Lords Sitting of 27 August 1968

Preamble
The House met at eleven of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Truro

NIGERIA: REPORTED SUPPLY OF STRIKE AIRCRAFT
11.5 a.m.
THE EARL OF CORK AND ORRERY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether it is true that Airwork Services Ltd. are to supply strike aircraft to the Federal Government of Nigeria, and to recruit ground crews for their maintenance; and if so, by whom these aircraft will be flown.]
The MINISTER OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS (LORD SHEPHERD):My Lords, in a short while I shall be speaking in the debate on Nigeria, and will touch on the role of Biafran propaganda. There is no truth whatsoever in this allegation, and therefore the answer to the noble Lord is,"No".
THE EARL OF CORK AND ORRERY: My Lords, I am much obliged to the noble Lord for this most reassuring Answer. I wonder whether he would feel inclined to think that an inquiry into this matter would be in order, as the information which he so reassuringly contradicts is alleged to have come from British Airwork Services themselves.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I do not think Her Majesty's Government would wish to spend money investigating the activities of the Mark Press and the various Biafran propaganda machines.

BUSINESS
THE PAYMASTER GENERAL (LORD SHACKLETON): My Lords, if there is any fresh news on the situation in Czechoslovakia, with the leave of the
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House we propose to interrupt business and make a Statement, but I cannot foresee whether any hard news will be forthcoming. Perhaps I might also add, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Beswick, the information that there will be a half-hour break for lunch.

NIGERIA
11.7 a.m.
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH rose to move, That this House takes note of the situation in Nigeria. The noble Earl said: My Lords, I am most grateful to the Government, to the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, and the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, for agreeing that I should move this Motion, following on the friendly understanding, which is also accepted in another place, that Government and Opposition Motions should alternate. I hope that it will also enable the noble Lord to deal with some of my questions at the outset, and thus make it unnecessary for him to refer to them again in his final winding-up speech. We welcome him back from, I think, Balmoral. I hasten to add that he has not, I think, been trying to adopt the "grouse moor" image but has, very properly, been attending a Privy Council.
My Lords, like my noble friend Lord Jellicoe yesterday, I think the Government were right to recall Parliament and to take the opportunity, of reporting not only on the situation in Czechoslovakia but also on that in Nigeria, for during the last week the situation in Nigeria has certainly been very confusing and disturbing. We heard early in the week that Federal Nigerian units were poised for a final onslaught on the Ibo heartland; and, on Saturday, that they were approaching Oweri, where Colonel Ojukwu was thought to have his headquarters. Yet another report on the same day stated that General Gowon was holding his troops back—holding them back, my Lords—until the possibility of a peaceful solution had been completely exhausted; and this despite heavy pressure on him to finish the war rapidly with a final military campaign. Then, yesterday, it was reported in the Daily Telegraph that Biafran troops had withdrawn from Aba; and last night, in an interview on "24 Hours", General Gowon openly admitted that the final push was on and that the war would

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probably be over in about four weeks. At the same time, Dr. Azikwe, who is Colonel Ojukwu's political adviser, was reported yesterday to have said that Biafra would fight to the bitter end.
I should be grateful if the noble Lord would comment on these reports (I do not think they can all be very wide of the mark) and tell us whether he thinks this final action by the Federal Government is indeed imminent. We might have hoped otherwise, and that the noble Lord was really satisfied with what I understood to be Chief Enahoro's assurances last week that the attack on Aba was not part of a final push. According to the Sunday Telegraph, fierce fighting on all fronts had been reported by Radio Biafra, indicating that the Federal Government is still intent on pursuing its "final solution" offensive against the breakaway State. At the same time, I understand from the same paper that Federal Nigeria and Biafra delegates to the peace talks at Addis Ababa have now agreed on a formula to send relief supplies to the victims of the war. I hope this really is a breakthrough, but I imagine that there will be many practical problems in the implementation of this agreement and that it will take some time to work out the details, especially in view of the vast size of the problem. I gather that it is estimated that between 2½million and 4 million are in Biafran refugee camps.
We on these Benches welcome the action which the Government took in regard to relief, and in sending the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, on his extremely difficult mission. I read with interest his report, which was published earlier this month. Whether or not the noble Lord feels he was successful in his task, I feel that we should all pay a very warm tribute to the very hard and devoted work which he did in this extremely difficult situation; and we are very glad to see him here this morning, and that he is to address your Lordships. He has the admiration of us all.
I should particularly like to ask the Government, in regard to the Mission's report, whether the recommendations in Part 6 have now been fully implemented by the Government. I know from the noble Lord's reply to the Private Notice Question put by my noble Leader Lord Carrington on July 31 that a large part
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of the sum allocated has been either spent or firmly committed. Altogether, I see that the Mission recommended that some £238,000 should be provided to supply transport, personnel and relief supplies to the starving people of Biafra. In parenthesis, here I think I should say how sure I am that noble Lords on both sides of the House must have been sickened by the films and pictures of starving children which they have seen, and that our hearts, and not only our hearts but our hard cash, must go out.
What I should like to know with regard to this report is whether Lord Hunt's recommendations regarding the provision of trucks and Landrovers, light aid detachments, river craft, ambulances, medico-social teams, civilian drivers, mechanics and food and medical supplies in categories and quantities advised by the International Red Cross have now been fully met. I know that there was some difficulty in determining the types of river craft likely to be most useful and readily obtainable. I wonder whether such river craft are now available. Also, I gather that some of the trucks aresecond-hand and need a good deal of maintenance, and that they will even have to be equipped with certain additional items. I wonder whether the noble Lord can give us further information regarding the detailed fulfilment of Lord Hunt's recommendations.
I read on Saturday that relief flights to Biafra by aircraft chartered by the International Red Cross had been resumed and that during last week there had been two flights nightly from Fernando Po, 8 tons of foodstuff and medicines being carried at a time. Yesterday I heard the B.B.C. report that four other countries, including Denmark, were sending aircraft. Am I right in thinking that all these flights are being continued and that the new Red Cross airfield in Biafra is functioning fully? There was a report, I regret to say, in The Times yesterday that it had again been bombed by Nigerian aircraft.
I am sure we all welcome—indeed I think that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has done so—the French attempt to fly supplies in by way of the Gabon, even if these supplies do not begin to meet the overall requirements. I gather that the French are landing only 5 tons each time but that the International Red Cross

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has to think in terms of 5,000 tons waiting in Lagos; 1,700 tons in Enugu, 1,000 tons in Calabar and 3,500 tons in Fernando Po. No doubt the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, will confirm these figures today, and I have no doubt that he is right in saying that only that sort of tonnage can make a difference to the suffering in Biafra. I wonder whether the Government can estimate what the total tonnage is which is being flown in by these various aircraft.
I wonder also whether the noble Lord can say whether reports that Britain might withdraw support from the International Red Cross if they started daylight flights to a Biafran airstrip without the consent of the Nigerian Federal Government are correct. As I understand it, this plan was put forward after the airstrip proposed by Colonel Ojukwu was rejected by General Gowon. Is there a possibility that the Federal Government may be reconsidering their position? Then there is the whole question of whether it will be possible to mobilise an observer force to assist in the solution of this dire situation. Can the noble Lord say anything further about the progress which has been made in organising such a force? I gather that recently General Gowon was urged to allow a team of international observers to accompany his troops in the final assault on Biafra, but I also understand that this proposal got little support when it was first mentioned in the peace talks. However, I understand that the Organisation of African Unity is strongly in favour of the idea, which has the support of the Emperor Haile Selassie who presides over the peace talks in Addis Ababa.
Finally, my Lords, on the delicate question of our supplying arms to the Federal Government, I recognise that certain countries have ceased to do so, and there has been considerable pressure from the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, and others to get the Government to reconsider their position. The noble Lord, Lord Brockway, may regret that we on these Benches have not been able to support him on this. I think our view is that while some countries may have stopped supplying arms, other countries have not or will not; and when I speak of other countries I mean in particular, of course, the country whose actions we all so much deplored
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in yesterday's debate. If we ceased to supply arms, what guarantee have we, my Lords, that other countries would do so too? I think that Nigeria would get its arms one way or another, and that there may have been a good case for supplying them legally.
I also appreciate the Government's argument that supplying the Federal Government with arms gives us some restraining influence on them, and I should like to ask this question of the Government. What has our influence been? What, in fact, have we done? We on these Benches accepted the necessity to continue such arms supplies on the basis of the argument that if the war degenerated into genocide, the Government would reconsider their position. Do they consider that the war has degenerated, or is about to degenerate, into genocide, and, if so, have they changed their attitude regarding arms supplies to what I agree is, after all, the legitimate Federal Government? We on these Benches accepted the Government's argument only after a great deal of heart searching. Are the Government changing their view with regard to an arms embargo in the light of the latest military actions by the Federal Government?
My Lords, we were all agreed yesterday in our attitude towards the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. There was no doubt in our minds as to what we thought about this. I think that world opinion in regard to Nigeria is perhaps less crystallised and that it may be more difficult to make up our minds about it. Yet from the Commonwealth point of view it could be said that this situation is even more our concern—it is indeed a family concern—than is the one within the so-called Eastern bloc. On this basis, we have even less reason to stand aside in a seemingly disinterested way in this conflict; and I am certainly not accusing the Government of doing so. Both conflicts involve our vital interests. I only hope that General Gowon's troops will show discipline and restraint, and that the General's expressed sympathy last night on television for the innocent starving children will be matched by appropriate action—relief action and restraint by his troops.
I am indeed most grateful to the noble Lord for having agreed to report the latest situation to us, and I hope that

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he will be able to elucidate it further. All our sympathies go out to the peoples of Nigeria, and I only hope that, in agreement with the International Red Cross, effective relief action may now be taken, even at: this very late hour. I am very glad that the noble Viscount, Lord Head, who has unrivalled knowledge of Nigeria, having been First High Commissioner of the Federation, is with us to speak today. We shall listen to his speech with the greatest interest. Meanwhile, we on these Benches will try to support the Government in every way we can in their attempts, even at this late stage, to help to achieve a ceasefire, and organise relief in a war which appears to be moving inexorably towards an agonising end. My Lords, I beg to move.
Moved, That this House takes note of the situation in Nigeria.—(The Earl of Bessborough.)
11.23 a.m.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, all of us deplore the events that have brought the House together at such short notice. Yesterday, as the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, said, we could unite in expressing our deep sense of shock and abhorrence at the appalling action of the Soviet Union in invading Czechoslovakia. Television has brought to us in a clear and unmistakable way the anger and bewilderment of the Czech people, on the one hand, and their dignity and restraint on the other. All this we have seen vividly in our homes. Today, we meet to consider another tragedy. It is not in Europe but in Africa, and in a country within the Commonwealth the tragedy of the Nigerian civil war.
In this case, again, television has brought the anguish and the consequences of civil war into our homes. The blank, expressionless faces of starving children clearly not understanding the causes of their misery, and the pathetic and heartbreaking plight of these children, must strike deep in all our consciences. For those of us who know Nigeria, particularly for those of us who are deeply involved in trying to find a solution to this tragic war, those faces will for ever be imprinted in our minds. They will haunt us when the conflict has been forgotten and the war has passed into history.
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There has been in this country, and in Parliament, a growing anxiety at the lack of progress towards peace in the peace talks, at the continued suffering of the civilian population, and at the reports of the renewed fighting. The Government therefore felt it right that it would be a proper response to this sense of concern if we took advantage of the recall of Parliament to offer a further opportunity to debate the situation in Nigeria. I am very grateful that the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, at very short notice, undertook to initiaLe this debate. I hope he will find that the speech I intend now to deliver will cover most of his points. Those questions which I leave unanswered I will seek to answer, if I have leave of the House, at the end of the debate.
My Lords, I welcome this debate not only to report the events since we last met but also to state once again Her Majesty's Government's policy in the civil war. I think our policy needs to be stated because clearly it has been misunderstood, and, I am sorry to say, deliberately misinterpreted in many quarters. The problem of Nigeria is like a threepenny bit: it has two sides and many edges. The cause of the present conflict, like its solution, lies in Nigeria. It can be resolved only by Nigerians; it cannot be imposed from outside. We, on the outside, can only offer help and assistance in finding a solution, but in offering our help and assistance we must be careful not to make more difficult the task of those immediately involved. Any course of action must be carefully assessed with regard to the consequences, and we must never forget that Nigeria is a sovereign, independent country. It is a country that has evolved through a colonial past and is naturally deeply sensitive on matters relating to its sovereignty.
Before I report on events since we last debated the Nigerian situation, I think it would be helpful if I covered some of the old ground; for such has been the emotion generated by this tragic war that there is a need to set out the whole problem, so that it may be seen properly in perspective. Indeed, Her Majesty's Government's policy can be understood only if we examine the events leading from our granting of independence to Nigeria to the outbreak of the civil war. I think that I ought also to reiterate

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what has been the British Government's efforts to prevent war and, later, to secure peace in Nigeria.
My Lords, Nigeria became independent on October 1, 1960. Her early years of independence showed great promise. It was a great setback and disappointment to all our hopes when the civilian Government was ousted by a military coup on January 15, 1966. Motives were, and still are, unclear. However, the first coup was probably the work of young radicals determined to oust a regime allegedly corrupt; and it is fair, I think, to say that it met with general acclaim. It brought into power the first Military Government led by an Ibo, Major General Ironsi. Ironsi established a Military Administration, and appointed Lt.-Colonel Ojukwu as a Military Governor of the Eastern Region. That is his sole right to command this particular area. At first great things were expected of the new regime. The arrogant behaviour of the Ibos, particularly in the North, quickly brought home to the Northerners that it was Ibo officers who had killed the Federal Prime Minister—a Northerner—and the Premier of the North, as well as the Premier of Western Nigeria.
It did not go unnoticed either, in the country generally, that the coup was not carried out in the Eastern Region. The result was growing suspicion in the minds of many Nigerians, especially in the North, that the Ibos were planning to take over the country as a whole. Ironsi's unification decree of May 24, 1966, was seen in the North as the first step towards Ibo domination of Nigeria, and resulted in the Northerners turning on the Ibos, and riots, and, alas! killings took place. In July, after resentment had grown to boiling point, a second military coup occurred. General Ironsi's military regime was overthrown, and General Gowon assumed power, promising to restore a federal structure, and to seek a new basis of inter-regional harmony and national unity.
A long period of negotiation between the Federal Military Government and Colonel Ojukwu. of the former Eastern Region, then followed. In spite of a meeting at Aburi, in Ghana, and many hopes of reconciliation in Nigeria, the situation continued to worsen, until Colonel Ojukwu declared the former
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Eastern Region to be the independent State of Biafra on May 29, 1967. This was then considered—and I do not believe unreasonably—an act of war, and fighting broke out in July when the Federal Forces sought to re-establish their authority in the Eastern Region. This, as the House knows only too well, has now developed into a full-scale civil war.
What are the issues that divide the two sides? Colonel Ojukwu and the Ibo leadership are seeking to create by unconstitutional and undemocratic means a sovereign independent State, Biafra, which would embrace the whole of the Eastern Region. But that Region is not only the tribal home of the Ibos, who number some 7 million; there are also in that Region some 5 million others, made up of various smaller tribes. We believe most of the 5 million non-Ibos, almost half the population of the Region, did not, and so far as we now know do not, favour secession. And it must be remembered that oil, the pipelines, the oil installations and the ports of the Eastern Region are mainly in the non-Ibo tribal areas. Therefore Colonel Ojukwu's concept of a separate State of Biafra could be achieved only by subordinating the wishes and the interests of the 5 million non-Ibos to those of the 7 million Ibos in the Region. If Colonel Ojukwu were to succeed in his aim he and the Ibos would acquire for themselves a territory rich in agriculture and containing the great oil installations and reserves—all this at the expense of Nigeria as a whole.
The position of the Federal Government, on the other hand, has always been clear. They see Nigeria as one sovereign State. They see the economic wealth of the country as something to be developed for the good of all the people of Nigeria. In short, if the Federal Government had condoned secession it could have been done only at the expense of the future development of Nigeria as a country. It would have increased the danger of further fragmentation and the possibility of future conflict between the main tribes in Nigeria. And so war broke out..
In the early days Colonel Ojukwu's army proved more ready for war than did the Federal Military Government. They were able to move to the attack; they occupied the mid-West Region, and

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marched towards Lagos. The first bombs were dropped by Colonel Ojukwu's air force. The truth is that Colonel Ojukwu had imported considerable quantities of arms in the expectation of war. And can anyone doubt that if his forces had continued to advance successfully they would have pushed on to Lagos, and perhaps beyond? I cannot help but observe at this stage that many of the more vocal of Her Majesty's Government's critics nowadays failed to condemn the civil war when Colonel Ojukwu was achieving military success—though I would acquit Lord Brockway from that particular accusation.
What should have been the policy of Her Majesty's Government in the events leading to the civil war and afterwards? Throughout this tragic dispute we have persistently worked for peace, first by trying to help the Nigerians compose their differences without resort to arms, and later by urging both sides to work for a negotiated settlement. Paradoxically, our continued arms supply to the Federal Government has lent weight to these efforts and has been a real help to us in urging moderation and flexibility upon the Federal Government. In January, 1967, Mr. Malcolm Mac-Donald's largely unknown and unsung work came very near to achieving reconciliation of the opposing viewpoints at the conference at Aburi, in Ghana. It was a tragedy that the agreement was so short-lived.
In March, 1967, we urged Colonel Ojukwu not to push Ibo grievances to the point of secession, because we foresaw the appalling consequences of such an action. We made it clear to him that if the East seceded we should be unable to recognise the secession and expressed the opinion that other countries would also be unable to do so. Even when secession had taken place at the end of May, and hostilities broke out in July, we took the calculated risk of leaving Deputy High Commissioner Mr. Parker in Enugu. He was widely respected and liked in the East, and we hoped that his continued presence there might be helpful in maintaining a contact which would enable the two sides to start talking again. Unfortunately, the secessionists themselves made it impossible for Mr. Parker to remain in Enugu because
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his staff were molested and his radio was forcibly removed.
Then the Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.) sought to mediate between the two sides. A distinguished delegation of Heads of African States visited Lagos in November, 1967, and as a result of their discussions with General Gowon, General Ankrah, of Ghana, was deputed to make contact with the secessionist leaders. His repeated efforts bore no fruit.
Mr. Arnold Smith, the Commonwealth Secretary-General, then took the initiative in trying to get the two sides to the conference table. It appeared to us that this was the best hope of bringing the parties together and we therefore fully supported his efforts, which were sustained throughout the autumn up until quite recently, when the O.A.U. stepped into the picture. Mr. Arnold Smith's initiative was taken on his own responsibility, and his tireless efforts deserve the greatest praise. We gave Mr. Smith full and unhesitating support throughout, and I believe that much of our contacts and our discussions with the Federal Government led to their flexibility and their understanding in their discussions and their eventual negotiations with Mr. Smith.
What we have done has necessarily been done for the most part behind the scenes. No doubt it would be more gratifying to many people if we tried to launch some more spectacular initiative of our own. But having decided that the best chance of making progress lay with the Commonwealth Secretariat we used all our efforts in trying to make his initiative successful.
Our support for the Federal Government throughout this difficult period gave us the right to express our views freely to them. We have done so continuously throughout the war and have used our influence towards moderation and a solution by negotiation. I can fairly say that our views have always been listened to by General Gowon and his Government with attention and respect, and they have responded, so far as they have felt able to do so. When, in April of this year, Mr. Arnold Smith had still not succeeded in bringing the two sides to the conference table, despite frequent contacts with each side separately, my right honourable friend the Prime

