RHODESIA

HL Deb 25 January 1968 vol 288 cc580-96

10.27 p.m.

LORD ALPORT rose to ask Her Majesty's Government whether there has been any initiative from Mr. Smith Which might indicate a wish to resume negotiations for a settlement since the Commonwealth Secretary's statement on Rhodesia on December 12, 1967. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I should like to take this opportunity of thanking your Lordships for the opportunity to ask this Question, in accordance with your procedure. I have no knowledge as to what the Answer may be, but if, as I assume, there has been no sign from Salisbury of a wish for further negotiations since Mr. Thomson's return, I am taking this opportunity to set out my reasons for thinking that an initiative should be made now.

Since I returned from Salisbury and the visit I paid there at the request of Her Majesty's Government, I have done my best to avoid public comment on the Rhodesian problem. I do so now only because I do not think much time remains before the final break takes place between Britain and Rhodesia. If anyone has anything to say which he believes may be practical and beneficial, I conceive it to be his duty to speak up now—and even now it may be too late.

On my return to London in July, I made a long verbal report to the Prime Minister and the Commonwealth Secretary. I see no reason to alter my appreciation of the situation as a result of what has occurred subsequently. I am a witness at first-hand of the strong desires of people of all races in Rhodesia—I believe a majority of people of all races—for a negotiated settlement with Britain; a settlement which must involve give and take on both sides but which would accord, on the one hand, with the principles accepted by both Parties in the United Kingdom, and which would, on the other, contain proper safeguards for the future of their country as the stable and civilised community which Rhodesia represents to-day.

When U.D.I. took place, I thought and said that there could be no agreement between the Rhodesian Front régime and any British Government. I now believe, as a result of "Tiger" and of the strong impressions which I received in Rhodesia last year, that an agreement could be reached which would be acceptable to Britain and which would have the support of a majority of all races in Rhodesia. Your Lordships are well aware that, as in the "Tiger" document, the problem falls into two main parts: agreement on the terms for a future Constitution and agreement on the means of a return to legality.

Although, like everyone else, I was disappointed at the outcome of the Commonwealth Secretary's visit to Salisbury last November, it did in fact achieve one very important result: it isolated the points of disagreement on the Constitution which then and to-day stand in the way of progress towards settlement. Those points are three in number. The first, and by far the most difficult—a breaking point, so far as the British are concerned—relates to the composition of the Senate and the Legislative Assembly and the representative character of the blocking quarter (that is, the 25 per cent. of the members) who would have the power to stop the passage of legislation designed to be racially discriminatory or to prevent the gradual enlargement of African political rights. Mr. Smith maintains that this quarter should comprise Chiefs and elected Africans. The "Tiger" proposals ensured that, quite apart from the existence of representatives of the Council of Chiefs in the Senate, the blocking quarter would consist of members, whether themselves African or European, who were for the most part elected by and responsible LO the African population.

My Lords, the whole of our experience of political reality in Africa, and indeed in Asia, and the recent precedents neighbouring countries to Rhodesia, like Malawi and Botswana, support our point of view. Chiefs have an important part in the life of the tribes over which they preside. Their office may have an almost mystical significance. They have administrative responsibilities and a minor judicial role; but they are not regarded in Africa as a whole as being the political representatives of their people. I think it is extremely significant that Sir Seretse Khama, whose hereditary chieftanship was far more important and influential that any Rhodesian chieftan, relics nom not on traditional but on elected status for political leadership in Botswana. The same applies to Chief Leabua Jonathan in Lesotho vis-à-vis the traditional position of Moshoeshoe III. I can think of nowhere in Central or Southern Africa where the Chiefs are regarded as being fully representative politically by Africans who may nevertheless regard them and their offices with great respect.

