SOCIAL WORK (SCOTLAND) BILL [H.L.]

HL Deb 09 April 1968 vol 291 cc177-321

3.23 p.m.

THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SCOTLAND (LORD HUGHES)

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.

Moved, That the House do again resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Hughes.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

House in Committee accordingly.

[The EARL OF LISTOWEL in the Chair.]

Clause 26 [Supervision and care of persons put on probation or released from prisons, etc.]:

Debate resumed on the Question, That Clause 26 stand part of the Bill.

LORD HAMILTON OF DALZELL

In supporting this Amendment to delete the clause, may I first say how sorry I am not to have been present at the Second Reading debate on this Bill, owing to the fact that I was abroad. May I also say how grateful I am to my noble friend, Lord Wells-Pestell—he was kind enough so to refer to me and I am happy to return the compliment—for his speech on that occasion, and for putting down this Amendment and introducing it so ably and convincingly last Thursday. I think it is a pity that discussion of the Amendment had to be interrupted then, since I know that some noble Lords who were here then have not been able to be here to-day. Equally, there are some noble Lords here to-day who were not here on Thursday. But I am sure that anyone who is interested in this subject will have read the report of what my noble friend said on that occasion, and therefore I do not propose to go over the whole of the ground again, although I should like to reinforce some of the points he made.

The view strongly held in the probation and after-care service in Scotland is that it would be a grave mistake not to keep an independent probation service for adults, and the main reasons for that are these. First, the probation officer is a specialist, requiring special training and using special techniques. He has to deal with offenders against the law, either as probationers or as discharged prisoners requiring after-care, and now also on parole. This involves a disciplinary element in his approach which does not arise in, and is quite foreign to, the approach of social workers dealing with children or old people or people s Suffering from some disability or misfortune;. It is very important that the probation officer's client should see him as an officer of the court, responsible to the court and exercising the court's authority, and not simply as one more council official taking an interest in his affairs. A measure of authoritativeness is essential if the relationship between the probation officer and his client is to produce results.

The courts themselves attach great importance to their special relationship with the probation and after-care service. Speaking as a magistrate, I know how much we value the close links between the bench and the probation officers with whom we work, and how much we should regret any weakening of those links. It is significant that the sheriffs substitute, who I understand are the opposite numbers, as it were, of the lay b niches in England, have declared themselves as most anxious to avoid the abolition of the probation service. I have no doubt that my noble friends who know more about the Scottish judicial system than I do will be referring to this point.

But there are other reasons why it is important that the probation and aftercare service should be independent of the local authorities. From the point of view of the service, a probation officer making a report to the court must feel free to be entirely objective and truthful, and not be inhibited by any consideration of the policies or feelings of any department of the local authority. How can this be if he is himself an employee of the authority? The same applies from the point of view of the public. Consider the case of a man against whom proceedings are brought by the local authority or who is in conflict with some department of it, as very often happens. Is he likely to have much confidence in the impartiality of the person appointed to advise, assist and befriend him, if that person is himself a servant of his opponent, the local authority? For all those reasons I cannot believe that probation and after-care, which is a specialist service dealing with offenders against the law as an integral part of the penal system, can continue to function properly as part of a local authority social work department. I am encouraged in this view by the knowledge that it was shared by the Kilbrandon Committee. But I accept that responsibility for children should be handed over to the new local authority service.

One of the arguments against keeping an independent probation service for adults only is that it would not be large enough to provide a proper career structure for its members, but I do not believe that that is so. I have no national figures on the point, but in one large combined probation area in Scotland over two-thirds of their work is now concerned with people over 17 years of age. But after-care is still in its infancy, parole has only just begun, and it may well be that prison welfare will also become a responsibility of the service as it already is in England. With all these developments, it is surely clear that in a very short time a service will be needed for adults only quite as large as the overall service of to-day, and that the need will continue to grow.

This is a Scottish Bill and it may be that English noble Lords will think that there may be some special reason why the abolition of the probation service would be a good idea in Scotland, even though it would not be so in England; but that is not so. The only real difference between the probation and aftercare service in Scotland and England lies in its administration, and arises from the fact that the lower courts in Scotland are not served by lay magistrates. In all other respects the functions of the service are exactly the same as they are in England, and this applies in particular to its relationships with the courts and with its clients. I ask English noble Lords to bear in mind how they would feel about a proposal to do away with the independence of the English probation service and to make it part of a local authority department. I ask them to consider whether the proposal to do so in Scotland now is not a threat and a warning of what may be in store for England, too.

I have put forward a number of reasons for keeping an independent pro- bation service, but what seems to me conclusive is that all those best qualified to know what they are talking about are of the same opinion—the service itself, the courts with which the service works, and the Kilbrandon Committee. I very much hope that your Lordships will take the same view and support this Amendment.

LORD BALERNO

I was indeed sorry that I was not able to be here last Thursday to hear the noble Lord, Lord Wells-Pestell, urge the deletion of this clause. To my mind, this is an important point; and if your Lordships will forgive rne, as the debate on it has been interrupted. perhaps I might recall to your Lordships something of what has gone on over the past few years in relation to this matter. This Bill stems largely from the Report by Lord Kilbrandon's Committee, and I think we should be aware and quite clear as to the conclusions which Lord Kilbrandon, one of our most eminent and humane Judges and Senators of the College of Justice in Scotland, and his Committee, came to on this particular matter of the independence of the probation service. The Report says that probation, as one of the methods to be applied by the criminal courts … will, of course, continue … the probation service as such will in future be related solely to the courts, and will occupy no similar special relationship with the juvenile panels,… It also says: The final resolution of questions about the future of the adult probation services goes well beyond our remit. To be fair, I should say that there were some sentences in the Report which showed that there were two sides to the question—and this is manifestly the case.

The Kilbrandon Report pointed out that the immediate result of following the recommendations of that Committee would be a reduction in the number of persons employed in the probation service. The Report says: …we are … looking to many serving officers of the probation service to fulfil an essential part by transfer to the new social education department. It also says: … we view with considerable regret the division which will necessarily result in an increasingly highly-trained organisation which has been painstakingly built up over the years". That shows that these difficulties were realised; and it was only right that when the White Paper (Command 3065) was issued from Sir Andrew's House it should deal particularly with this question. It had not really been finalised in the Kilbrandon Report, but I think that paragraph 27 came down in a somewhat loaded way against the probation service, reporting the Kilbrandon Report as saying that the future equivalent of probation supervision of children should be provided within the new local authority department. That is what they found it on. The White Paper goes on: This, as the Committee realised, necessitates change for the probation service and for its administration … And it concludes: The possible choices are to place the responsibility for these functions also on the local authority … or to set up a new service to carry out the more limited functions". This is a case of the tail wagging the dog. So far as the probation officers are concerned, their dealings with the local authority represent a very small part of their job, and it is a very indifferent argument to say that, because a small part of their job is looking after the juvenile delinquents, the under-16-year-olds, the whole service should be brought under the local authority administration.

Since the Kilbrandon Report was published the White Paper has put forward as an additional argument for putting the probation service under the local authority, to use the words of the White Paper, the assumption by the probation service of … the after-care of offenders released from penal institutions". I cannot see the argument there. The probation service is already doing precisely this. To extend the work that is being done by the probation service to the welfare of released prisoners makes practically no difference at all, because the probation officer, when he is looking after somebody on probation, is of course looking into the welfare and the home life of the person concerned, and is consulting with the local authority welfare department about that person; and he will be doing precisely the same thing for the released offenders. Extension from persons on probation to prisoners' welfare is hardly a sufficient material difference to put the whole probation service under the local authority. In fact, I think that that point is completely illogical, and rather shows that the authors of the White Paper were straining to justify a conclusion which they had already reached.

If we continue to have an independent probation service, it does not follow that the probation service will not be able to work at the welfare level in the local authority. The medical services work that way. Nobody is suggesting putting the medical services which do welfare work under the new welfare department. The child guidance clinics, which are mainly run by the education authority, will continue to operate with the welfare department as necessary. The education psychologists and psychiatrists, and the psychiatric social workers, will still be independent; they are not being put under the new welfare department. They will link up very closely with the welfare department, as they have done in the past. Association has very seldom led to any friction at all. Then, what about the social workers employed by hospitals? They are beyond the scope of the Bill. I should have thought there would have been more justification for bringing them into the scope of the Bill, so that they could have better pay. At present, they are poorly paid. There are so many other persons working kit the welfare level in the local authority who are not included in the Bill that I find it very difficult to justify why they have had to include the probation service.

The noble Lord, Lord Hughes, appreciates this point. Perhaps; he will recall that he himself said: … although the formation of a local authority social work department under the Bill will provide an integrated service able to tackle any social work problem, this does not mean that the new department can or should become a self-contained group within the local authority. It will be able to do its job properly only if it develops good working arrangements with schools, hospitals, general practitioners, the local health authority services, the courts and the police, as well as with planning and housing authorities with the Ministry of Social Security and with voluntary bodies of many kinds."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 21/3/68, col. 800.] We are asking only that to that list of bodies which will be working in association with the new welfare service there should be added, to ensure co-operation, the probation service. I do not think that is asking a great deal. It is very simple, if all these persons can be housed in the same building.

I do not want to go over all the other arguments that have been adduced by the noble Lord, Lord Wells-Pestell, and by the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton of Dalzell, but I want to emphasise that the courts, which are the important bodies in this matter (we are talking of juvenile delinquency) know and trust the probation officers. The points made by the noble Lord, Lord Wells-Pestell, are, I think, tremendously important: that inquiries by the probation officers are not influenced by the local authorities; that things may well go wrong in some of these institutions which the local authority is charged by this Bill to run; and that it is possible for the probation officer to draw attention to things which are going wrong without fear of losing his job or failing to get promotion.

I think there is an overwhelming case for giving the after-care and prison welfare services to a distinct service of men who are trained for that kind of job, and therefore keeping on the probation service to do that. I understand that something like 50 per cent. of the present 250 probation officers in Scotland deal almost solely with adult cases. I am not absolutely certain of it; but that figure has been given me. So it is not such a small service. As the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton of Dalzell, said, with the extension of the prison parole scheme coming into existence it is going to call for a positive increase in the numbers; so even if only one-half of the present probation officers in Scotland continue as probation officers, and if the others who want to transfer to the welfare services do so, an increase will be required in the number of probation officers to meet the increased work which comes from released prisoner welfare, and in respect of welfare inside the prisons, and so on.

There is another point which I think has not so far been mentioned. Probation has in it a very strong element of discipline, whereas I understand that the whole basis of this Bill in regard to the welfare department dealing with under 16-year olds is that there should be a permissive and an accepting relationship. Without that I do not think it would work. Finally, I want to echo what the noble Lord. Lord Wells-Pestell, said about the excellence of the present service. The probation service in Scotland has come through a "sticky" time, it has come through fire and has been forged, and is now a very good service. The noble Lord, Lord Wells-Pestell—and he is an Englishman—said that the probation service in Scotland is now perhaps one of the best organised, if not the best organised, and efficient services in Scotland. I hope your Lordships will not lightly allow the probation service in Scotland to be knocked on the head.

3.44 p.m.

VISCOUNT STONEHAVEN

I am in some slight difficulty in speaking to this Amendment, because I understood the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, to imply that all interested parties had been fully and carefully consulted. His remarks appear in Hansard of April 4, 1968 (col. 1333), and he says: I would remind noble Lords that the Bill embodies the decision in the light of all the comments that have been made by all authorities who have been consulted, both statutory bodies and voluntary bodies, since the White Paper has been published. I would not pretend, and my right honourable friend would not pretend, that it has been easy to arrive at a decision on this matter. The noble Lord was speaking to the first Amendment, and I took him to mean that those remarks covered the whole Bill. I hope this is so; because it seems to me, and I think to most people, that it should be so.

My difficulty is this. A letter from the Central Council of Probation Committees for Scotland complains that their request for a meeting with the Secretary of State for Scotland in order to put their views on the Bill was not granted. In another letter, from the vice-chairman of the Sheriff Substitute Association, the vice-chairman complains that although the Council of the Association sent the Secretary of State for Scotland a memorandum (one of ten pages, 23 paragraphs and a summary) on the White Paper, they received an acknowledgment but were granted no consultation at all. With your Lordships' permission, I should like to read two or three sentences from this mammoth document which I think are relevant. Part of it says: However, the proposal that this new local authority department should also be responsible for the work among adult offenders which is at present performed by probation officers raises different issues of principle and of feasibilities. These issues were not within the Kilbrandon Committee's remit and it is not clear how fully they were considered in the preparation of the White Paper. It goes on to say: Since most cases of serious adult delinquency are dealt with in the sheriff courts, the proposal is of major importance to this Council. We believe that for effective treatment of offenders and in the prevention of crime the continued existence of an independent probation service for offenders over the age of 18 is necessary. We do not believe that the supervision of adult offenders, whether on probation after-care or on parole from penal institutions, could be appropriately or satisfactorily undertaken by social workers of a local authority department. Towards the end, the memorandum reads: The continuation of an independent and efficient probation service for adults is perfectly practicable and, with reduced case-loads, would make better preventive work among offenders and their families possible. The probation service in Scotland has been steadily improving. Its abolition would involve a serious setback in the advance which has been achieved in the last 20 years in the treatment of offenders. And there is much more of it.

The third body that is against putting the probation service under local authorities is the National Association of Probation Officers which covers England, Scotland, Wales and also, perhaps (I am not sure), Northern Ireland. It seems to me that some bodies have been more fully consulted than others and that those responsible for administering the law have been consulted only very superficially. I regard this as being wrong, for the reasons which have been mentioned and which are set out in the document from which I have quoted. The problems of combining the functions of welfare services, which are looking after old people, children and young people and their difficulties, are quite different from the problem of dealing with tough young thugs—which is what the probation officers have to do. I maintain that in both fields an expert is required. I think the authorities must be joined together so that they are large enough to be able to support this system. I think this is something that must not be shirked.

Many old people would not freely consult a combined welfare and court officer, as their neighbours might consider that they were in trouble with the law. One of the great difficulties in dealing with old people—at least with decent old people—is the need to overcome their pride. In 1962 the Morison Committee said: A principal cause of the failure of the probation service to develop in Scotland as it should have done is that it has been regarded not as a court service but as a relatively minor local authority service. Since then, largely as a result of that criticism, the probation service has gone ahead by leaps and bounds. Probation committees are ad hoc committees, and although they include local authority representatives, they are definitely not local authority committees. Why put the clock back? Why fly in the face of the Morison Report?

More and more probation officers are being called on to make reports to courts. As an example, of the kind of thing that is happening, may I say that in our own tiny probation service the officers, last year made 537 reports to the courts. Quite often they have to make reports on young offenders whom the local authorities have placed in care. These officers must be free from all political, financial or any other kind of bias, otherwise they cannot possibly do their work. Life and human nature being what it is, local authorities are not free of that bias. The officers must appear to be independent in the eyes of the public, as at the moment they do. An offender must consider a probation officer as an officer of the court exercising the authority of the court, and not merely as a welfare officer exercising welfare functions.

For various reasons we in Scotland are behind England in developing the social services. If these services were combined with the probation service I know perfectly well which service would become the "Cinderella" of the outfit, and I think it would be wrong. If the sheriffs had no confidence in the probation officers, they would be reluctant to use the probation service when sentencing young offenders. They would send many young offenders to gaol, which would not be desirable, but they would do so because they felt there was no alternative as they had no confidence in the probation service. Several sheriffs have told me that that would be their reaction, so I think this would be a retrograde step.

A large body of opinion in Scotland still regards putting a person on probation as "soft". Although such opinion is being slowly overcome, this proposal would be an enormous set-back. Work in connection with welfare services in prisons, and the after-care service, and when prisoners are released to the care of the probation service, should be more closely linked, and the follow-up should be organised. There I think that the same kind of people are being dealt with and the work should be combined. It is not sensible to try to combine welfare work among men and women who are on parole, men convicted of crimes of violence and people who have been in borstals and similar institutions with work in connection with deprived children, unfortunate children, old people and other people who are dealt with in the ordinary way by welfare workers. There may be a similarity in the welfare work, but, my hat! there is a difference in the people to whom it is applied, and that is an important point. It is not that the work is not the same; it is that the people are different. Different officers are used to dealing with different people, and their work cannot be combined.

How the services have been used, and the extent of the confidence of the people in this matter, is shown by last year's probation officer's report in our own tiny unit. The statutory visits made during the year totalled 4,788. The non-statutory and more or less voluntary visits, because people have confidence in these officers and consult them, numbered 3,512. Statutory visits received by delinquents totalled 3,206 and non-statutory visits, which again are voluntary, numbered 1.326. Here we have a good service. If we do not accept this Amendment we shall set back by twenty years or more the administration of justice in Scotland.

3.58 p.m.

LORD FERRIER

I wish to saw a few words in support of Lord Wells-Pestell's Amendment. I agree with what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton of Dalzell. It is a pity that the debate has been interrupted, but I have no doubt that noble Lords will have read what Lord Wells-Pestell said. Following his speech, and after the speeches of other noble Lords, there is little left that needs to be said. It is fair to point out that no speech has been made opposing the Amendment, but there is one point which has not been mentioned and to which I should like briefly to refer.

It should be remembered that the clause contains a provision whereby appointments to the service shall be in the hands of the local authorities. I made that point in my speech during the Second Reading debate. I believe sincerely, and I think that other noble Lords agree with me, that the office of probation officer is a highly skilled and important technical position. Even though the Bill has been improved by amending Clause 1, and even though, as a result, we refer to counties and counties of cities, I believe that the appointments to the probation service should remain as they are now, and not be put in the hands of local authorities. I firmly believe that the probation officer should remain a servant of the court, and I should like to develop in some measure what the noble Lord, Lord Balerno, said about discipline.

I firmly believe that the welfare services in terms of children and young people should be of the permissive, the leadership, type, but there must be an element of discipline when it comes to the young thugs, to whom my noble friend Lord Stonehaven referred. Probation officers should come under the panoply of the court in order that the disciplinary nature of their work be made clear. After all, the courts are the ultimate sanction in the administration of the law. Though we seem to be concentrating our minds on children and young persons, this is a wide-ranging Bill and, as other noble Lords have pointed out, probation officers have other things to do besides attending the very young.

In conclusion I should like to refer to what my noble friend Lord Hamilton of Dalzell said about the situation in England. If this proposal were to take shape in Scotland, there would doubtless be an attempt to apply it to England. One could speak for a long time on the difference between our two legal systems. We had an instance of it to-day in the Question of the noble Lord, Lord Wade, about the reporting of committal proceedings. I would only remark that the sheriffs-substitute are professional lawyers and are not the opposite numbers of the lay magistrates in this country. The object of my mentioning England is that we are on the threshold of receiving the Report of the Seebohm Committee and probably interesting new lines of thought on the treatment of young offenders and children in care will come out in that Report; and I believe that the existing system in Scotland should be interfered with as little as possible until we have the findings of that Committee. I support the Amendment.

LORD DONALDSON OF KINGSBRIDGE

In spite of my Scottish name I am afraid that I can speak only as an Englishman, but I cannot let my noble friend's Amendment go through without brief support. The arguments have been well put forward, and I will not go through them. I will simply stress two points. A number of noble Lords meet and are in close contact with probation officers and magistrates and I, from the angle of prisons and after-care, have much to do with the service. We are all unanimous in our admiration for this service, and for the individuals who work in it. Surely their opinion should count a little in what we do to them. I understand that the probation service in England is solidly in favour of this proposal, and that only a minority is against it in Scotland. That being the case, I think it is rash to go this far in opposition to what we all believe to be one of the best services this country has yet produced.

The second point I want to mention has also been made before. Social work is integrally different from probation work. It is like an ambulance arriving at an accident. Somebody is found in a mess, and something has to be done for him. Whether or not the driver was drunk in charge has nothing to do with the ambulance and the social workers, but it has very much something to do with the probation officer. His approach to his client has to be different, a good deal more different, than that of the purely social worker. These are the only two points I want to raise. If this had been brought in for our probation service South of the Border, I should have been obliged to vote against my leaders and everybody else, I am so certain it is wrong. As it affects our cousins North of the Border, I do not feel that I can vote against my Government. They may know what their subjects North of the Border require better than I do. So I shall be content to abstain.

4.5 p.m.

BARONESS BIRK

I should like to speak against the proposal to leave out Clause 26, and as I am also one of the Members of your Lordships' House who is tempted to put a foot across the Border I do so only because I feel so strongly about the intentions behind this Bill. It does set about a comprehensive approach to the social services, something about which I have been concerned some time. In this set-up the probation service is one of the nerve centres. The distinction between the human problems which result in behaviour that is antisocial but not delinquent and behaviour that evolves into delinquency is becoming harder to define. This is right as we learn more about the causes and motivations of delinquency and its treatment, and about the importance of catching people with problems in our social network before these problems deteriorates into delinquency and bring them into the courts. And this makes it even more important that the present probation services should be incorporated and integrated into any new scheme of social work. It also involves that these services must reach many people before they get to the courts. Therefore it seems to me that to exclude the probation service, and by so doing put a ring around delinquency would be to wreck—though I am sure that is not the intention of those who oppose this clause—the practical application of this Bill and the social philosophy behind it.

Perhaps I may turn now to one or two points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Wells-Pestell, and others. They refer to services left out. I think that this is a negative argument. The fact that some of the services have not yet decided to take a new look at the social services should not be used as a reason for the probation service's not coming in. Also, some psychiatric social workers do work with local authorities, and not always with the medical services. In his speech on Second Reading the noble Lord, Lord Wells-Pestell, indicated that he thought young offenders should be dealt with by court proceedings. If we start from that basis, the rest follows as a logical consequence; but I do not think that this is the intention of the other parts of the Bill.

On the question of adult offenders, the noble Lord, Lord Balerno, mentioned that part of probation should be to stress the theme of discipline, and the noble Viscount, Lord Stonehaven, talked about probation officers dealing with "tough young thugs". Surely the first job of a probation officer is to establish human relations with the offenders put under his or her supervision. Now that aftercare and supervision of prisoners on parole are to be part of the social services, it seems to me wrong to break this up. If I may quote from the White Paper which followed the Morison Committee Report—and in between a certain amount of water flowed under the bridges—it points out that if a separate service was set up for those over sixteen this would point to the establishment of a new service separate from the local authority social welfare department.

It goes on to say: One fresh consideration since the Committee reported has been the assumption by the probation service of a function not closely related to the courts, the after-care of offenders released from penal institutions. The Government's intention that all after-care supervision should be provided by the local service which is also responsible for probation supervision has already been announced, and after-care would therefore grow and form a substantial part of the duties of a new service concerned with those over sixteen. On the other hand, the main duty of the probation officer—personnal work with the offender and his family in the community—is basically similar to that of other social workers. Here I think it is entirely a difference of concept as to whether we think that this should all be part of trying to help the community, without putting the different sources of help into compartments, or whether it should still be divided up because it has been done that way historically. When we talk about the families of prisoners, it seems rather odd to me that they should be helped by one set of people, while the prisoner should be helped by someone else.

So far as training is concerned (and here I ask your Lordships' forgiveness, because I am certainly not expert on training of social workers in Scotland), I understand that there are in existence six training courses, with another one starting in the autumn. A great deal has been said about the specialist training of the probation officer, but it is true that a number of successful probation officers had general training, then took a course of applied study, and were appointed by the Home Office. The whole movement in training now in social work is towards a more general training, followed by more specific shorter courses. The probation officer, under whatever other name, will still surely be doing a great deal of the same work, and it seems to me that a great range of flexibility is needed in order to ensure that a scheme prepared under Clause 26(2) is suitable for different localities. I was struck by the lack of rigidity of the clause. I think this is important.

The noble Lord, Lord Wells-Pestell, and other noble Lords have referred to the possible problem of someone who is employed by the local authority and then has to speak against the employer. This can happen; and a case can arise in the care of the aged, or of handicapped children, or in any one of the many other functions for which local authority workers are responsible to-day. But, if I may say so, I think that to make too much of this is to underestimate the responsibility of the local authority and the character of elected representatives. They ought to be acting as watchdogs, as I am sure they will, as also will the sheriffs and the judge-substitutes in Scotland—because presumably there is always an appeal to the court. I cannot think that this is a very strong argument. It needs adjustment and adaptability; but in trying something new one always has to start somewhere.

A great deal has been said also about the different groups of people and organisations who are against this particular part of the Bill. But I think it is only fair to say that there are numbers of people, including a great many probation officers—and younger ones—whom I have met and talked to (and this has been discussed with reference to the proposals for change in England) who are with this idea, and who in fact see it as the deepening and widening of their own work and their own possibilities. The impression seems to be that the present situation of probation officers is a very good and perfect one from their point of view. We know that this is not true. They are underpaid; they are overworked; they have a very high rate of drop-out, and part of this is due to the fact that there are not sufficient chances for promotion. If they were part of a much bigger service, I think that not only would they have more opportunities, but there would be more incentive for young people to come in.

Speaking as a magistrate in England, it seems to me that the probation officers, even the best of them, are at the moment hampered by the restrictions. In the first place, on the question of being attached to a court, there is a reverse side to that particular coin. There is an aura, there is a psychology about going to the court, and it is often difficult to persuade people with, say, matrimonial problems to see somebody to get help before they reach the stage when they have already made up their minds that they are going ahead with an order for separation or a court order of some sort. And, after all, why should someone with matrimonial problems come to see a probation officer? I think that this association with the court would make it harder for the probation officer to establish the sort of relationships that he or she needs to establish in order to help people over a wide range of problems. It is true that probation officers are already doing a great deal of the work of the social worker that is envisaged in this Bill. In many cases, where there is no question of putting somebody on probation, we—and I do not think we are unique—ask people to have a talk with the probation officer to see whether the probation officer can help.

There is another point on the present situation of probation officers. They may be independent to some extent; they are not employed or engaged by the courts. There is no reason why the courts should accept their recommendations; and there are many courts (I am happy to say not my own) where probation officers' recommendations are turned down time and time again. There are also still some courts where probation officers are not even asked for their recommendations. I feel that to strike out this clause would do tremendous damage, not only to this Bill but to what 1 feel is the whole structure of the future of our welfare services. If this clause is struck out, the Bill will be not only seriously weakened but, in my opinion, castrated. I hope that your Lordships will reject any such proposal.

LORD WELLS-PESTELL

I did not want to interrupt my noble friend Lady Birk when she was speaking, but I must correct one statement which she made. She referred to the vast areas—that is not her expression, but mine—of social workers who will be left out of the Bill, and to the fact that I had said so, and then explained the reasons why they were not being brought in. That means that it is not accurate for her to say that this is going to be the beginning of comprehensive social welfare. This is not comprehensive. Were it comprehensive. then it might alter the attitude of a good many people. It is only linking the probation service to the existing local authority, and leaving out vast areas of social work, including, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Balerno, pointed out, certain psychiatric social workers, child guidance clinics, medical social workers and people doing social work in the educational sphere.

