Lords Sitting of 14 November 1967

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock:
The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Lincoln
The Lord Foxford (E. Limerick)—Sat first in Parliament after the death of his father.

LORD CHANCELLOR'S VISIT TO THE NETHERLANDS
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD GARDINER): My Lords, on Thursday I have, with Her Majesty's permission, to go to the Netherlands, first, to sign on behalf of the United Kingdom the Convention on Enforcement of Judgments and the Convention on Civil Procedure; secondly, to deposit on behalf of the United Kingdom the instrument of ratification in respect of The Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents which the United Kingdom signed in November, 1965; and, thirdly, to fulfil a longstanding engagement to address the Anglo-Netherlands Society on the tendency towards unification of European law. I hope therefore that your Lordships will be good enough to excuse my absence from the Woolsack that afternoon.

PRESERVATION OF LEGAL RECORDS
2.36 p.m.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will make a statement on the Report of the Committee on Legal Records.]
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, the Committee on Legal Records reported last year, giving detailed advice on which legal records should be permanently preserved and for how long the remainder should be kept. I am most grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, and his Committee for their valuable Report. One recommendation was that only official copies of wills deposited since 1858 should be preserved and that the more bulky originals should be destroyed 50 years after the grant of probate. Many people interested in historical and genealogical subjects criticised this proposal; they urged that the original wills should be preserved for all time. In these circumstances I asked the Advisory Council on Public Records to consider the Report. The Council have now recommended the preservation of original wills deposited before the date of the introduction of the photostat copying process. Original wills deposited after that date should be kept for 50 years and then destroyed, subject to satisfactory tests as to the durability of photostat copies.
I hope the noble Lord will agree that this is a satisfactory solution to the problem, which is solely one of space. Original wills deposited since 1958 occupy almost 18,000 cubic feet, over four times the space taken by the copies.
The Council suggest minor modifications to some other of the original Committee's recommendations which I have also accepted. I do not think I need trouble your Lordships with the details. Their Report is being circulated to interested parties and will be published in their Annual Report. I am very grateful to them for their assistance.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, may I thank the noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack for making that statement, and may I join with him in thanking those who served on this Committee, which was appointed, I think, when I was Lord Chancellor.

DRINKING-AND-DRIVING LAWS: DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
2.38 p.m.
THE EARL OF BUCKINGHAMSHIRE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they can confirm the accuracy of the statements in the Press last September, to the effect that about 4,500 foreign diplomats in London were expected to be exempt from the new drinking-and-driving laws, and whether anything can be done to abolish or diminish such unjustifiable discrimination.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS (LORD SHEPHERD): My Lords, the immunity of the diplomatic agents and employees from the criminal jurisdiction of the State in which they serve has the effect that Part I of the Road Safety Act 1967 cannot be enforced against diplomats without their Governments' consent. This is a rule of International Law which it is not open to the United Kingdom to change unilaterally.
THE EARL OF BUCKINGHAMSHIRE: My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that Answer. Is he aware that the Diplomatic Corps give more parties in Central London than any other single group of people in the course of a year, and that, with all due respect, I therefore think it wrong that they should be diplomatically immune and should be able so to plead when stopped by the police?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, all persons entitled to diplomatic immunity are under a duty to respect the laws and regulations of the State in which they serve. If they fail to do so, appropriate action may be taken through diplomatic channels, but the number of occasions on which this action has been required is very small indeed.
LORD PEDDIE: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend whether, when there is an infringement of any regulation, the Embassy involved is notified?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I think it depends entirely upon the set of circumstances.
LORD SALTOUN: My Lords, may I ask Her Majesty's Government whether there is any prospect of limiting the people with diplomatic immunity in each Embassy to a reasonable number?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, that is a view which has been expressed on many occasions in this House. But as noble Lords will be aware, Embassies and High Commission Offices tend to increase in size, and therefore one can only give the same degree of immunity to all those individuals of a particular class or rank within that Embassy or High Commission.
LORD PEDDIE: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend what would be the set of circumstances that would justify the reporting of any infringement of any regulation to the appropriate Embassy?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I am afraid that, without notice, I cannot answer that question.
LORD HAWKE: My Lords, did the noble Lord say that the law could be enforced against these people with the consent of the Embassy to which they belong? If so, are Her Majesty's Government, in the interest of public safety, requesting all Embassies in London to agree that their servants should be affected by this law?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, clearly the Embassies will know what is the view of Her Majesty's Government. I think it is fair to point out that in those countries in Europe which have similar regulations—particularly in regard to drinking and driving—our own people carry out their responsibilities; and this is a view which is generally accepted throughout the Diplomatic Service.
LORD HAWKE: My Lords, when the noble Lord says "carry out their responsibilities", does he mean that they agree to be subject to criminal law in this respect?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I have no information with me about recent requests that have been made to Embassies where an infringement has taken place.

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I will see whether there are any figures, and if possible I will let the noble Lord have them.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: My Lords, could my noble friend say how many individuals in this field applied for diplomatic immunity last year?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, the figure I have here for members of the Diplomatic Missions is 3,928.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: My Lords, I want to ask the noble Lord how many individuals who had committed some offence applied for immunity last year.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I am sorry that I do not have these figures with me. I will communicate them to the noble Baroness.

ADEN: BRITISH CITIZENS' LOSSES
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they have any scheme in mind to compensate British citizens in Aden for the loss of their property and livelihood.]
THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (LORD SHACKLETON): My Lords, Her Majesty's Government will ensure that pensions and terminal benefits due at Independence are paid to all British civil servants employed by the local Governments in South Arabia, but I regret that we cannot assume financial responsibility in respect of British citizens who are not in Government employ. Her Majesty's Government will seek to ensure that the successor Government in South Arabia fully accepts its responsibility for ensuring that British lives and property are properly safeguarded after Independence.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: My Lords, I find it rather hard to thank the Minister for that reply. May I ask him how Her Majesty's Government intend to make any future Government in South Arabia recompense the
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interests of British citizens who have lost property and livelihood?
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I am sorry, but I did not understand the noble Viscount's supplementary question. My noble friend Lord Beswick has not had an opportunity to make an announcement on Business, because Statements, as is customary, are announced after Questions. But shortly after half past three I shall be making a Statement on the position in South Arabia, and that may help the noble Viscount.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: I thank the noble Lord.

GIBRALTAR: SPANISH NAVAL ACTIVITIES
LORD MERRIVALE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will make a statement regarding recent Spanish naval activities off Gibraltar.]
LORD SHACKLETON: Under International Law, Spanish and other warships enjoy the right of innocent passage through Gibraltar's territorial sea. This right has been exercised by Spanish naval vessels for many years. In recent weeks Spanish naval vessels have on several occasions passed unusually close to the entrance of the port of Gibraltar. The port authorities at Gibraltar have taken the matter up, on navigational grounds, with the local Spanish authorities, with satisfactory results.
LORD MERRIVALE: My Lords, if these naval activities of the past few weeks are not part of a programme of intimidation and a cold war harassment of the Gibraltarians, causing anxiety and speculation in Gibraltar, can the noble Lord give an assurance to that effect? It would satisfy the people of Gibraltar to a very large extent.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I appreciate the noble Lord's concern at the fact that this action might have been interpreted in that way; and some concern—although not much has appeared in the British Press—has been expressed.

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To the best of our knowledge this is not part of any such campaign, and therefore I hope that that assurance will meet the noble Lord's point.
LORD MERRIVALE: My Lords, I am grateful for that assurance. Can the noble Lord, in effect, confirm that there have been representations on the part of Her Majesty's Government, or that a reassurance has been received from the Spanish Government that, in effect, these activities are not part of a deliberate and continuing violation of the Gibraltar territorial waters?
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I would ask the noble Lord not to press me further. I said that it had been taken up with the local Spanish authorities, with satisfactory results.

BUSINESS: GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, as my noble friend Lord Shackleton has already indicated, he will be making a Statement on Aden at a convenient moment after 3.30 p.m. My noble friend Lord Shepherd will be making a statement on Rhodesia.

STANDING ORDERS COMMITTEE (PRIVATE BILLS)
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF L1STOWEL): My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.
Moved, That the Standing Orders Committee be appointed, and that the Lords following, with the Lord Chancellor and the Chairman of Committees, be named of the Committee:

M. Salisbury,

M. Willingdon,

L. Ailwyn,

L. Airedale,

L. Cawley,

L. Crook,

L. Douglas of Barloch,

L. Faringdon,

L. Terrington,

L. Tweedsmuir.—(The Earl of Listowel.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

CONSUMER PROTECTION BILL [H.L.]
2.47 p.m.
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF PUBLIC BUILDING AND WORKS (LORD WINTERBOTTOM): My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a second time. Some of you will no doubt remember that a previous Bill, which ran along very much the same lines as the present one, was given a Second Reading by this House in February, 1966. For reasons unconnected with its merits, that Bill did not reach the Statute Book; and for one reason or another it has not proved possible to renew these Government proposals to your Lordships before now. The need for better protection of buyers against misdescription impressed the Molony Committee on Consumer Protection. The Government are no less impressed, and I am particularly glad to have been given this opportunity to commend to your Lordships a measure which we believe will be of real value to the consumer and will prove to be a landmark in the history of legislation to protect him.
The Bill is firmly founded on the recommendations of the Molony Committee. That is not to say that we have followed their recommendations in every respect; but where we have departed from the advice they gave we have done so only after careful thought and in the firm conviction that we have found a better answer. We have, moreover, taken our proposals beyond the field covered by that Committee, where we believed that the facts of life in 1967 made this appropriate. And we have taken account of some of the helpful suggestions which were put forward in this House early in 1966. There will, I know, be a number of points of detail at which your Lordships will later wish to look closely—and, if I may say so without being thought presumptious, rightly so, for this is a measure which will touch the daily lives of all who buy or sell. But I feel sure, my Lords, that it will commend itself to you as an essentially sound and necessary Bill.
My Lords, it is many years since Parliament first legislated on the subject of misdescription. The general law on this

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subject has from time to time been extended and amended, and now rests on the complex series of the Merchandise Marks Acts, 1887 to 1953. This Bill essentially seeks to do four things: first, to bring together this complex of laws and restate them, as simply as may be, in a single Statute; secondly, to redefine its scope so that, in the circumstances of to-day and for as far ahead as we can hope to see, it will prohibit all those deceptions concerning goods or services which, for the consumers' protection, deserve to be treated as criminal offences; thirdly, to enable us to act when need arises for more positive measures to resolve uncertainties or even require that information be given; fourthly, to ensure that the requirements of this law are positively and uniformly enforced.
It is not the purpose of this Bill to impose harsh or onerous requirements on traders. On the contrary. It asks no more than that all should observe the standards of honesty which I am quite sure that the great majority of traders already follow. In that sense it will serve to protect the worthy majority from the unfair competition of the unscrupulous minority. It is necessarily drawn in strong terms, and it demands a high standard of care from those who describe their wares; but equally it recognises that those who have observed this standard of care should not be penalise for happenings beyond their reasonable control. This, and no less, is required to safeguard the shopper and the honourable trader.
My Lords, this is not a long Bill, but it contains a great deal of important matter. In the limited time available this afternoon, I do not think that the House would wish me to review every aspect of its provisions, some of which—necessary though they are to the proper functioning of this legislation—are better examined at a later stage. But with your Lordships' permission, I will outline its plan, and the significance of its main features.
We begin by defining the two basic offences as regard the misdescription of goods. They are essentially the same as in the old merchandise marks legislation—in simple terms, misdescribing goods, and trading in misdescribed goods—but in the latter case the definition is widened to cover methods of disposal which are
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not in the strict sense of the word "sale". It would have been possible, I suppose, to leave the offence of misdescription defined only in those very broad and general terms. But that would be most undesirable. If we embraced misdescriptions which are only marginally inaccurate, and misdescriptions which relate to quite unimportant characteristics or to matter on which the accuracy or inaccuracy of the description is not a matter of ascertainable fact, and provided no guidance as to what matters and what does not, we should not be strengthening but should be weakening the impact of this law. The resulting uncertainties could only create confusion and difficulty for trade, for enforcing authorities, and for the courts.
We have therefore taken care to define very clearly all those characteristics of goods which can be factually assessed and which are likely to be important to the buyer, and then made it clear that a misdescription of these characteristics is to give rise to an offence only if it is "false to a material degree". But we recognise that the misleading description can be as dangerous as the literally false one; so that, too, is covered, with a careful definition of what we mean by misleading. We also pick up the special case of the claim to comply with a standard when in fact no such standard exists. In these respects we are essentially following the pattern of the existing legislation, though refining and extending it in detail to match the needs of 1967. There are, however, two further provisions which I would especially stress, which your Lordships will find in Clause 4(2) and in Clause 5.
We propose to establish that an oral misdescription shall be an offence. From the consultations that have taken place before the introduction of this Bill, we know that this will not be universally welcomed. I dare say that we may have considerable debate about this later on. For the moment I will say merely this: that having taken careful note of what has so far been said to us about the alleged difficulties, we remain firmly convinced that they are far outweighed by the importance of establishing the principle that a misdescription by word of mouth is every bit as reprehensible—and every bit as damaging to the consumer—as a misdescription in writing. This is

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not a piece of theoretical reasoning. It is borne out by the hard facts of the market place—and of the doorstep.
We are also proposing the necessary steps to ensure that misdescriptions in advertisements are brought adequately within the Bill's control. This has been a source of some difficulty under the present law, which can operate only where the buyer has taken special steps to link his purchase with the advertisement—steps which have little relationship to normal shopping practice. They have even less reality in present-day circumstances, when, as your Lordships well know, people walk into the shop and order branded goods on the strength of what they have been told by an advertisement on television or in the national Press. If such advertisements are false, the provisions of Clause 5 will make it possible to deal with them accordingly.
I turn now from these provisions regarding the misdescription of goods to the important new powers which Clauses 7, 8 and 9 would confer on the Board of Trade. The first would enable the Board of Trade to define terms used in describing goods. This reflects the advice of the Molony Committee, who drew attention to the way in which certain words may be used to suggest to the consumer that goods possess certain characteristics—which they do possess, but to nothing like the degree which the customer, not unreasonably, expects. Yet because the words cannot be shown to have a precise meaning, it has not been possible to bring the misdescription law to bear on them. A power of definition would enable the Board of Trade to remove such uncertainties.
The power proposed in Clause 8 is a labelling power. It would enable the Board to require classes of goods to be marked with prescribed information or instructions where this seemed necessary or expedient in the interests of consumers. There is no such general power at present, although there are some Statutes which enable marking to be required for particular goods or particular purposes. But we consider that the consumer's interest in having information about the goods which he is purchasing demands that such a power be taken, to be used if it is required. Like the Molony Committee, we hope that the enlightened policy of
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manufacturers in introducing voluntary labelling will make its exercise a rare necessity. In this connection, I am sure your Lordships will join me in extending a warm welcome to the launching of the "Teltag" scheme by the Consumer Council.
This may be a convenient point to remind the House that one effect of the Bill would be to repeal the Merchandise Marks Act 1926, which among other things enabled orders to be made requiring indications of origin. Such orders as have been made under that Act will continue temporarily in force, in accordance with Clause 40 of the Bill. Your Lordships will observe that the terms of the enabling powers in Clause 8 are wide enough to enable orders requiring origin-marking to be made, subject to the rather different criteria specified in that clause and to the non-discriminatory provisions of Clause 10, which better reflect our international obligations.
As a corollary to the labelling powers, we are proposing in Clause 9 the creation of a power to require advertisements for goods to carry specified information whether or not there is a marking order in force in relation to the goods advertised. Later in the Bill your Lordships will find provision to ensure that all these order-making powers are exercised only after due consultation with the interests affected and after due notice has been published.
The next group of clauses, Clauses 11 to 14, deal with certain sorts of misstatement which, while not constituting false descriptions of goods, may none the less cause the consumer considerable damage. I know that many of your Lordships will be pleased to see that we propose specific provisions to deal with the nuisance of dual pricing. It is not, of course, our intention to inhibit genuine price reductions; indeed, we should like to see a great deal more of them, with all due publicity. What we are trying to stop here is the false or exaggerated claim about such reductions—the claim that the price has been reduced when in fact it has not, or that the price has been reduced appreciably when it is only a trifling cut, and so on; and also certain deceptive practices whereby a customer may be deceived into thinking that goods are being offered more cheaply than they really are.

