Lords Sitting of 9 May 1967

Preamble
The House met at two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR On the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Worcester.
The Lord Brain—Sat first in Parliament after the death of his father.

ADVERTISING COSTS AND SELLING PRICES
2.6 p.m.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether the recent pressure for reduction in the selling price of a widely distributed branded commodity on the grounds of high promotion cost content in the selling price is to be now regarded as normal practice; and if so what other commodities are at present listed for similar attack.]
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, BOARD OF TRADE (LORD WALSTON): My Lords, the discussions between the President of the Board of Trade and the two major manufacturers of household detergents followed the recommendation of the Monopolies Commission that these manufacturers should be encouraged to reduce their selling expenses by 40 per cent. and to pass on the saving to the consumers by a reduction of 20 per cent. in their selling prices. The report was confined to the particular circumstances of that industry, and no other heavily advertised consumer goods in a comparable market situation are at present being investigated by the Commission.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, arising from that reply, which appears to report a savage attack on private enterprise and market-place economy, I gather, if I correctly understood the noble Lord, that it is not intended to apply this treatment to any other commodity he can name. But can the noble Lord now give an assurance that it is unlikely that the same treatment would be applied to synthetic
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fibres, the sale of which must necessarily contain a similarly large proportion of promotion expense, as is the case with detergents; and, therefore, if such a step were applied, does he not think it would create dislocation in the industry in succeeding stages?
LORD WALSTON: My Lords, I would re-emphasise the fact that the particular action to which the noble Lord has referred was taken as a result of the recommendation of the Monopolies Commission, with which, I think I am right in saying, noble Lords opposite had something to do when the Commission was originally set up. The Commission made a particular recommendation, and it was following upon that recommendation that my right honourable friend made this particular order. Therefore, I do not think that it would be accurate to describe this as "a savage attack on private enterprise"; rather is it an action taken following upon a recommendation of the Monopolies Commission, which was set up to deal with abuses of monopoly situations.
With regard to the second part of the noble Lord's question, so far as I know there is no problem relating to synthetic fibres at present before the Monopolies Commission, which goes into these matters very carefully. It took some three years to make a thorough investigation of this last problem. Therefore, there need be no fear (if "fear" is the right word to use) that in the future, in the next few years, any similar order will be made. But clearly it would be wrong for me to give any blanket assurance covering the Government in future as to what might be done then. It will depend primarily on any action which the Monopolies Commission recommend.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, in thanking the noble Lord for his reply, may I ask whether he is in a position to make any disclosure as to the formula to be applied in similar cases, so that there would be some forewarning to other industries that might be attacked in a similar way, where the selling content contains so large a proportion of promotion expenditure?
LORD WALSTON: My Lords, I certainly could not give any short or concise terms of reference, as it were, for any future action. But in an attempt to do

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so for the noble Lord—without I hope laying myself open to the possibilities of being misunderstood—I would say that if the Monopolies Commission, having made a thorough investigation, come to the conclusion that certain monopolies, or quasi-monopolies, are operating in such a way that it is against the public interest, then it is open to the President of the Board of Trade to make certain orders in the public interest. This particular order does not in any way affect the freedom of the industries concerned, or the firms themselves, to continue to advertise as much as they like and to market under any trade names they wish to. That is not impeded in any way. This is, if one wishes to call it so, simply an experiment to see how a non-advertised product of similar quality in fact appeals to the public.

COLOUR TELEVISION SETS: ADVANCE RENTALS
2.12 p.m.
LORD WILLIS: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will reduce the amount of advance rental required for the hire of colour television sets, with a view to making such sets more widely available to all sections of the community.]
LORD WALSTON: My Lords, the control of advance rentals is linked with the control of down-payments under hire-purchase agreements, and imposed for the purpose of restricting credit. A special concession for colour television sets would not be justified.
LORD WILLIS: My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for that dismal, discouraging and doleful Answer, may I point out—
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: No.
LORD WILLIS: May I ask the noble Lord whether he realises that in fact the Answer goes against all the tenets of the Party of which he and I are happy to be members, in that it imposes a colour bar? Does he not realise that the down-payment required in hiring a colour television set is now of the order of £70?
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This will therefore create a class of élite people who will own colour television sets, just as Onassis owns yachts. Will he not give consideration to this in case the Government go even further than creating a colour bar and in fact create a new privileged class?
LORD WALSTON: My Lords, it pains me very much to have to disagree with my noble friend on any matter, and particularly on one so close to his heart and about which he knows so much more than I do. I disagree with him completely when he says we are now imposing a colour bar or, indeed, discriminating as between rich and poor. In fact in this instance, as in all others, we are giving exactly equal treatment to black—or, shall I say, black and white—television and to colour television. The fact that it may cost more to buy or to hire a colour television set is no responsibility of Her Majesty's Government. The actual conditions which are laid down for these rentals are identical, whether the receiver is for colour television or black and white.
LORD ROWLEY: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend whether, in view of the fact that when one goes to the United States of America one finds colour television in a great many homes, we are to understand that the obstacle to our own people having colour television is not that we are behind the United States technically, but is purely on an economic basis?
LORD WALSTON: My Lords, my noble friend is perfectly right.
LORD WILLIS: My Lords, may I press this matter just a little further? Does not the noble Lord realise that millions of people will not be able to have colour television because of the cost? Does he not agree that his comment that this condition applies equally to black and white and to colour is rather like the remark made by Anatole France, that it is equally wrong for a millionaire and a beggar to beg in the streets? The point is that it is unlikely that the millionaire will ever have to do so. Therefore, will not the Government make some concession by reducing the amount of rental required in advance so that ordinary people can have the opportunity to look at colour television, which they

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will not be able to do if the present rates are maintained?
LORD WALSTON: My Lords, I do not want to pursue my noble friend into the realm of analogies, but if he is asking whether it would apply to other things it is rather like suggesting that down payments on Rolls Royces should be significantly less than those on Morris Minors or Minis, thereby allowing people to buy Rolls Royces just as easily as Minis.
LORD POPPLEWELL: My Lords, would the noble Lord not agree that the main problem is really the high cost of television? We are told that colour television sets will cost somewhere in the region of £200 or more. Is my noble friend satisfied that this cost will be fully justified? If not, is he conducting some inquiries to see whether this is the cheapest price at which colour television sets can be placed on the market?
LORD WALSTON: My Lords, with respect, I would suggest that whether colour television sets are being sold at too high a price is a somewhat different question, but I will gladly undertake to look into that side of the matter to see whether there is any evidence for suggesting that the manufacturers of colour television sets are in fact charging too much for them. But I think that is going a little far in connection with the present Question.
LORD WILLIS: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that the rental companies are in fact prepared to allow hirers to have a set for a much lower advance down payment—something like 20 weeks—and that it is the Government who are insisting on 42 weeks?
LORD WALSTON: My Lords, I am well aware that the companies are quite happy to allow people to have all sorts of things—colour television sets, ordinary television sets, motor cars, washing machines or anything else, at a very much lower rate of down payment than the Government have laid down. This is part of our whole financial policy in our attempt—unsuccessful—to stem inflation. If the sellers or renters of colour television sets would be prepared to accept a lower rental, then the down payment would correspondingly become lower.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, would the noble Lord not agree that if
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the Government made it easier for all sections of the community to own colour television sets the price of them would probably come down?
LORD WALSTON: My Lords, I am sure that if the Government considered it was in the national interest to give a subsidy of 50 per cent. for colour television there would be far more sets sold or rented, in the same way that there would be more houses or other things if they were subsidised.
LORD SALTOUN: My Lords, may I ask Her Majesty's Government to ensure that any efforts which they make in the direction of cheapness will be modified by an awareness of the danger of getting what I am told is the crudity of colour that they have in the United States, as compared with the greater perfection in this country?
LORD WALSTON: My Lords, I think even more important than the crudity of colour is the crudity of some of the things one sees on the television screen. I think both these facets could be investigated.

METROPOLITAN WATER BOARD BILL [H.L.]
Read 3a, and passed, and sent to the Commons.
PORTSMOUTH CORPORATION BILL [H.L.]
Read 3a, and passed, and sent to the Commons.
SAINT MARY-LE-PARK, BATTERSEA BILL
Read 3a, and passed.

PRIVATE BILL STANDING ORDERS
2.20 p.m.
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF LISTOWEL)THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF LISTOWEL) rose to move that the following Amendment be made to the Standing Orders relative to Private Bills, etc.:—
Page 86, Standing Order 208, at end insert: "but only if objection to locus standi or such rights has been made in a memorial duly deposited as aforesaid".
The noble Earl said: My Lords, in moving the Motion in my name on the Order Paper I should like to explain briefly to your Lordships the purpose of the proposed Amendment to our Standing Orders. Your Lordships may recall the debate on April 4 on Lord Molson's Question regarding the locus standi of amenity societies to petition against Special Procedure Orders. At the conclusion of the debate I said that in view of what had been said during the debate by noble Lords in all parts of the House I would ask my right honourable friend, the Chairman of Ways and Means in another place, to study the debate and consider whether the Standing Orders of both Houses should be amended to give effect to the opinions expressed in this House and certain misgivings felt in another place.
The point was clearly made in the debate, and indeed I myself emphasised in my speech, that there is a very important difference in procedure between Special Procedure Orders and Private Bills. In the case of Special Procedure Orders the Standing Orders of both Houses require the Chairman of Committees and the Chairman of Ways and Means to examine Petitions and to decide whether or not the Petitioners have locus standi. In the case of Private Bills, however, it is only when the Promoters of a Bill challenge the locus standi of a Petitioner that in this House the matter is referred to the Select Committee set up to consider the Bill and in the House of Commons to the Court of Referees. The effect of this is that in the past in many cases, because their locus standi has not been challenged, amenity societies have been able to petition against Private Bills, whereas the Chairmen have had to decide in the light of the Standing Orders that similar societies had no locus to petition against a Special Procedure Order.
It is with a view to resolving this discrepancy of procedure between Private Bills and Special Procedure Orders that I am moving this Amendment to our Standing Orders this afternoon. The effect of this Amendment will be that it is only when the Minister or one of the applicants promoting the Special Procedure Order challenges the locus standi of the Petitioner that the Chairmen will be
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called upon to examine the Petition with a view to determining whether or not the Petitioner has a locus standi. I hope that for the reasons I have stated the House will agree that this Amendment goes some way towards meeting the points made in the debate on April 4. I think I ought to add that a similar Amendment is being moved by my right honourable friend the Chairman of Ways and Means in another place this afternoon. I beg to move.
Moved, That the following Amendment be made to the Standing Orders relative to Private Bills, etc.:—
Page 86, Standing Order 208, at end insert ("but only if objection to locus standi or such rights has been made in a memorial duly deposited as aforesaid").—(The Earl of Listowel.)
LORD MOLSON: My Lords, I realise that we have important debates this afternoon, and I am going, to confine my remarks on this Motion to as brief a speech as I can. The Lord Chairman has said that this Amendment goes a little way to meeting the points that were raised. Indeed it goes a very little way: this is, in tact, a hurried ad hoc measure designed to enable the Petitioners against the North Devon (Meldon Reservoir) Water Order to be heard. Your Lordships have heard from the Lord Chairman, and no doubt you will recall, the circumstances in which the amenity societies were refused locus standi to appear before the Joint Committee. When I drew the attention of the Government to the assurances that had been given by Mr. Herbert Morrison (as he then was) and Mr. Arthur Greenwood at the time of the passing of the Parliamentary Special Procedure Act 1945 they behaved more than fairly—I would say generously—in the matter, and withdrew the Order.
It is fairly clear that this hurried Amendment to the Standing, Orders, which I understand was agreed upon only in the middle of last week, is intended to deal with this particular case. In fact it does not necessarily deal even with this immediate case. I know that the Minister will not question the locus standi of the amenity societies, but there is nothing to prevent the North Devon Water Board from doing so. The Minister has no power to forbid them to do so, and when I asked the Department this morning

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whether they had received any assurance from the Board I was told that they had not. Indeed, they felt that it would be difficult to ask for an assurance until the Petitions had been laid. It therefore follows that if the North Devon Water Board question the locus standi of the Petitioners, the matter will go again to the two Chairmen, who will then be in this position: that either they will have to say that their previous decision was wrong, or we shall all be back in the same position that we were before.
Briefly I must invite your Lordships' attention to the much broader issues which this decision of the Chairmen has raised and which was very fully debated in your Lordships' House on April 4. Under Standing Orders as interpreted by the two Chairmen—and, what is of great importance, the Chairman of Ways and Means is also Chairman of the Court of Referees in another place—the amenity societies have no right to petition against proposals affecting landscape. I showed in the last debate that amenity societies have in fact petitioned without let or hindrance since 1910, and that has not been disputed by those who support the Chairmen's decision.
It is now argued that because in these cases Promoters of Private Bills have not objected to locus standi they will not do so in future, and that therefore the position is satisfactory. To that my answer is twofold. First, it is surely intolerable that a right to petition Parliament should depend, not upon the decision of Parliament or of the particular House concerned, but on the good will or negligence of the opponent. I should like to quote what was said by my noble and learned friend Lord Dilhorne in this matter. He said:
"It seems to me very wrong and anomalous that a right of being heard under the Standing Orders of either House—and the Standing Orders of the two Houses are the same in this respect—should depend, not on the decision of the House, or of anyone appointed by the House, but on the question whether or not the point is taken by the Promoters of the Bill."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4/4/67, col. 931.]
When there is this uncertainty as to whether Petitioners will be granted a hearing before a Select Committee, it is obvious that they will be reluctant to incur the very heavy expenditure involved in preparing a case because they do not know whether there will be an opportunity of putting it forward.
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The second answer that I would make is that the reason why Promoters of Bills have never objected to the locus standi of amenity societies since 1910 is that it was the accepted doctrine of practitioners that the Promoters would not be able to object successfully. What has happened now is that Parliamentary agents and the Parliamentary Bar have been alerted to the view of the Chairman of Ways and Means that if they do object, amenity societies and many other interests also will be denied a hearing. Clearly, it will be their duty in the interests of their clients to take this technical point, and they invariably will. The doctrine extends beyond amenity societies. It will apply probably to the Yachting Association in a matter which has already arisen, and also to the Central Electricity Board. It is surely quite intolerable that the right of Petitioners to be heard should depend just upon the willingness of the parties on the other side not to object.
What will be the practical consequences of this? In the first place, in the case of Private Bills, those who are concerned to oppose them will do so on the Floor of the House by having a Second Reading debate upon it, instead of the matter being referred to a Select Committee upstairs and being heard properly in a judicial atmosphere. Secondly, in the case of Special Parliamentary Procedure Orders it will become customary for there to be Motions for annulment moved on the Floor of both Houses. This was exactly what the Statutory Orders (Special Procedure) Act 1945 was designed to prevent.
I do not propose to ask your Lordships this afternoon to reject this Amendment, I have much in mind, as I have said, that there are important debates to come on, and I do not want to take up the time of the House. I recognise, with gratitude, that this is an attempt on the part of the Lord Chairman of Committees to give effect to the assurances which he gave in his speech on April 4. But I am bound to say that what he has been able to do so far is quite inadequate.
This involves a whole matter of principle in regard to which Petitioners are entitled to be heard by Parliament, and this Amendment does nothing to clarify the vague wording of the Standing Orders. Many of your Lordships will have heard the weighty speech from my noble and

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learned friend Lord Dilhorne, where in two important matters he differed completely from the interpretation put by the Chairmen and their legal advisers upon the Standing Orders that they are required to interpret.
I propose, therefore, to raise this matter at an early date after the Whitsuntide Recess, on a substantive Motion or otherwise, so that there may be an opportunity to probe the matter further. What I believe are involved are the following matters: first, the rights of the subject; secondly, efficient procedure for establishing those rights; thirdly, the need for harmony between the two Houses; and, fourthly, the need for Standing Orders to be so drafted that there is no doubt as to their meaning.
2.34 p.m.
LORD SALTOUN: My Lords, I shall not detain your Lordships for more that a few seconds. In all my experience of Private Bill Committees I have known a great many cases where the locus standi of Petitioners was challenged by the Promoters, and in every case it was your Lordships' Committee that decided whether or not the opponents had the locus standi that they wished to have. I admit that probably it would be more satisfactory to opponents if they knew earlier, but at least a body to which the matter has been committed by your Lordships' House has the duty of deciding the point.
Recently I was engaged in a Scottish Private Bill Committee where a Bill was objected to by the Petitioners and their locus standi was challenged on the ground that as they were not mentioned in the Bill they had no locus standi. My Committee accepted that view. I challenged it, and I asked whether Damocles had really no interest in the sword suspended over his head. But the matter was not of major importance because quite shortly it was going to be overlain by a Public Bill. So I did not press the matter. But it seems to me that my noble friend Lord Molson is exaggerating a little when he says that the matter is settled by somebody quite independent of your Lordships' House, because ultimately it is your Lordships' Committee which decides it.
EARL ST. ALDWYN: My Lords, I wonder whether the noble Earl the Chairman
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of Committees would consider having some consultation with those who are most directly concerned with this matter. To the best of my knowledge there has not been any consultation, certainly not through the usual channels. Although one or two individuals may have been consulted, there has not been any general discussion, and it seems to me that there would be considerable advantage in having some private discussion before the Motion which Lord Molson is proposing to move is tabled.
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES: My Lords, I appreciate the point of the noble Earl, Lord St. Aldwyn. I would point out to him that I take no cognisance of the usual channels, because all channels are to me equally usual. But if after the Recess he would like a consultation between all those who are interested in this matter, naturally I should be more than willing to take part. I will not reply to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Molson, because I do not want to detain your Lordships who are waiting for the continuation of a debate on a most important public matter. I would only say that I am sorry that I cannot satisfy him completely, but I am glad that he thinks that I have gone a short way towards meeting him, and that he supports this Amendment. I can assure him that if, after the Recess, he wishes to discuss the matter again on a Motion, I and my right honourable friend the Chairman of Ways and Means will give the most careful consideration to what he and any other noble Lord may say on such an occasion.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

FERTILISERS (UNITED KINGDOM) SCHEME 1967
2.38 p.m.
LORD WALSTON LORD WALSTON moved, that the Draft Fertilisers (United Kingdom) Scheme, 1967, laid before the House on April 18, 1967, be approved. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name. In essence, the Scheme is similar to the previous ones approved by the House regularly since 1952, but there has, of course, been a change in the rate of subsidy. This will give a saving of just under £2 million a year. Put another way, the cost will be

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6 per cent. less than it would have been had the subsidy for the fertiliser year of 1967–68 remained at the level at which it was previously.
As before, subsidy will be paid upon the phosphoric acid and/or nitrogen content of chemical fertilisers bought in lots of 4 cwt. or more for use on agricultural land or on crops or for growing mushrooms. No subsidy is paid on potash or on fertilisers wholly derived from organic matter. The cut in subsidy, which is a small one, was agreed at this year's Annual Price Review. It follows the general trend of past Reviews. I understand that expenditure on this subsidy during the next fertiliser year is expected to remain at the figure at which it runs during the current year—that is to say, £30 million. Incidentally, that is very much the same as it has been over the past eight years. This scale of contribution represents approximately 25 per cent. of the gross cost of those fertilisers on which subsidy is paid. Taken together with the improved returns to agriculture resulting from the other changes made in this year's Review, I am certain farmers will be well able to maintain and improve the productivity of their soil. At the same time it is proposed to give extra assistance, up to 50 per cent. of the cost of fertilisers, which will cover the cost of spreading, to those who qualify for grants under the Hill Land Improvement Scheme which we intend to make as soon as the Agriculture Bill becomes law.
Apart from this slight reduction in subsidy, as your Lordships know, manufacturers' prices for fertilisers have recently risen. The increase, however, was very thoroughly examined and reported upon by the National Board for Prices and Incomes, and the Government have accepted the findings of the Board. In spite of this rise, compound fertilisers are still cheaper per ton of plant food than they were ten years ago, and this is a point worth emphasising. It is a tribute to the efficiency of our fertiliser industry in this country. It is gratifying to know that since 1952–53 the use of fertilisers eligible for subsidy has gone up in terms of plant nutrients as opposed to gross tonnage by nearly 85 per cent. Apart from using a greater quantity of fertiliser, farmers now use different types, and they use especially the higher nitrogen
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applications, either through straights or compounds. At present, well over 75 per cent. of all plant nutrients in subsidised fertilisers are applied in the form of compounds. The concentration of such nutrients in fertilisers has gone up from under 27 per cent. in 1952–53, some 15 years ago, to about 42 per cent. to-day. In other words, the concentration has been nearly doubled.
This, of course, represents a very large economy to the farmer, since because of this higher concentration he has far less bulk to handle, and the merchant has far less bulk to transport to the farm. Put simply, to have distributed the 1966–67 plant nutrient tonnage at the 1952–53 concentration rate, merchants, manufacturers and farmers would have had to handle an additional 1½ million tons of product on top of the present movement of about 4¾ million tons—in other words, nearly one third more as regards actual bulk.
As to the future, there is no question that farmers now realise the benefits which they obtain by the use of the right kinds of fertiliser. A farmer's main problem is to judge how much more fertiliser he could profitably use in his own special personal circumstances. On the whole, I believe that farmers make the right decision in this matter, but in certain cases—I am thinking particularly of grassland—farmers are still perhaps inclined to be a little cautious, and they could, with benefit, use rather more fertiliser on their grassland with worthwhile returns. All the same, more and more farmers realise the good return that the sensible use of fertiliser gives them, and I am certain that the increased supply, especially of nitrogen, which is now available will encourage this trend still more. I am sure that the demand for more concentrated forms of nitrogenous fertiliser will go on increasing, and so will the supply. An added incentive to the use of straight nitrogen is that this is not affected by the recent price increases; there has been no rise there. A high and ever-growing rate of fertiliser use is essential if our agriculture industry is to maintain its record of productivity. The subsidy which is the subject of this Order encourages this. I therefore ask the House to approve this Scheme and to enable the subsidy to continue for a further year.
Moved, That the Draft Fertilisers (United Kingdom) Scheme 1967, laid before the House on April 18, 1967, be approved.—(Lord Walston.)
2.45 p.m.
LORD NUGENT OF GUILDFORD: My Lords, may I thank the noble Lord, Lord Walston, for explaining to us the purpose of this Statutory Order. I should like to comment on the major point which he made, that this year the Government have in fact made a reduction of about £2 million, about 6 per cent., in the rate of subsidy. I would point out that this coincides with the moment when the fertiliser manufacturers are increasing their prices, as the Prices and Incomes Board is now allowing them to do. I understand that this price increase is also, by coincidence, 6 per cent. One might have expected the Government to have increased the subsidy by 6 per cent., but No. So the total effect is that the farmers will have to pay 12 per cent. more for their fertiliser, which is quite a big increase in price. I suggest to the noble Lord that this could be a significant disincentive to the use, and indeed the greater use, of fertiliser which he so rightly advocates. My impression is that, despite the great increase in fertiliser used in the last decades, there is still a considerable under-usage, and indeed the noble Lord confirmed that this was the case on grass land. I should have thought that it applied to arable land as well.
If the noble Lord could give us the figures, it would be interesting to know how the Ministry of Agriculture's specific estimate of the tonnage of fertiliser for optimum application in Great Britain compared with the actual application. I suspect that there is a quite big discrepancy. Does the noble Lord not think that the effect of what he is doing now may be to cause a levelling off in the usage of fertiliser rather than bring about the increase about which he spoke? In fact there has been a reduction in the amount of fertiliser subsidy in the last couple of years. It was running at about £33 million a year and is now running at about £30 million a year, so that already there appears to be a reduction over the last couple of years as compared to the quantity being used before. Perhaps the noble Lord will be able to give the details
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of the actual figures of fertiliser usage in the last couple of years as compared with the figures for previous years of this decade.
One other point in this context is in relation to yields. It is noticeable that the yields of cereals have fallen in the last couple of years. There was in earlier years a certain levelling off in yields for wheat and barley, while there was a very spectacular increase in yields in the 'fifties. Has the levelling off been due to a check in the application of fertiliser? Perhaps the noble Lord could tell us whether this is so, or whether there is some other cause. Again, I ask: is this the right moment to make a 12 per cent. increase in price?
As we are about to continue with the very important debate on the Common Market, it is perhaps not inopportune to remind the noble Lord that if entry into the Common Market is accepted and we therefore have to adopt the E.E.C. agricultural policy, there will be a quite dramatic effect on arable farming, with a great increase in wheat prices of 40 per cent. and in barley prices of 25 per cent. Perhaps even more significant, the cost of imported grain into this country would, of course, go up very substantially. In fact the cost would rise by about 50 per cent., due to the application of the levy system; and bearing in mind that we import something over 10 million tons of grain a year, this would seem to involve a levy of about £100 million of which about 90 per cent. would then go to the E.E.C. So that for both of those two reasons there would be an enormously greater incentive to increase the arable acreage of this country. Therefore this again would seem to be a reason for looking very carefully at the fertiliser application, because the extension of acreage in this country would have to be on the less good land, and, of course, on land in the hands of the less good farmers. Again, I would ask the noble Lord: is he sure that this is the right time to start giving a disincentive to fertiliser use?
Finally, would the noble Lord, when he is asking his right honourable colleague the Minister of Agriculture to look at fertiliser policy, also ask him to look at the possibility of extending the subsidy to potash, which clearly will be very much more important if we are going to bring back into cultivation the

