HL Deb 09 May 1967 vol 282 cc1388-418

6.26 p.m.

LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE rose to draw attention to the urgent need for Government decision on the development of new British civil aircraft; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I regret very much having to detain some of your Lordships at this late hour—

LORD FERRIER

No, no.

LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE

—but as you know it was not of my seeking or making. Nevertheless, in spite of the hour I feel it necessary to pursue this debate, which raises a matter of vital national importance, whether we be in the Common Market or whether we be outside it. My problem is to try to put briefly and in fairly simple language various rather complicated questions.

It is accepted that it is essential for British civil aviation to be world-competitive, if world-competitive means having the right operational equipment at the right time; and to achieve this demands Government decisions which are well overdue. It is no easy task for anyone concerned, Government or otherwise, to forecast our needs during the 'seventies. Indeed, forecasting up to 1980 requires a mixture of deduction and crystal-gazing. The deduction involves consideration of what can be safely expected from development of the present type of aircraft. The crystal-gazing embraces guessing at results of new developments which are still in their early stages, and also guessing at the world conditions which may exist in the 'seventies and which have their impact on tourism, travel habits and the money which can be expended by the travelling public.

Britain's pattern of civil aviation divides broadly into three sections. There is the long haul, straddling the world; there is the medium haul over Europe; and there is the short haul, which comprises the short journeys to Europe, and our domestic requirements for aircraft. It is on the medium and short haul that I should like to speak briefly to-night, in relation to which decisions are both urgent and overdue. The long haul of British Overseas Airways I leave out of my remarks, because they have a fine fleet, their future is already decided, and is largely tied up in the success of the Concord. On the medium and short haul a vital national interest is in jeopardy, and every week's delay in decision is time lost for Britain and given to our competitors. I should like to interpose here words which I think will convince your Lordships of the importance of short and medium hauls. Last year that system carried 7 million passengers. It had a revenue of £100 million, of which £30 million was earned overseas.

May I give a brief summary of the essential needs for the short and medium haul if we are to remain competitive and are not to be outmoded and short of capacity in the early 'seventies, when the existing types of aircraft—Vanguards, Comets, Viscounts—are all phased out. The short-haul requirement for British European Airways, and for private enterprise firms as well, has been broadly met by a new edition of a 100-seater aircraft called the BAC 1–11, and 18 have been ordered for £32 million, with an option on a further six. So I think we can say that the short haul is looked after.

It is for the medium haul, the vital European medium haul, that the need remains unsatisfied. That need is, broadly speaking, for a 180–200 seater aircraft by 1970–71. Thirty will be needed by B.E.A., worth about £120 million, as a starting order, so your Lordships will see that it is no small order that we are discussing. Looking at the way the medium-haul need for 1970–71 onwards is to be satisfied, one looks at once at the Government's dilemma. There is a project for what is known as the air bus—the Anglo-French-German aircraft—a 300-seater, but it would not be in operation before 1975. I believe that there was a meeting on the Continent to-day about that.

The point I should like to drive home, and I trust that the Government will not counter it, is that while B.E.A. are not averse to that air bus it does not fulfil the requirement between 1970 and 1980 for a 180–200 seater. Also, as I say, it will not be in operation until 1975, when I believe the demand for that aircraft may be very small. A distinguished economist named Mr. Wheatcroft recently carried out on behalf of Rolls Royce a survey of likely needs of aircraft in the 'seventies. His conclusion was that only a very limited number of aircraft seating more than 200 people would be required in Europe for a great many years. I believe that B.E.A. would require about six of those, for a quite different role from that of the medium haul aircraft. Therefore, we must agree that the air bus will not satisfy the need for the 1970s.

At once one asks: how can that need be satisfied? There is a British aircraft, designed by the British Aircraft Corporation, called the 2–11. It is a 200-seater, which is just right; and it is about 4 per cent. cheaper to operate than its American counterpart, which is obviously an advantage. It is as silent as the Vanguard, which is about the only type that can operate without a noise limitation. So here is a tremendous new development in this aircraft, one that must appeal to everyone in this country and must appeal to the world's markets—the silent aircraft of the future. That aircraft should command a world market. If the Government would give a decision now it could be in operation by 1971. The cost of development is, I believe, about £100 million—£50 million for the engines, £50 million for the airframe.

I understand that the Government say that there are not the national resources available for the development of the air bus, which I admit has a political aspect, as well as for the 2–11. I think that is the measure of the Government's dilemma. If the Government can say to-night that they have the resources both for the air bus, to which they seem rather wedded, and for the development of this splendid BAC 2–11, then I can sit down happy and most of your Lordships need not take part in this debate, because the problem will have been solved. But I understand that this is not so. The Government say that there are not the resources available for both, so they are faced with the need to look at alternative courses.

It seems to me that there are three alternative courses, assuming that there are resources available only for either the air bus or the BAC 1–11. The first is to withdraw from the air bus project, and give the priority of resources to the development of the 2–11. That would be a politically difficult decision for the Government to make. I am no great believer in the air bus as a substitute for the 2–11; in fact, it would not do. To fly an air bus of 300 or 400 people, say, to Paris is going to reduce the frequencies which the public can enjoy. With aircraft carrying up to 200 people there can be a better frequency than if there are one or two aircraft each carrying 400 people.

I shall not develop the question of safety. I am a little fearful, with the art in its present state, of putting 400 people in one aircraft. Many years ago I started to learn to fly, and I learned a very healthy respect for the law of gravity—a respect which has not diminished at all through many years of experience. I think that if God had meant us to fly he would have given us wings. We are all the time having to overcome gravity, and none of us who leaves the ground either as a pilot or a passenger, need ever forget that fact.

The second alternative would be to fill the gap by allowing British European Airways to buy an American aircraft, the Boeing 727, for delivery in about eighteen months. That would mean reversing the Government's present direction to British European Airways that they must buy British. The third course would be to force British European Airways, by the issue of a direction, to buy British aircraft which are not best economically for the Corporation—an enlarged Trident or a rebuilt VC 10; and even for those many millions of pounds would have to be spent on development costs. My real objection to that is that the Government would at once be called upon to fulfil the undertaking which they have given, to make good, by some form of subsidy to B.E.A., any penalty which the Government forced upon them by insisting on their having unsuitable aircraft. It would be a deplorable step to force B.E.A., after many years of successful economic operation, to become a customer of the begging, bowl. That is the worst alternative.