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Clause 12 is basically a refurbishing elaboration and broadening of a principle established in the existing law. Clause 13 is, however, a major innovation. For the first time, it brings certain statements about services within the scope of this legislation. This subject was not considered by the Molony Committee, simply because it would have involved them in a mammoth task and delayed their Report unduly. The Government, however, are satisfied from the experience of departments, from cases brought forward in the Press, and from reports from many other sources, that an attempt must be made in this Bill to give the consumer some protection against mis-statements made about services. This is a tricky area to venture into, for a service is not tangible in the way that goods are. Its performance can often be judged only after the event, and many factors can enter into an assessment of it. I am not now going to elaborate upon the solution we have put forward. But I should like to emphasise that we have taken care to frame the clause so that it will bite only on those who deliberately or recklessly misdescribe the services which they are in a position to offer. It is supported by proposals for a power, similar to that which Clause 7 seeks in relation to goods, to define terms used in describing services.
Clause 15 provides an express ban on the importation of goods bearing false or misleading indications of origin. In the following clause are provisions enabling trade mark proprietors to enlist the help of Her Majesty's Customs and Excise to prevent the entry of goods which bear their marks without their authority. These differ from the existing provisions, which had in practice become of very little value. And here I might mention that the Bill—unlike the legislation it is designed to replace—does not include the unauthorised use of a trade mark among the matters which constitute a false trade description. Nowadays trade marks law gives the mark-owner adequate opportunity to defend himself against misuse of his mark, and we see no point in duplicating the law on this point.
My Lords, I think it is fair to say that the first sixteen clauses which I have been describing contain the pith and substance of the Bill. They protect the
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consumer by establishing appropriate offences; they provide powers to be exercised in his interests, and they cover particular types of mis-statement which may do him damage. The remaining clauses fill in this framework. They provide the detail, say how it is to work, and who is to enforce it and how; they provide suitable enabling powers and supplementary powers, what powers the enforcing officers shall have, and so on. They include a clause laying a duty on the larger local authorities to ensure that the Act is properly enforced. All these are important provisions, and none more so than those which specify the defences which are to be available—defences, which as I said earlier, we have carefully tailored to safeguard the man who has observed the high standard of care which must be required in this field. To all these details your Lordships will doubtless wish to pay close attention at the appropriate time. But I hope that I have said enough to convince the House that this is essentially a sound, important and necessary Bill which we should try to get on to tae Statute Book as rapidly as due consideration permits. My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a second time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a. —(Lord Winterbottom.)
3.5 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, for his careful exposition of this Bill. Your Lordships will greet it as an old friend, even if it has changed a bit in the intervening time. I am bound to say that on the whole I think it has changed for the better, and some of the changes, I am sure, will be welcomed as efforts to meet the views expressed here on the last occasion. Others we may want to look at rather carefully in Committee. But it is plain from what the noble Lord has said that careful consideration has been given to the Bill during the intervening time, to use his words, "in order to tailor the requirements to the requirements of the Bill".
Your Lordships will remember that we finished only ten clauses in Committee on the previous Bill, so there is a good deal that will have to be looked at with some care. It is fitting that this House should complete the job which it began

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then before the Bill goes to another place, and I should like to thank the Government for re-introducing it in this House. The main content of the Bill remains much the same, and I certainly do not propose to repeat the speech that I made on Second Reading nearly two years ago. However, there are some things that I think I should say, and as there is to be only one Front Bench speech from this side, I hope that I may be permitted to cover rather more ground than I would otherwise have done.
I should perhaps say right away that I am independent Chairman of the Advertising Standards Authority, which some of your Lordships may know is a body set up by the advertising industry to supervise the working of the industry's own voluntary control system, and consisting of an equal number of persons with advertising interests and of persons with no stake at all in advertising. I need hardly say that I am not speaking to-day for the Advertising Standards Authority, but I can tell your Lordships that the Authority very much welcomes the strengthening of the law along the lines of the Molony Committee's recommendations.
In making its recommendations (I should like to treat this rather broadly) the Molony Committee envisaged an important part for the voluntary system to play once the Committee's main recommendations had been put into effect. It was a matter of great regret to us all that the last General Election brought the previous Bill to an untimely end while it was still in the womb of Parliament. I thought that the noble Lord was a little coy about this. It is only after this measure which we are discussing has been in operation for some time that it will be possible to assess whether the combination of the law provided in this Bill and the voluntary system is really effective.
I think it is plain from this Bill that the Government have decided to give the Molony Committee's conception a run—the conception of an amended and strengthened law on trade descriptions and advertising, coupled with, or rather backed by, the voluntary system which came into operation at about the same time as the Committee reported, and meantime to keep an open mind on what, if any, further changes may prove neces-
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sary in the light of experience. We on this side believe in relying as much as possible on voluntary action, and we welcome the implementation of the Molony recommendations.
The noble Lord described the four main purposes of the Bill. Perhaps for the purposes of my argument I may say that I visualise this as making changes in three main directions: first of all, to ensure that what is said in advertising about goods by way of description conforms to the same rules as what is said about them in the course of selling them; and, in the language of the Bill, trade descriptions applied to the goods must not be false to a material degree. Secondly, the Bill would make it an offence also to describe goods in a way which is likely to mislead the customer to a material degree. Thirdly, it will cover not only goods, but services, accommodation or facilities provided in the course of business. I do not think there is much disagreement on any of these three objectives. The main source of disagreement may be on the means of supervision and enforcement in the case of misleading descriptions, and it is on this point that I should like to say a few words.
It can be argued that there is a fundamental distinction between deciding what is false and deciding what is misleading. As the noble Lord said, The one involves an objective appraisal, an objective appraisal of characteristics which can be factually assessed, I think it is said; and the other involves a subjective judgment: a subjective assessment as to whether a statement or presentation is likely to mislead. One deals with facts; the other with opinion. The problem, as I see it, is how to frame the law in such a way as to make that subjective assessment as practical, impartial and objective as possible.
I receive many complaints about advertising which is alleged to be misleading, in which the complainant says, in effect, "Surely this is misleading—but, of course, I myself was not misled". One may well ask in reply, "If you are not misled, what makes you think others will be misled?" On the other hand, I also receive complaints from people who have actually been misled, and one then has to consider whether it was the fault of the advertisement or their own fault, or a bit of both. It is not just a question of whether the

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buyer has been misled, but of whose fault it is, his own or the advertiser's. In my experience it is well nigh impossible to say anything at all which is not misunderstood by somebody, as anyone who has ever held a Press conference will know. In most cases, someone will get it wrong.
The first conclusion from these considerations, I would suggest, is that there must at least be an objective test of whether a statement made in the course of trade or business is misleading. This, I take it, is what the words "to a material degree" are intended to provide. The test should surely be: Has the statement induced, or is it likely to induce, a purchase which the purchaser will regret? We shall have to consider in Committee whether the meaning of the words "to a material degree" ought not to be defined more closely. In any event, people say things genuinely believing that they can be interpreted in only one way, only to find that someone else interprets them quite differently; and it is impossible to get the author of the statement to see how what he said can be so misunderstood. Does it really make sense in such a case that he should be taken to court and fined; or, indeed, taken to court at all? Clearly, it seems to me, there has to be a mediator who can go to the author of the statement and say to him, in effect, "Look. Incredible as it may be to you, what you say is being, or is likely to be, misunderstood. Hadn't you better change it?"
To deal with all this we need provision both for enforcement and for mediation. At first sight, the idea of a statutory body to do both is attractive. I read that the Consumer Council are still advocating a statutory body to supervise advertising, presumably with powers to stop advertising practices of which the body may disapprove, subject, no doubt, to appeal to the courts. They say that what they want is something along the lines of the Federal Trade Commission in the United States. The Federal Trade Commission consists of five distinguished lawyers backed by a staff of 140 or so, whose primary function is the defence of free competition against monopolistic tendencies and unfair or deceptive practices in inter-State trade.
The Molony Committee considered this idea and firmly rejected it, in para
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graph 794 of their Report. This is what they said—and I quote what appears to me relevant:
"Having regard to the nature and extent of the residual problem "—
that is, after dealing with the legal side—
"we do not think it necessary to propose a further statutory control, whether as an alternative or as a supplement to the voluntary system … we do not relish the idea of a statutorily backed authority making up the law as it goes along … we are satisfied that the wider problems of advertising ought to be, and can be, tackled by effectively applied voluntary controls".
There are, I think, decisive arguments against a statutory board, certainly at present. A case could be made out that, in place of this Bill, we should have a short measure declaring in general terms that it shall be unlawful to describe goods or services falsely, or in a way likely to mislead, and setting up a board to police the Bill. This is the kind of framework applying in America. The Government have clearly decided—and I agree with them—that in the field of goods and services we should stick to Molony, although I think it is fair to add that in the restricted field of drugs and medical devices they envisage something like a Federal Trade Commission kind of solution, precisely because, as they say in their own White Paper, drugs and medicines are not ordinary commodities. But no case at all can be made out for giving weights and measures authorities and a statutory board statutory powers to act over the same field. That is why I think the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, spoke about measures that would be positively and uniformly enforced. If we did otherwise, we should have chaos and confusion.
Nor, I believe, can any convincing case be made out for trying to divide the field, ether by laying the duty of enforcement, in cases of false description, on weights and measures authorities, and in cases of misleading advertising, or misleading description, on a statutory body; or else by leaving the duty of enforcement under the Bill to the weights and measures authorities, as provided in the Bill, and adding a statutory board with discretionary powers to tell the advertisers, the newspapers and the I.T.A., and so on, what to do and what not to do in matters not covered by the Bill. Either something is legal or it is not, and we really cannot have statutory boards stopping

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people from doing what is perfectly legal. It is quite a different thing for professional and trade bodies to make rules of behaviour under which their members agree to abstain from unethical conduct.
Moreover, the functions of such a statutory board could not be confined to advertising. In practice, it is often impossible to separate advertising from trading methods. There may be nothing wrong with the advertising itself; the trouble may lie in the follow-up action. I simply cannot believe that Parliament would be willing to concede the very wide discretionary powers over trade and marketing as a whole which a statutory board would need if it were to be effective. If such a board were set up, it would disrupt, and probably destroy, the voluntary system. However hard such a board tried, it could never, in my view, establish the same kind of relationship of friendly co-operation and common purpose as at present exists, and is growing. It would, I am afraid, create antagonism where antagonism does not at present exist. And I must say that I see the whole of this operation as an operation of co-operation. It is wholly wrong to try to separate the interests of producers, on the one hand, and those of consumers, on the other. What we have to work to is a merging of the two interests, so that they can see for themselves the way in which things are considered and administered.
Lastly, it would be expensive to have such a board. Proportionately, it would probably cost more than the Federal Trade Commission—and I think the cost of the Federal Trade Commission is around £2 million. It deals only with inter-State trade, the various States being responsible for their own trade and consumer protection legislation. I have ventured to deal at some length with this proposal because of its respectable origin. I have no doubt it will be given an airing to-day, and after that I hope it will be put away in the cupboard until we can all see how the present Bill works out in practice.
May I touch on one or two particular points? The noble Lord said that there were many points of detail, and I should like to deal with one or two. The first is the omission of the so-called "bypassing" provision, which appeared as
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Clause 23 in the previous Bill but has disappeared from this Bill. It permitted a defendant to notify the prosecution of the name and address of a third party who he claimed was responsible for the offence. It reproduced, in substance, Section 113 of the Food and Drugs Act 1955, and was included on the recommendation of the Molony Committee. What is left of it now appears as Clause 22. The National Chamber of Trade considered that the previous clause did not give enough protection to retailers. I wonder whether the noble Lord, Lord Brown, who is to reply, can tell us why the clause has been so drastically changed.
Retailers, in particular, feel that the Bill as drafted exposes them to prosecution unfairly. A retailer cannot be expected to know whether a statement on a manufacturer's tag, for example, that goods will not shrink is true. Retailers therefore feel that it should not be possible for someone to take them to court and make them prove what is perfectly obvious: that they did not know, and could not with reasonable diligence have ascertained, that the statement was untrue. Nor do they think that they should run the risk of being brought before the courts for orally telling the consumer what is on the label, instead of saying, "Read the tag for yourself".
I am not saying that it is wrong altogether to regard oral misdescriptions as being an offence, although I thought the noble Lord went rather further than the Bill appears to go. He said, if I understood him aright, that oral misdescription shall be an offence, whereas the Bill is a good deal more moderate than that. It says in Clause 4(2):
"An oral statement may amount to the use of a trade description".
That does not seem to be quite the same thing. We shall have to look carefully at the defences—and I am sure the Government want to do this—in order to ensure that they are fair for all; the manufacturer, wholesaler, retailer, advertiser, advertising agent and publisher.
The clause relating to offences originating outside the United Kingdom has also disappeared. I would ask the noble Lord how it is now proposed that offences due to an act or default which took place outside the United Kingdom are to be dealt with. The present situation is unsatisfactory. The Chief Inspector

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of Weights and Measures for Cheshire County Council said in his last report:
"In those cases where the goods were imported it was not possible to bring the actual offender before the court as the legislation makes it possible for an importer to plead a warranty defence, even when the warranty had been given by a person outside the United Kingdom. The number of such cases has increased considerably in the past year and it is observed that where such a state of affairs has existed legal proceedings could not be instituted."
It is clearly necessary that someone should be called to account in such cases, if only to ensure that home producers are not placed at an unfair disadvantage vis-à-vis foreign producers. It is surely up to the importer to satisfy himself when he buys goods that they comply with the requirements of our law and to obtain an indemnity to that effect to protect himself.
I must tell the noble Lord that we shall call for full justification of the power conferred in Clause 27(1)(d) on weights and measures inspectors to seize and detain any goods which they have reasonable cause to believe are liable to be forfeited under the Act. The circumstances in which a court would be likely to order forfeiture under this Bill do not seem to be likely to occur often enough to justify so sweeping and general a provision. The Government really ought to make up their mind as to the circumstances in which forfeiture would be justified and put them into Clause 17. This is quite different from food and drugs, where seizure may be necessary to remove a risk to health. If so, the goods can be seized under the Food and Drugs Act, and no powers for that purpose are needed under this Bill.
The noble Lord referred to Clause 11, which deals with comparative prices. I think this is the most difficult clause in the Bill. There is probably almost as much deception through dual pricing as in all trade descriptions put together. As the noble Lord said, where a trader has recently reduced his own price, it is quite legitimate for him to give the old as well as the new price. Also, so long as recommended or list prices are permitted, it is clearly permissible to quote them, provided that they are both genuine and current. I stress "current" because it is a common enough deception to refer to a producer's list price, the list having
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long since been superseded and the producer having reduced his price in subsequent lists. But as soon as a trader starts to compare his prices with the price at which he says the goods are offered by others, beware! Some itinerant traders, it seems, do not bother to find out the normal price; they just "think of a number"—and a pretty high one, too!
The main defect of Clause 11, so far as I can see, is that it only bans false price comparisons of certain kinds and by implication permits all others. For example, to say that goods are "made to sell at" such and such a price really cannot be genuine at all, and I suggest we shall have to consider in Committee a quite different approach—limiting the kind of price comparisons which are to be permitted. There is a strong case for insisting that only the price at which goods are offered for sale should be stated, except where the trader has himself recently reduced his price for the identical goods, or where there is a recommended price.
A good deal of misgiving has been expressed in trade circles about Clause 9, to which the noble Lord attached considerable importance. This empowers the Board of Trade to impose requirements as to the inclusion of information or instructions in advertisements where the Board thinks it is in the interests of the customer to do so. There are many forms of advertising in which it would be manifestly absurd to impose any such requirements—from neon lights to lead pencils, from cinema flashes to book matches. Also, one cannot say much about a product in a 30 second TV commercial, and if one were to prescribe what was to be said it would fill up quite a bit of that 30 second period. I personally believe that the Board of Trade do not intend to impose unreasonable or inappropriate requirements, but I should be grateful to the noble Lord for an assurance to that effect and for any indication he can give as to how it is intended to use the power. This is a very sweeping power which in the wrong hands could do a lot of harm, and Parliament generally dislikes conferring greater powers than the Government can show to be needed to meet particular foreseeable circumstances.
I am glad that the Government have increased the number of days' notice of

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intended prosecution which a weights and measures authority will have to give, from 14 under the last Bill to 28. This, of course, does not apply to anyone else who may choose to prosecute. It is quite possible that several prosecutions for the same alleged offence could be brought simultaneously by several weights and measures authorities in different parts of the country, and by other persons as well.
What do the Government propose to do to avoid this risk of public time and money being wasted by multiple prosecutions, not to mention the time of manufacturers? This risk is not remote; it is very real. When this measure was last discussed my noble friend Lord Cawley quoted a case where successive prosecutions were brought by a private person in different parts of the country on the same facts until a conviction was obtained. Speaking as an ordinary citizen, I would say that there is something radically wrong with a legal system which permits this. I am sure it could not happen in Scotland! Surely something should be done to prevent it happening in England and Wales. If a prosecutor does not see fit to appeal against an acquittal, the defendant should be free from further proceedings for the same alleged offence under this Bill. I should also like to ask why the old Clause 40, which related to the defraying of expenses, has been left out of the Bill. I hope this does not mean that the Board of Trade will not itself be able to bring prosecutions under the Bill. It is not difficult to envisage circumstances in which the Board of Trade could best do so.
Finally, does the term "services" include those of tipsters, whether in the area of horse-racing or football? Will the Government consider whether provision should not be made in the Gaming Bill, which I understand they are likely to bring forward? Perhaps the noble Lord will say whether this is to be considered, because it is an area where a great deal of deception goes on.
In a highly technical Bill of this kind there are bound to be many points on which there is room for difference of opinion. I have referred to some of the points on which I find myself in doubt or disagreement. But I support the broad
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structure of the Bill, which not only follows the recommendations of the Molony Committee, but, as I have said, is very much the same as the Bill to which your Lordships gave a Second Reading in February, 1966—indeed, somewhat improved to meet the views which your Lordships expressed in Committee. May I wish the Bill a fair passage. I believe the test of its success will lie not in the number of prosecutions brought under it, but in its general acceptance and implementation, and the extent to which the enforcement authorities and the voluntary systems work together to ensure fair competition and a fair deal for all. It is for this reason that I hope that when the Bill finally emerges on to the Statute Book it will be called the Fair Trading Act, so that it will not appear to be a restrictive measure directed against any sections of the community, but a positive one in the interests of all who buy and sell.
3.30 p.m.
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, I should like to join with the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, in wishing this Bill a fair passage, but I am bound to say that I think that the task of Second Reading speakers this afternoon is rather a difficult one. If it does not sound too conceited, I think I may say that broadly I am still of the opinion that I expressed in my Second Reading observations on the ill-fated Bill of two years ago. On the one hand, I would not presume to invite any of your Lordships to read any speech of mine of two years ago, but, on the other hand, I should not wish to inflict the same speech upon your Lordships again. That creates rather a void for this afternoon. However, I think I could perhaps usefully put forward two warnings that we might bear in mind as this Bill goes through this House.
The first is to resist the temptation, which I think exists rather strongly in this class of legislation, to be too grandmotherly towards the consumer. We shall not, I think, do the consumer much good if we legislate in any way which would encourage him to lower his guard in his dealings with the seller and to forget that very fine common-sense maxim which has been in existence for some centuries, "Let the buyer beware". If we were to lull the consumer into a sort of false sense of security we should not be doing him a service in the long run.