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Minister took the initiative with General Gowon which resulted in an important visit to London by Dr. Arikpo, the Federal Commissioner for External Affairs. Dr. Arikpo's talks with my right honourable friend the Prime Minister and my right honourable friend the Commonwealth Secretary resulted in the Commissioner for External Affairs announcing publicly in London that the Federal Government would not insist on a renunciation of secession as a condition of peace talks but would be prepared to talk unconditionally. This was a significant step forward, and I think we are entitled to claim that we played some part of bringing it about.
Subsequent peace talks in Kampala broke down on May 30. Colonel Ojukwu's delegation, which decided to withdraw, apparently did so on the ground that the Federal Government were unwilling to grant a cease-fire in isolation from some broad understanding about the political basis on which this was to be done. The Federal delegation remained throughout willing to continue the discussions. The leaders of the Federal delegation made it clear that they were prepared to go to the meetings whenever the other side was ready.
It is only natural that Colonel Ojukwu should have sought a cease-fire. Nevertheless, I do not think it unreasonable of the Federal Government to have sought some assurance that a cease-fire would lead to the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Nigeria, which is precisely what they have been fighting for. We, for our part, impressed upon the Federal Government how important it was that they should be prepared to negotiate flexibly, and I believe that, subject to their overriding commitment —the restoration of a united Nigeria—they were, and are, prepared to make concessions.
We regarded the Kampala peace talks as suspended rather than broken off. At this stage I took the opportunity of seeing representatives from both sides in London in an endeavour to get talks started again. I also flew out to Lagos for discussions with General Gowon with the same object in mind. The Federal Military Government said that they were prepared for further negotiation. They were prepared to meet anywhere at any
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time. It was the other side who failed to appear, despite having given me a promise to attend, and despite the fact that I drew the attention of both sides to the fact that while it might not have been possible to proceed with a political solution in these talks, at least we could talk about how we could get relief to both sides in Nigeria. The refusal did not come from the Federal Military Government; it came from the Biafran authorities. The Federal Military Government also declared their willingness to accept an outside observer force to reassure the Ibos about the consequences of a ceasefire. As the House will remember, we announced that we would be ready to contribute to such a force, on certain conditions, if we were asked by both sides.
There followed a further initiative by the O.A.U. Consultative Committee, which managed to get talks going at Niamey in Niger, under the chairmanship of President Diori. Both General Gowon and Colonel Ojukwu attended the meeting, which took place between July 15 and 19, though they did not confront each other at the table. Although final agreement on relief corridors was not possible, a three point agenda was agreed for a further meeting to take place at Addis Ababa, under the chairmanship of Emperor Haile Selassie. This meeting, in spite of its ups and downs, continues. I will revert to this meeting shortly. I have mentioned these points at some length because I am anxious that the House should know the part that Her Majesty's Government have played throughout this tragic civil war, not only to prevent the war itself, but also to bring it to a peaceful solution.
Now, if I may, I will come to our arms policy. Our arms policy has been discussed on frequent occasions in the House. I well appreciate the depth of feeling there is on this subject. But I think that we need to consider once again how Her Majesty's Government came to be supplying arms in the first place. The Nigerian Forces, like the forces of many Commonwealth countries, were trained and equipped on British lines long before independence. They naturally have looked largely to us for resupply. When the time came when they most needed supplies, they counted on our willingness to let them purchase from the United Kingdom. I do not

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believe that, in the circumstances I have set out, neutrality was a possible option for us at that time. We might have been able to declare ourselves neutral if one independent country had been fighting another, but this was not a possible attitude when a Commonwealth country, with whom we had long and close ties, was faced with an internal revolt. Such an act would have been one of condoning secession—in short, an act of support for the rebels.
This is important. What would other Commonwealth countries have thought? Some of them face minorities who seek to secede, who may be tempted to break up their countries in order to achieve secession. What effect would this have had on the rest of Africa, struggling to create modern nation States in the face of traditional tribal fears and rivalries?
How many Commonwealth countries for whom we train and support could have any faith in us if, at this moment of crisis for a Commonwealth country, we refused to continue our support? My belief is that they would have turned to the Soviet Union or one of the countries in the Eastern bloc to supply them, and your Lordships well know the political influence that would follow such a change of policy.
Our policy since the war began has been to continue authorising the exports of carefully controlled quantities of arms and ammunitions, broadly of the same kind as we supplied before the war. But we have not supplied any military aircraft or bombs. These supplies have amounted to about 15 per cent. by value of Nigeria's total arms purchases, and even in the particular categories of infantry arms and ammunition, our share is under half. Nigeria can and is obtaining the bulk of her supplies from elsewhere. Our supplies have been more important in political than practical terms.
It may be asked why, if this is so, we do not cut off supplies now. The answer is that we recognise the Federal Government and our continued, although modest, support gives us a right as a friendly country to use our influence with her towards what all of us want—an end to the fighting and a settlement. Some will argue that we have been unsuccessful in achieving these aims so far. Regretfully, in terms of a ceasefire and
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settlement, this is true. But General Gowon and his colleagues have been prepared to listen to our views And to meet us when they have felt they could. The fact of the matter is that we have been able to use this influence. The House may remember the communiqué that was issued after by own talks in Lagos.
As I said earlier, Nigeria is an independent country and we have no more right than any other nation to intervene in what she sees as an entirely internal affair. We have asked ourselves many times whether cutting off arms supplies would have made agreement more likely. It would certainly have eased our consciences, but would it have improved the prospects of peace or bettered the chance of getting relief supplies flowing? We do not believe so. We would lose our capacity to influence the Federal Government and I believe that it would make the Ibos even more intransigent. Far from persuading the Ibos to negotiate meaningfully, our action would encourage them to fight on. The recent ill-timed French announcement of support for Biafra, at the very moment of going to the Addis Ababa Conference, has certainly had the effect of encouraging the Ibos to fight on and not to negotiate.
There are other matters which we have had to take into consideration. The Russians have already secured a political foothold in Nigeria by supplying military aircraft and bombs which we ourselves refused to supply. If we cut off arms supplies, I am sure that Russia would be only too willing to fill the gap and gain the influence which we would lose. An international embargo on arms would have little chance of success unless the contestants themselves were willing to co-operate. Much of the international arms traffic is in the hands of private arms dealers who would certainly find ways of circumventing any inter-governmental embargo. In particular, the Ibos get their arms through irregular channels which would be impossible to control.
My right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary said in the House on June 12 that if we were to make the supposition that it was the intention of the Federal Government not merely to preserve the unity of Nigeria, but to proceed without mercy either with the slaughter of the

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lbo people, or if we were to make the supposition that it was the intention of the Federal Government to take advantage of a military situation in order to throw aside with contempt any terms of reasonable settlement, we should have to reconsider our policy. This remains our position. But the circumstances envisaged have not arisen. The Federal Government are well aware of these conditions, have accepted them, and have no intention of breaking them.
General Gowon has repeatedly said that his quarrel is not with the Ibo people, but with the rebel leaders. He has made it clear to his troops that if it becomes necessary to carry out a full-scale assault, civilians should not be ill-treated. Many thousands of lbos live and carry on normal life in Federal Nigeria. None of this adds up to the claims of Ibo propaganda that the Federal Government intends to obliterate the Ibo people. Nor are there any signs that the Federal Government are throwing away with contempt the prospects of reasonable negotiated settlement. They continue at Addis Ababa to seek a solution by negotiation. Her Majesty's Government have made it clear all along that we wish to see the earliest possible ceasefire and a solution by negotiation, and that we do not believe a military solution is the answer.
One of the factors which has added to the difficulty of assessing events in Nigeria has been that at times the Press has found it by no means easy to obtain objective first-hand reporting from the fighting areas. I am not, of course, referring to the well-authenticated reports of starvation. In the propaganda field the Ibos have often seemed to be winning the war of words while losing the battle of arms. Behind this success is a highly professional operation conducted by an advertising agency in Geneva. I have heard it said that it is the same agency that looked after the interests of Katanga. The Ibo official line is regularly telexed to Geneva and distributed wholesale and undiluted by the agency to world-wide outlets.
Much of the material distributed by or on behalf of the Ibos is utterly untrue. For example, we have been accused of sending 600 black-painted British troops to Nigeria, some 260 of whom it was
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alleged had been killed during the Federal offensive at Port Harcourt. A thousand Royal Marines were alleged to have been despatched to Nigeria for an amphibious attack on Port Harcourt, but to have been subsequently recalled. The Hibernian footballers who were touring West Africa were said to be parachute troops. A party of British school children on a cruise were said to be British soldiers. This would be laughable were it not for the fact that this particular rumour was responsible for the burning of British property in Port Harcourt by an Ibo crowd. In fact, of course, no British forces have served in Nigeria during the civil war, and we have repeatedly denied Ibo claims to the contrary. The Ibo propaganda machine has also gone on insisting that R.A.F. aircraft and British bombs were being used in the war, although there has never been the slightest shred of truth in this. But there are still some people in this country, even in high places, who believe this propaganda.
Another example of a "Biafran claim which paints an illegitimately lurid picture of events is their recent allegation that Federal troops massacred all the inhabitants, 2,300 people, of two villages. I do not believe these stories to be true; I believe they are a figment of the Biafran propaganda machine, for a reputable journalist, widely experienced in West Africa, who returned from the front last Friday, said that the whole population between the Imo River and Aba, the area where this massacre was supposed to have taken place, within reach of the road, had fled, and there were no signs of atrocities whatever. Is it conceivable, if the slaughter of 2,300 people had taken place, that there would not at least have been some evidence of this? He also said that he was particularly struck by the fine discipline shown by the Federal troops.
There is yet another allegation, about which I wrote to my noble friend Lord Brockway, that the 25 vehicles we sent to Lagos in July for relief purposes have been assigned to the Federal army. The vehicles were in fact handed over to the British Red Cross. But that allegation appeared in the British Press in such a way that I think most people would have believed that the British Government had handed over vehicles to the military

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forces of the Federal Government which had been allocated to the Red Cross. This to me is one of the great tragedies, because in some ways the Ibos are becoming the victims of their propaganda. The belief which it has instilled in them, that any concessions would lead to a planned genocide by the Federal authorities, is certainly a major stumbling block in achieving a cease-fire. As I have said, we do not accept that the Federal Government have any such intention of genocide or the like against the Ibos. They have offered to accept outside observers after a cease-fire for the purpose of reassuring the Ibos.
I would say to the noble Earl that they are also actively considering the possibility of having observers with their forward troops in the present fighting. They have suggested that after a cease fire, the East Central state should be policed by mostly Ibo police, not the Federal Army.
We have heard from reliable sources of captured "Biafran" soldiers being well treated by the Federal forces. Lord Hunt's recent mission to Nigeria found that an attitude of vindictiveness towards the Ibos among the people they met was noticeably absent. That is the impression that I had very much when I visited Nigeria, Calabar and Enugu. There are cases, too, of Federal troops helping to feed Ibo refugees.
It should also be remembered that there are at least 100,000 Ibos living peacefully in Lagos. Ibos continue to hold responsible and senior jobs in the rest of the Federation. These factors clearly show that genocide is by no means the Federal intention, although suicide for their people sometimes seems to be the intention of the Ibo leaders. The current war, together with their own propaganda, has probably convinced the Ibos that they can never live normally with other Nigerians. Those of us who have some ex perience of West Africa would not accept that. As I say, there is evidence in Nigeria to the contrary. The Federal Government have assured them of equal status and rights in a united Nigeria and have made offers to guarantee their word. Given the undoubted abilities of the Nigerians for conciliation and statesmanship, we believe that the Ibos would be able to return to their homes and jobs in Nigeria.
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Turning to the latest attempts to bring about the settlement, I am bound to say that the Addis Ababa conference has struggled hard but unsuccessfully, despite the very distinguished chairmanship and statesmanship of the Emperor of Ethiopia, to get political agreement. Having failed there, the parties turned to the possibility of an agreed plan for relief of suffering. Even here there have been heartbreaking difficulties and suspicions on both sides. The House will, however, be very happy to hear that Emperor Haile Selassie's formula for relief operations was this weekend accepted, in principle, by the Nigerian and Biafran delegations. A great. deal of credit for this is due to the determination of the Emperor. The agreement is for a simultaneous use of land and air mercy routes into Biafra. The House knows that the Government have always believed that, while land corridors were the only way to provide long-term aid in the necessary volume, there was also a short-term need for an emergency airlift to meet the immediate needs and to clear the stockpiles accumulated at Fernando Po.
We are happy to learn that the Nigerian Federal delegation has returned to Addis Ababa authorised to accept the Emperor's formula. The House will also be glad to know that the International Red Cross flights into Biafra from Fernando Po have been resumed, presumably with the concurrence of the Federal Government. Chief Enahoro was in Geneva on Saturday, August 24, and has had a useful meeting with Dr. Lindt, who is in charge of the International Committee of the Red Cross operations in Nigeria. The two have agreed to meet shortly. Meanwhile. I have heard with much delight that Dr. Lindt has been invited by the Emperor to join in the talks at Addis Ababa and is leaving Geneva today.
I do not wish to underestimate the difficulties that may still lie ahead before the relief plans on an adequate scale into the Ibo-held territories are implemented. We have had too many disappointing examples of agreements in principle proving difficult to implement. But we must all hope that, with the conscience of the world so clearly aroused and with the urgency of the Emperor behiid it, we shall be able to find a way of implementing this agreement. We must also hope that a working agreement on relief

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will yet bring about a cease-fire and eventual political settlement. We have pinned great hopes on the talks taking place at Addis Ababa under the auspices of the O.A.U.
My Lords, unfortunately I have very little to report about achieving a ceasefire. The Federal Government have put forward proposals subject, as I say, to the proviso of unity. All the other proposals are negotiable. On Colonel Ojukwu, I am afraid, they have made no impact. His demands appear to be as tough as ever, in that they amount to a claim for independence, or at least the attributes of sovereignty. His line on this would be understandable if he were winning the military conflict; but the reverse is the truth. We have made no secret of the fact that we hope that the people of Nigeria will be able to agree on a settlement which allows for the unity of their country, but we have also stressed from the outset that it was up to them to decide. This is still our view. We have used our influence; we have given all our encouragement to the Federal Government to meet the Ibo leaders, first at Kampala and now at Addis Ababa. We will continue to use whatever support, whatever help, we can should the Addis Ababa talks break down, but they have not yet broken down, and I hope that they will not do so.
I note that the noble Earl, Lord Bess-borough, spoke about the Press speculation regarding the Federal Forces, that they have already launched their all-out offensive. The situation has been fluid for some months. There has been a pattern of attack, counter-attack and infiltration. The noble Earl may have seen the television programme of Major Steiner (I think it is) of the Fourth Commando of the Biafran Army, who was speaking very much of his ability to get behind the Federal lines. So the situation has been extremely fluid.
We have been assured by the Federal Government that they will negotiate to the limit and will not resort to a general advance unless all attempts at negotiation have failed. Indeed, I am convinced from my talks with General Gowon that he has all along desired a negotiated settlement, because he knows the cost of a continued war. Nevertheless, I
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would not wish the House to think that the Federal Government are likely to be responsive to appeals merely to stop and give up what they are fighting for unless there is some sign that Colonel Ojukwu is ready to meet them over the question of unity. It is against this background that the vital importance of the Addis Ababa talks must be seen.
This might be the right moment to give the House the clearest account I can of what is necessarily a confused and obscure military situation. The Federal forces have now retaken all the non-Ibo areas of the former Eastern Region, and have thus established their authority in the South-Eastern and Rivers States. In addition, they now hold the areas of the East Central State —lboland—which lie to the North of the Onitsha and Enugu road. To get matters in perspective, I think the House should understand that it is now more accurate to talk of the "Ibo areas" rather than of "Biafra". Although Colonel Ojukwu still speaks of Biafra, he is in fact in control of not much more than half of Iboland. These are the realities of the situation. The Federal forces are in a strong military position, having cut off the Ibos entirely from outside.
Reference was made by the noble Earl to General Gowon's statement on the "24 Hours" programme last night. I did not see it; but I have a transcript. But I will say this to the House, from information made available to me on leaving the Office to come to this debate. There is no evidence of a major push from the North. The military activity on the Southern front which is now going on has followed strong attacks along the whole area by Biafran forces. Indeed, some of these attacks have been initially successful. I received during the course of the noble Earl's speech a message from Lagos, from which it is perfectly clear to me that the military advance which we certainly have in mind has not taken place, has not started; and it seems to me that the undertaking which General Gowon has given us, that he will continue as long as it is possible before a military solution has to be undertaken, still holds good.
If, however—and one must he frank about this—there seems to be no possibility of a negotiated settlement, and

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with tin continued and increasing supply of weapons to Colonel Ojukwu, and also the fear and the suspicion of the Federa Government following the French action, it may be understandable, though regrettable, that further military action by the Federal forces along the road to the remaining areas of Iboland for the purpose of capturing the airstrips and the seats of government, may now be considered vital by the Federal Government. We have always warned both parties of the desperate shortage of time.
I understand that in the same interview Genera! Gowon also spoke of the humanitarian problem and the need for early relief to follow the fighting. As the House will know, we have continually urged this upon the Federal Military Government. Time is desperately short. I apologise for speaking at length, but this is a situation in regard to which I think the House would wish to have this information. We share the concern that has been expressed on the question of relief, the plight of the refugees affected by the war. I have on an earlier occasion described the position of our own relief programme in which the Government provided some quarter of a million pounds. We had the advice of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, to whom again I pay a most respectful tribute. I think I can also say to the House that although it may be the case that the mission in itself was completed, the noble Lord, Lord Punt, feels so dedicated to his role that he still takes an interest, and was quite recently in Geneva seeing Dr. Lindt.
In thinking of the appalling problem of starvation and malnutrition, it is right to remember that the problem exists not only in the Ibo heartland but also in those areas controlled by the Federal Government. I think the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, will confirm when he speaks later on that we have reacted, within the sums that we had available, to all the requests that he made. I know that there was some criticism of some of the vehicles which were not new. I freely acknowledge this because they were sent on my own responsibility. I thought that the vehicles were so desperately needed in Nigeria that I did not feel able to wait for newvehicles to come off the lines. I obtained vehicles out of Army stock, and I give credit to the Army and
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to the shipping company who diverted a ship to Dover in order that those vehicles could be loaded. I should also like to pay tribute to the seamen who painted these Army vehicles white in the course of the ship's passage. We have always given our support to Dr. Lindt. He has taken over a tremendous task. I would say to the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, that we have never in any way suggested that we would ever withdraw support from the International Red Cross. We give our full support to the International Red Cross, and to Dr. Lindt in particular.
I conclude by giving this information that was released some 15 minutes ago as to what the International Red Cross has been able to do in co-ordinating efforts in Nigeria. They now have 14 relief teams working in Federal-held territories, and hope to have 18 more by late September. They already have 50 vehicles at the disposal of the International Red Cross for the transport of relief supplies. Twenty-five more provided by the British Government will bring this total up to 75. In addition, the International Red Cross are hiring trucks locally for the distribution of locally purchased supplies. Some 2,000 tons of rice and other local produce have been brought in from the Northern areas and transported by road to Enugu and Lagos. From Lagos they will be shipped to Calabar. Some 700 tons went last week and a further 1,000 tons will be shipped shortly.
A further 10,000 tons of food supplies, such as maize and cornmeal, are expected to reach Lagos from abroad within the next week. The International Red Cross have chartered two coastal vessels of 500 tons each in order that supplies can be moved from Lagos to Calabar. The International Red Cross have their own aircraft for supplies from Lagos to Enugu and Calabar. Two D.C.4's have been operating an airlift of 36 tons a day, and two more D.C.4's are being added in the next month. Two helicopters are being obtained for use in the Calabar area early next month, and we expect some 500 tons of food a month to be brought from the North by road and rail to Enugu and down South.
I should like to pay a most sincere tribute to the many voluntary societies and organisations who have done so