In considering these alternatives I would draw the Minister's attention to the £100 million which is reported to be the development cost of the 2–11. I think it is unfair in an argument to load all that cost upon an initial order. It could be spread widely, on the assumption that there are going to be other orders beyond that of B.E.A. I remember so well (at that time I was a member of the Board of B.E.A.) when the Trident was being developed, and there was great reluctance on the part of Rolls Royce to develop the Spey engine. Terms were agreed between the Government, the Corporation and Rolls. That engine was developed and is now a world winner. The demand is tremendous and cannot be satisfied. Who is to say that the new engines and the new airframe of the 2–11 would not equally be world winners? Therefore, I do not think one should turn down the 2–11 simply because the whole of the £100 million is loaded on the first order.

I put in order of preference the various alternatives to fill this need which I trust I have made clear to your Lordships. My first choice would be to have both the 2–11 and the air bus, if the resources can be stretched. If they cannot, my second preference would be the 2–11 and no air bus. My third alternative would be the American 727 to fill the gap, and the air bus. My last alternative—and the worst of all of them—would be to force B.E.A. to buy uneconomic British aircraft and also have the air bus.

These alternatives must have been under active consideration (that terrible Whitehall phrase!) for a very long time—too long, I am afraid. The decision is a pressing one. It is urgent, and it is overdue. Three Departments of Her Majesty's Government are concerned: the Treasury, the Board of Trade and the Ministry of Technology. It is open talk among those who know anything of the air world that there are differences between the Departments within the Government as to whether the 2–11 or the air bus should be developed. When the new structure for the Ministry of Technology was debated in your Lordships' House, some of us, including myself, saw dangers in the divided responsibility between the Board of Trade, responsible for aircraft operation, and the Ministry of Technology, responsible for selecting the type. We foresaw this dichotomy of responsibility; and I am afraid that, through this indecision, we are to-day seeing the results of that divided responsibility.

I hope the Minister will say that I am wrong and will be able to speak tonight with a voice representing the collective Government view. I hope to hear tonight whether the Government quarrel in any serious way with my picture, which I have tried to paint fairly, and with the alternatives I have put before your Lordships. I hope to hear that a decision has been reached, or that the Government are on the brink of a decision—because I repeat, in conclusion, that every week counts. So serious is the need for a decision that, speaking for myself, even if it were the wrong decision I should prefer it to be taken rather than for there to be no decision at all. I beg to move for Papers.

6.43 p.m.

EARL JELLICOE

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for initiating this debate, for the typically pungent and informed way in which he has put his case and for his pugnacity in pursuing his Motion after our long discussion on the Common Market. I should myself welcome a wide-ranging debate on the aviation industry and on civil aviation. There is much that needs our examination. There is the new Whitehall set-up for aviation, to which my noble friend referred. How is it in fact creaking along? There is our airport policy. Have we a national airport policy? There is our whole approach to co-operation in these matters with. Europe.

On that point I should like to say two things. I personally believe in this collaboration. If that technological community which the Prime Minister has recently discovered is to be really meaningful, it should extend to all the advanced forms of technology—computers, atomic energy and so on, and most emphatically, of course, to aerospace. This is widely accepted. But to preach collaboration is one thing; actually to achieve it and to make a commercial success of it—and this is the rub, especially with civil aircraft—is another thing. This whole area is one to which a great deal of careful and critical thought might well be given—more, I suspect, than has yet been given. On another occasion I should like to give your Lordships my layman's views on it. However, my noble friend has deliberately drawn the area of discussion this evening fairly tight, and I shall follow him in confining almost all of my remarks to the two projects to which he has particularly addressed himself, the BAC. 2–11 and the air bus.

Before turning to them I should like to put a couple of brief questions to the noble Lord who will be replying, one on a national project and one on an international project. Can the noble Lord, when he replies, give us a progress report, however brief, on Handley Page's admirable Jetstream? In particular, can he confirm the report which I noticed in the Daily Telegraph to-day that the United States Air Force may be on the point of placing a very important order for this aircraft?

Can the noble Lord also answer three specific questions which I should like to put to him about the long-haul aircraft (if my noble friend Lord Salisbury will forgive me for that phrase), the Concord? I gather that this great and greatly expensive project is going well, but on three matters I have some disquiet. In the first place—and this is very much a case of the pot calling the kettle black—there is, I have heard, a degree of weight escalation with the Concord. How significant is this, and how are the firms coping with the weight reduction programme on the prototypes? Secondly, there is the question of sonic boom. If the Concord were not allowed to operate supersonically over land, we know that its market would be almost halved. Very important commercial consequences would flow from that. But the Government, by their own admission, are still very much in the dark on this very vital issue. The Minister of State said in another place a month or so ago: …it will be necessary to have a more complete evaluation, particularly by tests conducted over cities."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, 3/2/67, col. 1017.] He added: …this problem of sonic boom is one about which decisions will soon have to be reached."—[Col. 1020.] "Soon", he said. That was in early February. What is now the position, three months later, in early May, on this particular problem?

Finally, what about the actual production of the aircraft? The noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, was blandly reassuring about this when we quizzed him on the Concord on February 20 last in answer to an Unstarred Question by my noble friend Lord Kinnoull. But in the British Aircraft Corporation Newsletter, which came out at almost the same time, the chairman of B.O.A.C., Sir Giles Guthrie, was reported as expressing anxiety over the lack of Government decisions on production. Within the past two weeks"— these are Sir Giles Guthrie's words— I have advised the Government that production of the Concord"— and by that he explained that he meant the actual production models and not the prototypes— should start". My question to the noble Lord simply is: has it? This is given some extra point by the American President's decision to proceed with the American SST.

My noble friend has made a very strong case indeed for the BAC. 2–11, to which I should now like to turn. As he has said, B.E.A. are keen to buy it, and the views of B.E.A.—one of our great industries, and one of our great earners of foreign currency, as my noble friend has explained—should command the Government's careful respect and attention. They have costed the project extremely carefully, and although I gather that they do not entirely accept the makers' full claims, they are confident that it will be substantially cheaper to operate—some 4 per cent. per seat mile, I believe—than its nearest competitor, the Boeing 720–200 series. Apart from this, as my noble friend has said, the Rolls Royce engine with which it would be armed would be extremely quiet. According to their calculations the other possible British types would be much more expensive to operate. This, of course, would entail substantial operating subsidies.

