebuilt.

As I understand it, the effects of Lord Airedale's Amendment would be to take away the power of the planning Minister to make orders removing or restricting the effect of those sections. The noble Lord, Lord Airedale, referred to the Westminster Bank case and reminded the House that this case was decided against the Minister in the court of first instance, broadly on the ground that the decision of the planning authority and of the Minister on appeal was a misuse of planning powers, because the land required for road widening would have been protected by the use of powers under Sections 72, 73 and 74 of the Highways Act 1959, powers which could have carried with them a right to compensation from the Bank. In the Court of Appeal this decision was reversed, Lord Justice Salmon dissenting, broadly on the grounds that highway considerations were an integral part of planning—a theme which has run very much through our discussions on this Bill—and the planning legislation contained its own compensation code which laid down the circumstances in which compensation should be payable for planning restrictions. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was granted, and the Ministry have recently been informed by the Bank that it is intended to lodge such an appeal.

The only basis for attacking the planning decision taken in reliance on Planning Act powers in this case lay in the existence of the alternative powers under the Highways Act, and if these alternative powers were not there, there would be no doubt about the validity of planning decisions of this type. Lord Airedale's purpose, presumably, is to prevent the Minister from acting to clear up the situation once and for all by exercising his power to make a development order or orders, under Section 14(7) of the 1962 Act, cancelling or restricting the effect of the relevant sections of the Highways Act in relation to all development or to the development specified in the particular order. This would have been in some people's view a remarkably recondite way of dealing with the problem presented by the court of first instance, if it had not been reversed by the Court of Appeal, and although it has occurred to my right honourable friend it is certainly not a course that he would have been recommended to take. To that extent, therefore, the Amendment before the House is guarding against a contingency which is never likely to arise.

The position of the Government in all this is that we regarded the situation as left by the decision of the Court of Appeal as satisfactory. It leaves with local planning authorities and the Minister powers which it was always assumed they had, and which indeed they must have if development control is to be exercised satisfactorily. In these days the planning of development cannot be regarded as something separate from the planning of roads, to be conducted by a separate authority and under separate powers.

Since the debate on the Committee stage my right honourable friend has considered what was then said on Lord Airedale's Amendment, but he is satisfied that for the time being matters should proceed as they are. He attaches great importance to the principle that planning powers should be available in cases where it is necessary to control development which would interfere with road improvements or road construction. Meanwhile, the Highways Act powers remain on the Statute Book. Until they are repealed it seems right that the Minister should have power to modify their effect by means of a development order if it should appear necessary.

It must be conceded that that power has not so far been used and it is indeed not likely to be used in practice. This is not, in any case, we feel, the moment to rush into an alteration of the law, especially one which would preclude the bringing of the two sets of provisions into concurrence without legislation, when leave to appeal to your Lordships' House has already been given in the case which has brought the question into prominence and that leave, it is understood, is likely to be exercised shortly. I hope that the House will agree, that in the light of these circumstances, particularly with the case pending, it should not accept tonight the Amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Airedale.

8.42 p.m.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

My Lords, I hope that the advice of the noble Baroness will be carefully considered. It raises one important point. There have been a number of cases in courts of law where there has been this sort of conflict between a power which can be exercised under the planning Acts without the payment of any compensation at all (which I think is this case), and another power under another Statute which may be on a cognate subject which does provide for compensation. It is not so much necessarily the power to reduce planning permission as to impose conditions upon its grant, and there has been a considerable exercise of judicial opinion about whether it is right to take away the compensation that would be due under other Acts by way of a condition under the Town and Country Planning Act.

I think that the noble Baroness certainly has a point when she says that we ought to wait until this House in another capacity decides whether or not in this case the Beverley Corporation were correct in the way that they dealt with the matter, and that the Minister was correct in upholding them. I hope that the Government have not taken a fixed line and made some policy decision about whether or not it is the proper way to deal with these things, so that the person who is otherwise entitled, as in this case, under the Highways Act to compensation, should, after all, be deprived of it by the exercise of these powers under the Town and Country Planning Act.