BARONESS BIRK

Perhaps the noble Lord will allow me to interrupt. What I was saying—and I apologise if I expressed it badly—was, first of all, that there are some psychiatric social corkers employed by the local authority; and secondly, that this was the start: of the comprehensive approach. I feel that we have to start somewhere. To say that so many other people are not ready to come in does not seem to me to be a valid argument. Unless we get it started —and I happen to feel that the probation service, as I said at the beginning, is one of the most important nerve centres —we shall not be able to encourage the other workers and the other, perhaps more conservative, approaches to this question to take a different view.

4.20 p.m.

LORD DRUMALBYN

The liable Lord, Lord Hughes, must feel rather relieved that at last he has found a friend. I was wondering, after all the speeches we have heard, whether he would have to come to reply without any friend, and I was even considering coming to his aid myself had it not been for the sharp rebuff I had received an hour ago when I tried to do so. I do not think we need apologise in any way for the length of time this particular clause is taking, because this is, after all, one of the key clauses of the Bill. Any reorganisation involves difficult problems, and this clause, as I see it, is an attempt to solve perhaps the most difficult one posed by reorganisation, which is the primary purpose of this Bill.

What I propose to do is to ask the noble Lord a number of questions in order to try to see how he thinks this clause is going to work out in practice. I wonder, however, whether I might start by indicating how I believe the system works at present, so that one can compare it. At the moment, as I understand it, the probation service is rather a hybrid sort of thing; that is to say, the service is trained by the Secretary of State, it is paid by the local authority with grant aid, and in Scotland it is appointed and supervised by an ad hoc local committee, which I presume it serves. The Bill, and particularly Part III of the Bill, as I understand it, involves the cessation of probation for children under 16. It involves the removal of detention as a punishment. So inevitably there seem to be two choices open: one is to absorb the remainder of the probation service into the social work service; and the other is to leave it as it is. That seems to be the choice. If this clause were carried, the service would be left as it is—that is, what is left of the service would be left as it is.

LORD HUGHES

If the clause were deleted.

LORD DRUMALBYN

Deleted, I am sorry.

LORD HUGHES

The noble Lord said, "If the clause were carried".

LORD DRUMALBYN

I meant, "If the Amendment were carried"; I am sorry. From the information I have been given, it is fairly clear that the case load of probation at the present time is about half for the under-16s and about half for those above 16. The figure I have been given is that the total case load at the end of 1966 was 8,623, of which it is estimated that some 4,400 related to persons over 16. I say "estimated" because we know what the figure was for the under-14s, but it is not quite clear for those between 14 and 16.

Reference has been made by several noble Lords to the expanding scope of probation officers' work; to the fact that prisoners released on parole became their responsibility from the first of this month; that statutory after-care of persons released from the detention schools, borstals, young offenders' institutions, and so on, is now their responsibility; and I believe there were about 1,400 of these cases at the end of 1966. Then there is the tendency at any rate evinced by what is happening in England and Wales, to absorb a growing volume of voluntary after-care; that is, assistance to any ex-prisoner who asks for it. Under the Bill, I suppose this would be the responsibility of the social work departments, but would presumably be carried out by those with special skills. If this clause is rejected, I take it that the responsibility for voluntary after-care work would more logically fall on the probation service in Scotland, as in England. In England and Wales probation officers are seconded to work as prison welfare officers, and this might also be done in Scotland if the service remains as it is.

Lastly, the courts, as has been mentioned, are now tending to ask for reports on adult offenders as well as young offenders. I rather think that the figure quoted by my noble friend Lord Stone-haven related to reports on adult offenders-500-odd.

VISCOUNT STONEHAVEN

It was the total returned. I have not actually sub-divided it—we are a very small unit—but that is the total number.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I am much obliged. In any case, this practice seems to be expanding and is likely to continue to grow; and, given these developments, some present members of the probation service will seek and obtain work in social work departments. The remaining members of the probation service would probably not be in excess of what would be required to deal with the over-16s.

I should like at this point to ask the noble Lord some questions about the service in the future. I take it that, in so far as a department of the Scottish Office is responsible for the probation service, the training and so forth, it is the Scottish Home Department, and will continue to be the Scottish Home Department under the clause as it stands. I should like to know whether it is envisaged that there will in future be a body of men and women within the social work service specially trained to work with the courts and to supervise adults who are put on probation or who have served a prison sentence. I am encouraged to think that this will be so by paragraph 11 of the White Paper. It says: As most prison social workers have acquired their training and experience in one specialty or another, the use of their specialist skills would continue. It is not clear from that whether there will continue to be special training for the people who have to deal with this class of cases, and whether they will still be called upon to exercise their special skills; in other words, whether there will be within the social work department a body of probation officers, whatever we may call them.

Will there be officers specially designated under the probation schemes which the local authority are to submit to the Secretary of State under this clause? I should also like to know whether guidance is going to be given by the Secretary of State as to the type of probation scheme he would expect to see submitted. I think we should all like to know how the professional independence of the probation officers in the exercise of their duties is to be safeguarded.

It seems to me that the fundamental issue here is this. The sole concern—I hope I am right about this—of the social work service, other than the probation service for adults and young persons over 16, is the welfare of families and individuals in need. But that certainly should not be the sole concern of the probation service. Probation officers also must have regard to the protection of the community and the correction of offenders—by "correction" I do not mean punishment, of course; I mean putting the offenders right and keeping them right and from harming others. The probation service is, and in my view should continue to be, an instrument of justice as well as a social service, and if it ceases to be that the courts, as my noble friend Lord Stonehaven has said, will be much less willing to order probation as a suitable treatment of the offender. The effectiveness of the probation service as a social service depends, as he also said, on the confidence of the courts in its ability to perform its function as an instrument of justice.

What I suggest the noble Lord the Under-Secretary of State has to do is to convince your Lordships that tie usefulness of the probation service as a probation service will be in no way impaired by making it part of the social work structure; that it will retain the confidence of the sheriff courts in its effectiveness in its role in the protection of the community. It is easy enough when we are concerned with welfare—and we are all concerned with fie welfare of the individual—to regard this matter purely from the point of flew of the individual and the family, without thinking of it in the context of the community. The protection of the community is very important. The balance of opinion among sheriffs-substitute seems to be that it will not retain that confidence if this clause remains in the Bill.

On the other hand, I do not thing there is any doubt that by their inclusion in the social work service the welfare work of probation officers will be widened and deepened, as I think the noble Baroness, Lady Birk, said. They will be better able to consider the welfare of the prisoner in the context of his family, his home and surroundings, and the welfare of his family. They may also be charged with his welfare when in prison as well as with his after-care. But what I am trying to suggest to your Lordships is that this is not the only or necessarily the overriding consideration. The welfare and protection of the community and the correction of the offender are at least as important, because this is the one service that does it. As I see it, this is not only a question of the professional independence of the probation officer in advising the court on the social background and history and character of the offender, but it is also a question of his efficiency as an instrument of justice and his effectiveness in the whole framework of the administration of justice in carrying out the duties which the court may place on him in relation to the offender.

The responsibility of the probation officer to the court should be his own personal and professional responsibility—not one which he is carrying out on behalf of, or on the instructions of, a local authority department. That is the sort of question with which I hope the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, will be able to deal in replying, because I am sure it is vital if he wants to get the clause.

For these reasons it seems to me desirable that a middle course should be worked out between the present system and the absorption of the probation service by the local authority social work departments. I do not necessarily accept that the two alternatives I have raised are the only possibilities. For example, it might be that the Secretary of State himself would not only recruit and train but appoint and post these probation officers to social work departments, on what I think in military parlance is called "attachment". The military parallel is an interesting and useful one that might be considered. In the Armed Forces, if I remember aright, there is a great difference between those corps like the Royal Army Service Corps, the Medical Service, the Physical Training Service, the Education Service, the Military Police, the Catering Corps, and indeed the Welfare Service, which have individuals attached to the fighting units and formations on the one hand, and to those corps which are integral parts of formations, on the other. The dual loyalty naturally gives rise to some difficulties, but the difficulties are accepted because they are considered to be more than compensated for by the advantages. I suggest that this should be considered: that the probation service should be treated like one of those corps and attached to the local authority social work department.

The other point is that this Bill represents a great social experiment. Can we be sufficiently sure of success so far as the inclusion of the probation service in the social welfare service is concerned to warrant the complete disbanding of the probation service? Should it not be kept together, while attaching probation officers to the social work departments? Would this not ensure that the confidence of the sheriff courts, at present withheld from the proposed arrangements, would be maintained? And would it not also maintain the morale of the probation service? I agree that the views of probation officers are divided on the merits of this clause, but that is surely all the more reason for seeking a compromise which will satisfy both sides. If the compromise does not work it will not be difficult either to go back to the present method or to move on to the proposed system. I ask the noble Lord to say that he will reconsider between now and the next stage of the Bill, the whole relationship between the probation service for adults and young persons over 16 on the one hand, and the social welfare framework on the other.

4.38 p.m.

LORD HUGHES

I am not quite certain what the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, meant when he said that about an hour ago he wished to come to my assistance but received a severe rebuff. I hope it was not from me.

LORD DRUMALBYN

No.

LORD HUGHES

Because, as he indicated, it looks as if I need any friends I can lay my hands on. But in fact that is not the case. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Ferrier, who, earlier on in the debate, said that there was very little left to say. The note which I put down following that remark was "except, of course, to state the other side of the case". It may well be that, having expressed the view that he did on Second Reading, that he was against the Bill, lock, stock and barrel, he did not consider that anything that could be said in favour of Clause 26 was in fact worth listening to.

LORD FERRIER

That was not what I said. I said that there was little else left to say in support of the Amendment.

LORD HUGHES

That may be what the noble Lord intended to say, but I think that if he looks at Hansard he will find it is not what in fact he said. However, I will take that as an acceptable amendment to his remarks.

There have been an extraordinary number of misconceptions about the probation service as it exists, and about the effect of this Bill, and in particular this clause, on the work of the probation service as it is to be carried out in the future. May I point out right away about such remarks as that made by the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton of Dalzell—how can a probation officer be objective and truthful (I am paraphrasing; these may not be his exact words but it is the sense of his remarks) if he is in the employ of the local authority—that the fact is that to all intents and purposes a probation officer in Scotland at the present time is an employee of the local authority.

The use of the words "ad hoc committee" does not alter the fact that the committee is appointed by the local authority from within its own membership and from without its own membership, frequently with a majority of the committee being from within its own membership, although not always so. The local authority have control of the finance of the probation committee, because at the end of the day they have to approve their estimates and can, if they feel so inclined, disapprove their estimates, disapprove the provision of money. I cannot see that there is any difference in the relationship which the probation officer will have to a committee consisting of elected members of the local authority and co-opted members calling itself a probation committee, and a committee called a social work committee which may also consist of elected members of the authority and co-opted members.

LORD BALERNO

Would the noble Lord allow me to intervene for information? I am not entirely au fait with the situation. May I ask him who it is who makes the appointment of a particular probation officer in a particular area? I believe the Secretary of State is responsible for the production of probation officers, but what body or which person makes the appointment of a probation officer to a particular area?

LORD HUGHES

A probation officer is appointed by the probation committee, just as the officers under this Social Work Bill, when it becomes an Act, will be appointed by the social work committee. If a man is to be doing probation work he will be in future appointed, in most cases, perhaps in all cases, by a committee which consists of local authority and co-opted members.

LORD HAMILTON OF DALZELL

Surely the point really is that at the pre- sent time the probation officer t links of himself as a member of the probation and after-care service. Under these new arrangements he will be an official of the local authority like all the rest of the officials of the local authority.

LORD HUGHES

I hope to elaborate on this point. What am wanting to make quite clear is that his technical position as an employee of tie local authority, or of a committee appointed by the local authority, will be no different under this Bill from what it is at the present time. I therefore cannot accept the argument. He is appointed by one committee coming to some extent under the jurisdiction of the local authority. I use the words "to some extent" advisedly, because the local authority appoint the committee and can control the finance, but they do not intervene in the work of the probation committee except at those points. It may well be that under a system of delegation they will no more intervene in the work of the social work committee, except on finance generally and on the setting up of the committee at the beginning of each local authority year.

VISCOUNT STONEHAVEN

May I say that the situation is a little analogous to the area water boards and the area police boards. I happen to be on the North-Eastern Police Board and the East of Scotland Water Board. It is true that we appoint our own officials and we have to pay them. But the officials lose all identity with any one particular local authority, and this is the big point Certainly they must not be tied to one particular authority. In our case, they are not. They are not on the water board, they are not on the police board, and they are not on the probation service, because we split between two counties. This is the great safeguard, and this is what I want to see preserved.

LORD WELLS-PESTELL

Before the noble Lord answers that point, would he allow me to say that the Scottish Home Department has the overall responsibility for the probation service in Scotland. In Scotland at the present moment if a local authority says, "We will not appoint another children's officer", nobody can compel it to do so. But if the Scottish Home Department, which, has the overall responsibility for the selection and training, in service training and further training, of probation officers, says, "There must be another probation officer at Court A and Court B and Court C", they must appoint them.

LORD HUGHES

That is not the information I have. After all, the local authority pays half of the cost of the probation service; it receives a 50 per cent. grant. The information which I received no later than 1 o'clock to-day was that if a local authority, in accordance with the fears which have been expressed in the service, were to hold back in the interests of keeping down the rates, if a local authority chose to do that sort of thing in the probation service when a vacancy occurred on account of someone going away to another authority, the local authority refraining from providing the finance to fill that appointment, the Scottish Home and Health Department cannot say to the local authority, "You must fill this vacancy".

LORD DRUMALBYN

Is it not the case that they cannot say that, provided the local authority is carrying out its functions properly? But if the result of their not appointing the officer is that they are not carrying out their functions properly, the Scottish Home and Health Department can and does say that.

LORD HUGHES

The Secretary of State will have powers of direction in many other cases, but the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, like many other people who have been and are Ministers, knows how easy it is for a Secretary of State to have general powers of direction but how difficult it is to find a specific occasion on which they can be exercised, and this would be one of them. It becomes a matter of opinion as between a local authority and the central Government Department whether a job is being carried out properly.

Having said that, I want to point out that from the time of the Morison Committee Report in 1962, to which reference has been made, there has been a considerable expansion in the efficiency and the size of the probation service in Scotland, but it is not, as one would have thought from some of the remarks made during this debate, because some time after 1962 there was a change in the apparatus of the probation service in Scotland—the notion that it had been regarded as a minor local authority service. The machinery is exactly the same. We did not alter the law to make it become the same. All that happened was that the central department exercised pressure, gave advice to local authorities, which pressure local authorities could succumb to, which advice local authorities could accept. In other words, they were and are in exactly the same position as they will be under this Social Work Bill. The central department will be in a position to give guidance and advice, to exercise pressure. Why should we assume that the local authorities, in the exercise of their responsibilities for probation, accept that guidance and pressure and because the title is changed to social work discover that the pressure from the Scottish Home and Health Department has suddenly become intolerable and the advice has suddenly become bad? I do not accept this as an argument with any foundation at all.

The other point is this—and this is my principal objection to what is being argued. I cannot make up my mind whether what is being said is an unconscious insult to other professional employees of local authorities or an even greater insult to probation officers, because the argument is being advanced that unless a probation officer feels that he can stick his thumb to his nose to the local authority at all times in the exercise of his professional responsibilities he will not be an efficient probation officer. Other people do not find it necessary to be in that position. The Medical Officer of Health has professional responsibilities. He does not feel that he has in any way to abrogate the integrity he would have in any other direction by becoming an employee of a local authority. Many other professional people are in exactly the same position. Why should the probation officer need this special treatment in order to be able to make the best and the most honest use of his professional training? I think he has absolutely nothing to fear.

May I take another point—the references to the court and what is almost implied, that probation officers are appointed by the courts. They are not appointed by the courts; they are appointed by this probation committee, and part of their duties is working for the courts. It is perfectly true that the service as it exists is one on which the majority of courts in Scotland have learned to place full reliability, and that confidence which the courts have is well merited. It may well be that in a change of circumstances the courts, cautious as they are, may say, "Let us wait and see whether in fact the new service works with exactly the same efficiency as the old one so far as the courts are concerned." But it is a big step to go from that to say that the courts are going to assume that the new service will not work with efficiency; and this in fact has not been said.

On this question of the examination of what are the duties of a probation officer, I was most grateful to my noble friend Lady Birk for her contribution, not particularly because it was a change of accent or a change of view, but because she brought some much needed facts in relation to the need for change in welfare and in the viewing of welfare, into the debate, which up to the present had worked on the basis that in the probation service we have, on this particular aspect, reached the acme of perfection and that we ought not to touch it for fear that we should be replacing it by something worse. Had we worked on that basis in the past the welfare services would be still the same as they were under the first Elizabeth. Always when you change there must be fear; always there must be a risk that some things will not work out so well as they did in the past. But where a change does not turn out to be as good as one wants it to be, as the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, has suggested, one can then carry on to make alterations.

LORD BANNERMAN OF KILDONAN

I wonder if the noble Lord would inform me, as a layman in this matter, whether or not the Bill which the Government are now putting forward will open the delinquent's home to the ordinary social worker?

LORD HUGHES

I hope to answer that question in due course. I would remind your Lordships that I said last time that I did not intend to speak other than briefly except on two occasions. The first occasion was on the first Amendment which we discussed, and this is the second. Both of them have been exceedingly important aspects, fundamental to the Bill. Because of that, I wart to go into some detail about what the Bill and this clause are intended to do. If I may come back to my noble friend Lord Wells-Pestell and what he said last Thursday, he said that this Bill would put an end to the probation service in Scotland as we understand it at the present day.

It may well be that what is happening in Scotland today will happen in England tomorrow. We are net discussing the end of the probation service. We are discussing its future, and we are discussing its future in Scotland. Ai I have had occasion to say recently, I do not for one moment accept the argument that because people may not want something to happen in England that is a sound reason for stopping it happening in Scotland. After all, if this is so good when it is put into operation that there is fear that England may follow it, who am I to prevent the English from getting the opportunity? If the English do not think it is good, when there is a Bill relating to England and Wales it will not be in the English Bill. If it is in, and Lord Wells-Pestell does not like it at that stage, then he will be just as free to move that it come out of the English Bill as he has been to move that it comes out of the Scottish Bill.

We are discussing the future in Scotland, and I want to emphasise the t what we are doing in Scotland is not necessarily the pattern that will be followed in England—not necessarily. The Government realise that there are a number of people whose points of view were ably expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Wells-Pestell, and who view with misgiving the proposal that the new social work department should discharge the functions of the present probation service; and we appreciate that it would be too much to hope that their doubts can be set completely at rest by any assurance that I or any other Minister gives, that we do not expect that the discharge of those functions will be found to be as difficult in practice as they appear to be now.

The points I mean are those concerning the probation service as a court service, the independence of the probation officer and the risk of conflict with a local authority's policy towards crime and delinquency. We believe that the schemes provided for in Clause 26 will enable the confidence of the courts in the new service to be built up. We do not believe that the fact that a probation officer will be an employee of a local authority through its social work committee, to whom it may delegate the power of appointment instead of through a probation committee consisting mostly of local authority members, will inhibit either his right or his ability to act as a professional adviser and to resist any attempt to influence his professional advice.

It was Lord Stonehaven who quoted from the Morison Report about the development of the probation service as a relatively minor service. I have already referred to that. But the one change to be made by this Bill is that the social work service will not be a "relatively minor" local authority service. The local authorities' duty under Clause 12 covers not only the alleviation of hardship among people who suffer from special disabilities or health risks, but also the welfare of the community at large.

May I say, in passing, that I doubt very much whether even those who sincerely wish to see the adult probation service continuing as a separate service would accept the point of view put forward by Lord Stonehaven, that basically what it would have to do is to look after "young thugs". In fact, what it is to do in relation to the adult service makes it so eminently part of a social work scheme, because it hopes to treat them as, and to create them into, if that should be the position, ordinary members of the community, and not to regard them as young thugs separate from the rest of the community who can only be given penal treatment. That is not how the probation officer approaches the task in relation to these young people at the present time.

VISCOUNT STONEHAVEN

May I explain that what I meant was that probation officers are trained and used to being with youths who have erred in this way. This is a special skill that is needed, but not necessarily from the penal point of view, although they have still to reform these people. But I feel that the probation officer is better equipped than a welfare officer, who is trained more in the safety and health of children or old people.

LORD HUGHES

That is a different matter from implying (probably the noble Viscount did not mean to imply it, but it sounded as if he did) that all the adults with whom the probation officer was dealing came into the category of young thugs. One must accept that some of the people with whom he would deal would come into that category, and I freely accept that part of the special training which he receives is designed to enable him to deal with that particular part of his duties. But it is only a part of his duties just as his responsibilities in relation to the under-16s is another part of his duties. I would remind the Committee that we are not proposing to exterminate the existing probation officers. Their skills will not suddenly disappear; their training is not going to be abandoned.

The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, asked me whether there would be specialists in probation work in future. The answer is that the whole course of social work training is directed towards more generic training, plus specialisation, of which probation is likely to be one element. We shall therefore continue to train people in these skills. Young thugs, among others, will have to be dealt with, and there will still be people within the social work service who will have the training to deal with them and who will at the same time be trained to deal with the others. We do not at present select a certain number of probation officers to concentrate on that particular type of person. It is part of the training they receive to deal with the whole problem which they face.

The social work committee will have to look at other local authority programmes; and the noble Lord, Lord Balerno, quoted my remarks on this matter on Second Reading. From the point of view of the community and its welfare as a whole (and this matter was touched upon by Lord Drumalbyn) it is not just the individual who has to be considered, but also the interests of the community at large. At a time when the relationship of environment to delinquency is becoming daily more apparent it is hardly credible that the new social work authorities will not have a far greater concern with crime and the community than was the case when the Morison Committee made their remarks in 1962.

I should like at this point to reply to the question put by the noble Lord, Lord Bannerman, about whether the Bill would open the homes of delinquents to the ordinary social worker. Inquiries into home circumstances of adult delinquents will be made by officers providing social work service to the courts under probation schemes. Similar inquiries about child delinquents will be made by local authority social workers on a voluntary basis. If compulsory powers of any kind are needed, these workers will have to get the authority of the children's hearing.

To return to my main theme, I have made these brief comments because it would be wrong for me not to comment on the specific points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Wells-Pestell. However, I am anxious to consider the matter not from the point of view of the difficulties to be overcome, but with regard to the great opportunities which we believe will be open for social work as a whole, including probation, if all the services are integrated in the new departments. The essence of this argument is that a great deal of the work of the probation service is carried out away from the court and is basically similar to the work of other social work services. The work of about half of the present probation service is concerned with children and will necessarily be discharged by the social work departments as part of the new children's panel system. There is a real danger that if the remaining half—dealing with adults alone—is not brought in it will become isolated from the main developments in social work and be forced to rely on cooperation rather than direct participation in keeping up with the main stream of progressive thought.

The White Paper Social Work and the Community said: The main duty of the probation officer—personal social work with the offender and his family in the community—is basically similar to that of other social workers". I wanted to have some greater assurance about this, and therefore turned to a publication which must be regarded as more authoritative on this subject than I would pretend to be. In it I found some passages which I should like to read to your Lordships. It says in a chapter on "Relations with the Community", at page 216: From the point of view of the community the first aim must be to promote the welfare of its members as a whole, and whatever special provision is contemplated for offenders, the others must be considered in this context". In concluding that section, it points out that the probation officer's approach stresses understanding of the offender rather than condemnation as the road to recovery.

Much of the book is concerned with the probation officer as a social case worker, and on this it says: All that has been said about general principles of case work applies with certain modifications to the work of the probation officer whether it be with child or adult, first offender or old lag. There are, however, certain special demands made upon the case worker in the probation setting and on those subject to probation or supervision orders. A little later it says: Delinquents have a particular need for friendship and the acceptance it implies, but we have seen that all clients are best helped by the special type of friendship, namely, the professional case worker relationship. Only the probation officer's warm and sincere concern fertilises the probationer's cape city for growth and change. It seems to me that the work of the probation officer is social case work. Certain special demands are placed upon the probation officer and his client by the setting in which they find themselves, but, of course, precisely the same could be said of the medical social worker, the psychiatric social worker and the childcare officer. In each setting there are special demands on workers and client. The book from which I have take these extracts is The Probation Service, edited by Joan King, on behalf of the National Association of Probation Officers.

I have looked again also at the Report of the Departmental Committee on the Probation Service—the Morison Committee—and on this particular point I find it also very informative. The Morison Committee emphasised that in their view the probation officer was: a worker engaged in a wide range of social case work functions within the ambit of the courts". They suggested that the Scottish probation officers could give a fuller service to the community than they were then called on to do, and among the duties which they regarded the probation officer as well suited to undertake, in addition to probation and after-care as generally understood, were the following: supervision of children in matrimonial proceedings; inquiries in adoption cases; inquiries in summary domestic proceedings; inquiries into application for consent to marry, and matrimonial reconciliation.

I am well aware that careful selection can lead to distortion, and in these quotations I have tried to avoid distortion. I think the quotations I have read must leave your Lordships, as they left me, with the impression that the work of the probation service is without any doubt social work which is very similar, both in nature and in range, to that of other professional social workers. It has its, own special interests and demands, but so also have other branches of social work.

The difficulty about knowing that one has a major point to deal with is that one is provided with much more material than the patience of the House would allow one to use. We still have over 200 Amendments to deal with after we have finished with this clause—though I hasten to assure noble Lords on both sides of the House that we do not anticipate that any other Amendment will take this amount of time.

I conclude by saying that I have no doubt, as has been suggested by Lord Drumalbyn, that Clause 26 can be improved in detail by Amendments both here and in another place. I can assure the Committee that we are anxious to make it as good as we possibly can. For that reason, I suggested that we should not at that stage look at Amendments. The Amendments were not withdrawn because we did not think it necessary to have Amendments, or because we thought that Clause 26 was perfect, but because we thought that we ought to have a debate on whether or not Clause 26 should stand part of the Bill. But I shall be very happy to look at any Amendments put down at the next stage, either those already submitted or others which may yet be put forward, provided that they are put forward in the spirit of the Bill—that having the probation service as part of a general welfare service is a major step forward—and provided they are designed to make the probation service work more efficiently within that overall service. If your Lordships accept my view on this, then you will not delete this clause from the Bill.

5.10 p.m.

LORD BALERNO

As one of those whose name is down as a mover of this Amendment, there are three questions which I should like to ask the noble Lord, Lord Hughes. He referred to Clause 12 and spoke about the Bill's being in favour of the welfare of the community at large. That is precisely what I find to be wrong with Clause 12. It is extremely narrowly drawn, and far from being in favour of the welfare of the community at large it says: It shall be the duty of every local authority to promote social welfare in their area by making available advice, guidance and assistance on such a scale — and so on. It then goes into a lot of detail, which is hardly what one would call the welfare of the community at large.

The second point I should like to make is this. The noble Lord claims that we were discussing the end of the probation service. Not one of us who is opposing this clause has been discussing the end of the probation service. We have been discussing its organisation and whether it has adequate opportunity to develop its scope, and that is what is in doubt. As to the independence of judgment of the local probation officers, the noble Lord made a perfectly reductio ad absurdum of that point. There is a fundamental difference between being under a county clerk and being under a committee which has a measure of independence of the county clerk and the local authoritity. Some county clerks in Scotland are very powerful persons, and we fear that what will happen is that the probation officers will come under the county clerk and the local authority.