The Minister in another place has accepted that B.E.A. requires interim aircraft. He apparently regards the BAC. 2–11 as an interim aircraft. I would only suggest that he is wrong here, and I think I should carry my noble friend with me in that. Both B.E.A. and other European operators are going to require aircraft of this type for a very long time to come. air bus or no. It would, in fact, be complementary to the air bus and fill a definite requirement from the early 1970s right into the 1980s. In any event, as my noble friend has said, B.E.A. have stated their requirements very clearly.

The Government are naturally worried about the considerable research and development cost involved here. I hope the noble Lord can expand on these points when he comes to reply. My noble friend has pointed out that it is unfair—or might well be thought unfair—to load all the research and development on to this particular aircraft. He has alluded to its export potential. In another place the Minister of State poured very cold water on the export possibilities of this aircraft. Our study—that is, of the export potential—he said does not yet give us any great cause for enthusiasm". May I put these questions to the noble Lord who will be replying? What does that little word "yet" mean? Does it mean that the Government are still studying an export market for this aircraft? If so, how far have they taken this study? How can they explain this pessimism if B.E.A. have done their sums right and this aircraft will, in fact, be substantially more economical to operate that any of its rivals? Would the noble Lord not agree that in aviation it is not always the early bird that scoops the pool? Time and time again the great American aircraft manufacturers have stood back and let others, often ourselves, do the pioneering work with new aircraft concepts and then have stepped in and creamed off the market. I should be very grateful if the noble Lord who is to reply would deal with those points.

But, my Lords, in probing the Government intentions on the BAC. 2–11 I am not arguing that we should jettison the project for the European air bus, the "Eurobus" as it is now termed across the Channel. I believe that an aircraft of this sort in the 300-seater range—give or take a dozen more or less—is bound to come. The major European airlines, including B.E.A., have all stated a definite requirement for it—a requirement, I think, in rather larger numbers possibly than my noble friend has suggested. I personally believe that it will be required, just as the 200-seater will be required. The two types, in my view, are complementary and not mutually exclusive. We can be sure of one thing: whether or not we in Europe, or in England, build this air- craft, the Americans (and possibly the Russians) will certainly build one. Lock-heeds already have a project; and the great new combine of McDonnell and Douglas are studying this actively. If we are going to make a success of it we should take the plunge very soon.

It is not very easy, my Lords, to discuss this project sensibly when, at this very moment possibly, the Ministers concerned, French, British and German, are discussing it across the Channel. But I believe it is a project of great promise. The requirement is clearly there; it is well within the technical capabilities of the European aviation industry and it offers the possibility of a partnership in the development of a major civil aircraft not merely on the Anglo-French plane but also on the wider basis of Anglo- French-German partnership. It is not unimportant to bring the Germans in here. I trust, therefore, that, subject to three conditions, we shall learn to-day or tomorrow that the Governments concerned have taken a firm decision to proceed with the air bus.

But the conditions in my view are crucial. The first is the recognition of the need for speed. I believe that if the three Governments act quickly it could come into operation before 1975, the date given by my noble friend. The second requirement is that the Governments should be able to deliver the goods; namely, the market. It would be absurd if they embarked on the great investment needed to develop this aircraft only to find at the end of the day that their national airlines preferred the American product. What assurance can the noble Lord give us that at least the national airlines of the potential consortium, Lufthansa, Air France, Air Inter, and B.E.A. will take the air bus if the Governments decide to develop it? Finally there is the power plant. The choice is between the American engine, the Pratt and Whitney, and the Rolls Royce engine, the RB 207. Some of the potential operators would have a preference for the American engine because the same engine is already going into the Boeing 747s that they are buying. That is understandable. Equally so, in my view, is the British Government's reported insistence on the acceptance of the Rolls Royce engine. After all, this air bus would hardly deserve the title of "Eurobus" if it had American engines. All in all, my personal view is that we should continue to insist on the Rolls Royce engine for this aircraft if it is built—that is, unless the smaller version of the Rolls Royce engine goes in the BAC 2–11 and there is neither the capacity nor the financial resources to develop both.

My Lords, those are my summarised views. I will not detain your Lordships because we have had rather a long day already; but I should like to mention two further aspects of the BAC. 2–11 complex of problems, which appear to me to have weight. In the first place, they highlight one of the difficulties which exist at the moment, the imbalance in Europe on the air engine side. On the one hand, we have in Rolls Royce and Bristol Siddeley a huge capacity; on the other hand, we have an advanced air engine industry in France, but a small one by comparison with that here. This means that for any major project there are always overwhelming claims for putting British engines into the aircraft. That, in turn, means that there is a strong—and natural—pressure from the other side of the Channel that the French should take the lead in the airframe. This is a difficult problem because, unless we are very careful, it could soon lead us to a position in which our airframe manufacturers are taking second place, are merely becoming sub-contractors.

On the airframe side, the French take the lead already in the Jaguar; they may take the lead in the Anglo-French variable geometry aircraft; and they could take the lead in the air bus if the Rolls Royce engine goes into it, as I hope it will. This is a serious problem. I do not pretend to know the answer to it. I have ideas; but this is not the time for them. I hope that the Government are fully seized of the situation which could be developing as a result of what in itself is a very fortunate thing, the international strength of the British air engine industry.

The second matter to which I would briefly allude is the political importance of these decisions. Like my noble friend, I hope that the Government can tell us that they are, at least, sympathetic with the development of both of these important projects. I hope they will give careful weight to what my noble friend has said about the 2–11. Equally so, I hope they will be fully aware of the damage which would be done to nascent European co-operation in aviation matters if we were, at this rather late stage of the game, to back out of the air bus project. I do not view this in political terms alone. I believe that technologically a lot is at stake in Europe.

Be that as it may, my Lords, I should like, in my final words, to endorse what has been said by my noble friend: that whatever decision the Government reach on the BAC. 2–11, they owe B.E.A. an early decision. B.E.A. cannot be kept hanging round any longer for a decision in this crucial era. I would remind your Lordships that only ten weeks ago, on February 20, the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, confirmed that the Government had taken a firm decision that B.E.A. should adopt British aircraft rather than American. I was not surprised to hear this, as it was entirely in line with what the Government said last summer. But only a month later, Mr. Stonehouse told another place that the Boeing 727 offered one of the possibilities by which the B.E.A.'s requirements could be met. I suppose that with this Government one should not be unduly surprised if the firm decisions of February melt sometimes, like snow, by the Ides of March. But what we deserve to know now, in May, is what firm decision the Government have taken or are proposing to take, on this matter. Can the noble Lord tell us? I shall await his reply with much interest.