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Secondly, I think we should be very careful in Committee not to get bogged down in too great detail. I do not know what your Lordships who attended the Committee stage of the last Consumer Protection Bill felt about it. I notice that the noble Baroness, Lady Burton of Coventry, is to be the next speaker, and the noble Baroness did attend the Committee stage on that former occasion, very assiduously. I wonder whether she will agree with me that we seemed on that occasion to get so bogged down in technicalities and detail that for some of us the General Election came as something of a merciful release from the morass in which we found ourselves.
I am sorry to say that I quarrel with the Title of this Bill. The ill-fated Bill was called the Protection of Consumers (Trade Descriptions) Bill. Who are consumers? Consumers are not a separately identifiable class within the community, like dentists. We are all consumers. So this Bill is for the protection of the whole of society. But then nearly all criminal legislation—and this is criminal legislation—is for the protection of the whole of society. Surely it is more important that the Short Title of a Bill should describe what the Bill is actually about; and what this Bill is about is trade descriptions. I should have thought that the proper Title for this Bill was the Trade Descriptions Bill. But if the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, is going to move an Amendment in Committee to call it the Fair Trading Bill, I shall be very pleased to agree with that, because I feel it would be vastly superior to calling it " Consumer Protection."
There are one or two points I could raise which I think would really be Committee points, but there is one which I might go into in some small detail because I believe it to be fundamental. The earlier Bill, the ill-fated Bill, was peppered with two notable defects. To begin with, it was peppered with the word " calculated", and nobody knew whether "calculated" meant "likely" or whether it meant " intended." We succeeded in Committee in deciding that it meant " likely", and the word "calculated" disappeared from the Bill in a large number of places.
This Bill is still peppered, as was the ill-fated Bill, with the device of deeming something to be something else. Criminal
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legislation, it has often been said, should be framed in language which ordinary people can understand; it should be absolutely clear and as precise as human wit can make it. The device of draftsmen of deeming something to be something else does not conduce to that end. May I give what I believe to be the most glaring example of this? If your Lordships will look at Clause 6 of the Bill you will find that it says that a person
"having goods in his possession for sale shall be deemed to offer them for sale".
Consider the position of a merchant who has a warehouse and a shop. He receives into his warehouse a consignment of goods, probably imported from abroad, and the moment he starts to examine the consignment he realises that the goods are packed in such a way that they would infringe the Consumer Protection Act. So he decides those goods shall remain in the warehouse and shall not be placed in the shop and offered for sale until he has had time to get them properly repacked.
An inspector from the Board of Trade arrives, goes into the warehouse and finds those goods, and he says to the merchant, "You have committed an offence under the Consumer Protection Act, Section 6". The merchant says, "I am not worried about that, because I was not going to offer those goods for sale in the shop until I had got them properly repacked". The inspector says, "unfortunately for you, the section of the Act says that you shall be deemed to offer the goods for sale". The trader comes before the court, and the moment he starts to say to the court, "But I never placed those goods on offer for sale in my shop", the court will be bound to say to him, "But Parliament has said, under Section 6 of the Act, that you shall be deemed to have offered those goods in your warehouse for sale, and we cannot hear you say anything to the contrary". Nobody in England is going to think that that trader has had a fair trial, a fair hearing, in those circumstances. I hope that we shall be able to amend Clause 6 in Committee and have a searching look at all the examples in this Bill of something to be deemed to be something different. All the other points that I could make would really be Committee points. I am sure that we shall have a lengthy, useful and interesting Committee stage, and I very much look forward to it.
3.40 p.m.
BARONESS BURTON OF COVENTRY: My Lords, November 14 has particular significance for me because five years ago exactly to this date I had the privilege of introducing in your Lordships' House our first discussion on the Molony Report. We were unfortunate that day, in that our discussions were interrupted by the Vassall case, and I was anticipating that we should be interrupted by something else to-day before I spoke. I am sorry your Lordships have to be detained in this manner, but it is no fault of mine.
Perhaps before I begin it would be fitting to declare the general interest I have in such matters. As I think the House knows, I am a consultant to Courtaulds and I am a member of the Independent Television Authority. As was the case with the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, I should hope that this makes me a little more knowledgeable, but neither would influence me in what I have to say. In common with other speakers to-day, I would welcome this Bill which, of course, lapsed during the last Session of Parliament. I should like to express appreciation to the Government not only for including the Bill in this Session's legislation but also for bringing it up so soon and for letting it start its passage in your Lordships' House. We are most grateful.
One new item greatly to be welcomed is that it will be an offence to make false statements about services, accommodation or facilities, provided these are made knowingly or recklessly. The decision to deal with comparative pricing, a subject which other noble Lords have already mentioned, should be a boon not only to shoppers but to industry and trade alike. As we know, in the past genuine price reductions made by reputable traders have frequently been regarded with suspicion because of the fraudulent practices of the dishonest minority. This is a much needed reform. But I would join with the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, in what he said, for the people with whom I have discussed this aspect and who are really knowledgeable tell me that one could drive a coach and horses through this particular clause of the Bill. I do not know whether you can drive a coach and horses through it, but I think it needs rewording if it is to be strengthened and to be effective. I hope
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that the Government will take note of that.
Coming now to the Title of the Bill, I am always glad to agree with the noble Lord, Lord Airedale. We agree, I will not say on most things but on a great many. I want to ask the Government about this matter. This time I see that the Bill is called simply Consumer Protection Bill. Last time we had the Protection of Consumers (Trade Descriptions) Bill. There are two points that I should like to raise on this subject. The first is, why the change in title?—why the deletion of " trade descriptions "? Secondly, I should have hoped that we could dispense with a title of " Consumer Protection". I would ask the Minister who is to reply why, if we could dispense with the words " Trade Descriptions", was it impossible to make other changes?
I think that the term "Consumer Protection" belongs to a bygone era; it does not belong to our modern society. Those of us interested in this work believe that we have now moved on to " consumer education", and, as both noble Lords who preceded me have said, we want to see industry in its widest sense, trade and consumer organisations, retailers and shoppers alike working together on consumer affairs rather than discussing consumer protection. I should like to stress this to-day, because I think that we shoppers have responsibility as well as those on the other side of the counter. I personally dislike the term "consumer protection" because I believe we should be rendering a disservice to ourselves and to everyone else if we conveyed a false feeling of security, a feeling that everything would be taken care of even if we shoppers did nothing about it. To me, the word "protection" conveys this impression. On the other hand, "education" implies, I think, that there is a job of work to do.
As the House will know the local authority is now taking a much larger part in this field, and this I am sure is welcomed by us all. I think the House might be interested to know something of the developing co-operation between the local authorities and the citizens' advice bureaux. It is the declared policy of the Council of the Citizens' Advice Bureaux that their Service would welcome more help from local authorities in the

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field of consumer protection; but also the Council hope that developments will be aimed at supplementing and strengthening, rather than overlapping the work of the bureaux—in other words, here is an opportunity for partnership which has been recognised already in some areas where local authorities have been willing to discuss consumer services with the citizens' advice bureaux.
I have been discussing with the Council of the Citizens' Advice Bureaux informatinon obtained from a questionnaire sent out by them to twenty-one bureaux. These were selected (a) on a regional basis in England, Scotland and Wales, and (b) for their known interest in consumer work. I think we must recognise that because of this known interest these bureaux are likely to have developed a better working relationship with their local authorities than might be the case in other places.
To-day it is possible to mention only a few of the questions in the questionnaire and I have selected five. I am giving only the affirmative replies—those with no qualifications. Two general questions were:
"Is your Weights and Measures Inspector prepared to talk over with you consumer problems outside his immediate province?"
Fourteen bureaux answered " Yes". The second question was:
"Have they ever offered to take action in any of these inquiries?"
Eight bureaux answered " Yes".
Three questions on independent testing and appraisal were:
"Is your Weights and Measures Inspector prepared to assist with other aspects of independent testing, for example, advising you about testing facilities, or making transport available to take bulky products to a testing laboratory?"
Eleven bureaux said "Yes" to this, but three had reservations. Secondly,
"Would the Weights and Measures Inspector be prepared to visit an inquirer's home to carry out an on-the-spot inspection of, for instance, a worn carpet; and would he give an opinion about whether it might be worth having the article tested?"
Ten bureaux said "Yes" to that. The third question was:
"Would the Weights and Measures Inspector be prepared to help with an independent appraisal, for example, asking someone from the Surveyor's Department to look at a prefabricated shed or extension building about which a complaint had been made?"
Nine bureaux said " Yes".
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It would not be fair to the House—it would be even more unfair at this moment—to take up more time on such detail, but it is evident from this questionnaire that local authorities are willing to help. The extent to which they are willing to help obviously varies, as one would expect. I believe I am correct in saying that the Citizens' Advice Bureaux would like help throughout the country, presumably at county and county borough level, on the lines indicated by the questions. I find these questions and answers, and in particular the background information that I have had the opportunity to study, particularly interesting and significant in relation to the legal aspect that I hope to develop later in my remarks.
We have come a long way from 1962 when the Molony Report was first discussed in this House, and the work of the Citizens' Advice Bureaux in the consumer field has developed a great deal. I need not remind the House that this work was put on the Citizens' Advice Bureaux by the Government of the day, and the House may be interested to know that the financial position in the current financial year, 1967–68, is as follows. The estimated expenditure of Citizens' Advice Bureaux in the United Kingdom is £74,000. The Board of Trade grant to the Citizens' Advice Bureaux is £42,000. The Board of Trade grant to the Consumer Council is £190,000. I would hasten to say to my noble friend Lady Elliot of Harwood that I am not suggesting a reduction in the grant made to the Consumer Council. But I would ask the House to note these figures: expenditure £74,000, grant £42,000, to which we have to add a grant of £12,000 from the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, making a total of £54,000. But that is £20,000 short of expenditure at the moment—not expenditure in the future, but expenditure to-day. Even allowing for the fact that local bureaux are grant-aided by the local authorities, this gap of £20,000 is certainly not closed.
I raise this financial aspect to-day on my own initiative and not at the request of the Citizens' Advice Bureaux, but I am quite convinced that more money is needed for this work which, I repeat, was laid on the bureaux by the Government of the day. I believe that the Council of the Citizens' Advice Bureaux is quite unable, because of the financial problem,

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to develop as it should, and indeed to appoint the staff actually needed now to deal with this burden. I would ask the present Government to have a look at this matter and to see whether my fears are correct. The work being done is first-class, and we should at least make sure that the bureaux are equipped financially to staff themselves adequately.
There are various matters which obviously many of us will wish to raise on the Committee stage. For example, I hope that this time we shall be told clearly and simply who is responsible for advertisements. In the case of contravention, who will be held responsible? This, I believe, is a fundamental point of general principle and not one for the Committee stage. Last time many of us tried to get an answer on this point. I do not know whether I am missing out any people, but the noble Lords, Lord Peddie, Lord Tangley, Lord Strabolgi, Lord Airedale and myself, all of us supporting the idea that responsibility should be defined, were unable to get an answer. I accept that the detail can be left to the Committee stage, but the wording of the present Clause 9(3) and that of the past Clause 9(3) appear to be exactly the same. I am quite sure that the Government will realise that we shall obviously hope to be enlightened this time about the meaning of the words, "any person".
To some of us it appears that as the present Clause 24 is exactly the same as the last Clause 25, what the noble Lord, Lord Tangley, said (in column 451 of the OFFICIAL REPORT of February 24 last year) is, unfortunately, still relevant. The noble Lord said, referring to Clause 9(3):
"The important thing is to say how much is subtracted by Clause 25, and it passes the wit of man to say."
My Lords, I hope very much that it will not pass the wit of the Front Bench to tell us this time. I want this Bill to succeed in the widest possible field, and if possible I want it to avoid ambiguity. I hope very strongly that we shall not include in it any provisions incapable of enforcement.
As an example of the type of clause which I believe cannot be enforced, I would cite oral misdescription, which is in Clause 4(2). Here I may well be in the minority—I do not know. The Lord
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Chancellor does not agree with me, and neither do the Government. I will not quote the Molony Report on this matter because we all remember that Molony, too, thought that it was not feasible. But, even when confronted by such opposition, I remain unshaken in my belief that this subsection is unenforceable. As I said, the Lord Chancellor does not share my view. He has told the House that this aspect is being dealt with all the time in oral contract cases. But surely, in general—and I say this with some temerity—such cases are limited to fairly expensive goods, perhaps a car, where the assistant concerned is easily identifiable. I do not see this being satisfactory where a small purchase is made over a shop counter and where no independent witnesses are available.
Therefore I would ask my noble friend Lord Brown how this provision is to be enforced. Are we to take somebody with us when we go shopping so that we have a witness—and how reliable is that witness? If we have no witness, and the shopper says one thing and the shop assistant another, what is to be done? I suggest that it is not good enough for Government spokesmen to say that nobody has ever suggested that it will be easy to prove or disprove offences which are based on oral misdescription, but this is no reason for leaving out of the Bill an important and useful provision. I maintain that if something cannot be enforced, any Bill is weakened by its inclusion. I have said many times that I agree with what the subsection is trying to do. I agree with what my noble friend Lord Winterbottom said in opening, that it is just as reprehensible to say something that is misleading as to write something that is misleading. Wrong information should not be given. But that is different from having a remedy that will not work.
To turn to another aspect of this matter which I raised last time, we have the difficulty that even the best-intentioned of employers may well feel wary of assistants' giving information to shoppers. And I repeat, I think that we may get less rather than more help when we ask questions about merchandise. It is all very well for people to say that it is better to have no information than to have wrong information. But I believe that, unless we look at this point very carefully, we may well start a trend of

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less information for shoppers. Everyone in this House to-day will be conscious of the problem of staff training. Certainly the House does not need me to say that there is a considerable turnover of staff in the retail trade. But I would ask noble Lords to remember that the average turnover of staff in the retail trade in the stores to-day is 40 per cent. The whole problem of information at the point of sale is something we have not yet been able to solve, and I would ask the Government to think again before making it more difficult.
Last time and on various other occasions I have raised the question of guarantees, and I make no excuse for returning to it briefly to-day, for a specific purpose. This is obviously a matter of great importance to all shoppers, and with this my noble friend the Lord Chancellor concurs: we have only to study what he said at column 419 on June 23 last year to appreciate that. But could the noble Lord, Lord Brown, give us a progress report? I realise, of course, that the Law Commission marked down for urgent study the general question of exemption by contract from Common Law liabilities, of which exclusion clauses in guarantees is one facet. We accept that we must leave this to be dealt with as part of that larger question. On the other hand, it would be helpful if we could have some idea as to where these matters stand today.
How near are we to decisions on this whole aspect? I am regarding this part of what I have to say today as the legal aspect. To continue with this, I saw in the Sun newspaper recently a statement to the effect that under the regulations we are discussing a housewife or organisation would be able to take a case to court. As the House knows, this was the position before the introduction of this Bill, but I should like to pursue this aspect because it is one of considerable importance. On June 23 last year (at column 414 of the OFFICIAL REPORT for the day), I drew attention to the problems and cost of bringing cases to court. I am quite sure that all of us are too unaware of our legal rights, but, in addition to that, the difficulty, the cost and the uncertainty of enforcing them by legal action deters us from making the attempt. I think that we are also deterred from making this
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attempt whether or not the merchandise costs a lot of money. We laymen believe quite definitely that to go to law can be expensive, whether or not we are right.
Taking the example of an organisation active in this field, the Retail Trading-Standards Association has rendered real service to shoppers, to reputable traders and to the Government of the day since 1950. Personally, I thought they were doing a job of government, but that is incidental at the moment. We all know that prosecutions which are won are a deterrent, but I want to ask my Front Bench whether it is right that such a service should cost the Association money. By September of this year the R.T.S.A. had taken 48 cases to court, and won 47. The cost since the first prosecution in 1950 has been about £6,200, of which £3,595 has been recovered by way of costs to the Association. So, in other words, the Association is £2,605 out of pocket as a result of this service.
Obviously, the minority of dishonest traders are influenced by successful deterrents; but should private organisations have to meet the cost?—and I am using the term "private" as being distinct from governmental. If we leave organisations of any kind aside for the moment, what about the private individual? What does it mean to him or to her to be able to take a case to court? If an association as skilled and practised as the R.T.S.A. can find itself out of pocket when it has won 47 out of 48 cases, what ordinary shopper is going to take a similar risk?—because obviously it is not sufficient to be proved right.
So before contemplating that step, what can the most persistent and aggrieved shopper do? He can complain to the shop, he can complain to the manufacturer, he can complain to his Member of Parliament, he can complain to the Citizens' Advice Bureaux, he can complain to the Press. If all these steps have been taken, if all of them have failed from the point of view of the aggrieved person, what remains?—the right to take the case to court. But I would ask my noble friend Lord Brown: what is this worth to the ordinary person?
For many years now I have been convinced that the legal machine has failed to provide satisfactory remedies for this class of complaint. If we go back some two and a half years to April 8, 1965,

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there was an article in the New Society by Mr. Robert Egerton called " Cut-Price Justice". I do not know the author, nor do I propose to deal with the whole of the article, but I was interested in one part. Starting from the point that court procedure has not been able to solve the length and cost of actions, which are both far too great to deal with the problem of small injustices, Mr. Egerton moves on to one specific field: that of the sale of goods.
It is always easier to take an actual example, so even though the House is waiting to get on to other business I am afraid that I am going to consider an upholstered suite which has frayed at exposed places after a year's wear. The contention here is that the facts could be ascertained, and that from these an experienced person could form a sound opinion as to what the legal decision ought to be. I want to ask those experienced in the law: need we go through the panoply and expense of the law to deal with such matters as we do now? I feel that, obviously, only the Lord Chancellor can help us here.
But is it really necessary in the case of my upholstered suite, where agreement cannot be reached by any of the steps mentioned earlier, that we must have a procedure under which one needs to employ a separate set of solicitors, furniture experts and, probably, counsel on each side? Because it is to the advantage of the plaintiff to give the impression that he will stop at nothing to get redress, and to the advantage of the defendant to use every possible argument and delay to complicate the matter. I maintain that no measure of consumer legislation can fail to deal with this aspect.
So I am back again to my original question. If the organisation or the individual cannot afford to take a case to court because of the cost, then of what use is the right so to do? I informed the Minister that I should be raising this particular question, and I gave him details of the article in the New Society. We laymen have a great deal of faith in the Lord Chancellor, and we know that he, particularly, does not take the attitude that what has been must necessarily continue. So I am wondering whether he
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can help us in this matter of common justice to all consumers.
I come now to the last general matter which I wish to bring forward to-day, and it is not long. The President of the Board of Trade, speaking at the Consumer Assembly arranged by the Consumers Association to celebrate the 10th Anniversary of the publication Which on Friday, November 3, last, was quoted in the Press as saying:
"Governments only do what they should under constant pressure from the consumer movement."
Gaining a small amount of encouragement from that attitude, I want to raise something which has been causing me considerable concern. I want to ask my noble friend Lord Brown: what is the attitude of the Government and of the President of the Board of Trade towards the grading of merchandise of any kind? I ask this because it had not seemed possible to me that different Government Departments could have different attitudes. A Government must have a collective attitude and a collective responsibility for something so vital to all shoppers—and shoppers are what we are talking about to-day.
I am sure I must carry Ministers with me in the affirmative when I say to them: Do we not buy merchandise that has a minimum shrinkage? Do we not buy garments that are non-flammable? Do we not buy materials that are colour-fast? I cannot believe that any Government would maintain that it is wrong or unreasonable or too expensive to have materials available with these properties; or that because everyone does not want them or cannot afford them, then they should not be available. Yet in the House on October 24 last this seemed to me to be the argument advanced by the Government. I gave notice, both to my noble friend Lady Phillips and to the Minister, that I would be raising this to-day. I am not concerned with fruit and vegetables and I am not, needless to say, attacking the noble Lady. But on her own words, at column 1635, she was speaking for the Government, and I am attacking what she said.
At column 1637 the noble Lady actually told the House that, because it would cost a shopper extra money to be offered a guarantee of quality, be this Class 1

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or Class 2, the Government could not support grading for the shopper. Furthermore, the noble Lady went on to say that when she had asked some shoppers whether they would buy something marked " Class 2", they seemed a little doubtful. I hope they did. But the only deduction to be made from this remark is that it is all right to buy Class 2 merchandise provided that you do not know it is Class 2, and I should have thought that such a philosophy ran counter to every belief held by the noble Lady, by the Government and by myself. I hope the Government spokesman will be able to disentangle the Government from such an apparent policy, because it really is complete nonsense. If you have grading anywhere of any merchandise, the object of the exercise is to grade, and as a result there must be various grades either numbered or described as in the Bill to-day.
As I think the House must know, I wish the Bill well. I have tried to be constructive in raising basic aspects which in my opinion any Bill dealing with consumer problems must take into account, and I have given notice of these where I thought it might be helpful. I hope the Minister, when he comes to reply, will be able to deal seriously with the points which I have taken a lot of trouble to make. I thank the House. I have never had such a good audience. I appreciate the reason and I apologise for taking up time.

