HL Deb 13 February 1968 vol 289 cc69-92

6.28 p.m.

LORD BROCKWAY rose, to ask Her Majesty's Government—

  1. (a) whether they are aware of the offer made by Colonel Ojukwu for immediate peace talks with the Nigerian Federal Government on the basis of no preconditions on either side;
  2. (b) what steps they have taken to secure that such talks are put in train forthwith;
  3. (c) whether pending the outcome of such talks they will make clear that no further arms from this country will be supplied to either side.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, last night I watched on television a film of the book of my friend George Orwell, Animal Farm, and as I listened to the debate on ponies which we have just concluded I rather wondered what would be the attitude of the ponies to the suggested legislation. But I now rise to ask the Question which is on the Paper in my name. It is now eight months since I first initiated a debate on the grave situation in Nigeria. That was before the civil war began, and I sounded a warning about it. I urged the Government then, first, to encourage the Commonwealth Secretariat to seek a settlement of the problem and, secondly, to look with sympathy to the Organisation of African Unity, representing the African Governments, with a view to their contributing to a solution. My Lords, I find it extraordinary that eight months have passed and that no debate on this subject has taken place, either in another place or here. It has become the forgotten war.

I find it extraordinary, first, because of the tragedy of the event. The Colony of Nigeria was regarded almost as a showpiece of British decolonisation. It was a quite extraordinary experiment of the federation of different tribes and regions within a vast area; and we looked to it with hope. Secondly, this war has deformed the image of Africa throughout the world. There are other events in Africa which are disappointing, but the fact that in Nigeria Africans should be slaughtering fellow Africans on a large scale is in an ugly contrast with what was hoped when African Governments moved towards their independence. Thirdly, I think that all of us must have been distressed by the atrocities which have occurred: the shootings in cold blood of 700 people; the quite unnecessary bombing of a hospital. These atrocities occur in every war, and I do not want to over-emphasise them. All I will say is that, moved as we have been by the atrocities in Vietnam, we surely should be conscious of what is happening in one of the member States of the Commonwealth.

Then, there is the very great danger of virulent epidemics extending front the East, Biafra, in Nigeria. They cannot be contained by any frontier, and the conditions of death, of the destruction of sanitation, and the absence of doctors and nurses, now make that a real cause of fear for the future. Lastly, and most important of all, is the depth of bitterness which has now been aroused in Nigeria. It has gone so deeply that it will almost require a miracle before the wisdom of political effort can bring cooperation between the peoples of the Federation.

When I have put Questions on this issue to Her Majesty's Government the line has been that there is a Federal Government in Nigeria; that it is the recognised Government, and we must support it against any rebellion. My noble friend Lord Shepherd said, in answer to a question which I put recently: … there is a legal Government in Nigeria and … we are bound to support it".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 29th January 1968, col. 600.] I do not criticise that principle in normal circumstances, where there are Governments democratically elected and there is an unprovoked rebellion. I accept what the Government have done in sending their troops to Mauritius in recent weeks; I applauded what the Government did in sending their troops to Tanzania, to Kenya and Uganda. In these last three cases there were revolutions within the armed forces against democratically elected civilian Governments. It is exactly the opposite in Nigeria. The Federal Government in Nigeria has resulted from the second of military coups begun by overthrowing democratically elected Governments.

My main purpose to-night is to serve the cause of peace and ending the war. I shall therefore be very objective and try to be impartial. I should like to make it clear that I do not attach special or isolated blame for the seizure of power by the present Administration in Nigeria. They inherited circumstances, and those responsible for those circumstances must also bear the responsibility for the consequences. But these circumstances should prevent us from reliance upon the traditional formula that the de facto Administration of a country at any time should necessarily be supported. The present situation reflects the conflict of tribal and constitutional factors which historically deny the validity of the conclusion, without qualification, that the Federal Government must automatically be supported.

It was a very daring experiment when the British Government, through my right honourable friend Mr. James Griffiths, with whom I have been on a deputation to-day to the Commonwealth Office on this very subject, established the Federation in Nigeria. There were four distinct races there, antipathetic: the Hausas and the Fulani in the North; the Yorubas in the West, and the Ibos in the East. It is a little ironic to-day to realise that in that period, when there was opposition from the different races to any coming together, or any federation, it was the Ibos in the East who led the whole movement for the unity of Nigeria. Dr. Azikiwe was the great advocate of that principle and he and his Party, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, went very far indeed in order to establish unity. After independence they entered into a coalition with the largest Party from the North, although they were radical in their views and the Party from the North were conservative in their views. They entered into a coalition with them in order to secure the unity of the whole of Nigeria. That coalition of the East and North had one unfortunate effect: it meant the isolation of the West; it meant within the West agitation which led to a new State, the state of the Mid-West.