7.2 p.m.

EARL AMHERST

My Lords, I should like to join the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, in his praise for the way in which the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, initiated this debate—a debate, if I may say so, which has come none too soon. Before I go on, I think that it would be proper for me to tell the House that as I have now left the services of the British European Airways Corporation I do not appear as a spokesman for either of the Corporations, or, indeed, for any other air company, and that I have no interest to disclose.

Like the noble Lord who opened the debate, I propose to confine my remarks to the short-haul, and if my remarks duplicate or perhaps amplify some of the things already said, I must offer my apologies. But I hope to be able to approach the matter in a slightly different way. It may be useful to consider what are the markets for the British manufacturer of short-haul aircraft. In the first instance, I think it must be the operators in the United Kingdom and, depending on the quality of the end product, delivery dates and general experience of the U.K. operators, sales to the rest of Europe and to the short-haul operators in the rest of the world should follow. It might, however, be useful and wise to enter a caveat not to count too much on the U.S.A., Canada and South America as markets, as with the exception of the very fine sales record for those excellent aircraft, the Vickers Viscount and the BAC. 1–11, these countries have for many years bought mostly American, and have similarly tooled and equipped themselves for repairs and maintenance. Therefore, unless the British manufacturer comes up with something really startling, they are unlikely to change their tune.

In any case, I think that everywhere, including the United Kingdom, British industry will have to face continuous and fierce foreign competition, notably American. If the British manufacturer is to keep his end up, he will have to see to it that he can, and does, exercise intense, energetic and effective sales effort. We might perhaps look at our immediate customers. Catering as it does for the large majority of regular scheduled services in the United Kingdom and in Europe, I think it is correct to say that B.E.A. is the largest British customer for short-haul aircraft. That is not to say that the independent companies do not also provide a considerable demand. They do, but B.E.A. is the biggest customer. Their combined experience with a new type of aircraft could have a telling effect on the sales in the rest of the world.

According to my information, the present position is as follows. The Vickers Viscount, which remains a first-class aircraft, has largely been replaced with the BAC. 1–11. Aircraft which will require replacement in the immediate future are the Vanguards and the Comet IVs. What I mean by "the immediate future" is around the 1970s. By that time, the delivery of the BAC. 1–11 500 series should have been completed, thereby enabling B.E.A. to replace a large number of its Vanguard fleet for passenger-carrying work.

The reason why Vanguards need to be replaced is mainly because they belong to the turbo-prop type of aircraft which, in the international field, and indeed on some of the internal U.K. routes, is becoming more and more non-competitive, largely for the reason that the travelling public is tending increasingly to regard propellers as old-fashioned and not "with it". They demand full jets. The status symbol, whatever that is, may have something to do with it. This is not to say that the Vanguards will entirely disappear from the scene by the 1970s, because they will probably be used for freighting. But they will certainly not be carrying the number of passengers that they are carrying to-day.

My Lords, the reason for the replacement of the Comet IV is that by 1970 the capacity of that aircraft will not be sufficient to cater for the increase in demand which it is now estimated will be the order of the day. They could be serious losers, even on the high density routes. It should be remembered that, splendid aircraft though they are, the Comets have never been cheap to operate.

What are the offers? The choice of equipment in the short-haul category seems to be the VC 10, modified for short-haul operations; the Trident 3; the Boeing 727–200; the BAC. 2–11, and the air bus. The VC 10, even if modified, is said to be hopelessly expensive to operate over short-haul routes, and on this count alone would seem to be ruled out of court. It must be remembered that this aircraft was originally designed and built for long-haul and, as your Lordships know, machinery seldom works well if it is changed about to meet a demand for which it was not designed. The Trident 3, while considerably less expensive to operate than the VC 10, is estimated as being likely to be a very high cost aeroplane.

The seat-mile cost of the Boeing 727–200 series, with a slightly larger capacity, is said to be about 5 per cent. lower than the Trident 3. But this is an American aircraft, and I should think there is considerable doubt that the British Treasury would countenance the expenditure of dollars necessary to buy it, quite apart from the political rumpus which would surely erupt if the British State Corporations were allowed to go further "American" than they have already done. So it seems that the Boeing is a non-starter.

The seat-mile cost of the BAC. 2–11 is reported to be likely to be at least 10 per cent. lower than the Trident 3 and about 5 per cent. lower than the Boeing. The planned capacity of about 190 seats is said to be just about right for the early 1970s. As the noble Lord has already said, I am told that the BAC. 2–11 is expected to be an exceptionally quiet aircraft, possibly the quietest yet, an aspect which could well make it an attractive proposition as the question of aircraft noise becomes more and more acute.

Last on my list comes the air bus, which I believe is to be the result of a tripartite effort involving the British, the French and the Germans. Not a great deal seems to be known about the project yet, other than that it is said to have a capacity of some 300 seats, which I am told is considered far too big for commercial successful operations on short-haul in Europe, even up to the late 1970s. Whether this aircraft is to be powered by the new Rolls Royce engine RB 207, for which I believe there is a tremendous sales potential, has still to be resolved, as indeed, according to a recent newspaper report, is the division of the development cost as between the partners. Unless these questions—and there may be others—are reasonably quickly resolved, the delivery dates may go back and back, even beyond the 'seventies. According to present estimates, it looks as if the development cost will come out something like this: the Trident 3, £15 million; the BAC. 2–11, £50 million for the airframe and £50 million for the engines—a total of £100 million. The British share in the development of the air bus is so far said to be probably around £100 million. The full cost will be very much more.

To sum up, the choice seems to narrow down to the BAC. 2–11 or the air bus. My information points to the BAC. 2–11 as best filling the Bill. If the Government would allow B.E.A. to place an order for this aircraft now, I am told that it could be ready for delivery in the early 'seventies. The air bus seems at the moment to be a project for which a number of important questions remain to be resolved, not the least of which is how it is to be powered, delivery dates, final capacity and the split-up of the production cost between the partners.

I should like therefore to ask the noble Lord who is to reply four questions, of which I have given him prior notice. They are: first, are B.E.A. and/or such independent companies as may wish to do so, to be given governmental permission to place an order now for the BAC. 2–11 or must they accept the air bus and wait its production? Secondly, should B.E.A. and others be permitted to place an order now for the BAC. 2–11, will the Treasury accept making payment for the development costs without delay, so that the delivery in the early 'seventies will not be held up? Thirdly, does the decision rest on Common Market politics or on the reasoning of commercial airline operation? Fourthly, if the decision favours the air bus and so results in the exclusion of the production of BAC. 2–11 will the British share of the production fully take up the British manufacturing effort, including staffs and personnel, which would otherwise have been occupied in the production of BAC. 2–11?