LORD HUGHES

I cannot conceive of a wider definition of "welfare" than we have put into this Bill. In fact, the comment which we have received from every direction is that for the very first time "welfare" has been defined in a Bill in such a way as to make it almost inconceivable that one could find something which would not fall within its ambit. As my noble friend Lady Birk said, we are departing from the position of legislating for particular needs as they arise and are seeking to anticipate all the possibilities by comprising them within a very general description. All I can say to the noble Lord, Lord Balerno, from whom I do not often find myself differing very much in principle, is that if he regards this as a narrow definition then I hope he never has the need to try to get a wide definition through the Treasury.

He also said that we were not discussing the end of the probation service. I said that we were riot discussing the end of the probation service; that what we were discussing was its future. One of the remarks made in support of the deletion of the clause was that the sheriffs-substitute were anxious to avoid the abolition of the probation service; and much of the debate was carried on as if the Bill contemplated the abolition of the probation service. So I was replying to the debate as it was made, although it may be that it was not what the noble Lord, Lord Balerno, said. My attention has been drawn to what the noble Lord, Lord Wells-Pestell, said last Thursday, in almost his opening remarks. He said: The thing that concerns me most, and I think concerns a number of your Lordships, is that whatever merit this Bill has—and it is not denied that there is a good deal of merit in it—it in fact puts an end to the probation service in Scotland as we understand it at the present day."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4/4/68, col. 1385.] So I have replied in the context of the debate.

I cannot claim that everyone who has put the opposite point of view will necessarily have changed his mind. I accept that the point of view which has been expressed is sincerely put forward and has been put forward because of misgivings. But I believe that the misgivings will prove in the main to be unfounded, and that some of the misgivings can be dealt with by amendment of the clause.

LORD HAMILTON OF DALZELL

I should like to make one point before we divide. I think we are all agreed in trying to get the best service for delinquents that can be devised. The noble Lord, Lord Hughes, made the point that the probation officer is a social case

worker, and that it is therefore reasonable that he should be included in the local authority set-up with the other case workers. But the whole point that we on this side feel is that the probation officer is a case worker specially trained for work with delinquents, whether on probation or on after-care from prison or other institutions—or I imagine, in the future, in prison itself—and has a different type of training and experience from the ordinary social worker.

The important point is that the probation service should be independent, and should be seen to be independent, of the local authority. It is significant that in spite of the point which.has been made, that the probation officers will have a better chance of promotion and security and prospects in a local authority service, they still feel that their work can best be done as an independent service.

The noble Lord made the point that English noble Lords should not take the view that, because this was going to happen in Scotland, it would therefore happen in England. He seemed to he inviting them to take the alternative view; that English noble Lords should support him on the basis of "trying it on the dog" that they should let this happen in Scotland and then, if they liked it, they could encourage it in England, but if they did not like it they need not have it. I hope that English noble Lords will not take that view of the matter, but will judge the point on its merits. The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, was, I think, suggesting that the clause as it stands is imperfect and that quite different arrangements would he preferable. I have no doubt that anybody who feels as he does will support the deletion of the clause in order that a better one may be provided at a later stage.

5.23 p.m.

On Question, Whether Clause 2f shall stand part of the Bill?

Their Lordships divided: Contents 48; Not-Contents, 46.

CONTENTS
Addison, V.	Bowles, L.	Gardiner, L. (L. Chancellor.)
Beswick, L.	Burden, L.	Garnsworthy, L.
Birk, Bs.	Chalfont, L.	Granville of Eye, L.
Blyton, L.	Champion, L.	Hall, V.
Henderson, L.	McLeavy, L.	Rowley, L.
Hill of Wivenhoe, L.	Maelor, L.	Rusholme, L.
Hilton of Upton, L. [Teller.]	Mitchison, L.	St. Davids, V.
Hughes, L.	Morris of Kenwood, L.	Shackleton, L.
Hurcomb, L.	Moyle, L.	Silkin, L.
Kennet, L.	Noel-Buxton, L.	Sorensen, L. [Teller.]
Kirkwood, L.	Peddie, L.	Stow Hill, L.
Latham, L.	Plummer, Bs.	Strabolgi, L.
Leatherland, L.	Popplewell, L.	Taylor of Mansfield, L.
Lindgren, L.	Raglan, L.	Walston, L.
Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, Bs.	Rhodes, L.	Winterbottom, L.
Longford, E.	Ritchie-Calder, L.	Wootton of Abinger, Bs.
NOT-CONTENTS
Aberdeen and Temair, M.	Denham, L.	Mancroft, L.
Airedale, L.	Dundee, E.	Meston, L.
Aldington, L.	Emmet of Amberley, Bs.	Monsell, V.
Amulree, L.	Ferrier, L.	Nugent of Guildford, L.
Ashbourne, L.	Fortescue, E.	Oakshott, L.
Atholl, D.	Fraser of North Cape, L.	Robertson of Oakridge, L.
Balerno, L. [Teller.]	Greenway, L.	Sempill, Ly.
Bannerman of Kildonan, L.	Gridley, L.	Stamp, L.
Beaumont of Whitley, L.	Hamilton of Dalzell, L. [Teller.]	Stonehaven, V.
Berkeley, Bs.		Strange of Knokin, Bs.
Brooke of Cumnor, L.	Henley, L.	Strathclyde, L.
Byers, L.	Ilford, L.	Trefgarne, L.
Conesford, L.	Kinnoull, E.	Tweedsmuir, L.
Cork and Orrery, E.	Lambert, V.	Vivian, L.
Cromartie, E.	Lloyd, L.	Wade, L.
Daventry, V.	Macpherson of Drumochter, L.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Resolved in the affirmative, and Clause 26 agreed to accordingly.

Clauses 27 to 30 agreed to.

Clause 31 [Children in need of compulsory measures of care]:

LORD HUGHES

Clause 31 defines the grounds on which a child may be brought before a children's hearing. This Amendment, No. 50, is simply drafting—the insertion of a word linking two paragraphs. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 20, line 42, at end insert ("or").—(Lord Hughes.)

Clause 31, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 32:

Formation of children's panels

32.—(1) A panel shall be formed for every local authority area (to be called "the children's panel") for the purposes of this Part of this Act.

(3) A local authority shall cause to be published a list of the names and addresses of members of their children's panel, and that list shall be open for public inspection at all reasonable times at the offices of the director of social work of the local authority, and at any place where an electors list for the locality is exhibited.

LORD DRUMALBYN

The purpose of this Amendment is to provide for more than one panel to be set up in a local authority area for the purposes of the Bill. This seems to be what Lord Kilbrandon meant in paragraph 92 of his Report. I think the point of it is quite clear. It would, for example, enable panels to be set up in large burghs within an area—within a county area or within a combined-counties area. It seems to me that this would be desirable. It would be appreciated by the large burgh; and administratively it would be much more satisfactory, rather than moving children and parents all round a large area, if they could attend a children's panel of their own burgh in their own burgh, which they could do quite easily. It seems to me that there may well be cases where it would be desirable to have more than one panel for a local authority area, and I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 21, line 6, after ("panel") insert ("or panels").—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD HUGHES

I could not quite understand what lay behind this Amendment, but it arises from a misconception of what a panel is. A panel is essentially a number of people from whom choices will be made from time to time to form the children's hearings. There is no need, in fact, to have more than one panel for each authority. The panel, having regard to the size of the authority, will be sufficiently big and will be sufficiently widespread over the area as to enable members to be chosen from time to time under Clause 33 to form the children's hearings which will deal with individual cases as they are brought forward by the reporter. In fact, what the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, indicates as being the desirable thing to be done is exactly what we expect will be done in the operation of the clause as it stands; and it will of course be made perfectly clear to all authorities in the administrative arrangements that it is not the suggestion that they should have a panel of two, three, four or five members sitting at one place and that everybody should come to them. The number of people involved will be chosen from the panel, and will sit as necessary in their area. I hope that, with that explanation, the noble Lord will accept my assurance that what he wants is what will in fact emerge from the operation of the clause as drafted.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I am grateful to the noble Lord. If there was a misconception, I am not certain it was not shared by the Kilbrandon Report, which recommended that: Panels should be set up in each education authority area, their number — being determined in each case by the appropriate Sheriff. However, we need not argue about that. I am grateful for what the noble Lord has said. If I understand him correctly, he will if necessary give guidance for the purpose of enabling those people who sit in a children's hearing in a particular place to be chosen from the panel as a whole. If that is what he means, then I shall willingly withdraw my Amendment.

LORD HUGHES

That is what I mean.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I must apologise for delaying the Committee. I cannot locate my notes.

LORD HUGHES

If it will help the noble Lord, I am prepared to indicate that I shall accept Amendments Nos. 52 and 53.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I an much obliged to the noble Lord. Amendment No. 52 is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 21, line 6, after ("panel") insert ("(to be called the children's panel")").—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD DRUMALBYN

I beg to move Amendment No. 53 formally.

Amendment moved— Page 21, line 7, leave out ("(to be called "the children's panel")").—(Lord Drnnzalbyn.)

LORD DRUMALBYN

This is a small point. I do not know whether "offices" includes sub-offices, or whether "offices" is a term of art meaning "the office". It was suggested by the Kilbrandon Report that for the purposes of decentralisation of social work in large areas there should be sub-offices. It was to elicit tint point that I put down this Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 21, line 15, after ("offices") insert ("and any sub-offices").—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD HUGHES

I expected this to be a probing Amendment. I confirm that the word "offices", so far as Parliamentary drafting is concerned, includes offices, sub-offices and so on; so technically the Amendment is not necessary.

LORD DRUMALBYN

In that case, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 32, as amended, agreed to.

5.36 p.m.

LORD BALERNO moved, after Clause 32, to insert the following new clause:

Duty of children's panel with respect to juvenile delinquency

".The children's panel for each local authority shall have a specific responsiblity for the prevention and reduction of juvenile delinquency in the area of that authority and shall, yearly or as may be required, make reports to the Sheriff and to the Secretary of State concerning juvenile delinquency together with recommendations."

The noble Lord said: The purpose of this Amendment is to make explicit a recommendation in the Kilbrandon Report, that the children's hearings which are to take the place of the juvenile courts should also take cognisance of the state of juvenile delinquency in their area. This comes under the conception of welfare of the community at large, and I cannot see how the insertion of this new clause could in any way upset the Treasury.

The relevant part of the Kilbrandon Report is paragraph 250 in which the argument is stated for the community at large taking an interest in, and some responsibility for, delinquency and the reason for having the children's hearings well down in the grass roots of their area. A summary is to be found on page 108, in the final two paragraphs of the Report. I quote: Moreover, since the incidence of juvenile delinquency, the forms and patterns it takes, and in many cases the combination of factors apparently underlying it, vary widely from one area to another, these problems must in our view be tackled at local level and must he clearly seen to be a local community responsibility. These aims cannot in our view effectively be met other than through, in each area, a locally-based agency publicly charged with specific responsibility for the prevention and reduction of juvenile delinquency. The social education department, throughout the range of its activities (including the exercise of its continuous responsibility for children under the juvenile panel's jurisdiction)"— that is, the children's hearing— would in fact be such an agency. I would particularly draw attention to the words: a locally-based agency publicly charged with specific responsibility".

LORD HUGHES

Would the noble Lord make clear whether, when he said, "that is, the children's hearing", he was still quoting or whether he was interpolating?

LORD BALERNO

I was interpolating. For what has now become known as the children's hearings and for what is discussed in the Bill as the children's hearings the words used in the Kilbrandon Report are, as I understand, "social education department". I was trying to clarify the difference between the wording of the Report and the wording of the Bill.

LORD HUGHES

Would the noble Lord not feel that it is the social work department to be set up under the Bill rather than the children's panel, or the children's hearing, that is the equivalent of the social education department described in the Report?

LORD BALERNO

I entirely accept the correction and thank the noble Lord for it. It is a lesson in not thinking too rapidly. All I want is that this responsibility should be made a public charge on the panel; because it is the panel, or the panel from which the children's hearings are constituted, that is at the grass roots of the juvenile delinquency.

I fully realise that the main way in which the children's hearings will work, when they are faced with a problem of youth delinquency or children's delinquency, will be in making sure that there are better local family services for these can often be the major factor in preventing delinquency. Certainly fewer children would get into trouble were better recreational facilities available, particularly in areas of high density and in the multiple dwellings which are springing up and in which the activities of children are inevitably curbed. Unless we make this part of the responsibility of the children's panels because they serve on the children's hearing, there is grave danger that it will be forgotten altogether.

The first function of the law is to protect the innocent. Crimes of violence reported in Scotland have increased from 1,829 in 1962 to 3.500 in 1967—that is to say, nearly double in five years. I concede that there may be a difference in the reporting, but in Scotland there is a distinct disquiet because of the substantial increase that has taken place in crimes of violence and because the maintenance of law and order in Scotland is being seriously threatened. Most of the crimes of violence are perpetrated by young persons. I would say that we must give the police powers to search for weapons, but that is incidental to this debate.

At present there is considerable anxiety, and the people who look at the children's hearings and juvenile delinquency in the local authority areas should at the same time take a wide authority for the delinquents themselves and a wider view of the community at large. They should have regard to the possibility of an increase in juvenile crime and to what steps may be taken to make the social environment better, so that crime is reduced. I realise that my new clause may require some amending but I put it down so that the children's panels would have an obligation to make a report of some kind to some body and that report, presumably, would be reported in the Press. Having to make at least an annual report would make the panels aware that they had a duty to the community at large as well as to the delinquent child. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— After Clause 32 insert the said new clause.— [Lord Balerno.]

LORD HUGHES

The effect of the new clause would be to place specific executive responsibilities on the children's panel of each local authority for the prevention and reduction of juvenile delinquency in the area of that authority. It would also require them to make reports and recommendations to the sheriff and to the Secretary of State concerning juvenile delinquency. This is a matter to which Lord Balerno referred on Second Reading. Subsequently, in the note which I sent to many noble Lords, they will have seen that the points raised on Second Reading were dealt with. I stressed that there was already cover in the Bill for the important question of the prevention and reduction of juvenile delinquency. Nevertheless, I am grateful to the noble Lord for putting down the Amendment, because it provides an opportunity to make this point clear to all those who are interested although his proposed solution is not acceptable for the following reasons.

The way we see it is that the responsibility for the prevention and reduction of juvenile delinquency is part of the major responsibilities of local authorities for promoting social welfare in their area under Clause 12 and for making available advice, guidance and assistance which would enable them to deal positively with the problems of delinquency by trying to prompt and encourage the right types of community development; the provision of appropriate social recreational facilities, and so on. It will also have to deal with delinquency and its pre- vention very specifically as the effective agency implementing the decisions of the hearings. The social work department of a local authority is the social education authority to which the Kilbrandon Report made reference, and in framing the Bill as we have done we feel that we have put into effect in this case what the Kilbrandon Committee asked for.

The social work department of the welfare authority will have the day-to-day responsibility and will be staffed for this responsibility: and to this work, in particular, it can be visualised that the present members of the probation service will have a particular contribution to make. This is not, as will be seen, to play down the role of the children's panel, but this panel, by reason of its membership and organisation, is designed essentially to run children's hearings and not to carry out this type of executive work. It should make its particular contribution by dealing through the children's hearings with the basic reeds of children in trouble at an early stage and therefore prove a most powerful line of secondary prevention. Beyond this the panel should be able, through the close links which the reporter, as a locally appointed official, forms with the social work department and the director of social work, to help and advise the social work department about the trends of delinquency as it sees them; and no doubt in appropriate cases can come to the help of the authority in forming suggestions as to action which might be appropriate.

That is how we see the machine working. To place the responsibility for this work on the children's panels would not work organisationally. I hope, however, that local authorities will take note of what the noble Lord, Lord Balerno, has said, for undoubtedly the children's panel, through the reporter, has a contribution to make in this field beyond its responsibilities for individual hearings, and this fact will not be forgotten. If it should be necessary, this is the sort of point to which attention can specifically be drawn. I am very grateful to the noble Lord for having emphasised this point, but I hope he may accept that the Bill as it is conceived is the best way of carrying out this very worthwhile and necessary objective.

LORD FERRIER

I apologise for not having been present at the beginning of Lord Balerno's remarks. I should like to support his proposed new clause for two reasons. As your Lordships may be aware, I come from an area which has been having a very distressing time recently, due to juvenile delinquency of a major kind, which I believe might not have developed as it did had there been more publicity; if the local people had known more and if the Press had known more, and if there had been less keeping under cover what was going on.

It has been decided now that the probation service shall come under the local authority. I am not at all happy that this does not provide a further opportunity to keep things under cover and not allow the public to know what is going on. I have every sympathy with the social worker who believes that more should be done to improve the conditions and the treatment of young people, but I believe that it is important that the people themselves should be taken along with the authorities in sympathy with the work being done, and I believe that the proposal of the noble Lord, Lord Balerno, would be a contribution. I consider that the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, has gone some way to meet him, in pointing out that the Bill provides for certain machinery of communication between children's panels and the people, but I am still not happy about it, and I feel that more thought could be given to making it a statutory obligation upon the people who are responsible for administration to see that people outside the courts and panels know what is going on, and are advised whether or not it has been a success.

LORD HUGHES

I would say, briefly, that what the noble Lord, Lord Balerno, has asked for, and what I have said he will get under the Bill, is in fact that those responsible for administering the service shall do the job for which he has asked. The point which the noble Lord, Lord Ferrier, has brought in about the publicity which may or may not attend children's hearings is dealt with in another part of the Bill. One cannot by any stretch of the imagination regard an annual report to the Secretary of State or a report to the sheriff as being publicity for individual children's hearings.

LORD FERRIER

My noble friend Lord Balerno said that he imagined it would find its way from the court to the Press, and that is what I picked up.

LORD HUGHES

I assure both noble Lords that there is an Amendment which will enable this to be discussed.

THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN

I should like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, for his reception of my noble friend's idea. If it is a fact that the social work department will give guidance in the way my noble friend has suggested, I think that he will be amply satisfied. One or two things said by the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, made me wonder whether the panel will ever meet as a body so that they can bring together their experience. I am sure that such a meeting would be valuable. The way in which it is subsequently transmitted from the reporter to the social work department is a different matter. But I think it would be worth while if they met from time to time and were not treated just as a panel from which names should be drawn for a hearing.

LORD HUGHES

I am not sure whether it is envisaged that they should meet from time to time, but I am in complete agreement with the noble Lord that it would be a great advantage for them to meet so that they may compare experiences, just as magistrates meet from time to time to discuss general problems in relation to the exercise of their duties.

LORD BALERNO

In the hope that the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, will persuade his right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Scotland to direct or make other arrangements whereby panels meet, I would be happy to withdraw my Amendment. I have little hope that any discussion of this nature in your Lordships' House would reverberate to such an extent that many months hence, when these panels come into being, anything said would be reported to them. My experience of being on a body set up by the Secretary of State for Scotland is that all the good advice he gave us when it was set up, and in which doubtless he reflected a great deal of the wisdom of the Parliamentary discussion in both Houses, I do not suppose I remembered within ten minutes of the meeting being over. It is good that warning should be held in front of those who are responsible for action. I do not think that there was much of the executive in my Amendment, but I do not want to quarrel too much with the noble Lord and accordingly I withdraw my Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

5.54 p.m.

Clause 33 [Children's hearings]:

LORD DRUMALBYN

This Amendment is to subsection (3). I think that it is in the spirit of this part of the Bill that children's hearings should be detached as much as possible from the atmosphere of the criminal courts and police stations. Hence this Amendment would insert after "accommodation and facilities" the words, "dissociated from criminal courts and police stations". I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 21, line 28, after ("facilities") insert ("dissociated from criminal courts and police stations").—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD HUGHES

This is a Kilbrandon recommendation, and I agree that we should take a note of it in any general guidance that may be issued. However, having regard to what the noble Lord, Lord Balerno, has said about the fate which meets general guidance from time to time, it is just as well that I had made up my mind to accept the inclusion of the specific reference to it in the Statute.

Clause 33, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 34:

Provisions as to time, place, privacy and notification of children's hearings

34.—(1) Any children's hearing shall be conducted in private, and, subject to the provisions of any rules made under this section, no person other than a person whose presence is necessary for the proper consideration of the case which is being heard, or whose presence is permitted by the chairman, shall be present.

LORD DRUMALBYN moved, in subsection (1), to leave out, "or whose presence is permitted by the chairman." The noble Lord said: The purpose of this Amendment is to reword subsection (1) so as to make it clear. We are dealing with the question of who should be allowed to be present at a children's hearing. I would agree at once that the fewer present the better. Under subsection (5)(f) the Secretary of State will have power to make provision with respect to persons whose presence shall be permitted at a hearing. It must be a question of fact in every case as to who is necessary, but the two criteria in the clause are, first, whether it is necessary and proper in considering the case; and, secondly, whether it is permitted by the chairman.

Side by side with that, paragraph (f) allows the Secretary of State to prescribe by rule whose presence shall be permitted. Obviously, in any particular case this leaves within the discretion of the chairman the question of whose presence is necessary in addition to those prescribed by the Secretary of State. As the subsection is drafted, it would allow the chairman to exclude somebody whose presence was in fact necessary to the proper consideration of a case. This is a case of either or: a person's presence is either necessary or the chairman permits it. I think that this is loose drafting, and my Amendment is intended to overcome the difficulty. I want to make certain that if a person whose presence is in fact necessary is excluded, the matter can be put right by appeal to the sheriff, which I think would be the appropriate remedy in this case. But if the chairman had said that a person's presence was or was not permitted, in this case that remedy would not exist. The end of the subsection, with my Amendment and my next Amendment No. 58, would then read: …no person other than a person whose presence is necessary for the proper consideration of the case which is being heard shall be present, provided that any other person may attend with the permission of the Chairman. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 21, line 34, leave out from ("heard") to ("shall").—(Lord Drumalhyn.)

LORD HUGHES

I do not think I can go along with the noble Lord Lord Drumalbyn, in his interpretation of the words as they are in Clause 34(1) as it stands, because I do not think that this gives the right to the chairman to exclude someone whose presence is necessary for the proper consideration, of the case. It says that no person other than a person whose presence is necessary for the proper consideration of the case which is being heard shall be present, provided that any other person may attend with the permission of the chairman. There is no question of the chairman's having to give permission to somebody whose presence is necessary for the proper consideration of the case.

Again, the question of attendance, as the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, has pointed out, is not left entirely to the chairman's discretion, because the noble Lord has drawn attention to Clause 34(5)(f), under which the Secretary of State can make rules for this purpose. A difficult question which will be dealt with in the rules (and this is the point to which I was referring in relation to the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Ferrier, and the noble Lord, Lord Balerno, on publicity) is the attendance of the Press at children's hearings. Clause 57 restricts the information about hearings which may be published, but the Bill says nothing about the attendance of the Press. In preparing rules under Clause 57 the Secretary of State proposes to consult representatives of the Press and to invite their advice on the necessary provisions. To allow completely unrestricted attendance by the Press might jeopardise the informal nature of the hearings, while the public and the Press will have a legitimate interest in the hearings and the Press will be able to do much to form public attitudes towards the hearings. A first approach to representatives of the Press in preparation for the drafting of rules about their attendance at hearings is likely to be made shortly.

Having said that, may I say that the noble Lord. Lord Drumalbyn, has just raised a little doubt in my mind whether the drafting is exactly what we want it to be. If he does not press these two Amendments at this stage, I will certainly undertake to have another look at the matter before the Report stage, and either try to persuade him, for reasons which I will endeavour to elicit in defence of the drafting, that the drafting is right as it stands, or put forward an alternative drafting about which I should be happy to consult him.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I am obliged to the noble Lord. I think he has raised an important point on the question of the attendance of the Press at children's hearings. Subject to what any of my noble friends may want to say at this stage, I should like to consider with them what the noble Lord has said, and perhaps we can revert to this subject at the next stage of the Bill or possibly when we come to Clause 57. The spirit of the White Paper, I think, was that the proceedings in children's hearings should be private. Obviously, they could still be private, even though the Press were present. But the intention may be just to give the Press background and prevent them under Clause 57 from making reports that would identify the child. This is an extremely difficult problem, and I should not like to probe it any further at the moment. I take note that the noble Lord will look at it again, and I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

LORD HUGHES

This is a purely drafting Amendment. To be consistent, the expression "children's hearing" should be written in full on each occasion. This is not done in subsection (5)(f). I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 22, line 20, after ("a") insert ("children's").—(Lord Hughes.)

LORD HUGHES

Subsection (4) of this clause, gives the Secretary of State a power to make rules for the constituting and arranging of children's hearings and for regulating the procedure of those hearings. The types of provision these rules may make are listed in subsection (5). The Amendment represents an addition to the Secretary of State's powers which would enable him, should it be proved necessary, to set time limits to the various procedures in the children's hearing to ensure that hearings do not allow cases to drag on too long. This power would be used only if there were evidence that it was necessary. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 22, line 20, at end insert: ("() the continuation of a children's hearing for further investigation of a case before that hearing and the number and duration of such continuations").—(Lord Hughes.)

Clause 34, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 35 [The reporter and deputies]:

LORD DRUMALBYN moved, in subsection (1), to leave out "a local authority" and insert "the Secretary of State". The noble Lord said: We turn now to the appointment of the reporter and his deputies. This Amendment would have the effect of causing the appointment of a reporter to be made by the Secretary of State and not by the local authority. In a sense, the reporter is something like a sheriff clerk dealing with children, and I think I am right in saying that the sheriff clerk is not appointed by the local authority. The reporter will not be a local officer in the same sense as a director of social work is a local authority officer, and it may be well to detach the administration of children's hearings from too close a link with the social work department and the local authority. This, again, is a probing Amendment, but this could quite easily be done in one of two ways.

I rather suspect that the reason why it has been decided to make the appointment by the local authority and not by the Secretary of State is so that the local authority can be made to pay for the reporter. I do not think that is a very respectable reason for doing it, if it would be better done the other way and the reporter service were to be a service for the children similar to the service of the courts for adults and young offenders. It seems to me it is more logical to do it in this way and have the reporter service a Secretary of State service rather than a local authority service. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 22, line 24, leave out ("a local authority") and insert ("the Secretary of State").—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD HUGHES

I must hasten to assure your Lordships that it is not because we want local authorities to pay for the reporters that we give them the opportunity of making the appointment. The Kilbrandon Committee stressed that they were anxious that, so far as possible, there should be local bodies able to consider children against their environment and able to work closely with local authority services. Lord Drumalbyn's Amendment in connection with multiplicity of panels was another aspect of the design to ensure that the panels worked in this way.

It is true that it has been necessary for the Bill in one or two specific instances to lay a little stress on the local nature of the panels and reporters because of the desire to ensure that there is a certain guidance and uniformity of standard in the appointment of new types of persons for the children's panels and new officials as reporters. The Secretary of State has taken the responsibility of formally appointing members of the panels, although this is to be exercised in the closest association with a children's panel advisory committee. He has also taken the power to ensure that persons he considers to be qualified are appointed as reporters.