My Lords, please forgive me for reminding your Lordships of these facts. I do not propose to give the subsequent history in detail, but if we are to estimate what we should do in the present situation we must understand what has led up to it. First, a census was taken of the North, West, East, Mid-West, in order to establish the registration for the elections. There was great criticism of that census—I think probably justified—from the East and the West. Secondly, there was an election upon the basis of that census, and there was an intimidation and a suppression of opposition candidates in the North and elsewhere which made that election of little value. There was victory for the North; there was intense dissatisfaction after discussion and controversy. Nevertheless a broad-based Government was established.

Then there came disillusionment and despair. The election in the West had been postponed and there was worse—not only gross malpractices but loss of life. Then came economic collapse throughout the country, growing unemployment, strikes, a general strike. In that condition of utter disillusionment and despair there came the first military coup. I hope I have already made it clear that I am opposed to these military coups. This one was accused of being under Ibo domination, and undoubtedly the personnel of the Armed Forces was such that members of the Ibo race were in control.

There were two events which happened following this second coup which none of us who has been to Nigeria and has met the individuals concerned can speak about without deep distress and anger. One was the assassination of the spiritual leader in the North, and the other was the assassination of the Prime Minister of Nigeria, who also came from the North. I want to be the first to recognise the depth of feeling which there must have been in the North when those terrible crimes were committed. Nevertheless, the Federal Government handed over the power to General Ironsi, who was an Ibo, but I would not say a very prejudiced Ibo. One democratic Government had been overthrown by a military coup. Now came another military coup. Officers in the North revolted against higher officers who were Ibos. They retorted to the assassination of their leader in the North and the Prime Minister who came from the North by assassinating General Ironsi and also the military governor of the West. This second coup was successful, and General Gowon was appointed to its head.

I want to say this to the Minister and to the Government, with all the emphasis that I can command. It is not possible to equate the Government in Nigeria claiming authority over a federation of different races, one of which, the most industrially and educationally advanced, repudiates that authority, and which has assumed power by a military coup after a preceding military coup—democracy once removed, thus revealing not only that it has no democratic authority but also that it represents a divided army—with legal government. How can one accept that such an administration has the moral attributes of a legal government in the accepted sense?

I recognise that one of the first actions of General Gowon was to call consultations with representatives of the Regions. That conference declared for a constitution in Nigeria on the basis of confederation. Nevertheless, the General announced his proposal to divide Nigeria into 12 States, each with very limited powers, and to strengthen the powers of the central Government. Then came the worst tragedy of all. In the North of Nigeria there was a massacre of every Easterner to whom the Northerners could turn their hand. I have heard from ordinary Christian people going to Christian churches there, how, as they came out of their churches, they were just slaughtered—men, women and children. It is estimated that 30,000 Easterners, not only Ibos, but from other tribes in the East, were slaughtered in that massacre. It is not necessary to put the figure as high. It was deliberate genocide. From that terror between one million and two million refugees somehow struggled to get back to the East. One in three of the homes in the East had refugees from the North. The emotional effect of that can be understood. It was from that moment that the Federation and the Eastern Governments began to arm.

I wrote to the Heads of all the African Governments. I asked them to try to get common action to intervene. I want to acknowledge a rather strange thing here: that whilst I had the response that I expected from my closest friends in the struggle for African freedom, the most dedicated responses came from General Ankrah of Ghana and from the Prime Minister of Sierra Leone, whose Administrations I have criticised. Thanks to General Ankrah in Ghana there was a meeting in Aburi of the Supreme Military Government and representatives of all the Regions in Nigeria. This was in January, 1967. It reached agreement to renounce force and on a re-definition of the powers of the Federation and the Regions. I think the crisis came then. General Gowon went back to Lagos. He failed to implement the agreement and reverted to his proposals of twelve States with limited powers and stronger powers at the centre.

I ask the Minister, how can one say, in this confused and tragic situation, with its deep-seated racial divisions, with its rights and wrongs on both sides, with no Government democratically elected by all, that the British Government was bound to support one side? That is red tape formula, which becomes blood red, death tape, without any consideration of the deeper historical causes or the disastrous inevitable effects.

There was developing crisis when General Gowon repudiated the agreement reached at the meeting in Ghana. General Ojukwu cut off the Eastern revenue to the Federation; General Gowon imposed blockade; General Ojukwu threatened to secede; General Gowon issued a decree dividing the East into three States, depriving the East of access to the sea through Port Harcourt, despite its Ibo population; and then war.

One of the strange things in this situation has been the different attitudes of Governments. There has been an extraordinary coalition between Soviet Russia and the British Government. Soviet Russia and the British Government have supplied arms to the Federation. There has been a coalition between France and Portugal which have supplied arms to the East, Biafra. Not only have the British Government continued to supply arms, but the British High Commissioner has declared on several occasions that we are wholly—I quote "wholly"—behind the Federal Government. The attitude of African Governments is interesting. They also had the problem of secessions from their territories, and they are naturally opposed to a secession from Nigeria. That is one factor why there has not been more active, effective pressure from African States.