7.14 p.m.

LORD OGMORE

My Lords, perhaps your Lordships will excuse my intervening at this late hour. It had been my intention to put my name down earlier but, owing to the way in which the debate has been going backwards and forwards with great velocity, I was not sure whether I should be able to be present. I should like to say a few words in support of the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye. First, I should like to thank him, on behalf of my noble friends and myself, for putting down this Motion. I would also congratulate my noble friend Lord Amherst on his speech. I am glad that he is now able to speak in your Lordships' House, because he has a vast experience of aviation over many years. Not only that: he has something which is not always joined with that, an up-to-date experience. He has been able to give us the benefit of that to-night. His analysis of the problem, by taking all the aircraft, then winnowing them out, was impressive.

The trouble is that aircraft manufacturers have a very limited number of customers. I do not think that there is any other industry which has so few. In the old days horse-breeders did not depend on the cavalry; firms who made railway engines did not depend on the engineering department of the War Office; the motor car manufacturers did not depend on orders for armoured fighting vehicles. But, because the size of fleets are so small, the aircraft manufacturers have to depend largely either on the military requirements of this country or on Government subsidy. I suppose that B.E.A. has only some 70 aircraft. When I went into this a few years ago, I found that the total number of civil aircraft in the world is about 2,000, and I notice that the estimate of need by I.A.T.A. for long-haul supersonic airliners is between 200 and 350.

We have to remember that aircraft firms are extremely important to the economy of the country and cannot be regarded like the manufacturers of other products. As military requirements are getting less and less, it means that the aircraft firms are more and more dependent on Government subsidy. The noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, has limited the debate to B.E.A.'s need for medium-haul and short-haul aircraft, but I hope, with the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, that at some time we may have a wider debate, because there are a number of important questions that I should like to put to the Government in the hope of getting answers.

One of the difficulties that the noble Lord and I foresaw when the Ministry of Aviation was destroyed or put into liquidation, is that there is no Ministry solely concerned with aviation, particularly with civil aviation. There are two Ministries concerned, both of which have a large number of other pressing problems upon their desks. I feel that it was a great mistake to do away with the Ministry of Civil Aviation. We are seeing some of the results of that decision and we shall see more as time goes on. One problem that is now being wrangled over by the Ministries concerned is where the third Airport for London should go, whether at Stansted, in the middle of Essex, or at some other place in the South-East of England. I will not advocate any particular place, because I shall be held to be a supporter of a certain site. But this is the sort of decision which should be taken immediately.

This is a question between the BAC. 2–11 and the 300-seater air bus. Like the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, I cannot see these as competitors, as alternatives. I think that we must go for the aircraft that B.E.A. want. If we were a board of directors, sitting around the table, and not wrangling Government Departments, I am perfectly certain that having heard what we have heard to-night we should say that we would go for the BAC. 2–11. It is British, and it is going to be a first-class machine, by a tried maker, B.A.C., with a first-class engine from Rolls Royce, the best engine makers in the world. It is the size B.E.A. want—a 180-seater. It can come into operation at the time they want. There does not seem to me to be any argument. If, for the sake of General de Gaulle and the Germans, we build a big air bus carrying 300 or more, we shall produce an aircraft that no airline either wants or will ever use—one, by the way, that has hardly got off the drawing board. If it is necessary for our friendship with Europe, well and good. But it is not something that we should impose on B.E.A. They are a commercial undertaking; they have to carry passengers and make a profit. They want an aircraft which can meet their needs.

We have seen these monsters before. There was the Brabazon, which was an enormous machine. That was too big for the time. Other smaller machines caught up with it and passed it. The Brabazon cost, I think, £12 million, which was a lot of money in those days, and, so far as I am aware, it never carried a passenger. There were the Princess aircraft on the Solent. I see that they are now being scrapped. How many millions they cost, I do not know. But they were to carry 200 or 300 people. I went in one of them, and it was like going into a cathedral. They never flew with passengers. I would not mind betting that this will happen with the air bus. It will be found that it is another aerial white elephant like the huge aircraft of the past.

There seems to be something in Government Departments: every now and again somebody gets a rush of blood to the head and decides that we must have these monsters. I think that their mothers must have been frightened by a whale at some time. As a matter of fact, what is wanted is an aircraft not much bigger than those in service now.

Then there are other problems. Have the present divided Ministry and the officials contemplated the effect of trying to land 300 seaters at London Airport or —

LORD FERRIER

Turnhouse.

LORD OGMORE

Well. they would not get into Turnhouse; they would have to come in backwards. It is difficult to get into Turnhouse at all. But what about Manchester and these other places? Have these problems been contemplated? If so, what arrangements are being made about them?

I entirely agree that this is a decision that must he taken here and now. But I do not give the latitude so generously given by the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, and the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye. I would urge the Government to go for the BAC. 2–11 and treat the air bus, as I am sure it will be, as a big mirage and not as a practical flying aircraft.

7.22 p.m.

THE EARL OF KINNOULL

My Lords, when I saw my noble friend's Motion on the Order Paper I hoped very much that it had been framed primarily to discuss the urgent problem facing the Government over their policy for short-haul aircraft projects. I am glad that my hopes have been more than fulfilled. I should like to confine my few remarks, as other noble Lords have done, to the two British projects in this field; namely, the European air bus and the BAC. 2–11.

What worries me about the Government's immediate policy of the short-haul aircraft is that certain fundamental assessments and conclusions which are normally common ground between Government, manufacturer and operator appear at present to be very much in dispute. May I start with the assessment of future passenger traffic requirements? It is, I think, agreed by all parties that in Europe air passenger traffic is rising on average 12 per cent. a year, and in America something like 20 per cent. a year. To cater for this increase, it is also agreed that the present aircraft in service, which are designed to carry between 90 and 135 people, will hardly be adequate to cope with the increasing volume of traffic within the next five years, and certainly not within ten years. It is on this point that the Government and their advisers, on the one hand, and the manufacturers and airline operators and their advisers, on the other, appear to disagree.