SOUTH ARABIA: INDEPENDENCE DATE
4.9 p.m.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, with your Lordships' permission I should like to repeat a Statement made by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in another place, on South Arabia. The Statement is as follows:
"Since my statement to the House on the 7th November the situation in South Arabia has become more clear.
"In the course of talks between the 7th and 10th November the officers of the South Arabian forces told the High Commissioner that they fully supported the National Liberation Front which they said was in effective control. These officers also said that in areas from which British forces had
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withdrawn the National Liberation Front was working to maintain a cease-fire. The National Liberation Front themselves claimed at Press conferences on the 8th and 10th November that they were exercising effective control and said that they wanted to enter into negotiations. They also demanded an end to violence against the civil community and called on the population to respect the persons and institutions of the foreign community.
"On the 11th November the National Liberation Front sent me a telegram which they later published. In this telegram they asserted their claim to be a popular authority in control and said they had formed a delegation to negotiate with Her Majesty's Government on the transfer of political power. They asked for our agreement to open negotiations within a week.
"I replied immediately agreeing to open negotiations. They have now asked that these begin on or about the 20th November, and I have agreed they will be held in Geneva. My right honourable and noble friend Lord Shackleton, who has a close knowledge of the problems of South Arabia, will lead our delegation.
"On the 2nd November I told the House that by the middle of this month we should fix and announce a precise date for independence and withdrawal. I also said that it might be useful to vary the date a few days one way or the other if this would help us over starting negotiations with an emerging Government. The High Commissioner, through his talks with the South Arabian forces, is at this moment working out arrangements for the negotiations, and Her Majesty's Government have therefore decided, in order to help this process, that South Arabia should become independent and the withdrawal of our forces be completed by the 30th November.
"There are important matters to be settled, and preferably before independence. But if negotiations cannot be completed before independence there is nothing to stop them continuing as between independent countries.
"Her Majesty's Government have not had an easy road to follow in bringing South Arabia to independence. I must here pay tribute"—

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as I have done myself in your Lordship? House—
"to the many Britons, both civilians and military, who have devoted their labours and in many cases, to our great sorrow, given their lives for this cause. I also grieve for the large numbers of South Arabians who have suffered death or injury. The whole House will surely join with me in hoping that South Arabia will enjoy a peaceful future."
4.14 p.m.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I must thank the noble Lord for the Statement which he has just repeated, but I do so with a somewhat heavy heart. Because, my Lords, this Statement marks the start of the closing chapter in one of the sorriest episodes in the long history of the relations between this country and the Arab world. It is far removed, if I may remind the noble Lord, from the fair hopes which he held out to us in this House only a few months ago. I do not, of course, impute any blame to the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton. We know that he did his best, his level best in the circumstances in which he was placed; and I am sure that your Lordships will wish him well in the negotiations upon which he is about to embark in Geneva. Nevertheless, what we have witnessed these last few weeks—rival Arab gangs shooting it out in the streets of Aden, with our troops standing impotently by and often being shot at by both sides—has presented a sorry spectacle. Nevertheless, I think we must agree that, things having got to this sad pass, there is really very little alternative to the humiliating abdication of our responsibilities on which the Government are now embarking.
I should like to put just two questions to the noble Lord. In the first place, can he tell us whether the States of the East Aden Protectorate are embraced in the Statement which he has repeated to us? Secondly, what assurance can he give us regarding the security of British property in Aden, including the very important oil installations, after independence? Above all, what assurance can he give us regarding the security of those United Kingdom citizens who elect to stay in Aden after independence?
That said, my Lords, I should like to associate myself with what is said in the Statement about the British Forces in
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Aden. I myself am not particularly proud of the part which we have played these last few months, but I think all of us can be proud of the way in which all our people there, both our civilians and our military Forces, have discharged their often distasteful duties.
LORD AMULREE: My Lords, I do not intend to comment at any length on the Statement. In fact, I should like to do very little more than express to the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, the best wishes one can in the difficult and complicated task he has in front of him. At the same time, I should like to associate noble Lords on these Benches with the tribute which has been paid to our Forces by the Foreign Secretary in another place, and by the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe; and to say that I hope very much that we shall now see a satisfactory conclusion to this extremely tragic and sad episode in the history of Aden.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, may I first answer the noble Earl's particular points? He asked me about the States of the East Aden Protectorate. It is my understanding, and to the best of our information, that they are now under the control of the National Liberation Front. As has always been the general wish of everybody concerned with South Arabia, they will be part of South Arabia, and they are at the moment being so incorporated.
On the particular point of security, we have discussed this matter before. There clearly will always remain a certain risk—and it is very difficult to see how great that risk will be—to foreign citizens in another country, particularly a country emerging to independence. It is a fact that in the areas controlled by the National Liberation Front—and I have particularly in mind Little Aden, where the oil refinery is—there has been no molestation or attack of any kind. There is a large British element working the refinery to which the noble Earl referred, and those people have gone about their tasks under the protection of both the South Arabian Army and the National Liberation Front. We have also discussed what would happen if chaos were to develop. Obviously, in such a situation Her Majesty's Government would do their utmost to bring about rescue operations: but I must say that I look

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with rather more optimism on the situation than I have done on previous occasions.
The noble Earl contrasted the present situation with what he called "the fair hopes" I expressed on a previous occasion. We have always been immensely conscious of the risk of a collapse of the Federal Government. What I think has surprised some people is the speed at which that Government collapsed in the face of a threat which did not come, as had at one time been mainly thought, from infiltration from across the frontier. Since the noble Earl has chosen to attack the policy of Her Majesty's Government and to talk about "a sorry tale" during the last few months, I must say quite seriously that a policy which created a structure which depended upon the continuous presence of the force of British arms was, as it was shown to be, doomed from the beginning. I do not want to go back over past history—we have done it before—but the noble Earl has chosen to criticise the Government. Indeed, for that reason I will not even discuss the way the Federation came into being. But I am glad that we can all agree on the part played by Her Majesty's Forces. Noble Lords will be aware that I have paid my tribute particularly to the Army, which has always been one of the most impressive examples (and indeed I think I used the phrase "shining example") of quality in a difficult situation; and that I have also paid tribute to the civilians.
In wishing South Arabia well, I should draw attention to the fact that the National Liberation Front has issued and has generally broadcast very firm instructions to the citizens saying that there should be no attacks on foreign property or on foreign persons. I have always thought that, provided we made clear that we were going, there would be a chance that a Government would emerge before independence. Of course, it will be my task to try to help arrive at a satisfactory arrangement. We are all agreed in wishing the people of South Arabia well. On a previous occasion, one noble Lady gave a very moving account of her affections for South Arabia. We wish the people of South Arabia well. I am sure that they are all sick at the killing that has gone on. We hope that it has now ceased for ever.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord this question? If I am right, at the end of the month we recognise the N.L.F. as the legal Government of the country. Can he say whether that legal recognition has been given by all the other Powers?
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I would ask the noble Lord not to press me too far on this. I am about to enter into negotiations. No recognition of the Government has yet come about; the legal processes are still being completed. If as I hope, we make good progress—arid Her Majesty's Government expect and hope that the other side are anxious to come to agreement—then there will be a Treaty of Secession and such like matters, and I expect there will be recognition from other Powers also.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: My Lords, may I take this opportunity of bringing to the attention of Her Majesty's Government the plight of British citizens in South Arabia who have lost their property, and some of them their livelihood? However one looks at this question, the British Government are really responsible because they have—and we cannot disguise the fact—abdicated our responsibility in South Arabia. When I asked my Question earlier this afternoon, I understood the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, to say that the Government might bring to the attention of the new South Arabian Government the plight of these British citizens. My Lords, is that really good enough?
We had to fight in this House for quite a few years to get support for the plight of the Anglo-Egyptians. Have we to go through this whole procedure again? I understood that Her Majesty's Government were going to give a large sum of money—and quite rightly—to the South Arabian Government. I think the sum of £50 million was mentioned. It was to go to the former Government that we were hoping were to become the South Arabian Government. Surely we are not now going to give this sum of money to the N.L.F. Government who only a few days ago were regarded as terrorists. It would be far better, I feel, to use some—
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (THE EARL OF LONGFORD): My Lords, I really must suggest to the noble Viscount that he put his question now.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: My Lords, would it not be far better to give some of these moneys to British citizens who have lost their property through no fault of their own?
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I suggested that it might be helpful for the noble Viscount to ask his supplementary question after the Statement was made, when he would have up-to-date facts. The number of British citizens in South Arabia is comparatively small—about 300 at the moment. If the noble Viscount has any particular examples in mind I should be interested to hear of them. He referred to the Egyptian precedent. I think he might have referred to almost any precedent. I know of no case—other than one or two isolated instances for particular rulers—when Her Majesty's Government in recent years have paid compensation under these conditions.
Nor am I as alarmed as the noble Viscount about the extent of the possible damage to property. I think it is very probable that far greater damage to British property and lives has recently been caused in other parts of the world. I also said that Her Majesty's Government would bring full pressure on the successor Government to accept responsibility; and the signs in this respect are encouraging. I do not wish to be drawn into a discussion on the question of virtue, but the fact remains that if a successful Government emerges, this will be very much in the interests both of British lives and British property.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend whether he is aware that we on this side of the House would also wish to express our hopes for the negotiations into which he is entering in Geneva. In view of what was said, moderately in this House and more provocatively in another place, is it not the case that the tragic situation in Aden has largely arisen from the recognition given to the South Arabia Government of sheikhs which proved so unrepresentative? Is my noble friend aware of the appreciation we have of the courage of the Government and of the Foreign Secretary in recognising that the people of Aden and South Arabia must have the opportunity of governing themselves according to the organisation which represents them?
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I am much obliged to my noble friend for the first remarks he made. I am naturally interested in the further remarks—which stimulated a characteristic reaction from the other side—but beyond saying that there is a great deal of truth in much of what he has said, I think I shall leave him to speak for himself.

RHODESIA
4.27 p.m.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, with the permission of the House I should like to repeat a Statement which has just been made in another place by my right honourable friend the Commonwealth Secretary about his visit to Rhodesia. The Statement is as follows:
"I should like to make a statement about my recent visit to Africa.
"I began by attending the Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference at Kampala, where I had the honour to lead the United Kingdom Branch delegation. Thereafter I met the leaders of the eight Commonwealth countries in East, Central and Southern Africa. In addition, I met the South African Foreign Minister in Pretoria.
"In the talks which I had with African leaders I laid particular stress on three things. First, that Her Majesty's Government were certainly not going to be parties to any sell-out in Rhodesia. Secondly, that we remained convinced that force or violence were not means that could be employed to achieve an honourable and peaceful solution. And thirdly, that we were not prepared to embark on economic confrontation with South Africa. I must not pretend to speak on behalf of the African leaders to whom I was speaking, but I believe I can safely say that, even if they did not always agree with my arguments, they did recognise that what I said represented firm British policy.
"I then went to Salisbury for talks with the Governor. On his recommendation, and under his ægis, I had talks also with Mr. Smith and a number of other Rhodesians. Mr. Smith and I met on four occasions—privately together, or with only the Governor and

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the Chief Justice present, or with Mr. Lardner Burke accompanying Mr. Smith and official advisers on both sides. Our talks lasted altogether about ten hours.
"I am sorry to have to tell the House that the differences between our position and Mr. Smith's proved even greater than earlier discussions had indicated. I am not here referring to our differences over the very important questions of NIBMAR and the return to legality, but to the constitutional proposals contained in Part One of the 'Tiger' Working Document. Last December Mr. Smith informed us that those proposals were acceptable to him. Subsequently, as my right honourable friend the Prime Minister informed the House on the 25th July, Mr. Smith told Lord Alport that there were one or two details that needed looking at again, and that one or two other points had occurred to him which he believed were reasonable and would improve the Constitution. At our talks last week it became apparent that in fact the changes which Mr. Smith wished to make in the 'Tiger' Constitutional proposals were of a kind that would fundamentally affect their nature. I made it clear to Mr. Smith that these changes could not be reconciled with the principles established by successive British Governments.
"With regard to procedure, at the close of our talks Mr. Smith and I agreed that each of us would reflect on what had been said and would consult our respective colleagues before decisions on the next step were taken. Her Majesty's Goverment are considering all aspects of the matter in the light of my report.
"This is a sombre report. I have not returned with any short cut to a settlement. But I believe my visit was worth making. It enabled me to explain our policies at first hand to Commonwealth African leaders in East, Central and Southern Africa, and to learn their views. It enabled me to meet for the first time that devoted servant of his Queen and his country, Sir Humphrey Gibbs. And it has given me the clarifications of Mr. Smith's position which we have been seeking since Lord Alport's return. I cannot pretend that as a result I feel hopeful
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of an early settlement. But the door remains open if, after reflection upon our discussions, Mr. Smith and his colleagues conclude that the true interests of Rhodesia and all its peoples, including the Europeans there, require that a settlement should be reached which could honourably be commended to Parliament."
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, the House will be grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, for having repeated that Statement. As he said, it is a sombre one, and I think all your Lordships will have felt disappointed that the result of these talks has been such as we have heard this afternoon. Even though we did not expect great things from them, we did perhaps expect something a little better than we have heard this afternoon. Be that as it may, I think that everyone in the House—and I think the Government, certainly—feels that the only possible means of settling this dispute is by negotiation. There is no other way of doing it, and I hope very much that, in spite of these setbacks, the Government will pursue their policy of talking; because it is much better to be in contact and talking with the Rhodesian Government than to be doing nothing. I have only one question which I wish to ask the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd. In the course of his Statement he said that Mr. Smith had said that there were some changes in the "Tiger" proposals which he wished to see. Could the noble Lord tell the House what those were?
LORD HENLEY: My Lords, we on these Benches are extremely sorry that it appears that the differences between Her Majesty's Government and the illegal régime are now greater than they were before. The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, says that he feels the only way is by negotiation. But we on these Benches cannot help feeling, particularly from the description of the way the recent negotiations have gone on, that Mr. Smith does not give the appearance of wishing to reconcile these differences at all. We are glad that Her Majesty's Government have, in fact, said that there shall be no sellout, because we remain convinced that the illegal régime must be brought down. Since it appears to us that negotiations are not getting us anywhere, we think that sanctions must go on. We feel

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that they have, in fact, been more effective than some of their opponents have suggested, and that they would be very much more effective than they have been if some other countries would "play ball". We feel that the immediate thing to do is to try to get discussions going in the U.N. as to how sanctions could be made more effective.
Apart from what may be said in the U.N. about what may be done to make the sanctions more effective, there are one or two things that Her Majesty's Government themselves could do with regard to tightening up sanctions in certain directions. I refer particularly to such things as passports, telecommunications and freight, Having said that, my Lords, I merely put that question, because like everybody else, we are extremely disappointed.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I am sure that all of us in this House, wherever we may sit, are very sorry to hear the Statement that has been made by the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd. I know that all of us had hoped that there might be a satisfactory settlement, at last, from these conversations between the Commonwealth Secretary and Mr. Smith. It seems to me, if I may say so with all deference, that the difference between the two Governments now is this. The Rhodesians take the view, a view which I and others share, that, rightly or wrongly (and no doubt there will be differences of view about that), the Rhodesians have got their independence and will not give it up. All that, for them, remains in dispute is whether or not Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom recognise that independence. The other view, the view of Her Majesty's Government here in this country, is that Rhodesia has not got her independence and cannot have it unless the United Kingdom Government agree.
My Lords, unless this fundamental difference of view is resolved, I cannot, I regret to say, with the best will in the world, see any chance of an agreed solution. And I am afraid that all that is likely to happen now, unless an agreement, even at this late hour, can be achieved in this unhappy dispute, is that it is likely to drag on with ever increas
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ingly disastrous consequences for the two Governments immediately concerned. That, as I see it—it may be right or wrong—is a hard fact which we all have to face, and which Her Majesty's Government, too, have to face. What I want to ask them is that they will at any rate give an assurance that they will not blind their eyes to hard facts, however unpalatable they may be. Otherwise, I am afraid that the situation will continue steadily to deteriorate. The only thing I felt that was in the least encouraging about the report which the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, has given is that he did, at any rate, say that the door is still open. And I beg Her Majesty's Government to keep it open as long as they possibly can.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend Lord Shepherd whether he is aware of the very great appreciation by many on these Benches of the assurance that there will be no sellout in Rhodesia? May I ask him whether that statement includes the Six Points, and the assertion by the Prime Minister that there could be no independence before there is majority rule in Rhodesia? May I further ask him, they having ruled out force, what steps Her Majesty's Government propose to take to make economic sanctions effective; and in particular whether he will raise in the United Nations, which has endorsed the policy of sanctions, the fact that many of its Member States are not applying sanctions? May I also ask whether he will supplement the blockade at Beira, in Mozambique, by requesting United Nations authority for a blockade at Laurenco Marques from which so many of the goods reaching Rhodesia are coming?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, with permission I will reply to the four points which have been made. First, may I say to the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, that I think that in his remarks he echoed the feeling of the entire House: a feeling of disappointment that once again negotiations, discussions, entered into by the British Government and the régime in Salisbury should have failed; although, as the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, pointed out, the Statement does refer to the fact that the door has not been closed. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, will not press at this stage for any