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less good land, most of which is very deficient in potash. Is it a fact that the old monopoly argument still applies to extending the fertiliser subsidy to potash?
I do not wish to detain the House any longer on this subject, although it is a very important one and may be even more important in the future, but I would conclude with these remarks. I should have thought it was always rather objectionable to make a disincentive to fertiliser use, and certainly it would be hard to find a time when it was more inappropriate than now. I would therefore ask the noble Lord whether he will most cogently convey to his right honourable colleague the Minister of Agriculture that this matter should be studied closely in the next Price Review, in order to see whether it would not be wise to continue to give the maximum incentive to greater fertiliser use, rather than tapering it off. With those rather critical remarks, I would reluctantly agree that the Order should be passed.
LORD INGLEWOOD: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord one question? In order that we may judge the effect of this Order as against the effect of last year's Order, can the noble Lord tell us what will be the extra cost to the farmer, assuming that the same levels of fertiliser are used? He has told us that there is a 6 per cent. decrease in the value of the subsidy and, I believe, an increase in the price which the farmer has to pay. What, in simple terms, does that really mean to the farmers' pockets, taking the country as a whole?
LORD WALSTON: My Lords, I must say that I am rather surprised at the point of view put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Nugent of Guildford. It seems to me the antithesis of what I always understood he and his friends stood for politically. But perhaps I can deal more specifically not with the political philosophy behind these matters, but with the questions which he has raised. At the same time, perhaps I can answer briefly the question of the noble Lord, Lord Inglewood. My information is that the reduction of subsidy will mean an additional cost of about £2 million, as the noble Lord said, whereas the rise in manufacturers' price will add a total of £6 million to the farmers' bill, making a total of £8 million, or approximately
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8 per cent. extra, which has to be paid for fertilisers. I think that answers the question of the noble Lord, Lord Inglewood.
So far as the under-usage (a curious expression, if I may say so, which the noble Lord used) of fertilisers is concerned, the fact is that very few farmers use the optimum amount of fertilisers. A few use more than they should and waste it, and the crops may go down, but the vast majority use rather less than they should. I do not know of any estimate of the amount, and it would be a very subjective estimate if there were one. My own purely personal guess, taken more or less out of the air, is that on our present cropping we could increase our use of fertilisers by at least 25 per cent. and still get an economic return. But I emphasise that that is my own personal view, my own guess, rather than any considered view of Her Majesty's Government or of the Ministry of Agriculture.
So far as the fall in yields is concerned, as the noble Lord knows well there are many reasons for that—climatic being very prominent among them. But I would say that it is more of a levelling-off of yields than a continuation of the spectacular rise which took place in the 'fifties. Far be it from me to suggest that the spectacular rise which took place in the 'fifties was due to Governmental action in the late 'forties, though we all know that there is a certain delayed action; nor should I like to suggest that any decrease in yields two or three years ago was due to Governmental action during the preceding decade.
I think that another possible reason, putting that aside, is the fact that during the war years, and the years immediately following, there was an enormous increase in the skill of farmers and in the techniques. The techniques of the best farmers were adopted and became the average techniques, due very largely to the National Agricultural Advisory Services and also to the admirable work of the plant breeders. We have now reached a levelling-off stage, which I hope will be followed in a few years by another surge forward. The present position is certainly not due to a decreased use of fertilisers.
I have the full figures here, which I shall gladly show to the noble Lord afterwards. May I simply read out the

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figure of nitrogen utilisation in 1951–52 and compare it with 1966–67? In 1951–52 it was 181,000 nutrient tons, and in 1966–67 it was estimated to be 630,000 nutrient tons; in other words, something over three times as much. Phosphates rose from 277,000 tons to 477,000 tons—not quite twice—and potash rose from 172,000 tons to an estimated 430,000 tons—about two-and-a-half times as much. The total of them all rose from 630,000 tons to an estimated 1,537,000 tons; in other words, over twice as much nutrient tonnage—not gross tonnage—is expected to be used in 1967 as compared with the figure for 1951.
The main point which the noble Lord, Lord Nugent of Guildford, made was when he asked me: is it right at this stage to reduce the subsidy? Of course, that really depends on what philosophy you hold. If you believe that the "gentleman in Whitehall knows best" and can dictate to the farmer what he should use, then obviously you should retain the subsidy in the hands of Whitehall as a weapon for encouraging what one might call an artificial use through artificial prices. If, on the other hand, you believe that after the initial stimulus for adopting new techniques, for making use of fertilisers and so on, it is really the farmer who should make the decision, then it is far better to lower the subsidy on fertilisers and raise the price, as we have done, on the finished product, on the crop itself, and leave the choice to the farmer. That, I believe, is the correct method to follow, and I repeat that I am a little surprised that the noble Lord suggests that it is really the "gentleman in Whitehall" who knows better than the farmer on the ground what fertiliser should be applied. I shall not detain the House any longer pursuing this rather fascinating subject, and I am thankful to the noble Lord for his qualified support.
LORD FORBES: My Lords, if the use of fertilisers decreases, will the Government raise the subsidy at the next Review?
On Question, Motion agreed to.

PLOUGHING GRANTS SCHEME 1967
3.0 p.m.
LORD WALSTON LORD WALSTON moved, that the Draft Ploughing Grants Scheme 1967, laid before the House on April 12, 1967, be approved. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I trust that it will be convenient, when dealing with this Order, to deal also with the Ploughing Grants (Scotland) Scheme 1967. This Scheme is somewhat different from previous Schemes. Your Lordships will remember that, going back quite a long way—25 years or so—it was necessary to introduce specific incentives to encourage farmers to follow what was then thought by many established farmers to be bad farming practice, but which leaders of agricultural thought realised was good farming practice; that is, to plough up old grassland, to take the plough round the farm.
In this context we all think of the name of Sir George Stapleton, one of the great pioneers in these matters. As a result of his work, of the work of many of his colleagues, and of the incentives given by successive Governments, advisory services and others, rotational farming has now become an accepted pattern of British agriculture. The benefits are very widely realised. There is scarcely a farmer to-day who does not know when it is profitable for him to plough up his old grass or his old short-term leys so as to cash in on the fertility of the land by growing other crops.
It has now been decided that it can safely be left to the farmer himself to decide whether it would pay him to plough a particular piece of grassland or whether he would prefer to keep the grass for grazing, for hay or for silage. That being so, there is no longer any need for the payment of a specific incentive by way of ploughing grant for ploughing up leys. But there is one exception to that; that is, the ploughing up of really old grass—the type of grass which is extremely expensive to plough; the sort of grass which has previously come under the provisions of Part II of the previous Schemes. Not only is this sort of grassland particularly expensive to plough, but it is becoming increasingly advisable in certain cases that it should be ploughed, because to some extent it counteracts the

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loss of land which is taking place year by year to urban development. So it is becoming increasingly necessary for farmers to bring in an increasing amount of land which was formerly considered uneconomical and which, because of its particular condition, costs a great deal to plough. It is therefore proposed that the £12 ploughing grant, which is for land of this sort, should be retained.
One minor change is proposed which is in effect the widening of a clause introduced last year to allow approvals given under the 1965 and 1966 Schemes to remain valid for the current Scheme. This is a convenience both to the farmer and to the Department, and involves no loss whatsoever of financial controls. I hope your Lordships will agree that even though the need for ploughing grants on what I may describe as the ordinary type of grassland is no longer necessary, there is still a place in our agricultural economy for the £12 grant. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Draft Ploughing Grants Scheme 1967, laid before the House on April 12, 1967, be approved.—(Lord Walston.)
LORD NUGENT OF GUILDFORD: My Lords, may I thank the noble Lord. Lord Walston, for moving this Statutory Order and telling us its purpose. May I also tell him that to this Order I can give a warmer welcome. I have no wish—in fact probably a good deal less wish than he has—to dictate from Whitehall what a farmer should do, but there are certain specific aids to farming which experience has proved to be valuable, and we should not lightly reduce them unless we are prepared to see consequences which may be unwelcome. But in this case I feel that the substantial removal of the ploughing grant is something which we can contemplate now, because times have changed. Although I feel a slight nostalgic pang at seeing it go (because it stems from the Agriculture (Ploughing Grants) Act, 1952, which my noble friends Lord Crathorne and Lord Carrington and I together put on the Statute Book; I think it was the first piece of legislation we put on the Statute Book in the 1951 Parliament), I think it is right that it should go and that it is also right, as the noble Lord said, that we should keep the special £12 per acre grant for ploughing out old grassland.
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As the noble Lord said, this grant was introduced originally as an incentive to rotational farming, and for that it was very valuable. The grant was kept on, first in its £2 or £3 an acre form, and then its £5 an acre form, because the general view was that the establishment of the three-year ley system was a valuable rotation on farms which were growing corn, but that in areas where for one reason or another they could not grow root crops, either sugar beet or potatoes, the three-year ley made a good break in the cereal rotation because the land could be restored in its fertility and the weeds could be brought, at any rate to some extent, under control. This problem, of course, is still very much with us—in fact, in some areas it is rather worse than it was. But there are now other ways of dealing with it, and I therefore think it is quite right to get rid of the rigidity of the three-year qualification.
The fact is that most land cannot be kept in continuous cereal production without running into serious problems of loss of fertility, on the one hand, and proliferation of weeds, on the other; but one can use such devices as the one-year or two-year ley, and also the kind of break crop for which the Government have introduced a subsidy in this Price Review—that is, the bean crop. It is in this particular context that I congratulate the noble Lord on choosing the right moment psychologically for removing this particular subsidy—because he is beginning to put something else in its place. There must be a break in the cereal crop. In areas where root crops cannot be grown then something else must be grown, and the bean crop is such an alternative. I would only ask the noble Lord that he should do even better and consider at the next Price Review including rape seed as a further crop which might be used as a break crop, and give a subsidy there as well. There are certain marketing problems, but I believe that they could be overcome; and this would introduce a little more flexibility into a picture which has considerable difficulties.
But the point I would make to the noble Lord is that he is sweeping away a system which had a certain specific value, apart from its original incentive, and he therefore has a particular responsibility to put something else in its place. He has begun to put something else in

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its place with the subsidy for the bean crop, but it seems to me that he must go rather further than that, and I look with confidence to him to see that this is done in the next Price Review. With those few comments, I have much pleasure in supporting the Order.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

PLOUGHING GRANTS (SCOTLAND) SCHEME 1967
LORD WALSTON: My Lords, I beg to move that the Scottish Order be approved.
Moved, That the Draft Ploughing Grants (Scotland) Scheme 1967, laid before the House on 19th April 1967, be approved.—(Lord Walston.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONWEALTH SETTLEMENT BILL
3.9 p.m.
Order of the Day for the Third Reading read.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS (LORD BESWICK): My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a third time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 3a.—(Lord Beswick.)
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, before assent is given to this stage of the Bill I feel obliged to raise an omission from the earlier discussions. It is a point about which I have given notice to the noble Lord; and, even though the Bill was covered effectively by my noble friend Lord Bessborough on Second Reading, he also omitted this point. I refer particularly to the migration of children from here to the Dominions. As your Lordships will be aware, a considerable number of children are in the custody of the great local authorities. They are very expensive to keep; and I suspect that the degree of cost to the community will not be within the knowledge of many noble Lords. These children are in their care as the result
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of orphanage, confused parentage, abandonment, and so on; parents are often not known. Regulations lay down that there shall be proper custody of the children and that guardianship should be established for each child.
In the Dominions, as is well known, are the four great approved societies to which the noble Lord referred in moving the Bill. There is the Fair-bridge Society, which has vacancies, and there are other societies which can be of assistance. Because of my long association with this movement—earlier as a member of the Overseas Settlement Board and, more recently, as chairman of the Overseas Migration Council—I have tried to keep myself familiar with these matters. In view of the expense to which I have referred it is rather strange that the local authorities put up every kind of resistance to releasing these children to the societies in the Dominions. I recognise that there has been some advanced thinking as to how, and into whose custody, children should be transferred; but these bodies in the Dominions are so conducted as to have the greatest compassion and sympathy for the children. There can be no question of anxiety whether these children will be properly cared for. Considerable numbers of children are involved and, there is, without doubt, plenty of room in the Dominions for them. There are societies ready to receive them. It is that point that I particularly wanted to raise, and I hope Her Majesty's Government will be more successful in the future than has been the case in the past in somehow fusing these various possibilities.
I am aware that in the Dominions it is thought that the best immigrants are babies, but my suggestion is not so much for the benefit of the Dominions as for the good of the children that are here. I can assure the noble Lord that he will find on investigation that the cost of keeping these children is burdensome and, indeed, difficult because recruitment of staff for their supervision is also difficult. I have read carefully the Second Reading debates in both Houses, and although the Secretary of State in another place dealt at some length with the question of children lie omitted this particular point. Owing to absence from London I regret that I could not attend the discussions here; and therefore I raise it now.

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My Lords, may I, at the same time, express disappointment at the small amount of money that is spent for this purpose? Your Lordships will be aware that Parliament voted recently about £1½ million a year—of which only £160,000 a year has been spent—to promote Commonwealth settlement. I am sure that more effort could be made to familiarise the country with the possibilities of life in the Dominions and with the advantages that might well come to those who have a sufficiently adventurous spirit. I have always believed it is the adventurous spirit which, in the main, has motivated migration from this country to the Dominions and built up the great overseas territories of which we are so proud. But so little is spent when so much can be done. It is incongruous that we should spend hundreds of millions of pounds in the development of new towns while there are large areas overseas where migrants could well help to increase the purchases from this country and expand our exports.
In another place, it was stated that by the end of the century, a little over 30 years, we are to expect a population of 75 million—some 20 million greater than at present. Presumably by then each household will have an automobile, and there is going to be great discomfort in moving around; but that is another angle. We have in this country a density of population of 570 to the square mile. What movement will then be like, I do not know. But it is because of that lack of perspective, because of what we spend to develop these things and of what could be spent in building up power abroad that I particularly wanted to draw attention to this matter.
There is another point I would bring to the attention of the noble Lord. I hope he did not overlook the suggestion made in another place, that out of this substantial unspent sum, since the movement of people is the best promise for the lessening of tensions in the world we should initiate various schemes in this country for the movement of undergraduates to the Dominions, and to Canada particularly. Would it not be possible for Her Majesty's Government to arrange that some part of these large funds could be made available to encourage more movement of undergraduates, in the formative years, to the
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Dominions, and that the schools should propagate the possibilities for the development of the large Dominions overseas? I support the Third Reading of this Bill.
VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS: My Lords, I had not meant to speak in this debate, but after hearing the noble Lord, Lord Barnby, I wondered whether my noble friend would consider paying very careful attention to the noble Lord's suggestion about shipping small children abroad when those children are already deprived of their parents, either by accident or by abandonment. A child who has lost his parents is already a very disturbed child. He has suffered a very great loss, and that loss is not good for the child's balance. It is important, as far as that child is concerned, that he should be kept in surroundings which he knows and understands and which are familiar to him. This is necessary for the sake of his mental balance and health. Therefore it is important for these children that great thought is taken before any are shipped abroad into circumstances which are very different. It is this point alone that I wish to bring to the attention of my noble friend.
3.20 p.m.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Barnby, emphasised the importance of emigration, and its value to the Commonwealth, and that of course is what this Bill is about. I am pleased to have his support for its purposes. The noble Lord raised two particular points. One concerned the possibility of orphaned children being sent to different parts of the Commonwealth, perhaps to the other side of the world, to start a new life there. This was the kind of thing that was done in the 1930s but as I said on the Second Reading of the Bill opinion nowadays does not favour this, and finance has not been made available, except in those cases where a child is accompanied by one parent. My understanding was that that attitude commanded support in another place, and the support of the majority of noble Lords in this House. I think my noble friend Lord St. Davids has indicated the kind of consideration that lay behind the decision to restrict the emigration of children to those cases where there is one parent.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord if it is to be understood

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that it is now a requirement that every child shall be accompanied by a parent? I do not think that has been the case up to now.
LORD BESWICK: Yes, my Lords, that is the present policy. But if in a particular case it was thought desirable that an orphan should be enabled to start a new life under one of these schemes in a Commonwealth country where these schemes operate, that would not be ruled out.
The noble Lord, Lord Barnby, also asked about the possibility of using the monies that will be voted under this Bill for the purpose of sending young men or women from this country to take a graduate course in a university in the Commonwealth. I am sure that many of your Lordships will have much more sympathy with this idea than with his first one. There is a good deal to be said for it, but the provisions in this Bill would not enable this money to be used for that purpose. Certainly there is a reference to the possibility of giving financial assistance for training those young men or women who were assisted to emigrate under this Bill but that was considered to be vocational training. Education in a university is not thought to be covered by the Bill.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: My Lords, as the Fairbridge Homes have been mentioned, can my noble friend tell me whether Australia is prepared to accept coloured orphan children?
LORD BESWICK: No, my Lords, I could not say without notice.
On Question, Bill read 3a.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill do now pass. As we are about to move on to a discussion on the Common Market, and as our courtship of Europe has been one of the factors that has given an impression in some parts of the Commonwealth that we have lost the interest in Commonwealth settlement and in the development of the Commonwealth that we used to have, perhaps I might say that I am
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particularly pleased to have the opportunity to move this Motion to-day. I am sure that we should all wish to take the opportunity to emphasise that whatever we do about going into Europe, it will not prevent us from looking forward to the continuance of the friendly connection between this country and those other lands of the world which we have helped to develop. My Lords, I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill do now pass.—(Lord Beswick.)
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: My Lords, I think I ought to support the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, in this matter, in just a few words. Whatever may have been said in another place, and in your Lordships' House, about the sums which have been set aside for this purpose and which are not related closely to the requirements in the past five years, we warmly welcome the Bill. I might also add that I fully appreciate the points made by my noble friend Lord Barnby. I am sorry that it does not seem to be practicable to consider them in the context of this particular Bill. I hope that the Government will look at the points made to see whether these proposals might be satisfied in some other way. Finally, my Lords, however keen we may be to get into the Common Market, the Commonwealth still exists, and this Bill is a fine example of the Commonwealth in action and I hope that it will now pass.
On Question, Bill passed.

ROAD SAFETY BILL
Returned from the Commons, with the Amendments agreed to.
HOUSING SUBSIDIES BILL
Returned from the Commons with certain of the Amendments agreed to, and one other Amendment disagreed to, with a Reason for such disagreement: the said Amendment and Reason to he printed.

THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
3.27 p.m.
Debate resumed (according to Order) on the Motion moved yesterday by The Lord Chancellor—namely, That this House approves the White Paper entitled Membership of the European Communities (Cmnd. 3269).
LORD MCCORQUODALE OF NEWTON: My Lords, I wonder whether I might ask for one moment of your sympathy, for one of the main difficulties in opening the second day of a great debate of this sort is the welter of conflicting words with which one has been oppressed yesterday and to-day. There were the admirable speeches yesterday in your Lordships' House, to some of which I was privileged to listen (and the rest I have read), and there was the debate in another place which occupies an enormous Hansard, including an hour and a half's speech of great importance by the Prime Minister. There was a very high-class speech, if I may say so, from Sir Alec Douglas-Home (as we in this House should expect) and some barbed wit from Mr. Michael Foot. I did not get any further, because there was not time. Then there was the "Panorama" exercise for the general public which one was supposed to pick up; and all the newspapers this morning had it all over again. Believe me, my Lords, I am a little confused. In this condition I feel that it is better, to use sporting parlance, to "go back to square one".
My Lords, it is a strange coincidence that in the great debate on Britain and the Common Market held in this House on August 1 and 2, 1962, I was privileged to be the last Back-Bench speaker on the second day, and was followed by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin. Incidentally, on that occasion the noble Lord was remarkably kind to me and about my remarks. I only hope that to-day, in following me again, he will not be too harsh. I am sure that the whole House is delighted, as I am, that we are also to have a speech from the noble Earl, Lord Cromer. It seemed to me that possibly the one gap in the debate yesterday was the lack of a real authoritative speech from the great commercial and banking centre of the City of London
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—something which the noble Earl is uniquely able to give us.
May I, at the outset of my remarks, quote two or three isolated statements from the previous debate to which I have referred, because I think they are not only pungent and relevant, but well worth reading to your Lordships. The late Lord Morrison of Lambeth made a great speech on that occasion which I well remember. In balancing up the pros and cons of going into the Common Market he finished up by saying:
"But that does not prevent my feeling that, if it be practicable, in principle it is right that the British should go into the Common Market."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 243, col. 312; 1/8/62.]
Lord Morrison of Lambeth was one of those great men who was able to put into simple words what a great number of people in the country were thinking at any one time. Indeed, he could exercise that gift possibly as well as anyone I have ever known. I believe that the feeling then expressed is now shared by the great majority of people in this country. I know from my association with organised industry that these views are overwhelmingly held by industrialists, both great and small.
I wonder whether I might quote, also from the previous debate, a remarkable prophecy made by the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Oakridge. He said, at the end of his remarks:
"….there remains one plain cold fact, and that is that if we do not join the Common Market, the Economic Community, the Community will go ahead without us; it will succeed without us; and it will grow in exclusiveness, to our detriment, because our voice will not be heard in its councils."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1/8/1962, col. 367.]
Surely five years later the truth of that prophecy is apparent to us all. Then, in possibly a lighter vein, may I quote one sentence of a former Prime Minister, Lord Attlee, who was strongly opposed to our application to join the Common Market and made a strong attack on the proposition at that time? He claimed that if we went in we should be putting the Germans before the Australians, and so on, and the noble Earl, Lord Home (as he then was) interjected with these words:
"Our motive in entering the Common Market is so as to be able to serve our old friends better by getting additional friends for Britain."—[col. 428.]