If they—that is to say, the Chiefs—aspire to act in this capacity, the capacity of political representatives, then let them offer themselves as candidates for election to the Senate or to the Legislative Assernbly, as has happened elsewhere in Africa. By adding elected status to their traditional role their prestige would be immensely strengthend, and I know at least two Rhodesian Chiefs who would make admirable members of the Legislative Assembly. If there is to be a settlement between Britain and Rhodesia, ii must be one which can mobilise the confidence of thinking Africans as well as safeguard the interests of other races in the country. It means having what is now called "credibility". The British Government would not be doing a service to Britain or to Rhodesia if they agreed to the inclusion of a piece of constitutional mechanism which throughout Africa would be regarded simply as a device to prevent 4 million Africans in Rhodesia from achieving over a period of years, perhaps over a full generation, what any reasonable man would regard as being their legitimate political aspirations.

On the other hand, the inclusion of a blocking mechanism against discrimination does not mean that it operates in such a way as to procure the premature transference of power from European into African nationalist hands. I accept, and I think Rhodesia would be right to accept, that no British Government wishes this to happen. Equally, I believe—and I think that the Rhodesians would be right to believe—that whatever may be the composition of the membership of a post-Independence Rhodesian Parliament, the blocking mechanism should be in the hands of the elected element which is representative, for the most part, of the African majority of the population. The composition of the Senate and of the Legislative Assembly, and the precise nature of the blocking mechanism is still, I think, a potential subject for negotiation in the light of the latest talks between Mr. Smith and the Commonwealth Secretary. I suggest that these negotiations should be held now.

My Lords, the second matter raised by Mr. Smith in his talks with Mr. Thomson was the whole principle of cross-voting. This is no occasion on which to go into the complexities of this constitutional device. I merely say that it is important to the long-term future of Rhodesia—which on Mr. Smith's own admission must one day move towards majority rule—that the Europeans and Africans who during the next ten, twenty or fifty years comprise the membership of the parliamentary institutions of the country should learn to look both to its black and to its white citizens for support. It should be remembered, in Rhodesia at any rate, that the founding fathers of Rhodesia believed in this principle; and I personally believe that it is more important to the white minority than it is to the black majority in the context of modern Africa. Here again is a matter for one further attempt to reach a negotiated settlement. There is, I believe, scope for agreement and compromise.

Thirdly, Mr. Smith objected to the proposed system of appeals against discriminatory legislation to the equivalent of a Rhodesia Supreme Court and, subsequently, to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council which was included in the "Tiger" document. Personally, I do not believe that in this present day and age a system of constitutional appeals from an independent Commonwealth country to the Judicial Committee is an effective or acceptable safeguard for political rights. On the other hand, I should have thought that the majority of Rhodesians, proud as they are of their own judicial system, would have agreed to constitutional appeals being heard by the equivalent of a Rhodesian Supreme Court. If they have had some inspiration from the political evolution of the United States, then there is a precedent which no-one need be too proud to follow. Again, here is a matter in which compromise would be possible, not involving the abandonment by either the British Government or Mr. Smith of the really important elements in the policies which they have so far advanced. The completion of agreement on the Constitution is, in my view, an essential first step towards any substantive settlement.

My Lords, in the case of these three features of the original "Tiger" agreement—or proposals, if that is what Ms. Smith prefers to call them—there is room, I submit, for sincere negotiation involving some give-and-take on both sides. I believe that if no further attempt at negotiation were made now, public opinion in the not so distant future would condemn, for a want of statesmanship and generosity, the party to this conflict which refused to make or respond to a new initiative.

Now, my Lords, let me turn to the second part of the "Tiger" document, which is in fact actually Part III though there is no disagreement of the principle enshrined in Part II. Part III deals with the process of a return to legality. A great deal has happened since the detailed provisions of the return to legality were discussed on H.M.S. "Tiger". It is my personal view that the procedures proposed then can now be greatly simplified without abandoning in any way the principle which formed the basis of British policy. Indeed, I think that the simplification is highly desirable, if any agreement about a return to legality is to be understood and not suspected by the average European Rhodesian to be a trick.