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much, perhaps under most difficult and frustrating circumstances, to bring help to the refugees. At the end of the debate I will, with permission, seek to answer any questions that may be raised in the course of the debate. I would only say this. Time is now desparately short if there is to be a negotiated settlement. Both sides are now at Addis Ababa. They have there the Emperor Haile Selassie who will do everything that is humanly possible to bring the two sides together.
It needs two sides to negotiate. One possibly is flexible. For one reason or another, one is not. I know that that side has many friends and sympathisers throughout this country and Europe. I suppose most people in their hearts tend to support what appears to be the underdog. I would beg those people to use whatever influence they have on Colonel Ojukwu and his fellow leaders in Biafra to recognise the military situation that now exists, the inevitable result unless there is a political solution. I would hope that all their efforts would now be directed, as I have said before, to bringing the two sides together. We for our part have not the slightest doubt that, provided there is this one exception of a united Nigeria, the Federal Government would negotiate with the greatest degree of flexibility, because I am convinced that they wish to avoid the necessity of a military solution.
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, and with the permission of the noble Baroness, I wonder whether, in view of the fact that Parliament will not be meeting again until October, it would be possible for the noble Lord to get from General Gowon, perhaps before the end of this debate, a positive statement that he has been completely misinterpreted. I am not the only noble Lord in this House who listened to him last night on "24 Hours," when he definitely said that the final push had started, or was immediately about to start. This seems to me to be in direct conflict with the assurances which he gave the noble Lord.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, the message that I gave was from our High Commissioner in Lagos, in response to an urgent message that we ourselves sent
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early this morning after hearing the reports on General Gowon. I do not know what the circumstances of the interview were. I understand the doubt in the noble Earl's mind, but the information that I have been given is, as one might say, minutes old, and not hours old.
12.20 p.m.
BARONESS ASQUITH OF YARN? BURY: My Lords, in yesterday's debate your Lordships discussed a tragic situation in Europe, the fate of Czechoslovakia, and we unanimously condemned its author. To-day, we are discussing another human tragedy—this time in Africa; and for one of its grimmest features we must indict our own Government. I refer, of course, to the continuous sale of arms to the Federal Government for use against the starving people of Biafra. Every civilised Government has now ceased to practise this hideous trade, with only two exceptions, ourselves and Soviet Russia.
The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, has reminded us in his speech of special pleading for the Federal Government (for that is what it was) that time is desperately short. What he does not seem to recognise is that it is through our Government's action in supplying arms that our moral authority and the power to mediate has been utterly destroyed. After all, what country in the world would seek mediation, or would accept mediation, from the arsenal of its most deadly enemy? Should we have welcomed Krupp as a mediator during the Battle of Britain? In the eyes of the world our Government represents our country, for better or for worse. Every one of us is thus implicated in a crime—for that is how I see it—which many of us abhor.
As has been often mentioned, both yesterday and to-day, our guilt is brought home to us nightly on our T.V. screens. Thanks to the miracle of television we see history happening before our eyes. We see no Ibo propaganda; we see the facts, and not one of us can say, "I did not know". We have no alibi. We see these things happening. We see the poignant tragedy of Biafra's starving children, 3,000 of whom are said to be dying every day. We see pictures of these children tottering on their spindly

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legs, with wasted bodies and huge tragic eyes charged with experience—experience of the approach of death; some of them held by agonised mothers because they are too weak to stand. I wonder whether the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, and his colleagues sleep well at night. I know that I cannot do so.
We also have seen the stocks of aid, food, powdered milk and medicine rotting in the warehouses of the port of Lagos. These, too, are shown to us. We hear people inquiring, "Can they be sent to the starving people?". Obstacles are mentioned, but our Saracen tanks get through. We are cheered to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, that at last there is some chance of aid now reaching Fernando Po by air. The arms that we are selling and have been selling for something like two years to the Federal Government for use against these starving people are provided by us, and the Federal Government may soon, as we hear, move in for the kill. It is the most inhuman deed that I can recall in the history of our country.
Now, what is the Government's case? What is their defence? They have two lines of defence, and one is that we must at all costs support the legal Government of Nigeria. There is no sanctity in being a legal Government. The last two legal Governments of Nigeria, I believe, were established by two military coups preceded by two murders. Take a very different instance, the Government of South Africa. Our Government have refused to sell arms to South Africa, I think quite rightly refused, on moral grounds, but, like it or like it not, the Government of South Africa is a legal Government. What is the distinction they draw between the two?
What is Biafra's crime? Biafra has seceded from a federation of incompatible tribal units. It is not the first time that an African federation, clapped together by ourselves with the very best intentions, has come to pieces in our hands. And we have accepted it. Secession is no crime. Take Ireland. Ireland's secession, violently and blindly opposed for years by pig-headed and short-sighted politicians, was not a crime. On the contrary, it was a reasonable demand and should have been far sooner reasonably conceded. As a result of its concession we and Ireland now live together
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in peace and friendship. There is peace and understanding between us. And Ireland in her turn has been forced to accept a secession, the secessi 311 of Ulster. They, too, belonged to diferent tribes, and they are far happier living independently under their separate and self-chosen Governments. Why should not Biafra have the same rights of secession?
The Government's second plea for continuing their supply of arms is that we should lose all influence with the Federal Government if we ceased to send them. I can only say that if the present nightmare in Biafra is the result of British influence she would be better off without its influence or its arms. Our arms have killed far more Biafrans than our influence has saved. Liberals have urged in vain the organisation of a Commonwealth force to police what we hole will be a cease-fire. We are glad to know that there is a chance that some observers may be sent. We have also begged the Government to second to the Red Cross some Hercules aircraft from the R.A.F. to fly supplies into Fernando Po under neutral supervision. Could not the second of these suggestions be accepted —to save what is still left to save while time remains? Above all, I entre it the Government to save what still remains of our good name, and now, at the eleventh hour, to stop the sale of arms. All Governments are fallible they consist of fallible human beings. Many of their failings, their sins of omission or commission, are in time forgiven and forgotten. But by this action our Government have branded our people with a stain which is indelible. They have made our people—our decent, kindly, human people—an accessory to a crime against humanity.
12.29 p.m.
THE LORD BISHOP OF LONDON: My Lords, yesterday we were debating one situation rightly described as "tragic". The situation we are debating this morning is, if possible, more tragic since those who are involved are, in a sense, our friends. Many of them who live In the two areas are personally known to many Members of your Lordships' House, and we suffer too, I think, from something of that sense of impotence. This is a Nigerian business, as the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, has rightly reminded us,

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yet we seem to be able to do so little to help them to solve their own problems.
Ten days ago the Anglican Bishops attending the Lambeth Conference had a special plenary session to receive a statement from the Bishops of the Provinces of West Africa. It was a deeply moving occasion. All 13 of the Bishops of the Provinces come from the area we have known as Nigeria; ten of them are African Bishops, some of them from one side in the conflict and some from the other. The statement which they presented to the Conference was drawn up at the first meeting they had been able to have together since the conflict had begun, and it was a unanimous and moving statement.
It asked first of all that the Conference should call upon all Governments to work effectively towards peace and reconciliation and to refrain from any action which would prolong the conflict in the area; and it asked us to call on the Governments on both sides to look with pity on those who were sick and starving, and to give every facility to the organisations endeavouring to bring them food and medical supplies. The statement concluded with words which perhaps I may be allowed to quote to your Lordships, remembering that these are African leaders from both sides in the conflict:
"We state our belief that the conflict can be resolved positively in a creative way only when each side is prepared to abandon its exclusive position and to seek to reach agreement on how to secure the vital interests of the peoples on both sides."
The Lambeth Conference, of course, endorsed the appeal made to them to call on the Governments to do these two things. But what does that imply? To refrain from doing anything which would prolong the conflict. The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, has given us a full and balanced account of the events and the reasons why Her Majesty's Government have felt it right to continue the supply of arms, but I wonder (and here I speak only for myself) whether it has not perhaps reached the point when we might hope that our Government would call on other Governments, even though the chances of success may not be great, to abandon the supply of arms and to give an earnest of it by refusing to sell any more arms ourselves.
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In the meantime, there is the other side, the call for pity for the sick and the starving. The report made by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, showed how difficult his task had been and, if I may add to what has already been said, increased our admiration for him by the way in which he had battled with those difficulties. And he will know far more than I do about what can be done and how it should be done. This we do know: that there is no lack of concern among the peoples of the world. Apart from the Governmental aid, such as the £250,000 set aside by Her Majesty's Government, there has been a magnificent response in personal giving to the various agencies—to the Red Cross, to the various Church relief services, including in our own country Christian Aid and OXFAM, and I think there is not the slightest doubt that money and volunteers will be forthcoming in fully adequate supply to meet the need, if only they can get through to those who are in such desperate straits.
Perhaps what this debate in your Lordships' House can do, along with what is being said in another place, will be to bring to those who have almost abandoned hope—the refugees and the starving, and the children—at least the assurance that the people of this country still care for what was once a colonial possession; indeed, they care for it perhaps more now than they have ever done in the past. It can also show those people that the people of this country will support their Government in everything that can be done to carry on the work of reconciliation; to support what is being done in Addis Ababa; to exploit, so far as may be without an easing of the situation, the bringing in of relief, and to work for a just and lasting settlement. Difficult though it may be, and difficult though we know it will be, if the message that goes out from us after this debate is that we believe that a solution can be found, and that we believe and are determined that relief shall get through in the quantities required, this debate, apart from all else, will have served a valuable purpose.
12.36 p.m.
LORD HUNT: My Lords, I do not proposed to speak in emotive terms about the suffering and starvation of innocent civilians in the Nigerian civil war, even

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though I propose to make it my sole concern to debate this aspect of the situation in Nigeria. I hope your Lordships will accept that this is not because I have not been, as the noble Baroness and no doubt every other one of your Lordships have been, deeply moved, but precisely because I have been. Your Lordships will have seen those terrible scenes on television.
Some of your Lordships will have read and heard much else from first-hand witnesses of the horrible things that are happening to civilians in that country. You will also have heard and read a good deal else that is not fact—that is fiction—but all I would say about that is that nothing that your Lordships have seen, have read or have heard can make the impact that is made when you actually meet these children and their mothers face to face; when you speak to them and you are empty-handed, and when you are powerless to help there and then on the spot. I have had this experience. It is something I shall never forget and never fully get over. But it is my view that many words that we have heard and read, stemming from emotional reactions, have hindered rather than helped a solution to this intractable problem. Therefore I propose to speak from a basis of hard facts about what is practicable. This means taking account of political situations and military facts. It is one thing to take account of them, it is another thing to form judgments about them, and I have no intention of forming judgments about those situations —the political situation in particular—any more than I had when I first went to Nigeria on July 5.
What are the facts which have continued for months to block the way to relief operations in Nigeria? There are a number of them. The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, has mentioned several, and I hope that your Lordships will forgive me if I go over some of this ground again, simply to provide a background for my own convictions. I will mention only three of these immediately, and I apologise for the fact that your Lordships know them all already.
The first is the fact of a state of siege in a civil war in an independent sovereign State—a siege which was the result of an act of deliberate forbearance by General Gowon, in the hope that he could persuade
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his adversary, Colonel Ojukwu, to come to terms without further bloodshed. General Gowon failed, and one evil has been replaced by another; and there will be no doubt in the minds of many of your Lordships that tin; evil which has followed is greater than the one that he tried to avoid. The siege has continued for several months, with the Ibos completely surrounded and cut off by land and by water; their physical communication with the outside world restricted to two or three night lights under hazardous conditions on to one improvised airstrip, when flying conditions make this possible, and landing within range of the Federal anti-aircraft guns. Brutal and inhuman though it is, the very essence of siege tactics is to reduce the defenders to physical conditions which they can no longer Idure. Colonel Ojukwu has chosen (and I do not for one minute criticise this) to endure.
Secondly, there is the fact that, despite three international conferences and numerous diplomatic efforts by Governments and individuals the opposing political objectives, both based on plausible ideals—many would, say tenable ideals —and both sincerely held, have proved incapable of compromise.
Thirdly, there is the fact that world opinion has been brought to bear on the political and human aspects of this war to an extent never before experienced in Africa. Of course there is the example in Asia of Vietnam, and yesterday the noble Viscount, Lord Eccles, made a most important point when he spoke of the power of public opinion over riding Governments and crossing frontiers. He was talking, as we all know, in the context of the situation in Czechoslcvakia. How true this is of Nigeria! But I hope that the noble Viscount, if he reads Hansard and what I am now about to say, will not disagree if I remind I him of the power of propaganda over public opinion, when I venture to suggest that sometimes public opinion, swayed and shaped by propaganda, can in the short term be unhelpful. In fact, it car even be a harmful factor when it fails to take full account of all the facts and the whole truth. I have a fourth fact to bring to the notice of your Lordships, but I shall reserve that until a little later in what little more I have to say. However, I

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select these facts simply to give a background to what I propose to tell your Lordships about my own personal convictions.
It is against the background of ideals of both leaders, of the forbearance of the one and of the fortitude of the other, that we must view the sufferings inflicted by both contenders, mainly on Ibos. But let us not forget that the suffering is not inflicted only on Ibos: it is inflicted also on Ibibios, Efeks, Ijaws and Calabaris; and not all the children your Lordships have seen on your television screens are in fact Ibos. It is against this background, too, that we should see the readiness of the Federal Military Government to facilitate relief operations by third parties, not only within the territory which they have regained and now control, but into the Ibo fortress itself. I question whether there is any precedent in history for relief operations by third parties in a situation comparable with this. Your Lordships may refer me to the Berlin airlift, but I should quickly say that that is a highly fallacious comparison. However, I do not propose to debate the point now.
Before I state my personal convictions, I should just say this. My colleagues and I went to Nigeria on July 5 on the understanding that we would be independent, that we took a neutral attitude, that our advice to the Government would not be political, and that we would act independently. I hope your Lordships will accept that even with the passage of time, or perhaps because of it, my attitude has remained independent and neutral ever since, and it is against the facts that I have chosen and give your Lordships that I wish to state my personal convictions.
The first is this. I am convinced from my personal meetings with him that General Gowon is a man of high ideals, of deep sincerity and real humanity. He is not bent on genocide of the Ibos. His dilemma is that of reconciling his ideals for a united country with his concern for the people who are suffering by his pursuit of it. If he were to remove all the obstacles and drop all safeguards in the way of relief aid, he would not only be delaying the attainment of his objective—he has been delaying that for months but would risk losing it altogether,
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for time is not on the side of General Gowon.
I could say the same about Colonel Ojukwu. I regret very much that Colonel Ojukwu did not think that any useful purpose would be served by myself or members of my mission going to meet him, because it is quite possible that had I done so I should now be able to say the sane nice things about Colonel Ojukwu as I have said, in all sincerity, about General Gowon. I am convinced that Colonel Ojukwu is in the same dilemma, but I am also persuaded that, unlike General Gowon, time is on Colonel Ojukwu's side.
My second point is one which the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, has already mentioned to your Lordships. I was impressed by the lack of vindictiveness in any of the high officials whom we met in Lagos and in the States, and in any of the senior commanders or battalion commanders whom we met, in the sense of a desire to punish, let alone to exterminate, the Ibo people. I refuse to believe, from my own convictions and observations and experience, that that is the intention. It makes very effective propaganda, but it just is not true.
I include in my belief Colonel Benjamin Adekunle, that very daring commander of the Third Division in the South-East. A great deal has been made, to his detriment, of his colourful personality and his outrageous remarks. Colonel Benji has enjoyed and encouraged this. It has been fairly lapped up by the B.B.C. and certain Press organs. Colonel Adekunle enjoys shocking journalists, but there is nothing particularly reprehensible about that. In the world of competitive sport there is at least one sport which both parties actively enjoy, and if circumstances were different I myself should enjoy that sport. He likes striking bellicose poses. He gave my Mission a tremendous dressing down for coming as a "do-gooding" Mission into the middle of his battle. But Colonel Adekunle is no sadist bent on genocide: he is a good soldier who is single-minded in doing his professional job. Many of your Lordships who have taken high command in war—I did myself—will agree that this is not incompatible with humanity.
Quite by chance, I received two days ago a letter from Colonel Adekunle. It

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was written some time ago, before this debate was arranged, and I hope he will forgive me—he certainly did not intend this—if I read out one passage from his letter. He said:
"The end is in view and the next problem is the resettlement and integrating of the misguided lot. It will be an uphill task, but we will try."
I think we must forgive Colonel Adekunle for referring to the Ibo people as a "misguided lot", but that is his point of view. But you cannot resettle and integrate dead people.
While on the subject of genocide, I can deny from personal observations the allegations of ill-treatment or genocidal intentions and concentration camp conditions in the refugee camps in the Federal areas. We visited four of them. The refugees are there because they are homeless, and because they wanted to go there. They are free to leave if they so desire, and they are well looked after within the fairly limited resources that the Federal forces can provide. That is my second point.
Thirdly, I am convinced that relief operations from all expatriate sources must take account of the hard facts, political as well as military, on which I have touched. It is sheer nonsense to talk, and to attempt to act, as though a legal Government, wielding its legal powers and conducting a military campaign, can be treated as though it were some dependency or some local authority of ours, as some people seem to think and write; its communications used and its battle lines cut through as though they were some form of red tape. Indeed, it is worse than nonsense, because such attempts have the opposite effect to what is intended: they are counterproductive. This may be very deplorable, but I suggest that it is an understandable reaction by the Federal Government, and the war has unfortunately produced a number of instances of that.
My fourth conviction, my Lords—and it is consequent upon the previous one—is that it is essential that all relief operations should be co-ordinated and controlled by a single authority acceptable to both sides. The only international body which by its traditional role is appropriate for this job is the International Committee of the Red Cross,
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the I.C.R.C. I was convinced about this, and so were my colleagues, from the evening of the first day of our stay in Lagos; and I have become more persuaded of it ever since.
My fifth conviction is this. Late in the day, but better late than never, the I.C.R.C. have grasped the full immensity of the task confronting them. For too long they had remained under-staffed, "under-gunned", without a man of the correct qualifications and calibre. For too long the voluntary bodies, with great devotion, have been operating, or trying to operate, independent ventures. To some extent there has been some consultation between some of them in regard to the help in the Federal-controlled areas, but there has been no consultation, no co-ordination, in regard to the help intended for Biafra. And for too long, too, the Nigerians themselves have done too little by way of relief operations, and have seemed to resent the help which was offered from outside.
I am convinced that this is all in the past. We now see in Dr. August Lindt a man really up to the job. Hen is a man of the required stature an I the appropriate experience—a strong, determined and energetic man. He is deeply imbued with the urgency of his job and the size of his tasks. I went to Geneva ten days ago to meet Dr. Lindt and to attend his conferences immediately on his return from a very exhausting and ex acting three-weeks tour in Nigeria and Biafra. I spent most of the whole 24 hours closely at his side, and I have remained it close touch with him, almost daily, ever since. I experienced the terrific pressures to which he was (and still is) subjected by Governments, by voluntary bodies and by individuals clamouring for Action, rightly clamouring for action—some of them already "going it alone"; others threatening to do so; many of them dubious about the man and his oil anisation; some, I regret to say, thinking at least as much in terms of the political cause of Biafra (and I say why should they not? 'The mistake is in combining these two thoughts at the same time) as of suffering human beings inside, let alone outside, the Biafran territory. I sensed the delicacy of his relation; with the conflicting parties concerned, circumscribed as they are by the political impasse and the military situation.