We find it difficult to envisage that the local authorities would find it acceptable that we should take the much more radical step of taking the appointment out of their hands altogether, as the Amendment would require us to do. It would not in fact be a logical thing to do unless we were seeking to make it a centrally organised service, and that is the reverse of what we are seeking to do. In fact, it would defeat one of the main objects of the Bill, which is to have close co-operation and "give and take" between the children's hearings and the social work departments in considering the best treatment for children in difficulties. I hope, therefore, that the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, will accept my assurance that it is because of the genuine wish to have much local participation as possible, and not out of any ulterior desire to please the Treasury.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I am not entirely satisfied with the argument that the noble Lord has put forward. It seems to me that if you are going to have to produce any close relationship of this kind, it is not the right thing to have them both under the same umbrella, the umbrella of the local authority; it would be better to have one under the Secretary of State and the other under the local authority. I should like to consider further what the noble Lord has said on this. Meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

6.12 p.m.

The MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN

This is a very small Amendment, and I am not certain even that it is necessary to move it, but the noble Lord will recall that I raised the matter on Second Reading because I thought there would be cases when a full-time reporter will not be necessary. I think the matter should be made quite clear in the Bill. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 22, line 25, after ("officer") insert ("whole-time or part-time").—(The Marquess of Lothian.)

LORD HUGHES

I am in fact assured that it is not strictly necessary to put these words in, but we find it is quite an acceptable Amendment and I am prepared to agree to it.

LORD DRUMALBYN moved to add to subsection (2): and if he considers none of the applicants to be suitable for appointment, he shall require the local authority to re-advertise the vacancy, and the local authority shall comply with the requirement with or without any change in the terms and conditions of service offered.

The noble Lord said: This Amendment and the next Amendment go together. This is the same point as we considered in relation to the appointment of the directors of social work, but here of course this is a continuing provision, whereas in the case of the director of social work there was only a provision that is to last until the Secretary of State makes rules about the qualifications of directors of social work. That being so, I think there is rather more point in this Amendment than there was in the last, though I also think it was valid in the case of the appointment of the director of social work.

I need not go over the purpose again, because the same argument applies. It the local authority is to have responsibility for the reporter, to appoint the reporter, then its choice should be a real one, and unless you put in the words in the Amendment it would of course be possible for the Secretary of State to send down a list of one person and give the local authority no option at all as to whom to appoint. That would be the case as the clause is worded. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 22, line 32, at end insert the said words.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD HUGHES

I am assured that, notwithstanding the noble Lord's fears, what he is asking is in fact what will be done. I do not know how much trouble I shall get myself into by agreeing to accept something which I am assured is unnecessary, but it does not seem to me that this Amendment can do all that amount of harm, and I am prepared to risk accepting it.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I beg to move Amendment No. 65.

Amendment moved— Page 22, line 36, after ("person") insert ("from among those").—(Lord Drumalbyn.

LORD HUGHES

This Amendment to subsection (7) is necessary as the provisions of Sections 82 and 92 of the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1947 relating to tenure of office provide simply that that office is to be held during the pleasure of the council. The reporter, however, is provided with the additional safeguard that he cannot be removed from office or required to resign except with the consent of the Secretary of State. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 23, line 3, after ("1947") insert (", so far as these provisions are not inconsistent with any of the foregoing, provisions of this section,").—(Lord Hughes.)

LORD DRUMALBYN

While agreeing with all the noble Lord has said, may I ask whether this will cover the point of the next Amendment, No. 67, which is to ensure that there can be only one reporter? Section 82(4) says in effect that the local authority may appoint two persons to fill an office jointly. I take it that this is not the intention in the case of the reporter. I also assume from what the noble Lord said that the intention is that there should be only one reporter; and if it is clear—and I am not sure that it is clear in the Bill as it stands—that there is to be only one reporter, that then would be at variance with the provisions of the Bill as he has indicated in this Amendment, and therefore it would cover my point. I am not quite sure.

LORD HUGHES

Amendment No. 67 is a little different. Section 82(4) allows a county council to appoint two or more persons jointly to fill one office or one person to fill two or more offices; and the purpose of Amendment No. 67 is to preclude this in the case of the office of the reporter. The Amendment is not in fact a competent one, because Section 82(4) does not deal with remuneration or tenure of office, and therefore does not apply to the Bill by Clause 35(7). It is also unnecessary since the point is adequately covered by Clause 35(5) under which the reporter may not, except with the consent of the Secretary of State, be employed by the local authority or any other local authority in any capacity other than that of reporter.

LORD DRUMALBYN had given notice of his intention to move to add to subsection (7), "but section 82(4) of the said Act shall not apply to the office of reporter". The noble Lord said: I am bound to say that I do not quite understand the relevance of the last remark of the noble Lord in regard to this Amendment. But I gather in general that the Amendment is not necessary, and that there will be only one person appointed to the office of reporter. If that is so, I need not move this Amendment.

LORD HUGHES

The relevance of the last remark was really that we took it that the Amendment was designed to ensure that there should not be duplication of appointment. The reporter may not, except with the consent of the Secretary of State, be employed by the local authority or any other authority in any capacity other than that of reporter. So in fact it is possible for this duality of appointment to be prevented by Clause 35(5).

LORD DRUMALBYN

Surely that cannot be correct. The mere fact that you cannot be employed in any other capacity cannot affect whether you have two people doing one man's job. They could both not be employed in any other capacity than that of reporter. They could both be doing the job jointly. I do not understand the relevance of that. However, I need not press this point at the present time, but perhaps the noble Lord would have a look at it.

LORD HUGHES

The noble Lord appears to have a point here. It certainly will prevent the reporter from doing something else, but whether or not it prevents two reporters being appointed to one job I do not know.

6.22 p.m.

LORD DRUMALBYN

This is one of the classical cases where we are generally told that "may" means "shall", but I cannot conceive that the Secretary of State can avoid making rules in relation to the duties of the reporter, and I should have thought Parliament could just as easily say "shall" here. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 23, line 4, leave out ("may") and insert ("shall").—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD HUGHES

The effect of this Amendment would be to require the Secretary of State to make regulations governing the duties of the reporter. It is already clear from our consideration that the Secretary of State will have to make rules for constituting and arranging the children's hearings and for regulating the procedure of these hearings. These rules will be made under Clause 34(4) and (5). It seems possible that the bulk of the duties of the reporter will in effect be covered by regulations made under the rules in Clause 34 and that it may not be necessary to make rules regulating the duties of the reporter. In these circumstances we think it is wrong to oblige the Secretary of State to make the regulations when there is no requirement for them. Clearly if the need is seen these regulations will be made. It is the unfortunate experience of everybody concerned that Governments do not have to be encouraged to make regulations; rather they have to be deterred from making them, and I am certain that if there is the slightest excuse they will be made.

LORD DRUMALBYN

If I were a betting man I should be prepared to take a bet that they would be made. But in view of what the noble Lord has just said I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 35, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 36 [Reports of cases of children who may require compulsory measures of care and the interim detention of such children in places of safety]:

LORD DRUMALBYN

The purpose of this Amendment is to make certain that if a child is detained after having been taken to a place of safety by a constable or authorised officer, not only the reporter of the case shall be informed forthwith but also the parent, if he can be found. He may not be found in all cases. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 23, line 20, after ("inform,") insert C the parent, if he can be found, and").(Lord Drumalbyn.)

THE EARL OF IDDESLEIGH

I very much hope the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, will not accept this Amendment. I remember moving a somewhat similar Amendment to the original Children's Act and it was pointed out to me at the time that though normally the parent would be informed—for one thing, we want the parent to pay for the child while he is in care—there might be exceptional cases where it would be undesirable to let the parent know of the child's whereabouts, and it was really much better to leave that matter to the discretion of the officers concerned. My own experience in the field of child care confirms that view, and I trust that the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, will reconsider his Amendment.

LORD HUGHES

This places me in a great difficulty. I had been prepared to say that I would accept this Amendment. It seemed to me that it was desirable that the parents should be informed as soon as possible and that in fact the police would normally do this.

THE EARL OF IDDESLEIGH

Would they normally do it?

LORD HUGHES

Yes, and I felt that putting it in as a statutory reference might help to ensure that a real effort was made to find the parent, if he was not immediately available. I cannot imagine that this would be done in circumstances where it would be very much against the interests of the child for the parent to be pursued, but I must admit that in saying I was ready to accept this Amendment I had not thought of it from that point of view. That was why I looked hopefully over to the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, to see whether he had had any second thoughts on the matter in the light of this wholly unforeseen intervention.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I should like to hear from the noble Earl, Lord Iddesleigh, the circumstances in which, in his experience, it has been thought justifiably undesirable to inform the parents. When I drafted this Amendment it seemed to be an absolutely natural and essential thing to do. However, I do not think we need pursue this matter now, and I shall not press the Amendment in view of what the noble Earl has said. We can always revert to it at the next stage of the Bill. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN

I am sorry that my noble friend Lady Horsbrugh is not here to move this Amendment and the other Amendments to which she has put her name, all dealing with the same general point. Besides Amendment No. 70, I refer to Amendments Nos. 71, 78, 79, 80, 81, 98 and 106. The point is that where a reporter considers that for one reason or another a child may not turn up to attend a hearing, or that he may disappear while investigations are proceeding, under the Bill the reporter is entitled to ask the children's hearing to issue a warrant for the detention of that child. My noble friends and I consider that the power to issue a warrant should not be placed in the hands of a non-judicial body such as the children's hearing. We feel it would be much better if that power was reserved for the sheriff, and these Amendments would alter the Bill in that respect. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 23, line 31, leave out ("issue") and insert ("apply to the Sheriff for").—(The Marquess of Lothian.)

LORD HUGHES

These Amendments do not seem to have any objection to the detention of a child in such circumstances where it is necessary in his own interests or if there is reason to believe that he may run away. The objection seems to be solely to the right of the children's hearing to issue warrants, which the movers of the Amendment advise should be left to the sheriff on the application of the hearing. It is true that the sheriff has an important part to play in relation to the hearings, as a precaution against any injustices arising. For example, Clause 41 provides that where the grounds on which a child has been referred to the hearing are not accepted by the child or his parent, they must go to the sheriff to be established. Under Clause 48 appeals to the sheriff may he made by a child or his parent against the treatment decision arrived at by a hearing. In cases where interim detention is necessary on a warrant, as in Clause 36, the rights of individuals are safeguarded again, and if they appeal to the sheriff against such detention the case must be heard within three days.

The machinery is, however, geared to bring the sheriff in at the second stage as a safeguard. A point of the Kilbrandon proposals is that the lay body—that is, the children's hearing—should make the running, as in the vast majority of cases there is no dispute about the facts. In addition, the powers given to a children's hearing under Clause 43 to impose a supervision requirement requiring residence in a residential establishment is a power that goes well beyond any minor power of interim detention. It is very difficult to give them the major power and then deny them the procedural means of making sure that a child's case can be properly dealt with without his running away, or to prevent them from forming the view that his interests can be best served by keeping him in a place of safety. The use of this power will, however, be very carefully watched, and should it prove necessary the powers of the Secretary of State to make rules under Clause 35(8) could be invoked to impose such safeguards as might be felt to be necessary.

The children's hearing can issue warrants in the following circumstances. First, under Clause 36(3), where a child has been detained in a place of safety under Clause 36(2), or under Section 40(3) of the Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937, and where a children's hearing has been arranged for the first lawful day after the commencement of their detention, and where the hearing is satisfied that further detention is necessary in the child's own interest or be- lieve that he will run away during the investigation of the case. Secondly, under Clause 39(4) where the reporter considers that a child may not attend the hearing of his case the hearing may issue a warrant to the reporter for the removal of the child from his home and detention in a place of safety. Thirdly, under Clause 39(5) where a child fails to attend the hearing of his case a children's hearing may issue a warrant for his apprehension. Then, under Clause 42(4), in order to investigate the case further, or where satisfied that such a course is necessary to secure the attendance of a child at a subsequent hearing or is necessary in his own interests, a hearing may issue a warrant requiring a child to be removed from his home and detained in a place of safety or to attend any clinic, hospital or establishment. All these warrants may last for a maximum of twenty-one days, but may be renewed, on application, also for a maximum of twenty-one days.

The power, we feel, is a necessary one, given the major duties which halve been placed on the hearings. The appeal procedure and the ability to make regulations are such that we are quite certain that it is a power which will only be used wisely, and if necessary regulations can be made to ensure that the circumstances are such that it will only be used wisely, and for what is essentially in the interests of the child.

THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN

I am grateful to the noble Lord for his assurances on this matter. I should like, in the absence of my noble friend Lady Horsbrugh, to reserve her position until she has had time to read what the noble Lord has said. I certainly do not intend to press these Amendments today. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

6.34 p.m.

LORD STONHAM moved, in subsection (5), after "sheriff", to insert: under the Summary Jurisdiction (Scotland) Act, 1954, and the person named in the warrant may be apprehended as a person unlawfully at large in any part of the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man,". The noble Lord said: On behalf of my noble friend Lord Hughes, I beg to move Amendment No. 72, and perhaps I may speak at the same time to Amendment No. 73.

This clause provides that a constable or authorised officer of the local authority who has reasonable cause to believe that a child may be in need of compulsory measures of care may give the reporter any information he may have about the child; and that he may take to a place of safety any child against whom there has or is believed to have been committed certain offences involving immorality and indecency, cruelty or danger to life. The child may be detained in the place of safety until arrangements can be made for him to be brought before a children's hearing on the first lawful day, and by warrant for a further period not exceeding 21 days if the hearing cannot dispose of his case or it is necessary in his own interests or to prevent his running away. The effect of the Amendments is to describe more fully the "warrant of apprehension issued by a sheriff" to which subsection (5) refers, and to provide for the apprehension of any child subject to a warrant of detention who is unlawfully at large. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 23, line 40, after ("sheriff") insert the said words.—(Lord Stonham.)

LORD STONHAM: I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 23, line 41, leave out ("such a warrant") and insert ("a warrant issued by a sheriff as aforesaid").—(Lord Stonham.)

Clause 36, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 37 [Initial investigation of cases by reporter]:

LORD DRUMALBYN

We are here dealing with reports to be made by constables of a police force to the appropriate reporter in addition to the Public Prosecutor. It seemed to me that it was quite possible that the child on whom a report was made would already be in the care of a social work department, and therefore that it would be reasonable for a copy of the report to be sent also to the Director of Social Work. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— and shall send a copy thereof to the Director of Social Work."—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD HUGHES

The effect of this Amendment would be to require the police to send to the Director of Social Work copies of the report that they will be required by Clause 37(2) to send to the reporter as well as to the prosecutor—that is the Procurator Fiscal—in relation to offences alleged to be committed by children. In the light of the way in which Clause 38 outlines the procedure for the reporter, such a provision seems at least at present unnecessary and may lead to duplication. Clause 38 places the onus firmly on the reporter to decide that no further action is required or to refer the case to the local authority, which means the Director of Social Work, in order to arrange for advice, guidance and assistance; or, where he thinks the child is in need of compulsory measures of care, he must arrange a children's hearing. In other words, the Director of Social Work can expect to be involved informally at an early stage in many cases. Once a children's hearing has been arranged under Clause 38(3) he will be brought in formally and reports will be requested. To bring the Director of Social Work in immediately in cases where offences have been committed will give the police extra work; will give the Director of Social Work's officials extra work; and, more important, may blur the issue of where responsibility lies.

Of course it is impossible to be sure how events will turn out in practice. They may show that the Director of Social Work is not being brought in by the reporter at an early enough stage. Should there be any signs that this was so, then the Secretary of State has power to make regulations under Clause 35(8) in relation to the duties of the reporter. It would then be open to him to make it a matter of routine that in certain types of cases or in all cases the reporter should pass the report he receives from the police to the Director of Social Work. This is certainly a possibility which will be watched most carefully.

In these days we have a tendency to encourage multiplication of paper work on the part of everybody concerned. This is a case where we think it most likely that the Director of Social Work will get those things which he really needs, and we do not see any reason why the police, burdened already, as they are, with a multiplicity of duties for which they are inadequately staffed, and social departments who will have a great many duties to undertake, should have to deal with any paper work unless it is absolutely necessary. I am quite certain that the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, will be at one with me in that. Perhaps he will therefore accept my assurance that we are content with the object of his Amendment and will take the necessary action to ensure that what he desires is in fact brought about.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I am obliged to the noble Lord. Of course duplication is exactly the purpose of this. I do not think it would be difficult to have a copy sent to the Director of Social Work. The point was that where the Director of Social Work received a copy which referred to somebody whom he was already supervising in one way or another, he would then be able to get in touch right away with the reporter and say, "I see you have a report about somebody that I am at present dealing with." I daresay that it may be a matter of routine for the reporter to telephone the Director of Social Work at the time he gets a report and to say "Do you know anything about so-and-so?". But the purpose of this Amendment was simply to establish the point of liaison. I do not want to press it. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 37 agreed to.

Clause 38 [Action on initial investigation by reporter]:

6.43 p.m.

LORD DRUMALBYN moved, after subsection (2), to insert: () Where a case has been referred by the reporter to the local authority in accordance with the foregoing subsection, the local authority may, if they are of opinion that the subsequent conduct of the child is such as to indicate that he may be in need of compulsory care, refer the case back to the reporter, who shall, after making such further investigation as he may think necessary, proceed with the case in accordance with the provisions of the next two subsections.

The noble Lord said: Subsection (2) enables the reporter to refer the case to the local authority for advice, guidance and assistance of the child and his family. What I want to know is, what happens if the child and his family do not accept the advice, guidance and assistance? This was a point which the noble Lord may remember I made on Second Reading. It seems to me that this is the counterpart of placing a child on probation as an alternative to punishment under the present system. If the reference to the local authority does not work, ought the case to come back to the reporter? In other words, if the child or the parents are recalcitrant, ought not the case to come back to the reporter? I recognise that Clause 36 seems to go some way to cover this point, but it does not seem to me to cover it completely. This seems to deal with rather a different set of circumstances from those envisaged by Clause 36. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 24, line 15, at end insert the said sub-section.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD HUGHES

If the local authority decide that a child who has been dealt with under Clause 38(2) by voluntary action, under Part II of the Act, requires a compulsory measure of care, the reporter will be obliged to arrange a children's hearing. It is a matter of policy that the decision to arrange hearings shall rest with the reporter. In fact, the Amendment does not achieve this purpose, since the reporter's discretion is re-established in the next part of the clause, subsection (3). I therefore invite the noble Lord not to pursue this Amendment.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I do not quite understand that. Subsection (2) says: Where the reporter considers it to be the proper course, he shall refer the case to the local authority with a view to their making arrangements for the advice, guidance and assistance of the child and his family in accordance with Part II of this Act. What I am saying is that it may well be that the parents or the child refuse to accept this "advice, guidance and assistance." In that case, this particular Amendment would provide for the matter to be referred back to the reporter. It does not seem to me that Clause 36 in itself does that, unless there is a fresh incident. So it seemed to me that there would have to be some machinery for the matter, having been referred to the local authority, to come back to the reporter in case of need.

LORD HUGHES

The advice which I have is that in those circumstances Clause 38(3) cites: Where it appears to the reporter that the child is in need of compulsory measures of care, he shall arrange a children's hearing for the consideration and determination of the case. In other words, he has tried to deal with it under Clause 38(2). For the reasons envisaged by the noble Lord, it does not work. He then proceeds to deal with it under Clause 38(3) as a case where the child is in need of a compulsory measure of care. That would arise if the opportunity is not taken to deal with the matter without compulsion.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I see that this point could just be interpreted in that way; but subsections (2), (3) and (4) seem to me to be clear alternatives, and I still think that the only way in which, as the clause stands, the matter can come back to the reporter at all is where the local authority reports it back to the reporter under Clause 36(1): Where a constable or authorised officer of the local authority has reasonable cause to believe that a child may be in need of compulsory measures of care"— that is to say, where he is not taking the "advice, guidance or assistance"— he may give to the reporter such information about the child as he may have been able to discover. When you are setting out procedures in alternatives, as this clause clearly does, it seemed to me that you needed a link in Clause 38, if subsection (2) failed, to take it back to the reporter again, otherwise it rests with the local authority. However, I do not need to pursue that any further now. If there is anything in it no doubt we shall hear more about it from the noble Lord. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

LORD HUGHES moved, in subsection (3), to leave out, "for the consideration and determination of the case", and insert: to whom the case shall stand referred for consideration and determination".

The noble Lord said: This clause sets out the courses of action which are open to the reporter when he has received a report of a child who may need to be brought before a children's hearing. The effect of this drafting Amendment to subsection (3) would be to establish clearly that it is the hearing's function to consider and determine the case. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 24, line 18, leave out from ("hearing") to the end of the subsection and insert the said new words.—(Lord Hughes.)

LORD DRUMALBYN moved, in subsection (4), to leave out which may contain information from any such person as the reporter or the local authority may think fit.

The noble Lord said: This is an Amendment to leave out the last phrase. The clause reads: …it shall he the duty of the authority to supply the report"— that is the report that is requested by the reporter. In regard to that report it says: which may contain information from any such person as the reporter or the local authority may think fit. This is the report for a children's hearing that we are talking about. As it stands, it seems to me that this is unsatisfactory. The reporter may request information to be obtained from a particular person, but as the clause stands that person is under no obligation to give the information. If he does not give information, then obviously the report cannot contain the information. Therefore these words are not valid. As for the local authorities, the report can contain any information from any such person as is thought fit. One does not need to put that into the Bill since it seems to be unnecessary. The only purpose in putting it into the Bill would be to preclude the reporter from forbidding the inclusion of any such information, which I should not have thought was the intention. These words are unnecessary and impracticable. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 24, line 23, leave out from ("report") to end of line 24.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD HUGHES

This would appear to be a case in which we are going in the opposite direction from the way in which the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, generally seeks to go, and where he requires us to be a little more explicit in what we want to do. We have in fact already done what he wants in this particular case. The words which this Amendment seeks to exclude make it clear that the report which the authority are under a duty to provide to the children's hearing may contain information from persons other than members of the staff of the director of social work. As amended, the report might only express the views of the director, whereas it might be highly desirable that the views from the child's doctor or his headmaster should be included. It may be argued that the words to be omitted do not add much and that a good director of social work will include all the information which should be made available to the hearing. It seems desirable, however, to emphasise the point that the report should canvass views other than those of the director's staff, and, as worded, it would enable the reporter to ensure that where he thinks that the views of a particular person should be taken, this will be done. We feel that if the words are not included, some people will say: "It is not there, so I have no right to ask for this", and that, no matter how desirable it may be, it will not be asked for. We think that there will be cases where it would be desirable that other opinions should be canvassed and that it is of value to make it explicit.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I take it from what the noble Lord has said that the person is under no obligation to give the information requested by the reporter. If the reporter indicates that he would like information to be obtained from such and such a person, this puts an obligation on the local authority to try to get it, but it lays no duty or obligation on the person to give the information—it is purely voluntary.

LORD HUGHES

Yes, that is so. A doctor or headmaster cannot be compelled to give the information.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I am much obliged. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 38, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 39 [Attendance of chill at children's hearing]:

LORD DRUMALBYN

Amendment No. 82 raises a very small point, and seeks to delete the words "children's hearing can meet", which give an unbusiness-like and slightly ridiculous impression, and if they remain in the Bill it may be difficult to get a children's hearing together. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 25, line 11, leave out ("children's hearing can meet") and insert ("case is heard").—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD HUGHES

We looked at this Amendment on the basis that it was being put forward purely as a matter of drafting. The advice which I have been given is that it is not a satisfactory Amendment, simply because of the indefinite nature of the words "until the case is heard". It could be interpreted as meaning either the first hearing, which might need to he continued to a further hearing while more information was collected, or "until the case is disposed of". We believe that the present drafting us pre-able, since it clearly refers only to the first hearing after the child is apprehended. That hearing is able to decide the case finally, or that the child should or should not be kept in a place of safety until a further hearing takes place. This matter is a little complicated, and perhaps what I have said does not sound very informative. But after the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, has read what I said—and assuming that he does not press it at this stage—I am satisfied that he will not find it necessary to put down this Amendment again.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I am obliged to the noble Lord. This is tied up with the continuation of hearings, and so on, but it is an important point from the point of view of the liberty of the young subject. Perhaps I can follow the noble Lord's advice and have a look at it, and, if necessary put the Amendment down again. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

LORD DRUMALBYN

This Amendment, No. 83, relates to the same point, dealing with what happens when a child is apprehended and kept in a place of safety pending the hearing. The question in these circumstances is how soon the hearing should take place. This concerns a case where a child has failed to attend the hearing of his case. The reason I picked upon a period of 72 hours was partly because it occurs in another part of the Bill, and partly because of the idea in the Kilbrandon Report that the children's hearings will take place often on Fridays and Saturdays. Therefore 72 hours seems a reasonable maximum which one could impose, since the period from Friday to Monday might be a limiting factor. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 25, line 12, at end insert ("providing that the child may not be so detained for a period exceeding seventy-two hours").—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD HUGHES

I would agree with this Amendment in principle, but I would ask the noble Lord to withdraw it now, and I undertake to put something else in its place. The subsection as it stands provides that a warrant may be issued for a child's apprehension and detention in a place of safety until a hearing can meet. As the clause is drafted, there is no limit on the time which may elapse between his apprehension and hearing, and it is necessary to prescribe such a limit. On the other hand, we are not at all certain that 72 hours would prove to be a practical period of time to meet the purpose. We should like to look at the matter to find out what is a reasonable period to lay down. I accept that the clause as it stands, without limitation, is not satisfactory.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I am obliged to the noble Lord for accepting the principle of imposing a limitation of time. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 39 agreed to.

Clause 40 [Attendance of parents at children's hearing]:

7.0 p.m.

LORD DRUMALBYN moved to add to subsection (1), "whether the child is required to attend or not." The noble Lord said: Subsection (1) says: A parent of a child shall have a right to attend at all stages of a children's hearing who are considering the case of his child. The Amendment seeks to add the words: whether the child is required to attend or not. I attach a good deal of importance to this.

Clause 39(2) says: Where a children's hearing are satisfied in a case concerned with an offence mentioned in Schedule 1 to the Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937 that the attendance of a child is not necessary for the just hearing of that case, or in any case where they are satisfied that it would be detrimental to the interest of the child to be present at the hearing of his case, the case may be considered and determined in the absence of the child. It seems that a case can be considered when the child is not present. These words seek to cover that. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 25, line 15, at end insert ("whether the child is required to attend or not.").—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD STONHAM

The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, made clear that his intention in moving the Amendment was to give the parent a right of attendance at all stages of the children's hearing, whether or not the child is required to attend. We do not need this Amendment, because Clause 40(1) confers upon a parent an absolute right of attendance at all stages of the consideration of the child's case before a hearing. This right is in no way affected, whether the child is absent or present. We had this possibility clearly in mind when the Bill was drafted, and the point is covered.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I am much obliged for that assurance. I wanted to make certain that it was fully covered. Accordingly, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

LORD DRUMALBYN moved, after subsection (1), to insert as new subsections: () A child, whose case is being considered by a children's hearing, or his parent shall have a right to object on any reasonable grounds to the participation in the hearing of any member of a children's hearing. () At the commencement of any hearing the chairman shall inform the child and his parent, if present, of his right under the foregoing subsection, and, if objection is taken, the hearing shall, unless the children's hearing is of opinion that the grounds of objection are unreasonable, forthwith be adjourned, and in arranging for another hearing the reporter shall give effect to the objection.