Mr. Smith indicated to me last July, and has now announced publicly, that he intends to hold a general election this year. I believe that to symbolise a return to legality for the purpose of this election Mr. Smith should make his request for the dissolution of Parliament to Sir Humphrey Gibbs. He would thus recognise the constitutional position of Sir Humphrey as Her Majesty's representative in Rhodesia. I do not believe that Mr. Dupont would allow his personal interest and position to stand in the way of an acceptable and workable settlement, or of the recognition of the position of a Rhodesian of long standing like Sir Humphrey Gibbs who is universally admired by members of all Parties, here and in Rhodesia.

My Lords, I believe I am right in saying that under the 1961 Constitution a period of up to four months may elapse between the dissolution of the Rhodesian Parliament and the holding of a subsequent election. During those four months it would be possible to give an opportunity of registering to anyone who would be entitled to vote in accordance with the 1961–62 franchise legislation. If the African elector failed to register inside this period then, frankly, the responsibility must be his.

There should also be appointed during this period, a Commission, chosen from the Privy Council and appointed by the British Government, on an analogy with the Cobbold Commission, to carry out an assignment for which it would have two clear and straightforward terms of reference: first, to report to Her Majesty's Government as to whether the election had been conducted in such a way as to reflect fairly the views of those registered and entitled to vote; and secondly to ascertain the views of those, being citizens of Rhodesia, who were not qualified to vote under the 1961–62 franchise legislation.

It would be for the Commission to decide whether any continuing censorship, or system of detention under emergency powers, or the use of any intimidation by political Parties, prevented the results of the election from fairly reflecting the real opinions of the European and African electorate. Equally they would, under the second term of reference, be responsible for giving effect to the British Government's Fifth Principle. I know that their task would be difficult, but I am quite certain that Her Majesty's Privy Council in Great Britain contains men and women with experience and integrity which would enable them to face and fulfil this task with objectivity and success.

During this process I envisage that there would be no relaxation or intensification of the sanctions system, and so far as Rhodesia was concerned there would, I assume, be no modification of its claim to independence.

At the end of this process—that is, when the results of the election were available and the Commission had reported—one of two situations would exist. On the one hand, if the result of the election was in favour of the Constitution agreed between Her Majesty's Government and the Rhodesian régime, and if at the same time the Commission had reported favourably, then steps would be taken forthwith by Britain to lift sanctions. And since a new situation would have arisen, Britain would proceed immediately to seek release from the NIRMAR obligation as a preliminary to the formal recognition of Rhodesian independence. If, on the other hand, the electorate in Rhodesia failed to endorse the Constitution and the Commission reported adversely in accordance with either of its terms of reference, then sanctions would continue and would be intensified, and there would be nothing, apart from force, to prevent a second phase of illegal independence from being instituted or the situation from moving inexorably to what would be both for Britain and for Rhodesia the bitter end.

I have no doubt that this would involve the declaration of a republic, the eventual withdrawal of Sir Humphrey Gibbs and the cutting of all ties with Britain. It would also mean the continued outlawry of Rhodesia in the international field. If this is what must be the end of this unhappy episode, then so be it. But I believe that along the lines I have sketched lies a chance—a real chance—for both Britain and Rhodesia of achieving an honourable solution which would avoid what both—the Rhodesians in particular—have good reason to dread.

I do not want your Lordships, or anyone else, to suppose that I have any inflated ideas about the influence that someone like myself, a private citizen, can bring to bear on the achievement of the solution of a complex and emotionally highly charged problem. But I believe that if there is the will here in Britain and if there is the will there in Rhodesia, a settlement along these lines would be possible.