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I think that that is worth remembering, too.
It is instructive to note that both Mr. Macmillan, the Prime Minister at our last attempt to get into the Common Market, and Mr. Wilson, the Prime Minister now, have become progressively enthusiastic about joining as they have gone more deeply into the whole question. This has been most marked. Why, it is only two years since Mr. Wilson was very cold about the whole idea. Two years ago, almost to the very day, he said:
"There can be no question at present of a new British effort to enter the E.E.C."
For my part, I am glad that he has now not only changed his own view but also changed the views of the great majority of his Party. That is a very good thing. I believed five years ago, and I believe even more strongly to-day, that entry by Britain into E.E.C. on anything like suitable terms will be a good thing, not only for Britain and for Europe but also, in the long run, for the people of the whole world.
Nevertheless, if French opposition once again makes it impossible for us to join on fair conditions—and I agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Sherfield, said yesterday, that we do not want the negotiations to be bogged down for months and years; we must have some time limit to these discussions—I am convinced that we should not despair. I agree with much of what the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, said on this subject yesterday.
I should like to speak from an industrial point of view for a few moments. What have we to offer Europe from an economic standpoint? We have one of the great markets of the world to share with them. We have an industrial potential second to none for the size of our country. And we have a know-how which has been developed over many years. There is a regrettable tendency in many quarters to criticise British industry, both management and men. Of course, neither arc perfect—no human beings are—and in industry we have great difficulties, many of our own making; but I believe that the worst mistake we possibly can make is to continue to decry ourselves and run ourselves down. I hope that if we get into the Common Market, this odd talent of ours will be abolished. For I claim confidently that British industry
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is remarkably healthy, considering all the buffets and difficulties that it has had to contend with in recent years. It is not only healthy, but also well able to stand up for itself most adequately in the competition in Europe, if we join the Common Market. After all, we are still the greatest exporting nation in the world for our size, and how many of the most notable technological advances in recent years have not come from Britain? We have not always developed them ourselves, to our cost, but the inventive genius is still there in British industry and still lively.
But what we shall need—and this I would impress upon your Lordships—is increasingly year by year a greater scale of individual operations in industry. The size of enterprises in the United States of America is so vast, the market is so great, that one firm can readily and rapidly evolve in its own special market to a scale which enables it to cater for a whole nation in Europe. And to get to this same level, Britain must be able to achieve a scale of operations which I believe can only be found (if I may put it this way) in balanced partnerships on an international basis. This will be most conveniently achieved by joining the E.E.C.
I wonder whether I may go into this matter a little more deeply. For these remarks I am much indebted to some admirable articles in the Economist recently, drawing attention to a remarkable and authoritative inquiry which has been held into the American and the British chemical industries at the present time. Nowadays it requires 2½ British chemical workers to produce as much as one American chemical worker. This disparity is due, not to bad management or to "feather-bedding" of unions—although, of course, this does not help—but chiefly to the advantage American industry enjoys through the economy resulting from its scale of operations.
The Americans, this report found out, gain greatly, not only from their much larger plants and their mass production of goods but also from such things as bulk buying, bulk handling, bulk transport and also—a point which I thought was interesting—from not having to export small packets of chemicals to so many small markets all over the world, as British exporters have to do, especially

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to the Commonwealth, if they wish to keep up the scale of their exports. The British exporter finds these small exports expensive, but he has to pursue them and then, when the market to which he is exporting becomes enlarged in value, the country to which he is exporting sets up its own plant, sets up tariffs against imports from outside, and an impasse is reached. Surely the Economic Community of the Six, a free market in Europe, is the obvious solution to this impasse. It is close to Britain and, very important, it uses in general the same type of goods as we do here at home.
In a speech the other day, Mr.Brown, the Foreign Secretary, gave some figures of gross national productivity which I think are worth mentioning in your Lordships' House. He said that in Britain to-day our gross national product, on a 1964 basis, is something like 35 billion pounds. But if we joined the European Economic Community and EFTA together the gross national product at the present time would be over 135 billion pounds. In the United States it is 210 billion pounds, and in the U.S.S.R. 72 billion pounds—more than twice what it is in this country. Here, then, is the price.
But there is another point. If size gives such advantages, as we saw in this inquiry into the chemical industries, then, if we do not go into the Common Market, and Germany, France and Italy, our competitors, have the advantage of size within their Community, they will be even more serious competitors to us in our own markets outside. But if we get into the Common Market, then I believe we shall benefit especially, because those industries in which we appear to have an advantage—the science-space industries, the modern industries, which if they are to grow need a mass market—will be the first to prosper. But this will be so only if we have this mass market.
There are many lessons which we can teach Europe, and there are many which they can teach us, to our mutual advantage. It is encouraging, I think, to note that, so far as industry is concerned, Europe as a whole is most anxious that we should come and work with them. Even in France the Patronat are most cordial and friendly to us in this project —and the Patronat are the equivalent of the C.B.I. in this country. I would at this
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point say how much I agree with one of the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Clitheroe in the debate yesterday—although I do not agree with all that he said—when he expressed the hope that we should adopt some of the taxation principles of the countries of the Common Market. They seem to base their taxation on principles to encourage enterprise and industry, and not to stifle it.
I claim, therefore, that it is the carefully considered view of industry in this country that we shall be able to compete reasonably successfully in this huge market of 300 million people if we succeed in getting into it, and that thereby we shall be able to increase greatly the prosperity of this overcrowded little Island of ours. Surely this is of great importance, so far as the Commonwealth is concerned. For if we prosper in this country, we can help the demands of the Commonwealth. As we have seen, over the last few difficult years we have had to cut off even sending capital to the Commonwealth because of the difficulties at home. One thing that the Commonwealth, and indeed the underdeveloped countries throughout the world, want above all others at the present time is capital; and we can provide this capital only if we are prosperous.
As a nation which has a larger inherited series of skills in manufacture, commerce and finance than any other in the world, it will surely be our own fault entirely if we do not compete successfully should we enter the Common Market. But I would emphasise that there will have to be adjustments, and painful adjustments; and we heard about a good many of them in the debate yesterday. Many people tend to be frightened of adjustments, but in industry, surely, we are having to make adjustments every day to meet the changing needs and requirements of our markets. It is those firms, those industries and those countries which refuse to make the necessary adjustments that go to the wall.
In conclusion, I would just say this. In the admirable debate yesterday, so much was so well said about the political opportunities, the cultural opportunities, the religious and moral opportunities and the opportunities, above all, for strengthening peaceful ties that I thought this afternoon I should confine my

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remarks mainly to the industrial scene in which I have been engaged all my life. But let me assure your Lordships that this in no way implies that I do not think these possibilities are not of immense and permanent importance, and in many ways probably even more important than the industrial scene which I have endeavoured to describe. I agree with every word spoken by my noble Leader, Lord Carrington, the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury, in his remarkable speech, and the noble Lords, Lord Caccia and Lord Sherfield, speaking from their expert knowledge.
Are we going into the Common Market? I trust that we shall go into the negotiations with our heads high and our reasonable demands firmly adhered to. We wish the Government well in their endeavours, and we only hope that their timing in this matter is right. But I see in some papers—indeed, in the majority of papers—that the possibility of our getting into the Common Market at this time is rated at only about 50–50. I hope this is not true; and I cannot believe that it is true. But even if, in spite of all the efforts—and this time the efforts of a combined nation, of all Parties together, which we never had before—we fail, then let us still hold our heads high, our principles intact and our confidence in ourselves unimpaired. We have many friends in the world outside Europe, and many other opportunities will offer themselves to this country in due course.
3.48 p.m.
LORD BLYTON: My Lords, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord McCorquodale of Newton, will excuse me if I do not follow him in the industrial, field. In the last paragraph of the White Paper the Prime Minister said:
"For all of us this is a historic decision which could well determine the future of Britain and indeed of the world for decades to come."
Although I take a contrary view to that contained in the document, a view long held by those in the Cabinet who are now embarking on this perilous journey, I agree that it is a historic decision, and one that will probably smash the Commonwealth to smithereens. The procedure that has been adopted by our Government is the same as that adopted by Mr. Macmillan when he was Prime Minister
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in 1962. First we had the probe, followed by an application to join the E.E.C. Then, when negotiations were taking place, we were told that nothing could be said because we could not show our cards. Then, if we had not been evicted by General de Gaulle, we should have faced a fait accompli. This is again the same procedure, and in the months ahead we shall probably be told that the negotiations are confidential until we settle the terms.
I do not apologise, on a day of loud hosannas from all sides for disturbing the jubilations by putting a contrary point of view. I rise to-day to restate the Labour Party policy of 1962 and support our Party's Conference decision on the five conditions laid down by our late respected Leader, Mr. Hugh Gaitskell, which up to date has not been changed. Those conditions were designed to safeguard the Commonwealth, its trade, British agricultural policy, the right to determine our own foreign policy without interference, the right to plan our own economy and safeguard our reserve currency and for the fulfilment of a pledge to EFTA. I know I shall be told that those conditions have been eroded since 1962, but in what respect they have been eroded has never yet elicited clarification. Even the Foreign Secretary, only seven months ago at our Conference at Brighton, said that those five conditions were still valid.
We were told last year that there would be the "great debate"; and what has been the debate till this week? It has been the Press and radio exclaiming in a loud voice: "We must go in. It is sure to come. If we do not get into the Common Market we shall be excluded from a substantial share of world trade. How can we isolate ourselves from Europe? Are we not Europe?". Those have been the headlines continually over the last twelve months. Then we had the fanatical "Europeans" of Britain shouting: "Sign the Treaty of Rome and negotiate after. Get in at all costs, regardless of the price to be paid and the damage done to our Commonwealth." I am pleased, as I said last week, that at least the Government have not gone that far.
Let me make it quite clear that, with all the attempts by propaganda in the last twelve months, I do not by any means think that the people of Britain have been brainwashed by it. I am confident that

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if this question can be tested with the people on the basis of the cost-of-living increase and the destruction of our Commonwealth, all those who advocate the Common Market policy must certainly get a rude awakening. I have not much in common with the Daily Express or the Morning Star, but they are the only two papers that have put the opposition point of view against the rest of the Press.
The Government have decided to apply, and in the negotiations there must be no sacrifice of our principles and no violation of our freedom. I seek co-operation with all countries, but not on terms dictated by the Economic Community of Europe. Neither does our survival depend on our being reluctantly admitted into the Market. The Treaty of Rome, the Treaty of Paris and Euratom are, political institutions seeking to reach a political goal by an economic method. Their goal is a European Parliament, and we shall have to accept it if we enter. When the last Government in 1962 tried to get in, and accepted humiliating terms in their endeavour to get in, they were always told of the perils if we did not get in and the real reward there would be if we did. But this time we are at the stage where now we are told, "In the first few years it will be painful, but in the long term great rewards will be yours."
What are we asked to do in our application to join, accepting the Treaty of Rome and the Treaty of Paris? We are asked to give up the right to determine our own destiny, for once we sign it is for an unlimited period and there is no escape clause. No country can legally withdraw, and that applies to us once we enter. We should have to accept in many spheres a European Court of Justice which will have power to overrule the decisions of the British High Court. And our elected Parliament would have to accept decisions made, though they might be derogatory to our economy. The House of Commons would be subservient to a High Authority abroad, and the elected representatives of the people would be powerless in many respects.
It has always been the cardinal principle in England for the people to exercise the right to influence Governments. We do this through the Press, lobbying, demonstrations and pressure on Members of Parliament. These things, as we
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all know, do exert influence, and rightly so. These rights would be stripped from us if we joined the Common Market under the Treaty of Rome. We should retain control over certain domestic matters such as education, housing and health. The Board of Trade, the Commonwealth Office, the Foreign Office, Customs and Excise, the Colonial Office, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Ministry of Agriculture would all, in varying degree, lose their independence of action. They would be no longer free to make decisions on their own judgment of facts and the people's wishes. They could take only those decisions which a majority of the Common Market agreed to permit. We should have to bow to majority decisions of a Council of Ministers, in which we should have 3 or 4 out of 20. Worse; these Ministers would be forced to take decisions against their judgment and against the people's wishes whenever a majority of the Common Market insisted.
It would be no good trying to sack a Government, as their successor would have to take up that position. It would be useless to demonstrate by lobbying; the matter would be out of Parliament's hands. Power of decisions would be shifted out of this country to a group of bureaucrats in Brussels and Luxembourg, whom we could not sack, except on the basis of a two-thirds majority in their Assembly, however much their policies might injure us. Since the High Authority is not responsible to us, we should not he able to lobby or demonstrate; and Brussels is a long way from London.
In the time that I have served in Parliament I have always seen a healthy anxiety lest excessive power be vested in our own Civil Service, who, after all, are accountable to Ministers, who in turn are responsible to the people. Under the Treaty of Rome, our civil servants will have no importance at all compared with the High Authority in Brussels, who will then have become our effective masters. The rights of our elected Parliament, for which struggles have taken place over the years, will have been usurped, at a time when many people are thinking of trying to make Government not less, but more, responsive to the public will. We shall have to surrender to the Executive Commission, composed of non-elected civil servants, the right to negotiate trade agreements

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with nations outside the Common Market. In other words, we shall not be able to make freely a trade agreement with Australia, Canada, New Zealand or South Africa, although these nations are among our best customers.
To take from the State its power to organise its economy is to give up a vital and essential part of Government. I want to see planning based not solely on economics, but with the aim of creating a kind of society which will be conducive to the happiness of our people. It must take into account such matters as the location of industry, the creation of the right balance between town and country, and the preservation of the beauty of Britain.
By joining the Common Market our country will be planned by others. It is true that we shall partake in these decisions, but in effect we shall cease to be able to build the Britain we want, and we shall have to accept the kind of Britain which foreign experts think will best fit in with their Continental plans. It will most certainly mean a substantial increase in food prices, estimated by some at 25s. a week for a family of four, and by others at 50s. a week, as the Meat Traders' Association said. Nevertheless, the Common Market requires big taxes to be imposed on agricultural imports from overseas. Half of our food to-day comes in duty free from the Commonwealth. In addition, control over our domestic food prices would pass from Parliament to officials on the Continent. I have seen Press reports of prominent men in this set-up stating that food prices must be stabilised at a higher level than that obtaining in the world market. It also involves the ending of our agricultural support system, which provides our farmers with a secure income and consumers with reasonably priced food, and substitutes for this a system specially designed for the needs of the less efficient peasant farmers on the Continent. It is known as an import levy system.
Our experience from the last negotiations was that the Government of the day accepted the principle of taxing cheap Commonwealth food in order to let dear European food come into this country tax free. At the last General Election the Conservatives made it a plank of their programme that they approved of an im-
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Ports levy tax which was to condition our economy for going into the Common Market. I have no complaint about that—they were defeated. But the Labour Party did not take the same line. Even the Prime Minister himself said at Bristol in the General Election, in the context of the Common Market
"That Britain should retain the right to buy its food and raw materials in the cheapest markets, the Commonwealth, and not have this trade wrecked by levies the Tories are so keen to impose."
This has been abandoned, and it seems that we have now accepted a dear food policy.
Whatever transitional arrangement we could get, at the end of the time we should be buying our food in the dearest markets of Europe and imposing a levy on the Commonwealth and the rest of the world. In accepting the Treaty of Rome it is implicit that we accept the European levy system. But what about labour and industrial issues, the movement of labour and the question of work permits for Commonwealth subjects? There will be free and unrestricted entry for workpeople from the Six countries. Will our Commonwealth people be allowed free entry into Europe? Trade unions have not much status in Europe; at High Authority level it is purely consultative. So far as I can see, all these issues are regarded as irrelevancies, but I am sure that they will loom as large issues before our entrance into the Common Market is effected
From the point of view of coal and steel, under the Treaty of Paris there is nothing to be gained for the worker. Coal on the Continent is stacked high on the ground, and so is steel. They have more than they can sell, and their capacity for producing steel has been reduced. These two industries of the European Coal and Steel Community are in serious trouble, and I doubt very much whether, on entry, our new nationalised Steel Board will not be forced to fragment the industry under the rules of competition under the Treaty of Paris. We know of High Court decisions against Belgium, which meant that they were prevented from price fixing in respect of coal. It is probable, if we get into the Common Market, that the Steel Board will be prevented from fixing steel prices as being against the rules of competition under that Treaty.

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Article 92 of the Treaty of Rome subjects workers and employers to the rules governing competition, one of which forbids any Member State to aid industry in any manner likely to destroy compettion within the Market. That means that our Government could be denied the right to give specific help to enable industries in this country to modernise and to become more efficient. If this rule were applied we should not be able to help the coal, steel or shipbuilding industries
The entry of Britain into the Common Market means the abandonment of the Commonwealth. When we tried to enter the Common Market last time, M. Couve de Murville, who was then the Foreign Minister of France, said:
"If Britain enters the Common Market with the Commonwealth, the Common Market is finished. If Britain enters the Common Market without the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth is finished"
How true this is, as we shall soon learn in the months that lie ahead. We know that when the late Government accepted the conditions for entering the Market, and accepted a discrimination within the Commonwealth, African dependencies were to be treated as second-class citizens and were to get in return a favourable entry to the British market. Canada, Australia and New Zealand did not even get this, and I, for one, do not expect that we shall get any better terms.
Many of the Common Market supporters have written off the Commonwealth. As one dependency after another attains independence, the stronger becomes the advocacy that Britain should now join Europe regardless of the Commonwealth. I do not subscribe to this philosophy. The Common Market is avowedly political in its aims. The Six form a political bloc aiming at a united Europe, and if we are accepted Britain, for the first time in her life, would be bound politically to the Continent of Europe. While I support the organisation of defence in NATO, which we can leave by giving notice, I do not support a Britain which would become merely a part of the Continent of Europe, bound up with the aims of the Continental powers which do not concern us. There is still the whole of the outside world with which we can trade. What is needed is world unity, not continental grouping. Europe, after years of domination,
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has now to live in a world where other continents, inhabited by black, whites and yellow races, no longer acknowledge white supremacy.
It is often suggested that a vast market is available if we join. By joining we must bring to an end Imperial Preference and discriminate against Commonwealth countries with a market of 700 million people. Our trade with the Imperial Preference area is 39 per cent.; with EFTA it is 14 per cent.; with the E.E.C. it is 19 per cent., and with the rest of the world it is 28 per cent. So if we join by ourselves we shall have to put tariffs against 81 per cent. of our trade with all countries outside the E.E.C. In turn we can expect that the other countries will reciprocate and put tariffs on our exports. In this context we could lose more world trade than we can gain by entering the Common Market. Our trade with the European Community has increased although we did not sign the Treaty of Rome and we still retain our sovereignty.
Again, if the cost of living goes up then wages will have to increase, and if we are also to put a levy on imports of our raw materials it will mean that our costs will go up, and that will reduce our competitiveness. And what happens to the prices and incomes policy? You cannot restrain wages when by your own political action you increase the cost of food that people have to buy. To those who say, in their advocacy of the Common Market, that the Market is necessary to us, I reply: so is our market necessary to them. In any case, big as the Common Market is, it is only part of a worldwide scene in which a nation like ours can look for its trade. One of our principles in the Labour Party has been that we will safeguard Commonwealth trade. That means that we cannot accept to tax imported food from the Commonwealth, as we will have to do under the Treaty of Rome. If our conditions are not acceptable—and they will not be unless the Treaty is altered to suit—then we ought to concentrate on a policy with EFTA and the Commonwealth. This would be a return to our future destiny of friendship and co-operation with the multiracial Commonwealth and the Scandinavian countries. After all, the Commonwealth and the EFTA countries as a whole offer most of the economic

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resources of the world, and their potential resources are much greater than those of any part of Western Europe.
We should invite all other countries, like Poland, Yugoslavia and the Soviet bloc, to join EFTA, and then we should all work out plans for a rapidly expanding trade between us. In this plan there would be no loss of sovereignty and no loss of our control over our own affairs. This is my alternative to the supra-nationalism that we see abroad, and if we must have groupings that is the grouping I should like to see. It is only the fainthearted, and those who want to tie us up, hip and thigh, to the Common Market, who will not see a programme of this character.
My Lords, it is my firm belief that if Britain does not get into the Common Market—and we are a long way from it yet—we shall not only survive but prosper; and we shall not only retain but increase our influence in the world. If we face humiliation a second time it will be most deplorable. The great task before us is to give a new lead in international policy aimed at the expansion of international trade, the maintenance of full employment and securing a greater share of world prosperity for the developing nations, without being hamstrung by High Authorities of Europe who are responsible to no Parliaments and who can override the wishes of an elected Parliament.
If the five conditions of the Labour Party Conference were accepted by the E.E.C., it would mean a conscious decision to liberalise their commercial policy and to become outward-looking rather than an inward-looking Community. It would mean they would have to recognise, in deeds as well as words, that Britain has obligations, not just to 200 million people within the Common Market but to 700 million people within the Commonwealth.
How is it that the Government now think that our safeguards are more easily attainable? There has been no alteration in the Treaty of Rome: it is the same as when it was made in 1957. And the Treaty of Paris is also the same. They are the same as when Mr. Heath got his terms. The Treaty of Rome is still the same as when members of my own Government were very critical of
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these Treaties in 1962. I see no evidence at all to justify the arguments we now have, that the Treaty of Rome is not so rigorous as they thought then, and many of us have grave misgivings about this. I seek to trade with all countries but not on terms dictated by the Treaty of Rome. Make agreement, yes, complementary to each other's economies, but not to hand over the liberties we have gained in Britain over all these years. There are many other problems that arise, though I will not touch on them to-day. I am thinking of the agricultural levy, the position of sterling, the balance of payments, and so on, which await the negotiations.
It is now becoming fashionable for those who disagree with my point of view to call us "Little Englanders" or "Ancient Britons", as "Manny" Shinwell was called. It is easy to sneer when argument fails. I must say that I am pleased to be a "Little Englander". I am fighting not to destroy the Commonwealth, which twice in my lifetime has come to our aid, with material wealth and manpower, in two world wars. Many of their sons, who fought to save us from those whom we now want to embrace, lie in battlefields abroad. Whilst I have forgiven much that was done by those who fought against us, I could not throw overboard our people of the Commonwealth for new-found friends in Europe, especially under the Treaty of Rome and all the political implications that are involved.
The peoples of Canada, Australia and New Zealand are, by birth and descent, as much British as we are, and we cannot sever or repudiate the union of history and of common interest. We cannot desert those other member nations of the Commonwealth of different blood who by conquest in the past are still with us as a result of our years in their countries. If we have to face a choice between Europe and our British partners in the Commonwealth, and it has to be made in the future, then, my Lords, I know my choice.
This decision should be taken only after the people have been told plainly what it involves and have been given the right to decide such momentous issues. Moreover, as we have long been accustomed to ruling ourselves, before any part of our liberty to do so has been delegated to