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My Lords, I was deeply impressed by what Dr. Lindt has already put in hand to meet the immediate needs, and your Lordships have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, something of what Dr. Lindt has achieved in a very stiort time. I was impressed by his staff structure build-up, by the contingent plans to meet different eventual situations, and the resources he can now call on to meet each eventuality. I came back quite determined to do everything in my power to obtain for Dr. Lindt the support he needs and deserves in order to create order out of chaos and to get a concerted relief operation into full swing, if possible in agreement with both the parties concerned.
I said that I would reserve and bring to your Lordships' notice one other fact. This is a logistical fact. So long as the siege continues, the two alternatives which have so far been used, attempted or discussed, one by air into Biafra, the "air bridge", the other by road through the fighting lines, the Awgu corridor, must be viewed logistically and not emotionally. It is very gallant, it may give some satisfaction to those who do it, and provide some outlet to pent-up emotional feelings about the humanitarian issue of many people outside Nigeria (I do not decry either of those points) to fly in one or two plane-loads of food by night when flying conditions make this possible. Two, five, ten or even twenty tons may be flown in by these means. If a day airlift were negotiated, the present limited landing conditions in Biafra might make possible something of the order of 16 or 20 flights, and therefore between 80 and 100 tons of food.
But how does this match up to the actual need? We heard something about this in an earlier speech. The need is to feed not 2 million (as I think the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, suggested) in camps, but perhaps 600,000 in camps; although certainly a total adding up to something of the order of 2 million or so if we include all those who are loose in the bush. The need is for at least 300 tons supplied into Biafra every day, and such a tonnage, it is quite obvious when you look at it logistically, can be met with far greater certainty, far greater regularity, at far less cost and
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for far longer, by land corridor. With even 30 5-ton trucks a daily convoy over a comparatively short distance—and that convoy exists—could run two ferries and meet this requirement. This is why the land corridor has always been far to be preferred if a choice has to be made. But of course the ideal would be to have both. In any case, a land corridor will be necessary to bring in the heavy equipment to make an airstrip in Biafra capable of taking the bigger and heavier aircraft, like the "Hercules", and thus giving a really significant airlift.
My Lords, I have touched on the background against which the whole problem must be viewed. I have stated my personal convictions on certain relevant factors and on certain personalities involved. I should like now to finish by voicing one or two personal doubts. I doubt the value to starving people—I repeat, to starving people—in any part of the whole war zone, whether it is in F.M.G.-held territory or in Biafran territory, of plugging Biafra incessantly and ad nauseam land I use those words advisedly) on B.B.C. "24 Hours" or through any other publicity medium, with the strong inference that it is all due to the callous wickedness of the Federal Military Government.
The noble Baroness said that we were seeing history on the screen. My understanding of the writing of history is that it must be seen in the round and in perspective. We are not seeing history written on the screen: we are getting a wholly fallacious impression of the facts, implying that the International Red Cross is ineffective. Such impressions, which promote a political cause and undermine confidence, and which play on the emotions in doing so, can do little, and certainly do little, to open land corridors or to widen air bridges.
Secondly, my Lords, I question the fairness of showing film of food supplies stacked in stockpiles in Lagos, and the inference that the food is being diverted to military purposes. And I question the interview with Dr. Lindt at the very outset of his mission, when he had not had time to look round—a film shown about a fortnight after the events in question, and giving the impression that it was a current state of affairs. The inference was unsupported by any evidence, and the facts no longer obtained at the time the film

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was shown. What is more, there is nothing intrinsically unsound or reprehensible about maintaining a substantial stockpile at the main base at Lagos. This is in fact precisely what Dr. Lindt is doing and intends to continue to do. He wants 5.000 tons at Lagos.
What was not shown was the state of the forward depots at the time the film was shown. At or about that time there were 1,000 tons of food stockpiled at Enugu, partly collected from ample local resources, actually being used for the relief of people on the Federal side and being stockpiled for eventual use through the land corridor. Only the difficulty at that time of negotiating a charter vessel to ply between Lagos and Calabar and to negotiate an air charter to fly both to Calabar and to Enugu, the two forward bases, to the level that Dr. Lindt required —1,700 tons at Enugu and 1,000 tons at Calabar—was delaying further stockpiling at these forward depots. Both these charters have now been obtained as we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd. and the stockpiles will be ready and filled by the end of this month.
The noble Baroness referred to the use of R.A.F. aircraft. It is not in my province to comment on the political complications of that or the objections to it. I should, however, like her to know that Dr. Lindt telephoned me two nights ago to say that he now has five large aircraft, D.C.6s, four from the Nordic countries in addition to the one he has already, with which he is going to supplement the limited flights at night—and soon we hope there will be flights by day—into Biafra. This is quite an appreciable amount.
In conclusion, my Lords, I hope that I have said enough to reveal my belief that there is idealism, fortitude and forbearance on both sides of this political struggle; that there is humanity among the Federal leaders who hold the military initiative and that help from every quarter whether direct, through the Press, or in any form whatever to wretched people who suffer and starve (and perhaps particularly the children who cannot possibly have any views whatever on the political ambitions of either Government) can best be administered by a strictly neutral posture; by a strictly realistic recognition of the legal and military facts; by the maximum possible co-operation between all humanitarian
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agencies and individuals; by backing the man in charge of operation: and, of course, by the deep caring of as all which, subject to these considerations, can provide the motive force for the whole enterprise.
1.3 p.m.
VISCOUNT HEAD: My Lords, I have listened, as I am sure all your Lordships will have done, to the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, about his mission to Nigeria, with great interest and with a sense of knowing how hard he has tried to achieve the task was given in his very difficult mission. I can remember that the noble Lord came to me when I was at the War Office to borrow equipment to go up Everest. I think I am right in saying that be got it for nothing—though that is not an easy task with the Treasury around. I said to him, I remember, "Will you get up Everest?". He said, "Oh, yes, we shall get up all right. It is purely an administrative problem." I hope hat I have not misquoted the noble Lord. This, too, is an administrative problem, but I think the noble Lord will agree that it is a very much more serious and difficult one than climbing Everest.
As some of your Lordships may snow, I spent the first three years of Nigerian independence in Nigeria. I grew very fond of its people and very hopeful of its prospects. It is therefore with some despondency, and almost with despair, that I address your Lordships to-day. If any of my remarks reach Nigeria I hope that the people there will believe that I address your Lordships entirely impartially politically, and entirely impartially so far as Nigeria and the, two sides are concerned. I think, and I hope, that I had a reputation for impartiality when I was there, and in my remarks I shall in every way be as impartia as I can.
In that respect I must say that I much regret the inability of the Government to act in any way as an impartial influence for settling this crisis. I do not wish to drag up old things and to talk about arms. It is indeed sad that the Government have forfeited this role in a situation which, after all—let us face it—is for the British unfinished business. We created Nigeria. We knew the difficulties; we knew about the North, and it is indeed sad that we cannot play a greater part in solving this present difficulty.

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The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, gave us an historical survey of what has happened. I should like to stress two points which the noble Lord did not mention, but which I think are of importance. In the cloud of propaganda that has gone out, and especially from Biafra in this respect (and I wish to try to stay impartial), one would perhaps think that it is impossible ever for Biafra or the Ibos to live with the North or the Yoruba. In fact the noble Baroness, Lady Asquith of Yarnbury, in her moving speech, was saying very much that thing. I would remind your Lordships that when I was there, for all of the three years that I was there, the North and the East were in close alliance and the Yorubas were in the doghouse". Enahoro was in prison; so was Awolow. Whom did you see when you went to the Saudauna's big receptions in Kaduna? Ibos, as honoured guests. There was a very close alliance between the North and the East. In considering the present situation I do not think it right to take the view that the two are irreconcilable, that they can never live together, that they are cat and dog. They are not like Ireland; and, anyway, when Ireland was a problem we were the Government.
The second thing I should like to stress to your Lordships about the past and the present is this. When I was in Nigeria, the North was a monolithic organisation under the influence of one man, the Sardauna. Two things have happened since then. The Sardauna was murdered, and, secondly, the North genuinely has been broken up and is no longer a monolithic organisation. The previous problem in Nigeria was that one big lump, the North, although not an overall majority in itself, could nick the East or the West as a partner and form a coalition and then they had the third part in the "ha'penny place". They chose the East when I was there so that the West went into "the doghouse". Now you may say they have the West and the East is "in the doghouse". But it is not quite that—and I have had a certain amount of information from Nigeria, from people who are both knowledgeable and living there, and I have seen quite a few. I am convinced that the North will never be the same unified force as the old North, under the Sardauna. It is in bits Maiduguri, Katsina,
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the Tivs, and so on. It is broken up and there is a genuine feeling in Nigeria that it must remain a loose federation of many small States.
I make this point about the alliance between the North and the Ibos because I think that the propaganda and the hatred and the ferocity of the present situation tend to make people feel that any long-term unity is impossible; that the Ibos cannot live within the Federation. I am not convinced of that, but I do see that for his own political reasons (again I do not wish to take sides) Ojukwu says it, and his propaganda in this respect is very strong.
My Lords, I am well aware that I am the last speaker before lunch. What I should like to do now, if I may, is to try to see this thing from the point of view of the Nigerians—because, after all, only the Nigerians can settle it. People may talk about the United Nations, or this and that, but it is the Nigerians who have to settle it and the people who have to settle it are the present leaders in Nigeria. Trying to see this matter impartially, and from a long way off, think that what they are doing now does not make sense. I am trying to be impartial but this is particularly true of Biafra. I do not address my remarks entirely to Colonel Ojukwu. He became the Military Governor and the whole thing built up around him. Events bore him along and produced a kind of political log-jam. But if anybody in Nigeria reads my remarks. I am addressing them to people like Sir Louie Mbanefo, an extremely able and intelligent man; Dr. Azikwe; Mr. Nokwe—all Ibos.
I wish to say this to them. "Do you really believe in your heart of hearts that with the present military situation, with the military strength of the Federal Government, you are going to get independence? If so, how? Are the French going to come and do it for you? Is the Federal Government going to say, 'Call it a day, we will give them independence'? "How is it coming? I cannot see it, I may be stupid. Looking at it a long way away they are going for something they cannot get. That is what I say to Louis Mbanefo.
If they say, "Well, maybe not; but if we do not have it, if we go back in and negotiate and reach agreement, we shall all be killed", again I say that I do not

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believe it. I saw an Ibo the other day who lives in Lagos. There are many, many Ibos in Lagos, and in the Western Region, and in the North, still, to-day. I do not believe they will all be killed—I cannot believe it. Of course (and here your Lordships may think I am being partial) it is a very good political stiffener to say, "You will all be killed". But I do not believe it. Nor do I understand how men of the intelligence of the ones I have talked about can believe it.
Then I would ask him a third question: "Have you thought out the full consequences of a 'backs to the wall, independence or death' policy? That may be all right as a slogan for you, but have you really thought it out in terms of human misery? "What we know about now is nothing compared to what will happen if that is the attitude under Ojukwu's leadership that the Ibos take. If the Federal Government take over all the centres and when I say "centres" I mean the big areas of settlement, the big towns and so on—and the Ibos have been told they are all going to be killed, anyway, then they will go into the bush, and the remains of Ojukwu's army will go into the bush.
If I may say so, people are much too complacent about such a situation; the horrors of it are almost beyond belief. I do not know where Ojukwu will be. What I do know is that his army will go into the bush; his people will go into the bush, and what is left of the harvest will be lost because people will desert their homes. They say that they will keep things in order, and people will not do this or that. But what happens? "Bang, bang, bang!" Somebody has shot at you out in the bush. You run out to find the chap who has shot at you; you find somebody, but whoever it was probably would have thrown his gun away so you do not know. It will he a shambles. It will not only be through fighting, but through starvation. Suppose you get the Red Cross, and all the aeroplanes over. If you go into the area where these people have taken to the bush, how do you find them? It is just as though you had a lot of beads and threw them in a hayfield and said, That will make it easier to look after the beads". I personally think that to bring this to a military conclusion and occupation would be fearful, and again I
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say to those in charge of the Ibos, and to Ojukwu, "Have you thought out the full horrors of what is going to happen?" Anyway, where will Ojukw I be?
Lastly, I would say, "Do you really believe that no negotiated settlement is any good? Do you believe that with a force sent in to see fair play—a Commonwealth force, a United Nations forcewith the world desire for peace, with terms that you would get (maybe getter than the Addis Ababa ones) you could not get assurances which would make for the Ibo people a negotiated peace such a terrible and lethal thing?" Here we come to the crux of the matter. I see that for Ojukwu there is no future in that negotiation, and that is one of the jams we are in. If a negotiated peace is made there is one thing I would guess that the Federal Government would say—"No, Ojukwu." In fact they have said it already. Whether they could swallow that, and whether they would agree to his playing a part. I doubt. What I say to Ojukwu personally is that it is an enormous responsibility to take on your shoulders, because your own political position is tied to insistence on no negotiation, to bring a whole people down to the misery which I forthe Ibos.
I would say one thing to General Gowon. He was on television last night. and I do not wish to be rude, but I must say that I was not terribly impressed by the C.R.O.'s answer to what he Kid on the television. But I do not want to be controversial and political. He said that he was going to complete and finish the war. I would say to him, "Have you thought out what you are going to do to the Nigerian people? Please do not forget, General Gowon, that you were all sitting down happily together only a few years ago. They are your people, they are your country." What is going to happen to them will never be forgotten in Nigeria, in Africa or even, to some extent, the world. I think this complete military victory will be a fearful disaster. I genuinely think that.
There are people who say: "Well, get the soldiers going; finish it: peace will then he declared and we can get down to it." I do not agree; that is not it at all. This would lead to a starving, minor Vietnam. That is what it is going to be. Gowon said that it would be over is four

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weeks, but it will be going on in four years. That is my view. I am not trying to scare anybody. I would say to Gowon: "You said in your television interview, 'I have got my soldiers so well disciplined that there will be no atrocities ' ". With the best disciplined soldiers in the world, and with respect to the noble Lord who has just spoken, if you are in the bush and you get shot at you get dispersed. The Nigerian army has expanded very quickly, the officers are not very experienced and, in many cases you may not have control of the men. In a lot of cases you are not going to avoid pretty awful things happening. I know you will not.
The second thing General Gowon said on television was, "I have told my soldiers that when the war is over—this is in four weeks' time—the battle is not really won, because we have to feed everybody". He cannot do so; most of the harvest has gone; the food is not in Nigeria; it has to come from outside. How are you going to get the food to them? By his acts Gowon will be creating a disaster. This is where I come to task with the Government. The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd—if I do not misinterpret him said, "You have to understand they may have to take over the airfields, et cetera." I thought—and I may be wrong; I hope I am—he was more or less giving the go-ahead for the completion of military conquest. I hope he is not, and that he will say so when he winds up, because in my view if the complete military occupation of Iboland, with the terrible consequences it would bring, is brought about—the moment that decision is made, which it appeared to be on the television—there is absolutely no case whatever for one single bit of ammunition or arms going from this country to the Federation. It should be cut off at once.
My Lords, I have tried to put the thing as I see it from outside, and I know how inflammable the situation is and how people in Nigeria can be carried away by partisan feelings. I would say to them that if ever they thought I could be of any assistance. I would get on an aeroplane to-morrow. But I do not expect they think I could help. But anything I can do I will do. I have a nasty fear that Ojukwu is going to go on, and that
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in time—maybe to-day—Gowon will go on with full military conquest. I hope I am wrong, but it is a dreadful prospect. What I would say to your Lordships, particularly the noble Lord who has just spoken, is if that is going to happen then we should prepare and bring all the influence possible, all nations, to get some Commonwealth force in being, something to hold the ring somewhere. Secondly, I believe that all that Dr. Lindt is doing now—if this takes place—would need to be multiplied by five or possibly ten. Unless that happens there is going to be a disaster of almost unique size so far as starvation and hardship is concerned.
My Lords, this is a gloomy situation and a gloomy speech. There is the Addis Ababa meeting still going on, and there is another meeting of O.A.U. next month. I only hope that even at this moment the leaders of Nigeria will think of their people, who I believe could live together. I hope that they will think again and talk, that they will negotiate and end the war.
LORD HUNT: Before the noble Lord sits down, may I, I hope, reassure him on the point he made latterly? Doctor Lindt is fully alive to the immensely greater problem that is going to arise in one of several contingent situations, and when I touched on his immediate plans which he is now developing and will realise in the next day or week or so, these are not the bigger plans on which he is working for this enormously bigger job.
[The Sitting was suspended at 1.22 p.m. and resumed at 2 p.m.]
LORD SEGAL: My Lords, I listened carefully to the remarks of my noble friend Lord Shepherd, speaking for the Government in this debate. There is no one, I think, who is held in greater esteem in this House, and no one, I think, has laboured more arduously than he to bring about peace in Nigeria. But as the debate proceeded, I think that many of us must have been left with many doubts as to the wisdom of the British Government's policy and as to the effects that it is achieving.
Those of us who recall the days of British rule in Nigeria will remember how the country was largely at peace, how all tribes learnt to live with each

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other and how steady progress was made under British guidance and the British traditions of political maturity. After independence was granted, an attempt was made to continue the British liberal tradition in a united Nigeria under Balewa. That attempt, unfortunately, failed. Since then Nigeria has been plunged into internal strife and tribal rivalry, and no one can look at the dreadful picture to-day without feeling how much better the country was even under colonialist rule.
What gave rise to the greatest doubts in my mind, after hearing especially the speeches of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and the noble Viscount, Lord Head, was the feeling that now Nigeria is going to be plunged into the final ordeal. The Federal forces are poised for the ultimate strike. But let none of us imagine that war will solve any of the present-day problems of Ibo independence. On the contrary, I think that a military victory now would only create vaster, new problems than existed before the civil war broke out. And I think that these facts ought to be brought home as emphatically as we can to the present leaders of Nigeria. No solution can be effected by military victory The concern of many of us is, after a military victory has been achieved—and, unfortunately, it now seems very imminent—how will the Federal Government be able to face up to the vast problem once the military resistance of the Ibos has been finally crushed?
One of the tantalising problems of Africa is that every new advance in any direction creates in its trail a vast set of new problems. As medical progress advances, we find that the population increases and problems of unemployment are created. As education increases, we find new problems created by individuals seeking to gain by their own education for their own ends, but not with a sense of strong social conscience of their duty to the community. These are still early days for African civilisation. Nigeria, which in itself is almost a subcontinent, comparable perhaps to India, will find these problems intensified immeasurably after military victory has been achieved.
Unfortunately, there is every possibility now that the odium will recoil on us in this country. Britain has borne the brunt
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of trying to render assistance to Nigeria to help it to solve its problems. I do not believe for a moment that this is. primarily a British problem. I feel that the only way to approach it is on a Commonwealth basis. It was not sufficient to my mind simply to send out the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth Secretariat as an individual to solve these problems. I should like to ask the Government seriously to reconsider the whole situation in the light of an impending Federal victory. Surely even now we can call a Commonwealth Conference specifically to deal with the problem of Nigeria. The military situation the famine and the suffering have already got out of bounds and it should not fall upon this country to be the only one to attempt to solve this problem.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords,I hope my noble friend will agree that the Emperor Haile Selassie and the O.A.U. are to-day actively working in this field; that this is very much an African problem and if an African organisat on is able to solve it, there is much to be said for that, particularly in terms of frican statesmanship and development. I hope my noble friend also agrees that if they are now working in this field and have these discussions going, it would be wrong to suggest that another outside initiative should now be taken. Of course, if there was a failure, clearly we should have to look at the whole matter again.
LORD SEGAL: My Lords, I fully agree with my noble friend, and I Can only say that I fervently hope that his optimism will prove justified. But I have a great many reservations. I feel that because we ourselves were formely the governing power in Nigeria, this is specifically a problem that we should not have left to the initiative of Haile Selassie or the African Powers. It is something much vaster than a purely African problem. Now it is a tremendous humanitarian problem, which has shocked the whole civilised work. If I may be forgiven for saying so, we ought not to be completely content to leave it as an African problem, much less as a purely Nigerian problem. I repeat that I only hope that my noble friend's optimism about the successful outcome of the deliberations at Addis Ababa will prove justified.

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But surely we ourselves ought to hold rather more than a watching brief and as a Commonwealth should extend our help to Nigeria, not only in the material sense and certainly not only in the provision of arms. I am one of those who feel that it would be wrong to cut off our supply of arms to Nigeria, because this at best would be only a gesture, and I do not believe in gestures. These steps may have an immediate effect but ultimately they fail in their objective. So I fervently hope that our Government may seek to have in reserve the calling of a Commonwealth Conference in an attempt finally to solve this problem.
Just as I do not believe that military victory will solve this problem, so equally I do not believe that the problem of Nigeria can be solved by federation. Federation is a Westminster solution, which has grown out of the centuries of our own political maturity in this country. But the whole concept of federation is simply alien to many parts of the world. We tried it in the Caribbean, and there it failed. We tried it in Central Africa, and again it failed. We tried it in Aden, and now the last thing one talks about in the South Yemen Territory is the idea of federation.
My noble friend Lord Shepherd said, if I interpret him aright, that the declaration of independence by Biafra was tantamount to an act of war. Would he also agree that the declaration of independence by Singapore was an act of war against Malaysia? The parallel holds good, with this difference: that the political wisdom of the Tungku, the head of Malaysia, prevailed over counsels of war, and we accepted the independence of Singapore as a reality.
My Lords, can we not make it clear now to the rulers of Federal Nigeria that they have far more to lose than to gain by persisting in this war? On the contrary, they have far more to gain by allowing Biafra some measure of independence, some means of self-expression, within a part of the vast territory of Nigeria. I would most fervenftly ask the Government to think once again and to try to find a basic reorientation of their policy. We have achieved a Federation in Nigeria only as a result of a union of four separate entities. Can we not put it now to the
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Federal rulers in Nigeria that their only hope of a united Nigeria, of a truly federated Nigeria, is by allowing some measure of independence, of freedom and self-expression to the Ibo element in their territory, which has been driven away from the Northern provinces by massacre and slaughter, and has now decentralised itself in part of the Eastern territory of Nigeria, and which I think has a claim now for recognition not only by Federal Nigeria, but also by our own Government here at home?
Unless we can give them some measure of guidance, some assistance out of our fund of political experience here in this country, I think that many of us might have grounds for questioning the political maturity of many of the African States to-day, and of the possibility of their being able to govern themselves and to help their peoples forward to a more enlightened future without vast help from the outside world, and particularly from the Commonwealth, not only help in an economic sense, but also active help in a political sense. I can only hope and pray that it may yet not be too late to avert further famine and slaughter in Nigeria.
2.14 p.m.
LORD GOODMAN: My Lords, it is perhaps the illest of ill winds that does not bring some slight comfort. The disaster in Czechoslovakia has given us the opportunity of discussing the position in Nigeria. There is, I think, a relevant difference between the two situations, in that in relation to Nigeria, even at this eleventh hour, I believe there is something to be done, and something that we can do. I heard with great interest and, if I may say so, great admiration the immensely constructive speech of the noble Viscount. Lord Head. I thought that what he had to say was precisely to the point.
My Lords, I believe that we have pursued a mistaken policy; I believe that we have pursued a disastrously mistaken policy. But I believe also that there is still an opportunity to rectify it. I do not believe that the people who have carried out that policy are criminals, with bloodstained hands. I believe that they are honourable, well-meaning people, who are as humane as anyone in this House, and certainly as humane as I am.