What I want to do in conclusion is to urge what action the Government should take in this situation. In the first part of my Question on the Order Paper I draw attention to the offer which General Ojukwu has made which appeared in the Financial Times on February 1. I am not a reader of the Financial Times because I have not got any finance, but I should like to congratulate it upon the despatches which it has published from Nigeria. Nearly every other newspaper has only a correspondent in Lagos. We are seeing only one side of the picture. I quote from the Financial Times of February 1: Lt. Col. Ojukwu, the Biafra leader, told a Press Conference in Umuahia on Tuesday that although Biafra still wanted sovereignty the whole question of sovereignty would have to be re-assessed and examined in the light of the current situation. Much would depend on the timing and the spirit of the negotiations. He hinted that Biafra might be willing to enter into a Confederacy with other Nigerian states. … " "Last Sunday Col. Ojukwu announced his readiness to agree to peace talks without pre-conditions by either side. He suggested that such negotiations might take place under the auspices of the Commonwealth, the United Nations or the Organisation of African Unity. Unlike similar moves in the past, the proposal did not stipulate acceptance of Biafra's sovereignty.

This is an extraordinary advance. Before this, Biafra has insisted on secession and cancellation of the decrees for the twelve States. The Federation has insisted on the cancellation of secession and the acceptance of the twelve States. Biafra has now said, in the clearest possible terms, that it is prepared for unconditional negotiations; that sovereignty is not necessarily a condition; that it is ready to look at the unity of Nigeria on the basis of confederation. I put it to the Minister that this entirely changes the situation. This is a new opportunity for peace.

I have good feeling towards the Ministers at the Commonwealth Office, and if I may say this to the noble Lord who is to reply, this is particularly the case with him because of my friendship in great old days with his father, when he was the agent in Blackburn for Philip Snowden. No one in the House of Lords will believe this, but I actually had Lord Shepherd in my arms as a baby in his home—no doubt that is why he has become so good now. I have all that friendly attitude towards him and his fellow Ministers. I recognise that the Government have made great efforts towards peace and that they have had to act under limitation. If they had proposed mediation in Nigeria there would immediately have been the reaction there that it was the old Colonial Power intervening. The strength of that probability I completely realise.

I know more than I can say publicly of what the Government have been doing. I will tell your Lordships where I differ from the Government. They have been doing these things secretly so that they cannot be announced. They have been doing these things secretly because they do not want to embarrass the Federal Government of Lagos. I ask the Minister just to consider whether that secrecy has not meant that, because publicly the Government here have appeared to be doing nothing, the bitterness and antagonism in the East, in Biafra, has grown. Surely it would be possible to balance the effects on the Federal Government and the East if, in reply to me this evening, the noble Lord would only say something that would go all over Africa: that Her Majesty's Government are at this moment seeking through every possible channel to bring the war in Nigeria to an end. If only he said that, the effect would be tremendous.

But I am going to ask him to say more. And I am myself going first to say something more. I know what the Commonwealth Secretariat have been doing. I have tremendous appreciation for them and for their unceasing efforts. I know what some African leaders have been doing. I am aware of all this. Yet eight months have passed and the war goes on. There is now this new opportunity.

I want to ask the British Government to do something rather drastic. They have been sending arms to one side. They have been sending arms to the Federal Government, on the ground that it is the de facto Government. I should hope that, from a democratic point of view, I have to-night destroyed that case. At least I am going to ask the Government to prove their sincerity in this way, by saying that, in view of the offer which General Ojukwu has made from the East, the Government will not send further arms to the Federal Government unless that Federal Government will now accept the opportunity for peace which has been made from the East by General Ojukwu.

The other proposal that I want to make is this, that there should be a great appeal to the members of the Commonwealth. If they, unitedly, were to make their pressure for peace in Nigeria, I think that the Federal Government and General Ojukwu would respond. Lastly, I would say how much I welcome the suggestions that are now being made for a Commonwealth peace force in Nigeria. It would have to be there not only during the negotiations but, I am afraid, for a considerable time afterwards, because of the bitterness which has been aroused. But it would be a magnificent reflection of constructive, creative contribution if the Commonwealth were to go into Nigeria now and prevent this slaughter.

These, my Lords, are the alternatives. Did your Lordships read that striking phrase in the leading article in The Times to-day asking whether Eastern Nigeria is to become "half cemetery and half concentration camp"? It will if this war goes on. I appeal to my noble friend. I know that his attitude about this is just as sincere as mine. But I ask him, as Minister of State for Commonwealth Affairs within the Commonwealth Department, with the influence of the Commonwealth Department within the Government, to depart from this policy of giving arms and support to one side, and of being silent in case it may arouse criticism from that side, and instead to come out boldly in favour of the cessation of the war and negotiations for a settlement, and for doing all he can for the constructive future of Nigeria.

7.8 p.m.

THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY

My Lords, I intend to add but a few words to what has been said so movingly by the noble Lord, Lord Brockway. I am sure that any noble Lord who has visited Nigeria at any time has been struck, as I was struck while visiting there, by the immensity of the differences between the different peoples within that vast country—differences in physique, in culture and in religion; differences as great as those between any group of diverse European countries. For the very different peoples of this vast territory to be united within one Federal State would indeed be a wonderful achievement—something of a miracle. I believe that we must ardently hope still for that possibility, because some of the alternatives are most dangerous to contemplate.

But the peace and unity of all these peoples can come about only by agreement and tolerance, and it is quite impossible on the basis of one or other section of the peoples imposing its will upon the other sections. If there is to be a peaceful settlement, it seems that certain conditions are utterly necessary. First, it must be recognised by both sides that it is impossible for either side to get all that it wants in its ambitions for its people. There must be "give" as well as "take" if any settlement is to be practicable.

A second condition is that if Biafra is to continue to be included within a federal Nigeria, there must be very definite and secure guarantees for the safety of the Biafran people. They have suffered the most terrible violence, and there can be no settlement including them which does not effectively guarantee them against some of the things which they have suffered in the past. The same is true in every direction, but it has now to be emphasised in relation to Biafra.

A third condition for a peaceful settlement—and here I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Brockway—is the cessation of the supply of arms to either side. I hope that the argument of the noble Lord has convincingly undermined the naive, unimaginative thesis that there is in Nigeria "a Government" and "a rebellion", and that therefore we must support the Government against the rebels. That is too unimaginative in relation to the complexities of history which the noble Lord's speech has exposed.

Those being the necessary conditions of a peaceful settlement, we wish great success in what the Government are doing towards a peaceful settlement. I very much hope that the Government will be able to tell us of their positive attitude towards the most recent peace feelers and will be able to speak encouragingly about them. I hope also that the Government will be able to speak encouragingly about the latest proposal of a Commonwealth peace force. The presence of a Commonwealth peace force among the belligerents would at least bring a pause in the terrible slaughters. Looking to the future, one remembers that African peoples are very quick to acquire resentment and bitterness, but that they have sometimes proved themselves quick to drop them if the conditions for dropping them really exist.

7.13 p.m.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

My Lords, I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, has put down this Question, although it would be wholly wrong if he were to give the impression that, merely because there had been no debate on this subject for some months, the problems of Nigeria have not been constantly in the minds of all noble Lords in this Chamber and indeed in the minds of most thinking people in this country. One does not always express every thought in this Chamber. There are many reasons why we should think of Nigeria. Nobody who has met some of the leading Nigerians can fail to be deeply impressed with the quality of men who live in that country and to see the justification for the high pride which we all had in the future of that country.

We must face the fact that we have had in the past a great responsibility. The form of Constitution we gave them has not, apparently, suited them, and we must accept some responsibility for that. Moreover, as the noble Lord has said, the longer the fighting goes on the deeper the bitterness will be, the greater the hatreds, and the longer it will take them to recover. We have considerable commercial contracts with Nigeria, and it is important to recognise that business contracts are mutual—they are the best form of aid. We have devoted a great deal of effort to that country, particularly in the development of oil, and £200 million has been invested there following investigations over twenty years. All this has given us a deep interest in Nigeria.

I detected in the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, a tendency to judge the rights and wrongs of an internal situation. This is really a legacy of paternalism. Nigeria to-day is independent, and it is not for us to say how she should govern herself. This is a matter for the people of Nigeria and is not for us, whatever the rights or wrongs of the matter may be. Civil wars always create great difficulties. One has only to recall the American Civil War to realise how difficult these situations can be and how easily they can lead to very much greater problems than exist at the beginning. I consider that the Government are right to maintain normal relations with the Government of Nigeria—in fact they have no option. But I hope that they will not just stop at that. I hope that they will lose no opportunity to bring about peace in that country, since the longer these troubles go on, the more difficult it will be for the people there to recover.

There is much gossip as to what is happening. I have great confidence in Mr. Arnold Smith and his assistant Mr. Adu. I hope that it will not prove necessary to take these discussions outside the Commonwealth to the United Nations. This is a matter which it should be within the compass of Commonwealth organisations to settle for themselves. I warmly welcome the suggestion by the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, of a Commonwealth force, should this be necessary. But let it be quite clear that we must be invited in such a matter. It is no good thinking that we can do anything there unless we are invited to do so. I hope, of course, that the Government will pick up any invitation, though my own feeling is that one will not get any real finality until General Gowon and Colonel Ojukwu meet: and the only place they could meet to-day is at sea. If they are asked for their assistance, I hope that the Government will not hesitate to give it. I will not press the Government further. but I hope that they will use every endeavour to see whether they can bring about peace; for without peace no development of Nigeria will be possible.

7.18 p.m.