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discussion of the points raised by Mr. Smith. As he will remember, both Mr. Smith and my right honourable friend have agreed that there should be a period of reflection and consultation. If we were to do that, I think it would inhibit both sides in their pause.
May I say to the noble Marquess that it is not for Her Majesty's Government to grant independence to Rhodesia; it is for the British Parliament. I think that it is recognised that the majority of Members on both sides of the House and in another place agree that independence in Rhodesia must be based upon the six principles. Certainly the main political Parties are committed to this. As I said in the Statement, it appears that the line Mr. Smith is now taking makes it more difficult to achieve these principles.
In regard to sanctions, these I fear will have to continue. Her Majesty's Government are considering ways and means by which they can become more effective. These are under active consideration by the Commonwealth Sanctions Committee. My right honourable friend the Prime Minister has made the Government's position quite clear in regard to NIBMAR. This assurance is in force, but we were prepared, as my noble friend will remember, if there was a significant move in the régime's attitude, particularly in the field of the Constitution, to discuss this matter with our Commonwealth colleagues. I do not believe that theft is much else I can say at this stage. The door is still open and I hope that in the end sanity will prevail in Rhodesia.
LORD SEGAL: My Lords, since many people in Rhodesia itself are now harbouring grave misgivings about U.D.I., is my noble friend in a position to confirm or deny whether Mr. Smith is totally unwilling to consider a return to legality and repudiation of U.D.I. in any circumstances?
VISCOUNT STUART OF FINDHORN: My Lords, while I do not support the action of the Rhodesian Government in U.D.I., I should like to ask one question on this subject. I have waited a long time to do this. Though I am a member of the Opposition, I have given the Government as long as I could control myself before asking this question. I am glad that the door is open. I am 100 per cent. opposed to the use of force. But do the present Prime Minister and the Gov-
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ernment realise at last that sanctions have never worked without the use of force? The Government and the Prime Minister seem to me to be particularly hidebound on this subject. They had better open their eyes to the fact and get on with the job, admitting that sanctions are a failure. I hope that the Minister speaking to-day will admit that sanctions have not worked, never have worked and never will work unless you surround and reduce to starvation the nation whom you are opposing.
LORD GRIMSTON OF WESTBURY: My Lords, may I also make an appeal to the Government to have some regard to the facts of life? The noble Lord has said that in no circumstances do they want a confrontation with South Africa. Even if sanctions could work, they certainly will not without a confrontation with South Africa. Previously to this, we had a Statement about Aden. It is my belief that unless the Government can show a much more flexible attitude in their approach to Rhodesia and forget a great many things they have said, this sorry business is going to lead to the humiliation of Britain, just as has happened with Aden, and with a people who fought with us in the War and whose only idea is to befriend us.
LORD ROWLEY: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend this question? He has referred to the fact that there is to be a period of reflection. May we take it that the door to further negotiations is not bolted if, at the end of that further period of reflection, the situation suggests that further negotiations may take place?
LORD LINDGREN: My Lords, as one who had the opportunity of seeing at first hand the Commonwealth Secretary in operation in East Africa, may I add my appreciation of the great work he did there in keeping the situation cool and open? The noble Lord opposite asked that the facts of life should be faced. The facts of life should be faced in Rhodesia. It was made clear by the East African States that the alternative to the non-granting of "one man, one vote" was "one man, one gun", and unless the people of Rhodesia appreciate the facts they are living on a volcano which may not take long to erupt.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, may I express a fear that we may be entering

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into a debate? I think that in the circumstances the House would regard that to be wrong. In reply to my noble friend Lord Rowley, I would say that the period of reflection is for both sides and, as the Statement made clear, the door is not bolted and further negotiations are always possible. But my noble friend will appreciate that negotiations require two parties and, above all else, the willingness of the two parties to come to an agreement. This was the spirit in which we entered the "Tiger" talks last year. I beg the noble Lords who make a plea for flexibility to read the report of the "Tiger" talks and they will see the extent to which we were prepared to go to meet the fears of the Smith régime, only to find in the end that we could not get the agreement which we believed to the very last moment was possible.
We have treated this as a matter of very great concern. We have been as flexible as possible within the framework laid down by Parliament—that is, within the six principles. We shall not give up seeking a peaceful, negotiated solution. I will not now go into the question of facing hard facts in terms of sanctions. Sanctions are a commitment placed on us not only by our own decision, shared by all Parties in the original instance, but also by the Commonwealth and the United Nations.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I say this with great respect and with a good deal of self-criticism. If any noble Lord reads the discussion this afternoon, without reference to the merits of any of the arguments and questions or to the side of the House from which they come, he will feel that we have passed a good way away from our ordinary conventions following a Statement. The only person who could be clearly criticised in this situation is the Leader of the House, but it was difficult to stop noble Lords. I would only submit, again with great respect, that next time we ought to do rather better.

CONSUMER PROTECTION BILL [H.L.]
4.50 p.m.
Debate on Second Reading resumed.
BARONESS ELLIOT OF HARWOOD: My Lords, we now return from Asia and Rhodesia to less complicated matters, to an important Bill which noble Lords on both sides have been discussing with considerable interest. Like other noble Lords who have spoken, I welcome this Bill; and I welcome it as warmly as I did its predecessor nearly two years ago. Along with other Members of the House I have pressed for the return of a Bill of this kind. With the co-operation of the noble Baroness, Lady Burton of Coventry, we now have the Bill in this House, and I am delighted that we are having this debate to-day.
I think that the changes which have been made in the Bill are, in many cases, changes of improvement. Some result from your Lordships' debates on the earlier Bill, and others show that the draftsmen have taken advantage of this opportunity to simplify and rationalise its style and form. The present Bill is more easily comprehended by the layman than the earlier Bill was. This is of the greatest importance in a measure of this kind. There is a lot of law which should be protecting consumers at present, but it is often so piecemeal and obscure that for these reasons too few take advantage of it; and as the noble Baroness said, it is very expensive. In codifying and explaining much of the law on trade descriptions, this Bill, when enacted, will give a much-needed new look to the Statute Book.
I am glad that provisions governing misleading advertisements, statements about services, double-pricing of goods, compulsory labelling, and, above all, false oral statements, remain part of the Bill. But in saying this, I do not want to be heard to say that we now have an absolutely perfect Bill, or that there is not room for further improvements, because I believe that there is. I speak this afternoon as the Chairman of the Consumer Council, and there are three significant improvements that I should like to see. The first two are closely linked and deal with the actual interpretation of the words "false trade description." The third point

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concerns the need for more certainty about the Board of Trade taking on prosecutions when offences occur, for instance, in advertisements, on a national scale. There are a number of other matters which I hope will be cleared up as we proceed with the Bill in Committee, but at present I should like merely to describe in a little more detail the three points I mentioned.
The first concerns my conviction that the Bill needs what I called on an earlier occasion a general misdescriptions clause or blanket clause. We should start by considering the effect of a false statement upon the mind of the buyer, rather than attempt to list all the components of what may theoretically be contained in, or relate to, a false trade description. I think it is a fallacy to believe that you can set down a precise yardstick to fit all circumstances, and by simply looking at the words, whether spoken or written, say with conviction that this is or is not a false trade description in all circumstances. Such an approach cannot close the ranks against every eventuality, and some practices are bound to slip through the list of matters relating to a false trade description set out in Clause 2. My proposal deals with false indications which may arise, as they so frequently do, by ambiguities, by omissions or by inference.
I should like to take one or two examples to show what I mean. Some synthetic furniture veneers are sold under the description of "teak grain" and "mahogany finish". These are, of course, man-made chemical compositions, and not wood at all. No doubt the people in this trade consider that customers will see from brochures and advertisements that the product is synthetic and is not made from wood. Indeed, as is well known, these products have special properties which are a great benefit for particular uses in the house. Nevertheless, the customer who seeks a pure wood veneer on his furniture may easily be misled if he sees a suite of furniture in a store marked "mahogany finish" or "teak grain". He may be induced to buy that furniture on a quite false inference: not perhaps falsely applied by the supplier, but none the less false to him. It should surely be the duty of manufacturers and suppliers to remove the obvious kind of pitfalls contained in
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such descriptions. It may be—and this is a matter that we shall discuss—that descriptions such as these may be caught by the Bill; and some perhaps believe that they will. Yet others take the contrary view; and others may think that it depends on the circumstances of the case. But the fact that the question has to be asked at all tells me that a more certain approach on this subject is needed. That approach should ask: Are these descriptions likely to induce a purchase on a false assumption?
I should like to cite to your Lordships another example where the same sort of doubt about the application of the Bill arises. There are quite a large number of shops trading under the title of "Railway Lost Property", or variations of that title. There are eleven of these in the London Telephone Directory alone. Some of these shops may indeed trade in property lost on the railways, but in certain cases we have substantial information to the contrary. New goods are being sold, and only a small proportion—if, indeed, any at all—is railway lost property. The shop front exhibits these words in large lettering, with the result that most people naturally believe that they are getting special bargains at these shops. People are induced to enter the shops and buy goods on this assumption. It takes a considerable amount of persistent questioning to extract an admission of the origin of the goods—and even this assumes an initial suspicion about the matter which the general public do not share.
It may be said that the words:
"other history, including previous ownership or use",
in Clause 2 cater for this kind of description. But I do not think this is quite so. The shop owner might argue that the title over the window did not refer to all goods in stock; that a proportion of the goods, however small, was in fact railway lost property; and he might try the argument that trading over the years under this title had made these qualifications clear to the public. It may be that a court hearing these arguments, strictly within the confines of the Bill, might find them insufficient; but I think that as the Bill stands there is enough doubt about this matter to leave a sizeable question mark in the minds of the public. The formula that I propose, on

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the other hand, would direct the court to consider whether the words "Railway Lost Property" over a shop window are likely to induce people to buy goods on account of the false inference or ambiguity inherent in these words, and in the circumstances of the particular case.
Another example comes from central-heating brochures which claim two minimum operating temperatures for both upstairs and downstairs respectively. What they fail to make clear is that in order to achieve the upstairs minimum the room in which the heater is fixed becomes unbearably hot. And this is a significant omission from such brochures. On an earlier occasion the Government resisted my proposal because, it was said, one must have certainty in criminal offences so that traders know the precise limits of the law. There is certainly much to be said for this. But the flaw in this proposal is that it is simply not true of criminal legislation, as is shown by such offences as driving on the roads without due care and attention, or driving dangerously, and other offences of the same kind.
Further, I think I can show that the Government have already adopted, at least to some degree, the spirit of my proposal. In resisting my proposal on an earlier occasion, on the second day of the Committee stage [OFFICIAL REPORT, 22/2/1966, col. 184], the noble Baroness, Lady Phillips, asked me to look at the words still standing in Clause 2(1): "an indication direct or indirect by whatever means given". Well, my Lords, it is true that these words have the flavour of a general misdescription clause, but their application is dependent upon the trade description relating to one or other of the list of characteristics which then follows. So that a court, in attempting to apply the wider wording at the beginning of the clause, will still find itself cramped by the list of characteristics. But for this restriction put upon the application of the words, "an indication direct or indirect by whatever means given", I would agree that it takes the same kind of subjective approach as I am advocating.
Yet I suggest that "indication" on its own expresses the need less fully than my wording, which includes the terms ambiguity, omission or influence and
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which puts the matter more clearly. It seems to me that there is little difference in the kind of activity asked of a court, first, in deciding what an "indication" means and, second, in judging ambiguity, inference or omission in any particular case. They are both equally subjective judgments. I find support for my proposal from some recent findings of the Federal Trade Commission in the United States. One judgment included the statement that
"the shrewd use of exaggeration, innuendo, ambiguity and half-truth is more efficacious from the advertiser's standpoint than factual assertions".
Another case shows that it is not a defence that an advertisement is literally true, and the court went on to hold that:
"To tell less than the whole truth is a well-known method of deception; and he who deceives by resorting to such methods cannot excuse the deception by relying on the truthfulness per se of the partial truth by which it has been accomplished."
I think these cases express the need for my proposal very clearly.
My proposal has also received encouragement by way of editorial comment in the New Law Journal last week; that is, on November 9, 1967. Dealing with a joint memorandum to the Board of Trade by the Consumer Council and Consumers' Association, which was published before this Bill appeared, it stresses the need for a general misdescriptions clause, and adds:
"The purpose of the Bill, of course,"
is
"to prohibit falsehood in trade descriptions, not falsehood in trade descriptions of some kinds and not others."
This, it says, will be the effect of Clause 2, and this is, of course, my criticism of the Bill in this respect.
The Molony Committee, who have been quoted before in the debate, in paragraph 634 saw clearly that the subjective effect on the buyer must be recognised, when they said:
"To support a charge under the present law a trade description applied must be false or misleading in a material respect as regards the goods to which it is applied."
And the Committee went on to explain this:
"that is to say, broadly the error must be of such substance that it could fairly be regarded as capable of inducing a purchase."

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The Criminal Law Revision Committee's proposed Theft Bill has, I see, taken the same approach by favouring the idea of deception as the common element in crimes ranging from larceny to conversion. The Committee say:
"It seems to us to have the advantage of directing attention to the effect that the offender deliberately produced on the mind of the person deceived, whereas 'false pretence' makes one think of what exactly the offender did in order to deceive."
Finally, I need not remind the House in any detail that the use of descriptions or advertisements which are false by reason of ambiguity and inference and/or omission is already an offence under food and drugs legislation in this country. On an earlier occasion I also gave precedents of wider effect from West German, United States and French laws, all of which employ the kind of proposal that I advocate.
That is my first criticism of this Bill, and now I make the second, which really overlaps to a considerable extent my first point. The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, successfully moved an Amendment to the previous Bill, which inserted the words "in a material respect" to the definition of a false trade description in the Bill, a qualification which already stands in existing merchandise marks law. The noble Lord also proposed the addition of the words "capable of inducing a purchase " as a further test of falsity, but that got less sympathy from the Government than from me. Now they have come up with the words "to a material degree", which seem to me to be a halfway house between "material respect" and the effect of the kind of general clause I propose.
On the last occasion I argued that "false in a material respect " pointed too closely to the wording of the description itself and to the goods it described, rather than whether or not it was false to the mind of the buyer. I suppose "false to a material degree" could apply more easily to the impression given to the buyer as well as to the description and goods themselves. But we are not given any clue as to which is the correct application. At an earlier stage in this debate, on the first Committee day, Lord Mitchison said that,
"what one wants to be clear about is the impression on the mind of the purchaser or victim."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 21/2/66; col. 34.]
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That is exactly my point. I think the words "to a material degree", left in mid-air, do not make this clear enough.
Last, I come to the question of enforcement. I note that the Explanatory Memorandum to the earlier Bill informed us that no duty of enforcement is placed upon the Board of Trade. While the position is unchanged, of course, I note that this little piece of explanation has dropped out of the print of the Bill. I hope this may be taken as an augury that the Board of Trade have stiffened their resolve to take prosecutions when necessary, and that they will not simply back out of this responsibility because there is no express duty upon them to do so.
My Council agree with the general principle that enforcement should be mandatory upon local authorities. But we discussed on an earlier occasion the special circumstances arising in the case of nationally advertised branded goods, where, if prosecutions were left to local authorities, it could result in several conflicting decisions by magistrates' courts, all founded on the same advertisement, but of course in different parts of the country. Now there are provisions requiring local authorities to give the Board of Trade 28 days' notice of impending prosecution. And although the Bill is silent on the point, the Board remain free to prosecute if they so decide. Yet there is nothing in the Bill which will make it certain that the Board will prosecute in the circumstances I mention relating to nationally advertised products, and I should like to see an express provision to deal with this admitted need.
In the previous Bill a clause dealt with the question of civil remedies open to the customer deceived by any of the false descriptions prohibited. In the interval the Misrepresentations Act has effected some changes in the law on civil remedies, and the relevant clause in the present Bill, Clause 33, has now been altered. I am, however, far from certain that these two Acts dovetail as closely as the draftsmen intended. This, however, is a point that can be considered at a later stage of the Bill.
My Lords, I have spent some time on the three particular aspects where I think there is room for improvement in this Bill. But I do not wish it to be thought,