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But I believe that they were totally mistaken, and that their mistake arises from error, and also perhaps from the least forgivable attribute, that of obstinacy. I believe that they have declined to look at the facts that are staring them in the face.
The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, shakes his head in disagreement, but I think that anyone who heard his "Child's History of Nigeria" this morning—appropriate, if I may say so, to be published as a "Child's History of the Federal Government "—would realise how very much he has omitted in relation to this matter, and how much he appears not to know. Ignorance is an entirely excusable situation; but an ignorance that refuses to admit that knowledge exists is a less excusable situation where it contributes to a catastrophe of the magnitude that has now developed throughout Nigeria. This is not a Biafran matter alone, and those of us who speak here are not concerned alone with Biafra, but are concerned with the welfare of the whole of Nigeria, which is totally affected by this disastrous situation. And we must be immensely concerned if we believe, as we sincerely do, that Her Majesty's Government have got hold of the wrong end of the stick and have been clinging to it with an almost unexampled tenacity.
There were three demonstrations, relatively simple ones, of how Her Majesty's Government and their spokesman here to-day have swallowed, totally uncritically and without question, everything that comes out of Federal Nigeria. First of all, there was the unedifying situation with regard to the construction of the speech made by General Gowon on television yesterday. That speech was open to only one interpretation. There was no possible element of doubt about what he meant; no gloss can be put upon it; nobody can refine it or adjust it or adapt it so that it fits into our comfortable preconceptions of what the policy is. The man has said in the clearest possible terms that he is going to force the fight to an issue. He has said that in my hearing. If there is one thing that I have come to trust over the years, my Lords, it is the reliability of my own hearing. When I cease to trust that, I shall cease to function in any capacity. I heard him say it on television, and other Members of your Lordships' House
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heard General Gowon say it. It cannot be explained away.
Then there were the reassuring utterances about what General Gowon was going to do when he got into the hot land of the Ibo. Not a word was said about the bloodcurdling utterances of his leader, the gentleman who has been announcing that he is going to shoot at anything that moves. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, to whom the whole of this House and the whole of the country is deeply indebted for having under aken that thankless mission, said (if I may paraphrase him) that the Colonel was nothing more than a public school type. Those of us here may well think that that is what the Colonel is, and we might come to regard him as a very agreeable and pleasant fellow to have a drink with in a club. But when you think of the cowering, terrified masses in Biafra, I am afraid that they will not construe these statements in that way. They will construe them quite literally. They will say: "This man intends to murder us". Not a word has been said on that subject by Her Majesty's Government.
And, if I may say so, most facile of all were the explanations of the various negotiations for peace treaties. These negotiations, in my opinion, have been totally and utterly valueless, because; they have been directed towards an impossibility. They have throughout been restricted to formal and procedural considerations. In London they argued about where the peace discussions were to take place, about what the agenda was to be, and about whether they were to have a chairman—and in fact they departed without a chairman. A greater absurdity it is impossible to imagine, than these two adversaries confronting each other across the peace table without an independent chairman. But that is not what the London discussions were about.
Then they went to Kampala, and many of your Lordships may have read the record of the proceedings in Kampala, as written about by Sir Louis Mbanafo. I should like to say a word about Sir Louis Mbanafo because the noble Viscount, Lord Head, said a word about him. I have known him foe most of my life; we were undergraduates together. If there is one man I would trust, it is that man. If there is one man

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whose opinion I would take, it is that man's. My concern and interest in the Biafran situation arises simply from my friendship with him. I have met over the years many other of the Biafran leaders. But I believe what he says, and he gave me an account of the Kampala negotiations that made it quite clear that the Federal Government were treading a stately minuet; that there was no genuine or sincere desire on anyone's part to achieve a settlement that involved a cease-fire. And, if I may say so, one cannot blame them, because each side wanted something quite different.
The Biafrans wanted a cease-fire because they were losing the war; a ceasefire would be a military advantage to them; it would relieve the military pressure. The Federal Government did not want a cease-fire: they wanted a capitulation. And the two people were negotiating for objectives to which they gave the same term, the same description, but which were totally different things. All the negotiations had been concerned with these preliminaries, preliminaries which could never achieve a result because the vital and essential matter with which we should have concerned ourselves—which was first to arrive at a constitutional settlement that would be acceptable to both sides—has, deplorably enough, never been discussed under our aegis or under our auspices with both sides present, or even without that intermediary.
Why is this so? I am afraid that I must detain your Lordships for a little time in trying to explain what I regard as a very important matter indeed. The explanation is that we have for some reason adopted the view that the Federal Government of Nigeria is a legal Government and the Biafran Government is an illegal Government, a rebel Government. May I review the situation as it was reviewed (though I will endeavour to do it more briefly) by the Minister this morning, when he was describing the situation to us. Nigeria was granted its independence in 1960. It was granted a Federal Constitution. It was granted a Federal Constitution after the most careful and anxious thought by this country. No one can be blamed. There were Commissions, minority Commissions, that went out to consider whether there should be
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three or four areas. There were discussions about whether there should be a Middle West tribe. The Willinck Commission considered the whole matter and decided in favour of three territories, and a Federal Government was granted.
I think that that form of Government was in itself incapable of achieving a successful result, for the simple reason that it created a division of the territory which ensured that in each of the three territories there was one dominant tribe, and no possibility at all that any one of the tribes could achieve a majority throughout the integrated territory. That was the built-in situation created by the Constitution which we granted. It was adjusted subsequently when a fourth territory was created, contrary to the recommendations of the Willinck Commission, by the creation of a Mid-West territory following the grant of independence.
Then in 1963 (I do not think this matter was mentioned by the Minister) there was of course the creation of a Republic, and the creation of a further Constitution, and Nigeria became fully independent as a Republican Constitution. At that stage legal government existed in Nigeria. One knew where it was; one knew where to find it. Then came the coups. In January, 1966, there came the first of the coups. What I believe were called the "Ibo majors" massacred the Prime Minister and a number of other people. It was, I have no doubt, a highly reprehensible matter. It was not a purely tribal matter, and it was significant that the massacred was put down by an army leader who was himself an Ibo. It was significant that the Quartermaster General at that time, himself an Ibo, was shot dead because he refused to hand over arms and ammunitions to the rebels.
Thus it was quite clear that this was not a division along purely tribal lines. But the fact remains that there was an insurrection largely inspired by the Ibos. That came in January, 1966, and at that stage the Cabinet, as I understand it, apprehensive of the continuation of democratic or legal government in civil form, asked General Ironsi if he would take over the Government and conduct it in a state of emergency.
At that stage, I should have thought, there ceased to be a constitutional legal government as we understand it. At that

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stage there was an ad hoc government operating because it exercised control in a certain territory. But, further, there came the second coup in June or July, 1966, when Ironsi was murdered and when, following a period of very considerable confusion, as I understand it, Colonel Go won emerged as the leader. Colonel Gowon was not even, in terms of seniority, the lineal successor to Ironsi. He was several stages removed in seniority, but he was the person who assumed power. How can it remotely be suggested by any legal authority that his Government has the status of a legal government? Yet we have stated this blandly and blindly; iterated it and reiterated it to a point where it has dominated all our thinking in this matter, and where, if I may say so, it has directed the whole of our policy, to the extent where we have imposed upon ourselves a total paralysis in any useful action. Because by saying that we are dealing with a legal government that was not a legal government, we have of course said that we cannot deal with anyone else.
The situation arises—and I do not profess to be art international lawyer; it may be that the Government will produce arguments to dispute this—that there are two ad hoc legal governments in existence in the Nigerian territory at the moment. There is the Gowon Government—or was—which ad hoc and de facto controlled an area of territory, because it was operating it and controlling it effectively; and there was the Biafran area—whatever portion of that was in fact controlled by Colonel Ojukwu. That appears to me to be the legal situation. But not only is that the legal situation, but that is the situation to which we should have cleaved with enthusiasm, because that gave us an opportunity of doing something effective. I agree, if I may say so, with the noble Viscount, Lord Head. I am by no means sure that the aspirations of the Biafrans towards total independence can ever be achieved. I am by no means sure that they take sufficiently into account the economic considerations and considerations of the minority. But what I am absolutely convinced of is that if we had effectively negotiated between these people on the basis that they both had ad hoc governments, we could have arrived at some compromise for a loose
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confederation that would have been acceptable to them both.
I have had long, almost endless, discussions with Biafran leaders. I have, put innumerable permutations and alternatives to them about what sort of Government might be a possibility within a confederation. I have had, personally, a most encouraging response. They have frequently said to me, "Yes, this might be a possibility. But how do we ensure, pray, that if we are attacked, we can defend ourselves?", because, if I may say so, Her Majesty's Minister this morning did less than justice to the real apprehensions of the Ibos and of the Easterners, because not only Ibos are concerned. He said very little about the fact that they fled back to their territory after a massacre. One does not want to make too much of it, but they have it fully in mind, constantly in mind. Their solitary recollection is that 20,000, 30,000 or 40,000 of them—I do not know how many, but nobody has ever put the figure at less than 20,000—were in fact massacred in the North. It was, I think a little unworthy that the Government should have suggested that there was a justification for this because there was a general apprehension that the Ibos were about to seize power. Supposing there was such an apprehension. Could that remotely have justified such a course? There is always an apprehension—
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, will the noble Lord permit me to intervene, because I am sure he would always wish to be accurate? I would not wish myself to set a figure as to the number of Ibos who were killed in the early massacre. Certainly the evidence that we have does not come anywhere near the 20,000 figure that the noble Lord has himself quoted. But I think he would also wish to be accurate when he speaks about the Ibos fleeing to Biafra. Some did. But at least I million have remained in the Federal areas. I think we need to get some degree of accuracy in the noble Lord's speech.
LORD GOODMAN: Well, my Lords, I hope the Minister is not suggesting; that everything I have said up to the moment is lacking in accuracy. I entirely accept from him that some Ibos have remained in the Western territories. Some in the

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mid-West, as he will know, and if I may say so failed to refer to, are still in insurrection. There are still elements of Ibos in the mid-West who are fighting for their independence, despite the fact that they are divorced from their colleagues in Biafra. I do not know whether it is as many as a million, but certainly there are members of the Ibo tribe who are in other parts of Nigeria. Equally, I do not know the number of Ibos who were massacred. It was a formidable number, and this is the first time that I have ever heard any Governmental denial that the figure was less than 20,000. This is the very first time that anyone has asserted that. Whether it was 10,000, 20,000 or 15.000, this is the factor foremost in the minds of the Biafrans.
Just think what we could have done to reassure them had we remained in dialogue with them. But we cut ourselves totally off from dialogue. We offered them no reassurance; we never said to them that these people were not going to murder them. We never said: "We will see to it that you are not murdered; international forces will see that you are not murdered". General Gowon is a nice civilised man, as has been said, and I do not deny it for a moment. The fact remains that this is not believed in Biafra, and if people tell me that the Biafrans are fighting because of notions of aggrandisement or because they want oil, or for any other reason, I tell them simply that that is not the case. Whatever the ambitions of Colonel Ojukwu may have been, the simple fact is that at this moment of time the Biafransthe simple people in Biafra—are fighting because they believe that if they give up the fight they will be massacred. That is their belief; it may be a mistaken belief, but it is a belief and an anxiety that we had it within out power to allay.
When I started to speak I said that I thought there was something constructive still to be done. This remains my belief. I believe that we should put ourselves into touch with the Biafran chiefs. I believe that we should allay the anxiety and suspicion about us that exists in Biafra—and that principally because of the dispatch of arms. It is not that we were under any obligation to dispatch arms. A more extraordinary proposition I do not think has ever been enunciated
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in international law. Allowing even that this was a legal State could we then in any circumstances be under an immutable and absolute obligation to supplyarms for whatever use they wanted to put them to?
LORD BOOTHBY: Hear, hear!
LORD GOODMAN: How does such an obligation ever arise, and when has it arisen before? I say, and I assert most positively, that this is not a legal State. This is a State that had no claim on any footing; and if it was a legal State this is an untenable claim for a legal State to make. But the damage of the supply of arms was not whether or not they would have got them from somewhere else, but that it shattered the confidence of the Biafrans in the British, because there is no territory in the whole of Africa where British authority sounded deeper and sounded richer than it did in Biafra before this war started.
Men like Mbanafo and his colleagues were Anglophiles to the last of their breath. They were educated in England. Here was a man created a Knight by Her Majesty and made the Chief Justice of Eastern Nigeria. He was an Englishman in everything but colour. His colleagues were wholly dedicated to the British cause. We forfeited the whole of that because of this imbecile persistence in supplying arms, and if the Nigerians could have got the arms from somewhere else, good luck to them. If we believed that the Nigerians ought to win the war, and knew also that they could win the war by getting the arms from somewhere else, well let them get them from somewhere else. But why should we have forfeited confidence, why should we have alienated the good will, why should we have created and maintained disaffection when it was going to do this irreparable damage?
I believe, as I started by saying, that this is not a case where recriminations serve any purpose. I believe that everything that has been done has been done with the best of intentions and in the belief that it is right, but alas! hell and Biafra are paved with good intentions. Even at this late hour I urge the Goverment to reconsider. I think the Government still can do something effective, but they must reconsider their policy, and reconsider it in the light

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of reality and not concern themselves with the question of what propaganda is coming out of Biafra.
How pitiful, if I may say so, that a Minister of the Crown should concern himself with the question of what stories were being put about and believed by poor, cowed, terrified creatures in Biafra, whether they believed that a football team was an army or not. If I were a native in Biafra whose child was starving, who was being subjected to bombardment, whose relatives were being murdered all around, I would believe absolutely any rumour and report that I was told. If I may say so, having at times found myself in England during the war, I well remember the rumours and reports that were believed by quite sensible people in this country at that time. There was no story too extravagent for some people to believe. But what a thing to reproach them with! If I may venture to say so, if they are defending themselves by propaganda, then it is the clament cries of a man sinking for the third time. Those cries may be very offensive indeed to civilised ears, but it is the only form of hope that is still open to the poor wretched creatures.
I venture to ask the Government to think very long before they pursue a policy that I am convinced can end only in disaster. I am absolutely convinced of the complete authenticity of everything the noble Viscount said—that there is no military solution to this problem at all. If the Ibo are defeated if the Easterners are defeated, because I do not accept the story that the whole of the rest of the Eastern tribes are not fighting with them; it is completely inconsistent with the fact that the war has been maintained for this length of time, and people who come out of Biafra do not support it—and these people take to the bush, heaven knows what disaster will descend upon the whole of Africa.
I would echo what the noble Viscount said to Colonel Ojukwu. If his position stands in the way of a settlement, then it is an enormous responsibility for one man to assume that he should allow his personal ambitions and hopes and notions to imperil the lives of the whole of his people. I have not met Colonel Ojukwu. I earnestly hope that he will give heed to these words, and that if
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there is a possibility of a settlement that involves compromising the maximum hopes and aspirations of the Biafrans, that the Biafrans, like everyone else, will listen to sense. But I am sure that even to-day we have a mediating role, and this is the role we should immediately undertake.
2.36 p.m.
LORD MILVERTON: My Lords, I have listened with deep appreciation of the technical skill with which the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, has destroyed practically everything within sight, and I have been wondering how best I could indicate that there were so many of his points with which I disagreed that I could hardly take them one by one and make a coherent speech. Therefore if I proceed to say what I had intended to say to your Lordships it will be evident how wholly I disagree with the approach and the conclusions of the noble lord, Lord Goodman.
It was with a heavy heart that I decided to take part in this debate, and with considerable reluctance. Nigeria has meant so much to me, in affection and in hope that the Federation would grow into a great nation, prosperous, happy and an example to all Africa of what Africans can do, and an inspiration to other nascent nations to exemplify the truth that unity is strength.
I begin in this way because I want to paint the picture as I see it. I yield to no one in my horror over the starving thousands of men, women and children and the terrible suffering which disfigures this civil war, on both sides. I am as anxious as anyone to terminate the terrible sufferings of innocent women and children. Equally I hope I may say, without being accused of inhumanity, that external intervention in this tragedy should beware of allowing our deep sympathy with the victims of the present situation to cloud our judgment to the extent of building up a future situation, the horror of which would dwarf even that which exists today.
Perhaps I may be allowed to go back twenty years and recall what Lord Lugard said to me in 1943, when I was about to go out and take over the Governorship of Nigeria. In several long talks which I was privileged to have with

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the greatest of all Colonial Governors he said:
"The future of Africa is pregnant with possibilities and the lot has fallen upon you. What you do in Nigeria over the coming few years may well affect not only the future of Nigeria but the future of the Continent of which she forms so important a part."
With humility, I should like to repeat this friendly advice to Her Majesty's present Government. We are not concerned only with an overwhelming desire to help the victims of a terrible rebellion. We must consider and take a decision on the setting and the real cause or causes of this fratricidal strife. So may I submit to your Lordships a brief summary of the position as I see it?
If I may travel for a moment over one or two of the features which have already been mentioned, the foundation on which the Federation of Nigeria was built was laid in 1946–47 and was originally based on the three Regions: the Northern Protectorate, the East and West, which constituted the Southern Protectorate (those were the three sections), and also, of course, Lagos, which was a small Colony where the person in charge of this conglomeration lived and worked. It was obvious that the Northern Protectorate (which, incidentally, at that time was not at all represented in the Southern Legislative Council and did not wish to be represented) was going to be, in any joint Government, in a dominant position, and that later that position would have to be corrected to ensure equality of influence in the constituent States as the union developed. Overall Government control was centred in the small Colony of Lagos and its immediate hinterland.
Development over the years 1947 to 1960 has been rapid, accelerated as ever by the approach of independence, which came about in 1960. I think we should never forget the great success with which Nigeria was adapting itself to this Federation, which received the rather contemptuous attention of the noble Lord, Lord Goodman. By 1960, the Regions had developed their own separate Governments with wide powers under a supreme Federal body still centred in Lagos.
In 1964, a new, separate region was excised from the Western Region, making four members of the Federation. Apparently Nigeria was an immense and
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successful Federation, and had an immense future before it. Then in January, 1966, occurred the Army coup, organised by a group of young Ibo officers who planned, inter alia, to kill all non-Ibo officers over the rank of major. The Federal Prime Minister, the Premiers of the North and West, and many others, were murdered. In addition to the ruling motive of lbo aggression (aggressive ambition was one of their characteristics) to control the country, there was a basis of popular dissatisfaction at the corrupt practices of certain members of the Federal regime, which did not of course include the Federal Prime Minister, who was a man of unimpeachable integrity and moderation.
In the subsequent confusion Major-General Ironsi, himself an Ibo, took charge as officer commanding the Army and formed a Military Government. He proceeded to pack the senior positions, civil and military, with Ibo nominees, and he promulgated the Unification Decree No. 34 of May, 1966, which abolished the Federal system and aimed at altering the very basis of the Nigerian political system, without consultation with anyone. Added to renewed popular dissatisfaction was the provocative arrogance of Ibo officers who flaunted their claim to having achieved control of the Federation.
The result, as we have been told this afternoon, was another military coup on July 29, 1966, culminating in the assumption of office by Major-General Gowon as Head of the Federal Military Government and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. An immediate return to the Federal system was ordered and certain eminent political prisoners were released. Conferences were held concerning a review of the Federal system in the direction of curing its constituent imbalance by the creation of 12 States of equal status. which in effect meant splitting the huge North into six States and the East into three. The West, of course, had already three.
These proposals were greeted with enthusiastic consent except by the Military Governor of the East, Colonel Ojukwu, who was determined to retain control of the minority tribes in the East because he wanted to control the rich oil supplies in their territories. Incidentally, for many long years the