I have said in a recent article in the Rhodesian Press, which curiously enough was not censored, as I have said in broadcasts to Rhodesia, that the initiative to break the present deadlock should be taken by Mr. Smith. I understand, however, the Rhodesian attitude to this sort of situation pretty well. They do not psychologically find it easy to take such an initiative. I say, therefore, that even if there is no sign from Mr. Smith in Salisbury, then Her Majesty's Government should make the next move for the reopening of substantive negotiations without delay, it being clearly understood that this is not a sell-out by Britain or a cave-in by Rhodesia, but an attempt—a last attempt and a genuine attempt—to reach an honourable settlement of a problem which, in my opinion at any rate, unless it is solved, cannot fail to end in tragedy.

10.48 p.m.

LORD BOOTHBY

My Lords, at this late hour I do not intend to delay the House for more than a few minutes. I think that my noble friend Lord Alport has rendered an immense service tonight. I agree with every single word he said. I am on my feet only because I was in Rhodesia recently—in fact, I got back only four days ago. I saw Sir Humphrey Gibbs. I was careful not to see any politicians and that they did not mind. I was staying with a cousin of mine in a farm 80 miles from Salisbury, miles away in the background of Rhodesia. I am bound to say that the farmers were more concerned with the drought than with the economic crisis. And this I must say to your Lordships: I found no racial tension at all. We were in the back of beyond, but I was told, and believed it and did it, that I could go out at night anywhere I liked, with absolute, total personal safety. That is the position there.

Economic sanctions as they are at present being applied will not bring down Rhodesia. Her Majesty's Government thought that they would. I think Her Majesty's Government are mistaken, and probably they are coming round to that view now. These sanctions as at present applied are a ceaseless irritant, driving us further apart from all the people of Rhodesia—not only white, but coloured. The proposal that I made in the debate the day before yesterday is that the sanctions should be called off. They are "no go"; they are no good. Rhodesia is being driven into the arms of South Africa as a result of the sanctions themselves and also as a result of our embargo on the export of arms to South Africa for the defence of our own shipping as well as their own defence. It could result in the creation of a South Africa which would be hostile to or separated from us, and could bring infinite damage, politically and economically, both to South Africa and to ourselves.

I say, therefore, and here I echo my noble friend, Lord Alport, that I think it would be wise to call off the sanctions, and then—and to this I attach immense importance—state our terms and proposals for a political settlement much more specifically than they have yet been stated. I would base them, of course, on the "Tiger". I would give them in much more detail. You cannot settle everything on a battleship or a cruiser in 24 hours. I would not impose a time limit. The one mistake that the Prime Minister made on the "Tiger", in my view, was the imposing of this time limit. I think that really got Rhodesia's back up. They should have time to consider in detail the proposals that we have to make, and then, if necessary, to negotiate about them. I am sure that this is the last chance, but I believe with my noble friend Lord Alport that a solution and settlement could be achieved now. But it really is the last chance. The alternative is to see the Rhodesians not being beaten by economic sanctions, but driven more and more into the arms of South Africa, and a kind of cold war between ourselves and South Africa as a whole.

My Lords, do not have any illusions. A settlement is desired tremendously in Rhodesia by the whites and by the coloured people equally. They all want to see a settlement of this problem. There was, to my mind, no doubt about that. I did not talk to the politicians, I talked to the chaps, which is much more important. I talked to the farmers, to the businessmen and to everybody that I could get hold of, and I am sure that they all passionately desire a settlement. I also think that there is still an immense fund of good will for this country in Rhodesia. After all, they fought gallantly and valiantly for this country during the war. But if this business goes on, if these sanctions go on—and they are causing a good deal of hardship to Rhodesia—it seems to me inevitable that we shall drift apart to a point at which no settlement is possible.

I therefore beg Her Majesty's Government—and I agree with my noble friend Lord Alport that it is for them to take the initiative—not to miss this last chance of stating quite clearly, and in more specific terms than they were stated in the "Tiger", the terms they would be prepared to accept, and also that they are prepared to give the Rhodesian Government time to consider these terms and to clear up any obscurities that may remain. My Lords, I feel very strongly about this, because I feel the sands are running out and that this may well be our last chance, as the noble Lord, Lord Alport, said.