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others the people ought to be consulted. Even to-day, it is reported that Professor Hallstein has said that we must accept political union. Without the people understanding what is involved, it is not right that the Government and Parliament should commit us forever to the European Community, which would deprive every future Parliament of much of its sovereignty in a number of major issues affecting the life of every person, living and unborn. To take this, as the Prime Minister said, "most historic decision in our lives" without giving the people that elected the Government, and for whom they hold their powers in trust an opportunity of deciding, or even expressing an opinion on Britain's future as a democracy, would, in my opinion, be travelling a dangerous road.
To-night, if a vote is taken I shall abstain and reserve my position until we see what conditions for entry are accepted by the Government. To-day, in my opinion, the so-called benefits from entry consist of speculation, conjecture and imagination. The Commonwealth countries are now becoming alarmed. They fear for the second time that they are to be sacrificed if we can get into Europe. The countries in the Commonwealth who grow sugar and which are one-crop-only countries are greatly alarmed also, as they know that the Six are concentrating on a huge sugar beet industry. They are dependent on our market because we geared their economy to ours. If we go in, ruin awaits those people.
I await with anxiety the long negotiations ahead. It is a gigantic gamble. The problems are immense. My last word is, let the people know and let them decide the issues. This is what Labour demanded from the Tories in 1962. I conclude by saying that it is a sad day for the Commonwealth, apart from all the other issues involved. In my 47 years in the Socialist Party I never dreamed that our Party would be the one to strike such a mortal blow at our friends with whom we have been associated for over a hundred years. At this stage I say to the Government and to the people of Britain, in the words of the great Bard, William Shakespeare:
"Those friends thou halt, and their adoption tried,
Grapple them to thy soul with hoops of steel"
4.24 p.m
THE EARL OF CROMER: My Lords, I rise to-day to support the Motion before the House. As has been said by a number of noble Lords, and by nobody more clearly than the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition, in what I thought was a remarkable and outstanding speech in yesterday's debate, this is a historic decision, of fundamental importance not only to the country but to the world at large. It is a declaration of our intent to move forward in step with like-minded neighbours towards building a world fitted to meet the problems, economic, financial and industrial, of the 20th century.
As the noble Lord, Lord McCorquodale of Newton, in another outstanding speech mentioned, the scale of industrial production is probably the keynote to the second half of this century in the industrial world; and the scale on which investment in industry of the future will be called for can only be justified on a market size that supports the demand. The capital intensiveness of modern industry is going to become greater and greater, and with the capital intensiveness the greater will be the investment required.
But this declaration of ours is at the same time an acknowledgment, I think, that we are now ready to leave behind us, albeit with honour and respect where it is due, those elements of outworn dogma, some of which have bedeviled our progress in the modern environment. If, with respect, I suggest that the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack did perhaps less than full justice to the changes implied in our life by accession to the Treaty of Rome, I think it can be claimed that other noble Lords have fully filled in any gaps there may have been. But I think it is right and proper that we should recognise that change is implicit. Some of these changes will be fundamental, and they will affect our daily lives in a variety of ways.
The basic subject of tariffs was touched on yesterday by the noble Lord, Lord Kahn, who deplored the fact that we should be lowering tariffs more than other countries would be doing. I personally welcome this move, as a move away from discrimination and preference, albeit only within the circle of the Community. But

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I believe it is a move in the right direction.
While this is indeed an Economic Community, the implementation of economic and financial policies stems from political decision. I think that the political decision lying behind the Motion before the House to-day is the right one for this country. So far as the political judgment in the timing of making the application is concerned, I am in no position to judge. I have no doubt that it has been carefully weighed by the Government against the serious and far-reaching results that are possible if the negotiations are not brought to a successful conclusion. I do not mean by this that there are not other alternatives for us if the negotiations are unsuccessful. Of course there are. I do not think they will be any easier. I do not think life will in any way be simpler; and the fact of the negotiations failing, were that to happen, would, I think, have a disruptive effect on world trade and world relations generally.
Most of the topics connected with our accession to the Common Market have already been touched on, with the rather notable exception of those particularly within the financial field, and it is with those that briefly I should like to deal to-day. I welcome this Motion, as I believe that if the negotiations are successful this country will once again find itself in the mainstream of world financial affairs instead of the financial backwater that we have busied ourselves in trying to contain, largely as the result of our Exchange Control measures, brought upon us by the circumstances of our affairs. I wonder whether noble Lords fully realise the extent to which we have withdrawn from the financial mainstream of the world as a result of these restrictions. Many of these restrictions now are even more rigorous than they were during the war. The noble Lord, Lord Clitheroe, yesterday mentioned that one of the companies with which he was associated had either branches or affiliations with the Common Market countries. Of course, he is lucky, because anybody else who wanted to emulate him to-day would not be allowed to do so; nor, for that matter—for those who think that this is entirely confined to the Community—would he, as things stand, receive any
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encouragement to make an investment in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa or Eire.
I feel that this degree of retrenchment is perhaps not as fully recognised as it might be. Curiously, it is more clearly discernible when viewed from a distant vantage point, with the benefit of perspective that only distance can give. We are finding ourselves opting out of more and more international business. It is true that the ingenuity displayed by the British financial community in seeking legitimate ways of participating in world financial affairs disguises to some extent the full effect of the restrictions which exist; but the cumulative effects of these restrictions are progressive. They work through over a period of time. The immediate results and effects are not particularly noticeable, but the erosion which is taking place is continuous.
I know there are those who are concerned at the possible results of the removal of restrictions inherent in accession to the Treaty of Rome. Personally, I feel that the fears on this score are rather exaggerated. I do not believe that there would be a rush of portfolio investment from this country into the Community countries if restrictions were removed—one has only to look at the yield on equity investments in Continental countries to find some support for this argument. But more fundamentally, whether we join the Community or not, I think that most economists, no matter what particular camp they belong to, agree—it is rare that they agree on anything, but I think they agree on this—that this country needs to see an inflow of foreign capital of investments from abroad coming to this country in the years ahead. This will come about only if the opportunities and conditions for the employment of funds in this country and the treatment of investments in this country are at least as good as they are in the other industrialised countries of the world.
If this is to be the case—and we must make it the case—the incentive to the British investor to seek the first opportunity to invest abroad in preference to investing at home is not very great. Given that the conditions at home are satisfactory, the degree of diversification that the average British investor is likely to seek is not, in my opinion, likely to be

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any serious threat. The institutional investor is a different matter; for quite different reasons he, too, has quite severe limitations on the extent to which he is likely to seek overseas investment—at least as the law stands at present—not as a result of exchange control, but as a result of his contractual liabilities to his investors.
I make these remarks in the hope that it may not be considered necessary to seek too long a transitional period in adherence to the Treaty of Rome in this regard. I feel that the next few years will see major changes in the structure of industry within the Community and the continuation of rationalisation within British industry. It would, in my belief, be unfortunate if these two movements take place separately—in two separate streams, if you like—rather than comprehensively to meet the needs of the European market as a whole as one envisages it existing towards the end of the century. And it is towards the end of the century that we should now be planning. In this connection, we have to look at the future. It is important, in my belief, that we participate as fully as we can in the process of rationalisation in the Community as it is a sphere of activity in which we are particularly skilled, and if vie fail to participate from the start it will become progressively more difficult to do so later; that is to say, if we accede to the Treaty of Rome.
One further point I should like to mention relates to the suggestions which have appeared in the Press that means should be found to differentiate between investment in the Community and investment on a world-wide basis. It would, in my belief, be a mistake to attempt to introduce by regulation discrimination between one area and another. The removal of discrimination on payments as between one country and another was one of the great tasks in the financial and monetary field in the decade following the war, culminating in regard to what are known as current payments with the adoption by the United Kingdom and the leading countries of Europe of external convertibility, from which great benefits have accrued to the trade. I feel that it would be a retrogressive step to attempt to introduce discrimination, and I would suggest that it would be displaying some naïvety
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in the knowledge of the viscosity of money.
One last point relates to sterling as a key currency, and the Sterling Area. Here again, I know that there are misgivings, misgivings amongst Continental observers rather than in this country. I regard these misgivings as being exaggerated. I think it is well to bear in mind that the Sterling Area is a by-product of British history in the field of finance, and is not an end in itself. The rather formal concept of the Sterling Area is of relatively recent origin. The use of sterling, both as a reserve currency and a trading currency has been, and doubtless will continue to be, a subject of a constant evolution. The foreign holder of sterling has long been entirely free to convert his sterling into some other currency, but despite the vicissitudes through which sterling has passed the tendency to do this has been markedly unimportant. The vicissitudes themselves have stemmed from the manner in which we have managed our economy here at home. The international use of sterling as a trading or a reserve currency has not of itself been a source of weakness, but has been the medium through which the lack of confidence from time to time has manifested itself. On the basis that we manage our economy here at home within our means, which is incumbent upon us whether we join the Common Market or not, then I do not see the international role of sterling as any impediment to the obligations which we may assume under the Treaty of Rome. If anything, I see it in the contrary sense as being advantageous to ourselves and to the other members of the Community.
The noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, introduced in his speech yesterday the thought of some sort of European currency, and indeed perhaps our grandchildren may see something of the sort. I myself do not believe that this is something which is of any great concern to us at present. I think it is a very distant dream. On the other hand, the degree of co-operation which exists to-day between the central banks, which has been of such immense assistance to us in this country, will, if anything, be enhanced, and I think that this development is likely to continue regardless of this particular discussion. I

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support this Motion, and I wish our negotiators all success in the task that lies ahead of them.
4.40 p.m.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, I had not intended to speak in this debate but I was asked yesterday to do so, and I felt very much like the noble Lord, Lord McCorquodale of Newton, in wondering what there was left to say after so many admirable speeches, and particularly after the opening speeches by my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor and by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington. I thought that at any rate the case for the Motion had been adequately covered in those two speeches, and I was quite ready to vote at the end of what they said. But I thought I should get some inspiration, as the noble Lord, Lord Lord McCorquodale of Newton, did, from the debate which we had on August 1 and 2, 1962, which was indeed a remarkable debate.
It was opened by my late noble friend, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, and there took part in it my noble friend Lord Attlee and my late noble friend Lord Lucan. All three of them were bitterly opposed to our entering the Common Market and, like the noble Lord, Lord Blyton, they stated what they thought was the Labour Party's position as that time. Among other people who were opposed to our entering the Common Market was the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, and I am very glad that he had courage to come and say that he had changed his view. May I say to the noble Lord, Lord McCorquodale of Newton, as I said on the previous occasion, that I agreed with everything he said? My own views have been very much confirmed by what has happened in the intervening years since 1962. I was gratified to find that a great many of the things which I said then have been repeated on this occasion. For instance, the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, talked about the spirit in which we should enter the Common Market. We should not enter as suppliants. We should not apply from weakness, nor from strength. All these things were said in 1962, and there were many others which have been said again now.
There is one important new factor which we did not adequately discuss at
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that time, and that is the common agricultural policy which has now largely been agreed upon but which at that time was merely foreshadowed. We had no exact idea as to what kind of agreement would be made by the Six, or whether any agreement would be possible. We now have it, with all its disadvantages in the short term, and those who are opposed to our entering the Common Market, and who always have been, have made use of this new factor in advocating their objection.
I am in favour of this Motion and of applying to enter the Common Market, as I think everyone else is, on two grounds. The first is our long-term self-interest: the larger markets that will be available to us; the greater opportunities for making use of our skill, our technological ability and experience, our nuclear progress and matters of that kind. I need not elaborate on this, because the case has already been made so admirably. If anything, the case is even stronger to-day than it was then. The second reason I favour entry into the Common Market is the political one, and in that I want to include, as the noble Lord, Lord McCorquodale of Newton, did, the cultural case, the opportunities for widening the scope of culture; the spiritual case, which was made by the most reverend Primate yesterday, and, generally, the widening and broadening of the whole sphere of human activity.
Some people, including myself, regard the political case as even more important than the economic case, although we all recognise that this will have to evolve and will not come about in the very near future. It would be highly dangerous to prepare to-day any framework for such an ultimate evolution. But we must face the fact that, if we do enter the Common Market, eventually political unity is inevitable.
We shall be working very closely economically with a number of nations, but we shall also be working with them in the modification of certain laws. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Blyton, that our entry into the Common Market must affect some of the Statutes and laws of this country; that we shall be handing over to the Commission of the Six the power to make laws which will affect this country. But, of course, we shall

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have a voice in any changes which are made and one must assume—and I do assume—that our fellow members of the Community will be acting reasonably, and that our influence will be felt in any changes which are made. Moreover, we shall retain our own domestic and national interests, and our national characteristics. The Treaty of Rome does not permit of any interference with the day-to-day lives of its member nations.
In 1962 a great case was made by my noble friend Lord Attlee about the danger of entering the European Community, from the point of view of its political consequences. He feared, as was the case at that time, that it might even accentuate the difficulties between the East and the West; that we should have been joining a clique which he thought at that time existed largely for the purpose of combating Communism and preventing its growth and influence. That view is not held to-day to anything like the same extent. I believe that most of the members of the Community would welcome a closer relationship with the countries of the East, and it would be very interesting, once we are in—as I hope we shall be—to see what line was taken if there were an application to join by, say, Yugoslavia, Poland or some other member of the Warsaw Pact. I think that we should be prepared to accept such an application on its merits, and that the Community would gain.
Eventually, if our objective is really achieved, it will be a Community of the whole of Europe. This may take many years, but that is the ultimate objective; a Community of the whole of Europe, with a population running into perhaps 500, 600 or 700 million people. The time may well come when even such a Community will not be too large, because we still have to face the possibility of a community of the whole of the American continent (and steps have already been taken in that direction by the United States) and the possibility of another Asian community, with China perhaps as its focal point. So I look forward, from a political point of view, to a Community of the whole of Europe although, as I have said, one cannot necessarily plan for this at the present time.
The real case against our applying, if there is one, was made by the noble Lord,
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Lord Kahn, the noble Lord, Lord Woolley, and the noble Lord, Lord Blyton, and it is that for the short-term it will undoubtedly mean some increase in the cost of living: how much is a matter for discussion and speculation. The Government have given certain figures. In their view, it might be between 2½ and 3½per cent.; but if they can negotiate to spread the effect it will be over a period of a number of years and will not be felt very substantially by those who are going to be affected. To the extent that it would be a hardship on certain classes of persons, such as people on fixed incomes, people on low incomes, old-age pensioners and so on, the Prime Minister, in his, I think, wonderful television appearance last night, answered by saying that the Government would contemplate increases in pensions for people who are the victims of any increase in the cost of living; and, of course, we should do everything we possibly could to mitigate and alleviate the results of any hardship that might be incurred.
I do not propose to give the Government any detailed advice on how to carry on the negotiations. The House, in passing this Motion, must be held to express confidence in the ability of our negotiators to do just this. Where some hardship is inevitable they will, as I have said, do their utmost to mitigate it, either by internal action or as the result of negotiations with the members of the Six. We shall also try to ease the transitional stage—and I agree with the noble Earl, Lord Cromer, that the transitional stage should not be too long. I think it would be a great mistake to hang it out for, as some think, four or five years. I do not propose to put a time limit on it, but I think it should be very much shorter than that.
The Prime Minister has already said that in negotiating he would try to discuss principles and not details, leaving these for determination until we are inside the Community. I think that is right. Once we are inside the Community and have settled the main principles then I think that our influence should be sufficient to ensure that we get a reasonable settlement of the details. To get bogged down by detail would be making the same mistake as I regret to say we made on the earlier occasion. In saying this I am not criticising Mr. Heath at all. He did his best, and I think he did an excellent job; but the one mistake I think he made

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was to get too much bogged down by detail, with the result that he gave the impression that, as a people, we were not really serious, or were not wholly serious, about joining the Market.
Of course, there was something to be said for that view. In the debates in this House and in the other place in 1962 there was a great deal of opposition to our joining the Market—opposition which does not exist to anything like the same extent to-day—so it was natural that getting bogged down in detail should have given the impression that we as a nation were not yet ready to join the Market. We must not give that impression to-day.
There are a few principles we must discuss and settle. We all know what they are. They have been referred to over and over again in the course of the debates here and in the other place. Once we have settled those, there should be no delay in applying formally to join the Market. I was very glad to hear the Prime Minister say, in this same Panorama programme last night, that he hoped we should be in a very favourable position for coming to a firm decision by the end of this year.
My Lords, there has been some question as to timing. Is this the right time for making the application? I am sure it is. My own view is that if we do not make our application now it will be too late. This is our last chance. We cannot go on discussing the pros and cons of joining the Common Market and remain shivering on the brink. This is the time when we must make our decision; and I agree with all those who have said that it is a most fateful decision that we are making. I myself am as convinced as ever that by accepting the Motion before the House to-day and by making application we shall be taking a step which will be for the benefit of our people, of the Commonwealth, of the whole of Europe and of the world.
4.58 p.m.
LORD BUTLER of SAFFRON WALDEN: My Lords, I hope noble Lords will excuse and tolerate me for a few minutes in a short intervention. I do not wish to make a speech because I think it is far too late; and I must apologise for not having been present during the debate yesterday, which was
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impossible owing to a previous engagement elsewhere. However, I have been able to read the whole debate in both Houses.
I speak as the Chairman of the Home Committee of the Government to which the negotiators reported during the course of our previous negotiations to join the Common Market. I speak also as one who sat side by side with Mr. Macmillan, when he was Prime Minister, at the very difficult Commonwealth Conference which took place before the negotiations finally broke down—a Conference of such extreme difficulty that I can remember walking round Marlborough House garden with our then Prime Minister and our wondering whether we should ever be able to bring that Conference along with us and make application. It was largely due to the drive and determination of Mr. Macmillan that we were able to go ahead and make application on the last occasion. I simply wish to say that the position with regard to the Commonwealth has, in my view, almost completely changed since that date, and from the point of view of the Commonwealth is very much better now than it was then.
I also speak as one who was President of the O.E.E.C. in Paris for four years running. In those days—it was only the 1950s—it was regarded as normal in Europe for Britain to take the lead and, indeed, to take the chair. The whole of the affairs of Europe, economic or otherwise, were then discussed; and I look forward with confidence to the day when Europe will again find it useful to have Britain taking the lead and taking part in her most intimate affairs. I often wonder why we did not take part earlier in the discussions about the Common Market. I believe it was due to our Ministers and our Government Departments—including the Treasury, the Foreign Office and the Board of Trade—not taking the Messina conversations seriously, and in their being unduly frightened about the word "federation".
I should like to say to the noble Lord, Lord Blyton, in answer to his very moving and eloquent speech to-day, that I think it is a very grave exaggeration to say that the signing of the Treaty of Rome is going to interfere with our own Parliament and with our own daily life. I believe that signing the Treaty of Rome

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is the sine qua non of successful negotiations with the Six at the present time. I am glad that the Government have taken that hurdle, because without it I do not think we could hope for the negotiations to be successful at all. I now wish the negotiations well for political and economic reasons.
As Sir Winston Churchill pointed out —and I gave recently the Churchill Memorial Lecture in Zurich describing his spirit and his ideas—it is vital that we should have a presence in Europe, politically. This has also been brought out by the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, not so much in his speech yesterday, but in his previous writings. It is really essential for Britain to be in Europe to keep the balance between France and Germany. There was little mention in the debate yesterday on the possibility of Germany developing in a certain way which we all fear. Whether she does or not, I believe that we are the only nation who, politically, in Europe can be right in the middle and be the right strength for peace by simply being part of Europe. That is the political argument.
The economic argument has been described by the noble Lord, Lord McCorquodale of Newton. The only difference I have with him is that his figures of the gross national product of the various countries differed markedly from those given by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor yesterday. I do not wish to go into details, except to say that when we see the size of our own gross national product as an Island, and what it would be if we had the Community and EFTA with us, if we all got together, I do not think it needs any further words of mine in this very short intervention to point out that for our industry it is absolutely vital to have wider markets, wider potentialities, and to take part in a wider and greater gross national product than we could alone.
My Lords, before I joined Mr. Macmillan in agreeing that I was in favour of entry into the Common Market, I had reserved my position about agriculture. I should like to warn the House that I do not think the position about agriculture is very easy to-day. The nub of the whole thing is the financial arrangement surrounding the agricultural policy. The Prime Minister said yesterday in the House of Commons that the levy bill
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might be as much for us as for all the other countries put together. The noble and learned Lord reminded us of the excellent paper which has been published by the Government on the agricultural situation, and that the strain on our balance of payments may be between £175 million and £250 million a year. We must find a solution to this problem.
I have kept in touch with the leaders of the Six ever since I was Foreign Secretary, and ever since I was taking part in the previous negotiations. I keep in touch with representatives of the French Government and with others concerned. I can assure noble Lords that this is the point upon which the Six feel that the difficulties will really arise. Some reference has been made to-day by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, and by other speakers to the fact that the transitional period should be short. I do not mind a bit if the transitional period is short on the rest of the canvas; but on the agricultural canvas we may find that we shall have a long transitional period before we finally settle this matter. I go so far as to say that if we settled this matter and then had a long transitional period for agriculture to work itself out, it might well be the most sensible solution of all—at any rate, a great deal more sensible than breaking down the financial arrangements of the agricultural policy.
My Lords, I promise not to detain you. I want to add only three further points. The first concerns what I have mentioned about the Commonwealth. What we said to that Commonwealth Conference was that a Britain strong economically would help the Commonwealth more than any other arrangement we could possibly make. It is because I believe that going into Europe will make Britain strong that I believe that, eventually, it will be better for the Commonwealth than any other plan. The second is in regard to the Treaty of Rome. I agree with the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor who said in his speech yesterday that the remarks made by the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, on August 2, 1962, were correct.
"I venture to suggest" —
he said —
"that the vast majority of men and women in this country will never directly feel the impact of the Community-made law at all"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, col. 420.]

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I think the noble Lord, Lord Blyton, was exaggerating greatly when he said that we shall all suffer in the way he suggested.
Lastly, my Lords, a word on the balance of payments. I was glad that the noble Earl, Lord Cromer, referred to this matter, because my friends in Europe tell me that our position with sterling is the second big difficulty—the first being the Financial Resolution relating to the agricultural policy. For once, I do not agree with Lord Gladwyn that we shall easily reach a European currency, although I hope, as Lord Cromer said, that that will come in due course. At the moment, we have to go in with our sterling proudly flying, as it should, as our own proud achievement. I hope that we shall never give it up as our currency and as a world currency.
I believe that the difficulties have been grossly exaggerated; though I recognise that there is a lot to be done by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and by other Ministers concerned, in supporting sterling internationally. I believe it will be strengthened by going into Europe. But means of supporting it, even within Europe, may be found. I believe that we are going to have difficult negotiations, particularly on the points of the agricultural Financial Resolution; and therefore I do not mind if we see a longer transitional period for agriculture to work itself out.
I agree with my old friend Lord Clitheroe that if we do not go in wider groupings are still possible, and that we should never lose our nerve. But I disagree with him in that I believe we should make this further attempt, make it firmly and on a wide front. The most reverend Primate spoke from the particular spiritual angle. I want to say a last word from the cultural angle. I have recently assumed the presidency of the British Committee of the European Cultural Foundation, because I believe that now I am not active politically I should do something in the sphere of culture to further what we all have at heart; that is, the unity of Europe. It is in that spirit that I shall support this Motion.
5.9 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I had not intended to intervene in
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this debate. For I am certainly not an economist, and I realise that I am speaking to a gathering of experts. If I do speak, for a very few minutes indeed, it is because of some things that were said—or perhaps it would be more accurate to say were not said—in this House yesterday. One noble Lord (I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Carrington) said in his speech that he thought our discussion was to some extent bound to be a sham fight; for everyone on both sides had made up his mind long ago what he thought on this particular subject. I am afraid that I am not one of those. Like, I think, the noble Lord, Lord Champion, who spoke yesterday, I am one who still finds it terribly difficult, even now, to decide my final attitude on this difficult and tortuous subject.
My main object in coming to this House yesterday, was to listen to what was said on both sides and to make up my mind on which side the true balance of the argument came down. Even after listening to the speeches of some of those in your Lordships' House whose judgment I most respect, in favour of the course which the Government now advocate, I still find, I must confess, that I am very much in two minds—even in spite of the advice of my own Leader—as to whether the present decision of the Government is right.
A striking feature of the debate yesterday—at least so I thought—was that, although all the theoretical arguments used in favour of our entry into the Common Market were impeccable, they were never supported by figures. On the other hand, all the speeches made by those expressing doubts did include figures—and all those figures seemed to me to point rather in the other direction. Take the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Kahn, to which we all listened with such deep interest. He is, I know, an acknowledged expert on these subjects, and one of very great distinction. What was the general effect of his speech? I think it was this: that the entry of this country into the Common Market would mean a substantial rise in the cost of living in this country, and, above all, in the cost of living of the very poorest classes; and he gave figures in support of that view.