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because I have gone into some detail, that I do not wholeheartedly welcome the general purposes of the Bill, as I said earlier. It is an excellent Bill and it gives both myself and the Consumer Council the greatest encouragement to see this much-needed measure moving towards the Statute Book at last. The Government deserve to be congratulated on the rebirth of a better Bill which, by and large, achieves a fair balance between safeguarding both honest consumer and honest supplier. Consumers will have a better chance of understanding their rights, and when they do so fully the Bill will earn the appreciation and gratitude of the public.
5.9 p.m.
LORD SAINSBURY: My Lords, it gives me great pleasure as a retailer to welcome this Bill. It is exactly five years ago, on November 14, 1962, in fear and trepidation, that I made my maiden speech on this very subject, the subject of consumer protection. On that occasion I listed some dubious trade practices and areas where, in my opinion, the consumer needed more protection. I also expressed the hope that a strong Consumer Council would shortly be set up. In the following year that organisation came into being, and under its capable and energetic Chairman, the noble Baroness, Lady Elliot of Harwood, it has played a most valuable role. During the last five years we have also enacted the Hire-Purchase Act 1964 and the Weights and Measures Act 1963, which provide some safeguards for the consumer. However, in my opinion our consumer protection legislation is far from comprehensive and the present Bill will fill an important gap, the existence of which was pointed out by the Molony Committee as long as five years ago.
Not only do I believe, in opposition to the Daily Telegraph, that this particular Bill is needed, but I am convinced that it will be welcomed by a large section of the retail trade and also by the majority of the general public. It is easy enough for this newspaper to write a flippant leader about "Coddling the customers". As I said five years ago, I do not believe that the consumer's hand can be held all the time, but I think it is right and proper to protect him from
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misleading trade descriptions. While there is no doubt that perfection in this or in any other matter cannot be brought about by legislation, I fail to see how an attempt to ensure that the information the customer gets is reliable can be regarded as coddling the customer, or as portraying an "offensively protective" attitude towards shoppers. The fact is that in many cases the customer has no means of verifying the details on the label, the claims in the advertisement, or the information given verbally at the time of purchase. I am convinced that it is wholly desirable that some sanctions should exist against those who provide false or misleading information.
In my opinion it is nonsense to claim, as the Daily Telegraph does, that the Bill is "blatantly hostile towards tradesmen". Honest and responsible tradesmen, who I am glad to say—as has been said by others this afternoon—are in the great majority, should have nothing to fear from this Bill. In my view the only legitimate reservations concern the clause dealing with oral misdescription and the enforcement of the provisions relating to false price comparisons. Naturally, I accept that it is desirable to prevent the giving of false information in any way, but I am concerned that the enforcement of the Bill in respect of oral misinformation will give rise to considerable difficulties. Neither the customer nor the retailer is endowed with an exceptionally good memory, and in those circumstances it will be difficult to establish what was actually said and whether there was a conscious attempt to mislead the customer. It is also important to remember the point that my noble friend Baroness Burton of Coventry raised earlier, that however regrettable it may be there is a large turnover of staff in retail trade, which means that a considerable number is always under training and is more likely to make mistakes.
I appreciate that the provision concerning oral misdescription is also contained in the Food and Drugs Act 1955. and in the more recent Weights and Measures Act 1963. It would be interesting to know how many cases have been brought under this provision in those two Acts during, say, the last year. I think it is a very important rule not to embody provisions that cannot properly be enforced. For example, I recall that

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two years ago in the then county of Middlesex there were only twelve weights and measures inspectors to serve a population of 2¼ million. Despite some improvement, this is still a very real problem in most of the country, and I understand that the current overall shortage of weights and measures inspectors is in the region of 200.
My second reservation concerns the problem of false price comparisons. I agree that action is necessary, especially to eradicate the distasteful practice of crossing out entirely fictitious prices. However, I hope that the law will be interpreted with moderation, otherwise its effect may be to prevent genuine price reductions. In particular, it is important to bear in mind the difficulty of establishing what is the usual price against which claims of price cuts are judged. In spite of these two reservations, may I reiterate that I wholeheartedly support the Bill and hope that it will have a speedy passage, through both this House and the other place.
5.19 p.m.
LORD AUCKLAND: My Lords, I must first apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Brown, and to your Lordships that I may have to leave the Chamber before the Minister finishes his final speech. I have to preside at the Annual Home Safety Conference in the Borough of Lambeth tonight, and in view of the legislation before us to-day I think the House will agree that there is some relevance in this particular commitment.
I join with those who regard this as a useful Bill. Of course its effectiveness will largely be measured by the ability with which its provisions can be enforced, and noble Lords with more experience than I of the retail trade and the manufacturing trade have already mentioned a number of matters which will obviously have to be examined very carefully in Committee. I speak as a Vice-President of the Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents, and therefore my approach to this Bill is largely from the aspect of safety to the consumer. I should like to ask the noble Lord one question, which perhaps his Department could consider. I refer to the position regarding oil heaters and electric fires of ancient vintage which are still on sale at various fetes and fairs throughout the country, and also,
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I believe, in some street markets. I do not know whether this matter is specifically covered in this Bill. But it is a point, when one is discussing consumer protection, which needs very careful looking into, particularly as, although under the 1961 Act these sub-standard oil heaters are illegal anyway, there is evidence that they are still being made for sale.
Then there is some rather untidy drafting in the Bill. I would direct your Lordships' attention to Clause 3(2), which is a little difficult to take in at one mouthful and, I feel, could be shortened a little to make it rather more easy to understand. Clause 4(2) has already been mentioned by my noble friend, Lord Drumalbyn. As one who is professionally concerned with communication training, I occasionally help to run courses for sales managers and sales representatives in various manufacturing firms, in the catering industry and other industries, and I think it is fair to say that the training given to sales managers and representatives these days is of a high standard. Inevitably, a retailer must depend to a considerable extent, particularly when a new product is being marketed, on what the representative can tell him. I presume that the onus in this business of oral misrepresentation will concern the manufacturer and sales managers of the firm concerned, rather than the retailer, because, obviously, in what he tells his customers a retailer must to a large extent depend on what he is told by the bona fide representatives.
The Molony Report, in paragraph 284 and several ensuing paragraphs, deals with the matter of labelling. I know that the Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents are concerned with the practice of firms, particularly ironmongers, who sell bleaches and other products in lemonade or other squash bottles. This particular substance is coloured to look like orangeade and lemonade, and if it is drunk by a child it has pretty nasty results. There are, of course, in villages particularly, a number of general stores which might deal with a number of commodities ranging from fruit squash to these various bleaches, and possibly garden liquid products, which can cause these accidents.
So far as advertising is concerned, I should like to pay my own tribute to the

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Incorporated Society of British Advertisers; having been to two or three of their seminars over the past year, I think that they have done much to curb misleading advertising which ten or fifteen years ago was rather prevalent. It is true that some of the television advertising is not only very irritating but positively stupid. But I think that consumers generally are beginning to be more discriminating as regards the shampoos and various floor polishes, which are not so effective, and even the soups, which are not so nutritious, as the advertisers would have them think. Therefore, I do not think that television advertising to-day has a great deal which can be criticised.
Finally, on Clause 13, as other noble Lords have mentioned, there is this question of guaranteed services. I believe that these days our manufacturers, whether of washing machines or various other electrical gadgets, do a very good job; but the same cannot always be said of the after-sales services. I myself have had experience of where a Hoover or some domestic appliance has been taken to a shop, and the customer has been told, "Oh yes, it will be ready within 48 hours". But when one goes in one is told that it will not be ready for a week, and some lame excuse is offered. I do not think one can necessarily blame the poor retailer. He may well be in the hands of the firm: possibly a part manufactured by another firm—it may be a foreign firm—is the cause of the trouble. The September issue of the very excellent magazine, Which?, tells of a case (I will not go into details of it; it is available in the Library) in which the housewife took a washing machine, a new machine to be serviced, and it took several weeks before it was put right.
This is the kind of thing which harms our own industries, because people say, "Of course, British firms cannot deliver the goods. We will go to another firm of a foreign nature". This is not always fair to the manufacturer. I hope that Clause 13 will be looked at very carefully, and that any blame emanating from that clause will not necessarily be put on the retailer. As I have said, this is a Bill which is generally to be welcomed, and the sooner it is on the Statute Book, with the loose ends which need tying up prop-
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erly tied up, the better for the country as a whole.
5.28 p.m.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, like other speakers, I should like to welcome this Bill, and in common with some other noble Lords declare an interest in that I have worked in advertising for many years and am connected with the Incorporated Society of British Advertisers. I am sure that the Society will be very glad to hear the kind words the noble Lord, Lord Auckland, has said about what they have been doing to try to improve standards. Indeed, in company with the Advertising Standards Authority, under the able Chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, the Society have done a tremendous amount through the voluntary code of British advertising practice.
For that reason I would submit that Clause 9, although we know little about the intention behind it, is hardly essential. This is the clause which refers to information given in advertisements. I should like to ask the Government what they have in mind, and how they intend to use these powers. The Molony Committee, in paragraph 758 of their Report, considered this, but concluded that it was clearly impossible. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, gave one or two examples of how it may be impossible to work in practice. In contrast I should be grateful if my noble friend Lord Brown would tell us how the Government think it will work; the reasons why they wish to have it this way and what they want to do about it; and why they think these statutory powers are necessary. Why do they think they need overriding statutory powers to bring in rulings which, I would suggest, are already being administered perfectly satisfactorily in a voluntary way by the bodies that I mentioned earlier?
I should also like to ask about Clause 9(3), and join with my noble friend Lady Burton of Coventry in asking the Government what they mean by the words "any person". As my noble friend said, this was raised on several occasions during the passage of the previous Bill during the last Parliament. The only reply we received was, "'any person ' means 'any person'". I should like to ask now, quite specifically of my noble friend Lord Brown, whether this means the manufacturer, the advertiser, the advertising agency, the newspaper or magazine, the

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printer, the poster-site owner, the retailer, the T.V. programme company or the I.T.A. Does it mean any of those, some of those, none of them, or all of them? I should be glad if the Government would give us an answer during the passage of this Bill.
I should like to say a few words on the other clauses, although I think these are matters to which we can return during the Committee stage. Clause 17 raises the matter of penalties. I welcome the taking out of the three months' imprisonment on summary conviction, but I am disappointed to see that the fine has been increased by £100 to £400. This is a matter which we can examine in detail in Committee, but on the face of it I think this is a rather large sum on summary conviction. It would be particularly onerous on the small retailer, especially if he is at risk from prosecutions brought as a result of oral statements under Clause 4(2). I heard with particular interest what my noble friend Lord Sainsbury had to say about the difficulties concerning oral statements.
Under Clause 18 there is the matter of the time-limit for prosecutions. I should have thought that three years from the commission of the offence is rather too long. One year, I should have thought, would be long enough and rather more fair. Indeed, I understand that the three years' limit dates from the year 1887, when the pace of commercial life was considerably slower than it is to-day. I also submit that there may be a case for an Amendment on Committee stage to require protection against multiple prosecutions. As the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, mentioned, we did not reach this clause; in fact, we got only half-way through the Committee stage before Parliament was dissolved for the Election. I believe an Amendment was put down, and if another Amendment is put down this time I hope that the Government will consider it. Similarly, I think that an Amendment may be required to Clause 30, so that the Board of Trade can lay down minimum standards of qualification and testing for those persons who are authorised to issue certificates.
Lastly, I should like to say a few words about Clause 41. This is a most important clause, relating to the Title of the Bill. Here may I say that I agree fully
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with what the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, and my noble friend Baroness Burton of Coventry have said. I am rather puzzled why this Title has been chosen. I have never liked the words "consumer protection", but I infinitely preferred the previous Title, Protection of Consumer (Trade Descriptions) Bill, because that at least had the words "trade descriptions" in it. Now those words have been taken out altogether. I prefer the suggestions of the Molony Committee which, as the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, said, were "The Trades Descriptions Bill", or "The Merchandise Descriptions Bill", and also the one put forward by the noble Lord, Lard Drumalbyn, "The Fair Trading Bill because I would suggest that in the Preamble to the Bill there is nothing about protection of consumer. In fact, the only place where that occurs is in the Title and in Clause 41.
In my view the Title is too restrictive and rather confusing. It does not reflect the fact that the Bill is also for the protection of the vast majority of manufacturers and traders against dishonest competition. There are also the defence clauses, Clauses 22 and 23, which give protection on account of mistakes, accidents and so on. Clause 24 gives protection to those publishing advertisements or arranging for their publication.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, would the noble Lord kindly forgive my interrupting him to enable me to put a point? First of all, may I thank him sincerely for his reference to myself. Secondly, may I ask him, on this point about publication, and in view of his reference to Clause 9(3), whether his question was to ask the meaning of "any person who publishes", rather than just "any person", and whether the word "publishes" in Clause 9 has the same meaning as it has in Clause 34?
LORD STRABOLGI: Yes. I follow what the noble Lord has said. I was using this clause in a slightly different way, to show that whatever "any person" means—and we hope that we shall be able to find out on this occasion—and whoever that person is, it gives him protection. The point I was trying to put forward is that this is another clause which affords protection to others who, while they are consumers, are not actually consumers in this particular clause.

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Further, I would suggest that the present Title gives the impression that advertising and selling are basically contrary to the interest of the consumer.
As the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, said, most laws are for the protection of somebody or something; and surely the rule of law of protection is the difference between a well-regulated and law-abiding society and an anarchic society. Therefore, I hope the Committee will consider an alternative Title to this Bill, so that we can arrive at one that is more accurate and describes exactly what the Bill is trying to do, because otherwise I think that the public will be confused. With these few reservations I welcome the Bill, and I hope that your Lordships will give it a Second Reading.
5.39 p.m.
LORD CAWLEY: My Lords, I have an axe to grind. I am a lawyer who is going to be asked later to explain to his clients the meaning of the sections in the Act which will arise from this Bill. It is therefore most important to me that they are reasonably clear. To start with, I must repeat the welcome that I gave the Bill earlier in my speech on the Second Reading in 1966. It is a most necessary Bill, and I hope that it will be passed in the best possible form.
In my speech on that Second Reading I quoted the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goddard, who was then Lord Chief Justice of England, in the case of Slatcher v. Mence Smith, in 1951. This is what he said of the 1871 Merchandise Marks Act, which of course is the basis of the present law:
"It is a most difficult Act to construe and has given rise to many appeals. Those who are responsible might well consider whether new legislation should not be introduced to set out the law on this matter in clear language which lay justices and others concerned in its administration could understand."
It is much to be regretted that the Government have either sought deliberately to ignore the noble and learned Lord's advice—and I do not think that is so—or, at any rate in the case of the 1966 Bill, employed a draftsman with little or no knowledge of what the average lay justice can understand.
In the last Parliament serious criticism was levelled, from both sides of the House, at the drafting of the Bill. I am
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glad to see that some steps have been taken to unpick the elaborate jigsaw puzzle created by the draftsman. For example, in Clauses 1 to 6 this has been achieved by rearranging the order of the clauses; and I am grateful for this small mercy. The Short Title has also been pruned. I do not really care what the Bill is called, provided it has a Short Title and has not things in brackets which have to be written out every time one refers to the Bill. But I am by no means satisfied that the process of untying the ravelled skein has gone far enough. I give warning that I shall do my best in Committee to improve the Bill generally.
I must call attention to-day to Clause 20. The noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, said nothing about this clause, but it is exactly the same clause that was introduced in the 1966 Bill. We did not reach it in Committee, but I shall have to weary your Lordships with what I said on Second Reading on February 8, 1966:
"Clause 20 is, I must say, a very weird clause. This morning I consulted Queen's Counsel who is accustomed to dealing in this branch of the law, and we argued for about a quarter of an hour about what the first part of the clause meant, without coming to any consistent conclusion. It appears, if one reads the clause (I will not read it now), that an offence under Clause 1 of the Bill may depend on the state of mind, the intention, of the offender. That would lead to most extraordinary circumstances. Let us say that a man has a roll of black cloth with the word 'black' written on it. That is a perfectly true description, and is not false. Let us say that in Ruritanian language the word 'black' means white. That is false. It appears from this clause that if the man intends to export the goods to Ruritania, then he is committing an offence, but if he intends to sell them in this country, it is all right. I can see nothing in Clause 1 which deals with that, but Clause 20 does suggest that that is the law, and I think it should be looked into carefully.
"A little later in the clause there is the most astonishing phrase, which does not occur anywhere else in the Bill:
'being an indication which could not on any reasonable view be regarded as true.'
I do not know what that means. I should have said that, if that were so, it was a false indication. It could not on any reasonable view be regarded as being true. We seem now to have a gentleman who is a reasonable viewer and who has come in. I really feel that the Government ought to consider taking this phrase out altogether. It adds nothing to the Bill, and to me it only creates confusion." [OFFICIAL REPORT, cols. 699–700.]