This is really a quite broad matter. It does not apply only to the Westminster Bank case; it applies to a large number of other provisions in the law where there are inter-related possibilities of this sort. I hope that what the noble Baroness says does not imply a general policy decision upon this matter. If it does, then I think that the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, has a point and that the matter ought to be pursued. But I hope that her speech was not intended to direct our minds in that particular way.

LORD SANDYS

My Lords, I should like to support the Amendment so closely argued both on Committee and on Report by the noble Lord, Lord Airedale. I should declare an interest in this subject as a member of the Country Landowners' Association, an Association which comprises some 38,000 members. It must be remembered that the Association comprises largely owner-occupiers, and this is an important factor which I will come to a little later.

When this Amendment was moved in Committee on July 8, the noble Baroness, Lady Serota, assured us (col. 739): … the Government regard the situation left as a result of this case"— that is, the Westminster Bank v. Beverley Corporation case— as satisfactory, in that it leaves with the local planning authority and the Minister powers which it will always be assumed that they had and which they must have, if development control is to be exercised satisfactorily. I think we may agree that this position is highly satisfactory, but only from the point of view of a local planning authority. They are in a most enviable position, because they are able to choose between two procedures which they may adopt. They can either take powers formally under a development plan prepared under Part II of the Town and Country Planning Act 1962, to define what land in their area is proposed to be used for a highway in future; or, alternatively, they can take powers under the Highways Act 1959. The provisions for widening roads, of course, come under Sections 72 and 73 of this Act, involving payment of compensation for injurious affection.

It so happens that this particular case involves the Westminster Bank. But can we say that this is typical? After all, in a large number of cases a road frontage due for widening so often consists of perhaps three bungalows, a filling station, a newsagent's and a house or two. In that case, there may be a quite substantial number of occupiers and owner-occupiers, all of whom would be affected to a greater or lesser extent. I wish to emphasise that in this Bill we are planning for the 1970s and the 1980s, and we are not looking backwards. With that in mind, we should perhaps have our intentions set clearly on what is the important factor at the outset, and in my view Lord Airedale's Amendment underlines a particularly important point.

LORD AIREDALE

My Lords, I am very grateful to the two noble Lords who have supported my Amendment. I suppose that if I were to proceed to divide the House now upon this Amendment I should not get much thanks, because I daresay there would not be a quorum and we should be prevented from completing the Report stage of this Bill. And in that event, I suppose that the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, would never speak to me again. But I shall return to this matter on Third Reading. I shall have had the advantage of reading carefully in Hansard what the noble Baroness has said in replying to this Amendment this evening.

In the meantime, may I say to the noble Baroness, in all friendliness, that, just as I complained that in her speech in replying to my Amendment in Committee she said nothing which indicated in the least that what we were discussing was whether a person whose land was taken away was to get any compensation or not, again this evening not one word of the noble Baroness's speech would lead anyone to suppose that what was being discussed was whether or not a person whose land was to be taken away was to receive the compensation which Parliament had said in the 1959 legislation was to be given.

Finally, let me emphasise once more that when Parliament passed that legislation in 1959 it had before it the Town and Country Planning legislation. As I see it, the objection to adopting the course advocated by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, is that we all know that by the time this House, in its judicial capacity, has decided the Westminster Bank case this Town and Country Planning Bill will have passed into law. However strongly their Lordships sitting judicially may deplore the existing state of affairs, we shall be told just how long it will be before any further legislation can be passed to deal with this matter; that "it was only yesterday that the Town and Country Planning Bill was passed into law and there is no more Parliamentary time for this matter". That is what we shall be told, and that is why I want sincerely to get this matter resolved before this Bill reaches the Statute Book, notwithstanding that a case is sub judice. I shall seek leave to withdraw this Amendment now, but I shall come back to it on Third Reading.

BARONESS SEROTA

My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down—I hesitated to interrupt him when he was speaking—I must apologise for not taking up the specific point he made on compensation. It is perfectly true that the Highways Act powers necessarily bring the right to claim compensation at the time of prescribing the building or improvement, but it is my view—and certainly I am advised by those who have much greater knowledge of this subject, and of this very involved and difficult legislation, than I myself have—that it is far too facile a generalisation to say that in contrast to the Highways Act, the Planning Acts give no compensation at all.