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minorities, who were 5 million strong in the Eastern province, had been demanding the creation of separate States to free them from the domination of the 7 million Ibo majority whose land adjoined their territories. All sections of Nigeria agreed on this political reconstruction except the East, re-named Biafra by Colonel Ojukwu. This decision to insist on retaining control over the proposed South Eastern and Rivers States was, of course, that of Colonel Ojukwu and his group of intensely ambitious men. The oil-bearing areas of the Eastern Region are located in these non-Ibo territories. Under the Federal Constitution all minerals belong to the Federal Government, and all agreements in respect of exploitation of these minerals are made with the Federal Government.
Protracted negotiations and communications followed. In short, from August, 1966, until May, 1967, the Federal Government made every possible effort of compromise and conciliation to avoid the use of force against Ojukwu, who consistently refused to attend any meetings and continued a steady and highly organised illegal importation of arms and ammunition. Finally, he organised a systematic campaign for the return of Eastern Nigerians resident in other parts of Nigeria, in the expectation that existing public services in other parts of the Federation would thus collapse. He then hoped to be able to dictate his own terms.
On March 31, 1967, he promulgated an edict which seized all Federal assets and stopped all Federal operations in the Eastern Region. On May 30, 1967, he illegally declared the former Eastern Region of Nigeria as a sovereign State under the name of the Republic of Biafra. My Lords, there was surely no alternative in this situation; the Federal Government must employ economic sanctions and force, and it is amply justified, in justice and in mercy, in trying to effect the earliest possible end to a situation which casts such an ominous shadow over so much of Africa.
My Lords, as has been said this afternoon, thousands of lbos have continued to work despite the crisis in the Nigerian armed forces, the police, the Federal Public Service, in the services of some of the States, and the private sector outside the Central Eastern State, their own
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land. General Gowon offers the recalcitrant leaders of the rebellion the opportunity to resume their place as welcome and equal partners in the national progress of Nigeria. He says, and has repeatedly said, that Nigeria needs the Ibos and the Ibos need Nigeria. He further has again and again asked hem to assist in conferences of represents fives of the 12 equal States to settle the details of the new Federation and to facilitate as early as possible a hand-over of Government to civil authorities.
I have tried to sketch the background which, from past experience, makes it clear that any cease-fire before the, renunciation of secession by the rebels will be abused by their leaders to rearm and resume fighting on a larger scale. It is not fair, in considering this situation to overlook the fact that the rebel leader is prepared to use the starving bodies of innocent women and children to achieve his ends by evoking foreign public sympathy for a disaster which he could have terminated by one word of his own at any time in the last six months. The Federal Military Government al ways keeps before it the major policy goal of the current military operations; that is, to create and safeguard the conditions of lasting peace, and not only la sting peace but stability and communal harmony, so that the nation can continue its economic and social development at an acceptable pace under a civilian Government.
One of the most significant developments from the capture of Enugu has been the discovery by the Federal forces of documents which throw greater light on the expansionist ambitions of Colonel Ojukwu and his rebel clique over the Federal Republic of Nigeria. While Colonel Ojukwu has been telling the world that the fight for his fatherland was for the survival of the allegedly oppressed Ibos, it is now clear that his plans were in fact to conquer the greater part of the Federation of Nigeria and subjugate her peoples to his own douination. Ojukwu's planned empire, as these captured documents show, was to extend from the Cameroon border in the North-East to the Dahomey border in the West. It would include the whole of Iorin, Kabba and Benue Provinces, and parts of Adamawa and Sardauna Provinces of the Benue River and Southwards including

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all the territories stretching to the coastline.
My Lords, whatever foreigners may think, the people of Nigeria have known all along that Ojukwu's claims are unfounded. They know that his real ambition and that of his advisers was not only to carve an empire for themselves but to overrun the rest of Nigeria. He has sedulously spread among his own people the utterly false story that the Federal Government aims at genocide, the extermination of the Ibo people. The Nigerian people were satisfied that the Mid-West misadventure, which your Lordships may remember, when Ibo forces captured Benin, which so narrowly missed success was only part of the unfolding of the great rebel plans. The captured documents illustrate, as never before, the major cause of the Nigerian crisis, namely, the mad ambition of Ojukwu to conquer and subdue the Federation of Nigeria and instal himself over it.
If I have not exhausted your Lordships' patience I would make a brief reference to the visit to Lagos of the Organisation of African Unity Consultative Mission of September last year, headed by the Emperor of Ethiopia. General Gowon, in a welcome address, analysed the position, with admirable brevity and clarity, as a choice between agreement to the disintegration of Nigeria and the use of force to preserve its territorial integrity. My Lords, the Emperor of Ethiopia in his reply stated, inter alia:
"Ethiopia, as a founding member of the Organisation of African Unity, fully subscribes to all the principles enshrined in the Charter. The national unity and territorial integrity of Member States is not negotiable. It must be fully respected and preserved. It is our firm belief that the national unity of individual African States is an essential ingredient for the realisation of the larger and greater objective of African Unity. It is precisely because of this that we oppose any attempt at national fragmentation on religious or ethnic or other grounds. That is why Ethiopia unreservedly supports Nigerian national unity and territorial integrity."
Perhaps I ought to add a postscript of my own to these comments. It concerns the allegation which has been made by the Biafran propaganda people that religious differences have influenced Nigerian politics. There is no justification whatever for this statement. From
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colonial days until now religion has never become mixed with politics in Nigeria. A glance at the religious adherence of members of the Cabinets of the various States or of the courts would indicate that religion had no influence whatever in such appointments.
In their communiqué the Mission of the African Heads of State reaffirmed their views in these words:
"It recognised that the crisis is purely an internal affair of Nigeria and that no solution is possible except within the context of the national unity and territorial integrity of the Federation. Further the Mission is in complete agreement with the Federal Government's insistence that, as a prior condition for an end of the war, the rebel regime must accept the administrative structure of twelve States as a basis for permanent peace and stability in the Federation."
My Lords, I have tried to give a clear picture of the background of this complicated situation as I see it, and I think it is most important to realise what the background is. I feel considerable sympathy with the difficulties of Her Majesty's Government in having at one and the same time to deal with a misguided public opinion in this country, which has been inflamed by the emotional falsification of the issues under the influence of clever and unscrupulously perverse propaganda, and with their own delicate position of long traditional friendship with an independent country in whose internal affairs they have neither the right nor the desire to intervene.
It is my view, in support of which I have tried to indicate the facts, that any attempt to cut off, or to lead a movement to cut off, supplies of arms to the Federal Government would in effect amount to support of a sordid rebellion and, whether effective or not, would give moral support where I presume Her Majesty's Government would least wish to give it. The responsibility for the terrible suffering in Nigeria lies firmly on the shoulders of Colonel Ojukwu and his group of colleagues, and, in my view, the quickest and most humane way of ending this suffering, and, incidentally, to prevent even worse calamities, would be the early and complete victory of the Federal forces, or a last-minute return to reason by the rebel leaders.
I am glad to see in the Press that at long last an agreement has been reached to enable food and medical supplies to

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reach the stricken areas, both by road and by air. But the fighting continues, and I can only express a hope in the name of humanity that an early and complete victory of the Federal forces will terminate one of the saddest periods in Nigerian history. There is still hope that Nigeria will recover and, in spite of the views of the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, will yet become that shining example to the rest of Africa that a wise combination of the diverse qualities of her citizens can evolve from the increasing development of her natural wealth.
I end, my Lords, where I began, by emphasising that action dictated and guided by emotion is a dangerous substitute for statesmanship. I have avoided direct reference to the sordid negotiations of Ojukwu with a foreign Power eager to gain promise of future oil and mineral concessions as the price of heavy finance of the rebel supplies of guns, ammunition, planes and war material. I have also refrained from emphasising—and I merely mention it in passing—that an initial support by Her Majesty's Government, had they been able to see their way to do it, in allowing to the Federal Government an increased purchase of war materials from British sources to meet the emergency might well have ended the rebellion in a few weeks and have saved thousands of innocent lives. Her Majesty's Government were then perhaps in a very difficult position to make such a decision, or honestly thought they were. No such doubt can surely exist to-day.
May I repeat that, in my view, Her Majesty's Government should give every possible support to the Federal Government in the name of humanity and the future stability of Africa? I felt that it was my humble duty to hand on the torch. The Federation has grown to manhood, and I implore Her Majesty's Government not to listen to those whose short-sighted emotional pleas would help to put out that torch, whose light would gladden and encourage the whole of Africa. If Her Majesty's Government will refuse to hinder by any withholding of their support, I am confident that not only the people of Nigeria but future generations of Africans all over the Continent will bless the British Government as its truest friend. I therefore plead with Her Majesty's Government to take a firm unequivocal stand in favour of the Federal Government, lest any faltering
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now may cause the situation to deteriorate beyond the reach of regret.
3.6 p.m.
LORD SORENSEN: My Lords, it is with considerable temerity and indeed diffidence that I venture to intervene in the presence of so many who have obviously had rich experience of Nigeria, who are very greatly informed about recent developments there, and who are possibly much greater authorities on these matters than I would ever dare pretend to be. But I must comment on the fact that the last two noble Lords who have spoken gave us an excellent example of the difference between the subjective and objective view. The same faces are there, but their interpretation by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, and the noble Lord, Lord Milverton, are quite different. Of course, that is very characteristic of much else in human history. Again, the noble Lord, Lord Milverton, said that in his view religion and politics have never been mixed in Nigeria. I should have thought that remark needed qualification, particularly in regard to the Northern Region, where the Hausas are almost exclusively Moslem, and where the religious tenets of their faith are intertwined in the social structure and determine in some measure the outlook of the Hausas and their Emirs to the rest of Nigeria.
Here I pay tribute to the splendid services that the B.B.C. and the L.T.V. are both providing, although I quite agree with the implications of certain words by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, that at times there has been—undoubtedly unconsciously—a certain distortion of facts or omission of other facts. Be that as it may, on the whole I am sure that the people of this country have been considerably enlightened by both of those channels providing us with some knowledge of current events.
When I went home last night I sat down, turned on the television, and on to the screen there came the features of Dr. Azikwe. In a moment or two I realised that I was sitting in precisely the same seat in my room in which he had sat over twenty years ago, and it seemed very odd that he should be looking at me as if to remind me of that fact. I mention that, because I knew Dr. Azikwe many years ago, and many other leaders of Nigerian political

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ferment and aspiration at that time. Since then many of them have been murdered or have disappeared, so I am not so familiar with the present leaders of Nigeria.
I remember being present, with other Members of this House and the other House, at the celebration of Nigerian independence in Lagos, and sharing with others the high hopes and expectations when Chief Awolowo and Dr. Azikwe —the one a Yoruba and the other an Ibo—went together with the Hausa Prime Minister to the flagmast on which the Nigerian flag was raised for the first time in a shaft of light amid the enveloping gloom. I thought that was symbolic; and undoubtedly all of us there looked forward with great hopes to this Federation.
Unfortunately, everyone will agree now, those hopes have been dashed to the ground. There are cynics, of course, who utilise this to fortify their claim that Nigeria should never have been given its independence. I disagree. I disagree on grounds of expediency, on the one hand, and of moral consistency, on the other. We in this country cannot claim to believe in freedom and democracy and withhold it from any portion of an Empire, which by its very entymology and significance means domination. This does not mean that in some measure we were not apprehensive about the future, mixed up with our high hopes and expectations. It does mean, however, first of all expediency on the ground that if we had withheld that independence, then certainly Hausas, Yorubas, Ibos, Ibobios, Efeks and Falaras would all have found a temporary unity against the resistance of this country to what they claimed to be their legitimate plea.
So one has to admit at the present time to dismay, sorrow and grief, but I am not inclined at all to engage in recrimination or to try to apportion blame to either the Biafrans or the Federal authorities. Rather, I feel an overwhelming compassion for the human beings on both sides, and for the well-meaning people on both sides of the present conflict; I suggest that that, perhaps, is the mood which is best calculated to help the Nigerians of all tribes or ethnic types, rather than to accuse them of sinister and even malicious motives.
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Of course, it is true that if we are to understand the present situation we have to go back much further than the advent of independence. The noble Lord, Lord Milverton, quite rightly reminded us of the great work of Lord Lugard, who founded Nigeria; or, to put it another way, who laid the foundations of Nigeria upon which we hoped Nigerians themselves would build. For he it was who drew a pencil round a portion of the map and said, "All those diverse ethnic groups within that area, whether they be nomadic or settled, whether this tribe or that tribe, shall be in what we shall now call Nigeria." Whatever criticism we may make of British imperialist colonisation—and I have many criticisms—that is nevertheless one of the good elements that I think were contributed by British imperialism.
I draw a distinction between the two kinds of colonisation, for colonisation is perfectly natural. We have a million different peoples from various parts of our Commonwealth to-day who are colonising this country. Be that as it may, imperialist colonisation is of a different type. Rightly or wrongly, whether used benevolently or malignantly, it is the imposition by an outside Power on other peoples of their concept of how the people should behave. That I reject. At the same time, I think we must recognise that some contributions of value have been made even by British imperialism.
That being so, I think we should appreciate that we are responsible for forming the foundation of Nigeria which the Nigerians themselves then accepted, and I think it is a little unfair for Nigerians, or others in this country who are as hostile to imperialist colonisation or colonialism as I am, to complain that Britain did not do all that it is now believed it should have done. As in India, so here: there were many problems left unsolved. But if we are going to transfer power to other countries, we must also transfer responsibility. They must find out how to solve their problems, and not constantly turn back to us and say, "You should have solved these for us". We cannot have it both ways. Certainly there were great perils and dangers when the foundation of Nigeria was laid. The Nigerians knew this, too, but they accepted it. They would have accepted nothing less. If we had withheld from them at the time not merely independence but our

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groundplan of the future, they would have accused us of leaving them in the lurch and of not giving a proper start to their new venture. It was for them, afterwards, of course, to alter and change, to adapt, amend and expand as they chose.
That being so, I think we must recognise that not only did we make a great contribution in forming this nation, but also that the Nigerians themselves have accepted the fact and have tried to build on it ever since. So I reject the suggestion that we should have withheld independence. We could not have done it if we wished: we had enough on our plate as it was. But in addition to the fact of expediency, there was also the moral obligation to be consistent. I myself at the time when I was in Nigeria—I have been in Nigeria two or three times —was perfectly aware of these disparant elements inside Nigeria. I knew, for instance, that Dr. Azikwe, for whom I had a high regard—and I am glad to find he is now in this country; I wish I could see him personally once more—was an Ibo. Although he was one of the outstanding, perhaps the outstanding, political leader at that time and for years, I was conscious of a certain resentment against him because he was an Ibo.
In addition to that, I have had experience in other ways. For some years I was chairman of a body known as the West African Students Union Limited. There was also another body known as the West African Students Union, consisting only of students. I was chairman of a body holding property which was able to give hospitality to students, and I am very glad that the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London, who is not here now but who spoke this morning, was one of my Committee, together with the late Canon Campbell, Chaplain of the House of Commons. There were others, European and Africans as well. Sometimes it was a somewhat turbulent assembly. I do not mean that the Bishop of London was turbulent at that time —heaven forbid!—but there was a certain turbulence from time to time. There were many reasons for this but one reason was because of the tension between the different ethnic groups. There were cross-currents of politics as well. I remember one occasion when our admirable warder discovered that the telephone
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bill had leapt up alarmingly, and on investigation we found that, surreptitiously, some of the students, not by any means all, had broken into the office and had made clandestine telephone calls to places like Moscow and Prague. They were passing the bill on to us, and they Complained when we protested at this outrage.
On the other hand, there were people of different types altogether. Dr. Arikpo, who is now one of the Ministers it the Nigerian Government, was a member at one time. I knew him very well. Mr. Akintole was another member of that body. I think he was secretary. He was murdered at the time of the great putsch. I mention this because, as I say again, I was sensitive then to the fact that not only were there tensions and conflicts as between Ghanaians and Nigerians and Sierre Leonnians and Gambians, but also among Nigerians which now, unhappily, have come to be expressed even more virulently and tragically. I think that is the real cause of the present trouble. Not that we should not have made the attempt to bring them together. We did it with some measure of success. At the same time, we have seen an erruption, and erruption is not peculiar to that country, for it has obtained elsewhere as well.
Here I would say, in regard to the supply of arms, that while I personally regret that arms have been supplied, and while I personally would have said, if I were a dictator, "Sooner than have the bloodshed and the misery which have been imposed on the people of Nigeria, I will let them go their own way", that is my own inclination shared by very few people. I mention that purely as a personal attitude. To come back to the main theme, we have to realise that if, for instance, Canada, which is pact of the Commonwealth, had been receiving certain arms from us, suddenly found (shall we say), which I hope will never happen, that some of the people of Quebec had rebelled against Canada, would we then have refused to supply arms to Canada on the ground that some of the people in her own territory had suddenly rebelled? I think not. We should have said that, lamentable as it is, it was for Canada to deal with its own secessionists and rebels. All we could do

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would be to continue to supply arms as we did before.
Equally, I would ask: if the Biafrans had penetrated with some temporary success, and finally got to Lagos and disrupted that Government and become the dominant power in the place, what would have happened then? They would have been the first to say, "We want arms supplied to us in exactly the same way as they were supplied to our predecessors". Indeed, if they had had a military success we should not have had so many complaints from Biafra that arms were being supplied to Nigeria while they had to obtain arms from other Powers. I hope that all Governments will agree not to supply arms, though if some do and some do not it is a different picture altogether. But even if they did that, it would not cure the situation. The tribal hostilities would still be there. They would fight with bows and arrows, spears and cudgels, and would be just as ferocious, as the stories in the Old Testament very well remind us. We have to get underneath all this and find out what it is that makes people with tribal gregariousness so conscious of their entity, their autonomy, their distinctiveness, that they are prepared not only to defy one another but also to go to war.
I hope most earnestly that Her Majesty's Government will continue to exercise that influence which they have exercised. I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Shepherd and others who I know have spent themselves without limit to try to get some good influence to bear on all the participants. I hope that this process will go on, but we have to realise that in the long run what happens to the future of Nigeria depends not on us but on the Nigerians. Bitter as is the hatred between the Biafrans, on the one hand, and the Nigerians, on the other, it is possible of dissolution. They are fellow human beings with the same common needs, and if they can somehow transcend their hatred and bitterness and start afresh there would be great hope. Otherwise Nigeria may be not the example which the noble Lord. Lord Milverton, hoped, but quite the reverse—a morass, added to the many other morasses that obtain in that great Continent of Africa at the present time.
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Though it may be a non-political plea, I would add my voice particularly to reach the authorities in Lagos, who obviously are now capable militarily of completing their campaign, and ask them to be magnanimous, in the hope that, somehow, that will penetrate beyond the fears and the dreads of the people of Biafra. It can be done only by this sort of appeal which might at last bring them back to a sense of their common Nigerian humanity. I hope earnestly that the Nigerian Federal Government, with its much superior strength and military capacity to complete the campaign, will do its utmost to recognise instead the right of Biafra to some measure of independence within a larger corporate Nigeria; and will in any case guarantee to the world that there shall be no genocide but the utmost humane treatment of all those who have been the rebels of the last few months.
My Lords, much else could be said but time does not allow. My mind went back this morning to the words of Abraham Lincoln in the famous Gettysburg Address, which I am sure your Lordships remember:
"We are here highly resolved that the dead shall not have died in vain; that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom."
I would join in that prayer and trust that this will mean not only a new birth of freedom but a return to fraternity, sanity and humanity, so that the high hopes of Nigeria will yet be fulfilled. If the Nigerians can look to us to give them such assistance as we are able, I trust that they will forget any hostility they may have had towards us in the past and will recognise our genuine desire to extend to them not only material help but every other means by which they can yet be a great nation, with the bitterness of the past at last dissolved in a new spirit and a new hope.
3.25 p.m.
THE EARL OF LYTTON: My Lords, the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, who is sitting next to me on the Cross-Benches, enables me to reduce the length of my speech from about ten minutes to two minutes. I call the noble Lord a "colleague", but we have not exchanged a single idea—Cross-Benchers never do. But what I feel about this was expressed by him so much better