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I intend, if possible, to consign that curious phrase to the wastepaper basket, along with "calculated," which disappeared into that receptacle when we were in Committee stage on the former Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Brown, must realise that it is a most extraordinary phrase to have in a Bill and it must be extremely difficult to construe. I think that it is for the Government to persuade noble Lords that this Bill is one that would be intelligible to lay justices as a class.
I now turn to two main criticisms of the Bill, which have nothing to do with the drafting. The first is the question of multiple prosecutions, a matter which I brought up on the Second Reading of the former Bill and to which the noble Lords, Lord Strabolgi and Lord Drumalbyn, have referred this evening. It is rather hard on a manufacturer or a multiple retailer who commits some very small offence in labelling if he is to be attacked by a dozen or more local authorities. I know that in the food and drugs legislation that is exactly what happens, and one cannot help thinking that if one public health inspector finds that there is a slight misdescription on a carton he rings up all his friends all over the country, because quite frequently the wretched multiple retailer gets complaints from six or seven places at the same time.
That surely cannot be a fair way to deal with the matter. I suggest to the Government that there is a way of getting round this, and that is by the Patents Act 1949, where one can get a declaration of non-infringement. I think that if a retailer or manufacturer is attacked from a number of places at once he should be permitted to go to the High Court, possibly making the Board of Trade respondent, and seek a declaration whether what he is doing is or is not a breach of the law. Because, of course, there is no finality in a magistrate's decision. A magistrate may decide that an offence has been committed under, say, the Merchandise Marks Act, but that decision is not binding upon any other magistrate. Therefore the next magistrate may decide that no offence has been committed. I would ask the Government to consider this matter carefully.
The second criticism is a rather curious one, and refers to the second part of the Bill, Clauses 7 to 10, headed:
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"Power to define terms and to require display, etc. of information".
Under the former Bill there were clauses, all to the same effect, which qualified all these clauses; and Clause 7(2) of the old Bill will show what I mean. Clause 7(2) of the old Bill said:
"Before making an order under this section the Board of Trade shall consult with such organisations as appear to them to be representative interests substantially affected by the order."
That requirement does not appear in the present Bill, and I should like to blow why. When I first saw it in the former Bill, I said, "This is ridiculous. It has no effect in law and ought not to be in the Bill, so why should it clutter it up?" But a Member of your Lordships' House with enormous experience of Government office—possibly more experience than any man in this country—said, "No, it is very important," since a Minister who was being bulldozed by his Permanent Secretary to do something of which he did not really approve would use this as a defence. It would allow him to say to the Permanent Secretary, "Have you consulted all these people, and what did they say?" If the Permanent Secretary says, "They were not very enthusiastic", the Minister has something to catch hold of. I feel that these provisions ought to be in the present Bill, and I do not know why they have been left out.
I was going to say something about Clauses 33 and 34 in regard to the complete change of the liability in civil proceedings, but I gather than it has something to do with the misrepresentation Bill. I am afraid that I am not such a good lawyer as I ought to be and have not that legislation in mind at the moment. But I think we can leave that matter for discussion later.
There are some minor criticisms that I should like to make, the first in regard to Clause 12. I have criticised this provision before. I will not trouble your Lordships with what I said then, but I think one ought to refer to the matter. This clause prevents people from falsely saying that they have the approval of various persons and bodies. The 1966 Bill included the Crown, Members of the Royal Family and Government Departments. I will let your Lordships into a secret. This was dug out

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of that source of ancient legislation, the 1887 Act; but it does not apply to the present day. Government Departments, Members of the Royal Family and the Crown are protected, but nobody else is protected at all. The National Coal Board is not. Under this clause I commit no offence if I say falsely that I supply beer to the National Coal Board or, indeed, to the House of Lords. But if I say falsely that I supply it to the Royal Mint, then I commit an offence.
It is very interesting that the draftsman of this Bill, as distinct from the 1966 Bill, has included local authorities. It seems to me extremely odd that you can say falsely that you supply something to the National Coal Board, or can say that it is approved by that Board, without committing an offence but if you say, falsely, that you supply something to the Little Mudcombe Parish Council, or say that it is approved by that body, then you do commit an offence. There is surely something very queer about that. This provision ought to be spread to cover any person, whether existent or not, because you ought not to be able to say that you have the approval of somebody who is dead when you never have had it, or to say that you have the approval of some imaginary person or body. The only reason why such persons were not included is because the clause was copied slavishly from the 1887 Act, and I hope, now that 80 years have gone by, that something better can be done. A very curious thing is that, if the clause is left as it is, the Post Office will be covered until it becomes a public Corporation under the Bill which was mentioned in the gracious Speech; but then it will suddenly lose all its protection. That also seems to me a very odd situation.
The noble Lord, Lord Sainsbury, said that an honest trader has nothing to fear under the Merchandise Marks Act, but I think he has. One of the most striking examples is a case brought under the 1953 Merchandise Marks Act against the seller of homeopathic medicines for cows, when it was alleged that he had applied to the medicine a false trade description as to its properties. That developed into a full-scale battle between homeopathy and allopathy, and two doctors gave evidence. Of course, the case finished with no conviction being secured, because there was
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a complete conflict of evidence. But that Act was something which was definitely to be feared; and those who were prosecuted certainly feared it very greatly.
As the time is getting late, my Lords, I must curtail what I was going to say, but I want to refer to the fact that when the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison (I see that he is not in his place), was in charge of the last Bill, he criticised the fact that the Committee stage took too long. Indeed, I think that the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, suggested that we plunged in a bit too deep. But there are matters in this Bill which are extremely important, and it is the first comprehensive Bill that we have had for 80 years. So I think that we shall have to go through it very carefully in Committee, at the cost of wearying the noble Lord in charge. But I wish this Bill a happy passage in Committee, and I hope that it will get on the Statute Book and be a credit to all concerned with its progress through both Houses of Parliament.
5.54 p.m.
LORD LEATHERLAND: My Lords, my interest in the question of consumer protection stems from the day, a good many years ago, when I was assistant editor of one of our national morning newspapers. In that capacity I organised, as one of the newspaper's sidelines, what we called "a fair shopping bureau". We had thousands of complaints from our readers about rubbishy goods of one kind and another—furniture, carpets, clothing, electrical appliances, and so on—and I came to the conclusion that further legislation to protect the consumer was certainly necessary. I am of that opinion to-day, and that is why I wholeheartedly support this Bill.
Despite what has been said in some quarters of the House with regard to its Title, I am not ashamed of its Title—the Consumer Protection Bill—for it is precisely to protect the consumer that the Bill is intended. I was especially pleased, of course, to hear that the noble Baroness, Lady Elliot of Harwood, who is Chairman of the Consumer Council, gives this Bill her support. It may be that I do not agree with everything that she and the Consumer Council do, but I certainly recognise the assiduous way she devotes herself to that branch of public service, and her welcome to this Bill is something which I welcome, too.

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When I first read the Bill, I thought that its aims were so beneficial that I expected our Second Reading to be as calm as a session of transcendental meditation. It has not quite been that. It has been calm, but some fascinating suggestions have been put forward, and of course some hints of fur and feather flying when we ultimately reach the Committee stage. I am not one of those supercilious males who thinks that in matters of shopping our womenfolk are dim-witted. Naïve they may sometimes be, but as a rule they know what they want; and they also know how to set about getting it. All the same, if we are to believe the advertisements which we see on television, while the cat can find its way unerringly to the "best buy" among several brands of cat food, it seems that the majority of our housewives cannot tell Stork from butter.
But in order to get the right atmosphere in the House, so far as what I want to say is concerned, I think I ought to say that I believe the majority of our manufacturers and merchants are honest men; that they produce products which are of high quality, some of the best in the world, and, incidentally, some of them the cheapest in Western countries. But there are some gentlemen, whose consciences are perhaps a little under-nourished, who know every slick trick in the trade, and it is against their activities that the housewife really needs protection. And so does the honest trader. I think that this Bill, combined with the regulations with regard to the labelling of food which have been issued in the last few days and which are now being studied by the trade associations concerned, is likely to give a very great measure of protection to the ordinary shopper, whether she be housewife or otherwise. I have to confess that I myself know very little about shopping. I certainly am not an expert. If I am sent out to buy a pair of kippers, it is just as likely that I shall come back with a Dover sole or a couple of salmon steaks. But it is not for part-time shoppers like myself that this Bill is designed. This Bill is designed for the ordinary housewives, the women who spend over £6,000 million a year on food—half of it, incidentally, either packed or processed food.
Before I look at some of the details of the Bill I should like to make a general
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comment on one matter which is hardly covered by it. I feel that we waste an enormous amount of money by the extravagant method of packing both our foodstuffs and our other merchandise—what I believe is known to-day, in our quest for brevity, as "packaging". I think there is an unnecessary amount of money spent on that particular process. Of course, nobody wants to see in the shops packages which are dowdy, unattractive and unhygienic. Nobody wants to go back to the old days when raw food was exhibited, liable to be contaminated by animals, by dust, or by dirt. But I think that if the food producers and the manufacturers of other merchandise could get together, and agree among themselves on a more economical form of packing, it would enable the cost of living to be reduced to a considerable extent.
Another point I feel rather strongly about, perhaps in my crankish way, my Lords, is that a lot of housewives would like prices to be marked in plain figures. Anyhow, I think they can be persuaded to adopt that point of view. As it is now, they are confronted with something labelled, "3d. off"; they are confronted with something else with which there is being given away a free mug or a free basin; or they are told when they buy another product that in exchange for a certain number of coupons they can get table knives at specially cheap prices. I think all this is masking and disguising the real basis of our pricing system. Even some of our shopkeepers are employing it as a kind of currency. I went into a chemist's shop a few weeks ago and I said, "I want a tube of toothpaste". "Yes", said the assistant, "this one is 5d, off, that one is 3d. off". I replied in my simple way, "How many pennies do I have to give you for it?", and she said, "This one is 2s. 6d. with 5d. off, that one is 2s. 1d. with 3d off". I took the 2s. 1d. tube. She said to me, "Ah! You had to pay less for that one, but if you had had the other one you would have saved more".
I wish that we could get down to a straightforward system of pricing our goods. In the old days, before hire-purchase became respectable and middle-class, any furniture that was bought on the deferred payments system was delivered in plain vans. So, of course, if

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you saw a plain van coming down your street you knew the neighbours had not paid for the furniture. And even today we can answer advertisements for intellectual and erudite books which are guaranteed to be sent under plain cover. So why, can we not have some plain figures when we are talking about prices of everyday commodities that the housewife has to buy?
There is one thing which I am not quite sure is covered by Clause 11. We know that from time to time a manufacturer will reduce the weight of the contents of a particular package, while keeping the price unchanged. On the other hand, I must be fair and say that on some occasions he increases the weight of the contents of his package; but on that latter occasion he blows his trumpet so loudly that we cannot fail to hear. Yet when he reduces the quantity of the material in the package we learn very little about it. In those cases I should like to see him required to put on a label, or to overprint in some way, indicating that the quantity has been reduced. I know that many foods and other commodities have to bear on the label an indication of the net weight, but that is usually found in very small print and it does not draw attention to the fact that the current net weight is something less than it was a few weeks previously.
But whatever gaps there may be in Clause 11 of the Bill, I feel that it is going to be extremely helpful to the shopper. I certainly think that it will call for a higher standard of ethics among the managers of big stores which run summer and winter sales from time to time. I do not believe that all our lady friends are deceived by a price-tag which says that a coat which was £50 is now £30—though judging from the football scrums in which they take part on those occasions, some of them probably do. I do not want to be misunderstood. I am not against these bargain sales. I think they do a lot of good. They are a lot of fun; and even if the tickets were marked in honest terms I think a good many bargains might still be secured.
Now I should like to look at Clause 4. That is the clause which says that an oral statement may be regarded as a trade description within the meaning of the Act. This is going to be extremely controversial. I know that the word
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"may" in that particular provision will probably dilute it, and will probably mean that none but the most blatant case of deception will ever be taken to court. But despite what some of my noble friends have said, I still feel that that particular provision ought to remain in the Bill, because if it does not some very quick-witted people will be able to ride rough-shod over many of its provisions.
There is another thing, my Lords, about which I think we shall have to be rather careful; that is, that what are called "trade descriptions" must be in terms which are meaningful not only to the trade expert concerned but also to the ordinary shopper. I know that in Clause 14 there is a statement to the effect that a trade description must have a "definite meaning", but I think that refers only to services and to accommodation, and does not refer to merchandise or foodstuffs as a whole.
I mention the importance of the trade description being meaningful to the ordinary purchaser because many years ago, when I was much younger and even more innocent than I am to-day, I was a victim because I did not understand a certain very technical trade term that was used in connection with a transaction in which I took part. I had gone to a horsecoper in our neighbouring market town to buy a spare hunter. We exchanged the usual questions and answers; there had been the usual patter—"It has been ridden by an officer of the Household Cavalry", and so on—and then I said to him, "Has this horse got any peculiarities which I, as its future rider, ought to know?" "No", he said, "though it does lift its leg a bit". It was not until I got home and put the horse in the stable that I realised that "lifting its leg" really meant kicking out with its hind-legs with all the force of a steam-hammer. So we must really have meaningful terms which are comprehensible by the ordinary buyer when we talk about the phraseology of these trade descriptions.
The section of the Bill dealing with advertisements is one in which I might have had an interest in my old, newspaper days, but which I leave to experts now currently engaged in that industry, such as my noble friend Lord Strabolgi. I would merely say this: that I hope there

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will not be interference with the advertiseing industry and with the Press merely for the sake of interference. It is a fact that most newspapers now give a guarantee that if any reader suffers by answering an advertisement which is not true in all the particulars it advertises, then the newspaper will see that that person is properly recompensed. Of course, it may be desirable to have this power in reserve—and I emphasise the words, "in reserve"—to use against anybody who blatantly outrages the canons of decent trading; but I hope that there will not be any undue interference with the newspapers, which are already trying to raise the standard of advertising ethics on their own account.
I am not quite so sure about television advertising. The noble Lord, Lord Hill of Luton, has gone, but I sometimes wonder about that cat which goes straight to that bowl of meat. I also sometimes wonder whether the two sheets or the two shirts are exactly of the same texture. I think many other people would like to know that, too. Because I have no proof, I will not pursue it any further, but I wish we could be enlightened.
I am very pleased indeed that the enforcement of this Bill is to be handed to the weights and measures inspectors. These are highly intelligent, very well-trained people of absolute integrity. When we discussed consumer protection in a general way about two years ago I suggested that any consumer protection legislation ought to be put into the hands of the weights and measures inspectors to administer. I called attention then to the new régime set up at Sheffield where a Consumer Protection Department has been established under the leadership of the chief weights and measures inspector. That department is doing very well, and I hope it will be followed by others in other parts of the country. That merely confirms me in my view that the weights and measures inspectors are the people to deal with legislation of this kind. Let me tell the noble Baroness, Lady Elliot of Harwood, that I am not trying to detract in any way from the very valuable services rendered by the Citizens' Advice Bureaux.
There is, however, one little administrative snag that I see in connection with this particular clause of the Bill. It is usual—and I will omit county boroughs
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for the moment—for the weights and measures inspector to be an officer of the county council. He takes the whole county in his stride. Yet—
THE MINISTER OF STATE, BOARD OF TRADE (LORD BROWN): My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lord? I am anxious not to let him build up a big case on a slight misunderstanding. The power of enforcement is not given to the weights and measures inspectors; it is given to the local authorities who will, in very many cases, employ weights and measures inspectors. I hope that the noble Lord will not mind my interruption.
LORD LEATHERLAND: It was not very helpful but, nevertheless, I am grateful. The local authority of course will act in pursuance of a report which will be submitted by the weights and measures inspector; so, although there may be a technical difference between my noble friend and myself, although he may be technically more accurate than I am in connection with this point, the fact remains that the weights and measures inspector will be the man who does this job.
I mention this because I wish to point out that the weights and measures inspector is usually a county officer covering the whole county with his activities; yet the Food and Drugs Act is somewhat fragmented in its administration and is often administered by urban district councils and small borough councils. You might get the position, under the Bill as it now stands, where the county weights and measures inspector and the urban district food and drugs inspector go into the same shop and examine and test the same item of merchandise. That might be awkward for everybody concerned. But if my noble friend agrees that that is a possibility, and an anomalous one, it is easy to put the matter right by a small Amendment at Committee stage.
My Lords, there are a number of other small technical details which it is hardly right for me to deal with in a Second Reading debate but which, if my noble friend agrees, I shall be pleased to send him in written form so that the experts of the Department can look into them before Committee stage. There is one particularly in Clause 6 where the expression, "offer for sale" is used. Yet in every other clause of the Bill where this

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same kind of transaction is envisaged, the term is, "offer to supply". If the two things mean the same I think it would be for the convenience of everybody—lawyers included—if they were worded in the same way. This is not just a matter of semantics. It could be rather important in these days of self-service shops, because under the Pharmacy and Poisons Act there have been quite a number of decided cases where it has been held that articles shown in the window or shown on the shelves are not being "offered for sale".
Another small detail which we can think about in Committee concerns the lengthening of the period for consideration of prosecution from 14 days to 28 days. I should like to see the 14 days restored. We are not talking only about 28 days; we are talking about the time in which the inspector goes to the shop, takes his sample, takes it away for analysis or weighing or some other process; we are talking about the time he takes in writing his report, submitting it to the next meeting of his committee and ultimately getting authority to serve the summons—and then the 28 days. And, on top of all that, we have to bear in mind that the magistrates' courts are now so overwhelmed with work that summonses entered sometimes have to wait months until they are heard. I think it is unfair to any defendant to be told he has to wait several months—during which time his memory may conceivably fail him, or the picture of the incident may become blurred in his mind—before he has the chance to answer the charge against him.
Another thing which I rather regret is that ballast for construction purposes is being omitted from the Bill. I shall be told that short weight in delivering ballast is dealt with under the Weights and Measures Act. I see my noble friend confirms this. Nevertheless, where we have huge quantities of short-weight ballast concerned it might be more appropriate, and preferable, that the offence be dealt with under this Bill where the penalties provided are very much bigger.
My Lords, that is all I really want to say. I welcome this Bill. I welcome it wholeheartedly and in no niggardly spirit. I hope that a few Amendments may be made; but, rather than see us
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take an interminable time over the Amendments, I would prefer it to go through in its virgin state; because I think it is an important measure. The traders and manufacturers of Britain have a very high reputation in the eyes of the world for the standard of their trading ethics. This Bill will help to raise that standard a little higher. For that reason I support it warmly.
6.17 p.m.
LORD BROWN: My Lords, I knew that we should be hearing a constructive and lively debate this afternoon and I think we have not been disappointed. I should have liked—and I fully intended to try—to make my closing speech a short one; but whether I shall be able to do so is doubtful in view of the number of notes I have collected on points which have been made by speakers in the debate. I noted the views of the noble Lord, Lord Cawley, about the drafting of this Bill. I am not really competent to judge whether, from the legal and technical point of view, the drafting is good or bad; but I should like to emphasise that, for once, I was able to read the entire Bill and—so I thought—I understood it thoroughly. From that point of view I think its present form of drafting, although it may be possibly a nightmare to lawyers, will be something of a relief (when it is compared to some Bills which have been passed through Parliament) to the traders that it affects.
From the point of view of emphasis, I should like to return to one point to which my noble friend referred in his opening speech, and that is the proposal to repeal the Merchandise Marks Act 1926 with the rest of the merchandise marks legislation and assimilate origin marking requirements with the other labelling requirements for which the Bill provides powers. This is logical. It will also help—and I want to emphasise this—to bring our origin marking legislation up-to-date and remove the slur of protectionism which is levelled against it. Under the Bill, except as otherwise provided, the requirements to mark goods with their origin are to apply not only to imported goods but to those produced in the United Kingdom. This should be a matter of satisfaction to all our trading partners to whom we have obligations in operating such regulations in a way