As I understand it, a refusal of permission which falls within Part II of Schedule 3 to the Act of 1962—and that includes the case, of extension of an existing building by not more than one-tenth—distracts compensation. Compensation, or the right to require the opposing public authority to buy the land, might arise under other provisions of the planning Act in certain circumstances. For these reasons, which I am sure are very familiar to the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, who is so expect in this subject, I find it difficult to accept that action under one set of legislation provides compensation and the other one clearly does not.

LORD AIREDALE

My Lords, I will not make a third speech, because we are on Report. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

BARONESS SEROTA moved Amendment No. 111:

Page 101, line 37 leave out paragraph 11 and insert— ("11. Any reference to section 68 of the Act shall be construed (according as the context may require) as including, or as being replaced by, a reference to section 26 of this Act.

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, the effect of this Amendment is to enable transactions authorised in relation to land under Clause 26 of the Bill to be carried out also in relation to land previously acquired under Section 68 of the 1962 Act. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD KENNET moved Amendment No. 112:

Page 101, line 44, at end insert— (". In section 15(1)(b) (certain planning applications not to be determined by local planning authority before expiration of a specified period), for the words from 'appearing from the evidence' onwards there shall he substituted the words of the application'.")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, we have already discussed this and the next Amendment in the context of Amendment No. 47. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD KENNET

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 113.

Amendment moved—

Page 102, leave out lines 18 to 21 and insert— (". In section 17 (determination of planning applications),—

  1. (a) at the beginning of subsection (1)(a) there shall be inserted the words 'subject to sections 59 and 60 of the Act of 1968'; and
  2. (b) in subsection (2), for the words from 'appearing from the evidence' onwards there shall be substituted the words of the application'.")—(Lord Kennet.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

BARONESS SEROTA

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 114.

Amendment moved— Page 103, line 36, leave out ("following"). —(Baroness Serota.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD KENNET moved Amendment No. 115:

Page 104, leave out lines 9 to 26 and insert— ("33. In section 159 (determination of applications etc. by statutory undertakers in respect of operational land) the following amendments shall be made:—

  1. (a) in subsection (1), after the words 'such an application' there shall be inserted the words or such an application is deemed to be made under section 16(7) of the Act of 1968 on an appeal under that section by statutory undertakers';
  2. (b) after subsection (1) there shall be inserted the following subsection:

The noble Lord said: My Lords, we have already discussed this in the context of Amendment No. 22. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

BARONESS SEROTA

My Lords, I beg to move Amendments Nos. 116 and 117 together. The object of these revisions is to ensure a technical defect in the service of an enforcement notice cannot be pleaded in the courts as ground for upsetting the notice, but must be raised by way of appeal to the Minister. The Minister has jurisdiction under Clause 16(4)(b) to disregard the failure of service, where no one has beer, prejudiced. I beg to move.

Amendments moved—

Page 105, line 24, leave out from ("section") to ("above") in line 34 and insert— ("(a) the validity of an enforcement notice shall not, except by way of an appeal under Part II of the Act of 1968, be questioned in any proceedings whatsoever on any of the grounds specified in paragraphs (b) to (e) of section 16(1) of that Act; (b) the validity of a listed building enforcement notice under section 40 of the Act of 1968 shall not, except by way of an appeal under Part IV of Schedule 3 to that Act be questioned in any proceedings whatsoever on any of the grounds specified in sub-paragraph (b) or (e) of paragraph 18(1) of that Schedule. (2) Subsection (1)(a)") Leave out from beginning of line 47 to end of line 7 on page 106.—(Baroness Serota.)

On Question, Amendments agreed to.

BARONESS SEROTA moved Amendment No. 118:

Page 107, line 22, at end insert— ("(b) in subsection (3), for the words in either of the preceding subsections' there shall be substituted the words' in subsection (1) of this section'").

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, this is a consequential drafting Amendment. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

BARONESS SEROTA moved Amendment No. 119:

Page 107, line 44, at end insert— (". In section 196 (expenses of county councils), after the word 'thereto', there shall be inserted the words 'or under the provisions of the Act of 1968'.")