I said much of this the day before yesterday. Of course I may be wrong; I do not know. But I dealt at least with a subject which is not unimportant. My speech was "killed" stone dead by the Press, for the first time in over forty years of Parliamentary life. Now if I thought that Her Majesty's Government were responsible for that I should be quite happy,—

LORD SHEPHERD

We are not as strong as that.

LORD BOOTHBY

—because I could have a "bash" at them. But I know very well that Her Majesty's Government were not responsible in any kind of way. And I say, quite sincerely, that the Press, who are always talking about the de-dine of Parliament, are more responsible for that decline than any other organisation in this country, for the disgraceful way in which they report the debates in both Houses of Parliament. I would much rather have had my speech smashed altogether, as I did, than have it massacred, as the speech of my noble friend Lord Gladwyn was massacred in The Times the day before yestreday.

I do not want somebody up in the Press Gallery to pick out half-a-dozen sentences which have no relevance to the main theme of a speech, and none to each other. That makes bad worse. I am old enough to remember the old days when Parliamentary reporting in the Press was good; the days when Sir Colin Coote was political correspondent of The Times. I would much rather have a sketch of a Parliamentary debate written by an intelligent man who knew what it was all about than these little snippety sentences which have no relevance to each other or to the general theme of a deba.:e and which make nonsense of the whole business. And I say to the Press that if they are complaining about the decline of Parliament, it is very largely their own fault, because their reporting of Parliamentary proceedings in both Houses is an absolute disgrace to this country.

Well, I do not know 'whether I am in time to get that into the Press, but I hope so, because they deserve it. The reporting of the Parliamentary debates is disgraceful, and that is the main reason why Parliament has—in their opinion—declined. They write pompous leading articles saying that we count for nothing and then they make such a mess of our debates that they are bound to bring down the repute of Parliament all over the country. Here we have had a very brief debate to-night, but Lord Alport's speech was of supreme importance. Will they report it? I doubt if they will report it at all. If they do, they will take three sentences out of his speech which have no relevance to each other, and then expect the public to understand what has been said.

But I say to Her Majesty's Government, with all sincerity, that I believe that if they take the initiative they do have a last chance—and I think it is the last chance—of a settlement with Rhodesia which will be agreeable to both sides; and I have considerable authority for making that statement, and the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, may perhaps guess the source. I think there is a real chance left if Her Majesty's Government will take this initiative. I very much hope they do, because Rhodesia does not want to break with this country; but if we go on like this she may be compelled to do so and have no alternative.

10.59 p.m.

LORD NOEL-BUXTON

My Lords, I take my noble Leader's hint that even an Unstarred Question is not an occasion for general debate. I appreciate that at this hour it is for me to say extremely little, and also to say I am immature enough not to know that any Questions could lead to debate. Also at this hour it is too late to talk at length on a subject which, I agree with the noble Lords, Lord Alport and Lord Boothby, is of supreme importance. I, too, have been in Rhodesia in this day and age—within the last ten days on Rhodesian soil. I think that one should simply say that one noted that it was expressed in Her Majesty's Speech that a settlement with Rhodesia should be come to. I feel that most earnestly. Unlike the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, I saw most of the senior members of Mr. Smith's Cabinet. I have paid previous visits to Rhodesia, but in a week in Salisbury I had, as it were, a week at university, with everybody, including Mr. Smith, speaking very openly and at length, and I do not think people would speak at length to an extremely back Back-Bencher unless they thought it was relevant to do so.