LORD GOODMAN

My Lords, previous speakers have properly adopted a tone of great moderation, and it would be wrong to depart from that tone in a situation as tragic as this. At this moment we know that men of goodwill are making earnest efforts to mediate in a situation which should be brought to an end at the earliest possible moment. I would venture to comment on the remark by the last speaker that he hoped that the Government would not seek to determine moral issues. I am not sure that in this particular case that is the right approach. But if it is the right approach it must at least amount to this: that if arms are to be supplied, then they should be supplied to both sides and not to one side. That is the approach recommended by the last speaker. My own view is that if this debate is to serve any purpose at all, it will have achieved all we can hope for if it persuades the Government to cease supplying arms to either side, for there is no rational, moral or legal justification for supplying arms to one side and not to the other.

One repeatedly hears the parrot-cry that the Federal Government is a legal Government. If it were a legal Government—and I do not want to go into the legal and constitutional considerations—we should still be under no moral obligation whatever to supply arms to a legal Government which was using them for a purpose of which we did not approve. I am told that the Biafrans are rebels. I venture to doubt whether some decades ago we would have used that phrase about Garibaldi. Garibaldi was certainly a rebel. Would we have said that we were entitled to provide arms to the people who were seeking to defeat him in his fight for freedom? Would we have said that we were entitled to deny arms to the Greeks in their battle against the undoubtedly legal occupation of the Turks, because the Greeks were rebelling against oppression? This is an argument that must be totally intolerable in this Chamber; it is an argument that has no validity of any kind. To suggest that, because people are rebelling against undoubted oppression, against terror for their very lives, they are on that account to be regarded as rebels and, therefore, we are morally justified in providing their oppressors with the weapons with which to oppress them is an argument which I hope will find no countenance here.

I believe that the Government are pursuing this course only because they are receiving advice which I regard, to put it no higher, as extremely dubious. I think it is due to the simple fact that the advice they are receiving emanates from Lagos, and if your Lordships will bear with me for a moment you will see why they are receiving that advice. Lagos is the active centre of Nigerian life if you are living there. You see things going on around you which suggest that it is the capital city, and that in some remote corner of a large country of which it is the capital city some unimportant insurrection is in progress. The advice which we are receiving from the Commission in Lagos is that, somewhere remote from Lagos, there is a minor insurrection taking place and it is quite right that the Lagos-controlled Government should receive aid and assistance in order to suppress it. So I venture to say—

LORD MCCORQUODALE OF NEWTON

My Lords, is the noble Lord really saying that anybody would suggest that this was a minor insurrection in a far distant part?

LORD GOODMAN

My Lords, I am seriously suggesting that, if one has to find some sensible justification for the Government's policy, that is as sensible as any that I can imagine at this moment of time. I cannot imagine a sensible justification for the Government's policy in seeking to supply arms in this dispute.

Consider the facts, which have been retailed with such accuracy by the noble Lord to whom we are indebted for this debate. Unarguably, there was a massacre in the North of the Ibo tribe. Unarguably. Ibos resident in the North—expatriates from their own Eastern territory—were massacred to the extent of 20,000, 30,000 or 40,000 people. Nobody knows the numbers. Unarguably, a vast flood of refugees fled back to their homes. Unarguably, that is the case. The Government are not going to dispute any of those facts. The Ibos have now taken refuge within their own territory. They have their backs to the walls. They have nowhere to which they can fly. The Cameroons are behind them. The Western Territory, full of their enemies, is in front of them. They have nowhere to go. They are fighting for their very lives. That is the simple situation.

This is not a case of people who have raised the flag of rebellion because they have nationalist aspirations, because they have expansionist aspirations. This is a case of people who have raised the flag of rebellion because they have no conceivable alternative. They are fighting for their lives. Is it remotely justifiable that in those circumstances, having regard to that known background of facts, we should be supplying the people who are attacking them with the means to destroy them? Can it be that this House will accept for one moment that this is a policy which ought to be pursued for another second by Her Majesty's Government if the facts are those? I know that Her Majesty's Government are as conscious of moral rights and moral positions as I am. I know, therefore, that if they are pursuing this policy it must be because of some serious misapprehension, because information that they are receiving from some quarter is misleading or inaccurate—not deliberately misleading but conveying an erroneous impression.

I plead with Her Majesty's Government that they should give the most serious consideration to these facts and if there is any doubt, the facts can be ascertained by the simplest inquiry from a great number of people in this country. It is very significant that Biafran representatives who come here are never received. This is not a scandalous matter but it is a tragic matter, because they return to Biafra believing that their voices are still unheard. I venture to say that if we are in any doubt as to the truth of these facts, if we do not believe that this pogrom of 20,000, 30,000 or 40,000 Ibos took place, if we do not believe that one million or two million refugees fled for their lives, let us send a fact- finding mission out to see whether it is right. In the meantime, let us at least suspend the dispatch of arms to these territories, so that we cannot be open to the terrible, shameful criticism of having provided people with the means of destroying other people in circumstances as totally unjustifiable as this.