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If I am not misquoting the noble Lord, he said that the rise in the general cost of living might amount to about 3½ per cent., and that for the poorest classes, if I may say so, where bread consumes a much larger proportion of their weekly wage than is the case in other sections of the population, it would be very much more. The rise in the cost of bread was likely to be about 14 per cent., and though this was likely to be offset over the whole country by a fall in the cost of vegetables and fruit, the poorest classes, as he pointed out, do not in fact eat much vegetables and fruit and so it would not help them very much; and the noble Lord gave other examples of the same kind.
What is more, my Lords, similar views were expressed by my noble friend Lord Clitheroe, also a man of long experience in politics, and later in financial circles; and he, too, quoted figures in support of his argument. Nor have these figures, so far as I have heard, been controverted in any way by protagonists of the other side. The Prime Minister, indeed, has given an assurance (I think he gave it in another place, and I gather that he repeated it last night) that if the poorest people—for example, the pensioners—were heavily hit, their difficulties would be alleviated—he gave that assurance—by higher pensions and lighter taxes.
But, my Lords, if there are to be lighter taxes and higher pensions for these people, and possibly for others as well, it is surely fair to ask where the money for that is to come from. That point was very much skated over in your Lordships' debate yesterday. It was hardly mentioned at all. The money will clearly not come from the taxes on tobacco and alcohol which to-day, as was said by the noble Lord, Lord Kahn, bring in, I think, £1,700 million annually to the Exchequer; for, as the noble Lord pointed out (col. 1237), there are already proposals being considered by the Commission for:
"the harmonisation of tax rates on alcohol and tobacco"
I do not know exactly what that means; but in the context in which the noble Lord used the words, it seemed to indicate that, at any rate in his view, if we joined the Common Market there would be a lower yield to the Exchequer from these two items.
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Where then, my Lords, is this money to come from? We have not been told, and I feel that the country, and your Lordships, too, ought to be given more information on this particular aspect. I hope that the Leader of the House will give it in his reply. It would be a very great help to a great many of us, I am sure, to know what his answer is, and it is surely relevant; for, up to now, all we have been given are comfortable assurances that all will be well in the long run. My Lords—and I would say this in particular, if I may, to the noble Lord, Lord Silkin—my grandfather, who was Prime Minister at the end of the last century and who as a result of the hard experiences of his political life had become more and more sceptical about comfortable assurances, used to have a phrase which he sometimes used. It was, "My old enemy, the long run." Much that we have heard to-day seems to me to be a classic example of "My old enemy, the long run."
I may of course be asked, and quite properly, "You may not be altogether happy about this plan, but what is your alternative?" My Lords, judging by the debate to-day there seems to be a number of alternatives. We have heard them produced in more than one speech. The noble Lord, Lord Caccia, mentioned no fewer than three—certainly two, and I think three; and no doubt there are others. I must confess that for political and other reasons the one I should have greatly preferred would have been what the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, yesterday called
"…a trading association of EFTA with the Atlantic Powers, or such an association with selected Powers to include Australia and New Zealand as well as Canada; this with or without the United States and Japan, at least in the first stage".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, col. 1230.]
I think that an admirable idea, if I may say so with all deference. It seems to me to have no important disadvantages over the Government's present plan and to have one vastly greater advantage, in that it provides, politically, a far more adequate balance between the Communist bloc and the Free World than an arrangement limited strictly to Europe can ever have. I do not know whether President Johnson would prove as obstructive as General de Gaulle has been; but he could not possibly be worse.

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However, having said all this, and having expressed my doubts, I do not, I can assure your Lordships, propose to vote against the present proposal, if it is pressed to a vote. We must recognise that it is supported by the leaders of all the great political Parties and by the majority of their supporters, at any rate in Parliament. I emphasise the words "in Parliament", because it seems to me to be yet another example of a steadily growing practice, even in Parliamentary democracy as it is now developing, that there is no necessity for Parliament to consult the people, even on matters that most intimately concern them. In this case, I recognise that a decision has been taken: the die has been cast. Mr. Wilson has made up his mind: Mr. Heath has made up his mind: Mr. Thorpe has made up his mind. In such circumstances, and matters having gone so far, may I very diffidently wish the attempt well. But my Lords, I cannot conceal from myself that it will not break my heart if this attempt fails and we can turn to Lord Caccia's alternative; and I suspect that in saying this I speak for quite a considerable proportion of the British people.
5.19 p.m.
LORD BYERS: My Lords, we have had a long debate and a good debate, and I am glad to say that we on these Benches do not have the difficulty the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, has in making up his mind; although I must say from these Benches how much we appreciate the good wishes with which he ended his speech. We have believed for a very long time in the British people playing their full part as good Europeans in the politics and economics of the world. It is for this reason that for many years we have been unwavering in our support of efforts to bring the European nations together in a much larger political and economic community. This has not by any means been a Liberal monopoly, but leading Liberals, like the late Lord Layton, my noble friend Baroness Asquith of Yarnbury, and my noble friend Lord Gladwyn, who spoke yesterday, have all played a vigorous part in trying to educate the public of this country to appreciate the excitement and the challenge presented by these wider horizons.
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Liberalism is essentially international; it is essentially a belief in the free movement of peoples, goods and services across frontiers. To many of us this greater community, enlarged by British membership to about 300 million people, offered the economic scope and the breaking down of barriers which we believed would bring out the best in our industry, and indeed, even in our agriculture. It had the added advantage to the free traders that it made the protection of the common external tariff seem respectable. I was interested in what the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Saffron Walden, said in his short intervention about the way in which there was so little enthusiasm in this country and also in Europe for a wider community and a wider arrangement.
As I have said, we claim no monopoly, but we can claim not to have wavered in our support for British entry. In the other Parties there have been changes of view and of heart. Some of them we have welcomed. We do not object to people changing their minds. Mr. Shinwell in 1951 was a strong advocate of European unity. Mr. Peart, however, has never wavered, so far as I know, in his opposition to the idea. Some of the Conservatives were, on the whole, pretty lukewarm and aloof for quite a long time after 1957, until they presented Mr. Heath with the almost impossible task of trying to negotiate our entry with inadequate preparation of the public mind. I think that it was this lack of previous enthusiasm by the Conservatives, coupled with an uneducated public, a hostile Opposition and a frightened Commonwealth, which made Mr. Heath's task so unenviable and thankless in those days.
To-day, as many speakers have said, the climate is much better. The Commonwealth has had time to diversify and adjust a good deal of its trade. Public opinion, despite the crusade of the Express newspapers, is far more understanding an amenable, and the Opposition is more friendly to the idea. But we still have to overcome the suspicions of our future co-partners, as a result of the hostility and lack of support by the two other Parties over the early years of the building up of the Common Market.
In 1959 Mr. Maudling was assuring the country that: "We never dreamed of

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entering the Common Market". The I am sure is the way to success in our Conservative Party Weekly Newsletter of August 6, 1960, which criticised the Liberals for voting in favour of the Common Market, and listed the four major disadvantages of joining, ended by saying:
"Why not ask your local Liberal M.P. or candidate whether he is willing to accept all these consequences of the policy his Party advocates."
I well remember this anti-Liberal and anti-Common Market campaign, because a few weeks afterwards I fought the Bolton by-election, and fought it largely on this issue. So unenthusiastic were the Conservatives that it was said of my Conservative opponent that he thought the Common Market was behind the Town Hall—and there were many people who agreed with him. This was the atmosphere in the early 'sixties which made it difficult to get in.
I mention these things because they undoubtedly lowered Mr. Heath's chances of success when he was given the job of entering, and also because to-day I am worried on another score. I am worried whether the well-publicised divisions in the present Cabinet will impede our negotiations in Brussels. I very much hope that they will not. It is inexplicable to me how one can hope to demonstrate one's sincerity and enthusiasm for entry into the E.E.C. when it is reported that at least six members of the Cabinet are against entry in any event. I hope that this is not true. But it is odd that one of these members is in charge of trade, and another is in charge of agriculture. These are the two major issues on which we have great difficulty. If there is no division of opinion in the Cabinet, the sooner this is said the better. I believe that we must not lower our chances of success in our discussions by having people in the Cabinet who are known to be completely against entry at all costs. I do not think that our future partners will be impressed if we try to get into the Community on the basis of a majority verdict.
I was particularly reassured by the emphasis which the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor put on our intention to discuss matters on the, basis of what will be best for the new expanded community, rather than of seeking advantages for Britain alone all along the line. This
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I am sure is the way to success in our negotiations. We must think and behave like good Europeans from the start. We must not go in and try to seize every advantage we can for this country. We have to see that what comes out of the discussions is good for the Community as a whole. The prize is a large one. The advantages of this vast market which is offered to us can be many. But I believe that, in the long run, notwithstanding what the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, said, that this will be a good thing.
I want to deal briefly with two or three general points. The first is the attitude of the Commonwealth. I would reinforce what the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Saffron Walden, said. Two months ago I was in Australia. I found, from talking to businessmen and politicians, that the general concensus of opinion was exactly what was said at the Commonwealth Conference. They said to me that the most important thing for Australia is for Britain to be economically strong. If membership of the Common Market will bring about that strength, then they were in favour of it. I found this practically everywhere I went.
I know that the noble Lord, Lord Blyton, feels sincerely about the Commonwealth, but the idea that our entry into the Common Market will smash the Commonwealth to smithereens is absolute nonsense. We should also remember that from the trade and politics points of view Australia is rightly looking more and more towards Japan and the Far Eastern complex. You cannot avoid getting this impression as you travel through South-East Asia, Japan and down into Australia. In Hong Kong and Malaysia I found no fear of the effect which Britain's joining the Common Market would have. In the last four years there have been major readjustments of trading patterns in this area. New Zealand presents a real problem and one on which we have to keep our eyes very firmly. But in 1958 special treatment was afforded by E.E.C. to Algeria and Surinam: therefore there is a precedent for exceptions being made.
I do not think that the Commonwealth is going to suffer. I believe that the improved strength of Britain and of Europe will help the member countries more than Britain could do alone. Regarding the problem of agricultural

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policy I believe, with the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Saffron Walden, that the answer is largely to be found in the length of the transitional period. Although I would go for a short period on other issues, I think that a long transitional period for agriculture might be the right answer. But as the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said yesterday, we must realise that we have to accept Common Market policy as it stands to-day. The only question is the length of the period of readjustment. Some of the agricultural agreements in E.E.C. have been reached only with great difficulty and after long negotiations. The agricultural marathon of January, 1962, involved 45 separate meetings, 137 hours of discussion, with 214 hours in sub-committee, and the result was over half a million pages of documents and three heart attacks. Surely we are not going to ask people to renegotiate in a hurry in that sort of detail.
Of course, the E.E.C. system will mean a rise in the cost of living. There have been many different estimates of what this rise will be, but I am sure that the increase from this cause is not likely to be nearly as much as we get through the normal annual increase of inflation. I think that we should remember two things. First, we can, and should, deal with this problem for those on low incomes through social security. It is not just a question of pensions; it also concerns those on low incomes. We are moving into a new social security atmosphere in which we have to take care of people who, from whatever cause—low wages or large families—are not able to keep up. I have no worry on this score. The other thing we must remember is that we are going into the E.E.C. to obtain the economic benefits which offer us a real chance of an improved standard of living all round: greater production runs, economies of scale—which the noble Lord, Lord McCorquodale of Newton, mentioned—the better use of manpower, lower overheads per unit, and all the other benefits which we hope will provide bigger incomes for both farmers and consumers.
The only other economic matter of importance and difficulty might be with our regional policy and economic subsidies,
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such as investment grants. I want to say only one thing to the Government on this. I hope that where an investment grant has been promised and is to be taken over a period of years, there will be no question of taking it back or cutting it off suddently at a particular point. This could create a great deal of uncertainty, particularly in the development areas, where the investment grants are serving a useful purpose. In the main, I believe that this vast new trading area must be good for Britain and good for Europe. We welcome the initiative taken by the Government. I only hope that there may be a vote to-night, because I should like to see an overwhelming vote on the part of your Lordships in favour of our entry into the Common Market, which I believe would help our negotiating power.
5.31 p.m.
LORD ERROLL OF HALE: My Lords, I am sure we all agree that we have had a most interesting debate, extending well into the second day, and that a number of extremely important and valuable speeches have been made. I should like, however, to begin by thanking the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor for his introduction to our debate yesterday afternoon, and for the extremely cogent and lucid description he gave of the legal consequences of our entry into the Common Market. It could have hardly been bettered, and will certainly serve to allay the fears of those who, although generally in favour of our entry, may have had reservations on that count. In other respects I thought his speech was cast in a somewhat sombre vein. Maybe, having scored such a notable success in the papers with his speech over the weekend, he thought it was the turn of the Prime Minister to have the headlines on the following day. I should have liked to see a little more of the exuberance and enthusiasm of his speech over the week-end in his speech of yesterday.
Noble Lords have made a great number of points in the course of their speeches, and it would be a superhuman task for the noble Earl, Lord Longford, to try to reply to them all in the course of his winding up. I am sure I can say on behalf of those who have already spoken that we certainly should not expect him to reply immediately to all of them. We in this House may perhaps feel that

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the debate in another place is getting more public attention. On the other hand, we can rest assured that the Government will look carefully at what has been said here and seek to benefit from the course of our discussions. It would take too long for me to praise the many good speeches made from the Benches behind me, and I am grateful to my noble friend Lord McCorquodale of Newton for thanking yesterday's speakers and so lightening my task. But it was a particular pleasure to hear the noble Earl, Lord Cromer, and also my old friend Lord Butler of Saffron Walden, contributing with their usual clarity and from their wide experience.
Despite all that has been said, there are, I think, still several matters which might usefully be referred to at this point. I should have liked to hear more, for example, about the problem of population movement. This is a sensitive area. We do not want to think just of our own difficulties in this matter. For example, will Pakistanis in Bradford be able to go to the silk mills at Lyons, with equal freedom for Italians to come and work in Britain, and so on? These are matters of great importance to the trade union movement. While I have not heard every speaker in this debate, I have heard most of them, and I do not think any noble Lord referred to the views of the trade union movement. They must, surely, have views on this subject and I am surprised that they have not been ventilated in your Lordships' House, particularly when so many have spoken about the need for large-scale industry, manufacturing complexes, taking Europe as their market. Surely in the British trade union movement there must be some thought about a European trade union movement: perhaps a single chemical workers' union for the whole of the large Community—and if things are to go wrong, a chemical workers' strike throwing every chemical plant in Europe out of action for the time being. But to look on the brighter side of this matter, let us hope that the trade union movement in Britain is as solidly behind a move to the Community as the Government are at the present time.
I was going to say something about capital movements, but the noble Earl, Lord Cromer, has said it so well, and it was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Saffron Walden, who reminded us of what. I had temporarily forgotten:
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namely, that there was a time when Britain was the automatically accepted leader of economic affairs in Europe and we were expected to take the chair at the O.E.E.C. We have come a long way indeed from that day, when it is now practically impossible for a British firm to obtain the necessary foreign exchange from the Bank of England to add to an existing factory plant which they have on the Continent of Europe. This is an important matter which the Government must do their best to clarify as soon as possible.
In view of what has been said on the problems of the Commonwealth countries, I would make one comment on a subject that has not been referred to, and that is the difficult problem of Commonwealth textiles coming from Asian Commonwealth countries into this country. When we were involved in the negotiations we were able to bring about some sort of arrangement whereby Europe would take a little more, and thus ease the burden on our own domestic textile industry, which would at the same time derive benefit from access to the markets of Europe. This is a field which can cause difficulties later on, and I hope the Government already have the matter well in hand.
I am concerned, too, about our EFTA partners. This Association has successfully withstood a number of extremely difficult situations, and not least the one when Her Majesty's Government felt it necessary to impose a 15 per cent. import surcharge with the minimum notice. Despite that severe blow to our partnership, it remained firm and resolute; and even now they have accepted the compromise from the original London Declaration because they are confident of our good faith. I am sure they are right to be confident of our good faith, but I earnestly hope there will be no question of letting down our EFTA partners at any stage in the negotiations.
On technical matters, I think the question of a European patent and of European designs, the merging of our patent system with that of Europe, will represent a substantial change for established technological producers in this country; but this is something that we shall have to face. The noble Lord, Lord Byers, referred briefly to the development areas

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policy, and I was glad to see from the Prime Minister's Statement that he has found the present development areas policy no obstacle to our joining the Community.
I should like to stress at this stage that if we try to prevent development in the London and South-East—assuming, that is, that we join—we shall be denying ourselves a considerable economic and geographic advantage. With its proximity to the Six, London and the South-East must assume greater importance in our economic development. While not in any way wishing to derogate from the importance of revivifying our development areas, I think we shall have to accept a further surge forward of economic activity in London and the South-East of England.
On a lighter note, when one understands that the Community represents a Customs Union, noble Lords who have not yet seen the illustrated article in the Weekend Telegraph might be well advised to do so. It is illustrated, and it shows the smuggling which now takes place on the frontier between Holland and Belgium. This is a prosperous and lucrative business, and by the time a man is 30 he is usually able to retire on the profits. What are they smuggling through this non-barrier frontier?—butter. Apparently, with all the arrangements that have been made, with all the piles of committee documents to which the noble Lord, Lord Byers, referred, the differential in the price of butter in Holland and Belgium is such that there is a profitable and lucrative, and sometimes rather bloodthirsty, smuggling trade going on. This leads me to ask what the Government are going to do about the harmonisation of excise duties. Are we going to continue with purchase tax when we join the Community, or are we going over to the added-value tax; and, if so, are we contemplating a move to the French or the German model?
Several of your Lordships have referred to the costs of entry. The noble Lord, Lord Butler of Saffron Walden, particularly referred to the cost of the levy on agriculture, but there are other costs as well. The speech of my noble friend Lord Clitheroe yesterday was particularly cogent on this matter, as indeed was The Times in an extremely good and balanced article on Monday, May 1, from
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which I might give a short quotation, if noble Lords would bear with me. It says:
"All things considered, £600 million a year after the transitional period would appear to be the minimum realistic estimate of the total balance-of-payments (current and long-term capital) cost of joining the E.E.C. If the range of probability is preferred, the bracket might extend from £500 million to £800 million."
My noble friend Lord Clitheroe expressed the hope that Her Majesty's Government would be able to comment on the figures he gave, and perhaps I may reiterate that point and hope that Her Majesty's Government, in replying, will be able to deal with the question of these extra costs.
Another reason why I was particularly glad that Lord Butler of Saffron Walden was able to be here to-day and to speak was that he referred to the fact that he was Chairman of the Ministerial Group which was looking after the progress of the negotiations at the home end. I had the privilege of serving in that Committee under his inspiring leadership, and I am glad to have this opportunity of saying so to your Lordships. Having been a member of that Committee, naturally during the last few weeks I have permitted myself a backward glance over my shoulder to remind myself of some of the difficulties we had and some of the problems we solved, which will thus make the present negotiations that much more easy, and also to consider to what extent the negotiations should follow the same path as last time and to what extent the present Government may be able to learn from our experience.
The first question is whether there is going to be a new Ted Heath. Are the Government going to find such a single man? I must say—and I do not wish to strike a violently partisan note in this amicable Assembly—that it would be extremely difficult for them to find someone as good as Ted Heath for this job. And, if they fail to get somebody equally good, then whoever is chosen will suffer by comparison, because in Brussels it will be said, "This chap isn't as good as Ted Heath was." Therefore, they may well be driven to, and it might be wise to adopt, a different policy from the start; namely, that of a Ministerial Group in Brussels, or visiting Brussels, each Minister being responsible for his own sector. It is a problem for the Government, but I suggest that they should go into the question very carefully.

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As the negotiations proceed there may come various occasions when one is apt to say, "We have come to the crunch"; but then that difficulty is overcome and the next arises. In these negotiations there may well come a stage when it would be in the Government's own best interests to refer the issue back to Parliament, not for a broad, progress-report type of debate, but to discuss a particular issue and obtain a Parliamentary mandate. The Prime Minister in his speech held out a good deal of hope in this respect, and I will quote briefly from the end of what he said:
"We shall take the opportunity to enable Parliament to form a full, fair and informed judgment of the great issues involved."
There is no point, really, in working away to have an informed judgment unless we can have an opportunity of exercising it.
This is not a theoretical matter. It is difficult to give an exact case, because the negotiations have not begun, but the problem could arise in an acute form if the Six, for example, said they would be prepared to consider immediate British, and perhaps Danish, applications but no others for the time being. This could happen, and it would mean that we should be in breach of our undertakings to our EFTA partners. This is not a matter which the Government on their own should decide, because it involves the honour of Britain as to whether we withdraw from the negotiations because of our EFTA partners, or say, "It is too bad. We have enjoyed the ride with EFTA, but we shall now let them go". A decision of that sort should be taken by Parliament and not just by the Government. But I hope it will not have to come to that.
In moving on, I wonder why so much should have been made of the fact that the negotiations are going to be prolonged. Inevitably, some of the Prime Minister's favourite clichés came into his statements and speeches: they are going to be "tough negotiations", naturally; they are going to be "realistic". The thing that bothered me was that they are going to be long negotiations. We felt at the end of our negotiations, when they broke down, that we had at least got the difficulties ironed out, and that, if there were to be a second application, long negotiations would not be necessary. In my view, it would seem that all that
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has to be done, if I may put it colloquially, is for the present Administration to pull out the old papers where matters were agreed, and alter a few figures and a few dates, because all the essential features were agreed. The details have changed, but not the main fabric of the agreements which we negotiated.
Do we really have to go back to square one and start all over again with the duty on imported tea from India and Ceylon? Well, we do not have to do that one, because, thanks to our negotiations, although they broke down, the Six agreed to abolish the duty on Commonwealth tea; so that is one thing less to be done. But has the whole of the Commonwealth section of the negotiations to be gone over again in detail? Because that can take a very long time. Several noble Lords I think were quite right when they stressed that there should be a timetable or time limit on the negotiations.
But overhanging everything else is one crucial issue which I believe ought to be faced squarely and openly; and I say this in a constructive spirit. At the end of 1962 the negotiations were on the point of success, but, as everybody knows, in January the President of France made a statement which showed that the negotiations were going to be broken off; and (without going into a lot of detail, if I may put it in "telegraphese") he said that Britain was not ready to join the club; Britain was not sufficiently European to be a member of the Community. This had never been part of the discussions. It had never been taken into account at all. In other words, the negotiations were broken off for something which had nothing whatever to do with the negotiations for entering the Community. Whether the General was right or not is another matter. That is history, although I have put it to your Lordships very briefly so as not to take too long.
I think that the first thing to make sure of, before making a second application, should be to get it clear from the Government of France that we have in fact grown up, so to speak, in their opinion, and that entry to the Common Market will not be denied to us any longer on those grounds. It seems to me that the whole negotiations will inevitably have an element of unreality about

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them so long as this issue remains unresolved. I should not ask the President of France to say he would not exercise a veto in any circumstances when the negotiations had come to an otherwise successful conclusion, because conceivably new factors could arise; but in regard to the facts of January, 1963, could he not give us an open, clear undertaking that what he had claimed then was an obstacle was an obstacle no longer?
It seems to me, from all that has been said, and from the Prime Minister's excellent replies on the Panorama broadcast last night, that he has not, and the British Government have not, been successful in this matter. It is therefore taking a chance. But maybe, by the way the negotiations are carried out, it will be shown that we have, in fact, in the opinion of the General, grown up enough to be good Europeans. But I think it is going to hamper the negotiators in the coming months, and I am only sorry that it has not been possible for it to be cleared up in advance. Indeed, it is not too late, if the Government were so minded, to hold up the letter of application for a few days. They could say to the General, "We have had our debate. You now see how enthusiastic Parliament is. Will you give us our clearance before we post the letter to Brussels?" I make that as a constructive suggestion.
Inevitably one thinks of the decision as being the General's, but it is important to realise that many people in France are suspicious of our entry. I have been surprised at the number of prominent French businessmen whom I had the privilege of meeting who have expressed doubts about our going in. Indeed, one of the matters which give rise to most suspicion is the very reason why we tell each other we should go in; namely, that it will have great advantages for us. So they say, in their logical way, "That means it will be a disadvantage to France."
I should like to see the Government, in the weeks and months to come, stressing to us and to Europe the great advantages to the Six of our going into Europe. I presume there are such advantages. We have hardly heard of them. I have done my best to trawl around to find some of the advantages, one of which would be access to the London capital
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market, if only that could be done; but there are many others. It would strengthen the hand of our negotiators immensely, because I know Mr. Heath always found that the difficulty was that there was no real bargaining; and the negotiators this time will be faced with the same problem. One goes as an applicant, and then the matter gets whittled down and one has to decide whether to accept a little less than one asked for. It is impossible to put anything else as an alternative on the bargaining table, and it would be a great help if the Six could be made to feel that there were great advantages for them in our going in and that it would be a great misfortune for them if our application did not succeed and was not handled expeditiously.
So although I wish the Government well, I think there is an intrinsic weakness in our posture as we begin the negotiations, and it would be foolish if we did not recognise that our negotiators will be working under substantial difficulties. First, we have not spelt out the advantages to the Six; secondly, the negotiations will have an air of unreality as long as the General refuses to revoke publicly his former objections, and, thirdly, we are applying for the second time. How much better it would have been if we could have been invited unanimously to make an application! However, realising that there are some weaknesses in our application, I am sure your Lordships have been a great help to the Government to-day in supporting almost unanimously the Government's proposals, which I myself most heartily endorse. Her Majesty's Government have demonstrated their intention to succeed. We wish them well and we hope that the Membership of the Community will crown their efforts.
5.53 p.m.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL: (THE EARL OF LONGFORD): My Lords, I know that the Government, and I am sure the House, will be grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, for postponing his Motion after it had been brought forward from tomorrow. I can assure him that we all admired his speech—I might almost call it his conversion—yesterday, and I hope that that knowledge will be some consolation for what must have been a rather inconvenient afternoon.