As Lord Alport's Question specifically mentions the Commonwealth Secretary's Statement I should like to report the Salisbury view of his visit. I gather that Mr. Thomson made a very satisfactory impression in Salisbury, but after all, although it is only 15 hours' flying at 650 miles an hour, it is in the Southern Hemisphere and misunderstandings can easily happen. What has worried Mr. Smith, and perhaps Mr. Dupont, particularly is that they understood (and I am only expressing what they said to me) that on leaving Salisbury neither Mr. Thomson nor the Rhodesian Government would say anything further without consultation, either by telephone or by personal meeting. In a sense they regard Mr. Thomson's Statement of December 12 as a sort of disclosure—and the word "disclosure' was said in a mood of nearly meaning betrayal. I know that is just their side: and the other side, obviously, is that the Rhodesian Prime Minister himself was going about, saying that there were extremely few differences between the Mother Country and his Government, which of course is not true either.

The main worry, which I completely share with Lord Alport and Lord Boothby, is the great risk of the two countries as such drifting apart, and that it is terribly late in the day—one must have the faith not to say "too late". I felt a very great good will towards the Mother Country. It is not a quarrel with Crown or country but, let it be plain, with a succession of Governments—not just with this Labour Government; and my personal view, for what it is worth, is that we should accept them without any interim period.

It may well have been thought at the time of U.D.I. and when sanctions were imposed—in fact I understand that is the only reason why mandatory sanctions have been imposed—that such a country forms a threat to world peace. Who can say that that is true of Rhodesia after two and a half years? Here are the people in their offices, the equivalent of Whitehall; here is a sensible régime which feels lost and discontented, as indeed so many of us do in the Mother Country, and I personally feel that the ball is in our court. The "Tiger" talks broke down, and it is up to the British Government to say specifically what they are prepared to do and to settle for. After all, the Rhodesians are only just you or me gone overseas, the great percentage of them post-war settlers, and in this family quarrel I think we must show all the tolerance we possibly can.

11.5 p.m.

LORD BROCKWAY

My Lords, I recognise the importance of this occasion. The noble Lord, Lord Alport, who has opened this discussion, went with the good will (and more than the good will) of our Government, to Rhodesia and has reported back; and what he has said tonight must be taken in a very serious way. Therefore, in my comments upon it I want to be as responsible as I can. I find it a little ironical that we should be having this debate, which I believe is of great significance between this country and Rhodesia, with five Members on the other side of the House, five Members on this side, and one Cross-Bencher. But despite the small attendance, after a very heavy week, I have no doubt that every word that is uttered in this debate tonight is going to have some significance so far as the solution of this problem is concerned. Therefore, I am going to speak very carefully.

The second thing I want to say is this. I do not suppose that any one of us wants the situation between Southern Rhodesia and this country to persist. Certainly those who take the view which I hold recognise that if it goes on without a solution there will be a tendency in Southern Rhodesia itself to move more towards the South African system of apartheid, which we all deplore, and that there will be a tendency in Southern Rhodesia to extend still further the system of segregation and suppression and potential apartheid which has unfortunately been in its recent legislation. And none of us want that.

Thirdly, I think all of us recognise that the situation in Southern Rhodesia itself is not only dangerous for Southern Rhodesia, but dangerous to the nature of a white and black conflict which could spread over the whole of Southern Africa with appalling results. Therefore, every one of us, whatever our view may be about the Southern Rhodesia situation, will want to find a solution of this problem.

I want to say at once to the noble Lord that I should like to see this issue submitted to the people of Rhodesia itself, and I welcome the proposals which he made upon these lines. But if this issue is to be submitted to the people of Rhodesia there must be a lifting of the present restrictions on freedom of speech and the rights of political parties in Southern Rhodesia; and there must be a release from detention and imprisonment of the leaders of the African parties who have been suppressed. Otherwise, any presentation of solutions to the peoples of Rhodesia will be unreal, because of the censorship of the Press, because of the restrictions on free speech and the restrictions on political organisations which are there. I ask the noble Lord, Lord Alport, to recognise that I am trying to find a solution of these problems, which I believe depends on a decision by the Rhodesian people. But if there is to be a decision by the Rhodesian people it must be under free conditions in which they can express themselves.