Here perhaps I should make it perfectly clear that it seems to be not only B.E.A. who differ from the Government, but also the other airlines, both in Europe and in America. The Government claim, as we have heard, that within the next six to seven years the prime need for the world market will be the 250 to 300 seater aircraft, and that the 180 seater, although required possibly between now and say 1973, will command only a limited stopgap demand during this interim period until the larger aircraft come into service.

The Minister responsible, as my noble friend Lord Jellicoe has already pointed out, has gone on record as saying in another place on March 21 that the 250 to 300 seater European air bus, if it receives the go ahead, will have a committed market of 100 aircraft before the project even begins production, a potential European market of 300 aircraft, and a potential world market of between 800 and 1,000 aircraft. I understand that both BAC., who cover a world-wide requirement, and B.E.A. have formed a very different view. They have formed the view, as I understand it, from two independent studies, that the prime demand over the next ten to fifteen years will be for the 180 seater, with a world market potential of between 1,500 and 2,000 aircraft, and that the 250 to 300 seater, although important, will not be required in anything like the large numbers suggested. Their argument, as I understand it, is simply that the 300 seater air bus will be needed for peak periods of the day, but that for the remaining 80 per cent. of the time the 180 seater will be quite large enough to provide a fast and frequent service: and it is the fast and frequent services that the airline operators consider so important.

It is my information—and I may say it is only a whisper—that the independent study reports on the European air bus—and I particularly have in mind the Wheatcroft study—have shown a very disturbing picture of the potential market of the European air bus. These studies say that the air bus is already two to three years behind the American version, and that when produced it will be more expensive. Due to this, it seems to have little hope of competing in America with the American versions; and in Europe its immediate potential is something in the region of a mere 30 aircraft.

As this figure seems in such variance to the Government's statements, perhaps the noble Lord when he comes to reply will advise the House what the Wheat-croft report and the BAC. report have actually said on the potential air bus market. And would the noble Lord also give us, at the same time, the Government breakdown figures about the 100 air buses that they have claimed will be already committed should the project proceed? I presume that this figure is based on orders being placed jointly by B.E.A., Air France and Lufthansa.

If one accepts the argument that there will be a need for the 300 seater air bus, and an even greater need for the 180 seater aircraft, one sees at once, despite the Government's view, an immensely exciting opportunity available for the all-British BAC. 2–11 project. It has the chance, if developed, of grabbing a slice of the world market which, as I have said already, has been forecast at between 1,500 and 2,000 aircraft. This BAC. 2–11, although still admittedly only in its specification stage, has, I believe, an immense advantage over other new aircraft. It comes from the same stable as its very successful elder brother, the 1–11. As the House will know, the 1–11 is an outstanding aircraft, and it is the only British aircraft since the Viscount to have broken into the tough American market, where the "buy American" policy operates so rigidly. The 1–11, I am told, has a present sale figure in the United States alone amounting to 64 aircraft, at a figure of 73 million dollars. Its present export sales throughout the world total 129 aircraft, and it is with 16 overseas airline companies. Performance is superb and (I think this is an interesting point), it seems that the foreign airline companies themselves are urging the development of the 2–11.

Why do they do this? For the very simple reason that its only rival at the present time in the 180-seater range appears to be the Boeing 727. Admittedly, this aircraft is already flying, and has a three to four year advantage over the BAC. 2–11. But it has a number of serious economic drawbacks. It has been criticised for being very noisy—a most important factor to-day. It has been criticised for a poor safety record, and a bad airfield performance, and poor economics; and, perhaps most important of all, it seats only 155 passengers and has come to the limit of its development.

Weighing up both the Boeing and the 2–11, it is my belief that if the Government announced the development of the BAC. 2–11 to-morrow, option orders for it would immediately be placed by a considerable number of overseas companies. In view of such potential, one is forced to ask the Government whether the British aircraft industry would be making the best use of its existing resources if they ignored this development. There is, after all, a possibility, at a conservative figure, of over £1,000 million-worth of exports in this project. One is forced again to ask the Government what will be left for the key B.A.C. design team if this project is scrapped. Will this be yet another example of accelerating the brain-drain to America? Yet another question comes to mind. What will happen to the employees of B.A.C., the 12,000 men who could so profitably he employed in this project? Will they become gradually redundant?

Having said that, and described the immense potential of the 2–11, one finds, I have noticed, on further research, that its future in fact rests not so much with a Government development contract for the airframe, but almost entirely on a decision by Rolls Royce. They hold the key to whether the project ever gets off the ground at all, because the 2–11 requires the development of the new technology engine, known as the RB. 2–11; and no existing engine, I am told on good authority, would meet its requirements. But Rolls Royce have said—and I do not think there is any dispute about this—that they have only the resources to develop one engine at a time, and if they concentrate on the 2–11 engine they will be unable to develop and tender for the larger 50,000 lb. engine known as the RB. 207, required for the European air bus. This dilemma is increased, of course, because at this time Rolls Royce are no doubt keeping their eye not only on the 2–11 project and the European air bus project, but also on winning a contract against Pratt & Whitney for the American air bus.

But the plot appears to thicken here, because the Pratt & Whitney Company, who are already supplying the JT 9D engine, as I understand it, for the "Jumbo-jets", are saying that both the American air bus and the European air bus should fit the same engine and so rationalise their future maintenance. Perhaps the noble Lord could tell us whether this American engine is seriously being considered by our European partners for the air bus. The answer, of course, to suit all projects would be for Rolls Royce to persuade both the American and the European air bus projects in their specifications to accept the smaller engine, the 30,000 lb. engine, which would also suit the BAC. 2–11. If this could he agreed it would not only have the advantage of rationalisation of the European air bus and the 2–11 but would bring Rolls Royce, I suggest, immense gain.

I believe that there is yet another possibility, and that is for the Lockheed air bus to accept three of the smaller engines. If this should happen, the European air bus specification may still insist that the larger engine should be fitted. If this were the case, where would Rolls Royce's loyalty lie? Would the Government be prepared to participate in an air bus if the British engine was not fitted? Perhaps the noble Lord could comment on this point later. The Rolls Royce dilemma is, I believe, very great. At best they have within their grasp a contract for all three projects—the American and the European air bus and the 2–11; at worst, they may win only the contract for the European air bus, with their bigger engine. If this should be the case, I believe that for the price of a ticket into the Common Market this would be a great tragedy for the British aircraft industry and a disastrous omen for its future.

7.34 p.m.