The noble Lord said: With permission I will also deal with Amendment No. 86. These Amendments are designed to secure a right to the child or his parents to object to the presence of a particular member of a children's hearing, adjudicating in the case. Some of the representations that I have received would make the right absolute, but it seems that it should be limited to objections on reasonable grounds, that is, of prejudice or too close knowledge or something of that kind. It seemed also that if the chairman decided that the grounds were not reasonable, it would in any case be open to the child or his parent to appeal to the sheriff against the children's hearing's disposal of the case. There would be a means of challenging the chairman's decision that the grounds were not reasonable. I hope that this is so. The main purpose is to give a right of objection to the participation of a particular member of the children's hearing in the adjudication of the case.

Amendment moved— Page 25, line 15, at end insert the said subsections.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD STONHAM

I am sure the noble Lord appreciates that the effect of his Amendment would be to enable the child or his parents to object to a member of the panel on any reasonable grounds, and if they did so the hearing would have to be adjourned and rearranged without the person objected to. I am not cavilling at the aim behind the noble Lord's Amendment, but feel that it is unacceptable because at each hearing an objection could be raised requiring an adjournment. The child and the parents would have an effective power to frustrate the work of the hearing. It would be better to secure the interests of the child and parent in the way that the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, wishes, by rules made under Clause 34(4). To this end we should like to consult the Council on Tribunals for the best form of rule for this purpose. There is nothing at issue between us about the objective, but if the Amendment were accepted there could be a case of complete obstruction and frustration of the purpose that we both have in mind.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I am much obliged for that explanation. It was not my purpose to secure the obstruction of children's hearings in this way. The course that has been suggested is most suitable, and I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

LORD DRUMALBYN

If a parent has a right to attend, the fact that in the opinion of the children's hearing his attendance would be detrimental to the hearing of the case seems irrelevant. The purpose of this Amendment is to leave out the words "or detrimental" in line 20. To include them might mean the reporter in the children's hearing bringing pressure on the parent not to be present, and this would be a serious infringement of the parent's right to be present under Clause 40(1). If a parent applies to be excused from the hearing under the clause the sole criterion for granting or refusing the application should surely be: Is his presence necessary? I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 25, line 20, leave out ("or detrimental") —(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD STONHAM

The noble Lord is perfectly right. The words which he seeks to delete are irrelevant, and it is sufficient for the children's hearing to be empowered to decide whether or not the presence of a parent who wishes to be excused or has difficulty in being present is necessary. For that reason, I would advise your Lordships to accept the Amendment.

LORD DRUMALBYN

The purpose of this Amendment is to secure that a parent should not be fined for non-attendance at a children's hearing if he did not receive notice requiring him to attend. I dare say that if he could prove in court that he did not receive notice he would probably not be fined anyway, but it is just as well to make this specific. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 25, line 21, leave out from ("person") to first ("shall") in line 22 and insert (", having received notice requiring him to attend a children's hearing and not having been excused in accordance with the foregoing subsection, fails to comply with the notice")—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD STONHAM

The Amendment draws attention to the notice which the parent should receive of the hearing. In the Government's view, subsection (3) read with subsection (2) is adequate. The business of drawing attention to it would be provided for by rules under Clause 35(5) and the complementary requirement on the parent to attend is by subsection (2) of this clause. Nothing can be achieved that is not already achieved by the Bill as drafted. If the noble Lord were to insist that the matter should be spelled out in more detail, I must point out that the Amendment is defective since it would have to include: "…having received notice under this part of this Act." This would be necessary in the same way as there is a reference in subsection (1) of Clause 39 to the procedure whereby the child receives the notice. I hope that the noble Lord will agree that the Amendment should be withdrawn.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I am not in the least surprised to know that my Amendment is technically defective. I am quite satisfied with the noble Lord's assurance that this matter will be covered by rules. For that reason, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 40, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 41 [Conduct of children's hearing and summary application to sheriff for findings]:

LORD DRUMALBYN moved, in subsection (2)(a), after "accept" to insert: or if his parent is not present the child accepts,".

The noble Lord said: This Amendment goes with Amendment No. 94, to leave out subsection (8). It seems to me that the drafting of the Bill is, in general, clear and intelligible, but at the end of Clause 41 there seems to be a sudden lapse. In my view, subsections (7) and (8) are decidedly sub-standard. Subsection (8), which Amendment No. 94 seeks to delete, reads as follows: The acceptance by a parent of the grounds of referral shall not be a requirement to pro- ceeding with a case under this section where the parent is not present. In any event, I do not see why this should be put in as an after-thought in the clause. My Amendment would bring it to the forefront of the clause so that at line 33, page 25, it would read: where the child and his parent accept or it his parent is not_present the child accepts, the grounds stated by the reporter for the referral the hearing shall proceed". That seems to me to be perfectly clear and to make subsection (8) unnecessary. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 25, line 33, after ("accept") insert ("or if his parent is not present the child accepts,"). —(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD STONHAM

The noble Lord will, I think, accept that if his Amendment No. 89 is unacceptable—and I regret to have to tell him that it is—his Amendment No. 94 to delete subsection (8) falls. The effect of the deletion of subsection (8) would be to make it impossible to proceed with a hearing unless a parent were present, even if the parents could not be found. In our view, that would be wholly unacceptable. With regard to Amendment No. 89, apparently the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, wants to make it clear that if a parent is not present and a child accepts the grounds stated for referral of a case, the hearing should proceed. The difficulty here is that it is, presumably, the intention of the noble Lord that the hearing should similarly proceed in subsection (2)(b) and (c) in the absence of the parent, but the absence of specific provision there would certainly cast doubt upon this. In our view, the aim of Amendment No. 89 is already achieved by subsection (8), which the noble Lord wishes to delete. In these circumstances, I feel either that his apprehensions have no foundation or that his aim is misconceived.

LORD DRUMALBYN

My æsthetic sense is offended, if I may put it that way. I quite agree that if we amended paragraph (a) as I should like, we should also make an Amendment in paragraph (b). I am sorry that I did not put down such an Amendment. It would obviously follow. I do not attach a very great deal of importance to the Amendment. I merely think that subsection (8) is very inelegant and that the Amendment would be a more elegant method. However, the noble Lord does not agree. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

LORD STONHAM moved, in subsection (2), to leave out from the beginning of paragraph (c) to the first "sheriff" in subsection (3) and insert: (c) in any other case, unless they decide to discharge the referral, the children's hearing shall direct the reporter to make application to the sheriff for a finding as to whether such grounds for the referral, as are not accepted by the child or his parent, have been established having regard to the provisions of section 31 of this Act. (3) An application under the last foregoing subsection shall be heard by".

The noble Lord said: I should like the Committee to consider also Amendment No. 91, to substitute a new subsection (6). The clause makes it a duty of the chairman of a children's hearing to explain to the child and his parent the grounds stated by the reporter for bringing the child before the hearing and to find out whether they accept the grounds either in whole or in part. As the clause stands, the procedure to be followed, in cases where a child or his parent does not accept, or a child whose parent is not present does not understand the grounds, is that the hearing—unless it is decided to discharge the referral—must refer the case to the sheriff for a finding on the facts of such grounds as are not accepted or understood.

Such reference is to be by way of summary application to the sheriff in chambers, who is given specific power to ask for reports and who may make one or other of the following findings: (a) that the grounds are established, in which event he must refer the case back to the reporter to arrange a hearing to proceed with it; or (b) that the grounds have not been established, in which case he must dismiss the application and discharge the referral. Amendment No. 90 would have two effects. First, it would make more explicit that what the sheriff is required to do in response to an application for "a finding on facts" is to establish whether the grounds for referral as defined in Clause 31 have been made out. Secondly, the Amendment to subsection (3) removes the reference to summary application and leaves it open for a different, uniform and simpler procedure to be laid down.

Amendment No. 91 would meet a point raised by the sheriffs that it is important that the standards of proof required should be clearly laid down. The procedure before the sheriff is clearly a civil procedure to which normal civil standards of proof of "balance of probability" might be expected to apply. The difficulty arises in cases where the ground for the referral is the commission of an offence, as stated in Clause 31(2)(g). The proposed solution is that the sheriff, in hearing an application in relation to such a case, must apply the standard of proof required in criminal procedure. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 25, line 40, leave out from beginning to ("the sheriff") in line 2 on page 26 and insert the said new words —(Lord Stonham.)

LORD DRUMALBYN

I am grateful to the noble Lord for having moved this Amendment. But I think he will agree that this is rather a complicated matter, and I should like time to examine it before the next stage of the Bill.

LORD STONHAM

I beg to move Amendment No. 91.

Amendment moved—

Page 26, line 13, leave out subsection (6) and insert— ("(6) Where the sheriff is satisfied on the evidence before him that the grounds in respect of which the application has been made have been established he shall remit the case to the reporter to make arrangements for a children's hearing for consideration and determination of the case, and where a ground for the referral of the case is the condition referred to in section 31(2)(g) of this Act, the sheriff in hearing the case shall apply to the evidence relating to that ground the standard of proof required in criminal procedure.")—(Lord Stonham.)

LORD DRUMALBYN

This is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 26, line 17, leave out ("and").— (Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD DRUMALBYN

I beg to move Amendment No. 93.

Amendment moved— Page 26, line 18, after ("present") insert ("and").—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

7.25 p.m.

LORD DRUMALBYN moved, in subsection (8), after "by" to insert "a child or". The noble Lord said: This is by way of being an exploratory Amendment. Taken with No. 96 it would make subsection (8) read: The acceptance by a child or a parent of the grounds of referral shall not be a requirement to proceeding with a case under this section where the child or the parent, as the case may be, is not present. Am I right in thinking that the hearing cannot proceed unless the child is present, except in the circumstances prescribed in Clause 39(2), which relates to Schedule 1 to the Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act; that is, where an offence has been committed against the child? In other words, in any case where the child has committed an offence, or for some reason or another is in need of compulsory care, then the child will always be present at a hearing and the child's acceptance is an invariable prerequisite to proceeding with the hearing. Incidentally, I much prefer the word "prerequisite" to the word "requirement". However, that is a matter of taste. But is this so? The purpose of this Amendment is to elicit this important information in connection with the whole conduct of children's hearings. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 26, line 26, after ("by") insert ("a child or").—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD STONHAM

The effect of the noble Lord's Amendment is perfectly clear. It would be to allow a children's hearing to proceed with a child's case without the child's or his parent's acceptance of the grounds if neither was present at the hearing. This would not be acceptable—

LORD DRUMALBYN

If the noble Lord will forgive me, that is not so, be-cause the words are "a child or the parent, as the case may be". Obviously, the words could not be interpreted to mean "neither". It must be one or the other. The key word is "or".

LORD STONHAM

I think that is exactly what I said. The noble Lord's Amendment could not be accepted, because the purpose of subsection (8) is to make it clear that a hearing can proceed with a child's case without the acceptance of the parent if he is not there. Apart from cases where the parent may simply have disappeared, his attendance, as subsection (2) of Clause 40 provides, may not always be required by the hearing if it is satisfied that it would be unreasonable or unnecessary. But in those circumstances the child's acceptance would still be required. It is entirely appropriate that either a child should have to accept the grounds or that the matter should go to the sheriff. I do not suppose the noble Lord needs me to enlarge on the kind of case where it would be unreasonable to expect the child to accept the grounds, as he can well imagine such a case. But that is the position as we see it, and though my noble friend Lord Hughes will certainly consider what the noble Lord has said, on my understanding of the case his Amendment is unacceptable.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I think I understand what the position is. Of course there are cases—and the Bill provides for these—where the acceptance of the child is not necessary, because the child cannot be expected to understand the grounds of the referral; and that I understand. As I said, this Amendment is exploratory and to make quite clear that, apart from such a case, and the case covered by Clause 39, the child must be present and must accept the grounds of a hearing before the matter can proceed. I hope the noble Lord can tell me that is so, because it is crucial to the Bill.

LORD STONHAM

I am happy to be able to say that the answer is, Yes.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I am much obliged to the noble Lord. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 41, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 42 [Power of children's hearing to order further investigation after consideration of the facts]:

LORD DRUMALBYN

This is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 26, line 36, after ("decide") insert ("that").—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD DRUMALBYN

This is a question of the time that a child can be held during further investigations. Earlier in the Bill a period of 21 days is laid down for investigations, but we are now dealing with the case where there already has been a hearing and further investigations are required. It seemed to me that perhaps 21 days was rather long and that 14 days would be more appropriate. On the other hand, there is the question of holding a child for assessment, and I have no idea how long that would take. It might he expected to take more than 21 days in certain cases, and in that event I wonder what the procedure would be. 'There could be a case of mental health or something of that kind. But an absolute 21 days seems either too much or too little, and this Amendment would reduce the period to 14 days. Of course, I imagine the period could always be continued in cases of need. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 27, line 4, leave out ("twenty-one") and insert ("fourteen").—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD STONHAM

As the noble Lord has made clear, the effect of his Amendment would be to restrict detention for further investigation to 14 days under subsection (4)(a) of Clause 42, and to restrict further detention to a similar period. I do not think the Amendment is either necessary or helpful, and I want to explain why. First of all, the circumstances in Clause 43 are such that interim detention for further investigation is to be embarked on only when it is either necessary to secure the attendance of the child or is necessary in the child's own interest. In the vast majority of cases further investigation will not require interim detention, or even a requirement to attend a clinic. Where it does so require, the circumstances will normally be circumstances of non-co-operation, mainly of the child, where the reports obtained have not been particularly helpful. The interim detention will provide the first opportunity for a careful assessment of that child. The first reason, as it were, justifies the detention; the second reason justifies the period.

The professional advice available to the Secretary of State leads us to the belief that in most cases it should be possible to complete the necessary assessments by three weeks, but that two weeks is perhaps not quite enough in some cases. We are talking about a maximum period: we are not talking about a minimum. We think it would be a pity to have to bring in the hearing again after two weeks when the case would perhaps be completed very shortly thereafter. Needless to say, the guidance of my right honourable friend the Secretary of State would make it quite clear that such detention should last no longer than was necessary for the investigation required. I hope that, in view of that explanation, which convinces even me, the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, may feel able to withdraw his Amendment.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I am glad that the noble Lord has convinced himself. He has also convinced me, and therefore I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 42, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 43 [Disposal of case by children's hearing other than by discharge of referral]:

LORD STONHAM

I beg to move Amendment 100.

Amendment moved— Page 27, line 32, leave out subsection (4).—(Lord Stonham.)

Clause 43, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 44 [Rules as respects transmission of information and conveyance of children to residential establishments etc.]:

7.32 p.m.

LORD STONHAM

I beg to move Amendment No. 101—and I am delighted to have exceeded the century. Clause 44 deals with the mechanics of transferring information about children subject to supervision requirements from the reporter to the persons who are to be in charge of them, and of the conveyance of such children to residential establishments and to other places where they may be required to reside. The aim of this rule-making power is to provide guidance, and thus to avoid difficulties between the various authorities concerned. The effect of the Amendment which I am now moving would be to ensure that rules made under this clause enable temporary accommodation to be provided where a child cannot go immediately to the particular residential establishment in which the hearing has decided he should be placed. I think this is a very useful provision. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 28, line 23, after ("them") insert (", for the temporary accommodation, where necessary, of such children,").—(Lord Stonham.)

Clause 44, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 45 agreed to.

Clause 46 [Duration of supervision requirements and their variation]:

On Question, Whether Clause 46 shall stand part of the Bill?

LORD DRUMALBYN

I should like to ask a question about subsection (2) of this clause, which is a rather important one. It says: A supervision requirement shall cease to have effect in respect of a child when he attains the age of eighteen years", and so on. The point I have in mind is that a person might be still under supervision when he was between the ages of 16 and 18, and then, being under supervision, and being subject to the children's hearing jurisdiction and not, normally, to the sheriff's court's jurisdiction, he might towards the end of this period commit some serious offence. Yet, despite that further serious offence, he might still continue to be simply under supervision as a child because he had been under supervision before he was 16 and the supervision ran on. In a case like that, it would seem to be wrong even to contemplate that the supervision requirement should end at 18. Of course, the answer may be that in such circumstances if he committed a serious offence he would probably be prosecuted on the instructions of the Lord Advocate, and that would be that —this case would not then arise. But I think this point is of sufficient substance to make it worth raising, in order to see what would happen in such a case.

LORD STONHAM

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, for raising this point, and I am quite certain that it is of sufficient substance to justify his raising it. I would ask him to allow me to look into the point and to inform him in due course—at least, my noble friend Lord Hughes will inform him—of the result of our consideration of his point.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I am much obliged to the noble Lord.

Clause 46 agreed to.

Clause 47 [Review of requirement of children's hearing]:

LORD DRUMALBYN

This is a relatively small drafting Amendment. It seems to me that the wording as it is: and where there is a failure to review a supervision requirement within the period of one year might well he an unjustified slur on somebody. It implies an omission or oversight, or neglect. The child may have been quite deliberately left under supervision for a year, and there may have been no failure at all on the part of anyone. I should prefer the neutral words which I have put down, so that the clause would read: where a supervision requirement is not reviewed within the period of one year". I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 29, line 25, leave out from ("where") to ("within") in line 26 and insert ("a supervision requirement is not reviewed")—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD STONHAM

I do not accept that this would be an unjustified slur, but I accept that this is a useful drafting Amendment which I should advise your Lordships to accept.

Clause 47, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 48 [Appeal against decision of a children's hearing]:

LORD STONHAM

I beg to move Amendment No. 103, and I should be grateful if your Lordships would consider at the same time Nos. 107 and 108, on page 30, at lines 30 and 32, respectively. These Amendments have the effect of deleting the reference to procedure by way of summary application to the sheriff, which has also been deleted from Clause 41 by Amendment No. 90. They are not precisely consequential, but are almost equivalent thereto. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 30, line 3, leave out ("by way of summary application")—(Lord Stonham.)

LORD DRUMALBYN

The purpose of this Amendment—it may not be necessary, but the purpose of putting the Amendment down is to find out whether it is necessary—is, I think, self-explanatory. I propose to insert a new subsection in the following terms: Where a child appeals in accordance with the foregoing subsection,"— that is, to a sheriff in chambers— the reporter shall inform his parent of the time fixed for the hearing of the application, and the parent shall have a right to attend". It seems to me that it is right that the parent should be present at a hearing by the sheriff in chambers just as much as at a children's hearing. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 30, line 6, at end insert— ("() Where a child appeals in accordance with the foregoing subsection, the reporter shall inform his parent of the time fixed for the hearing of the application, and the parent shall have a right to attend.")—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD STONHAM

It is quite right and proper for the noble Lord to raise this point. If his Amendment were accepted, it would give the parent of a child, in addition to his right to attend all stages of a children's hearing, a right to attend when an appeal against a decision of a children's hearing was being heard by the sheriff in chambers. But it would not be appropriate. The sheriff, sitting in chambers for any purpose, has complete discretion as to whom he may or may not admit, and it is felt that it might be inappropriate to impose upon him by Statute a duty to admit parents to the hearing of appeals under Clause 48.

There seems no objection in principle to the proposal that the child's parent should be informed of the time fixed for the hearing of the application, but the parent's admittance or otherwise to the hearing would be for the sheriff to decide, and it might he expected that the attendance of the parent would usually be re- garded by the sheriff as of advantage. As to the mechanics of informing the parent, it may be that this should be done by the reporter or possibly by the sheriff clerk. This is a matter we should like to consider and in due course to work out with the various authorities concerned. But with regard to making it a duty by Statute imposed on the sheriff, we feel we must say "No". I hope the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, will share that view.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I am not at all sure about that. The child appealing to a sheriff is presumably entitled also to legal aid. It seems very illogical that the parent should have to be present at the children's hearing but that if the appeal should be made in the name of the child or if the child himself should appeal (whichever the lawyers decide) the parent would not then have the right to be present. I imagine the answer is that it will be the parent who appeals in that case, if he is not getting his rights. I do not think we should be unduly frightened of making an innovation in regard to imposing a right to attend at a hearing by the sheriff in chambers, even if that right is unprecedented at the present time. We are setting up entirely new machinery and it would not be surprising if we had new procedures. It might be more appropriate to do it by Rules; but it seems to me to be tidier to have provision for it in the Bill. However, as the noble Lord has said he is going to look at it, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

LORD STONHAM

I beg to move Amendment 105 on behalf of my noble friend. This is a drafting Amendment designed to tie in reference to appeal with a particular decision of a children's hearing in respect of which it has been made.

Amendment moved— Page 30, line 27, leave out ("such a") and insert ("that").—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to,

LORD STONHAM

I beg to move Amendment No. 107 formally.

Amendment moved— Page 30, line 30, leave out ("a summary application") and insert ("an appeal").—(Lord Stonham.)

LORD STONHAM

I beg to move Amendment No. 108.

Amendment moved— Page 30, line 32, leave out ("application") and insert ("appeal").—(Lord Stonham.)

Clause 48, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 49 [Appeal to Court of Session]:

7.43 p.m.

LORD HUGHES

With the Committee's permission I should like to move Amendments Nos. 109, 110, 111 and 112 together. These are associated Amendments. As it stands, this clause provides for appeal to the Court of Session at the instance of a child or his parent, or of the reporter, in two circumstances: first, against a decision by the sheriff in a case which is referred to him for a finding where the grounds for referral to a children's hearing by the reporter are not accepted by the child or his parent; and, second, against a decision by the sheriff in relation to an appeal against a decision of a children's hearing heard by the sheriff under Clause 48(1). The Amendments to page 30, lines 36 and 38, would withdraw the power given to the Court of Session by subsection (1) to give leave for an appeal if the sheriff had previously refused it. This was a slightly unusual provision and following consultation with a number of legal interests—these included sheriffs principal and substitute, principal clerk of Session, clerk of Justiciary, sheriff clerks and procurator fiscals, who were all seen at a meeting chaired in Edinburgh by the Lord Advocate—it was decided to leave it out.

The Amendment to page 30, line 41, would remove the right of appeal on a question of public interest. Legal interests are of the opinion that this would be an unusual power and can think of no cases that might arise which could not otherwise he dealt with by the sheriff certifying that a point of law was involved. The Amendment to page 31, line 3, would provide that appeals to the Court of Session are to be by way of stated case. The opinion of legal interests is that this would be the normal and the best course. I beg to move Amendments Nos. 109 to 112 inclusive.

Amendments moved—

Page 30, line 36, leave out from ("sheriff") to ("at")

Page 30, line 38, after ("sheriff") insert ("under this Part of this Act, and no other appeal shall be competent")

Page 30, line 41, leave out from ("decision") to the end of line 43.

Page 31, line 3, leave out from ("decision") to end of line 5 and insert (". and any appeal under this section shall be by way of stated case").—(Lord Hughes.)

LORD DRUMALBYN

It is puzzling to know why this was first put into the Bill and later, after consultation, taken out. It is very puzzling to a layman to know why it is thought by lawyers that a question of public interest can never be involved in an appeal of this type. If a question of public interest cannot be involved there is no particular reason for giving the Court of Session a power to override a refusal of the sheriff to give leave to appeal—because I think that could happen only on a question of public interest. That is a surprising view. The difficulty here is that we are moving in uncharted territory. I should have thought it impossible to predict what sort of cases of public interest might arise. No wonder the legal experts cannot think of a case; it has not happened yet; it is uncharted territory. For my part, I am somewhat reluctant to let this go through. I have the feeling that a case of public interest is likely to arise. It is quite impossible to foresee it. I think it would be better to keep these words in.

LORD HUGHES

The difficulty we were in, having decided to consult these legal interests about these rather novel legal points, is that having obtained their advice it was difficult not to accept it, particularly when this very powerful gathering, with their legal experience and background, could not think a case would arise which could not be dealt with by the sheriff certifying that a point of law was involved. They do not think that circumstances can arise which cannot be dealt with under the procedure as it is at present. If my right honourable friend the Lord Advocate was persuaded, then the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, would not expect me to venture into these troubled waters.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I am much obliged to the noble Lord.

Clause 49, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 50 [Rehearing after appeal and subsequent appeal]:

LORD HUGHES

This is a drafting Amendment consequential to the removal of the references to "summary application" in Clause 48 by a previous Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 31, line 17, leave out ("by way of summary application").—(Lord Hughes.)

Clause 50, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 51 [Power of Secretary of State to terminate supervision requirement]:

LORD HUGHES

With permission, I will refer also to Amendment No. 115, as they are related Amendments. These are purely drafting Amendments, designed, respectively, to generalise the reference to a case in line 22 and to remove any ambiguity in the word "him" in line 24. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 31, line 22, leave out second ("the") and insert ("a").—(Lord Hughes.)

LORD HUGHES

I beg to move Amendment No. 115.

Amendment moved— Page 31, line 24, leave out ("him") and insert ("the child").—(Lord Hughes.)

LORD DRUMALBYN

I do not think we can let this Amendment go without comment. I cannot believe that there could be any ambiguity in fact. It could not mean that the Secretary of State is satisfied about his supervision. But we will accept the Amendment.

Clause 51, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 52 [Legal aid in proceedings before the sheriff and any appeals to the Courts of Session]:

LORD HUGHES

I might say about the previous remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, that if the draftsman expresses the view that there is ambiguity about his own wording, who am I to argue with him? This again is purely a drafting Amendment to make it clear that the proceedings before the sheriff or in any subsequent appeal to the Court of Session are proceedings in respect of a decision of a children's hearing. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 31, line 28, after ("of") insert ("a decision of").—(Lord Hughes.)

LORD DRUMALBYN

I was not certain that this was purely a drafting Amendment. Might it not be about the procedure at a children's hearing? It may well be that the procedure is not right and I should have thought that the procedure at a children's hearing should also be covered. I hope that these words will not be inserted, and I wonder whether the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, would reconsider the matter.

LORD HUGHES

I have not yet caught up with the place. Would the noble Lord like to leave this matter on the basis that I will have a look at it? I do not think he is right, but I should not like to be dogmatic without taking time to look at the Amendment alongside the Bill, which would be rather time wasting at this stage. If the noble Lord will allow the Amendment to be made, if there is substance in his point I will put down another Amendment at a later stage.

Clause 52, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 53 [Transfer of cases to another children's hearing]:

LORD HUGHES

Once again this is listed as a drafting Amendment. I do not know whether he is doing it intentionally, but the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, is beginning to shake my confidence in my notes. I am informed that this is a drafting Amendment designed to make it clear that the children's hearing has the power at any stage in its proceedings to transfer a case to another hearing. The words, "during their consideration of the case" in Clause 53 made this somewhat doubtful, as Clause 41 separates "consideration of the case" from the ascertainment as to whether the facts are accepted. It might not be possible, therefore, as the Bill stands, to transfer cases after facts have been established, although that is the occasion when the power is most likely to be used. The Amendment will enable transfers to take place at any time. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 31, line 37, leave out from ("during") to ("request") in line 38, and insert ("the course of the hearing").—(Lord Hughes.)

Clause 53, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 54 agreed to.

On Question, Whether Clause 55 shall stand part of the Bill?