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We have listened to close on thirty speeches, all of them interesting and some of them deeply impressive, even moving, from the classic exposition in which the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor opened the debate, to the graceful encouragement of the noble Lord, Lord Erroll of Hale, who has himself had so much experience of international negotiation. He was kind enough to absolve me from the duty of replying to all, or most, of the points that have been raised, but I can assure him that the Government will study all that has been said, and in particular what has been said by him, although I cannot think that after tonight the idea of sending a messenger to General de Gaulle to try to clear up his attitude, would commend itself to many of us. I am sure the noble Lord realises that the Government have conducted a most systematic probe and while perhaps it would have been agreeable to have discovered more than we have discovered, I do not think that a last-minute and rather desperate plea to get the General to "come clean" would be particularly helpful.
The noble Lord, Lord Erroll of Hale, put one other question with which I will deal now, then I will deal with his general argument, perhaps, as I go along. He asked whether there was a single man in the Government who was the equal of Ted Heath for the purposes of negotiation. I do not know about a single man—we have so few batchelors in our Government—but we have quite a few excellent married men who I think could do the job exceedingly well.
In the spirit of the noble Lord's remarks I will ask some noble Lords to forgive me if I do not comment on their speeches. For example, I will take the notable contribution of the noble Earl, Lord Cromer, which I am sure will be widely studied. But there will be other noble Lords whom I cannot even mention; I can only ask them to believe that I value their remarks almost as highly as those of the noble Earl, Lord Cromer. The Government have every reason to be grateful to the House, to those who have spoken and those who have attended the debate, and those who, in one way or another, I suppose, will show their approval in perhaps half an hour from now. We are particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, the Leader of the official
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Opposition; to the noble Lord, Lord Byers, the Leader of the Liberal Party, who spoke so generously in support of the Government, and also, if I may say so, to the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury who gave us spiritual guidance. We certainly hope that when this Motion is put by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor the House will overwhelmingly support it.
The noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, has done more perhaps than any one man in this country to bring about this day, and I think he is entitled to sing a Magnificat to-night, though not, I hope, a Nunc Dimittis, because we cannot do without him quite yet. But certainly it must be a happy day for him and for many others who followed him in his course. The fact that the House now seems ready, so far as one can judge, to support this Motion does not mean that anybody has won a victory over anyone else. The noble Baroness, Lady Gaitskell, divided us into three categories: the fanatical pro-Marketeers, the fanatical antiMarketeers and the cool, dispassionate group (to which I think she herself certainly belongs), which judged the matter at every stage on the facts and according to the balance of the argument.
I suppose that the great majority of the House can now be said to belong to that third group, but within that third group I should say the overwhelming majority now appear, so far as I can judge taking the sense of the debate, to favour an application for entry. There were one or two noble Lords of great eminence who expressed some doubts: for example the noble Lord, Lord Champion, and the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury. I understand that if I give the noble Marquess satisfactory answers before the end he may come round. I hope that will be possible. I must not say that there will then be more joy over one sinner who repents, because it is not yet a sin to be doubtful about the Common Market; but I think I can say that there will be more joy about a "doubting Thomas" who becomes a believer than about all the other Apostles put together. At any rate, we shall see at the end of the debate.
My Lords, we are going forward, I hope enthusiastically, with this application. But, of course, we are applying to enter upon a negotiation: we are not applying

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to sign on a dotted line. We are not asking a favour of anybody. To use an image of Lord Champion's, we are not "crawling on our bellies", or, to adapt an even more elegant phrase of Mr. Gladstone's, we are expecting, hopeful, though on this occasion far from suppliant. Speaking of negotiations and the negotiating posture, which the noble Lord, Lord Erroll of Hale, dealt with, we (and I am speaking now of my own Party and of the Government, and also, I think, of the political leaders generally) have never failed to insist that essential British and Commonwealth interests must be secured. We believe that the essential British and Commonwealth interests will be secured; but secured they must be if these negotiations are to succeed.
The noble Lord, Lord Rowley, speaking with all the authority of one who has done so much for Commonwealth relations, and who is also a convinced European, asked me to satisfy him rather fully on a number of points affecting the Commonwealth. In view of the debate yesterday, perhaps both he and the House will forgive me if I do not deal with his points at length. May I remind the House, or inform the House if they have not had the time to read the discussion elsewhere, of the words with which the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations wound up his speech last night. He said:
"Of course, we may fail in our negotiations… They may refuse to give us safeguards for ourselves. They may refuse to give us the safeguards for the Commonwealth that we seek. If that turns out to be the case, our rejection, or maybe withdrawal, will be honourable, and will. I believe, be understood and accepted by the Commonwealth and the people in this country alike."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, col. 1184.]
In view of those words, I hope there will not be even the faintest suggestion anywhere that we are "selling the Commonwealth down the river"; and while it is possible for "the ranks of Tusculum" to have been moved by the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Blyton, I would say that he was totally wrong about the intentions of the Government with regard to the Commonwealth. Indeed, safeguards of Commonwealth interests will be one of the main features of the whole negotiation.
It was very encouraging to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Saffron
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Walden, who intervened in the debate to the pleasure of us all, that he feels (though he did not spell out this point) that the situation with regard to the Commonwealth is going to be a great deal easier this time than last. I felt that was one of the important things said in the debate. I certainly agree with another thing said by him and by the noble Lord, Lord Rowley, and others; that one of the best services, certainly an outstanding service, that we can render to the Commonwealth is to make sure that Britain herself is strong and prosperous. Certainly, a weak and economically wretched Britain can be of no use to the Commonwealth at all. That is obvious, and I think the other side of that is equally true.
As regards our negotiating posture, I was not quite clear where the noble Lord, Lord Erroll of Hale, discovered his grounds for criticism. But I must read more carefully what he said about where he felt that we had erred—I could not quite follow him there. As regards our posture and tactics, I think that all who want these negotiations to succeed—and that is nearly everybody here—can draw much pleasure and encouragement from the words of some distinguished Ambassadors who have taken part in this debate, including the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, who was in charge of the Foreign Office at the time of the last negotiations, and also the noble Lords, Lord Sherfield and Lord Hankey. They, as I understood it, applaud us for not exaggerating the difficulties and not ignoring them but for taking up a balanced approach. I feel that we are entitled to rest a great deal of weight on their opinions.
I must not spend too long on any of the main issues raised; I shall have to proceed through them fairly rapidly. As regards agriculture, I was bound to note the rather doubtful assessment by the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Saffron Walden. He certainly feels that that road is going to be hard. Turning for a moment to the noble Lord, Lord Erroll of Hale, may I assure him that we do not want these negotiations to last any longer than they must. We are not seeking lengthy negotiations for the sake of them, but we face the fact that they are going to be hard; and of course they may be long.

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Lord Woolley's tribute to a great Labour Minister of Agriculture was appreciated far and wide among his own colleagues and throughout the House. I hope that he, with his infinitely greater knowledge of agriculture than mine, will accept the general proposition that a Community where the proportion of the labour force employed in agriculture is four times what it is in the United Kingdom is not likely in the long run to set out to damage agriculture. In other words, agriculture globally is likely to receive very careful treatment, to say the least, and favourable treatment it may be, within the Community.
But, of course, we are insisting on a transition, and doubts have been expressed as to what will occur during the transition and what will occur afterwards. I think the language used about agriculture in the Statement is quite firm. The House will be aware of the statement in the White Paper, that:
"…the financial arrangements which have been devised to meet the requirements of the Community's agricultural policy as it exists to-day would, if applied to Britain as they now stand, involve an inequitable sharing of the financial cost and impose on our balance of payments an additional burden which we should not in fairness be asked to carry."
I hope that that language is quite clear enough for any noble Lords who wonder whether we are going to stand up to our partners in these discussions. I would only add that all these arrangements arc due for review in the course of 1969. So, while one cannot guarantee success—and clearly we are calling for quite substantial adjustments—I can only assure the House that there is no sign of weakness in any language or posture that we are employing.
The noble Lord, Lord Blyton, referred to the five conditions propounded by the late Hugh Gaitskell. I have said a word about our determination to safeguard Commonwealth interests and agricultural interests. The other three conditions would not appear to afford the same difficulty.
The noble Lord, Lord Erroll of Hale, asked me about EFTA, and hoped that there was no question of forsaking or betraying EFTA. I can give him that assurance absolutely; there can be no question of forsaking or betraying EFTA. Without embarking on new assurances,
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because the whole matter has been recently cleared up with EFTA, I should have thought that our relationship with our EFTA friends was healthy at the present time: they understand the position very well.
The noble Lord, Lord Blyton, no doubt was concerned, is concerned, about the interference with our freedom of action. I will not pursue that aspect in detail now, but if we look at the way the European countries have handled their own foreign policies during the time of the Community, or their own internal economic policies, I would feel—and this is certainly the view of the Government—that it is a good deal clearer to-day than it was five years ago that the Community as it functions is not precisely the same entity as the Community as written and described on paper. So as regards those two points, freedom of action in foreign policy and domestic economic policy, our anxieties are not of the same order, or, rather, do not weigh so heavily with us.
But of course since 1962, to be quite candid, and speaking as a champion of this policy, one has to admit that the balance-of-payments question has come to loom larger. It was not in itself one of the five conditions, but clearly it is now a very important issue. And, this being so, any Ministers who in recent discussions would say that they have been supporters of this kind of policy for years are bound to consider very carefully indeed what effects, so far as one can possibly tell, there would be on our balance of payments and on our cost of living. Here, perhaps, I can discuss the issues most conveniently by referring to some of the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Kahn, who is one of the leading economists in the country.
The noble Lord confesses himself quite at a loss to understand how what he calls the "malaise", and the difficulties and tribulations of the transition period, can be reconciled with the promotion of economic growth. According to my dictionary, a "malaise" is defined as "bodily discomfort, especially without the evidence of a specific disease." I am not going to accept from the noble Lord that my colleagues have admitted that there will be a malaise. I do not quite know how this phrase has crept in.

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Certainly there will be adjustments to be made. The noble Lord, Lord McCorquodale of Newton, told us earlier with great authority that he has been engaged in adjustments all through his business life; and we gathered from him, I am sure correctly, that they never did anybody any harm. So I feel that the talk of the difficulties and tribulations of a transition period have been considerably overstressed by the noble Lord, Lord Kahn. Certainly, British business does not seem to share his pessimism.
The noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, attached great weight to the words of the noble Lord, Lord Kahn. If I may say so in a friendly spirit, he has not always attached so much weight to the sayings of theoreticians as compared to practical men. I am told occasionally that what is much more useful than academic experience is a little management of affairs. So here the great business leaders are against him, or at any rate against Lord Kahn.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I would only say that I regard Lord Kahn as both.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: Well, far be it from me to disparage Lord Kahn's reputation as a tycoon, but I think he is better known as a political economist. At any rate, we have tycoons here who can speak for tycoons, and there is no doubt that British business does not in any way share this rather painful pessimism of the noble Lord, Lord Kahn, which for the moment seems to have infected the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury.
May I turn to the noble Lord, Lord Clitheroe, who certainly made a powerful speech. He has explained to me that owing to an engagement, I believe in church, he cannot be with us this afternoon. I am sure he is much better occupied there than listening to me. But I listened to his speech carefully, and I read it carefully. He quoted an article from The Times, with a great deal of approval, on the damage to our balance of payments if we join the Common Market. The article in The Times must of course be read like other documents. But as the Prime Minister yesterday explained, some of the figures which are being bandied about are based on the assumption that nothing whatever comes
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of our negotiations. They are based on the assumption that we go into the Community exactly as it is, which is all right, I suppose, for an academic discussion, but clearly has little or no relationship to the practical situation. We must all assume that if these negotiations are to succeed, as we believe they will, something practical will come from them. So those who make the other assumption are falsified from the beginning.
The truth is—I say this with great respect to the noble Marquess if it is of any interest to him—that I personally would distrust anybody who came out too confidently with some estimate of what the balance of payments in the middle 'seventies will be if we go into the Common Market, compared with what it will be if we do not go in. The noble Marquess seemed to feel that the kind of speculative dogmatism that would lead one to lay down figures of that sort constituted evidence of a practical mind. But I would distrust a man who believed that things of that sort could amount to very much, and if I had any money I would take it out of his business.
If I may still be allowed to use The Times, I should much rather quote the conclusion of their leading article in the same issue from which Lord Clitheroe quoted, which I think we may treat as their summing up.The Times says that one fact is clear, that British business stands, almost unanimously, strongly in favour of the United Kingdom joining the Common Market. So if we can talk about the practical men and the men who know their job, and we put our cards on their experience and prudence, I would myself consider that this view of British businessmen is one of overwhelming significance in this debate. The noble Lord, Lord McCorquodale of Newton, spelt out some of the reasons why they believe that this is so. I will not go into them now, but I think we can accept that this is the conclusion of those who have, in a personal sense, to make the decisions on which the fortunes, net only of themselves, but of their depositors or shareholders, or whatever they may be, will rest.
The noble Lord, Lord Kahn, rather leaned in his argument on the rise in food prices that would follow membership of the Community. I have already discussed with him privately one of his

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phrases, which I will not argue about now. His main point in this connection was perhaps the argument that the prospective rise of 2½ to 3½ per cent. would represent a considerably higher rise for the poorer citizens of the country. This aspect has also worried the noble Lords, Lord Wells-Pestell and Lord Segal, among my own colleagues, and also the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury. As the Prime Minister said yesterday, we are only too well aware that, whether the increase is 2½ or 3½ per cent., or a little less or a little more, this is a serious matter for the poorer section of the population, those on the lowest incomes.
I am sure that all noble Lords will have been consoled by something which the Prime Minister said yesterday in another place, and also, I gather, on television. In another place the Prime Minister, speaking of these people with the low incomes, said (col. 1065):
"The answer to their problem must lie in social policies, particularly pensions, to ensure that they are not asked to bear a disproportionate part of the cost of British entry into the Community. Rather, indeed, will it be our aim to shield them from any short-term adverse effects."
I hope noble Lords will feel that even since yesterday considerable reassurance has been given on that most important point.
The noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, however, went on to ask where this money was coming from. Again, I do not think that, looking so far ahead, one can speak dogmatically there. May I call the attention of the noble Marquess to something else that the Prime Minister said just before the passage which I quoted a moment ago. He referred in the same column to the figures of increase in the cost of living, and he said that they should not be laughed off at all, but
"they should be capable of some offset through the reduction of prices of non-food items, for example, imported consumer goods, to say nothing of the possibility of some reduction in taxation as a result of savings in agricultural subsidies."
So that there will clearly be, on the face of it, and looking some years ahead—I think the Prime Minister is wise not to pledge himself about the use of some moneys that will fall into the pool in this way—a considerable sum available to the Exchequer when we switch over from our present method of subsidising agriculture
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to the method of the Community. So the short answer is that on the face of it, although some years ahead, there will be a considerable sum of money available here from the reduction in the subsidies. I hope, therefore, that I have done something, if the noble Marquess was exactly balanced before, to bring him over.
The noble Lord, Lord Kahn, went on to assert that the Government have left entirely out of their appreciation the consequences of substituting over a period of years a new system of indirect taxation for our present one. On this matter I can at least speak with first-hand knowledge. The noble Lord is certainly quite mistaken in thinking that this has simply been overlooked by the Government. I hardly think that, on reflection, he meant to say that. He can hardly suppose that the Government failed to notice Article 99 of the Treaty of Rome which deals with the harmonisation of indirect taxation. I have only time to say a word of reassurance. This whole business of harmonising indirect taxation has proved long and arduous. It was only a few weeks ago that the Community managed to agree on the first step, which will not come into force until 1970. It is unlikely that any harmonised rates will have been settled before our own application is decided, and once we are members we shall be able to play a prominent part in producing a system acceptable to all. I am afraid that I must leave some of the noble Lord's other points for correspondence with him, or possibly for discussion on the next occasion.
My Lords, we are approaching a conclusion. The decision has been based both on political and on economic considerations. Though I would feel myself that it is impossible to separate these two considerations in a great matter of this kind as readily as some find convenient, basically this is a political decision. The economic arguments to me, and I think to most of my colleagues, seem to favour entry, but it is the political arguments which seem to us to be the strongest. On that matter we had with us a number of noble Lords, certainly my noble friend Lord Silkin who spoke very strongly about the political arguments. We see great opportunities here for us, as the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, pointed out, for Europe, and for the world.

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A point which was made with much force by the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Saffron Walden, was the balancing role which we can play in Europe. Certainly we do not see this policy as being aimed against anybody. We are convinced that it is in everybody's interest. We feel sure that a Europe united economically and developing its full economic and technological strength will have a better role to play in the future political development of the world than ever it has done in the past. We think of our role within the Atlantic Alliance, in promoting a detente between East and West, and our role, which was stressed by the noble Lord, Lord Ritchie-Calder, of giving far more assistance to the underdeveloped countries of the world. There are those of us, certainly I am one, who see our way beyond this stage to an even greater vision, a vision of an even wider unity within the world. I myself think that this is the one clear step which we can take at this time in the direction of ultimate world government.
Therefore, I leave these thoughts with the House. I have done no more, as Edmund Burke said, than state a case and, as he said all those years ago, many things occur. We cannot be sure, as we come together today, whether our application will succeed, whether the negotiations will succeed, and we cannot tell what will happen thereafter. Certainly we in the Government believe that success is not only possible, but probable; but it is only probable so long as we do not at any time suppose that the Common Market is going to offer us an easy way out, a sort of magic carpet which will heal our woes without any great exertion by ourselves. We shall only succeed now and later if we view this step as a tremendous and glorious challenge to greater efficiency, greater exertions, and much more dedication than in the past. Whatever the outcome, let this at least be said of our generation, when the history of this period comes to be written: that we responded fully to a unique opportunity, that we took up a position inspired in the first place, not ignobly by enlightened self-interest, but on a deeper level by concern for all humanity. Let it be said that at this moment of destiny we stood where it was an honour to stand.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

CIVIL AIRCRAFT NEEDS
6.26 p.m.
LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE rose to draw attention to the urgent need for Government decision on the development of new British civil aircraft; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I regret very much having to detain some of your Lordships at this late hour—
LORD FERRIER: No, no.
LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE: —but as you know it was not of my seeking or making. Nevertheless, in spite of the hour I feel it necessary to pursue this debate, which raises a matter of vital national importance, whether we be in the Common Market or whether we be outside it. My problem is to try to put briefly and in fairly simple language various rather complicated questions.
It is accepted that it is essential for British civil aviation to be world-competitive, if world-competitive means having the right operational equipment at the right time; and to achieve this demands Government decisions which are well overdue. It is no easy task for anyone concerned, Government or otherwise, to forecast our needs during the 'seventies. Indeed, forecasting up to 1980 requires a mixture of deduction and crystal-gazing. The deduction involves consideration of what can be safely expected from development of the present type of aircraft. The crystal-gazing embraces guessing at results of new developments which are still in their early stages, and also guessing at the world conditions which may exist in the 'seventies and which have their impact on tourism, travel habits and the money which can be expended by the travelling public.
Britain's pattern of civil aviation divides broadly into three sections. There is the long haul, straddling the world; there is the medium haul over Europe; and there is the short haul, which comprises the short journeys to Europe, and our domestic requirements for aircraft. It is on the medium and short haul that I should like to speak briefly to-night, in relation to which decisions are both urgent and overdue. The long haul of British Overseas Airways I leave out of

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my remarks, because they have a fine fleet, their future is already decided, and is largely tied up in the success of the Concord. On the medium and short haul a vital national interest is in jeopardy, and every week's delay in decision is time lost for Britain and given to our competitors. I should like to interpose here words which I think will convince your Lordships of the importance of short and medium hauls. Last year that system carried 7 million passengers. It had a revenue of £100 million, of which £30 million was earned overseas.
May I give a brief summary of the essential needs for the short and medium haul if we are to remain competitive and are not to be outmoded and short of capacity in the early 'seventies, when the existing types of aircraft—Vanguards, Comets, Viscounts—are all phased out. The short-haul requirement for British European Airways, and for private enterprise firms as well, has been broadly met by a new edition of a 100-seater aircraft called the BAC 1–11, and 18 have been ordered for £32 million, with an option on a further six. So I think we can say that the short haul is looked after.
It is for the medium haul, the vital European medium haul, that the need remains unsatisfied. That need is, broadly speaking, for a 180–200 seater aircraft by 1970–71. Thirty will be needed by B.E.A., worth about £120 million, as a starting order, so your Lordships will see that it is no small order that we are discussing. Looking at the way the medium-haul need for 1970–71 onwards is to be satisfied, one looks at once at the Government's dilemma. There is a project for what is known as the air bus—the Anglo-French-German aircraft—a 300-seater, but it would not be in operation before 1975. I believe that there was a meeting on the Continent to-day about that.
The point I should like to drive home, and I trust that the Government will not counter it, is that while B.E.A. are not averse to that air bus it does not fulfil the requirement between 1970 and 1980 for a 180–200 seater. Also, as I say, it will not be in operation until 1975, when I believe the demand for that aircraft may be very small. A distinguished economist named Mr. Wheatcroft recently carried out on behalf of Rolls Royce a
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survey of likely needs of aircraft in the 'seventies. His conclusion was that only a very limited number of aircraft seating more than 200 people would be required in Europe for a great many years. I believe that B.E.A. would require about six of those, for a quite different role from that of the medium haul aircraft. Therefore, we must agree that the air bus will not satisfy the need for the 1970s.
At once one asks: how can that need be satisfied? There is a British aircraft, designed by the British Aircraft Corporation, called the 2–11. It is a 200-seater, which is just right; and it is about 4 per cent. cheaper to operate than its American counterpart, which is obviously an advantage. It is as silent as the Vanguard, which is about the only type that can operate without a noise limitation. So here is a tremendous new development in this aircraft, one that must appeal to everyone in this country and must appeal to the world's markets—the silent aircraft of the future. That aircraft should command a world market. If the Government would give a decision now it could be in operation by 1971. The cost of development is, I believe, about £100 million—£50 million for the engines, £50 million for the airframe.
I understand that the Government say that there are not the national resources available for the development of the air bus, which I admit has a political aspect, as well as for the 2–11. I think that is the measure of the Government's dilemma. If the Government can say to-night that they have the resources both for the air bus, to which they seem rather wedded, and for the development of this splendid BAC 2–11, then I can sit down happy and most of your Lordships need not take part in this debate, because the problem will have been solved. But I understand that this is not so. The Government say that there are not the resources available for both, so they are faced with the need to look at alternative courses.
It seems to me that there are three alternative courses, assuming that there are resources available only for either the air bus or the BAC 1–11. The first is to withdraw from the air bus project, and give the priority of resources to the development of the 2–11. That would be a politically difficult decision for the