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than I could do it, and so I am able to be brief.
Yesterday the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, exhorted us to support the principle of self-determination and apply this to a State which is impotent militarily in the face of an overwhelming Power. To-day the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, invites us to subscribe to a different principle which he has described as non-fragmentation and which others have described as territorial integrity. This principle if it is an adjunct to self-determination is valid, viable and effectual. If it is a substitute for self-determination it is diabolical. All of us should know that the colonial boundaries in Africa, as we handed them over, were riddled with absurdities which are screaming out to be put right.
To-day we have had the case put for one side only. The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, spoke as the mouthpiece of Colonel Gowon. The Emperor Haile Selassie is on the same side with territorial integrity as the supreme political principle. We heard him quoted in that sense by the noble Lord, Lord Milverton. Were the Emperor not to hold this principle, his own Empire would long ago have disintegrated. Therefore we have had this side only put to us by the Government. I do not know either of the Colonels I have not been in Nigeria. But I am interested in Africa as a whole, and in all parts. I am horrified at the cost in lives which the application of this false principle of territorial integrity is inflicting on unfortunate people in the Southern Sudan. in Ethiopia, in the Congo, in Northern Kenya, and elsewhere. I estimate that some 2 million people have paid the tribute of death to the principle of territorial integrity, and it is wrong that it should be placed above the principle of self-determination.
I also think that Colonel Ojukwu has been misquoted. It is true that I have received documents from both sides, but I have not read either side because the documents are too voluminous and I have not had the time. But I read the B.B.C. monitored reports from that part of the world every day, and my belief is that the Colonel has asked for the principle, not demarding independence as such, for a particular area as such, but the application of the principle of self-determination to the area of Biafra, and
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a decision by a neutral Commission as to whether they want it, what they want and what the boundaries shall I cannot see why we should resist that sort of thing as a solution to this, and to many other problems of this kind in Africa. I may be asked whether any Africa has ever expressed the opinions which I express. I remember at the beginning of 1967 the Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity said that in his view the main task of the last year for the O.A.U. was to correct the irregular boundaries, or words to that effect.
As regards the application of this solution, I feel sure that the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, has made a recommendation which should be given the most consideration. I feel that those who resist the principle of self-determination in Africa should have from us—as we gave yesterday—an expression of our disgust, and from us no arms and no aid, because the principle of self-determination is the principle by which we live. We intend to preserve it even with that abominable thing, the nuclear deterrent. If we can do that, surely we can understand what others feel about it? If there is doubt as to whether 7 million, 5 million or 14 million want this or that, it should not be beyond the wit of man and a nentral, impartial, commission to find out what they do want, very much as the Regional Boundaries Commission we sent to Kenya before independence made an admirable report of the wishes of the people.
3.32 p.m.
VISCOUNT MONCKTON OF BRENCHLEY: My Lords, one of the difficulties of being a Member of your Lordships' House is to try to listen to speeches and then to take a view on self, if one has not already come with preconceived ones. This afternoon it is apparent that views differ quite regardless of Party, and thank God for that! Equally, I realise that I would never make a lawyer. I found myself agreeing with every word of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and I then found myself agreeing with every word that my noble friend Lord Head said. I was pretty near agreement with everything the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, said. So your Lordships will appreciate the extreme difficulty I am in.
As an ordinary British soldier, one can say that those who served in Nigeria

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liked that country and liked the Nigerian people. We realised the differences existing there, and we realised, I think, that it was kept together by an outside Power who was strong, and was not of either religion, or any religion. I think most of us genuinely loved the Ibo people. I have many friends still, both of the Moslem North and Ibo Eastern Region. The Ibos were the advanced people who provided the lawyers, doctors, priests and, of course, the traders throughout Nigeria, and not only in the Regions.
This is where I find some difficulty, because after 1966 nearly 1½ million had to come back into their own part of the Eastern Region. This made the difficulties of refugees difficult and, therefore, what ghastly position they must be in now is inconceivable for an ordinary Westerner to conceive. I can understand the difficulty of Her Majesty's Government in the decision on arms. I can see that they were probably right to continue to do so, but I wonder now, if the final attack is on, if the Government know it is on—and only they can probably know—is it then right to continue? Can we ever hope to influence the other side, or both sides, if we are seen to be supporting only one? That is the plea I am making at this time, to reconsider this matter in the light of the knowledge of a final attack.
One last thing, and I shall be very short. The International Red Cross Committee in Geneva estimate that about 5,000 people a day are dying in this Region. That excludes the Federal area, where people are also dying from starvation and from wounds. But 5,000 a day in this small area is a greater total loss than has taken place in the whole of the Vietnam war. I wonder whether people in this country realise that it is not only the soldiers who are dying—there are very few—but also women and children; and the children who do not die will be affected right up to the next generation, and probably the generation after that. If the Government will realise that it is better than nothing. There is one more thing the Government should do, that is, to give a promise that whatever happens they will give a further grant to the International Red Cross to help those left in Biafra. I can
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do no more than end with the Salvation Army cry, "For God's sake, help".
LORD RITCHIE-CALDER: My Lords, I apologise to the noble Earl, Lord Cork and Orrery, for intervening when I had withdrawn my name. I withdrew my name because I so much agreed with what Lord Goodman has said, and I felt that anything I had to say was unnecessary. All I want to say is that I believe it so much that I must stand up and say so.
3.35 p.m.
THE EARL OF CORK AND ORRERY:My Lords, there was a moment when, with a mixture of disappointment and relief, I thought that my noble friend Lord Monckton of Brenchley had shot my speech entirely from under me. I do not think he has quite done so, and therefore I will venture to say what I was going to say. I should also like to make another venture, which is perhaps a rather unusual one, that is, to allow the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, to begin my speech for me. I take the words he uttered about a month ago in answer to a Question. They were these:
"The approach of Her Majesty's Government can, I think, be summed up like this."
This is the approach of the Government to the supply of arms to the Federal Government of Rhodesia.
"If we were at this moment to change our policy and stop the supply of arms to the Federal Government, that would in no way affect the power of the Federal Government to do evil: it might, however, affect our influence upon them to do good."—[OFFICIAL. REPORT, 18/7/68; col. 442.]
I think, having listened to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, this morning, those remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, are probably still considered by him to be valid and in force.
Of course, taken in vacuo the argument seems unexceptionable. Indeed, it was received with something like sympathetic approval by noble Lords in all parts of the House when it was stated, including myself. But in overseas affairs, Governments do not operate in vacuo. They operate very much in publico. The public in this country—and any other country—are likely to bend a rather more searching gaze upon the argument. The sympathy with which your Lordships

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received it was due very largely, I am certain, to an understanding of the enormous difficulties that confront the Government in this situation. Heaven knows! the situation in Nigeria presents plenty of difficulties to the Government.
But I believe there is an extra difficulty, one that does not originate in Nigeria, but here in Whitehall, and one that is really the responsibility of the Government themselves. That is the difficulty of having no proper book of rules to go by. I mean by that that they do not seem entirely to have evolved a completely fixed set of standards or principles: moral, ethical, political, logical—or you can use any adjective you choose. In any case, standards or principles, that will provide a consistent system of guidance in dealings with other Governments. Of course, I do not mean by that that they have no such standards or principles. That would be as offensive as it would be untrue. What I mean is that these are not fixed, so they are inclined to use now one set, now another set, and now yet another set. There is the result that it is sometimes not only inconsistent, but actually contradictory. This is not the way to win respect or enhance one's chances of influencing other people for good.
We have here in this case an almost perfect example of such contradiction. My Lords, I wonder whether you would agree with me if I said this. If in the argument put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, he had simply changed the name of the Government, it could have been stated in those identical words with greater force in relation to the supply of arms for the external defence of South Africa. Yet we know in fact that the line the Government took in that case was the exact opposite.
I submit that these two policies, or principles upon which they are based, are frankly contradicting one another, and it follows that they cannot both be right and they cannot both be true. Nor does it follow that because one is wrong the other is right. I think they may both be wrong; I think they both are wrong. I will explain why I think they are wrong in connection with Rhodesia. With South Africa, of course, we are not concerned in this debate. Before doing so, I want very briefly to make this point.
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Thanks to this contradiction we have an ad hoc morality. Ad hoc policies and procedures are, of course, very often necessary and right. But ad hoc morality is something I do not greatly care a bout, and I do not believe your Lordships do either. And I do not think either that it is at all likely to command the respect of a Gowon or an Ojukwu or anyone else. I think that in this respect the Government exaggerate their chances of being listened to when they try to exert an influence for good.
Now I turn, very briefly, to the argument that if we were to stop supplying arms to the Federal Government that would in no way lessen the power of that Government to do evil but might —not would, only might—affect our influfence upon it to do good. Even a month ago the aspiration was not put forward with very much confidence, and with some reason, and with even more reason now, could it be repeated. For I suspect it seems fairly clear that our influence upon the Federal Government to do good is precisely nil.
What then is the first part of the argument that slopping the supply of arms would not in any way lessen the Federal Government's power to do evil? Taken strictly at its face value, this argument is untrue. If the Federal Government has the power to do evil, and means to do it by force of arms, and if some of those arms are supplied by us, then by ceasing to supply those arms—and particularly ammunition, I suppose—we should automatically lessen its power to do evil. There cannot be any argument about that; it is a simple arithmetical fact. In order to make the argument true—which the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, cert Ainly intended it to be—something has to be added to it, some implied additional argument that has not yet been stated in so many words and probably never will be. I do not see how this additive can be anything but this: that if we did not supply the arms to the Federal Government they would be supplied by somebody else. We very nearly had that said, but not quite. It is the same as saying that if somebody is going to supply the arms in any case, why not we? But unless you are going to insist that the purpose for which they are going to be used contains no evil—and I do not see how you can say that—then this is an

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argument that no honourable Government can use, for it is the classic self-justification of the black marketeer, the looter, the drug pedlar.
I am quite aware of the dilemma confronting General Gowon, and I am not at all sure from the news that has come in in the last 24 hours that he has not decided how to resolve it, in face of Biafra's intransigence, and probably in any case he would not be able to stop without conceding the right to secede. But that is his dilemma, not ours and in any case its existence makes no difference to the fact that what is going on in Nigeria is evil—and this is where I converge very closely upon the speech of my noble kinsman, Lord Head, in his most graphic description of what is likely.
I think "likely" is the word, but one might even say probable—I am not sure —to happen in Biafra, if things go from bad to worse, as they appear likely to do. But if you suppose—and I do suppose—that we have no chance of stopping this evil, there are still two reasons why we should send no more arms to the Federal Government. Firstly, a burst of 9 mm. bullets in an African stomach is an evil thing anyway you reckon it, and if we send those bullets from England knowing that they may be so used, then that particular share in the general evil is ours, and that share is neither diminished nor magnified by a hair's breadth by the likelihood that if we did not send those bullets they would be sent by somebody else.
The second reason I will put in the form of a question. How much evil of this kind are we justified in doing, never mind anyone else? How many corpses, of men, women or children, from British bullets— how many of such things as these are justified by a vague hope that somewhere, some time, we may be able to exert some influence for good? Is there any way of showing that the good we can do will balance all or any of the evil that is being done with our assistance? If there is, then I beg the Government to set it forth. If not, then let us, I beg, withdraw immediately from this beastly trade.
Lastly, in case there may be any (though I doubt it) who are not moved by moral arguments of this kind, let me add this. Affairs in Nigeria seem to be
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moving on into a phase in which the Government are standing in a certain danger of appearing to be, if they are not actually doing so, playing both ends against the middle, and that is a process which inevitably ends by incurring the contempt of both.
3.47 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I regret very much the fact that time has gone and that I am intervening at such a late hour. It has been recognised, I think, in this debate that I have been among the Members who have been the pioneers in raising this issue, and because of that, and because I am so deeply concerned, I feel that I must, even at this late hour, put the case which I hope your Lordships will find constructive, which I have in mind.
First, I want to express my appreciation to the Government that they have arranged this debate. Nine months ago, when I raised this issue, I said there was a danger of the war in Nigeria becoming a forgotten war. That is not the case now, and I think this is largely due to the same influence which aroused all the indignation about Czechoslovakia yesterday. We have yet to estimate the effect of television in keeping us aware of events in the world and the impression which it makes on the public mind. We saw the tanks in Prague and we have seen the starvation in Biafra. Nine months ago, when a few of us first called on our Government to stop their supply of arms to Lagos, we were isolated voices. Now, as this debate has shown, this view is expressed from all sides of the House. And it is quite remarkable how the daily Press—The Times, the Daily Telegraph, the Guardian—the voices of responsible published papers, are now coming to the same view.
May I just say this to the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, whose speech I very much appreciated? He argued that there was a case for this country to continue to supply arms to the Federal Government because if we did not do so others would. I think he will be awar—certainly he will be if he refers to Hansard—that whenever we have raised this issue we have also put as a priority an appeal to all Governments to stop supplying arms to both sides.

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My noble friend Lord Shepherd has pointed out that there is a black market which might not be controlled by Governmental decisions. I put two points. First, I have consulted with representatives in London, with Ambassadors of other Governments, before some of the Governments ceased their supplies, and I have also consulted with Ambassadors representing Governments who are continuing supplies. I will not put it higher than this: that I have had a completely different impression from that which has been given by the Front Bench, that other Governments who are supplying arms would not be prepared to enter into consultation and agreement with the British Government if our Government would stop their supply of arms to the Federal Government. So far as the black market is concerned, Governments are not only involved in giving authority for arms to be supplied; they also have authority at the points of embarkation. If an agreement could be reached to stop supplies, there is no Government which could not say that there must be no further export of arms to either side in this terrible war.
I understand the British case. It is the legalistic view. It is the classical routine view. Because the Federal Government is the recognised Government, and particularly because in this case it is a Commonwealth Government, to whom we have supplied arms in the past, we must continue to supply them. I think in the modern world that legalistic view does not represent the dynamic forces of the situation. I have been involved from the very beginning in the struggle for independence in Nigeria. I remember that even before independence was secured, ironically, it was the representatives of the East who were the greatest advocates of the unity of Nigeria. Both Dr. Azikwe and Chief Awolowo actually postponed the independence of the South because they wanted to bring in the North and have a united Nigeria as a whole. They made that daring experiment, and the British Government endorsed it. I am one of those who do not wish to see the Balkanisation of Africa. Therefore, I have stressed the unity of Nigeria. But, however deeply one wants certain prospects of this kind, one must recognise human facts, and the human facts in Nigeria are that tribal
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loyalties and tribal traditions were not ready for the unified Nigeria which the pioneers sought and which our Government endorsed.
If I may, I would congratulate my noble friend Lord Shepherd on his survey of the history of what has occurred. With very minor adjustments, I accept that broad statement. But look at that history. The Constitution of a Federal Nigeria was so unreal that the democratic Government could not stand. One military coup; the assassination of a Prime Minister; the assassination c f the leader in Northern Nigeria; another military coup. It is said that 30,000—and undoubtedly 20,000—not only Ibo: but others from Eastern Nigeria, were massacred in Northern Nigeria. There are nearly 2 million refugees from Northern Nigeria in the Eastern Region. How can we begin to underestimate the psychological effect of this? And with that kind of psychology in Nigeria, can we really expect a centralised regime to continue to operate? We are paying attention to a legalistic constitution and absolutely neglecting to recognise the psychological facts among the people. There can be unity only if there is a spirit of unity among the peoples who would compose a united Nigeria.
Let me say this on the subject of secession. I regret it when it takes plane in Africa, because I want the unity of Africa, but do not let any of us think that the right of secession is something that is contrary to historic progress. My noble friend Lady Asquith of Yarnbury (if I may call her such, because I feel like that towards the liberal thing; for which she stands) indicated the case of Ireland. Would the history of Roland have been any better if Southern Inland had not gained the right of secession? Would the centre of Europe have been better if Hungary had not obtaindependence from the Austro-Hungarian empire? And what about the Sudan, under a condominium of British and Egyptian control? The Sudanese people decided in favour of secession from Egypt. Can anyone look at the map of Africa and say that there could lave been more progress if secession had not taken place? Secession is not of itself a retrogressive fact. We have to learn that unity can operate only if among

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the peoples concerned there is a spontaneous acceptance of the co-operation which that unity demands.
In that situation the British Government should not have followed the classical routine, the cold legalistic, constitutional role. They should have tried to understand the psychological facts, the social forces and the tribal forces which made up Nigeria. In that situation we should not have offered arms to either side, and the whole of our contribution should have been towards conciliation between the two sides.
My Lords, perhaps I may mention something which I think strengthens this argument, and that is the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. I would join with others in this House (I think the noble Lord knows this) in offering my very sincere appreciation of all he did in Nigeria to relieve the suffering. But he was hampered. It was necessary for him to see the Biafran authorities, as well as the authorities at Lagos, if he was to fulfil his humane task. The Biafran authorities declined to see him. Why did they decline to see him? It was because he had the misfortune of going to Nigeria from Britain with the endorsement of the British Government, and the Biafran authorities felt that the arms that we were sending to Lagos made any representative from this country someone with whom they were not able to communicate. If the British Government had been neutral in this matter, my noble friend Lord Hunt, with his great abilities, might now have come back to this country, not only with the proposals which he was able to make after going to Lagos, but with proposals which had the co-operation and endorsement of Biafra, as well, and hundreds of thousands of starving children could have been saved from their deaths.
My Lords, the Government have said that they have only been continuing the arms supplies which they previously sent to Nigeria. I recognise that they have not sent heavy armaments, but I do not think the Front Bench will deny that the extent of the arms supply has been tremendously escalated. Unfortunately, we have not been able to get the figures, but I have been able in this House to indicate the enormous escalation in the
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supply of arms from this country to Lagos through the Crown Agents.
I want to say how much I welcome the fact that the Government are now reconsidering their policy. I wrote a letter to the Prime Minister on this subject, and I had a reply from 10 Downing Street on August 21, from which I propose to quote. It mentions a statement by the Foreign Secretary in another place on June 12, and then the letter continues:
"He"—
that is, the Foreign Secretary—
"said in effect that we would have to reconsider our policy if it became the intention of the Federal Government to proceed without mercy to slaughter or starve the Ibo people or to reject any reasonable settlement. That remains our position."
And in fact from the Front Bench the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, has to-day made a similar statement. I want to submit to the noble Lord, as I would submit to the Prime Minister, that this is exactly what is happening. He will forgive me for saying that I was completely unconvinced by his argument that the final intended military thrust upon Biafra had not begun.
I was taking part in the debate last night, and therefore did not hear the speech on television of General Gowon. But not merely did the representative of the Front Bench on the opposite side indicate that General Gowon said in that speech that this thrust had begun, but everyone with whom I have spoken who saw and heard that television presentation takes the view that General Gowon intimated that the thrust had opened. I am told, indeed, that he said it was likely to be so effective that the complete military defeat of the Biafrans in the area which they still occupied would be completed within one month. I gather that the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, agrees with that statement.
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: So do other noble Lords.
LORD BROCKWAY: With all the desire in the world to believe what the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, said, I would ask this. Does he really think that military action from the South on the Iboland that remains, with armies attacking three towns—indeed two prongs of assault were actually described—does he believe that this can begin and then be

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held up without the complete thrust, intended to be final? Does not this assault in its terms defeat the conditions which the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister and he himself have laid down for the continuation of arms to the Federal Government? Does he really believe that, if the rest of Iboland is to become a battlefield this way, the relief of hunger can go on?
I do not believe that the noble Lord, if he will be honest in his own mind, can stand by the view he has expressed in this House: that this final military effort is not being made, and that if it is being made it does not merely mean the loss of thousands of lives on the battlefield, but means no hope at all for the relief of those starving children to whom aid is now being given.
I want to be absolutely fair. I did not hear this broadcast of General Gowon's, but I was not surprised to hear that his attitude was a humanitarian one. I have had the same impression. Indeed, years ago, in the struggle for Nigerian independence, I met him. But I have also had the same impression with every public statement he has made. The real difficulty is that General Gowon cannot control his own commanders in the field, and he cannot control his own troops. I wonder whether my noble friend Lord Shepherd has seen the interview which has appeared with Lieutenant-Colonel Benjamin Adekunle, who is the Commander-in-Chief of the Federal troops in the southern front who are now undertaking the advance in Biafra. These interviews have appeared in two papers. They first appeared in De Telegraaf published in Holland and they were reproduced in the Sun in this country; and second, they appeared in the Stern, the German magazine, and were reproduced in the Evening Standard last night.
I draw attention to these words by the Commander-in-Chief of the Federal forces which are now advancing into Biafra:
I do not want to see the Red Cross. no Caritas"—
that is the Roman Catholic organisation of relief—
"no World Church Committee, no Pope, no missionary, and no United Nations' delegation".
Asked whether this means that the thousands of tons of food stored in Lagos
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would never get to the refugee camps, he replied:
"That is exactly what I have said. I want to avoid feeding even one Ibo until these people capitulate".
That cannot be suggested as the propaganda of a Biafran agency. It is a direct interview with the commander of the Federal troops who are making the advance into Biafra. May I say that the impression I gained, when I watched I the television interview with this commanding officer a few days ago, confirme I the attitude which was expressed in those words?
I want to conclude by being constructive. What are the possibilities of peace? As my noble friend knows, I an the chairman of the Committee for Pease in Nigeria. It is the most represeni alive and influential committee over which I have ever presided. It has two ex-Governors General of Nigeria, it has an ex-Colonial Secretary, it has representatives of all the missionary societies, it has leading members of the three political Parties in this country, both from the House of Commons and from your Lordships' House. It has ex-colonial servants; extraordinarily enough it also has representatives of businessmen in Nigeria and Biafra; and perhaps most extraordinary of all we have Africans from both sides, the Federal side and the Biafran side.
I admit that as chairman I sometimes have difficulty. My noble friend knows what we have done and how we have gone to both sides; he knows how we have gone to the big industrialis s of the West African Committee; he knows how we have gone to the Common-wealth Secretariat and to the Secretary of State in this country, because he was present at that interview. We have gone to the Archbishops and the Bishops at Lambeth, and as a result of all that work I would only say that I begin to sympathise with the Minister when he says that despite the present situation we have contributed something. That is my feeling. I wish that the representatives of the two sides whom we received would say publicly what they have said to us privately. If they did that there would be a possibility of a solution. These possibilities now lie mostly in the conference which is being held at Addis Ababa.