LORD DRUMALBYN

I merely wish to ask what kind of order under the dispensation the court will be able to make. If there is to be no imposition of detention as a punishment, I am wondering what kind of order the court will be able to make in respect of children, except to refer the case back to the reporter as is said here. My remarks relate to line 3 in Clause 55.

LORD HUGHES

I am afraid that I cannot answer that point off-hand. I have now received a note, which I thought I should get eventually. Unfortunately, although the first word on the note is "fine" and the last word is "caution", I cannot read the second word. Would two out of three satisfy the noble Lord?

Clause 55 agreed to.

Clause 56 agreed to.

Clause 57 [Prohibition of publication of proceedings]:

7.57 p.m.

LORD DRUMALBYN moved, in subsection (3), after "justice" to insert "or in the public interest". The noble Lord said: We are here dealing with prohibition of the publication of proceedings. Subsection (3) of Clause 57 states: The Secretary of State may in any case, if satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to do so, by order dispense with the requirements of subsection (1) of this section to such an extent as may be specified in the order. Subsection (1) limits the right of anybody to reveal the name, address or school; or include any particulars calculated to lead to the identification of any child concerned in a hearing. The Amendment would put in the words, "or in the public interest." The fact is that even boys of 14 to 16 could be dangerous.

The noble Lord will be aware that there has been considerable interest focused on what happens when people escape from prison in Scotland and the amount of publicity which may be given to that. In the same way it is conceivable that in the public interest it might be desirable for the Secretary of State to dispense with the requirements of subsection (1). I take it that "the interests of justice" relate to a case where a child of between 14 and 16 is obviously culpable and is charged and prosecuted before the sheriff. In such cases it may well be that there will be a public interest, and that it would be in the public interest that publication should be made. I am not sure whether it would not be better to deal with the next Amendment also—or even with the whole of this clause at one time. I am seriously concerned about whether this clause is workable at all.

We started by having a clause which was to extend not only to Scotland but also to England and Wales. This is a clause which places a ban on the publication of the proceedings of a children's hearing or proceedings before a sheriff under Clause 41. From the next Amendment, it seems that it is proposed to leave out the application to England and Wales, so that we are to have the totally ridiculous situation that it will not be permissible to publish what happened in a children's hearing in Scotland but that it may be published in England and Wales. That would be all right if the case had not already received some notoriety, and there is no ban, and cannot be a ban, on the publication of the details of an incident which may give rise to a children's hearing.

Suppose there was a notorious case of arson or of causing a rail accident. At the time when it occurred nobody would know whether the person concerned was a child or an adult and full publicity would be given to the incident. The public would want to know what happened subsequently, but under this Amendment it is going "under the carpet" entirely. Surely this is the kind of case where it would be in the public interest that the facts should be published in Scotland. Public alarm might be aroused and ought to be assuaged by being told that appropriate action had been taken. That is going to happen in England if the matter was originally reported in England as well as in Scotland and if public interest was aroused there. We may be certain that Press reports will appear in England and Wales, yet under the Bill they will not be allowed to appear in Scotland.

This does not seem to me to be workable at all. I understand the object of keeping children's hearings private, so far as possible. The noble Lord has said that all this is to be worked out with the Press, but when it comes to the bit they are not to be allowed to publish anything about the culprits. In the large majority of cases it would be right that these hearings should be treated privately, both in the interests of justice and in the public interest, but there will be a number of cases where it will be in the public interest that the full facts should be disclosed. I hope that the noble Lord will look at this point again and will be able to give us a better idea of how this clause is intended to work.

Amendment moved— Page 33, line 16, after ("justice") insert ("or in the public interest").—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD HUGHES

I am afraid that my next Amendment. No. 119, has rather confused the position for the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn. May I say right away that the only reason I shall be moving that Amendment is that it was found on closer examination that subsection (4) is not required, as the extension of Clause 57 to England and Wales is provided for in Clause 95. Subsection (4) has to come out only because we are doing it twice. We have not changed the position in relation to England and Wales, as I think the noble Lord was entitled to assume from the proposed excision of this subsection.

If I may return to Amendment No. 118, Clause 57, as drafted, is based on Section 54 of the Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937, which empowers the Secretary of State to dispense with the prohibition of publication only in the interests of justice. The corresponding provision for England and Wales is in identical terms. To import a new concept of public interest in this context could be done only after much more careful thought than has been given to it up to the present, and our present view is that it is wiser to adhere to the reasons which are in the existing legislation, both in England and Wales and in Scotland. Having said that, may I let the noble Lord know, quite irrelevantly, what was the missing word in regard to his question on Clause 55? He will never believe me when I tell him that I genuinely could not read the second word which was "probation".

LORD DRUMALBYN

In view of what the noble Lord has said I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment. In regard to the second thing he said, somewhat out of order, on probation, I had been under the impression that probation no longer applied to children. Now I understand that it is only children's hearings which cannot order probation, but that courts will still be able to do so.

LORD HUGHES

That would appear to be the position.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

LORD HUGHES

I have already explained the purpose of this Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 33, line 19, leave out subsection (4).—(Lord Hughes.)

Clause 57, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 58 and 59 agreed to.

Clause 60 [Control of residential and other establishments]:

LORD HUGHES

This clause gives the Secretary of State power to make regulations as to the conduct of residential and other establishments managed by local authorities, voluntary organisations or any other person and which provide accommodation for persons in need. The aim of the rule-making power is to secure the welfare of persons in such establishments. The Amendment is purely drafting. The word "and" in line 22 has been found to be unnecessary. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 34, line 22, leave out ("and").—(Lord Hughes.)

Clause 60, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 61 agreed to.

Clause 62 [Registration]:

LORD HUGHES

This is a purely drafting Amendment. To be consistent, the singular form is appropriate. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 35, line 27, leave out ("persons") and insert ("person").—(Lord Hughes.

8.9 p.m.

THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN moved, in subsection (4), to leave out from "establishments" to the end of the subsection. The noble Marquess said: This Amendment concerns the powers of local authorities to cancel the registration of a person in respect of an establishment. I can see that the first part of subsection (4) is perfectly reasonable, in that it enables a local authority to cancel a registration on the ground that the person registered has been convicted of an offence against this Act or against the regulations under this Part of the Act concerning the use of these establishments or their conduct. What I fail to understand is why the ground that any other person has been convicted of an offence in respect of that establishment should affect the cancellation of the registration of the first person. My Amendment seeks to leave out the second proviso. Perhaps the noble Lord could explain what is behind that. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 36, line 19, leave out from ("establishments") to end of line 21.—(The Marquess of Lothian.)

LORD HUGHES

I must agree with the noble Marquess that it is not clear on a first or even a second reading of this clause why we should wish to include these words, but in fact there is a perfectly simple reason. It could be that someone other than the person registered had been convicted of an offence in relation to an establishment. It is always difficult to talk about cases, for fear that people think you are talking about a case that really exists. I want to make it quite clear that I am not doing that. The sort of case one has in mind is that an assistant matron might have been found guilty of cruelty to a child in the establishment. It might, therefore, be reasonable that it should be part of the continued registration that that person no longer continue in this employment. But the registered person, for reasons which seem perfectly good to him or her, might not be willing to dispense with the services of that particular person. We think there could be circumstances where such an offence not being dealt with should be reason for cancelling the registration. It is really a sanction against an unsuitable person's being continued in employment in the place. As noble Lords will appreciate, there are appeals against the cancellation of a registration. We do not think that any hardship is being imposed. On the other hand, we think it is a necessary safeguard which could arise in some circumstances.

THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN

I am grateful to the noble Lord for explaining this matter. I now see the point behind it. But, to be frank, I am not absolutely happy about the wording of the subsection as drafted. Perhaps I can have another look at it, and in the meantime I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 62, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 63 agreed to.

Clause 64 [Appeals against refusal or cancellation of registration]:

LORD HUGHES

With your Lordships' permission, I will move Amendments Nos. 123 and 124 together. These are drafting Amendments. The mandatory "shall" is the appropriate word on page 38, line 11 and the substitution in page 38, lines 29 and 30, provides a more accurate reference to a notice of intention to appeal. I beg to move.

Amendments moved—

Page 38, line 11, leave out ("will") and insert ("shall")

Page 38, line 29, leave out from ("notice") to end of line 30 and insert ("to which the appeal relates").—(Lord Hughes.)

Clause 64, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 65 [Removal of persons from establishments]:

LORD HUGHES

With your Lordships' permission I will move Amendments Nos. 125 and 126 together. Again these are drafting Amendments. The Amendment to page 38, line 44, is necessary because it is also a contravention of Clause 61 for a person who ought to be registered to carry on an establishment without being so registered, and the Secretary of State may in such circumstances require the local authority to act. The Amendment to page 39, line 6, provides a more accurate form of wording, as subsection (1) places a function with a local authority rather than a duty upon them. I beg to move.

Amendments moved—

Page 38, line 44, after ("him") insert ("or ought to be so registered").

Page 39, line 6, leave out from ("For the") to ("of a") and insert ("performance of the functions").—(Lord Hughes.)

Clause 65, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 66 agreed to.

Clause 67 [Inspection of establishments by local authorities]:

LORD HUGHES

This clause provides the authority for any duly authorised officer of a local authority to enter any establishment registrable under Part IV of the Bill, or which he has reasonable cause to believe is being used as a registrable establishment, to see how the place is being run, its general condition and the condition and treatment of persons in it, and to inspect records or registers. The Amendment is purely drafting in order to be consistent in using the word "officer". I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 40, line 21, leave out ("person") and insert ("officer").—(Lord Hughes.)

Clause 67, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 68 agreed to.

Clause 69 [Escape from a place of safety, or from the control of a person imposed by a supervision requirement]:

LORD DRUMALBYN

This Amendment and Amendments Nos. 129, 133 and 134 go together. In each case it is proposed to substitute the word "absconds" for "escapes". I am informed—I am not certain whether it is right—that "absconds" is the technical term here. It seems to be a better word in the context. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 41, line 5, leave out ("escapes") and insert ("absconds").—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD HUGHES

There is not much in this point, but the information that I am given is that it may be that the word "absconds" does not always fit very closely with the concept of the kind of establishment that the child is removing himself from. The word "absconds" is also, apparently, from a drafting point of view, to some extent restrictive in its meaning. Perhaps the best I could offer to your Lordships is to ask that the clause stands as it is at the moment, and we will have another look at it to find out whether we can get another word which combines the virtues of "absconds" and "escapes" which is acceptable.

I know the reasoning behind the preference for the word "absconds" on the part of some of the officers—for instance, they think it is perhaps psychologically a better word to use. But if noble Lords will accept my suggestion, we will see whether we can think of something else. I may say that one of the suggestions which was made was that we should put in the very simple term "runs away". But that suggestion fell clown because it might be that if he walked out or went out on his hands and knees you could not do anything about it.

LORD DRUMALBYN

If I remember rightly, the words "runs away" come into the Bill somewhere. The word "escapes" implies that the person who escapes is being held in some way Dr another. I do not know what is the right word, but I agree to what the noble Lord has suggested, and beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

LORD HUGHES

This is a drafting Amendment. The phrase to be omitted has no relevance in relation to a supervision requirement which includes a condition of residence in a residential establishment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 41, line 18, leave out ("either 10 that person or").—(Lord Hughes.)

LORD DRUMALBYN

It is thought that it may not be practicable to return a child right away to the residential establishment from which he has escaped or absconded; and in addition, in some circumstances it might not be desirable, as the child might have a justifiable cause for complaint, if not for actually absconding. If the noble Lord agrees that there may be circumstances in which it is not appropriate to return the child to the residential establishment from which he has escaped, then perhaps he would think fit to add these words. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 41, line 19, at end insert ("or to a place of safety").—(Lord Drutnalbyn.)

LORD HUGHES

The difficulty which we see in this Amendment is that if we were to accept it we might be placing ourselves in the position that a person would be taken to an establishment where there was no direct machinery in the Bill for dealing with him, and no provision for his being brought before a hearing within a set time. It is thought that this can be dealt with by the power which the director of social work will have to act under Clause 43(7), which allows him to transfer a child in urgent circumstances.

However, we are not in fact completely satisfied that Clause 43(7) might not be subject to the same difficulties as we see in the Amendment which the noble Lord has put forward, and it is only on a close examination and comparison of these two things that we are satisfied that there is something to be looked at here. But we have not yet found what would be the most satisfactory answer. If, therefore, the noble Lord will withdraw Amendments Nos. 131 and 132, we will certainly look at the matter and in due course either explain why we find that the present situation is satisfactory, or alternatively submit an Amendment.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I thought that Amendment No. 132 was on a slightly different point, but if the noble Lord would like to look at that as well, I beg leave to withdraw No. 131.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 69, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 70 agreed to.

Clause 71 [Harbouring]:

LORD DRUMALBYN

Amendment No. 135 is drafting, and gives one syllable instead of four. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 42, line 3, leave out ("conduct himself") and insert ("act").—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD HUGHES

This Amendment is very satisfactory.

Clause 71, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 72 [Supervision of children moving to England or Wales]:

8.22 p.m.

LORD HUGHES moved in subsection (1) after "Wales" to insert "or in Northern Ireland". The noble Lord said: This Amendment, together with Nos. 138, 139, 140 and 141, all deal with the movement between Scotland and England or Wales of children subject to a supervision requirement of a children's hearing or its equivalent in England and Wales. The general aim of the provisions is to ensure, now that systems for dealing with children who need compulsory measures for treatment or care will be different in each country, that suitable arrangements exist for transferring from one system to the other children who change, or whose parents change, their country of residence.

Clause 72 deals with a child who is subject to a supervision requirement of a children's hearing, which does not require him to live in a residential establishment—that is Clause 43(1)(a). If such a child intends to live or is living in England or Wales, the children's hearing can either discharge the supervision requirement or send notification of the requirement to the juvenile court for the area in which the child intends to live or is living. The juvenile court concerned may then make a supervision order making the child subject to the supervision of a probation officer for a period of one year from the date on which the court received notification of the supervision requirement. On the making of such an order the supervision requirement of the children's hearing will lapse. The Amendment would extend these provisions to such children intending to live or living in Northern Ireland where the system for dealing with children in need of compulsory measures of treatment or care is similar to that in England and Wales. I beg to move Amendment No. 136.

Amendment moved— Page 42, line 16, after ("Wales") insert ("or in Northern Ireland").—(Lord Hughes.)

LORD HUGHES

Amendment No. 137 is a drafting Amendment. "Child ", not "person", is the more appropriate word to use in relation to a supervision requirement of a children's hearing. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 42, line 23, leave out ("person") and insert ("child").—(Lord Hughes.)

LORD HUGHES

Amendments Nos. 138, 139, 140 and 141 I have spoken to in connection with Amendment No. 136. I beg to move these Amendments together.

Amendments moved—

Page 42, line 27, after ("1963") insert ("or, as the case may be, of the Children and Young Persons Act (Northern Ireland) 1950 ")

Page 42, line 27, leave out ("they") and insert ("those provisions respectively") line 29, after ("1963") insert ("or to a supervision order within the meaning of section 63(1)(d) of the said Act of 1950").

Page 42, line 36, after ("1963") insert ("and in relation to Northern Ireland means 'petty sessions district' within the meaning of Part III of the Magistrates' Courts Act (Northern Ireland) 1964").—(Lord Hughes.)

Clause 72, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 73 [Supervision of children moving to Scotland]:

LORD HUGHES

This clause makes provisions similar to those of Clause 72 but for children moving into, instead of away from, Scotland. If a juvenile court in England or Wales is satisfied that a child subject to a probation or supervision order intends to live or is living in Scotland, it may either discharge the order or send notification of it to the reporter for the area in Scotland where the child is or will be living. The reporter must then arrange a children's hearing to consider the child's case and to determine it under Part III of the Bill. When this is done, the original probation or supervision order ceases to have effect. The Amendment would extend these provisions to cover children moving to Scot- land from Northern Ireland. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 42, line 37, after ("Wales") insert ("or in Northern Ireland ").—(Lord Hughes.)

On Question, Whether Clause 73, as amended, shall be agreed to?

LORD DRUMALBYN

I wonder whether this clause is not a bit too rigid. Does the noble Lord think that in all circumstances it is necessary for this rather elaborate procedure where a child in respect of whom a probation order or supervision order is in force proposes to reside, or is residing, in Scotland, the probation order having been imposed in England? It seems to me that there may be many circumstances where it could be possible to deal with this matter rather more flexibly. There does not seem to be any particular reason why a probation order or supervision order should be discharged simply because the parent moves to Scotland. The alternative is to send a notification of the order to the reporter and to have a hearing in Scotland, when the case would have to be heard all over again. What will be the effect of this on the child? Will not the child rather resent a second hearing, and being dealt with in an entirely different way? Would it not be easier simply to arrange for the supervision order to be carried on without a children's hearing, just to transfer the responsibility for the child, whether it is a probation order or a supervision order, to a continuing supervision order in Scotland when he moves? I should have thought that it was not really necessary to have the case heard all over again where the juvenile court is satisfied that the probation or supervision order should continue. Surely it should continue whether he moves or not. Is this procedure not unduly inflexible and cumbersome?

LORD HUGHES

I would be inclined to agree with the noble Lord, but the advice I have is that with this procedure we cannot in fact accomplish what is intended, and it would obviously be undesirable that simply by reason of a change of residence, which would have nothing to do with the child's needs, the order should otherwise lapse. I am quite certain that if we could have done it in a simpler way we would have done so; hut it just does not appear to be possible. The first part of the note that has just been handed to me I have already anticipated, and it goes on to say that it may be advisable to change a supervision order at a children's hearing—for example, to release the child to make a new start in a new country. So what the noble Lord has said about the virtual rehearing of the case necessarily resulting in the same decision does not follow. It might well be that the circumstances were such that the children's hearing decided not to continue with the order.

Clause 73, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 74 [Parents of a child in a residential establishment under a supervision requirement moving to England or Wales]:

8.31 p.m.

LORD HUGHES

This is a drafting Amendment. The Interpretation Clause, Clause 93, provides that in the Bill "parent" means either or both parents. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 43, line 13, leave out ("parents") and insert ("parent").—(Lord Hughes.)

LORD HUGHES

I beg to move Amendment No. 144.

Amendment moved— Page 43, line 15, leave out ("propose") and insert ("proposes").—(Lord Hughes.)

LORD HUGHES

This and a number of Amendments which follow all have the same effect, merely changing from the plural to the singular, the change being consequential on the Amendments to substitute "parent" for "parents". I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 43, line 15, leave out ("are") and insert ("is").—(Lord Hughes.)

LORD HUGHES

Amendments Nos. 146 to 160 are consequential on Amendments which have already been made, and with your Lordships' permission I will move them together. They are all references to Northern Ireland, and so on. I beg to move.

Amendments moved—

Page 43, line 16, after ("Wales") insert ("or in Northern Ireland")

Page 43, line 35, after ("Wales") insert ("of in Northern Ireland")

Page 43, line 37, after ("1933") insert ("or, as the case may be, a training school within the meaning of the Children and Young Per. sons Act (Northern Ireland) 1950")

Page 43, line 38, after ("authority") insert ("or, as the case may be, of the welfare authority")

Page 43, line 16, leave out ("parents") and insert ("parent")

Page 43, line 16, leave out ("propose") and insert ("proposes")

Page 43, line 16, line 39, leave out ("are") and insert ("is")

Page 43, line 16, line 41, after ("1963") insert ("or, as the case may be, of the said Act of 1950")

Page 43, line 16,line 43, after ("school") first occurring insert ("or of a training school")

Page 43, line 16, after ("approved school") insert ("or a training school")

Page 44, line 1, after ({"1933") insert ("or section 75 of the said Act of 1950")

Page 44, line 2, after ("school") insert ("or in a training school")

Page 44, line 4, after ("1963") insert ("or, as the case may be, of the said Act of 1950")

Page 44, line 6, after ("authority") insert ("or, as the case may be, of a welfare authority")

Page 44, line 7, after ("Acts") insert ("or that Act").—(Lord Hughes.)

Clause 74, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 75 [Parents of a child subject to an approved school order or a committal order moving to Scotland]:

LORD HUGHES moved, in subsection (1), after "State" to insert: "or the Minister of Home Affairs for Northern Ireland." The noble Lord said: This clause makes provisions similar to those of Clause 74, but for children subject to an approved school or a committal order whose parents move or intend to move to, instead of away from, Scotland. If the Secretary of State is satisfied that the parents of a child subject to an approved school order in England or Wales intend to live, or are living, in Scotland he may refer the case, giving particulars of the order, to the reporter for the area in which the parents intend to live or are living. The same provisions are made for referral to the reporter, by a local authority to whose care a child has been committed, of the committal order. In either case the reporter must arrange a children's hearing to consider and determine the child's case. Once this is done the original order ceases to have effect. The Amendment would extend these provisions to cover children subject to a training school order or committed to the care of a welfare authority in Northern Ireland whose parents intend to live or are living in Scotland. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 44, line 8, after ("State") insert ("or the Minister of Home Affairs in Northern Ireland").—(Lord Hughes.)

LORD HUGHES

Amendments Nos. 162 to 179 form another series in reference to Northern Ireland, and so on, and again are consequential on Amendments already approved by your Lordships. With permission, therefore, I beg to move Amendments 162 to 179 together.

Amendments moved—

Page 44, line 9, leave out ("parents") and insert ("parent")

Page 44, line 9, after ("school") insert ("or training school")

Page 44, line 10, leave out ("propose") and insert ("proposes")

Page 44, line 10, leave out ("are") and insert ("is")

Page 44, line 12, leave out ("parents") and insert ("parent")

Page 44, line 12, leave out first ("are") and insert ("is")

Page 44, line 12, leave out second ("are") and insert ("is")

Page 44, line 17, after ("Wales") insert ("or of a welfare authority in Northern Ireland")

Page 44, line 17, leave out ("local")

Page 44, line 18, leave out ("parents") and insert ("parent")

Page 44, line 18, leave out ("propose") and insert ("proposes")

Page 44, line 18, leave out ("are") and insert ("is")

Page 44, line 19, leave out ("local")

Page 44, line 23, after ("school") insert ("or training school")

Page 44, line 24, after ("or") insert ("as the case may be,")

Page 44, line 25, after ("local") insert ("or welfare")

Page 44, line 25, leave out ("as the case may be")

Page 44, line 31, after ("Wales") insert ("or in Northern Ireland").—(Lord Hughes.)

Clause 75, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 76 [Procedure]:

LORD HUGHES

Amendments 180 to 184 are associated Amendments. Clause 76 makes a number of fairly standard and unexceptional provisions in relation to the procedure of a children's hearing or of a juvenile court acting under Part V of the Bill, and in relation to the duties of various persons or bodies to ensure the sending of documents, the transfer of the child from one country to another, and the attendance of the child at a children's hearing if that is called for.

The Amendment would extend these provisions to cover children moving from Scotland to Northern Ireland or the other way about. I beg to move.

Amendments moved—

Page 44, line 43, after ("Wales") inert ("or in Northern Ireland")

Page 45, line 4, after ("school") inert ("or training school")

Page 45, line 6, after ("Wales") insert ("or of a welfare authority in Northern Ireland")

Page 45, line 7, after ("school") inert ("or of the training school")

Page 45, line 7, after ("local") insert ("or welfare").—(Lord Hughes.)

Clause 76, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 77 [Meaning of child for the purposes of this Part of this Act]:

LORD HUGHES

This Amendment is necessary to make it clear that in Part V of the Bill, which deals with the movement within the United Kingdom of children subject to a supervision requirement of a children's hearing or its equivalent, and of the parents of such children, the word "parent" includes a guardian. The meaning of a guardian for the purpose of the Bill is set out in the Interpretation Clause, Clause 93. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 45, line 14, at end insert ("(2) 'Parent' in this Part of this Act includes a guardian.") —(Lord Hughes.)

LORD DRUMALBYN

May I ask whether the same applies in Part III? What happens if a child under Part III, so far as children's hearings are concerned, has no parent but has a guardian?

LORD HUGHES

I asked that question this morning, and the information I have been given is that the use of the word "guardian" applies only to this Part, and that is why it has been imported only at this point. I do not know why it does not apply in the other Part, but it does not.

Clause 77, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 78 and 79 agreed to.

Clause 80 [Enforcement of duty to make contributions]:

LORD HUGHES

With permission I will move Amendments Nos. 186, 187 and 188 together. The Amendments to page 46, at lines 20 and 26, are to make it clear that entitlement to receive contributions payable under a contribution order in respect of a maintainable child is restricted to the local authority. Overall responsibility for any child who becomes a maintainable child by virtue of being received into care or by virtue of a supervision requirement rests with the local authority, whether or not the child is boarded out or placed in a foster home, and it is to the local authority, therefore, that contributions to his maintenance should be made. The Amendment to page 46, at line 34, is drafting. The reference is to Part II of the Bill, not to a section. I beg to move.

Amendments moved—

Page 45, line 7, line 20, leave out ("person") and insert ("local authority").

Page 45, line 26, leave out ("person" and insert ("local authority").

Page 45, line 34, leave out ("section) and insert ("Part").—(Lord Hughes.

Clause 80, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 81 [Provisions as to decrees for aliment]:

LORD HUGHES

I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 47, line 1, leave out from ("Where") to ("and") and insert ("a maintainable child is illegitimate").—(Lord Hughes.)

Clause 81, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 82 agreed to.

Clause 83 [Variation of Trusts]:

LORD HUGHES moved to leave out "required by a supervision requirement to reside in a residential establishment", and insert "under a supervision requirement". The noble Lord said: This clause provides for the situation where a child is obliged under a supervision requirement to live in a residential establishment and the person who formerly had care of the child is entitled under a trust to receive money for his maintenance. In such a case the sheriff who has jurisdiction in the area in which that person lives may on application by the local authority which has taken over the care of the child order the money to be paid to the local authority and to be applied to the benefit of the child in such a way as the sheriff, having regard to the terms of the trust, may direct.

As it stands, the clause provides for the diversion of trust money to a local authority only in a case where a child is required to live in a residential establishment. These provisions do not cover the case of a child subject to a supervision requirement which does not impose such a condition—for example, a child who is subject to a supervision requirement requiring him to stay with certain foster parents—and the Amendment would extend the provisions of the clause to enable them to be applied in the case of a child subject to any supervision requirement of a children's hearing. This would have the effect of bringing the clause more closely into line with the corresponding existing provision; that is, Section 95 of the Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 47, line 42, leave out from ("is") to (",and") in line 43 and insert ("under a supervision requirement").—(Lord Hughes.)

Clause 83, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 84 [Transfer and compensation of officers]:

LORD HUGHES

This is purely a drafting Amendment. The reference is to the provisions "of" any local Act, not "or" any local Act. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 48, line 28, after ("or") insert ("of"). —(Lord Hughes.)

Clause 84, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 85 [Adjustments between authority providing accommodation et cetera and authority of area of residence]:

LORD HUGHES

This, again, is a drafting Amendment. Part II of the Bill deals with the provision of services and facilities. For that reason we add the words "and facilities". I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 49, line 28, after ("services") insert ("and facilities").—(Lord Hughes.)

On Question, Whether Clause 85, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?