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, the purpose of this Amendment is to extend the application of Section 196 of the Act of 1962 to the provisions of this Bill. This provides that the council of any county may direct that any expenses incurred by them, under certain specified sections, shall be treated as expenses for special county purposes, chargeable upon such part of the county as may be specified in the directions. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

BARONESS SEROTA moved Amendment No. 120: Page 109, line 22, after ("under") insert ("Part II or").

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, this Amendment brings a proposal to serve a notice under Part II of the Bill within the subsection, as well as notice under Part V of the Bill. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

8.55 p.m.

LORD KENNET moved Amendment No. 121:

Page 110, line 5, at end insert— ("() After subsection (3), there shall be inserted the following subsection:— '(3A) Without prejudice to subsection (3) above, where an order has been made—

  1. (a) by the Minister of Transport, either before or after the commencement of section 80 of this Act, under section 153(1) of this Act or section 49 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1947; or
  2. (b) by the Minister of Housing and Local Government under the said section 153(1),
so much of the order as relates to a footpath or bridleway may be varied or revoked by an order made under the said section 153(1) by either of those two Ministers.'")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this hangs together with Amendment No. 81, which we have already discussed. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD KENNET

My Lords, Amendments Nos. 122 and 123 depend from Amendment No. 22, which we have already discussed. I beg to move them together.

Amendments moved— Page 112, line 43, leave out from ("16(7)") to end of line 45 and insert ("or (Grant of certificate by Minister on referred application or appeal against refusal) (5) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1968 is deemed to have been made for such planning permission as is mentioned in the said section 16(7) or, as the case may be, the said section (Grant of certificate by Minister on referred application or appeal against refusal) (5)'.") Page 113, leave out lines 1 to 3 and insert ("or (Grant of certificate by Minister on referred application or appeal against refusal) (5) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1968 is deemed to have been made for such planning permission as is mentioned in the said section 16(7) or as the case may be the said section (Grant of certificate by Minister on referred application or appeal against refusal) (5)'.").—(Lord Kennet.)

On Question, Amendments agreed to.

LORD KENNET moved Amendment No. 124:

Page 114, line 19, at end insert— ("This amendment of section 14 shall not have effect in relation to a notice thereunder served before the commencement of Part H of this Act.")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment ensures that a notice served under Section 14 of the Civic Amenities Act, that is a "tree enforcement notice", before the commencement of Part II of the Bill is dealt with according to the existing enforcement code. The Amendment is consistent with the new transitional provisions for enforcement notices generally, which are contained in the forthcoming Amendment to Schedule 8. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Schedule 8 [Transitional Provisions and Savings]:

LORD KENNET moved Amendment No. 125:

Page 117, leave out lines 2 to 7 and insert— ("10.—(1) References in this Act to an enforcement notice shall be construed as not including references to an enforcement notice served, before the commencement of Part II of this Act, under section 45 of the principal Act, or having effect by virtue of paragraph 11 or 12 of Schedule 13 to the principal Act, or paragraph 1 or 17 of Schedule 14 to that Act. (2) In relation to an enforcement notice so served, the provisions of the principal Act, and of any other Act passed before this Act, shall continue to apply as if this Act had not been passed. (3) Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the withdrawal, after the said commencement, of an enforcement notice so served or the service thereafter of an enforcement notice under Part It of this Act.")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, machinery! I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD KENNET moved Amendment No. 126:

Page 117, line 21, leave out paragraph 13 and insert— ("13. In relation to a notice served under section 139 of the principal Act before the commencement of sections 31 and 32 of this Act, and to any hereditary or agricultural unit which is the subject of the notice, sections 140 to 151 of the principal Act shall, after that commencement, have effect without any of the amendments made by Part IV of this Act.")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, the effect of this Amendment is to replace the existing paragraph 13 with a more flexible and generous transitional provision. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Schedule 9 [Enactments repealed]:

LORD KENNET moved Amendment No. 127:

Page 121, line 1, column 3, at end Insert— ("In section 1(6), paragraphs (b) and (c)")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, we have already discussed this Amendment in the context of Amendment No. 47. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.