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which affords non-tariff protection to domestic producers.
The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, started his speech with what I thought was a very welcome reference to the fact that he desired to see a combination of voluntary control and legislative control exercised. So far as the Government are concerned, it is very much their wish to introduce legislation which meets with the approval of consumer councils, advertising and voluntary associations, and other bodies which have proved such a help in this field prior to this proposed legislation. There was a considerable debate in which the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, and others took part with regard to the Title. It is not for me to commit the Government to a change of Title, and I am not doing so when I say that the comments made about the present Title struck a chord of deep sympathy in me. That is not a committal to alter it. I do not know what I am laying myself in for by saying that, but I will do my best, because I was attracted by the ideas put forward, particularly by the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, of a trade descriptions Bill.
My Lords, I am dealing with points made, not in the order in which they were made—in fact, not in any particular order, because I have not had time to arrange them, and perhaps noble Lords will excuse me for that. I took note of the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Burton of Coventry, about the feedback of information from the Citizens' Advice Bureaux. The noble Baroness went on to refer to the issue of grants to the Bureaux and I have to say at once that I am quite unprepared to comment on that issue in this debate; it will have to be taken up separately. The noble Lord, Lord Airedale, drew attention to a very important point in connection with Clause 6. I will undertake to have this looked at very carefully, because he drew attention to the situation of a shopkeeper who had in his store a quantity of goods which he had not satisfied himself were fit for sale. An inspector might deem them offered for sale because they were in the store, and therefore the shopkeeper might be treated as a criminal. I am not satisfied that the noble Lord's
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interpretation of Clause 6 is a fair one, because it does say:
"A person exposing goods for sale"—
and I am sure that the noble Lord will not object to that—
"or having goods in his possession for sale …"
The shopkeeper might not have deemed them ready for sale if he had not inspected them. But I undertake to have the point looked at, because it seems possibly to be a very important one.
The noble Baroness, Lady Burton—I say this with hesitation—raised a number of points which were of very great interest, and I am sure that the whole House recognises the prolonged and sincere interest of the noble Baroness in consumer protection. But a number of the points do not, I think, come within the ambit of this Bill or our discussion. I refer to the grading of merchandise. In so far as grading exists, and persons purport to suggest that their goods are in accordance with some particular grade when they are not, the Bill will catch them; but in so far as there is a suggestion that the Bill should seek to give powers to introduce grading, that is outside the Long Title of the Bill.
In the same way the noble Baroness made a plea for me to give a report on the progress of investigations into the laws of contract which are going on now. I am very sorry to say that I am not in a position to do so. I do not know, as I stand here, when the report is due for publication and I cannot respond to her invitation. I hope that on another occasion the noble Baroness will be able to obtain the information which she requires. The noble Lord, Lord Auckland, raised the question of eliminating the danger to the consumer over the sale of dangerous goods. The Consumer Protection Act 1961 is the Act which deals with that. The Bill with which we are now dealing is concerned with misdescription and not with the protection of consumers in respect of dangerous goods.
The noble Baroness, Lady Burton of Coventry, raised the whole question of the cost of court proceedings. We have heard about the need for simple, cheap and informal methods of getting redress for a consumer who has been sold faulty goods. I do not want to go into the merits of this proposal or in any way to imply that it is unworkable—I do not

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know—but I think that it is outside the scope of this Bill and the aspects of consumer protection which we are discussing this afternoon. We are concerned with the use of the criminal law to protect consumers against deceptive practices, not with the provision of new procedures to procure for the consumer civil remedies for his disappointments. The only proceedings to which this Bill can give rise are criminal proceedings. It is right that these should be handled by the established courts. I do not believe that the expense of bringing a prosecution will deter local authorities in cases where a prosecution is clearly justified. The new arrangements for local authority enforcement should — and I ask the noble Lady to note this—reduce the need for private prosecutions by such bodies as the Retail Trade Standards Association, whose expenditure on prosecutions was raised as a point in the discussion.
Now may I come to some of the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Elliot of Harwood, about false trade descriptions? I think she made clear that she does not agree with the attempt to establish a precise yardstick. I must say that this contrasts with what I understood the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, to suggest, that either a thing is illegal or it is not. I think that these are the two boundaries of the debate: those who seek to have something which is so imprecise that we are quite certain that we can catch anybody who is a criminal, and, on the other hand, a definition of such precision that we avoid catching anybody who is not a criminal.
The noble Baroness, Lady Elliot of Harwood, raised the question of railway lost property. I cannot comment on all the examples she gave, but my advice (this was an example which has already been raised in the drafting of this Bill) is to the effect that a person or persons advertising goods as being railway lost property, when in fact they are not, would be caught by the provisions of this Bill, and likewise many other cases. I think that we have to leave to the Committee stage this whole question of the tussle between those who want more definition and those who want less. In this Bill the Government have provided a halfway path between the two, and it seems to me
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that that perhaps is the best course to take.
The noble Baroness, Lady Elliot of Harwood, again raised the question of the amendment to the definition "to a material degree". I am sure that this will be debated at great length in the Committee stage. This phrase is a reference to the relationship between the goods themselves and a description of the goods. It is not an attempt to protect the consumer directly, I suggest, but an attempt to protect the consumer indirectly by trying to ensure that a description matches the goods supplied or put on offer. To this extent I would defend quite strongly the term "material degree", although we may, as I suggest, leave that for the Committee stage. The noble Lord, Lord Cawley, raised a point which concerns me because he drew attention to the fact that an original clause—I cannot remember the clause he quoted—which appeared in the 1966 Bill seemed to have disappeared with the result, as he saw it, that the Board of Trade would no longer be under the necessity of consulting the trade in moving towards a definition.
LORD CAWLEY: My Lords, it has been pointed out to me that I am wrong.
LORD BROWN: My Lords, I am very glad to hear that someone has reassured the noble Lord, Lord Cawley, as I was certain that he was wrong but I should not have been able to tell him the clause which covered the point.
LORD CAWLEY: My Lords, it is Clause 35.
LORD BROWN: I thank the noble Lord; I could not find it.
The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, has raised a substantial issue in the sensible use of order-making powers. He suggested that some of the powers might be used to specify unreasonable requirements. These powers have certainly been drawn widely to cover many needs which may conceivably arise during the lifetime of this legislation; but, equally, we have been careful to draw them so that they can be used with the necessary degree of flexibility. If we were to require information to be given in an advertisement for a certain class of goods, we should not require it to be given in every form of advertisement, or in the same manner or to the same

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extent in different forms of advertisement. What might reasonably be satisfactory in a large advertisement in a newspaper might be wholly inacceptable in a brief television flash. Of course we should expect a common-sense approach to be taken where such standards were appropriate. Certainly we shall not use these powers lightly or frivolously.
Your Lordships will know that the Board can use these powers only after adequate consultation with the interested parties. And we need to draw on the experience of others in drawing up regulations. I hope and believe that your Lordships will find this assurance, that the proposed powers will be sensibly used, sufficient. To some extent we have to wait and see, because this Bill is of an exploratory nature, as I think we all recognise.
Many speakers have referred to the question of oral misdescription and referred to the perils which lie in our path. I think that I should be frank about this. We have a serious choice to make in drawing a line between descriptions thought to be false without power to do anything about them and tackling this extremely difficult issue in legislation, knowing that prosecution might in many cases be difficult. We have to choose between some degree of imprecision on this matter or nothing at all.
My noble friend Lord Sainsbury asked how many cases under the Food and Drugs Act had been brought before the courts last year and prosecuted successfully. I am sorry, but I do not know: this type of prosecution is carried out locally. However, I can obtain the answer, though it will take some time, and will send it to my noble friend in writing. My noble friend also referred to the need for more inspectors of weights and measures. I would repeat the point I made in an interruption when my noble friend Lord Leatherland was speaking. Responsibility for the enforcement of this new legislation will rest on the local authorities, who will have to rely largely on the weights and measures inspectors to perform these tasks for them. But skilled and qualified weights and measures inspectors are rare birds, and the difficulty of increasing, their number is their rarity. So long as the burden of responsibility rests on local authorities, it would
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seem possible that they could use on enforcement procedures competent people who need not necessarily have the special skill embodied in the weights and measures inspector. This may help the situation.
I come next to the question of who is the advertiser. I think that the questions asked are over-simplified. The question of who is the advertiser can be decided precisely with reference to the advertisement. It does not mean that I am being imprecise if I give an answer of this sort. The advertiser may be the manufacturer, who has control of the advertisement and insists that what he has written in the way of copy should appear in the newspaper. He is clearly the responsible person, the advertiser.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I think that the noble Lord is referring to what the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, was saying. The question here is, who is "any person who publishes"? Is the noble Lord equating the advertiser with "any person who publishes."
LORD BROWN: My Lords, I answer that direct question with some hesitation. I am not sufficiently familiar with the Bill to distinguish between an advertiser and a person who publishes. If I proceed with what I have to say, I may clear up the issue. If the matter is not clear we may look at this point again on Committee stage.
The "advertiser" may be an advertising agent who has taken over total responsibility from the manufacturer for producing the copy, without referring it back to the manufacturer, and getting it into the newspaper. Or it may be the newspaper. Orders issued by the Board of Trade may insist, when certain goods are advertised, that certain statements about these goods must appear in newspaper advertisements. The newspaper will know the law in that respect, and will have the responsibility of exercising some supervision over all advertisements in the light of these orders from the Board of Trade. If we cannot say precisely whether the "advertiser" is the manufacturer, the advertising agent or the newspaper or magazine owner, that does not mean to say that the situation is indistinct. It means that we can decide with precision in the circumstances of

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every particular case, which I think, with respect, is fair enough.
BARONESS BURTON OF COVENTRY: My Lords, I have been listening carefully to this point, but I am completely in a fog, as bad a fog as when I raised it before. We have just been told that it could be any one of four persons. Does my noble friend not think that on Committee stage he could perhaps give us a more definite answer?
LORD BROWN: My Lords, I am extremely sorry. I think that I have made an extremely clear statement. But I will leave the matter as it is, because I cannot be clearer than I have already been. I am sorry to have to leave it like this.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, perhaps I may be able to help the noble Lord by putting it this way. Is he trying to limit the culpability to the actual section where it occurs? I can see the point he is trying to make, about the manufacturer who does his own advertising and the agency does not come into the question. Are the Government thinking more in terms of libel law, where everybody involved might be culpable and at risk?
LORD BROWN: My Lords, I do not think that we can go on with this discussion, otherwise I shall never finish to-night. What I am trying to point out is that the "advertiser", or the person who publishes, is whoever is responsible for the content of the advertisement. It is the content with which we are concerned. The matter is quite clear to me, and I am somewhat surprised that I am not getting it across with the clarity that exists in my own mind. Perhaps I have not sufficiently grasped the implications of the question to enable me to answer it in its entirety. But I suggest that we should raise this point again on Committee stage.
The noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, asked about information in advertisements and specifying what is to be included. We have no immediate proposals. We are clear about what we want to do but, to give a signal example, we may require a mail order advertisement of a sweater to include the same details about its fibre content as the goods themselves have to bear because of a Clause 8 Order. In other words, you may find that many
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of the orders with regard to the insertions of advertisements are linked with the other orders about the marking of goods. There would seem to be sense in taking powers that if you insist on the marking of goods you should also insist that the advertisements offering them for sale contain some reference to the conditions attached to the goods themselves.
The noble Lord, Lord Cawley, raised the question on Clause 12 of the approval of Royalty falsely claimed, and pointed to the inclusion of local authorities and so on. They are included on the supplication of certain local authorities. I take serious note of the comments he has made, and we shall have to consider them. I am certainly impressed by the point. The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, and my noble friends, Lady Burton of Coventry and Lord Sainsbury, all commented on the question of comparative prices. I do not think there has been any really serious criticism of the principle underlying our proposal that changes in the prices should be restrained. Such doubts as have been expressed have been about its formulation and the possibility of prosecuting under certain conditions. I can assure your Lordships that it is not easy to come up with a perfect formulation which catches the kind of mis-statements which we wish to restrain in terms which are readily understandable and applicable by those who have to observe and enforce those requirements. We have done our best, but I can assure your Lordships that if any noble Lord comes forward on the Committee stage with something better, our minds will not be closed to the possibility of improvement.
The noble Lord, Lord Leatherland, made a point about the practice of reducing the price from the previous price, quite honestly, but also reducing the quantity inside the packet. It seems to me clear that if the quantity has gone down commensurately with the price, and the claim is made that the price has been reduced, such practices would be caught by the legislation.
LORD LEATHERLAND: Let us get this clear, for the Record. I think I referred to cases where the price had been retained at the same figure but the quantity in the packet had gone down.
LORD BROWN: Then I am afraid that I misunderstood the point the noble Lord was making. Nevertheless, the point that I have made may be useful and right, although it is not in answer to the question asked. The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, has raised the question of the apparent exclusion from the Bill of express third-party defence. We are really omitting only the third party procedure contained in the last Bill: we are omitting the procedure, but not the defence. The defendant who can satisfy the requirement of an express third party defence could, on the same facts, take advantage of the same general defence certificate provided in Clause 23. An express defence is, therefore, superfluous. I would also point out that in Clause 22 we have retained a by-passing procedure whereby a third party whose act causes the committing of an offence by somebody else can be proceeded against for the offence committed by that other person. All that has disappeared is the special procedure previously envisaged in Clause 23(2), which your Lordships considered last year.
I would remind your Lordships that this Bill, unlike other legislation in which a similar procedure is specified, provides for proceedings on indictment, and not just summary proceedings. The third party defence procedure—and I mean the third party defence procedure; not the third party defence—has been dropped because we now feel that there might be serious and practical difficulties in applying it in the very different circumstances of proceedings on indictment. The disappearance of Clause 24 of the old Bill is, therefore, consequential. I hope that the noble Lord is reassured on that. I think that for defendants it has got rid of a tiresome procedure, and it will make their position simpler than it would have been under the 1966 Bill.
The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, raised the question of the possibly sweeping nature of the powers under the Bill to inspect and confiscate. The details of the clauses which cover this matter can, I think, better be dissected on a later occasion, but I can assure your Lordships that in the light of past experience we believe that all these powers are needed if the facts necessary to the proper enforcement of the Bill are to be elicited.
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It is very much the same situation that we found ourselves in on some of the powers required by the Board of Trade under the Companies Act, and it is only for the purposes of enforcing the Bill that these powers can be used, with due safeguards later in the clause against improper disclosure of information obtained by their use.
There is one further point with reference to the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn. The Bill calls for forfeiture of goods which have actually been used only to prove an infringement of the law. So that the idea that a court, having found an infringement of the law on the basis of a few samples, can then order forfeiture of the whole of the contents of the warehouse, worth £100,000, is not in accordance with the Bill.
Many noble Lords have raised the question of the danger of dual prosecutions under these clauses. There may be a danger that this can happen, but I think what has been overlooked by many who have drawn attention to the point is the fact that local authorities are responsible for giving 28 days' notice to the Board of Trade before proceedings of prosecution so that prosecutions can be co-ordinated. It must be clear that the Board of Trade can themselves in each case prosecute, if they so choose. It is true that they cannot veto a prosecution by a local authority. But it seems to me—and I am advised in this way—that the possibility of stupid dual or repetitive prosecutions in the country under the clauses as they are written is virtually nil. We should have to have a recalcitrant local authority insisting on their rights of raising a prosecution—and it would be an expensive matter—behaving quite irresponsibly, for this to happen. I hope that this comment will be sufficient reassurance to noble Lords.
The noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, raised the question of penalties, and I think he deplored the increase of fines from £250 to £400, on the ground that this was a very large figure to levy on a small retailer. The noble Lord may have forgotten that this is a maximum fine. In the second place, we are certainly not always dealing with small retailers. We are sometimes dealing with possibly very powerful gangs of crooks—who knows?—and in the light of this the fine does not appear to us to be unnecessarily large.

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In the same way, one would refer to the three years that may elapse from the commission of the offence before it is prosecuted. But if one gets hold of a really big piece of cheating, it is surely proper not to allow a serious criminal to escape merely because there has been an unfortunate delay in taking account of his criminal offence. If one considers the possibility of major offences in this, the increase in penalties and the length of time during which a prosecution may take place do not seem to me to be unduly large or lengthy.
The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, has raised the question of who is to prosecute for offences committed overseas. I am not quite sure whether I understood his question. If it is connected with marks of origin, then if the marks are falsely put on overseas, and a foreigner mis-describes them in his own country to our importer, then I do not think we can do anything about it. That offence is committed overseas, and it is up to our importer to make sure what he is buying. But if the goods are delivered in this country wrongly marked as being from one country when they were really from another, or if they are not marked, then it is the job of the Board of Trade to prosecute the offence in this country. If in other respects he offends in mis-description, and so on, then he is in the same position as any British manufacturer or merchant. It may be that I have misunderstood the noble Lord's question in this respect.
The noble Lord, Lord Cawley, raised the question of the clause that deals with accessories in the United Kingdom to offences committed abroad. We shall have to examine this matter. I am always a little afraid of lawyers when they get to work, because they mystify me. It seemed to me, when I read this clause, that it was a thoroughly proper clause; that somebody in this country who was printing whisky labels for Scotch whisky overseas, which were in fact forgeries, saying it had come from Scotland when it was being manufactured in some other country, and sold as Scotch whisky, was accessory to a crime that was very serious indeed, and that if it was known he was doing it he should be prosecuted. I have noted Lord Cawley's point, that
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this is legal nonsense, although I am not sure whether he used that phrase—
LORD CAWLEY: My Lords, I am very glad to hear what this is all about. I was not in any way objecting to the content of this, but I could not quite understand what the meaning of the clause was.
LORD BROWN: My Lords, I hesitated to think that it was necessary for me to explain this clause to a lawyer, because I have always assumed that lawyers' wisdom is such that they can get at these things. But if the content of the clause seems to be all right to the noble Lord, then perhaps the necessary attention to drafting which I think he is suspicious of can be dealt with at the Committee stage.
I come now to the last point on which I have notes: the absence of an expense clause. I am glad I have a note on this because it is a difficult point. The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, raised this question, noting the absence of the usual clause enabling any increased expenditure attributable to the Bill to be defrayed out of moneys provided by Parliament. I can assure him that this will not fetter the ability of the Board of Trade to undertake prosecutions if and when this appears desirable. The Board already incur expenditure in enforcing the Merchandise Marks Acts, and it is not to be expected that they will incur any greater expenditure on prosecutions under this legislation.
There was, it is true, an expense clause in the Bill which the House considered last year, but it was there merely to cover the possibility of increased payments from central Government to local government as a result of the latter's increased expenditure on enforcement. We are advised that this cover is no longer necessary in view of the different arrangements which now govern financial support for local authorities. I hope that that explanation has enlightened the noble Lord. I am not quite sure that it has enlightened me, but I will read it later and see whether I really understand it myself. I have detained your Lordships for rather a long time. I have attempted to answer nearly all the questions raised in the debate. I hope I

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have done so to your Lordships' satisfaction.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.