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Government to make. I am no great believer in the air bus as a substitute for the 2–11; in fact, it would not do. To fly an air bus of 300 or 400 people, say, to Paris is going to reduce the frequencies which the public can enjoy. With aircraft carrying up to 200 people there can be a better frequency than if there are one or two aircraft each carrying 400 people.
I shall not develop the question of safety. I am a little fearful, with the art in its present state, of putting 400 people in one aircraft. Many years ago I started to learn to fly, and I learned a very healthy respect for the law of gravity—a respect which has not diminished at all through many years of experience. I think that if God had meant us to fly he would have given us wings. We are all the time having to overcome gravity, and none of us who leaves the ground either as a pilot or a passenger, need ever forget that fact.
The second alternative would be to fill the gap by allowing British European Airways to buy an American aircraft, the Boeing 727, for delivery in about eighteen months. That would mean reversing the Government's present direction to British European Airways that they must buy British. The third course would be to force British European Airways, by the issue of a direction, to buy British aircraft which are not best economically for the Corporation—an enlarged Trident or a rebuilt VC 10; and even for those many millions of pounds would have to be spent on development costs. My real objection to that is that the Government would at once be called upon to fulfil the undertaking which they have given, to make good, by some form of subsidy to B.E.A., any penalty which the Government forced upon them by insisting on their having unsuitable aircraft. It would be a deplorable step to force B.E.A., after many years of successful economic operation, to become a customer of the begging, bowl. That is the worst alternative.
In considering these alternatives I would draw the Minister's attention to the £100 million which is reported to be the development cost of the 2–11. I think it is unfair in an argument to load all that cost upon an initial order. It could be spread widely, on the assumption
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that there are going to be other orders beyond that of B.E.A. I remember so well (at that time I was a member of the Board of B.E.A.) when the Trident was being developed, and there was great reluctance on the part of Rolls Royce to develop the Spey engine. Terms were agreed between the Government, the Corporation and Rolls. That engine was developed and is now a world winner. The demand is tremendous and cannot be satisfied. Who is to say that the new engines and the new airframe of the 2–11 would not equally be world winners? Therefore, I do not think one should turn down the 2–11 simply because the whole of the £100 million is loaded on the first order.
I put in order of preference the various alternatives to fill this need which I trust I have made clear to your Lordships. My first choice would be to have both the 2–11 and the air bus, if the resources can be stretched. If they cannot, my second preference would be the 2–11 and no air bus. My third alternative would be the American 727 to fill the gap, and the air bus. My last alternative—and the worst of all of them—would be to force B.E.A. to buy uneconomic British aircraft and also have the air bus.
These alternatives must have been under active consideration (that terrible Whitehall phrase!) for a very long time—too long, I am afraid. The decision is a pressing one. It is urgent, and it is overdue. Three Departments of Her Majesty's Government are concerned: the Treasury, the Board of Trade and the Ministry of Technology. It is open talk among those who know anything of the air world that there are differences between the Departments within the Government as to whether the 2–11 or the air bus should be developed. When the new structure for the Ministry of Technology was debated in your Lordships' House, some of us, including myself, saw dangers in the divided responsibility between the Board of Trade, responsible for aircraft operation, and the Ministry of Technology, responsible for selecting the type. We foresaw this dichotomy of responsibility; and I am afraid that, through this indecision, we are to-day seeing the results of that divided responsibility.

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I hope the Minister will say that I am wrong and will be able to speak tonight with a voice representing the collective Government view. I hope to hear tonight whether the Government quarrel in any serious way with my picture, which I have tried to paint fairly, and with the alternatives I have put before your Lordships. I hope to hear that a decision has been reached, or that the Government are on the brink of a decision—because I repeat, in conclusion, that every week counts. So serious is the need for a decision that, speaking for myself, even if it were the wrong decision I should prefer it to be taken rather than for there to be no decision at all. I beg to move for Papers.
6.43 p.m.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for initiating this debate, for the typically pungent and informed way in which he has put his case and for his pugnacity in pursuing his Motion after our long discussion on the Common Market. I should myself welcome a wide-ranging debate on the aviation industry and on civil aviation. There is much that needs our examination. There is the new Whitehall set-up for aviation, to which my noble friend referred. How is it in fact creaking along? There is our airport policy. Have we a national airport policy? There is our whole approach to co-operation in these matters with. Europe.
On that point I should like to say two things. I personally believe in this collaboration. If that technological community which the Prime Minister has recently discovered is to be really meaningful, it should extend to all the advanced forms of technology—computers, atomic energy and so on, and most emphatically, of course, to aerospace. This is widely accepted. But to preach collaboration is one thing; actually to achieve it and to make a commercial success of it—and this is the rub, especially with civil aircraft—is another thing. This whole area is one to which a great deal of careful and critical thought might well be given—more, I suspect, than has yet been given. On another occasion I should like to give your Lordships my layman's views on it. However, my noble friend has deliberately drawn the area of discussion this evening fairly tight, and I shall follow him in confining almost all of my remarks to the
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two projects to which he has particularly addressed himself, the BAC. 2–11 and the air bus.
Before turning to them I should like to put a couple of brief questions to the noble Lord who will be replying, one on a national project and one on an international project. Can the noble Lord, when he replies, give us a progress report, however brief, on Handley Page's admirable Jetstream? In particular, can he confirm the report which I noticed in the Daily Telegraph to-day that the United States Air Force may be on the point of placing a very important order for this aircraft?
Can the noble Lord also answer three specific questions which I should like to put to him about the long-haul aircraft (if my noble friend Lord Salisbury will forgive me for that phrase), the Concord? I gather that this great and greatly expensive project is going well, but on three matters I have some disquiet. In the first place—and this is very much a case of the pot calling the kettle black—there is, I have heard, a degree of weight escalation with the Concord. How significant is this, and how are the firms coping with the weight reduction programme on the prototypes? Secondly, there is the question of sonic boom. If the Concord were not allowed to operate supersonically over land, we know that its market would be almost halved. Very important commercial consequences would flow from that. But the Government, by their own admission, are still very much in the dark on this very vital issue. The Minister of State said in another place a month or so ago:
"…it will be necessary to have a more complete evaluation, particularly by tests conducted over cities."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, 3/2/67, col. 1017.]
He added:
"…this problem of sonic boom is one about which decisions will soon have to be reached."—[Col. 1020.]
"Soon", he said. That was in early February. What is now the position, three months later, in early May, on this particular problem?
Finally, what about the actual production of the aircraft? The noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, was blandly reassuring about this when we quizzed him on the Concord on February 20 last in answer to an Unstarred Question by my noble friend

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Lord Kinnoull. But in the British Aircraft Corporation Newsletter, which came out at almost the same time, the chairman of B.O.A.C., Sir Giles Guthrie, was reported as expressing anxiety over the lack of Government decisions on production.
"Within the past two weeks"—
these are Sir Giles Guthrie's words—
"I have advised the Government that production of the Concord"—
and by that he explained that he meant the actual production models and not the prototypes—
"should start".
My question to the noble Lord simply is: has it? This is given some extra point by the American President's decision to proceed with the American SST.
My noble friend has made a very strong case indeed for the BAC. 2–11, to which I should now like to turn. As he has said, B.E.A. are keen to buy it, and the views of B.E.A.—one of our great industries, and one of our great earners of foreign currency, as my noble friend has explained—should command the Government's careful respect and attention. They have costed the project extremely carefully, and although I gather that they do not entirely accept the makers' full claims, they are confident that it will be substantially cheaper to operate—some 4 per cent. per seat mile, I believe—than its nearest competitor, the Boeing 720–200 series. Apart from this, as my noble friend has said, the Rolls Royce engine with which it would be armed would be extremely quiet. According to their calculations the other possible British types would be much more expensive to operate. This, of course, would entail substantial operating subsidies.
The Minister in another place has accepted that B.E.A. requires interim aircraft. He apparently regards the BAC. 2–11 as an interim aircraft. I would only suggest that he is wrong here, and I think I should carry my noble friend with me in that. Both B.E.A. and other European operators are going to require aircraft of this type for a very long time to come. air bus or no. It would, in fact, be complementary to the air bus and fill a definite requirement from the early 1970s
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right into the 1980s. In any event, as my noble friend has said, B.E.A. have stated their requirements very clearly.
The Government are naturally worried about the considerable research and development cost involved here. I hope the noble Lord can expand on these points when he comes to reply. My noble friend has pointed out that it is unfair—or might well be thought unfair—to load all the research and development on to this particular aircraft. He has alluded to its export potential. In another place the Minister of State poured very cold water on the export possibilities of this aircraft. Our study—that is, of the export potential—he said
"does not yet give us any great cause for enthusiasm".
May I put these questions to the noble Lord who will be replying? What does that little word "yet" mean? Does it mean that the Government are still studying an export market for this aircraft? If so, how far have they taken this study? How can they explain this pessimism if B.E.A. have done their sums right and this aircraft will, in fact, be substantially more economical to operate that any of its rivals? Would the noble Lord not agree that in aviation it is not always the early bird that scoops the pool? Time and time again the great American aircraft manufacturers have stood back and let others, often ourselves, do the pioneering work with new aircraft concepts and then have stepped in and creamed off the market. I should be very grateful if the noble Lord who is to reply would deal with those points.
But, my Lords, in probing the Government intentions on the BAC. 2–11 I am not arguing that we should jettison the project for the European air bus, the "Eurobus" as it is now termed across the Channel. I believe that an aircraft of this sort in the 300-seater range—give or take a dozen more or less—is bound to come. The major European airlines, including B.E.A., have all stated a definite requirement for it—a requirement, I think, in rather larger numbers possibly than my noble friend has suggested. I personally believe that it will be required, just as the 200-seater will be required. The two types, in my view, are complementary and not mutually exclusive. We can be sure of one thing: whether or not we

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in Europe, or in England, build this air- craft, the Americans (and possibly the Russians) will certainly build one. Lock-heeds already have a project; and the great new combine of McDonnell and Douglas are studying this actively. If we are going to make a success of it we should take the plunge very soon.
It is not very easy, my Lords, to discuss this project sensibly when, at this very moment possibly, the Ministers concerned, French, British and German, are discussing it across the Channel. But I believe it is a project of great promise. The requirement is clearly there; it is well within the technical capabilities of the European aviation industry and it offers the possibility of a partnership in the development of a major civil aircraft not merely on the Anglo-French plane but also on the wider basis of Anglo- French-German partnership. It is not unimportant to bring the Germans in here. I trust, therefore, that, subject to three conditions, we shall learn to-day or tomorrow that the Governments concerned have taken a firm decision to proceed with the air bus.
But the conditions in my view are crucial. The first is the recognition of the need for speed. I believe that if the three Governments act quickly it could come into operation before 1975, the date given by my noble friend. The second requirement is that the Governments should be able to deliver the goods; namely, the market. It would be absurd if they embarked on the great investment needed to develop this aircraft only to find at the end of the day that their national airlines preferred the American product. What assurance can the noble Lord give us that at least the national airlines of the potential consortium, Lufthansa, Air France, Air Inter, and B.E.A. will take the air bus if the Governments decide to develop it? Finally there is the power plant. The choice is between the American engine, the Pratt and Whitney, and the Rolls Royce engine, the RB 207. Some of the potential operators would have a preference for the American engine because the same engine is already going into the Boeing 747s that they are buying. That is understandable. Equally so, in my view, is the British Government's reported insistence on the acceptance of the Rolls Royce engine. After all, this air bus would hardly deserve the title of "Eurobus" if it had American engines. All in all, my
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personal view is that we should continue to insist on the Rolls Royce engine for this aircraft if it is built—that is, unless the smaller version of the Rolls Royce engine goes in the BAC 2–11 and there is neither the capacity nor the financial resources to develop both.
My Lords, those are my summarised views. I will not detain your Lordships because we have had rather a long day already; but I should like to mention two further aspects of the BAC. 2–11 complex of problems, which appear to me to have weight. In the first place, they highlight one of the difficulties which exist at the moment, the imbalance in Europe on the air engine side. On the one hand, we have in Rolls Royce and Bristol Siddeley a huge capacity; on the other hand, we have an advanced air engine industry in France, but a small one by comparison with that here. This means that for any major project there are always overwhelming claims for putting British engines into the aircraft. That, in turn, means that there is a strong—and natural—pressure from the other side of the Channel that the French should take the lead in the airframe. This is a difficult problem because, unless we are very careful, it could soon lead us to a position in which our airframe manufacturers are taking second place, are merely becoming sub-contractors.
On the airframe side, the French take the lead already in the Jaguar; they may take the lead in the Anglo-French variable geometry aircraft; and they could take the lead in the air bus if the Rolls Royce engine goes into it, as I hope it will. This is a serious problem. I do not pretend to know the answer to it. I have ideas; but this is not the time for them. I hope that the Government are fully seized of the situation which could be developing as a result of what in itself is a very fortunate thing, the international strength of the British air engine industry.
The second matter to which I would briefly allude is the political importance of these decisions. Like my noble friend, I hope that the Government can tell us that they are, at least, sympathetic with the development of both of these important projects. I hope they will give careful weight to what my noble friend has said about the 2–11. Equally so, I hope they will be fully aware of

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the damage which would be done to nascent European co-operation in aviation matters if we were, at this rather late stage of the game, to back out of the air bus project. I do not view this in political terms alone. I believe that technologically a lot is at stake in Europe.
Be that as it may, my Lords, I should like, in my final words, to endorse what has been said by my noble friend: that whatever decision the Government reach on the BAC. 2–11, they owe B.E.A. an early decision. B.E.A. cannot be kept hanging round any longer for a decision in this crucial era. I would remind your Lordships that only ten weeks ago, on February 20, the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, confirmed that the Government had taken a firm decision that B.E.A. should adopt British aircraft rather than American. I was not surprised to hear this, as it was entirely in line with what the Government said last summer. But only a month later, Mr. Stonehouse told another place that the Boeing 727 offered one of the possibilities by which the B.E.A.'s requirements could be met. I suppose that with this Government one should not be unduly surprised if the firm decisions of February melt sometimes, like snow, by the Ides of March. But what we deserve to know now, in May, is what firm decision the Government have taken or are proposing to take, on this matter. Can the noble Lord tell us? I shall await his reply with much interest.
7.2 p.m.
EARL AMHERST: My Lords, I should like to join the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, in his praise for the way in which the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, initiated this debate—a debate, if I may say so, which has come none too soon. Before I go on, I think that it would be proper for me to tell the House that as I have now left the services of the British European Airways Corporation I do not appear as a spokesman for either of the Corporations, or, indeed, for any other air company, and that I have no interest to disclose.
Like the noble Lord who opened the debate, I propose to confine my remarks to the short-haul, and if my remarks duplicate or perhaps amplify some of the things already said, I must offer my apologies. But I hope to be able to
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approach the matter in a slightly different way. It may be useful to consider what are the markets for the British manufacturer of short-haul aircraft. In the first instance, I think it must be the operators in the United Kingdom and, depending on the quality of the end product, delivery dates and general experience of the U.K. operators, sales to the rest of Europe and to the short-haul operators in the rest of the world should follow. It might, however, be useful and wise to enter a caveat not to count too much on the U.S.A., Canada and South America as markets, as with the exception of the very fine sales record for those excellent aircraft, the Vickers Viscount and the BAC. 1–11, these countries have for many years bought mostly American, and have similarly tooled and equipped themselves for repairs and maintenance. Therefore, unless the British manufacturer comes up with something really startling, they are unlikely to change their tune.
In any case, I think that everywhere, including the United Kingdom, British industry will have to face continuous and fierce foreign competition, notably American. If the British manufacturer is to keep his end up, he will have to see to it that he can, and does, exercise intense, energetic and effective sales effort. We might perhaps look at our immediate customers. Catering as it does for the large majority of regular scheduled services in the United Kingdom and in Europe, I think it is correct to say that B.E.A. is the largest British customer for short-haul aircraft. That is not to say that the independent companies do not also provide a considerable demand. They do, but B.E.A. is the biggest customer. Their combined experience with a new type of aircraft could have a telling effect on the sales in the rest of the world.
According to my information, the present position is as follows. The Vickers Viscount, which remains a first-class aircraft, has largely been replaced with the BAC. 1–11. Aircraft which will require replacement in the immediate future are the Vanguards and the Comet IVs. What I mean by "the immediate future" is around the 1970s. By that time, the delivery of the BAC. 1–11 500 series should have been completed, thereby enabling B.E.A. to replace a large number of its Vanguard fleet for passenger-carrying work.

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The reason why Vanguards need to be replaced is mainly because they belong to the turbo-prop type of aircraft which, in the international field, and indeed on some of the internal U.K. routes, is becoming more and more non-competitive, largely for the reason that the travelling public is tending increasingly to regard propellers as old-fashioned and not "with it". They demand full jets. The status symbol, whatever that is, may have something to do with it. This is not to say that the Vanguards will entirely disappear from the scene by the 1970s, because they will probably be used for freighting. But they will certainly not be carrying the number of passengers that they are carrying to-day.
My Lords, the reason for the replacement of the Comet IV is that by 1970 the capacity of that aircraft will not be sufficient to cater for the increase in demand which it is now estimated will be the order of the day. They could be serious losers, even on the high density routes. It should be remembered that, splendid aircraft though they are, the Comets have never been cheap to operate.
What are the offers? The choice of equipment in the short-haul category seems to be the VC 10, modified for short-haul operations; the Trident 3; the Boeing 727–200; the BAC. 2–11, and the air bus. The VC 10, even if modified, is said to be hopelessly expensive to operate over short-haul routes, and on this count alone would seem to be ruled out of court. It must be remembered that this aircraft was originally designed and built for long-haul and, as your Lordships know, machinery seldom works well if it is changed about to meet a demand for which it was not designed. The Trident 3, while considerably less expensive to operate than the VC 10, is estimated as being likely to be a very high cost aeroplane.
The seat-mile cost of the Boeing 727–200 series, with a slightly larger capacity, is said to be about 5 per cent. lower than the Trident 3. But this is an American aircraft, and I should think there is considerable doubt that the British Treasury would countenance the expenditure of dollars necessary to buy it, quite apart from the political rumpus which would surely erupt if the British State Corporations were allowed to go further "American" than they have
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already done. So it seems that the Boeing is a non-starter.
The seat-mile cost of the BAC. 2–11 is reported to be likely to be at least 10 per cent. lower than the Trident 3 and about 5 per cent. lower than the Boeing. The planned capacity of about 190 seats is said to be just about right for the early 1970s. As the noble Lord has already said, I am told that the BAC. 2–11 is expected to be an exceptionally quiet aircraft, possibly the quietest yet, an aspect which could well make it an attractive proposition as the question of aircraft noise becomes more and more acute.
Last on my list comes the air bus, which I believe is to be the result of a tripartite effort involving the British, the French and the Germans. Not a great deal seems to be known about the project yet, other than that it is said to have a capacity of some 300 seats, which I am told is considered far too big for commercial successful operations on short-haul in Europe, even up to the late 1970s. Whether this aircraft is to be powered by the new Rolls Royce engine RB 207, for which I believe there is a tremendous sales potential, has still to be resolved, as indeed, according to a recent newspaper report, is the division of the development cost as between the partners. Unless these questions—and there may be others—are reasonably quickly resolved, the delivery dates may go back and back, even beyond the 'seventies. According to present estimates, it looks as if the development cost will come out something like this: the Trident 3, £15 million; the BAC. 2–11, £50 million for the airframe and £50 million for the engines—a total of £100 million. The British share in the development of the air bus is so far said to be probably around £100 million. The full cost will be very much more.
To sum up, the choice seems to narrow down to the BAC. 2–11 or the air bus. My information points to the BAC. 2–11 as best filling the Bill. If the Government would allow B.E.A. to place an order for this aircraft now, I am told that it could be ready for delivery in the early 'seventies. The air bus seems at the moment to be a project for which a number of important questions remain to be resolved, not the least of which is how it is to be powered, delivery dates,

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final capacity and the split-up of the production cost between the partners.
I should like therefore to ask the noble Lord who is to reply four questions, of which I have given him prior notice. They are: first, are B.E.A. and/or such independent companies as may wish to do so, to be given governmental permission to place an order now for the BAC. 2–11 or must they accept the air bus and wait its production? Secondly, should B.E.A. and others be permitted to place an order now for the BAC. 2–11, will the Treasury accept making payment for the development costs without delay, so that the delivery in the early 'seventies will not be held up? Thirdly, does the decision rest on Common Market politics or on the reasoning of commercial airline operation? Fourthly, if the decision favours the air bus and so results in the exclusion of the production of BAC. 2–11 will the British share of the production fully take up the British manufacturing effort, including staffs and personnel, which would otherwise have been occupied in the production of BAC. 2–11?
7.14 p.m.
LORD OGMORE: My Lords, perhaps your Lordships will excuse my intervening at this late hour. It had been my intention to put my name down earlier but, owing to the way in which the debate has been going backwards and forwards with great velocity, I was not sure whether I should be able to be present. I should like to say a few words in support of the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye. First, I should like to thank him, on behalf of my noble friends and myself, for putting down this Motion. I would also congratulate my noble friend Lord Amherst on his speech. I am glad that he is now able to speak in your Lordships' House, because he has a vast experience of aviation over many years. Not only that: he has something which is not always joined with that, an up-to-date experience. He has been able to give us the benefit of that to-night. His analysis of the problem, by taking all the aircraft, then winnowing them out, was impressive.
The trouble is that aircraft manufacturers have a very limited number of customers. I do not think that there is any other industry which has so few.
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In the old days horse-breeders did not depend on the cavalry; firms who made railway engines did not depend on the engineering department of the War Office; the motor car manufacturers did not depend on orders for armoured fighting vehicles. But, because the size of fleets are so small, the aircraft manufacturers have to depend largely either on the military requirements of this country or on Government subsidy. I suppose that B.E.A. has only some 70 aircraft. When I went into this a few years ago, I found that the total number of civil aircraft in the world is about 2,000, and I notice that the estimate of need by I.A.T.A. for long-haul supersonic airliners is between 200 and 350.
We have to remember that aircraft firms are extremely important to the economy of the country and cannot be regarded like the manufacturers of other products. As military requirements are getting less and less, it means that the aircraft firms are more and more dependent on Government subsidy. The noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, has limited the debate to B.E.A.'s need for medium-haul and short-haul aircraft, but I hope, with the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, that at some time we may have a wider debate, because there are a number of important questions that I should like to put to the Government in the hope of getting answers.
One of the difficulties that the noble Lord and I foresaw when the Ministry of Aviation was destroyed or put into liquidation, is that there is no Ministry solely concerned with aviation, particularly with civil aviation. There are two Ministries concerned, both of which have a large number of other pressing problems upon their desks. I feel that it was a great mistake to do away with the Ministry of Civil Aviation. We are seeing some of the results of that decision and we shall see more as time goes on. One problem that is now being wrangled over by the Ministries concerned is where the third Airport for London should go, whether at Stansted, in the middle of Essex, or at some other place in the South-East of England. I will not advocate any particular place, because I shall be held to be a supporter of a certain site. But this is the sort of decision which should be taken immediately.