LORD FERRIER

My Lords, because of a word used by the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, I am tempted to intervene briefly in this debate. The word is "frequency". This was touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, in his references to these large aircraft. I wish to speak particularly about the needs of the internal air services in this country. The Concord, for instance, is of little interest indeed to me, as it is of little interest to the average man. What about the potential for intermediate internal airports in this country—airports like Carlisle Airport, and airports like those in the West country? What about the services for outlying airfields in Scotland, especially the Islands? What is being done about the (for want of a better word) Dakota replacement?

To anyone who has used Australian air services, to anyone who is conscious of the short-haul potential in this country, to anyone who knows Scotland's needs, no matter how adverse airfield conditions may be the factors of diversity, frequency and reliability are important. Plenty of people—and I refer to what Lord Amherst said—would much rather see a propeller driven aircraft than no aircraft at all. It is important, to my mind, that for the needs of the country in this lowlier role, a really economical, reliable "workhorse" should not be overlooked.

7.36 p.m.

THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS (LORD BESWICK)

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, made a stimulating speech, and we have had a useful discussion on the points he has raised. The noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, and other noble Lords who followed him, asked a considerable number of questions in what I might call medium-haul speeches. Frankly, I cannot attempt at this late hour to answer all the questions put to me, but if there are any other items of information I can give, possibly I may be allowed to write to the noble Lords concerned.

All speakers have emphasised that urgency is the essential factor behind the need to take decisions on Britain's next family of new aircraft. Of course, it is always easier to demand bold decisions when one has no executive responsibility, and when one is not spending one's own money. Nevertheless, I agree that the sooner we can see the way forward to the new, bigger medium-haul aircraft, the better it will be both for our operators and for the aircraft industry. Since it is B.E.A.'s re-equipment problem that has been highlighted particularly, may I set down for the Record the general background, as I see it. Until June, 1966, B.E.A. of its own accord had always preferred to buy and fly British. The famous partnership of B.E.A. and Vickers, with the great personalities of Sholto Douglas and George Edwards dominating the scene, and based on the remarkable Viscount series of aircraft, must go down as one of the most successful and profitable periods in our aviation experience.

However, last June the Minister of Aviation was asked to approve a purchase of 18 Boeing 707–200 and 23 Boeing 737 aircraft, at a total cost of little less than £100 million. The Minister was unable to give his approval to this proposed investment, and the majority of people in this country supported him; and as I understand it, from what has been said this evening, there is no one in this Chamber who seriously demands that we should contemplate the expenditure of that amount of money in the American market. What the then Minister said on August 2 was: B.E.A. will buy British. The Government will take steps to ensure that B.E.A. is able to operate as a fully commercial undertaking with the fleet it acquires. In the light of this decision, B.E.A. prepared fresh proposals and sought approval to invest in BAC. 1–11–500 series to meet part of their requirements for new aircraft. This request was approved in December, and B.E.A. have now ordered the 18 BAC. 1–11–500s, with an option on a further six aircraft. This is the substitute for the Boeing 737 in B.E.A.'s earlier plans.

In February, B.E.A. submitted a request for investment approval for the purchase of 30 BAC. 2–11 to fulfil their remaining requirements as an alternative to the rejected Boeing 727—part of their original proposal. I am asked by the noble Earl, Lord Amhurst whether, in the event of B.E.A. or any other airline wishing to place an order now for the BAC. 2–11, they would require Her Majesty's Government's permission to do so. The theoretical answer, I suppose, is "No". If any company is prepared to pay the economic price for an aircraft and the aircraft constructor is prepared to build the machine, then the Government would be unlikely to intervene. But, of course, the question is academic. Such large sums of money are involved in research and development of modern aircraft, that inevitably some Government finance is required. And if the Government have to provide money, and money of this order, then they have an obligation to ensure that the nation's resources are utilised in the most effective way.

What is now being considered jointly by the Corporation and the Government is the best possible combination, or, to use the modern jargon, the best possible mix of aircraft. The sums that are now being worked out—and I mean now, for the experts from the Ministries and the Corporations have been hard at work in the last few days—concern four intermediate sized aircraft, the BAC. 2–11, the Trident 3B, the VC 10 and the Boeing 727. In addition, of course, they take into account the projected air bus. Whichever aircraft B.E.A. decides to buy will complement the air bus when this larger machine comes into service, and I agree with what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, and the noble Lord, Lord Jellicoe, that it is misleading to think that the choice is simply between, say. the BAC. 2–11 and the air bus, as far as B.E.A. is concerned. Of course from the Government's point of view there are obvious financial, engineering and technical problems, as was suggested by the noble Lord who went into the question of the aircraft engine problem, and particularly is this a problem within the time scale which B.E.A. envisage. Nevertheless, the comparative facts and figures about these four machines are being established as firmly as is feasible.

I am asked about possible subventions to the Corporation in the event of their choosing an aircraft other than the most economical but which makes a sensible element in a "mix" which takes into account all the factors relating to the Corporation, to our national resources and to the international markets. The economics of the various alternatives do not pose a simple problem. Of course, B.E.A.'s particular requirement is one factor, the development costs of the selective mix is another factor, the prospects of a wider market than the British Corporation are also important. The attraction of the BAC. 2–11 to B.E.A. lies in its ability to meet B.E.A.'s needs instead of the Boeing 727. This one factor cannot be judged in isolation from the large development costs which would be involved, and the Government must consider the financial aspects of B.E.A.'s re-equipment over the whole field of both the Corporation's prospects with a particular fleet, the launching costs to be borne and the prospects for their recovery. What precise financial agreements are agreed upon and whether by capital reconstruction or otherwise, can only be decided in the context of eventual decisions on the re-equipment programme. For example, if support were given to the construction of a particular aircraft and its individual unit costs were brought down, there would clearly be a less strong case for direct financial assistance to the Corporation.

The noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, spoke of the advantages of European collaboration, and I thought the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, and the noble Earl, Lord Amherst, were a little critical of this collaboration. Some people, I suspect, have come round to the European idea because of this very factor of the imperative need for collaboration on such technological projects requiring huge sums of "R and D" expenditure and which depend on an assured large market for any hope of economic solvency. If I had time I should like to refer again to the comments in the Plowden Report on this question of a large base market. Noble Lords will remember that after recording that the U.S.A. had 70 per cent. of world exports in the Western world as against our 14 per cent., it said that in spite of the scale of American exports their home market is nine times larger than their export sales. This against our ratio of 3½ to 1. Obviously we have to take into account this kind of situation, and there are certainly great advantages in getting as wide a base as possible for the air bus project.