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I want to make five constructive suggestions, which I will put in a sentence each for reasons of time. First, there should be an immediate truce. Biafra took the initiative for that. It is all very well for my noble friend to say that it is natural that Biafra should do that because the Federal side are winning—
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I did not say that.
LORD BROCKWAY: I beg my noble friend's pardon and I withdraw my observation at once, because I never want to misrepresent anything that is said. That was my understanding, but I will now only say that the chairman, Emperor Haile Selassie, has supported this proposal for an immediate truce. My second suggestion is for a peace-keeping force, on which it has been suggested that Canada, India and Ethiopia should have representatives. Both sides have agreed to a peace-keeping force, and I hope they will agree to the representatives of those three countries.
Thirdly, there is the reported agreement on air and road relief. Perhaps my noble friend in his reply could tell us the facts about this, because I am puzzled. This was reported about four days ago, and since that time it has been reported that International Red Cross aeroplanes have been fired upon by Federal forces as they have been going to the Biafran territory. The noble Lord used the phrase that the International Red Cross had resumed flights, presumably with Nigerian concurrence. My own general practitioner has volunteered for service for six months without payment. That is typical of the heroism of doctors and nurses and others who have volunteered for this purpose. He went in the last week. He left Fernando Po in a Swedish 'plane. That Swedish'plane was fired upon by Federal forces before it reached Biafra.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I am glad the noble Lord has at least identified the aircraft. I think, after examination, he will find that that aircraft was fired on before the agreement was reached at Addis Ababa.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I should be glad if that is the case; but there have been so many inconsistencies
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of statement in all these proceedings that my noble friend will forgive me if I am just a little sceptical.
My fourth point is that all arms supplies should be stopped and that the British Government should give the lead. My fifth point is with regard to the political settlement, and to this I want to add a little because it is important to be precise. I find, as I meet representatives of Biafra, that the thing that concerns them most is their further security. Massacred in the North, overwhelmed with refugees, defeated with thousands killed in military warfare, the hunger of thousands of their children—quite naturally, above everything else they demand security. I strongly hope that we shall support the proposal for an international peace-keeping force which will enable such security to be maintained.
In conclusion, I want to refer to the basis of settlement. I believe that both sides have to give up the rigid terms which they have so far employed and which have kept them apart. May I say to my noble friend (I think he may know this) that Mr. James Griffiths, M.P., the ex-Colonial Secretary, and I have appealed to both sides to give up the rigidity of terms and to show some flexibility in their negotiations. I want to acknowledge this, which goes a little further than what my noble friend said. He said that the Federal Government had been prepared no longer to demand the renunciation of secession as a condition of negotiations. Actually they appear to have gone further than that. In the Guardian of August 17 there was a letter by His Excellency Ogundipe, the High Commissioner, who used these words:
"The Federal Government do not even insist on the public renunciation by the rebel regime of secession; but instead suggest a Joint Declaration in which both sides agree to maintain the unity and territorial integrity of Nigeria and to ensure for all time the security of all its inhabitants."
That is not merely a condition of negotiation; that is a suggestion of the terms of a Joint Declaration.
My Lords, I welcome that. It might be argued that the use of the terms "unity and territorial integrity" mean renunciation of secession. I am inclined to agree with that. But our appeal to both sides at this moment should be to be flexible. It should be the duty of both sides to find a basis of a free association,

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with common services for both Biafra and the Federal area, and a plebiscite in disputed areas. I can assure my noble friend that some of us who have been critical of the Government have been urging that kind of formula upon our Biafran friends.
There are two alternatives to fulfill those conditions. The first is confederation. The Biafrans themselves proposed that. They have rather gone back on it because of what has occurred, but I do not believe that that reversal of view need be permanent, and it may easily prove to be an acceptable pattern for the future constitution of Nigeria. It may easily be that the Hausas and the Yorubas may desire a confederation on the basis of a grouping of the smaller States which are proposed. We must not close our eyes to that possibility.
The second alternative is that Biafra should be limited to the Ibo heartland. It still contains a population of 7 million, which is much greater than some sovereign countries. It would be landlocked and it would need access to Port Harcourt and representation on the administrative authority in that city, which historically has been associated with the Eastern region and the Ibos, and it would necessitate a plebiscite of the Eastern States. I do not ask my noble friend to make a comment on those two alternatives now. I ask him whether he will consider them, and perhaps when he reads them in Hansard to-morrow ask whether there is not a possible solution in one of those two alternative lines. My Lords, I apologise for having spoken at this length, but I think your Lordships will know not only my deep concern but my endeavour to find the truth of this matter and to try to contribute towards a solution.
4.24 p.m.
LORD WEDGWOOD: My Lords, I intervene, as briefly as I can, to make one or two points and to seek a little further information. In doing so I would add my voice to those of noble Lords who have spoken eloquently and with close personal knowledge of the circumstances of this tragic civil war in Nigeria, and in particular the noble Viscount, Lord Head, with whose assessment and fears I found myself so very largely in agreement.
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I should like to emphasise just this: that Nigeria is undoubtedly within the British sphere of influence and responsibility, not only as a part of than old British Empire but now as a member of the Commonwealth of Nations in which Britain is at least a senior member. Consequently we have the proud responsibility of determining our attitude and the attitude of other interested nations towards a solution of this ghastly war. We cannot, I am sure, just say that Nigeria is an independent emergent nation and that we have no rig it to exercise to the full any power or influence that we may have in preventing what may become an old-fashioned nineteenth century war of tribal extermination but backed by 20th century weapons—not the bows and arrows which the noble Lord, Lord Sorensen, said were used before and will be used again. I hold no brief for the rulers of either Federal Nigeria or breakaway Biafra. In my view, they are exercising powers which are at present of very doubtful use for the future benefit of those whom they rule. Like every one of your Lordships, my only concern is for those he pless victims of this gigantic gang warfarin, the 99·9 per cent. who make up the rest of the population.
The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, made a vigorous defence of Government policy and demonstrated what I thought was almost full support for the Federal Government and their actions towards the secession of Biafra. What worried me very much was his strong contention that what we hear of massacres and possible genocide appears to him as only Biafran propaganda. But is it? I wish I could be sure that he is right, that his information is authentic and his assessment correct. There are those on the spot who would disagree, and the noble Viscount, Lord Monckton of Brenehley, gave us just now some very disturbing figures of 5,000 a day. We shall not know accurately what the picture is.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, did the figure of 5,000 relate to battle casualties?
LORD WEDGWOOD: My Lords, the noble Viscount gave that figure as the total deaths per day.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, are they battle casualties or deaths by starvation? I really want to know.
LORD WEDGWOOD: My Lords, I believe those figures came from the International Red Cross. Am I not correct?
VISCOUNT MONCKTON OF BRENCHLEY: Yes, my Lords.
LORD WEDGWOOD: My Lords, I remember some varying reports of those who were liquidated in the Northern Provinces in July, 1966. They varied from some 10,000 to some 100,000. I also remember the figures given by a previous British Government after the Zanzibar uprisings of January, 1964, when some 23 were given as dead, but when those of us who were a little nearer to the fighting knew that the figure was in the thousands. It was eventually assessed by, I believe, thoroughly reliable individuals at about 10,000 people. That is why I wonder whether the noble Lord. Lord Shepherd, can be quite sure that his estimate is more exact than others we receive. I pay little attention to the Mark Press publications: they are obviously slanted. But there are other sources of information. If the noble Lord's figures are correct, then of course the Federal Government is shown in a much better light and Her Majesty's Government's policy in continuing arms supplies appears less odious. I hope he is right, but I fear that he is over-optimistic. I feel that he rather overpainted the picture of the rightness of all the Federal Government's actions and our own.
Rightly or wrongly (I am not going to argue that now) we have sent arms to Federal Nigeria, and those are being used at this moment in this bloody strife. I also see in the Press that we have recently agreed to supply a sum of £10 million to Nigeria for various purposes. It is my view that at this point both arms and money should be withheld until there is a general cease-fire, and that we should, moreover, openly condemn any further military action by either side and say that no further assistance will be forthcoming until there are firm prospects of a more peaceful solution. What we feel about Russian tanks in Prague should, I believe, not be so very different from what we feel about Federal troops going into Biafra. I do not believe that
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this will immediately end the fighting, or help the destitution and starvation of millions; but it will show the same sort of disapproval that we directed at the Russians. I also do not believe that such a policy as I urge would mean that Nigeria will get all she wants from other great Powers. Soviet aid in nearby Ghana was an expensive failure.
What worried me even more, was the apparent implicit acceptance by the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, that General Gowon had no alternative but to continue to destroy Biafran resistance. The noble Viscount, Lord Head, drew our attention in most convincing terms to the implications of a further reduction of Biafran resistance and of the Biafrans' continuing to fight to the end. He said what needed to be said. I say, my Lords, that a firm call should now go out to General Gowon to hold his hand. He should be told now, in unmistakable terms, that if he continues the bloodshed it will mean the loss of British good will and of all material and financial support. Tell him clearly, and tell Colonel Ojukwu, that only a peaceful solution will find us in any way willing to help to repair the economy and further the development of Nigeria. There has been a terrible toll of human lives in tropical Africa to which the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, has drawn our attention. I think it is high time that we should exert all our power and influence to halt that toll.
Finally, my Lords, I think that the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, should give us, if he can, some more up-to-date information about the intentions of General Gowon. As perhaps the noble Lord realises, there is some conflict of information, and time is not on the side of the Nigerian people. I cannot close without referring to the brave efforts of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, to bring succour to the needy and distressed under the most difficult conditions. His effort has been so very deserving of our praise, and I found his speech most moving. But I would say this. It is no use organising food for the starving if the mouths that are to be fed may soon no longer exist, as will be the case if General Gowon persists with his final attack.
4.33 p.m.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, we have had a long debate. I think it was

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generally understood that if possible we would conclude the debate at 4 o'clock, and we have slipped one half-hour. Therefore, and particularly as I made a very long speech at the beginning of the debate, I do not intend to go again over much of the ground that I covered at the beginning. I apologise for the length of the speech I made, but I must say on reflection, and having listened to some of the speeches made during the debate, that I am glad I made it. My only regret is that some noble Lords came to this debate with their speeches prepared and took very little notice of what I said, as a Minister, in reply to the speech made by the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough. I would say to my noble friend Lord Goodman that I made a very special effort to be accurate in what I said, and I hope that noble Lords will find it worth while to read my speech before perhaps they change their minds one way or another on this very difficult and very unhappy affair.
My Lords, we had from the noble Baroness, Lady Asquith, a very emotional speech. I do not remember ever hearing her make a speech which was not in some respects emotional. Then we had the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, who I thought, if I may say so, made a very partial speech. I do not know what the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, knows personally about Nigeria, but I thought, particularly as I know Sir Louis Mbanafo, that his speech very much reflected the views of Sir Louis Mbanafo. The noble Lord has given him service. I thought the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, produced a paradox. He complained that because the British Government had supplied arms to the Federal Government we had lost all possibility of influencing the Biafrans; that it was no longer possible for us to negotiate with the Biafrans. I would not accept that. But the noble Lord does not seem to recognise that if we had not carried out our traditional policy, which I went to great lengths to explain at the beginning, or if we were now to change our policy, we should immediately have lost that influence which I believe we do have with the Federal Government.
The noble Lord, Lord Goodman, asked whether we could not make contact with the Biafran leaders. I did that as soon as I became responsible, at Whitsun, for the Nigerian desk. I took the opportunity,
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because Sir Louis Mbanafo was in London, as were the Federal Government leaders at the Kampala talks, to meet both, not on one occasion but on many occasions; and it was because of those meetings that I went to Lagos in order that I should be in a position to satisfy Sir Louis Mbanafo that there could be meaningful talks so far as the Lagos Government was concerned. My Lords, the gravest tragedy is that when I came pack, having been satisfied, Sir Louis Mbanafo was no longer present in London, and a message was received that he would not be returning, despite the fact that we made it clear to him that not only did we want to discuss the political questions, to see whether we could find a political solution, but we wanted also to deal with perhaps the most fundamental point, the question of relief. So, my Lords, we have done, certainly within our limits, what could be done towards finding a peaceful solution.
My noble friend Lord Segal asked for a new, special effort. I honestly believe in one saying at least, and that is that too many cooks spoil the broth. Already the O.A.U. and Emperor Haile Selassie are working very hard, and with great determination and skill, and I would think it would be wrong at this stage to consider some new British or Commonwealth effort. My noble friend made the point, if my memory is right, that if, perhaps, there was a recognition of unity by the Biafrans—not necessarily a united Nigeria, but a form of unity—and if we could take time to find out what is to be the relationship between the State and the Central Government, and between one State and another, then this might hold out hope. That is what the Federal Government offered at Niamey and at Kampala, and again at Addis Ababa. But, my Lords, the response of the Biafran authorities, when the Emperor asked them to put the minimum demands for a settlement, was that when the demands were presented, I gather, one skilled diplomat said he would like to know what the Biafrans' major demands would have been. They were well beyond any possible consideration or negotiation. But the point which my noble friend Lord Segal made would, I believe, be possible if only it were acceptable to the Biafrans; and I will certainly look at the points that were made by my noble friend Lord Brockway.

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I should like not only to thank the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, but to express very great appreciation for the way in which he described his visit to Nigeria. I thought it was very fair; and I think perhaps the House will have seen, since his speech came from the Cross-Benches, that this is not in itself an easy problem: we have to deal with the political problems in order that relief can flow. I will say to my noble friend Lord Hunt that Her Majesty's Government will give all possible support to Dr. Lindt, and we will see that a message is conveyed to him as soon as possible.
My Lords, if I may, I will turn now to a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Wedgwood, and the noble Viscount, Lord Head. I may say that I agree very much with nearly everything the noble Viscount said about the present situation in Nigeria. I entirely agree with him that a military solution in what is now Iboland would not be a military solution, as generally understood. It would be a long, drawn-out guerrilla war of terrible ferocity, and I would say this to the noble Viscount: General Gowon also understands this; and this was one of the reasons why he had refrained from seeking a military solution.
I should like to deal with this aspect because I gather that my speech may have been taken as implying that the British Government were giving passive agreement to a military solution by the Federal Government. When I spoke I think I had the point in mind, and what I was trying to do was to point out the dilemma of the Federal Government. I need hardly say that all our influence has been towards a settlement by negotiation, because we believe that only such a settlement has any hope of bringing long-term stability to Nigeria, since the Ibos and non-Ibos in Nigeria will have to live together, once a settlement has been reached, whether it is military or political. I agree with the noble Lord when he said that, despite all that has happened, he believes that the factors for cohesion are greater than those of diversification in Nigeria, and that, given time, the people can in fact live together, as in tact many Ibos are now living together, with others of different tribes.
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The noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, asked me to make a very special effort in regard to the television programme of last night. I have been, through the Office, in communication by telephone with General Gowon. I am bound to say that the line was not very good, so perhaps the noble Viscount. Lord Head, will guess that it may be raining in Lagos —the weather seems to have affected telephone lines. The information that we have I think I had better put in this way. We have just been informed personally by General Gowon himself that when he said that the final push was now in progress he was referring to the continuing preparatory operations in both the Northern and Southern sectors for the final Federal push. General Gowon explained that the rebels had seized advantage of the Addis Ababa peace talks to harass Federal troops on all fronts. Extreme restraint has been exercised by all Federal commands. He says that, owing to the relentless attacks of the rebels, authority was given by him—General Gowon at the weekend to check the rebel activity in all sectors.
What he has said is in line with my understanding of the fluid military situation, particularly in the South. I should like to end that particular point by saying that General Gowon and the Federal Government are under no illusion as to what our view is. There must he every conceivable effort to find a peaceful, negotiated settlement, if possible, at Addis Ababa, and there is no question at all that our view is anything other than that.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, may I interrupt my noble friend? Does not the message which my noble friend has read from General Gowon absolutely confirm the impression that was given by the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, and others who heard that broadcast that the Federal Government has now begun preparations to begin its final push in Ibo land?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, there is often a good deal of difference between the prepartory operations and the military solution.
LORD GOODMAN: One hesitates to interrupt, but may I suggest that it is not necessary to communicate with General

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Gowon; that it is necessary only to communicate with Portland Place? The Minister should take an opportunity of asking to see the television programme, because what has been stated by General Gowon is a misinterpretation of what he said yesterday.
TILE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: Hear, hear!
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I have seen the transcript. I was in an aeroplane last night, so I did not see the programme. The noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, asked me to get in touch with Lagos, and if possible with General Gowon. That is what I have done, and the message I received I have conveyed to the House.
I want now just to deal with my noble friend Lord Brockway and others who have mentioned this rather famous, perhaps even notorious commander of the Third Division in Nigeria. I am bound to say that I disapprove of much that the commander has said. I am bound to say, too, that I have on many occasions disapproved of what other military commanders have said from time to time. But I think that in fairness, particularly in view of what the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, said, I should say this. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, would prefer to take what the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, said to what I may say in this matter, but my knowledge from my visit to this area was that the discipline of this particular Division, having regard certainly to African military standards, was of a considerably high order.
I should like to conclude by referring to what I think has been the kernel of the debate. There has been very little new that has been put before us as to possible solutions. Most of it has been criticism one way or another, but the kernel of the debate has been whether, if we were to give up the supply of arms to Nigeria unilaterally. we should bring peace quicker to Nigeria. I want to say this to the noble Lord, Lord Goodman. I am relatively new to the Nigerian problem in terms of office. I was therefore
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not committed to the policy other than as a Minister, and I had the opportunity of examining the despatches over o long period of time. I have been able to look at all the papers that are available to me, and I have been able to question officials. Those who know me know that I do not take things for granted or that because I like a man's face I necessarily accept what he says. I have questioned and I have challenged, and I believe that the policies that we have adopter and that we now carry on subject to the qualifications of the Foreign Secretary are the only policies that are available to us. I do not believe in neutrality. But I will say to the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, and to the House, that knowing what is going on in Nigeria and being very conscious of it, if I believed that giving up the supply of arms altogether would bring peace one hour nearer I would personally resign from office if my colleagues took a contrary view and continued to supply arms, because this is in itself a matter of conscience. I personally am satisfied that in the circumstances now existing there is no alrernative policy open to Her Majesty's Government, distasteful though it is to all of us, because none of us likes to see the use of arms in war, and particularly in a civil war.
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGHMy Lords, I think that I should spend one minute in thanking the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, for having replied twice i t this debate, and also in thanking all the other noble Lords who have taken part. I am sure that it has been a very useful debate, though it has shown a very considerable divergence of view. None of your Lordships who heard General Gowon's broadcast last night was satisfied with the earlier reply of the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, but I am most grateful to him for his second reply, although it may not be wholly re assuring. In view of the terms of the Motion, I do not think that I should withdraw it.
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House adjourned at eight minutes before five o'clock until the 7th October.