LORD DRUMALBYN

May I raise one point on the last subsection: Any question arising under this section as to the ordinary residence of a person shall be determined by the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of State may determine that a person has no ordinary residence. There is a decreasing number of people with no settled way of life in this country, but it seems a bit hard that if a person has no ordinary residence because he has an unsettled way of life, if one may put it in legal terms, the loss lies where it falls; that is to say, wherever the chap lands up, the local authority has to pay for him, which I take it is what this subsection means.

Is that really right? People who go about with no ordinary residence come to rest some time or other. I had some experience of this in my constituency, and it did not seem to me that the matter was ever settled satisfactorily. It seems to me that people who have no ordinary residence and do not have a settled way of life ought not to be a charge on the local authority where they land up. It is wrong in principle. There has been a lot of bickering about this matter, and it seems to me that the only solution is for the State to make itself responsible.

LORD HUGHES

That is the sort of suggestion which is frequently made by local authorities and is perhaps more acceptable to them than to central government. I think that, by and large, this works out on the swings and roundabouts principle. They do not all finish up in the area of one authority, and I doubt very much whether the application of this provision is going to create any severe hardship for any particular authority. I think it is preferable that the Secretary of State should say that the person has no ordinary residence, rather than that he should, as he could presumably, say that the place where he happens to he is his ordinary residence; because so far as the type of person to whom the noble Lord is referring is concerned, his ordinary residence is in fact the place where he happens to be at the given time. So these people will land within a particular authority one way or the other, and I think most authorities will have their share of them at one time or another.

LORD DRUMALBYN

The trouble is that this is a positive disincentive to providing decent accommodation for people of this kind, because the grapevine works and word gets round. If a local authority does provide decent accommodation, they will all be, round like bees in a honey pot. That is not satisfactory.

LORD HUGHES

I know it is not satisfactory, but this is not the way to deal with it. At the present time I believe there is a Bill before another place. seeking to provide permanent accommodation for people of this type and placing a duty or obligation on local authorities to do it, but as at present drafted that Private Member's Bill applies only to England and Wales. It has not been a problem North of the Border of the severity that it has at least in certain parts of England and Wales, and it is for that reason that the Bill is having only an England and Wales context at the present time. But it may well be that the problem will develop to such an extent that a similar provision is necessary in Scotland, and if it should arise I think the way in which it is being tackled in that Private Member's Bill is the correct way to deal with it, rather than taking the matter out of its present position, as the noble Lord would suggest.

VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS

While having considerable sympathy with the noble Lord opposite and his ideas—one can see exactly what he means and the force of his argument—may I suggest that to do what he wants would require a very considerable central authority and a very considerable increase in officialdom in central organisations. Surely that cannot be what the noble Lord would desire to happen.

LORD HUGHES

May I add this? I received this note after I sat down. The determination of "no ordinary residence" is a well recognised technical matter for the Secretary of State. This is the point which I think will be of interest to the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn. Special financial sharing arrangements are at present sometimes made by order, for this kind of difficulty. The matter having been raised by the noble Lord, I will certainly undertake to look at it from the point of view that where there are circumstances in which it is desirable we should consider sharing arrangements. That will certainly not be overlooked.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I am much obliged to the noble Lord. In reply to the noble Viscount, Lord St. Davids, it is not a question of providing accommodation; in a case of this kind it is a question of paying for it.

VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS

But, surely, to make arrangements for payment would involve some considerable increase in central authority officialdom to determine who should be paid. Payment out always requires a large number of people to make sure that it is correctly done.

Clause 85, as amended, agreed to.

8.50 p.m.

On Question, Whether Clause 86 shall stand part of the Bill?

LORD DRUMALBYN

This clause picks up quite a large section of the responsibilities under the National Assistance Act and, in a sense, transfers them to the Secretary of State. The hour is late, and I do not want to go into this in detail; but it seems to me that it would have been appropriate to take over all these sections of the National Assistance Act. They are rather out of date. By and large, they are expressed in terms of England and Wales, with cumbersome application clauses to Scotland, and I should have thought that this would be the right time to rewrite them into this Bill, as for example, the clauses of the Children's Act have been rewritten into the Bill. It would have been much neater and far easier to refer to.

I know that local authorities are well accustomed to handling matters under the National Assistance Act, but the fact is that the National Assistance Act inevitably still has an aura of the Poor Law about it, and it is not really satisfactory in the context of this particular Bill. I should have liked to see it rewritten for Scotland in the context of this Bill. I need not say more about it, but I should be quite willing to have a talk about it with the noble Lord and to outline my ideas in that respect.

Clause 86 agreed to.

Clause 87 [Duty of parents to notify change of address.]

LORD HUGHES

I should like to move Amendments Nos. 193 and 194 together as drafting Amendments. Subsection (2) of this clause should refer to a parent of a child who has been transferred under Part V of the Bill which deals with the transfer of children to and from Scotland. I beg to move.

Amendments moved—

Page 51, line 3, leave out ("or") and in-sent ("of").

Page 51, line 5, leave out ("this Part") and insert ("Part V").—(Lord Hughes.)

8.53 p.m.

LORD DRUMALBYN moved to add to the clause: () In any case where custody of the child has been granted to one parent, this section shall not apply to the other parent.

The noble Lord said: This is a small point, but it seems to me that where custody of a child has been granted to one parent this section should not apply to the other parent. I appreciate that this can be readily understood in terms of subsection (1)(a) and (b)—that is, where the child is received into the care of a local authority under Part II of this Bill or where he is subject to a supervision requirement—but it may not be quite so applicable in the case of subsection (1)(c) where a contribution order or a decree for aliment has been made.

It may be thought that it is not unreasonable to prosecute somebody for not sending aliment that he is due to pay under a court order to the other party, and now, because the child is in supervision or something of that kind, he has to pay it to the local authority, but I am bound to say that to me it seems inappropriate that a person should be fined in those circumstances when he cannot be fined for not paying aliment to the party to whom he is ordered to pay it. It seems to me quite inappropriate that lie should be fined for not paying it to the local authority. So I think that in none of these three circumstances a spouse who is obviously separated from the other spouse or, if they are not married, is obviously not together with the other and who has not the custody of the child, should be liable to supply this information as to his address, or should be fined if he does not. To me, it seems rather absurd, and I think this provision should be taken out. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 51, line 13, at end insert the said bsection.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD HUGHES

We should be sorry if any of these three circumstances were taken out, because the reasons go beyond finance. It is perfectly true that finance is one of the reasons, because, irrespective of who has custody, there is an obligation on parents to contribute to the maintenance of the child, and notification may be required on that score. Secondly, even where contributions are not an issue, the local authority are undertaking a considerable burden if they have a child in care or are administering a supervision arrangement. There may be occasions when they have to consult or seek the help of either parent, or they may wish to try to create conditions where the child or children can return to a new family atmosphere.

All that the subsection does is to require that the parents' whereabouts should be known, and it seems reasonable that local authorities should be able to act in a way which would be possible if they had the information about the location of both parents rather than having only the information about the parent to whom custody had been granted. This is one of those cases where we are seeking in fact, as is quite necessary in legislation, to provide not for the sort of circumstances that are going to arise every day, but the sort of circumstances which may quite conceivably arise. We think there are circumstances where it would be greatly in the interests of the child that a local authority could proceed in one or other of these ways; and they could be prevented from doing so if they had access only to the address of the parent to whom custody had been granted. I hope that, with that explanation, the noble Lord will accept it that we are not just gathering information for the sake of having information.

LORD DRUMALBYN

No, I do not say that at all; but it seems to me there is a difference between parents who are living together, having joint custody of the child, and a parent, say a father, who has no remaining connection at all with the wife or the child, except possibly that he has to pay aliment. I cannot conceive that in matters of interest to the child, as opposed to the interest of the pocket of the local authority or the approved school, the local authority would be getting in touch with the parent who had not the custody of the child. They would be bound to get in touch with the parent who had. It is as simple as that.

LORD HUGHES

I do not think I can accept it that where one parent has the custody of the child this deprives the other parent of all rights and interest in his or her child. There can be circumstances in which the parent who has been deprived of custody still has an interest and has a right to be consulted on certain things, and where the child might wish that other parent to be consulted. If we were to accept what the noble Lord suggests, it would simply mean that once one parent had been granted custody the other party should in fact be considered as having no further interest or rights iii the child's welfare. I cannot accept that.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I believe that the noble Lord has a point there, and I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 87, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 88 to 92 agreed to.

Clause 93 [Interpretation]:

LORD DRUMALBYN moved, in subsection (1), to leave out "or the context otherwise requires ". The noble Lord said: I do not know how common are the words "or the context otherwise requires" in legislation. They always suggest to me loose drafting or lack of confidence of the draftsman in his own drafting. The reason why I put forward this Amendment is linked with Amendment No. 198 to leave out "non-residential" in the definition of "establishment". The word "establishment" comes very frequently indeed in Part IV of the Bill. The heading is "Residential and other establishments". I cannot make out which are residential and which are non-residential. There is either something the matter with the definition of "establishment", or there is something very much the matter with the words, "or the context otherwise requires". Nobody is going to be able to sort this out. The courts will have to decide what the context requires, whether it is non-residential or residential establishment, or both. I was prepared to let the words go by until I came to the definition of "establishment" and looked back at the context and could make nothing of it. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 52, line 26, leave out ("or the context otherwise requires").—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD HUGHES

The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, has a certain right to be a little mystified on this matter, and yet it can be sorted out—at least to the satisfaction of the draftsman. There will be a consequential Amendment at the next stage which will satisfy the draftsman still further. The effect of the Amendment would be to cast in doubt some of the definitions in the clause. An example is the definition of "establishment" as being non-residential accommodation in Clause 93, which obviously is not appropriate for the word "establishment" in page 41, line 28, where the establishment referred to is clearly a residential establishment. The phrase which the noble Lord wishes to omit is well precedented in interpretation clauses. As he well knows from his former experience as a Minister, nothing commands so much respect in drafting as precedents. And when it is a precedent of his own Government it should commend itself the more forcibly to the noble Lord. The phrase appears in Section 111 of the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1960. and in Section 145 of the Education (Scotland) Act 1962. There are a number of things which have been done by the previous Administration with which I do not agree, but I do not think it is necessary to go charging over the Highlands disagreeing with the use of that particular phrase, which I am happy to adopt.

In regard to Amendment No. 198, I shall read the note which I have on that which I hope will be helpful to the noble Lord. The effect of Amendment 198, to leave out "non-residential", should be resisted as leading to possible confusion with the definition of residential establishment. The definition of "establishment"—and this is where the draftsman has picked himself up a little—has, however, to be amended slightly to ensure that day establishments run by Government Departments are not subject to local authority inspection. Therefore, I can give the promise that we will look again at the whole question of definition and try to make it certain that residential establishments, non-residential establishments and day establishments of Government Departments are in no danger of being confused with each other. If the noble Lord will accept that assurance, I think that what will emerge will be something which will be as acceptable to him as are Amendments Nos. 196 and 198. and also will have the added merit of being acceptable to the Government.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I am obliged to the noble Lord. I want the context to make clear what is required. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

LORD HUGHES

The effect of Amendment No. 197 is to insert in the Interpretation Clause the meaning of the term "approved school" as used in Clause 74, which deals with the transfer of a child who is subject to a supervision requirement of a children's hearing and whose parents move to England or Wales. One of the courses of action which may be taken in relation to such a child is for the Secretary of State, on the basis of a recommendation made by the hearing, to make an order transferring him to the care of the managers of an approved school in England or Wales. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 52, line 27, at end insert— ("'approved school' means a school approved by the Secretary of State under section 79 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933.").—(Lord Hughes.)

9.6 p.m.

LORD AMULREE moved, in the definition of "person in need", to leave out "or age". The noble Lord said: During the Second Reading debate I expressed dismay at the suggestion that the care of the elderly person should become the responsibility of the new social welfare department. It seemed peculiar to me, on reading the Bill and the White Paper for the first time, that the elderly seemed to have been popped rather casually into the White Paper and the Bill because they might need care and attention. But they seemed to be a long way away from delinquent children on probation, and from all the other matters dealt with by the White Paper and the Bill.

The noble Lord, Lord Hughes, went some way to allay my fears when he wrote and told me that there was no question of the general responsibility of the health department being taken over by the new social welfare department. I did not expect that there would be any question of that happening, so that did not give me a great deal of consolation. I have found in the past that the close cooperation of doctors and medical social workers in the health department and the welfare department has been of enormous value in the care of the elderly, but I feel that to put them under the social welfare department is a retrograde step.

As I explained on Second Reading, the old will not become in need of care merely by the fact of being old. There is no need for any care. But when you are old and your physical and mental health begins to fail, you become in need of some kind of care from the voluntary bodies or local authorities. That is why I hoped that this category would be kept firmly under the medical umbrella rather than under the social work umbrella, and that is why I put down this Amendment to delete the old from this subsection of Clause 93. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 53, line 39, leave out ("or age").(Lord Antlree.)

LORD HUGHES

Periodically there has cropped up the impression that the main purpose of this Bill is to deal with children. This is, first of all, because we re-enact in the Bill many of the provisions of the Children Act, and secondly, because we are setting up completely new procedures for dealing with children. But that must not obscure the fact that the purpose of the Bill is to enable local authorities to look after the well are of all, and it is not the case that: elderly people are just being tacked on as a sort of after-thought.

The noble Lord has indicated that he would like the welfare of elderly people to be taken away from the social work department, on the ground that more frequently, if not all the time, they require help for reasons which fall more within the purposes of the health authority or a hospital board, or some similar organisation. But the provisions of this Bill go much further than providing accommodation for them. The provision of "advice, guidance and … facilities (including the provision of residential … establishments)" would remain the responsibility of the social work department in relation to elderly people as well as to other social groups under Clause 12(1). It is a central feature of the Bill that, as I have said (it seems to me much too frequently), it does not seek to define the functions of the local authority discharged through its social work department in terms of categories of people. The local authority's duty to promote social welfare includes the duty to promote the welfare of elderly people.

I think we should look at what are the purposes of the welfare services and the facilities provided for elderly people. There is a certain misconception about this, and nowhere is it more clearly demonstrated than in relation to old people's homes. The welfare departments of Scottish local authorities provide at present nearly 8,000 places in home; for elderly people, and registered voluntary and private homes provide a further 5,600 places, of which 1,500 are occupied by residents sponsored by the local authorities. The welfare departments are therefore at the present time substantial providers of residential accommodation for elderly people no longer able to live in their own homes. This is the point. These places are intended to be a substitute for an elderly person's own home.

As a matter of Government policy, medical services to the people in those homes are provided where possible by their own general practitioners, and nursing facilities for short-term illnesses which do not require admission to hospital are provided by the domiciliary nursing services. So that, to all intents and purposes, the old person going into one of these old people's residential homes of a local authority is in all health matters treated, so far as possible, as if he remained a resident in his own home.

The criteria for admission to these homes are social, not medical. Were this not appreciated, the priorities for admission (because I can assure your Lordships that the demand for admission to these homes is very much in excess of the capacity available) could be biased to favour those with the most pressing medical condition, with the risk that the homes would thus become small geriatric establishments. These homes are neither designed nor staffed for that purpose. Where a person is in need of medical or geriatric attention, the place to which he or she should be taken is a hospital, and this Bill will not interfere in any way with that provision. But it would be a waste of hospital resources if someone who needed only the support that he could get in a residential establishment, to enable him otherwise to be as he would have been if he could have continued in his own home, were forced into a hospital. We do not want that to happen, and the noble Lord quite rightly, also does not want that to happen.

On the other hand, we have to make certain that these homes are for those who are in social need, not medical need, and therefore do not become an overflow for those who cannot get into hospitals. These is a need for more accommodation of both kinds; but where the medical condition is not a condition which requires admission, then the responsibility is clearly a welfare one, just as it is in the case of a younger person or a child who requires the protection of a residential home.

I hope that with these remarks the noble Lord will feel that we are leaving the medical responsibilities where they properly rest and where they are at the present time. The social responsibilities will continue where they are at the present time—in these social residential homes of local authorities. I hope, therefore, that the noble Lord will find it possible to withdraw his Amendment. I am very sorry that such a simple Amendment as the deletion of two words should have required so long an explanation from me, and I apologise to your Lordships if it has been too long.

LORD AMULREE

It is extremely kind of the noble Lord to give me such a long explanation. I entirely appreciate every word he has said, but I repeat what I was trying to say before: that I should have preferred that things should remain as they are. Many of the welfare and health departments in Scotland are joined together, and this, I think, gives the best service for these old people. I do not think they will get such good service from the social work department operating by itself. But I do not intend to press the Amendment. I am very grateful to the noble Lord for his explanation, and I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN

This is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 54, line 2, leave out ("and").—(The Marquess of Lothian.)

LORD HUGHES

I agree.

LORD HUGHES

I think that Amendments Nos. 201 to 206 may all be moved together. The general effect of these Amendments is to add to the interpretation clause the meanings of "probation order", "supervision order" and "welfare authority" in relation to Northern Ireland; and to extend subsection (2) to cover references to enactments of the Parliament of Northern Ireland. Amendments Nos. 201 and 203 are necessary to distinguish probation and supervision orders made in England and Wales from those made in Northern Ireland. I beg to move.

Amendments moved—

Page 54, line 12, after ("' order'") insert (",in relation to an order imposed by a court in England or Wales,")

Page 54, line 13, after ("1948") insert (",and in relation to such an order, imposed by a court in Northern Ireland, has the same meaning as in the Probation Act (Northern Ireland) 1950")

Page 54, line 20, after ("order") insert (",imposed by a court in England or Wales,")

Page 54, line 22, after ("1963") insert (",and in relation to an order imposed by a court in Northern Ireland, has the meaning assigned to it by section 63(1)(d) of the Children and Young Persons Act (Northern Ireland) 1950.")

Page 54, line 24, at end insert—

("'training school' means a school approved by the Ministry of Home Affairs for Northern Ireland under section 106 of the Children and Young Persons Act (Northern Ireland) 1950,

'training school order' means an order made by a court in Northern Ireland sending a child or young person to a training school,")

Page 54, line 27, at end insert ("'welfare authority' means a welfare authority constituted under the Public Health and Local Government (Administrative Provisions) Act (Northern Ireland) 1946.")

Page 54, line 31, at end insert—

("(3) Without prejudice to the last foregoing subsection, any reference in this Act to an enactment of the Parliament of Northern Ireland, or to an enactment which that Parliament has power to amend, shall be construed, in relation to Northern Ireland, as a reference to that enactment as amended by any Act of that Parliament, whether passed before or after this Act.").—(Lord Hughes.)

Clause 93, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 94 [Minor and consequential amendments, repeals and savings]:

THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN

This is another drafting Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 55, line 3, leave out ("they") and insert ("it").—(The Marquess of Lothian.)

LORD HUGHES

I agree.

Clause 94, as amended, agreed to.

9.18 p.m.

LORD HUGHES moved, after Clause 94, to insert the following new clause:

Power of Parliament of Northern Ireland to make consequential amendments of this Act

". Notwithstanding any limitation imposed on the powers of the Parliament of Northern Ireland by the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, that Parliament may, by any Act re-enacting (with or without modifications) or amending the law in force in Northern Ireland with respect to children requiring compulsory measures of care, make such amendments of the provisions of this Act which extend to Northern Ireland as may be necessary for the purpose of bringing the said provisions into conformity with the provisions of that Act."

The noble Lord said: This Amendment would insert in the Bill a common form provision which would enable the Northern Ireland Parliament, in re-enacting or amending the law in Northern Ireland relating to children in need of compulsory measures of care, to make any necessary amendment to those provisions of the Bill which extend to Northern Ireland—that is, Clause 95, as amended—to enable them to be brought into conformity with the provisions of the re-enacting or amending Statute. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— After Clause 94 insert the said new clause. —(Lord Hughes.)

Clause 95 [Extension of certain provisions of Act to England and Wales, Northern Ireland, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man]:

LORD HUGHES

I do not intend to move Amendments Nos. 209 and 211. On further examination, we find that they are in part defective, and will require to be tabled in a slightly amended form at Report stage. Amendment No. 209 is therefore not moved.

THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN

This Amendment seeks to extend to England and Wales the provision; of Clause 87, which places on the parents the duty of notifying any change in their addresses to the person responsible for the care or supervision of their child. I am not quite certain of the position at the moment. I imagine that if the parents moved from Scotland to England they would have to notify; but it seems clear that if they then move again from one address in England or Wales to another address in England or Wales they would not have to notify. It seems to me important that this provision should be extended to cover England and Wales. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 55, line 11, at end insert ("section 87").—(The Marquess of Lothian.)

LORD HUGHES

I appreciate the intention behind this Amendment. It seems a reasonable one. I also accept that it would not appear to be possible to achieve this object without including Section 87. However, doing it this way is a rather cumbersome way to bring it about. We should like to look at the matter further to find out whether the object can be brought about in a simpler way, if it can be brought about at all. If the noble Marquess is prepared to withdraw this Amendment, I will certainly undertake to consider what can be done about it.

THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN

I am much obliged to the noble Lord. I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 95 agreed to.

Clause 96:

Commencement

96.—(1) This Act (except this section) shall come into operation on such date as the Secretary of State may by order appoint.

THE EARL OF CROMARTIE moved to add to subsection (1), but not earlier than six months after the publication of the Report of the Royal Commission on Local Government in Scotland under the chairmanship of Lord Wheatley.

The noble Earl said: I hope I can persuade the Minister to accept this Amendment but I rather doubt it. The necessity for it seems to be overwhelming where the Highland counties are concerned, and desirable in the case of the other Scottish counties. With his customary courtesy the Minister sent me his reply to the many points raised at the Second Reading of this Bill, and he may argue that as the timing of the Act's implementation is to be at the discretion of the Secretary of State for Scotland that would be an adequate safeguard. I do not consider that to be the case. If, as is implied, delay in implementation is inevitable, what is the objection to this Amendment?—especially when we remember the noble Lord's words during the marathon Second Reading of this Bill that only those parts which were adaptable to the structure that might emerge would be implemented.

Briefly, may I stress the importance of not rushing the implementation of this Bill from the specifically Highland point of view? If the Wheatley Report suggests that, for example, Ross and Cromarty should join up with the County of Sutherland, the population affected would be 70,303, inhabiting an area of 5,117.4 square miles. If, on the other hand, it is decided that the five mainland crofter counties (Argyll, Inverness, Ross and Cromarty, Sutherland and Caithness) should be amalgamated, the combined population will be 241,861 and the area 13,975 square miles. Perthshire might also be included. If this were to take place considerable reorganisation of the single-county set-up would become necessary, with the consequent trouble of considerable redundancies and also very heavy expenditure. That, in itself, makes it worth while to consider putting in a specified time of implementation. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 55, line 25, at end insert ("but not earlier than six months after the publication of the Report of the Royal Commission on Local Government in Scotland under the chairmanship of Lord Wheatley").—(The Earl of Cromartie.)

THE EARL OF MAR

I agree with the noble Earl, Lord Cromartie, that the Bill should be delayed. We are both county councillors and both have the same problems. I have read Lord Hughes's memorandum with special care for the timing, but I am still completely unconvinced, and shall be until we have all seen the Report of the Royal Commission. It will be up to date with the present position, which possibly the Government and St. Andrew's House are not. With further reorganisation during the next year or two it is almost certain that alarm and despondency will be created among the staff and very few will join our service. The Kilbrandon Committee was set up six years ago. I see no reason why this Bill should not be further delayed until we have all fully studied the Report of the Royal Commission.

LORD HUGHES

I completely appreciate the reasons which led the noble Earl, Lord Cromartie, and the noble Earl, Lord Mar, to put their names to this Amendment, but it is quite an unworkable suggestion which they put forward. They are seeking to delay the implementation of an Act of Parliament until six months after a completely indeterminate time. No one knows when the publication of the Wheatley Commission Report will take place. In fact we cannot even guarantee (although there is little likelihood that it will not happen) that the Wheatley Commission will publish a Report. There have been cases when, for one reason or another, a Commission has not reported, even after it had done as much as Wheatley has done, because of some circumstance which had arisen and which made it impossible for the Commission to complete its work.

If we accepted the Amendment we should be in the ridiculous position of having passed an Act of Parliament which would come into effect six months after a date which was never going to arise. While that might commend itself to the noble Lord, Lord Ferrier, who has made no bones about the fact that he does not like this Bill at all, to put in such a provision would be tantamount to having denied the Bill either a Second or a Third Reading, because it would be of no effect. Let us assume that the likely, or what is virtually the certain, does happen, and the Wheatley Commission Report is received. The date of the receipt of the Report has absolutely nothing to do with the reorganisation which may or may not take place. The noble Earl used the words "the sort of local government which is likely to ensue", but who is to say, even on the receipt of the Commission's Report, what is likely to ensue?

Not everything which has been recommended by a Royal Commission is the subject of ultimate legislation by Government; sometimes the recommendations of a Commission are accepted in part and sometimes legislation bears not very much reference to what has appeared in the Report. The varieties of action which may follow on the receipt of such a Report are almost infinite. What is quite clear—and I think that I have stated this before—is that after the receipt of the Commission's Report there will be a long period of preparation and discussion with the local authorities on the implementation of the effects of this measure. I have also made clear that neither the Act nor any part of it will be brought into effect immediately. I think I have made clear that different Parts may be brought into effect at different times. It may well be that the ordinary operation of the procedures which are necessary to implement a Bill of this kind when it becomes an Act will achieve what the noble Earl desires, and at the end of the day he may say, "Well, I told you so. I asked for it to be delayed until six months after Wheatley had reported. Wheatley has reported, and your first appointed day is in fact more than six months after the date when Wheatley reported. You could have agreed to my Amendment." But that would be merely a coincidence. We should be accepting it for a reason which has no relevance. The change of local government will take place after a great deal of activity following the publication of the Report.

I mentioned on Second Reading that at least part of these proposals arise from a recommendation in relation to children in need stated in 1961 to be urgent. If we accept the noble Lord's Amendment, we should be delaying the implementation of the Act until local government had been reorganised, and that means until 1974 or 1975. It is intolerable that we should add another seven years of needless delay to the implementation of proposals which we were advised in 1961 were already urgent. I hope that I have satisfied the noble Earl that while I am not accepting the form of words, I am certain he will never have any cause to complain that what actually happens will necessarily be any different from what would happen if this Amendment were accepted. I hope that I have persuaded the noble Earl not to press an Amendment which, in terms of legislation, is meaningless and would only frustrate the whole operation of the Bill.

LORD FERRIER

I had not intended to speak on this Amendment, though I had great sympathy with the noble Earls, Lord Cromartie and Lord Mar; but the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, has chosen to point the finger of scorn at me—not for the first time to-day. He misinterpreted words that I used, when he stated that I had said there was nothing left to be said on the subject of an Amendment and then added that I had opposed the Bill lock, stock and barrel—words which I did not use.

LORD HUGHES

The only reason I mentioned the noble Lord's name was because he will recollect that when we were talking at dinner I said that at least we had got the worst part over, and the noble Lord said, "Oh no, I still have my lot which I intend to pursue". The last thing I should wish to do at this hour would be to provoke the noble Lord into making a speech which he had not intended to make, but I am convinced that nothing I might say would prevent him from speaking. If I am wrong, I am sorry. I would remind the noble Lord that I did not misrepresent him because, in concluding his speech on Second Reading, he said that, while he would not divide the House on the Bill, if other noble Lords chose to divide he would he happy to vote against the Second Reading. To vote against the Second Reading of a Bill in your Lordships' House is to be against it lock, stock and barrel.