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This is a question between the BAC. 2–11 and the 300-seater air bus. Like the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, I cannot see these as competitors, as alternatives. I think that we must go for the aircraft that B.E.A. want. If we were a board of directors, sitting around the table, and not wrangling Government Departments, I am perfectly certain that having heard what we have heard to-night we should say that we would go for the BAC. 2–11. It is British, and it is going to be a first-class machine, by a tried maker, B.A.C., with a first-class engine from Rolls Royce, the best engine makers in the world. It is the size B.E.A. want—a 180-seater. It can come into operation at the time they want. There does not seem to me to be any argument. If, for the sake of General de Gaulle and the Germans, we build a big air bus carrying 300 or more, we shall produce an aircraft that no airline either wants or will ever use—one, by the way, that has hardly got off the drawing board. If it is necessary for our friendship with Europe, well and good. But it is not something that we should impose on B.E.A. They are a commercial undertaking; they have to carry passengers and make a profit. They want an aircraft which can meet their needs.
We have seen these monsters before. There was the Brabazon, which was an enormous machine. That was too big for the time. Other smaller machines caught up with it and passed it. The Brabazon cost, I think, £12 million, which was a lot of money in those days, and, so far as I am aware, it never carried a passenger. There were the Princess aircraft on the Solent. I see that they are now being scrapped. How many millions they cost, I do not know. But they were to carry 200 or 300 people. I went in one of them, and it was like going into a cathedral. They never flew with passengers. I would not mind betting that this will happen with the air bus. It will be found that it is another aerial white elephant like the huge aircraft of the past.
There seems to be something in Government Departments: every now and again somebody gets a rush of blood to the head and decides that we must have these monsters. I think that their mothers must have been frightened by a whale at some time. As a matter of fact, what
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is wanted is an aircraft not much bigger than those in service now.
Then there are other problems. Have the present divided Ministry and the officials contemplated the effect of trying to land 300 seaters at London Airport or —
LORD FERRIER: Turnhouse.
LORD OGMORE: Well. they would not get into Turnhouse; they would have to come in backwards. It is difficult to get into Turnhouse at all. But what about Manchester and these other places? Have these problems been contemplated? If so, what arrangements are being made about them?
I entirely agree that this is a decision that must he taken here and now. But I do not give the latitude so generously given by the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, and the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye. I would urge the Government to go for the BAC. 2–11 and treat the air bus, as I am sure it will be, as a big mirage and not as a practical flying aircraft.
7.22 p.m.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: My Lords, when I saw my noble friend's Motion on the Order Paper I hoped very much that it had been framed primarily to discuss the urgent problem facing the Government over their policy for short-haul aircraft projects. I am glad that my hopes have been more than fulfilled. I should like to confine my few remarks, as other noble Lords have done, to the two British projects in this field; namely, the European air bus and the BAC. 2–11.
What worries me about the Government's immediate policy of the short-haul aircraft is that certain fundamental assessments and conclusions which are normally common ground between Government, manufacturer and operator appear at present to be very much in dispute. May I start with the assessment of future passenger traffic requirements? It is, I think, agreed by all parties that in Europe air passenger traffic is rising on average 12 per cent. a year, and in America something like 20 per cent. a year. To cater for this increase, it is also agreed that the present aircraft in service, which are designed to carry between 90 and 135 people, will hardly be adequate to cope with the increasing volume of traffic within the next five years, and certainly not within ten years.

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It is on this point that the Government and their advisers, on the one hand, and the manufacturers and airline operators and their advisers, on the other, appear to disagree.
Here perhaps I should make it perfectly clear that it seems to be not only B.E.A. who differ from the Government, but also the other airlines, both in Europe and in America. The Government claim, as we have heard, that within the next six to seven years the prime need for the world market will be the 250 to 300 seater aircraft, and that the 180 seater, although required possibly between now and say 1973, will command only a limited stopgap demand during this interim period until the larger aircraft come into service.
The Minister responsible, as my noble friend Lord Jellicoe has already pointed out, has gone on record as saying in another place on March 21 that the 250 to 300 seater European air bus, if it receives the go ahead, will have a committed market of 100 aircraft before the project even begins production, a potential European market of 300 aircraft, and a potential world market of between 800 and 1,000 aircraft. I understand that both BAC., who cover a world-wide requirement, and B.E.A. have formed a very different view. They have formed the view, as I understand it, from two independent studies, that the prime demand over the next ten to fifteen years will be for the 180 seater, with a world market potential of between 1,500 and 2,000 aircraft, and that the 250 to 300 seater, although important, will not be required in anything like the large numbers suggested. Their argument, as I understand it, is simply that the 300 seater air bus will be needed for peak periods of the day, but that for the remaining 80 per cent. of the time the 180 seater will be quite large enough to provide a fast and frequent service: and it is the fast and frequent services that the airline operators consider so important.
It is my information—and I may say it is only a whisper—that the independent study reports on the European air bus—and I particularly have in mind the Wheatcroft study—have shown a very disturbing picture of the potential market of the European air bus. These studies say that the air bus is already two to
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three years behind the American version, and that when produced it will be more expensive. Due to this, it seems to have little hope of competing in America with the American versions; and in Europe its immediate potential is something in the region of a mere 30 aircraft.
As this figure seems in such variance to the Government's statements, perhaps the noble Lord when he comes to reply will advise the House what the Wheat-croft report and the BAC. report have actually said on the potential air bus market. And would the noble Lord also give us, at the same time, the Government breakdown figures about the 100 air buses that they have claimed will be already committed should the project proceed? I presume that this figure is based on orders being placed jointly by B.E.A., Air France and Lufthansa.
If one accepts the argument that there will be a need for the 300 seater air bus, and an even greater need for the 180 seater aircraft, one sees at once, despite the Government's view, an immensely exciting opportunity available for the all-British BAC. 2–11 project. It has the chance, if developed, of grabbing a slice of the world market which, as I have said already, has been forecast at between 1,500 and 2,000 aircraft. This BAC. 2–11, although still admittedly only in its specification stage, has, I believe, an immense advantage over other new aircraft. It comes from the same stable as its very successful elder brother, the 1–11. As the House will know, the 1–11 is an outstanding aircraft, and it is the only British aircraft since the Viscount to have broken into the tough American market, where the "buy American" policy operates so rigidly. The 1–11, I am told, has a present sale figure in the United States alone amounting to 64 aircraft, at a figure of 73 million dollars. Its present export sales throughout the world total 129 aircraft, and it is with 16 overseas airline companies. Performance is superb and (I think this is an interesting point), it seems that the foreign airline companies themselves are urging the development of the 2–11.
Why do they do this? For the very simple reason that its only rival at the present time in the 180-seater range appears to be the Boeing 727. Admittedly, this aircraft is already flying, and has a three to four year advantage over the

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BAC. 2–11. But it has a number of serious economic drawbacks. It has been criticised for being very noisy—a most important factor to-day. It has been criticised for a poor safety record, and a bad airfield performance, and poor economics; and, perhaps most important of all, it seats only 155 passengers and has come to the limit of its development.
Weighing up both the Boeing and the 2–11, it is my belief that if the Government announced the development of the BAC. 2–11 to-morrow, option orders for it would immediately be placed by a considerable number of overseas companies. In view of such potential, one is forced to ask the Government whether the British aircraft industry would be making the best use of its existing resources if they ignored this development. There is, after all, a possibility, at a conservative figure, of over £1,000 million-worth of exports in this project. One is forced again to ask the Government what will be left for the key B.A.C. design team if this project is scrapped. Will this be yet another example of accelerating the brain-drain to America? Yet another question comes to mind. What will happen to the employees of B.A.C., the 12,000 men who could so profitably he employed in this project? Will they become gradually redundant?
Having said that, and described the immense potential of the 2–11, one finds, I have noticed, on further research, that its future in fact rests not so much with a Government development contract for the airframe, but almost entirely on a decision by Rolls Royce. They hold the key to whether the project ever gets off the ground at all, because the 2–11 requires the development of the new technology engine, known as the RB. 2–11; and no existing engine, I am told on good authority, would meet its requirements. But Rolls Royce have said—and I do not think there is any dispute about this—that they have only the resources to develop one engine at a time, and if they concentrate on the 2–11 engine they will be unable to develop and tender for the larger 50,000 lb. engine known as the RB. 207, required for the European air bus. This dilemma is increased, of course, because at this time Rolls Royce are no doubt keeping their eye not only on the 2–11 project and the European air bus project,
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but also on winning a contract against Pratt & Whitney for the American air bus.
But the plot appears to thicken here, because the Pratt & Whitney Company, who are already supplying the JT 9D engine, as I understand it, for the "Jumbo-jets", are saying that both the American air bus and the European air bus should fit the same engine and so rationalise their future maintenance. Perhaps the noble Lord could tell us whether this American engine is seriously being considered by our European partners for the air bus. The answer, of course, to suit all projects would be for Rolls Royce to persuade both the American and the European air bus projects in their specifications to accept the smaller engine, the 30,000 lb. engine, which would also suit the BAC. 2–11. If this could he agreed it would not only have the advantage of rationalisation of the European air bus and the 2–11 but would bring Rolls Royce, I suggest, immense gain.
I believe that there is yet another possibility, and that is for the Lockheed air bus to accept three of the smaller engines. If this should happen, the European air bus specification may still insist that the larger engine should be fitted. If this were the case, where would Rolls Royce's loyalty lie? Would the Government be prepared to participate in an air bus if the British engine was not fitted? Perhaps the noble Lord could comment on this point later. The Rolls Royce dilemma is, I believe, very great. At best they have within their grasp a contract for all three projects—the American and the European air bus and the 2–11; at worst, they may win only the contract for the European air bus, with their bigger engine. If this should be the case, I believe that for the price of a ticket into the Common Market this would be a great tragedy for the British aircraft industry and a disastrous omen for its future.
7.34 p.m.
LORD FERRIER: My Lords, because of a word used by the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, I am tempted to intervene briefly in this debate. The word is "frequency". This was touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, in his references to these large aircraft. I wish to speak particularly about the needs of the internal air services in this country. The Concord, for instance, is of little interest

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indeed to me, as it is of little interest to the average man. What about the potential for intermediate internal airports in this country—airports like Carlisle Airport, and airports like those in the West country? What about the services for outlying airfields in Scotland, especially the Islands? What is being done about the (for want of a better word) Dakota replacement?
To anyone who has used Australian air services, to anyone who is conscious of the short-haul potential in this country, to anyone who knows Scotland's needs, no matter how adverse airfield conditions may be the factors of diversity, frequency and reliability are important. Plenty of people—and I refer to what Lord Amherst said—would much rather see a propeller driven aircraft than no aircraft at all. It is important, to my mind, that for the needs of the country in this lowlier role, a really economical, reliable "workhorse" should not be overlooked.
7.36 p.m.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS (LORD BESWICK): My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, made a stimulating speech, and we have had a useful discussion on the points he has raised. The noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, and other noble Lords who followed him, asked a considerable number of questions in what I might call medium-haul speeches. Frankly, I cannot attempt at this late hour to answer all the questions put to me, but if there are any other items of information I can give, possibly I may be allowed to write to the noble Lords concerned.
All speakers have emphasised that urgency is the essential factor behind the need to take decisions on Britain's next family of new aircraft. Of course, it is always easier to demand bold decisions when one has no executive responsibility, and when one is not spending one's own money. Nevertheless, I agree that the sooner we can see the way forward to the new, bigger medium-haul aircraft, the better it will be both for our operators and for the aircraft industry. Since it is B.E.A.'s re-equipment problem that has been highlighted particularly, may I set down for the Record the general background,
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as I see it. Until June, 1966, B.E.A. of its own accord had always preferred to buy and fly British. The famous partnership of B.E.A. and Vickers, with the great personalities of Sholto Douglas and George Edwards dominating the scene, and based on the remarkable Viscount series of aircraft, must go down as one of the most successful and profitable periods in our aviation experience.
However, last June the Minister of Aviation was asked to approve a purchase of 18 Boeing 707–200 and 23 Boeing 737 aircraft, at a total cost of little less than £100 million. The Minister was unable to give his approval to this proposed investment, and the majority of people in this country supported him; and as I understand it, from what has been said this evening, there is no one in this Chamber who seriously demands that we should contemplate the expenditure of that amount of money in the American market. What the then Minister said on August 2 was:
"B.E.A. will buy British. The Government will take steps to ensure that B.E.A. is able to operate as a fully commercial undertaking with the fleet it acquires."
In the light of this decision, B.E.A. prepared fresh proposals and sought approval to invest in BAC. 1–11–500 series to meet part of their requirements for new aircraft. This request was approved in December, and B.E.A. have now ordered the 18 BAC. 1–11–500s, with an option on a further six aircraft. This is the substitute for the Boeing 737 in B.E.A.'s earlier plans.
In February, B.E.A. submitted a request for investment approval for the purchase of 30 BAC. 2–11 to fulfil their remaining requirements as an alternative to the rejected Boeing 727—part of their original proposal. I am asked by the noble Earl, Lord Amhurst whether, in the event of B.E.A. or any other airline wishing to place an order now for the BAC. 2–11, they would require Her Majesty's Government's permission to do so. The theoretical answer, I suppose, is "No". If any company is prepared to pay the economic price for an aircraft and the aircraft constructor is prepared to build the machine, then the Government would be unlikely to intervene. But, of course, the question is academic. Such large sums of money are involved in

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research and development of modern aircraft, that inevitably some Government finance is required. And if the Government have to provide money, and money of this order, then they have an obligation to ensure that the nation's resources are utilised in the most effective way.
What is now being considered jointly by the Corporation and the Government is the best possible combination, or, to use the modern jargon, the best possible mix of aircraft. The sums that are now being worked out—and I mean now, for the experts from the Ministries and the Corporations have been hard at work in the last few days—concern four intermediate sized aircraft, the BAC. 2–11, the Trident 3B, the VC 10 and the Boeing 727. In addition, of course, they take into account the projected air bus. Whichever aircraft B.E.A. decides to buy will complement the air bus when this larger machine comes into service, and I agree with what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, and the noble Lord, Lord Jellicoe, that it is misleading to think that the choice is simply between, say. the BAC. 2–11 and the air bus, as far as B.E.A. is concerned. Of course from the Government's point of view there are obvious financial, engineering and technical problems, as was suggested by the noble Lord who went into the question of the aircraft engine problem, and particularly is this a problem within the time scale which B.E.A. envisage. Nevertheless, the comparative facts and figures about these four machines are being established as firmly as is feasible.
I am asked about possible subventions to the Corporation in the event of their choosing an aircraft other than the most economical but which makes a sensible element in a "mix" which takes into account all the factors relating to the Corporation, to our national resources and to the international markets. The economics of the various alternatives do not pose a simple problem. Of course, B.E.A.'s particular requirement is one factor, the development costs of the selective mix is another factor, the prospects of a wider market than the British Corporation are also important. The attraction of the BAC. 2–11 to B.E.A. lies in its ability to meet B.E.A.'s needs instead of the Boeing 727. This one factor cannot be judged in isolation from the large development costs which would be
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involved, and the Government must consider the financial aspects of B.E.A.'s re-equipment over the whole field of both the Corporation's prospects with a particular fleet, the launching costs to be borne and the prospects for their recovery. What precise financial agreements are agreed upon and whether by capital reconstruction or otherwise, can only be decided in the context of eventual decisions on the re-equipment programme. For example, if support were given to the construction of a particular aircraft and its individual unit costs were brought down, there would clearly be a less strong case for direct financial assistance to the Corporation.
The noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, spoke of the advantages of European collaboration, and I thought the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, and the noble Earl, Lord Amherst, were a little critical of this collaboration. Some people, I suspect, have come round to the European idea because of this very factor of the imperative need for collaboration on such technological projects requiring huge sums of "R and D" expenditure and which depend on an assured large market for any hope of economic solvency. If I had time I should like to refer again to the comments in the Plowden Report on this question of a large base market. Noble Lords will remember that after recording that the U.S.A. had 70 per cent. of world exports in the Western world as against our 14 per cent., it said that in spite of the scale of American exports their home market is nine times larger than their export sales. This against our ratio of 3½ to 1. Obviously we have to take into account this kind of situation, and there are certainly great advantages in getting as wide a base as possible for the air bus project.
As the House will know, since the initiative taken by the United Kingdom Government and the decision in 1965 to set up a joint Anglo-French working party, there has now evolved the idea of an industrial consortium of Hawker Siddeley Aviation, Sud Aviation and a German air bus working group comprised of a number of German firms. We are now at a point at which Governments have to make another important contribution, and the meeting taking place this very day—I expect it is over by now, for they have probably arranged their affairs

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rather better than we have in this House this afternoon—is for the purpose of reaching a judgment on the case for investment in this project. Clearly I cannot this evening say anything more about what that decision may or may not have been.
The possible prize is an attractive one. It is estimated that the market for an aircraft of this kind in Europe alone is between 100 and 200 in the 1970s, while the world market could be 700 to 800. Last February the French, German and British Governments agreed that a purchase by the respective national airlines—Air France, Air Inter, Lufthansa and B.E.A.—was necessary for the launching of this European venture. If such commitments can be established, and they can cover up to 100 aircraft, then the basis for success could firmly be laid. I was asked about the engine, and I agree that this is a relevant point. I wish we had an afternoon or an evening which we could devote to this fascinating problem.
I am afraid that I cannot answer all the questions which the noble Earl put to me. It was agreed last February that if the Rolls Royce RB.207 engine were chosen for the European air bus, the French and Germans would each take a share of the launching costs of this engine. Meanwhile, Rolls Royce are discussing with Lockheeds the possibility of their participation in the proposed Lockheed air bus. Rolls Royce have on offer their RB.211 engine of about 30,000 lb. thrust for a three-engine air bus configuration, and the RB.207 engine of about 50,000 lb. thrust—a three-stage engine of which the noble Earl spoke, for a twin-engine air bus configuration. One decision in this problem is locked in with another, and I hope I shall be excused if I do not say any more about this side of the matter, because frankly I am unable to do so this evening.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: My Lords, would the noble Lord allow me to interrupt for one moment? I think he mentioned a potential figure for the air bus of 600 to 700 on the world market. I think I am right in saying that on March 21 the figure was quoted at 800 to 1,000.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, what I actually said was 700 to 800, but if
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some people have gone to 1,000 there is not much in it in discussing this sort of matter.
I was asked by the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, what we are doing with our French partners in connection with the sonic boom problem with the Concord. The French have a test programme using the Mirage 4 and we share their results; there is an informal working group studying this problem. Also relevant to this, and extremely interesting I think, is the newly established tripartite official group, with the French, ourselves and the United States studying the data available to us, and with an impending meeting for the specific purpose of studying the results of the tests carried out at Edwards Airfield with the supersonic B-70 bomber. The noble Earl reminded your Lordships that we ourselves were proposing to carry out tests in this country similar to those over Oklahoma City. There have been certain legal difficulties in the way of these tests, but I understand that a statement about our future programme is due to be made reasonably shortly.
The noble Earl also asked about the situation if there is a prohibition of overland flying of the Concord aircraft. As I think I have already stated in this House, if overland flying is prohibited in this way it does not mean to say the Concord will be an uneconomic aircraft to fly. And there will be certain incidental competitive advantages as between our machine and the American in so far as their sonic boom problem with the larger aircraft will be more serious than ours.
Doubt was cast by the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, on the advisability of developing these large civil aircraft, especially if powered by only two engines. I think he would probably agree that more than two engines are difficult to justify to-day, on the basis of available accident statistics, or recently available accident statistics. Economics, too, tend to support the advisability of a twin-engined aircraft. I must confess that, with him, I personally have my doubts, and presumably at some point there will have to be serious thought about how many people we can put in the air at any one time in one aircraft.
We have been talking this evening about planes with a capacity of 300 to

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400 people. The Americans are talking about 800 or 900 passengers. I can well imagine, without wishing to raise any scares, that if there is an accident to an aircraft of this size, involving 700 or 800 people, we shall have the sort of public debate stimulated by what occurred after the mishap to the very large oil tanker. Up to that point, operating economics alone appear to have entered into calculations; but it then became clear that there were wider public considerations which should be taken into account. However, for the time being manufacturers and operators are expected to observe the general regulations for air safety, and of course the public licensing authorities, not least our own admirable Air Registration Board, will no doubt have these considerations in mind.
The noble Lord, Lord Ferrier, asked about replacement for the Dakota. I should have thought the competitive Handley Page machine and the HS 748, as a Dakota replacement are certainly selling very well. There are a number of other sturdy British aircraft also selling in world markets. I was asked by the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, about the Jetstream, and whether the report in this morning's Press could be confirmed. I understand that this report, like others from that Daily Telegraph stable, is not entirely noted for its accuracy. But although to say that we have achieved the military sale there is a little premature, I can say that the civil version of the Jetstream is selling very well in the American market.
The noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, ended by criticising what he described as the dichotomy of the national direction in these affairs; and the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, also called attention to this aspect. I will not go into that problem this evening. We require more time. I absolutely agree with what the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, said about the advisability of having a debate on this matter at some future occasion. I would only say this: because you have a problem within one Department you do not necessarily make it any easier; you still have the divergent considerations to be reconciled, and usually within the Government machine, as most noble Lords in this House this evening will know, the reconciliation takes place in a Government
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Committee, whether one Minister is involved or two.
I would end by thanking all noble Lords who have taken part, who have given us their informed opinions. I am all in favour of these issues being ventilated fully and in time—by which I mean before the purchases are made, and not at an earlier hour of the evening. I ventured recently to express the personal view that had we seen in this country since the war full, informed, public discussion of future aircraft procurement, both civil and military, we might well have saved ourselves money running into nine figures. I will certainly endeavour to see that what has been said this evening is studied most carefully by those responsible.
7.56 p.m.
LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE: My Lords, in asking your Lordships' permission to withdraw my Motion, may I be allowed to thank all noble Lords who, no doubt at some personal inconvenience, waited here and have taken part in this debate. I should also like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, both personally and in his capacity as a Minister, for the courteous reply he has given to the debate. He has thrown some light upon the problems. We are glad to hear that the problem is realised acutely by Her Majesty's Government. I very much agree with the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe: this is a fascinating, wide subject, and I hope that before the House adjourns for the Summer Recess we shall have a further, perhaps more leisurely, opportunity of covering this and other questions in an even wider way. In asking permission to withdraw the Motion, I once more express my thanks to the Minister and to all noble Lords who took part.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

GREATER LONDON COUNCIL (MONEY) (No. 2) BILL
  PORT OF LONDON BILL
    UNIVERSITY OF ASTON IN BIRMINGHAM BILL
    Brought from the Commons; read 1a, and referred to the Examiners.
BATH UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY BILL [H.L.]
  NEWCASTLE-UNDER-LYME BURGESSES' LANDS BILL [H.L.]
  Returned from the Commons, agreed to.
EAST KILBRIDE BURGH BILL
Returned from the Commons, with the Amendment agreed to.