I urge Her Majesty's Government, in whose judgment and wisdom I have the highest confidence, to give the most careful thought to this position and not to continue with a policy which, whether brought about by ignorance or by mistake, is in my view utterly shameful and will be so regarded in the light of history. The suggestion that we can plead the cry of legality to justify the dispatch of these arms is historically unjustifiable and runs against the whole trend of British history. Alas! we do not have a Byron, and we do not have a Palmerston, here to-day who can speak in terms appropriate to this matter. But in such inadequate terms as we have been able to muster, I most seriously and urgently plead that we should cease a traffic which is wholly inappropriate, wholly shameful and wholly wrong.

7.26 p.m.

THE EARL OF IDDESLEIGH

My Lords, I rise to make one point only, and to make one request with which I am perfectly sure Her Majesty's Government will be very glad to comply. The most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury has made an extremely important pronouncement and has put forward suggestions, with which I am sure everybody must agree, for a basis of settlement of these disputes. I beg Her Majesty's Government, considering the great importance which Africa will attach to the most reverend Primate's words, to give every publicity to the suggestions that he has made and to ensure that they are fully conveyed by wireless, by all the means of publicity in our power, to both sides in this conflict.

7.27 p.m.

LORD RITCHIE-CALDER

My Lords, I had not intended to intervene in this debate which was initiated by my noble friend Lord Brockway, but I should like to follow my noble friend Lord Goodman. I feel that we have found ourselves in an inevitable trap of this piece of history in which we live. I have reminded your Lordships on many occasions that we now see around us some 35 countries which are under military government. I will repeat what I have said; that military or junta Governments are the official receivers in political bankruptcy, and I suggest to your Lordships that, if we recognise that they are, in fact, the official receivers in political bankruptcy, it raises a very serious question of what we mean by de facto recognition of abusive and destructive régimes.

I will not catalogue them. I would only remind your Lordships that at this moment we are confronted in relation to Nigeria with the same sort of situation as we face in relation to Greece. We accept a de facto situation; and if we stop and say that we cannot but recognise them, that may not be too bad. But I suggest most seriously to Her Majesty's Government that it is a very grave matter when, in support of a de facto situation, they insist upon providing arms and providing support for a régime which has no basis whatever by any democratic definition, and certainly had no basis whatever when we gave freedom to Nigeria.

7.29 p.m.

LORD SHEPHERD

My Lords, I fully understand the very deep emotion that has been expressed here this evening, and also the distress felt about events in Nigeria. My noble friend Lord Brockway has been some time in dealing with the events which led up to what he referred to as the second military coup. My noble friend Lord Goodman, if I may call him that, spoke from the Cross-Benches about the massacre of Ibos. In speaking from the Box, I do not think that I shall serve the cause of peace if I attribute blame to one section or another. My noble friend Lord Brockway's Question does not deal with the past. It really looks to the present and the future; to the achievement of peace.

I do not believe that there is anyone who does not deplore the suffering and the damage in Nigeria, and who does not share the regret that the high hopes that we once had for Nigeria may appear for a time to be very bleak indeed. But I think we must make it perfectly clear that we have no right to tell the Nigerians how to order their affairs. What we say here must be judged, not as to its effect at home but as to its effect in Nigeria; and I am bound to say—and I say it with a degree of temerity—that some of the speeches that have been made here this afternoon could be construed in such a way that they do not serve the long-term interests of obtaining peace, although I fully recognise that the motives behind those speeches were quite to the contrary.

My Lords, the central point of the Question that my noble friend Lord Brockway has asked is: What is the British Government's attitude to Nigeria? Our position has been perfectly clear throughout, but in view of some of the speeches I think it needs to be re-stated at greater length than perhaps the hour might condone. We regard the breakdown of understanding in Nigeria and the outbreak of hostilities as an appalling tragedy. We did our utmost—and my noble friend Lord Brockway recognised this when he spoke in June—and all that was humanly available to us, to prevent the outbreak of fighting in Nigeria. Our attitude both before and after the outbreak has been based on three principles. The first is that, as the founders of modern Nigeria, we are against its fragmentation. One reason is perfectly dear: that this great country of Nigeria, in unity, could realise its full potential and, perhaps of greater consequence, as a united Nigeria, prospering and developing, it could have a very significant effect throughout Africa. As my noble friend Lord Brockway well knows, there have been moments in which splinter action was likely in Africa. This, therefore, was a matter of very grave regret to us.