LORD FERRIER

The noble Lord has chosen to misinterpret my words for a third time this evening, and I propose to go on with the speech which, until I was provoked, I had not intended to make. We have been dealing with a Bill of 94 clauses, to which in this Committee there have been 212 Amendments, and of 7 Schedules. with another 24 Amendments. I think that I am entitled to say that is clear evidence that what I said on Second Reading is correct; that the Bill ought to have been rejected then because it was a muddled Bill. I took that view then, and I take that view now. I want to say most emphatically that this is not because I resist the idea of advance in regard to the care of young people and children, but because the Bill is badly drafted. If 212 Amendments and 94 clauses is not fair enough proof of that, I do not know what is.

I go further. I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Amulree, has left, because he put his finger on another omission in the Bill to which I referred on Second Reading. I do not think that enough care has been given to the problem of old people. Why I said on Second Reading that the Title required to be amended was because I felt that we were concerned with children and young people; and the Bill should have concentrated on them. It is for that reason that I said on Second Reading, and I say now with the noble Earl, that when we come to Third Reading I.reserve my right to speak in support of a move of this nature. As the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, has said, the Bill as drafted gives extreme latitude to his right honourable friend to introduce this or that at whatever time he chooses. I think this is very wrong in regard to Parliamentary control of affairs in Scotland, and I feel entitled to say so. Therefore, I am saying it.

I think it is fair to say that the whole treatment of this Bill has been muddled —and I am glad to see the noble Lord, Lord Bowles, here. What happened on Second Reading? It was on the Order Paper for the first item after Questions, and it came on at the end. We began, I think, at 8.40 at night. What happened in Committee?—the Committee stage was truncated at 6.30 for the Theft Bill, the Bill on which we have spent hours and hours in this House, at great cost to the State, on all sorts of subjects: as to how to spell"and"or something like that, with the most eminent lawyers in the land disagreeing and going into different Lobbies. Why on earth could that not have been dealt with upstairs? I believe that could have been done under the Regulations. And if the Regulations today are not such that it was capable of being handled in Committee upstairs, then it is time, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Bowles, will agree, that something was done about it.

The fact is that Scottish Peers have these problems of residence and travel. It is all very well the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, saying that he has missed his train, but he has quarters to go to. Many of us have to give up our rooms in our clubs, and if we miss our trains we are pretty well stuck.

LORD HUGHES

Would the noble Lord—

LORD FERRIER

May I continue? For a Bill of this nature to be treated in this way is to my mind unsupportable. I am speaking in this way only because I feel that it is being suggested that those of us who, like the noble Earl, have said, "Let us put it off", are trying to hold up the advances in regard to the treatment of young people. This is not so. We want to see young people treated properly, and treated in a way that is within the capacity of the State. The noble Lord himself has said that there are not sufficient places for young children. He has also told the noble Lord, Lord Amulree: "It is all very well talking about age, but the accommodation in old people's homes is simply not sufficient to meet the demand".

I apologise to your Lordships for speaking at such great length, but I feel that it is fair to face the fact that people are entitled to hold their views in this House, and to state them without being accused of trying to be retrograde in the views they hold. If the noble Earl moves his Amendment at another stage, I will support him for the reasons I have stated.

9.39 p.m.

LORD HUGHES

I am very sorry indeed that misfortune should have placed me opposite the noble Lord, Lord Ferrier, at dinner, because had it not been for that accident I should never have mentioned his name, and we should not have had the last ten minutes or so of complete irrelevance, so far as the Amendment is concerned. It is only the fact that it is almost impossible to be out of order in your Lordships' House that has enabled this to happen. The noble Lord would not give way to me, and I am not going to give way to him. I wanted to get up during his second set of remarks only to contradict his statement that it was all very well for me to say that I had missed my train, but I had quarters to go to, and that he, like others, had lost his place in the club. Like him, I did not know until I left here whether I had a hotel room to go to. So I was in no different position from that of the noble Lord, and he should not be so ready to impute to Ministers things which he is not prepared to accept for himself.

At one time the noble Lord criticised the inadequacy of the Bill, and almost immediately went on to say that it is far too wide in its scope; it gives the Secretary of State power to do virtually anything. And then he comes back and says that there is not enough provision for all people, and that I had admitted it. Of course I had. This is part of the justification for the Bill: that so much more needs to be done. We are widening considerably the powers to enable local authorities to do these things, and we hope that when this Bill has been in operation for some time some of the deficiencies which at present exist for children, for the handicapped and for the elderly, will have been overtaken. That is why the Bill is being introduced.

The noble Lord seeks to defend what he said on Second Reading. I still maintain that I did not misinterpret hire. He made it quite clear that he was against the Bill as a whole. But no useful purpose will be served by pursuing that. The noble Lord puts a different interpretation on the attempt to have the Bill rejected at Second Reading from my interpretation. We must rest content on what we each think that that means. But he went on to justify his remark by saying that the fact that all these Amendments have been submitted is clear evidence that the Bill was badly drafted. The noble Lord—and I am not blaming him for this—is in the same position as I was in until three and a half years ago, when I had no experience of the drafting of Bills—a position which he is still in. I could have made exactly the same mistake then. But the position is that some of the Amendments could not possibly have been drafted until after the Bill was published, because they are Amendments which arose, and could only have arisen, after the people concerned—the other Departments concerned and other Government Departments concerned—had seen the Bill. First the Bill has to be published, then there is an opportunity for people to come forward with drafting Amendments; and out of all the Amendments which are put forward a most every one which has come from the Government side has been a drafting Amendment.

I accept that there has been a certain amount of carelessness, to the extent that sometimes the word "or" has appeared instead of the word "of". But I should have thought it would be obvious even to the noble Lord, Lord Ferrier, that there has been a mistake of the printers. The draftsman, obviously, knows the difference between the meaning of the word "or" and of the word "of", but we have to amend printers' errors as well as to make changes which arise as a result of representations which are made.

I made it perfectly clear that there has been very considerable consultation in relation to this measure over a long period of time. But—and perhaps the noble Lord will continue to listen to me—consultation does not stop when the Bill is published. People have legitimate points of view to express—people outside the House and inside the House. It would be quite wrong if the Government took up the attitude, "We have published the Bill, and it does not matter whether you have drawn our attention to a better way or an alternative way of doing this, we are going to adhere to the Bill".

Many of the Amendments I have accepted are Amendments which could just as easily have gone one way as the other. But I have not been difficult in this. Where an Amendment moved by a noble Lord opposite was one that I could just as easily accept as my own wording, I think I have gone out of my way to accept the alternative words. But if I am to take the attitude of the noble Lord as being the response which is to be shown to this, then both my noble friends and I myself will take it that to be reasonable in accepting reasonable Amendments means laying ourselves open to the charge of incompetence. I do not accept this, any more than I accept that I have been unfair to the noble Lord, Lord Ferrier.

I am very sorry to have replied at this length, at this time, with words which are relevant only to the noble Lord's irrelevancies, because in this speech, like him, I have made no reference at all to the Amendment which is before us, and which I invite the noble Earl to withdraw.

LORD FERRIER

I would only say how well it is that our Scottish motto is, "Nemo me impune lacessit".

THE EARL OF CROMARTIE

Having been somewhat reassured by the Minister's assurance that this Bill will be implemented with common sense, and although I am not saying that it may not be necessary at the next stage for somebody—not necessarily myself—to put down an Amendment as to timing, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 96 agreed to.

Clause 96 agreed to.

Schedule 1 agreed to.

Schedule 2 [Children's Panels]:

9.46 p.m.

LORD DRUMALBYN

The purpose of Amendment No. 216, which, if the Committee will agree, I will take together with the next Amendment, No. 217, is to provide for the period for which persons shall be appointed as members of children's panels. Paragraph 2 says: A member of a children's panel shall hold office for such period and then after those words I would insert the words not exceeding three years". It is felt that there should be an opportunity for reviewing these appointments at regular intervals, and three years seems to be a reasonable period. It might be that, to start with, some people would be appointed for a shorter period, and if a person is coming up to retirement age he might be appointed for the residue of the time, not being more than two years.

The next Amendment goes on to say and shall be eligible for reappointment, but no member of a children's panel shall continue to hold office after he has attained the age of 65". The idea of a children's panel was that people should not stay on them too long. I have not attempted to cover that point in my Amendment, but it seems right that they should be eligible at least for one period of reappointment, and also it is fairly strongly held by the official side—children's officers, and so on—that it would not be a good thing for people to continue to hold office and to deal with children after they get into their later old age. I hope the noble Lord will agree to these Amendments, at least in principle. I beg to move.

Amendments moved—

Page 58, line 8, at end insert ("not exceeding three years")

Page 58, line 9, after ("State") insert ("and shall be eligible for re-appointment, but no member of a children's panel shall continue to hold office after he has attained the age of 65 ").—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD HUGHES

The purpose behind these Amendments is eminently reasonable. They are very constructive points. Notwithstanding that, I wish to invite the noble Lord not to press them, for reasons which I will state. Obviously, it is desirable that people should be appointed for a fixed term, and, as the noble Lord knows, that is the practice. It is not necessary to have to specify the period of years, because the Secretary of State has full discretion. Also it has been found desirable, in bodies where there is a reasonable number of people, to make provision for people ceasing to be members, or coming to the end of their term (which is not necessarily the same thing) at different times, so that there is not too much change all at once. In quite a number of bodies, say twenty years ago, three years was fairly generally accepted. Some people in the beginning were appointed for one year, some for two and some for three, so that eventually you had a situation where one-third of the appointments were being considered each year. But recently it has been found—I rather think this happened in the previous Administration, but I know we are certainly carrying it on—that to be having changes at such frequent intervals sometimes leads to disruption in the proceedings of the body, and in some we have gone on to four years with changes every other year. It may be that four years would be accepted as better, and two and four year appointments with a possible change every two years would be even better. The point is that as soon as we put a fixed period of this kind in we deprive ourselves of the flexibility which is so very important in voluntary bodies of this kind.

Similarly, on the question of age, having regard to some of the things I have myself said on this, we see merit in these problems of children's panels not being in the hands of too old people; when I say that I mean people who have become too old and been perhaps too long on the job. There is considerable merit in having at least some of the people of a comparatively youthful age. But as soon as you put a definite limit in and say that nobody shall continue over the age of 65, sooner or later you come up against the case where you say,"I wish I had had the power to continue this man because, notwithstanding his age, he is so very obviously the suitable person ". The present Government have continued people in office, although not in a category of this kind, of an age far beyond the normal retirement. It would be wrong for me to mention individuals, but noble Lords can think of a case where someone was continued by this Government in appointment well beyond the three score years and ten, and a very satisfactory chairman he made for many years after he passed that stage. It would have been a disaster if we had had a fixed age which would have deprived us of the services of that individual. And it can happen so very often.

I readily concede that when a person reaches 65 he is more likely not to be a suitable person for this particular kind of work, but it is so important that the Secretary of State of the day, in continuing legislation of this kind, should have the maximum freedom for so ordering the terms of appointment, the length of time, the age at which people can continue to serve, or even the periods which they may serve, that it may be a mistake to put in any limitations. I would remind your Lordships that there are very considerable powers in the Bill for the Secretary of State to remove people from membership if he finds that that is necessary. I hope that with those remarks the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, will find it possible to accept that what he has in mind will be the general principles on which successive Secretaries of State, I would think over many years, I would seek to work, and that will be accomplished without putting words of this kind into the Bill.

LORD BALERNO

I should like, to support my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn in his Amendment. It is all very well to say that the Secretary of State is given power to remove from office any member of the children's panel, but in fact this is a power which is very seldom exercised because of the ignominy that accompanies such a dismissal from such a committee or panel. Because it is seldom exercised it is very wise to have a natural period at which that person can drop out gracefully without any heal ignominy. It is this local association that matters. The whole point of these panels is that they are local panels. The local people know the people who are on them, and they in turn know the parents of the delinquent children. To allow a graceful demission from the children's panel is a wise thing. Therefore I strongly support my noble friend in stating a term of years which can be renewed by the Secretary of State.

LORD HUGHES

I thought I made it perfectly clear that that part of it presented no difficulty. It is not necessary to fix a period to accomplish that. What I was really taking the strongest objection to was fixing an age limit which would mean a compulsory retirement. Although it is true that I referred to the fact that the Secretary of State has power to remove a person, I am in complete agreement with the noble Lord that that would not be the normal way of bringing a person's membership to an end. The normal thing would be where a person was approaching the age where another term would take him beyond the age of 65 and it was felt in his particular case that there was no special circumstance requiring his continued membership, and he would not be appointed for another term. But you can accomplish this in, if I may use the noble Lord's own phrase, a more graceful way than saying to a man, "I am sorry; you are aged 65 and Parliament considers that at the age of 65 you no longer have any useful purpose to serve in relation to a children's panel.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I am most grateful to the noble Lord for his explanation of the Government's attitude on this matter. One can take one of two views on this question, and there are conveniences, advantages and disadvantages in both methods. I think he has made quite a reasonable case on this matter, and I beg leave to withdrawn the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

9.52 p.m.

THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN moved, in paragraph 2, to leave out "but may be removed from office by the Secretary of State at any time", and insert: . The Secretary of State may remove a chairman, deputy-chairman or member of a panel if, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, he is guilty of misconduct or neglect in the performance of his duties as a member, or he is through age or infirmity no longer capable of performing them, or he is convicted of an offence (other than an offence under the Road Traffic Acts). The noble Marquess said: I do not want to take up the time of the Committee with this Amendment. I have heard what the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, said about the last two Amendments and the need to give the Secretary of State as wide a discretion as possible in this matter. I feel, however, that there is something to be said for defining the position a little more precisely, which I think this Amendment does; and even if he cannot accept it, I would ask him to comment perhaps a little on it. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 58, line 9, leave out from ("State") to end of line 10 and insert the said new words.—(The Marquess of Lothian.)

LORD HUGHES

I do not know whether I can give the noble Marquess a satisfactory explanation. It is the customary Government explanation, and when I say "Government" I mean any Government. It is that when a Minister is given a discretion in matters of this kind, particularly affecting membership of the voluntary bodies, because it is probably more important in this direction than anywhere else he should really have a fairly wide discretion rather than a discretion which can be exercised on certain grounds. If I were a member of one of these panels and I thought that I was in danger of being removed on any ground, I would want to get out as quickly as possible, because I should not like people to be speculating as to the reason why I was being removed: that I had been guilty of misconduct or guilty of neglect in the performance of my duty, or that I was aged or infirm and was no longer capable of performing my duties. It would be little satisfaction to know that everybody knew that I had not been removed because of an offence under the Road Traffic Act. For these reasons, it would be much better that the Secretary of State's discretion should be unfettered.

I couple that with what I said in concluding my remarks to the noble Lord, Lord Balerno, with whom I agreed that in practice the power to remove a person is a power which is seldom exercised because it is almost impossible to do so without inflicting almost unnecessary suffering and hardship on people who, after all, are there in the first place because they have been willing to give voluntary service. Generally speaking, no great difficulty arises. I say "generally speaking" because it could arise. There is no great hardship allowed in permitting the person to serve out the rest of his term, but this is to make certain that he should not be called upon too frequently to exercise his duties during the rest of that term.

THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN

I am obliged to the noble Lord. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Schedule 2 agreed to.

Schedule 3 agreed to.

Schedule 4 [Appeal Tribunals]:

THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF L1STOWEL)

Before I call Amendment No. 220, I must point out to the Committee that if this Amendment is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment No. 221.

10.0 p.m.

LORD DRUMALBYN moved, in paragraph 6, to leave out sub-paragraph (2), and to insert instead: () In any proceedings before an appeal tribunal a person shall have a right to be represented by another person. The noble Lord said: The purpose of this Amendment is to put it definitely in the Bill that one person may be represented by another person. It does not seem proper to leave it to the discretion of the Secretary of State whether he shall make rules allowing one person to be represented by another person in any appeal proceedings under Section 64. In my view, the Bill should offer the right, even if the Secretary of State is left with the power to make rules as to the procedure for such representation, for one person to be represented by another.

Legislation often does not confer this right in regard to tribunals. There are tribunals before which there is not a power for one person to be represented by another, but it seems without doubt to be right in this case, and I think that it should be clearly stated in the Bill. No doubt the Secretary of State will make rules of procedure, but he is not bound to make provision as to the representation of one person by another. I think that we should make it quite clear in the Bill that one person may be represented by another in these particular proceedings before this particular tribunal. I suggest that, if the noble Lord dies not feel disposed to accept this Amendment here, it ought to go in as a substantive provision in Clause 64. He can then, if he wishes, keep the powers to male rules on procedure. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 61, line 24, leave out sub-paragraph (2) and insert the said new sub-paragraph.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD HUGHES

As the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, has indicated, the power to make such a provision is in the Bill in paragraph 6(2). If it should prove necessary to set up a tribunal— and I would point out that we have been able to go from 1948 right up to date without having to set up a tribunal—the Council on Tribunals must be brought in. The Council have been given by Clause 88(b) powers of supervision over thee tribunals. The Council will certainly have views as to how representation should be covered, and it may be taken that they will have particularly in their minis the interests of appellants. I can certainly give the assurance that any views which the Council on Tribunals express in relation to the way in which a person should be represented before tribunals will be given effect to by the Secretary of State.

I think that that assurance should be satisfactory to the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, but in case it is not I have an alternative suggestion to make to him. I do not see any reason why I s could keep this up my sleeve and invite him to make a second speech saying that he does not like the first proposal. The second proposal is an alternative way of dealing with the matter; that is, that I would give an undertaking that we will in the meantime consult the Council on Tribunals about their views on this matter with a view, if they think it desirable, to the Government's putting down an Amendment at a later stage. What I cannot undertake, if we take the second course, is that that will necessarily mean that information will be available for us to act on in your Lordships' House. But if the noble Lord prefers the second course, then I will certainly undertake that my right honourable friend will have a consultation of that kind and will act upon it in another place in due course.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I am much obliged to the noble Lord for his two suggestions. As I say, I think there should be a substantive provision as to the right of representation. The noble Lord has suggested that he should consult the Council on Tribunals about the rules as to procedure, and I think that that would be very helpful. I think it will help his colleagues in the other place to know the answer when he comes to pilot the Bill there. I am much obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, and I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Schedule 4 agreed to.

Schedule 5 [Transitional Provisions]:

10.7 p.m.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I have put down this Amendment because I should like to know what are the circumstances that the Secretary of State has in mind to prescribe under this paragraph. It says: 4.—(1) On the coming into operation of Part Ill of this Act it shall be the duty of every local authority in such circumstances as may be prescribed by the Secretary of State to arrange for the case of any child who is—

1. (a) subject to an approved school order.
2. (b) committed to their care as a fit person under an order of a court,
3. (c) under a supervision order, or
4. (d) under a probation order,

to be brought before a children's hearing for his case to be considered and disposed of under Part III of this Act. Can the noble Lord say how many children there are at the present moment who fall into those four categories? If I understand the position aright, there are something like 4,000, but I do not know. However, it seems to me to impose a very heavy load indeed on children's panels at the outset of their work if a high proportion of these children are to be brought before them. It would therefore be useful if the noble Lord could give some indication of what circumstances the Secretary of State has in mind to prescribe under this paragraph.

I quite appreciate that the Bill is intended to abolish detention as a punishment, and for that reason it may be theoretically desirable for children's panels to see the children who have been sent to an approved school as a punishment by the courts. There would be a change there. But I should have thought that the sorting out of children at approved schools was primarily an administrative matter. I should like to know whether court orders for detention will be automatically converted into supervision requirements when the Bill comes into force, or is that the kind of case that the Secretary of State has it in mind to prescribe? If they were to be automatically converted, then the child and the parent would have 'their right to require a review in accordance with Clause 47, and therefore it is possible that they would be brought before the children's panels. In view of the relatively large number of children affected, it would be useful to know what circumstances the Secretary of State has in mind. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 62, line 43, leave out paragraph 4.— (Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD HUGHES

If we were to accept this Amendment, the effect would be that any of the orders mentioned in paragraph 4 would cease to have effect from the date the Bill became an Act. I do not think that is the noble Lard's intention. I think it would be nearer his intention that the orders should be allowed to continue in the normal course. The first of these would be the effect if the Amendment were carried, but it does not seem to us that either of them is appropriate. It is just as wrong that they should all come to an end on the Act coming into force as that they should all continue. For example, if we made provision that they should all automatically continue, then we would have a very fair measure of injustice as between one child and another. We have to picture the circumstance that one child might have been put on probation for three years a few days before the Act came into operation, in which case, if we continue an order, that child is stuck with that provision for three years, whereas another child might be dealt with a few days after the Act comes into operation, in which case it will be placed under the supervision requirement and will have regular rights of review and rights of appeal which the other child is going to be denied.

I think that what we expect to happen, and what we are seeking to make provision for happening, is in fact what the noble Lord wants. He has said that it would be an impossible task for all these cases to be considered at once. With that I agree. Because of the numbers involved, that would be a sheer impossibility. So what we provide in paragraph 4 is to take power to prescribe that in certain circumstances children subject to the various orders should be brought before the hearings. This will have to be fully worked out in rules, but the kind of solution that is likely to be found is that, say, orders which have over one year to go would be allowed to stand, orders for one year or less would be allowed to run out and the other cases would be reviewed during the year that followed and would be either turned into supervision requirements, as appropriate, or, alternatively, discharged. This seems to be a reasonable way of dividing up the existing cases in a way that has a certain amount of justice as between one child and another and yet does not place on the hearings an impossible burden. I hope that this explanation will provide the noble Lord with a picture of what is going to happen which is consistent with what he would like to see happening.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I am very much obliged to the noble Lord for his explanation of the intentions in this matter. We will study these. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Schedule 5 agreed to.

Schedule 6 [Minor and Consequential Amendments]:

LORD DRUMALBYN

This is a consequential Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 64, line 41, after ("of") insert ("a large burgh or").—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD DRUMALBYN

I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 65, line 2, at end insert— (". In section 41(2)(a) for the words `large burghs' there shall be substitued the words counties of cities'.")—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD DRUMALBYN

This Amendment is put down for information. I understand there is only one remand centre in Scotland. Is that correct? It seems a rather odd provision in this context. I do not think remand centres are mentioned at all in the White Paper. Assessment centres definitely are. I wonder whether this word will be more appropriate than "remand" centres. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 66, line 43, leave out ("remand") and insert ("assessment")—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD HUGHES

I hope the noble Lord will find it possible to withdraw his Amendment. As I understand it, there is no remand centre in Scotland, and the remand centre will be nonsense it relation to this. The only purpose of remand centres is to provide accomodation for remands under Section 28 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1949 which has not yet been brought into force. Remands are still carried out under Section 41 of the Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937, and as yet there are no establishments in Scotland designated as remand centres. The remand institution at Longriggend—and this is probably what the noble Lord has in mind—is technically a prison, although it performs this function acting as a place of custody on remand for all under-21s including unruly and depraved children from the West of Scotland. I can say that Section 28 is likely to be brought into effect before this Bill is brought into effect. I hope, therefore, the noble Lord will withdraw his Amendment.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I am much obliged. I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

LORD HUGHES

The effect of this Amendment is to give a Scottish court jurisdiction in proceedings against persons residing in England or Northern Ireland for a contribution order under Clause 80 of the Bill. The effect of the Amendment is to continue the jurisdiction of Scottish courts relating to the making of contribution orders against persons residing in England or Northern Ireland by substituting for reference to the Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937 a reference to the present Bill. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 67, line 18, at end insert—

("Maintenance Orders Act 1950

In section 9, in subsection (1), for paragraph (a) there shall be substitued the following paragraph— (a) for a contribution order under section 80 of the Special Work (Scotland) Act 1968 (enforcement of duty to make contributions by parents in respect of their children while in the care of a local authority under Part 11 of that Act or under a supervision requirement'").—(Lord Hughes.)

LORD DRUMALBYN

This is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 68, line 29, after ("or") insert ("in Scotland").—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

Schedule 6, as amended, agreed to.

Schedule 7 [Enactments repealed]:

LORD DRUMALBYN

This is a fairly simple point. It is difficult to understand the repealing of either "young person" or "person"'. It is not sense to leave out "person" except where it first appears, without there being something in its place. It occurs seven times in that subsection. If you remove it every time it occurs except once, it does not seem to be sensible. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 72, line 30, leave out from first ("person") to end of line 33.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD HUGHES

I accept that the drafting is an improvement on our own.

LORD HUGHES

The effect of this Amendment is to delete from Section (1) (1) (d) of the Police, Fire and Probation Officers Remuneration Act 1956 the effects of the Third Schedule to the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1949 which the Bill repeals. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 74, line 42, at end insert—

("5 & 6 Eliz. 2. c.1.

The Police, Fire and Probation Officers Remuneration Act 1956.

In section 1(1)(d), the words from 'or' to '1949'")

10.20 p.m.

LORD DRUMALBYN

Section 69(1) of the Mental Health (Scotland) Act deals with persons sentenced to imprisonment or detention in approved schools where they have been sent to hospital for treatment for mental disorder and they no longer require treatment. Paragraph (b) gives the Secretary of State power to exercise any power of releasing a person on license or discharging him under supervision as he would have done if the person had been returned from hospital to the prison or the approved school, or to authorise the managers of the approved school to exercise that power. Now that detention is being abolished as a punishment for children, I see that the provision as to approved schools may no longer be necessary, though I should have thought that if the court had ordered a child prosecuted under the instructions of the Lord Advocate to be detained in an approved school, it might still apply. What I do not understand is why the provision as to imprisonment should cease to have effect in this Bill. It seems to me right outside the scope of the Bill. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 75, leave out line 7.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)

LORD HUGHES

I am in grave difficulty. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, will not think it necessary to draw the attention of the noble Lord, Lord Ferrier, to what I am about to say. This is a mistake. It is Section 69 (1)(b) that should be repealed and we shall proceed to repeal that in due course. I therefore accept the Amendment.

LORD DRUMALBYN

This is a very small point. I am not clear why the accountant should cease to include in his annual report which he submits to the Secretary of State abstracts of accounts of all bodies of managers of approved schools. I wonder whether the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, can explain why it is necessary to make this omission. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 75, leave out lines 16 to 18.—(Lord Drurnalbyn.)

LORD HUGHES

Section 80(1)(e) must be omitted because it requires the Scottish Education Department accountant to submit in his report details of the accounts of approved schools. But since approved schools as such will no longer exist, such a report would be inappropriate. During the transitional stage envisaged in Schedule 5 grant would still be payable. It can, however, be safely assumed that there will be quite adequate investigation of accounts before grant is paid, just as there is at present. Similarly the words "(in an approved school)" must also be removed from Section 104 as there will be no approved schools. I hope that that explanation satisfies the noble Lord.

LORD DRUMALBYN

I am obliged to the noble Lord. I ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Remaining Schedule, as amended, agreed to.

House resumed.

Bill reported, with Amendments.