As the House will know, since the initiative taken by the United Kingdom Government and the decision in 1965 to set up a joint Anglo-French working party, there has now evolved the idea of an industrial consortium of Hawker Siddeley Aviation, Sud Aviation and a German air bus working group comprised of a number of German firms. We are now at a point at which Governments have to make another important contribution, and the meeting taking place this very day—I expect it is over by now, for they have probably arranged their affairs rather better than we have in this House this afternoon—is for the purpose of reaching a judgment on the case for investment in this project. Clearly I cannot this evening say anything more about what that decision may or may not have been.

The possible prize is an attractive one. It is estimated that the market for an aircraft of this kind in Europe alone is between 100 and 200 in the 1970s, while the world market could be 700 to 800. Last February the French, German and British Governments agreed that a purchase by the respective national airlines—Air France, Air Inter, Lufthansa and B.E.A.—was necessary for the launching of this European venture. If such commitments can be established, and they can cover up to 100 aircraft, then the basis for success could firmly be laid. I was asked about the engine, and I agree that this is a relevant point. I wish we had an afternoon or an evening which we could devote to this fascinating problem.

I am afraid that I cannot answer all the questions which the noble Earl put to me. It was agreed last February that if the Rolls Royce RB.207 engine were chosen for the European air bus, the French and Germans would each take a share of the launching costs of this engine. Meanwhile, Rolls Royce are discussing with Lockheeds the possibility of their participation in the proposed Lockheed air bus. Rolls Royce have on offer their RB.211 engine of about 30,000 lb. thrust for a three-engine air bus configuration, and the RB.207 engine of about 50,000 lb. thrust—a three-stage engine of which the noble Earl spoke, for a twin-engine air bus configuration. One decision in this problem is locked in with another, and I hope I shall be excused if I do not say any more about this side of the matter, because frankly I am unable to do so this evening.

THE EARL OF KINNOULL

My Lords, would the noble Lord allow me to interrupt for one moment? I think he mentioned a potential figure for the air bus of 600 to 700 on the world market. I think I am right in saying that on March 21 the figure was quoted at 800 to 1,000.

LORD BESWICK

My Lords, what I actually said was 700 to 800, but if some people have gone to 1,000 there is not much in it in discussing this sort of matter.

I was asked by the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, what we are doing with our French partners in connection with the sonic boom problem with the Concord. The French have a test programme using the Mirage 4 and we share their results; there is an informal working group studying this problem. Also relevant to this, and extremely interesting I think, is the newly established tripartite official group, with the French, ourselves and the United States studying the data available to us, and with an impending meeting for the specific purpose of studying the results of the tests carried out at Edwards Airfield with the supersonic B-70 bomber. The noble Earl reminded your Lordships that we ourselves were proposing to carry out tests in this country similar to those over Oklahoma City. There have been certain legal difficulties in the way of these tests, but I understand that a statement about our future programme is due to be made reasonably shortly.

The noble Earl also asked about the situation if there is a prohibition of overland flying of the Concord aircraft. As I think I have already stated in this House, if overland flying is prohibited in this way it does not mean to say the Concord will be an uneconomic aircraft to fly. And there will be certain incidental competitive advantages as between our machine and the American in so far as their sonic boom problem with the larger aircraft will be more serious than ours.

Doubt was cast by the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, on the advisability of developing these large civil aircraft, especially if powered by only two engines. I think he would probably agree that more than two engines are difficult to justify to-day, on the basis of available accident statistics, or recently available accident statistics. Economics, too, tend to support the advisability of a twin-engined aircraft. I must confess that, with him, I personally have my doubts, and presumably at some point there will have to be serious thought about how many people we can put in the air at any one time in one aircraft.

We have been talking this evening about planes with a capacity of 300 to 400 people. The Americans are talking about 800 or 900 passengers. I can well imagine, without wishing to raise any scares, that if there is an accident to an aircraft of this size, involving 700 or 800 people, we shall have the sort of public debate stimulated by what occurred after the mishap to the very large oil tanker. Up to that point, operating economics alone appear to have entered into calculations; but it then became clear that there were wider public considerations which should be taken into account. However, for the time being manufacturers and operators are expected to observe the general regulations for air safety, and of course the public licensing authorities, not least our own admirable Air Registration Board, will no doubt have these considerations in mind.

The noble Lord, Lord Ferrier, asked about replacement for the Dakota. I should have thought the competitive Handley Page machine and the HS 748, as a Dakota replacement are certainly selling very well. There are a number of other sturdy British aircraft also selling in world markets. I was asked by the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, about the Jetstream, and whether the report in this morning's Press could be confirmed. I understand that this report, like others from that Daily Telegraph stable, is not entirely noted for its accuracy. But although to say that we have achieved the military sale there is a little premature, I can say that the civil version of the Jetstream is selling very well in the American market.

The noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, ended by criticising what he described as the dichotomy of the national direction in these affairs; and the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, also called attention to this aspect. I will not go into that problem this evening. We require more time. I absolutely agree with what the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, said about the advisability of having a debate on this matter at some future occasion. I would only say this: because you have a problem within one Department you do not necessarily make it any easier; you still have the divergent considerations to be reconciled, and usually within the Government machine, as most noble Lords in this House this evening will know, the reconciliation takes place in a Government Committee, whether one Minister is involved or two.

I would end by thanking all noble Lords who have taken part, who have given us their informed opinions. I am all in favour of these issues being ventilated fully and in time—by which I mean before the purchases are made, and not at an earlier hour of the evening. I ventured recently to express the personal view that had we seen in this country since the war full, informed, public discussion of future aircraft procurement, both civil and military, we might well have saved ourselves money running into nine figures. I will certainly endeavour to see that what has been said this evening is studied most carefully by those responsible.

7.56 p.m.

LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE

My Lords, in asking your Lordships' permission to withdraw my Motion, may I be allowed to thank all noble Lords who, no doubt at some personal inconvenience, waited here and have taken part in this debate. I should also like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, both personally and in his capacity as a Minister, for the courteous reply he has given to the debate. He has thrown some light upon the problems. We are glad to hear that the problem is realised acutely by Her Majesty's Government. I very much agree with the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe: this is a fascinating, wide subject, and I hope that before the House adjourns for the Summer Recess we shall have a further, perhaps more leisurely, opportunity of covering this and other questions in an even wider way. In asking permission to withdraw the Motion, I once more express my thanks to the Minister and to all noble Lords who took part.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.