I think it is also significant that no African country, or any other country in the world, has recognised any other Government than the Federal Government in Lagos. If we were to say that because a Government has not been constitutionally elected we should not recognise it, I am bound to say that there would be many countries throughout the world with whom we should have no diplomatic connections whatsoever, and the world would be in an infinitely more dangerous position than it now is. I think—and I hope my noble friend Lord Brockway will not consider me unfair in this—that when my noble friend spoke on June 20, 1967, about the inherent rights of independence he said: The rights inherent in independence must be very much in our minds as we seek to find a way to help heal the wounds in Nigeria now."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, col. 1367.] At that stage the present Government, the Federal Government, was in power. They came to power in 1966. I find it hard to say that you recognise that Government in seeking to prevent war and yet, when war unfortunately breaks out, you then cease to recognise it. The noble Lord, Lord Goodman, has said that we take advice only from Lagos. We have a High Commission office there. The only reason we have no diplomatic connection in Biafra is because of the attitude of the Biafran authorities. Much could have been done if we could have maintained our office in the Biafran territory. It is not that we do not wish to have an office there: the position is that it was made impossible for us to remain there.

LORD GOODMAN

My Lords, will the noble Lord give way? I hesitate to interrupt him because it is late at night, but the fact is that there was in London a most responsible delegation of Biafrans, including, if I may say so, a very old friend of mine, Sir Louis Banafo, and other gentlemen whose friendly disposition towards this country cannot be exaggerated. Will the noble Lord tell me why the opportunity was not taken of the presence of these gentlemen, educated in England—Anglophiles, if ever there were any—to discuss this matter and secure the opportunity of proper representation?

LORD SHEPHERD

My Lords, our relations are with Nigeria. We regard Biafra as part of Nigeria. If we had an office there in Biafra, we should have our connection. In regard to these eminent gentlemen, of whom I have heard, I am bound to say that Her Majesty's Government are in very grave difficulties. We have never recognised Biafra as an independent country, but it has seceded from the Federal State of Nigeria, and it would therefore seem to me wrong, at least in an official capacity, for Her Majesty's Government to make contact with these gentlemen.

LORD BROCKWAY

My Lords, may I interrupt? Really, is this not nonsense? We are not asking Her Majesty's Government to have official talks with these gentlemen. My noble friend knows, as I know and as others of long political experience know, that there are all kinds of methods by which one can have unofficial conversations which are nevertheless of the greatest value in finding a solution to these problems. Our complaint is that although these responsible and distinguished individuals have been in London, not even on the circumference has the Commonwealth Office been prepared to have any connection with them.

LORD SHEPHERD

My Lords, I have stated what Her Majesty's Government's position is, but if the noble Lord will permit me—because I think we are perhaps going slightly away from the Question that is on the Order Paper; and this is as much my fault as the noble Lord's—he will see the steps that we have been taking to achieve peace in Nigeria. We believe that we must seek a solution by negotiation. I do not believe that it can be said that we have ignored this whole affair. My noble friend Lord Brockway spoke of the eight months of the forgotten war. I share the view of the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, that while we may not have debated it in your Lordships' House, this has been very much on all our minds, not only in Parliament, among Parliamentarians and the Church, but very much in the minds of those Ministers who have particular responsibility in the field of the Commonwealth.

We have welcomed the continuing efforts of Mr. Arnold Smith and the Commonwealth Secretariat to assist in the restoration of peace in Nigeria, and we have given Mr. Arnold Smith—and will continue to give him—maximum support. We are and will remain in close touch with him. I cannot, however, comment on the various Press reports about Mr. Smith's recent visit and his proposed return to Lagos. The position of Her Majesty's Government in their relationship with the Commonwealth Secretariat is well known. I hope the House will feel that if there are negotiations taking place between Mr. Arnold Smith and the Nigerian leaders, perhaps a delicate position has been reached. Therefore I think it would be best to leave the Commonwealth Secretariat's particular effort for the time being; but we will give all possible support to Mr. Arnold Smith and the Commonwealth Secretariat. I think it should be said also that we ourselves have been working very actively—and genuinely actively—behind the scenes, as have many other friends of Nigeria. I personally take the view that while it may be more attractive to take a positive public position, the situation now in Nigeria is such that the more secret forms of diplomacy are more likely to produce a settlement.

I should like now to turn to the three basic questions on the Order Paper. My noble friend asks first, whether we are aware of the offer made by Colonel Ojukwu for immediate peace talks with the Nigerian Federal Government on the basis of no preconditions on either side". I have seen the Press report to this effect to which this offer is attributed, but I am bound to say that there are some other versions of that particular conference which make no mention of this particular offer but which refer more generally to a call for early negotiation. Without an authoritative text, I therefore should not wish to place too much reliance upon it. But this report and the fact that the noble Lord has drawn our attention to it will be taken note of, certainly in Lagos and, no doubt, by the Commonwealth Secretariat.

LORD BROCKWAY

Yes, my Lords, but this report appeared 13 days ago. Did not the Commonwealth Department, immediately on its appearance, make some inquiry about whether it was accurate or not?

LORD SHEPHERD

We have not been able to obtain an accurate, authoritative report in regard to that statement. But if there is some authenticity, I believe that this will have been taken note of, particularly by the Commonwealth Secretariat.