The fourth thing I want to say is this. It is not only Her Majesty's Government who are now involved, and it is not only the illegal Smith régime in Southern Africa. The whole of the Commonwealth is involved. A most definite promise has been made to the Commonwealth countries and, therefore, if we are thinking of new proposals which are to be made to Southern Rhodesia, it will be most important that one has the confirmation of the other member States of the Common-wealth to which we have given pledges.

The last point I wish to make is this—and, believe me, though I hold strong views on this question, I am trying to speak in a responsible way. We have had a debate to-day on the United Nations. I will tell your Lordships the greatest impression which was made upon me by that debate. It is that in this country we may be seeking a solution of problems which may be very real in the political context within our own nation, but are quite unreal in the context of world opinion. We had the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Gaitskell, who indicated to us that on the Commission which is dealing with human rights almost everything that is urged by a representative of this country is rejected be cause they feel that we are not standing for human rights, particularly in relation to Southern Africa.

One of the great nightmares of these latter years of my life, in the light of what I have been struggling for through my years, is that there may be an appalling racial conflict in Southern Africa. While I would make almost any contribution to prevent that, I say that we must be most careful at this moment that we do not take steps which may seem to bring an easy and early solution of these problems but which, in actual fact, will only arouse greater problems in the future, because we shall have lost the confidence not only of the people of the Continent of Africa, but of peoples all over the world who believe in the principle of racial equality.

11.14 p.m.

LORD SHEPHERD

My Lords, I would first of all express the appreciation of Her Majesty's Government, and I am sure that of all Members in both Houses, for the services that the noble Lord, Lord Alport, rendered to Africa, to Central Africa in particular, for some weeks last year in his efforts to provide a glimmer of light in regard to a reconciliation between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Rhodesia. I say "reconciliation between the Governments"; perhaps I should correct that and say "between the Parliaments", for in the end this is a matter for Parliament. I stress this point, since I am conscious that in my own Department, which I have joined only recently, I have a responsibility to see that the voice and the will of the people of dependent territories is clearly expressed when constitutional advance is involved. It is not for us to impose progress; it is for the people to accept it voluntarily.

I could answer this short debate in three ways. I could restate the Government policy in this matter. In fact, I would in practice be restating the Conservative Government's policy, that of the previous Administration, since in broad outline their policy is identical. I could restate that policy, but I do not believe that any useful purpose would be served this evening in the context of what we are seeking to-day. The position is well known and Parliament has endorsed it. I could seek to answer all the very detailed and thoughtful points, or points of considerable importance, put by the noble Lord, Lord Alport. At this time of night, and in view of their importance, I think that this would be unwise. I intend to look at them and to read them in detail. I express the hope that men and women, politicians or ordinary men in the street in other countries, will read those words with care and thought, and will accept the spirit which clearly lay behind them and which, I believe, is in all our hearts in this matter. If those words could go out from this House, then I hope that that will be possible.

I will leave it there, my Lords, but I will say that we have made it abundantly clear, particularly in the last Statement which was made by my right honourable friend the Commonwealth Secretary on his return from Rhodesia, that the door is not closed and that we in this Government—and I believe that this is the will of Parliament—will not close that door. Whether we can take an initiative, in view of the previous initiatives—particularly the one which followed the visit of the noble Lord, Lord Alport—is a question to which we shall have to give serious consideration. I am convinced, knowing my colleagues, that if there was a genuine glimmer of light, whether it be through officials or Ministers, it would not be the will of Parliament that Her Majesty's Government should not seek to approach that light and to turn it into something we all wish to see. Therefore I hope that the suggestions made by the noble Lord, Lord Alport, to-night can become a subject of debate and thought amongst Members of Parliament in other Parliaments apart from ours, and also among officials and Ministers. I give the noble Lord my assurance that we, for our part, will look at his suggestions with the greatest seriousness and sympathy.

House adjourned at nineteen minutes past eleven o'clock.