LORD GOODMAN

My Lords, this is a matter of such importance that I do not apologise for interrupting. There are in London at this moment other distinguished Biafrans in a position to confirm totally the accuracy of this offer. May I ask whether the noble Lord will be prepared to meet them and receive at their hands information about whether this offer exists or whether it should be regarded as being sincere?

LORD SHEPHERD

My Lords, if there is anything I can do I will certainly do it. If the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, would care to meet me privately or in my office on this matter or can give me any information that might give us a glimmer, then I should be only too happy to see him and to convey whatever information he has to the highest possible authority in Her Majesty's Government.

LORD GOODMAN

I am very much obliged.

LORD SHEPHERD

My Lords, perhaps I should now turn to the question of pre-conditions. I cannot myself believe that there can be any settlement in Nigeria if either side insists on preconditions and we shall be working towards that end. Perhaps I can now come to the more controversial element, the supply of arms. My noble friend asks that no further arms should be supplied from this country to either side, pending peace talks. I fully sympathise with the views that have been expressed that it is wrong for us to allow any weapons to go from here to a country where there is a scene of civil war.

I should like to make it clear that there is no question of arms being supplied now, or having been supplied in the past, to anyone except the internationally recognised Government of Nigeria. But there is a good deal more to this than what I have just said. I do not disguise the fact that the question of arms supplies has presented us with some very difficult problems. I dealt with some of those aspects of the subject in the Answer to a Question by the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, on January 29. We cannot divorce these problems from their general political background. We helped to found a single Federal Nigeria. Like every other country in the world, we accept that the Federal Government is the Government of Nigeria. We do not recognise a separate State of Biafra and we warned the Ibo leaders in advance that, while we sympathised with many of their fears and anxieties, we could not support any attempt by them to secede. In addition, we have always been the traditional suppliers of arms to the Federal Government of Nigeria. Whether it was the constitutional one or the two succeeding military Governments, we have been the traditional suppliers of arms. To cut off all supplies, as is now suggested, would be seen by them as an un-neutral and one-sided act against them and against our own declared policy of support for a single Nigeria.

It would scarcely have any immediate effect on the fighting. It would not, in our view, actually bring peace nearer nor improve our chances of working for peace; and I am bound to say to my noble friend that such an action might well be to the reverse. There is no question of arms exports from this country being unrestricted either in type or in quantity. What we have agreed is that the export should continue of a reasonable quantity of arms and ammunition of broadly the same type which have been supplied in the past before the civil war broke out. We have not supplied such things as aircraft or bombs. The noble Lord should not exaggerate what is the flow of arms to Nigeria. Unfortunately, in this unhappy world there are many others willing and able to supply arms in considerable quantities—and, incidentally, arms more powerful and destructive—perhaps for scruples and motives different from ours. I would ask the House to accept that we have given this matter the deepest thought. We have no wish to play a part in a civil war. We feel that our decision in the present circumstances is right.

I should like now to end on a more constructive note, on the question of the Commonwealth peace force. It has been suggested in the newspapers, and again in this House, that a Commonwealth or a neutral presence of some kind, such as observers or an organised military force, should be offered to bring about a settlement. I agree that it is possible that some such presence could have a useful part to play; although I am bound to add that the mounting and deployment of a force—and it would need to be a force of some considerable size—would entail acute political and practical difficulties.

It would, of course, be essential that both sides in the present dispute in Nigeria should favour its use. It would not be possible for us to impose such a force at the request merely of one side. All I can say now is that if there should be a serious request, agreed to by both sides, for such a force, we should naturally be prepared to consider it. This would be in line with our undertaking that we would look at any suggestion that the Nigerians wish to make for our help in getting peace talks going or in any other way. My Lords, any proposition would have to be examined with extreme care, but the noble Lord knows our attitude towards the United Nations peace-keeping force; and I am quite sure that we should treat such a proposal, if it could establish peaceful conditions in Nigeria, with the greatest possible sympathy.

The noble Lord, Lord Brockway, put one question and said he would be satisfied if I could say that we would seek by every means available to us to bring an end to this bloody war in Nigeria. My Lords, I am surprised that the noble Lord needed to ask that question. Our record as a Government is one which reveals that although we may not always have succeeded, we have sought, and never ceased to try to find a way to end conflict and war. My Lords, I give my noble friend that assurance.

I think it was the most reverend Primate, the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury, and also the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, who said that merely bringing an end to a war was not to provide peace. Peace is a much more constructive thing, and I hope that there are men and women in Nigeria and in the Commonwealth who will now be putting their minds to what will need to be done in Nigeria, when the fighting ceases, to heal the wounds and revive this country into a force which I believe could have a tremendous effect in Africa. My Lords, I say to the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, in regard to his suggestion about a meeting on board ship, that I cannot believe, if that was what the Nigerian leaders themselves wanted, we should fail in our duty.